Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

JICPR

Editor D. P. CHATTOPADHYAYA

VOLUME III
NUMBER 1
AUTUMN
1985

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research Vol. 1 AUTUMN 1985

JICPR

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Indian Council of Philosophical Research
Guru Nanak Foundation Building, New Mehrauli Road, New Delhi 110 067

Printed in India
by Shri Shantilal Jain at Shri Jainendra Press, A 45 Naraina, Phase I,
New Delhi 110 028
and Published by Shri Kireet Joshi
for Indian Council of Philosophical Research,
Guru Nanak Foundation Building, New Mehrauli Road, New Delhi 110 067

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Obligation, inclination and moral failure

RAJENDRA PRASAD
Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur

The problem of obligation and inclination can be understood in more than one sense. For example:

(*a*) One can take it to denote an empirical problem, the problem of ascertaining how, *as a matter of fact*, the acknowledgement by a person of his obligations is related to his inclinations, what sorts of inclinations or desires go or do not go with what sorts of obligations, what sort of impact modifications in the one have on the other, how the evolution or maturation of one's obligations is related to that of his inclinations or vice versa, etc. It is obvious that these questions can be competently answered only by systematically conducted empirical studies of the relevant items of human psychology.

(*b*) It can also be taken to denote a purely or primarily ethical problem, the problem of determining, *from the ethical point of view*, the relationship between human obligations and inclinations, the proper place, significance, or value, of inclinations in a moral life, a life devoted to the fulfilment of moral obligations. One can then, for example, ask whether, in the interest of morality, inclinations of a particular kind or of all kinds be annihilated, controlled, sublimated, or let to live and flourish in a natural, uninhibited, manner. The classical Indian theory of *puruṣārthas* gives a general answer that only such inclinations (*kāma*) deserve to be satisfied which are in conformity with, or at least not in conflict with, morality (*dharma*). I am not saying that it is a good (or a bad) answer to the above question, but have mentioned it only to illustrate what can,log ically speaking, be considered a candidate for an appropriate answer to the above ethical question.

(*c*) But there is also a third sense in which the problem can be taken, the sense in which it becomes a problem about the logical relationship between the concept of obligation and that of inclination. I call it the philosophical or logical problem of obligation and inclination. Taking it in this sense, one can ask whether or not it is logically or conceptually possible to acknowledge an obligation without having a relevant inclination. For example, he can ask whether or not he can—and if he can, when he can—meaningfully, self-consistently, admit that he has an obligation, say, to arrange for the proper education of his deceased friend's son, the only trustee of whose property he is, but has no inclination to do that.

I am not saying that the three senses of the problem are absolutely unrelated to one another, nor do I intend to imply that anyone of the three is more important than the other two. But in this paper I shall be concerned primarily, or almost exclusively, with (*c*). To be more specific, I shall be

concerned with characterizing the logical relationship between one's *acknowledgement or admission* of an obligation to do something and his inclination to do it and not with that between his obligation to do something and his inclination to do it or his doing it.

It is not difficult to see that (*c*) is very different from what, in ethical literature, has been described as the problem of obligation and ability. This is clear from the fact that if one believes that I cannot do *x*, he will consider it pointless to try to convince me that I ought to. On the other hand, if he believes that I am not inclined to do it though I can, he can quite consistently believe that I ought to do it, and if he does, he will think it not only not pointless but very much appropriate or felicitous to remind, or even to try to convince, me that I ought to. It may even be said that this reminder or argument has a point, or is required, only because or very much because I am not inclined to do what in his judgement I ought to.

An obligation may be moral or non-moral. I am legally, not morally, obligated to pay income-tax because there is a law enacted by the appropriate law-making body of my country to the effect that any person whose annual income exceeds a certain limit must pay a certain percentage of his income as income-tax to the government of the country and because the law applies to me. Had there been no such law or the law not been applicable to me, there would not have accrued any such obligation to me. But it is my moral obligation to abstain from deliberately creating hurdles in the way of *A* and *B* meeting each other when both, being sincerely in love with each other, need and enjoy each other's company. The authority which this obligation has is not derived from the enactment of any law to the effect that one ought to abstain from.... Rather, the obligation has accrued to me because I and my society consider such interferences in other's lives to be morally wrong (whatever 'morally wrong' may mean), no matter whether or not there exists any such law. Even if there is one, it can be said *a la* Warnock* that it is not the law which *makes* abstaining from deliberately creating hurdles in...morally obligatory, or deliberately creating hurdles in...morally wrong. On the other hand, it is the fact that abstaining from deliberately creating hurdles in...is considered to be morally obligatory, or deliberately creating hurdles in... morally wrong, which can be said to provide a reason or justification for the enactment of the law, if such a law is ever enacted.

Obligations may also be positive or negative. I may be obligated to do something or to abstain from doing something. On the marriage altar the groom is charged with the (positive) obligation to support the woman he is accepting as his wife as well as with the (negative) obligation, in a monogamous society, to abstain from giving to any other woman the status of a wife as long as the present one retains her status as his wife. Similarly, an inclination also can be taken in a positive or negative sense. I may be inclined

*G.J. Warnock, *The Object of Morality*, Methuen, 1971, p. 60.

to travel with a particular person, and inclined to avoid travelling with someone else.

In this paper by 'obligation' I shall ordinarily mean moral obligation, including both positive and negative moral obligations. From the point of view of logic, what is true of a positive obligation is also true of a negative one, and this is definitely so as far as the relationship between obligation and inclination is concerned. To the question whether the logic of moral obligation is the same as that of non-moral obligation, I shall not venture any answer.

I shall use 'inclination' also in a broad sense to cover both of its positive and negative varieties. The proper contradictory of 'being inclined', therefore, would be 'being indifferent'. The central question to be answered by a logical study of the relationship between the acknowledgement of an obligation and the relevant inclination is the following: does one's admission that he ought to or ought not to do *x* logically involve his inclination to do or avoid doing *x*? To give a negative answer to it would amount to claiming that one's acknowledgement of an obligation, conjoined with his declaration that he is completely unmoved or indifferent towards doing or abstaining from doing what he admits he ought to or ought not to do, would not cause any conceptual deformity. In fact, one would be justified in giving the negative answer only after substantiating this claim. On the other hand, in order to justify an affirmative answer to the question he would be required to establish its contrary. To do this one needs to show that the acknowledgement of an obligation to do something *conceptually* involves an inclination to do or to avoid doing it, and not merely to show that it empirically or contingently involves an inclination to do it. However, since in a broad but quite reasonable sense of 'do', avoiding or abstaining from doing something is doing something, in a relevantly broad sense an inclination to avoid or abstain from doing something can also be called an inclination to do something. Therefore, if an affirmative answer is the right answer, it can be asserted as a general thesis that the acknowledgement of an obligation logically involves an inclination to do something.

'Inclination' is obviously a dispositional term. Therefore, if one says he feels inclined to do a certain thing, we have to take him as saying that he is disposed, feels an urge (strong or weak), to do it and not that he is actually going to do it. That is, it is possible that he does not, in fact, do it, since the exhibition of his disposition to act in actual action would require the satisfaction or fulfilment of certain other conditions in addition to his being disposed to do it. Therefore, from any number of instances of one's not actually doing what he acknowledges to be obligated to do, it would not be logically fair to infer that his acknowledgement of the obligation involves no relevant inclination. For example, if we find that one does not actually support his wife though he acknowledges his obligation to support her, we cannot take it as a conclusive evidence for asserting that at least in one case the acknowl-

edgement of obligation carries no inclination; or even for saying that he is not truthful or sincere in acknowledging his obligation on the ground that he is not, in fact, doing what his (declared) acknowledgement, if true, would have inclined him to do.

We cannot say all this because it may be true that (*a*) the acknowledgement of an obligation to do something involves necessarily some inclination to do it and also that (*b*) he is inclined to do what his acknowledgement of the obligation requires him to do, i.e. to provide whatever support he can to her. But he is not actually doing that because some of the conditions necessary for realizing this inclination into action are missing. For example, (*a*) it may be the case that the woman who is his wife, being inordinately self-conceited, considers acceptance of the support he is prepared to offer as going against her self-respect. Therefore, he has to wait till the time she changes her attitude towards receiving his support. Or, (*b*) his acknowledgement of the obligation to support her has been superseded by what he considers to be a superior obligation, say, his obligation to support his invalid, widowed, otherwise supportless, mother. Or, (*c*) his inclination to support her has been obstructed by his (more intense) love for another woman whom he finds to be more congenial and appreciative of his capabilities. To say that one has an inclination to do x is thus to say nothing more than that he has a disposition, some sort of a mental preparedness or orientation, to do it.

Further, one's being inclined to do x does not imply that doing x is in his self-interest. It is quite sensible to say that what he is inclined to do is not in his self-interest, or that he is not inclined to do what is in his self-interest. Human beings may, as a matter of fact, be inclined generally to do what is in their self-interest, but the relationship between their inclinations and self-interest is empirical and not logical. Therefore, we sometimes consider it not at all odd but rather creditable if we find someone inclined to do something which is not in his but in someone else's self-interest. This is important to notice in order to realize the neutrality of the concept of being inclined to do x with regard to x's being an egoistic or altruistic action. A theory which says that the acknowledgement of an obligation involves a corresponding inclination does not entail egoism, nor the one which denies it altruism. The controversy about the logical relationship between obligation and inclination is indifferent to the egoism-altruism dichotomy.

The concept of moral obligation is relational in more than one sense. It is relational in a linguistic, semantic, sense insofar as the predication of it, when made fully explicit, unfolds itself in the form of a relational sentence, in some such form as 'A is under obligation to do x to or for B'. It is incomplete to say 'A is under obligation' or 'A is obligated'. Therefore, it would be wrong to treat obligation as a character-trait or state, as a one-place property, like contentedness, mental peace, etc. But it is also relational in a more substantial sense because obligations can meaningfully be said to arise or to be generated only in the context of human relationships. The attribution of an

obligation presupposes a moral community or group constituted by a network of relationships which makes possible interactions, i.e. conflicts and co-operations, which legitimizes certain demands and expectations among its members. This group may be informal or formal, natural or artificial, loose or tight, small or large. But the relationships among its members must be such that one considers it legitimate to expect some other member or members of the group to do certain things to or for him, and feels that if he himself does not do certain other things to or for some other member or members, he would be failing to have done what his membership of the group commits or requires him to do.

Some obligations we inherit, whether we like to inherit them or not, e.g. the obligation to support our dependent parents; some obligations we acquire or assume by some of our deliberate acts, e.g. the obligation to support a woman after entering into marriage-relationship with her; some obligations accrue to us by someone else's doing something to or for us even without our asking for it, e.g. A's obligation to be grateful to B who willingly paid for the coffin of A's dead father when A was absent; some obligations transcend or extend the boundary of the group the membership of which generates them, e.g. if A becomes a Jaina, he acquires the obligation to abstain from doing violence not only to the other Jainas but to all living beings; some obligations are our obligations because their general fulfilment is necessary for the health of the human society, e.g. our obligation to be kind to children and to people who are sick or infirm or in some other way helpless, etc., etc.

The purpose of mentioning the above examples is not to offer an exhaustive classification of obligations but only to illustrate some of the contexts which generate them, or some of the universes of discourse which make it meaningful to speak of them. It is clear, however, from the examples that an obligation could be very particularized or very general, e.g. the obligation to support one particular woman who is one's wife is very particularized, while the obligation to be kind to children, to infirm people, etc. is very general. One may, therefore, say that some obligations which are less general are derivable from some others which are more general, e.g. the obligation to support one's wife may be said to be derivable from the obligation to keep one's promises. But the attempt to demonstrate the derivability of all other obligations from a few purportedly the most basic ones, as made unsuccessfully by some philosophers, is not of great philosophical merit. We can quite satisfactorily attempt to understand what it is to be under an obligation or under any specific obligation, even if the world of obligations is not monistic or monistically interpretable.

Whether any obligation is particularized or general, it involves at least three terms, namely, the person who is under obligation, the person or group of persons to whom he is under obligation, and what he is required to do in respect of the latter on account of his being under the obligation he is. What

he is required to do may be an action or a set of actions, or to experience a feeling or an attitude, or a set of feelings or attitudes. *A*'s obligation to be grateful to *B* who bought the coffin cloth for *A*'s dead father is fulfilled to a large extent if *A* feels and expresses gratitude to *B*. One cannot acknowledge an obligation unless he knows who or which group of persons it is he is obligated to, though in some cases the group he is under obligation may be loosely structured or not neatly definable. Similarly, what he is required to do may also not be in some cases neatly, definitively, or exhaustively describable or definable. But the relevant contexts and social conventions and practices generally throw sufficient light to help him see with enough clarity what his obligation commits him to do.

Generally obligations get their concrete form or instantiation through some institutions like family, marriage, neighbourliness, property, etc. The obligation of conjugal fidelty to one's spouse, if the latter fulfils certain conditions, is the result of one's having contracted through the institution of marriage the husband-wife (or wife-husband) relationship with the woman (or man) who has thereby become his (or her) spouse. But every obligation does not have to be parasitic on some institution or institutionalized relationship like conjugal relationship. Even such non-institutionalized relationships as friendship, or love between a man and a woman not related to each other by marriage or blood, generate some obligations.

If, for example, *A*, who is a reputed painter and is in love with *B*, finds that for no fault of hers she has been made extremely unhappy and her talents as a painter are getting stiffled, he may feel, *because* of his love for her, that he has the specific obligation to help her develop her painting talents, which to him seems to be the best way to make her a happy person once again. What I intend to emphasize is that he feels *obligated*, not just moved, to do something for her *because* of his love for her which is not the conjugal love born out of the institution of marriage, nor the kind of love that is born out of a biological blood relationship like that between a brother and his real sister. This happens because the experience of love, like that of friendship, is not merely an emotion but a value prized in itself, a value with some built-in normative components. It is, therefore, that the love-relation generates a set of obligations and makes it a good argument to say to *A*: You ought to stand by *B* because you love (or have loved) her (or because she loves, or has loved, you).'

To acknowledge an obligation is to declare that one is committed or bound (not forced) as a result of his acknowledging it to do what he is obligated to. *A*'s acknowledgement of his obligation to support his wife is a reason, rather a conclusive reason, if there are no countervailing circumstances, for providing whatever support he can provide to her. It is a conclusive or ultimate reason in the sense that, after admitting that he is obligated to support her, he forfeits his right to ask for a (further) reason, since in acknowledging that he has an obligation to support her he has already acknowledged that he has

one. Similarly, we cannot ask him to give us a reason for his supporting her or for his wanting to support her, if we have already accepted his claim that he is obligated to support her. There is no logical point in pursuing the quest for reason for doing anything, either for the doer after his admission that he ought to do it, or for an outsider after accepting the former's admission. One may question his reason for admitting that he ought to, but that would be a different matter. It would not be the same as questioning his admission that he ought to do it to be a reason for his doing it.

'Being a reason for' denotes a transitive relation. If *P* is a reason for *Q* and *Q* a reason for *R*, then *P* is a reason for *R*. But if it is found that *P*, which has been offered as a reason for *Q*, is not really a reason for *Q*, it would not follow that *Q* is not a reason for *R*. What would follow from this is that *P* is not a reason for *R*. Since one's admission that he ought to do *x* is a reason for his doing it, a reason for his admitting that he ought to would also be a reason for his doing it. Suppose, *A*'s reason for his feeling obligated to control *B*'s movements is that he is the latter's local guardian. But, according to the prevalent moral, legal, and social norms, one's being someone else's local guardian is not a real reason for his feeling obligated to control the latter's movements. This, if admitted, will only imply that *A*'s being *B*'s local guardian is not a reason for his feeling obligated to control *B*'s movements; it would not imply that his feeling obligated to control is not a reason for his controlling *B*'s movements. As long as he feels obligated to...he has a reason to....

Acknowledgement of obligation by itself is, therefore, a reason for doing what it requires one to do, whether or not there is a good reason for the acknowledgement itself. A demonstration that the reason offered for it is not a good or tenable one will take away or weaken the reason the acknowledgement is for the action it requires only by nullifying or weakening the acknowledgement itself, not otherwise. But though one's acknowledgement of the obligation to do something is a reason for his doing it, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the latter. It is not a necessary condition since he may do it even without feeling obligated to do it. For example, he may do it because he considers it instrumental to the fulfilment of a self-interest, or because he enjoys doing it. It is not a sufficient condition, since even if he considers doing it obligatory, he may not do it because his sense of obligation is overpowered or superseded by a counter-desire to abstain from doing it on some prudential or expediential ground, or because the existing circumstances are not favourable for doing it.

Can one *know* that he is obligated to do *x* without *acknowledging* or *admitting* that he is so obligated? It seems obvious to me that he cannot. To know that one is obligated...is to admit that he is obligated...just as to know that *p* (when *p* is a factual proposition) is to believe that *p*. He can refuse to admit that he is obligated to...after knowing that he is obligated to...only by becoming irrational or self-inconsistent, as is the case with knowing that *p*

and refusing to believe that p. He can *know* that, according to some others, he is obligated to...and refuse to admit that the is obligated to. ... But this would not be the same thing as knowing that he is obligated to.... It is this conceptual link between knowing, feeling, etc. and admitting or acknowledging, that one is obligated to...which makes it permissible to say synonymously: 'I know, I feel, I admit, I acknowledge, that I ought to....' The uses of 'know', 'feel', 'admit', and 'acknowledge', in appropriate obligational contexts, may have some emotive differences or differences of emphasis, but they all communicate the same fact, the fact that the speaker owns to be obligated to....

Since to know is to admit that one is obligated to...and to admit that one is obligated to...is to admit that one has a reason to...it is self-inconsistent to say: 'I know I ought to but have no reason to do x.' He can say it nonchalantly only by virtually sacrificing his self-consistency and consequently his rationality. It is a demand of rationality to admit that one has a reason when one has it. But it is also a demand of rationality that a rational person be inclined, disposed, or prepared to do what he admits he has a reason to do. In this, an important sense of rationality, it is irrational not to be inclined to do what he has a reason to. It is this concept of rationality which logically links together his acknowledgement of the obligation to do x and his inclination to do it. To say I admit I ought to do x but I am not inclined to do it is to say I admit I have a reason to do x but I am not inclined to do it. To say the latter, and, therefore, the former, is definitely an exhibition of irrationality.

If we assume that one is a rational person, then, if he owns that he has a reason to do x, he gives us some sort of a logical authority to say that he is inclined to do it. For a rational person, therefore, to declare or convey that he is obligated to do x is to declare or convey *ipso facto* that he is inclined to do it.

This type of logical link between the possession of reasons and the relevant dispositions or actions is not peculiar to the field of morals. It can be easily seen to exist in other fields as well. For example, if a rational person accepts as true the statement (c) that smoking generally causes cancer, it offers him a good inductive reason for believing (a) that *his* smoking also may cause cancer. Similarly, if he accepts as true (d) that all middle-aged persons are dogmatic, he has a good deductive reason for believing (b) that his middle-aged political preceptor must also be dogmatic. Given the assumption of his rationality, it is logical to require or expect him to believe (a) if he accepts the truth of (c), and (b) if he accepts that of (d). In the event of his unwillingness to do all this, we can retain our assumption only by assuming further that there are some excepting factors, i.e. factors which make the existing reasons inapplicable or inadequate. Even he can defend his (claim to) rationality only by making available to us some such considerations. On the other hand, if he disowns to be or is not assumed to be a rational being,

we cannot expect him to cognize properly any logical relationship existing between two propositions. Therefore, the question of requiring or expecting him to believe something because of his having a reason for believing it will not arise. But when we assume that he is a rational being and that he has a reason to believe that p, we are entitled to say (almost) analytically that he believes that p.

Leading a moral life is a rational, deliberative, affair, since it involves (a) appreciation of the link between actions and the reasons for doing them, and (b) the preparedness to honour that link. Only a rational being can experience the force of a reason in disposing him to do what it is a reason for. If one declines to do x for doing which he has a reason in his being obligated to do it, theoretically we can do nothing but help him to realize that his refusal lands him in a situation which is self-inconsistent or irrational. We can tell him: you admit you are obligated to do x, admitting that you are so obligated is a good, conclusive, reason for doing or at least being inclined to do x; therefore, you are self-inconsistent or irrational in refusing or not being inclined or prepared to do it. Similarly, in a non-moral case, we can say: you accept that p, and that p is a reason for q; therefore, in not accepting that q you are self-inconsistent or irrational.

One who does not consider self-inconsistency or irrationality to be an evil, who does not want to be, or cannot realize what it is to be, self-consistent, cannot be made a party in a moral, or any, argumentation. We cannot even train him to be moral. We can force, brainwash, or drug him to do what *we* think he is morally obligated to do. But even then he would not be fulfilling what *his* obligations are, since he does not have the basic rationality required to enable him to know what it is to be obligated to. Only a rational being can realize the full force of what it is to acknowledge an obligation, since only he can realize that the acknowledgement of an obligation to do x is a reason for doing it, and that having a reason to do it but not being (at least) inclined to do it is irrational.

If one *admits* that he ought to do x but denies any inclination or the legitimacy of having one to do it, he is irrational or illogical. But if x is also something he ought really, objectively speaking, to do and he disowns having any inclination to do it, then he is immoral as well. But the immoral need not be irrational and the irrational immoral, or the rational moral and the moral rational.

For example, if A thinks that he ought to condemn B publicly (believing that B has passed on to the agent of an enemy country an important national secret) and, therefore, condemns him, when, objectively speaking, he ought not to have done that (because B has not done any such thing), then what A has done is rational but immoral, since he has publicly condemned an innocent person. But if he does not feel inclined to condemn B and, therefore, does not, while admitting that he ought to, then he is irrational but not immoral. He would be both rational and moral, if and only if he is inclined

to do what he admits he ought to, and what he admits he ought to do is really what he ought to do.

It is in no sense far-fetched or against ordinary usage and common sense to say that *at least* one of the necessary constituents of being rational is the potentiality for reasoned behaviour, the possession of a pre-disposition or inclination to do what one has a reason to do. This I have claimed to be involved in the very concept of a rational being, because we would hesitate to call a man rational if his acknowledgement of there being a reason for doing x carries no *authority* for him. Whether or not it also has any *power* and if it has, how much, to make him actually do x, is, of course, an empirical matter. The concept of obligation has its full meaning only in the context of a rational being, a being who is disposed to do what he has a reason for doing. We can say, therefore, that the inclination, which the acknowledgement of obligation logically or conceptually involves, is a rationally grounded inclination, an inclination generated by man's rationality. The feeling of coercion, the feeling that one is bound to do x by his obligation to do it, can be explained as an offshoot of the awareness by a rational being of the force of reason, the force which his admission that there is a reason for doing x generates in him. The awareness of there being such a reason is, as has been shown, a part of the awareness of obligation.

That a rational being is he who is (at least) inclined to do what, on his own admission, he ought to is thus an (almost) *a priori* truth. It is not an inductive generalization based on observation, claiming that those who acknowledge an obligation have also been found to be inclined to fulfil it. Therefore, it is not falsifiable by a counter-instance. Rather, if we meet a person who says he is not inclined to do what he (apparently) admits he ought to, we would not like either to modify our understanding of the concept of admitting an obligation or that of the concept of a rational being. We would rather like to treat him as irrational, or his admission as not serious or sincere, or his use of 'incline' and 'ought' as incorrect or non-ordinary. For example, he might be meaning by 'I am not inclined to...' I am not going to... or by 'I admit I ought to...' I admit that according to my social mores I ought to..., etc. Such special, non-standard, uses of 'incline' and 'ought' would not refute the present thesis. I shall explain sometime later in the paper some such cases, which may *seem* to go against it, when I shall take up the problem of moral failure.

To say 'I ought to...' has, therefore, its logical point only if it is assumed to imply that the speaker is also inclined to.... If I say in an admissive sense that I ought to..., I almost analytically entitle my hearer to infer, and raise in his mind a hope, that I am inclined to.... By denying that I am inclined to.... I destroy what I imply which is to destroy his hope and the point of my saying I ought to....

Suppose I am trying to convince A that he ought to compose his differences with his brother and give to him his due share in the paternal property.

I would not conclude that he admits he ought to, unless he gives me some evidence that he is also inclined to.... Or, if I am in doubt how to interpret what he says, e.g. as meaning his admission that he ought to, or as meaning he feels he is compelled to..., I would interpret it to mean the former only if I have reason to believe that he has now become inclined to.... But someone else's saying, declaring, or judging that he ought to share the property would not imply that he is inclined to. It is not even the fact that he is really, objectively, obligated to, which implies his inclination to do it. Unless he himself owns that he is so obligated, his being so obligated would not have any normative force for him. To acknowledge that he is obligated is to feel obligated, which is to be at least potentially or dispositionally oriented towards doing what he acknowledges to be obligated to do. It would not matter whether we hold conscience or something external, teleological or deontological, to be the source of the obligation. In either case, it is not the obligation *per se* but its acknowledgement which would imply a corresponding inclination. It is not at all odd to say that his acknowledgement that he is obligated to do x, though that he ought to do x has been prescribed by some external agency, provides him with a reason for doing it and, therefore, since he is a rational person, inclines him to do it.

The relationship between a rational person's, say R's acknowledgement that he ought to do x and his being inclined to do it is thus such that when he makes the acknowledgement to another rational person, say S, it is a necessary condition of S's *receiving* the point of R's acknowledgement that he (S) believes or presupposes that R is inclined to do x. Secondly, it is a necessary condition of there being any point in R's sincerely trying to convey, pass on, or transmit, to S that he (R) acknowledges to be so obligated that he (R) feels inclined to what he says he ought to. In case S has any ground to doubt that R is so inclined, he would also doubt the genuineness or sincerity of R's acknowledgement. He may even then question justifiably the point of R's acknowledging that he ought to.... If R, on the other hand, himself disowns his being so inclined, then again S can justifiably question the point of his acknowledgement or say that there is no point in it.

The absence of the belief/presupposition on the part of S that R is inclined to do x, or the absence of the inclination to do x on the part of R would frustrate, stultify, or make pointless, if not fully, at least to a large extent, R's acknowledging to S that he ought to or is obligated to do x.

The relation of implication between acknowledgement of obligation and inclination, as stated above, may, borrowing a term from the current philosophical tradition, be called pragmatic implication, though I will not mind if one considers it an inappropriate label. But to me it does seem obvious that this relation is not what is denoted by either material or logical implication. It seems to be conceptual enough to be called implication but not formal enough to be called material or logical implication.

We can either say that *one's acknowledgement that* he ought to do x

implies *his inclination to* do it, or that *he* in acknowledging that...implies *his being* inclined to.... In either case, it seems to be a non-propositional relationship, one between acknowledging to be obligated to... and being inclined to.... This should justify calling it pragmatic. One may present it as a (seemingly) propositional one in some such form as 'If *R* acknowledges that he ought to do *x*, then he is inclined to do it'. But this would not be a fair presentation. It is not the proposition '*R* acknowledges that...' which implies 'He is inclined to...' but *R*'s *acknowledging* that... which implies his inclination to... or his *being* inclined to.... Moreover, the denial of the consequence of the propositional form by *R* himself or by anyone else would not make the antecedent false, as it would if the implication is taken to be material or logical but simply pointless, functionless, or infructuous. It seems, therefore, to be inappropriate to treat the relationship between one's acknowledgement of his obligation to do something and his inclination to do it either material or logical. For the sake of brevity, in what follows, wherever necessary, I shall use 'obligation implies inclination' as the shortened form of 'whenever a rational person admits/acknowledges his obligation to do *x*, he (or his admitting/acknowledging) pragmatically implies his inclination/his being inclined to do *x*'.

Though one cannot say admissively that he ought to but is not inclined to do *x* without being self-inconsistent, it does not mean that he cannot admit an obligation without being appropriately inclined. He *can* do the latter because he *can* be self-inconsistent, irrational, or insincere, in his admission. That doing something is irrational or illogical does not hinder one from doing it.

Whichever label we choose to name the relationship between obligation and inclination, that it is a not-too-loose link is also shown quite convincingly by certain important facts pertaining to how they behave in the phenomenology of moral life.

If no inclination is built into obligation, i.e. if one's acknowledgement of obligation does not possess the normative force to incline or move him to act, the possibility of one's doing something simply because he considers it to be a duty, a Kantian possibility, would become a myth. But it is not; it is empirically true that some men sometimes do certain things only because they consider doing them their duties or obligations. Reason may not be the master of passions, but it is also not their slave all the time. We do sometimes do certain things simply because we have a good reason for doing them, and, in some of these cases, the operative good reason can very well be our considering doing them our duties.

The Kantian claim that doing something can be called the fulfilment of a (moral) obligation, only if it has been done out of reverence for the moral law, does not show that the acknowledgement of an obligation does not involve a relevant inclination. Rather, if we look closely at the concept of reverence, it admits in effect that the former involves the latter. Reverence

includes an attitudinal, inclinational, element, an element of preparedness to act in a certain manner; it is not a mere feeling or wish. To recognize or acknowledge that I ought to do *x* is a genuine acknowledgement, *a la* Kant, if I have a reverence for the law that everyone, similarly situated as I am, ought to do *x*. But I cannot say, without being self-inconsistent, that I revere the law, or doing *x*, but have no inclination towards obeying the law, or doing *x*.

To experience reverence for the law is, in some sense, to feel bound, constrained, or committed, to act in accordance with it. But it is not just to feel bound. It is also to experience a sense of glory or pride in feeling so bound. In addition, when one has fulfilled his obligation of acting in accordance with the law, i.e. has done *x*, what the law requires him to do, he feels satisfied and happy. But he does not feel merely satisfied or happy; he also feels proud of having done what he was obligated to do. Similarly, when he does not fulfil his obligation, or flouts the moral law, he not only feels dissatisfied, or frustrated, but also guilty, or ashamed of himself.

The fulfilment of any inclination whatsoever results in some kind of satisfaction or happiness. But the fulfilment of every inclination is not accompanied with a feeling of pride, greatness, or worthiness. It is this feeling, which invariably accompanies the fulfilment, or even the attempt at the fulfilment, of the inclination involved in the acknowledgement of an obligation, which distinguishes the latter inclination from others. The satisfactoriness resulting out of its fulfilment shows its akineness with, and the accompanying feeling of pride, etc. its difference from, other non-obligational instances of inclination-fulfilling behaviour.

Using a Kantian phraseology, we can say one feels proud of himself for having fulfilled an obligation, because it is a case of having done what everyone else, circumstanced as he is, ought to have done, since for any person to recognize or acknowledge an obligation is not to recognize it as something unique to himself but as one which everyone else like him ought to. The relationship between 'I ought to do *x*' and 'Everyone like me ought to do *x*' is very peculiar. One can say 'I ought to do *x* because everyone like me ought to do it', or 'Everyone like me ought to do *x* because I ought to do it'. There is no circle involved in saying both together because to admit that I ought to ...and to admit that everyone like me ought to...is to admit the same thing. All this is again a rational affair, and, therefore, we have to agree with Kant that only a rational being can have the full-fledged recognition or acknowledgement, of an obligation. The inclination, involved in the acknowledgement, for this reason, can also be called a rationally grounded one.

The normative force, the action-guiding power, i.e. the dynamism of (the acknowledgement of) an obligation can be strengthened, weakened, or even obstructed or superseded by a non-moral inclination, and vice versa. *A*'s desire, born out of his love for *B*, to contribute his best towards her attaining a respectable social status can strengthen as well as be strengthened by his

acknowledged obligation to help her develop her talents as a painter. The former will make the fulfilment of the latter smoother or pleasanter, and the latter will add dignity or pride to the fulfilment of the former. A Kantian would say that one can get the credit of having fulfilled an obligation only if he has done it out of sheer reverence for the moral law. Therefore, *A* would not or should not get the credit if, in fulfilling his obligation towards *B*, he was also moved by his (non-moral) desire to help her. We may or may not accept the Kantian criterion for the award of moral credit. But even if we do, it would not affect the point made here, since even then the fact that the recognition of an obligation and a relevant non-moral inclination can augment each other remains undislodged.

There are some relationships which generate a set of obligations and also a pro-inclination towards the things required to be done to fulfil the former. For example, the brother-sister relationship generates an obligation of the brother to protect his sister and also his desire to protect her. Similarly, the relation of amorous love generates in the persons concerned both an obligation and a desire to promote each other's interests. In such cases, recognition of obligation and the relevant desire or inclination naturally support each other with the result that one enjoys doing his duties, or does what he wants to do with the satisfaction that in doing it he is also doing what he ought to be doing.

That a counter-inclination or desire can weaken, obstruct or supersede an acknowledged obligation is also too obvious to be over-emphasized. *A* may provide but with a great amount of self-resistence, or hesitate to provide, or even may not provide any, financial support to his wife, though he admits that he ought to, because of his strong disinclination to do that born, for example, out of his judgement that she is incommensurate with his picture of a good wife. But the vice versa may as well happen. His strong sense of obligation may neutralize the obstructive force of the disinclination.

There is an important feature of the conflict between an obligation and a counter-disposition (or desire) which is likely to remain unnoticed, but which is very relevant to the present discussion. *A*'s counter-disposition not to provide support to his wife collides not with the abstract general principle that a husband ought to provide support to his wife, nor with its particular exemplification that he, *A*, ought to provide support to his wife, but with the disposition involved in his acceptance of the principle (or its exemplification, since to accept the one is to accept the other). It is not a duty, but the acceptance of something as a duty, which may conflict with an opposing desire. That the former may conflict with the latter shows that it involves some inclination or disposition to behave in a manner antagonistic to the manner in which the opposing desire disposes or requires the acceptor of the duty to behave. That is why a conflict may occur only when the acceptance of the obligation is genuine or full-fledged, since a malingered or half-fledged acceptance does not imply or involve any inclination to fulfil it. Had it been the

case that accepting an obligation did not mean being disposed to behave in a certain manner, another disposition would have found in it nothing it could counter or oppose. This would have made antagonism or conflict between an obligation and a counter-inclination, a duty and a counter-desire, an impossibility or a mystery.

The physiognomy of a conflict is instructive in another way as well. When the disposition involved in the acceptance of an obligation collides with a counter-disposition, its presence is felt or experienced more prominently or conspicuously than it would have otherwise been. If fulfilling an obligation is smooth or unobstructed, one may not feel the existence of the disposition, though it is nonetheless there. It is not that the habitual moralist's acceptance of his obligations does not dispose him to behave in certain ways. It does, but because of the absence of any opposition or friction the disposition does not, or does not need to, raise its head high enough to be easily visible. Therefore, a conflict-situation offers a good opportunity to the analyst to realize that a realistic analysis of the acceptance of an obligation must not ignore its disposition to action. It is also easier in a conflict-situation to decide whether what has been done has been done solely because of its having been considered to be obligatory or because of some other consideration. This is so for the same reason, namely, the reason that the disposition involved in the obligation is clearly visible in it. That is why it is equally important for the moralist as well. A Kant may use it to explain what he means by the case in which one may be said to have done his duty for the sake of duty, i.e. out of sheer reverence for the moral law. And, if some such things are shown to be empirically real, he may say that the ideal of duty for the sake of duty is not the figment of his imagination.

One of the most appropriate contexts for trying to convince or persuade a person to acknowledge his obligation to do x is provided by the situation in which we find him adversely inclined, or very weakly inclined, to do it. This is so because of the assumption, well-supported by experience, that by leading him to acknowledge the obligation we may be able to counter the adverse inclination, or strengthen the weak pro-inclination. There is not much point in trying to convince him that he ought to...when he is already inclined to...and the inclination is too strong to be nullified by any counter-inclination, nor there is any when we think it is impossible to motivate him to do what we think he ought to. We try to convince a person that he ought to...to direct his volitions. We may, therefore, do it pointfully only if it is reasonable to assume that his accepting that he ought to...would mean his equipping himself with an extra, supplementary, disposition to do it. This is the reason why a moral reformer considers it a matter of great practical importance to persuade people to accept as obligatory an action which, he thinks, they ought to do but they are not disposed to do or feel tempted to omit.

It is because of its logical, or almost logical, link with the relevant pro-

inclination that the acceptance of an obligation has the importance it has in moral life. The pro-inclination, on the other hand, owes its importance to the fact that a moral action is intentional. One of the necessary conditions an action has to satisfy to be called moral is that the doer has towards doing it a pro-inclination, i.e. he does it because he wants to, because he is willing to, and not because he is forced to, do it, or does it immitatively.

The obvious empirical truth that the acknowledgement of an obligation can collide with, weaken, or strengthen the motivational force inherent in a (non-obligational) desire and vice versa is of great philosophical importance, because it provides the empirical illustration of the genuineness of the logical or quasi-logical claim, made earlier in the paper, that the acknowledgement of an obligation implies an inclination to fulfil it. On the other hand, granting the validity of the latter offers a good clarification of the former and contributes very greatly to our understanding of it. Admitting that the acknowledgement of an obligation has a built-in motivational force, a force capable of directing one's volitions in some way comparable to the force inherent in a human desire or inclination, makes the facts mentioned above completely non-puzzling. Only a motivational force can counter, weaken, or strengthen another in a situation of conflict or co-operation. If, on the other hand, it is held that to acknowledge an obligation to do x is only to note, infer, perceive or intuite that x has a certain property, and not at all to have an inclination to do it, then even the logical possibility of the acknowledgement of an obligation obstructing, weakening, or strengthening another inclination would become inexplicable.

The fact of the matter is that we would not call a man's acknowledgement genuine if he disowns experiencing a corresponding inclination, howsoever weak it may be. When one *seems* to report truly that his awareness of a certain obligation is not accompanied with the relevant inclination, if he is not irrational, it is in all likelihood the case that the motivational force inherent in his awareness of the obligation is so feeble, or overpowered by the superior one present in a counter-inclination (or even a coherent one), that its presence is not adequately felt. The illumination produced by a thousand-watt electric bulb is very likely to make one unnotice, or be oblivious of, the illumination produced by a candle. But this in no way means that the candle is producing no illumination. We would not call a candle a candle if one can light it without producing at least some illumination.

Our ordinary moral consciousness also seems to operate on the assumption that obligation implies inclination. If a person (morally) ought to do something, we (morally) commend not only his actually doing it but even his acknowledging that he ought to do it. The reason for the latter fact seems to be nothing but the belief, or the assumption, that to acknowledge an obligation is to be at least disposed or inclined to fulfil it. Since to be inclined to fulfil a real moral obligation is a commendable thing, acknowledging an obligation, which implies it, *ipso facto* becomes commendable. On the other

hand, if we consider that what one feels obligated to do is something he really ought not to do or ought to abstain from, using a similar logic we (morally) condemn his doing it as well as his acknowledging that he ought to do it. Further, since one's being inclined to do x is, as has been said earlier, a necessary condition for making his doing x a moral action, he does deserve (moral) credit or commendation for acknowledging that he ought to do it if his acknowledging that...implies his being inclined to do it and it is something he really ought to do. Leading a moral life seems to be inaugurated by acknowledging the right kind of obligations. Our ordinary moral consciousness seems to record this truth of our moral life by judging the latter to be morally commendable.

It is true, however, that sometimes some people do not do what they admit they ought to, or do what they admit they ought not to. Such lapses exemplify what has traditionally been called moral weakness or weakness of the will. I shall prefer to use the term 'moral failure' for omissions and commissions of this type, since both demonstrate that one has failed to do, in a broad sense of 'do', what he ought to have done.

One exhibits his moral failure when he omits doing x, or prefers doing y to doing x, if and only if he admits (a) that the obligation of doing x is applicable to him and (b) that doing x carries moral merit, or carries more moral merit than doing y. He would not, therefore, exhibit any if he denies either one of (a) and (b), even though on objective grounds, or in the opinion of another person judging his behaviour, the obligation of doing x is applicable to him and doing x is morally meritorious, or more meritorious than doing y.

For example, suppose A does not help B develop her painting talents on the (alleged) ground that it is not his obligation to help her, since it is not he but C who is her formally appointed tutor, or on the (alleged) ground that a senior painter's helping a budding one carries no moral merit, or carries less moral merit than his promoting his own professional prospects, and, therefore, he prefers the latter to the former as he cannot do both. A will not then be exhibiting any moral failure on his part. We may question his facts, e.g. we may prove that it is not C but he himself who is her formal tutor, or that she is more friendly and respectful to him than to C, etc. Or, we may question his evaluations, e.g. we may regard a senior painter's promoting his own professional prospects morally less meritorious than his helping a budding painter. To do all this is not to accuse him of moral failure but of something else. But suppose, while admitting that he ought to help B and that helping her is morally more meritorious than his promoting his own professional prospects, A opts for the latter and completely withdraws his helping hand from her. A then would have failed to do what (he himself admits) he ought to have done.

Some philosophers think that the occurrence of moral failure presents a serious threat to internalism, the theory according to which motivation

is internal to obligation. How can one fail to fulfil an obligation when the motivation to fulfil it is already built into its acknowledgement? Some forms of internalism, for example, prescriptivism, do find it extremely difficult to present a satisfactory explanation of moral failure, or are forced by their own logic to deny that it ever occurs. But this is not the case, as will be shown in what follows, with the present theory which, though, is obviously a variety of internalism. An occurrence of moral failure will go against or be a counter-instance to it only if it shows (but it does not) that to own an obligation is not (always) to be disposed or inclined to act accordingly.

A's stopping all help to *B*, or proceeding to promote his professional prospects superseding his acknowledged obligation to help her, is a good counter-instance to an internalist theory of the prescriptivist variety, for example, to Hare's, which maintains that to acknowledge an obligation is to *decide* to act accordingly. If acknowledgement of obligation (implies or) entails action, or the decision to act, then one cannot acknowledge it and not act accordingly or act adversely. The only way left open to handle the phenomenon of moral failure would then be to either deny that it ever occurs, or to deny that the acknowledgement of obligation available in it is genuine or full-fledged. That the two alternatives are not fundamentally different from each other will be clear from what follows.

To protect his prescriptivism Hare adopts the second alternative. He says that in the kind of cases which seem to exemplify moral weakness the acknowledgement of obligation is 'off-colour' or down-graded. For him *A*'s failure to help *B* is a case of 'ought and cannot'; *A* is overpowered by his professional ambition, and, therefore, is unable to fulfil his (acknowledged) obligation to *B*. Since he is unable, his acknowledgement is not a genuine but only an 'off-colour', or unreal, acknowledgement. As 'ought' implies 'can', he cannot be said to be really obligated to help *B* when he is not able to.*

But this explanation amounts to asserting, or implying, that a moral failure never occurs. As per what we ordinarily mean by moral weakness or failure, *A* can be said to have failed to fulfil his obligation to help *B* only if his acknowledgement of it is a full-scale, genuine, acknowledgement. In Hare's scheme the acknowledgement itself becomes 'off-colour', and therefore, his failing to fulfil the acknowledged obligation also becomes 'off-colour' or unreal. We cannot say of a person that he has failed to fulfil an obligation if he has not acknowledged it to be his, or if his (alleged) acknowledgement of it does not satisfy the criterion (or criteria) of a genuine acknowledgement, since then also it would not be an obligation he has really acknowledged to be his.

Moreover, one does not always fail to fulfil an obligation because of being overpowered by an emotion or desire. He may do that in what are called precipitate actions. But occasionally he may deliberate and choose to do

*R.M. Hare, *Freedom and Reason*, chs. 4 and 5, Oxford, 1963.

something he considers to be wrong, or morally less meritorious than something else which he considers to be his obligation. For example, *A* may reason and argue with himself before he starts becoming indifferent towards *B*. He may *choose* to postpone, supersede, or sacrifice his obligation to her after calculating in imagination the likely consequences of fulfilling his professional ambition. Being the kind of person he is, he may find the latter more satisfying. He may still feel that fulfilling his professional ambition at the cost of his obligation towards *B* would be wrong, but opts for it because of some non-moral, pragmatic, short- or long-range, considerations. His behaviour would then exemplify his moral failure. But it will not pose any problem to the present theory because it only holds that obligation implies inclination and not action or decision to act. One can be inclined to do x, i.e. what he considers morally obligatory, more or less strongly than to do y which he does not consider to be morally obligatory, or considers to be less obligatory than x. This can happen even if he considers y to be immoral.

One decides, or does not decide, to do x; one cannot decide to do it more or less strongly. But one can be more or less inclined, i.e. inclined more or less strongly, to do one thing than another. Therefore, he, who does not fulfil a moral obligation he acknowledges and acts to satisfy a non-moral or even an immoral inclination instead, can still be described as being inclined to fulfil the former but not strongly enough to actually fulfil it, or as being inclined to fulfil it less strongly than he is to satisfy the latter.

If acknowledging that I ought to do x implies 'Let me do x' or 'I shall do x' ($O \supset A$), as it does for prescriptivism, then acknowledging that...but not actually doing x ($O.\sim A$) i.e. the occurrence of moral failure, would not be for the latter only an unsolvable puzzle. Rather, it would be its conclusive refutation because if $O.\sim A$ is true, $O \supset A$ must be false. The present theory, on the other hand, according to which obligation implies inclination ($O \supset I$), does not have to face this sort of embarrassment. Since it is not the case that not doing x implies not being inclined to do it $\sim(\sim A \supset \sim I)$, $O \supset I$ and $O.\sim A$ can both be true at the same time. Only if $\sim A \supset \sim I$ were true, $O.\sim A$ would have implied, as it can be formally shown in a few steps, the falsity of $O \supset I$.

My not doing x does not imply my not being inclined to do it, since it may be the case that I am inclined to do but do not do it because my inclination to do it is not strong enough to motivate me to do it, or is weaker than some other one which motivates me to do y. Not every inclination but only that which possesses a certain amount of motivational force and is not superseded by another one of greater motivational force leads to action. Consequently, $O.\sim A$, i.e. the occurrence of moral failture, cannot be used to refute $O \supset I$, the thesis of the paper, or which is the same thing, to prove $O.\sim I$.

An inclination to do what one feels obligated to, of course, sometimes turns into *a decision* to do it, and then he really does it if not obstructed by some extraneous agency. But it need not always turn into a decision; it may

sometimes become weaker and turn into a mere wish. It may be said that the ideal moral hero's such (moral) inclinations *always* turn into decisions, the normally moral (or the morally strong) person's *more often than not*, and the morally weak person's *very rarely or never*. The morally wicked, on the other hand, is very different from the morally weak. He is one whose sense of obligation is distorted, who acknowledges such obligations which, objectively speaking, or from a neutral spectator's point of view, are perverted. Therefore, if he does not feel inclined to do what he really ought to do, it would not be a case of acknowledgement of obligation conjoined with absence of inclination. He is inclined to do what he thinks he ought to do. That is why we condemn him or consider him to be a menace to society. On the contrary, the morally weak is he whose sense of obligation is not distorted, but whose inclination to fulfil it is either too feeble to be realized into action, making him morally idle or ineffective, or is superseded by some other stronger one to do something amoral or immoral.

Some of the factors which determine the turning of an inclination into a decision, or its enfeeblement, are: (*i*) the agent's character, (*ii*) absence or presence of conflict in his mind, (*iii*) his value-system, (*iv*) his social and cultural milieu, (*v*) his physical environment, etc. But all of these factors work in a very complicated manner, and anyone of them may not be operative in the same manner in all cases. One person may exhibit his moral failure by accepting bribe while admitting it to be wrong, but may not do that in matters of sex, while another may do the reverse.

I have maintained earlier that the acknowledgement of obligation is a conclusive reason for doing what one is obligated to and to be rational is to be at least inclined to do what one has a conclusive reason to do. To say this is not to assert or imply that a rational being by definition is one who fulfils all of his acknowledged obligations. If it did, then it would make moral failure impossible and bring back the Socratic paradox with the problems, conceptual and empirical, associated with it. A rational being may not only make a mistake in fulfilling an obligation but also fail to fulfil one.

In order to be called a rational being one must recognize the authority of the relevant reason, and, therefore, be inclined to do what he has a reason to. But like any other inclination, the rationally grounded one, involved in the acknowledgement of an obligation, can vary in strength in different persons or in different circumstances. Since only an inclination of a certain strength can result into action, the latter may sometimes not, as has been shown, being not adequately strong, lead to the action required. That is, the rational man's (rational) inclination may not sometimes have the *power*, while retaining its *authority*, needed to get itself executed into action, and some other, a counter-inclination, i.e. one which is morally condemnable, or not commendable, may have. The morally weak is thus not irrational. That he still recognizes the authoritative nature of the former is clear from the fact that when he fails to execute it into action, or acts to satisfy a counter-inclination, he feels remorseful or guilty. He chastises himself by experiencing what we call the bitings of his moral conscience, or defends himself by doing some rationalization. A person who does not accept the authority of the inclination implied by his acknowledgement of an obligation, or feels no remorse for not acting accordingly or for acting antagonistically without any justification, on the other hand, is either irrational, or morally obtuse, or does not know what it means to acknowledge an obligation.

The relationship between one's acknowledgement of obligation and his inclination to fulfil it is, thus, via the assumption of his rationality, conceptual or logical. But the relationship between the inclination and its exemplification into action, on the other hand, is empirical. Therefore, the relationship between the acknowledgement of obligation and its fulfilment is also empirical. But to say that it is empirical is not merely to make a logical point because, as has been mentioned earlier, it is a fact that sometimes some people do certain things simply because they consider doing them obligatory.

