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Editor D. P. CHATTOPADHYAYA

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The myth of the puruṣārthas

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Any discussion of traditional Indian thought about man and society usually revolves around the notions designated by such terms as *varṇa, āśrama* and *puruṣārtha*. It is also generally assumed that the three are so intimately related to each other that each cannot be understood without the other. But even amongst these, the notion of *puruṣārtha* is perhaps more fundamental as it defines those ultimate goals of human life which give meaning and significance to it. The usual four-fold classification of the *puruṣārthas*, it is claimed, encompasses within it all the actual or possible goals that mankind may pursue for itself. Yet, is this true, and do the terms designate in any clear manner the goals men pursue or ought to pursue?

The usual designation of the *puruṣārthas* is given as *dharma, artha, kāma* and *mokṣa*. There is, of course, the dispute as to whether originally there were only the first three *puruṣārthas* and that the fourth, i.e. *mokṣa*, was added later on to them. But even if this is admitted, and there seems overwhelming evidence to support the contention, there still remains the question as to what is meant by these terms; and whether, if the Indian tradition is to be believed, they comprehend meaningfully all the goals that men pursue or ought to pursue in their lives.

If we forget *dharma*, which is regarded as the distinctive feature of human beings distinguishing them from animals, and concentrate only on *artha* and *kāma* for the present, we would discover that it is not very clear as to what is exactly meant by them. *Kāma*, in the widest sense, may be understood as desire and, by implication, anything that is or can be the object of desire. But then everything will come under the category of *kāma*, since obviously one can and does desire not only *artha* but even *dharma* and *mokṣa*. Such a use of the word *kāma* is not so unwarranted as may seem at first sight. There is the well-known saying in Sanskrit:

nāhaṁ kāmaye rājyaṁ, na svargaṁ na ca punarbhavam /
prāṇināṁ duḥkhataptānām kāmaye duḥkhanāśanam //

Here *punarbhavam*, that is, *mokṣa*, is expressly mentioned while *dharma* may be supposed to be indirectly implied in the last line. In order to avoid the difficulty, one may restrict the notion of *kāma* to certain forms of desiring or to certain objects of desire or both. Thus, it may be said that the term *kāma* refers only to those desires whose objects are sensuous in nature or where

desiring is done in such a way that it necessarily leads to bondage. But this would not only raise the question as to what is meant by bondage, but also whether *svarga* which is supposed to be the object *par excellence* of Vedic sacrifices is sensuous or non-sensuous in character. The Vedic injunction in this regard is unambiguous in its formulation. It clearly states '*svargakāmo yajeta*', that is, 'one who desires heaven should perform (the required) sacrifices.' Thus, it is clear that *svarga* is the object of *kāma* for the Vedic seers. Also, as the whole rationale of Vedic authority is supposed to rest on the distinction between *dṛṣṭa* and *adṛṣṭa phala, svarga* cannot but be treated as *adṛṣṭa* and heaven as non-sensuous in character, that is, as non-apprehensible by the senses. But if so, the restriction on *kāma*, as referring only to those desires whose objects are sensuous in character, would become invalid.

The Vedas, of course, also contain injunctions which promise *dṛṣṭa phala* only, and, as far as I know, none has seriously argued that these parts should be treated as non-authoritative on this ground or as having only lesser or secondary authority. There are, for example, sacrifices prescribed for those who desire to have a son or rainfall or other such worldly things, and the injunction for these has the same form as the injunction for those who desire *svarga*. The text says, for example: '*putrakāmaḥ putreṣṭyā yajeta, vṛṣṭikāmaḥ kārīryyā yajeta.*' There is, thus, no essential difference between '*svargakāmaḥ*' and '*putrakāmaḥ*' or '*vṛṣṭikāmaḥ*', even though the latter are the sort of objects which are known to everybody while the former is accepted only on the authority of the Vedas. In fact, the Vedas are charged with containing false injunctions on the ground that these worldly objects of human desire are many a time not obtained in actual practice by the performance of the prescribed *yajñas*. *Nyāya-Sūtra* 2.1.58, in fact, raises it as an objection on behalf of the *pūrva-pakṣa*, and tries to reply to it in 2.1.59 by saying that the failure to get the desired result may be due to possible defects in the procedure adopted or the material used or the attitude of the sacrificer itself or all of these together. The strategy adopted by the author of the *Nyāya-Sūtras*, if accepted, would make it impossible in principle to give a counter-example to any causal claim advanced by anybody. This is, of course, not the occasion to discuss the *Nyāya-Sūtras* but only to point out the fact that the so-called Vedic authority in that period was supposed to extend as much to the secular desires of man as to those which dealt with matters pertaining to life after death. Later, if Śaṁkara's evidence is to be believed, there would be an attempt to disentangle the two, and the Vedic authority confined only to matters which were regarded as strictly non-empirical in character. But if such a distinction were to be seriously insisted upon, a large part of the Vedas would have to be treated as redundant. Not only this, as what they promise in the empirical domain is also attainable through other means which have little to do with sacrifices, their importance for these purposes would only be marginal in character.

But whether *svarga* is treated as transcendentally sensuous or non-sensuous in character, there will remain the problem of characterizing non-sensuous, non-transcendental objects of desire. How shall we characterize, for example, desire for knowledge or understanding? Shall we treat it as a *puruṣārtha* under the category of *kāma* or not? In the Sāṁkhyan framework, as everything, including *manas* and *buddhi*, is a part of Prakṛti, there should be little difficulty in treating knowledge or understanding as coming under the category of *kāma* as *puruṣārtha*. But what about those who do not accept the Sāṁkhyan position? The Naiyāyikas, for example, treat *manas* as a distinct entity which is required to be postulated because of the fact that one does not have two perceptions at the same time, even though different senses are in contact with the same object at the same time. *Nyāya-Sūtra* 1.1.16 gives this as the reason for postulating *manas*. On the other hand, no specific reason has been given for postulating *buddhi* as a *separate, independent prameya* in 1.1.15. It only says that the terms *buddhi, upalabdhi* and *jñāna* are synonyms for each other. It would perhaps have been better if *buddhi* had been postulated to account for non-perceptual knowledge. Also, it is not clear what the role of *manas* is in non-perceptual knowledge or, for that matter, in the context of *karmendriyas* which, perhaps, may be regarded as relatively more important as far as the *puruṣārthas* are concerned. Of course, the ātman itself is supposed to be postulated as that which is required to account for *jñāna* besides *icchā, dveṣa, prayatna, sukha* and *duḥkha*, according to *Nyāya-Sūtra* 1.1.10. But then, what is the necessity of postulating *buddhi* as a separate *prameya* if ātman is already postulated to understand *jñāna*?

Our task, obviously, is not to go into the details of Nyāya here or to discuss its conceptual structure. What we want to point out is merely the fact that once we grant relative autonomy to the realm of the mind or intellect, then the desires pertaining thereto cannot be treated under *kāma* without transforming the nature of *kāma* itself. But once the term *kāma* is stretched to cover all ends of human seeking, there would remain no distinction between it and the other *puruṣārthas*. The difference between them could perhaps, then, be drawn on other grounds. *Artha*, for example, could mean instrumentalities for the satisfaction of what is desired, or even generalized instrumentalities such as power or wealth which could be used for the satisfaction of any and every desire. *Dharma* could mean the desire for social and political order without which no desire could be fulfilled. Or, alternatively, it could mean any ordering principle which would obviate or adjudicate the conflict between desires, whether of one and the same individual or of different individuals. *Mokṣa* could mean either the desire for freedom in all its senses, or the desire to be free of all desires—a second-order desire which itself may take other forms also.

Perhaps, the idea of *niṣkāma karma* is such a second-order desire with respect to all first-order desires. It tries to suggest how desires 'ought' to be desired. But this 'ought', it should be noted, is essentially a conditional

'ought' as it is formulated in the context of the desire to be free from the consequences of one's actions. If one is prepared to accept the consequences of one's actions, the injunction to do *niṣkāma karma* will make no sense. It may be argued that consequences inevitably bind one, and that as none desires bondage the imperative for *niṣkāma karma* is essentially unconditional. However, it is not clear why all forms of bondage be treated as intrinsically undesirable or why consequences should inevitably bind one—a point recognized in *bhakti* literature where there is nothing wrong in being a servant of the Lord or even in being born again and again, if it is to be in his service or do his work or sing his praises.

Further, if *kāma* means desire, then *niṣkāma* should mean desirelessness, or a state where desire is absent. But not all desire necessarily leads to action, and if it is the action performed from desire, that is, *sakāma karma* which leads to bondage, then there is no reason to believe that desire or *kāma* by itself would lead to bondage. If desire be translated as *icchā*, then *karma* requires not merely *icchā* but also *prayatna* and *śarīra* with its *karmendriyas*. On the other hand, if *icchā* by itself is supposed to give rise to bondage, then *karma* would become redundant in the situation unless it is argued that *karma* produces bondage of a different kind or in addition to what has already been produced by *icchā* or *kāma* or desire.

This is not the place or the occasion to discuss the whole notion of *niṣkāma karma* or the relation of *karma* to bondage or liberation. What we are interested in here is to understand the traditional notion of the *puruṣārthas*, and it is interesting to note in this connection that *karma* does not occur as a *puruṣārtha* at all. Perhaps, it is assumed as a generalized means of attaining all *puruṣārthas*. But, then, *karma* would become necessary for attaining not only *kāma, artha and dharma* but also *mokṣa*. This would be unacceptable to at least one major school of Indian philosophy, i.e. Advaita Vedānta, as, according to it, *karma* is inevitably a sign of one's being in *avidyā* and hence in bondage. The *Gītā*, which emphasizes the inescapability of *karma* for all embodied beings, does not seem concerned with the ends which are sought to be achieved through action, but rather with the psychic attitude with which the action is undertaken as it is that which, according to it, is the cause of bondage and not action *per se*. But, then, *kāma* would denote not the end for which the action is undertaken but the attitude with which it is done. The attitude, however, in such a case, cannot be treated as one of the *puruṣārthas* as it is not only not an end of human action but also is naturally present in all human beings, and hence need not be striven for by any special effort on their part.

There is, of course, the problem as to how the word *puruṣārtha* itself is to be understood. Is it to be taken, for example, in a descriptive sense, that is, as describing what men actually pursue in their life? Or, is it a prescriptive word which suggests what men ought to pursue in order to be worthy of being human? *Artha* and *kāma* as examples of *puruṣārthas* tend to suggest

the former, while *dharma* and *mokṣa* lead to the latter interpretation. There does not seem much sense in saying one ought to pursue *artha* or *kāma*, as one naturally pursues them and needs no great exhortation to do so. And if one does not pursue them with great zeal or intensity, one is normally praised and not admonished for not pursuing them, particularly if one is pursuing some other ideal value, say, knowledge or social reform or political freedom or the end of exploitation and repression, or even much a thing as the creation of beautiful objects. I have used these examples consciously as it is difficult to subsume them in any straightforward manner under the categories of *dharma* or *mokṣa*, which are the only other *puruṣārthas* permitted to us by the traditional classification. Perhaps, the best way might be to construe it as being both descriptive and prescriptive, thus reflecting the human condition itself wherein the determination by norms and ideals, and the striving towards them is inbuilt into the condition itself. The Upaniṣadic terms *preyas* and *śreyas* describe well this amalgamation, though they do so by opposing them to each other, treating them as dichotomous opposites rather than as necessary components of the human situation.

However, to bring a prescriptive element into *kāma* and *artha* would not be to bring them under *dharma* or make them subservient to *mokṣa* as, say, in *tantra* as has usually been understood but rather to say that each human being has to pursue them for the utmost flowering and fulfilment of his being, and if he does not do so because of any reason, it is a deficiency that ought to be rectified as soon as possible. This, however, does not only run counter to the dominant thrust of Indian thought in the field, but also runs against the difficulty that it is not clear what sort of ends are meant by the terms *kāma* and *artha* in the theory of the *puruṣārthas*, which is supposed to be India's profoundest contribution to thinking about the ends of human life.

Perhaps, the term *puruṣārtha* should be construed on the analogy of *padārtha* which plays such a crucial role in classical Indian thought about the nature of reality. But the so-called *padārthas*, which have been dealt with most thoroughly in the Vaiśeṣika system of thought, themselves suffer from a basic ambiguity. It is not clear from the way things are stated in the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras*, or in the commentaries thereon, whether the enumerated *padārthas* are categories of language or thought or being. The term *pada* in *padārtha* would tend to incline one to the first alternative, but, as there is some talk of some of them being *buddhyāpekṣa*, one is inclined to the second alternative, at least as far as they are concerned. The third alternative is suggested by the way the first three *padārthas*, that is, *dravya, guṇa* and *karma* are treated in the text. The situation becomes further confused if we take *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* 8.2.3 into account which restricts *artha* to the first three *padārthas* only. But then what happens to the last three *padārthas*, that is, *sāmānya, viśeṣa* and *samavāya*? Are they *padārthas* or not? The usual way out is to treat them as *padārthas* in a *gauṇa* or secondary sense. But

this would be to interpret *artha* in the sense of meaning, as it is only meaning which can be primary or secondary. But, then, *puruṣārtha* would mean that which gives meaning or significance to human life. However, in that case, *dharma* and *mokṣa* would lose that preeminence which normally is attributed to them.

There is another problem with the term *artha* as it occurs in the word *puruṣārtha*. *Artha* itself is a distinctive *puruṣārtha*, and hence could not mean the same as in the compound *puruṣārtha*. Normally, *artha* as a *puruṣārtha* is taken to mean wealth or power or those generalized instrumentalities by which what is desired can be attained. But, in this sense, *dharma* itself would become a part of *artha* as it can be legitimately argued that without the maintenance of *dharma*, or what may be called the normative order, most people will not be able to fulfil their desire with any reasonable expectancy of success. The maintenance of social or political order would, then, be only a means for the satisfaction of *kāma* which would be the primary *puruṣārtha* of life. Further, as the distinction between means and ends is always relative and changing with the way one perceives and orders what one seeks, the distinction between *artha* and *kāma* itself would become relative in character. As for *mokṣa*, it is usually supposed to transcend both *dharma* and *kāma* and thus occupies an anomalous position amongst the *puruṣārthas*, for it is never clear whether this transcendence should be understood as a negation or fulfilment of the other *puruṣārthas*. The Indian thought on this subject has never been able to make up its mind on either side with the result that confusion has prevailed at the very heart of Indian theorization about the ultimate goal or goals whose seeking renders human existence meaningful. *Mokṣa*, however conceived, is a desire for release from desire itself, and hence negates the *artha* in the *puruṣārtha* in a radical manner. To use a metaphor from a different context of the use of *artha*, what is being asked for is a language in which there is no reference, except self-reference. Even this residuum is denied in Advaita Vedānta, which argues for the untenability of the very notion of *puruṣārtha* itself. The theory, which argues for the *nitya-siddha* nature of *mokṣa* against the one which treats it as *sādhan-siddha*, attests to this.

The essential ambivalence with respect to the relation between *mokṣa* and the other *puruṣārthas* is nowhere more evident than in the discussions on its relation to *dharma*, which is the most clear prescriptive or normative end in this theory of the four *puruṣārthas* in Indian thought. Is *dharma* necessary for attaining *mokṣa*? The usual answer is that it helps one in getting *svarga* but not *mokṣa*. *Dharma* as well as *adharma* are the causes of bondage and rebirth. For liberation, one has to go beyond both, that is, not only beyond *adharma* but *dharma* also. That is why the author of the *Gītā* has treated the Vedas as the realm of the three *guṇas*, that is, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, whose heart is *kāma* and whose injunctions, if followed, lead to *bhoga* and *aiśvarya*. *Mokṣa*, on the other hand, is beyond the three *guṇas*[1] and

hence beyond the world which is constituted by them. But, then, it cannot exactly be called a *puruṣārtha* or, at least, a *puruṣārtha* in the same sense in which the other three are called *puruṣārthas*. Normally, only that should be designated as a *puruṣārtha* which can be realized, at least to some extent, by human effort. But all effort or activity is supposed to be due to the element of *rajas* which is sought to be transcended in *mokṣa*. Perhaps, that was one reason why Śaṁkara argued so insistently that *karma* cannot lead to *mokṣa*. In any case, the radical difference between *mokṣa* as a *puruṣārtha* and the other three *puruṣārthas* has not only to be recognized in any discussion on the subject but also the radical incompatibility between them at least in the direction to which their seeking would lead. The seeking for both *artha* and *kāma* leads one naturally out of oneself and seeks to establish a relationship with objects and persons, though primarily in instrumental terms. It is the pursuit of *dharma* which makes one's consciousness see the other, not as a means to one's own ends, but in terms of one's obligations towards it. Normally, such a sense of obligation arises only for other human beings or even all living beings, but it can be extended beyond these also. *Mokṣa*, however, is a transcendence of that other-centred consciousness from which the sense of obligation arises. In fact, the ontological roots of most conceptions of *mokṣa* in the Indian philosophical traditions either deny the ontological reality of the 'other' or relegate it axiologically to a peripheral position. The Advaita Vedānta radically denies the ultimate reality of the 'other', while the non-Advaitic schools primarily assert the relationship of the self to the Lord, and only secondarily the relation between one self and another. Basically, this relation is mediated through the relation of each to the Lord and is thus indirect in character. Sāṁkhya does assert the ontological plurality of selves, but they all are like Leibnitzian monads, having no interrelationship amongst themselves. The hard core Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position denies the very possibility of any conscious relationship between selves in the state of *mokṣa*, as they are not supposed to be conscious in that state. Amongst the non-Vedic or even anti-Vedic traditions, the Jains seem to have more or less a Sāṁkhyan conception with little essential relationship between selves which have become free. The Buddhists do not accept the notion of self, but at least they do accept a relationship between the realized and the unrealized persons, and articulate it in their notion of *Karuṇā* or *Mahākaruṇā*. Parallel to this is the notion of the Bodhisattva who feels his obligation to the suffering humanity to such an extent that he is prepared to forego entering the state of *nirvāṇa* in order to help them. But even though this is a great advance in the articulation of the relationship between those who have attained liberation and those who have not, it still is an asymmetrical relationship. It is the suffering humanity that needs the *Bodhisattva;* the *Bodhisattva* has no need of it. The seemingly similar notion of *Avatāra* in Hindu thought is even more asymmetrical as it is a relationship between God and man. It is only in certain schools of *bhakti* that the relation becomes a little more

symmetrical as God is supposed to need men almost as much as men need God. But the relation between men, as we have pointed out earlier, becomes basically contingent as it is only as *bhaktas,* that is, as devotees of the Lord that they can have any real relation with one another.

Tantric thought, on the other hand, does seem to conceive of a necessary relationship with the 'other' without which one cannot be oneself. But then, this 'other' is confined to a member or members of the other sex only, and the relationship is restricted primarily to the sphere of sex. In the Tantric perspective, men need only women, and presumably, women only need men for self-realization. However, if one reads the texts, it all seems a male affair —at least, at first sight. In fact, if one considers such a ritual as the *kumārī pūjā*, or the worship of the virgin, it is difficult to see how she is involved as a *sādhikā* or seeker in the process. Rather the whole thing shows a callous disregard for the feelings of the female or the traumatic effect that such a ceremony may have on her for life.

The self-centric and male-centric character of large parts of Hindu *sādhanā* need to be explored in greater depth and with greater detachment than has been done until now. One of the possible reasons for this may, perhaps, be the identification of the feminine principle itself with Prakṛti and Māyā, which are conceived as non-self or even antagonistic to self and as the main cause for the non-realization by the self of its own nature. The roots of the self-centredness of Indian thought, on the other hand, may be said to lie in its ontological, ethical and psychological analysis of the human situation which gradually came to be accepted as unquestioned truth by a large part of the culture over a period of time. The analysis is epitomized in the famous statement of Yājñavalkya, the outstanding philosopher of the Upaniṣadic period, in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* that nothing is desired for itself, but is desired only because it is dear to the self.[2] The illusion referred to here is the illusion that any object whatsoever can be dear for itself, the truth being that it is dear only because it subserves the interest of the self. The self in this context is, of course, supposed to be the Self with a capital 'S' and not the little ego or the self with a small 's' which is associated with *ahaṅkāra, manas* and *buddhi* which are supposed to constitute the *antaḥkaraṇa* in some schools of traditional philosophical thought in India and with which the self is usually identified. But such an identification, however inevitable or natural it may seem, is the root of that foundational ignorance which is the cause of all suffering, according to these thinkers. It hardly matters whether the self, so conceived, be with a capital or a small 's' as the centre of all concern, striving, and attention remains something that is not the other but oneself. There is, of course, no 'other' in Advaita Vedānta, but that does not mean that the 'other' is treated as one's own self with a capital 'S' but rather as someone who ought to treat the 'others' as one does oneself, that is, as absolute ontological nullities.

The statement of Yājñavalkya, it should be noted, does not hesitate

to use the word '*preyasa*' in the context of the Ātman, that is, the self with a capital 'S', and hence does not seem to subscribe to that radical distinction between *śreyasa* and *preyasa* which is usually made in this context. Rather, it points to a continuity in the concern with *preyasa* which, it is contended, cannot be given up in principle as it is the very nature of Being as consciousness to seek it, for it is what it essentially is. The only problem is the illusion with which it is also primordially endowed that it can achieve it through something other than itself. The difference between *kāma* and *mokṣa*, on this understanding, would then consist in the fact that the former is necessarily the result of the illusion that the happiness of the self can be achieved through anything other than itself, while the latter is the giving up of the illusion. But giving up the illusion does not necessarily mean that one is happy or fulfilled or blissful; it only means that one is not dependent on anything else for the achievement of such a state. It may be argued that if it depends completely upon oneself, then what could possibly stand in the way of its non-achievement? Perhaps, it could be the attitude of the self to itself. The famous lines '*Ekohaṃ, Bahuṃsyām*' suggest some such dissatisfaction at the root of creation itself. The concept of *līlā* does not get away from this difficulty as the impulse to play requires as much a dissatisfaction with the previous state as anything else. But if non-dependence on anything else, or even the total absence of all 'other', does not ensure that there shall be no dissatisfaction with the state of one's own being in the sense that one does not want a change in it, then the way is opened for the perception that it is not the 'other' which is the cause of one's bondage but the attitude that one has to the 'other', or perhaps the stance that one takes towards the states of one's own consciousness. This could perhaps provide the clue to the ideal of *niṣkāma karma* adumberated by the author of the *Gītā*.

The return to the ideal of *niṣkāma karma* does not, however, tell us how to pursue *kāma* or *artha* or even *dharma* in a *niṣkāma* way. The author of the *Bhagvad-Gītā*, it should not be forgotten, is also the author of the *Kāma-Gītā*, if the identity of the two is admitted. The *Kāma-Gītā* is propounded by Vāsudeva in the *Aśvamedhikaparva* of the *Mahābhārata* and consists of *ślokas* 11-17 in Canto 13 of the 14th *Parva*. The short *Gītā* concludes not only by making fun of all those who try to destroy *kāma* by stationing themselves in *mokṣa*, but also declares itself to be '*sanātana*', *i.e.* eternal and '*avadhya*', i.e. indestructible—terms that remind us of the characteristics of Brahman itself.[3]

It may also, be noted that the term used in the *Kāma-Gītā* for the state of those who are supposed to be steadfast in *mokṣa* is *mokṣarati*, a term that resonates with what *kāma* stands for in its central meaning in the Indian tradition, that is, sex.

It is, of course, true, as Charles Malamoud has argued, that there is always a wider and a narrower meaning of each of these terms, and that the dis-

cussion of the *puruṣārthas* continuously slides between the two. According to him, in 'the sliding from the narrow to the wide meaning, it is always possible to make *dharma, artha* or *kāma* into the +1 that encompasses the two other terms in the list, and the *mokṣa* to boot'.[4] It is not clear, however, whether the statement is supposed to apply to the fourth *puruṣārtha*, that is, *mokṣa* also. *Prima facie*, the term *mokṣa* does not seem to have a wide or a narrow meaning; it simply has a fairly determinate, specific meaning, even though it may be conceived of differently in different systems of philosophy or even of spiritual *sādhanā*. Also, in the usual interpretation, it cannot encompass the other *puruṣārthas*, specially *artha* and *kāma*, as not only does it transcend them but also negates them. Their functioning as active *puruṣārthas* in the life of any human being may be taken as a positive sign of the fact that not only *mokṣa* has not yet been achieved, but that it is not even being striven for.

The deeper problem, however, relates to the notions of narrow and wider meanings of the three *puruṣārthas*. Professor Malamoud has tried to give the narrow and the wider meanings of each of the three *purusārthas*, but it is difficult to agree with his formulations. *Dharma*, for example, in its narrow meaning is, for him, 'the system of observances taught by the Veda and the texts stemming from it.'[5] To the unwary reader, this may seem very specific and definite, but it is nothing of the kind. The texts are so many and prescribe so many conflicting things that the talk of a 'system of observances' is to hide the difficulty, or even the impossibility of determining what one's *dharma* is. If *dharma* in the narrow sense were as clear or as unproblematic as Malamoud seems to make it, the *Mahābhārata* could not have been written. The determination of what *dharma* means is the central enquiry of that great epic, and it is difficult to say whether any definite answer has been given at the end of the epic. Perhaps, the message is that no such simple answer can be given. On the other hand, it is difficult to see how *dharma* in the wider sense as 'the order of the world and of society' or as 'the point of view allowing perception of the whole as a system organised into a hierarchy,[6] can even be treated as a *puruṣārtha* in the sense that it is something to be achieved or realized by one's actions. An 'order of the world and of society' can obviously not be a *puruṣārtha*, though the achieving of the vision of such an order may perhaps count as one. However, it should be remembered that the achievement of such a vision is the cessation of all activity as to see things *sub specie aternitatis á la* Spinoza or as revealed in the *Viśva Rūpa* or cosmic vision presented in the eleventh Canto of the *Bhagvad Gītā* is to see that everything is what it is, and could not be otherwise. One may, of course, try to order one's own actions in accordance with the vision or to say 'thy will be done' or '*kariśye Vacanam tava*' as Arjuna does in the *Gītā*, but that would be to admit that the cosmic order permits an essential indeterminancy of a certain sort, that is, whether one would act in accordance with the vision or not. Or, rather, as most of the time one does not have the vision and does

not know what the so-called cosmic order is, one has to live and act in the context of this essential and almost inalienable ignorance.

Dharma and *mokṣa*, as *puruṣārthas*, have difficulties of a different order in the context of their so-called wide or narrow senses than *artha* or *kāma*. But the latter two are not exempt from difficulties, even though they may be of a different order. Malamoud contents himself by saying that '*artha* is a most elastic notion',[7] and seems to think that this absolves him from the responsibility of giving its narrow and wider meanings which he had promised to do earlier. The examples given by him later from the *Arthaśāstra* on page 46 are themselves not very clear regarding the point that is being made, unless they are taken as illustrative of the elasticity or even the ambiguity of the concept. The *Arthaśāstra*, it may be remembered, is concerned with the *puruṣārtha* of a king, but as everybody cannot be a king what is described therein cannot be regarded as a *puruṣārtha*, if *puruṣārtha* is to mean that which is and can be an end for every human being by virtue of the fact that he is a human being. *Artha* in the sense of wealth may be a *puruṣārtha* for everybody, but in the sense of political power it can hardly be regarded as such. But there are no *Śāstras* to tell how to pursue *artha* as a *puruṣārtha* in the sense of wealth, unless all the diverse methods of cheating the state described in the *Arthaśāstra* are treated as such.

Kāma as a *puruṣārtha*, on the other hand, has perhaps no such problems as whether in the wider sense of desire or narrower sense of sexual desire it can be a *puruṣārtha* for everybody. The *Kāmasūtra*, which is a text ostensibly devoted to *kāma* as a *puruṣārtha*, gives both the wider and the narrower meanings in *sūtras* 1.2.11 and 1.2.12. The first defines *kāma* as the fitting relationship between each sense and its object which, when in perfect harmony, give pleasure to the self conjoined with the mind.[8] The second emphasizes the preeminence of the sense of touch and the supervening pleasure derived from it that is supposed to be the *kāma par excellence*.[9] But it seems that the second definition does not carry forward the insight of the first definition. *Kāma* in the narrow sense, the sense in which the *Kāmasūtra* is concerned with it, may be treated as the paradigmatic case in which not only all the senses find simultaneous fulfilment from their appropriate objects but where the subject is also simultaneously the object. the enjoyer who is also the enjoyed. Malmoud, however, is not using the wider or narrower senses of *kāma* in the sense of the author of *Kāmasūtras* but rather of Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa*. Bhoja's attempt to universalize the concept of *sṛṅgāra* is certainly interesting, but it is not clear how it illumines the notion of *puruṣārtha*. Rather, it renders it still more confusing, for it is difficult to see how *rasa* can be a *puruṣārtha*; for if it is to be treated as one, it would not only have to be a *puruṣārtha* alongside other *puruṣārthas*, but also multiple in character.

But, however one may conceive of the wider or the narrower senses of the *puruṣārthas*, it hardly helps in solving the problems pointed out earlier,

nor does it illumine the problem of the interrelationships between them. Professor K.J. Shah, in one of the most thoughtful articles on the subject, has suggested that the *puruṣārthas* as goals of human life should be treated as interactional in character, and not as hierarchical.

> He argues: We must realise that artha will not be a puruṣārtha unless it is in accord with *kāma*, *dharma* and *mokṣa*; *kāma* in turn will not be *kāma*, unless it is in accord with *dharma* and *mokṣa*; and *dharma* will not be *dharma*, unless it too is in accord with *mokṣa*. Equally *mokṣa* will not be *mokṣa* without the content of *dharma*; *dharma* will not be *dharma* without the content of *kāma* and *artha*. The four goals, therefore, constitute one single goal, though in the lives of individuals the elements may get varying emphasis for various reasons.[10]

But if there is only one single goal, then what is it, and what are its relations to these four goals? Shah is a careful thinker, but, if one reads carefully what he has written, one would find diverse and conflicting pulls in it. One is, for example, surprised to find *artha* omitted when he is talking of *kāma*, and both *artha* and *kāma* omitted when he is talking of *dharma*. Is the omission deliberate or accidental? What has *mokṣa* to do with *kāma* and *artha*? why has it to relate to them only through the medium of *dharma*? Are *artha* and *kāma* only contents, *dharma* both form and content, and mokṣa only pure form, according to Shah? There may be satisfactory answers to these questions but, unless they are given, merely saying that there is only 'one single goal' will not suffice.

The relationship between the *puruṣārthas*, and the hierarchy between them, have been the subject of discussion and debate even in classical times. One of the best known of these discussions is in the *Mahābhārata* where Yudhiṣṭhira asks all his four brothers as well as Vidura as to which of the *puruṣārthas* among *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma* is the highest, the lowest and intermediate in importance.[11] Arjuna extols *artha* in the sense of production of wealth through agriculture, trade and diverse forms of crafts as the highest of the *puruṣārthas*. Bhīma, on the other hand, extols *kāma* as the essence of both *dharma* and *artha*, while Nakula and Sahadeva try to support Arjuna's position with some modifications. Vidura tries to give an extensional definition of *dharma* and describes what it consists in. Yudhiṣṭhira, at the end, talks of the transcendence of *artha*, *dharma* and *kāma* in *mokṣa*, though he is candid enough to admit that he knows nothing about it. He ends by making a statement which hardly offers any clarity on the issue and, in fact, has a fatalistic flavour about it. All in all, it is a poor show on the part of the heroes of the great epic on this profound theme which is of such importance to fundamental reflection on human life. The situation appears even more disquieting if we remember that the reflection is being done by persons after the Great War in which Arjuna had been given the discourse

on the *Gītā* by Krishna and after Yudhiṣṭhira had to face moral problems of the acutest kind. It is not a little ironic that the one who comes nearest to talking about *niṣkāma karma*, which is supposed to be the central message of the *Gītā*, is not Arjuna but Yudhiṣṭhira.

However, even if we leave aside the *Mahābhārata* discussion regarding the interrelationship and the hierarchy between the *puruṣārthas* as unilluminating, the usual traditional answer in terms of the supremacy of *dharma* is not helpful either. And this is for the simple reason that it is not clear what *dharma* is. The four sources usually given by Manu and others for finding what *dharma* is are of little help, as not only do they conflict with each other but there are deep conflicting divisions within each of them. The so-called revealed texts are no less conflicting than the tradition embodied in custom or the behaviour of people generally known as good or one's own inner conscience. The question as to whether they should be treated in a descending or ascending order of importance is irrelevant as none of them by themselves or even all of them together can help in settling any difficult problem of *dharma* except in an *ad hoc* or pragmatic manner.

The oft-repeated traditional theory of the *puruṣārthas*, thus, is of little help in understanding the diversity and complexity of human seeking which makes human life so meaningful and worthwhile in diverse ways. The *kāma*, centric and *artha*-centric theories of Freud and Marx are as mistaken as the *dharma*-centric thought of sociologists and anthropologists who try to understand man in terms of the roles that he plays and society in terms of the norms of those roles and their interactive relationships. For all these theories, the independent seeking of any value which is different from these is an illusion, except in an instrumental sense. The ultimately suicidal character of all such theories is self-evident as they do not provide for any independent value to the life of the intellect which they themselves embody. Fortunately for the Indian theory of *puruṣārthas*, it has postulated the ideal of *mokṣa* which is tangential to all the other *puruṣārthas*. But it, too, has no place for the independent life of reason as a separate value or for that matter for any other life which is not concerned primarily with *artha*, *dharma*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*, This is a grave deficiency and points to the necessity of building a new theory of the *puruṣārthas* which would take into account the diverse seekings of man and do justice to them.

NOTES

1. *Bhagavad Gītā*, II 46.
2. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 2.4.5*: na vā are sarvasya kāmāya sarvaṁ priyaṁ bhavatyātmanastu kāmāya sarvaṁ priyaṁ bhavati|*
3. *Yo māṁ prayatate hantuṁ mokṣamāsthāya paṇḍitaḥ|tasya mokṣaratisthasya nṛtyāmi ca hasāmi ca|avadhyaḥ sarvabhūtānāmahamekaḥ sanātanaḥ—The Mahābhārata* 14, 13-17.