The questions and the non-questions of metaphysics

MIHIRVIKASH CHAKRAVARTI
University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad

Metaphysical questions, e.g. 'What is the nature of the universe as a whole?', 'Why is it that there is something rather than nothing?', 'Do we survive after death?', 'Does the world possess any unity?', and such like, are said to be *logically unanswerable* by many. To give the position a name, let us call it the 'unanswerability-thesis'. The thesis, as we see it, embodies a fundamental and a most invaluable truth about the nature of metaphysics. Nothing else so simple as this, we think, can individuate metaphysics more uniquely or explain its proverbial peculiarities better and more fully. And may not this, by itself, count as a fairly good reason for accepting it? However, to our worst misfortune, the meaning of the thesis remains till today very much misconstrued and obscured on account of a number of age-old misconceptions. The misconceptions we have particularly in mind relate mainly to the following:

(1) The exact logical character of the unanswerable questions;
(2) The functioning of questions in general in our discourse;
(3) The logical character of the non-questions which figure in the metaphysical discourse;
(4) The exact relation of these non-questions to the metaphysical questions.

So, in what follows, an attempt has been made by us to conduct a re-examination and purification of the unanswerability-thesis and, in the light of the results, a reconstruction, if possible, of the idea of metaphysics itself.

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The project, we are afraid, is likely to generate some initial misgivings: not unnaturally at all, one may assume a sceptical attitude towards its final outcome. The source of the scepticism is that the thesis of unanswerability happens to be linked up with certain parallel developments in metaphysics, and it is by no means obvious that the proposed re-examination of it will not, in actuality, end up ultimately more by reinforcing some such development than by helping our intended reconstruction. The developments alluded to are by and large familiar to us. They are:

(1*a*) The *logico-linguistic* metaphysics;
(1*b*) The *ontological* metaphysics;
(1*c*) The antimetaphysics.

Incidentally, it may be noted that (1*c*), because of its relatively uncompromising posture, will occupy a place of a little more importance than (1*a*) and (1*b*).

Anyway, lest by any chance one does not have a sufficiently clear idea of the setting, we should, even at a risk of being tedious, conduct at least a cursory survey of the three items, keeping specially in view two points about them, namely:

(1*d*) the exact nature of their connection with the unanswerability-thesis; *and*
(1*e*) their possible bearing on the concept of metaphysics in general (or on the one that we envisage).

To check up the points is no doubt advisable before we get off the ground: it is a precaution against the eventualities of crash-landing.

1.1. In speaking of (1*a*), the logico-linguistic metaphysics, we have in mind mainly the examples of Russell and Moore and of the numerous other philosophers who have followed their style of metaphysicalp hilosophizing. Russell starts with the belief that, taken in their traditional material mode, metaphysical questions as a sub-class of philosophical questions are not answerable "with our means of knowledge" and then proceeds to conclude: "...every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and purification, is found either to be not philosophical at all, or else to be..., logical."[1] Moore, in turn, takes a metaphysical question, e.g. 'Does the soul exist?' to stand for a linguistic enquiry of a kind, e.g. 'What do we mean when we say such things as 'I see this', 'I see that' and the like'.[2]

Thus for about seventy years now since Russell and Moore, we have a philosophical culture which is prone to read in metaphysical questions queries that are *logical* or *linguistic* rather than factual.

(1*b*) is not necessarily incompatible with (1*a*). In appropriate cases, it may well become a variant of the latter. At any rate, it is not without peculiarities of its own.

Instanced, among others, by Quine[3] and Strawson[4] and, more recently, by Nicholas Wolterstorff[5] and Martin,[6] (1*b*) is a move towards restricting metaphysics to ontology (or to a preferred sector of it), keeping cosmological and pneumatic questions usually at a safe distance. Ontology is considered unavoidable, as it is supposed to constitute the presupposition of our conceptual system, of logic and of mathematics.

Incidentally, this type of ontological metaphysics, in some cases, seems to have taken its cue apparently from Kant's *Transcendental Analytic*, and, therefore, not unnaturally, it tends at times to leave in our mouths the epistemic taste of a critique of judgment.

Come to (1*c*). For many years now, antimetaphysics, as everybody knows, has come to occupy a fairly large area in philosophy. Understandably, that is a consequence of the general metaphilosophical seriousness characteristic of this century philosophy.[7] However, we need not explore the whole field. It would be enough for our purpose to consider only two examples of antimetaphysics: the classical example of Kant and the recent example of the logical positivists. They assume special relevance for us, the reason being their notorious connection with the unanswerability-thesis. The thesis plays crucial roles in both, though the role in one is not exactly the same as that in the other: there is difference.

As a discourse which claims to talk science or science-like, metaphysics, on the Kantian hypothesis, is an *unreality* and, on the positivistic hypothesis, a corpus of *nonsensical* sentences. In either case, however, the position emerges from the blending of two things: (*i*) a doctrine of metaphysical questions; *and* (*ii*) a doctrine of metaphysical non-questions.

As far as Kant is concerned, the former is stated completeiy in terms of the unanswerability-thesis itself; whereupon, it proceeds straightway to function as the ground of the latter, namely, that metaphysical non-questions, as answer-claims, embody *transcendental illusions*.

Contrast logical positivism on the points. Unanswerability is not the whole truth or the last truth about the metaphysical questions; it is rather a step towards the conclusion that these questions are nonsensical. Note further that between this doctrine and the doctrine of metaphysical non-questions, namely, that they are instances of nonsense, there is no obvious connection. The latter, as a matter of fact, has been worked out by the logical positivists independently of the former.

1.2. How, possibly, may (1*a*)-(1*c*), as outlined above, relate to the idea of metaphysics as such or to our contemplated variant of it?

(1*a*), i.e. logico-linguistic metaphysics, is unmistakably opposed to the idea of metaphysics as a material mode of enquiry: the latter, it is supposed, amounts to a search for answering questions which are logically unanswerable. However, being itself metaphysics of a kind, it cannot be opposed to metaphysics in principle. Nor, again, is it in a position to rule out any parallel metaphysics, if that happens to be conceivable in terms of such concepts as would be able to neutralize the alleged implications of the unanswerability-thesis or, therewith, better still, make the unanswerable questions meaningfully the very stuff of itself.

The same holds of (1*b*), the ontological metaphysics, which also, being a kind of metaphysics itself, cannot commit itself against metaphysics as such. Neither need it have any necessary commitment against a metaphysics being possibly pursued as cosmology or pneumatics, only if it somehow turns out to be such that the latter is thoroughly protected against the alleged dangers

of the unanswerability-thesis or that the dangers are shown to be illusory.

(1*c*), i.e. the two antimetaphysical hypotheses. The name itself suggests an unconditional commitment against metaphysics. And, unfortunately, that is also how the matter is generally construed. But this seems very much misleading. The hypothesis, we think, call for a second look.

How far are the two hypotheses truly antimetaphysical? Are they antimetaphysical at all?

In reply some may speak of a hidden metaphysics already woven in their structure. As for ourselves, we are not bothered by that. We shall just let the hypotheses unfold themselves.

What, precisely, is that the reality of which is denied by Kant, when he denies the reality of metaphysics? Well, he is not opposed to metaphysics as such, which is obvious from the one fact he admits dispositional metaphysics as inescapably real. What he sets out to deny is, in fact, only the reality of a particular brand of metaphysics, the one which would make scientific claims, in other words, say that the questions and the non-questions and the concepts of metaphysics are basically similar to their counterparts in science. And stated with absolute plainliness, this amounts only to a simple proposition to the effect that *metaphysics is not science*. And leave aside all its usual paraphernalia (e.g. the analytic-synthetic dichotomy, the analytic—*a priori* equation, the characteristic theory of meaning, the positivistic commitment, etc.) the anti-metaphysics of the logical positivists also boils down to the same position.

It is obvious that the position is not *per se* anti-metaphysical. It assumes an appearance like that only when we go a fairly long way to liken metaphysics to science, more philosophically, to view it in terms of such concepts as are metascientific rather than metametaphysical. So it appears that the anti-metaphysics is antimetaphysical only in a relative sense. It could, of course, be otherwise, if the metascientific style of looking at metaphysics were absolutely unavoidable. But that is far from true.

Take, for example, one who thinks of metaphysics distinctistly as metaphysics itself and then proceeds to read it in terms of concepts tailored exclusively after the individuating peculiarities of the subject. For him, the position that metaphysics is not science is merely an innocuous truism. It is in no sense antimetaphysical any more than the description 'Science is not metaphysics (or mathematics)' is antiscientific or 'Mathematics is not metaphysics (or science)' is antimathematical.

On a distinctist construal of metaphysics, the so-called antimetaphysics turns out to be a truism, its name being a misnomer. So, *qua* antimetaphysics, it does not come in our way at all, if our projected view of metaphysics is faithfully wedded to a distinctist ideal.

2

So far we considered certain very well-known specimens of metaphysical and antimetaphysical philosophy. Needless to say, they figure on our agenda not on account of themselves but because of their link with the thesis of unanswerability. Besides, initially, there was a fear that they might prejudice the idea of metaphysical rediscovery as such. Anyway, let us now undertake the proposed review of the thesis and recapture its correct import by removing the traditional misconceptions about it. No doubt, this will produce some repurcussions on the logical and historical claims of the philosophical specimens we have referred to. For, each of them happens to take off from the supposed difficulties of the unanswerability-thesis; whereas one particular thing which the review is intended to accomplish is to expose these supposed difficulties, to show that they are misconceived or imaginary. But about all that later.

2.1. To state it once more the thesis of unanswerability is the thesis that the questions of metaphysics are *logically unanswerable*.

What, really, does it tell us about metaphysical questions? To spell out the matter is naturally to concern us first. But the job is far from too easy.

For one thing, we have got to handle two separate problems:

(2*a*) What is it that is to be meant in saying that metaphysical questions are *unanswerable*?

(2*b*) What is it that is to be meant in saying that they are *logically* unanswerable?

(2*a*) is far more general than (2*b*): 'being *logically* unanswerable' is not co-extensive with 'being *unanswerable*'. The former entails the latter, but the converse is not true. There, indeed, are numerous questions, e.g. 'What did Plato do at eight o'clock in the morning of his fiftieth birthday?', 'How much did Homer weigh when he wrote the first line of the *Illiad*?',[8] and so on, of which it is right to say that they are unanswerable but wrong to say that they are logically so.

But in just dividing the problem we have not conquered it. The two epithets 'unanswerable' in (2*a*) and 'logically' in (2*b*) turn out to be a source of some difficulty. Neither can be said to have any clear-cut meaning. On the contrary, both are liable to be understood in a good number of different senses, and *prima facie* there is nothing to indicate which particular sense, being itself justified, would at the same time blend perfectly with the notion of a metaphysical question. Anyway, for (2*a*) let us examine the following formulations:

(*a*.1) An *MQ* is such that whatever *S* is supposed to stand in an alleged *QA* relation to it is a nonsense.

(*a*.2) An *MQ* is such that whatever *S* stands in a *QA* relation to it is false.

(*a*.3) An *MQ* is such that no *S*, true or false, can stand in a *QA* relation to it.

(*b*.4) An *MQ* is such that what is to count as its right answer is *not knowable*.

To an extent, the formulations happen to draw on the results of an earlier analysis by us.[9] It is fairly clear that (*b*.4), which stands alone among the formulations, would be favoured by Kant and (*a*.1) by the logical positivists. As distinguished from (*b*.4), (*a*.1)-(*a*.3) have an underlying unity, in the sense that, with minor variations, they all echo a mistaken view about an unanswerable question in general, viz. the view that an unanswerable question is such as *has no answer*.

To examine the formulations.

(*a*.2) is palpably self-contradictory. For what really might be the sense of saying that *all S* in *QA* relation to an *MQ* is false, unless it is presupposed that there is at least one *S* in that relation which would be true.

(*a*.1) and (*a*.3), on the other hand, tend to dispossess *MQ* of questionhood itself, i.e. reduce it to an entity which is not a question at all.

For every question there must be an *S* standing in *QA* relation to it. That is a necessary requirement, so that what does not fulfil this requirement is not to count as a question, its question-like sentential form notwithstanding. Therefore, to say that an *MQ* is that to which nothing can stand in *QA* relation amounts to going as far as to say that an *MQ* is not a question at all.

(*b*.4) is at a safe distance from the above difficulties, in so far as it is free of the mistaken commitment of (*a*.1)-(*a*.3). Never denying that a metaphysical question has an answer or a right answer, all it addresses itself to do is to say that the right answer *is not knowable*. This characteristic epistemic dimension of (*b*.4) is what precisely is the most significant point about it.

In our judgment, as an account of the sense in which a metaphysical question may be called unanswerable, (*b*.4) is good enough to deserve our acceptance at least hypothetically. And we shall hold on to it unless it breaks down at any point later or a better account becomes available.

So an answer to (2*a*) is obtained. Saying that a metaphysical question is *not answerable* will mean for us that it is *not possible to know* what the right answer to the question is.

But what is it that is to be the meaning of saying that the impossibility to know is *logical* rather than merely *empirical*? And this brings us to the consideration of (2*b*).

Inherent in (*a*.1) above, there is one answer. It is this. Well, a sentence purporting to express the supposedly *known* answer to a metaphysical question is such that it is in principle unable to 'describe' a fact: it turns out to violate the 'rules of grammar' and become that way meaningless.[10]

As far as we are concerned, the answer, however, is not available for

acceptance. The reason is obvious. Already, we have rejected (*a*.1) and along with that the 'meaninglessness' hypothesis. We see little, indeed, that might be said to go against the supposedly known answers *qua* sentences or as supposed vehicles of propositions.

However, at this juncture, the characteristic epistemic dimension of our accepted account of the unanswerability of metaphysical questions proves suggestive and helpful. It tends to provide clues towards a certain range of sentences by reference to which it seems possible to articulate a fairly satisfactory answer to (2*b*). These sentences happen to express knowledge-claims or disclaims as regards the purported facts of the alleged answers to metaphysical questions. Let us mention some examples,[11] taking *q* to stand for a metaphysical question and *p* for a statement of the purported fact:

(2*c*) I *know* that *p*.
I *know* that *p* is the right answer to *q*.

(2*d*) I *might know* that *p*.
I *might know* that *p* was the right answer to *q*.

(2*e*) I *do not know* that *p*.
I *do not know* that *p* is the right answer to *q*.

(2*f*) I *might not know* that *p*.
I *might not know* that *p* was the right answer to *q*.

With these sentences before us, we are in a position now to formulate our answer to (2*b*) in two ways, namely, *epistemic* and *syntactic*.

In epistemic terms, saying that a metaphysical question is *logically* unanswerable, we may say, is to mean that (2*e*) and (2*f*) *are*, while 'contrarily' (2*c*) and (2*d*) *are not*, warranted by the necessary framework of our knowledge.

The position is *basically* Kantian. We say 'basically', because it is non-committal about the detailed account of the framework which is Kant's.

On the other hand, syntactically, to say that a metaphysical question is *logically* unanswerable would amount to saying that, in any language correctly designed to talk about metaphysics, (2*c*) and (2*d*) would be *self-contradictory*, while their contradictory (2*e*) and (2*f*) would be *trivial*.

3

What may we be said to have obtained from the above explication of the unanswerability-thesis? Does it bring to light anything that is new or important for the metaphysical questions and, for that matter, for metaphysics?

The first reactions, we fear, are likely to be as follows:

(3*a*) Our construal of the unanswerability-thesis being in substance admittedly Kantian, what, it may be asked, can resist the Kantian anti-

metaphysics supposedly based on it? Which means, after a pointless preoccupation with the thesis, we are once again willy-nilly back comprehensively to Kant itself.

(3*b*) It may also be alleged that the thesis, as before, continues to yield the positivistic view that metaphysical questions are nonsensical. In a bid to keep it off our way, we have, of course, highlighted an epistemological facet of the thesis. But, in actuality, it will be said, that can constitute hardly a barrier for the logical positivists.

Consideration of these two sceptical points will give us a fuller view of the thesis of unanswerability and, that way, will also bring us closer to our objective, namely, the purification of the thesis.

4

To begin with (3*b*). A metaphysical question *has* no doubt a right answer which follows from its questionhood itself; and to say that it is logically unanswerable is to mean that it is in principle impossible for one to know what the right answer is.

In this formulation, the epistemic dimension of metaphysical questions is restated explicitly. What, however, is crucial for us to do is now to show how this can be of help towards warding off the alleged meaninglessness of unanswerable questions as such or of their metaphysical sub-class. For, as indicated, the position that unanswerable questions are meaningless has been upheld actually in spite of it and, what is more serious, on the very ground of it. We have in mind particularly the example of Morris Schlick who, asking "...what about those questions for which it is logically impossible to find an answer?"[12] proceeds to answer: "It would not be a genuine question at all, but a mere row of words with a question mark at the end";[13] or, as elsewhere, "a question which is unanswerable in principle can be no question at all; it is nothing but a nonsensical series of words."[14]

4.1. The position begins to appear pretty confusing on a first glance itself.

Why must it be such that some questions, just because they are logically unanswerable, are to be classed as meaningless also? The explanation is far from plain. Are we to suppose that 'logically unanswerable' and 'meaningless' are just two synonymous expressions in language, so that whatever admits of characterization in terms of one admits *ipso facto* of characterization in terms of the other? This is totally inadmissible. Consider, for example, 'Is philosophical wisdom rectangular?', 'Does philosophy smoke cigarettes?' and the like, which, unreservedly, are specimens of meaningless questions. But does anybody call them 'logically unanswerable'? Not at least in the sense in which a standard example of logically unanswerable question, metaphysical or otherwise, is called so. That is to say, about them no one would say: 'They have right answers, though the right answers are in principle unknowable to us.'

Another notable point. Compare the two unmitigated examples of meaningless questions with the logically unanswerable questions, say, of metaphysics. There is one difference between the two which is perhaps not without significance. Once it is understood that they are meaningless, the meaningless questions tend to exit from our erotatic discourse. Unluckily, the unanswerable questions are not that obliging. Recurrent claims of the exposure of their supposed absurdity (and similar other vices) notwithstanding, they do, in actuality, linger, as if endlessly, as the subjects of our most purposeful thinking. What, possibly, may explain this? In the Kantian style, one might, of course, speak of a 'dispositional necessity'. But that is far from enough. It can meet the explanatory demand only half way and at a psychological plane. Why not think, then, that it is certain basic and inherent peculiarities of the logically unanswerable questions which really distinguish them from the typically meaningless questions? There is perhaps nothing which would appear to go palpably against such a hypothesis.

4.2. The questions which are *logically unanswerable* are not *prima facie* such as are *patently meaningless*. There is significant disanalogy between the two. And happily enough, a fuller examination of Schlick's doctrine, as far as we can see, goes only to confirm this point.

Well, it follows from questionhood itself that every question, answerable or unanswerable, *has an answer*. This is an analytic truth: its denial would be self-contradictory. But what is there in a question or in its answer, we would ask, which might be supposed to necessitate that the answer is to be knowable? The notion of 'having a *knowable* answer' is not internal to that of question; neither is the notion of 'being knowable' internal to that of answer. The whole idea that a genuine question is a misnomer without a knowable answer has its origin perhaps in the same philosophical undercurrent by which Schlick and his colleagues are alleged by their critics to have irresistibly drifted to solipsistic conclusions in many cases.

So one thing seems fairly certain. The position that 'a question which is unanswerable in principle can have no meaning' is not such as can justify itself. It is not self-justified. What, possibly, may then be said to justify it? The answer, fortunately, is not hard to find. The position is supposed to follow from a characteristic theory about what it is that constitutes the *meaning of a question*. The theory is this. The meaning of a question consists in the "ways in which the answer to the question is to be found".[15]

Now the question is: Wherein lies the required link between the theory of meaning and the position, I mean the link by virtue of which the former might function as the logical ground of the latter? That is by no means clear. On the other hand, if one goes out in search of any hidden link, presuming that there is some, he only happens to stumble against a number of propositions such as are absolutely unequal to the job. In an article "Are There Logically Unanswerable Questions?"[16] a few years back, this argument was worked out by me at considerable length. I shall not repeat that performance.

Instead, I shall turn to the theory of meaning itself and scan it. I suppose that will subject Schlick's doctrine of unanswerability to a far deeper exposure. Not only that, it will also directly lay bare the four types of misconceptions which have been alleged by us to be mainly responsible for the traditional misconstruals of the thesis of unanswerability.

4.3. Anyway, let us investigate what, possibly, may be the logical base of the theory; what truly is the ground for saying that the *meaning of a question is the way of knowing its answers.*

The view, we are told, has been modelled after its notorious counterpart as regards the meaning of the indicative sentences, that is, the view which holds that the meaning of an indicative sentence is the 'method of its verification'.

But this is perhaps of little relevance for us; it does not contain any answer to our query. The theory of indicative meaning has numerous limitations which are well known. But we are not thinking of that at all. What we intend to point out is this. Granted that the theory is absolutely justified, the fact of its employment as a model towards the construction of a corresponding theory about the meaning of a question can be said to provide us at best with an historical account of how the latter has been conceived or discovered, and not an account of what contributes validity to it. Employment of a model is essentially a heuristic device, not a method of validation.

As far as we can see, the only cited ground for upholding the position that the meaning of a question consists in the ways of finding its answer is a claim to the effect that every attempted explanation of what is to be meant by a question amounts to nothing more than an account of the ways in which its answer is to be found. In the language of Schlick:

> A conscientious examination shows that all the various ways of explaining what is actually meant by a question are, ultimately, nothing but various descriptions of ways in which the answer to the question must be found. Every explanation or indication of the meaning of a question consists, in some way or other, of prescriptions for finding its answer.[17]

This presupposes a lot. For our purpose, it would be enough however to consider only two presuppositions which are:

(4*a*) The one and the only one function of a question in our discourse is to yield the answer which, *qua* question, it has.
(4*b*) Whatever utterance is a question must yield the answer which, *qua* question, it has; else, it is not a question at all.

By an alternative and more convenient formulation, styled after the familiar distinction[18] between what are called the *illocutionary* and *perlocutionary* roles of a speech act, the two may be made to stand thus:

(4*c*) The one and the only one *illocutionary* act which a speaker performs when he asks a question is to indicate his desire that the question should yield the answer which it necessarily has; likewise, the one and the only one *perlocutionary* act wnich is performed by the speaker when he asks a question is to make the respondent give out the answer.
(4*d*) Whatever utterance is a question must involve at least the specified *illocutionary* act; else, it is not a question at all.

Anyway, in whichever language you formulate them, the two presuppositions, we think, tend only to stand for two most dangerous mistakes. The mistakes relate to the part played by questions in our language.

Nobody denies that a question is to yield its answer, that is to say, that it is wedded to its specified illocutionary and perlocutionary functionings. But illocution and perlocution in this standard sense represent only standard functions of standard questions: they are, by no means, the exclusive functions or inseparable functions of all questions whatever. It is of utmost importance to remember this. For past philosophers, having missed this point, we feel, have served only to create and perpetuate a lasting source of illusory tragedy for their subject in general and metaphysics in particular.

(4*e*) There, indeed, are questions which apart from their standard jobs, perform of good deal of non-standard jobs.
(4*f*) In the same way, there, indeed, are questions which are not supposed to do their standard jobs at all but are, on the contrary, intended to perform a variety of significant non-standard jobs.

An exploration of the conventions that govern our use of questions will provide endless examples for the illustration of these two points.

For (4*e*), consider the following samples:

(*a*) What's the time, please?
(*b*) How do you know that I smoke marijuana?
(*c*) Mr. Councillor, were you ever convicted of tampering records?
(*d*) What is the square root of 64?

Each of the questions is normally supposed to elicit an answer from the respondent. However, interestingly, in appropriate cases, they may well perform a variety of such additional jobs as have nothing to do with their answers. For instance: (*a*) may be uttered, say, to admonish someone who does not come at the appointed hour, or to express the utterer's annoyance at that, or to remind a guest that it is time for dinner, or to suggest that we should go out for a walk, and the like; (*b*) to challenge a certain statement made by

the respondent, or to suggest to the respondent that he does not know the fact, or that he is prone to credulity, and so on; (*c*) to humiliate the respondent before others, to expose his character, and so on; and (*d*), say, to test a student's knowledge of arithmetic.

The examples of questions which would illustrate (4*f*) are as follows:

(*e*) Are you reading? (seeing very well that I am doing it).
(*f*) Will you pass the ashtray?
(*g*) Can't you realize my difficulties?
(*h*) Am I not a human being?

In asking such questions one does not normally wait for answers. By the conventions that govern their asking they do not, as a matter of fact, call for any answers at all. The purport of saying this however is not that they do not arouse responses from the hearers. The responses may well be there. But that matters little. For, while all answers are responses to questions, all responses are not to count as their answers. And the conventional responses in the case of the questions we are considering certainly will not.

The multifarious jobs which these questions are supposed to perform are different from that of collecting answers. As for instance: the utterance of (*e*) would usually do the function of, say, '*namaste*', 'good morning', and the like; (*f*) is a device for making a request and (*g*) an appeal for your empathic understanding; and (*h*) is only a means for emphasizing a point which is obvious.

But are (*e*)-(*h*), one may quip, questions at all? Some, actually are inclined to deny that they are, despite their interrogative form. But this, in a sense, is not justified.

Suppose that someone has his eyes especially on the syntactical side of these questions. In that case, they may well be credited with the ability to collect answers for themselves. For each, possibly, is answerable by saying 'yes' or by saying 'no'. Isn't it so? The syntactical role of a question is not exactly a matter to be ignored. To overlook or undervalue it would be as much unjust as to overlook or undervalue its semantical role. As a matter of fact, an approach to any mode of speech whatever, if it is to produce fruitful results, must take a comprehensive and balanced interest in both its semantical and syntactical features.

4.4. The analysis above does one thing for us. It explodes the basis of the notorious claim that the meaning of a question is the ways of knowing its answer. So that one now is left with little to fall back on for saying that the range of meaningful questions is confined to those that are logically answerable or, conversely, that whatever questions are logically unanswerable are meaningless just on that account.

To see in the logical unanswerability of a question a mark of its meaninglessness is a gross mistake. It misrepresents the logical character of the questions which are unanswerable and, that way, the nature of metaphysics which deals with such questions. Let us, therefore, attempt at a counter-construal of the notion of unanswerability.

Unanswerability and its opposite, answerability, we suggest, are two basic logical properties of a question. Each alike presupposes that the question it characterizes is meaningful. That is to say, a question which is meaningless is just meaningless, neither answerable nor unanswerable. To say of a logically unanswerable question that it is meaningless is self-stultifying.

The construal happens to draw on the model of a statement, which is not hard to see. As we know, a statement is characterized by truth or falsity which constitutes its basic logical values. Which means that to say of a statement that it is true or that it is false is to commit, in either case, that it is meaningful. Contrarily, to deny that it is meaningful implies that it is not truth-valuable. The model, we suppose, is obtainable also from other modes of speech, especially, from commands and performatives, that is, from the consideration of the relation holding between their meaningfulness or meaninglessness and what may count as their primary logical characteristics.

The reference to model is not intended to provide a justification for our construal. That is not its job. Yet, incidentally, it tends to do, if we may say so, something very much like that. For one thing, may it not be said, in a way, to mark for questions a kind of kinship with other modes of speech without, at the same time, proving prejudicial to their semantic identity? That is no doubt a point in its favour.

And there perhaps are some more favourable points also. First, if accepted, our construal will provide a far simpler and a more systematized scheme of concepts for understanding the logical character of questions *vis-à-vis* those of the other modes of speech. Second, in a significant sense, it is particularly close to the spirit of scientific enquiry, closer at least than any such doctrine as would be prone to expel from the precincts of meaningfulness the class of questions which, even though they have never been answered, have stayed on in our intellectual history and have concerned us considerably. Happily enough, this idea is not without a support to fall back upon. The support comes from an incidental observation made by Stephan Gale in his article "A Prolegomenon to an Interrogative Theory of Scientific Enquiry". Gale writes: "Scientific inquiry arises from a primitive kind of curiosity and, without any legislation of an ontological or metaphysical sort, all questions and their interrogative forms must be accepted as legitimate."[19]

5

To summarize the results of our analyses so far. The supposed equation of logical unanswerability with meaninglessness is a gross mistake. The truth, on the other hand, is just the opposite. A question which is logically unans-

werable is *ipso facto* meaningful as much as an answerable question. So nobody, we suppose, will have any reason now to deduce from the thesis of unanswerability the further thesis that metaphysics is nonsense on the basis of the fact that the questions it deals with are logically unanswerable. Thus, to a great extent, the unanswerability-thesis is retrieved.

5.1. Anyway, our strategy in encountering (3*a*), that is to say, the suspected reversion on our part to the Kantian antimetaphysics has to be considerably different. Here, what would be demanded of us is to make a case for a position to the effect that there is no genuine connection between the unanswerability-thesis, on the one hand, and the alleged illusoriness or impossibility of metaphysics.

As we have already mentioned, Kant is not averse to metaphysics straightway on account of the answers to its questions being logically unknowable. The unanswerability of a question in this sense does not, for him, prejudice its meaningfulness; the two are perfectly compatible concepts. The precise source of what, according to Kant, goes to vitiate the claim of metaphysics as a scientific study lies elsewhere. It is the metaphysicians' actual responses to their questions, i.e. the corpus of non-questions produced by them.

These metaphysical non-questions need not be a logically homogenous class of entities. In fact, they are not. However, the range of entities they are intended by us to cover here are just those which, as a matter of fact, they almost always stand for, that is to say, the statements which are made by the metaphysicians, as if answeringly, in response to their questions. The statements apart, there may, of course, be entities of different kinds. But we can well afford to ignore them; that will not prejudice our present enquiry. For these entities are not exactly the paradigms of metaphysical non-questions, not at least to the degree the statements are. At any rate, it is because of its statemental non-questions that metaphysics appears to be an illustion or impossibility to Kant. How so? The explanation is not difficult to find. While proceeding towards a construal of such non-questions, Kant, as it usually happens, ties himself to the models of standard non-questions, that is those by which a respondent will normally follow up a standard question. The inevitable result: he is swayed irresistibly by the common tendency towards identifying them with intended answers or with allegedly known answers to the metaphysical questions. Yet, paradoxically, these questions, by their very nature, are precisely such as are incapable of yielding any knowable answers.

5.2. However, the whole thing, namely, that the metaphysical non-questions are answers to the metaphysical questions appears in my eyes only to represent, if I may call it so, a common and most unfortunate semantical illusion. There is little justification for it. It all stems just from an incomplete and incorrect understanding of the functioning of the metaphysical non-questions and of their exact relation to the metaphysical questions. A metaphysical non-qusetion is a non-answer as well. To read any answer in it is simply to misread it.

But how could so obvious a truth remain completely unseen by Kant? How could metaphysical non-questions come to simulate in Kant the standard answers to standard questions so perfectly that he had no hesitation against modelling them after the latter?

One initial explanation may be that the metaphysical non-questions figure in actual metaphysical discourse as responses to the questions of metaphysics. But this is most unlikely to be correct. For even though it is true that answers are invariably responses to questions, the converse, that is, that responses to questions are invariably to be counted as their answers is plainly false. There are, indeed, more ways of responding to a question than by giving an answer to it. And this fact is too obvious to be able to have escaped Kant's notice.

5.3. In being responses to questions, the non-questions of metaphysics resemble standard answers. That, no doubt, is true. However, that alone, as we have pointed out, can never be the sufficient ground for the former's assimilation to the latter. And neither has it been so for Kant. The matter, we suppose, has to be explained differently.

If we are not grossly incorrect, one thing which may possibly be said to have led Kant to foist answerhood on the metaphysical non-questions is their apparent similarity to answers at a logical level. The similarity is definable in terms of the property of a *known* or *knowable truth-value* which is supposed to be possessed alike by non-questions and answers.

An actual answer must have a truth-value known or knowable. That follows from the notion of answerhood itself. But why must it be taken to hold good of metaphysical non-questions also? That is by no means obvious. Anyway, one possible answer may be this. Well, how else is the notorious disagreement which marks metaphysical statements to be intelligible to us? Take, for example, p and $-p$. Howsoever diverse may their logical contents be, they exhibit no genuine conflict until you assign the same truth-value to them. Value-neutrality neutralizes incompatibility.

Nobody, we suppose, will deny this. But what remains to be asked: How possibly can, one, from the presumed reality of a conflict among metaphysical non-questions, proceed further to attribute a knowable truth-value to them? This appears quite intriguing. The entire procedure is in fact an example of begging the question. For, to say that the non-questions conflict with one another is to commit already that they have knowable truth-values.

The disagreement in metaphysics, even if it is taken to be a fact, does not lend any credibility to an hypothesis to the effect that its non-questions must possess, at par with answers, a knowable truth-value.

But can there be any alternative ground for upholding that metaphysical non-questions have truth-values? It seems worthwhile to examine the possibility. And for that we shall scan the non-questions themselves.

5.4. One thing is certain. Metaphysical non-questions are not overtly truth-valuable in the sense that the sentences which embody them, e.g. 'God

exists', 'Human beings survive after death', and so on, do not embody explicit truth-claims, that is, they are not sentences of the form '*S* is true', 'It is true that *S*', and the like. True, metaphysicians do often produce such sentences as, for example, 'It is true that God exists', 'It is not true that we survive after death', 'The belief that the world has a goal is true', and so on. However, strictly speaking, such sentences do not exemplify any metaphysical non-questions at all; they should rather be classed as what may be called non-questions about metaphysical non-questions, which are non-metaphysical. In producing them, metaphysicians make only an excursion beyond their professional jurisdiction, that is, produce a sentential order which is alien and secondary to what is truly their own.

The point is suggested to us by Russell and Tarski, and for an attempted rationale of it I would refer to my *Metaphysical and Model Philosophical Questions*.[20]

Anyway, it may be asked: Must knowable truth-value be confined to those statements which are expressed in explicit truth-sentences? Is there anything mandatory to this effect? Take, for example, the sentence 'Yes, she has stopped beating her husband', or 'No, she hasn't'. Depending on the fact of the case, either may count as the answer to the question 'Has she stopped beating her husband?' Well, neither is a truth-statement; yet *qua* answer, it has an undeniable claim to knowable truth-value. Truly so. A claim to truth is built in whatever statement has a claim to answerhood. And this, in turn, makes it justified to expand the statement by adding to it such operators as, e.g. 'I know that...', 'Let it be known to you that...', 'It is true that...', and the like. But this does not hold good for metaphysical non-questions. The basic impediment is the crucial fact that they are, after all, responses to a species of non-standard questions, i.e. questions which, unlike their ordinary counterparts, will not admit of such analyses as are usually available to us, e.g. 'Bring about that I know the answer to *Q*', 'I request that you answer *Q*', 'I ask you *Q*', and so on.

5.5. Thus metaphysical non-questions are freed of their misconceived truth-values, and this, we suppose, tends to go a long way to fortify them against the artificial dangers of imposed answerhood.

The position is not without many far-reaching implications, of which it is specially worthwhile to mention one. It renders baseless all worries of philosophers about the so-called problem of metaphysical disagreements and whatever other worries may go with them. It is important to remember this, lest we misjudge metaphysics and, thereon, institute an ingenious metaphilosophy,[21] specially designed to provide an account of metaphysical disagreements.

Illusions of truth-values are however only one thing that explains why Kant has been misled to misconstrue the non-questions of metaphysics as answers. The misconstrual has in fact a far deeper origin. It is, once again, the misconception already spelt out above in (4*a*)-(4*d*), i.e. the traditional

idea about the illocutionary and perlocutionary forces of questions in general. As you will remember, the idea is that the singular illocutionary point of asking a question is to indicate the questioner's desire that it should be answered, while the singular perlocutionary point of it is to induce the respondent to give the answer.

6

The fallacy of their misconceived answerhood having been exposed, the non-questions of metaphysics, we are now in a position to claim, stand rediscovered. The metaphysical non-questions are all non-answers. And this provides enough ground for us to say that the link between the thesis of unanswerability and the supposed illusoriness of metaphysics is itself illusory. The thesis is, thus, completely retrieved. It contains no commitment against metaphysics. Yet that in actuality it has crept into philosophy to assume an anti-metaphysical role is solely on account of our past mistakes.

But how is this result going to help us towards a possible reconstruction of the idea of metaphysics?

In dealing with its questions, metaphysics is not supposed to provide their answers and it does not do so. To think that it does or is supposed to do is just to think in the wrong way. What, then, is the function of metaphysics? The clue to our answer is to be found in what, in positive terms, the metaphysical non-questions are.

What may a metaphysical non-question be said to really stand for? Borrowing the expression from Hintikka,[22] we would suggest that it is only a member of the 'desiderata' of the particular question to which it happens to be an intended response. In our case, the notion of desiderata has little which might appear unfamiliar. Roughly speaking, it designates a particular part of the range of the question's presuppositions. Now, the function of metaphysics, we may say, is to make an attempt to discover, to enumerate and to explicate the items in the desiderata of its questions.

The idea of being a member of the desiderata of a question is not absolutely distinctive of a metaphysical non-question *vis-à-vis* an answer. Take, for example, the sentence 'He is at home'. Alongside 'He is not at home', it has a place in the range of the desiderata of the question 'Is he at home?' However, membership of the metaphysical and that the ordinary desiderata do not at all amount to being the same thing. There are basic differences between the two.

A desideratum of an ordinary question is a potential answer having a *knowable* truth-value, so that when the truth-value is known it counts as an actual answer. Contrarily, a metaphysical desideratum is a potential answer having a *logically unknowable* truth-value, so that it is debarred *a priori* from ever assuming any actual answerhood for itself.

And from this follow further differences. To mention just a few.

(*a*) A non-metaphysical desideratum is amenable to verification at least in principle. But to talk of verifiability or unverifiability in the case of a desideratum which is metaphysical would make no sense. Here the only thing to look for is explication or analysis.

(*b*) The desiderata of a non-metaphysical question comprise potentially incompatible members; but the words 'compatible', 'incompatible', etc. cannot figure at all in the characterization of the items in the desiderata of a metaphysical question.

(*c*) An item in the desiderata of a common question goes with an epistemic operator, e.g. 'I know', 'I believe', etc. so that the question is not fully analysable in terms of the desiderata alone. But in the case of a metaphysical question, the range of the desiderata is absolutely co-extensive with the analysis of the question.

7

The final point. How does metaphysics, conceived as an attempted discovery, enumeration and explication of their questions in terms of their desiderata, become worth it?

Our brief answer. It demarcates the logical boundary of scientific knowledge. That is one thing. Besides, it provides science with the absolute presupposition which constitutes its starting point. To illustrate this point. Take for example, the metaphysical question 'Is the world real?' and its desiderata which may be tabulated thus:

(*a*) The world is real.
(*b*) The world is unreal.
(*c*) The world is real as also unreal.

None of the three has any knowable truth-value. Yet assuming hypothetically that (*a*) is true, science happens to have based itself on it. But isn't it possible, in theory at least, for a possible science to be, in the same way, based on (*b*) or (*c*)?

Notes and References

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2. See Wisdom, "The Metamorphosis of Metaphysics" in *Studies in Philosophy*, (ed. Findlay) OUP (Paperback), p. 216.
3. See *From a Logical Point of View*, Harper Torchbook, New York, 1953; also *Word and Object* (1960), Cambridge.
4. *Individuals* (1959), University Paperbacks, Methuen, London.
5. *On Universals An Essay in Ontology*, (1970), University of Chicago Press.
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7. cf. the author's *Metaphilosophical and Model Philosophical Questions* (1972), CASP, Visva-Bharati.
8. The examples are Moritz Schlick's. Vide his "Unanswerable Questions" in *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy*, ed. P. Edwards and A. Pap (1965), The Free Press, New York, p. 792.
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Mercy

INDRANI GANGULY
Jadavpur University, Calcutta

The place given to mercy in prevalent legal systems reveals the limitation of punishment in terms of strict law. The purpose of this paper is to show how this is so, and how mercy (and incidentally punishment) should be conceived that it may cease being so.

The problem which arises with regard to mercy is whether this concept can be accommodated in that of punishment or whether it is counter to it, necessarily lying outside the punishment concept altogether. In other words, the problem is one of the status of mercy in any discussion about punishment. It thus becomes necessary to show how the prevalent theories of punishment fail to incorporate the notion of mercy.

But this paper seeks to point out that mercy must be accommodated in punishment, otherwise punsihment will become dehumanized. The mercy, incorporated in legal theories, is not real mercy. For mercy to be possible at all in law, one must step beyond law to the realm of, say, the President's mercy in Indian or other constitutions. Even this, it may, however, be pointed out, is not entirely real mercy. Real mercy arises from within the individual, from the philosophy of man which proclaims that every man is capable of being restored to the knowledge of his own being in relation to others from which he has slipped. Mercy carries with it the belief that if punishment is withheld in the conventional sense the offender will accept that he has wronged, will inflict self-punishment and be restored. Thus, it is only a theory of punishment which has as its aim retrieval or restoration that can accommodate mercy.

In order to explicate all this, one should first try to understand the meaning of the term and fully comprehend 'mercy' the ways in which it is used in ordinary language. Indeed, the term 'mercy' is not an unfamiliar one. It figures in expressions like 'take mercy upon him', 'show him mercy', 'show mercy to the weak', etc. For example, a priest, coming upon a group of householders beating up a thief caught stealing, may tell them: 'Take mercy upon that poor man.' One also frequently refers to a cruel, hard-hearted person as being 'merciless'.

The *Oxford Dictionary* says that 'mercy' means 'clemency', 'forbearance', or 'compassion towards one who is in one's power and *who has no claim to it*'. The first thing that strikes one is that 'mercy' refers to some attitude of mind which stems from the individual. That is to say, it arises somewhat from and is related to character, inasmuch as being merciful or merciless throws light on a person's total mental make-up and nature. Another impor-

tant point reveals itself on closer scrutiny. And that is, for mercy to be shown, the one showing it must somehow be in a more powerful position than the one to whom it is being shown. This excess of power may be understood as greater physical, spiritual or social power, i.e. the person showing mercy must be more powerful than the one to whom it is being shown, either by virtue of superior physical prowess (as when a more valiant warrior shows mercy to his opponent whom he has felled) or greater spiritual attainment (i.e. when a *sadhu* shows mercy to a bandit) or by virtue of higher social standing (for instance, an employer shows mercy to his employee who has lapsed in his duty). These are not different varieties of mercy, because through all the cases one factor remains constant and that is compassion for the one to whom mercy is being shown. Another point which draws our attention is that the question of mercy arises only when a person has wronged someone else in some way, so that the power of the one showing mercy emanates from the fact that he has not wronged whereas the one to whom he shows mercy has, i.e. the one receiving mercy must be an offender, guilty of committing an offence. As A. Smart says: 'Mercy takes into account the seriousness of the wrong committed and in this is akin to pardoning. It is however to be distinguished from condoning which treats an offence in such a way as if it weren't an offence at all.'[1] This is because the one who shows mercy does not fail to acknowledge the seriousness of the wrong done by the one to whom mercy is shown.

A pertinent question which may be raised at this juncture is as to how this *wrong* is to be understood. An action is wrong when it is a violation of law or of some extra-legal principle or both. Consideration shows that whatever be the nature of the wrong committed, mercy to be worth its name must be based ultimately on the individual's discretion and that the question of mercy arises only when there is a wrong punishable by some agency. As an ideal instance of mercy, one may refer to the Bishop, in Victor Hugo's *Les Miserables*, who tells the gendarmes who had caught Jean Valjean for having stolen some silver from the Bishop's house that it was he [Bishop] himself who had presented it to Jean. Here the Bishiop shows compassion to a thief who has no claim to it but, on the other hand, deserves to be punished. In his own particular sphere, this exercise of mercy shows the Bishop's freedom from every kind of restraint. What is to be noted is that this freedom is not arbitrary or random but one in which a philosophy of man—that man can be *restored* by showing mercy—lies deeply embedded. This is the sense that this paper proposes to impart to the concept of mercy. Some would insist that mercy is a technical concept, and what the Bishop does is that he really forgives the man who wrongs him; yet the difference between mercy and forgiveness does not lie in technicality. Forgiveness is a state of mind where the victim waives the punishment due to the person who offended him. But mercy contains a belief that, though institutional punishment is not inflicted,

the recipient of mercy will inflict punishment on himself through remorse and thereby be restored.

Now here the following questions may arise:

(1) What are the conditions for appropriate exercise of mercy?
(2) How is one to decide how much mercy is appropriate?
(3) When can there be identifiable morally obligatory situations in law where mercy is relevant?

In an attempt at answering these questions mercy has been sought to be codified, so that the concept of mercy becomes meaningful in the legal sphere as well, where the unpleasantness of the suffering that punishment involves is sought to be lessened without injustice.

In replies to the first question one may refer, as an instance, to Sections 299-311 of the Indian Penal Code, dealing with offences affecting life which have several exceptions where the punishment can be lessened, thereby showing leniency in a sense. Thus premeditated murders (for that matter all premeditated crimes), which take a longer time to plan and execute, are more serious than heat-of-the moment murders/crimes though both may be equally serious in effect. Take two following instances:

(1) *A* plans slowly in advance and in cold blood murders his wife for her money.
(2) *B* murders his wife in the heat-of-the-monent and as a result comes to inherit his wife's money.

Both are instances of murder but in the latter case the law recommends a lesser punishment. According to Section 106 of the Indian Penal Code, less severe punishment is meted out to one who has caused harm in self-defence and not just because he wanted to cause harm.

Also it is appropriate to treat with leniency cases where a murderer acts under great provocation. Suppose, as Smart says:

> A's wife is unfaithful to him and flaunts her adultery and so is murdered by A, an immigrant in whose land murder for adultery is a minor offence. B's wife too is unfaithful to him but does not flaunt her adultery but is still murdered by B, a resident of the country where adultery leads to desertion or divorce, murder being too severe an offence.[2]

Here *A* deserves leniency more than *B*.

Again, suppose *Y* provokes *A* and *A* fires at *Y* but kills *Z* instead; then *A* deserves leniency much more than *B*, who is provoked by *Y* and so fires at *Y*, killing him.[3]

In the above case then, more severe punishments are meted out for crimes which are intrinsically worse, mercy is recommended for lesser crimes because circumstances of the crimes makes one take a somewhat lenient view of the crime, although the effect of both the crimes are the same. But there are also cases where important excuses may be made for the offender, even though his offence may be as intrinsically evil as the other cases. Thus, in manslaughter various extenuating circumstances may arise constituting grounds for leniency. For example, *A* kills *Y* by running over him in his car. *B* also kills *Z* by running over him, but at that time *B* was somehow not in himself and his car was not roadworthy. B deserves leniency, not *A*.

Another extenuating circumstance, which makes a crime less grave and warrants lenient treatment, is coercion, i.e. when the offender has in some way been forced to commit the offence. Thus, suppose *A* murders *Y* to avoid a threat of harm made by *Y* to *A*'s wife and *B* murders *Y* to take revenge on him, then *A* should be shown leniency.

There may be other cases of murder where lenient treatment is warranted. For example, as Smart says: '*A* unable to control his car, ran over his own child and as a result estrange his wife and so suffers mentally (and morally) for his offence.'[4] Here in this case, arises 'a gap between moral and legal justice', the possibility of which the law recognizes when it makes provisions for recommendations of leniency.

Thus, lenient treatment is appropriate not only when an offence is intrinsically less offending than another and where a person acts under greater provocation, but also where there are extenuating circumstances like impaired judgment, coercion and ignorance and also when the offender has already suffered for his crime.

Now, Smart says that there are two ways of looking at mercy and that in the majority of cases mercy is understood in the above sense just discussed, i.e. 'as making the punishment fit the crime'; in other words, 'making the penalty just.'[5] That is to say, this lenient treatment is what Smart regards as the popular notion of mercy.

However, it is not true to say, as Smart seems to be trying to, that the popular notion of mercy can be explained completely in terms of making the punishment fit the crime through law. In fact, such an account seems to be beginning an analysis from the second step, which is as abortive as trying to build an edifice from the second storey, leaving out the first. For, it cannot be denied that the origin of this notion of mercy lies in the belief that the offender will be restored by mercy. This is the first step in the genesis of mercy.

But the moment mercy is sought to be absorbed in law at the second step, it assumes the form of making punishment fit the crime, through gradation of crime and punishment. It may be objected here that gradation of crime refers to crimes of different degrees of severity, as, for example, stealing being less offensive than culpable homicide. But, within the category of murder

der itself, the extenuating circumstances like provocation, etc. do not constitute gradation of crime; they merely provide difference of evidence; the crime, viz. murder, remains the same. As against this, it may be pointed out that difference of evidence through extenuating circumstances also brings about a shading in the colour of the crime, for example, murder, which too may be regarded as a kind of gradation within one and the same category of offence.

But the point is that what all these gradations, whether in the first sense or in the second, try to do is that they attempt to capture not just the bare act but the man behind the act. However, these attempts are all relevant within certain limits set by the law, so that when mercy enters into codified law to make punishment fit the crime through leniency, it no longer retains its original character but becomes a legal concept, engulfed in a strict legal code. Thus, for instance, when it has been proved in court that an offender who has committed a particular offence, say, murder, had certain extenuating circumstances, the judge cannot but give the verdict as laid down by law, even if this means not punishing the offender. It is because of this that it has often been criticized that 'the law is an ass', following the law to the letter without taking into account the human factor of the offender's relation to other members in society, which could otherwise have given a different and distinctive colour to the whole situation.

It may still be argued that provisions are there within the framework of law to open its eyes to the human situation and the crime committed. Thus, when imprisonment or fine or both, for instance, is the punishment for a particular offence, the judge has the right to decide the severity of the imprisonment or the amount of fine or even whether both or only one of the two is to be imposed. Yet it can be said that these too are cases of leniency of verdict, not to be confused with mercy. For, the lessening of suffering which the judge is capable of carrying out is possible only within the limits of the legal punishment. The judge has not the freedom to overstep the bounds of law in order to show mercy. However, when one shows real mercy to an offender, it is not because the offence is considered less grave. So, no question of fitting the punishment with crime can possibly arise in cases of real mercy.

To make the point clear, one may imagine that Jean Valjean was put up for trial in a court of law; that the prosecution established the case against him; and that Jean Valjean was found guilty of stealing. The judge, under the circumstance, would have had no alternative but to inflict the punishment laid down by law, with perhaps a minor attempt at leniency of the kind discussed before. The Bishop's mercy, however, was not bound by any rules but at the same time was not *ad hoc*, since it arose from an underlying philosophy of man.

What this shows is that statute law thus thwarts its own purpose. For, in spite of an attempt at incorporating mercy in law, it is not possible for law to make provisions for each and every particular case of crime, nor does

law claim to do so, since that would make it lose its essential universalistic or general nature which is both its strength and weakness. What one finds then is that law is never able to free itself from the bounds set to itself. As such, mercy is an ideal which the law always pursues but is never able to capture. For, as discussed before, what it captures and absorbs in its system is no longer mercy but at best leniency. This then is the paradox of mercy and legal punishment.

What then is the status of mercy in the retributive and utilitarian theories of punishment?

It has been seen that the retributivist defines punishment in terms of guilt which, in turn, is understood in legal terms as violation of law. As such, whenever a person is found guilty, because he has broken the law, punishment must necessarily follow. So it is that utilitarians hold that the tie between guilt and punishment being this rigid, the retributivist cannot interpolate mercy in between. There can thus be no room for mercy in retributivism.

The retributivist, however, adroitly points out that mercy, in the sense of mercy as incorporated in law, can well be accommodated in his thesis. But since, as has just been discussed, mercy in law is nothing but gradation of crime and punishment but not mercy proper, the retributivist actually confuses real mercy with what passes in law in the name of mercy to ward off the charge of cruelty, commonly urged against retributive justice. At this juncture, one remembers Rawls' view of punishment, set up as an institution by a legislated legal code, as 'a rule of practice', admitting of no exceptions. Mercy is clearly a case of exception in the sense that freedom is exercised by one who is in a position to punish. But the judge, who is in a position to punish, essentially lacks this kind of freedom as he is bound by non-contingent rules of the codified law, and hence cannot exercise mercy. Thus, Smart's contention[6] that 'the notion of mercy gets its grip only on the retributive thesis' falls through.

Is there then no room for mercy proper in the punishment concept? Rawls, it has been seen, holds that the legislator provides for the institution of punishment defined by rules. Mercy may be presented in the mind of the ideal legislator but cannot present itself in the rules, because by the time it enters law it undergoes a metamorphosis, as already argued. Now this mercy, present in the ideal legislator's mind, may be understood in utilitarian terms. And so the utilitarian may hold that there is no difficulty in accommodating mercy in his theory.

Now there may be three alternatives as to the position of mercy in the utilitarian thesis. To utilitarians the *summum bonum* is greatest amount of social utility or good. Mercy then may be regarded as producing greater social good than punishment or less social good than punishment or again the same amount of social good as punishment.

On the first alternative, if mercy be regarded as producing greater good than punishment, then the justification of punishment, as producing greater

good, is pulled away from under its feet. What one is left with is mercy understood in terms of and engulfed in the concept of social welfare, so that it becomes an utility commodity to satisfy the purpose of utilitarianism. This mercy then is at best only *technical* mercy, where the individual is lost and so not mercy proper. As such, although, as seen earlier, mercy proper does not seem to find a place in the retributive scheme, this is no cause for elation on the part of the utilitarian, since he too fails to incorporate mercy proper in his theory of punishment.

According to the second alternative, mercy may be regarded as producing less good than punishment. However, it is known that the utilitarian ideal is greatest social good. If then punishment alone satisfies this criterion and not mercy, the latter obviously has no place in the utilitarian thesis.

Finally, it may be urged that the balance of punishment and social good is not affected by mercy, since both punishment and mercy produce most good. In that case, however, there arises a choice between punishment and mercy, so that the two become parallel concepts, and the pivotal question of this paper as to how mercy can be accommodated in a theory of punishment itself cannot be tackled by the utilitarian scheme.

From this it follows that the concept of mercy cannot be inserted in the utilitarian theory of punishment, and even where it can be inserted it is not mercy proper but technical mercy. So the problem of mercy is present both in the retributive and utilitarian thesis, though the problem in the latter case is rather different from that of the former.

Does this mean that there are no instances of punishment where mercy can be shown, i.e. is mercy then a concept which by its very nature lies outside the boundary of punishment? Yet there are cases where the two concepts, mercy and punishment, are attributed to one and the same source without contradiction, as, for instance, when it is said 'God punishes us' and 'God grants us mercy'. If that be so, it is possible for the two concepts, punishment and mercy, to co-exist in the same agent witnout being incompatible. Also here both concepts retain their proper meanings. Granted the scope of God's freedom is much wider than that of human beings, yet, even in their limited freedom, is this co-existence really not possible?

Smart admits in her paper that the popular notion of mercy as making punishment fit the crime is not genuine mercy. Genuine mercy, she holds, consists in 'the judge's letting off part of the appropriate punishment by considering the claims made on the offender by others', for example, the offender's family, the people the offender works with, etc. That is to say, 'genuine mercy involves the imposition of less than the deserved punishment on an offender or less than the just penalty.'[7]

However, three points may be urged against the above view. To begin with the last point first. Real mercy is not shown by considering the claims made on the offender by others but by considering the need of the offender *himself*. That is to say, the individual who commits an offence has the need

to be reformed, or, as this paper proposes, retrieved and restored, and this restoration is the aim of true mercy. Next, real mercy consists in letting off the whole of the appropriate punishment, i.e. punishment understood in the prevalent sense of coercion. This is because the punishment which mercy calls forth is not physical, inflicted externally, but which the offender inflicts on himself. Finally, meting out of mercy is not really in the hands of the judge. For, as has been seen in the prevalent system, legal boundaries are rather rigid, and, within the legal realm, whatever mercy the judge shows will necessarily be legal leniency, not mercy in the true sense of the term.

It is true that, in the legal sphere, there are cases where the highest punishment is that the offender deserves and has received at the hands of the judge; yet it is possible for the Head of State to take mercy on the offender, if the Head of the State is appealed to. But this only shows that, for mercy to be possible at all in law, an autonomous island is created for the President's mercy, an island which is kept beyond the contours of strict legality by law itself. This is virtually an admission of the limitation of the theories of institutional or legal punishment. Now, for instance, according to Section 303 of the Indian Penal Code (before it was struck down by the Supreme Court as invalid), if an offender being under sentence of like imprisonment commits murder, then he shall be punished with death. Even here, if the criminal appeals to the President (even though he has been sentenced to death by the judge), it is possible for the President to grant him mercy. Here one finds that the offender deserves the punishment given by the court of law. Yet it is possible for the President to take mercy on him, which is not codified nor understood as gradation in law.

No doubt questions of state policy, social utility, etc. may enter into the President's considerations for mercy, yet the core meaning of restoration may not have been lost in view of the 'discretion' in Presidential grant of mercy. However, in the Bishop's mercy the aim of restoration figures in a clear and pure form, so that if the Bishop and the President both be asked, 'Why do you show mercy?', the latter will try to explain mercy in terms of discretion—that he applied his mind and so decided—whereas the former will unhesitatingly reply that mercy was shown to restore the offender because the conventional form of legal or institutional punishment could not do so.

Now it may well be objected that the Bishop's mercy can hardly be regarded as an ideal instance of mercy, since even the Bishop could not grant mercy openly but had to have, recourse to lies, i.e. he had to tell the gendarmes that Jean Valjean had not stolen the silver, on the contrary he (the Bishop) had presented it to Jean. But consideration shows that the Bishop's lying had nothing to do with his granting mercy. Flaws in the existing social system made him have recourse to falsehood to safeguard the moral value of retrieving a 'poor' man. In fact, this only reveals all the more the defects of the prevalent institutional punishment which is unable to draw mercy within its scope, so that the punishing agent and the mercy giver remain distinct

and are not one and the same either in the President's mercy or that of the Bishop.

What is thus being urged is that the agency for meting out punishment and for granting mercy can coincide and co-exist in a wise judge who evolves as an embodiment of the highest wisdom and culture attained in a society. And this is possible only when such a judge operates by taking his stand on a philosophy of man whereby the being of every individual is necessarily related to the being of others (both in crime and punishment), so that the justice he dispenses is able to capture the individual offender-in-society with the view of restoration. That is to say, the entire configuration or *gestalt* of a crime should be taken into account in the sense that responsibility for committing an offence is confined not only to the individual offender but is shared also by others in society related to him, since they too are responsible for creating conditions susceptible to crime. It is only in this way that the limitation of law (which consists in its placing mercy outside its own realm) can be overcome, and mercy be brought within the punishment concept by creative adjudication. Hence the concept of law is broadened so that the aforesaid philosophy of man, which is the morality internal to society, also becomes internal to law, and punishment acquires its much-needed extension beyond severe legal bounds as a value concept in a cultural setting.

Notes

1. Alwynne Smart, 'Mercy' in *Philosophy*, October 1968, vol. xliii, no. 166, p. 350.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 346.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 347.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 348.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 358.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 356.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 355 and 358.

Martin Buber's notion of dialogue

GAUTAM BISWAS
University of North Bengal, Rammohunpur, Darjeeling

I

The fundamental paradox of ontology that man is a being in whom the world participates as experience and who participates in the world as existence is the point of departure for philosophical anthropology. Any concept of man, based on either of these two directions, is evidently inadequate at the point of explication of the paradox. The usual attempts to inquire into this problem in terms of a subject-object dichotomy do neither properly explicate nor resolve it in a satisfactory manner. They tend to split the original unity of human existence into epistemological oppositions between subject and object, or to erase the distinction by relegating one of these two to some absolute, be it of the idealists or of the materialists, and thereby leave the problem unfathomed. Hence there is a need to take an alternative stand beyond the paradox, which will lead us to the original being of man in-and-through a different experiential order. Within this order and in terms of the pattern of thinking suggested by this experiential level, study of man in his wholeness may be carried out concretely. Martin Buber's philosophy of man presents us with such an alternative framework. In what follows we try to give an exposition of it and show that his notion of dialogue as a key to understanding man demands an extension of its own at the metalevel with a view to forming a comprehensive discourse on man. The possibility of a philosophical anthropology as a self-conscious project from Buberian viewpoint is thereby ensured.

II

According to Buber, the first condition of philosophical anthropology is to be met by pointing a way of conceiving and discussing man in his concreteness. Conception of man in his concreteness does not permit any abstraction and dissection, and is not realizable within the subject-object polarity of epistemology. The reason is that the concreteness of man is *lived* and known through living, but it cannot be known in the same way as an object is known by a subject. Hence a transcendence of such polarity and also treatment of man under the existential category of 'personhood' rather than under the categories of substance and attribute are inalienably connected with any attempt to understand the totality of man. To guard philosophical anthropology against any false unity of man in terms of notions like 'human species',

'soul'—a unity which is ultimately an abstraction—Buber shows us the relation between 'concreteness' and 'wholeness' of man. He says:

> A legitimate philosophical anthropology must know that there is not merely a human species but also peoples, not merely a human soul but also types and characters, not merely a human life but also stages in life; only from the systematic comprehensions of these and of all other differences, from the recognition of the dynamic that exerts power within every particular reality and between them, and from the constantly new proof of the one in the many, can it come to see the wholeness of man.[1]

In this conception of philosophical anthropology, both the abstract unity and the meaningless relativity are avoided, and the unity is looked for in terms of a fundamental pattern of humanity that pervades the flux of individuals and cultures. It is noteworthy that anthropology for Buber is philosophical in this sense, as it searches for the pattern of patterns and unifies the two in the being-becoming character of humanity. Along with this conflation of being and becoming, the concreteness and wholeness of man also combine. While concreteness is located in multiple segments and different departments of humanity, in the uniqueness of different individual patterns, that is to say, in finitude, every instance of finitude indicates further possibilities. In Buber's phrase, it is the dynamic that exerts power within every particular reality. It signifies man's wholeness which is ever expressing but not yet fully expressed and is the infinite in finitude.

By pointing to the wholeness of man, Buber goes beyond the too-narrow definition of man in terms of reason alone. In his own words:

> ...the depth of the anthropological question is first touched when we also recognize as specifically human that which is not reason. Man is not a centaur, he is man through and through... Human reason is to be understood only in connexion with human non-reason.[2]

This perfectly tallies with what Jaspers describes as the contemporary situation of philosophizing:

> The rational is not thinkable without its other, the non-rational, and it never appears in reality without it... It is appropriate for philosophizing to strive to absorb the non-rational and counter-rational, to form it through reason, to change it into a form of reason....[3]

To consider man in his wholeness is to consider him as more than a part of nature and not merely as a natural object. In telling us about the principle of human life, Buber writes:

> The one way to expose the principle of a being is first to contrast its reality with that of other known beings. But the reality of the spirit is not given to us apart from man: all the spiritual life which is given to us has its reality in him. Nature alone presents itself to us for this act of contrasting—nature which certainly includes man but which, as soon as we penetrate to his essentiality, is compelled to loosen its grasp and even to relinquish for our separate consideration this child which from its standpoint is an aberration.[4]

By the act of contrasting man with nature we come to grasp the principle of human life which consists of two basic movements, viz. 'the primal setting at a distance' and 'entering into relation'. The former makes room for the latter. The act of setting at a distance can be performed by human beings alone, because only man has a 'world'. By 'world' Buber means 'that which is extended substantially beyond the realm of the observer who is in the world and as such is independent'.[5] An animal does not have a world but only an environment or realm. He lives *up to* it in terms of his need but doet not see it as a separate whole with which he can set up a relation. Man has not only an impulse but also a distinct awareness of an unaccomplished task before him, that of discovering the world. He undertakes the task through personal participation in it, and tends to complete what is perceived by what *can* be perceived. According to Buber, while distance provides the human situation, relation provides man's becoming in that situation. For Buber this act of entering into relation with the world as a whole is a 'synthesizing apperception'. He states:

> ...by synthesizing apperception I mean the apperception of a being as a whole and as a unity.... The conception of wholeness and unity is in its origin identical with the conception of the world to which man is turned.[6]

Now this entering into relation assumes two primal forms. As per one of these forms—and this has been discussed by many thinkers—man becomes a 'tool maker', and is thereby distinguished from animals. Man does not simply make the tools, he assigns a separate existence and value to them as being at his disposal. To quote Buber:

> Only man, as man, gives distance to things which he comes upon in his realm; he sets them in their independence as things which from now on continue to exist ready for a function and which he can make wait for him so that on each occasion he may master them again, and bring them into action.... A monkey can swing the branch of a tree as a weapon; but man alone is capable of providing the branch with a separate existence, in that it is thenceforth established as a 'weapon' and awaits man's pleasure to be used again.[7]

This form of entering into relation with the world constitutes the world as consisting of specific *Its*. Each 'specific It' continues to exist with its known capacity for being used by man. Whatever changes are afterwards brought in one specific It—for example, the branch of a tree as a weapon is now shaped into a proper cudgel—'there is no further essential change'. As Buber points out: '...technique only fulfils what has been given by the primary choice and assignment, by a primary nomos.'[8] Besides this form of relationship, man enters into the world in a different way too. Unlike animals, he does not remain satisfied simply by using thing. He desires also to enter into personal relationship with things and to imprint on them his relation to them. Herein lies the origin of art. With this art form being assigned to a thing, the thingness of thing is lost; 'it ceases to be accessory to a tool and becomes an independent structure'. As Buber states:

> The form indicated by even the clumsiest ornament is now fulfilled in an autonomous region as the sediment of man's relation to things. Art is neither the impression of natural objectivity nor the expression spiritual subjectivity, but it is the work and witness of the realtion between the *substantia humana* and the *substantia rerum*.[9]

Here man enters into a dialogical relation with his image work, the created form is taken up into the meeting of I and Thou and not left out as a detached object of observation, use and analysis. In Buber's words: '...all art is from its origin essentially of the nature of dialogue.'[10] In *I and Thou* Buber refers to an artistic experience as a form of or extension of a more basic mode of human existence which consists in between 'I' and 'Thou'. According to Buber, man is always in either of the two primary attitudes and relations, viz. 'I-Thou' and 'I-It'. The first basic movement which is 'the primal setting at distance' shows how man is possible at all, but to have answer to the question 'what is man?' or 'who is man?', the becoming of man has to be taken into account. And for Buber, it is impossible to do so unless man is set into a relational sphere of becoming. He has to take a stand in relation to the world. Without a conception of man in such a relational sphere of becoming, philosophical anthropology itself would be impossible. Buber initiates his philosophy of man into *I and Thou* with the following paragraph:

> To man the world is twofold, in accordance with his twofold attitude. The attitude of man is twofold, in accordance with the twofold nature of the primary words which he speaks. The primary words are not isolated words but combined words. The one primary word is the combination *I-Thou*. The other primary word is the combination *I-It*; wherein, without a change in the primary word, 'one of the words' *He* and *She* can replace It. Hence the *I* of man is also twofold. For the *I* of the primary word *I-Thou* is a different I from that of the Primary word *I-It*.[11]

The image of man alternates between these two. The primary word *I-Thou* is spoken with the whole being of man. When we address a human being, we mean to address the whole of his being; we do not address his or her body or mind or any other part of the other's existence, but the person as a whole. By this act of addressing I posit myself as a 'Thou' the whole being of myself as a person is directed to the other and awaits the other's response. Here Buber resembles the Gestalt or configuration school of psychology which emphasizes the wholeness of the perceived reality. They claim, for example, that it is not that we see one tree first, then two, then more than two and only then conclude that there is a forest; we have rather the impression of the forest as a whole in the very beginning of our perceptual flux and only afterwards analyse it into seeing of many trees. Buber says:

> Just as the melody is not made up of notes nor the verse of words nor the statue of lines, but they must be tugged and dragged till their unity has been scattered into these many pieces, so with the man to whom I say *Thou*. I can take out from his the colour of his hair, or of his speech or of his goodness. I must continually do this. But each time I do it he ceases to be *Thou*.[12]

This is the sphere of the 'between'. To enter into this form of relationship, transcendence of subject-object polarization is a necessary requistite. The relational form in which this polarization dominates is the one which Buber styles as *I-It*. In such a relationship, the consciousness is the consciousness *of* something; it is not directed to the world, but it turns to the world to *possess* it. Here the self which is the subject becomes a tyrant; it treats all objects of experience, including other human beings, and all possible knowledge-content as things. They can be put into an order and systematized, but they have to leave the depth of the existence of the person untouchy, the person who is the knowing subject. *I-It* relation is chiefly utilitarian. Things are always at the subject's disposal to be used by him. The world of *Its* is regulated by the law of casuality: 'Causality has an unlimited reign in the world of *It*.'[13] It is in space and time. Knowledge of It is always an objective knowledge conditioned by such objective categories. The *I* of *I-It* is a limited *I* because only one dimension of man's being is revealed here; in its creative passage of becoming, the being of man, in this context, is not integrated into the experience of the object known. From the standpoint of physical time, the object of experience or knowledge is usually denied to have any experience of its own. The physical time, that is to say, the concept of time which is used to describe events, is an abstraction that takes the standpoint entirely outside the experience of objects. The object of experience has a sheer bodily existence occupying a fragment of space. But a conception of the larger space or the infinite space remains as a mere inference, as another abstraction from the world. The law of casuality signifies a physical structural relationship

between events and things; it is superimposed by the knowing mind in isolation to be able to explain the 'worldly', 'physical' phenomena. The possibility of an immediate, direct experience of the harmonious relationship between man and the world and man and his becoming is simply denied by a schizophrenic approach. The split between subject and object thus originates in the world of *It*; and herein lies the source of traditional form of epistemology too. Maurice Friedman, in his article 'Buber's Theory of Knowledge', writes:

> In its traditional form epistemology has always rested on the exclusive reality of the subject-object relationship. If one asks how the subject knows the object, one has in brief form the essence of theory of knowledge from Plato to Bergson; the difference between the many schools of philosophy can all be understood as variations on this theme. There are, first of all, differences in emphasis as to whether the subject or the object is more real—as in rationalism and empiricism, idealism and materialism, personalism and logical positivism. There are differences, secondly, as to the nature of the subject, which is variously regarded as pure consciousness, will to life, will to power, the scientific observer, or the intuitive knower. There are difference, thirdly, as to the nature of the object—whether it is material reality, thought in the mind of God or man, pantheist spiritual substance, absolute and eternal mystical Being, or simply something which we cannot know in itself but upon which we project our ordered thought-categories of space, time, and causation. There are differences, finally, as to the relation between subject and object: whether the object is known through dialectical or analytical reasoning, scientific method, phenomenological insight into essence, or some form of direct intuition.[14]

In I-It relationship, we are not in the 'presence' of the object.[15] As distinguished from this relational form which is more a division than relation, *I-Thou* form of relationality is characterized by a transcendence of subject-object polarization, mutuality, directness, intensity and ineffibility. It is beyond the law of causality. It is non-spatial and non-temporal. Referring to the world of relation [I-Though], Buber says: 'Here I and Thou freely confront one another in mutual effect that is neither connected with nor coloured by any causality.'[16] He assetts the non-temporality and non-spatiality of *I-Thou* form of relationship in the following manner: 'The world of *It* is set in the context of space and time. The world of *Thou* is not set in the context of either of these.'[17] It is non-spatial in the sense that none of the two poles—the knower and the known, i.e. I and Thou—is localized in any particular point of space. None of them is real in separation. What is real is the inbetween sphere. This is an ontologically prior relation of presence. Here there is actuality only in the sense of co-actuality. The realm of the between is thus trans-spatial.

It is non-temporal or trans-temporal in the sense that any experience, which intimately involves or harmoniously integrates into itself the event *that is facing* the experiencing man, will have the largest slice of duration, that is to say, it will have a 'present', a 'now' which encompasses all time and in that sense goes beyond time. It is like the time in prayer but not the prayer in time.

III

According to Buber, the thou-orientation is fundamental to human being, and, therefore, man is essentially dialogic. So far as man's entering into relation with the world is concerned, Buber holds that *I-Thou* precedes *I-It*. On this point, he gives examples of the life of primitive folk and children. The I-Thou unity at that level significes a pre-reflective primitive and child-like unity between subject and object, a primary togetherness that antedates their separation. As the process of objectification starts, man steps down from this natural unity. This is what Buber calls 'natural separation'. But this loss of 'natural combination' (the pre-reflective I-Thou) paves the way for a maturation of the I-Thou relation in such a way that the alienated self starts realizing its inner craving for mutuality, learns to see the other *at a distance* and approaches the other *consciously*. His act of addressing itself becomes matured, leading toward a conscious fulfilment of each other's existence as a *Thou* in an unalienated whole. I *accept* the other as another and *confirm* him to be so by setting myself in relation to him. It is like the difference between the primitive man's unity with the object or the world as a *Thou*, and the artist's realization of his own creation—the art form.

Dialogue, therefore, does not simply mean an exchange of words. It signifies the depth structure of human existence, the essential element of man's being-becoming essence. Buber calls it 'the in-born thou'. Basically it is ineffable, the inarticulate core of man's being-becoming.

The wholeness of man is cloistered in this core. It leads through its own extension to a matured realization of itself via its own fall.

Now the problem-situation of philosophical anthropology lies in a search for the whole man. A complete knowledge of man in terms of the unification of divergent aspects of him, envisioned through an integration of his states of becoming both in *I-Thou* and *I-It*, has to be sought, this is possible only by using dialogue itself as a method. In objective knowledge of man, he is known as an *It*. But man is, as Buber points out, capable of entering into both the *I-Thou* and *I-It* relationships. In observing man as a third person (as *he*) in his knower-aspects, I reduce him to an *It*, because a 'third-person-approach' is always indirect and inherently incapable of taking into account the 'second person-aspect' of man, which makes him truely a 'person' capable of having a direct access to other second persons. For example, a description of someone's knowledge by acquaintance of a third thing be-

comes another type of knowledge by description, and the essential immediacy characteristic of knowledge by acquaintance would be completely lost or at best preserved as a description of a fact. But in a dialogical method, on the other hand, I know the other as a *Thou*, and hence grasp *directly* his capacity for both *I-It* and *I-Thou* forms of relationships and knowledge. So dialogue between man and man has to be unfolded from beneath the level of speech, its inarticulate core, and taken up consciously to the level of translatability. An anthropological discourse will then be possible. This transition from the ineffability to the translatability of dialogue presents us with the notion of 'metadialogue' which retains the basic characteristics of dialogue and yet makes dialogue transparent; it is dialogue self-consciously and zestfully exteriorizing itself in a reflective pattern. It thereby resolves the problems of uncertainties, ambiguities, and the lack of criteria of validity of dialogic understanding.

IV

For a proper mode of understanding man's being, we must avoid, on the one hand, the negation of consciousness that comes through self-reflection and, on the other hand, the negation of being through objectification. Only thus may the centrality of man's being be retained. Now this can be done only through a dialogue in which exists an awareness of the relationship of the mutual reflectiveness of each consciousness in the other, which is dynamic, infinite and living. The dynamic calls for a dynamic and not a static awareness; a *being-seen* nature can be grasped in its entirety only through a *being-seen* approach. Thus a dialogical nature of man necessitates the dialogical approach for the study of man. Hence the essence of philosophical anthropology consists in a metadialogical description of the dialogic nature of man.

Dialogue means a sphere of relation—a communion—which is the condition of a true human communication. Now the question is to know how it can be translated into discourse without being denatured. If metadialogue is conceived as a reflection on dialogue which makes dialogue itself an *object* of reflection, it surely contradicts the Buberian perspective. To make the dialogic nature of man more apparent, Buber introduced the term 'between'. But the difficulty is not thereby dispelled. As Buber says in his reply to the criticisms of Gabriel Marcel and Philip Wheelwright:

> I proceed from a simple real situation: two men are engrossed in a genuine dialogue. I want to appraise the facts of this situation. It turns out that the customary categories do not suffice for it. I mark: first the 'physical' phenomena of the two speaking and gesturing men, second the 'psychic' phenomena of it, what goes on 'in them'. But the meaningful dialogue itself that proceeds between the two men and into which the acoustic and optical events fit, the dialogue that arises out of the souls and is reflected in them, this remains unregistered. What is its nature, what is its place? My appraisal of the facts of the case cannot be managed without the category that I call 'The between' . . . I cannot define it in an 'artithmetical or geometric' language. It seems mysterious, as he [Marcel] says, so it seems to me.[18]

Hence the problem is to make the dialogue transparent and the matter of anthropological discourse. The mystery remains as long as it is not done so. For Buber it has remained mysterious 'only because one has not uptill now been concerned about it'. But Buber himself had a great concern about it. Yet he stops at the ineffability of it. The task of the anthropologist is not to make the ineffable effable, but to make the 'call' for it prominent in his discourse and, therefore, to construct a pattern of thinking which would *live* up to this basic reality of man.

This is the most fundamental pattern of human exchange. It is a mutual transmission of consciousness of two persons and their gaining of self-consciousness in the passage *between I* and *Thou*. The exchanges which keep up with this basic pattern can be said to have retained humanity. They are to be understood in a derivative sense. It is this kind of exchange that forms the soil of communion upon which the anthropologist has to stand. There is no other way of experiencing it. It is interesting to note that Wittgenstein makes an allusion to one's coming 'into a strange country with entirely strange traditions', and even with 'a mastery of the country's language' one may not *understand* the people. This happens, Wittgenstein adds in parenthesis, 'not because of not knowing what they are saying to themselves', but because 'we cannot find our feet with them'.[19]

Metadialogue does not signify any meta-level of inquiry. It is not *used* to describe or to talk *about* dialogue as a first order experience. In other words, it does not bring about the distinction between first-order knowledge as experience and second-order knowledge as conceptual clarity of the former; or the distinction between object-language consisting of words having extra-linguistic reference and metalanguage which comprises names having infra-linguistic reference. It is a pattern of reflection suggested by dialogue itself rather than objectification of dialogue. On the one hand, dialogue as such cannot be comprehended in a non-existential objective manner. On the other hand, a genuine reflective mood which is a result of man's becoming requires a comprehension of it, and seeks to integrate it into one's self-consciousness. For this an extension of dialogue is necessary. In other words, the term 'metadialogue' is used to signify the process of 'dialogue becoming self-conscious'. The extension of dialogue into metadialogue solves the problem concerning the validity of anthropological knowledge through dialogue. The dialogical mode has unique characteristic of providing valid criteria through self-reflection of its own dynamic.

V

The basic presupposition of philosophical anthropology is that it is possible to have a comprehensive knowledge of man. As such knowledge must include any experiential aspect of man, and, as the subject-object paradigm suffers from limitations of scope, philosophical anthropology must go beyond it in search of a wider and suitable method. While the nautral phenomena, natural laws and human limitations in view of such laws are respectively known, discovered and realized within a subject-object framework, this framework does not cover the whole arena of human knowledge and experiences. We say, for example, 'I know your sentiment', 'This poem is beautiful'. We do not become aware of the beauty of a poem or know one's sentiment exactly in the way we know that the poem consists of certain words or it is written by some particular person. Whereas in a subject-object perspective knowledge is always the knowledge of some fact, in these cases knowledge involves a direct participation in the immediacy of experience. A poem is, for example, a talk, an act of the poet in which the world and other humans are addressed; it is a living speech charged with the intensity of dialogue. To experience the beauty of it means to participate in that dialogue. The anthropological knowledge is complete and comprehensive when it includes both ways of knowing within its purview and thereby grounds itself on a full-fledged ontology of man. Man cannot be known in terms of our partial visions of him. Though the partial visions may be integrated or synthesized at a purely reflective level, such reflections amount to sheer abstractions that divorce philosophical anthropology from its existential basis, viz., *I* in its 'encounter' with man. The two sources of human knowledge are his encounters with other humans and nature. The domain of human expressions is non-solipsistic, and as philosophical anthropology aims at knowing man as an expressing being the existence of a non-solipsistic world is an essential requisite for it. Man encounters man's being-becoming essence in this domain. The proof of the existence of such a world is not merely out there in an objective social order or a common meaning-structure but in man's capacity to address the other existing being as 'you'. The child's capacity to address his mother or the artist's capacity to wonder at the beauty of the nature as a living being is not socially given. It is in the human instinct. In the words of Buber:

> ...what is central to man is not the relation of the human person to himself, not, therefore, that in his attained to self-consciousness. What is central, rather, is the relation of man to all existing beings. What appears here as the *Humanum*, as the great superiority of man before all other living beings known to us is his capacity 'of his own accord', hence, not like the animals out of the compulsion of his needs and wants but out of the overflow of his existence, to come into direct contact with everything that he bodily or spiritually meets—to address it with lips and heart or even with heart alone. In distinction from the animal, man can grasp all that encounters him on his life way as a being existing in itself beyond his own interest. He can enter into relationship with this independently existing other. By knowing and acknowledging the other at times as a whole, he can at times himself relate to it as a whole.[20]

The wholeness of man is mutilated when we reduce man, who is essentially a dialogic being, to an 'object' of our knowledge or to a knower of objects alone; and the conception of man that is arrived at is not only too narrow and partial but also false because it loses sight of the core of human existence. Philosophical anthropology breaks through the surface of objectivity, and reaches the personal man who encounters other humans and nature. It is the personal man alone who knows objects as his discoveries in the process of his continuous self-actualization, and in the context of whose passionate involvement in the total knowledge process objects become meaningful. The same knowledge process flows out of its boundary and man encounters non-natural beings equally endowed with the power to generate meaning, i.e. other human persons, works of art, etc. To know the whole man is to know him as a knower in both senses. The task of a philosophical anthropologist is to bring out the complementarity between these two ways of knowing into a comprehensive discourse. On the one hand, philosophical anthropology has to avoid any objectification of man because a description of man as an expressing being (the 'personal man') under the presumption of the subject-object model of epistemology (i.e. a description of the personal man in impersonal objective terms) is self-contradictory. On the other hand, the philosophical anthropologist has to retain an element of self-consciousness as an enquirer because he is not a mere 'drifter' in the stream of humanity. He takes part in the main stream, and yet he is conscious of his task. He holds the dialogue but he is never lost in it making thereby a description of it impossible. To guard philosophical anthropology against these two possibilities we have devised the concept of 'metadialogue' with a special methodological import. In philosophical anthropology, the dialogic communication itself becomes self-reflective; the entire intentional sphere of *I-Thou* is consciously intended by the anthropologist when he posits himself as a *Thou* over against the whole range of humanity. The dialogue lets man know its essence in man himself. Thus no transcendental ego is required to explain human intentionality. The reflection in philosophical anthropology takes place at the concrete experiential level alone. In an *I-Thou* perspective, intentionality is mutual and both the participants *present'* themselves to each other in an unreduced immediacy. This mode of intentionality is adopted by the anthropologist as his mode of understanding. He talks to man in the metaphor of talking about him, and talks about man in the metaphor of talking to him. Dialogue and description are thus combined in metadialogue. It is a mode of understanding in-and-through dialogue.

As a concrete mode of understanding metadialogue reveals that the centrality of man's being-becoming lies in freedom. If 'meaning' in the objective sense of the term as presupposing the definiteness of the objective fact is applied to man, it amounts to a failure to transcend the finitude of man and grasp his essential characteristic of creative becoming. By endeavouring to achieve precisely this transcendence, philosophical anthropology gives a direction towards the meaning of humanity in terms of the wholeness and continuity of man. In dialogue man unfolds himself to man, and knowledge of man is generated in an in-between field. Metadialogue as a method is envisaged in view of the problem of philosophical anthropology as that of presenting the whole dynamics of human existence with a lien on the unbound possibilities of man. The dynamics is carried on by a constant actualization of the boundless possibilities. It, therefore, points to the 'surplus in man' which is never exhausted in any of its particular expressions. Metadialogue as a method provides an orientation to philosophical anthropology as a practice of human freedom, and holds promise to know the unknown modes of man's being.

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8. *KM*, p. 65.
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13. *I and Thou*, p. 51.
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15. In James Brown's words: 'The object may be "present", but we are not in the "presence" of the object.' See James Brown's *Subject and Object in Modern Theology*, 1955, p. 115.
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Value-education in a secular democracy*

BRIAN V. HILL
Murdoch University, Western Australia

There is a mounting concern amongst Indian leaders and educators about what many perceive to be a moral vacuum in the curriculum of secular education. It is a problem confronting all the world's secular democracies. The issue is complicated by controversies over the relation of religion to morality, and the degree of value-neutrality it is reasonable to expect of secular education. I propose in this paper to address these issues by asking two questions: (*i*) how should the secular school respond to religious pluralism? and (*ii*) how should it approach moral education? Whether the two questions are interrelated is itself a matter of debate, and an answer will appear in my analysis.

By way of clarification, I will first comment on the concepts of (*i*) value-neutrality in the curriculum; and (*ii*) the secular society. Part 3 will examine six logically possible relations between religion and morality. Subsequent parts will then identify three normative strategies for value-education which are featuring in current curriculum discussions, noting the degree to which the way they respond to our first question strengthens or weakens the philosophical plausibility of their answers to the second.

I

Value-Neutrality

The entry of governments into the field of compulsory schooling coincided with the development of secular societies committed to accommodating value pluralism. Schools of earlier eras had largely been sponsored by groups representing distinctive value-stances. It was felt, however, that the *state* schools, in order to be fair to all students and to avoid identification with one partisan view of reality, must strive to be value-neutral. But this rubric could be, and has been, interpreted in a number of different ways.

Many believed, for example, that the easiest way to achieve value-neutrality was *exclusion* from the curriculum of those topics and subject areas most

*These reflections arise from a sabbatical visit to India by the author in the Australian summer of 1983-84 to compare Indian and Australian thinking on this topic. In the course of visiting institutions in many major cities and towns, he would especially acknowledge benefit from discussions with Mr. Kireet Joshi, Special Secretary, Union Ministry of Education; Professor S.P. Banerjee, Joint Secretary to the National Teachers' Commission; Dr. T.N. Dhar, Joint Director of the National Council for Educational Research and Training; and Professor C. Seshadri at Mysore Regional College of Education.—AUTHOR

likely to let loose the dogs of sectarian strife. Several states in my own country bear grim witness to the effects of such a policy, but my task at this point is not to debate empirical claims but to clarify ideas.

Conceptually, exclusion is the negative face of curriculum selection. Significance is to be attached both to what is included and to what is excluded. Both kinds of decision are value-loaded. Inclusion carries the implicit message that society attaches importance to the area in question. Exclusion might signify merely that the area had been overlooked, or that it was felt to be not politic to include it. Logically, however, exclusion implies that the area was not thought to be important enough to represent in some politically viable way.

The logic of curriculum begins even further back than this. Compulsory schooling as such is a strategy of social intervention. It is predicated on the belief that the value of this kind of intervention outweighs the infringement it represents of the liberty to which, *prima facie*, children are entitled. Curriculum selection is then a second intrusion, which has to be justified. Theorists appeal to grounds of various kinds to show the value of the curriculum to the individual. Value-education has thus already begun. If, then, areas of value-controversy are excluded, the logical inference (and likely learning outcome) is that these areas, which happen to be the very ones most relevant to elucidating value systems, are to be viewed as less important than the allegedly more 'factual' studies which qualify for inclusion. A policy of value-neutrality cannot be coherently implemented by a simple rule that controversial matter of this kind be excluded.

A more sophisticated attempt to keep the curriculum value-neutral involves *descriptive presentation*. This policy invites students to explore various value positions, but without comparison or evaluation. In approved phenomenological style, questions about the status of their respective truth claims are 'bracketed'; it is enough to recognize them as social realities. This policy has been admirably exemplified by Smart's (1968) 'phenomenological approach to the teaching of religion', and less convincingly by the 'values clarification' strategy of Raths, Harmin and Simon (1978), but again our task at this stage is to see if the policy is compatible with the notion of value-neutrality.

Problems crowd in. Descriptive presentation without evaluation implies the equal status of all the belief systems presented. If this belief itself is not examined, then the curriculum has to that extent aligned itself with the contestable ethical position of ethical relativism. Furthermore, the issue of curriculum selection has still to be faced. Which viewpoints shall we include? Should we provide a representative sample of the local culture only, or the national, or the international? And to what extent should we make students aware of the principles of selection on which we operated? To the extent that such questions as these go unexamined in the classroom, the value-ladenness of the curriculum will have an indoctrinative, rather than an educative, effect.

A third version of value-neutrality accepts the inclusion of relevant subject-matter and concedes that selection will be value-laden, but reckons that we can save the day by *impartial analysis*. Students will be encouraged to inspect the stances chosen and analyse their systematic features, including their responses to intellectual objections lodged against them.

The subtlety of this version resides in the fact that its claim to neutrality rests not on content but on method. It is maintained that use of critical rationality as method is inherently anti-indoctrinative. This is because indoctrination is by definition the *prevention* of genuinely rational investigation of evidence claims (see Snook, 1972). Critical rationality, it is claimed, neutralizes the biassing effect of having to select curriculum content.

The argument is persuasive, but it slides over the fact that the commitment to critical rationality itself is value-laden and requires to be justified. Some value-systems are more hospitable to it than others, and in some countries critical dialogue, especially regarding the official ideology, is forbidden. The policy is not, however, disabled by this criticism. I will later argue that it is compatible with, and, indeed, necessary to the idea of a secular democracy. If *this* political value is embraced, then value-neutrality in the third sense can be maintained within a larger value-framework of democratic theory. But what is secular democracy?

II

The Secular

The word 'secular' suffers from an ambiguity in its history as the antonym of 'sacred'. On the one hand, it can refer simply to matters beyond the jurisdiction of religious authorities, as when we speak of 'secular affairs'. On the other, it can represent ideas and attitudes positively antagonistic to religion and the supernatural. In the West, this second sense is usually made clearer by use of the terms 'secularist' and 'secularism', though an inconsistency arises in the phrase 'secular humanism', where an anti-religious value-stance is also implied.

Usage in India is somewhat different. Political speakers advocate 'secularism' as a policy in which religious traditions are respected and tolerated, consistent with the maintenance of an open democratic society. Many citizens, however, give the term a meaning akin to our second sense, causing disputes over words instead of policies. This then rebounds on the meaning of the phrase—intended to be descriptive—'secular society'. I shall continue to use 'secularism' as the label for an anti-religious humanism.

As a descriptive term, the 'secular society' points to a social fact, not a faith. Whereas in the past most societies were unified in thought and action by one over-arching world view or value-stance—whichever one it might have been in the particular case—a process has been occurring whereby progressively more and more social structures have emerged from this umbrella or canopy of meaning and legitimation. Each has become a relatively auto-

nomous social institution with its own functional logic. This has created a kind of middle ground where people from various faiths and cultures can transact their business and engage in dialogue, protected by the freedoms associated with democratic government.

When sociologists refer to this process as 'secularization', they are expressing no opinion as to whether it is a good or bad thing. It is simply something that is happening. The contraction of the religious canopies of former times to voluntary communities of believers is likewise a fact to be faced. In retrospect, it can be seen to have been caused by such large-scale forces as industrialization, migration and cultural mixing. Admittedly, some societies, notably in the Islamic and Communist spheres of influence, are seeking to prevent value-pluralization by enforced value-homogeneity; but the sociologist as such can pass no judgment on them. Descriptively, they are not yet secular societies.

The relatively neutral middle ground, which has emerged in modern secular societies, is validated not by the ontological affirmations of any particular religious or secularist value-stance but by the political liberties associated with the democratic form of government. Democratic justifications are concerned, that is, not with life-goals and ultimate destiny but with individual freedoms and representative government. What the West calls the 'liberal-democratic' state and India the 'secular democratic' state passes no judgment on the individual's beliefs and life-style, except in so far as they pose any threat to principles of justice, equality, fraternity, and liberty of thought and speech.[1]

The middle ground of democratic societies is inhabited by such institutions as government, public administration, law, industry, and business. Many of the agencies of recreation, social welfare and education also operate in the secular domain, though, in addition, communities of faith continue to sponsor services of these kinds as well. To the extent that the latter are seen to be serving the purposes of the secular state, they are usually considered worthy of some financial subsidy, though not that full support which would imply the state's identity of interest with their value-stance. The middle ground is created and maintained by agreements at a *practical* level between citizens whose *theoretical* justifications for supporting such agreements may differ greatly. The middle ground is defined by a continuously negotiated consensus, not a blueprint or final solution.

The secular school stands on this middle ground. The value-judgments, which underlie it as a strategy of intervention, include beliefs in the right of all citizens to be given adequate educational opportunity,[2] to be made critically aware of the kind of society and world they live in, and to be initiated into democratic processes of rational negotiation, persuasion and mutual care. This minimum value-charater for the state school says nothing about the desirability of the various life-stances and world-models the students will encounter in their studies, only that they should be prepared to live and work together with people of diverse convictions in the democratic spirit just enunciated. To this extent a coherent meaning can be attached to the idea of the secular school being value-neutral.

This perspective prohibits the state school from advocating a particular religious view of life, but it does not rule out advocacy on behalf of the procedural values of democracy. One of these procedural values, of course, is the one recognized in the Indian Constitution as the liberty to propagate one's faith in the open society. Teachers have the duty of commending this value in the compulsory classroom, while themselves refraining from exercising the liberty itself. That is, they must not propagate their faith while functioning as officers of the secular state, though outside their professional role they too will be free to enjoy this liberty if they wish to do so.

III

Religion and Morality

So far I have been enquiring whether a coherent meaning can be attached to the notion of value-neutrality in a secular school. The specification arrived at leaves open the question whether to include as subject-matter the study of particular religious traditions. At this level of curriculum specificity, the answer depends on what is perceived to be the relation of religion to morality. Since the three normative strategies I will be comparing go in different directions on this issue, a third necessary preliminary is to consider which of the six logical possibilities (*see also* Bartley, 1971) are consistent with the secular, neutral idea I have been developing. The six possible relations between religion and morality are as follows:

A. Independent domains



B. Identical domains

C. Incompatible domains



D. Morality derivative from religion

E. Religion derivative from morality

F. Different domains, but some area of overlap

Exemplars of arguments, representing each of these logical types, are not hard to find in today's pluralistic world. Type *A* receives some endorsement from Animism's concern to keep the spirits tractable, while leaving morality to be defined by tribal custom.[3] Taoism may come closest to regarding the religious and moral domains as identical, as implied in type *B*. Secular humanism endorses type *C* when it claims that morality works best when religion is not falsifying its motives.[4] The dependence of morality on religion for both justification and motivation (type *D*) is well exemplified in orthodox Christianity, whereas Friedrich Nietzsche pioneered the claim that religion was created to reinforce moral sanctions (type *E*). These comments are merely meant to illustrate a point; the larger argument does not hinge on the accuracy of such snap judgments.

I have not yet commented on type *F*. This acknowledges that religion and morality are conceptually separate domains, but also with an area of overlap in which the interaction of religious belief and moral conduct is an open question. Examples of arguments of this type could be given, showing that it is a normative stance in its own right, but what is of greater interest to the present enquiry is that it incorporates all the three logical components—*R*, *RM*, and *M*—which feature in the other five. Procedurally, each of the other types can be interpreted as a more severe alternative which involves the denial of one or two of these components, as the following table demonstrates.

Type	Components
A	R — M
B	— RM —
C.1	— — M
C.2	R — —
D	R RM —
E	— RM M
F	R RM M

This is, of course, merely a taxonomic device which indicates nothing about the superiority of *F* over the others.

Nevertheless, this procedural feature of type *F* must have a particular appeal to curriculum developers, for it can serve as a base line against which to compare all the types of argument and identify the real normative positions studied in the curriculum. In that sense, it is the most neutral. For this reason, it is logical to deduce that the secular curriculum should include the study of religion, ensuring that at some point in this study attention is drawn to the grounds on which various religions claim to have a stake in morality. Similarly, it should also include, separately, the study of morality, ensuring that at some point in *this* study the arguments for and against the necessity of religion to morality be examined. This area of overlap is an obvious candidate for curriculum integration.

The policies we have just arrived at will not strike the reader as new, since, on other grounds, they were advanced in Section I. Those grounds, it will be recalled, were that such a policy was necessary to sustain a coherent claim to value-neutrality. In so far as the two arguments are based on conceptual-logical considerations, they constitute a *prima facie* case. It would be absurd to say, however, that this precludes making alternative curriculum decisions. Policy and action are driven by normative beliefs which may, in this case, provide persuasive reasons for overriding such an apparently logical schema.

It is time, therefore, to turn to three curriculum models for moral education currently being advocated in some countries. I present them as pure types both to simplify the analysis and to avoid doing injustice to the rounded thought of those theorists who are quoted in illustration of certain aspects of the models.

IV

Religious Monopolism

The first model I shall label Religious Monopolism. In this model, morality is considered to be dependent on one's religious or secularist world-view, and must be taught within the framework of religious studies. The strong version of this argument is that there is only one true faith, and, therefore, only one efficacious morality. Irrespective of whether the faith in question is traditional, modernist or secularist, the logic of this stance requires adherents to seek an exclusive curriculum monopoly, either at state level or by operating their own schools.[5]

Clearly there is no room in this approach to accommodate the rights of minorities in the system or the liberty of individuals in the classroom. Whatever proprietors of private schools may advance in justification of a policy of this kind, to set the state school on this course would be to deny its function as an agency of the secular, pluralistic society.

There is a milder version of the type *D* logic which this policy exhibits. It does not insist on the exclusive claim to truth of any one religion, but only on the necessity of morality to be undergirded by *a* religious viewpoint. This version seeks to accommodate the fact of pluralism. The appropriate curriculum policy is one which calls for the provision in each school of two or more religious electives, while a separate strand of moral education proceeds in parallel with them. In both strands, morality's dependence on religion would be affirmed, but students would be left to choose which religious electives they studied.[6]

Such a policy would, in several respects, look like a type *F* policy: separate religious and moral curriculum strands, pluralistic representation of value-systems, and recognition of an overlapping area. But equally, there would be three significantly different features.

Firstly, the criterion of pluralism would only apply to the school, not the pupils. They would only encounter one value-system, presumably the one most congenial to their previous backgrounds. To them, the logic would be type *D*.

Secondly, the policy excludes the option of morality without religion, so even the limited pluralism it represents falls short of mirroring the society. In this respect it would be an even tighter policy than the strong version, which at least allowed for secularists creating schools to represent their point of view.

Thirdly, in so far as the policy called for religious studies as a means of buttressing the force of morality, it would run the risk of not studying religion as such. Smart (1968) has argued convincingly that the phenomenon of religion will not be fully understood unless at least six separate dimensions of the phenomenon are taken into account: the mythical, the doctrinal, the ritual, the experiential, the ethical, and the social. If all the stress were placed on the ethical or moral dimension because the religious electives were only viewed instrumentally, this would *de facto* become a type *E* policy.

This pseudo-pluralistic policy would have one further consequence. It would conceal from students two problems central to the question of religion's part in morality, crisply summarized by O'Connor (1957). One is the logical difficulty of appearing to derive a moral 'ought' from a religious 'is' The second is the empirical difficulty of claiming that people cannot be moral without being religious adherents. Religious philosophers have ways of answering these two objections, but the difficulties are real and affect one's understanding of the behaviour of others in the pluralistic society. This underlines the pseudo-pluralism, as I have called it, of the mild version.