4. Charles Malamoud, 'On the Rhetoric and Semantics of Puruṣārtha' in T.N. Madan (ed.), *Way of Life: King, Householder, Renouncer: Essays in Honour of Louis Dumont*, (New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1982), p. 44.
5. Malamoud, p. 44
6. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
8. *Śrotratvākcakṣurjihvāghrāṇānāmātmasaṁyuktena manasādhiṣṭhitānāṁ sveṣu sveṣu viṣayeṣvānukūlyataḥ pravṛttiḥ kāmaḥ*—1/11
9. *sparśaviśeṣaviṣayāttvasyābhimānikasukhānuviddhā phalavatyarthapratītiḥ prādhānyātkāmaḥ*—1/12
10. K. J. Shah in T. N. Madan.
11. *The Mahābhārata*, Śāntiparva, adhyāva 161.

What is moksa?

MOKṢA AS A DOGMA AND MOKṢA AS A PERVASIVE URGE OF LIFE

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Mokṣa is freedom and with freedom goes mastery. Now, are freedom and mastery, not the pervasive urges of life, of the cosmic evolution itself? Do progressive adjustments to environment not work out in slow degrees freedom, i.e. self-existence and mastery, i.e. survival?

At the human level, with the emergence of self-consciousness and reflection, freedom and mastery acquire a richer connotation. And what are our psycho-therapies seeking to do in recent times? Is their work of securing liberation from inner repressions and compulsions not one of promoting freedom in life?

And it may also be observed that all urges for freedom in various forms and fields of life culminate in *mokṣa*, which is spiritual freedom, i.e. freedom in entirety from all possible limitations and compulsions, external and internal. Evidently such freedom is an ideal, the highest conception which gives direction and some content to all lesser freedoms. Therefore, *mokṣa* is involved in all our efforts for freedom. Besides, *mokṣa*, through various approaches and processes of achieving it, shows the true quality of freedom, freedom fully lived and enjoyed, and also of the varied forms of enslavements that man is subject to. A true appreciation of *mokṣa* is, thus, necessary for a proper direction of human life and its culture.

It is interesting how in one conception all pursuit of knowledge was conceived as a working for liberation. It is said सा विद्या या विमुक्तये knowledge is that which makes for liberation. And this can be easily appreciated. If progress in knowledge increases fear in life, surely there is something wrong with our knowledge. This holds out a strong warning for our present cultural situation. Our knowledge is growing fast, and we also talk of imbalances and dangers to life.

It would be helpful to consider freedom and its relation to other values of life and existence. Freedom involves mastery of one's own self as also of

*This note on the concept of *mokṣa* is written in response to some important questions raised by Daya Krishna in his paper entitled 'Indian Philosophy: Revisiting an Old Controversy (*JICPR*, Vol. II, No. 1, Autumn 1984). The contributor attempts to state his own point of view on the 'Old Controversy' without intending to go into counter-arguments with Daya Krishna. He thanks him for the rich contents of his paper which stirred the contributor to fresh thinking and crystalization of his ideas about one of the most distinctive aspects of Indian philosophical thinking.—EDITOR

external situation. It would also involve joy, and knowledge too. It may be summed up by saying that freedom as an intrinsic value would include all other values which are equally intrinsic. And in the Absolute, in *Sachchidananda* (*Sat*, *Chit*, *Ānanda*), we have Reality, Force and *Ānanda*, which would include freedom, beauty, harmony, peace and unity too.

Thus, *mokṣa* becomes the focal theme of all life and existence; and it needs to be understood and taken as such, not as a favourite historical concept in Indian philosophy with fixed variant usages and conflicting connotations. We can easily get lost in these usages and connotations, if we forget the essential human urge behind them. This urge really unifies and gives them coherent meanings.

Our ordinary life is all a life of conditionings to the things of the environment, of involvements in them, of attachments to them, of hankerings for them and of responses to their actions on us. Our life involves compulsions and necessities. Apart from external necessities, there are internal necessities and compulsions too. We are not 'one will' within us, but truly a multitude of willings, conscious and unconscious, and each willing has a separate pull in it. They exercise among themselves pressures, which constitute compulsions, conscious and unconscious. Among these willings we do, however, develop a dominant trend which becomes our normal personality; but the pressures of the variant and contrary pulls continue to exist, and freedom as a true spontaneous whole-hearted feeling and action is not normally possible. Freedom from external pressures is a gross thing, but freedom as an inner fact is a thing of deep aspiration, which needs a long inner work of self-observation and of self-detachment from all the normal willings; and of the ultimate discovery of the distinct unified central consciousness of life and its spontaneity and wholeness and freedom. This quality of experience in its fulness and stability is an achievement of life, but a glimpse of it is not difficult to have if we seriously seek it and look for it.

The ordinary experience of involvements and this one of true spontaneity deep within as an occasional experience should become more or less vivid. One can then also imagine the possible state of full freedom of thought, feeling and action, of its large and wide consciousness, its clarity and its certitude. This inner freedom implies an objectivity of a deeper satisfying quality: one sees things as they are, though yet variously in accordance with the form and the quality of the percipient consciousness. This freedom is felt as an intrinsic value, as supremely desirable.

With this experience in some degree present, the diversities of opinions of variant texts and still more variant commentaries appear to be unnecessary confusion of words. And when we deal with them—the texts and the commentaries—and do not ask for the essential experience to enlighten us, we get awfully mixed up. It is also clear that, in our philosophical history, there was a long period when experience interested us less and the words more.

We were then divorced from experience, and, if we take this period as our source, we get doubly divorced from experience.

Preyas and *Śreyas*, the pleasant and the good, are the two most enlightening experiences of life in the Upaniṣad. The plane of experience which seeks pleasures, the transient sense-gratifications, is the plane of the superficial contacts with things. And there is a deeper plane of experience which seeks and promotes the good, the essential well-being, a pervasive and lasting joy of life. How simple is the truth involved and how clear and significant are the two words, *preyas* and *śreyas*, which really hang together to show the contrast between them. But later developments have a story of their own. *Niḥśreyasa* is *śreyas* with an emphasis, and as well-being it would bear close affinity to *apavarga*. All this can be duly appreciated and enjoyed, if we keep in mind the simple experiential facts of the starting point and the psychological conditions of the later historical developments. If, on the other hand, we forget the experience and go by the words and build up concepts of our own, we get farther and farther away from the solid ground of experience, and its clear enlightening guidance gets, as time passes, badly mixed up. Philosophy becomes a pursuit of clearing up concepts on their own, and we begin to live in words and concepts and lose even the invigoration of the seeking for truth or reality or wisdom. But this happens, too, when our urge for truth, reality and wisdom is not strong enough. Further, handling of words and concepts has a joy of its own, and that can become quite engrossing. But the joy of truth and wisdom is incomparably greater and superior.

This trend of human nature can be illustrated from Western and Indian histories of philosophy abundantly and with ease.

Just consider the case of Gautama, his disappointment with the transitoriness of things and his earnest quest for something above and beyond them, his enlightenment, his certitude of the truth in life, his blissfulness, his freedom and mastery over life, his Buddhahood, the Awakening, the *nirvāṇa*. All this is very clear and understandable. Now, consider the later developments of the Buddhistic schools and their distinctive philosophies and our present-day struggles to understand them. How mixed up we feel even regarding 'what *nirvāṇa* is'. The question is: will it not help us to understand the later developments if we turned to, as best we could, by sympathetic experience and some imagination to the original experience, and then with its help tried to understand the later doctrinal formulations, appreciating the psychological conditions attendant on them? Even Buddha's own words must be seen in the light of the quality and the character of his personality, his search and his attainment and the nature of the attainment as displayed in life.

The same approach may be adopted for the understanding of *mokṣa*. First, we must call up our best possible experience of *mokṣa* as against the ordinary life of involvements, fixations and compulsions, its supreme desir-

ability, its necessity for dispassionate knowing of things and a general mastery over life. Then, while keeping this experience alive, we should turn to understanding this word or its equivalents in different contexts. Our experience of it will help us to appreciate that *mokṣa* is also a matter of degrees and of growth. Further, that it cannot be antagonistic to knowledge. A scientist, who exercises his intellect in a dispassionate search after truths of nature, is exercising freedom and mastery in a field of life. However, he does not enjoy freedom and mastery in life generally, e.g. in matters of food, sex and others. *Mokṣa*, in its true sense, is spiritual freedom which means living and acting as spirit or soul and exercising detachment from body, life and mind and mastery over them. All this is great clarity on the subject which experience can give. And then many contradictions among the meanings given to the term by different systems of thought can become intelligible. *Mokṣa* being not possible while we are yet in our body would really show that the body imposses a limitation on our freedom, since our freedom has to accept the conditions of the body for using it. Hence full *mokṣa* is possible when this limitation goes. But the *Gītā* so highly speaks of the *muktasya karma*, the action of the liberated person, as the ideal of the normal man in the world. Both ideas have their validity. Similarly, we can see relative validities in other variant usages of the term.

Mokṣa in the various systems of Indian thought is freedom of the spirit from nature. Man in his identification with the body, life and mind stands involved in the environment of which these are parts. The spirit is then ignored or suppressed. The spirit coming to its own and man identifying himself with the spirit means freedom or *mokṣa* of the spirit or soul. That is self-realization. That is the general sense of the term.

Sri Aurobindo makes a new contribution to the concept of *mokṣa* by insisting that the liberation of nature must accompany the liberation of spirit.* The spirit becomes free when it throws off the yoke of the nature part the body, life and mind. But how does this nature part become free? When it gets transformed and akin to the spirit and thus independent of the universal nature. That is a new development in the concept of freedom and *mokṣa*. That is integral *mokṣa* which Sri Aurobindo envisages as a possibility for man in the course of his spiritual evolution. With that goes the possibility of spiritualization of environment too. In fact, it is only when the environment too changes that full freedom can become available to man in life. Sri Aurobindo also recounts from tradition four kinds of *mokṣa*—*sāmīpya* (nearness), *sāyujya* (contact), *sālokya* (being of same plane) and *sādharmya* (sameness of nature) showing increasing degrees of freedom and identification of man with the Absolute.

Here it would be interesting to consider what Klaus Klostermaier has

*Sri Aurobindo, *The Synthesis of Yoga* (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram), Pt. IV, Ch. VIII and IX.

said on *mokṣa*. In an article entitled 'Mokṣa and Critical Theory' in *Philosophy East and West* (January 1985), he presents 'desire for liberation (mumukṣatva) as the deepest and the most genuine human concern'. He found in the literature of the Frankfurt school also 'the centrality of the notion of freedom and liberation'. His article is a delightful study of Śaṁkara and Habermas. The purpose is to see:

> Whether it is possible to enlarge the Śaṁkarite *mumukṣatva* (desire for liberation) so as to encompass the changing historical realities through which a living person's liberation is being worked out and whether it is possible to deepen Habermas's 'emancipatory interest' beyond the level of psychoanalysis.

It is all a sympathetic and a constructive study. The similarities and the differences between the two are shown and sought to be applied to the present situation. And the writer of the article finds 'the emancipatory interest... the deepest bond of human solidarity throughout history and across cultures'. His final assessment of the two thinkers is as follows:

> While Śaṁkara and Habermas agree in a great deal of their analysis of the human condition, Śaṁkara seems to be clearer and more definite in offering a solution to the human predicament. The depth which his *ātma-jñāna* reaches surpasses that of the psychoanalysis referred to by Habermas. The practical guidance which he offers, too, appears to be less ambiguous and informed by a praxis that is sure of itself, because it has been tested by many generations.

In all this discussion *mokṣa* and *mumukṣatva* (desire for liberation) are living concepts entirely relevant to contemporary life.

The Jungian analysts, too, are showing interesting clinical evidence which bears on our subject. *Jungian Analysis** is a recently published work which makes a survey of Jungian psychotherapy.

It contains a lot of interesting material, a specimen of which is presented below:

> A significant aspect of Jungian treatment, however, is not described so well by the term analysis. This is the experience of the self that often occurs in, or as a result of, Jungian therapy. Jungian analysis results not only in self-knowledge but also in a new kind of self-experience. People who enter Jungian analysis may do so because they wish to know more about themselves, but if the analysis actually works, they come to experience themselves in a way that was previously not possible. This

*Murray Stein (ed.), *Jungian Analysis* (Boston and London; Shambhala, 1984).

> new kind of self-experience takes place as the rigidities of ego-consciousness dissolve, and as the unconscious responds and is acknowledged within the security and understanding of the analytical framework. What actually creates the therapeutic effect in Jungian analysis is the increasing amplitude of a person's experience of the Self. This experience, moreover, usually brings with it an influx of energy and vitality, so that one common result of analysis is more creativity in one's responses to life and its challenges (*Jungian Analysis*, pp. 30-31).

Does not this creativity imply freedom?

Is *mokṣa* characteristic of Indian philosophy? Can Indian philosophy be distinguished as spiritual or religious? Is there anything at all which can be called its distinctive character? These are difficult questions and perhaps not necessary too.

After all, human nature is the same and existence is the same, but the approaches can be many; and each approach is useful for the development of the human personality and of our knowledge of existence. And today, in particular, world life is becoming an increasing reality and world philosophy a pressing need.

From this primary base of thought we can certainly ask, what has been the characteristic contribution or emphasis of India, China, Greece, Modern Europe and others to our knowledge of man and existence. Surely India has sought truth of life and existence and done so persistently. And it has much insisted on the ultimate. The approach has been of man as a whole in thought, feeling and will. And this approach has expressed itself in a body of knowledge called *Darśan,* signifying that reality is at the root a matter of seeing, a vision. However, this is perhaps the dominant and recurrent trend of India in respect of life and existence as a whole. Human nature is a complex affair, and different facets of it have had their play more or less always, and different periods have shown the domination of now one part, now another. The idea of *mokṣa* comes up as a result of the attitude for the ultimate: the attitudes are always more important than particular ideas. The inner research has also been in India a popular approach to truth and existence.

The Greeks were men as Indians, alike in natural capacities. Inner research was in favour with them too, and Socrates had his trances and inner-voice guidance which he respected most, and so did his contemporaries. Yet, the most favourite instrument of knowledge with the Greeks was perhaps reflection. But Aristotle was a great observer of nature too.

With the Chinese the seeking is the same or similar, but social reference is an important conditioning with them.

Modern Europe has displayed an attitude and an interest of its own. Again, here, too, all human nature is operative, but dominantly the interest is in the empirical facts of life.

Now, are all these approaches not useful, in fact, complementary for a fuller view of life and existence and so important for mutual enrichment? There can be no reason for a competition among them. For a future world philosophy they are all valuable contributions. And no country should really try to be like another in approach and standards of philosophical activity. Then it will lose its traditionally accumulated merit and not so easily build up another quality. It will surely be a loss to the outflowering of the multifaceted world philosophy. However, in the present world situation and world awareness, each approach must widen itself to incorporate other influences as it finds them for it own useful enrichment.

What for do we really study the philosophical orientation of others in the Western and Indian histories of philosophy? Is it not as an aid to the discovery and cultivation of our own philosophical faith, clarity and certitude, as a thing we need for a clear-minded, effective and enjoyable living of our life? Our pursuit of philosophy should naturally be integrative, creative and enlightening. Then alone we grow philosophically, i.e. in depth and insight and confidence regarding life and existence.

Why should we need *ānvīkṣikī*, a term equivalent to philosophy as currently respectable? *Darśan* has a characteristic emphasis for the Indian pursuit of truth and reality, and it has covered Nyāya and Navya-Nyāya too which are eminently logical pursuits. Why should *Darśan* not continue to be the Indian equivalent to 'Philosophy'? And why should philosophy, in the present context of world life and thought, be not consciously widened to cover all seekings for life and existence as a whole? That would certainly enrich the pursuit as also its attainments. It is extremely improper to make the current meaning of 'Philosophy' as absolute and judge other similar pursuits as unphilosophical because they do not conform to it. The English language in its wider world use is already acquiring connotations representing the experiences of peoples from different parts of the world. Has not Sri Aurobindo imported spiritual connotations into English, altogether new to it?

The cognitive approach and cognitive evaluation are these days often taken as an assumption of philosophy. Is man, the seeker and inquirer, only a 'cognitive' fact? Is his cognition not intimately connected with his affection and conation? Can cognition at all be separated from the others except in a limited way? Further, if affection and conation keep pace with cognition, is cognition not able to go much farther? Egoity is subjectivity which militates against objectivity. But is egoity or subjectivity not eliminable from affection and conation as it is practised in regard to cognitive functions? Elimination of egoity from affection and conation is no doubt more difficult, but the gain from it is immense as it brings in an objectivity of a wider and a deeper quality.

As man, the seeker and inquirer, is not a purely cognitive fact, so must reality be, if *Piṇḍa* (the microcosm) has some representative relationship

with *Brahmāṇḍa* (the macrocosm). Hegel had no doubt said: 'Logic is Metaphysics and Metaphysics is Logic.' But can Absolute consciousness be exclusively cognitive? India has conceived it as *Sachchidānanda*, (*Sat*, *Chit* and *Ānanda*).

The approach of Indian philosophy of the whole man, of affection and conation besides that of cognition, or of refusal to separate the theoretical and the practical interests of life, of keeping philosophy, religion and spirituality (*Yoga*) together is a most valuable feature of the Indian pursuit of philosophy. It is a special enrichment of world philosophy and deserves to be cherished and respected as such too.

Mokṣa as spiritual freedom, which is freedom in its entirety from all kinds of internal and external compulsions, surely involves the whole man—his cognitions, affection and conations, his conscious, subconscious and superconscious dimensions of life. And it involves the discovery of the spirit in man and existence, the self-existent consciousness, which is spontaneous and free. It also involves detachment from nature, which works by external causation, which is a play of external necessities and uniformities, and of which man is genetically a part. However, though a part of such necessities, man at his evolutionary stage becomes capable of transcendence of nature and of the enjoyment of the freedom of the spirit. That is, he can seek, achieve and enjoy *mokṣa* and give to his entire cultural life a trend towards this highest and completest freedom.

Unravelling the meanings of life?

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§1. *Untangling the problems, and setting aside the matters of life and meaning and absurdity and their semantics, nihilisms, value subjectivisms and ultimate explanation puzzles.* The problem of the meaning of life is not a problem as to the semantics of *life*, as to what is meant by 'life' (difficult problem though this is). Nor is much light case on the problem by a detour into modern semantical theory of one brand or another, into the theory of (symbol and sentence) meaning—despite recent hopes for the success of, for instance, a (modified) Davidsonian semantical programme in ethics, and in particular as regards the meaning-of-life problem.[1]

For 'meaning' in the frame of the problem has the meaning of (*worthwhile*) *point* or, slightly differently, *purpose, object*, or even *goal* (though the latter may misleadingly suggest that a life must culminate in something in order to have point): not 'meaning' in the meaning which is supposed to cash out in terms of truth or assertibility conditions. Similarly, for a life to be meaningful is for it to have point good *or* evil, and not be entirely pointless: not for it to be assignable some semantics. But untangling the meanings of 'point', and of its relatives such as purpose, like distinguishing *point* from *worthwhile point*, definitely falls within the framework of the problem. In the process it will become clear also that there is little reason to presume that there is only *one* point that all lives which have point must have, or even that each life can have no more than one point. In fact, the standard description, '*the* meaning of life', is seriously misleading. For, as we shall argue, there is no one thing, object or activity that answers to the description: rather many help to (it is partly in this way that nihilism is avoided).[2]

To get to grips with the much advertised but poorly delineated problem of 'the meaning of life', it is also important to separate three other classes of issues that are often conflated with the problem: nihilist worries, absurdity problems, and ultimate explanation puzzles. It is not that these issues are, in no way, connected with the meaning problem. Certain nihilisms, according to which there is nothing of value, positive or negative, *imply* that life has no meaning, *given* that meanings for lives imply things of positive or negative value. So, in a perverse way, nihilism solves the problem (negatively) with the answer to 'What is..?', 'Nothing'. Still nihilism is a separate issue, for the meaning problem *remains* after nihilism is duly refuted.[3] The reason is that it has somehow to be explained *which* (worthwhile) things give life point—or at least give the lives that have point the sort of point that they have.

It is also important to separate the question of life's meaning from certain forms of the question of life's absurdity after the threat of nihilism is duly removed. There is a sense of 'absurd', that which figures prominently in existentialist literature, in which to ask whether life is absurd is tantamount to asking whether it is meaningless. But there is also a less philosophically loaded sense, noted by Nagel,[4] in which absurdity results from a marked disparity between pretension and reality. This sense, despite Nagel's claims to the contrary, has little to do with meaning. In this sense of 'absurd', meaningless lives need not be absurd, and absurd lives need not be meaningless. Richard Wagner's life, to take a conspicuous example, exhibited a considerable disparity between pretension and reality but was hardly meaningless on that account. The actual connection between absurdity (in Nagel's sense) and meaninglessness would seem to be the following: if it can be shown that life is meaningless, then the fact that so many undertakings are taken to be significant and invested with such importance opens up the gap between reality and pretension from which absurdity emerges. This is a very much weaker connection than that which Nagel seems to envisage, and one which renders absurdity virtually useless as a key to the problem of meaning of life.

More readily separable than nihilist and absurdity worries are puzzles as to ultimate explanation, commonly presented in such questions 'Why does anything (at all) exist?' and emphasized by the usually-complained-about eventual giving out of answers to repeated 'Why?' questions.[5] For the assignment of meaning or meanings to life is independent of whether 'ultimate' explanations can in principle be obtained. On the one hand, meanings may be assigned, and commonly are, when no ultimate explanation is forthcoming; on the other, ultimate explanations may be proferred in purely extensional settings from which meanings (as intensional items) have been eliminated.[6]

Most important, then, answers to questions as to the meaning(s) of life do not require—what has often been thought necessary—an all-embracing cosmology or religion which affords deep explanations. However, less devious answers do require rejection of positions which imply a complete elimination of meanings, purposes and intentions from the world (of objects); that is, they require, it will emerge, a rejection of thorough-going empiricism and materialism,[7] and more generally of positions which imply complete extentional (or referential) reduction. The genesis of the largely modern problem of the point of life lies in part, it will be argued, in such reductionistic positions. (It also lies in part in altered socio-environmental circumstances, as will be seen.)

A further way in which the problem is often exacerbated stems from the use of evaluative terms in purely subjective senses. Thus, for example, 'worthwhile' is taken to mean 'subjectively worthwhile' or 'worthwhile to the liver (to me). Quite apart from the usual alliance of these usages with theories

which reduce values to psychological states, restricting value terminology to purely subjective uses adds further problems. For what seems worthwhile is not stable across individuals, nor even with the same individual across times. Accordingly, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to specify even a broad range of items to which, many creatures might sufficiently agree in assigning a high value, so that specification of such a range could be held to be an answer to the questions: 'What makes life meaningful?' or 'What constitutes a worthwhile life?'. Pleasure, happiness or satisfaction are almost the only contenders which even *look* plausible, but the well-known objections to utilitarian theories of motivation can be easily redeployed against such accounts. If evaluative terminology is used subjectively, then question as to the worthwhileness of a life become questions ofindividual psychology (answerable, if at all, by introspection), and thus lose most of their force and interest.

The problem (or problems) of the meaning of life has not infrequently been presented as the most important philosophical problem. This is, in part, because of the misguided expectation that once an answer to the question 'what makes a life meaningful?' is correctly given, then anyone who comes to believe the answer (assuming that it is not 'nothing') will thereby come to find their lives meaningful. This was clearly the motivation for Tolstoy's excursion into philosophy: an expectation that philosophy will, in this regard at least, prove therapeutic. Given that many contemporary lives seem—and, indeed, are—meaningless, were this expectation realistic it would clear that philosophy has a major work of salvation at hand. But, as we shall argue, the prevalence of meaningless lives is not the product of the prevalence of mistaken beliefs about the meaning of life, so much as, often enough, the prevalence of faulty socio-environmental conditions. Accordingly, there can be no expectation that philosophy *on its own* can impart meaning to meaningless lives (even the lives of those who read the right philosophy books), for what is needed is to change the conditions. This is not, of course, to deny that the philosophical enterprise has any practical value; for theory is, as always, an important guide to the sorts of changes that are required.

But there is another respect in which those who are troubled by the meaning of life problem may be disappointed by a philosophical answer. It may be that people *feel* their lives to be meaningless even when, in fact, they are not. This may be because they have incorrect beliefs about what provides the meanings for lives: they may mistakenly believe that some more exalted contribution than they are capable of is required to make a life meaningful. In such cases, of course, philosophy may prove therapeutic, and might serve to convince them that their own contributions were adequate. But more intractable cases are possible. For people may correctly *believe* their lives to be meaningful, believe that they are engaged in valuable, even important, activities, and yet still *feel* that somehow it is all pointless. It seems, from

his account, that J.S. Mill's mental crisis was of this kind.[8] What is missing is not a correct set of beliefs, but a certain animation, or comph, a sufficiently strong internalization, or appropriation to oneself, of the values believed in, to make a life correctly *believed* to be meaningful actually *feel* so. Against this sort of apathy, in which a life is insufficiently touched by the values it exemplifies, philosophy is comparatively powerless—certainly it is no more likely to prove therapeutic than poetry (which helped Mill), or hiking (which helped Leslie Stephen), or any other activity. What this indicates, however, is that sometimes those who ask 'What is the meaning of life?' are not asking a philosophical question, but indicating a medical problem, e.g. some chemical imbalance, or expressing a psychological problem, e.g. their feelings of despair, or even asking for emotional help. Those, who mistakenly believe that philosophy can provide this type of emotional help, not unexpectedly see the problem of the meaning of life as the most important one on the philosopher's agenda. But there can be no guarantee that even an affirmative answer to the question 'Has this life meaning?' is going to be sufficient to make the life *feel* meaningful to the creature living it. Thus the psychological problem, of feeling that one's life is meaningless even when, in fact, it is not, is not susceptible to purely philosophical resolution. Of course, philosophy can help even in such cases, for coming to believe that one's life has meaning is often a first step in coming to *feel* that is has.

§2. *The theory dependence of the problem.* The problem of the meaning of life is highly theory sensitive. Change the theory (paradigm, ideology)—most obviously by supplying a different metaphysical, religious, or cultural setting (e.g. that of a primitive, traditional or religious society)—and the problem recedes or vanishes. 'It is virtually a platitude..that the anxieties and despair of the present age can be tracked back to the crumbling of religious institutions, and religious faith following the Enlightenment...'[9] And these anxieties as to the point of life do not surface in the traditional societies that remain. Unlike religious societies the point of a life in such societies is often not the attainment of salvation, but rather the continuance of the tradition. Of course, in traditional as in religious societies, a person's roles, purposes, and the reasons why he or she does the things done are in considerable measure determined for him or her through the cosmological theory. Furthermore, actions are imbued with meaning (ritual significance) through that theory. An action reflects, or is identified with, its mystic archetype, enacted *in illo tempore;* and so it acquired 'meaning' reaching far beyond itself.

Such comfortable ways of injecting meaning into life are no longer easily acceptable.[10] In these enlightened days, we know that such cosmologies are unscientific and do not stand up to empirical testing. Modern cosmologies, by contrast, characteristically assign no such cosmic meaning to human actions.[11] So the problem cannot be transformed away by change of theory

back to an alternative cosmology which ascribes significance to certain (human) actions. So much can be more or less granted with one important qualification. A modern cosmology does not have to be coupled with, and does not entail, a reductionist theory of value or meaning, such as naturalism or materialism or subjectivism. Yet it is precisely such reductionisms, characteristic of positivism and carried over into modern analytical and linguistic philosophy, that at the very least aggravate the meaning problem and enable its (sharper) modern formulations. That much is evident from the way the problem is characteristically set up. Recent presentations of the problem regularly appeal to—one might be excused for gaining the impression they have to appeal to—a (defective) mechanistic picture of the world. Such is the way, for instance, that Bach sets up the problem:[12] 'There is little (indeed, so it soon appears, *no*) comfort in a world constituted by the mindless, inexorable workings of matter and nature' (B, p.5). For Russell, also, the problem arose from the fact that the world, including human history, was 'but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms'.[13] Similarly, Taylor backs up his subjectivist case at a crucial point with the claim that 'this life of the world presents itself to our eyes as a vast machine'[14] and Schopenhauer's argument depends on a mechanistic picture to get going:

> (Men) are like clockwork that is wound up, and goes without knowing why. Every time a man is begotten and born the clock of human life is wound up anew, to repeat once more the same old tune that has already been played innumerable times, movement by movement and measure by measure, with insignificant variations.[15]

Likewise, Solomon relies on the theme that 'in a materialist world there are no meanings' (S p. 30).

It is, however, unnecessary to appeal to a mechanistic picture to produce (what is usually taken to be) the problem. Mechanistic reduction is only an excellent way of generating the problem, since it removes (for example, by reducing to psychological states) the values in terms of which the problem could be solved or avoided; that is, mechanistic reduction is sufficient, though not necessary, for the problem. *The more general source of the problem lies in the reduction of value* itself, whether to natural features of the world, as in naturalism, or to psychological states (typically of humans) as in versions of 'non-cognitivism'. An immediate consequence of the latter reduction is the thesis that the value of life, such as it is, is *in us* (as psychological states are), so that life can have no non-subjective value, no value independent, not just of our lives, but of our mental states. And since it is *then* difficult to explain what value these mental states which 'explain' value have, it is difficult to explain what value, if any, life has.[16]

A similar problem-generating reduction is an important and integral part of existentialism as well. Thus Sartre: 'As a being by whom values exist,

I am unjustifiable. My freedom is anguished at being the foundation of values while itself without foundation....I do not have nor can I have recourse to any value against the fact that it is *I* who sustain values in being.[17] The salient difference in approach is that existentialists are more candid about the effects of the reduction thesis on value itself. An existentialist, one might say, is only a positivist in despair.[18]

All this suggests that it is *not* necessary to have—discover or invent a religious, mythological or other like 'unscientific' backdrop, which somehow imbues things with meaning, in order to alleviate or remove the problem. *It is enough*, to substantially *reduce* (if not to solve) *the problem*, to dispel the forces of reductionism, and *to admit irreducible values*. In any case, so long as the reduction of values thesis is retained, the addition of such backdrops is *insufficient* to imbue things with meaning. For just as questions about the value of everyday objects and activities can be raised, so, too, can questions about the value of their religious or mythical correlates—and these cannot be answered unless the reduction of values thesis is rejected. For unless values are retained somewhere, they cannot be introduced through the addition of religious or mythological doctrines. Nor is it hard to see that other ideals can replace religious ideals, and give lives point—as such secular (but unsatisfactory) ideals as that of progress (as an overall goal), or accumulation of material wealth, seemed, for a time, to be able to do.

But only for a time. The question of meaning is especially a contemporary (nor merely modern) problem and now considered so difficult not only because 'we are [now] much more resistant..[to] all attempts to locate meaning..in mystical and metaphysical conceptions' and because reductionism persists, but because of the abandonment of the idea of the 'importance of emancipation or progress (as a correct conception of spiritual advance)' (W,P. 335), and more generally, of the breakdown of modern secular ideals. In Solomon's view: 'the Absurd was born, not of loss of religion, but of gain in humanism' as a result of 'extravagant..faith in human justice and.. potentialities' (S, p. 35). The extraordinary burgeoning of interest (even obsession with) the problem during the nineteenth century was part and parcel of the (Victorian) crisis of faith—itself engendered partly by the rise of scientific materialism and partly by deteriorating social conditions.

It is not just that the progress and perfectibility models, emerging from the Enlightenment, have ceased to be persuasive;[19] just as important they have now been *seen* to fail in crucial respects. The progress model, for example, already severely damaged by the deteriorating living standards in much of the Third World, has been further eroded by the decline of rising expectations even in USA, where many parents no longer expect that their children will do better than they did.

> The harder one worked or saved the less security one seemed to have. The younger generation...began to experience the rags-to-riches, Horatio Alger myth, from upside down. They were becoming the first generation in American history facing the possibility of doing less well than their parents.[20]

The models have also been experientially undercut by the radical unsatisfactoriness of main features of the modern industrial life-style: unsatisfactoriness, and often pointlessness, in both work and leisure. Both are frequently remarked, are quite genuine enough and need little emphasis. (Indeed farm yard animals often lead superior lives to suburban humans.) Work is frequently repetitive, monotonous, and seems (like Sisyphus's activity) to be going nowhere, especially assembly line and absolutely routine work. Hence, for example: '..the meaninglessness, the monotony, which so many Americans feel in their work today.[21] Work is often bad— 'a Monday through Friday sort of dying'—yet unemployment is considered worse[22]. And leisure is mostly given over to passive spectatorship, whether on television or in the stadium, lecture theatre or concert hall. 'The spectacle is the dominant model of social life', 'modern society is fundamentally..a society of spectacle' (J. Woodman see in WGS, setting down the basic observation of the international situationalists). These activities are often viewed as just as meaningless as the work they substitute for or complement.

This crucial dimension of *social criticism* is left out of most philosophical discussions of the meaning of life, which tend (not untypically) to support the status quo, by attributing point to *every* (human) life or to *none*. This is a further aspect of the denial of the social reduction of social life forms to individual life forms (a consequence of the individual reductionism built into western analytical thought, and reflected in capitalist society)[23]. What is required instead is a socially more *discriminating* approach, which allows a point to *some* lives but *not* to *others*, many of which have had their point, or what point they might have had, attenuated or even destroyed by socio-economic arrangements. Even those, who recognize that some lives have more point than others, often fail to recognize the primarily social nature of this fact. Thus Camus who, in typical subjectivist fashion, uses 'quality of experience' as his yardstick goes on, in typical individualistic fashion, to claim that 'the mistake is thinking that..quantity of experiences depends on the circumstances of our life when it depends solely on us'.[24]

The leading philosophical discussions of the question of meaning in life are conservative, anthropocentric, individual reductionistic, and evade issues of social responsibility. There are two main approaches to the question, that of the European movement (predominantly French) which, on the basis of nihilistic arguments, allows meaning to no lives, and the recent Anglo-American approach, in part a reaction to this, which attributes meaning to every human life.[25] *In neither case need anything be done about social or environmental conditions to improve meaningfulness*: (human) lives have all the

point they can or need have. There is, as well, an attempt to amalgamate these approaches, assigning *objective* meaning to no human lives, but *subjective* point to every one. All these approaches will be rejected.