In short, whether in its strong or mild form, religious monopolism is unsuited to be the model for value-education in a secular, pluralistic society. It might appear that I was merely demolishing a straw man in considering it, were it not that it was possible to cite in the footnotes real-life examples.

V

Moral Universalism: Substantivist

The second strategy, which I am calling Moral Universalism, maintains that religious disagreement is an undesirable and unnecessary complication in moral education, and the way ahead is to avoid it be identifying and teaching such universal moral principles as may be expected to command common agreement. There are two versions of this policy also, which I shall call, respectively, substantivist and formalist.

Substantivism maintains that it is possible to identify several moral principles which are common to all religions and are together sufficient to provide a moral base for society. It follows that there are four conditions such a policy must be able to satisfy:

(1) It must prove possible to identify such principles, and to demonstrate that the verbal formulation of them is understood in the same way by each of the systematic belief-systems with which they are said to be compatible.
(2) Together, the principles must be sufficient to provide a coherent moral base for the secular, democratic society.
(3) The residual moral differences between religions must be demonstrably trivial or at least not such as to conflict with agreed priorities.
(4) It must prove possible to achieve community endorsement of the resulting code on the understanding that it can be inculcated without reference to religious underpinnings.

I shall call these, respectively, the Identifiability, Sufficiency, Harmony, and Acceptability conditions.

All four conditions present difficulties. Regarding Identifiability, it may seem that moral universals congenial to all religions would be easy to find, but the crunch comes when we ask how candidates are perceived within different value-systems. For example, reverence for all life-forms finds a place in all the high religions, but the working out of this principle validates killing for food in some but not in others; pacifism in some and the holy war in others. Active benevolence towards one's fellow-being is a plausible claimant and important to the operation of a secular society, yet the reluctance, say, of the Hindu to interfere too radically in the *karmic* condition and destiny of beggars contrasts sharply with the activist principle of social justice in, say, Judaism.

Similar problems beset the Harmony condition. What is to be done about the status of women, given the great divergencies between the faiths? Or again, is the granting of unequal social advantage towards members of one's own faith, which is positively enjoined in some religions and amplified by theories of caste in others, to be accommodated in the democratic state as a trivial domestic variation from the norm?

The Acceptability condition requires that people will, in fact, be willing to acquiesce in an approach which keeps religion out of the curriculum of value-education whilst promoting a code which purports to be sufficient for the maintenance of the moral institution of life. There is already a lot of evidence to the contrary, and more opposition can be expected if curriculum proposals include teleological values such as the encouragement of spiritual quest and liberation from the self, as mooted in some Indian reports.[7]

The Sufficiency condition presents special logical problems. How are the criteria for sufficiency to be determined without bias? If it is claimed that they achieve adequacy on strictly rational grounds, then this amounts to the claim that one has generated a full normative theory within the domain of autonomous ethics. The discipline of moral philosophy hardly encourages the belief that the criteria will be universally acceptable to philosophers. And

if they were, then the contingent fact that the principles thus brought together were first found in the major religions would no longer be relevant to justification of the code as such.

Alternatively, if the claim were the weaker one that sufficiency would be dependent on community consensus, would it then be adding anything to the argument to claim that what has been agreed upon *happens* to be congruent with the religions (in the unlikely event it did)? In either case, the argument is really a type *A* argument which implies the self-sufficiency of the moral domain and denies the views of those members of the pluralistic society who believe in the necessity of religion to the justification and motivation of morality. Substantivism is not pernicious and subversive, as the earlier strategy of Religious Monopolism was seen to be, but it is utopian and, from an educational point of view, misleading.

VI

Moral Universalism: Formalist

The formalist version of this model claims to obtain two neutral guidelines for moral education from the formal features of moral discourse. The first guideline establishes rationality as the keystone of morality. Morality is rationality applied to our dealings with other persons. Moral reasoning is that which attempts to answer the question: is this rule such that, when applied impartially to myself as well as others, it conduces to the general good? From Immanuel Kant to Richard Hare this universality criterion has had considerable appeal as the heart of moral choice. Because it is a formal rather than a substantive criterion, it has additional appeal as the mainspring of moral education in the secular school.

The second guideline invites us to derive further moral principles from an inspection of the preconditions necessary for moral discourse to occur. Thus, it is said, one cannot seriously engage in moral discussion without thereby committing oneself to respecting other persons and being prepared to take their interests into account, in a spirit of impartiality, fairness and honesty. These are not just values plucked out of a hat, but the logical prerequisites of this kind of discourse. That is their justification.

The task of moral education on this model then becomes that of urging and helping individuals to become rational. Hare (1972) has boldly asserted that if children learn to use the language of morals, with a proper grasp of its formal characteristics, then the substantive code will 'look after itself'. Certainly the problems of justifying the particular 'bag of virtues' proposed by substantivist theorists will be avoided. Surely the promotion of moral rationality is as neutral a specification as one can get, and very appropriate to the secular school.

It is not that simple. We saw in Section I that the commitment to critical

rationality is itself a value-judgment, and one, moreover, which is often viewed with some irritation by political and religious authorities. Again, there are those in moral philosophy who dispute the adequacy of focusing on moral discourse rather than substantive codes and ways of life (Thus Hill, 1972; Warnock, 1969). Despite the value of the second-order principles derived from the moral language game, we still have not resolved the problem of deriving 'ought' from 'is'—in this case the 'is' of western moral discourse—and the strategy has told us nothing about the desirability or otherwise of more substantive first-order principles such as filial 'piety, revenge, active benevolence, or reverence for all life-forms. Hence formalism causes offence to some not only by what it puts in, but also by what it leaves out.

I give notice that I shall nevertheless be arguing later that what formalism wants to put in is necessary and desirable, but rather than use the formalist or transcendental justification, as it has been called, I will be appealing to the substantive requirements for the maintenance of the secular, democratic ideal, and this will also provide other more substantive principles for inclusion.

The other thing which causes many people to take offence at formalism is its declaration of independence from religion, both logically and psychologically, which is the common ground it shares with that other version of moral universalism which I called substantivism. By appealing to first-order moral principles endorsed by all religions but capable of being taught without reference to them, substantivism exhibits type *A* logic. Formalism, appealing directly to reason, exemplifies type *C*. On both the Sufficiency and the Acceptability criteria mentioned earlier, formalism succeeds no better than substantivism in qualifying as an adequate model for a pluralistic society.

VII

Consensus Pluralism

My label for the third curriculum model is Consensus Pluralism. In determining what shall constitute the content of moral education, its basic ground of justification is the secular, democratic ideal. Value-education is regarded as two-pronged: on the one hand, studying moral commitment in the secular society; on the other, inviting inspection of the major value-stances which render that society pluralist. The aim is to make students aware of the human quest for ultimate justifications and able to dialogue with persons of different persuasion without feeling threatened or hostile, while at the same time working with them to make the democratic community function morally.

It is clear that on this model value-education, so-called, is neither religious instruction nor moral education alone, but embraces both. At the same time, it is more than the direct inculcation of values that is often associated with both. It requires that students develop a critical awareness of the value-domain and assume personal responsibility for value-adoption. At one level, such a curriculum is neutral; at another, committed.

The curriculum is neutral as regards ultimate principles and their justification. To endorse a particular religious or secularist worldview would be partisan, but so would the exclusion of the study of such views (Section I). The secular school, on this model, seeks to give students an understanding of the questions their neighbour's faiths seek to answer, and to encourage them to integrate their own beliefs and values in a rational way. This is highly consistent with modern expectations of education.

At another level, the curriculum is committed. The secular school is committed to exemplifying and upholding the democratic society. To this end it requires a negotiated code of values by which to function, and for which it is advocate. Many of the procedural values identified by the formalists (Section VI) would quickly find their way into such a code; but since the code is to be built on consensus and not just formal analysis of rationality, agreements will also be forthcoming at the first-order level, about such values as the desirability of protection for the weak, justice for the oppressed, active benevolence, and the encouragement of interpersonal sharing.

Not only is such a school committed substantively to a code obtained and justified in this way, but it is committed procedurally to teaching methods which practise the amenities of democratic interaction. Persuasion is preferred to dictation, rationality to subrational manipulation, mutual concern to ruthless competition. To this extent, especially through school rules and teacher example, it instantiates the democratic code and seeks to become itself a just and convivial society. At the same time, it avoids the double trap of implying, firstly, that the value charter it represents is sufficient to sustain personal as well as social life; and secondly, that the justification of that charter is in any sense ultimate. The safeguard, in both respects, is the school's concurrent study of worldviews and the search they represent for ultimate justifications and motivation.

In contrast to religious monopolism (Section IV), this model is pluralist while achieving unity at the practical-political level through consensus. In contrast to moral universalism (Sections V and VI), it makes no claim to ultimate ethical justifications but includes the study of worldviews. It is substantivist (Section V) to the extent that it negotiates a common code of ethics, but formalist (Section VI) in including opportunity to develop rational autonomy and self-determination. It maintains a conceptual distinction between the domains of religion and morality, but strives to blend reason and commitment.

The reader will have already detected that this strategy is identical with that recommended on conceptual-logical grounds in Section III. In subsequent sections I have in effect been developing a third line of argument for this strategy, based on a critique of some actual normative models. The final test is whether the value code called for in this strategy stands any better chance than the moral universalist approaches of meeting the four conditions by which *they* were judged.

The Identifiability criterion is met by the very fact that the code rests on the negotiated agreements of people meeting, not in their religious enclaves, but on the neutral middle ground of the secular society. The Sufficiency criterion is satisfied at whatever level the negotiators deem to be literally 'sufficient'. The Acceptability criterion—that there will be a general willingness to embrace the code without direct appeal to religious underpinnings—is met partly by the process of negotiation itself, and partly by the fact that inclusion of religious studies in the curriculum would allay the concern of those who wanted students to be alerted to the widely held opinion that morality cannot be effective without religion.

As in the case of moral universalism, the Sufficiency condition is the most difficult one to satisfy. It requires that the differences which remain after the code has been formulated must not be so great as to conflict with the agreements which have been reached. Interestingly, however, the process by which the code is obtained may help to reduce the temperature of ideological disagreements. For whereas some tenet such as the subordination of women to men may be a stumbling block to agreement between some religions at the level of ultimate justification, it is likely to be resolved more readily at the practical level, since the presumption of equality is necessary to democratic process. Something akin to this has happened in the drawing up of the Indian Constitution, which, in the interests of maintaining an orderly pluralism, has conferred political freedoms on minority groups and disadvantaged castes which are not granted them in some of their own or their neighbours' religions.

VIII

Summary

The most useful form of summary in this case is a brief list of some prescriptions for curriculum developers which follow from what has been argued. They are:

(1) Religion and morality should be recognized as conceptually separable curriculum domains in the same way as, say, physics and chemistry; and accorded comparable status in priorities of curriculum selection.
(2) The study of religion should include inspection of major religious and non-religious value-stances in a non-partisan manner.
(3) The study of religion should also include comparisons of the different positions taken on the question of the relation of religion to morality.
(4) Moral education should include elements both of code advocacy and critical moral reasoning.
(5) Allowing that other moral values will also be studied, the values actually advocated through the curriculum should be obtained by negotiation to achieve community consensus on the principles essential to the maintenance of a secular, democratic society.

(6) The rules and procedures of the school, including teacher behaviour and example, should be brought under the ethic agreed upon, since such elements have a substantial effect on the moral education of students, independent of what is formally taught in moral studies.

Many questions remain, of course. How are religions to be 'inspected', and at what age can children handle this kind of assignment ? Should these domains be handled in any way different from other subjects? How is a negotiated consensus actually to be obtained and sustained? And so on. These are questions further down the road in the curriculum process. The present essay has been concerned only to answer two philosophical questions without which the subsequent process cannot even be adequately conceived.

Notes

1. The Preamble and Part III of the Constitution of India provide a clear statement of this ethos, manifestly drawing on a well-articulated tradition in western philosophy. These sections warrant explicit expository study in a secular curriculum.
2. Even this is negotiable as a policy, since, for example, some democratic theories interpret it as equalized access, some as equalized achievement, and some as extension of opportunity according to demonstrated ability.
3. The position of Hinduism is interesting in this regard. At the populist level, religious expression is often close to Animistic, while moral behaviour is defined more by cultural expectation, which approaches type *A* logic. At the philosophical level, however, Hinduism represents virtuous action (*dharma*) as one path to spiritual realization (*mokṣa*), a state which brings with it, paradoxically, liberation from the realm of causality and *karmic* duty (See Puligandla, 1975). Whether this is a type *A* or type *D*, or even a type *C* argument is a debate fit for sages.
4. Since our concern is with value education, I have not tried to find an example of what in the text is later labelled type *C*.2, i.e. only religious domain is real.
5. Examples would include Islam in Iran and Pakistan, Communism in Albania, and on the private school front many of the schools sponsored in various countries by devout religious groups.
6. By way of living example, when in 1980 the Singapore Minister of Education saw evidence of firmer moral principles amongst national servicemen whith mission school backgrounds, he decreed that moral education should be given in schools, working from a religious underpinning. Schools could nominate which options they would present as electives from Bible Knowledge, Islamic Studies, Hindu Studies, Buddhist Studies and World Religions. Later, recognition was accorded to Confucianism as a sixth. This system is due to be fully operational within 1985.
7. Statements in some recent Indian reports have read this way. See also Seshadri (1981). It is relevant here to note that Hinduism distinguishes between the 'religious', which is often regarded as relating to cultic and ritual observances, and the 'spiritual' as the plane of identification with the infinite which is beyond naming (p. 297).

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Reflection and constitution: Kant, Hegel and Husserl

R. SUNDARA RAJAN
University of Poona, Pune

I: From Kant to Hegel: A Metacritique

The central nuclear principle of Kantian critique is the constitution of an objective order of experience by means of a *priori* synthesis of the materials of sense by the understanding. Experience in a significant sense is an achievement of the understanding which is neither archetypal nor ectypal.[1] An archetypal originative intellect would be creative of objects; such an intellect would be an intuitive intellect; but the denial of an intellectual intuition is an essential feature of the Kantian understanding of man.[2] But what is important for us to note at this point is that, for an archetypal intelligence, the distinction between phenomena and noumena, between objects for us and things-in-themselves would not obtain. Such an intellect would have no place for the discursiveness of human knowledge. Also a merely ectypal intellect, which is a reflex of sense experience, would, in its own way, fall short of the transcendental distinction between phenomena and things-in-themselves. We may perhaps say that if an archetypal intelligence is above the transcendental distinction, then the ectypal intelligence is below the transcendental threshold.

This constitutive function of the categories must be seen in both its subjective and objective aspects; as Kant himself says the categories are at once the condition of the possibility of experience and the condition of the possibility of the existence of objects of experience.[3] Kant's basic intention in emphasizing this double movement of constitution may be explicated somewhat as follows: a judgment claiming objective validity or, to use his terms, a judgment of experience as distinguished from a judgment of perception[4] is possible only in terms of a conceptual framework or system, and the categories in their interrelationship provide such a framework for objective judgments.[5] In this sense, subjectively or for us, the categories present the form of objectivity, but Kant is also reminding us that to recognize something as an object, i.e. to identify it as something real, is to locate it in an order of law-like relationships. Only within an order of nature, conceived as a system, can any entity or event or process be taken as objective, and the categories precisely present the scaffolding of this natural order. In this sense, the categories constitute objectvity but the point to note is that the objectivity possible for us is a constituted objectivity. In this constitution of our experience, we must keep in view both the aspect of spontaneity and of givenness. There is a passive receptive side to our mode of experience, for we have to receive the con-

tent. The manifold of sense is given to us but merely this mode of givenness does not eplicate objectivity; that also requires the synthesis of the manifold by *a priori* rules of order and connection of appearances. This is the 'moment' of activity, of the spontaneity of thought, which gives the form.[6] The achievement of objective cognition, therefore, depends upon the formation of the content of sensibility by *a priori* categories of the understanding, on the reciprocal functioning of our two primordial powers—sensibility and thought.[7] Here, of course, arises the Hegelian question as to how sensibility and thought, if they are thus regarded as radically heterogenous, can act together. In other words, there seems to be a certain tension between two claims which the critical programme is equally making. On the one hand, Kant is claiming that objects of experience are essentially related to thought but, on the other hand, he is equally claiming that this relationship to thought does not eliminate their independence, for phenomena or appearances have to be understood both in terms of the categorization by the understanding as well as in their relationship to things-in-themselves. The problem, of course, arises precisely at this point: how are we to understand this 'relationship to things-in-themselves'? To speak of this relationship in causal terms as things-in-themselves affecting our sensibility and producing representations would be to misuse a category. More generally, since in the Kantian scheme possibility, actuality and necessity are themselves categories, they cannot be applied to things-in-themselves. If so, it would appear that we cannot speak of things-in-themselves as either possible or actual or necessary.[8] As Hegel remarked, without the concept of things-in-themselves one cannot enter the Kantian philosophy but with it one cannot stay within it.[9] Or we may also say: the Kantian idea of constitution which is the central doctrine of the Analytic and the Kantian idea of limitation which is the central teaching of the dialectic generate a tension within the critical programme. If this is the manifestation of the critical tension in the context of objectivity, then there is a similar tension on the side of the subject also. The difficulty here may be conceptualized in terms of reflection and constitution. Kant holds that the understanding is constitutive of objects but the constitution or 'making' of objects is something behind our backs, as it were. To our empirical consciousness, the world of objects is 'given'; we do not recognize our empirical thought as constituting the objects. Nevertheless, we are told that it is reason that is constitutive of the domain of objects. The question may be asked as to who is this 'we' or whose reason is thus constitutive and by what mode do we comprehend this act of constitution. To take up the second issue first. The critical doctrine of constitution is, we must remember, not an empirical but a transcendental thesis; as such, it cannot be grasped by any faculty of objective judgment but by way of reflective comprehension of experience. It is only when we regressively search after the grounds of possibility of our knowledge, or move from the *quid facti* to the *quid juris* of our experience, are we in a position to grasp the categorical synthesis and its transcendental function. This moment of regression is the mark of transcendental reflection. In other words, it is by an act of reflection rather than by the faculty of judgment that we can think of constitution. The constitution is, in Kantian terminology, a transcendental rather than an empirical synthesis. It is because of this that to our empirical consciousness the constitution of the world of experience is 'invisible' or opaque. It is reflection which can illuminate the synthesis and it is reflective judgment which can move from the empirical to the transcendental.[10] But even if we grant the faculty of reflection, a number of other questions remain. For instance, one may ask about the medium of this reflective comprehension: is it some kind of a pure act of consciousness as Husserlian phenomenology would suggest[11] or is it some kind of comprehension of the conceptual structuring of our experience by language as analytic philosophers like Strawson hold[12] or even, more radically can we, following Marxist philosophers like Sohn-Rethel, think of division of labour as the constitutive medium?[13] Here different media of reflection would give rise to different articulations of the programme of constitution, but we may just now attend to an even more basic issue. We may ask not about the medium of transcendental reflection but about the subject. Who is this 'we' we are talking about? It seems to me that there are four possible ways of responding to this issue.

(*a*) We may say that all this talk of consciousness as the subject of constitution is only a kind of metaphor and that we can very well dispense with it. When we do so, we are left with the description of the conceptual structure of experience. This, I suggest, is roughly the strategy that Strawson recommends.[14] But apart from the fact that such a programme would involve a massive surgery to be carried out on the body of critical philosophy, even if so carried out, it would result in the replacement of critique by descriptive metaphysics. Such a wholesale metamorphosis of Kant into Strawson is a possibility I do not propose to consider at present.

(*b*) We may perhaps take a Hegelian tack and say that this constitutive reason is the absolute mind. But from the point of view of the critical programme, this response, too, would involve a massive transformation of critique; for, firstly, if it is the absolute mind which is constitutive of nature, then it would follow that we cannot counterpose to it any realm of noumena or things-in-themselves. This would mean that both the form and content of experience would be determined by mind; Kantian realism would have to negate itself as only a 'moment' of absolute idealism. Secondly, at the epistemological level, in so far as reflection is the grasping of the constituting subject, it would follow on the Hegelian alternative that in reflection we comprehend the absolute itself; thereby reflection, a purely Kantian faculty, would be transformed into speculative reason.

(*c*) Or it may be claimed that the constituting subject in each case is the individual consciousness and that for each one of us the world is a constituted one. Here the constituting subject is the individual consciousness. It must be obvious that, of all the possible responses, this one would be most

contrary to the intentions of the critical philosophy; for what it amounts to is a simple reduction of transcendental idealism to subjective idealism. Although in retrospect the incompatability of the two is evident to us, yet we must remember that at the time of the birth of the critical philosophy there was a strong tendency to interepret critique along radically subjectivist lines. But in principle it is clear that such a subjectivist understanding of the critical achievement would simply repress the moving problematic of Kant from being even recognized. The central problem of the critical philosophy is how the individual subject is enabled from within the realm of his own finite sensory experience to make judgments claiming objective validity.[15] The possibility of such a claim would involve a certain common and intersubjective framework, for to be objective is to be valid not only for me but for all with similar epistemic powers.[16] In this sense, the Kantian understanding of objectivity presupposes intersubjectivity, and one of the claims of critique is precisely to show how such an intersubjective perspective on experience is possible.[17] If so, the present subjectivist interpretation would be decisively at odds with critical philosophy. But, apart from this, there is also a certain incoherence about the subjectivist understanding of critique. If the individual subject is the constituting subject, then, since in our psychological experience of this subject we experience ourselves only in the form of an empirical psycho-physical unity of a person, it would follow that the constituting subject is also a constituted subject. But how can the subject of constitution be conceived as an object constituted? Furthermore such a subjectivist interpretation of critique would reduce reflection to simple introspective consciousness and thereby at one stroke dissipate it, for introspection simply does not discover any constituting act. From the point of view of an introspective consciousness, constitution is simply a myth.

(*d*) Hence only the fourth and final possibility seems to be left open, and this is to make a distinction between a transcendental constituting subject and an empirical constituted subject of introspection. But this precisely brings us back to the transcendental distinction between noumena and phenomena. The problematic of constitution led us, in the context of objective cognition, to the necessity of distinguishing appearances as phenomena from things-in-themselves. Now the problematic of reflection leads us to the same distinction in the context of the subject. Since this distinction seems to be a persupposition of critique itself, we may perhaps call it the metacritical principle in the sense that, in analogy with the operations of critique, we may say that the distinction between phenomena and noumena is the condition of the possibility of critique itself.[18] But the important question is about its validity. Is it just an unargued presupposition of critique and in that case does it not appear that within the very heart of critique itself there is a residual dogmatism? And even more damagingly does not such a distinction lead precisely to a scepticism of knowledge, despite its avowed intention of safeguarding and grounding it? For, to know a thing not as it is in itself but only as it is relatively to me, i.e. as it appears to me, is precisely not to know *it*. From this point of view, it would seem that there cannot be knowledge of appearances. If so, critique is doubly flawed, for it is dogmatic in its presuppositions and sceptical in its consequences.[19]

This surely cannot be the resting place of philosophical reflection. We must move beyond critique and it is precisely this movement beyond critique which is the distinguishing mark of reflection and which takes us from the level of understanding to that of reason.[20]

It must be obvious that we are now on the threshold of the transition from Kant to Hegel. From the point of view of Hegel's phenomenology of the spirit, we must, in phenomenological reflection, recover the formation of the shapes of consciousness and the corresponding forms of objective order these configurations of consciousness comprehend; we must, in reflection, follow the history of this formative process which is at once the history of the formation of the object and of the subject.[21] In this sense, a certain dynamic nisus is imparted to the Kantian notion of constitution which now becomes a history of the formation of the spirit. It is this history of consciousness that becomes the theme of reflection. Reflection is now no mere transcendental act of an instantaneous enlightenment but becomes a recollective recovery of a certain history.[22] In this historicization of critique, critique loses its closure and immunity in one sense, but gains a dimension of scope in another sense; for now critique becomes the comprehension of the formation of the subject. It is this comprehension of self-formation that constitutes the main goal of reflection. But reflection in this still preserves a continuity with Kant. This connection between Hegel and Kant at the level of reflection may best be approached by way of the third critique. We may incidentally remember that Hegel greatly appreciated the *Critique of Judgment*.[23] But before we take up this issue, we may first remark that when we move from Kantian critique to Hegelian phenomenology, the lingering and residual enlightenment belief in the capacity of subjective reason to illumine itself completely is given up. In one sense, the formation of the subject takes place behind the back of the subject itself; thereby the Kantian privilege of subjective reason is called into question.[24]

The second reversal is easier to deal with. It may be remembered that Kant differentiated himself from both rationalism and empiricism by means of a differentiation of critique from dogmatism, on the one hand, and from scepticism, on the other. But from the Hegelian perspective, what strikes one is the underlying motivation of all the three, for all of them start from the conviction that it is first necessary to undertake an inquiry into the scope and limits of our knowing in the form of an examination of the cognitive faculty or power. All of them, in their respective ways, begin with this premise or presupposition of the primacy of an epistemic examination. We must first, it is said, chart out the nature and capacities of the instrument before we employ it. Or, in terms of an alternative model or metaphor, it is said that we must

examine the medium before examining the objects of knowledge which are presented by means of the medium. From the Hegelian point of view, all of them are characterized by a certain distrust or suspicion, a certain fear of falling into error.[25] At the most fundamental level, it is this fear of error, of this distrust that is common to all the three. From this vantage point, the differences between rationalism, empiricism and criticism appear less momentous. In fact, the Hegelian critique could go one step further and hold that critical philosophy has the worst of both the worlds, for, in so far as it presupposes the possibility of a total self-understanding of reason, it harbours within its credo a certain dogmatism; but, in so far as it operates with the distinction between phenomena and things-in-themselves and limits the strictly cognizable to phenomena or appearances only, it denudes, in effect, the aim of knowledge. Thus Kantian critique appears to be dogmatic in its presuppositions (the rationalist temptation) and sceptical in its consequences (the empiricist outcome).

But what is the root of this scepticism? What is the source of this distrust of cognition? Strangely enough, the sceptical impasse seems to be not the result of any failure in thoroughness of critique but precisely the working out of its fundamental motivation. As we saw, the basic claim of critique is the primacy of an examination of the faculty of cognition over its employment; it counsels us to test first the strength and reliability of the instrument before trusting ourselves to its use. However sound such counsels may be in relation to external implements and instruments, with regard to our inner spiritual powers such methodological caution is self-defeating. Hegel brings home to us this point by taking the metaphors of instrument and medium seriously, and working out their irrelevance and inappropriateness.[26] The point is not merely to criticize the Kantian imagery but to suggest the artificiality of the whole critical project. Cognition is neither an instrument nor an intervening medium. It is not an external appendage at all but an intrinsic mode of our being in the world. The Kantian project of reason being both the subject and object of critique is a chimerical enterprise of a man trying to outstrip his shadow by agility of movement. Or, to use Hegel's own anology, it is like learning to swim before entering into the water.[27] But does this mean that we must relapse from the Kantian level of critical reflection, that we must regress back to the dogmatism of pre-critical philosophizing? Or does it mean reconciling ourselves to agnosticism which holds that reason cannot understand itself, that reflection is a myth and an illusion? Hegel would certainly deny that this criticism of Kant is inspired by any nostalgia for what had gone before; his critique, he would insist, is forward-looking, post-critical rather than pre-critical. And, indeed, it is precisely this element of a forward-moving dynamism that he is thinking of when he distinguishes between abstract negation and concrete negation.[28] Concrete negation, we remember, is *internal* to as well as *preservative* of its object. It is no mere rejection of a point of view from the outside and neither does it leave a vacuum

behind. On the contrary, it enters into the inner spirit of a way of thinking and drawing out its implications surmounts its limitations and prepares the ground for a more adequate standpoint.[29] In the formal terminology of the Hegelian dialectic, the negation, the moment of anti-thesis, arises out of the initial starting point itself. Hence, in the Hegelian critique of Kant, the critical spirit does not dissipate itself but rather comes to self-consciousness. It is in this deeper sense that the Hegelian critique of Kant could claim to be a metacritique in the sense of a reflective self-understanding of critique. In all this, Hegel claims that he is not subjecting critique to any external norm or prescription, that he is not setting a goal or objective outside critique to which it has to conform itself; rather, the claim is that in this process of negation, the critical spirit is brought bear upon itself and thereby achieve its self-consciousness by means of this act of self-criticism.[30] It is by means of this reflective consciousness of itself, of its own limits and destiny, that it liberates itself and paradoxically achieves a freedom it claimed falsely for itself in the beginning. The Hegelian metacritique is, therefore, not a destruction or anhilation; but for all its harshness and severity it is *therapeutic*, for it dispells critique of its own false consciousness and bad faith and makes it something 'for itself' and not merely 'in itself'.

This is the metacritical message of the famous dialectic of the Master and the Bondsman in the *Phenomenology*.[31] Of course, the celebrated Hegelian text has been the focus of varied interpretations and explications, but here I would like to suggest an epistemological reading of certain aspects of the dialectic.

In the initial position, the master who is immune and exempt from the necessity of labour and toil sees himself as free in relation to the slave who is burdened with the destiny of endless toil. But as the dialectic unfolds there is an ironic reversal to this initial self-understandings of the master and the slave. The bondsman accepts himself as a slave and struggles in the fields and forests, bending the resistance of the world to his effort and will; he meets with opposition and strife and imposes his will on forces external to himself. But in this seemingly negative process of struggle and toil, he proves the autonomy of his will and by means of his labour wins for himself his independence. The master, on the other hand, immune from all worldly activity, sees his isolation and separation as his freedom; but, precisely because of this estrangement from toil and struggle, becomes increasingly dependent on the slave, not only for the care and sustenance of his life but, much more importantly, for recognition of his spirit by the bondsman. Cut off from all worldly travail, the master can assure himself of his sovereignity and independence, only if the other recognizes it. Hence both inwardly and outwardly, the master becomes parasitical upon the labouring bondsman and his fate is the fate of all parasites; the dialectics of the bondsman reach a point, where the master-slave relationship itself has become obsolete; and hence, in Marx's words, there occurs 'the expropriation of the expropriators'—the parasitical being of the master withers away.[32]

This is, of course, only an aspect or a profile of the dense and overdetermined text of the master and the bondsman; but for our metacritical purposes this aspect may be important. Like the master, transcendental critique differentiates itself from all 'worldly' dogmatic involvements and, thus immunizing itself in its purity, defines itself as legislative of empirical reason. But, precisely by means of this isolation, it becomes parasitical as the master upon the bondsman, whereas the lowly dogmatic reason, by means of its labours in the world of actuality, by its mastery of phenomena, gains its real sovereignty and transcendental critique has to wait upon the labouring intellect for its own sustenance. In the positivistic development beyond Kant, it is precisely this vicarious existence of philosophy as a second order discipline that we witness. Transcendental critical philosophy degenerates into a philosophy of science—this, indeed, is the nemesis which waits upon a critique of subjective reason.

But does this mean that we must, therefore, refuse to separate philosophy from science altogether? Surely, that would be falling prey to a worse alternative, *scientism*. But how then do we keep the balance between the scylla of an empty formalism and the charybdis of a formless empiricism? How can reflection find a point of entry between these two antithetical temptations? It is here that the narrative structure reflection is introduced. To recur back to the dialectic of the master and the bondsman: the emancipation of the slave, unlike the fancied freedom of the master, has a certain dynamic; it is by means of a career of toil and labour that it is achieved. But to be exact, not merely by the outward or external vicissitudes of that form of life; autonomy is gained only in so far as the bondsman's consciousness follows this form in thought and understanding. Only in so far as he 'internalizes' his destiny that he masters it. His freedom, therefore, is unfolded in the history of his consciousness as it follows the form of his life. It is this narrative structure of consciousness, its trajectory one might say, that is emancipatory. It is only by comprehending the objective forms of his life in the shape of his consciousness, only in this odyssey of the spirit, is there a chance of mastery of destiny. It is in this sense that freedom is the recognition of necessity; only we must remember that this recognition is not any instantantaneous flash of understanding but has the structure of a life history. With this in mind, if we go back to the problem of philosophy *vis-à-vis* the worldly sciences, we can say that reflection, too, has a certain narrative structure and shape; only here the history is not the history of an individual but that of the species. Reflection now is the narrative form of a consciousness which articulates the trials and tribulations of the human kind; it is the phenomenology of the objective spirit.

Although, in its full development, the particular shape of critique as phenomenological reflection appears to be far removed from Kantian critique, yet there is a certain inner connection, a certain possible link with the *Critique of Judgment*. We know that, of all the great critical texts, Hegel admired the

Critique of Judgment most. When we come to think of this, there is something enigmatic about it, for on the substantive level the aesthetics of Hegel is far removed from the aesthetics of the *Critique of Judgment*. I feel that Hegel's recognition of the third critique has a deeper subtranean ground. And in what follows, I would like to offer a conjecture as to why and how the *Critique of Judgment* could have appealed to the author of the phenomenology of the spirit.

It may be recalled how Kant himself came to the recognition of the need for a critique of judgment beyond the achievements of the first critique. Kant seemed to have felt that science as an ongoing enterprise also required the idea of nature as a system of empirical laws, that we must presuppose a more concrete perspective which would prescribe a certain conception of the systematic unity of empirical laws. It is this idea of nature as a system of concrete laws which can explain the progressiveness of science. Merely the *a priori* conditions of the possibility of cognition are too formal to give this perspective on nature. Hence, in addition to the transcendental framework of the first critique, science as an evolving enterprise also requires a more concrete form of conceiving the systematic unity of laws. This picture of nature as an empirical system is, of course, not a constitutive condition on the same level of the categorial framework; it is, on the other hand, only regulative.[33]

Thus far the methodological remarks of the introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* take us; but having come to this point, it is not too great a step if we suggest that this regulative perspective of the image of nature as an empirical unity of laws is a certain historically evolved perspective, a form of understanding nature which has had a history. Unlike the transcendental conditions, which are constitutive of any objective cognition whatsoever, this regulative paradigm is an emergent out of the processes of ongoing enquiry; in other words, I am suggesting that there is a historical process in which the regulative presuppositions unfold themselves. But surely such regulative models are also given in the context of socio-cultural life. Just as there is a history of perspectives on nature, there is also a history of the forms of culture. Here, too, there are images and schema of understanding; here, too, there is a history of these shapes of science, forms of understanding and interpretation in the objective as well as the subjective contexts. These shapes and forms of nature and culture are not merely the guiding images of science and cognition; they are also the presuppositions of forms of feeling and ways of conduct. They are the generative matrices of science as well as of art, of morality as well as of religiosity. In this wide sense, they are the forms of civilizational consciousness which articulate the specific styles and forms of cultural life. The formation of these shapes of consciousness, their conflicts and antagonisms, the career of these spiritual gestalten—all this fall within the wide domain of philosophical reflection. Critique now becomes the recollective recovery of these forms in the consciousness of the cogitating philo-

sopher. The thinker, in the loneliness of his meditations relives the history of the species; and, in this reflective re-enactment of life, achieves an emancipation from the coercive bonds of these forms. In his self-consciousness he relives the history of his race, and in this second cogitative form, what was once bondage and limitation in actuality, is overcome in thought and reflection. It is thus that philosophy shapes itself as the celebratory mastery of destiny in thought and Idea.[34]

The Return to Kant

One of the themes with which I have been concerned in the previous discussion of the Hegelian critique of Kant is the vast extension of the scope of reflection. Already in Kant and particularly in the *Critique of Judgment*, we are brought to the recognition of the importance of reflective judgment; it may be remembered that I had argued that in a sense it could even be said that reflective judgment is the faculty of critique itself, and that the self-understanding of reason in the form of its *a priori* constitutive synthesis is accessible only on the level of reflection. But when we move into the Hegelian perspective, reflection assumes a far more important role; it becomes indeed, the primary medium of philosophical understanding itself. The phenomenology of the spirit is made possible only by the faculty of reflection. We are not at present interested in what this reflective faculty is concerned with; hence we shall not follow the contours and shapes of the odyssey of the spirit. Our main interest is rather with certain methodological and metatheoretical features of reflection; and here, as with Kant, Hegel, too, does not directly deal with the nature of reflection itself but we may perhaps gather a few salient features from his account of what reflection does or accomplishes.

In the Kantian framework, critical reflection is distinguished from transcendent speculation (metaphysics), on the one hand, and from empirical cognition (science), on the other. In its own way, Hegelian phenomenological reflection also makes a similar twofold differentiation. On the one hand, phenomenology is not metaphysics, i.e. reflection is not the same as speculative reason. On the other, it is also not the judgment of the understanding. It is this latter differentiation of phenomenological reflection from objective judgment that would concern us more, for this difference marks the distanciation of phenomenology from science. In substantive terms in phenomenological reflection different configurations are only presented for our meditation but there is no commitment to these shapes; there is a disengagement from these forms of thought and action, and it is precisely this disengagement that makes possible the transcendence of these shapes. Thought in the form of reflection is freed from the limitations of these episodes, when it recollects them in philosophical meditation. In Husserlian terms, Hegelian phenomenology also performs in its own way, a kind of epoche, a disengagement from the natural standpoint.[35] There is a second Husserlian anticipation also in

Hegelian reflection. In phenomenological reflection of the Hegelian kind, there is a certain peculiar modulation of specific or concrete instances and episodes. Thus, for example, the figure of Antigone is not comprehended as a specific or concrete singular artistic form but it stands for an entire form of feeling and thought.[36] This 'essentialization' of the particular, as it may be called, happens throughout the course of phenomenological reflection; specific episodes and characters are divested of their particularities and are treated as exemplars in it. It is thus that, in phenomenological reflection, concrete history is shorn of its accidental and episodic contingency, and is made to reveal its essential meanings and exemplary significance. This essential comprehension, this understanding of exemplary significance, which marks off the career of phenomenological reflection from the episodic destiny of actual history or the history of actuality, is akin to the Husserlian notion of edietic intuition, which, we may remember, is also the grasping of the universal in and by way of an act of exemplary perception.[37] Of course, the fundamental difference between the Hegelian and Husserlian notions is that, in the case of the latter, the essential insight claims to be a perception or intuition; whereas, in the case of Hegel it is a comprehension, a noesis rather than a seeing. And this, indeed, brings us to the critical point, for it may be felt that the Hegelian reflective phenomenology is a massive retrospective interpretation of phenomena, *a reading* rather than an intuitive evidencing; to put it in Husserlian terms, the Hegelian phenomenology is only an as-if phenomenology and not a pure phenomenology. I would like to pause upon the ramifications suggested by this notion of a pure phenomenology, for it is, of course, obvious that the idea of a pure phenomenology is evocative of Kant.[38] But what is intriguing about this is that the Kantian evocation is made in a context which denies the contrast of phenomena and things-in-themselves. The latter, of course, is in the spirit of Hegel but the former, the idea of a pure theory is emphatically Kantian. We may, therefore, open up a perspective on Husserlian phenomenology as a movement which is impelled towards Kant from a Hegelian insight. It is as such, as the return of transcendental critique, from within phenomenological reflection that I propose to consider Husserl in a sequent study. If this study of Hegel moved us from constitution to reflection, that study of Husserl, we shall find will take us back from reflection to constitution.

II. From Husserl to Kant

It is interesting to note that Kant was aware of the term 'phenomenology' in its philosophical use through his friend Lambert, and even thought of describing the critique as the phenomenology of pure reason.[39] But what is even more interesting is to reflect upon the reasons which might have dissuaded him from adopting that title, for in Kant phenomenology seems to have had a negative connotation as a doctrine of the forms of illusion or false appear-

ances. In this sense of the term, the Dialectic alone would be a phenomenology, but when we move into Husserl phenomenology describes the most evident and rigorous form of knowledge that we can hope to have. But in spite of this reversal of the negative into the positive connotation, there is also a complicating element of continuity event at this level, for we remember that in his latest period Husserl comes back to this Kantian idea of a doctrine of illusion and describes phenomenology as a science of transcendental illusion.[40]

This is symptomatic of the fact that in the development of Husserl's thought there is an increasing convergence on some basic Kantian themes. We may just mention two such large-scale movements towards Kant:

(*a*) The all-important distinction between Formal and Transcendental Logic—this is not only Kantian in its terminology and conceptual apparatus but serves the same function as Kant's own distinction between General Logic and Transcendental Logic.[41] Of course, the all-important difference is that in Husserl there is nothing corresponding to the programmes of metaphysical and transcendental deduction, which in Kant follow upon the distinction.

(*b*) The redescription of his earlier intentional analysis as transcendental analysis and the turn towards transcendental subjectivity which this redescription implies.[42]

But apart from such methodological convergence, we may more profitably attend to more basic similarities of intention and objectives. Like Kant, Husserl, too, was in search of a new method of philosophical investigation and like Kant, Husserl too regarded it as the necessary foundation of the validity of sciences. This validation of science is not to be seen in positivistic terms as the elimination of metaphysics, but Husserl like Kant sees phenomenology as the prologomenon to a properly conceived metaphysics. Not only in his positive aims but in his critical movements also Husserl recapitulates the basic strategies of the critique. Like Kant, Husserl, too, situates phenomenology in terms of a two-front opposition to rationalism and empiricism. Husserl's critique of Mill as leading to psychologism recalls particularly the basic contention of Kant that Locke has only a natural physiology of the mind.[43]

The above prefatory comments are meant only to prepare the ground for the central thesis which I wish to expound, namely, that Husserl's conception of the mission and method of phenomenology leads us back to the conception of Kantian critique. More particularly, I shall try to show that right from his early programmatic essay 'Philosophy as a Rigorous Scince' there is found a typically Kantian theme in Husserl, namely, the separation of philosophy from science and the need for grounding objective cognition in terms of a

more fundamental foundation. It is this idea of a foundation for objective science which forms the main problematic of the essay 'Philosophy as a Rigorous Science', whereas the separation of philosophic from scientific cognition takes the form of the thesis of the natural standpoint and the theory of the phenomenological reduction or epoche. But, as I shall try to show, the epoche leads us to the idea of constitution and starting, in this sense, from the idea of reflection, we are led necessarily to the problematic of constitution. In terms of the previous discussion of Hegel, we can perhaps say that the Hegelian attempt to disconnect constitution from the idea of reflection does not seem to have been successful, for this paradigm of reflection itself requires a certain separation of reflective cognition from objective judgmental cognition; and as we have already seen, even within the Hegelian paradigm, it becomes necessary to separate philosophy as phenomenology from the sciences and other forms of judgmental cognition. In the phenomenology of Husserl, this need for a distancing of phenomenology from the sciences is most clearly discernible in his celebrated critique of psychologism in *Logical Investigations*[44] and more broadly in the essay 'Philosophy as a Rigorous Science'.[45] But this distancing of phenomenology from science leads, as we shall see, to the constitution problem. It is this return to the problematic of constitution from within the paradigm of phenomenological reflection that shall be the major theme of our present discussion. We shall also see that the problem of constitution becomes particularly acute when critique takes the phenomenological turn, for now what has to be shown as the constituted domain is the *life-world* which includes other subjectivities, i.e. the problem now takes shape as the transcendental deduction of intersubjectvity;[46] not merely that but the life world is essentially a world of practices; if so, the question is the derivation of the idea of practice from the point of view of pure reflection. Critique now seems to be called upon to cross the Kantian barrier between pure and practical reason. One of my suggestions would hence be: since it appears that it would be impossible to derive praxis from reflection, we may perhaps try the converse possibility of deriving reflection from praxis; and, as may be anticipated, this will take us on to a discussion of some philosophical issues in Marxism.

Prima facie it may seem that the very notion of philosophy as a rigorous science is an assimilation of philosophy to science rather than a differentiation; one may be tempted to link the Husserlian programme with that of the early Logical Positivists who also thought in terms of philosophy as a science in their own way. But such an identification would fail to make the all-important distinction which Husserl insists upon, in a variety of ways, between rigour and exactitude of our cognitions. Even mathematics, which is the very paradigm of an exact science, lacks rigour in the phenomenological sense. A discipline may be said to be exact if it is capable of deductive systematization or it may be said to have degrees of exactitude in so far as it approaches such systematization. In this sense, 'exactness' is a relative matter of

approximation to the deductive ideal. But rigour in the Husserlian sense does not have to do with the form of presentation of a theory but with the clarity or self-evidential nature of its fundamental concepts and propositions.[47] In so far as even the exact sciences do not have this clarity about their fundamental concepts, they are not rigorous disciplines. Here also Husserl is not merely saying that the sciences make use of certain concepts without a philosophical analysis and clarification of such concepts, but he is saying something much more Kantian; in terms of his later doctrine in the Crisis lectures, he is saying that exact scientific cognition is based upon a certain primordial stratum of experience which he calls the life world, but although objectively possible only on the basic stratum of a pre-given understanding, the objectifying sciences are forgetful of their origin; they are oblivious of the acts of constitution which are responsible for the structure of the life world and are thus naively objectivistic in so far as they tend to take for granted their object domains.[48] Here what is lacking is not merely conceptual exactitude of definitions but a failure or neglect to thematize the constitutive acts of our intentional consciousness by which any domain of objectivity is possible for us. Where there is such an awareness of constitution we would experience it in the form of self-evidential certainty. From this point of view we may also say that the empirical analytic sciences are not radical enough, for they do not go to the roots of cognition, the mother-structures as he describes them in his later works.[49] In other words, I am suggesting that the basic point of his early works, namely, that rigorous cognition is cognition characterized by self-evidential certainty and the later doctrine that rigour means the comprehension of transcendental constitution are the earlier and later stages of the same thought. If so, the very form of the distinction between rigorous and exact cognition is, at least implicitly, a foreshadowing of the later explicit transcendental turn. This suggestion may be strengthened if we ask: how does Husserl understand the roots of certainty of our knowledge, wherein does he see the beginnings of our episteme? The first answer returns us to the phenomenon themselves as they are given to us and in so far as they are given to us. This movement towards phenomena, the celeberated 'back to the things themselves', is, of course, the first turn towards objects; and it is in the light of this absolute commitment to experiences without any theory or interpretation that makes Husserl claim that phenomenology is, indeed, a radical empiricism, more thorough and deep-going than philosophical empiricism which very often halts at the threshold of sensory experience.[50] But this turn towards objects was soon followed by a turn towards the subject. From *The Ideas* onwards Husserl began to explore the radix of knowledge deeper in consciousness or the knowing subject.[51]

Given this turn towards the subject, we can see how in Husserl the thesis of Brentano regarding intentionality of consciousness takes a strongly Kantian cast.

For Brentano, intentionality is, as it were, a simple unanalysable characteristic of mental acts. One simply finds that every mental act is directed towards something and this directedness is a simple intentional reference or pointing to.[52] But in Husserl intentionality acquires far more theoretical weight and complexity. We may consider a few of these functions of intentionality as understood by Husserl. First of all, intention *objectivates* in the sense that an act refers the immediate data given to consciousness to 'intentional objects' or noema in the later terminology. Objects are given *thru* such data or alternatively we relate in our intentional acts such data to an object which is not itself a datum. But we must note the two senses of 'object' here, the intentional object and the real (transcendent) object, which is supposed to have an existence beyond all such acts. (Later on we shall come to see that even this idea of a transcendent object is conceivable only in terms of a subject or consciousness.) But at this point what I would like to emphasize is that in Husserl, unlike in Brentano, intentionality is not a simple reference but a complex function in which data are used as raw materials in a synthetic act of objectification. Secondly, we may observe that intention *identifies*. Here what Husserl is pointing out is that a variety of successive acts bear upon the same object. In this sense, acts are the media of the identity of an object. The identity of a datum is given in presentational immediacy but the identity of an object is the function of a synthetic unity of acts. Taking the two characteristics of intentionality together, we can see that in his own way Husserl is making the Kantian point that the conditions of a possible experience are also the conditions of possibility of the existence of objects of experience.[53]

From this it also follows that intention connects each aspect with others in an act of synthetic unity of objectification. Taking all the functions of intentionality together in their complex totality, we can see that intentionality is constitutive. It is thus that from the simple thesis of intentionality we build up to the idea of constitution, but we have now to face a barrier which we came up against in Kant also—we may call it the paradox of constitution—namely, that while empirical cognition is possible only on the basis of such constitution, it itself is 'invisible' to cognition. Being the ground of possibility of judgments, such intentional constitution itself cannot be grasped by judgments. The access to constitution requires a shift in levels from the objectifying mode to the transcendental reflective one. But what is novel in the Husserlian development of this idea is the preliminary but essential negative step or stage in the access to the constitutive level; I am, of course, referring to the operation of the epoche or phenomenological reduction.

The operation of the reduction may be approached from two standpoints, Cartesian and Kantian. These two are, of course, not unrelated; on the contrary, there is a systematic connection between them in the sense that the first leads to the second as Husserl's text *Cartesian Meditations* bears witness.[54] But for the purpose of thematizing this connection we may deal with them separately. As is well known, the *Cartesian Meditations* introduces the epoche in the tradition of Descartes' programme of methodical doubt. But

in Husserl what is at issue, even at this early preliminary stage, is no mere method but a change of attitude or orientation from the natural to the reflective standpoint.[55] The natural attitude is the common style of living in the world. Santayana called it animal faith, whereas Hume described it in terms of custom and habit. But from Husserl's point of view what is distinctive of the natural attitude are conviction and casualness and following from it an impersonality. The reflective orientation runs counter to this: as opposed to conviction and assurance, it is characterized by puzzlement. This puzzlement or to give it a more positive description, this *wonder*, may take two forms, objective and subjective. The first form of wonder could lead to the question of Being; in Heidegger this becomes the question: why is there something rather than nothing? But the more characteristic Husserlian wonder is the wonder about subjectivity or consciousness. We remember the celebrated Husserlian statement 'the wonder of all wonders is subjectivity itself'.[56] As opposed to casualness, the reflective or philosophical attitude emphasizes seriousness of questioning. But this philosophic questioning or interrogation is different from ordinary querries. First of all, phenomenological interrogation is distancing in the sense that by the very act of interrogation we disconnect ourselves from the natural attitude. Secondly, this distancing interrogation is radical in the sense of asking for the originary grounds of the given, i.e. phenomena. And, thirdly, this radical reflective questioning, unlike ordinary questioning, is not merely a pause and preparation for further activity but a total suspension of activity. In so far as all mundane practices are possible only within the natural attitude, with the suspension of this orientation all mundane activities and practices are also suspended, not in the sense of physical cessation but in the sense of a disengagement of consciousness. And, lastly, radical questioning is the beginning of the return to subjectivity.

This operation of *epoché* may then be described as a persistent movement of reflection which passes through three stages: mundane reduction, eidetic reduction and transcendental reduction. Mundane reduction is the suspension of all presuppositions and anticipatory theoretical assumptions and conjectures we naturally bring with us in making sense of our experiences. Since this aspect of the phenomenological method is only too well known, I shall not say anything further about it except that by itself it does not fully characterize phenomenological reflection proper, for this kind of anticipatory reserve and withdrawal from conjectural interpretation is possible within the natural standpoint also; it may be remembered that in his own way Bacon also recommends what he calls the suspension of idols of the cave, the market place and the theater.[57] Hence mundane reduction is only the beginning of phenomenological reflection properly so called. But with editic reduction we move into a proper phenomenological terrain. It may be remembered that Husserl holds that, by suspending our engagement with the particularity of a phenomenon and by means of a redirection of our gaze thus purified of singularity the essences are revealed. The essences, of course, do not have an existence or

being separate from the particulars. In this sense, Husserl holds that the intuition of essences does not involve ontological platonism. But it is not this issue with which I am concerned at this point; but rather the important thing for us is the idea that in essential perception we are no longer concerned with existents but that our awareness is now directed onto a vastly new field of cogitata, which are not objects in the sense of the natural attitude; the grasp of these intentional objects is, therefore, entering into a new mode of experience—the experience of reflection; with Husserl's doctrine of noetic—noematic correlation, with new noema there is also a new modulation of consciousness, a new attitude or orientation. Since the essences are not existents, this orientation is altogether different from that of the natural standpoint. There are two aspects of transformation into the eidetic attitude that we may notice. First, in so far as practices are possible only in the context of a particular existent i.e. in the world of concretes, in the eidetic realm, the style of our awareness is purely contemplative or theoretical. As in Platonism, there is an internal affinity of eidos and theoria. In Husserl's own words: 'The ray of consciousness is a ray of pure reflection.' But the second aspect of eidetic perception is, for our purpose, more interesting. As we saw in eidetic reduction, the particular is 'perceived' not in its particularity or exclusive 'this-here'ness but rather in its generality; it is not merely an instance subsumed under a general idea or concept but in its own way there is a 'seeing' of the general in the particular. We might perhaps say that eidetic intuition is what we, in the context of Hegel, described as exemplary perception. If so, it would appear that eidetic reduction is implicit in Hegel's phenomenology, although it is quite true that Hegel does not thematize it. This evocation of Hegel is not merely a matter of interest in the context of history of ideas but is also of systematic interest. Here again Husserl's methodological remarks concerning eidetic reflection illuminate an aspect of Hegel's procedure. Hegel specifically remarks that the subject of phenomenological reflection is in one sense an individual subject, for the shapes of consciousness that form the substance of the phenomenology arise in the recollection of an individual cogitating philosopher, i.e. Hegel—'the living-thinking-suffering centration of experience'. But in an another sense, the subject is all of us, for in this exercise of reflection the individual becomes, as it were, a prototype of the species. In this manner, the subject becomes a universal subject; but not in the manner of an abstract universal which is a mere negation of individuality but as a concrete universal which in its very particularity exemplifies the universal. Thus even in Hegel's phenomenology both the subject and subject of reflection are universalized. But this is, of course, how the phenomenology of Hegel appears when we view it from the Husserlian view point, for Husserl tells that in eidetic reflection the noesis and not merely the noema are essentialized. It is thus that eidetic reduction opens out into transcendental subjectivity. But with the recognition of intentionality as constitutive a new and far more formidable problematic opens up, for not merely the domain

of objects but also the inter-subjective realm of the life world is to be constituted. As *Cartesian Meditations* puts it:

> As radically meditating philosophers, we now have neither a science that we accept nor a world that exists for us. Moreover this affects the intramundane existence of all other egos, so that rightly we should no longer speak communicatively in the plural; other men than I and brute animals are data of experience for me only by virtue of my sensuous experience of other bodily organisms and since the validity of this experience too is called into question, I must not use it. Along with other egos, naturally, I lose all the formations pertaining to sociality and culture. In short, not just corporeal nature but the whole concrete surrounding life-world is, for me, from now on, only a phenomenon instead of something that is.[58]

In other words, transcendental reduction seems to have landed us in the deepest and most radical form of solipsism.

It is precisely this point which marks the parting of ways between phenomenology and existentialism and also the point at issue within phenomenology itself between the earlier realistic wing and Husserl of the Ideas. The immediate response to this is likely to be a recoil from transcendental reduction itself, for now the epoche is perceived as plunging us into the abyss of a total and irremediable solipsism. Reduction and with it the transcendental turn altogether is felt as responsible for the loss of all contact with reality. But perhaps this spectre of a world-loss is more the result of a misunderstanding of what reduction accomplishes; perhaps this distrust is more due to the misleading overtones of the term 'reduction'. We are likely to pass over without sufficient realization, the profound shift in meaning when we go over from eidetic to transcendental reduction, i.e. from the *Logical Investigations* to the *Fundamental Considerations* in the *Ideas*.[59] Husserl himself describes it as a change in nuance but one which has momentuous consequences for philosophy.[60] I am suggesting that even eidetic reduction of the Investigations is in a sense within the limits of the natural attitude; it is a demarcation of a region of essences within the overall framework of mundane experience. But transcendental reduction cannot be approached in this manner at all, for here even the realm of essences is suspended. If reduction it understood as removal from awareness, it would appear that transcendental reduction leaves no residue behind whatsoever. As Husserl remarks, the whole realm of experience of nature as well as of other subjects is suspended—hence the threat of a world-loss—which feeling is only heightened by the way Husserl introduces the transcendental reduction in terms of an experiment in world anhilation.[61] But surely such apprehensions are possible only if we take reduction as some kind of elimination, some kind of cosmic vanishing trick. What the reduction removes is not the world but a certain wrong interpretation of our experience of it. The idea that reduction is not any ontological elimination

but a noetic change and that in this sense it is hermeneutic rather than a metaphysical thesis can be made plausible only if we carefully differentiate epoche from doubt. In this connection, we remember that Husserl himself dissociates epoche from Cartesian doubt in two respects. First, doubting is not something wholly in our power, for it is possible only if the context or situation is of a certain kind, but reduction, Husserl holds, is a perfectly free act. Secondly and more importantly, doubting is within the natural attitude in the sense that it is partial and selective, whereas in reduction the entire natural or mundane orientation is itself overcome. Hence reduction is not to be modelled on any operation within the frame of reference of the natural standpoint. To put this in a different way: even after reduction, the phenomena continue to be presented as they were—there is no change in the *what* of experience. Reduction neither gives nor takes away anything. It can only mean a change in the *how* of experience, in the mode or manner of construing it. It can only mean the removal of a certain incorrect or illusory understanding of the world, an interpretation of it as something absolute and independent of consciousness, as having a reality or being in itself and of our consciousness as dependent upon and relative to this absolute being of the world. It is the removal of this understanding or what may be called the absolutization of the world that the reduction brings about. In Kantian terms, the transcendental reduction replaces the dogmatic understanding of consciousness and the world; in doing so it may appear to be scepticism but in reality what it effects is a Copernican revolution which shows the transcendental unity of consciousness to be the presupposition of the existence of a world of objects in so far as it is a world which one can understand and know. Reduction is, therefore, the replacement of an illusion by an insight, but this noetic change does not make the world disappear; on the contrary, it makes it accessible to us. Similarly, reduction of other subjects need not be taken as the annihilation of interpersonal relations; one need not, therefore, invoke the Sartrean 'look' to assure ourselves of the reality of the other against Husserl.

Here too, reduction is a hermeneutic rather than an ontic operation, an interpretation of our mode of being with others.

But Husserl talks not merely of the reduction of the object and other subjects but in the Fundamental Consideration, which I am now commenting upon, he also talks of the reduction of the self or of the subject and not merely of reduction to the subject. I propose to understand this difficult move in the programme of transcendental reduction within the scheme of a Kantian approach to phenomenology. But before I proceed to do so I would like to suggest that we must be sensitive to the differences between the three forms of reduction that we are now concerned with. A merely one-dimensional interpretation of reduction, as in conventional presentations, ignores these differences and hence projects a nihilistic interpretation of transcendental phenomenology. But when we deal with the concept of constitution in pheno-

menology, we must bear in mind that it has a different meaning for each level of reality. We must be aware of these differences; for although there is an analogy between self-constitution and the constitution of things, there are also relevant differences. The similarity is that we can speak of a falsifying interpretation in both cases. The difference is that the 'mind' as 'mind' owes its very existence entirely to this interpretation. For the 'mind' purification means elimination of mind as mind. It is unmasked as a fiction. In *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl writes: 'The ego as ego in the natural attitude is also and always a transcendental ego but it comes to know this by carrying out the phenomenological reduction.'[62] Such an identity between the mundane ego and the transcendental subject can only make sense if the former is a fiction. There is, therefore, a fundamental difference between the constitution of the object and the constitution of the ego, for in the case of the constitution of objects what is constituted is not a fiction in the sense in which the ego is a fiction. This difference is, furthermore, essential for the possibility of the *epoché* itself. I have argued that the transcendental reduction is the replacement of a fictive absolutization of the world; in a sense the ego is the locus of this interpretation but in another sense it is also the product of this hermeneutic *avidya*. That is why the transcendental reduction eliminates the ego in the sense in which it does not eliminate the worldly experiences. This means that the constitution of the ego is the basis of the transcendental illusion, and the reduction can be successful only in so far as the ego is dismantled.

Although it is necessary to distinguish the three types of constitution—the constitution of the objective, inter-subjective and subjective worlds—it is equally necessary to comprehend the complex interlockings and interdependencies among these forms of constitution, for it is this complex net work of constitutive acts that is pre supposed in the making of the life world. Perhaps one could claim that what we lack in Husserl is the theory of inter-relationships. This point is retrospective in its intention, for what it suggests is that constitution must be seen in terms of a certain framework which objectifies phenomena. In so far as Husserl's theory of constitution does not directly deal with the media of constitution, one may say that one is not in a position to comprehend the structure of constitution. In spite of all the refinements and modifications that he brings to Brentano's thesis of intentionality, it would appear in the end that for Husserl, too, intentionality is an irreducible direction of consciousness. I am suggesting that a vectorial theory of constitutive intentionality, which does not have an account of the structures of the constitutive framework, does not help very much. In Kantian terms, the theory of constitution is inseperable from the programme of the transcendental deduction. The question is, therefore, whether we have a different projection of the deduction than that of the Kantian one. The implied suggestion of this essay has been that we must look elsewhere than in Hegel and Husserl for a possible answer to that question.

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The Vedic corpus: some questions*

DAYA KRISHNA
University of Rajasthan, Jaipur

1. Hard Core of the Vedas

The Vedas are supposed to be, by common consent, the oldest and the most authoritative fountainhead of almost all tradition in India. In fact, it is with respect to the express acknowledgement or denial of their authority that the various traditions tend to define themselves and be defined by others in the long course of Indian history. Except for Buddhism, Jainism and certain forms of Tantrism, even radical movements against Brahmanism tended to make themselves accepted by claiming derivation from the Vedas or at least by acknowledging their authority. The Vīra Śaiva movement in South India which started as early as the twelfth century A.D. is a classic example of this. So is perhaps the movement of Śaiva-Siddhānta which tries to articulate the classical Tamilian thought on philosophical issues, primarily of an ontological kind, without questioning the authority of the Vedas. Dayanand Saraswati's repudiation of all later scriptures, and the response which his call for a return to the Vedas aroused at the end of the last century, is another testimony—if testimony be needed—to the same truth. But when one asks oneself the question as to what it is whose authority is being invoked or being denied, one does not find from the texts or the tradition any clear or definite answer. There is, of course, the famous statement, purporting to give a clear-cut answer to the question, that it is the Mantras and the Brāhmaṇas which constitute the Vedas. But then, what are the Mantras and the Brāhmaṇas that form the body of the Vedas? Do the Brāhmaṇas include or exclude the Āraṇyakas and the Upaniṣads? In case they are taken to include the latter, the question would arise as to whether they include all of them or only some of them. It is difficult to accept—and nobody does—that the Upaniṣads, composed as late as thirteenth or fourteenth century, are to be included in the Vedic corpus. But, on the other hand, if we include only those Upaniṣads which form an integral part of the Saṁhitās, the Brāhmaṇas or the Āraṇyakas, then we would have to exclude such well-known Upaniṣads from the Vedic corpus as the *Muṇḍaka*, the *Māṇḍūkya*, the *Praśna* and the *Śvetāśvatara* which are not supposed to form a part of any of them.

*Dr. Mukund Lath, Dr. R. C. Dwivedi, Dr. F. E. Krishna and Dr. R. N. Dandekar have helped in various ways in the completion of this article. It is no exaggeration to say that without their sustained help it would have been almost impossible to complete it.

Though all care has been taken to check the factual accuracy of the statements made in this article, there may still be marginal inaccuracies at places. However, I do not think they will affect the main conclusions in any substantive manner.

Perhaps, one way out of the dilemma might be to draw a date line and say that Upaniṣads, written after the date so chosen, will not be counted as part of the Vedic corpus. But not only would any date line so chosen be arbitrary; it would also run into the difficulty that some great Ācārya or other has treated the left-out Upaniṣads as a part of Śruti, that is, the Vedas, assuming the two to mean the same thing. The difficulty might be solved by treating all the Upaniṣads, referred to by any of the Ācāryas, as part of the Vedas, or to delink the notion of Śruti from its close identification with the Vedas and treat it as including all texts which are regarded as having ultimate authority in the tradition that recognizes the Vedas as authority also. But the problem, then, would be how to distinguish between the so-called non-Vedic Śruti from what the same tradition regards as Smṛti, that is, texts of secondary authority. Perhaps, we could think in terms of a hierarchy of authority amongst the texts of the so-called orthodox or mainstream tradition in India with Saṁhitās, the Brāhmaṇas, the Āraṇyakas and the Upaniṣads which are integral part of the first three at the top. The Upaniṣads, which are independent of these and have been referred to by the Ācāryas as authoritative, could then be treated as occupying the second place in the hierarchy of authority with the Smṛti texts occupying the third place.

The notion of a hierarchy of authoritative texts is well known both in legal and non-legal contexts. But if the above formulation were to be accepted, then one would also have to decide who is to be accepted as an Ācārya in the tradition and what is to count as a Smṛti text. In other words, what shall be the criteria for any text or person being designated as a Smṛti or an Ācārya? The issue is important as it has to be decided whether the term Ācārya is to be confined only to the well-known Ācāryas of the Vedānta tradition or it can be considered to include other founders of famous *Saṁpradāyas* also. The *Saṁpradāyas* extend, as is well known, to all schools—Vedic or non-Vedic. The famous founders of the various Buddhist schools, for example, are all known as Ācāryas. Asaṇga, Vasubandhu, Nāgārjuna, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are some of the well-known names in that tradition. The same situation obtains in Jainism also. But even if we count the non-Vedic Ācāryas out, we will have to settle the issue with respect to the non-Vedāntic Ācāryas of the tradition. The simple solution would, of course, be to accept only the so-called Vedāntic Ācāryas, and even amongst them only those who are usually recognized as such. This would leave, besides Gauḍapāḍa and Śaṁkara, only Yāmunācārya, Rāmānujācārya, Madhvācārya, Vallabhācārya and Niṁbārkācārya. But even this extreme extensional restriction, imposed on the term Ācārya in this context, would not serve the purpose as neither Yāmunācārya nor Rāmānujācārya nor Vallabhācārya nor Niṁbārkācārya has written separate, independent *Bhāṣyas* or commentaries on any of the Upaniṣads. Only Madhva has written independent commentaries of his own which happen to be on the same texts on which Śaṁkara is also supposed to have written his commentaries. There is some dispute amongst scholars regarding the attribution of Śaṁkara's commentaries to Śaṁkara himself. Paul Hacker and Sengaku Mayeda are supposed to have done the most careful work in this connection; but, as the same type of work has not even been attempted with respect to the work of the other Ācāryas in the Vedantic tradition, there can hardly be any significant comparative judgment about it.

One may argue that it was not necessary for the Ācāryas in the Vedāntic tradition to write independent commentaries on the Upaniṣads, as they had already written commentaries on the *Brahma-Sūtras* which was supposed to contain the quintessence of the Upaniṣads themselves. But if this were really the case, one would be hard put to explain why Śaṁkara or Madhva wrote *Bhāṣyas* on both the *Brahma-Sūtras* and the Upaniṣads. On the other hand, it seems equally wrong to think that all the Vedāntic Ācāryas have written commentaries on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, even if they have not done so on the Upaniṣads. If Dasgupta's list of the works of Yāmunācārya, given in the third volume of his *History of Indian Philosophy*, is taken to be authoritative, then it can safely be said that he has not written any independent, full-fledged *Bhāṣya* on the full text of the *Brahma-Sūtras*. The same will be true of Niṁbārka if the list of his works, given in the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* (vol. i, ed. Karl H. Potter), is taken as complete and authoritative.

It may be noted that even the general impression regarding the authoritative character of the so-called *Prasthānatrayī* for the Vedantic Ācāryas is not sustained by the evidence, as many of them have not only not written any commentaries on the Upaniṣads or the *Brahma-Sūtras*, but even on the *Gītā* which forms the third text of the triad. Neither Niṁbārka nor Vallabha, for example, has written commentaries on the *Gītā*. The latter has instead written on the *Bhāgavata*, while the former has not done even that. It is only Madhva who has written on the *Brahma-Sūtras*, the Upaniṣads, the *Gītā* and the *Bhāgavata*. Śaṁkara has commented only on the first three, Rāmānuja on the first and the third, Yāmunācārya only on the third, Vallabha on the first and the fourth and Niṁbārka on neither. One wonders how, in the light of this evidence, the myth of the *Prasthānatrayī* came to be accepted even by such scholars as Radhakrishnan who himself wrote commentaries on the first three, falsely imagining that he was following in the footsteps of the great Ācāryas.

One may, of course, give up the criterion of independent commentary on the texts usually supposed to belong to the Vedic corpus, and be satisfied with what may be called authoritative references to them in the works written by the Ācāryas. However, as neither the question regarding the authenticity of the attribution of the various texts to the Ācāryas has been settled nor all the texts allegedly written by them have been published, it is not possible to adopt the alternative and reach any satisfactory conclusions on its basis. But even a cursory glance at the material, wherever available, suggests that no startling results may be expected from the procedure. The Vedic texts

considered by Rāmānuja, for example, in his *Śrī Bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-Sūtras* relate mainly to such well-known Upaniṣads as the *Kaṭha*, the *Kauśītakī*, the *Chāndogya*, the *Taittirīya*, the *Praśna*, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, the *Muṇḍaka* and the *Śvetāśvatara*.[1]

The question as to whether the Upaniṣads form a part of the Vedic corpus or not has always been there. But even those, who have not hesitated to give an affirmative answer to the question, have not generally accepted all the texts that have been known as the Upaniṣads in the tradition as part of the corpus. Nor have they ever been able to give any reason why only some of the Upaniṣads should be included in the corpus and the others excluded. The same has never been the situation with respect to the Saṁhitās and the Brāhmaṇas. As for the Āraṇyakas, nobody seems to have raised any questions about them. Those, who have regarded the Saṁhitās and the Brāhmaṇas as alone forming the genuine Vedic corpus, have ignored both the Āraṇayakas and the Upaniṣads, and relegated them to a secondary place in the context of the acceptance of authority in the Vedic tradition of India. On the other hand, those who have opted for the inclusion of the Āraṇyakas and the Upaniṣads as essential parts of the Vedic corpus, have tended to emphasize the latter, and treated the former as providing a transition to the latter and thus a sort of no-man's land in which neither the votaries of *Karma* in the technical Vedic sense nor those of *Jñāna* found any interest whatsoever.

If we forget the Āraṇyakas and the Upaniṣads, what remains are the Mantras and the Brāhmaṇas making up the hard core of the Vedic corpus. And this is what tradition has consecrated as the Vedas. But what is this hard core about which there seems hardly any dispute? Perhaps, one should distinguish between the two, and ask about the relative priority with respect to their claim to form the hard core of the Vedic corpus. Perhaps, most would opt for the priority of the Mantras over the Brāhmaṇas, though it is by no means the case that the latter have no votaries of their own against the primacy of the Mantras. In fact, the dispute with respect to this issue, as we shall see later on, reaches down to the very heart of the dispute as to what is to be understood as the Vedas even in the tradition.

II. Sāmaveda: A Book of Melodies

But even supposing we accept, however provisionally, the primacy of the Mantras over the Brāhmaṇas, the question remains as to what Mantras are supposed to constitute the Vedas. The question may seem preposterous, unwarranted and even gratuitous when everybody has assumed since times immemorial, that there are four Vedas known as *Ṛk*, *Sāma*, *Yajur* and *Atharva* and the Mantras contained in them give each its distinctive identity, status and flavour. But this is just not true. The *Sāmaveda*, for example, for the most part, does not have any separate Mantras of its own and yet is regarded as a separate, independent Veda in its own right. According to Jan

Gonda, only 76 stanzas out of 1810 in the *Kauthuma Saṁhitā* are not found in the *Ṛgveda*.[2] Had he included the *Araṇya Kāṇḍa* which consists of 55 stanzas, the ratio of the non-*Ṛgvedic* part to the *Ṛgvedic* part would be about four per cent. The *Jaiminīya Saṁhitā* of the *Sāmaveda*, on the other hand, seems to contain only 48 non-*Ṛgvedic* stanzas out of a total of 1678 stanzas as given in Dr. Raghu Vira's edition of this work.[3] The ratio of non-*Ṛgvedic* part to the *Ṛgvedic* part in that case would be about three per cent. One cannot certainly claim that it has the status of an independent text on the basis of only three or four per cent new material in it. Or, if one wants to do so, one would have to take only this three or four per cent as constituting the real independent *Sāmaveda* text, and not all that goes under that name and is usually included in it.

But even this three or four per cent is not as innocent as it looks. First, many of these stanzas are found not only in other Saṁhitās but also in other works on ritual, as Gonda has remarked, even if they are not found in the extant Saṁhitās of the *Ṛgveda*. Secondly, there is some evidence to suggest that traditionally all the Mantras of the *Sāmaveda* were supposed to have been taken from the *Ṛgveda*. The very title of the two parts of the *Sāmaveda—Pūrvārcikaḥ* and *Uttarārcikaḥ*—as Gonda has noted, suggests this. Gonda has translated these as 'collections of ṛc stanzas' and has said that 'this name is most appropriate because, 76 excepted (a few of these occur in other *saṃhitās* or works on ritual), all these stanzas are taken from the Ṛgveda-Saṃhitā, mainly from the books VIII and IX of that corpus'.[4] But even the so-called exceptions seem only apparent as Sāyaṇa, in his Preface to the *Ṛgvedabhāṣya*, has written that 'the *Sāma* verses are all taken from the *Ṛgveda*,'[5] and hence it may be taken as established that at least in his time there were no Mantras in the *Sāmaveda* which had not been taken from the *Ṛgveda*. The English translation of Sāyaṇa's original,[6] is of course, not as accurate as one would have wished, but the sense, on the whole, seems to remain the same. In fact, one may assume that had exceptions been known in Sāyaṇa's time, he would certainly have mentioned them. The very fact that he has not done so may be taken as a fairly strong evidence in favour of the view that traditionally the *Sāmaveda* was not supposed to contain any Mantras which were not found in the *Ṛgveda*. The phrase *Āśritatvād* may reasonably be taken to mean this.

But, ultimately, even this controversy regarding the fact as to whether there are any independent Mantras which belong to the *Sāmaveda* and the *Sāmaveda* alone is irrelevant, for, as everyone knows, the *Sāmaveda* is not supposed to be concerned with the content of any Mantra or set of Mantras, but only with the way they should be sung. As Gonda has clearly stated: 'Now, in both books the essential element is not the texts—the Sāmavedins are less interested in the meaning of the words than (sic. obviously Gonda meant to write 'or' not 'than') in prosodic correctness—but the melody.'[7] And, as he adds: '*To teach the melodies is their very purpose*'.[8] But if this is

the central purpose of the *Sāmaveda*, then it is Veda in a sense which is very different from the sense in which the *Ṛgveda* is regarded as one. The Mantras occurring in the *Sāmaveda* could, then, only have an illustrative function, for a melody can be sung to different stanzas without losing its identity. On the other hand, as the same stanza can be sung to different melodies, the uniqueness of identity of the Mantric text ceases to be relevant in the musical context. In fact, most texts undergo an alteration because of the requirements of the song, a situation which obtains abundantly in the case of *Sāmaveda* also. Many of the differences between the *Ṛgvedic* verses and their *Sāmavedic* version is attributed to this fact. As Gonda has written: 'Some of these Ṛgvedic verses appear with different readings which must be explained as due to alterations introduced when the words of the text were set to music.'[9]

It may, of course, be said that, as the *Sāma* singing was an integral part of the Vedic *Yajña*, both the Mantra and the melody were so integrally and intimately related that, at least in that context, one cannot think of the one without the other. The *Udgātar*, along with his assistants who were usually five in number, formed an integral part of the ceremony constituting the *Śrauta* rites which formed the Vedic sacrifice, and the *Udgātar* was the priest who chanted the hymns which are there in the *Sāmaveda*. But if this is accepted, then it would mean that those hymns of the *Ṛgveda* which are not included in the *Sāmaveda* could not be sung to the *Sāma* melodies; or even if they could be so sung, they could not be used in the Vedic sacrifice just because they have not found their way into the collection that goes by the title of the *Sāmaveda* today. In case we accept this conclusion, we would be forced to divide the *Ṛgvedic* Mantras into those which could be used in the Vedic sacrifices and others which could not be so used. The former would be further divided into those which are sung to the *Sāma* melodies by the *Udgātar* and his associates and the others which are recited by the *Adhvaryu* and are found in the *Yajurveda*. The latter, that is, those which are found neither in the *Sāmaveda* nor in the *Yajurveda* would be deemed to have no role to play in the *Śrauta* sacrifices, and thus would provide the hard core for that part of the *Ṛgveda* whose meaning has no relation to the sacrifice, and hence has to be understood as essentially independent of it. This, as we shall see later, would affect the usual understanding of what the Vedas are in a fundamental manner.

The *Sāmaveda*, then, cannot be considered a Veda if by 'Veda' we mean a text with independent Mantras of its own. We may, of course, treat the three or four per cent of the present texts which are not found in the *Ṛgveda* as forming the *Sāmaveda*. But as even these are important only for the melody to which they are supposed to be sung, it is that melody which would constitute the Veda and not the Mantras that are distinctive of it. It should be remembered that even the Mantras from the *Ṛgveda* are subjected to relevant modifications, so that they may be suitably sung. The comprehensive

term for all these modifications, required for a Mantra to be sung according to the *Sāma* pattern, is called *Stobha*. As Gonda observes:

> Stobha is a comprehensive term for all modifications to which a *ṛc* is subjected when it is sung to a melody of the Sāmaveda, viz. modifications (e.g. lengthening) of syllables, repetitions, breaking up of words, insertions of apparently insignificant words or syllables such as *hoyi, hūva, hōi* (so-called 'chanted interjections,' *padastobha*, often briefly *stobha*)—which, admitting of a mystical interpretation, could serve esoteric purposes—and short inserted sentences (*vākyastobha*).[10]

But even if complete sentences could be inserted for melodic purposes, what happens to the sacrosanct character of the *Ṛgvedic* Mantras which were supposed to have been revealed and thus not amenable to any modification whatsoever? It may be said that, as the *Sāma* was also revealed, there is no harm in admitting one revelation as modified by another. But if revelation can be modified in such an arbitrary manner, it can hardly be considered a revelation at least by those who are prepared to modify it. The result of these modifications was, as is well known, not marginal but substantive in character. As Gonda observes: '...it will on the other hand be clear that the luxuriant ornamentation of *sāman* chants affected by repetitions, insertions, ungrammatical mutilations, whatever their significance for the believers, etc. render them abnormal as pieces of literature.'[11] It should be remembered that traditionally the *Sāmaveda* is supposed to have about a thousand *Śākhās*, though only two of them are extant at the present, the *Kauthuma* and the *Jaiminīya* or the *Talavakāra*. But this would imply that there were as many arbitrary modifications or *Stobhas*, both *Padastobha* and *Vākyastobha*, as the *Śākhās*, thus rendering the whole notion of Vedic revelation virtually meaningless. Not only this. As the same Mantra can be sung to different melodies, it is extremely likely that different *Śākhās* would sing the same text to different tunes, and that the modifications introduced might be due to this exigency rather than any other. But this would result in there not being just one *Sāmaveda* but as many as there are *Śākhās* with all their variations in melody and textual modifications.

In fact, as music was the central concern of the *Sāmaveda*, the actual text of the Mantras which were to be sung to those melodies seem to have become less and less important. There is some evidence to suggest that there was a school of *Sāma* which held that the real *Sāma* was independent of the Mantra and, in fact, had nothing to do with it. Dr. Mukund Lath, the well-known scholar on the history of music, has drawn attention to this in one of his recent articles entitled 'Ancient Indian Music and the Concept of Man.'[12] He writes:

> *Sāma* was a revealed form in its own right, just as the *ṛca-s*. Further, in

> many cases, *sāma* was valued for music alone. An example is that of the *anṛca sāma. Anṛcasāma* was a form of *Sāma* that had no *ṛk* base and was sung to meaningless syllables.[13]

The term *Anṛca*, literally speaking, can only mean a melody which is not sung to a *Ṛc* Mantra. Dr. Lath has, however, taken it to mean a melody which is sung to no text whatsoever. This is rather an arbitrary interpretation, the justification of which is supposed to lie in the *Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa* where, in the *Prathama Khaṇḍa* of the fourth *Anuvāka* of the first *Adhyāya*, it is said that *Sāmnānṛcena svargaṃ lokaṃ prayāteti*; and in the second *Khaṇḍa* of the sixth *Anuvāka* of the third *Adhyāya* it is said that *sa meśarīreṇa sāmnā śarīrāṇyadhūnot*.[14] The identification of *Anṛca* with *Aśarīra*, though not entirely unjustified, rests on the assumption that *Ṛc* alone can be the body of the *Sāma*. But this obviously is a questionable assumption. For, if *Ṛc* is taken to mean the corpus of Mantras which are found in the *Ṛgveda* and if it is accepted that there is no substantive ground *at present* to think that the three or four per cent of the Mantras in the *Sāmaveda* belong to the *Ṛgveda*, then these Mantras obviously form the non-*Ṛc* body for the *Sāma* melodies, according to the *Sāmaveda* itself. But the term *Ṛc* may be taken in a wider sense as referring not only to the Mantras which are actually found in the *Ṛgveda* but to any Mantra or Mantras which display the basic characteristics found in them. But even if this extended sense of *Ṛc* is accepted, it would not necessarily lead to the interpretation which Dr. Lath is putting on it for the simple reason that any particular melody can be sung to a diverse number of texts, *Ṛc* or non-*Ṛc*, unless it be established that the *Sāma* melodies can be sung *only* to texts which display the *Ṛc* characteristics. The identification, therefore, that Dr. Lath wishes to establish between the *Anṛca* and *Aśarīra* cannot be established.

Besides this, there are other objections to Dr. Lath's attempt to identify the two. First, he seems to assume that only meaningful words and/or sentences could be said to form the body or *Śarīra* of music. But there is no reason for this assumption. The term 'body' here merely means *Āśraya* or base and that could be provided by anything, meaningful or meaningless. Secondly, the distinction between meaningful and meaningless is relative, and that which is meaningless in one context or at one time may become meaningful in other contexts or at other times. The so-called meaningless syllables to which *sāma* came to be sung were later on invested with profound, mystical meanings. The word *Om* is the classical example of this. Thirdly, Dr. Lath seems to have overlooked the fact that while the first story refers to *Devas*, the second refers to men. Presumably, the *Devas*, usually translated as gods, did not have bodies—at least human bodies. There is, of course, the added question as to why the *Devas* desired heaven when, being *Devas*, they may be presumed to be already there. On the other hand, it may also be noted

that in the second story the king did not want to go to heaven but only to meet his friend who had died.

However it may be, the stories do show a desire to assert the independence of the essential *Sāma* from its accidental involvement with the Mantras of the *Ṛgveda*. Not only this, there is a strange undercurrent of hostility to the *Ṛgveda* and a desire to show the superiority of the *Sāmaveda* over the *Ṛgveda*. The Mantras of the latter are compared to the body while the *Sāma* is considered to be its soul. After the soul has left, the various parts of the body are supposed to be scattered all over which are then collected by Prajāpati and given the form of the *Ṛksaṃhitā*. Surely, the denigration of the venerable revealed *Ṛgveda* could not have gone farther.

The so-called essence of the *Sāmaveda*, that is, the melodies contained therein, are usually divided in at least a seemingly non-essential manner. The first division is made on the basis of the place where the melodies may be sung, that is, in a village or a forest. The second division is based on the basis of their use in the sacrifices or rituals of various types. The former are called the *Grāmageyagāna* and the *Āraṇyakagāna*, the latter the *Ūhagāna* and the *Ūhyagāna*. It it obvious that the two bases for division are based on different criteria. In fact, the latter are supposed to be an adaptation of the former for ritual or sacrificial purposes. As Gonda observes:

> The Ūhagāna containing the *sāmans* in their ritual order adapts (*ūh*) the melodies of the Grāmageya to the exigencies of the ritual praxis. The Ūhyagāna—the name is an abbreviation of Ūharahasyagāna, *rahasya* 'secret' being synonymous with *āraṇyaka*—has the same relation to Āraṇyakagāna with which it is affiliated.[15]

If this is accepted, then it would imply that *Sāmagāna* was used in two radically different contexts, one of pure singing and the other of rituals and sacrifices. The former was distinguished only by the place where one was supposed to sing them, the latter by the sort of sacrifice or ritual one was engaged in. But then not only would it have to be accepted that the context of the sacrifice is contingent for the *Sāmaveda*, but also that the so-called modifications in *Ṛc Mantras* are necessitated by two different kinds of exigencies—one, those arising from the fact of something being sung at a certain place and the other from the fact of their being used in ritual or sacrifice. The necessity for modification imposed by the former may be regarded as far more intrinsic than those implied by the latter. But it is not quite clear why any modifications should be needed by the fact that something has to be sung in a village or a forest. Similarly, it is not clear why any sacrifice involving a *Ūhyagāna* should be performed in secrecy in a forest.

Also, Gonda's discussion seems to imply that the hard core of the *Sāmaveda* is the *Pūrvārcika*, even though chronologically it may be later, and the important distinction there is between the *Araṇya Kāṇḍa* and the rest. The

Mantras in the *Āraṇya Kāṇḍa* are supposed to be sung in a secluded place such as a forest, while the rest require no such secrecy and may be sung in places where others are present, such as a village. The modifications involved in the *Ṛc* Mantras in these contexts is due to the exigency of singing, though it is not clear what difference, if any, should be made to the style of singing by the fact that it is sung in a forest or a village. The *Uttarārcika*, if Gonda's statement is to be believed, should be the same as the Mantras in the *Pūrvārcika* except that they have added modifications required by their use in rituals and sacrifices. However, it is not clear why these modifications should be needed and whether they can be regarded as musical in nature.

Unfortunately, it is not true that the Mantras in the *Pūrvārcika* and the *Uttarārcika* are the same, as would have to be the case if Gonda's statement is correct. From a rough calculation of the *Varṇānukramasūcī* given in the *Sāmaveda Saṃhitā* published from Pardi under the editorship of Satvalekar, it would appear that only 267 of the Mantras are repeated at more than one place in the text. Out of these, as many as 259 from the *Pūrvārcika* including the *Āraṇya Kāṇḍa* and the *Mahānāmnyārcika* are repeated in the *Uttarārcika* which is supposed to be concerned with rituals and sacrifices. But while this lends some credence to Gonda's claim, it should not be forgotten that the majority of the Mantras of the *Pūrvārcika*, 391 to be exact, are not repeated in the *Uttarārcika*. The total number of Mantras in the *Uttarārcika* being 1225, even if we take out 259 of them which are mere repetitions from the *Pūrvārcika*, there remains a hardcore of 966 which belong to *Uttarārcika* and *Uttarārcika* alone. Surprisingly, there are repetitions—both full and partial—in the *Uttarārcika* itself. *Mantras* (Nos. 758 and 1331), for example, are repeated in full in those numbering 1264 and 1679 respectively. On the other hand, there are partial repetitions of Mantras 651, 1145, 1575, 1576, 1577 and 1578 in 763, 1465, 1703, 1704, 1694 and 1695 respectively.

Gonda is a careful scholar and it is surprising to find him mistaken, particularly in the context of Vedic studies. What is, however, even more surprising is his explanation of *Ūhagāna* and *Ūhyagāna* as a *modification* of the *Sāmagānas* for ritual and sacrificial purposes. The use of the term 'modification' in this context can only be regarded as misleading in the extreme. Even a cursory look at the text of the *Ūha* and *Ūhyagāna* would show that what is happening is an incredible elaboration, complication and innovation which can hardly be described as modification by any stretch of imagination. The *Ūhyagāna*, for example, is supposed to start from Mantra 1160 of the *Uttarārcika*, yet it is preceded by thirty-three full pages of *Ūhyagāna* in the text. Similarly, *Ūhyagāna* is supposed to end with Mantra 1159 of the *Uttarārcika*, yet it continues on and on for almost eighteen pages of the text.[16]

The examples can be multiplied, but it is obvious that the situation that obtains in the case of the *Ūha* and *Ūhyagāna* can by no means be described as 'modification', as Gonda seeks to do. Not only this, even his equation between the *Āraṇya Kāṇḍa* and *Ūhyagāna* does not seem to be correct as the

number of Mantras, common to the *Āraṇya Kāṇḍa* and the *Uttarārcika* as a whole, hardly add up to ten out of fifty-five if the *Mahānāmnyārcika* is not included and out of sixty-five if it is included. However, none of these eight Mantras of the *Āraṇya Kāṇḍa* repeated in the *Uttarārcika*, is recited in a place where it could be subjected to an *Ūhyagāna* treatment. In fact, the five Mantras, which are repeated in the section where they are subjected to *Ūhyāgāna* treatment, are taken from those portions of the *Purvārcika* which occur earlier than the *Āraṇya Kāṇḍa*.[17] We may conclude, then, that the presumed relation between the *Āraṇya Kāṇḍa* and the *Ūhyagāna* does not exist.

The styles of singing that may be regarded as the hard core of the *Sāmaveda* need a description other than the one usually offered in terms of *Grāmageyagāna*, *Āraṇyagāna*, or even *Ūha* and *Ūhyagāna*. Basically, it is a question of the identification of melodies, musical patterns and their distinctive differences from one another. It is strange that it has been usually alleged that there was no written notation for writing music in India till very recent times, when there must have been such a system since at least the time when the *Sāmagānas* were reduced to a written form. In fact, the relation of traditional *Sāma* singing to the development of musical tradition in India needs to be explored in greater depth than has been done until now.

The *Sāmaveda*, thus, can hardly be considered a Veda as not only it has no independent text of its own, but is not even supposed to have one in the strict sense of the term. Once the concepts of *Aṛca* and *Aśarīrī Sāma* are accepted, and the emphasis shifts from the text to the melody, the way is opened for the development of pure music for the sake of music. And once the emphasis turns on the music, there develop as many schools as there are styles of singing. The so-called one thousand *Śākhās* of the *Sāmaveda* may perhaps be understood in some such way. They might have been like the musical *Gharānās* of today—proliferating over centuries and developing and preserving their distinctive styles and taking pride in them just as they do today.

III. Division of Yajurveda

The *Sāmaveda*, even in the tradition, has not been given the same importance as the *Yajurveda*. The *Yajurveda*, in fact, is the heart of the *Yajña* as without it the *Yajña* cannot even be conceived. Sāyaṇa wrote his first *Bhāṣya* on the *Yajurveda* and not on the *Ṛgveda*. Presumably, there were great objections to this, as in his Preface to the *Ṛgvedabhāṣya* he tries to explain why he did this. And his explanation is none other than that of its prime importance for the performance of sacrifice which is the central concern of the Vedas. As he argues: '...still the *Yajurveda* is properly explained before it. Because the *Yajurveda* is most important for the sacrifice; and it is in order to perform the sacrifice that we must know the meaning of the Veda.'[18] And later he says:

'...this being so, the body of the sacrifice is formed in the *Yajurveda*, the Veda of the *Adhvaryu* priest: the hymn and lesson required by the sacrifice as parts of it are filled up by the other two Vedas. Here then the *Yajurveda* is dominant, and it has been properly first explained.'[19]

The *Yajurveda*, then, is the body of the sacrifice or rather its very being, if Sāyaṇa is to be believed. But which of the two *Yajurvedas* constitutes this body, for, as everybody knows, there are two *Yajurvedas* and not one, as is the case with the other Vedas. As both have been recognized from the very beginning as the Vedas, the sacrifices may, more properly, be said to have two bodies instead of one.

The *Śukla Yajurveda* and the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* are two Vedas and not one. They are not two *Śākhās* of the *Yajurveda*, and have never been treated as such. In fact, each one of them has *Śākhās* of its own; and if such be the case, there can be no ground for regarding them as parts of a single Veda and not as two, separate, independent Vedas. But if this is accepted, then even on the traditional reckoning there would have to be five Vedas and not four, as is usually believed. Usually, the distinction between the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* and the *Śukla Yajurveda* is supposed to lie in the fact that while in the former the Mantra and the Brāhmaṇa portion is mixed, in the latter it is separated. But if this were the only difference, there would be a close relation between the Mantra and the Brāhmaṇa portion of the one with the Mantra and the Brāhmaṇa portion of the other. But this is not the case at all. If we take the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* as the point of reference and compare it with the *Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā* of the *Śukla Yajurveda* and the Brāhmaṇa parts of the former with the *Śatpatha Brāhmaṇa* which is supposed to belong to the latter, we find that many of the Mantras or the Brāhmaṇa portions found in the former are not there in the latter. Out of a total of 651 Mantra and Brāhmaṇa texts of the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, only 392 are found in the *Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā* and the *Śatpatha Brāhmaṇa* together. If we delete the Brāhmaṇa part and consider only the *Mantras* which are common to the two, then their absolute number would obviously be less. The total number of Mantras in the *Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā* of the *Śukla Yajurveda* is supposed to be 3988, while the total number of *Kaṇḍikās* happens to be 1975. The total number of *Kaṇḍikās*, including the *Brāhmaṇa* portion in the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*, now happens to be only 651. The number of *Kaṇḍikās* consisting only of Mantras, therefore, is bound to be lower still. Hence there is little likelihood of any fit between the Mantra portions of the two *Yajurvedas*, the *Kṛṣṇa* and the *Śukla*. In fact, Keith comparing the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* with the *Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā* and the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* of the *Śukla Yajurveda* finds that only 392 *Kaṇḍkās* of the one are repeated in the other.[20] There is thus a substantive difference between the two *Yajurvedas*; and if one were to cut down the similarity between the Brāhmaṇa portions, the difference would loom even larger. The

prevailing idea, therefore, that the differences between the two amount *only* to the stylistic fact that while the Mantra and the Brāhmaṇa portions are amalgamated in the one they have been separated in the other is incorrect. The differences go far deeper and substantially warrant their being treated as separate Vedas.

The *Śukla Yajurveda*, in fact, comprises many more Mantras than are found in the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*. As Gonda observes: 'The *mantras* proper, many of which in fact *ṛgvedic* verses, are more numerous and important than in the Black Yajurveda.'[21] Not only this. 'The text has...in course of time been much enlarged.'[22] In fact, only one to eighteen chapters are supposed to belong to the original part of the *Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā* of the *Śukla Yajurveda*. as 'they are the only ones that coincide with the ancient parts of the Black Yajurveda and are alone in being commented upon in the corresponding first nine books of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, no more than a few quotations from the following chapters being found in that voluminous work.'[23] But if *twenty-two* chapters out of *forty* are later additions to the Saṁhitā and if they have not been even commented on in the relevant Brāhmaṇa related to the text, then how can the *Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā* of the *Śukla Yajurveda* be regarded as authoritative at all? Also, there is supposed to be an 'ancient part of the Black Yajurveda with which the first eighteen chapters of the *Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā* of the *Śukla Yajurveda* are supposed to coincide. But if that be so, then the hard core of the *Yajurveda* should be regarded as consisting of those texts which are common to the two. But if one looks closely at the list of the Mantras which are common to the *Vājasaneyī* and the *Taittirīya Saṁhitās* of the two *Yajurvedas* as given by Keith, one finds that while, by and large, Gonda's statement is correct, it is not as completely true as one would expect it to be from the way he has put it. For example, large parts of chapters 24 and 25 of the *Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā* are found in *Kāṇḍa* Vth, prapāṭhaka 5, 6 and 7. Similarly, *Kāṇḍa* 7. *Prapāṭhaka* 1 reproduces Mantras from *adhyāya* 22 of the *Vajasaneyī Saṁhitā*. Elsewhere, we have mantras from chapters 33, 22, 19, 39, 38, 35, 27, 29 and 23. In fact, more than sixty Mantras from the *Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā* are found in the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, according to the list given by Keith.[24]

The *Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā* of the *Śukla Yajurveda*, we are told, borrows at least fifty per cent of its material from the *Ṛgveda*. According to Gonda: 'Half of this *Saṁhitā* consists of verses, most of which (over 700) occur also in the *Ṛgveda*.'[25] It is not clear from Gonda's statement whether these verses from the *Ṛgveda* are confined only to the first eighteen chapters of the *Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā* of the *Śuklayajurveda* or are scattered all over the text. Further, it is not clear what Gonda means by a verse in this statement. In case he means a Mantra, then he seems to be definitely wrong, for the total number of Mantras in the *Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā* happens to be 3988, and 700 is certainly not half of that number. Perhaps, Gonda is referring to *Kaṇḍikās*

and not Mantras, but even they are 1975, a number substantially higher than twice 700 which he ascribes to them.

In fact, the whole problem is further complicated by the fact that there is no single criterion for deciding what constitutes a Mantra. Prof. Dandekar has brought to my attention the fact that Sāyaṇa in his Preface to the *Ṛg-vedabhāṣya*, has extensively considered this question and concluded 'It is a good definition to say that whatever the sacrificing priest calls a *Mantra* is such.'[26] But what if the *Yājñikas* differ? Sāyaṇa has not considered this possibility. On the other hand, *Āpastamba Śrautasūtra* first defines Brāhmaṇa as *Karmacodanā* (24.1.30-35) and Mantra as that which is not a Brāhmaṇa. But perhaps it is this discrepancy in the criteria used which explains why, even when the printed text is almost the same in two different editions of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*, the number of Mantras given by them differs—a fact which would otherwise be totally inexplicable. Take, for example, the number of mantras contained in 1.1.4, 1.1.5 and 1.1.6 of the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* edited by Satwalekar and the *Mūla Yajurveda Saṁhitā* edited by Maharishi Devarata. The former contains 19, 17 and 11 Mantras respectively while the latter gives their numbers as 17, 18 and 12 respectively.[27] It is not as if the text is different in the two editions, but what is conceived of as a Mantra differs in the two cases. It is also not the case that the discrepancy is confined to these three *Kaṅḍikās* only. One finds it again in 1.1.10, 1.1.13, 1.6.21, 1.6.4, and so on. It may also be noted that there is no uniformity in the discrepancy. It is not as if one has always more or less Mantras than the other, or that the amount by which it is more or less is the same. In fact, Sāyaṇa in his commentary on the very first Mantra of *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*, wrote that there was a difference of opinion regarding whether it was to be construed as one Mantra or two *Mantras*.[28] He writes, अत्र केचित् युष्मच्छब्दावृत्त्या द्वे यजुषी आहुः। It is obvious from the wording that there are two opinions on the matter—some holding that because of the repetition of the word *Yuṣmad* twice, the text should be construed as containing *two Yajuṣa* Mantras instead of one, while others are of a contrary opinion. But it is equally obvious that whatever may be one's opinion on the matter, it is bound to be arbitrary in character and essentially undecidable in principle. The differences regarding the total number of Mantras in *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* 1.1.4, for example, do not arise because of the difference of opinion regarding *Yuṣmad* as it does not occur there at all. The first difference, for example, occurs in the treatment of दू॰हस्व मा ह्वाः as a separate independent Mantra by Satvalekar while Daivarāta treats it as a part of the previous Mantra. The second difference arises because Satwalekar treats वैश्वानर ज्योति as a separate Mantra while Daivarāta treats it as forming a part of the earlier Mantra. None of these distinctions rests upon the use of *Yuṣmad* about which Sāyaṇa had written in his commentary.*

*Incidentally, Sontakke and Dharmadhikari seem to regard दू॰हस्व मा ह्वाः not as an independent *Mantra* but as forming a part of the *Mantra* starting from 'हविर्धानँ' and

Obviously, the situation is disquieting; but none of the eminent editors of the text seems to feel disconcerted by it as none of them has given any reason as to why *his* construal of the Mantra should be accepted rather than that of the others.