3. *The two pictures, the route to the theme that life is objectively meaningless, and the argument from permanence and the irrelevance of morality.* That life *is* objectively meaningless has been argued by a string of philosophers, perhaps most persuasively by Taylor.[26] However, "objective' meaninglessness is contrasted with subjective point: '..an existence that is objectively meaningless...can nevertheless acquire a meaning for him whose existence it is' (T, p. 260). And the solution to the problem of the meaning of life is, if Taylor is right, that 'the meaning of life is from within us,[27] not bestowed from without' (T, p. 268; cf. also KB, p. 20). It is important in defending, and in reaching, a more objective account of the meaning of life to see in detail why Taylor's arguments do not sustain his conclusion.[28]

The detailed *structure of Taylor's argument* to objective meaninglessness is encapsulated in the following diagram:



Taylor's main argument depends, rather like that of Camus before him, upon elaborating a (non-standard) version of the myth of Sisyphus, (branch [1] of the argument tree) and applying it to all life. Part of the argument is that just as the labours of Sisyphus have no objective point, so, assimilating the cases, the lives and labours of living creatures have no objective point.[29] A further main part of the argument is that much as the life of Sisyphus can

be given an inward (or subjective) point, so the lives of humans and other creatures have such an inward point. Neither the arguments concerning Sisyphus nor, more important, the comparisons and assimilations succeed.

Taylor claims to have 'cited' the myth of Sisyphus 'only for the one element it does unmistakably contain, namely, that of a repetitious cyclic activity that never comes to anything' (T p. 257). This is not so; he also needs the picture of the activity as *pointless.* But in one (the?) standard version of the myth, where Sisyphus is endeavouring to roll the stone to the top of the hill, the activity *does* have a point, though its achievement is always frustrated (branch [2]). There are many examples of repetitious cyclic activity that (at least in a straightforward sense) never come to anything, but which are not pointless, e.g. the assembly line worker's activity, the playing of the same piece of music every day. Taylor's repeated inference—'Nothing comes of it, and (so) the work is simply pointless' (e.g. T p. 268)—involves further assumptions, which in crucial cases, e.g. that of *all* human activity, should be withheld. Further, something like Taylor's non-standard myth, which has pointlessness *built* into it, is required. According to this story (not to be found in any dictionaries of mythology we have tracked down), Sisyphus—Taylor's Sisyphus—is obliged to roll the stone to the top of the hill where it is immediately returned to the bottom for him to roll uphill again.

Even if the argument to objective meaninglessness in the case of Taylor's Sisyphus can be made good, as can be freely conceded, the general argument (of branch [1]), from activities lacking an object or point to their being meaningless, does not succeed. For the argument depends on an illicit slide on 'pointless', between 'pointless' as 'meaningless' and, what is very different, 'lacking an object'. (The word 'point' is, in fact, quite radically ambiguous. See OED.) If an activity is pointless in the sense of lacking a point or object (it must be distinct from the activity), then no basis is given for concluding that it is meaningless, i.e. in the sense of 'pointless', *pointless therefore meaningless* is an invalid argument. The activity may be meaningful because valuable in itself. Possible examples include performances of works of art, e.g. musical performances or 'happenings', and many social and personal activities, e.g. making love or meeting friends. If, however, the activity is pointless in being meaningless, then the ground for putting the activity in the class of things that lack an object is removed.

Taylor distinguishes two ways (subsequently referred to as 'two pictures') of introducing 'point' into Sisyphus's activity 'in which the image of meaninglessness can be altered' (T p. 259):

(1) THE MONUMENT OR OBJECTIVE PICTURE. The activity is changed so that it does have a point (in the ordinary sense) and an end or objective, e.g. Sisyphus assembles the stones rolled up the hill into a temple or other monument.

(2) THE OBSESSION OR SUBJECTIVE PICTURE. The stone rolling activity is not reoriented, but an impulse, or obsession, to be rolling stones is implan-

ted in, Sisyphus, e.g. by injecting a substance into his bloodstream or by 'rewiring' him. Taylor contends that (a) 'the picture with which we began [of his Sisyphus] has not really been changed in the least by adding this supposition' (T, p. 260), but nonetheless (*b*) 'his life is now filled with mission and meaning' (T, p. 259). If (*a*) is true, then (*b*) is not since the initial picture was that not just of repetitive but meaningless activity. The activity remains (objectively) meaningless despite the magic substance or the obsession, even if this is not how it *appears* (subjectively) to the stoneroller. These points are unaffected by the fact that (*a*) is not entirely true; for the *intensional* picture has changed. Sisyphus now sees the activity as desirable, what he would even choose to do.

'Which of these pictures does life in fact resemble?' Taylor asks. He is intent upon removing as inadequate the first picture. P1, both in the case of Sisyphus and more generally. His method of disposing of P1 relies upon the old trick of redefinition, of redefining 'real point' or 'real significance' in terms, as least as regards buildings, of 'permanence,' with 'permanence' redefined as 'enduring forever'. Hence the (otherwise amazing) claim that for the 'creation of a temple to make any difference, it had to be a temple that would at least endure, adding beauty to the world for the remainder of time' (T, p. 213, rearranged). Then follows the more general presentation of all human and creature achievement as 'bubbles', because merely delivering 'transitory' goods (branch [3]).

Even without the redefinition of 'permanence' such claims remain shocking, since it would normally be considered that some items may be of genuine and even considerable value, although they might last for only a year to two. The temporary regression of progressive diseases is a case in point. And treatments which delay the onset of blindness, e.g. would normally (and quite properly) be regarded as achieving results of real, though temporary, value. There is *no requirement* on real value or significance (in the more ordinary sense) of permanence or even endurance. It is entirely false that, for picture P^1 of Sisyphus to succeed, the temple must endure for ever. If Sisyphus builds a beautiful temple, he has achieved something of (objective) value, even if the temple falls down after some centuries. The stone house one of us has helped build may well last for several hundred years; it will certainly not last forever, but its value is not thereby diminished to zero, or very seriously affected. Secondly, some achievements, e.g. the design of a theory, or proof of a theorem, do have a lasting value, since theories and theorems, unlike buildings and paintings, are not subject to the 'ravages' of time. Thirdly, outcomes of positive value may be achieved by the destruction of harmful items which reduce overall value, for example, evil social systems, environmental blights, and diseases like smallpox. Such outcomes may be permanent even in Taylor's sense. Finally, in taking over pictures P^1 and P^2 to the more general life situation, without due modification, Taylor has presented us with a false choice. There are options, not properly

allowed for, in Taylor's presentation. As Wiggins remarks, it is doubtful that the effects Taylor aims for 'could have been contrived if the gradual accumulation of scientific understanding or the multiplication (in a manner accessible to the living) of the sublime utterances of literature or music had been brought into the argument' (W, p. 337). Nor are the options exclusive. A building may be built *both* because of the satisfaction it gives the builder *and* the value of the product: monuments are not merely 'hostages for the objects of psychological states' (cf. W, p. 375). An 'adequate description' of the meaning of life—as of valuable experiences as like those of wilderness—'must do more than treat our appetitive tastes in would-be isolation from their relations to the things they are directed at' (W, p. 395).

The unrealistic and unnecessary requirement of permanence has accentuated the problem of the meaning of life in new ways with the decline of the Christian world-view. The Christian doctrine of an after-life did, in fact, offer one form of permanence which meets even Taylor's standards. Indeed, the permanence, not of objects created during one's life, but of life itself came, mistakenly, to be seen as a necessary condition for life's having a meaning (see KB, p. 24 for more on this theme). Once the after-life doctrine ceased to be tenable the inevitability of death came to be seen as the main cause of the meaninglessness of life. Thus Tolstoy:

> Illness and death would come..if not today, then tomorrow, and to those whom I loved, to myself, and nothing would remain but stench and worms. All my acts, loved, to myself and nothing would remain but stench and worms. All my acts, whatever I did, would sooner or later be forgotten, and I myself would be nowhere.[30]

So, too, Camus:[31] '[M]y way of acting as if everything has a meaning...is given the lie in vertiginous fashion by the absurdity of a possible death', and Heidegger[32] and Sartre: 'Thus death is..that which on principle removes all meaning from life'.[33] Ironically enough, under these specifically post-Christian circumstances, death came to be seen (e.g. by Camus, and also Tolstoy, *op. cit.*, pp. 65, 66) as a tempting escape from a life made absurd by death—in Bismarck's famous phrase: 'committing suicide for fear of death', or pretty nearly.

For present purposes, however, the inevitability of (real) death argument is merely one form of the 'need-for-permanence' diversion, and not an especially interesting one. For, even within the framework of the permanence requirement, it does not ensure the meaninglessness of life, since lives might be meaningful even given the permanence requirement if they result in the production of objects of permanent value. Real death becomes decisive only if the permanence requirement is adopted *together with* either a psychological reduction view of values, or the view that the purpose of life is life itself. If values are reduced to psychological states which are terminated

with death, then the world contains nothing of permanent value and thus, on the permanence assumption, is meaningless. And if meaning requires permanence, then real death ensures that life itself cannot provide what is required. All three assumptions are rejected here, however, with the result that the fact of death has a negligible impact on the problem of the meaning of life.

Nor does it have much positive impact, despite many claims to the contrary.[34] The view that immortality would make life meaningless is certainly a minority opinion, but one supported by a quite a wide range of argument. Among the more simple is Popper's claim that it is the possibility of losing one's life which 'brings home' to us the value of it. While it is certainly the case that, on occasion, the threat of loss may bring home to us how much we value something, it is also the case that we may be vividly aware of how much we value something even though the prospect of its loss has not occurred to us. Moreover, the value of a thing, as distinct from our valuing it, can hardly be held to depend upon the possibility of losing it. So even if Popper were right in assuming that only what is losable is valued, it would not follow, without a subjectivist account of values, that only what is losable is valuable. Another argument for the meaninglessness of immortal lives is the *argument from boredom:* an argument sometimes ironically used to explain why God bothered to create the world, and also to debunk the charms of the Christian after-life. But the popular argument from boredom requires several auxiliary assumptions in order to work. Key among these are the twin assumptions that the alleviation of boredom requires constant novelty, and that the supply of novelty in the world is rather limited (*the principle of finite variety*). Neither assumption seems justified, since not even all simple pleasures pall with repetition and the world so far suffers no lack of change or variety. Further, it must be assumed that memory remains undimmed even over long periods, so that widely separated repetitions do not suffice to alleviate the hunger for novelty. And finally, there is the assumption that boring life is necessarily a meaningless one, a view which depends upon a subjectivist view of meaning.

In fact, the prospects and evils of boredom are much overrated, especially by Taylor and Williams, who both use the argument from boredom though in superficially different ways: Taylor maintains that permanent objects of value become boring, and Williams that permanent lives become boring. Either way, permanence is held to induce meaninglessness. Williams is at least more selfcritical in his use of the argument from boredom. He admits, for example, that some activities may be boring and yet not be valueless since things of value were achieved by means of them (BW, p. 424). But this, he claims, could not be the case if life itself were boring, for in that case there would be no redeeming value that the life was lived for.

This argument relies, however, on the assumption, already criticized, that life itself is the only source of value. Williams' further argument that

immortality would be tedious turns out to depend upon a quite restricted view of what is available for an immortal. To avoid cases in which immortal lives become meaningless through increasing decrepitude, Williams considers someone, Elina Makropulos from Capek's play, whose physiological and mental development is arrested permanently at the age of forty-two, such a person then lives for ever as a person of forty two. From the fact that Makropulos becomes bored, however, very little follows: indeed, nothing follows any creature that falls outside the class of creatures, of which Makropulos can be considered fully representative. To achieve the necessary generality Williams appeals to considerations about age and character, designed to support a weakened principle of finite variety. Williams' initial claim is that Makropulos' boredom is 'connected with the fact that everything that could happen and make sense to one particular human being of 42 had already happened to her' (BW, p. 418). Thus, although there may be infinitely many things of interest and significance in the world, it is claimed only finitely many of them can be of interest and significance to a person of forty-two. Williams' strategy is to establish his claim about boredom on the basis of a weakened, and thus supposedly more reasonable, principle of finite variety than was used in the argument from boredom considered above.

The new principle, however, is still far from reasonable. It is obviously somewhat naive to suppose that age makes so much difference to what is significant to an individual. Williams' argument, if taken seriously, suggests that there are only so many things that can significantly happen to a person of forty-two and that others have to wait until fortythree, or sixty-three. It is hard to believe that the significant events of a life are thus regulated by its physiological or mental clock. Williams tries to consolidate his position by switching the focus from physiological and mental age to character (BW, p. 418). The finite variety principle is then amended to the claim that there are only finitely many things in the world or interest or significance to someone of a given character. But now Williams is caught in a dilemma. For either character is strictly tied to age, so that freezing someone for eternity at a given age implies freezing them in a certain character for eternity, in which case the new approach is only a terminological variant of the old; or else character can vary independently of age, in which case nothing has been done so far to ensure that immortals must spend eternity with a fixed character.

On this last point, Williams does try to provide what is necessary, in two ways, neither of them very persuasive. On the one hand, he suggests that character is fixed for good early on in life, through the laying down of unconscious memories and desires (BW p. 425-6), but he does nothing to substantiate that dubious Freudian claim. On the other hand, he seems to stipulate that fixity of character is a necessary condition for immorality. He gives two conditions for immorality (BW, p. 420): the first is the unexceptionable claim that for a creature to be immortal it must be the self-same creature

that lives for ever. 'The second important condition is that the state in which I survive should be one which, to me looking forward, will be adequately related, in the life it presents, to whose aims which I now have in wanting to survive at all' (BW, p. 420). It is not immediately obvious what this rather vague requirement amounts to, but in context it appears to be interpreted as a requirement that the character of an enduring individual not undergo too drastic a change (each stage being 'adequately related' to all the others).

Much hangs, in fact, upon how 'adequately related' is to be understood. However, the only reading on which the condition becomes unexceptionable is if two states are held to be adequately related if they are two states of the same life. But on this reading the second condition collapses into the first. On any other reading, it seems that the condition illegitimately excludes some forms of change. There seems little reason to suppose that relative fixity of character is a necessary condition for a worthwhile eternal life, nor even a worthwhile finite one. Animal metamorphosis provides examples of very radical changes of character in a single lifetime. Imagining such an animal endowed with sufficient intelligence surveying at the outset its life prospects, there seems no reason why it should regard the quality of its life after metamorphosis as a matter of indifference. In the case of humans, the changes are much less marked, and there is correspondingly less justification for Williams' excluding them by fiat.

Williams' condition suggests that there should be some continuity of aim throughout a single life, so that future activities can be 'adequately related' to current aims and current activities to past aims. Mortals who live meaningful lives do not meet this requirement, and there is no reason why immortals should be required to. Many of our aims of twenty years ago are no longer our aims today, nor very closely related to them; and not just because we have already accomplished them, nor because they now seem to us not worth accomplishing. Very many old and now neglected projects are such that, had they been accomplished, they would have contributed much to a satisfactory and meaningful life—not infrequently, they were given up precisely through lack of time, the very thing that the immortals would have in such abundance. Such changes, when they occur in major, life-governing projects, may well amount to a change of character, but seem none the worse for that. Still less, in assessing the value of our lives as a whole, would we (necessarily) wish to exclude from consideration all our activities prior to the last character modification. Even in prospect, such changes in character are not too difficult to assimilate (though, of course, they are difficult to anticipate in detail). We may well anticipate, contrary to Williams' second condition, that our aims and interest twenty years hence will be quite different from what they are today, but this need imply no denigration of either our current interests or our future ones. There seems, in short—no reason why—if we look forward to immortality (whether at a 'fixed' or 'frozen' age or not), we should want or have to insist that we retain our present character throughout.

It is much more reasonable to allow immortals to change their character in at least the ways that mortals do. This will include the possibility of drastic changes and some which results from conscious intention. In particular, it will allow for the gradual change of character which often results from experience. If such changes are allowed, however, Williams will not be able to use his weakened principle of finite variety—that there are only finitely many things of interest and significance to a given character—to obtain the result that unending lives must inevitably be tedious. The finite variety principle, moreover, has troubles of its own. Even if one faces eternity looked into a single character, there may still be infinitely many things to interest one—infinitely many problems to solve, for example. We may even concede that, for any given character, some possible life-events will be meaningless for a person of that character, but this is no reason to conclude that the remaining events, those which are meaningful for a person of that character, will be so few in number or so impoverished in nature as to condemn a life spent in their eternal enjoyment to ultimate boredom. While some characters may be like this, by no means all are. The most Williams' argument could show is not—what it requires—that immortality inevitably leads to boredom, but that having a certain sort of character might. In fact, it doesn't even show this much, since the permanence of character assumption on which it rests are mistaken. Finally, even if we waive our objections to both the finite variety principle and the permanence of character assumption, Williams' argument will still not work without the false 'need-for-novelty' assumption. There is simply no ground for claiming everything loses its point on repetition, and to claim that it does is to run counter to a vast mass of human experience.

Nietzsche gives a metaphysical argument designed to prove his doctrine of eternal recurrence—essentially a form of the principle of finite variety.[35] Given a world of finite spatial extent and finitely many atomic constituents, but infinitely extended in time, Nietzsche argues that every possible combination of constituents will have occurred infinitely many times in the past and will recur infinitely many times in the future. What meaning can there be in taking any action, when only one will[36] have already taken it infinitely many times in the past, but one will also have failed to take it infinitely many times? According to Nietzsche, only by taking joyous delight in one's own recurrence. In fact, however, even on Nietzsche's own assumption (all of them debatable) the danger of eternal recurrence is a myth. For the continuity of space will permit nondenumerably many spatial arrangements of only finitely many atomic elements.[37]

A different position, apparently endorsed by Frankl, is that mortality is a sufficient condition for having a meaningful life (he says that mortality 'is the very factor that constitutes its meaning', (F p. 69))—though not for being aware that one's life has meaning. This has all the disadvantages of the usual indiscriminate answers to the question, for on this basis only God's life will

be meaningless! However, Frankl's arguments only support the weaker thesis that morality is a necessary condition for meaningfulness. 'If we were immortal', he argues, 'we could legitimately postpone every action for ever' (F, p.64). Accordingly, there would never be any point in doing anything, since anything could always be done later. As Nozick has pointed out, even on Frankl's own terms immortals could still lead meaningful lives if they believed themselves to be mortal (N, p. 579*n*). Or, for that matter, even if they knew the truth, provided that they continued to act in worthwhile ways despite the opportunities for eternal procrastination. Moreover, it is simply false to say that *any* action could be postponed, for some opportunities for worthwhile endeavour do not recur even to immortals, at least once the myth of eternal recurrence is duly removed.[38]

4. *Taylor's further case against the objective picture.* Taylor's more general argument against P1 (T, p. 261ff.) is that 'all living things present essentially the same spectacle' as the glow-worm, the cicada, the migrating bird, 'of pointless activity'. 'And we are part of that life...None of the differences really cancels the meaninglessness that we found in Sisyphus, and that we find all round, wherever anything lives' (T, p. 262, rearranged). [Having cancelled the objective point of any life, Taylor will proceed to give subjective point back to every life.] But the temple-building Sisyphus did *not* present the spectacle of pointless activity. Do other creatures? Always?

Taylor's result is obtained by use of very truncated descriptions of the life cycles of the creatures, misleading descriptions which remove requisite social, ecological and intensional settings. Consider the cicada which is simply said to 'emerge for a brief flight, lay its eggs, and die' (T, p. 311).[39] But in its brief life a cicada usually does much more than this misleading description conveys. It makes many flights, engages in much calling and singing, often in combination with other cicadas, which emerge about the same time, mates, etc. Nor should the cicada's activities be seen in isolation from those of neighbouring birds, for whom they provide a food festival. More generally, the truncated descriptions neglect the place of the cicada in the larger ecological network. And they also ignore the part that cicadas can play in aesthetic appreciation of the seasons, analogous to the more widely recognized role played by the cuckoo.

Again, it is false that migrating birds migrate 'only to ensure that others may follow' the same routes. Birds migrate for other reasons also, e.g. in order to enjoy a sustainable food supply. There is no mention of features of birds' rich social lives, of their nest building, etc. Were there, Taylor would not be able to conclude quite so quickly that 'there is no point at all' in (migrating) birds' lives, that they culminate in nothing and accomplish nothing, repeating themselves through millions of years (T, p. 262). The point of birds' lives may be seen in their day-to-day doings, especially in the breeding

season, in their social and cultural activity, in the continuing of lives and distinctive life-styles (rather as with many tribal peoples). This is not to endorse, but to repudiate, Taylor's claim—seemingly contradicting his assertion that 'there is no point to it at all'—that 'the point of any living thing's life is, evidently, nothing but life itself' (T, p. 252). For then divergence of life-styles of living creatures would simply not affect the point of their respective lives. But, as will further emerge, it does; and some lives have more point than others. Again it is simply untrue thatbirds accomplish nothing. some of them, not all, build nests (quite an accomplishment often), raise young, and so on. Nor does the cycle of lives of a species endlessly repeat itself; that is to ignore evolution, the rise, fall and changes in species, etc. Thereby something more sweeping is accomplished, the survival or perhaps enhancement of a species, and also of dependent species, and so perhaps the enrichment of the world through the continued presence of the creatures without whom it would be a vastly poorer place.

Much of what Taylor has to say about the objective pointlessness of the lives of 'we' humans is disputable for the same sorts of reasons. Thus, in particular, the alleged resemblance of Sisyphus: 'We toil after goals, most of them—indeed every single one of them—of transitory significance and, having gained one of them, we immediately set forth for the next, as if that one had never been' (T p. 262; similarly p. 267 bottom). Again, this is not true to experience. Some people do rest, perhaps for a very long time (though the work ethic discourages this), after a major goal has been achieved, and much they do subsequently is influenced by that achievement. They are not to be 'condemned' for that. Nor are all such achievements transitory, something that is far from ephemeral may be done or achieved: the low redefinition of 'transitory' deployed, which makes all goals of 'transitory' significance ('bubbles'), corresponds to the high redefinition of 'permanent' observed earlier.

So it is also with Taylor's *other* attempts to remove picture P1 and establish objective pointlessness in the human case. They depend on the following assumptions, all disputable: that the production of further humans, a family, a culture—to which much human effort is bent—is never very worthwhile, because 'each man's life (just) resembles one of Sisyphus's climbs to the summit' (T, p. 263). The resemblance breaks down because the human efforts sometimes do have worthwhile results but Sisyphus's do not. It is simply false, in the ordinary as distinct from redefined senses, that no production, such as a temple or culture or a nation, could be suitably worthwhile, 'could make any difference', unless it was permanent, 'would at least endure—for the remainder of time'. Such quite excessive requirements on what is worthwhile—which are, however, satisfied in a sort of way by intellectual productions such as theories—need not and should not be accepted. Taylor suggests that if a temple has been built but subsequently falls into ruin, a great civilization founded which eventually declines, then

in each case it has been *for nothing*' (branch [3]). Not so. The only answer he finds to the question 'what for?' asked regarding such a production—the answer he thinks is clear—is that so just that sort of thing 'may go on for ever'. What is clear, as we have seen, is that the answer is defective, that a production may be valuable in or for itself whatever its later status.

Taylor wants to deny that even (what he thinks impossible) the production of something of lasting value can give life (an objective) point (branch [4]). He has Sisyphus build a beautiful enduring temple and then rest and enjoy the result (T, p. 265; the move is repeated in part for humans, pp. 267-69). What emerges, Taylor claims, is 'a picture of infinite boredom'. But this hypothesis is simply imported without argument. Nor is it true: completion does not induce boredom invariably, especially in scientific and artistic cases. Similarly, his claim, upon which his argument and his progression to picture P 2 depends, that 'what is really worthwhile seems to have slipped away entirely', lacks further substantiation, and certainly appears to be false, since the temple remains.

Taylor's argument for the exclusion of picture P1 and adoption of P2 in its stead accordingly fails. Although picture P2 is inadequate, and not just (as we shall see) because picture P1 must be retained, elements of picture P2 are parts of the larger picture. Consider the builders of a by-gone civilization who somehow return to see 'the trivial remnants of what they had once accomplished with much effort'. Taylor suggests that there was no objective point to what they did: '...it was just the building, and not what was finally built that gave their life meaning' (T, p. 266). But (at least in many cases), it *was* both, the activity *and* its fruits, and the second cannot be reduced to the first (or to 'inward' things). The two may be interdependent, as in Wiggins' example of a man who helps his neighbour dig a ditch (W. p. 374). Here, the end is clearly an important part of making the whole activity meaningful, the activity would be neither undertaken nor worthwhile if its end were incapable of attainment. But the end is not the whole story. Part of the value of the activity comes from the fact that the man enjoys working with his neighbour. Both the product and the process of its production are important: the man would not pay a contractor to come and dig his neighbour's ditch for him, nor would he join his neighbour in the process of digging holes in the backyard and filling them up again simply in order to enjoy the pleasure of weilding a shovel alongside him. Activities that do not culminate may have a point in the *doing*; those that culminate may have a point both in the doing and in the culmination, both in the doing and in what is done or achieved.

It is because crucial elements of picture P1 are omitted that Taylor's final theme concerning glow-worms, birds and men[40], that 'their endless activity, which gets nowhere, is just what it is their will to pursue. This is its whole justification and meaning' (T, p. 267)—should be rejected, as a travesty. So should its corollary concerning all living creatures: 'The

point of his living is simply to be living, in the manner it is his nature to be living' (T, p. 267), or more briefly, since it is questionable how many humans live in the manner it is their nature to be living, 'the point of any living thing's life is nothing but life itself' (T, p. 262).[41]

This assigns every living creature's life a uniform and trivial point, the same point (life) irrespective of how the life is lived, what experiences had, what objects produced.[42] No life has any more, or less, point than any other, no matter how well or badly it is lived. This severe *point* from its usual moorings, e.g. with importance, value, etc. For surely (without any damaging elitism) some lives are more important than others, some are worthwhile, while others have little or no merit, or may be downright evil, and so on. Moreover, Taylor's uniformity view distorts: '...how it feels for most people from the inside...in general the larger the obstacles which nature or other men put in our way, the more hopeless the prospect, the less the point most of us will feel anything has...point is not independent of outcome (W, p. 340). A related, and damaging, consequence of Taylor's very limited reassurances is that, even if one's life is unsatisfactory and rather pointless, one need and can, do nothing about it. It has all the point it can have, and as much as richer and more satisfactory lives.

There is, however, on Taylor's account, something that one can do—one can get oneself brainwashed. For, in describing the case in which the gods rewire Sisyphus in order to 'make him want precisely what they inflict on him,' Taylor says that '[h]owever it may appear to us, Sisyphus'...life is now filled with mission and meaning' (T, p. 259). This claim is inconsistent with the uniformity view without strong, false assumptions. For if the point of a creature's life is 'nothing but' life itself, then every creature's life at least has this point, however minimal it may be. On the desire view, however, it would seem that life of the rewired Sisyphus has a point which that of original Sisyphus did not. In fact, the desire view can only be made compatible with the uniformity view on the assumption that the sole desire of all living creatures is for life itself; an assumption which is plainly false and which Taylor, by his example, rejects. In any case, the desire view is hardly a plausible candidate to explain how some lives have more point than others, for it takes no account of how the desires were come by: whether by indoctrination, brainwashing, hypnosis, lobotomy or brain-damage. The assumption underlying the desire view is that the person, who desires, has been moulded to fit the circumstances in which he finds himself, always has a more meaningful life than the person who hasn't—a higly counter-intuitive view. Indeed, as the circumstances involved become more severe, we seem to approach more closely paradigms of lives rendered meaningless by external intervention—exactly the reverse of Taylor's desired view, in which the severity of intervention renders the conformity of desire to life-situation more secure.

It is hardly necessary to expand upon the highly conservative, even totalitarian, nature of the desire view, nor on the way in which it totally

ignores the role of the social and environmental factors in determining whether life is meaningful or not. The incompatibility between Taylor's uniformity view and his desire view may be avoided, if we take the uniformity view to be about the objective meaning of life (such as it is, on that view) and the desire view to be about its subjective meaning, namely, the meaning it appears to the liver to have. But this reconciliation is blocked by Taylor himself, who denies that life has objective meaning, and seeks throughout a purely subjective, 'internal' account. Moreover, what the examples surely show is that a person's subjective feeling or conviction about the meaningfulness of his or her life is no more an infallible guide (though it may, of course, be an indication) to its actual meaningfulness, than their subjective feelings of physical well-being are an infallible guide to their state of health.

5. *Another recent therapeutic attempt to eliminate the problem, and the galactic dwarfing argument.* Another popular recent approach to the meaning problem is represented in Bach's work. In fact, however, Bach offers an even more negative reassurance than Taylor, along still more ramshackle lines. Concerning what he calls the 'roadblock' of 'the demand for meaning' he writes, by way of summary:

> There is not way to make the moments of life add up to something, but there is no real need to. For it is at particular moments that this seeming need is felt. There is no possiblity of a final endless moment when everything comes together and stops there. Ironically, seeking the meaning of life prevents a person from finding what ends the quest. That happens when you realise that what you're looking for is nowhere to be found—it's here already (B, p.85).

Bach is not offering a superficial elimination of the question as meaningless because of a metaphysical question in the fashion of the logical positivists. Certainly, the question is meaningful and invites rival answers. Bach's 'elimination' derives from two sources, from an anti-theoretical (and anti-philosophical) theme, not uncommon among philosophers, and from a rather pure experiential picture of life in which only the present really counts or matters. The anti-theoretical theme emerges, for instance, as follows:'Every time I look at things from a global [more generally, theoretical] perspective, indeed whatever I am doing loses its meaning and fades into a wisp of triviality. But when I am involved in something, my outlook on life as a whole doesn't enter in...., (B p. 7). What one is (supposed to be) 'looking for', *present involvement*, which may be 'here already', disappears under reflection or analysis. And such reflection prevents one 'finding what ends' the search for meaning, namely, such involvement, and so serves, like the philosophical demand for meaning, as a blockage to be eliminated (cf. S & D, p. 2).

The contrast upon which Bach's case rests is, however, a false one.

Nothing stops reflection, even from a global standpoint, on whatever one is involved in. Nor does such reflection, whether global or not, always trivialize things. Bach wants to claim that reflection has to be global, and so involves conditions that cannot be met, at least nontrivially: 'To have a view of life as a whole requires assuming a global perspective, [for which] there must be some principles of unity and permanence (B, p.7). But, first, the global perspective does not require principles of permanence—as consideration of Taylor's argument has shown—or of unity—for things of value may not be unified. Secondly, the view does not have to be quite so sweeping: the point of an individual life or of a group of lives can be investigated. A global perspective is not compulsory. The usual *context of the problem* is more limited: it is set within the space-time scale of (human) life on earth. Moreover, even if adopted, the global context does not lead to triviality. Admittedly, a favourite ploy in arguing for nihilism and against non-subjective accounts of the meaning of life is to dwarf all such contributions by setting them against a galactic backdrop. Undoubtedly, the relative impermanence of human affairs, when set against a geological or galactic time-scale, is an important element in the feeling of futility some humans experience. But, strictly, the ploy should show little. The outline of a tree or an island tends to vanish when looked at from afar, but that doesn't show they lack outlines. A common trick in dwarfing creatures' lives to insignificance by use of a galactic scale is to employ a measuring device which is *not* likewise scaled to insignificance. It is as if the same ruler were used to measure a tree's diameter as represented on a photo taken from afar as had been used to measure it close up; the measurments taken do not admit of direct comparison for different scales, of contexts, have been adopted. What should, of course, happen is that the measuring device is *similarly* dwarfed in the transformations, so that, for example, an insignificant amount as seen galactically—but nonetheless a discriminable amount—is likewise required to yield a meaningful life.[13]

What prevents moments of life adding up to something worthwhile—what refutes the (non-trivial, interesting, but ultimately erroneous, as we shall see) Aristotelean thesis that 'a meaningful life is just a sum of activities worthwhile in themselves' (W, p. 274)—is not any consequence of the anti-theoretical theme alone. Rather, the argument here relies on the *live-for-the-present-only-theme*, a theme often thought mistakenly to derive from an existence-is-existence-now thesis (a thesis of EMJB). A moment is had, lived through, and vanishes, and what has vanished cannot be added up. None of this is entirely true: what no longer exists can still be assessed, and often assessed mathematically, e.g. added in calculations (see EMJB). The living-for-the-present theme has, like connected disengagement themes, deeper roots, namely, a (too strong) freedom thesis—asserted by existentialists, especially by Sartre —that one is only free if one has no external constraints imposed upon one, in particular to be free one can have no serious future commitments nor labour under any past constraints. Naturally, it is assumed, one wants

to be free (even in this bizarre sense), which requires cutting links with the past and future. Cutting these links at the same time, however, erodes the notion of involvement (likewise satisfaction), which is supposed to explain subjective point, virtually to zero; for involvement requires relationships extending over time.

Meaning is not to be found only in the present moment, it does not contract into present involvement. Projects, which extend into the future and have roots in the past and, especially, have continuing social and communal connections, often help in giving a life meaning. Bach's advice, to live for the moment, while it is occasionally good advice, is often bad advice, and can lead to lives much of whose point has been removed. Similar objections apply against *uniform* solutions, to life's problems and meaning issues, through individual disengagement (including the quest for emptiness).