Besides this problem of what constitutes a Mantra and that of the relationship between the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* and the *Śukla Yajurveda*, there is the deeper problem of the so-called *Śākhās* of these Saṁhitās. After all, there is no such thing as *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*. There is either the *Taittirīya* Saṁhitā or the *Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā* or the *Kapiṣṭhala Saṁhita* or the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā* and each has a distinctive status and character of its own which is different from the others. Keith has given a comparative chart of the four *Saṁhitās* of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* in his well-known work on this Veda, taking the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* as the standard base and comparing others in relation to it. The comparison reveals that out of a total of 651 *Kaṅḍikās* of the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, only 490 are found in the *Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā*, 417 in the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā* and 229 in the *Kapiṣṭhala Saṁhitā*. Thus the number of *Kaṅḍikās*, missing in the *Kāṭhaka*, happens to be 161, while in the case of *Maitrāyaṇī* and *Kapiṣṭhala* it happens to be of the order of 234 and 422 respectively.

Now this is not a minor or negligible difference, and to treat it as such is to do violence to facts. If one looks at the matter closely, one finds that in the *Kapiṣṭhala Saṁhitā* the whole of the 6th and 7th *Prapāṭhakas* and large parts of the 8th *Prapāṭhaka* of the first *Kāṇḍa* are missing. As for *Kāṇḍa* 2, it is almost totally absent except for ii.5.4, ii.6.4, ii.6.5. and ii.6.6. In *Kāṇḍa* 3, the story repeats itself. Except for iii.1.8, iii.2.10, iii.5.7 and iii.5.8, we draw a complete blank. In *Kāṇḍa* 5, in *prapāṭhakas* IV, V, VI and VII, we again find very few occurences, the total number coming to nine only. As for *Kāṇḍa* 7, it is almost totally absent from *Kapiṣṭhala Saṁhitā* except for one solitary piece mentioned in vii.2.7. Thus, if we take *Kāṇḍas* 2, 3, 5

ending with 'विक्था' (see p. 69). Neither Sāyaṇa nor Bhaṭṭbhāskara seems to have anything to say about this in their commentary on this *Mantra*. The situation thus may be summaried in the following way:

According to Satwalekar, the mantra should read as:

1. दू॰हस्व मा ह्वाः *Mantra* no. 93, p. 2).

According to Sontakke and Dharmadhikari as:

2. हविर्धानं दू॰हस्व मा ह्वाः[5] मित्रस्य त्वा

चक्षुषा प्रेक्षे मा भेर्मा सं विक्था (p. 69).

And according to Daivarāta as:

3. त्वं देवानामसि सस्नितमं पप्रितमं जुष्टतमं वह्नितमं

देववहूतममहतमसि हविर्धानं दू॰हस्व मा ह्वाः[5] (p. 4)

and 7 we find that the total number of occurrences comes to about eighteen only.

However, it is not only that large parts of what is found in the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* is absent from the *Kapiṣṭhala Saṁhitā*, but also that what is found in the latter is absent in the former. If we take Keith's comparative chart as the basis and reverse the direction of comparison, we find that only twenty-six chapters out of forty-seven have any counterpart in the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*. Even amongst the chapters that do have a counterpart in the *Taittirīya*, some are only nominally there. Chapter 4, for example, has only one part, that is, section 8, represented in the *Taittirīya*, and that, too, occurs only partially. Similarly, chapters 34 and 47 have only sections 1 and 2 respectively, represented in the *Taittirīya*. It is true that the manuscript of this Saṁhitā has been found only in a fragmentary form, but even in such a fragmented form it contains material that is not found in the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, and yet was treated *as authoritative* by the followers of the *Śākhā* as the followers of the *Taittirīya* did theirs.

The situation is no different with *Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā* of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*. The former does not merely have 161 *Kaṇḍikās* less than the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* but also has at least three *Sthānakas*, that is, full chapters which are not found in the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*. These are *Sthānakas* 36, 37 and 38. Even where a *Sthānaka* has a counterpart in the *Prapāṭhakas* of the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* as *Sthānakas* 14 and 35, the number of *Anuvākas* which are found in the latter are very few. For example, only the first four *Anuvākas* of *Sthānaka* 14 find a place in the *Taittirīya*, when their total number in that *Sthānaka* happens to be ten. The situation is worse if we look at *Sthānaka*.[35] Out of its twenty *Anuvākas*, only two are found in the *Taittirīya*, that is, nos. 8 and 13. As for the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā*, it has not only 234 sections less than the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, but its whole fourth *Kāṇḍa* is supposed to be *Khila*, that is, an appendage or addition which is not supposed to be a regular part of the text. But if this is so, then those parts of the fourth *Kāṇḍa* of *Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā* which are found in the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* should also be regarded as *Khila*. But the counterpart material of the fourth *Kāṇḍa* of the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā* is scattered over all the *Kāṇḍas* except 5th and 7th of the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*. This would make these portions *Khila* also, unless what is regarded as *Khila* in one Saṁhitā need not be regarded as *Khila* in another. But normally the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* is not supposed to have any *Khila* portions in it—a situation that can be explained only on the latter hypothesis. But if it is seriously accepted, it would destroy the very idea of their being *one Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* and the so-called other Saṁhitās being its *Śākhās*.

IV. Vedic Śākhās

In fact, the whole question of *Śākhās* needs to be examined with greater care than seems to have been done until now. Normally, a *Śākhā* implies something akin to what is meant by the term 'recension' with respect to a text. There is a large common core and marginal variations in different renderings of the same text. The term *Śākhā*, however, has the added connotation of being a school which had branched off from a common source and developed differences because of that. But even though this is the usually accepted story, it hardly squares with the facts as even superficially known. If one asks, for example, which is the *Yajurveda* and what are its *Śākhās*, there is no satisfactory answer. First, there is no such thing as the *Yajurveda*. We have either the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* or the *Śukla Yajurveda*. These are not treated as *Śākhās* of the *Yajurveda*, but if one were to do so one would have to point to some *Mūla Yajurveda* of which they were the *Śākhās*. And there is no such *Yajurveda* extant at present. But do we, then, have a *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* or a *Śukla Yajurveda*? As far as I know, there is no such thing either. What we have is the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* or the *Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā*, or the *Kapiṣṭhala Saṁhitā* or the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā*. These are all supposed to be *Śākhās* of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*, but then where is the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* of which these are the *Śākhās*? Normally, the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* is treated as being identical with the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* proper and the rest as its *Śākhās*, but no justification seems to be given for it. In fact, if we look at the structure of these four Saṁhitās of the Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda, they show such variations that it is difficult to see how they could be regarded as *Śākhās* of one and the same Veda. The *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* is divided into seven *Kāṇḍas*, each further divided into *Prapāṭhakas* which are then further divided into *Anuvākas* consisting of Mantras and Brāhmaṇas. The *Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā*, on the other hand, has no *Kāṇḍas* but only *Sthānakas* which happen to be forty in number. These are divided into *Anuvākas* which contain the Mantras. The *Kapiṣṭhala Saṁhitā*, which also is supposed to belong to the *Kāṭhakas*, consists of forty-seven chapters containing various sections. The *Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā*, on the other hand, consists of only four *Kāṇḍas* containing *Prapāṭhakas* which consist of *Anuvākas* containing Mantras.

It is not only that the structure of these texts is different but also the sequence of the Mantras or even the *Anuvākas* is different in different Saṁhitās. Even a cursory look at the comparative chart given by Keith reveals this. To give but one example, while 1.6.6 is found in the 5th *Sthānaka* of the *Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā*, 1.6.7 is found in the 31st and 32nd *Sthānka* of the *Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā*.[29] But if both the structure and the sequence are so different, how can they be regarded as variants of the same Veda? Gonda has admitted: 'What is lacking is the original *Yajurveda Saṁhitā*.'[30] Not only this, according to him, 'the considerable difference between the *Śākhās* extant does not even allow us to attempt its reconstruction, except for some sections, among which that dealing with the horse sacrifice.'[31] Gonda's own conclusion is: 'So we are led to assume that, while part of these collections developed from one common source, they were after their separation, amplified according to a similar plan or similar principles.'[32] But even if the plans or principles

behind the amplifications were similar, the contents were not. And it is the difference in contents that is crucial for determining whether they are to be regarded as different or just minor variations of a single text. Not only this, Gonda does not even see the significance of the whole activity of addition and amplification on the part of the *Ṛṣis* of a presumably common heritage which had been given to them as a common Vedic patrimony. Obviously, they would not have regarded it as *Apauruṣeya* or *revealed,* or viewed it in any such manner that it was only to be memorized and passed on and nothing added to it or altered.

In fact, the very large proliferation of the *Śākhās,* at least as mentioned in the tradition, testifies to the fact that the *Ṛṣis* of those days treated their Vedic patrimony with a degree of freedom that seems sacrilegious when viewed in the perspective of attitudes with which the Vedas have been traditionally looked at for a long time past. The *Yajurveda* itself is supposed to have 101 *Śākhās,* the *Sāmaveda* 1000, the *Atharvaveda* 9 and *Ṛgveda* 21.[33] The works of most of these *Śākhās* are not available today, but the very fact that such was the opinion prevalent in Patanjali's time is sufficient to prove that the Vedas were regarded in a totally different way in Vedic times. At what point and why the development of Vedic *Śākhās* stopped is an interesting historical question which needs to be investigated further. Perhaps the interest shifted from the sacrificial ritual to the Upaniṣadic speculation which continued to be written till as late as the thirteenth century A.D.

The problem of the *Śākhās,* even in their extant versions, deserves more serious attention than has been given to it up till now. Ultimately, it is the differences or the additions, deletions and modifications in the various *Śākhās* that are distinctive of them, and these have to be emphasized and brought out in a distinctive manner. It should not be forgotten in this connection that even when there is a repetition of the text between one Saṁhitā and another, it is seldom complete or total. Also, normally it is embedded amongst other material which is absent in the text in terms of which the comparison is sought to be attempted. Keith's table comparing the contents of the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* with the other texts of the *Yajurveda* is thus systematically misleading; it not only makes confusion between a *Kaṇḍikā* and Mantra, but also gives the impression that the whole of the *Kaṇḍikā* or the Brāhmaṇa text has a counterpart in the other texts when, in fact, it has only certain of its parts common with them. Further, for a fuller comparison each of the texts should have been taken as the basis for comparison and not just the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā,* as only then we could have had a complete, full-bodied picture of the situation.

The problem of the *Śākhās* gets further complicated by the fact that even the same *Śākhā* is multiplied into several subdivisions which have independent texts of their own. The *Kāṭhakas,* for example, are supposed to be divided into twelve *Śākhās* which in turn have their own subdivisions. In fact, the *Kapiṣṭhala* and the *Maitrāyaṇī* are both supposed to belong to the *Kāṭhaka*

school. But then to which school does the *Kāṭhaka Saṁhitā* belong? And in case it is the original Saṁhitā of the *Kāṭhaka* school, then how is it that there are substantial differences, including structural ones, between it and the *Kapiṣṭhala* and the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitās* which are also supposed to belong to the same school? Further, what happens to the *Taittirīya* and to what school does it belong?

There seems little point in ignoring these questions or brushing them under the carpet. In fact, the *Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā,* as already pointed out, raises the problem of the whole fourth *Kāṇḍa* which is supposed to be *Khila* in character. Also, the Saṁhitā has a total of 1701 Mantras taken from the *Ṛgveda* out of which 1062 belong to the fourth *Kāṇḍa.* These are taken from all the *Mandalas* of the *Ṛgveda* including the *Pariśiṣṭa* part.[34] But these are not the Mantras which are treated as *Khila* in the *Ṛgveda,* and if *they are not* so treated there, how can they be so treated here? Further, the occurrence of such a large number of Mantras from the *Ṛgveda* raises problems of its own. As already discussed in the context of the *Sāmaveda,* it raises the basic question of the unique identity of a text being regarded as a separate Veda by itself.

Ṛg-Vedic Repetitions

The problem of repetitions, in fact, plagues the *Ṛgveda* itself. Even a cursory glance at Bloomfield's *Rig-Veda Repetitions*[35] would show the enormity of the extent of these repetitions and the complex problems they pose for any serious student of the subject. It is not only that a very large number of Mantras from the *Ṛgveda* are repeated in the other Vedas, but that there are substantive repetitions in the *Ṛgveda* itself. *Rig-Veda Repetitions* is based on Bloomfield's earlier monumental work, *The Vedic Concordance,* published in 1906. As Bloomfield himself has said in the Introduction to *Rig-Veda Repetitions* the complete picture of Vedic repetitions would emerge only when the *Reverse Concordance* is completed. Unfortunately, no one seems to have completed Bloomfield's unfinished work in this area until now. Yet, even the *Rig-Veda Repetitions* throws light 'on the way in which the poets of the Rig-Veda exercised their art... by studying the manner and extent to which *they borrowed from one another, imitated one another, and, as it were, stood upon the shoulders of one another*' (*italics* mine).[36] But if this was the relation of one Vedic *Ṛṣi* to another, how can that relationship be understood either in terms of *Apauruṣeyatva* or revelation or even in terms of the usual notion of Vedic authority? The problem is even more complicated as the text of the *Ṛgveda* along with the Saṁhitās of the other Vedas include portions which are self-consciously proclaimed as *Khila.* Now, if people were prepared to add even to the *Ṛgvedic* Mantras and pass them off as originally belonging to the Saṁhitā then where is that sacrosanct attitude to the Veda about which there is such incessant talk amongst the scholars of

the tradition? In fact, there are supposed to be *Khilas* 'which found entrance into the Ṛgveda-Saṁhitā.'[37] According to Gonda:...'they are real, though insignificant, Vedic hymns but are considered to be inferior and half-apocryphal.'[38]

Gonda does not seem to realize the import of what he himself is saying, a situation not unusual in the field of Vedic scholarship. First, if the Vedas are to be regarded as Vedas, there cannot be a distinction of superior and inferior, or significant and insignificant between its different parts. Also, there can be no such thing as 'half-apocryphal'; either it is apocryphal or it is not. Gonda is misled into characterizing it as such, because the *Vālakhilyas*, unlike those which are just *Khilas*, 'found entrance into the Ṛgveda-Saṁhitā.'[39] But that *was* the intention of all the *Khila* compositions; only some succeeded while others failed. Yet, even those who failed found a permanent place in the *Pariśiṣṭa* section of the Saṁhitā.

It may be said that we are totally mistaken in our approach as we are thinking of the Vedas as if they had some distinctive, specific content of their own. It is this presupposition that makes us wonder about the large-scale repetitions which are found in the texts as they ought not to be construed as contents but rather as different aspects of the Vedic ritual in the context of which alone they have meaning. The *Yajuṣa* formulas, for example, are supposed to be spoken by the *Adhvaryu* at the sacrificial ritual while the *Udgātar* chanted the hymns of the *Sāmaveda* to the melodies prescribed in them. The *Hotar*, on the other hand, 'was supposed to 'recite definite consecratory texts (*yājyā*), and the *nividas*.'[40] As 'the latter represent the oldest prose preserved from the period of the Ṛgveda',[41] it may be taken that the *Hotar* represented the *Ṛgveda* at the Vedic *Yajña* just as the *Adhvaryu* represented the *Yajurveda* and the *Udgātar*, the *Sāmaveda*. The *Atharvaveda*, even though having only 'slight relation to *śrauta* rites'[42] seems to have got itself there in the role of a priest 'who, briefly called the *brahman*, oversees, accompanies (*anumantraṇa*) and corrects by means of expiatory formulas (*prāyaścitta*) possible accidents and blunders of the officiants.'[43]

The fourfold division of functions between the *Hotar*, the *Udgātar*, the *Adhvaryu* and the *Brahman* corresponds, we are told, to the four Vedas, and the unity of the sacrifice is the unity of the Vedas. But this idyllic picture hardly corresponds to the facts as attested to by the tradition itself. First, it is well known that the *Atharvaveda* never enjoyed the same status as the other three Vedas in the tradition. As Gonda writes:

> Although the doctrine of the fourfold Veda...found acceptance various later texts continued speaking of the Threefold Holy Knowledge. Even in modern times there have been brahmins who refused to recognise the authority of the promulgators of the fourth Veda, because of a certain prejudice prevailing against it. Even today brahmans of the other Vedas do not dine or marry with the atharvanic (*paippalādins*) of Orissa.[44]

The more important point, however, is that even the other two Vedas, that is, the *Sāmaveda* and the *Yajurveda* have their material borrowed from the *Ṛgveda* in such an overwhelming quantity as to make nonsense of the claim that each is performing a different function in the ritual sacrifice. If, for example, *Ṛc* and *Yajuṣa* are totally different, then how can a *Ṛc* Mantra perform the *Yajuṣa* function in the ritual? It is not as if the *Ṛc* Mantras that perform the *Yajuṣa* function do not perform, say, the *Sāma* function in the sacrifice. In fact, when the same text from the *Ṛgveda* is found both in the *Sāmaveda* and the *Yajurveda*, one would be hard put to distinguish its respective functions in the three Vedas or in the sacrifice in which it is used. As most of the Mantras of the *Sāmaveda* are from the *Ṛgveda* and a very large portion of the Mantras in the various *Saṁhitās* of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* or the *Śukla Yajurveda* are also from the *Ṛgveda*, it is extremely unlikely that the *Sāmaveda* and the *Yajurveda* have no Mantras in common. Even if we forget the *Ṛgveda* for the moment, the occurrence of a Mantra both in the *Sāmaveda* and the *Yajurveda* would mitigate against the view being propounded above. Take, for example, the Mantra 1.456 of the *Sāmaveda* (*Indro Viśvasya rājati*) which also occurs in the *Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā* of the *Śukla Yajurveda* as the eighth Mantra of the thirty-sixth *Adhyāya*. Now, shall we treat it as performing a *Sāma* function or a *Yajuṣa* function? It is true that in the latter it occurs not as the whole Mantra but only as a part of one (*Indro Viśvasya rājati Śaṃ noṃ astu dvipade śaṃ catuṣpadaṃ*). But then this raises the old question we raised earlier; 'What is a Mantra?' Surely, if '*Indro Viśvasya rājati*' forms one complete Mantra in the *Sāmaveda*, it cannot cease to do so in the *Yajurveda*.

The *Atharvaveda* itself is supposed to have taken whole sections of the *Ṛgveda* for use by the *Brahman* priest in the sacrifice. According to Gonda:

> '...it was for the ritual use of this *brahman* priest, and specially for one of his assistants, the *brāhmaṇācchaṃsin*, that AVS, XX was, as their special collection (*saṁhitā*), added to the corpus. Some portions (13 of the 143 *sūktas*) excepted this book consists of literal borrowings from the *Ṛgveda-Saṃhitā*.[45]

To get some idea of the sort of borrowing that was done, we may take the first *Sūkta* of XXth *Kāṇḍa* of the *Atharvaveda*. It consists of only three Mantras, the first taken from the 10th *Sūkta* of the *Maṇḍala* III of the *Ṛgveda*, the second from the 86th *Sūkta* of the *Maṇḍala* I of the *Ṛgveda* and the third from the 46th *Sūkta* of the *Maṇḍala* VIII of the *Ṛgveda*. This, frankly, is not even straight borrowing, but borrowing to cover one's tracks so that none may suspect the act of borrowing. These are borrowings of whole full-fledged Mantras from the *sūktas*. One would be hard put to explain how they undergo a differentiation of function just from the fact of being borrowed in such a clandestine manner from one text into another. In fact, one may

easily find from Bloomfield's *Vedic Concordance* scores of instances where the same text occurs in all the four Vedas. The proponents of the sacrificial functional theory would be hard put to account for such a situation. The usual way out is the *ad hoc* injunction that if in any sacrifice a particular Mantra is being used from a particular Veda which is presumed to perform the function peculiar to that Veda alone, then the same Mantra, even if it occurs in the other Vedas, is not to be used in that sacrifice for the performance of the other functions belonging to those Vedas. But this obviously is an *ad hoc* solution to the problem which must have been adopted by the ritual practitioners to avoid the embarrassment caused by the identity of Mantras in what were ostensibly supposed to be different Vedas.

The operational theory of the Vedic texts is deeply enshrined in the Mīmāṁsā way of looking at them. Sāyaṇa's commentary on the Vedas is perhaps a classical example of this. In fact, his decision to write first his commentary on the *Yajurveda* and his defence thereof, as already pointed out, is an evidence of this. But this, it is forgotten, would make Brāhmaṇas the centre of the Veda as it is they and they alone which operationalize the Veda. The Mantra portion would then be subsidiary or ancillary to the Brāhmaṇas as it is through them that they find their meaning which is contained in the sacrificial operations that they specify. The procedure, followed in the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, not to separate the Brāhmaṇa portion into independant texts, would then be justified as there is no point in giving the operational meaning separately when it *alone tells* us what is being meant. Also, if it is the Brāhmaṇas that provide the meaning to the text, then, strictly speaking, there would be as many Vedas as there are Brāhmaṇas. This would be in accordance with our earlier conclusion that it would be more correct to treat the extant texts of the so-called *Śākhās* as independent works rather than as variants of a common text, as they are generally held to be. In fact, even when there is a textual repetition between the different Saṁhitās of the various *Śākhās*, it is very seldom in the same order and almost always embedded in extraneous material. Even a cursory examination of any of the contents of the *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* with the other texts of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* as given in Keith's work, *The Veda of the Black Yajus School Entitled Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, would convince one of this. But if the sequence itself is changed in an operation or if it is embedded in a different context, it cannot be deemed to have remained the same operation. Thus, the induction of the Brāhmaṇas into the central position for understanding what a Veda is would make the Vedas far more in number than most would like to admit.

Also, once the Brāhmaṇas are accepted as essential parts of the Vedas or as identical with them, it would be difficult to argue for the so-called *Apauruṣeyatva* of the Vedas, for none would seriously maintain that all the ritualistic instructions along with the stories that are meant to emphasize their importance are not of human origin. At least, their conflicting diversity and the attempt to make them acceptable through all the various ways, which

are included under the so-called *Arthavāda* doctrine evolved by the Mīmāṁsakas, could hardly be ascribed to anyone but the human carriers of the Vedic tradition. And as far as ritual is concerned, it is they and they alone who have any authority in the matter. In fact, for the sacrificial ritual, it is not even the Brāhmaṇas which *alone* are sufficient. One needs the Śrauta or the Kalpasūtras also, and not just them but the whole of what is usually called the Vedāṅga literature with them. Thus, along with the Brāhmaṇas and the Kalpasūtras we have to have the knowledge that is embodied in the texts known as the *Śikṣā*, *Vyākaraṇa*, *Nirukta*, *Nighaṇṭu*, *Chandas* and *Jyotiṣa* in order to perform the sacrificial rituals as they are supposed to be ordained by the Saṁhitās and the Brāhmaṇas. But no one has ever maintained that the Vedāṅgas are not of human origin. In fact, they have always been treated as Smṛti and not Śruti. But if this is so and if it is also true that without their knowledge one cannot perform the prescribed sacrifices correctly, and if the injunction for performing those sacrifices is the essence of the Vedas, it follows necessarily that the Vedas can not, in principle, be *Apauruṣeya* in character.

V. Need of The Revision

According to tradition, it was the sage Vyāsa who gave shape to the present collection which is known as the Vedas. It is difficult to believe this of all the *Śākhās* of the different Saṁhitās or of the various Brāhmaṇas that are supposed to be associated with them. As for the Upaniṣads, particularly those which are selections out of pre-existent Vedic texts,[46] it is difficult to believe that the same person, who made the first arrangement, made the second selection also. The latter activity presupposes the former and hence, most probably, would have been undertaken by someone other than Vyāsa who came after him. But however it may be, the whole thing is so unsatisfactory that a new arrangement of the whole Vedic corpus is urgently needed. There is nothing sacrosanct in what somebody collected thousands of years ago and the format that he gave to that collection. We need a new Vyāsa for modern times who would undertake the work keeping in view the needs of the times.

For far too long, the problems relating to the Vedic texts have been swept under the carpet. Even when formulated, they have been seldom squarely faced. The tradition has been accepted too unquestioningly, as if what somebody arranged and edited has to be taken as the final word in the matter. That there are four Vedas, and that they are the Śruti or the final authority for all orthodox Hinduism is axiomatically accepted by everybody who writes on the subject. Also, that they form a unity, a musical harmony like that of a string quartet.[47] The so-called *Śākhās* are nothing but rescensions of the same text, and there are no problems in this best of all possible worlds.

The truth, however, is very, very different. Instead of the proclaimed

harmony, there is a continuous one-up-manship amongst the specialists of the different Vedas. It is not only the *Sāmavedin* who relegates the *Ṛksaṁhitā* to the realm of the lifeless body whose soul is the *Sāma*, as pointed out earlier in our discussion of Dr. Lath's article on 'Ancient Indian Music and the Concept of Man'. The *Atharvavedin* 'explicitly asserts that those who study the Threefold Veda will reach, it is true, the highest heaven, but yet the Atharvans and Aṅgirases go beyond to the great worlds of Brahman.'[48] Not only this, in order to assert their supremacy over the other three Vedas, the *Atharvavedin* resorted to 'the spread of legends and allegorical stories in which the other Vedas are represented as incompetent and the Atharvaveda appears as superior to them.'[49] As for the Yajurveda, it places itself not only in the centre of the sacrificial ritual, but by making the ritual itself as central to the Veda it relegates all the non-ritual parts of the other Vedas to a secondary status and dismisses them as *Arthavāda*.

As for the *Śākhās* being recensions, one can only say that the use of the term in this context is systematically misleading. It tends to suggest that there are various manuscripts of the same text from which the original may possibly be reconstructed. This, obviously, is not the case. Each *Śākhā* may have its own variant manuscripts out of which the original Saṁhitā of the *Śākhā* may possibly be reconstructed. On the other hand, the text belonging to a particular *Śākhā* cannot be regarded as a 'recension', even in the literal, technical sense given to it in *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*. The latter givest he meaning of 'recension' as 'the revision of a text, est. in a careful or critical manner; a particular version of a text resulting from such revision.' Now the *Śākhās* are not the result of any attempt at '*careful* or *critical revision*' of a pre-existent text on the part of anybody. Further, there is so much of addition, omission and change of sequence that they cannot be regarded as even 'revisions' of the text, for any revision in order to be called a 'revision' must be only marginal in character.

The Vedas, thus, have to be rescued from the age-old forms in which they have been imprisoned and immobilized. For this, a new way of looking at the texts is required. It is hoped that this essay would provide a small, first step in this direction.

Notes and References

1. Diwan Bahadur V.K. Ramanujachari, *Vedic Texts Considered in the Śri Bhāshyam* (*Kumbakonam*, 1930.)
2. Jan Gonda, *Vedic Literature* (Wies Baden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1975), p. 313.
3. Raghu Vira, *Sāmveda of the Jaiminīyas: Text and Mantra Index* (Lahore: The International Academy of Indian Culture, 1938).
4. Gonda, p. 313.
5. *Sāyaṇa's Preface to the Ṛgvedabhāṣya*, trans. Peter Peterson (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1974), p. 5.
6. Sāyaṇa has written, साम्नामृगाश्रितत्वाद which may be translated as 'because

of the fact that Sāmaveda is completely based on the Ṛgveda.' Dr. Lath has suggested that the term *Ṛc* here should not be taken to mean the *Ṛgveda* but rather the *Ṛc* Mantras which may be found in the *Ṛgveda* or in any of the other *Saṁhitās*. This would have been plausible if those Mantras of the *Sāmaveda* which are not found in the *Rgveda* were to be from any of the other *Saṁhitās*. Also, it raises the problem of finding the essential characteristics which constitute a *ṛc* mantra.

7. Gonda, p. 314.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 314.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 314.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 316.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Mukund Lath, 'Ancient Indian Music and the Concept of Man' (*NCPA Quarterly Journal*, vol. xii, nos. 2 and 3, June-September, 1983),
13. Lath, p. 5.
14. Bellikoth Ramchandra Sharma, *Jaiminīya Ārṣeya—Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇas* (Tirupati: Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, 1967), p. 21 and p. 125.
15. Gonda, pp. 317-18.
16. Ramnath Dikshit, *Ūhagānam and Ūhyagānam* (Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University, 1967).
17. The mantras that are so repeated are 108, 122, 184, 320 and 465.
18. Peter Peterson (trans.), *Sāyaṇa's Preface to the Ṛgvedabhāṣya* (Poona, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1974), p. 3.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
20. A.B. Keith, *The Veda of the Black Yajus School Entitled Taittirīya Saṁhitā* (pt. 1), Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1967, p. xlvii-lxvi.
21. Gonda, p. 328.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 328.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 328.
24. *Keith, op.cit.*
25. Gonda, p. 328.
26. Sāyaṇa, Peter Peterson. p. 44.
27. Śrīpāda Dāmodara Satavalekara, *Kṛṣṇayajurvedīya Taittirīya Saṁhitā*; Pardi, *Svādhyāya Maṇḍala*, (4th ed.), pp. 2-3 and Maharishi Devarata, *Mūla Yajurveda-Saṁhitā* (Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University Sanskrit Series, vol. viii, 1973), p. 4-5.
28. Sontakke, N.S. and T.N. Dharmadhikari (eds.), *Taittirīya Saṁhitā*, vol. i, (Poona: Vaidika Saṁśodhana Maṇḍala, 1970), p. 12.
29. Keith, p. 9.
30. Gonda, p. 323.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 323.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 324.
33. All of these estimates are based on Patanjali's statement in the *Mahābhāṣya*. See Bhagvada Dutta, *Vaidika Vāṅmaya Kā Itihāsa*, (Delhi: Praṇava Prakashana, 1978).
34. Satvalekar (ed.), *Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā* (Vikram Samvat, 1998), p. 515.
35. Maurice Bloomfield, *Rig-Veda Repetitions*, pts, 1, 2 and 3 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1916).
36. Bloomfield, p. 3.
37. Gonda, p. 37.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 268.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 269.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 268.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 269.
46. See on this point my article 'The Upaniṣads— What Are They?', *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, vol. i, no. 1 (Autumn 1983).
47. 'The functions of the four Vedas being comparable, to quote Caland, to the parts of the players of a string quartette the role of the *hotar* cum suis (i.e. the *hautra*) must be learnt from the *sutras* of the Ṛgveda, the office of the chanters (*audgātra*) from those of the Sāmaveda, the activities of the *adhvaryu*—the officiant who is in charge of the manual operations and mutters the sacrificial formulas (yajus) and his assistants (i.e. the ādhvaryava)—from the Yajurveda; as to the task of the *brahman* priest (*brahmatva*), he owes his dignity to the 'sap extracted from the other Vedas', although the Atharvavedins claim his close connection with the atharvanic tradition.' See Gonda, *The Ritual Sutras*, pp. 471-72.
48. Gonda, *Vedic Literature*, p. 271.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 271.

Wittgenstein: a second look*

A. P. RAO
1016/38-B Chandigarh

II On Natural History

"When you are philosophising you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there."
—WITTGENSTEIN

It is appropriate that I should begin this lecture with a characterization of the kind of enquiry that I tried to conduct in the first lecture. If my enquiry was Wittgensteinian, such a characterization would go a long way to help us in comprehending what Wittgenstein wanted to achieve through philosophical enquiries. (As whether this kind of an enquiry is philosophical at all may itself be a debatable—and obviously a much debated—issue, we might as well drop the qualification 'philosophical', and try to understand what constitutes a Wittgensteinian enquiry.)

It is said that there are two kinds of philosophers: one of these, if better educated, would turn out to be theologians; and the other, if well educated, would turn out to be scientists. I take pride in my self-education, and I do not think that Wittgenstein ever regretted his training; so it is impossible with either of us to have received any education other than the one we received respectively. Consequently, the earlier enquiry about names has not been either scientific or eschatological. And if it does not qualify for the appellation 'philosophy' either, it is because—as Wittgenstein was fond of saying—it is not philosophy, but only a distant descendent of philosophy (and hence, I may add, is necessary).

Now, what did we achieve in the earlier enquiry? Or, to be a bit modest, I may drop that presumptuous query and ask: what was it that we (Wittgenstein and I, that is) were struggling to gain? Obviously, we were striving to find out a plausible answer to the quadrinomial question: what is a name? We were trying to spin a theory which would account for a symbol's being a name. This much is evident, I trust. But, I am afraid, it may not be all that obvious that we intended this theory to be in consonance with our intuitive understanding of what constitutes a name, that is, the understanding which each proficient user of language (any empirical or natural language, that is) would exemplify in using names. This is to say that we were attempting theoretically to account for a chunk of our linguistic behaviour which goes under the name of naming. Thus—we can now introduce a technical term—we were trying to work out a *natural history* of naming (or a natural history of names), and thereby a natural history of man, for the former is a part of the latter.

*The first part of this article 'On Naming' appeared in *JICPR*, vol. ii, no. 2 (Spring 1985).

Wittgenstein uses the term 'natural history' (and uses it not too infrequently in his latter writings) to make important statements concerning the nature of mathematics, the nature of induction, and the nature of philosophical enquiry as such, to mention a few. In the *Investigations* he remarks that enquiries into the nature of language are enquiries into the natural history of man. And in the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (from now on to be referred to as *Remarks*) he holds that mathematics is not a natural history of mathematical objects. To any discerning reader of these and other works of Wittgenstein, it should be obvious that he is using this expression as a technical term, indeed as a crucial technical term. As one who is impatient with a philosopher (if there is any like that in my audience, I advise him to better go to a video parlour rather than waste time here) or one who is an impatient philosopher (for whom my advice would be to see a therapist and get over his *vorlust* for cocksure conclusions) is unlikely to be such a reader, it has by now become commonplace that Wittgenstein is indulging in anthropology—empirical anthropology, but a slightly better one than the stuff of, say, a Dube here and a Garfinkel there. Taking this term as if it were an expression of common parlance—as in, say, the sentence 'I plan to take my kids to the National Museum of Natural History'—it has come to be believed that Wittgenstein has, in the second innings of his philosophical career, taken to empirical investigations. This (nothing less than a) scandal in Wittgenstein-studies could have been eliminated, had it at least been noted that there was a technical (that is, philosophical) sense in which this term has been used in philosophical literature for two thousand years by now. (This is to say that had philosophers been better educated this could as well have been precluded.) For instance, when in the *De Anima* Aristotle sets out to work at the natural history of *Psyche* (Soul! Mind?), he was *not* intending to do experimental psychology. I do not entertain even for a split second, even for arguments sake, that Wittgenstein at any time in his philosophical career doubted the autonomy of philosophical enquiry—autonomy of the type of enquiry he was conducting, even if philosophers are not charitable enough to include it in their discipline, that is.

That this is the case with the *Tractatus* period of its author's life may not be doubted by anyone, so let me cite a passage from the later period,published posthamously in *Culture and Value*:

> A Philosopher easily gets into the position of an incompetent manager who, instead of getting on with his *own* work and just keeping an eye of his employees to make sure they do their properly, takes over their work until one day he finds himself overloaded with other people's work, while his employees look on and criticise him (Italics added).

Wittgenstein has always been disinclined towards disciplinary transgressions; and he was as much against reductionism as he was against seductionism (the type of philosophy that results in assertions like: x is not only x, but also y).

Yet if he was taken to be reducing philosophy to anthropology, it largely due to a large number of his readers taking to him in a period in which such reductive attempts were being carried out, or due to their coming to his work after being acquainted with the reductionist writings. (The passage cited above concerns such attempts.) A case in point is Quine's reduction of epistemology to natural science and Kuhn's reduction of epistemology to academic politics, that is, to intracurricular intrigue. (The appearance of much of the Wittgensteiniana and almost the whole of literature on Wittgenstein coincides with the spreading of these reductionist philosophies.) Taking 'natural history' as a term denoting an empirical enquiry concerning Nature, these readers took Wittgenstein to be attempting at an empirical description of man (or Man, if one is fond of capitals); worse still is taking him to be attempting at a behavioral study of man. This account of Wittgenstein's philosophical activity is extremely unfair to him, and does violence to his aim and the spirit of his activity. Not only did he not think that he was doing behavioural studies but thought that such studies hardly contribute towards the natural history of man. (We should remember his demaging comment on contemporary psychology, namely, that in it there are only conceptual confusions and experimental methods, to note this.) What then could the Wittgensteinian conception of natural history be!

* * *

In order to elicit what, according to Wittgenstein, natural history is, let us first note that philosophy is natural history of man in the sense in which physics is natural history of matter. Let us consider then, first, the natural history of matter. An important step in understanding what matter was, as any ten cents series in or on physics would show, the development of the atomic theory. The Greeks did introduce the idea, no doubt; but, as Wittgenstein would have said, we cannot legitimately say that they had an *atomic conception of matter*. This is so, if not on any other count, just because their *speculation*—that is the right term for it—was so remote from the commonsense view, even their commonsense view, to provide any intelligible picture of matter either to them or to us. Neither the Hellenes nor we *see* the world as composed of the Greek atoms. What differentiates mere speculations about something from having a concept of the very same can be highlighted by an illustration or two. Suppose that someone found

$$e = mc^2$$

nscribed twenty thousand years ago in a cave in Ethiopia! or take Wittgenstein's own example:

Suppose that 2000 years ago someone had invented the shape:



and had said that one day it would be the shape of our instrument of locomotion. (*Culture and Value*)

What are we to say of these! Obviously we will not be inclined to say—at least in moments of our sanity—and other moments do not matter for philosophy as they seem to matter in Indology—that the Ethiopian cave dweller was a quantum physicist and had a conception of matter. And we will not be inclined to say that as a mere introduction of a sign (even an idea) will only be a sterile activity. It is sterile, for it falls short of what is needed for being able to say one had introduced a concept—one *had* a concept. What is required for that is the way in which such an introduction helps or enables us to formulate laws of the phenomenon such that those laws are close to ordinary conception of the very same phenomenon. (The last two words have clearly a realistic import, but I will not play on it here.) This is what Wittgenstein is hinting at in the thought-experiment that he is suggesting in the lines that follow the passage quoted above.

'Or perhaps' he continues, 'that someone had constructed the complete *mechanism* of a steam engine without having any idea that, or how, it could be of *use* to anything'. (Italics added in the second case.)

Obviously, to be able to ascribe an awareness of such a *use*—that is, to be able to ascribe the possession of concepts—what we need to show and show convincingly is that the inventor of that mechanism had all the required paraphernalia to be able to *use* that mechanism as a *locomotive*. But this, as we know, requires tremendous progress: it requires knowledge of laws relating to various sciences. Similarly with the case of the atomic pictures of the world. To be able to have an atomic conception of the world, one requires a massive amount of data belonging to disparate disciplines—disparate by our ordinary conceptions, that is—for instance, spectroscopy, optics, chemistry, to mention some. Further, the atomic conception of the Greeks was brought closer to our ordinary conception not by hitting at isolated relations between these disciplines but by achieving, what Kreisel would call, massive (intellectual, for it is theoretical) progress culminating in a systematic theory enveloping all those and many more disciplines which hitherto remained discrete and unrelated. Such a massive progress is achieved by using conceptions of very extraordinary power.

Only after such an accomplishment did the atomic conception of matter become first testable and then closer to our ordinary conception of matter. The first step in this massive progress, bringing the Greek conception of matter closer to our commonsense conception, was the discovery of chemically pure substances among the impure substances, in which Nature is abundant. This allowed the distinction between atoms and molecules. With this the chemical theory developed at an accelerated pace. This development, however, required only a crude idea of the atomic structure; to be precise, it required only the valency of particular atoms. But this could hardly tell us what matter was, as it left an enormous number of combinations of atoms which never turn up in Nature at all. The second advance in the development of the atomic conception was made by relating valency to the internal structure of atoms in Rutherdford's 1913 theory, refined by quantum theory in the late twenties. With this theory we came to have an intelligible picture of the atomic world, so that we can now be said to have not only an atomic conception of the world but also a conception which is convincingly close to our commonsensical picture of the world. This is what Wittgenstein would call the natural history of the atomic conception of the world or a natural history of matter.

* * *

In attempting at natural history then, what is it that we are attempting? On reflection, it emerges that we are relating the terms of our daily discourse to the terms that go into the constitution and production of what we, in our daily life, take seriously to be knowledge of the world. As daily discourse and daily life go hand in hand, this attempt tantamounts to making intelligible to ourselves how our daily life obtains; or it amounts to making the commonsensical conception of the world intelligible in terms of our scientific conception of it.

This distinction between the commonsensical view of the world and the scientific conception of the world should *not*, however, be confused with a similar distinction which Bachelard has drawn between the world as we live in and the world as we think of. For Bachelard the former is not cognitive and hence is devoid of any knowledge. For Wittgenstein, on the other hand, it is the commonsensical view of the world that has cognitive content, and the scientific view of the world is, for its cognitive content, parasitical on the commonsensical view. Optics will be inutile, and hence indulging in it will only be an idle exercise, if it is not hooked to the sentence 'the dial of my wrist watch is blue'. Science has cognitive content only in so far as it intersects at some point or other with our commonsensical picture of it, and by being an explanation of how the commonsensical picture obtains.

The question of transcending the commonsensical view of the world does not arise at all; we are, so to say, destined to live with the pride of our impo-

tence to transcend it, or else live in horror of it. (This almost reminds us of the Kantian view of enlightenment as the recognition of the limits of reason, and reconciling to it with dignity and solemnity.) This does not, however, mean that we cannot change our concepts or replace our intellectual batteries. Of course, we can and as history shows, we have been doing so. But we do these by developing them to a point where they come into conflict with our commonsensical view, where they collide with the very general qualitative aspect of our familiar experience. This is to say that we reject a concept on the ground that it fails to formulate laws close to our ordinary conception of the phenomenon, that is, on the ground that it fails to provide a natural history (should we say, of man).

* * *

That natural history of a concept is a part of the natural history of man is a bit intelligible now; we now know at least that (to speak Kantish) natural history exhibits the transcendental grounds of our commonsensical view—the view on the basis of which we live and act in our day-to-day life. This goes towards establishing the legitimacy of natural history as a discipline. At the same time, it raises doubts as to how much of natural history is needed. Wittgenstein seems to have felt—and I think rightly—that much of natural history (or variantly, natural history of many concepts) is, indeed, wasteful; it is wasteful for the purpose of understanding human activity. Take, for instance, the case of language itself.

Much of the natural history of language (in the ordinary sense of the term), worked out assidulously during the period of reconnaisance and later during the high tide of colonialism, has not been of much use in pinning down the nature of human languages (or human linguistic activity). This does not mean that all that work—which certainly is a monument to human industry—does not contain any interesting ideas; only these ideas, some of them really brilliant, are not even sufficient to spin a systematic theory of language. One of the reasons for this failure is the way in which those linguistists—trained or untrained—conducted their enquiry; they concentrated on the idiosyncracies of the individual languages and compared and contrasted those idiosyncracies. Never they searched for linguistic universals; this was left to Chomsky. But Chomsky too fails to give us a convincing theory of language; his invocation of the *a priori*, his last-resort naturalism fail him in convincing us that the way he sees is the way our linguistic life obtains.

Contrast this situation with what has happened or is happening in genetics. Concentration on bacteria and virus proved successful for developing a systematic and convincing science of genetics. By this one could observe, in a short time, many generations of a species enabling us to note how the difference in degree could be explained to produce the difference in kind.

That is why Wittgenstein (aiming at a convincing natural history of language and the world it represents (or supposed to represent) concentrages on some unique kinds of languages—the type of languages that we do use in our day-to-day life, the type of languages that we would still be using even if we restricted our life to a bare minimum and live a restricted life; these are that type of languages that even if we restrict our life so, the use of those languages in such a life can be said to be integral parts of the very functioning of the human organism itself. Methodologically, there is nothing wrong in this. After all, we and our languages have both evolved in the world we live in; so why not we use our built-in views to give a reliable and convincing representation of the world and language! Why not we use our built-in view in our self-understanding! Why should we see this as an obstacle between us and the world or between us and our language!

* * *

Let us now repeat the question: how much of natural history of language (in the ordinary sense of the term) has been useful in making intelligible what language is? The reply is not encouraging, of course. But contrast this with the move towards a natural history of language (in the technical sense of the term). Though we cannot say that we now have a convincing scientific theory of language (variantly though we cannot presume that we have worked out a natural history of the concept of language), nevertheless we have moved quite a long way in that direction. An important step in that direction (that is, an important step in the development of linguistic theory) was the discovery of *essential language* among the natural languages (in the ordinary sense of the term). This allowed the distinction between essential and accidental features of language—any language, that is. With this discovery (in the *Tractatus*) linguistic representation came to be developed—at a greater length (than it was possible earlier)—as it required only a crude idea of sense and a crude idea of reference. But this was hardly sufficient to tell us what language is. The reasons are obvious, namely, language (specially the language that we use in our daily communication) has enormous number of expressions (simple as well as complex) which have no direct—maybe not even remote—role in representation. Then a significant advance was made (in the *Investigations*) by relating sense and reference to *use* (pace the last chapter of my *A Survey of Wittgenstein's Theory of Meaning*). By this we have not achieved a natural history of language, but it is rich enough to induce us to believe that we are somewhere near about that.

This much, I trust, is sufficient to enable us at least to surmise what it is to do natural history of a concept. But it still is confusing as Wittgenstein sometimes talks of the natural history of man. What, after all, natural history is about? Is it something about the world or is it something about the knowledge about the world? Such a possible confusion, issuing out of these queries,

is perhaps the result of our ignoring a crucial fact of our linguistic life. Representation is so essential in our linguistic life that we need not harp on the above distinction between the conceptual realm and the mundane world which is its extension. Saying, for instance, that Wittgenstein was a philosopher and saying that the sentence 'Wittgenstein is a philosopher' is true, both seem to *do* the same thing even though one is about a fact and the other about a sentence. In our linguistic life, we do the same with either of these sayings. The material and the formal modes of enquiry should be differentiated, for there are contexts where not to do that would tend our enquiry towards confusions, but there are contexts where they play the same role in our linguistic life. If so, there may not be any feature of a fact (object) that is independent of the features of the corresponding sentence (word). That is why the picture theory of the *Tractatus* was intended to go into the natural history of man as well as the natural history of language. As such, it is idle—at least rather priggish—to be puzzled at, say, whether Kant in the *First Critique* is giving us a natural history of human mind or a natural history of the concept of human knowledge. This example itself might have puzzled you; so to enable you to get out of that possible puzzlement let me offer a clarification; and from this borrowed clarification another facet of natural history as a discipline ought to be discernible.

I note two (but they are not all the) important features of Kant's programme. First, Kant did not attempt either to bypass or transcend the commonsensical picture of the world; his intention as I understand it, on the contrary, was to show—and show convincingly—how that picture obtains. The second feature that I note here concerns the way he executed this programme. Though I have no distaste for Kant exegesis (for it provides good exercise to the medulla), I will not indulge in it here, at least beyond the point that is needed for the purpose at hand. For the present purpose, it suffices to state what Kant was up to in the *First Critique*. And I state this fusing the formal mode and the material mode (but as you will note without confusing anything that figures in my enquiry); that would vindicate the point that I made earlier, besides serving the intended purpose, that is. Now, the empiricists and the rationalists before Kant had their respective conceptions of human knowledge. Kant is rejecting both of these conceptions on the ground that the formulations of neither of those theories is closer to the way in which we intuitively think that our minds work or we acquire knowledge. Both those theories start with the assumption that there is a class of sentences whose truth-conditions we know we grasp in our primitive interaction with the world. They are the paradigms for settling whether or not other sentences are true—how other sentences are to be understood even. Let us call the first class of sentences *Preferred Class of Sentences*, and the later class of sentences *Problematic Class of Sentences* (For short Pd and Pc, respectively). "The difference between empiricists and the rationalists is in their respective choice of the Pd. They have different Pds. Kant's point was that Pd as an input (whatever might be the members of Pd) will not give Pc as an output unless we envisage an analytic programme than either the empiricists or the rationalists allowed for. In order to write such a programme, we need to understand what the mind must be like, so that it may make it possible for us to get Pc as output with Pd as input. This is to say that a theory of mind and its way of working is at the very foundations of human knowledge, and this theory itself is one of the most important things that we have got to know first". Further, this theory of mind has to strike a very delicate balance; it must be modest enough to remain plausible in the face of drastic changes it may ask for in our commonsensical views, and yet it must be bold and explicit enough to give us a powerful analytical tool. From these demands on the projected theory of mind it should follow that Kant was after a theory of the sort that we are talking about, that is a theory of mind which provides a convincing account of the commonsensical view of mind. This account, however, was not intended to be empirical or descriptive; fortunately for philosophy, the *First Critique* is not a treatise in experimental Psychology.

This can be elicited by considering the nature of the laws Kant formulates concerning mind. One of the laws of his theory of mind is that Euclidean three-dimensional space had to be the space in which human mind localizes, particularizes, and differentiates individual appearances. What he means by this is rather subtle, but I will try to state it intelligibly. The mind, he thought, "was bound to impose this three-dimensional Euclidean space as a form of intuition, and that it was bound to do so as it is constricted by itself to objectify appearances". (To speak the Wittgensteinian lingo, the inexorability is of the mind and not of the world. See *Remarks*, I, 118.) This is why Kant does not hold that 'real' and objective space will have to be three-dimensional Euclidean. His arguments would certainly have led him to reject the idea that we know the structure of any real space a *priori*. What he thought was that we might say that visual or phenomenal space was three-dimensional Euclidean. We have no choice but to concede that real space might as well be non-Euclidean or n (>3) dimensional. *This is the way things are with us—or this is what we are.*

This Kantian digression is extremely important to understand what Wittgenstein was doing in the *Remarks*—specially his rejection of Intuitionism and his explication of the concept of proof. His central argument is substantially similar in structure to the argument of Kant. (To be a bit personal, both these arguments gave me equal thrill; there are better scholars of either of these great minds who are excited about one but not the other, but I consider them to be philosophically immature.) Anyhow, if what we said of the Ethiopian cave dweller is true, we will not be able to say that Wittgenstein had given us a concept of natural history until and unless we are in a position to show how *using* that concept he works out a convincing theory of proof or a natural history of proof. So let me move some distance in that direction.

The Nestroy passage[1] which figures as the motto to the *Investigations* is more appropriate to the *Remarks*. (This is what both those who subscribed to the *Remarks* view of mathematics and those who thought that view of mathematics—like Kreisel, for instance—to be 'the surprisingly insignificant product of a sparkling mind',[2] did miss till now. Even if Kreisel is right in his evaluation, it in no way affects the stature of Wittgenstein as a philosopher, for only mediocres can excel continuously.) There is something of the Galilean conception in the *Remarks* theory of mathematics. By holding that mathematics is what mathematics does like money, Galileo pushed the ontological status of mathematical entities from the realm of philosophy to the realm of theology. What Wittgenstein is trying to do in the *Remarks* is to push the remanants of that Platonic lagacy from the realm of theology finally to the field of folklore—to the realm of the ludicrous, that is. That is what he wants to gain in arguing—contra Platonists—that mathematics is not a natural history of mathematical objects[3] but only of proof. (This view of mathematics is already present in the *Tractatus* in its seminal form though. See for instance 6.211. 'Indeed in real life a mathematical sentence is never what we want. Rather we make use of mathematical sentences *only* in inferences from sentences that do not belong to mathematics to others that likewise do not belong to mathematics. In Philosophy the question "what we actually use this word or this sentence for?" repeatedly leads to valuable insights.')

Let me contrive an illustration to show how this is convincing in the sense that it appears closer to our intuitive conception of mathematics or the conception of mathematics which seems to be embedded in our daily activity. Suppose, you want to get a specific quantum of work done in a specific period of time by engaging the required number of workers. To find out the number of workers you need to hire, you form a quadratic equation. Now, suppose that this equation has two solutions, say, (where n and m are natural numbers)—n and m. You contact—*naturally*, and that is crucial—a ganger and hire m workers. But why? You may as well have engaged $-n$ workers. (You may have engaged negative workers or you may have got your work undone even, as a Nabadweep Naiyayik would want you to do.)[4]

These wonders are offsprings of an illusion, namely, that in mathematics there is choice. In reality, in mathematics, as in marriages, there is no choice. Personal preferences have no role to play in arithmatic. Mathematical proofs tell us:

'Yes, this is how it has to be' (*Remarks*, II, 23)

and

'This must be like this' (*ibid.*, 30).

However, this is *not* due to the nature of mathematical reality or mathematical objects, as the Platonists have come to believe. Such a belief is worse than an illusion—it is a mistake, for there are no mathematical objects. The necessity in mathematics is due to the nature of human beings. (This, in the Wittgensteinian framework, is as much a constitutive condition of man, as much as for Kant three-dimensional Euclidean representation is constitutive of human mind.) The concept of number that we embedded in our representation of the world does not leave us any freedom to hire either 'negative men' or a 'negative number of men'. And (see *Investigations*, I, 230) with our settling for a concept, we are settled, or as Wittgenstein puts it in the *Remarks* (I, 119): 'The hardness of mathematics is indeed our hardness.'

Still, one might wonder, why is it that we embedded this concept of number in our representation of the world, and *not* some other concept which might have permitted us to hire either negative men or $-n$ workmen? Wittgenstein has a long-winding argument to let philosophers out of this 'flybottle', and I will recast it in its bare essentials. Earlier I remarked how this concept is constitutive of our nature; this then amounts to saying that we could have been different from what we, indeed, are, and that we could have embedded a different concept of number![5] True, 'the formation of concepts can be explained by the facts of nature'; only, as Wittgenstein would say, mathematical concepts are not of such type, for mathematics does not state facts of Nature (*Remarks*, I, 116). All that mathematics does is to provide a framework for handling the facts, a framework in which we alone, and in which alone we, can handle facts.

Try then to imagine that we are different from what we are, that is, that facts of our nature are different, 'then the formation of concepts different from the usual ones becomes intelligible' (*Investigations*, I, 230). Now if this is possible, that is, '(i) f the formation of concepts can be explained by facts of nature, should we not' then 'be interested, not in grammar, but rather in that in nature which is the basis of grammar?' (*Ibid.*, II, xii.)

A clarification regarding this thought-experiment is in order, and Wittgenstein himself provides it.

> I am not saying [he writes in continuation of the passage quoted above] if such-and-such facts of nature were different, people would have different concepts (in the sense of a hypothesis).[6] But, if anyone believes that...having different ones would mean not realising something we realise—then let him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to *him*.

The last pronoun in possesive case is crucial to understand the intention of Wittgenstein, for the entire irony of the passage is encoded in it. So we need to read it as: will become intelligible to him if he really reflects on what is involved in such an exercise, and see through what it all amounts to. It amounts to saying that we have this concept of number because we are what we are, and that if we were different so would our (?) concept of number could have been. But in order to think of ways to represent a reality embedding a different concept of number, that is, in order to imagine an arithmatical

representation of the world with a different arithmatic, we have to *use* (in this intellectual exercise) arithmetical rules which our arithmetic forbids. (Such semi-paradoxical exercises are attempted at not too infrequently; finding fault with extensional logics and then working our intensional logics using only extentional logics for their matalogical results is a case in point). Anyhow, the rules of our arithmetic differentiate the permissible representations from the impermissible representations; and 'if I use the forbidden combinations I shall talk nonsense' (1931 lectures in *Wittgenstein Lectures* 1930-32, Kind and Lee; pace the Wittgenstein argument concerning imagined languages which do not contain names which I considered at length in the earlier lecture.)

This does not, however, mean that there is some essential (or necessary) connection between our concept of number—our arithmetic, that is—and the world.[7] Belief in such a connection is 'dangerous and deceptive', for it would end up either in a reification of concepts or else in a conceptualization of objects. To preclude these we need to refrain from an 'assimilation of facts of nature (and) the determination or formation of a concept' (*Remarks*).

'The dangerous, deceptive thing about the idea: "The real number cannot be arranged in a series", or again, "The set is not denumerable" resides in its making what is a determination, formation, of a concept look like a fact of nature' (*Remarks*, A II, 3). Such a confusion is not unique to mathematics; throughout our language many such confusions have crept in, and many more can creep in. Do we not, on occasions, conflate the *imperative* and the *indicative* moods! Compare for instance the two sentences: 'I want you to hang yourself', and 'You should hang yourself.'

If you are obliging, the effect will pleasantly be the same. This is not, however, philosophically interesting. What is of professional interest is that there is a difference; the first sentence is *about me* (in a precisely definable sense of aboutness), and the second is not so—it is not about you either. It is this sort of a confusion that Wittgenstein is hinting at to be residing at the roots of set theory when he says that in that theory there are only conceptual confusions and methods proof (*Investigations*, II, xiv). Suppose we eschew reification and ontologization of mathematical concepts then what is left in mathematics! Obviously, methods of proof; and this is the Galilean view of mathematics. But what is a proof? what is, at least, central in a proof? The formalist account that it is a transformation of a set of well-formed formulae to another set of well-formed formulae, satisfying certain well-defined conditions, does not throw much light on its nature, and hence is inadequate.

A proof, first 'introduces a new concepts'. By this Wittgenstein 'meant something like: the proof puts a new paradigms of language...' (*Remarks*, I, II, 31). As paradigms are prescriptions, a new proof then issues in a new prescription. This is the case in two senses—one trivial and the other rather subtle. Once the *deduction theorem* is proved using the primitive rules of inference, we have what we call *derived rules of inference* such that we can

say, as we do say, with some legtimacy that we have a new concept of a *rules of inference*; we have, at least, a new picture of the concept of a *rule of inference*. This, however, is the trival sense, in which proofs are said to introduce concepts. Compare this with what has happened in the development of the set theory from Cantor to Cohen. With keeping it on an axiomatic base..., and with the obtaining of the independence results, we can *now* ascribe to ourselves the possession of a concept of a set which is so qualitatively different from the one embedded in Cantor's naive or intuitive definition (indeed characterization) of a set, such that we can say that we have a new concept of a set. (Personally I feel even that is an arrogant claim; all that I am inclined to subscribe to is that after all those results are arrived at we have come to a vantage point from where we can have glimpse of the nature of a set.)

We have been talking about the concept of number, the concept of a set... But what, after all, is a concept? To strip it off from the mystique aura with which philosophers seem to use the term 'concept,'[8] a concept is a consistent bunch of rules; concepts are constituted by rules.

Fine, but when once reification is refrained from where are these rules to be grounded? That was a problem for Frege too, for he, too, eschewed reification and psychologism too. Having shown why the rules are not in the world and that they are not the rules of thought either, he came to hold that they are 'the boundary stones fixed in an eternal soil'—an eternal soil of thoughts and theories, what Popper would call the Third World. This *tertium munda* offended Wittgenstein's philosophical sensibility as much as Frege's twin-function semantics offended his semantic taste (recollect the intial part of my earlier lecture). So here, too, Wittgenstein took a departure from Frege and joined hands with Occam in not multiplying worlds. His point was that these rules are constitutive of man. (As an aside, I might add that the normative character of rules thus makes man a normative being but as in Aristotle, with a natural base.) It is not the case that there was in the beginning, that is, man, and then he created rules and then followed them. Man *is* a rule-following, rule-inventing and rule-revising being.[9] These are integral parts of what it is to be a man; that is the essence of the following passages from *Investigations*, I:

> Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much *part of our natural history*, as walking, eating drinking, playing. (25, Italics added.)
>
> What does a man think for? ...We are not interested in causes—we shall say: '*Human beings do in fact think*'. (466, Italics mine.)
>
> Does a man think *because* he has found thinking pays? (Does he bring up his children *because* he has found it pays? (467, Italics added.)[10]

And so is counting! From my son's seggregating four toffees into two groups

of two each and sharing them equally with his sister to my dizzy flights in or into Canter's Paradise and Cohen's Hell, all this is part of the way 'in which *we* act' (*Remarks*, v, 18). What my son did and what I did, both are rule-governed activities, conceptual plays, so to say.[11] Now, where are the corresponding rules—the concept of number, the concept of a set, etc.—to be located? This is the same as to ask where are the rules of arithmetic to be grounded! The answer obviously is: in my and my son's activities which are parts of the indivisuators of human beings.

If the foregoing is correct, we need to face another serious problem. If the rules are constitutive of what we are, how to account for conceptual changes! To put it differently: is Wittgensteinism a form of conservatism? I shall try to answer this issue by splitting it into two sub-issues; I shall, however, handle here only one of these sub-issues and reserve the other for a different occasion. These two sub-issues are: first, does Wittgenstinian way of thinking provide for conceptual changes and revisions? Secondly, if it does, how to account for such changes and revisions, within its framework. Here I shall concern myself with the first issue. Even so balanced a scholar like Walsh (see his *Metaphysics*) thought that Wittgenstein was a conservative of the Burkean sort. This, I trust, is due to Walsh's failure to differentiate between the two central tenets of Burkean conservatism. They are, first, the existence of a rule (or a practice or an institution) is the evidence of its rationality; second (and hence), demanding the existing rules (practices, institutions) conform to the requirements of the imagined alternatives is irrational. Wittgenstein would subscribe to the second tenet but *not* to the first. Rules, practices, institutions, etc. are for Wittgenstein constitutive of our being, all right; but they are so only *contingently*. They do not constitute us essentially,[12] for 'essence is *not* a characteristic of an object' (*Remarks*, I, 73), that is, anything which is a part of Nature. (Pace my earlier remark that for Plato and Aristotle, and for Wittgenstein and me, we are normative beings with a natural base; maybe, that is why I could not think of myself without my body!) And 'if you talk about essence, you are merely mentioning a convention', a rule (*Ibid*, 74). For rules determine concepts, concepts can be said to have essences; and only concepts are determinate, the rest are indeterminate and open. (So we are free; shouldn't we grin!) In fact, we *have been* revising and changing our concepts ('we' changed some after 1526 and some more after 1783) that have been part of the natural history of man (obviously in the commonsensical sense of the term).

Further, it is not legitimate to talk of the rationality of the concepts which *we do, in fact, use*, for, firstly, it is these very concepts that go into any possible explanation that we may be able to offer for some thing's being 'rational' or 'irrational'. (This is why Wittgenstein's thinking is in agreement with Burke's on the second tenet of conservatism.) The issue of the rationality of the rules and practices which are constitutive of our being does not arise at all, and because these rules and practices constitute the normative structure

of our activity. For the ultimate bases of our action are the ultimate bases of our thought, the only reason for our acting in accordance with the rules in accordance with which we do, in fact, act is only that we after all do so act (*On Certaintity*, 284). The search for the grounds of our thinking must come to an end sooner or later, but 'the end is not an ungrounded pre-supposition; it is *an ungrounded say of acting*' (*ibid.*, 110). This way is 'what we find it natural to do' (*ibid.*, 471). The final ground of all our knowledge (and action) *is a fact about us*, a fact of the natural history of man.[13] This has a Kantian ring, for to reduce Kant's argument to its bare bones and characterize it, what Kant was doing in the *First Critique*, is showing how we, being what we are, know what we know in the way in which we do, indeed, know. Our epistemological statements are statements about us.

* * *

All this, however, may sound complaisantly complacent talk—all the more so as there are tiringly countable number of passages in the later writings of Wittgenstein which create the impression that he is rather reluctant to see the problem. For instance:

> 'We have a colour-system as we have a number system. Do the systems reside in our nature or in the nature of things' (*Zettel*, 357)?

Let it be that these systems are in our nature; let this nature and our practices be related in the way in which Wittgenstein finds them to be related. But one might wonder whether it is not going a bit too far to say that:

> 'the bases of our practices are not called into question: They are there—"Like our life".' (*On Certainity*, 559).

I will take into account number systems a little later, and consider our colour systems first. We have *our* colour system, just as—as entomologists say—the butterflies have theirs. We represent (describe) a butterfly in our polychromatic system, and another butterfly represents 'the very same' (I will not spell out my realistic bias, for I need not do that here) butterfly in the diachromatic system of butterflies, that is, a system of black and white (different shades of black and white, of course). Now, can we and the butterflies swap our ways of representation? Perhaps not, for we and the butterflies are constrained by our respective occular apparatus and our respective cerebral mechanism. So, Wittgenstein argues that:

> '(t)ill now only the ratiocinative element in knowledge has received attention—the animal part of it too be given proper place' (*Ibid.*, 475).

Nevertheless, physiology seems to be irrelevant here. Even if such constraints do not exist, there does not seem to be any point in such a swapping, for the representations of the butterflies are geared to their *interests* (of which reproduction and food-gathering seem to be dominant ones), and our representtations are geared to our interests (of which recreation is one, aesthetic enjoyment another, and scientific knowledge yet another). Thus, when there are no interest-shifts, conceptual changes seem hardly to be in order. You see things differently, if your interests are different.

Fine, but can we say the same thing about our number system too? There do not seem to be any physiological constraints in this case. Why cannot we, then, from tommorow morning see things the way the Intuitionists claim to see? Does our becoming Intuitionists amount to changing our life? If there is no point in such a conversion, it is not only because our interest has not shifted (it remains to be in representation)—let alone Intuitionism serving either our current interest or our possible new interest better—but also for a still better reason. At least, Wittgenstein has suggested one such.

No methematician worth his salt ever thought that the Browerian battle would batter his bastions. (They treated it with the same composure with which physicists of the yore treated Zeno's puzzles. And the scribblings of other philosophers can safely be ignored, for they hardly mattered in the mathematical practice, in the development of mathematics during the last half a century. Practicing methematicians virtually ignored these philosophical profundities, only occasionally departing from this, and also their practice to have a hearty laugh; I do not have particularly on my mind Klein's view of Lakatos' *Proofs and Refutations*).[14] If Wittgenstein is right (and in the foregoing pages I have indicated my inclination to believe that he is right) in holding that a proof introduces a concept (a new proof a new concept). Intuitionists have introduced a new concept of number. For in constructing their proofs, they refrain from using the Law of Excluded Middle (among other things, as is well known), and let us note first what this law amounts to.

Wright[15] is right in pointing out that for the Intuitionists—and also for Wittgenstein—this law meant its stronger version, namely, that the disjunction of a statement and its negation is valid, and *not* the weaker version namely that there is no third value. (Why the Intuitionists accept the stronger version is a long story which I will not be able to tell here; moreover, that is not relevant to my present aim. But I will give the reason for which Wittgenstein accepted it.) Wright hints at why the Intuitionists could not have gone for the weaker version; it is because they accept the double denial of the disjunction of a statement and its denial as valid. As he does not tell why Wittgenstein does not go for this version, I will add a word about it. The issue is not, as Wittgenstein saw it, about there being or there not being a third possibility. It *is*, as he thought, about: '...(d)oes reality accord with this picture or not (*Investigations*, I, 352).[16]

Wittgenstein accepted the stronger version, for accepting it and arguing out that mathematics does not *sensu stricto* contain statements but only rules would provide him a single stick with which he could beat both the Intuitionists and the Platonists. If both the sentences

> 'every even number greater than 2 can be represented at the sum of two primes'

and

> 'there is an even number which is greater than 2 but cannot be represented as the sum of two primes'

are rules, Platonism is misleading as much as Intuitionism is inutile, for one of the sentences is not contradictory of the other.

> 'You should do x'

and

> 'You should not do x'

contradict each other; but this is not the case with

> 'You should do *x*'

and

> 'You should do (not *x*)'.

(Moreover, how is the Law of Excluded Middle itself used? There must be a prescription to use it or one prohibiting it.) But no proof of any of those two sentences is forthcoming. True, what does that indicate? Not that we should refrain from applying the Law of Excluded Middle on infinite totalities or entities whose existence proofs are not constructive, but (among other things) that the concept of number—that is, our concept of number—is not as yet totally determined. This is to say that what Wittgenstein thought about set theory has an analogue about number theory too. In number theory we have conceptual fuzziness[17] and methods of proof.[18]

But this fuzziness should in no way constrain us in using the concept of number, for that is what Wittgenstein is emphatic about: '...(t)o use a word without justification does not mean to use it without right' (*Remarks*). Further:

> 'The danger here, I believe, is that of giving a justification of our procedure where there is no such thing as a justification, and we ought simply to have said "that is how we do it".' (*Ibid.*)

And that is the end of it. 'That is how we do it.' Is mathematics then descriptive of a chunk of our life? Wittgenstein's answer is: 'No. Mathematics is the method of proof; it is a set of rules constituting, so to say, the statute book of our representation (as much as grammar is). Then,

> ...[a]re sentences of mathematics anthropological sentences saying how we men infer and calculate?—is a statute book a work of anthropology telling how the people of this nation deal with a thief etc.? Could it be said: 'The judge looks up a book about anthropology and thereupon sentences the thief to a term of imprisonment?' Well, the judge does not *use* the statute book as a manual of anthropology (*Remarks*).

The statute book is not to the judge what a field guide is to an orinthologist, nor is it to him what a map of city is to the tourist. How then does he use it? Obviously by taking it 'to regulate his perfermance of his office'. Mathematics is thus *normative*; encoded in it are the norms to which our representations should conform and—that is important—do conform. The natural history of mathematics is geared to account for this normative character.[19]

* * *

Coda. Now it should not be difficult to surmize what I meant when I said in the first lecture that we were after a natural history of naming. And taking what traspired in these two lectures together we may even surmize what it means to say that *we do use names*. Yet there is a rub, for Wittgenstein, in the *Tractatus*, remarked that we can represent the world without resorting to names.[20] Does it not follow from this that names can bed ispensed with, that is, that we can do without using names? In the next lecture I shall argue that it does not.

III. On Generality

> "Working in *philosophy*. . . is really more a working on oneself. One one's own interpretation. One one's own way of seeing things."—WITTGENSTEIN

Though exercising the prerogative of a satirist Swift caricatured Hobbes who, as the professor in the School of Languages at the Academy of Lagado, sought to reform language by abolishing all words in favour of miniscule things and also laughed at the natural historians of language of the Age of Rennaissance (recollect my discussion of these in the second lecture), no one— I presume, not even Hobbes, for he, too, at a certain point of his intellectual life, was fascinated if not bewitched by Euclid—ever doubted that it is in the nature of human thinking itself that its natural thrust is invariably towards *generality*. The natural history of man (in the ordinary sense of the term) shows—contra the Laputan academicians—how man liberated himself from the constraints of things with language; and, as Rene Thom (in his *Catastrophe Theories*) remarks, from the constraints of language itself with the Invention of mathematics! The belief of the twentieth-century man (this could be used as a criterion to show how in India there are only ancestors of the twentieth-century man) is that nothing can slip from his mathematical net; indeed, that anything that cannot be caught with it does not exist. This belief finds expression in the *Tractatus* (5.526):

> We can describe the world completely by means of fully generalised propositions, that is, without first correlating any name with a particular object. Then, in order to arrive at the customary mode of expression, we simply need to add, after an expression like, 'There is one and only one x such that...' the words 'and that x is a'.

I intend to devote this lecture first to understand this claim, and then to evaluate it in order to fix its legitimacy and also its limits. As involved in this are innumerable hard perennials of philosophy which may not be traceable completely until the whole ground is dug up and upturned, I may have to carry on this task with restricted aims. I shall not thus be able to explore any issue, however important it otherwise might be, which has no immediate relevance to my task here and now. Nor shall I repeat here what I explored elsewhere. (Not only because of spatial and temporal constraints but largely because of taste, I do not repeat; I am habituated to think afresh, even if this does not result in fresh thoughts.) I devoted a whole monograph to one of the issues involved here (which should be forthcoming under the title *A Critique of Free Logics*), and another entitled *Quine's Criterion of Ontological Commitment* devoted to different issue and published a deade ago. So here I assume the results of those explorations and move to the present task; and in carrying out this task I also assume an acquaintance with the standard quantification theory and some metatheoretic results concerning that theory—of course, in addition to a minimal ability to toy with that theory and those results. (However, this is not assuming too much as for those interested in analytic philosophy it is a staple diet.)

* * *

In the recent logico-philosophical investigations the two issues, namely,

(*a*) what is (the nature of) a general (ized) sentence? and
(*b*) what is the general form of a sentence?

are separated. See, for instance, Strawson's Introduction to *Philosophical Logic* edited by him, where he creates the impression that the so-called 'Philosophical Logic'—an expression which Wittgenstein thought to be meaningless—is exclusively concerned with [*b*]. Also, one might note some ambiguity in the framing of the first interrogative. A Quinean certainly would, as for him a sentence by definition would be one in which only bound variables occur, and well-formed expressions containing free variables are mere sentential schemata. For the present context I need not make an issue out of

this, and what I subscribe to will be evident from what follows.) Now, one of the central theses of the *Tractatus* is that each sentence—whatever be its surface structure, in its deep-structure—is a *general sentence*. (How much Quine owes to Wittgenstein!) The 'essence'—that is, the logical structure—of a sentence is its generalized form (5.471); and this mechanism is geared to provide rubrics for stating: this is how objects stand (4.51).

But there is a rub; we know little about objects; the ontic category to which they belong eludes us particularly. That is why, as Wittgenstein remarked to Waisman (see the latter's *Ludwing Wittgenstein und der Weiner Kreis*), '[i]t makes no sense to ask whether the objects are something thing-like, whether they are something that stand in the subject place, or are something like a property, or are relations and so on'. (For some of the reasons why it does not make sense, see my *A Survey of Wittgenstein's Theory of Meaning*.) Nevertheless, a part of the little bit that we know of objects is that they exist. To put the same differently, their existence is assumed by our linguistic activity.

> What looks as if it (object, that is) had to exist is a part of our language. It is a paradigm (a norm, that is) in our language game, something with which comparison is made. And this may be an important observation; but it is none the less an observation concerning our language-game—*our method of representation* (*Investigations*, I,50, interpolations and italics added).

To credit it to one to whom it is due, this, indeed, was a discovery of Aristotle, who first tried to show how, though there can be a false statement about the existent, there cannot be a true statement about the non-existent, and then made it one of the foundation stones of his Syllogistic (see my *Aristotle's First Philosophy in Proper Perspectives*). And it finds embedded in the standard Quantification Theory. This theory, as is well known, takes its models from only domains that are not empty.

There have been five scores of suggestions (of which five are mine) as to how the standard quantification theory can be redeemed from this assumption, which in literature is referred to as the *existence assumption*. (I will not touch upon any one of those suggestions—not even one—unless and until it cuts across the point of discussion here.[21] This point, to state succinctly, is that the rubrics of the standard quantification theory capture only two of the three mechanisms required for a successful referential use of language. These three mechanisms are: (*i*) the *existence* of the referent; (*ii*) the *constancy* of reference; and (*iii*) the *uniqueness* in referring. The standard quantification theory, Wittgenstein rediscovered in the *Tractatus*, does not provide for the last of the three.

Russell tried to overcome this lacuna in the standard quantification theory by augmenting it with a theory of descriptions. This theory of descriptions

needed in turn a theory of identity to which Wittgenstein had, as every student of the *Tractatus* knows, serious objections. What he had to say Wittgenstein said about identity in 5.53, 5.5303, 5.533, 5.5352, etc.:

> Identity of objects I express by identity of sign and not by using a sign for identity. Difference of objects I express by difference of signs. Roughly speaking, to say of *two* things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical to itself is to say nothing. The identity-sign, therefore, is not an essential constituent of the concept-script...(p)eople have wanted to express, 'There are no *things*', by writing '–(Ex). x=x. But even if this were a sentence, would it not be equally true if in fact 'there were things', but they were not identical with themselves? (notation is altered for typographical convenience, and 'satz' is translated as 'sentence' sticking to the spirit of the conclusions of the first lecture.)

was, as he thought, though expressible in the standard quantification theory with a non-standard interpretation, was not expressible in the standard extended quantification theory with standard interpretation; this is the same as to say that the Frege-Russell view of the standard quantification does not fit in with his view of identity. Here is the crux of the issue. As one's understanding of the concept of identity and interpretation of the variables go hand in hand, given the interpretation of the variables *a la* Frege-Russell (that is, the inclusive interpretation), and their way of extending the standard quantification theory to include identity, the following schemata come out valid.

(*i*) $(x)Fx \equiv (y)\ Fy$
(*ii*) $(Ex)Fx \equiv (Ey)\ Fy$

Because of this, that is, as in this interpretation all the variables are interpretated to be ranging over the entire domain of interpretation, numerical statements require identity. For instance that there is only one individual with a certain property, say P, can be represented as

$$(Ex)\,(y)\,(Px.\ (Py \rightarrow x=y))$$

and that there are two individuals with the same property as

$$(Ex)\,(Ey)\,(z)\,(Px.\ Py.\!-\!x=y.\ (Pz \rightarrow (x=z\ v\ y=z))).$$

On the other hand, if we interpret the variables assigning different domains to different variables (or in a weaker fashion allow different elements of the domain of interpretation to be the values of the variables while allowing all the variables range over the same domain), the very same can respectively be represented as

$(Ex)\ Px$, and
$(Ex)\ (Ey)\ (Px.\ Py)$,

for this style of interpretation will allow neither

$(x)Px \equiv (y)Py$, nor
$(Ex)Px \equiv (Ey)\ Py$

to come out as a valid sentences.

Yet, quantification theory, so interpreted but unextended in some way or the other, fails to incorporate the mechanism required to capture uniqueness. For example, consider two models M and M^* with the same domain D, and let D be $\{e, e^*\}$. Let it be the case that the monadic predicate P in M be defined over the subset $\{e\}$ of D, and M^* over $\{e^*\}$. Now '$(Ex)Px$' comes out to take both M and M^* as its models. To paraphrase a well-known result about quantification theory, if it takes M' as its model it takes every M'' that is isomorphic with M' as its model; to illustrate the same to those who are uninitiated in this philosophical ornamentation, let us assume that there is not anything else in this universe except your bedside bookshelf and my bedside bookself. (In reality, I do not have one, but you assume it as you assume several other things about me.) Let it be the case that each of these shelves contain two books, say, the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*; let it also be the case that the cover of my copy of the *Tractatus* is red and that of your copy of the same is green, and the cover of my copy of the *Investigations* is green and that of your copy of the same is red. (Note that in this universe there are two books, but four copies; as our universe of discourse here consists of copies, by 'book' in this context we mean 'a copy of a book'. There is nothing wrong with this use; consider the question: how many books are there in the Panjab University Library? You might answer that it has 469282 books, and I might say that it has only 297522 books. Who is right depends on the context in which that question is asked.) Now that there is a red book (that is, a book with red covers) on the shelf, that is

$(Ex)\ (Rx.Bx)$

—to telescopically symbolize it—is *true* both about your shelf and my shelf. It is *true of uniquely* every shelf which has at least one red book in it, and is also true of any shelf which has at most one red book on it. But it is not *uniquely true of* anyone of these shelves. The Frege-Russell referential inclusive interpretation of the variables is geared to make it a truth about all those shelves which have at least one red book on them;and Wittg enstein's referential exclusive interpretation is attuned to make it a turth about all those shelves which have at most one red book on them. Wittgenstein's trust was in that, as our referential use of language assumes the existence of the referents, Frege-Russell interpretation is needless; his belief was that the existence of at least one red book assumes that the interpretation of the variables should be carried with the intention of guaranteeing the existence of at most one red book. And as his interpretation assures us, it follows, that under his interpretation the above sentence tantamounts to be asserting that there is at least one and at most one red book on the shelf. Yet that would be true of both your shelf as well as mine; and in order to make it not only *true of uniquely* about both the shelves, but *uniquely true of* only one of those, it might be suggested that we can bring into action additional variables and predicates, of course, in addition to quantifiers, and reformulate the same as, say

$(Ex)\ (Ey)\ (R^*y.Sy).\ (Rx.Bx).\ Sxy)$

that is, by showing that the sentence 'there is red book on the shelf' is only an elliptical version of the sentence:

> There is something such that it is a shelf and is of Rao, there is something (else) which is a book and has red covers, and this something (else) is stacked on a something which is a shelf and is of Rao.

The issue is, to put it bluntly, whether the term 'else' should figure in this sentence which is intended to bridge the gulf between the two senses of being true. To disclose the outcome of the following discussion, the issue is whether the other sense of being about is brought in by the variables or the predicates. Wittgenstein insists that it is due to the efficacy of the variables, bound variables to be precise; and Frege-Russell emphasize that it is the work of the predicates. Thus, assuming the Quinean precept that ontology is determined by bound variables, what needs to be settled is whether being uniquely about is an ontological matter, or an ideological affair (for ideology analogously, is determined by predicates.)

It is known to every student of philosophy that Russell, while sticking to his interpretation of the quantification theory, wanted to gain for it what it would come to have under the Wittgenstinian interpretation by bringing in identity; he tried to show that in the extended quantification theory we would be able to state how at least one and at most one individual has a certain property. And to capture uniqueness too, he brought in descriptions to further extend the already extended quantification theory. Thus—it was the claim of Russell—in this fully blown theory all the three mechanisms required for a successful referential use of language, namely, existence, constancy, and uniqueness, can be captured.

But quantification theory so extended has, in addition to the features which Wittgenstein thought were objectionable on the count of incorporating an illegitimate concept of identity, an unpleasant 'logical trick' built into it. It blurs the distinction between *terms* and *sentences*, that is, the primitive

base and the results of syntactical formations on the basis of that base. Wittgenstein should then have found—but did not find—fault with Russell's theory on this count; he should have done that but did not do as that goes against the very core of his semantic system, namely, that the class of referring expressions and the class of expressions that have sense are mutually exclusive. (Pace my first lecture.) In virtue of the semantic equivalence of —in the *PM* system, that is—

$(Ix)Ax$, and
$(y)\,(Ex)\,(Ax.Ay \rightarrow x = y)$,

and the syntax of the system permitting substitutions of the expressions of the former form for individual variables, the distinction between *sentences* and *terms* gets vitiated (see my 'Towards a Free Description Theory', *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, 1974.[22]

Now, placing ourselves in the second decade of this century, we may wonder what, after all, the outcome could be if we had declined to extend the quantification theory *a la* Russell but reinterpret it in the fashion of Wittgenstein.[23] Obviously, that is what Wittgenstein was thinking about.

> 3.24 In fact a generality sign contains a prototype, it leaves something indeterminate, and descriptions in terms of gererality are devoid of uniqueness.

Working further on Wittgenstein's insights in the *Tractatus*, we might note that this, that is, the rubrics necessary for capturing uniqueness not being present in the standard quantification theory, is not due to any inherent defect of that theory (with or without the Wittgenstinian interpretation of the variables). Uniqueness does not belong to the realm of syntax or even semantics; it falls in the realm of pragmatics.[24] A sentence could be uniquely about a fact (and not about any other fact isomorphic with it) only in the context of its *use* (or as I cryptically put it, earlier in 1961, a picture is a picture because it is used as a picture). I shall devote some time to elaborate this point and also attempt at a clarification of those ideas in the *Tractatus* that are required for that elaboration.

First I intend to harp a little more on the distinction between (*a*) uniquely being about, and (*b*) being uniquely about, which I have hinted at earlier. For convenience let me refer to these two senses respectively as : uniqueness-1 and uniqueness-2. It is in the sense of uniqueness-1 that we say that physics, for instance, is about the physical world.[25]

> 6.3431 The laws of physics, with all their logical apparatus, still speak, however indirectly, *about* the objects of the world. We ought not to forget that any *description of the world* by means of mechanics will be of the *completely general kind.* For example, it will never mention *particular* point-masses. It will only *talk about any* point-masses whatsoever. (italics added.)

As it is geared to capture only uniqueness-1, a generalized sentence *cannot* be treated as a truth-functional compound.[26] The understanding that Wittgenstein did treat generalized sentences as truth-functional compounds has come to be commonly believed due to a misunderstanding of Russell. In fact, as Wittgenstein did point out in the *Tractatus*, it was Russell who held that position and not he himself.

In the section 'On Naming', I drew attention to how continuously Russell attacks a philosophical position, which he himself held at an earlier period, by attributing (or imputing) it to others.[27] Russell does it once again in his 'Introduction' to the *Tractatus* by imputing to Wittgenstein the view, which the latter is attributing to Frege and Russell. At 5.521 Wittgenstein is saying:

> I dissociate the concept *all* fromt ruth-functions. *Frege and Russeell introduced generality in association with logical product or logical sum.* This makes it difficult to understand the sentence '$(\exists x).fx$' and '$(x).fx$' in which both ideas are embedded. (Italics mine.)

Russell's confusion may have been occasioned by the pithy remarks of Wittgenstein regarding the relationship between generalized sentences and elementary sentences, namely:

> 4.411 Understanding of general sentences *palpably* depends upon the understanding of elementary sentences.

Identifying elementary sentences with those that are traditionally designated as singular sentences, Russell may have come to believe in what he did believe. However, Russell's belief is unwarranted, for as what Wittgenstein is hitting at in that remark is that understanding elementary sentences provides us with a clue to understand generalized sentences, for their *structural components* are the same, or to put it differently, they are all made up of the same logical components. That is why

> 5.454 In Logic there is no distinction between the general and the specific.

As expressive power is derivative of structure, the general and the specific are non-distinct with respect to their expressive power, that is, their capacity to represent, which they come to have solely by virtue of their logical constitution, that is, due to their being constituted by logical components. That sentences are constituted by the same logical components (namely, predicates, variables, and quantifiers) gives them their logical form, in which the

representational power remains constant, and, as Wittgenstein remarks in 3.312, everything else is a variable.

> 5.547 An elementary sentence really contains all logical operations in itself. For 'fa' *says the samething*[28] as '(Ex).fx.x = a'. Wherever there is compositeness, argument and function are present, we already have all the logical constants. (Italics added and notation altered.)

Wittgenstein's view is that if we proceed on the lines suggested by Russell in showing how descriptive phrases—that is, 'the so-and-so...'s—do not augment the expressive power of the expanded quantification theory, we arrive at a point where we would realize that names (indeed, singular terms) also do not augment the expressive power of our descriptive language, whose logical structure coincides with the standard quantification with exclusive referential interpretation of variables. (The one intelligent philosopher, who exploited this Wittgensteinian discovery quite early, is Quine). Names, indeed, are the sort of variables that we use in existential instantiation—they are what Quine calls flagged variables. Note that in

$(Ex)Fx$
°
Fa

or in

$(Ix)Fx$
°
Fb

we are using a and b as variables,[29] just like y in

$(Ex)Fx$
°
Fy

All this has a consequence which may surprise some and shock others. It is that there are no genuinely singular sentences in the sense in which this term has been understood usually. This should, I think, be the initial reaction; but we are, after our enquiries in the preceding sections, a little wiser; and hence we may begin seeing things anew. We may now see how to account for the way in which we have been using singular terms and singular sentences in general, and names in particular. We are now in a position to work out a natural history of naming.

What emerged till now is that the logical behaviour of names is precisely the same as those of variables of instantiation. And we have noted that this

view goes well with the idea that our descriptions are structural only. A sentence is descriptive only in virtue of its being structurally isomorphic to the corresponding fact; as such the descriptum is the corresponding fact and not any of the objects that configure in it. The general form of a descriptive sentence (namely, such-and-such is such-and-such) links the sentence and its constituents to the components of the corresponding fact (namely, objects) only through the shared form. That is how that a sentence comes to be about those objects—is about them only indirectly. Now note that if 'the such-and-such is such-and-such' is true at all, it is also true of 'such-and-such like is such-and-such like'. If 'everything is momentary' is true, 'the flower that blossoms in the morning fades away in the evening' is also true; and so is 'for thou wert not yesterday, thou shalt not be tomorrow', for the sentence 'everything is momentary' is about you as well as the flower. (Each of us has some fragrance, perhaps because there is at least one sentence true of all of us.) To forsake poetry for semantics, does it not then follow that there is no particularity in objects (of reference) either; objects are values of bound variables after all! Even if objects cannot be described (see Appendix, *Philosophical Grammar*) they can at least be named (3.2221). Cannot we then at least pick up objects of the world by means of names? If we share the spirit of the Wittgenstinian style of thinking our reply should first be: let us see first what is being sought after, what is it that is being asked, that is. Let me now attend to this.

A name has no unique semantic relationship with the object in its particularity.[30] This is so first for a trivial reason, which can be illustrated by an example. 'Gautam', for instance, does not only refer to the biped sitting before me and listening as I was thinking this aloud but also to the biped which went with me to the vegetable market the Sunday before that...the biped with whom I would be sharing a bottle of Black Bull on its birthday...and *ad infinitum*. As unity and particularity go together, I do not know (that is one of the things with which I would be busy in the next few years) how to unify all these apparently disparate bipeds to individuate a particular biped and hook it by a name.

If so, what would happen to 3.203! Have I expended my labour in the first enquiry in vain? Wittgenstein created the impression that he was rather half-inclined to give a positive reply. In his 1932 conversation with Waismann (see his *Ludwig Wittgenstein und der Weiner Kreis*), Wittgenstein is reported to have admitted that in the *Tractatus* period he thought that ostensive definitions confront names and the world (objects?), that is, that 'this is Oberoi' marries off the world and language monogamously. But Waisman writes that Wittgenstein went on to say 'when I wrote the *Tractatus*, I was unlcear about logical analysis and ostensive definition. I then thought that there is a linking up of language with reality.'

Maybe, (no one should be taken to be having the best understanding of his earlier thoughts and actions). I am inclined to think that this does not

tantamount to, as it was usually taken to be, a rejection of 3.203. As I see, in this conversation neither Wittgenstein nor Waisman saw clearly through the implications of the remark quoted above. There are, in so far as I can isolate for the present, two distinctly different issues which are being jumbled up by Wittgenstein. The first is: how are names related to objects? And the second is: what kind of objects do names refer to? The first is a semantic problem, and the second is an ontological issue. (Also the second is an issue in substantive ontology and not formal ontology which is one of the concerns of Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*.) 3.203 is not a remark in ontology, least of all substantive ontology; it is a semantical statement. Further, and that is important to note, this, that is, my characterization of 3.203, does not vitiate what I said earlier, namely, that there may not be any feature of the world that may not be revealed by language. For descriptions are only structural and none of the structural features of the world go unrepresented in language. If the individual unity, the particularity, of objects of reference is not revealed either by the syntactical or the semantic features of language, it is because it is something that belongs to the realm of pragmatics, that is, to applications and uses of language. Now that we cannot use language to represent the world in its totality and unity is obvious; we are condemned to use it to represent the world only *subspecies*; we are logically constrained—that is the message of the incompleteness theorem—to be content with only partial descriptions or descriptions of a partial world.

Each of our partial theories has its own way of individuating or particularizing, to put it differently, its own method of constucting a class of identical unit classes.[31] Occasionally, it may, as it does, turn out that some partial theories have the same way of individuating incorporated in them; and this happens when language in those theories gets applied or used in the same fashion. It could even be that in some theories objects come out on their own fully individuated as Godess Athena came from the forehead of Zeus fully grown and fully dressed; fundamental particle theory is one such. In such cases, the theory, providing a description of that part of the world which those objects make up, will not contain a principle of individuation, for no such principle is needed. There is nothing wrong in this, for what is given to us prior to our linguistic or theoretic intervention is an undifferentiated and non-descript mass revealed to us through our sensory apparatus. (*Note*: I am not saying that this mass is ejaculated by this apparatus; so no one need to activate his or her anti-idealist batteries.) Carving out particular individual chunks out of this mass is a linguistic affair. Such affairs fall in the purview of pragmatics, for they issue out of our applying or using language to describe the world.

This has at least two important messages. Firstly, the principles of individuation does not come apiece; this is to say that each object is not individuated separately. (Perhaps this is why a sentence in which a name is linked by a copula to a descriptive phrase, whether true or false, is still informative;

recognizing this may go some way to solve some of the riddles in Frege-Russell philosophy of language.) The principle of individuation embedded in a theory, whether explicitly formulated or left tacit but continuously used in its interpretation over the intended models, individuates all and only members of the entire domain of the interpretation of that theory. (The legacy of the Stagrite! See my *Aristotle's First Philosophy*.)[32]

If a name refers uniquely, in the second sense of the term (that is, uniquely-2), to an object in the domain of interpretation, it is, as we have come to note, due to its being able to figure in the place of a variable (to be precise, to figure as a substituted of a bound variable) of the theory in which that name occurs as a primitive term *together with the principle of individuation incorporated in that theory*. Thus:

> 3.328 If a name had reference on its own, it is difficult to see why it fails to refer

or we might add, refer to uniquely-2. This means that the autonomy of the nomial reference does not sound plausible. In the beginning there was not the word; there is a need to rewrite that part of the *Genesis*.[33] Moving in that direction, Wittgenstein notes (in the *Philosophical Grammar*) that '[t]he referent of a name is *not* the thing we point to when we give an ostensive definition of the name' (italics added); it is, on the other hand, the object which the principle of individuation individuates, and into which the object of the ostensive definition goes as a constituent in a given theoretical context. (The object which figures in an ostensive definition is what Wittgenstein calls 'the bearer of the name' and is different from the referent of the name.) As such, what a name refers to is theory-dependent or theory relative.[34] Further, because of this, whatever it refers to, it does so not in isolation that is, in isolation from all the other referring terms of that theory. We cannot fish the objects of the world by a nomial rod; we have to net them in a theory. One can start picking up Quinean capsules here. As I do not propose to attempt at that, I shall move to consider—in brief, though—a couple of other ideas relevant to the issue-at-hand.

First, what I have been saying about names does apply to predicates too. There is no reason why we should not consider properties, which are referents of predicates, as spatio-temporally, or spatially, or temporally, scattered objects. There appear to be sentences which we use creating the impression that we in our daily life do, indeed, tacitly subscribe to that sort of a carving of the world. 'This lady will ruin this country', 'this inflation will swallow us all', for instance. And, after all, a broken plate is still a plate, though a bit of it is here and another there. Or I can and I do talk of my career, even though it has a dozen intermissions and in-betweens. Spatial contiguity or temporal continuity should not go as essential ingredients of individuation.[35] It is possible to pick up chunks of the world relegating spatial and temporal

features of the world to the background. This is indicative of how individuation of properties is theory-relative and belongs to the realm of pragmatics. (This should, I trust, be evident from a more familiar experience; in certain descriptions we treat a property as simple, and in others we treat the same as complex).

It is this similarity between proper names and predicate terms that led Wittgenstein to the belief that the general form of a sentence can be captured only by a totally generalized form, that is, by treating predicates as instantiated predicate variables (of a language whole logical structure coincides with second order quantification theory with an exclusive interpretation of predicate as well as individual variables)

> 5.5261 A fully generalised sentence like every other sentence is composite. (This is shown by the fact that in (Ex,ϕ) (ϕx) we have to mention 'ϕ' and 'x' separately.) They both, independently, stand in signifying relations to the world, just as is the case in ungeneralised sentences (notation altered)

like 'Socrates is taller than Simmias', or even 'Socrates is snubnosed', perhaps.

It is, that is, if the behaviour of the argument-part and the function-part in a sentence are that much alike, why in a sentence they be presented, after all, by different *kinds* of signs? Why not, instead of transcribing it as

$$(Ex,\phi)\ (\phi x),$$

transcribe the same as

$$(Ex,y)\ (x,y)$$

or as

$$(\mathrm{E}\phi\phi')\ (\phi\phi')$$

I shall try to draw out a Wittgensteinian answer (note, not Wittgenstein's answer) from ideas scattered all over the *Tractatus* in the form of cryptic remarks full of insight. That we should use two different kinds of signs in exhibiting the sentential form—one for argument and another for function—follows from Wittgenstein's views on (*a*) identity, (*b*) mode of signification, and (*c*) mode of sign-production.

To start with the last, generalizing on 3.322, we may note that:

> ...our use of the same (kind of) sign(s) to signify two different (kinds of) objects can never indicate a common characteristic of the two, if we use (them) with two different *modes of signification*. For the sign(s), of course, (are) arbitrary. So we could choose two different (kinds of) signs instead...

In the two immediate comments on this remark Wittgenstein is drawing our attention to how frequently, in our common parlance, we err in sign-production by using the same kind of signs with different modes of signification, and different kinds of signs with the same mode of signification. And having diagnozed that

> 3.324 In this way the most fundamental confusions are easily produced,

he recommended:

> 3.325 In order to avoid such errors we must make use of a sign language that excludes them by not using the same kind of signs for different kinds of symbols and by not using in a superficially similar way signs that have different modes of signification. That is to say, a sign language that is governed by *logical* grammar—by logical syntax. (The concept-script of Frege and Russell is such a language, though, it is true, it fails to exclude all mistakes.)

Earlier, we noted how the signification of a term, irrespective of the fact whether it goes as an argument or a function, is dependent upon the principle of individuation. Then as 'rose' and 'red' or 'Socrates' and 'snubnosed' are individuated by different principles, they have different modes of signification; hence they cannot be used as substituents of the same kind of bound variables. That is why in our theories, whose logical structure is exhibited by the standard quantification theory, we have different kinds of primitive terms.

As we find configured in a sentence, be it a generalized one or not, at least two terms—one constituting the argument and the other consisting of the function—with different modes of signification, a sentence is composite. This compositeness needs to be analysed before we can hit at the general form of sentences. But

> 3.25 A sentence has one and only one complete analysis.

If that be the case, there are a lot of surface itches and some brain teasers. For instance, what of the so-called relational sentences 'Socrates is taller than Simmias'? In my first lecture I attended to the Wittgensteinian demand that in an *essential notation* (which is nothing more than the one that captures the essence of notation as such) this sentence could be transcribed as

$$SOsi$$

where the relation, which is said to be holding between the object Socrates and the object Simmias, is to be shown forth by the juxtaposition of the names of these objects, perhaps as in the hieroglyphic sentence above. Then, should

we treat the form which this sentence shows forth to be the real (that is, the depth) form of a sentence, and also treat those two names, namely, *SO* and *si*, to be having different modes of signification? From the foregoing it should be evident that Wittgenstein would consider that such a language or a language in which sentences have that form is too elementary to be of any *use to us*, and has too restricted an expressive power to be of use to us in giving the type of descriptions of the world that we intend to give and do, in fact, give. (This argument may be seen in the light of what we have said about natural history.) So any language in which the different terms of a relational sentence are required to signify in different modes will not be of any use to us, for arithmetic cannot be stated in such a language.[36] Should we then consider the form of relational sentences to be

$$(Ex,y,R)\ (Rxy),$$

or else

$$(Ex,Rx)\ ((Rx)y)?$$

Here is a serious problem, namely, which of these two programmes should we pursue? This, however, requires a separate enquiry. I shall not be attempting it here.[37] I shall confine myself to pointing out that Wittgenstein's programme is yet to be completed. (There are areas of human enquiry where providing an answer is more important than posing the problem; and there are areas of enquiry where the case is the other way round. Philosophy belongs to the latter sort of an enquiry. So I have the satisfaction that I gave at least one research problem.) Not that Wittgenstein was not aware of this, for he despaired in the preface to the *Tractatus* of this inability to pursue to their repective logical ends all the perennials he has dug up in the philosophical garden. 'Here I am conscious of having fallen a long way short of what is possible', he writes in it, 'simply because my powers are too slight for the accomplishment of the task. May others come and do it later?'