The anti-intellectual theme connects with one form of subjective reductionism, namely, the view that life is meaningless only when the liver thinks that it is. Active involvement, which (allegedly) blocks out thought beyond what is necessary for the practical task at hand, inhibits, in particular, the thought that life is meaningless. Thus, given the appropriate form of subjective reductionism, life at moments of active involvement is meaningful. But active involvement rarely excludes thought for more than comparatively short periods. A life in which action excluded all thought except that necessary to bring about the action gives us, in fact, a picture of a life of meaningless activity, full of sound and fury, no doubt, but most likely signifying nothing, or at least, very little. Appeal to this form of subjective reductionism does the anti-intellectualist little good, for the required reduction thesis is false. Not only does it exclude legitimate third-person evaluations of a life's meaning, but also retrospective first-person evaluations. One may look back on a period of involvement in one's own life and conclude, not that one's life is now meaningless, but that it was *then*. Indeed, the entire picture is faulty. One might as well take a puzzle to consitt merely in the sense of puzzlement it gives one (subjective reductionist thesis) and conclude that the best way to resolve it is not to think about it (anti-intellectualist conclusion). The shoe won't pinch if you don't wear it, but that doesn't show that it's the right size.

6. *The transcendence move : Nozick and the reborn American transcendentalist.* A popular means of trying to resolve 'the meaning of life' problem, which can avoid the shoals of subjectivism but often not of individualism,[44] is through some form of self-transcendence. It is argued that a life has whatever meaning it does have through union with, absorption in, or participation in, some larger whole; or, conversely, that lives are meaningless because of the impossibility of such union or participation. Of course, not every larger whole will do for this purpose; it is typically assumed that the whole itself have meaning and be capable of transmitting that meaning downwards. Such views are not uncommonly associated with religious or mystical positions, but secular versions are available, and Nozick's work (N, chp. 6) is a striking recent example of the latter.

The transcendentalist 'solution' seems most effective when the problem has been set up—illegitimately, as we 've seen—by means of the galactic dwarfing argument. If the problem arises simply because, when viewed against a cosmic background, all activity seems dwarfed to insignificance, then the problem is removed if it can be shown that the cosmic background (or some even broader, more all-embracing, background), so far from revealing insignificance of life, actually imbues it with meaning. The transcendentalist approach operates by throwing the galactic dwarfing argument into reverse. Nozick sets up the problem primarily in terms of the dwarfing argument (N, pp. 597-98) which he generalizes into the principle that, in general, a wider standpoint always undercuts the meaning which a narrower standpoint might have, and 'it seems we always can conceive a context wide enough so that the thing appears insignificant' (N, p.604). (It is significant that for Nozick the dwarfing background does not have to be actual, but merely conceivable, in order to remove meaning from narrowed concerns.)

For Nozick 'the problem of meaning is created by limits' (N, p. 595, p. 599). 'The narrower the limits of a life, the less meaningful it is' (N, p. 594). Accordingly, meaning is to be found by transcending limits. Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear what is meant by limits, nor what it is to transcend them. There is a suggestion, in Nozick's discussion of personal relationships (N, p. 595), that to be limited in this case is to be insufficiently open or trusting with another person. But, in general, it seems that to be limited is 'to exclude something' (N, p. 600), not, as might be expected, in the sense being incapable of undertaking some task or of cutting off some possible further development, but simply to be less than all-encompassing. One is limited 'by being just this, by being merely this' (N, p.595). Hence the extraordinary claim that to see something's limits, to see it as that particular thing or enterprise, is to question its meaning' (N p. 597). Now, in ordinary usage, to see something as limited may, indeed, be to question its meaning (or importance or value)—though it is difficult to concede that this is always so—for to see it as limited is to see it as falling short of the grandeur or more important thing it might have been. But if 'to see it as limited' means, as it does with Nozick, to see it as itself and not another thing, then there seems no reason to suppose that this involves questioning its meaning (unless, perhaps, one had previously supposed it to be a much more significant thing than it actually was). One can see one's child or one's friend as the particular person they are without in any way coming to question their meaning, and in this case it seems unlikely that even seeing them as limited (in the usual sense) would lead one to question their meaning unless their limitations were particularly catastrophic.

Yet, Nozick plainly needs to use 'limit' in his special wide sense. For if to be limited was merely to fail to live up to one's promise, to fail to achieve all that one might achieve, to have deficiencies in skill, intellect, physical

prowess, or whatever; then the way to overcome those limits, and thus to achieve a more meaningful life, would be through a successful attempt to do better. But this would remove the need for Nozick's romantic notion of transcendence to the Unlimited (one feels the need for nineteenth-century capitaís). It is only if the problem of meaning is generated for an item by the fact that that item is merely itself, one thing among many, and not all-encompassing, that the heroic measures of Nozick's transcendentalism are required.

Even supposing that problems of meaning are produced by limits in Nozick's sense, there seems no good reason to suppose that meaning can only be achieved by transcending those limits. Given that life is limited, it may well be that the meaningful life consists in living well within them. Such views are not without advocates, e.g. Stephen's now trite comparison of life to a game, the good life being one which was played well without breaking the rules.[45] While such views take on a deplorably conservative aspect when the recognized limits include class and other socio-environmental constraints or are purely conventional (as is generally the case with games), if the limits in question are simply those of being a biological organism, doing the best one can *within* the limits is not an unsatisfactory procedure. While Nozick is not unaware of this damaging alternative to his postion (N, p. 596), he does little directly to show that it is unviable.

If an item's limitations are simply the result of its being the item that it is, the prospect of any genuine transcendence of those limits, of becoming literally a different item, is removed. The best we can hope for is some sort of surrogate transcendence sufficient to invest out lives with meaning. This is to be achieved, according to Nozick, by linkages or connections to items outside the self (N, p. 595). Unfortunately, it is not clear what linkages or connections are admissible for this purpose. There is a repeated suggestion in Nozick that the *more* such linkages one's life has the more meaningful it becomes (N, p. 597). But, clearly, simple *quantity* of connections is not to the point: every physical item, for example, has spatio-temporal linkages to every other physical item; if sheer number of connections were all that is required for importance, all physical items would be very important indeed. Obviously, the nature of the connections must be more important than their sheer number. Nozick acknowledges that not 'all ways of connecting need be of interest' (N, p. 601), but offers little by way of an answer to the question '*which* ways of connecting are of interest?' At one point, it seems that Nozick places special emphasis on thought, thereby assigning contemplation (and philosophy) a peak position in the range of human activities (N, p. 598). The main reason for this, however, seems to be the wide range of items with which one can be connected through thought: 'Via thought, we can be linked to anything and everything' (N, p. 598). While thought is undoubtedly (in some cases) an important activity, the range of its objects has little to do with its importance. It is not at all clear that we would assign greater significance to the life of a dilettante, who thought (ineffectively, let us suppose) about a wide range of items, than to that of a specialist, who made profound and beautiful discoveries in a comparatively limited area. If we consider the case of a bed-ridden philosopher, who spends his life reviewing a wide range of objects and activities, lamenting bitterly in each case his inability to understand, appreciate, experience or take part in them, the picture that emerges is not one of a very meaningful life.

Elsewhere Nozick suggests that 'taking account of' is the required form of linkage; again those activities which require one to take account of more items are treated as the more meaningful (N, p. 597). For this reason, it is claimed, the craftsman's work if more meaningful than that of the assembly line worker: the craftsman 'must take account of more than the assembly line worker' (N, p. 597). But, first, it is by no means clear that the craftsman must take account of more, for the assembly line worker must (in some sense) take account of, maybe, several hundred people, who work in his factory, and with whom he, one way or another, comes into contact; and maybe of several hundred duplicated parts, each of which has to be fiitted to the product being assembled in a day's labour. Secondly, and more important, Nozick's account of why the craftsman's work, if more meaningful (characteristically), leaves out entirely the social condition of exploitation and alienation (diagnosed by Marx and others) under which the industrial worker labours, and the routinized and repetitious nature of his work which typically leaves little room for the exercise of his skills. Indeed, if the number of things taken into account is all that matters, a life spent counting grains of sand on a beach would likely prove more meaningful than that of either the industrial worker or the craftsman.

In the end, Nozick's attempts to find meaning through linkages to large numbers of things get replaced by an attempt to secure meaning through linkage to one all-encompassing thing. As we have already noted, Nozick maintains that meaning can, in general, be undercut when attention is shifted from a narrower to a wider context, and that to effect this shift does not require an actual wider context, but merely a conceivable one. Thus the meaning of the entire universe will be undercut if a broader framework is conceived, a framework which includes unrealized possibilites. This process of undercutting can be brought to a stop only by the supposition of some framework which cannot itself be undercut. This framework (for which Nozick adopts the Hebrew term 'Ein Sof') will have to include not just all that is actual, but all possibilities as well. (In this and much else it resembles Bradley's Absolute and so also the supreme spirit of various idealisms and religions.) The apparent need for 'Ein Sof', however, arises only from the false undercutting principle and its associate, the view that meaning can only be achieved through transcendence to some wider framework. What remains to be shown is that, even if the meaning problem is generated in these ways, 'Ein Sof' can do nothing to alleviate it. So Nozick's account must be considered a failure in its own terms.

If it is true that meaning can only be acquired through a transcendence of limits to some broader framework, then, since 'Ein Sof' has no broader framework, 'Ein Sof itself must be without meaning. On the other hand, if, as Nozick also requires, meaning can only be acquired when the broader framework which is reached through transcendence itself has meaning, then Ein Sof can only secure meaning at narrower levels if it is meaningful itself. Since Ein Sof fails the first condition for meaningfulness, everything else will fail the second. Nozick wrestles with this problem but comes to no very satisfactory conclusion. That Ein Sof fails the first condition does not imply that Ein Sof is meaningless, but rather that the category of meaning simply doesn't apply to it. Since meaning presupposes a wider framework, the absence of such a framework in the case of Ein Sof results in Ein Sof's being neither meaningful nor meaningless (N, p. 601). But this offers scarcely more assurance for Nozick's picture than the claim that Ein Sof is meaningless. If meaning is to flow downwards, from broad to narrow, there seems as little reason to suppose that it will flow from an item which is neither meaningful nor meaningless, than to suppose it will flow from one which is meaningless. Certainly, if the category of meaning doesn't apply to Ein Sof, there is no more reason to suppose that meaning will flow from it than to suppose that meaninglessness will flow from it. In short, attempts to save Nozick's position by amending the second condition on meaning to exclude Ein Sof do not look at all promising.

Instead, Nozick works on an amendment to the first condition (N, pp. 602-03). It is necessary (though not, as we shall see, sufficient) for the success of Nozick's account that he be able to show that Ein Sof has meaning. But his arguments for this are prefunctory at best. His first argument relies upon an analogy with infinite sets:

> Only an infinite set can be mapped onto a proper subset of itself, and only an unlimited being can include itself as a part, only an infinite being can embed itself. Consider mapping as a kind of connection; only an unlimited being can map onto and so connect with something apparently larger and external which turns o ut to be itself. Only an unlimited being can have its "wider" context by itself, and so be its own meaning (N, p. 603).

This is an attempt to have your cake and eat it too. The analogy on which the argument depends is hardly satisfactory, especially since the sort of mapping (or connection) required for the transmission of meaning is unclear. However, if the analogy with the infinite number sets is any good, what it should show is that an unlimited or infinite being will not be unique and, more important, there can be no largest such being; for (paradoxical sets excluded) there is no largest set or number. But Nozick's attempts to ground meaning in Ein Sof will not work, if there are numerous Ein Sofs ascending in an endless heirarchy, as, e.g. in the orthodox cumulative hierarchy.

Nozick's second argument restricts the first condition on meaning in such a way as to exclude unlimited beings: 'Meaning involves external connections *because* for a limited and finite being, meaning involves transcending limits' (N, p. 603). But this leaves us either with the conclusion that the term 'meaning' cannot significantly be applied to unlimited or infinite beings, or else with the task of specifying what meaning involves for infinite and unlimited beings. The furtherest that Nozick goes towards the latter is to claim that the meaning relation should be specified, so as to yield the result that only Ein Sof stands in the meaning relation to itself (N, pp. 602-03 n;). This is the mere self-serving stipulation, and, if it works for Ein Sof, it can be made to work for less inclusive items.

In this third argument, Nozick abandons the attempt to show that meaning flows down from Ein Sof, which provides its own meaning, in favour of arguments designed to show that an item only comes to seem meaningless when it is placed in a larger context. Since there is no wider context for Ein Sof, it never comes to seem meaningless, the question of its meaninglessness never arises (N, pp. 603-04). Even if these arguments were sound, they would not suffice to show that Ein Sof has meaning, a conclusion which does not follow from the supposed fact that it is not meaningless. Nor from the supposed fact that it never comes to *seem* meaningless does it follow that it is not meaningless. Nor, just because meaning can be undercut by a wider context, does it follow that meaning can be derived from a wider context. However, Nozick's arguments are not sound, but are based upon strongly counter-intuitive principles. He starts, reasonably enough, with the claim that 'the typical way to place the meaning of something in question is to discover another standpoint from which it is not meaningful, valuable, or important' (N, p. 603). He then goes on to draw attention to two alleged features of such standpoints: (*a*) they are never narrower than the original item whose meaning is placed in question; and (*b*) they are never disjoint from it. The non-disjointness condition will be discussed later in connection with the relations which transmit meaning, Nozick supports the first condition by examples: 'We do not ask what the importance of our life is for this particular hour, or for these cells it includes. The question always goes in the other direction, toward the wider thing: what is the importance of this hour or of these five cells for my life as a whole' (N, p. 604). But the examples show little. Which way the question goes surely depends upon where we locate value—in the wider or the narrower thing. Thus the individualist may inquire as to the importance or value of the state for the individual;[46] and the human chauvinist inquires into the importance or value of the ecosystem for humans who form only a part of it. Nozick himself later admits that the value of a process may be explained through its having valuable parts, a situation which could not occur if the value of the parts were derived entirely from that of the whole (N, p. 616). In fact, Nozick's entire picture of meaning, as something that can only be derived or undercut from what is wider, or even from what is external,

is seriously mistaken. There are alternative answers even within the transcendentalist camp; for example, Emerson's view that 'the purpose of life seems to be to acquaint a man with himself' for 'the highest revelation is that God is in every man' (a result obtained apparently by mapping the universe onto man).[47] There is much wrong with Emerson's account, but it does reveal that even a transcendentalist does not have to buy Nozick's version.

Even if we grant that Ein Sof is meaningful of itself, without reference to anything external to it, why suppose that it can convey meaning downward, or at least downwad far enough to provide meaning for lives? In the first place, the appropriate relations for the transmission of meaning have to be specified. For this purpose Nozick considers identity (N, p. 606). This would clearly be sufficient, but the Mystical identity of each life with Ein Sof faces enormous obstacles and, after a short discussion, Nozick abandons it. Nozick clearly favours the part-whole relation for the task (N, p. 602): the parts acquire meaning through being parts of a meaningful whole. The trouble is that the part-whole relation does not transmit meaning in this way: not all parts of meaningful things and processes are themselves meaningful. A life, in particular, may be meaningful, though it contains meaningless periods. The same goes, of course, for the transmission of value. Moreover, even if the part-whole relation did transmit value or meaning downwards, there seems no guarantee that any, or enough, will filter downwards to individual lives. Our lives may remain meaningless, because we are simply too far away from Ein Sof to get enough.

Finally, even if we grant that sufficient meaning can trickle down from Ein Sof to make our lives meaningful, the outcome is totally undiscriminating. Since all lives are equally part of Ein Sof, all will receive equal meaning. Not only that, but if meaning can travel that far it can presumably travel further: to each cell in our bodies and every atom in the universe. Each is a part of Ein Sof. It turns out, in fact, that there could be no meaningless events or things in the universe. Like the Spaniards in their search for gold, we, having searched so far for meaning, have returned with such quantities of it as to completely undermine the currency. In fact, things are far worse than this, for Ein Sof is to include, not just all actualities, but all possibilities as well. Not only are there no meaningless events in the universe, but none are conceivable either. Imagine a life as meaningless as you like; consisting entirely of alternating periods of impotent rage and apathy; that of a character from a play by Beckett, only worse. Since such a life is conceivable, it is a part of Ein Sof, and thus is as meaningful as anyone else's. This result has nothing to do with the supposed features of the life, to conceive a life as meaningless is to ensure that it has meaning. The concept of meaninglessness has become incoherent on Nozick's account, and that of meaninglessness correspondingly either incoherent too, or else vacuous.

7. *The problem is often not an individual (subjective) one but a social one.* There has been a concerned attempt by many, both from within and from outside the transcendentalist camp, who properly admit that some lives have more meaning than others, to render the problem of comparative meaninglessness of some lives a purely individual matter, having little or nothing to do with the socio-environmental framework within which individuals are cast or stuck. This resembles the attempt to write off even such bad news as increasing cancer as due to individual life-styles, and as having little or nothing to do with industrial pollution (often generated in the interests of only a few among us), the attempt to pretend, Pogo-wise, that the problem lies in each of us individually, when the problem, like environment problems, is very different from one that succumbs to such simple individual reduction.

Solomon, for example, like Bach, attempts to *restrict* the problem of meaning in a life and its setting to an individualistic one, and, accordingly, seeks an individualistic way out. The problem is always *oneself*, never a socio-environmental one.[48] Thus, says, Solomon: 'We must change ourselves before we change society; and we must understand ourselves in order to change' (S, p. 8); and again 'because these [our] inadequacies are self-imposed, the corrective for them must begin with self-recognition' (S, p. 416). This is a distortion, unfortunately, since the individualistic paradigm is pervasive, a very widespread misrepresentation of the matter, as examples help reveal. Consider, for example, primitive peoples whose life-styles are entirely disrupted by Western industrial activity, e.g. the Dyaks by logging of the forests upon which they depend and by destruction of their longhouses. Their lives are changed, and sometimes rendered rather pointless (especially in comparison to what might have been), through no fault of thir own, but owing to intervention from outside. Their subsequent inadequacies are not self-imposed, and the changes that are called for are not in themselves, but rather in Western attitudes (e.g. to the natural world and alternative cultures) and the socio-economic structures that reflect these attitudes. Where change is needed in such cases is in the structures, not in the individuals affected who are largely victims of the framework. So it is also, though showing it requires a little more work, with many very poor or otherswise socially disadvantaged people, not only in the less developed countries, but also in the developed countries, such as the USA. Peoples' lives are sometimes rendered relatively pointless by factors largely beyond their control, of their social environment, certainly not self-imposed factors.

Nor will Solomon's analysis do even for those who can afford to buy his book: 'Our passions constitute our lives. It is our passions, and our passions alone, that provide our lives with meaning' (S. p. xvi, also a back cover theme). Not only is this erroneously individualistic at back ('one's own passions'; for each individual x, x's emotions....); it also involves, like Taylor's account, an attempt to internalize value, and further to reduce value (which is what gives point) naturalistically to a matter of the motions (cf. the

reduction of desirability to desire). There are other objections too to such an analysis. For example, reasoning and the search for truth and understanding at least help to provide some lives with meaning. Solomon would try to include all these matters, not all of which are simply emotions, under the passions, e.g. 'there is no ultimate distinction between reason and passion' (S, p. 7). He is thus operating with, and requires for several of his theses, an unacceptably low redefinition of 'passion'.

The end-result is not the same as Taylor's, since on Solomon's analysis some lives can have more meaning, more (worthwhile?) passions, than others, but the case on which it rests is defective in the same sort of way as Taylor's.[49] The result of a project, for example, is not a passion (short of a serious category mistake), but it may help endow a life with point. Value cannot be internalized in this simple way, or reduced to a matter of individual emotions.

On the other hand, the individual does not drop out of the account either, as some Marxist approaches claim. Although favourable socio-environmental conditions are important in obtaining a positively meaningful life (and even necessary for it, except perhaps for exceptional creatures), they are *not* sufficient. A creature may live in a society where the quality of life is high, in the sense that the *conditions* for the satisfaction of needs (for happiness, for a good life) are adequately met, but still live a rather meaningless life: not because it simply fails (through ill-luck, or apathy) to take advantage of the opportunities the society provides for meaningful activity. Thus even a high quality of life is not sufficient for a positively meaningful life (though a modest quality of life may be in general necessary for such a life, to adapt Aristotle).

8. *The incoherence objection to internalist accounts, and Wiggins' attempt to escape non-cognitivism.* Wiggins lodges a general, and if correct, important and decisive, incoherence objection to all internalist accounts of the meaning of life, such as Taylor's and Solomon's—accounts he calls not unreasonably (though the accompanying characterization is inadequate), *non-cognitivist*. The objection is:

> ....the non-cognitive account depends....upon abandons at the level of theory that inner perspective which it commends as the only possible perspective upon life's meaning. This is a kind of incoherence; and one which casts some doubt on the....supposed distinction of the inner or participative and the outer, supposedly objective, viewpoints (W, p. 340).[50]

Wiggins has three shots at explaining this incoherence, none thoroughly successful. The most elaboration of the crucial point is this:

> ....for the purposes of the validation of any human concern, the non-cognitive view [theory] must always readdress the problem to the inner perspective *without itself adopting that perspective*. It cannot adopt the inner perspective because [on the theory] the inner view has to be unaware of the outer one, and has to enjoy essentially illusory notions of objectivity, importance, and significance whereas what the outer view has to hold is that life is objectively meaningless. The noncognitivist mitigates the outrageousness of so categorical a denial of meaning by pointing to the availability of the participant perspective. But the most he can do is point. Otherwise the theorist will be engulfed by a view which he must maintain to be false (W, p. 342).

Put differently, were the internalist to express her position in due detail it would (like many other philosophical position) be self-refuting. It appears, however, that the internalist can draw the familiar (if dubious) object/meta distinction (which other considerations very likely drive here towards), and defeat the objection by contending that the theory is at a meta-level, and so does not have to adopt either the inner or outer object perspectives. Thus Wiggins' objection needs to be underpinned—by what is really required, since use of the distinction ultimately does involve cheating, but what takes more work to sustain—a critique of the object/meta distinction, or at least its use in such cases to avoid incoherence. To see the force of this, compare underwriting an inconsistent logic by a consistent metalogic, of a non-classical theory by a classical metatheory, etc. Ultimately, such strategies *are* unsatisfactory, and involve a *double standard*—acceptance at the meta and higher levels of what is rejected at the object level, and so should (if the object theory *is* taken *seriously*) be rejected at all levels.

Similar underpinning is required for Wiggins' other shots: namely, that, second, the inner perspective supplies experience which implies abandonment in the theory of that perspective (cf. W, p. 346), and that, third, 'the theory ...is untrue to the actual experience of object-directed states which are the starting-point of that theory' (W, p. 348).

Wiggins' own attempt to cast light on 'the meaning of life' problem has important similarities with our own positive account (to be outlined in the next section, though already anticipated in several respects).[51] He rejects the view that there is some one thing, in the world or in ourselves, which could count as *the* meaning of life (W, p. 376-77). That is, he rejects (as we do), a monistic account of the meaning of life, in both its naturalist and inter-naturalist forms. But the pluralist account he gives differs from ours in the rather surprising and artificial distinction it urges between values and point and in what *seems* to be a retreat *toward* subjectivism with regard to the latter. Unless strong connections are preserved between point and value, it will be impossible to avoid decidedly counter-intuitive results: highly valuable lives might nevertheless be pointless, and it would always be legitimate to say: 'Clearly, x's life was one of great value, but what was the point of it?' Surely,

however, to understand that activity is valuable is to understand that there is some point in doing it. Wiggins seems to admit as much when he attributes the failure of naturalist theories of value to the failure to discover something in nature which the vast majority of people 'could find reason to invest with any overwhelming *importance*' (W, p. 375).

On Wiggins' theory (W, p. 272-3), valuational predicates stand for properties in a world, properties which 'impinge upon practical appreciation and judgement'. Ascriptions of such predicates are truth-valued, and thus valuational judgements have truth-values. As regards ascriptions of value, therefore, Wiggins' theory is cognitivist. Ascriptions of point or meaning, however, are 'cognitively underdetermined', by which Wiggins means that 'the world impinge[s] upon but [does not] determine the point possessed by individual lives' (W, p. 378). 'Individual human lives can have more point or less in a manner partially dependent upon the disposition in the world of [the] value properties' (W, p. 372). But this disposition of value properties does not *determine* the point a life has, because 'life's having a point may depend as much upon something invented (not necessarily *arbitrarily*), or upon something contributed by the liver of the life, as it depends upon something discovered' (W, p. 373). A meaning for life is thus, in part, invented and 'whereas discovery is answerable to truth, what involves invention is not' (W, p. 369).[52] Thus ascriptions of meanings to lives are not truth-valued (as ascriptions of value are).

Now, the two claims (*a*) that meanings for lives are invented (by the livers) and (*b*) that invention is not 'answerable' to truth are the two defining features Wiggins gives of non-cognitivism (W, p. 369). Where Wiggins' cognitive underdetermination position differs is in the claim that meanings for lives are not *completely* invented, but depend in part on the disposition of value properties in the world. Is this enough? It seems very doubtful. Unfortunately, Wiggins does not give any recipes for combining the two parts. Would a creature, for which the distribution of value properties was particularly bad, nonetheless be able to *give* itself a meaningful life (as distinct from deluding itself into *believing* that is *had* one) by an appropriate invention? On the other hand, would a creature for which the distribution of value properties was especially propitious have nonetheless to resort to invention in order to obtain a meaningful life? If not, then wouldn't the ascription of a meaninful life to that creature have a truth-value, contra Wiggins? If it would still have to invent a meaning for its life, then what does this requirement amount to if not the (subjectivist) requirement that to be meaingful a life must seem to the liver to be meaningful, that concerning the meaning of life 'the final authority must be the man himself', as Wiggins says apropos Aldous Huxley's non-cognitivism (W, p. 369) ? This subjectivist strain in Wiggins' account is emphasized by his use of the word 'discovery': 'Life's having a point may depend as much upon something invented....as it depends upon something discovered' (W, p. 773). The implication is that even a favourable distribution

of value properties cannot help to impart meaning to life *unless* the distribution is *discovered* by the liver. Yet it seems quite possible for someone to live a highly meaningful life which nonetheless appears to the liver to be entirely meaningless. Such, e.g. was Tolstoy's later evaluation of the period of his life in which he wrote his great novels. It is not implausible to claim that he was simply wrong.

Subjectivism is given further rein by Wiggins' failure to impose adequate constraints on the degree and scope of invention which may be necessary to impart (*a sense of*) meaning to life. Wiggins does claim, reasonably enough, that the invention is not necessarily arbitrary, but this is nowhere near strong enough. One form of invention which may be *thought* to imbue life with meaning is the invention of a cosmic backdrop or myth in which one's activities (or certain of them) take on extra significance. But surely the key point in considering whether this actually *makes* life meaningful, as distinct from making it *appear* meaningful, is precisely a matter of whether the invention fits the facts (and that makes the judgement about the point of that life a truth-valued judgement). Clearly, highly inventive individuals may suffer from messianic delusions which make their lives *appear to them* highly meaningful. Again, a schizophrenic, who spends much of her life in a catatonic stupor and believes she's the Virgin Mary and Cliff Richard's wife (to take a case from Laing and Esterson[53]), may gain from her beliefs a *sense* of meaning, which is not to say that, her life *in fact*, is meaningful. At less extreme levels, Walter Mitty's absurd sense of self-importance does not in any way diminish the essential pointlessness of his life. Properly constrained the required degree of invention diminishes to zero.

The subjectivist cast of much of Wiggin's position is reinforced by his (brief) account of what it is to find meaning. To find meaning, we 'interest ourselves afresh in what everybody knows about—the set of concerns he actually has, their objects, and the focus he has formed or seeks to bring to bear upon these: also the prospects of purifying, redeploying or extending this set' (W p. 377).[54] By this stage (near the end of his paper) the problematic distribution of value properties in the world has dropped out of view, and no reference is made to whether a creature's concerns and the objects produced as a result of them are valuable or not. Moreover, since virtually every creature has concerns of some sort, meaning is distributed uniformly, though not to uniform degree, at least across those creatures which 'interest' themselves in their own concerns. Meaning has again been trivialized.

§ 9. *Towards a More positive account of the Meanings of life.* As we have seen, even in putting the question 'what is *the* meaning of life?' we are liable to go wrong. It is better to ask instead 'When does a life have meaning?' A start on answering this question can be made by simply assembling differences, already brought out, from Taylor's account. His conclusion has been summed up (somewhat inaccurately) as follows. [Taylor] 'asks whether

our lives have any more meaning than [the unobsessed Sisyphus's did]; he says they do, but not in that we produce anythig the existence of which gives our lives meaning, but only in that the tasks we take on for ourselves are tasks we choose for ourselves and want to carry out—this itself makes the difference'[55] Firstly, some lives do have meaning—and not merely subjective meaning—in part at least because of what they produce. And very many lives have a meaning in part in virtue of what they are, goal-directed enterprises, with worthwhile goals *or* the opposite. Secondly, some lives which do satisfy the choice and desire requirements have comparatively little or no point. A life devoted entirely to c[ricket], for example, could have this character, in contrast to a life like that of Antisthenes or Gandhi. Suppose C is not a top-class c[ricketer], and 'contributes nothing to the game' but is enthralled by c[ricket], wants to and chooses to do nothing except what involves c[ricket], devotes all his waking life to c[ricket]: he watches it, plays it, reads about and converses about it, and does little else. In one sense, his life has a point, an objective, namely, to be always c[ricket]ing. But in the intended sense of point, meaning, it does not. Many everyday human lives are not so very different but are largely humdrum, much of all of them consisting of c-ing in one form or another.[56] For connected reasons the fact that someone finds point in her life, or thinks she does, does not show that it has point.[57] Subjective impressions do not always sustain non-subjective claims.

The object, then, is to explain when, how, and why a particular creatures' life has or may have point, *not* to try to show, what appears accordingly to be an illusory and mistaken aim, that every life has point. In order to provide such explanation, it is important to introduce some mostly neglected distinctions, gradually infiltrated into the preceding text and now indicated in the following table:

Range/ Item	*Negative*	*Zero*	*Positive* *valuable boundary*[58] ↵
Activity (Process)	has [evil] point	has no point is pointless	has [good] point
Product	has [negative]	has no worth	has [positive] worth,
(Small) Periods	is [negatively] meaningful	is meaningless	is [positively] meaningful
Life (Overall)	is overall [negatively] meaningful, has overall [negative] worth	is overall meaningless *or* no overall [neutral] worth	is overall [positively] meaningful, has overall [positive] worth

The table gives only absolute statements: there will also be comparative statements, and so on, e.g. 'is highly meaningful', 'is more meaningful than,'

etc. In the table *activity* is construed widely to include active concerns: thus concerns and preoccupations in so far as they are reflected in activities and products are duly taken into account.

Much work in value theory, on the alleged virtues of personhood as well as on the meaning of life, neglects the evident fact that activities and products (of a person, for example) may contribute to the growth of evil, may be of negative value or have negative outcome. Likewise often forgotten is the problem of the connection between a life (which may also be evil, despite 'the best of intentions') and its activities and products. A life normally stretches out over time, and so involves very many activities and often many productions. Its overall significance depends on both its processes and products, that is, it is a function (a certain sort onsigned and *weighted* sum, so it will turn out) of the positive *and* negative rankings of both its activities *and* its products. Because negatively ranked processes and products can cancel out positive accomplishments, a creature can have an *eventful* life, with much point in it, of no overall worth. Thus *two* quite different routes can lead to overall worthlessness of a life (in the first, the activities and products lack positive or negative value; in the second, those of negative value cancel those of positive value)—an awkward complication that deserves further exploration.

At a first approximation, life consists of periods, is a summation of periods, and such period will also have, or lack, significance; a meaningful life can, for instance, contain meaningless periods. But a life which contains no meaningless periods will not be meaningless if positive periods cancel out negative ones; in that case it will be meaningful, but with neutral overall worth. A life will be meaningless overall only, if sufficient periods of it are meaningless; and such periods will be meaningless, if they are dominated by zero ranking activities and products. As we have argued, some lives are of this sort, are straightforwardly meaningless, while others are not but have point. A creature's life has meaning in proportion as that creature engages in pointful activities and perhaps sometimes produces in these activities pointful products, and *More* point in so far as it does more of these things. There is thus only one route to a meaningless life.

To be more explicit about some of the recipes that are starting to emerge: the significance of a (small) period of a life is a matter of the activities and products of that period; and the procedure in assessing significance may be likened to that of a cost-benefit analysis. In terms of the results *two* further assessments can be made—the overall worth of a life, and the overall meaningfulness of a life. The first *is* the (signed, and perhaps weighted) sum of the results for the periods of the life. (This is the assessment of the 'meaning' of a life built even into colloquial discourse, where the question 'What meaning has *a*'s life had?' can often be interchanged with 'What does *a*'s life add up to?') A life's meaningfulness is also determined by what components of it sum up to, though here negative periods do not cancel out positive ones. The second assessment may differ from the first, especially

where a neutral worth outcome emerges owing to the cancelling out of positive negative results or there a life has some periods (e.g. in childhood as in the case of Tolstoy's Ivan Illych) which are meaningful but is dominated by meaningless periods.

The procedure indicated cannot be reversed and the ranking of an activity determined by the ranking of the life concerned (as Wiggins supposes it can, m, pp. 374-75; indeed, he erroneously claims that it is the only procedure open to the cognitivist!). For it would in general require an unscrambling of the negative elements that belong to periods of almost any life; but in this process rankings the elements are already presupposed.

Representing a life as a series of periods is messier and less illuminating than presenting it in terms of the moments that matter for the assessment of significance. For the representation in terms of periods involves both a further analysis in terms effectively of such moments—processes and products —that matter, and a double summation (both that already compared with a cost-benefit analysis, and then a further summation of an analogous sort) where a single sum should suffice. These moments, which are moments (perhaps of quite long duration) of notable deviation from the base line of day-to-day undistinguished humdrum living, in directions which may be either positive or negative (above or below the base line), we shall call *notabilia*. The initial graph of life (or a segment of a life) is accordingly like a wave line produced in an oscilloscope, and takes the following schematic form:



The graph represents the life (or segment of the life) of a creature x plotted over time, and depicts notabilia in (or of) that life. We can imagine such a graph produced by an electronic device, what we call a *diaitascope* (following the Green (Siaita for *way of life*), which takes as input details of creatures's lives (one at a time, say) and processes these, through a system of operations, into graph form. For the present we treat diaitscopes as devices, of a rather blackboxish type (the inner processes of not being presented), for producing life graphs.

It should be noted that the technical term 'notabilium' has been chosen in order to avoid linkages which migh suggest the assimilation of our account to other axiological accounts which typically provide too narrow a basis for the assessment of a life's value or meanig. Thus notabilia are not to be identified with periods of pleasure or pain as they would be on hedonist utilitarianism. Nor are they necessarily associated with periods of heoric activity or other special contributions on the one hand, nor with periods of contemplation, mystic illumination or personal 'growth' on the other. Any of these may contribute to a notabilium, but none of them are necessary.

Elaborating the oscilloscope comparison leads to a more sophisticated graphic representation of meaning of life assessments. For both the base line and the shape of the graph depend on the socioenvironmental circumstances of x's life. Change these circumstances, change, that is, the situation or world involved, and the graph will change. The device we are envisaging for generating life graphs may be programmed to take into account such alternative socio-environmental circumstances. Taking account of certain (limited) variations of this sort is standard practice in sociology where equations are redeployed (and programme run again) using different constants which allow for different incomes, education levels, etc. Sophisticated diaitascopes will do at least as much: they will have a *world switch* or (conintuous) control, which enables x's life to be graphed in worlds different from the actual one. Thus a sophisticated diaitascope enables us to see not only what x's life is and has been like in terms of notabilia, but also what it *could* have been like in alternative situations. These matters, which are often more or less determinable, are important in assessing such things as x's (Moral) *worth* as a creature, as well as indicating, of course, how socio-environmental arrangements may be changed so in particular that more creatures lead meaningfu lives.

In order, however, to make interworld and also intercreature comparisons, at least some standard of comparison between base lines is required (as well as, what is likewise far from trivially determined, a common scale). This can be achieved by having the screen of the diaitascope marked with a *zero-value* line, the same for each world.[59] The base line of a creature x whose social situation is seriously deprived may well fall below the zero-value (or real) line, as is shown in the following sketch of a super-sophisticated diaitascope:



In real terms x's life is one of negative worth, since even its positive notabilia lie below the zero-line, though as seen from x's base line (still *not* how x may view it) the life contains significant positive and negative moments. The *super* (sophisticated diaita) *scope* will have controls, which enable the regraphing of x's life, to show, for instance, how it would have been, had circumstances been more propitious. The worlds resetting control (and much less revealingly the vertical shift, which can include a zero-basing setting) facilitates this, with an associated dial printing out the changes involved in a given world shift.

A superscope will have several additional features, some of them fairly trivial and largely for technical nicety, such as horizontal and vertical scaling controls, which allow facets of the lives' of creatures to be accentuated, etc. More important, a superscope can store graphs in its memory system, and thus can upon request produce additional graphs to that, or those, showing at any given time. In this way we can, for instance, compare x's life-graph with y's, or x's graph with what her graph would have been like under other circumstances, e.g. had she lived longer, not grown up in the Sao Paulo favelas.

A superscope will have dials which separately show the positive and negative sums of the lie whose input is being considered. The positive sum is the sum (perhaps weighted) of positive notabilia of that life, the negative of negative notabilis, the sums being assessed basically in terms of areas (as given by integrals) enclosed by notabilia and perhaps weighted in terms of vertical or horizontal extent. From these sums two further innovations result, a *direct* sum comprising the sum of the positive and (signed) negative sum, and a *modulated* sum which is the positive sum less the (signed) negative sum, that is, negative memorabilia are positively assessed. The direct sum gives the relative net *worth* of the life (net worth that is relative to the individual's base line), while the modulated sum affords a measure of the *meaningfulness*, positive *or* negative, of a life. As observed, an eventful life may have a large modulated sum and a small or zero direct sum.

To obtain an assessment in real terms instead of, as hitherto, in terms of lives' base lines, a similar set of summations, but using the zero-value line as base, is required. In these assessments, components of notabilia will be accounted positive or negative according as they lie above or below the zero-value line. The summations resulting are real as opposed to base-relative sums. Base-relative lifegraphs are not to be confused with subjective lifegraphs. A *subjective* lifegraph shows how the subject whose life it is sees that life in terms of notabilia. The relativity of base-relative assessments is often minor compared with that of subjective assessments, which a superscope also depicts upon turning on the subjectivity switch. A subjective lifegraph may bear comparatively little resemblance to that of the subject's lifegraph as normally shown (i.e. when the subjectivity switch is off). As

noted, subjective assessments are generally of little use in assessing the net worth and meaningfulness of a life.

Both the separable issues of when a life is *worthwhile* and when it has *quality* (perhaps of such and such a degree) concern, of should concern, real assessments. A worthwhile life, like (what is closely associated) a life *of* quality, is one of (sufficient) real net worth. Since, put differently, if a particular life is worthwhile overall, then it has (had) real point, because it has yielded something of real net worth. A valuable life is always a meaningful one (no matter how it appears to the liver). The converse does not hold. A meaningful life is not always a *de facto* valuable one. It is not so much, or just, that *valuable* tends to suggest sufficiently or particularly meaningful as in 'making valuable contributions' (thus, e.g. the acceptable claim that x had a meaningful but not valuable life—the level of value which suffices for a valuable life is set by the valuable boundary in the table on p. 41, as that a negatively meaningful one, one full of evil processes and products, is the opposite of a valuable life. Thus, while having a valuable life, a life which contributes enough of net positive worth, is a sufficient condition for having a meaningful life, it is not a necessary one.

A separate issue is then: when is a particular life worthwhile? At a minimum it must be positively meaningful overall. It seems clear that a sufficient condition for worthwhileness is the contribution of enough of net positive worth. As before it has to be *net* worth: otherwise, an evil life which incidentally contributed something of real worth could be accounted worthwhile. The condition is, of course, not necessary for a meaningful life, else creatures that lead lives without special contributions would lead to pointless lives! For example, this would apply against many of those engaged in continuing or forstering worthwhile parts of a cultural or rural or race function; as, for instance, in raising and educating more Plumwood Mountain scrubwrens. On the other hand, special contributions of some sort are required if the life is to count as valuable.

Evidently, how ranking are assigned and weightings determined, in working out both the (degree of meaningfulness and the worthwhileness of a particular life will depend heavily on the underlying value theory adopted, and will vary with it, as the superscope will show graphically on altering the value-setting control. Lives may be assessed differently under different value systems as the diaitascope model reveals. The availability of different value systems does not, however, imply subjectivism. Indeed, a non-subjective account of value is crucial in avoiding both the shoals of reductionism and a main source of the meaning problem. Point is tied to worth, which is connected to net value, which is accounted for nonsubjectively.[60]

It is also important to remove other erroneous pictures of value, not only reductionism. One such picture is that of the explanation of value as by way of ever enlarging systems, as in certain transcendentalisms, e.g. through terrestrial ecosystems to a universal system, value being transmitted from the

larger system to the smaller: but then there is no way of explaining the meaning or value of the bigger systems, because there is nothing outside them. The picture is defective: for explanation may proceed inward also.[61] A system may be valuable because of the valuable things it contains, the valuable things some parts of it are or produce.

Another faulty picture of value is that which tries to restrict worth to human activities and products, to impose human chauvinism.[62] In a particularly glaring example of a human chauvinist approach to the problem of meaning, Edward moves immediately from the questions of whether life has meaning or value to the questions 'Is human life ever worthwhile?' and 'Does (or can) human life have any meaning?' without any argument and apparently without even realizing that the question has changed.[63] The human chauvinistic restriction exacerbates the problem often to the point of insolubility. For the usual assumption on which human chauvinism is based is that value is restricted exclusively to human actions, mental states, products or human life itself. This often takes the form of a reductionist account of value which, as already noted, serves to make a solution of the problem of the meaning of life impossible. Even without reductionism, however, the restriction values exclusively to human concerns will make questions about the value of human concerns themselves vacuous. The fact that such questions are not vacuous, but may and often are quite seriously raised and felt, is *prima facie* evidence against the human chauvinistic restrictions. In any case, on human chauvinistic assumptions, if the questions of the meaning of human life are still raised, there is very little that can be done to answer them beyond blanket assertions that all human life is valuable (or none is) and exhortations to 'invest one's life with meaning, responses already criticized above.

Yet another faulty picture of value, already criticized, is that which tries to detach value from its social connections, and to reduce all value to that of independent individuals. Such a picture has, however, played an important part in setting up the meaning problem, and in indicating wrong directions for its resolution, in particular highly individualized directions, whereas often social and political changes are what are really required. For the extent of point in a creature's life is only partly a matter under that creature's control, and in some cases a life may have reduced point or largely lack point because of social or environmental factors beyond that creature's control (including some largely uncontrollable factors such as luck, both good luck and fortune, and bad luck and tragedy). So, in particular, inducing a point, or further point, in creatures' lives is often not a matter of individual change, but of social and structural change.

Since some lives do have [a] meaning, so life has meaning.[64]

Notes

1. Undoubtedly there are linkages between meaning (or significance) as semantics and meaning as point, especially in symbolic, mythic settings; but they appear of little relevance to the philosophical problem at hand. Dilman has claimed, however, to the contrary:

   > As Wittgenstein has shown us, there are far reaching connections between what makes discourse possible [intelligible and meaningful] and what makes possible the kind of life that has a meaning, the kind of life that can lose its meaning (I. Dilman and D.Z. Phillips, *Sense and Delusion* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971) p. 7 (hearafter page references prefixed by 'S & D' are to this work).

   But the argument, where correct, only show certain parallels.

   Much of what strength Dilman's repeated comparison of the meaning of life, of a life, with the meaning of discourse, of a word, has, derives from an unwarranted anthropocentrism: thus, for example, the first move of restricting the question of meaning to that of human life and insisting that [human] life is *not even conceivable* in the absence of...language (S & D, p. 7) and the related strategy, backed up by appeal to Wittgenstein, of tying intentionality, and so meaning, to the mastery of language, which only humans are taken to have. The inadequacy of such strategies is explained in detail in R. Routley, 'Alleged problems in Attributing Beliefs, and Intentionality, to Animals, *Inquiry*, 24 (1981), 385-417.

   Dilman's later moves point out that the comparison holds good for such notions associated with meaning as that of *understanding and failing to understand*: just as we speak of understanding a word so we speak of understanding a person's actions. But the comparison is again severely limited: it does not sustain what Dilman proceeds to, that having no purpose and interest..and having nothing to say —these go together (p. 9). These are neither necessary nor sufficient for each other.
2. This Russellian point, that in even putting such a question as What is *the* meaning of life? We are liable to go wrong, is spectacularly developed by D. Wiggins in his important article Truth, Invention and the Meaning of Life. *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 62 (1976), 331-378 (henceforth W):

   > We bewitch ourselves to think that we are looking for some one thing like the Garden of Hesperides, the Holy Grail...Then finding nothing like that in the world, no one thing from which all values can be derived and no one focus by which all other concerns can be organised, we console ourselves by looking inwards, but again for some one substitute thing, one thing in us not instead of the world. Of course if the search is conducted in this way it is more or less inevitable that one consolation will be *dignity* or *nobility* or *commitment:* or more spectactorially *irony, resignation, scorn*...(W, p. 377).
3. As it may be, like other forms of soepticism: see Part II.
4. T. Nagel, 'The Absurd' in E.D. Klemke (ed.) *The Meaning of Life* (Oxford: Oxford, University press 1981).
5. Whether explanation must always give out, or may at some stage terminate or become self-elucidatory or else invert (outward proceeding explanation giving way to explanation from within), thus breaking the apparent regress, is another question, considered in a preliminary way in R. Nozick, *Philosophical Explanation* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1981) (henceforth N) and in R. Routley, Light on the Why Does Anything Exist? Question?' typescript, Australian National University, 1980.

A clever resolution of the explanation puzzle, in terms of a distinction (ultimately unsustainable) between unvexing explanation and model-explanation, is proposed by K. Baier, *The Meaning of Life*, Commonwealth Government Printer, 1957 (hereafter KB) : see especially p. 11ff. Baier's paper and several others cited have recently been republished in E.D. Klemke (ed.), *The Meaning of Life* (Oxford; Oxford university Press 1981).

For one example of the conflation of *value* questions with *explanation* questions, see K. Britton, *Philosophy and the Meaning of Life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1979) (hereafter Br), chapter 1. The meaning-of-life literature is rich in such examples.

6. Presumably these distinctions may be confirmed, in the course thereof sharpened, by descriptions of appropriate worlds.
7. The rejection can be independently argued for, as for instance in R. Routley, *Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond*, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1979 (hereafter referred to as EMJB), chapter 9, where, too, referential reduction is severely criticised.
8. See this *Autobiography* (*Collected Works*, J.M. Robson (ed.), Toronto, 1981), vol. 1, esp. p. 143.
9. R.C. Solomon, *The Passions*, Anchor Books, New York, 1977, p. 35 (hereafter page references to this work are prefixed by 'S'). Similarly Baier: 'A Christian living in the Middle Ages would not have felt any serious doubts about Tolstoy's questions. To him it would have seemed quite certain that life has a meaning and quite clear what it was (p. 3). Similarly, many other authors. The thesis is compatible with the further point, made for instance by Baier (p. 29), that Christianity has aggravated the modern problem by its low evaluation of earthly life and the use of unjustifiably high standards for meaningfulness. Sometimes, as in R.W. Hepburn's paper 'Questions About the Meaning of Life' in Klemke (ed.), *op. cit.*, the high Christian standards for a solution are presented as matters of common agreement. Then it is argued that *only* a religious position can answer the question of life's meaningfulness affirmatively. The strategy is to try and force into choosing between a religious, positive answer to the question and a nonreligious, negative one. The dichotomy is spurious.
A useful discussion of traditional religious answers to the meaning question (seen in terms of (1) an externally set goal which (2) one can accept as intrinsically worthwhile; Br. p. 17) may be found in Britton, chapter 2. The answers considered presuppose an after-life and, in all but one case, the existence of God.
10. This is not to imply that such ways are not still proposed, even in textbooks assigned for philosophy courses, such as M. Eliade, *Cosmos and History*, Harper and Row, New York, 1959: for example

> ...it is only by presupposing the existence of God that he [man] conquers... freedom...and...the certainty that historical tragedies have a trans-historical meaning, even if that meaning is not always visible...Any other situation of modern man leads, in the end to despair (p. 162; similarly p. 161).

But not by any valid argument: see NNL

11. A recent exception is the Anthropic Principle of Dicke and Carter, uncritically presented in J.A. Wheeler, Genesis and Observership in R.F. Rutts and J. Hintikka (eds.), *Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences*, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1977, pp. 18-9, according to which (roughly) the universe evolved as it has because humans are here. It would take us too far afield to discuss this rather unfounded piece of human hubris. In fact, however, the principle can be amended to avoid objections to such human chauvinism indicated below, by replacing (as Wheeler in effect sometimes does) 'human life' by 'life' or 'consciousness'.

12. K. Bach, *Exit-Existentislism*, Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont, California, 1973, pp. 2ff. Page references prefixed by 'B' are to this work.
13. B. Russell, 'A Free Man's Worship' in, *Mysticism and Logic*, (London; Allen and Unwin, 1963) p. 41.
14. R. Taylor, 'The Meaning of Life', Chapter 18 of his *Good and Evil* (London; Macmillan, 1970), p. 262. All page references prefixed by 'T' are to his article.
15. R. Schopenhauer, *The World Was Will and Representation*. E.F.J. Payne, (New York; Dover, 1966, vol. I, p. 322. Schopenhauer then switches immediately to a parallel idealist picture, with parallel unsatisfactoriness.

The trivial repetition theme is brought out even more eloquently by the author of Eccelesiastes (especially, chapter 1, 1-10).

16. Wiggins basis for this point against naturalistic theories—that their failure is bound up with their inadequacy in coping with the question of meaning—may be enlarged to apply against reductionism more generally, namely that they fail to provide

> 'anything which the generality of untheoretical man could find reason to invest with overwhelming importance. These theories offered nothing which could engage in the right way with human concerns or give point or focus to anyone's life' (W, p. 375).

17. J.P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, H.E. Barnes (trans), New York Philosophical Library, pp. 38-9.
18. Note also Wittgenstein: 'In the world there is no value, and if there were it would be of no value' *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (Ogden translation), London; Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922, E.641.
19. There are in fact, different determinate progress models to be distinguished. For example, while the idea of progress by natural development goes back through mediaeval times

> the idea of progress; [as a] march towards greater perfection...is a peculiarly modern one. It is scarcely to be met with, if at all, before the first decades of the eighteenth century...(J. Passmore, *The Perfectability of Man*, Duckworth, London, 1970; p. 195, rearranged).

What did emerge much emphasised from the Enlightenment was the more determinable (generic) idea of human progress as endless improvement (what is left redetermined is improvement how). Thus the English and French Enlighteners, as well as others such as geneticists 'often write as if they had *established*...that man can in fact look forward to an endless history of constant improvement' (Passmore, p. 190, emphasis added). Contemporary events have at least indicated that their arguments far from being sound, were build on sand.

The failure of the progress and perfectibility models (both personal and social) to provide satisfaction in at least one nineteenth century case is brought out strongly by Tolstoy in the early chapters of *My Confession*, Walter Scott, London, n.d.

20. T. Hayden, 'The Decline of the American Frontier', *Social Alternatives* 1 (8), 1980, pp. 41-2.
21. J. Woodmansee *et al.*, *The World of a Giant Corporation*; *A Report From the BE Project*, Seattle; 1975 North Country Press, (hereafter WGS).
22. See, e.g. M. Eliot and T. Harris, 'A Monday through Friday Sort of Dying..., *Social Alternatives*, 1 (8), 1980 pp. 8-11.
23. On the extent and basis of the denial of the social in Western analytical thought, see

V. and R. Routley, 'Social Theories, Self Management, and Environmental Problems' in *Environmental Philosophy* (ed. D. Mannison, M. McRobbie and R. Routley), Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980.

24. A Camus, 'The myth of Sisyphus' in *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*, J.O' Brien (trans) New York; Knopf, 1969), p. 62.
25. Thus, on the one side, Sartre: 'It is absurd that we are born; it is absurd that we die' (*Being and Nothingness*, *op. cit.*, p. 547). And, on the other, Britton: 'I am saying that the life of any man does have meaning' (Br p. 192). But (1) Britton's argument for this claim involves a modal fallacy; and (2) he also makes assertions inconsistent with the claim. As to (1) the argument is 'that it is possible that a man's life *may* matter to him' (e.g. p. 193), so it 'may matter to him', so it does matter, so it is his life has meaning. As to (2) Britton admits that a person's 'life may lose its meaning (p. 194), implying that the lives of some may come to lack a meaning.
26. Taylor states his theme, for example as follows:

> ...if the philosopher is apt to see in this [the pattern of human history] a pattern similar to the endless cycles in the existence of Sisyphus and to despair, then it is indeed because the meaning and point he is seeking is not there—but mercifully (T p. 268).

Similar themes Taylor's are advanced in Bach, op. cit.

27. In some cases at least, it is 'the inner compulsion to be doing just what we were *put here* to do, and to go on doing it forever...this is the nearest we may hope to get to heaven, (T, p. 266, italics added: the italicized terms, in particular, beg some large questions). More generally, for any creature (of whatever gender), 'the point of his living is imply to be living, in the manner it is his nature to be living (T, p. 267).
28. Taylor elaborates some of his themes in a very recent paper 'The Meaning of Human Existence' in *Values in Conflict*, yet to be published. It is, for the most part, more of the same, the same moves and arguments over again, 'with only insignificant variations' (as both Taylor and Schopenhauer might put it), in the emphasis on zest for life as a sheer escape from (that 'great evil') boredom, in the false Freudian stress on human culture as repressed or substitute sexuality, in the more detailed description of life as an endless pursuit (branch [2], and in the shape of more and different illustrations (especially the chanting nuns who often stand in for Sisyphus).

    For the most part, but by no means entirely. There is a crucial change. We are *now* offered in the end—what is inconsistent with the earlier paper—an account of the (objectively) meaningful life which some gods attain, and which talented (=creative) persons, but no other animals, can approximate or even (in cases such as Plato) achieve. The high redefinition (its height posted by the modifiers 'truly' and 'genuinely') Taylor now proposes is this: Life is truly meaningful only if it is directed to goals of one's own creation and choice and if those goals are genuinely noble, beautiful, or otherwise lastingly worthwhile and attained'. The creative element is, Taylor argues an essential ingredient, its absence being what disqualifies the 'vast majority' of human lives from meaningfulness: The only genuinely meaningful existence is one that is creative." There are, it will emerge in the text, good reasons for not buying this redefinition, and in particular for rejecting the creativity requirement. The reasons include the failure of Taylor's arguments to exclude other sorts of lives (e.g. certain less creative but nonetheless worthwhile lives) as meaningful.

    But the new Taylor paper is not explicitly considered in the text. Nor, for that matter, is more than a small proportion of the extensive philosophical literature on the topic. Very much of it is however criticized by implication.

29. Thus T, p. 264: 'The two pictures—of Sisyphus and our own lives, if we look at them from a distance—are in outline the same.' Similarly T, p. 263: 'If we think that unlike Sisyphus, these labours [of humans] do have a point, that they culminate in something lasting and independently...worthwhile, then we simply have not considered the thing closely enough.'
30. Tolstoy, *My Confession*, *op. cit.*, p. 32.
31. Camus, 'The Myth of Sisyphus', *op. cit.*, p. 57.
32. The more unveiledly [death as possibility] gets understood, the more purely does the understanding penetrate into it *as the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all*. Death, as possibility, gives *Dasein* nothing to be 'actualized', nothing which *Dasein*, as actual, could itself *be*. It is the possibility of the impossibility of every way of comporting oneself towards anything, of every way of existing. In the anticipation of this possibility it becomes greater and greater'; that is to say, the possibility reveals itself to be such that it knows no measure at all, no more or less, but signifies the possibility of the measureless impossibility of existence. (M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, by John Macquarie and Edward Robinson trans, New York; Harper, 1962,) p. 307, [p. 262 in late German editions]. R.F. Beerling summarizes Heidegger's view of man thus:

> All that remains is man in the scaffolding of his essential finitude, with no possibility of refuge in any metaphysical context of meaning and no interior shelter in any order of society, liberated but at the same time sunk in the abyss of nihilism, but, without a trace of pessimistic apathy, responding to the summons of this lot through the acceptance of his own possibilities, which he clearly recognizes as negativized, in an attitude of, literally speaking, *deadly realism*. (*Moderne doodsproblematik*: *can vergelijhende studie over Simmel*, *Heigegger en Jaspers* (Delft, 1945), p. 223; q. J.M. Demske, *Being*, *Man*, *and Death*, (The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, Ky, 1979, p. 58).

    Beerling's interpretation of Heidegger on death is controverted, in particular by what might be called the golden opportunity school, who claim that Heidegger saw death as the crown and culmination of life. (See P. Edwards, 'Heidegger and Death as "Possibility", *Mind* 84, pp. 548-66 for a critical account of this interpretation.)
33. *Being and Nothingness*, *op. cit.*, p. 539.
34. Notably V. Frankl, *The Doctor and the Soul*, Knofp, New York 1968, pp. 63-69 (cited as 'F'). Also K. Popper, 'How I see Philosophy', in A. Mercier and M. Svilar (eds.), *Philosophers and Their Own Work*, Peter Lang, Bernes, 1977, vol.iii, p. 148, endorsed by Klemke in *The Meaning of Life*, *op. cit.*, p.6. A much fuller argument for this thesis is given by B. Williams, 'The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality in J. Rachels (ed.) *Moral Problems*, Harper, New York, pp. 410-428. (Henceforth 'BW'.)
35. The argument is most fully developed in *The Will to Power*, Chapter 2 (*The Complete Works*, ed. O. Levy, Russell and Russell, New York, 1964, vol. x, p. 430). But its impact on the meaning of life question is best brought out *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, chapters 57-59 (*Complete Works*, vol. xi, esp. pp. 270-1). The eternal recurrence theme has a long history going back to Prescoratics.
36. Nietzsche seems inconsistent on the question of whether qualitatively identical but numerically distinct individuals recur at different times, or whether it is numerically the same individual that recurs. Either way, his argument runs into trouble. For the view that the repeats are numerically identical is inconsistent with their having *inter se* different temporal relations. While if they are numerically distinct the impact of the argument on the question of life's meaning is lost. For the value of one's life

need not be affected by the fact that carbon copies occur at other times (or for that matter, at other places) in parallel universes.

37. This line of refutation was apparently available even before Nietzsche formulated the argument in E. *Duhring's Kursus der Philosophie*, Leipzig, pp. 84-5. An elegant refutation based on the transcendentality of π is given in the following thought experiment due to G. Simmel: Suppose three wheels of equal size, each with one point marked on the circumference, and rotating about a common axis. Suppose now that all three marked points are aligned in a straight line, and that the second wheel rotates at twice the rate of the first while the third rotates at $1/\pi$ the rate of the first. The alignment of the three points will never recur. (G. Simmel, *Schopenhauer and Mietesche*, Leipeig, 1907, pp. 250-1)
38. We owe this point to L. Mirlin.
39. Taylor says, inaccurately, that the *larva* of the cicada does these things.
40. The assimilation of species has other serious weaknesses. Contrary to Taylor (T, p. 247), some humans do eventually ask whether their living is 'worthwhile or whether anything of significance will come of it'. Nor are the differences between members of different species merely invented: creatures of different sorts differ markedly in their abilities to formulate and accomplish projects, in their contributions to their communities, etc. in short, in value-relevant respects.
41. A similar answer, 'Living in order to live...The whole meaning of life is life itself, and the process of living', is presented elsewhere as the only answer to the problem. See S&D, p. 1.
42. As Wiggins observes (in a different context), 'surely [not]...just any old set of concerns and beliefs will do, provided one could live a life by them. Surely if any old set would do, that is the same as life's being meaningless? (W, p. 335). Well, not quite but almost.

    In assigning a uniform point to all (human) life, the Taylor position continues and extends the tradition of what Nietzsche asserts are 'nihilistic' religions, namely, those that deny any ultimate difference of value between one person and another: such, according to Nietzsche, are both Christianity and Buddhism. (See Nietzsche, *The Complete Works*, (ed) O. Levy, Russell and Russell, (New York, 1964), vol. xiv, pp. 19, 21, vol. vi, pp. 130-03, 147.

    Our position, however, differs importantly from Nietzsche's. For, from the fact that different lives are of different value, it does not follow, as Nietzsche seems to have supposed, that the range of morally permissible action with respect to a creature will vary according to the value of the creature's life. Once this is recognized, the damaging aspects of Nietzsche's elitism—in particular, the distinction between master and slave moralities—can be eliminated. It is desirable, for independent reasons, to place activities in pursuit of axiological ends (such as the maximization of value) within deontic constraints, to ensure that only certain methods of value maximization are morally permissible. While it is clear that such deontic constraints are not uniform across the entire domain of items of moral concern, their variation does not depend exclusively upon the differential values of items in that domain. This is sufficient to block the derivation of Nietzsche's pernicious deontic system
43. The galactic backdrop is often used (e.g. by Russell, *op. cit.*) not just to dwarf the value of lives by a change of scale, but to show that life can have no value because the universe as a whole has none. A detailed refutation of this claim would have to take account of the relation which was claimed to hold between creatures and the universe they inhabit. (Russell himself avoids the nihilistic consequence essentially by transferring values to a realm beyond the physical universe to which humans alone have access.) However, it is clear that if the relation is that of part to whole nithilism by no means follows, even if the universe as a whole is without value (which

we dispute). The triviality of much Tin Pan Alley music does not reduce at all, much less reduce to zero, the value of compositions which are masterpieces of Tin Pan Alley style. Indeed, in certain cases, a setting of zero or negative value may enhance the value of certain items, e.g. of minor acts of kindness or courtesy in prevailing conditions of great brutality.

44. This holds also of some positions which appear at first to escape the charge. Although, for example, in attaining Buddhist Nirvana, individuality is supposed to be extinguished, and the self absorbed into something larger, still the enterprise involved in trying to attain this (rainbow-end) state of tranquility is a decidedly individualistic one.
45. 'A Bad Five Minutes in the Alps', *Freethinking and Plainspeaking* (London), 1908.
46. It is curious, indeed, to find Nozick insisting that meaning can always be undercut by appeal to a wider context, since among its implication is the view that the meaning of individual lives can always be undercut by appeal to the state or community—an Althusserian theme not to be expected from the author of *Anarchy, State and Utopia*.
47. Emerson, journal entry of 3 September 1833 in *Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks of Raph Waldo Emerson*, W.H. Gilman *et. al.* (ed.) Cambridge, Mass., 1980-63); iv, p. 84.
48. Nor would such a problem reduce, except under a strong and implausible T 10 reductionism, to a matter of problems of individuals.
49. This shows that non-cognitivist positions are not all the same: Huxley's position, which Wiggins presents as a remarkable anticipation of the noncognitivist's principal point, is different again. According to A. Huxley in *Do as You Will* (London, 1929, p. 101): 'The purpose of life, outside the mere continuance of living (already a most noble and beautiful end), is the purpose we put into it. Its meaning is whatever we choose to call meaning....' This Humpty-Dumptyism is inessential to non-cognitivism. Nor is what Wiggins wants to add to Huxley's (upon reflection, murky) account—that 'concerning what "living most fully" is for each man, the final authority must be the man himself' (W, p. 369fn)—a part of Taylor's non-cognitivism.
50. The familiar objective subjective contrasts are earlier criticised by R.M. Hare, *Applications of Moral Philosophy*, Macmillan, London, 1972, but on such verificationist grounds as to be unpersuasive.
51. Our understanding of Wiggins position has been aided by a number of explanatory letters from him. If we still misrepresent his view, it is from no lack of attempts on our part to understand it, nor on his to explain it.
52. Wiggins points out, however, that this is a position he ascribes to the non-cognitivist, that he never felt happy with the 'invention' terminology (though it is integral to several of his main themes), and that he nowhere takes up the question of whether ascription of meanings to lives have truth-values. If so, his position is seriously incomplete (and simply incomplete also as regards the correctness or otherwise of the two defining features he gives for non-cognitivism on p. 369). In correspondence, Wiggins has suggested that statements ascribing meanings to lives can have truth-values, though not of quite the usual type, since true meaning of life statements may lack what Wiggins terms 'the third mark of assertibility' which normally attaches to true statements. The third mark of *every statement which lacks it lacks it independently of a speaker's means of recognizing it; and every statement which possesses it independently of a speaker's Means of recognizing it.* (Wiggins, 'What Would Be a Substantial, Theory of Truth? in Z. van Straaten [ed.], *Philosophical Subjects*, Oxford, 1980, p. 208). But exempting meaning of life statements from this requirement leaves the subjective change essentially unanswered: for whether a first-person meaning of life is true *is* independent of the speaker's means of recognizing it. A position which denies this is not unfairly classed as subjective.

53. R.D. Laing and A. Esterson, *Sanity, Madness and the Family*, (London: Penguin, 1964).
54. Wiggins here quotes approvingly from Williams, but the passage cited appears to be astray on several points: first, in linking meaning of life with categorical desires; secondly, in taking a life to have point if its propelling concerns provide grounds of happiness (happiness, where it is relevant, has *itself* to be worthwhile); third, in the (very dubious) thesis that 'one good testimony of one's existence having a point is that the question of its point does not arise'. In particular, as against Dilman also, finding a meaning in life is not (just like that) developing a 'concern for things' (S & D, p. 37).
    Tolstoy's trite Christian answer to the meaning problem given towards the end of his revealing story, *The Death of Ivan Illych*, that meaning consists in care and concern for (some) other humans, is defective in the first and second of these way. Such care and concern is neither necessary nor sufficient for a meaningful life.
55. J.J. Thompson, Review of Taylor, *op. cit.*, *Philosophical Review*, 81 (1972), p. 116. Observe that for the summary to be *at all* accurate, 'our' has to be construed very liberally: to include all life.
56. Should you think that cricketing is an intrinsically valuable activity then choose something else for c, e.g. noughts and crosses, chess, horse racing, whist... Some human activities, in particular watching games or sports (e.g. on television), have in general no valuable product and no valuable lived-through experience. Another good example is 'time killed'.
57. This indicates part of what is wrong with Dilman's astonishing thesis that 'when we claim a person's life to be meaningless we are not claiming that *we* find that sort of life meaningless but that *he* finds it so, although it may appear to him otherwise (S&D, p. 20). We are normally claiming neither of these things; nor could we be claming either without serious damage to what we do say. This is brought out by Phillips, who demolishes Dilman's thesis. See S&D, especially pp. 59-60, and also pp. 96ff.
58. The presence of the valuable boundary indicates the presence of a threshold beyond which positive worth or point has to accumulate in order for an activity, product or life to be counted as valuable. The boundary is important, as it places a lower limit on the value of these products and processes of positive worth which may count as valuable (see below).
59. It is important to note that the zero-value line is a purely normative line, it does *not* represent anything like the *average* hum-drum life in x 's world or society. Baier, for instance, would, quite mistakenly, assess the worthwhileness of a life in terms of how far it fell above or below the average for that society (KB, p. 27), irrespective of the worth of the society. Moreover, unless the average is determined normatively this will have the result of making the average life of zero worth. (Baier does, it is true, admit normative features in determining the average: his phrase is 'the range of worthwhileness which ordinary lives normally cover'. But this does not remove the objections.)
60. That is, either objectively, or better nonjectively. Details of such a theory of value are given in R. and V. Routley, 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics in *Environmental Philosophy*, *op. cit.*
    There is another potential difficulty for the Aristotelian extensional sum suggestion, namely that a creature's worth (especially e.g. moral worth) depends not only on what it does but what it *would* do. However, whether a life is (*de facto*) meaningful seems, interestingly, to depend just on the extensional part.
    This suggests an important distinction between the worth of a creature (which takes account also of what the creature would do were it able) and the worth of a creature's life (which takes account only of what it actually does). The distinction can be captured through the world-switch on the superscope, since the value of the creature can be defined in terms of its life in some alternative world; that is, we evaluate the creature by evaluating its life in a world like the actual one except that certain barriers to the creature's activities (e.g. illhealth, disability, etc.) are removed. The problem is, of course, defining the range of impediments which may be removed for this purpose (of specifying in which alternative world the evaluation of the creature's life will yield the value of the creature in the actual world). Clearly we would want to include the removal of impediments such as accidents which incapacitate or kill a well-intentioned creature before it can accomplish much of worth. Such creatures are valuable creatures, though they may lack (through no fault of their own) valuable lives. On the other hand, we obviously would not want to define the range of impediments so widely as to assign high positive values to creatures on the ground that they would make large positive contributions were they not the vindictive, bigoted slobs that they have proved to be.