Nevertheless, Wittgenstein succeeded in throwing much light on the general form of a sentence which has come to show us to be the same as the form of a completely generalized sentence, and also in bringing our attention to the fact that names in ungeneralized sentences behave like bound variables in generalized sentences. In trying to highlight these points, I continuously used, in the foregoing, following Wittgenstein, only existential quantifiers. This should not, it hardly needs to be mentioned, lead one to believe that names behave like only existentially bound variables. (There is a likelihood of even good minds embracing such an error; did not Alanzo Church think that existential commitments creep into quantification theory only through existential quantifiers?) The choice of a quantifier, that is, whether we opt for the existential quantifier or the universal quantifier is really a trivial choice. Given the interdefinability of quantifiers, what is said in the foregoing can as well be said

using the universal quantifier in illustrating our point.[38] Wittgenstein opted for the other way.

5.5321 Instead of $(x):fx\rightarrow x=a$ we write
$(Ex).fx\rightarrow fa:\text{—}(Ex,y)fx.fy$

* * *

Then, if we can give a description of the world by using only generalized sentences, should we drop using names altogether? In reply, I might say that though chemistry, as I am told, is reducible to physics, there is, again as I am told, a point in doing it the way it is being done all these years. So there is a point in using names; only our use of names from now on is backed by a reflection on what such an activity amounts to—we now have a natural history of naming.[39]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to the Indian Council of Philosophical Research for the financial support it gave in the form of a fellowship during the last two years. Without that help—though I could have thought these thoughts—I could not have been in a position to transcribe them. If today they are accessible to others, they should be thankful to the University Grants Commission for providing me an opportunity to share with them what I have been brooding over all these years. I take this opportunity to express my gratitude to my wife who kept baking bread while I was spilling ink.

NOTES

1. Which when freely translated would read: 'Generally it is the nature of every advance that it appears much greater than it really is.'
2. See his review of Wittgenstein's *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* in the *BJPS*, 1958-59.
3. 'Arithmetic is the natural history or minerology of numbers', writes Wittgenstein in the *Remarks*, 'but who talks like this about it? Our whole thinking is permeated with this idea'; and a little earlier to this he remarks that '[I]t is the earmark of mathematical alchemy that mathematical statements are regarded as statements about mathematical *objects*, and so mathematics as the exploration of these objects.'
4. Pace the *Tractatus*, according to which there are no negative facts; nor are there any negative elementary sentences. Throughout his philosophical career Wittgenstein held that Nature was after all positive.
5. Whether the referent of the personal pronoun in plural is the same in all the three of its occurrences in this sentence is really problematic. As I see, this sentence is anomalous. I will be handling this type of sentences and their semantics in a future work on 'Identity'; so nothing more about it here.

6. Note that for Wittgenstein that the tennis ball is round is a statement, and that the Earth is round is a hypothesis.
7. This idea persists in Wittgenstein's thought right from its beginning. Did not he write in the *Tractatus* '...[t]he fact that it can be described by Newtonian mechanics asserts nothing about the world; but *this* asserts something, namely, that it can be described in that particular way in which *as a matter of fact* it is described!' This is not a truth about the world but about man—not a fact of the natural history of the world but in the natural history of man.
8. If conceptual confusions about *Concept* are eliminated, a large chunk of what passes as philosophy will appear what it really is, namely, poppycock.
9. For a discussion of this idea of Wittgenstein, and also for an overview of the work done by others on it, see Gautam's *Reasons for Action*.
10. This is a bit Spinoza-like. Did not Spinoza maintain that what is meant by that man is a value-oriented being is not that there are values *and* we pursue them, but that what we pursue *are* values?
11. This rule-following and rule-inventing behaviour cannot be explained away in terms of *dispositions* as behaviourists (specially Quine, and Quineans) try to do. Further, because of the rule-governed nature of all behaviour, inscrutability is precluded, for rules are *public* or *objective*.
12. An almost infinite number of ontological problems arise in linking *contingent constitutivity*, *persistence*, and *change*; I shall be tackling some of them in my future work on 'Identity'. I shall not be able to take up even one of them here, for I shall not be able to do justice to any of those problems; I shall not be able to do justice to me either.
13. This is Wittgenstein's subtle unpacking of Goethe's equally famous and notorious line from the *Faust*: '...in the beginning was the deed.' For a vulgar understanding of the import of that remark by Neitzsche, see my *The Politics of Philosophy*. Anyhow, I do not think that Goethe was aware of the multiple implications of his gifted line.
14. Without exception 'philosophy of...' has always remained irrelevant to each of those hyphen-filling disciplines. That is why I do not take that expression into my cognizance unless and until the blank is reserved for the name of a person. I can understand what it means to talk about the philosophy of Plato, the philosophy of Hegel, even the philosophy of Popper. But I fail to figure out, despite my best effort, what philosophy of science, philosophy of social sciences...philosophy of sex are. This conviction ought to be evident from my work; I wrote on Aristotle, on Wittgenstein, on Quine, on Rawls—and on myself—but never on philosophy of home science. Philosophy for me is an adventure of a mind, not information, however interconnected it might be.
15. See his excellent (but needlessly lengthy) book: *Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics*. I agree with most of what he says, specially on Wittgenstein's response to Hilbert, Brower, and the empiricists. This is one of those rare books on Wittgenstein (the two other are of Anscombe and Stenius), which no one interested in Wittgenstein's philosophy can afford to miss. What I have to say here should thus be taken as a supplement, and *not* as an alternative to what he has to say in his book.
16. This reinforces my quarter century-old argument that Wittgenstein, at no stage of his thought, rejected the picture theory *in toto*. See my *A Survey of Wittgenstein's Theory of Meaning*.
17. It could even mean that in number theory we have only partially determined concepts, or even that we have there only partial concepts, and impeccable methods of proof.
18. Mathematics is an (the!) exact science only in its method; I shall say a little more on this point in the next lecture when I take up 'Generality' for discussion. Thus *there are no exact sciences*, there *are only exact methods*.

19. Just as a theory of grammar should account for its normative character. On this count Wittgensteinians will have to collide with Chomskians as for the latter grammar is descriptive.
20. In the foregoing I used Wittgenstein's thoughts ignoring their chronological order. It is immaterial when he thought a particular thought, for what is important is whether his thoughts form a coherent whole. Secondly, I am not a trinitarian to isolate the early, the middle, and the later Wittgenstein. I take his thought as a unitarian would take it. Moreover, there is a Wittgenstinian reason legitimizing this practice, that is, relegating history into the background. For him a philosophical enquiry is not an historical investigation. And I am interested in his contribution to philosophy (or a variant of it, if you like) and not in the evolution of Wittgenstein as a philosopher (or a pale copy of a philosopher, for he did what he did, as I do what I do, without assuming Miltonic high seriousness.)
21. Some of the alternative solutions towards redeeming quantification theory from existence assumptions, which may be of interest and relevance to the present context, are: (*a*) reformulating the standard quantification theory by replacing the normal existential generalization, which is a bit strong, by a weaker rule; that is, by replacing

$$\begin{array}{l} Fx \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \\ \hline (Ex)Fx \end{array}$$

by

$$\begin{array}{l} Fx.\ (Ex)\ (x=y) \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \\ \hline (Ey)Fy \end{array}$$

This way has been suggested by Hintikka.

(*b*) Blocking the inference of $(Ex)Fx$ from $(x)Fx$; there are exhaustingly countable number of alternatives to accomplish this. The one which is better known to philosophers is due to Quine.

(*c*) Accepting Meinongianism, *a la* Routley and resort to multi-sorted quantification.

(*a*) Leads to many-sorted quantification, and makes it virtually impossible to handle mathematical theories within the framework of such a modified quantification theory. The Quinean version of

(*b*) involves vaccuous quantification. For instance, though

$$(X)\ (Fx) \rightarrow (Ex)Fx$$

comes out invalid

$$(x)\ ((x)Fx \rightarrow (Ex)\ (Fx))$$

comes out valid. Wittgenstein would have treated this as a *logical trick*, as he wondered in *Culture and Value*: 'If you use a trickin logic, whom can you be tricking other than yourself?' What could be the role of the first generality sign? What does it generalize upon? In a different context (see 4.0411 of the *Tractatus*), he specified his expectations concerning the syntax of the generality sign.

'Gen.fx', or 'F(x)' are not substitutes (that is no alternatives notationally

speaking) for '(x).fx', for the first does not tell what is being generalised and the second does not show the scope of the generality sign.'

(c) Traps us in what its salesman Routley himself called the Meinongian jungle and beyond. Thus Wittgenstein would not have assented to any of these alternatives; that, however, is a different issue, which has no direct bearing on the major argument of my enquiry here.

22. Nor does the strategy which Quine subsequently designed solve the problem, though it has the virtue of not vitiating this distinction. Quine wanted to hook uniqueness by introducing singular predicates (in favour of singular terms), for these predicates are to be mapped on to unit subsets of the domain of interpretation while allowing the variables range over the entire domain. The relationship between these singular predicates (say, 'Socratises') and the objects of which it is true (the object Socrates, obviously) is as intriguing as the relationship between a name and its referent. Quine's strategy constitutes his way of solving the problem of uniqueness while sticking to the referential inclusive interpretation of the variables. There is no reason why we should indulge in this syntactical reformulation, rather than opt for the Wittgenstinian semantic reinterpretation. (See my *Quine's Criterion* cited earlier, and also my 'The Concept of Logic', *NJOFL*, 1972.)

23. The foregoing and the following, too, need to be taken together with Foegelin's *Wittgenstein* (specially ch. 5, sec. v), for I will not touch upon the issues which I think find clarification there. Though I disagree with Foegelin on many issues discussed in the other parts of his book, I treat this part of it pertinent to the issue-at-hand. Yet, I treat the way he is taking Wittgenstein's interpretation of variables to be rather misleading. He agrees with my argument in my earlier book on Wittgenstein, to which I referred more than once, when he writes:

> Writers on Wittgenstein do not usually stress the role of the *application* or *use* of language in the 'Tractatus'. Some, I think, are merely diffident about projecting back upon the 'Tractatus' doctrines thought characteristic of Wittgenstein's later writings. Others seem anxious to maximise the distance between the 'Tractatus' and Wittgenstein's later writings in order to make the transition more dramatic. In fact, the notion of application is central to the 'Tractatus', for it is only through application of language that we are able to resolve many questions that defy proper formulation within our language (Italics in the original.)

I am inclined to disagree with Foegelin on another half a point which he raises in that chapter. It is not the case that, as Foegelin thinks, 'the 'Tractatus' is silent about the way we picture the world using only fully generalised propositions'. We find Wittgenstein 'agonised over this problem' (these are Foegelin's words) not only in the *Note Books*, as Foegelin notes, but also in the *Tractatus*, which he seems to be ignoring. That this is the case will be evident by the time I close my argument here.

24. It seems that Wittgenstein wanted to demarcate between clearly these three realms. His objections to extending quantification theory to comprehend identity could be treated as his refusal to transfer what belonged to the area of semantics to an area that belonged to syntax. Similarly, his objections to the theory of descriptions (as developed by Russell) could be considered as his reluctance to smuggle in what belongs to pragmatics to syntactics. This fits with the general spirit of Wittgenstein's vision of language, namely, that all that is there to a language cannot be exhaustively captured in any specification of its syntax, however elaborate this specification might be.

25. As this sort of descriptions of the world is geared to represent the world uniquely-1, what Wittgenstein is suggesting may be likened to what Marx is attempting at in the *Capital*. In this work, Marx is trying to give a description of the capitalist economy in terms of the total social capital and total labour, etc. which are a bit too much

ethereal, and yet are related to concrete social reality. Marx is trying to give an abstract representation of the concrete; this sort of a representation should be differentiated from a concrete representation of the abstract. Compare, for instance, Marx's representation of the capitalist phenomenon with, say, a *tantrik* representation of the human anatomy. I might rip open the bowels of all of you, but in none I may find a cup with *jatharagni* in it. Those, who are incapable of seeing any intelligence in Marx or his followers, may note the same by observing the difference between the relationship between a Schrödinger equation and a particle and the relationship between the *tantrik* canvas and what it portrays.

26. Another reason for this is that such a move would be permissible if the world is finite, that is, if the world has at most $n \leq \aleph_0$ objects. But it is, as Wittgenstein would say, *sans* sense to tell that the world has this number of objects. (As the reasons for this would emerge from what follows, here we may just note that all that one can say is that this theory requires such and such number of objects). This, however, falls outside the scope of my present concern; so I will not pursue it further.

27. This dialectical trick was, perhaps, borrowed by Russell from Moore who is adept at it. The one exception to this normal practice of the then Cambridge thinkers is Keynes. See his preface to his *General Theory* where he writes: 'I myself held with conviction for many years the theories which I now attack.' Maybe this is due to the reason that economists have better memories, and philosophers have bitter memories.

28. It is this criterion which I used in the foregoing to say that Wittgenstein should have objected to Russell's theory of descriptions on the ground that it semantically homogenizes the class of expressions. But methodologically Russell's discovery that $(Ix)Ax$ and its definitional equivalent say the same, and Wittgenstein's discovery that 'fa' says the same as '(Ex). fx.x=a' are at par. They are, to use Ramsey's phrase, paradigms of philosophical analysis in virtue of showing how the apparent structure of the definiendum is deceptive, and how its real structure is the one exhibited by the definiens.

29. See, for instance, his *Methods of Logic*. One should go to this book after the *Tractatus*; but unfortunately in my case it has been the other way round.

30. This is the moral that we received from all those metatheoretical results concerning quantification theory since Gödel. See Suppes' contribution to Daya and Rao (ed), *Modern Logic: Its Relevance to Philosophy*.

31. Russell's definition of number is not just the way in which only abstract objects like numbers are individuated; it is not unique to abstract objects, it is the way in which any object is individuated. To note how this was used as early as Aristotle, see my *Aristotle's First Philosophy in Proper Prospective*.

32. Obviously, if a theory is intended to be about a heterogeneous set of objects, then that theory will have as many principles of individuation as there are types of objects in the domain.

33. Each discipline is an attempt to rewrite a bit of the *Genesis*—astronomy, geology, zoology—for example; philosophy too has its share in this blasphemeous activity.

34. The relativity of reference that I am talking about should not be confused with Strawsonian relativity of reference, which may have some Hegelian affiliations, in the sense that it tantamounts to saying that language generates its own world. Though I would not be able to argue it out here, I do not think that reference of relative pronouns is, in any way, different from pronouns, nouns, or even bound variables. Strawson would, of course, differentiate between the way in which 'the doctor' and 'he' would refer in the sentence. 'If the doctor prescribes wrong drugs, he is liable to punishment.' Strawson entertains the possibility of the third x referring to the one which is said to be, that is, individuated by, F in

$(Ex)\,(Fx.Gx)$.

On the interpretation that I was talking about both the instances of x refer to the same and is individuated in one stroke, but neither by F nor by G.

35. Until and unless the principle of individuation of properties is settled for, it cannot be said whether Leibnitz's law of identity (as it is usually understood), that is, the law of identifying numerical identity and property identity, holds or not. There exist theories which incorporate principles of individuation for properties and objects in such a way that Leibnitz's law does not hold; for instance, fundamental particle physics where any two given photons (or electrons) have all the same properties. I have elsewhere (in an as yet unpublished paper delivered to the seminars at the departments of philosophy at Chandigarh, Shillong, Poona and Calcutta) argued that in Leibnitz's ontology itself properties and objects are assumed to come fully individuated on their own and hence that Leibnitz himself has no ontological use of Leibnitz's law.
36. Where n and m are natural numbers, imagine how impossibly complex doing arithmetic would be if we need to individuate the referents of n and m respectively in $n+m$ by different modes of individuation. Compare it with the way in which we individuate natural numbers with a simple recursive definition, namely,

    (*a*) 0 is a number, and
    (*b*) the successor of a number is a number.

37. I indicated my inclination towards (*b*) and also gave a reason for this in my 'The Concept of Logic,' *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, 1973.
38. Tarski, for instance, has shown how any proof in which existential instantiation is used can be recast as a proof in which existential instantiation is not used. See his 'A Simplified Formulation of Predicate Logic Without Identity', *Archiv fur Mathematische Logik*, 1965.
39. Socrates is reported to have said that an unexamined life is not worth living. By this he could not have meant that animals have no right to life. What he meant perhaps was that such a life was not human at all. Similarly, our unexamined use of names has been with us either as a habit or a ritual. And this is essentially a human habit, for, as Wittgenstein would say: you may train your dog to respond to an utterance of your name, you cannot say, even then, that your dog, in so responding, has used your name. How can we let such an essentially human activity go unexamined?

Notes and discussions

CAUSALITY IN ECONOMICS—A NOTE

INTRODUCTION

Causality is a key concept in natural and social sciences, law and, of course, philosophy. In these various disciplines it has been used in at least three senses: in sense I, the word 'cause' is used for any action which an agent performs in order to bring about an event or state of affairs. This concept of cause is particularly important in law and perhaps history. A cause in this sense is necessarily prior in time to its effect, and generally, though not necessarily, contiguous in space. In sense II, the word 'cause' is applied to explain phenomena occurring in nature. Thus we can speak of the cause of an earthquake or an eclipse. A cause in this sense has the connotation of a sufficient condition of its effect. Thus to discover the cause of an event is to locate something among its temporal antecedents such that, if it had not been present, the event would not have occurred.

There is a third sense in which the word 'cause' is used: as an 'explanation' whether or not the explanation is causal in senses I and II. In this sense a cause need not be an action or event, but may be a state of affairs, a trait of character, or an abstract principle. It is in this sense (sense III) that the word 'cause' is generally used in modern sciences, though the use in senses I and II is not entirely absent either.

We would be in a better position to appreciate the interconnections between the three concepts of cause, if we take a brief review of the historical development of this idea.

At the time that Aristotle wrote on the subject, it was customary to couch all explanations of natural events in anthropomorphic terms. For Aristotle all science was the search for 'causes', and he distinguished 'four causes' for any object or event:

(*i*) The material cause which is the matter from which the thing is made;
(*ii*) The formal cause which is literally the shape, or metaphorically the structure or organizing principle which distinguishes it from other bits of the same matter;
(*iii*) The efficient cause is the agent who brings the thing into being or imposes the form on the matter; and
(*iv*) the final cause is the purpose for which the thing is produced.

The first two causes really pertain to the description of a thing rather than providing any causal explanation of it. The efficient cause is very similar

to cause in sense I defined above. The final cause indicates the anthropomorphic nature of the definitions, underlying the fact that everything is 'produced' with a particular purpose in mind of the agent.

Aristotle's concept of causation, even though it dominated thinking right up to the sixteenth century, slowly underwent a change, with progressive elimination of the anthropomorphic elements. The work of the medieval scientists was largely responsible for the latter trend. Many of these scientists followed the tradition of Pythagoras and Plato, according to which to explain a phenomenon is to discover the laws which it obeys. The astronomer Ptolemy, in the second century A.D., regarded as legitimate any attempt to interpret the facts of planetary motion by means of a mathematical scheme, provided 'the phenomena were saved'. The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries witnessed a revival of Platonism; Kepler equated 'causes' with 'reasons' and regarded the cause of planetary motion as a set of laws from which the observed movements of the planets can be deduced. This view introduces the idea of necessity into that of causation—the logical necessity which relates promises to conclusions. The full transition from explanations in terms of efficient causes to explanations in terms of law occurs in the work of Galileo. A phenomenon is explained in Galileo's system when the regularity which it exemplifies is able to be incorporated into a system of laws, by being shown to be a logical consequence of these laws.

Hume offered a fundamental critique of the concept of cause as used in the works of scientists such Galileo and Newton in his *Treatise of Human Nature* (1739). He showed that the relation of cause and effect is neither logically necessary nor observable in a single instance. It is not logically necessary since we can conceive of an event as being preceded by any other event whatsoever, and hence the causality relation is not observable in a single instance. Hume came to the view that for an assertion of causality we require that the succession should have been repeated many times without any contrary instance. According to Hume, an assertion of cause is an expression of confident expectation based on habit. Hume's analysis was thus a fundamental contribution to the science of induction.

In the natural sciences today explanations are mostly of the type known as 'hypotheticodeductive', according to which observation suggests a generalization or law from which consequences can be deduced. The consequences can then be verified or falsified by controlled experiment or by observation. Any set of laws which 'saves observed phenomena' is considered legitimate; but since a given set of phenomena can be saved by a number of alternative sets of laws, it is necessary to provide criteria for choosing one set rather than another. The usual criteria are mathematical simplicity, elegance, comprehensiveness, predictive fruitfulness, etc. The concept of efficient cause, however, still appears within this framework in those sciences (like economics) which depend largely on qualitative analysis.

Causality in Economics

In the preceding section, we discussed very briefly certain general considerations pertaining to 'causality'. However, owing to the specialized nature of every science, the way the concepts are applied in a particular science would exhibit special features. A characteristic feature of economics is the probabilistic nature of its laws. Hence the preceding discussion, largely based on deterministic systems, may seem to have little bearing of a direct nature on economics. However, economists for long, have proceeded as if deterministic laws could be viewed (at least approximately) as certainty equivalents of probabilistic laws. Hence it is no wonder that the first attempts by Wold and Simon to introduce the concept of causality formally in economics eschewed probabilistic considerations altogether.

Simon, for example, notes that the standard predicate calculus of formal logic is inappropriate to express causal relations in economics. Suppose $A(a)$ is the cause of $B(a)$. It is not necessarily true that the absence of $B(a)$ can cause $A(a)$. But in the standard predicate calculus.

$$(x)(A(x)\rightarrow B(x)) \equiv (x)\,(\sim B(x)\rightarrow\sim A(x)\,).$$

While the inverse inference is undoubtedly accepted, we cannot regard it as causal. Thus two statements corresponding to the same truth function need not express the same causal ordering. Thus, according to Simon, the main question is how to define the causal relation to preserve the asymmetry between cause and effect.

In the so-called causal-chain approach of Wold and Simon, the causal connection between two variables depends on the context provided by a (deterministic) scientific theory—a set of laws containing these variables. For concreteness, consider the important special situation where a scientific theory takes the form of a set of n simultaneous linear algebric equations in n variables. However, it may be found in particular systems of this kind that certain subsets of variables can be solved independently of the remaining equations. Such subsets are called self-contained subsets. A causal ordering among variables of a linear structure that has one or more self-contained subsets can now be defined as follows: consider the minimal self-contained subsets of the system. With each subset associate the variables that can be evaluated from that subset alone. Call them variables of order zero. Next, substitute the values of these variables in the remaining equations of the system, and repeating the same procedure, obtain successively variables of order 1, 2, etc. Now, if a variable of same order (say 1) occurs with non-zero coefficient in an equation of the linear structure belonging to a subset of a higner order (say 2), then that variable is said to have a direct causal connection to the endogenous variables of the latter subset.

This method accounts for the asymmetry of cause and effect but does not

base the asymmetry on temporal precedence, i.e. it imposes no requirement that the cause precede the effect.

In recent years, the Simon-Wold approach has fallen out of favour with most economists. In an important contribution, Granger attempted to give an operationally meaningful definition of causality, incorporating probabilistic elements.

In discussing deterministic causation we say that A causes B, if whenever B occurs, A must have occurred. But deterministic causality is irrelevant in a probablistic science. For example, if a person smokes he does not necessarily get cancer, but we can still consider smoking as a cause of cancer, if he increases the probablity of contracting cancer by smoking. Suppes has attempted to introduce probabilistic theories of causality. One of his definitions is:

DEFINITION: An event $B(t^1)$ (occurring at time t^1) is a *prima facie* cause of $A(t)$ *if* (*i*) $t^1 < t$ (*ii*) $P(B(t^1)) > 0$ and (*iii*) $P(A(t)/B(t^1)) > P(A(t))$

Granger in his work uses a definition of causality which is based on Suppes' definition above.

We now give a brief exposition of Granger's ideas. Consider a universe in which all variables are measured at pre-specified time points $t = 1,2....$ Let all the knowledge in the universe available at time n be denoted by Ω_n; Ω_n includes no variates measured at time points $t > n$, although it may well contain expectations or forecasts of such values. Three axioms are now assumed to hold.

AXIOM A: The past and present may cause the future, but the future cannot cause the past.

AXIOM B: Ω_n contains no redundant informatio, i.e. if some Z_n is functionally related to one or more other variables in a deterministic fashion, then Z_n should be excluded from Ω_n.

AXIOM C (Hume): All causal relationships remain constant in direction throughout time.,

Suppose that we are interested in the proposition that the variable Y causes the variable X. At time n, the value X_{n+1} will be, in general, a random variable and so can be characterized by probability statements of the form $P(X_{n+1} \in A)$ for a set A.

DEFINITION: Y is said to cause X if
$P(X_{n+1} \in A/\Omega_n) \neq P(X_{n+1} \in A/\Omega_n - Y_n)$
for some A.

The general definition introduced above is not operational in the sense that it cannot be used with actual data. To become operational, a number of constraints need to be introduced. To do this it is convenient to restate the

general definition. Suppose that one is interested in the possibility that the vector series Y_t causes the vector series X_t. Let J_n be an information set available at time n, consisting of terms of the vector series Z_t, i.e.

$$J_n : Z_{n-j},\ J \geq 0$$

Define J_n^1 as follows

$$J_n^1 : Z_{n-j},\ Y_{n-j},\ J \geq 0$$

Then Granger gives a series of definitions:

DEF. 1: Y_n does not cause X_{n+1} *w.r.t.* J_n^1 if
$$P(X_{n+1}/J_n) = P(X_{n+1}/J_n^1).$$

DEF. 2: If $J_n^1 \equiv \Omega_n$, the universal information set and
if $P(X_{n+1}/\Omega_n) \neq P(X_{n+1}/\Omega_n - Y_n)$
then Y_n is said to cause X_{n+1}

DEF. 3: If $P(X_{n+1}/J_n^1) \neq P(X_{n+1}/J_n)$ then Y_n is said to be a *prima facie* cause of X_{n+1} *w.r.t.* the information set J_n^1.

Granger also introduces the weaker concept of 'causality in the mean' where the probability distributions in the above definitions are replaced by expected value operations. The concept of causality in the mean combined with the theory of point forecasting can be appled to empirical data. Thus if $\sigma^2(X/J_n)$ is the variance of the one-step conditional forecast error of X_{n+1} given J_n, then Y is a *prima facie* cause of X *w.r.t.* J_n^1 if $\sigma^2(X/J_n^1) < \sigma^2(X/J_n)$. This corresponds to a definition of causality introduced by Wiener in 1958. A great deal of empirical work has been done using this and related concepts of causality. However, fundamental difficulties in the interpretation of such causality tests still persist. One such problem is the problem of missing variables. Suppose that X causes both Y and Z, but the causal lag from X to Y is shorter than that from X to Z. If X is not observed, the causality test may well indicate that Y causes Z. Another problem arises when there is a lag between the occurrence of an event and its observation. To take a simple example, mere observation may lead one to conclude that lighting causes thunder, when, in fact, both are consequences of the same electrical discharge. This problem is particularly evident in economics where data on events usually becomes available with a substantial time-lag.

It is too early to judge what role Granger's causality concept will play in the future. A strong criticism of Granger's position is to be found in Zellner's work where it is proposed that causality should not be considered as an isolated empirical phenomenon, but only in the context of some accepted theory. One compromise that emerges is a Bayesian approach. The investigator may start with a prior belief or probability that X causes Y. These prior probabi-

lities could be based on some accepted theory. The Granger type of tests may then be used to derive the posterior probabilities in the standard Bayesian fashion. The procedure looks sufficiently attractive, but its full implications have not yet been worked out.

It is undoubtedly true that understanding causality is going to be a major preoccupation of economists for the foreseeable future.

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D.M. NACHANE

University of Bombay, Bombay

THE QUEST FOR THE REAL

Introduction

Human quests are many and multifarious. They are for wealth, power, popularity, distinction, knowledge, safety, etc. These have their normal forms but aberrations and exaggerations too.

But in and through all of them does not man really seek the 'Real' and does he not want to be 'Real'? Wealth is for power, position, control, effectivity. But without reality can there be effectivity? And what would be popularity and distinction without reality? Knowledge has to be of truth and truth is reality. And security is sure existence, inviolability, and that means reality.

So through all these apparent forms man's quest is really for the 'Real'. However, these apparent forms have apparent satisfactions which do not really satisfy. And through disappointments and frustrations man persists in his quest for the True and the Real.

Further, man is poised rather insecurely in life. There is, as it were, an inherent insecurity or anxiety in it. Life has, therefore, an inherent urge for a poise and position of security, inviolability, absolute safety.

However, only a few squarely feel this urge and boldly follow it. The average man lacks the depth and the courage to entertain the challenge of the quest of the Real; he accepts the short-lived satisfactions as the best that he can have.

The Search for the Real Within

But those, who feel deeply shaken by this challenge, start scrutinizing their experience in search of the Real.

Now human personality and its varied experiences of the day and of the night under different situations of life are full of complexities. The scrutiny has, therefore, to be a prolonged and a devoted one, a close and guarded observation of one's inner self by the self itself without being disturbed by the thinking of others.

Now when a man starts seeing himself with some clarity, he will begin to identify and recognize many facts rather quite dominant and influential in his make-up, which much falsify his perceptions of things. He might, e.g., notice that when he is engrossed in the world of senses which is outside of him, he is full of superficialities. On the other hand, when he is collected within his own self he enjoys a sense of depth. These two poises might get fairly marked and contrasted, and then they would lead to many other interesting discoveries. The poise of depth means restfulness, concentration, detachment and freedom. And as the depth turns deeper and deeper, these qualities in-

crease in intensity and the deeper poise becomes an attraction in itself. This situation is helpful in tenching the region of greater depths and making interesting discoveries in inner life. One would, e.g., discover that anger is superficial, that agitation and disturbed condition are superficial, and that all hankering after things external is superficial. The activity of thinking might emerge as agitation and superficial. Instead, inner quietitude and silence might emerge as firm, stable and deeply enjoyable states which would, indeed, be a great achievement of inner exploration and research.

This distinction and demarcation in the superficial reactions and involvements of personality and its relative inner self-poise has one important consequence. One becomes a better master of one's thinking. One feels confident that one thinks with freedom on own initiative and not compulsively as though of necessity. Then thinking, too, becomes more purposive and creative. Similarly, with regard to the ordinary impulses and desires, a relative detachment, freedom and power of direction and control come about. All that means a clearer sense of selfhood *vis-à-vis* the environment. That also means more self-integrity and a sense of self-reality.

A Yet Deeper Plunge

However, a yet deeper plunge is necessary. One feels drawn to it, one does occasionally get into a really deeper depth and feel a consciousness distinct from what one had felt so long, and stands struck by its quality exclaiming: 'Oh! this is really Real, the rest is in comparison with it superficial and external.' That occasional experience tends to stabilize itself, and the sense also gets strengthend and cries out in joy: 'Oh! really that is the Real in me.' This deep fact has the tendency to strike the corresponding depth in the vast fact of the universe, and one begins to feel a vast secret Reality behind the wide phenomenal existence. And slowly the feeling gets clear: 'Oh! this is the Real in me and that the Real there in the world.' Given, this experience, one feels drawn to working out in thought and word an elaborate philosophy of life and existence. And this conceptual structure breathes the certitude of the initial experience. The initial experience can take many forms and display much individual variation. But each form and variation will have a sense of reality. The conceptual elaborations, too, will be varied, but they all will carry a sense of the Real. They will not be just mental constructions and speculative possibilities.

Philosophy as the Quest for the Real

Thus the quest for the Real becomes the issues for philosophy and the philosopher. And this is the issue for a man, who cannot feel satisfied with transient working solutions of the practical urgencies of life and insist on feeling and knowing, what is really Real, absolutely Real, utlimately Real as the basis of life, the true foundation of it. Reality is inescapable as through a

contact with it, an identification with it, life gains clarity, purposiveness and certitude in its varied pursuits. Says an ancient Indian philosophical text बल बुद्धिश्च तेजश्च दृष्टतत्वस्य वर्धते. Experience of the Real increases one's force, understanding and illumination.

Seeking the Real in the World Outside

Seeking the Real within, however, is one approach, which has been popular in India as also in ancient Greece in its own way. But it is pefectly possible to seek the Real externally in the wider world phenomena by penetrating the superficial forms deeper and deeper. Normal human personality is in constant interaction with the environment and is ordinarily outward-gazing. The inward look becomes strong when the self-consciousness and the reflective spirit become prominent. So outward-turn is, in fact, the more common attitude and observation of the external phenomena and reflection on it is more likely. But there should also be the urge to go deeper and deeper, and discover the Real in the wide world existence. Evidently, one must seek the Real trying one's best to eliminate all partialities and prejudices of personal disposition as also of social suggestion. A feeling of universality of action and force may be an early perception in this approach. This perception may take the form of Unity or Plurality and of Matter or Spirit or any combination of all these. But this urge for the Real is different from the impulse of the empirical science as representated by its attitude of collection of facts and achieving generalizations. At the stage of explanation, however, science does take a deeper poise. But the search for the Real, the Abiding, the really True is surely different from finding the laws of nature or the principles of its behaviour and action.

Both the approaches have their validity, and the human temperament has to be respected and given its play. But the inspiring motivation will be the same in both—the search for the Real, the True, the Permanent, the unfailing, the Eternal.

Various Approaches in Philosophy

Can we not say here that this may be the true characteristic of philosophy and the philosophical seeking? Man must seek the Real and be himself a vibrant Reality. That is an inalienable urge of human nature even when expressed in a few persons. The quality of this urge has a wide uplifting influence on humanity generally. However, this urge is difficult and not easy to sustain continually. The moods of pragmatism, positivism, agnosticism and the like are natural. But the urge for the Ultimate, the Absolute, the Final and the Last in existence does assert itself again and again in the individual as also humanity.

The Greeks had thought of philosophy as the search for wisdom, but in

Plato, the representative figure, it did culminate in the search for the Real, the world of ideas.

Hegel called philosophy 'the thinking consideration of things'. But why should the philosophical urge to know things be subjected to the limitation of 'thinking'? Is this urge not of an absolute kind, of knowing things in whatever way and degree we can? The very touch of the Real is necessary to feel and enjoy Reality ourselves. Thinking is, after all, a phenomenal activity in man directly serviceable for dealing with the universal phenomena. And the Real, the noumena, may well be not responsive to 'thinking'. Did Kant not say that we can 'know' things-in-themselves but cannot think of them, since the categories of understanding are inapplicable there. Even in ordinary sense-perception we know, we are aware of things and we may not think of them. So philosophy may be a deeper awareness of things, but not a 'thinking consideration' of them.

Wittgenstein has in recent times taken a stand that the philosophical judgments are not expressible in language, hence philosophy is not possible. An influencial school of Logical Positivism has in consequence come up, which has made a useful study of the capabilities of language. This is all fine, but can we eradicate the human need for the Real, the urge to know and to be that? And is the expression in language adequately a necessity? Is the satisfaction of the human need not the essential fact? And in the past has the attempt not been made to express the Real, the Ultimate, the Infinite and recreate a language and a symbolism for the same? For a mood of positivism and agnosticism logical positivism has, no doubt, a justification.

Let us seriously consider whether philosophy, as an unhampered and free search for the Real, can possibly harmonize all the varied approaches to philosophy or not, and also restore to philosophy a rich creativity in recognizing the possibility of infinite approaches to the Infinite and infinite elaborations in thought and language, however inadequate they be. If there is at the core a certitude of perception, it will certainly afford a deep satisfaction and all creations will be enrichments of our knowledge of the Infinite, the Ultimate, the Real.

What is Man? And Which Part of Man Has the Competence to Know the Real?

In this connection, it will be useful also to consider: what is man?, and who is it that philosophizes and seeks to know the Real. Is man just mind plus body or something more? The *Gita* regards 'body', life, mind and soul (*śarīra, prāṇa, manas* and *ātman*) as the major factors in human personality. The *Upaniṣads* affirm five sheaths or levels of being in man—body, life, mind, *vijñān* (the plane which directly knows the truth) and delight (the essential joy of existence). Here is a much larger conception of personality. Sri Aurobindo has elaborated this in great detail into a form of Integral

Personality. Now, in this integral personality, there are parts which, when cultivated, give us an intimate experience of the Real in the individual as in the universe. The mind in this conception of personality is an instrument of help for the organism's adjustments with the environment. It is a form of consciousness adapted to external organization of life, not for apprehending truth of things. The deep-lying unifying spiritual self-existent consciousness is really the principle for knowing the inner unifying truth of things. Thus what remains speculation or inference to mind can be clear direct knowledge to the inner spiritual consciousness. We cannot, therefore, afford to remain ignorant of the more competent parts of our personality for the solution of the anamolies of our mental handling of things.

Sri Aurobindo has contributed a capital idea to contemporary thought for the consideration of man and existence. It is that three terms—the individual, the universal and the transcendent—represent three essential aspects of man and existence, and that all these aspects need to be considered for a due appraisal of both. Man has an individuality, it is in solidarity with the society and general nature, and it has also an aspect of a potentiality of further 'becoming' or a course of future evolution. All the aspects are involved in man and that makes his personality a rich and a complex fact. Similarly society, nature and existence have to be considered in this fuller manner.

Man becomes thus a transitional being to be evolutionally exceeded and transcended, and so mind is a function with a purpose for a stage of growth. For the deeper purposes of philosophy one has to seek other parts of integral personality capable of intuition and integral perception of things.

This brings us to a close of a preliminary consideration of the quest for the Real and we may now, in the end, attempt a few comparative appraisals.

Comparative Appraisals

It is interesting that the Indian philosophers of the past and western philosophers stand rather contrasted in one important respect. The former start from a basic spiritual experience or realization and their philosophical system is an elaboration, explanation, justification of the same. The latter start from a temperamental inclination or bias. Fichte had said more or less: 'Philosophy is a rationalization of what one knows by instinct.' Karl Jasper's *Psychology of Worldviews* is a fine study.

Now Kapila, it appears, had as though vividly felt and realized the witness status of consciousness involving an inner distinction between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. The Sāṅkhya philosophy is an elaboration of the same. The Vedantic realization is the reality of the one *brahman* in existence. This is elaborated by Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva and Vallabha. The differences among them show variations in the relation between *brahman* and the *world*. Sri Aurobindo presents a neo-Vedanta where the determining experience is that of the supermind, the plane of consciousness and being, where unity

and plurality meet and *brahman* starts self-objectification towards the world. The supermind is really central to the entire edifice of Sri Aurobindo's philosophical system. And it is extremely interesting that Indian philosophers are almost normally yogis, who have aimed at and gone through *sādhanā*, spiritual discipline, and attained to a realization.

The western philosophers, too, have gone through a discipline deep and prolonged but of a different kind, a discipline of thought, reflection, concentration and dedication. Spinoza lived an austere life and Kant had a wonderful discipline in his life, Socrates was an inspiration to his contemporaries and ever afterwards. So also others more or less.

But it can be said that thought and thinking are the power of the western philosopher, realization or a spiritual status of the Indian.

Now Indian Philosophers, it appears, have normally followed the inner route to the Real. In the West, this route has not been popular. However, Socrates was eminently conscious of an 'inner voice' which warned him against doing certain things. He also went into trances, inner states of spiritual self-engrossment, which enjoyed respect among his contemporaries. The inner voice and the trances were held above his reflections, which were, no doubt, brilliant. Plato was a profound thinker of the affairs of men, but his thinking culminated in a powerful theory of the Real, which continues to influence thinking up to this day. His thought sparkles with intuitive hits like 'time is the moving image of eternity'. Aristotle was a vast empiricist who initiated so many sciences. But he, too, needed the 'First Principles' of existence.

In the modern period, it was Descartes who in a way adopted the inner route. His pursuit of philosophy had landed him in a state of crisis. He became desparate and wanted to know what Real is, and he provisionally rejected everything from within himself. And, to his surprise, he found that he was sure that at least he himself existed. Self-existence was an uneffacable certitude. From that, by a sort of mathematical deduction, he was led on to the reality of the world and of God. And then peace returned to him.

This was certainly a sort of individual inner approach, though very different from the one we have represented, i.e. one of inner exploration of personal experience in search of the Real.

But in Bergson we have the best example comparable to our approach. It will be best to consider this inner research in his own words.

Says he in his *Introduction to Metaphysics*:

> There is at least one reality which we all seize from within, by intuition and not by simple analysis. It is our own person in its flowing through time, the self which endures. With no other thing can we sympathize intellectually, or if you like, spiritually. But one thing is sure: we sympathize with ourselves.
>
> When, with the inner regard of my consciousness, I examine my person in its passivity, like some superficial encrustment, first I perceive all the perceptions which come to it from the material world. These perceptions are clear-cut, distinct, juxtaposed or mutually juxtaposable; they seek to group themselves into objects. Next I perceive memories more or less adherent to these perceptions and which serve to interpret them; these memories are, so to speak, as if detached from the depth of my person and drawn to the periphery by perceptions resembling them, they are fastened on me without being absolutely myself. And finally, I become aware of tendencies, motor habits, a crowd of virtual actions more or less solidly bound to those perceptions and these memories. All these elements with their well-defined forms appear to me to be all the more distinct from myself the more they are distinct from one another. Turned outwards from within, together they constitute the surface of a sphere which tends to expand and lose itself in the external world. But if I pull myself in from the periphery toward the centre, if I seek deep down within me what is the most uniformly, the most constantly and durably myself, I find something altogether different.

This is the kind of research needed which must be carried on far and wide within to discover the realities of different grades and levels and ultimately the deepest Real. That will tend to evoke the corresponding universal Real and afford the satisfaction of fulfilment in the quest of the Real.

Bergson is a reaction against the intellectualist philosophies. However, he accords to intellect a place of honour in the external world of determinate finite objects. Existentialism, too, is a reaction against the same trends and stresses individual person's concrete existence, and its problems of insecurity, anxiety, isolation, freedom, etc. It powerfully voices the cultural crisis of the contemporary situation where the meaning of life and existence is very much in doubt. Considered in the light of Integral personality of man it represents the difficulty experienced by the superficial human ego in contemporary industrialized life of mechanization, stress and strain.

Sri Aurobindo's observation on the present cultural situation may be helpful. As he says in *The Life Divine*: 'Science can only help by standardizing, by fixing everything into an artificially arranged and mechanized unity of material life. A greater whole-being, whole-knowledge, whole-power is needed to weld all into a greater unity of whole-life.'

The ego is an environment dependent and environment-involved personality. And it is finding itself inadequate for the highly complicated and exacting situation of the present. It misses freedom, misses leisure and existence is felt as intolerable. But deep down within us, in the large frame of integral personality, stands the self-sure and self-existent distinct consciousness of wholeness and of joy, our true spiritual personality. We must withdraw from the superficial involvements, get into touch with our holistic principle and seek to import into our strained and divided external life a wholeness of

perception and action. That will surely restore meaningfulness to our life and activity. That will appease the anxiety of existentialist philosophy and restore to the contemporary man joy and freedom.

Our quest of the Real has been quite a long excursion. But what is needed most is a sincere personal attempt at diving deep down within ourselves and making an experience of the inner quietitude and ultimately of the spiritual self-hood of joy, clarity and certitude.

INDRA SEN

Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry

Book reviews

ROY J. HOWARD, *Three Faces of Hermeneutics*, University of California Press, 1982, pp. 187.

Most of the students of contemporary philosophy are gradually being aware of the growing importance and influence of hermeneutics in the present day. Though the historical roots of hermeneutics can be traced to distant past, yet it is undeniable that it has its rejuvenation in the recent past. Following the path of phenomenological-existential movement, hermeneutic ideas are gaining now-a-days more and more prominence in the philosophical world. With the growing popularity of this trend, one needs to be professionally acquainted with its basic principles, historical origin and course of development. The currently available literature on hermeneutics is quite rich, though not very large or extensive. The book under review *Three Faces of Hermeneutics* by Roy J. Howard is undoubtedly a very stimulating contribution to this field.

The present book is not obviously meant to be a mere historical introduction or detailed description of the course of development of the hermeneutic movement. This sort of requirement has already been met by such works as Richard Palmer's *Hermeneutics*.

In his introduction Howard traces the historical roots of philosophical hermeneutics in the nineteenth century. The term 'hermeneutics', taken out of the narrow theological context, implies the understanding and interpretation of texts, giving it a distinct philosophical connotation. Though the reader may not find here the expected exhaustive or detailed analysis of all current developments of hermeneutics, the book, however, provides an explanatory mapping of the major areas of the field.

To start with, in the first chapter, the author delineates the developments within the analytic tradition as it has been influenced by the writings of the early and the later Wittgenstein. It is to be noted that the author adds 'analytic' to 'hermeneutics' for indicating his inclination towards formal or logicist ways of elucidating the problems of intersubjective understanding. His choice of the authors of the analytic persuasion—von Wright and Peter Winch—is interesting and unconventional in the hermeneutic context. von Wright, of late, explicitly enrolls himself in the hermeneutic tradition. But the promise was there right from the days he started taking deep interest in practical reason. One might think that Peter Winch is rather a new convert. But judi-

cious exploitation of the later Wittgenstein's concept of *form of life* has enabled him to make significant contribution to what is called philosophy of interpretation. Howard's account of these analytic-hermeneutic thinkers is both refreshing and thought-provoking. Contrary to the popular belief that analytic philosophers always thrive on the dubious distinction between fact and value, Howard shows how both these analytic-hermeneutic writers successfully use the notions of action and freedom to clarify the development of human understanding. Such an exposition also brings to light how our aspirations, wants, desires and interests are themselves interpretatively active in the emergence and promotion of knowledge (p. 85).

The arguments developed on and around 'psycho-social hermeneutics' are mainly intended to reject mono-methodologism both of positivism and of classical Marxism and deals with the speculation of an evolved and more adequate Marxism. As the representative of such psycho-social hermeneutics, the author discusses the views, among others, of Jurgen Habermas of the Frankfurt School. The three phases of the latter's philosophy—negative, positive and programmatic, are constructively analysed. Elaborating these various phases Howard describes how philosophy as anchored in the psycho-social linguistic sciences is specially concerned with the emancipatory interest of the Marxian type. Following the Marxian idea that there is no such a thing as interest-free knowledge, the author makes an investigation into the adequate method of knowledge, whereby the governing interests can be exposed, questioned and corrected in the pursuit of truth, justice and freedom (p. 119).

Such analysis of Habermas and Marx often reminds one of another relevant work entitled *Habermas and Marxism: An Appraisal* by J. Sensat, where we find a more elaborate discussion of a similar cluster of ideas. A comparative discussion of Kant and Dilthey is broached in the third chapter of the book under the heading 'Ontological Hermeneutics'. By relating the phenomenological development of the ideas of Hans-Georg Gadamer with this theme, Howard carves out for himself a place to gaze around a wide intellectual horizon. Analysing Gadamer's conception of truth he directs our attention to the reason which led Gadamer to choose aesthetics and history as the paradigms of interpretative analysis. 'Effective-historical consciousness' reveals itself more clearly in the experience of the aesthetic and historical objects than it does in the objects of natural science. Quoting from Gadamer, Howard shows how 'in the process of understanding there takes place a real fusion of horizons, which means that as the historical horizon is projected, it is simultaneously removed. We described the conscious act of this fusion as the task of the effective-historical consciousness...it is, in fact, the central problem of hermeneutics. It is the problem of application that exists in all understanding.' (*Truth and Method*, pp. 273-74).

After discussing these various versions of hermeneutics, the writer concludes that the negative task of philosophical hermeneutics is to show, quite contrary to the vigorous claims of positivism and scientism, how the possibility of truth comes before and is supposed by the possibilities of method. The positive task, however, is to show how such a possibility of truth becomes real in the linguistic existence that is man.

As one goes through the web of analyses and arguments of the book under review, one feels disappointed to see that Paul Ricoeur is conspicuous by his absence in Howard's scheme of thought. At least I felt so. One can well understand the reasons for not paying much time and space to such historical forerunners of the hermeneutic movement as Schleirmacher and Betti among others. But the contributions of Dilthey, Heidegger and Ricoeur in the present day are so central and influential that their views and arguments certainly deserved more attention and examination. It would have certainly enhanced the worth of this otherwise good work. True, the author makes use of Ricoeur's ideas in the concluding section of his book for the limited purpose of assessment and evaluation of some versions of hermeneutics. But proper exploitation of Ricoeur's resources would have yielded richer fruits in the chosen areas of Howard's interest.

The chief merit and the major utility of the present book lie in the fact that here the author seeks to trace the development of hermeneutics from a rather unconventional point of view. The reason why I consider Howard's perspective unconventional is that though ordinarily philosophical hermeneutics is regarded as opposed to positivism and analytic method, Howard wants to open up a promising dialogue between the said two seemingly opposite movements. He wants to show that positivism by its own development, by its way of isolating, framing and trying to solve problems of language, has been a decisive and progressive influence in the growth of hermeneutics. The development of hermeneutics, in its turn, has also persuaded positivists and their successors to reassess their own presuppositions. These two movements have been treated in the book as complementary, and not contradictory. Their development and interaction, as presented by Howard, show the possibility of emerging new and impregnated dialogial ideas in the field of contemporary social and philosophical thought.

KRISHNA ROY

Indian Council of Philosophical Research
and *Jadavpur University, Calcutta*

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