61. See also footnote 4.
62. Human chauvinism is rife in discussions of the meaning of life. Bach, to consider just one of the more extravagant examples, supposes that there is a sharp contrast between humans and the rest of nature: the rest is 'merely combinations of particles' (p. 2). He dismisses respect for the world, nature, etc. immediately, without any argument, and puts up instead a reductionist, mechanistic picture (p. 3). The natural world is a mechanism built extensionally from particles, and both the social world and its history reduce to constructions from individual humans: 'societies, cities, institutions, and organisations are composites of people...and nothing more' and 'history is nothing but the cumulation of people's acts' (p. 2, of similarly Wiggins, and Klemke's introduction to his Meaning of Life collection). None of these chauvinistic reductions can succeed (see EMJB); none are at all adequate to the date to be reflected.
63. P. Edwards, 'Life, Meaning and Value', *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. P. Edwards, Macmillan, New York, 1967, iv, p. 467.
64. The authors are indebted to several, members of the Philosophy Department at McMaster University, where an early version of this paper was read. They are also indebted to members of the Philosophy Departments of La Trobe University and the University of Western Australia, where slightly revised versions of the paper were read.

Jain theory of knowledge

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The problem of knowledge, in general, is divided into three branches; Psychology, epistemology and logic. But the present treatment is confined to the contribution of Jainism towards the first two branches only.

Psychology of Knowledge

Jaina psychology can be analysed under the following three heads:

(1) Organs of knowledge;
(2) Their function for producing cognition; and
(3) The stages of knowledge from sensation to judgement.

The Organs. In discussing the causation of knowledge generally the following four factors come into consideration:

(*a*) The Soul
(*b*) The Mind
(*c*) The Senses
(*d*) The Object

The Soul

According to Jainism, the soul is a permanent substance. It possesses consciousness as its natural attributes. There is no soul without consciousness and no consciousness without soul. This consciousness expresses itself in all the psychological functions of knowing, feeling and willing. The first, i.e. knowing, is its natural and pure manifestation while the remaining two are mixed. In feeling consciousness is mixed with the effect of *vedaniya karman* (see theory of *karma*) and in willing with that of *mohaniyakarman*. But knowing is natural. Here, the soul does not depend upon any external assistance. As there is heat in the fire and coolness in the water, similarly we have knowledge in the soul.

A question arises: if knowledge is a natural and permanent attribute, why is it phenomenal? It appears after some positive effort and vanishes automatically. Similarly, when all the souls possess this attribute equally, why is there inequality in knowledge? Jainism replies these objections through the theory of obscurance. Out of eight *kurmans* accepted by Jainism, the first,

second, fourth and eighth are known as *ghatins*. They put obstructions in the natural expresssion of the soul. The first two are related with the obstruction of conscious manifestation. They are compared with a cloud obscuring the light of the sun. The removal of that obscurance is necessary for knowledge. The liberated soul which is free from this obscurance gets the full manifestation. Infinite knowledge dawns there in full bloom without any external dependence. There, it is constant as well as similar in all states and persons.

The Mind and the Senses

The mind and the senses are divided into two aspects: physical and spiritual. In their physical aspects senses are parts of the physique of a living being. They are material as the body itself. They are further divided into internal and external parts which are interesting for the study of ancient physiology. In their spiritual aspects they are nothing but the soul itself. They only represent various expressions of the powers of the soul and their applications. This spiritual aspect is again divided into power (*labdhi*) and application (*upayoga*). In the process of knowledge the physical mind and the physical senses play the part of windows only. A man sitting in a closed room cannot see anything outside even with perfect vision. The window enables him to peep outside. The sphere of objectivity depends upon the size of the window. Similarly, man is confined into the closed room of karmic obscurance. A hole into that obscurance enables a person to look at external objects. As the window is nothing but a natural outlet for the sense of vision, similarly the senses are nothing but partial removal of karmic obscurance. Thus senses in their positive aspect are nothing but souls.

The Object, etc.

Now we come to the fourth category: the object, light, etc. Jainism does not give them any importance in the causation of knowledge. They are admitted as occasional helpers but not as essentials. The object which exists does not appear in illusion. On the other hand, that which does not exist appears.

It means that the presence of object is not a necessary condition. The Nyaya system includes big dimension, manifestation of colour, and light also in the causation of visual perception. But Jainism does not feel this necessity. The questions why there is no perception in darkness, why we do not see atoms or air, etc. are replied by the theory of capacity (योग्यता). It is the capacity provided by the removal of obscurance which regulates all the gradations of limitations in knowledge. Though contact between senses and objects is not regarded as essential condition, yet it has been accepted in the case of four senses. The mind and the sense of vision do not require

any physical contact with the object about which the system of Nyaya is very particular.

Thus, we can see that soul is the only efficient as well as material cause of knowledge. It is the agent too. The help of other accessories is negative, i.e. their contribution is confined to the removal of the obscurance. Ăyaranga says: 'The soul is knower, the instrument of knowledge also is soul.'

It may be made clarified here that the systems of Sāṅkhya, Vedānta and Buddhism make a distinction between the discursive knowledge and the transcendental knowledge. In the former type, matter (*prakṛti*) or nescience (*avidyā*) plays the prominent part.

According to Sāṅkhya, knowledge means a simultaneous reflection of the object as well as consciousness (*puruṣa*) into *buddhi* which is a product of the matter. Of course, consciousness also has its share by way of reflection. But the material cause of a reflection is not the reflectee but the reflector. Thus, knowledge, according to Sāṅkhya, is a mode of matter. Jainism does not accept any contribution on the part of matter. All modes belong to the soul. Secondly, Jainism does not believe in the theory of reflection or representation. It holds that the objects are presented to the soul direct.

According to the Vedānta, discursive knowledge is a complex phenomenon. It analyses the appearance into two parts. One part is consciousness and the other the object. As far as consciousness is concerned, it is nothing but soul. There is no difference between Jainism and the Vedānta in this respect. But, in case of the object, the Vedānta holds that it is supplied by nescience. The mind, which is a product of *avidyā*, goes out through the channel of cognizing senses and establishes a contact with the object. There it performs twofold function. Firstly, it removes the obscurance for manifestation of consciousness. Secondly, it projects an object which gives the knowledge a form. Jainism does not admit this illusory projection.

According to Yogachara Buddhism, all concepts are subjective. They are products of past impressions.

Thus, in discursive knowledge, all the three systems recognize the contribution of matter or nescience in their own style. But, according to Jainism, subjective contribution is confined to the act of feeling and willing only. As far as knowing is concerned, it is purely objective. The transcendental knowledge, according to them, is devoid of all concepts. The discursive knowledge is both a cause as well as the effect of something different from soul. The transcendental knowledge is pure consciousness, unpolluted by the association of object. Jainism does not support the above view. It does not make any qualitative difference between the ordinary cognition of a layman and that of an omniscient. The difference lies in quantity only. The cognition of an ordinary person is confined to the consideration of one aspect only, while that of the omniscient covers all the aspects. The former is partial while the latter is complete. Jainism contends that incompleteness does not mean it is wrong. It is wrong only if the cognizer is impertinent as to reject other aspects.

Thus, wrongness is not connected with the appearance but with the attitude behind it. This is why in early Jainism the basis of truth and falsehood is not objective validity but attitude of the subject. If the cognizer possesses a right attitude his knowledge is right. If, on the other hand, his attitude is perverted, the knowledge is wrong.

Of course, Yaśovijaya Upādhyāya (A.D. 18-0) has interpreted the Jaina theory also under the Vedāntic influence. He admits that the complete knowledge is a pure manifestation of the soul, while incomplete one is produced by the soul assisted by the *karman* obscuring complete knowledge. But his theory is not supported by the old tradition.

The Nyaya also holds knowledge as the attribute of soul, but, according to it, it is not a permanent factor. It is not natural but advertitious. Through the *collection* of certain factors it appears in the first moment, exact in the second and disappears in the third automatically. In the states of sleep and salvation it is totally absent. According to Jainism, it is the very essence of soul and never totally absent. One cannot conceive the fire without warmth. Similarly, the soul without knowledge is inconceivable.

Umāswati has given knowledge as the definition of soul. Vidyānanda, while explaining the above, differentiates it from ordinary types of definitions and says that it is the very essence of the soul. It is definition as well as the definee, while ordinary definitions are mere definitions.

The Nature of Obscurance

The soul is, by nature, cognizer and the object knowable. There is a permanent relation between the two as knower and the knowable. There is no limit to this relation as far as capacity is concerned. The soul possesses the power to know all the objects and even more if they happen to be. It is like the scorching sun which can illumine all objects. But that power is restricted by the karmic obscurance. Yaśovijaya compares this obscurance with a cloud obscuring the sun. It is a material substance attached to the soul. It pollutes the purity of the latter, and does not allow it to shine in full brightness.

The Theory of Upayoga

The question may arise: if obscurance is the only regulating factor, what is the use of sense organs? we cannot see an object with closed eyes with any amount of *ksayopaṣamā* as the partial removal of obscurance is recognized.

The Jaina reply to this question is a bit complicated. There are ten completions (*paryāpti*), they say, which a being completes gradually after entering into the womb of the mother. The five senses and the mind constituting one completion of visual sense is supposed to possess the power of seeing an object. Similarly, the animal after completion of auditory sense is supposed to possess the power of listening, and so on. The gradation in these powers

depends upon the capacity of completions. There are two factors which lead to the completion of the senses of knowledge. The responsibility for creating physical senses goes to *nāmakarman*. The spiritual senses being the faculties of soul itself are restored by the *ksayopaṣamā*. Thus *ksayopaṣamā* is responsible for providing a faculty with the birth. It is also responsible for later developments, good or bad. But it has no control over the day-to-day appearances. It limits the knowing capacity in every sense. It is there even when the senses are no more in action. Similarly, there is no difference in *ksayopaṣamā* when we apprehend a lion or a cloth, requiring the same amount of knowing capacity. Thus, *ksayopaṣamā* is responsible for providing a capacity only, which is known as *labdhi* in Jain terminology. The day-to-day phenomena of cognition are regulated by the theory of *upayoga* or application. The physical senses are useful in the function of an application without which the faculties do not work.

The Jaina term for all types of cognitive activity is *upayoga*. It means application of the cognitive power possessed by the soul naturally or through restoration as the result of the removal of obscurance.

Division of Knowledge

The term knowledge denotes a judgement. It is the stage of conclusion in the process of thinking. But in discussing the psychology of thinking one has to consider the preceding stages also, beginning with the first sensation or inclination of the soul to know the object. We have stated above that the comprehensive Jaina term, for this purpose, is *upayoga*. It is divided as follows: (*i*) Nirākāra Upayoga or Darśana, (*ii*) Sākāra Upayoga or Jñāna.

Nirākāra Upayoga or Darśana

There is much controversy about the actual position of *darśana*. It is commonly held as the first general appearance, apprehending mere existence. But this view does not hold good with the concept of *vyāñjanāvagraha* which is defined as the first contact between senses and the object and which is accepted as the first stage of *jñāna*. No appearance, whether general or particular, is possible before that contact; and thus, the possibility of *darśana* before that stage is out of question. On the other hand, it is accepted unanimously that *darśana* must precede the first stage of *jñāna*. In order to remove this anomaly, some Āchāryas have accepted *avagraha* and *iha*, the first two stages of knowledge preceding the judgement (*avaya*) as *darśana*. But it is a rough estimate. The point has been discussed eleborately by Brahmānanada, the commentator of *Bṛahaddravya Saṅgraha*, and by Vireśwara in *Dhavlā*. Both of them hold that *darśana* in actual sense is the first inclination of soul for knowing the object. The action of senses begins after this inclination. It is the activity of pure consciousness before the entrance of the object into the sphere.

Darśana is generally compared with the indeterminate perception of the Nyāya or Buddhist perception. But this comparison holds good only if the common view is held.

Division of Darśana

Darśana is divided into four types:

(1) *Cakṣurdarśana.* The inclination preceding visual cognition;
(2) *Acakṣurdarśana*: The inclination preceding the cognition arising from other senses and mind;
(3) *Avadhidarśana.* The inclination preceding the extraordinary perception with limited sphere; and
(4) *Kevaladarśana.* The inclination preceding perfect knowledge.

Sākāra Upayoga or Jñāna

Jñāna means judgement. As stated above it is the last stage of thinking process. Jaina psychology divides the process into four stages. These stages are related with the ordinary perception only arising through the senses and the mind, which constitutes the first type of its five fold division. It is better, to have an idea of the division of *jñāna.* It is divided into the following five types:

(1) *Matijñāna.* Knowledge through the senses and the mind;
(2) *Śrutajñāna.* Verbal knowledge;
(3) *Avadhijñāna.* Extraordinary perception with limited sphere or clairvoyance;
(4) *Manohparyayajñāna.* Knowledge of the states of mind; and
(5) Kevalajñāna. Perfect knowledge.

Matijñāna

Mati includes all types of sense-expereince. It is also known as *Abhinibodhikā'*, It is divided into the following four stages:

(1) *Avagraha*—Sensation
(2) *Iha*—Proposition
(3) *Avāya*—Judgement
(4) *Dhāraṇā*—Confirmation

Avagraha is again divided into *vyāñjanāvagraha* and *arthāvagraha. Vyāñjanāvagraha* means a contact between the senses and the object. This stage does not occur in the case of visual or mental perception, where physical

contact between the object and the senses is not necessary, while the remaining four senses must have it before apprehension.

Arthāvagraha is the apprehension of an object in its most general form.

After sensing the object in its general form, we have a natural desire to know the object in detail. This desire is followed by a proposition or suggestion of a certain class, quality of the individual. This is called *Iha.*

The above proposition is followed by the judgement which transfers the probability into a decision. It is called *Avāya.*

This judgement is further confirmed in the stage of *Dhāraṇā,* where the impression takes a firm root in the mind and can revive later on as memory. It leaves a definite impression in the subconscious mind.

Śrutajñāna

The *Śruta* is just like Śruti in the Vedic tradition. It is the knowledge based on scriptures or the words of authority. While describing it in detail the Jains enumerate their canonical literature of the period after Mahāvīra which is divided into *Aṅgapavittha,* i.e. occupying the position of a limb in the body of cannon personified and *Anaṅgapavittha* (not occupied as a limb). The pre-Mahāvīrian canon was divided into fourteen *purvas.*

It could be mentioned here that Jains do not regard their scriptures as eternal or the words of some eternal being. In every cycle of time, new pontifs are born and give their sermons as they like. Those sermons are arranged into book by their chief disciples known *as Ganadhāras.* In addition, the contributions of Śrutakevalins (the sages possessing the knowledge of complete forteen *purvas*) and of those with a minimum knowledge of ten *purvas* also are regarded as Āgāmas. The composition of Ganadhāras is regarded as *Aṅgapavittha,* while that of others as *Anáṅgapavittha.* In the post-Mahāvirian tradition, there are twelve *aṅgas.* The number of *not-aṅgas* is uncertain.

Leaving aside the canonical literature, when Śruta is considered in its widest sense it enters into the province of Mati and it is difficult to draw a clear line of demarcation between the two. Jinabhadra holds that all knowledge is associated with word, and, therefore, terminates at Śruta. The sphere of Mati is confined to the presentation of data. The classification of that data come under the province of Śruta. Mati conrtibutes the stuff and Śruta arranges it into different categories. Jinabhadra compares them with raw jute and rope made thereof. It is for this reason that Mati and Śruta are accepted as existing in every being.

Umaswāti in his *Tattvārtha* expresses a different view. He expands the sphere of Mati and contracts that of Śruta. He confines Śruta to canonical literature and all types of perceptual and conceptual knowledge are included in Mati. He says that the sense cognition, memory, recognition, induction

and deduction—all are different types of Mati. This enumeration of the various types of Mati provides a clue for the division of knowledge by the logicians.

Avadhi Jñāna

The *avadhi* is an extraordinary perception akin to clairvoyance. Generally it is regarded as a supernatural power obtained through penances or yogic practice. But in the kingdoms of heaven and hell it is acquired with the birth. Perhaps Jains have regarded extraordinary knowledge as a necessary equipment for enjoying the extreme types of both happiness as well as pain. *Avadhi* is confined to material objects only.

Manahparyāyajñāna

Manahparyāyajñāna means the reading of thought waves. It is obtained when soul is extraordinarily purified through a high order of conduct. Only a monk can have it.

Kevala Jñāna

Kevala jñāna means the knowledge of the absolute. It dawns when obscurance is totally removed, and all the powers of soul get their manifestation. It is same as realization in other systems.

The word *kevala* means absolute. In the aphorism of Patañjali as well as in the system of Sāṅkhya *kaivalya* means the knowledge of distinction between consciousness and matter. In Buddhism it is interpreted as the highest knowledge. But in Jainism it is interpreted as omniscience.

Etymologically, the word *kevala* does not mean 'all'. It appears that the sense of omniscience is a later innovation.

In Indian systems omniscience is regarded as a supernatural power obtained through Yogic practices. Nowhere except in Jainism it is held as a necessary equipment for salvation. Jains also include it among *labdhis*, i.e. supernatural powers, which are not necessary steps in the path of salvation. In Buddhism the knowledge of Four Great Truths is sufficient for obtaining *nirvāṇa* only who adopts the carreer of preaching others and converting them to his order. In Brāhmanical schools it is an epithet of God. It can also be possessed by the ascetics of high order. The Jaina Tirthaṅkara compares well with the Bodhisattva of Buddhism. He also adopts the carreer of preaching others. Thus, it appears that omniscience came to be accepted as an equipment of Tirthaṅkara only. Its inclusion in the special embelishments of Tīrthaṅkaras indicates that in ordinary cases *kevala* did not mean omniscience. Later on, logical conclusions led to its acceptance in other souls as well. One can visualize two reasons behind it. First, according to Jainism,

knowledge is the nature of soul. It does not depend upon external help for its full manifestation. Consequently, the souls which are entirely free from the *karmic* obscurance cannot have any difference regarding knowledge. Thus, in parity with the Tīrthaṅkaras, other souls also came to be recognized as omniscient. Secondly, according to the theory of non-absolution, all objects have a relative existence. Thus, a complete knowledge of one object is impossible without knowing all objects. The Ayaranga announces: 'One who knows one object knows all the objects, and who knows all the objects knows only one object.'

The Upaniṣads also propose the knowledge of all through the knowledge of one. But their approach is different, According to them, the effect is only a manifestation of the cause; and therefore, one who knows the cause knows the effect automatically. Brahman is the cause of entire universe. Thus, the knowledge of Brahman leads to the knowledge of entire universe. But, Jainism believes in plurality. It holds that the cause and the effect both are equally real. Thus, the knowledge of one cannot lead to the knowledge of the other. But, at the same time, they are correlated; consequently the knowledge of one is incomplete without knowing the other. In this way the knowledge of entire plurality becomes a necessary condition for complete knowledge of one thing.

The soul is admitted to possess infinite knowledge; infinite intuition, infinite bliss and infinite energy. One cannot interpret 'infinite' as 'all'. Similarly, in the case of knowledge and intuition also, 'infinite' cannot give the idea of all. Anyway the concept of omniscience is firmly rooted in Jaina tradition and has come to be recognized as an *integral* part of their theology.

Influence of Logic

The above division of knowledge is an original contribution of Jainism. It is found in the canonical literature and serves as the nucleous of Jain theory of knowledge. In the later period, as a result of the contact with logicians, Jains also have remodelled their terminology in accordance with the prevalent logical terms.

The first stage of this development is noticed in the Tattvārtha (A.D. 200) and the Niryaktis (A.D. 400). They divided the abovementioned five types into *pratyakṣa* (*immediate*), *parokṣa* (Mediate) cognitions. But the definitions of *pratyakṣa* as well as *parokṣa* were their own. They held that the cognition arising direct from the soul without the assistance of senses or mind was *pratyakṣa*, while that mediated by the senses, etc. is *parokṣa*. Thus, the first two types of Mati and Śruta were regarded as *parokṣa* and the remaining three as *pratyakṣa*. We can notice here that, in spite of the introduction of two terms from logic, there is no change in the spirit.

In the Nandi (A.D. 400) perception is divided as sense-perception and no-sense-perception. Thus, due to the influence of other systems, the sense-

cognition also came to be recognized as perception, but there was no attempt for adjusting the same in the old scheme. In the later part of the same treatise, all stages of sense-cognition have been included into *parokṣa*. It only shows that a necessity was felt to recognize sense-cognition also as perception.

Akalaṅka (A.D. 800) has suggested the final solution. He accepted the sense-cognition as *Śāṁvyavahārik* (सांव्यवहारिक) *pratyakṣa*, i.e. perception according to the common usage.

Akalaṅka is regarded as the father of Jaina logic. The shape given by him was accepted as final. No important change has been introduced later. He defined knowldge as follows:



EPISTEMOLOGY

According to Jainism the appearance 'This is a jar' means 'I know a jar'. It means the appearance of the self as well as the jar. According to the Naiyāyika, the appearance, 'This is a jar' apprehends the x mere object. The cognition and the cognizer are apprehended by a subsequent appearances which he calls *anuvyavasāyas*. But Jainism holds that all the three—the object, the cognition and the cognizer—are apprehended in one and the same appearance.

Both the self as well as the jar possess objective existence. According to Jainism, there is no appearance without a corresponding object. All notions of relation, causation, generality or class exist externally. Thus, Jainism is a strong devotee of *ex-priori*. There is nothing *a priori*. Still we cannot say that Jainism is empiricist in the Western sense of the term. Modern

empiricists regard senses only as the source of knowledge. Inference and other types of mental deliberations, they hold, are mere deductions. The mind does not contribute anything new. Its activities are confined to the act of feeling or deduction. But, according to Jainism, mind and soul also have their independent contribution towards knowledge. Of course, that contribution is not subjective. It is also objective. Thus, we can say Jainism is empiricist with threefold organs of experience, i.e. the senses, the mind and the soul. Though, in reality, soul is the only organ, others are mere accessories; yet, the above differentiation takes the helping cause also into consideration. In the first two categories of knowledge, the soul works with the assistance of the senses and mind. In the third category, it works independently. But in all cases, whether assisted or not assisted, it is only a discoverer and not creator. Jainism holds that knowledge is a discovery and not projection.

Compared with rationalism Jainism is against the theory of mere subjective existence. All the same it holds that there are some objects which cannot be known through senses. The same is the case with intuitionism. It admits that there are objects which can be known through intuition only. But it differs that they do not exist in intuition only.

According to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, the particular objects exist externally. But all concepts of class, relation, etc. are subjective. The Sāṅkhya holds an opposite view. According to it, universals are objective while particulars are subjective. The German philosopher Kant also holds certain categories of interpretations as subjective and the thing-in-itself as objective. But, according to Jainism, both universals and particulars, the percepts and concepts, the categories of interpretation as well the thing-in-itself have an objective reality. No appearance without external existence is the keyword of Jainism.

ILLUSION

According to Jainism, illusion does not mean false appearance. No appearance is false. The appearance of rope as a snake is as true as its appearance as a rope. The rope is not absolutely different from the snake. It also possesses certain qualities common with the snake. In darkness only those qualities are discovered, while the distinguishing ones are not detected. The common qualities, assisted by the complex of fear, produce the appearance of a snake which is not without objective basis. It is regarded false, because in later stages the distinguishing qualities get prominance. The change occurs only in the attitude of the subject. Formerly, he was holding it as a snake and denying the existence of the rope. Now, he holds the same object as a rope and denies the existence of the snake. In reality, the object is both, the snake as well as the rope, in relation to their respective qualities. Both appearances are true. The common distinction of true and false depends

upon the pragmatic consideration of serving the useful purpose. The illusive snake connot bite, and, therefore, the appearance is regarded as false. But we cannot say that it does not do any function common with the real snake. In that case, the fear also would not have been there.

Vidyānanda holds that there is no qualitative difference between the appearances held as valid and invalid. All of them are apprehensions of truth in part. The complete apprehension is possible in the stage of omniscience only. Absolute validity of incomplete knowledge is judged on pragmatic valuation or on the attitude of the subject as it is in the ethical aspect. In their objective consideration, there is no difference between the two.

Relative Existence

It is essential to know here that, according to Jainism, every existence is relative. The same object can exist in as many forms as there are relations. And this is an acceptance of subjectivism in another form. It makes no difference if one holds that the object is devoid of all concepts or that it possesses all concepts in different relations. After all the judgement formed on the basis of relations is the choice of subject only. It is his business to form a judgement on the basis of a particular relation. The only difference is that in Jainism it is a choice while in idealistic systems it is subjective creation. The point may be clarified through the following illustration: three ladies are sitting together and a gentleman comes from outside. One of the ladies says: 'There is my husband.' The other says: 'There is my brother.' The third says: 'There is my son.' The Buddhist will say that all the three concepts of husband, brother and son are subjective.' But the jain would say: 'No, all the notions are objective.' The gentleman under consideration possesses all the three qualities in different relations. The ladies made their choice according to their respective relations. There is no concept without relation. The question may be raised the first child at its birth cannot possess the quality of being a brother. But he comes to possess that quality when the second child is born. How can the second child, without any physical relation with the first, produce a new quality in the latter? The Jain reply is that physical contact is not necessary for generating a quality. Thus, the sphere of objectivity in Jainism is so wide that it loses the very sense of it.

A question may be raised again as to whether all the attributes of an object, the original as well as the derivative, stand on the same level of reality. In the example quoted above, the attributes of being a husband, brother or son are not original. They have been derived from the relations with different persons. But the quality of being a human being is original. If there is any difference between these two types of attributes, that must continue in knowledge also. It means that we shall have to make some distinctions between the knowledge of original qualities and the desired ones.

The Jain reply is this: as far as the existence is concerned both stand

on the same level. But the pragmatic outlook creates an apparent gradation. To the child of a professor the factor of his being a father is more real than that of professorship. To his mother he is more a son than a professor or a father. To his student he is a professor more than anything else. To his servant he is a master. To a distinterested person all the factors stand on the same level. But he also takes into consideration mainly those factors that have a universal value; and here in lies the difference between original and the derivative attributes. Those with universal values are regarded as original while those with a limited sphere of valuation are accepted as derivative.

Jainism takes four factors into account for existence: *dravya* (person), *kṣetra* (space), *kāla* (time) and *bhāva* (state).

When an individual exists in relation to the above factors belonging to his own personality, he is regared as real. In respect of the relation other than his own, he is nonexistent.

We can compare these categories with those of Kant with certain reservation.

Theory of Presentation

According to Jainism the object is presented to the subject direct without any via media. According to Śaṅkhya, the object itself is never perceived. It is reflected into mode of Buddhi and that reflection only becomes the object of perception. The existence of the object itself is inferred through that reflection. But Jainism does not believe in the theory of reflection. Of course, Kunda has compared the soul with a mirror and shown a liking for this theory. He also proposes that in reality an omniscient sees his self only, and, as all the objects are reflected into the self, he comes to know the objects also. His view can be compared with Vijñāna Bhikṣu, but it lacks support from Jain tradition. The canonical literature defines knowledge as the illuminer. The school of logicians also supports the same view. Yaśovijaya compares soul with the sun, having a natural faculty of illumining the objects. For this purpose it does not require any physical contact with the object. Kunda also says: 'The omniscient neither enters into the objects nor is entered into by the object. Still, it perceives all the objects.'

The Soutrāntika School of Buddhism admits two factors as the regulator of knowledge. Firstly, it cognizes the object from which it is produced. Secondly, the cognition takes the form of the object. As knowledge is self-luminary, it perceives the modified form and infers the object through that. Jainism does not enter into these complicacies. It does not admit object as the producer of knowledge nor believes in the theory of modal change. It believes in attention or *upayoga* only. The consciousness is like a lamp in one's hand. It is always burning with its glaring light. One is required to direct it towards the object for apprehension. This direction is known as *upayoga*.

Infallibilism or bust?

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1. Faith as Non-Propositional

John Hick in *Faith and Knowledge*[1] and other writings on the same topic claims that the uniform epistemological character of faith can be laid bare: to know God is not to hold or believe in a series of propositions such as 'God is the Father of mankind', or 'Jesus Christ is the son of God'; to know God is to experience Him in a way epistemologically similar to the way I experience a table or a cat. Admittedly, the objects of experience in the two cases, e.g. God and a cat, are described by statements which are of logically different types, but the way the knower knows the two objects is identical. The major and the minor prophets of the Old Testament, the Apostles, and Christ himself did not, Hick thinks, believe in a set of propositions about God: they experienced for themselves the God the living and the true. Hick writes:

> Instead of assimilating faith to propositional belief whether such a belief be produced by reasoning or an act of will, or both—we must assimilate it to perception. I therefore want to explore the possibility that the cognition of God by faith is more like perceiving something, even perceiving a physical object, that is present before us that it is like believing a statement about some absent object, whether the statement has been proved to us or because we want to believe it.[2]

I wish to raise two questions about Hick's identification of faith with some sort of immediate experience of God. Firstly, is his neat classification of Aquinas' views about revelation as solely propositional adequate?[3] Secondly, can experience which contains no propositional or cognitive element provide an adequate phenomenology of what is said and done in the full range of Christian belief and worship?

The only section of the *Summa Theologica* Hick quotes and discusses is Part II. Question 1.ff. Here Aquinas writes:

> Accordingly the object of faith may be considered in two ways. First, as regards the thing itself which is believed, and thus the object of faith is something simple, namely the thing about which we have faith. Secondly, on the part of the believer, and in this respect the object of faith is something complex by way of a proposition.[4]

Here, Aquinas is undoubtedly saying that faith in this life involves believing in propositions. But does it follow from this, as Hick seems to imply, that for Aquinas faith is restricted to, and is never anything over and above the acceptance of propositions? I think that Hick is following the popular Roman interpretation of what Aquinas says rather than looking to see what Aquinas actually wrote. Just as the popular Roman interpretations of the Quinquae viae suppose that these arguments provide demonstrative proofs of God's existence, so the popular teaching about Aquinas on faith suggests that he restricts faith to nothing but the acceptance of a set of propositions. I think that Aquinas is rather saying that because our knowledge of God in this life is never and, in the nature of the case can never be complete, faith, if it is to be cognitive, requires both a propositional and an experiencial aspect. Firstly, it is nonsense to say that the only model of faith for Aquinas is assent to propositions. There is a certain amount of common ground between Aquinas and Protestant thinkers such as Kierkegaard, Brunner and Barth: they all insist that the New Testament doctrine of faith consists in obedience to what is divinely given, and therefore faith itself is a gift of God, and can never be identified with human nature, or any element of it, not even propositions. Thus:

> We are directed by the help of divine grace to our ultimate end. But the ultimate end is an open vision of the First Truth in Itself... therefore before it comes to this end man's intellect must be subject to God by way of belief, under the influence of divine grace which accomplished this.[5]

Secondly, Aquinas makes clear that assent to propositions is only one of the elements in faith. God is in the end 'the Unknown', and so transcends any propositions which may be used to describe His nature. Thus Aquinas claimed: This is the ultimate in human knowledge of God: to know that we do not know Him.[6] But further, in the *Summa Theologica,* he makes the point explicitly that revelation of God's mystery is conveyed to us by means of our sense experience. For,

> Holy Scripture fittingly delivers Divine and spiritual realities under bodily guises. For God provides for all things according to the kind of things they are. How we are of the kind to reach the world of intelligence through the world of sense, since all our knowledge takes its rise from sensation. Congenially, then, Holy Scripture delivers spiritual things to us beneath the metaphor of bodily things.[7]

Thirdly, for Aquinas faith is primarily adhesion to God Himself, inasmuch as He discloses Himself to us. Therefore in this sense faith is an immediate and personal knowing of God.

> Since man can only know the things he does not see himself by taking them from another who does see them, and since faith is among the things we do not see, the knowledge of objects of faith must be handed on by one who sees them himself. How this one is God, who perfectly comprehends Himself, and naturally sees his essence. Indeed we get faith from God.[8]

Hick arrives at the conclusion that we can only have knowledge of God by experience by putting forward a dilemma:

> God can be known either by perceiving His presence or because He is an inferred entity. God is obviously not an inferred entity in the same way that sub-atomic particles are inferred entities; therefore knowledge of God can be by experience and is never the result of an inference.[9]

But does this neat and compressed argument prove that we can know God only by having some sort of experience, and that any indirect inferential knowledge of God is always illicit?

Why should there be one and only one way to get to know God in this life? The phrase 'knowing God' seems to have a variety of divergent uses: I know God through the record of His revelation to and through the prophets, apostles and martyrs; I know God in His presence in the eucharist; I know God in the works of His creation. In all these instances and many others, I can claim that I 'know' God; but the various uses of 'know' cannot be identified with my 'experiencing' God and nothing else.

Consider the statement that Jesus died on the cross in A.D. 33. This statement is central to the Christian belief that Christ opened the way for the possibility of man's salvation by his atoning death on the cross. No death on the cross, no atonement. But do I know the historical statement that Jesus died on the cross in A.D. 33 by experience? It is true that someone must have once experienced Christ dying on the cross, or thought they had, and then recorded it in oral, written, or perhaps pictorial form, so that the information has been conveyed to me here and now. But I do not, and in the nature of the case cannot experience Christ being crucified, in the way I can feel pain at listening to John Stainer's 'Crucifixion', or the pleasure of listening to J.S. Bach's 'St. Matthew Passion'. My experience of the crucifixion is not immediate, and because the New Testament documents are written records I can know of the crucifixion by means of propositions. It is a contingent fact that the record of the crucifixion is propositional: it might have been straightforwardly pictorial, or it could have been conveyed by means of some musical 'description'.

The statement 'Christ died for me on the cross around A.D. 33' is not a straightforward historical statement. It is an autobiographical statement describing what I think Christ's death on the cross has done for me. The

statement presupposes the historical truth of the proposition 'Christ died on the cross', but it also describes part of my experience. I am claiming that this death was different from any other crucifixion in the same year; other crucifixions may have been recorded or not; the records may have been kept or lost. But Christ's death is claimed to have significance for my present experience. This statement describing my present experience of Christ is of a different type from that recording historical events about Christ's early life. But it does presuppose a record of the historical event of Christ's death; and that record is stated in propositions.

To take another example, Hick is quite correct in asserting that Isaiah's inaugural vision (Isaiah 6) was a matter of what Isaiah saw, heard, and felt. (Thus Isaiah writes: 'I saw the Lord sitting on a throne..' 'I heard the voice of the Lord...) In order to be communicated the vision was described in propositions. And granted the fact that Isaiah wrote a book about his vision and did not describe it in pictorial or other form, if I am to come to know the God to which the Old Testament bears witness, I must read the propositions Isaiah wrote, and reinterpret them in terms of how I can come to experience God. Isaiah's experience cannot be communicated to me as a sort of pure experience independently of some form of communication.

Propositions then were, as a matter of fact, used to communicate God's revelation in the Old and New Testaments.

There do seem to be some uses of the word 'know' in which what is known is not something directly experienced in the sense that I am now directly experiencing a white blur, and yet is not an inferred entity either. I know that in 1917 the Bolsheviks staged a revolution in Russia, but I did not experience the revolution in the way, for example, I experienced the Cuban revolution. In the latter case, I saw pictures in the paper and on television, and I heard and read news reports and so on. Again, I did not experience the Cuban revolution in the way I have experienced the student revolution in Durham in 1968. In this case, I saw the 'Sit In' in Old Shire Hall.

In other words, there is not an impassible gulf between inferred entities on the one hand and experience on the other: such a rigid distinction between the two cannot be upheld. The two extremes of sub-atomic particles and my seeing a red patch now are distinct, but 'experience' and entities supposedly inferred from such experience tend to become fairly inseparable, in knowledge of the past, in knowledge of concepts, and in knowledge of the future. But Hick confuses his whole analysis by pretending that 'experience' and entities inferred from experience are totally distinct and separate, and then extending his first use of the word 'experience' to cover what is not in any sense neat experience.

Hick claims that there is no difference in principle between learning to recognize a fork and learning to recognize God. He writes: 'I shall try to show while the object of religious knowledge is unique, its basic epistemological pattern is that of all our knowing.'[10] The great difficulty is to discover

what exactly Hick means by experiencing a fork. To elucidate his belief that concepts are dispositional capacities, Hick uses examples drawn from Wittgenstein's discussion of 'seeing as' in the *Philosophical Investigations*.[11] Jastrow's duck-rabbit can be seen as either the head of a duck or the head of a rabbit.



Wittgenstein argues that in the case of puzzle pictures the interpretation of the lines and marks on the paper is not an additional fact about the picture. The person, who can distinguish nothing in the above diagram, sees the same lines and marks as the person who can see it as a duck, or as a rabbit, or as both of these. The 'seeing as' element in the perception of the puzzle pictures adds no additional fact, and is not produced by any additional fact in the puzzle picture. Thus Wittgenstein writes:'...but what I perceive in the dawning of an aspect is not a property of an object, but an internal relation between it and other objects.'[12]

As applied to puzzle pictures, these points are quite acceptable and unexceptionable. Hick, however, extends the notion of 'seeing as' in two ways.

Firstly, he extends the notion of 'seeing as' to that of 'experiencing as'. Just as I can see this desk as a motor car if I look at it from a certain angle, so I can hear the sound of my cat mewing as the whistle of my best friend, or smell the decaying of old fish as the fermenting of beer. The sense of sight has no monopoly in providing information about the external world, and I think Hick is quite justified in extending the idea of 'seeing as' to the other senses.

Secondly, Hick suggests that 'all seeing is "seeing as"' and 'all experiencing is "experiencing as".' Hick asserts:

> The next point to be introduced will considerably affect the upshot of what has gone before. This is the thesis that all experiencing is experiencing-as...not only, for example, seeing the tuft of grass, erroneously, as a rabbit, but also seeing it correctly as a tuft of grass.[13]

But can all experiencing meaningfully be regarded as experiencing-as?

Hick admits that it is necessary to draw the distinction between objects which we experience as something other than they are, (e.g. a tuft of grass as a rabbit), and objects we experience as what we normally describe them as being (e.g. experience a tuft of grass as a tuft of grass). There is a type distinction between these two cases. In the first case (i.e. when I experience a tuft of grass as a rabbit), there are two possibilities:

(*a*) I may be deceived by the appearance and believe that there is a rabbit where there is only a tuft of grass;
(*b*) I may know that the tuft of grass is not really a rabbit, but see the likeness of a rabbit in its appearance.

Both these instances differ from my seeing the tuft of grass as what it is, a tuft of grass.

It is hard to see what Hick gains by his linguistic recommendation that we begin to regard all experiencing as 'experiencing-as'. If everything we experience is 'experienced as', then it will be necessary to introduce further terminology to distinguish those 'experiencing as' situation in which something is 'experienced as' other than it is from those situations in which something is 'experienced as' what it actually is. The linguistic recommendation only generates a more complicated terminology than the terminology it is recommended to replace. Hick certainly seems to be misinterpreting Wittgenstein in making 'experiencing as' do the job which the word experiencing normally does. Wittgenstein was quite categorical: '"Seeing as..." is not part of perception. And for that reason it is like seeing and again not like.'[14]

What is Hick trying to do with the notion of experience? He is trying, as I indicated earlier, to divorce 'experience' from any propositional element, or element of judgment. To experience *X* is no guarantee that I will logically be able to judge that *X* or state that *X*. But if the possibility about making a judgment about an experience is removed, is not the possibility of my saying that a given experience is true or false also removed? Despite his claims to be an empiricist, Hick seems to be attempting to make the paradigm of experience, those experiences which can neither be said to be true or false, veridical or non-veridical. Thus:

> Faith is an uncompelled mode of "experiencing as"...experiencing the world as a place in which we have to do at all times with the transcendent God; and the propositional belief to which it gives rise is correspondingly non-coercive in that it is not only presently unverifiable but also unable to be supported by arguments of probability.[15]

But if faith is the result of some sort of experience which is neither verifiable nor falsifiable in this life, what logical status does it have? Is the experience which faith gives us of the same status as my seeing a patch of red? The statement 'I see red now' may be incorrigible, but it has to buy this incorrigibility at the price of being uninformative about the world. Hick tells us that 'for to the believer faith is not probability but a certainty.'[16] We are never told, however, what sort of certainty faith gives us, and it very much looks as though it is that type of certainty in which problems of ontology are submerged in some sort of self-authenticating epistemology.

This assimilation of experiencing to 'experiencing as' is matched in its

obscurity by Hick's exposition of the theory that concepts are dispositional capacities. He is quite correct, I think, to follow Wittgenstein, Ryle, and Price in affirming that there is not necessarily some sort of ghostly mental activity going on, every time I recognise an object, or perform an action. I do not need to put every action I do into a propositional form in my mind before I perform it. When I want to turn my car to the right, I do not need to utter in my head the Highway Code formula, 'mirror-signal-manoeuvre', before turning right. Knowing what to do in this instance is being able to perform the necessary actions correctly. Similarly, in recognizing a pre-1958-Morris Minor, I don't need to perform an intellectual somersault, and run through the details in my mind of what such a car looks like, before I do the recognizing. If I did, I would need to perform a second-order intellectual act in order to recognize the first one, and so on *ad infinitum*. If questioned as to how I know that this car is a pre-1958 Morris Minor, I can reply, because it has a flat radiator grill, a windscreen divided into two halves, a solid chassis, and so on. A thorough check of my act of recognition does involve the drawing up of this type of list. But my initial recognition is not an intellectual list making of this sort.

Hick seems to me correct in affirming that recognizing and thinking are not ghostly replicas of experiencing and sensing; and I do not wish to deny the value of his dispositional analysis of knowing God. But he is wrong in supposing that sensing and experiencing are in no way connected with judging, and the use of propositions. As in the case discussed above of 'experiencing as', Hick here also seems to wish to place whatever we do when we recognize and experience beyond the range of cognitive empirical checking, safely out of the way of the dangers of the demand for verification or falsification.

There is practically no discussion in Hick of problems about misrecognizing, and 'mis-experiencing as'. The fact that concepts are recognitional capacities provides no guarantee that I use the concepts I have learnt correctly. For example, when C.S. Lewis's book, *A Grief Observed*, first came out, I misrecognized the title, (despite the fact that I read the book from cover to cover) as *A Grief Obscured*. Everytime I looked at the cover of the book, because I expected to see the words of the title I had invented, I saw that title and not the correct one. This mis-recognition went on for several weeks, until, when I discussed the book with a friend, my mistake was pointed out. Hick seems to be attempting to produce a theory of how we experience or recognize which at one and the same time avoids the appeal for verification, and is still sturdy enough to provide us with knowledge about nature, man and God.

The description which Hick provides of the processes by means of which we acquire religious belief may or may not be correct. But the truth content of a given set of religious beliefs is not specified by means of such a phenomenology. To say all concepts are recognitional capacities, does not tell me which concepts are instantiated and which are not. The fact that in seeing

my desk, I see my desk, and not a proposition or set of propositions, does not mean that judgment and experience are two separate and totally unrelated things. As G.N.A. Vesey put it: 'The look of things is something phenomenal, not intellectual. This is not to deny that experience and judgement are connected: for what an object looks like to a person is what he would judge that object to be if he had reason to judge otherwise.'[17]

Hick attempts to strip recognition of its propositional, and intellectual elements, and leaves it as a non-cognitive act. In *Thinking and Experience*,[18] H.H. Price distinguishes between the recognition of individuals, and the recognition of characteristics. Individuals are such things as tables, cats and men, etc. Characteristics are blueness, heaviness, hardness, etc. Price regards the recognition of the characteristics as in some sense fundamental, in that the recognition of the individual is in the end dependent on the recognition of the characteristic. There is a sense in which the recognition of the individual is inferred from that of the characteristic; yet inferred is not quite the right word. There is no formal and or conscious process of inference, but rather an 'all at once character' of secondary recognition. But Price claims 'secondary recognition is always subject to verification (that is how its fallibility is discovered) and in this respect it really does resemble inductive inference.'[19]

Hick seems to want to get rid of this appeal for verification at an ordinary empirical level in this world, in order that he can introduce his 'eschatological verification' at a later stage.

Hick's claim that there is 'no difference in principle between learning to recognize a fork and learning to recognize acts of God,'[20] falls to pieces at this point. If I recognize that this is a fork, I can also verify that this is a fork here and now. But for Hick this is not true of my recognition of God, because I have to wait until I die before I can verify that He is God. It is not accidental that the notions of verification and falsification are hardly mentioned in Hick's discussion of our knowledge of forks, rabbits and tufts of grass. But if our acts of knowing material objects, and our acts of knowing God are to be shown to be epistemologically similar, then either there must be some verification procedure, at least in principle, for verifying there is a God here and now, or ordinary material objects, which we know and recognize, must not be verifiable in principle in this life. Hick takes the latter course, despite its utter counter-empirical emphasis.

A further puzzling feature of Hick's phenomenology of religious belief is his use of the puzzle picture examples. The religious interpretation of the universe is regarded rather like Jastrow's duck-rabbit puzzle picture in the sense that just as both interpretations of the puzzle picture are equally valid, so the theistic or atheistic interpretations of the universe are equally valid. But why is only one type of puzzle picture, the totally ambiguous one, suitable as the model for the religious interpretation of the universe? Further, if the duck-rabbit is the correct model for religious epistemology, can I be said

to know of God and to know of a fork in the same way? A fork is not ambiguously a fork and something else at one and the same time.

The puzzle picture analogy is illustrated by the parable of two men on a road, one of whom thinks that the road is just 'one damn'd thing after another', yet the other thinks it is a road to the celestial city. Life 'in via' has this total ambiguity: only when they come to their journey's end will they discover which guess at the way the road went was correct. Here Hick seems to be taking up the position of a hypothetical impartial observer: if Hick's phenomenological analysis of religious belief is correct, then there is no rational way of choosing between the Christian and non-Christian view of the universe. But, as Hick recognizes, both Christians and non-Christians do claim to know that their beliefs are true. But, further, Hick claims that he knows Christianity is true: 'For to the believer faith is not a possibility but a certainty.'[21] The initial scepticism about the Christian interpretation of life is not genuine. The use of the puzzle picture analogy as a model for religious belief does not in the end help to evade issues of truth and falsity. Even within the puzzle picture universe of discourse, some interpretations of the puzzle picture are correct, others are incorrect. I can interpret the duck-rabbit as a duck, or as a rabbit, or as both, but it would certainly be wrong to interpret it as an elephant, or as a kangaroo. But Hick offers no criteria for distinguishing the correct interpretations of puzzle pictures from incorrect ones. To quote G.N.A. Vesey again: 'To say "all seeing is seeing as"', is to say that perceptions like judgments are either true or false... they are true when what the object looks like to somebody is what the object is.'[22]

2. The Impossibility of Alogical Probability

Most of what Hick has to say about the impossibility of applying the notion of probability to the universe as a whole, I am in full agreement with. But one of his arguments[23] seems to make impossible any type of Christian apologetic, in this life, or in any other. In discussing F.R. Tennant's two-volume work, on *Philosophical Theology*, he writes:

> The standard naturalistic theories do indeed display serious inconsistencies and inadequacies under examination, and these can be exposed by arguments which are as valid for the unbeliever as for the religious believer. But in the constructive apologetic, the method changes, overtly, or covertly, from impersonal demonstration to personal persuasion, from argument to recommendation. For there are no common scales in which to measure, for example, the evidential weight of apparent universal mechanism against that of the impact of Christ upon his disciples. There is no objective measuring rod by which to compare the depth to which wickedness can sink with the height to which goodness can rise, and so to balance the problem of evil which challenges theism, against

> the problem of good which challenges naturalism. Looked at in a completely neutral light, and through the spectacles of no philosophy, the face of the world would present a checkboard of alternative black and white. It can be seen either as white diversified by black—a divinely ruled world containing accidental pockets of evil; or as black diversified by white—a godless world containing the incongruous factor of moral goodness.[24]

This is an interesting argument, but if it is correct two moves Hick might want to make are ruled out. Firstly, it makes any Irenacan type of theodicy in this life logically impossible, because I cannot weigh the value of soul making against the existence of the vast amount of evil there is in the world. Secondly, if I logically cannot weigh the existence of evil against the fact of Christ and so on in this life, it will not be logically possible in an eschatological world either. Now what God is like is presumably determined in part by what he is allowing to happen in this world here and now. But if I can never weigh up these incommensurables, I can never know in an after-life whether the being before me, whom others worship, is an all-loving God, or nothing but a devil.

Hick gets round my first point by doing at a level of theodicy what in *Faith and Knowledge* he does at the level of epistemology: he places the resolution of the problem of suffering in an after-life, and not in this one. Thus: 'If there is any eventual resolution of the interplay between good and evil, any decisive bringing of good out of evil, it must lie beyond this world and beyond the enigma of death.'[25] This invulnerability of belief in this world can be brought only at a high price: 'Experienced from within stresses of human existence, evil is a sheerly malevolent reality, hostile alike to God and His creation.'[26] Just as in the case of epistemology in this life, the evidence is equally in favour of the theist and the atheist, so in the case of theodicy the evidence for and against the existence of a loving God is totally ambiguous.

In the same paragraph as the latter passage however, Hick writes:

> Seen...in the perspective of a living faith in the reality of a great, ongoing, divine purpose which enfolds all time and all history, evil has no status in virtue of which it might threaten even God Himself...neither its beginning, its course, nor its end lies outside God's ultimate control.[27]

But, if I can see the resolution of the problem of evil in the after-life only, how can I assert anything about God's ultimate purpose for, or control of the world from the standpoint in which I am placed in this life? Hick's claim that in this life we do not know God because of the ambiguity of the evidence, again turns out to be a sham.

Hick's theodicy does presuppose, nevertheless, that when I die and live with my resurrection body, I will see that God's ultimate purpose, not only for me, but for the whole of mankind was and is good. But this presupposes that in the after-life I can weigh the pros and cons for and against God's goodness. If I cannot see whether or not the fact of Christ outweighs the problem of evil and so on, my after-life experience of religion will remain as systematically ambiguous as it is at present. If the pieces of evidence against and in favour of God's goodness are in principle incommensurable as Hick suggests, then no theodicy is ever possible, and cognitive knowledge of God is logically impossible, in the present and in the hereafter. But if evidence can be weighed in the after-life, why is it in principle impossible that some of the weighing should be done in this life?

People as a matter of fact can and do weigh the evidences for and against the existence of a good God against each other. The existence of the weighing process is no guarantee that it is logically justifiable. Hick, however, seems to suppose that unless there is a strict objective means of measuring the existence of evil against the fact of Christ and so on, no sort of measurement is possible. But consider the utilitarian system of ethics. In this ethical system, there is no strict and rigid measuring rod by means of which I can measure the pleasure I can get from a short sharp tickle, against that which I get from a lethargic throbbing tranquility. Or, more seriously, there is no metre rod provided for me to measure whether the telling of lies will cause more unhappiness for the greatest number, than telling the truth. Most human beings are utilitarians some of the time, and we manage to make rule of thumb calculations about what the greatest happiness of the greatest number will be, without there being any need for what Hick would call a strict objective measure. Likewise, in the case of Hick's scales, people can and do in their own consideration of their religious beliefs compare the fact of Christ with the existence of evil. Hick has a point in suggesting that any system of weighing we employ in this world will always be provisional and incomplete; but it is better to use inadequate tools, when they are the only tools we have got, than no tools at all.

3. The Three Decker Universe

'Experiencing as' is not just a chance recognition of individual phenomena. What we 'experience' can, Hick suggests, be divided into three distinct but interrelated areas: the natural, the moral and the religious. In each of the three spheres I come to know about the material world, morals or religion by the same epistemological process; that of 'experiencing as'. The three spheres are not distinct and separate, but interpenetrate each other. Hick claims that the natural aspects of our environment are the most basic, they force themselves on us whether we want to believe in them or not. I cannot help but believe, except when for a few minutes I play the part of a sceptical

philosopher, that there is a room in which I spend most of my waking life, and that in it are a desk, bed, chair, and many books. The moral aspects of our environment presuppose the natural, in that moral action always occurs so far as we know, within and through the natural world. I have relative freedom in the moral sphere, in that I can choose whether I want to steal or to be honest, to murder or to live at peace with my neighbours. If I am to live in a society of any sort, I have to adopt some moral code, however rudimentary, even if it is only to preserve honour among thieves. In the religious sphere which presupposes both the moral and the natural, freedom is the greatest. I can accept or reject God as I see fit. Hick argues:

> Has this epistemological peradigm—of one order of significance superimposed upon and mediated through another—any further application? The contention of this chapter is that it has. As ethical significance interpenetrates natural significance, so religious significance interpenetrates both ethical and natural. The divine is the highest and ultimate order of significance, mediating neither of the others, and yet being mediated through both of them.[28]

What does Hick mean by the metaphor 'interpenetrate'? What exactly are the relations between the three levels: the natural, the moral, and the religious? To say they 'interpenetrate' each other without unpacking what the word means is to say nothing. What, if any, are the logical relations between statements about the moral and the natural spheres? What are the logical relations between statements about the moral and the natural spheres, and statements about the religious spheres? Hick offers no answer to these questions; but if the claim that all the three spheres are in fact known in the same way is to be anything more than a statement about our psychology, isn't it necessary to have at least some knowledge of how statements about the three spheres are logically related?

But granted that it is the case that the religious, the moral and the natural aspects of our experience do have a common epistemology, how do we know that the concepts we have been taught to use in each of these three spheres do in fact refer to something actual? Even if we grant that in the natural and the moral sphere we have developed a set of concepts which we know how to apply reasonably correctly, yet the concepts are becoming progressively more and more general as we pass from the natural to the moral and then on to the religious; and is there any guarantee that by the time we reach the religious sphere the concepts have not become so general that they cease to have meaningful application? I know what it is like to see a table; I also know what it is like to 'see' stealing is wrong; I do not know nearly so clearly what it means to say that I 'see' God. At this more general level of recognition, Hick still seems to evade the issue of how I can distinguish recognition from misrecognition. As I stressed earlier, I can be taught a whole series

of coherent concepts, e.g. medieval views about witchcraft, which we know now don't apply to anything. How, on Hick's analysis, do we know that the Christian conceptual system describing God is not in a similar position?

4. Eschatological Verification

Hick seems determined to put all his eggs in one basket: any possible solution both to problems about the verification of religious belief, and to problems of theodicy can, logically, be solved only in some after-life.

The theory of eschatological verification takes the final step in the attempt to reduce ontology to psychology. The logical and psychological factors involved in verification and falsification are inseparable. That *X* has been verified or falsified, means that *X* has been verified or falsified by someone.

> I suggest that "verify" be construed as a verb which has its primary uses in the active voice: I verify, you verify, we verify, they verify, or have verified. The impersonal passive, it is verified, now becomes logically secondary.[29]

If meaning is identified with the possibility of verification, this statement will lead to phenomenalism of a very radical kind, and make the process of verification and falsification largely mind-dependent. Surely, it is perfectly meaningful to say 'there is a stone of Mars which no living person will ever see.' Further, it is meaningful to claim that 'there is a stone on Mars which no human being could possibly see'; e.g. in the sense that there may be so many stones on Mars that even all the human beings who eventually land on Mars all working together could not see every stone. These two statements are verifiable in principle however, in the sense that we know what it is like to see a stone, and by analogy can postulate what it would be like to see any given stone on Mars.

Hick attempts to get round the charges that theological statements are not meaningful because they are not verifiable in principle, by suggesting that in one sense they are. Although we cannot, because of God's being God, 'see' God in this life, in an after-life we can expect to be confronted face to face with God, or at least with God as revealed in Christ Jesus. The possibility of such a confrontation tells us what it is like to verify in principle the statement 'there is a God'. But is some sort of verification in an after-life a genuine suggestion about verification in principle?

Suppose someone says: 'I believe the surface of Pluto consists of rock and stone.' This statement is verifiable in principle, in that we know what it would be like to land a spaceship of Pluto, and to send back television pictures from Pluto, and eventually for the men to return in their spaceship. The problem about verification in principle, is that it is an after-life, and not in this life. In an after-life, there is no sending back of television pictures,

no return to earth for the weary travellers. I do not think verification in principle can be extended to apply to an after-life, the nature of which we cannot specify clearly but which might not exist. In the case of Pluto, we can at least verify that there is such a planet in which to look for stones; we cannot verify that there is an after-life in which we are to look for God.

Hick does offer some suggestions as to what the after-life may be like. He suggests the analogy of a man in Princeton who suddenly finds himself in Australia with the same body, the same memory contents and the same remains in his stomach as the man who disappeared in Princeton. (But isn't part of what we mean by saying someone is the 'same' person that this being lives in space and time in a certain way.) Hick appeals to ordinary language and asserts that if persons habitually changed inexplicably from place to place, or from this world to the next world, then our use of the word 'person' and the word 'same' would become enlarged in such a way that we would say that a person who at one moment is in Princeton, and who at the next mement is in Sydney, would be referred to as the 'same' person. This claim about the development of ordinary language in this situation may be true; but only experience of such a situation can show that it is true. But the language change might go against Hick. If frequent changes of place occurred to persons, we might decide to give them a new proper name every time such a change occurred.

A difficulty which Hick acknowledges in his position is that even if we do survive death, the evidence for and against the existence of God may be as systematically ambiguous as it is in this life. My awareness of having survived death, in an by itself, provides evidence for the statement that there is life after death, but it provides no evidence for the existence of God. Saying what would verify the statement 'God exists' in some hypothetical after-life is as hard as making a similar specification in this life. The problem is just pushed one stage further back.

It is easy enough to assert a somewhat superficial summary of St. Paul's view in *I Corinthians* that in this life we have a material body, and in some future state we will have a resurrection body. But if the resurrection body is to be a means of verifying God's existence, I must know in some detail what it is like, and how it perceives what it perceives. (Suppose that the resurrection body could perceive nothing but its own states of self-consciousness, the self being distinguished from the not-self, by the memory of there having been a self...non-self distinction in the material world). In such a situation I could know nothing except (*i*) that I once existed in the material world; (*ii*) that now I exist, but can only remember what I once experienced, but can no longer experience any new data.[30] Even if we grant that a 'resurrection' body in some sense identifies and reidentifies 'resurrection' objects as things other than itself, the problem still remains: what evidence would verify or falsify God's existence in this state? This is a question to which Hick seems prepared to offer no serious answer.

I think that Hick cannot escape the charge or circularity of argument. I think Kai Nielson stresses the wrong point in saying that the circularity occurs when Hick suggests that God's existence in the after-life would be verified if (*a*) we saw the completion of God's purpose as disclosed in Jesus Christ in the New Testament; (*b*) an eschatological confirmation of Jesus and hence of his revelation of God.[31] Surely, Hick's argument becomes circular at the point at which he starts discussing Paul's notion of a 'resurrection' body. The resurrection of the body is not something according to Paul which we achieve for ourselves, or do by our own cleverness or ingenuity. God raises us from the dead by His own gracious act, as He raised Christ from the dead.

> But some one will ask "How are the dead raised? With what kind of body do they come?" You foolish man. What you sow does not come to life unless it dies...But God gives it a body as He has chosen, and to each kind of seed its own body...But thanks be to God who gives us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.[32]

If, however, it is God's gracious action which raises us into a resurrection body, no part of this process can be appealed to as evidence in principle for the existence of God, without obvious circularity.

5. Two Uses of the Phrase 'To Know' in Hick's Epistemology of Religion

Hick claims: 'It is not being denied here that the religious man already enjoys a genuine knowledge of God; it is not being suggested that he has to wait until after death to find with certainty whether God exists.'[33] I wish to argue that the major problem in Hick's epistemology of religious belief is that I am said to 'know' God in this life in a logically different sort of way from the way I am said to 'know' God in the life hereafter.

Hick is making a valid theological point in his statement of his theory of eschatological verification. This point is that my knowledge of God in this life is always and can only be provisional. Our knowledge of God will only start to become complete when in the after-life faith is changed into sight.

I wish to take issue with Hick when he claims that our partial knowledge of God in this life is of a logically different order from our knowledge of Him hereafter. Our knowledge of God in the present, and in any future life we may live to experience, is of logically the same type. Although Hick probably does not intend this to be the case, his analysis of our knowledge of God in this life, seems in the end to be non-cognitive. This is shown by his repeated refusal to describe the criteria for distinguishing between 'experiencing as' and 'mis-experiencing as', between recognizing and misrecog-

nizing. His refusal to allow what Price refers to as 'secondary identification', seems to force him to place the basic data of religious experience on the same logical level as that of sense data. I cannot doubt that I see a red blur, but this incorrigibility is bought at the price of this experience being unable to tell me anything about the outside world. Hick shows a desire to produce a set of basic experiences of religious awareness, which are beyond the pale of doubt and falsification, and yet on which can be built the whole complicated framework of Christian theology and worship. Hick attempts, in fact, to prize apart experience from judgment, concept recognition from concept verification.

Faith and Knowledge looks like an attempt to invert the popular notion of Aquinas' views on religious belief.[34] The crude popular interpretation of Aquinas asserts that faith in propositions is the only sort of faith we can reach up to in this life; only in an after-life do we experience God. Hick comes very close to asserting that we have to wait until the after-life to have propositional and therefore cognitive knowledge of God: in this life all we can get is 'experiencing as'. Therefore, despite explicit denial, he produces a perfect example of an infallibilist theory of knowledge. We can really know God only when we find ourselves in an after-life: but this is putting us in a position where we cannot be mistaken.

Notes

1. *Faith and Knowledge* (2nd ed.), 1967.
2. John Hick, Religious Faith as "Experiencing as" in *Talk of God*, p. 21 'Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, Vol. II, 1967-68.
3. *In Faith and Knowledge*, Chap. 1, *passim*.
4. *Summa Theologica*, Pt. II, II Question 1 (English Dominican trans.), 1901, p. 6.
5. *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Vernon J. Bourke (trans.), Bk. III, Chap. 152, Image Books, pp. 236-37.
6. *Questiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei*, 7, 5, Ad. 14.
7. *Summa Theologica*, I.I. 9, (New Dominican trans.), pp. 33 and 35.
8. *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Vernon J. Bourke (trans.), Bk. III, Chap. 154, Image Books, p. 239.
9. John Baillie in *Our Knowledge of God*, demolishes the theistic proofs by means of a similar argument.
10. *Faith and Knowledge*, p. 97.
11. Pt. II, Sec. II.
12. *Philosophical Investigations*, Pt. II, p. 212e.
13. *Op. cit.*, *Talk of God*, p. 24.
14. *Philosophical Investigations*, Pt. II, p. 197e.
15. *Faith and Knowledge*, p. 151.
16. *Op. cit.*, p. 53.
17. 'Seeing and Seeing As' in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1955-56.
18. Chap. 2.
19. *Thinking and Experience*, p. 51.

20. Notes on Hick's Lectures, Cambridge, 1967.
21. *Faith and Knowledge*, p. 53.
22. 'Seeing and Seeing As', in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1955-56, p. 114.
23. *Faith and Knowledge*, Chap. 7.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 155-56.
25. *Evil and the God of Love*, p. 375.
26. *Op. cit.*, p. 395.
27. *Op. cit.*, p. 395.
28. *Faith and Knowledge*, p. 113.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 170-71.
30. See an analogous suggestion for a disembodied, as distinct from an embodied self, in P.F. Strawson, *Individuals*, pp. 115-16.
31. Nielson, *Canadian Journal of Theology*, XVIII No. 4, 1960. Also, Hick, pp. 196 ff. in *Faith and Knowledge*.
32. I Corinthians 15.v 35+36; 38, 57.
33. *Faith and Knowledge*, p. 193.
34. Cf. *Faith and Knowledge*, Chap. 9, p. 200, *passim*.

Grammar, communicative function and the growth of language

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This paper deals with some theoretical issues relating to the Chomskian notion of grammar, or linguistic competence, the parallel notion of communicative competence, and the nature of relationship that can be postulated between man's communicative abilities and the theoretical notion of grammar. More specifically, it proceeds from an examination of the logical arguments which are often advanced in order to show that a communication-based approach to the study of man's linguistic capacity is not only possible but is, in fact, more explanatory than an approach based exclusively on the formal properties of language to an examination of relevant evidence from the ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of language which is often cited in support of such a view. It goes on to conclude that communication-based approaches to the growth of language, both in their ontogenetic and phylogenetic forms, suffer from some basic infirmities, and that they are unlikely to provide a plausible alternative to the grammar-based approach in the foreseeable future.[1]

Any study that takes up for discussion the relevance of the communicative approach to the study of human language must start by doing two things: (*a*) define 'communication' and (*b*) define 'human language'. It is then compelled to discuss whether, and if so in what way, the defining principles of communication are involved essentially in the definition of human language. This is particularly important today since the view that communication is an essential function of language and that the nature of language cannot be understood without taking into account this essential function is under a serious challenge from the theory of language propounded by Chomsky. Chomsky, of course, does not underrate the value of communication studies *per se*, nor does he dispute the importance that pragmaticists currently attach to studies in communicative behaviour. However, he makes it quite clear that he regards all such studies of verbal interaction as falling in the domain of 'the use of language', which he distinguishes from the domain of 'the knowledge of language'. Both these domains (and a third one: how does the knowledge of language develop?) belong to the study of language (see, e.g. Chomsky 1981: 32). Chomsky further holds that knowledge of language is independent of its use, by which he means that we can specify what constitutes knowledge of language (and therefore 'language' in its most important sense of a code) without referring to the various uses to which

this knowledge is put. He also says that the use of language plays only the activating role in the acquisition of this knowledge by the child, and probably played a correspondingly unimportant role in the phylogenetic growth of language in man. Chomsky tries to establish his position both empirically and conceptually: empirically, by specifying the knowledge of language in man with the help of principles which owe nothing to man's communicative abilities and, conceptually, by defending (against Searle, 1972, 1976) the notion of the autonomy of formal grammar and arguing not only that it is possible to formulate the principles of grammar (in its wide sense including rules of phonology and semantics) without recourse to notions like 'communication-intention,' 'function', etc. but that any theory of grammar (meaning, etc.) based on such notions must, directly or indirectly, presuppose the notion of a linguistic rule, or linguistic meaning. Both these approaches have important bearing on the theme of the present paper and I shall refer to them time and again in the course of my exposition.

Among the views opposed to Chomsky, I shall be concerned with two main types: the first (represented, e.g., by Halliday (1970)) rejects the distinction between knowledge vs. the use of language and holds that the structure of language (which is supposed to represent knowledge) is determined by the functions it performs. I shall be concerned with the latter aspect of this view ('the functionalist hypothesis') more specifically when I examine issues concerning the ontogenetic and phylogenetic growth of language in the latter part of this paper, though the theoretical discussion that presently follows also applies to it in a general way. The second view does not quite reject the competence-performance distinction but takes the view that the notion of competence must be so interpreted as to include 'competence for performance' or ability to use language. This view is held or implied in works like Hymes (1972), Gordon and Lakoff (1971), Ross (1975), Searle (1972) and several others. It is to this latter view that I shall turn my attention first.

Chomsky later (1980: 59) realized that the seed of this latter view was contained in his use of the term 'competence', which also implies ability. The fact, however, that he never intended it to be interpreted in this way is clear from his frequent identification of grammar with competence; at any rate, the association between competence and ability is one that he would like to sever. Competence, as he has now stated quite clearly, refers to knowledge of the language, where 'knowledge' is characterized not by a capacity or ability to do something, or a system of dispositions of some kind, but by a mental state, or 'a mental structure consisting of a system of rules and principles that generate and relate mental representations of various types.' Thus, knowing English is a mental state. This mental state represents a kind steady state which is reached by the mind starting from the initial state and passing through a succession of states during which the initial state interacts with experience. The initial state of the mind is common to all members of

the human species, and is attributable to genetically determined neurological structures. This initial state is characterized by certain rules and principles which may be peculiar to the language faculty, or which, more probably, overlap with rules and principles which enter into other cognitive faculties of man. These rules and principles are collectively characterized as Universal Grammar (UG).

This revised account of 'knowledge of language', of course, does not *a priori* exclude the incorporation of those generalizations concerning the interactions of syntax with context (verbal and non-verbal) which communication-theorists, sociolinguists, pragmaticists, sociologists of language and a host of other people set great store with. Some of these generalizations may be raised to the level of universals, and thus become candidates for rules or principles for universal grammar. It must, however, be noted that the fact that the competence for the appropriate use of language (let us call it 'pragmatic competence') may be characterized by a 'certain system of constitutive rules' is by itself not enough to give it a place in the initial structure, or the UG. The issue must be settled empirically, i.e. by proposing theories of both and checking them against a range of facts for descriptive and explanatory adequacy. The present position in this regard is that whereas Chomsky has been able to propose some very abstract but very specific principles which could be considered to characterize the initial mental structure (which have the further characteristic that they abstract away from, and thus allow for, the subsequent interactional development of features specific to individual languages), the rules of pragmatic competence are still stated in terms of the speaker's beliefs, intentions, knowledge, etc. which are hard to translate in terms of formal principles of cognitive structure. Though the issue regarding the place of pragmatic principles in Universal Grammar must be left open for empirical proof, there is some reason to believe that an alternative theory of this kind is unlikely to be forthcoming. The reason may be traced to the essentially inductive nature of pragmatic generalizations. To instantiate with the example of the speech-act theory, the set of conditions that is said to be necessary and sufficient for the performance of a speech-act like promising or asserting is an extrapolation from a number of acts of promising and asserting. This seems to reflect the fact that a child learns the rules for promising, asserting, etc. from a set of examples, and, in fact, the child passes through stages when a full appreciation of what it means to make a promise is not available to him and has often to be imparted through conscious training. As compared to the case of the acquisition of grammar, where, as has been repeatedly demonstrated, the stimulus is highly inadequate and utterly insufficient to explain the range and complexity of the structures and representations acquired, examples of pragmatic competence often involve cases in which learning replaces acquisition and training plays the crucial role. Given a set of speech-acts of a particular type, it is, therefore, possible to formulate their constitutive rules by inductive generalization,

but the rules and principles which characterize the knowledge of linguistic structure are, as Chomsky has repeatedly emphasized and demonstrated, impossible to learn inductively and must therefore be supposed to arise innately.

It is possible to go on to provide evidence from various areas like language acquisition, aphasia, etc. to show why the notion 'knowledge of language' must be limited in a way that excludes ability for use, but it will suffice to refer to relevant chapters in Chomsky's *Reflections on Language* or *Rules and Representations*. The purpose of introducing the foregoing discussion was only to prepare the ground for a discussion of the difficulties which one must face who, like the theorists of communicative or pragmatic competence, shares Chomsky's belief in the uniqueness of human language but at the same time holds a view of competence which (unlike Chomsky's) incorporates elements of communicative, or pragmatic, ability.

Chomsky has repeatedly denied that communication is an essential function of language. Language, he points out, is used to serve many functions, e.g. transmitting information, expressing thoughts, lying, play, establishing personal relations, creating poetry, arousing emotions, indicating class backgrounds, etc. and there is no reason to regard any one particular function as essential. All these functions are of interest to different people in different ways, but none of them is essential (in the sense of providing an explanation) to the study of language structure or form. To use the analogy provided by Searle (1972), while it may be useful to know that the function of the heart is to pump blood, it does not completely explain why the heart has the structure it has or why it develops in the same way in every individual. The heart develops because the genetic programme determines that it will develop as it does. Consequently its structure and development can be stated quite independently of its function. Language can be similarly viewed as a mental organ, the structure and development of which can be studied independently of its function.

An unfortunate move, often made by communication-theorists (e.g. Strawson, 1971: 107), is to say that communication includes communication with oneself. This is apparently done in their anxiety to account for self-expression, an important function of language. The move robs the notion of communication of whatever interest it has (Chomsky, 1975a: 57), since if communication includes self-expression and verbal interaction includes interaction with oneself, then monologue is no different from dialogue, and the Chomskian characterization of language already includes the 'dialogic' or 'interactional' perspective which some (e.g. Bruner, 1975, 1979, 1981, Ervin-Tripp and Miller, 1977, Macnamara, 1977, etc.) consider to be the essential point of difference between the grammar-based acquisition theory and the communication-based theory.

Let us now turn to the notion of interpersonal communication and ask in what sense it is essential to language. The philosophical answer to this

question generally makes reference to the evolution of language. Thus, Strawson (1971: 94 ff.) argues that any attempt to elaborate the notion of communication-intention which does not presuppose the notion of linguistic meaning must take the route from pre-conventional communication. This is because we cannot start with the assumption that man had complicated communication-intentions before he had the linguistic means to fulfil those intentions. The notion of 'pre-conventional communication' satisfies both requirements of the communication-theorist: there is a communication-intention but no pre-existing communication-intention to fulfil it. Pre-conventional communication succeeds by accident, but once it has succeeded it sets up a precedent. An utterance which was at first accidentally taken to mean *that P* comes to mean *that P*. As Strawson puts it: 'Because it has worked, it becomes established; and then it works *because* it is established.' This story can be elaborated to involve larger groups of people on the one hand, and structured utterances on the other. Nor is the story merely a philosopher's fancy: anthropologists (e.g. Pfeffer, 1969: Ch. 21; Hockett, 1960; Hockett and Ascher, 1964) have actually suggested that this is how language may have evolved in man.

Now supposing something like this actually happened in the evolution of language, what does it prove? It proves little more than what it says, viz. that the function of communication played a role in the evolution of language among the ancestors of man. That it did not play the determining role is evident from the fact that other species (e.g. gibbons) which make use of verbal calls for rudimentary communication failed to develop language. The question that must be faced is what led to the development of the cognitive structures appropriate to language in man while it failed among other species. The answer must lie in genetic coding. The peculiar mental organization that led to the growth of language among humans is not adequately explained by selectional advantage or survival value of features of communication, though obviously they facilitated the evolution of language. The mental organization and the genetic structure, which determined that organization, evolved in ways, of which we have little or no understanding today; but it seems reasonable to assume, given the generally accepted belief about the insufficiency of the stimulus, that they could not have been fully determined, and cannot, therefore, be fully explained, by elements of the communicative function.

It is useful in this context also to remember that even if we grant a role to communicative function in the phylogenetic development of language, its ontogenetic development (i.e. the development of language in an individual) can hardly be accounted for in the same way. We have cited above some studies which attempt to show that language acquisition in children may be facilitated by the growth of communicative, or interactive, abilities in children soon after birth. These studies argue for a continuity theory of language development in the child. Briefly stated, the idea is that very soon after

birth the infant starts interacting with its mother and other persons in a way (non-verbally, of course) which gives rise to communication acts in which various kinds of roles begin to receive definition, e.g. 'referencer and recipient, demander and complier, seeker and finder, task-initiator and accomplice, actor and prohibitor, etc.'

> A close analysis of the first year of an infant's life provides not only a catalogue of the joint 'formats' in which communicator and recipient habitually find each other, but also provides a vivid record of how roles developed in such formats become conventionalized (Bruner 1979: 70).

Similarly, Bates argues for a continuity theory of development in which no clear line can be drawn between acting on the environment and representing it, and in which propositional structures evolve out of previously acquired performative frames (Dore, 1979a: 346). The view has been labelled as the functionalist hypothesis about the origins of grammar in child language.

We must try to ascertain the precise claims of this hypothesis before proceeding to make comments on them. The hypothesis has two versions.

> The weak version suggests only that surface grammatical devices are 'correlated' with various communicative functions and processing constraints...it makes no statements about the way that children derive or discover surface forms. The strong version goes a step further to suggest that grammatical forms are 'determined' and 'maintained' by these same communicative functions and processing constraints. [It]... leads to a developmental model in which children discover the structure of grammar through their experience with competing communicating factors (Bates and Macwhinney, 1979: 174).

Stated in Chomskian terms, the strong version of the functionalist hypothesis (the weak version is of little interest and is automatically answered when we consider the strong version) must be viewed as a hypothesis about the initial structure, since, if we view it as a hypothesis about the successive or the steady state structures, there is no conflict with the Chomskian theory: both involve parameters which are admittedly influenced by communicative interaction. Bruner goes even further and claims that there is, in fact, no conflict even if the hypothesis is viewed as a hypothesis about initial structure. 'There is nothing in Chomsky's writing that would in any sense deny the role of prelinguistic precursors of prerequisites in aiding acquisition of language' (Bruner 1979: 70). The difference between Chomsky and the functionalists would then be reduced to this: where Chomsky claims that the initial structure is innate, the functionalists would claim it derives from the pressure of communicative factors. As regards the universality of this structure, Bruner argues that 'many of the elaborated forms of mother-infant interdependence

are sufficiently invariant in our species to make inescapable the conclusion that they are in some crucial measure based on innate predispositions' (*op. cit.*: 71). When the problem is stated in this way and what remains to be settled is what it is that is innate—the mental structures or the predispositions of the Brunerian variety—the issue begins to appear to be capable of empirical resolution. It is not denied in the functionalist approach that the communication strategies lead to the building up of a certain kind of cognitive structure which determines the 'encoding decisions' of the child; what is denied is that these encoding decisions are 'based on anything other than these pragmatic and semantic constraints' (Bates and Macwhinney, 1979: 210). In fact, in some accounts, even the autonomy of formal grammar is not denied.

> ...the conclusion that the child eventually ends up with an arbitrarily defined surface structure is quite independent of the claim that he begins with arbitrarily defined syntactic categories. If children in some language communities do arrive at autonomous categories and relations in surface syntax, the functionalist view nevertheless provides a 'natural' route by which children could derive such solutions (*Ibid.*).

The problem, therefore, turns on the empirical question regarding the nature of the principles or structures which are proposed to be innate. In both approaches, the attempt is to maintain a progress from less abstract categories and principles to more abstract ones. This approach has its dangers in the sense that one may be impelled to postulate structures which are so abstract that they cease to have any but the vaguest relationship with the specificity of facts that they are supposed to explain. Functionalist explanations of grammar are prone to fall into this trap, e.g. when grammatical categories like subject-predicate and grammatical devices like ellipsis, pronominalization, initialization, use of articles, etc. are all sought to be related to a single given-new or topic-comment relationship. Theories of a common cognitive space inevitably depend on cross-systemic generalizations of the vaguest kind. The virtue in Chomsky's theory seems precisely that it is unafraid to propose principles and structures specific to a system (viz. language) at the cost of losing functional generalizations, since the latter seem to impose a straitjacket of dogma on free inquiry into the nature of mental structures rather too prematurely. Nor are the functional generalizations lost entirely, since by proposing the theory of modularity, Chomsky allows for interaction of the language faculty with other cognitive faculties like the conceptual faculty or the pragmatic faculty and their various sub-systems (Chomsky, 1980: 90). The steady state in the knowledge of a language is reached only after such interaction has taken place.

Quite apart from this theoretical disadvantage, functionalist explanations also suffer from a methodological weakness. The pre-linguistic vocalizations, and other kinds of behaviour on the part of an infant are largely at the mercy

of the theorist's interpretation. There is, in such a situation, the lurking danger that the theorist may read in the actions of the infant more than what is warranted by the facts. An example of this in Bates is discussed by Dore (1979a: 347). Bates's infant subject, Marta, produced the vocalization *Mm* with long duration and high pitch.

> If the adult responded with something such as *Is this what you want*? while reaching for the requested object, Marta would then grunt *Mm* at a lower pitch of brief duration...If, however, the adult was mistaken in interpreting Marta's needs she would repeat the long *Mm* request with increased pointing and other gestures.

From Marta's vocalization of *Mm*, Bates concludes that the grammatical mood of the imperative can be identified even before the acquisition of words. Dore rightly points out that the conclusion is quite unwarranted. To quote Dore:

> The identification of grammatical structures like sentence mood requires explicit markings in systematic relation to each other, and these are lacking in the child's speech. It is clear that *Mm* can be responded to as if it were the functional equivalent of a request in some cases, but since it exhibits no structure, equating it with the imperative mood seems unwarranted. Rather, it is more likely that such functional intentions provide one cognitive basis for the later acquisition of the mood system. It is necessary in such cases to maintain the distinction between the adult's interpretation of the infant's functional intention and grammatical categories; otherwise, one's theory attempts to account for extensive belief systems as well as formal categories and consequently fails (Dore, *op. cit*).

Dore's comment brings out the central problem with functionalist explanations: if they try to be specific, they are unfounded and unwarranted, if they confine themselves to what is warranted and justified, they are too vague to be of any explanatory value.

If is, in fact, doubtful if even the kind of limited inference that Dore draws from Marta's behaviour, viz. that it shows a schema of conversation (Bruner's 'joint action format') would be fully justified in all cases. In the above case, the behaviour seems to be capable of an almost unambiguous interpretation, but as Dore (1979b: 333) himself points out in another paper:

> ...the prelinguistic child's pointing is multiply ambiguous [and] during the early stages of speech what a child says is difficult to interpret...not only because his meanings for words are different from adult meanings, but also because it is often unclear how he intends his utterances to be taken.

What this means for a communication-based theory of language is obvious: it means that the notion of communication-intention which was proposed as the cornerstone of the theory will not work, since in the case of the prelinguistic child such communication-intention cannot be identified. Faced with this problem, the communication theorist is left with two alternatives: either to jettison the notion of communication-intention or to give up hope of building a comprehensive communication-based theory of language accounting for both the adult and child use of language, the prelinguistic precursors of language in the infant as well as the phylogenetic development of language in the human species. Functionalists believe that the problems that the notion of communication-intention runs into can be somehow overcome, if we speak instead of functions of communication that language serves (Bruner: 1979: 72). One, of course, can't entirely do away with intentions, but instead of speaking of an individual's communication-intentions one speaks of the more conventional 'functional intents' (see the quote from Dore above). It is, however, difficult to see how 'functional intents' can succeed where communication-intentions fail, since if any thing, the route from function to 'linguistic meaning' is even more difficult to find than the route from communication-intention to the same goal.[2] Chomsky showed (1975a: 67-68) that, given the vagaries of personal beliefs and intentions, it is not possible to depend entirely on communication-intention to give us linguistic meaning and that dependence on some independent notion of 'literal meaning' is inescapable. Some independent notion of literal meaning is unavoidable in the functionalist theory too, for knowing the meaning of an arbitrary sentence is quite independent of knowing its function. A sentence may not occur in use at all, i.e., have no function whatsoever, and yet we can identify its meaning, e.g. we can tell whether or not it is synonymous with another sentence, entailed by it, presupposed by it, and so on. Further, we must also consider the fact that the same sentence may be used to perform different functions, not all of which may be relevant to meaning: one may, e.g. use the greeting 'good evening' to frighten, or as a code word, to convince somebody that he is insane, and so on (Cooper, 1973: 38). To relate it to meaning, we must identify the standard function of this utterance. While it may be straightforward in this case, identifying the standard function of an utterance without knowing its meaning is not always so. And if function cannot be identified without meaning, we cannot do without an independent theory of language that explicates meaning. This is not to deny that correlations between semantic-syntactic structures and functions may exist, and sometimes even illuminate the relationship between the two, but to assume that a complete theory of language may be based on functionalist principles is clearly an overstatement.[3]

We thus see that communicationist and functionalist accounts of the ontogenetic development of language fail to reach a satisfactory explanatory level. We must now return to the question of the phylogenetic development

of language once again, and examine particularly the relationship between the communicationist explanations of the evolution of language and the view that language is a uniquely human possession. Although this question has been discussed in detail in Lenneberg (1967; Ch. 6) some remarks on the issue in the light of later developments may not be out of place.

The idea that human forms of communication, including language, have descended directly from primitive animal forms of communication has been called the continuity theory by Lenneberg. The theory asserts that there is no essential difference between man's language and the communication systems of lower animals. Theories of this type fall into two categories, depending on how they choose to describe the continuity between animal forms of communication and human language (Hill, 1974). Comparative intelligence theories stress this continuity by ascribing what they call 'nonspecific intelligence' to animals. Theories of this type need not detain us. Lenneberg (1967: 228-30) has shown that attribution of problem-solving abilities (i.e. nonspecific intelligence) to animals is quite compatible with discontinuity and does not necessarily entail continuity. The second set of theories is labelled 'ecological theories' by Hill. These theories do not find it necessary to lay stress on shared cognitive properties of men and animals. They argue that enough external or environmental factors are available which can explain the continuity between animal and human forms of communication. These theories take various forms depending on the factor they proceed to highlight, but common to them is the belief that organisms found selectional advantage in the behaviour patterns of communication, and, as a result, went on refining and developing them resulting in the evolution of human language from the communication systems of the ancestors of man. It would, however, not be unreasonable to cut short the discussion of pure ecological theories in view of the admitted fact that 'at present there is no evidence concerning the natural evolution of a communicatory signaling system toward the symbolic and combinatorial system of human language' (von Glaserfield 1976: 224).

Faced with the failure of both comparative-intelligence and ecological theories to support a continuity theory, functionalist approaches have ceased to worry about the continuity issue, and have lately begun to concentrate on the task of developing an explanatory hypothesis which would formulate general principles which can account for both ontogeny and phylogeny of language. Insistence on purely ecological factors has also weakened somewhat and cognitive factors are allowed to enter the theory along with various social, perceptual and production factors. What has remained intact is the argument that 'languages look the way they do for functional or adaptive reasons' (Bates & Macwhinney 1981: 178). Among the social functional reasons which have come to play a dominating role is the need for co-operation and interaction. The role of these factors in any kind of social organization, however rudimentory it may be, is emphasized, and it is sought to be

proved that forms of language are determined by patterns of interaction. Different levels of functionalism, 'ranging from a relatively conservative historical view to some radical proposals about the nature of adult grammatical knowledge', are identified by Bates and Macwhinney (1981: 178), the strongest of which claims that 'the grammar or system of representation that mediates the interaction between form and function can be fully described in terms of natural functional categories and performance constraints' (*Ibid*: 187). In this formulation, the species-specific contribution of the human to the acquisition and development of language is reduced to an even lower level than was the case with the earlier psychological learning theories. The specific version of the functionalist theory that applies to the phylogeny of language is, as Bates and Macwhinney show, only a weak version of this theory. It is confined to 'a purely historical claim that certain forms evolved under pressure from one or more specific constraints' of the type mentioned above, which they describe as 'a kind of linguistic Darwinism'. This theory is a weak version of the functionalist theory, since it 'does not imply any ongoing correlation between forms and the functions that brought them about' (Bates and Macwhinney 1981: 179). It follows that, if one can refute the functionalist theory in its strongest version, the derivative theory that applies to language phylogeny would automatically stand refuted. What we have said above about the strong version of functionalism may not amount to a total refutation of the theory, but it does show up the problems inherent in the position and the premature nature of any putative explanations based on it.

In recent years, some psycholinguists (notably the Piagetians) have taken a position somewhere between Lenneberg's discontinuity hypothesis and the functionalist hypothesis. They share with Lenneberg the belief about the uniqueness of human language, and also seem to agree that 'cognitive function is a more basic and primary process than language and that the dependence relationship of language upon cognition is incomparably stronger than vice versa' (Lenneberg, 1967: 374). Where they seem to differ from Lenneberg is in believing that the cognitive function is not specific to language only, i.e. that what is encoded in cognitive structure is not the rules and principles of UG but some general and specific rules which underlie all human communication, verbal as well as non-verbal. Communication-theorists, who have been influenced by this approach, now claim that the child is born with some global communicative patterns, and these patterns unfold in various modalities. Language seems to be one of the later modalities to unfold, and its unfolding is facilitated by the previously existing interactive patterns.

It seems fairly obvious that what we have here is a version of the 'communicative competence' theory of Hymes with greater stress on the interactive patterns of communication than on communicative abilities in general. As such, the arguments given above against that theory apply to his version

too. The nature of the innate cognitive structure (the initial state), as Chomsky points out, is not a matter of stipulation but empirical discovery. If it can be shown that an innate cognitive structure, like the one this theory proposes, leads to a better account of language and its use, there is no further argument. As the situation obtains at present, the language-specific-cognitive-structure theory seems to provide a more explanatory alternative, while the communicative-cognitive-structure theory, like the functionalist theory, seems to be at a stage where general and abstract formulations are still to be translated into specific propositions regarding the structure of human cognition. Surely, it is rather difficult to believe that such specific principles do not exist, and that the child has innate knowledge of interactive schemas involving addresser-addressee, giver-receiver, and other communicative roles involved in social settings.

I shall now turn to a problem of more general interest and try to show why theories of language which proceed from communicative function, or place central emphasis on it, may find it rather difficult to maintain the discontinuity hypothesis, particularly when we view language from the evolutionary perspective. Lenneberg shows that the discontinuity theory of language development is not incompatible with the principles of evolution (1967: 234ff). More recently, another view of evolution, known as the 'punctuated equilibrium' theory (Eldredge and Gould, 1972) has been gaining prominence which makes the compatibility easier to establish, since evolution is seen in this view not as a continuous process but as characterized by long periods during which nothing happened but punctuated intermittently by rapid bursts of significant change. The intermittent nature of fossil record, which has puzzled anthropologists, seems to lend some credence to this theory. The periods when these spurts occurred can be identified with the periods when speciation occurred, i.e. a genetically variant sub-group, under some special circumstances, was forced to interbreed and stabilized into a new species (Mayr, 1963). When combined with the view that the human species is a result of phyletic (or anagenetic, i.e. without branching) evolution (Dobzhansky, 1962: 220 ff), the scenario in which man evolved a unique capacity for language becomes quite intelligible.

It may, however, be noted that the discontinuity theory becomes incompatible with evolution, if we adopt the view that language emerged as a result of the operation of the same principles that govern communication among other species. This is, of course, the reason why advocates of communication theory have generally tended towards the continuity theory. The exceptions may be those who take the notion of communication-intention as basic to communication, since, it may be argued, it makes no sense to attribute intentions to animals. We have, however, seen how the inadequacy of the intention theory led to the alternative functionalist theory. It cannot be denied that communication among non-humans, e.g. bees, apes, etc. is functional. In fact, even the notion of 'purpose' has been attributed to animal communication by those who, dissatisfied with more mechanistic definitions of communication (e.g. Hockett 1958: 573; Haldane, 1955, etc.), have tried to define communication in general terms (Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bigelow, 1943). Mackay (1972) even uses the notion of intention defining it in terms of 'negative feedback'. But in whichever way we define communication, if we believe that the same principles of communication govern animal and human communication, then it is difficult to explain how human language evolved as a discontinuous system. Arguing against the continuity theorists, Lenneberg writes:

> ...it is now assumed by most students of the genetic basis of evolution that the variations due to imperfection of replication would be rich enough to have a self-cancelling effect, counteracting one another in such a way that the end-result of evolution would be erosion of all species-specificities and general levelling of all characteristics were it not for the biases of natural selection which tends to preserve some variations but not others (Lenneberg 1967: 235-36).

Lenneberg goes on to show why we can expect species-specificities to exist despite the randomness of the replicatory process and despite the fact that he believes that biases of natural selection cannot account for them. For the functionalist view to hold we must believe that species-specificities are wholly caused by the biases of natural selection, the development of communication-strategies being one of the most favoured selectional factors. But if the view simultaneously holds communication to be common to men and other animals, the species-specificity of human language cannot be satisfactorily accounted for.

It is sometimes thought that an approach like that of Hockett (1960), which proceeds by an analysis of the 'design features' of language, may provide a way of reconciling the uniqueness of human language with the communicationist-functionalist view. This view seems to be shared by various anthropologists (e.g. Hockett and Altmann, 1968; Mackay, 1972) and is also relied on by psychologists (e.g. von Glaserfield, 1976). The suggestion is that communication among animals and men is not quite the same; and that there are logical features present in human language, all of which are not to be found in animal communication, notably creativity. It appears that the presence of all the features to be found in human language is the necessary as well as the sufficient condition for the emergence of language. For this argument to succeed, of course, each design feature must be translated into a corresponding selectional feature, and it must be shown that the introduction of this selection feature led to selectional advantage and eventually to its genetic codification in man. For the argument to be *convincing*, the feature must also be shown not to be specific to language alone but shared by other activities of the prehistoric man. Something of this kind has been attempted

for the feature 'displacement' by Hewes (1972, 1976) who argues that the activity of tool-making also involves this feature and that language and tool-making may, therefore, have evolved together. This, of course, leads to the controversial assumption that language, and, therefore, knowledge, followed and did not precede tool-making.

However, the design-feature approach seems to me to be flawed in a fundamental way. The way the approach works is as follows: it picks up some species of animals, irrespective of their phylogenetic closeness to man; studies their system of communication; compares it with the human language; and constructs logical features in respect of which they are similar or different, depending upon the ideological orientation of the analyst. The features are not chosen from any theoretical framework of the study of communication; they are chosem at random and range from the physiological organs involved to abstractions like expression of falsehood. If some system of animal communication is found to have all the features common to the human language at some stage of analysis, it is always possible to step deeper into the infinite richness of human language and come up with another very specific feature like 'the capacity to articulate the future tense' mentioned by Steiner. If tomorrow someone interprets some feature of animal communication to be equivalent to the expression of future tense (which suggests that another parameter involved is the ingenuity of the theorist), language can be relied on to provide another feature. No wonder the number of features keeps rising from seven (Hockett, 1958) to thirteen (Hockett, 1960) to sixteen (Hockett & Altmann: 1968), with interested bystanders always ready to supply a few more. In principle, at least, one can visualize a stage when the theorist will in effect be claiming that 'human language is unique because it has the properties $P_1 \ldots P_n$ where $P_1 \ldots P_n$ define human language exhaustively, which is equivalent to claiming that "Human language is unique because it is human language" '. The only difficulty with this approach is that the n is infinity.

Something of this kind was what led Chomsky to discount all those features which are too general and shared by various communication systems (e.g. purposiveness, syntax, informativeness, etc.) and to concentrate on the two that he thought were the essential and distinctive features of language, not to be found in any animal system (by the sharpest theorist), which represented at the same time the 'barest rudiments' of language (Chomsky, 1967). These may provide the determined communicationist with the crucial differentia that he needs to uphold his thesis that human language is unique while tying it at the same time to communication strategies as the determining factor. The two features are:

(*i*) The human language by means of constructional processes determines a set of sound-meaning correspondences which have an infinite range.

(*ii*) The distinction between the surface structure of a sentence which determines how it is spoken and the deep structure which determines its semantic interpretation.

There are however two difficulties which the communicationist must overcome, if he is to be able to use these differentia:

(*a*) He must translate these into selectional features operative during the evolution of language.

(*b*) But before he tries to do so he must wait till Chomsky finally makes up his mind about whether it is the deep structure or the surface structure that determines semantic interpretation.

The communicationist might well object that features of this type are certainly not what he would admit, and he would be right. But the point in mentioning the features here is different. Essential differences between human language and animal communication systems do not lie on the surface and are not accessible to induction. The differences which are inductively accessible turn out to be the least significant. The fundamental differences can only be arrived at after we have been able first to understand what is closest to us—the languages that we speak and understand—and have been able to look beneath their surface diversity into their common core. This itself is a task which has barely begun. If some day we are in a position to claim that we understand what is common to different human languages, the principles and structures that constitute universal grammar, it may be time to start on another stupendous venture: to study what is common to various systems of animal communication, to probe whether there are principles of communicative cognition which hold across species, or, as there is reason to believe, cognition is species-specific, and to try and understand the genetic basis of our findings. On the answers that we get to these questions will depend whether or not a comparison of human language with animal communication systems will yield results which can be meaningfully used. But if the differentia suggested by the two principles of language that Chomsky mentions (or anything like it) and the studies of Lenneberg in species-specific cognition are any indication, comparative studies of human language and animal systems of communication are likely to remain exercises in futility, if the purpose is to find an explanatory theory of human language.

Notes

1. This paper is a modified version of a paper of the same title presented at the National Seminar on Human Communication held at IIT, Kanpur, in February 1985.
2. My discussion of the interactionalist and functionalist theories here has been philosophical and general. In some of her papers (e.g., 1981, 1982), Marlyn Shatz has

recently examined the interactionalist theory from the cognitive-psychological and empirical points of view. She breaks down the issue of the relationship between interactional (or social) knowledge and language into four questions: is the acquisition of social knowledge and linguistic knowledge simultaneous or is one prior to the other? Are there facilitating effects of one system on the other and are they unidirectional or bidirectional? How much is the relation mediated by the internal properties of the child? Finally, is the relationship based on structural commonalities between the two systems and, if so, what is the nature and extent of these commonalities? Answers to these questions range from the strong position, deriving syntax acquisition directly from interactionally provided social knowledge, to a weak one, where the process of syntax acquisition is considered to be an autonomous one. Shatz discusses all the positions at length and reaches the conclusion that 'first, while some social knowledge is acquired earlier than linguistic knowledge, it is likely that much of the acquisition of one system is not prior to the other. Given this, it is likely that facilitation will be bidirectional; if its occurs at all. [Secondly] ... there is at best only a partial structural commonality and even this is relatively indirect, suggesting that internal properties of the child are central to a characterization of the relation' (Shatz, 1981: 18).

3. Functionalists would, of course, deny that they need to account for linguistic meaning, since they would define meaning as use. However, investigators of linguistic context (e.g. Bates 1976) as well as shared meanings (e.g. Nelson 1985) agree that context and function based theories must also account for the conventional aspects of meaning, or meaning considered as an object existing independently of use.

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The rejection front and the affirmation front: Marx and moral reality

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I

There are distinguished Marxists of an analytical persuasion who think Marx in socio-political domains rejects an appeal to morality or even to the taking of the moral point of view and who believe, as well, that contemporary Marxists should follow him here. There are other distinguished Marxists of an equally analytical bent who believe that Marx does not reject the moral point of view and that, talk of ideological twaddle to the contrary notwithstanding, contemporary Marxists should follow him here in refusing to make such a rejection. Instead, they argue, Marx has a determinate moral vision rooted in and empirically grounded on a contextually and historically nuanced moral realism that both gives us a basis for a critique of moral ideology and a firmly realist conception of moral realities to be contrasted with the ideological distortions of most moral belief.

Richard Miller is a distinguished representative of the rejection front concerned to show both how Marx does and Marxists should reject the moral point of view and Allan Gilbert, on the affirmation front, articulates in a powerful way a Marxist moral realism while being as much against *moralism* as Miller or the staunchest of Marxist anti-moralists.[1] Fortunately, Gilbert in articulating his own views criticizes Miller's.[2]

We can begin to compare and assess which account here has the greater faithfulness to Marx, and, more importantly still, which view, Marx apart, has a closer approximation to soundness by assessing the strength of Gilbert's criticisms of Miller. I will conclude by gesturing at another 'affirmation front view' compatible with Marxism which rejects moral realism without rejecting the moral point of view. It maintains a reasonable belief in moral objectivity without commiting itself to moral realism and without either affirming or denying any of the several plausible versions of subjectivism in morals. In articulating this view, I will end with a methodological coda on how moral claims are to be justified.

II

In the third section of his 'Marx's Moral Realism: Eudaimonism and Moral Progress,' Gilbert argues against Richard Miller's calling 'into question both the moral character and moral objectivity of Marx's normative judgments'[3]

(G 155). In ferreting out what is at issue here, it is well to start with a point about traditional moral philosophers whether they are intuitionists (e.g. Sidgwick, Moore or Pritchard) or non-cognitivists (Ayer, Hägerström or Stevenson). The intuitionists, of course, are people who think fundamental moral principles are synthetic *a priori* truths, and the non-cognitivists by contrast take them to be something like decisions of principle or expressions of pro and con attitudes. Miller sees these representatives of ethical rationalism and ethical empiricism respectively as having more in common than most philosophers realize. Miller believes that such conceptions come in conflict with Marxist social theory and political strategy, because both the intuitionists and the non-cognitivists believe that *fundamental* moral principles are not constrained by 'empirical circumstances or specific institutional practices', while Marx, by contrast, like Dewey, thinks they are so constrained. Miller thinks that this leads Marx to reject morality, while Gilbert believes that this leads Marx to the holding of a distinctive contextualist moral realist conception of morality. Marx, they both agree, rejects the power of ethical theory to discern the most general moral principles without regard to empirical circumstances. This for Miller is evidence that Marx rejects morality; for Gilbert *au contraire* it is evidence that Marx was a moral realist. On the one hand, Miller, more like a traditional moralist, takes 'factual questions about institutions and strategies largely, if not entirely, [as] *belonging somewhere outside moral theory*, in politics, social theory or social engineering' (G 175) (Gilbert quoting from Miller with Gilbert's emphasis). On the other hand, Gilbert maintains that for Marx, and Engels as well, in contrast with Kant and Sidgwick, and all ethical rationalists and non-cognitivists, 'historical theory strongly governs his moral judgments' (G 174). This comes to the contention that contingent social beliefs and conceptions strongly govern our moral judgments. There is no useful setting out of fundamental moral principles in a contextless or a historicist way.

Miller thinks that anyone, who so contextualizes things and does not give general norms a pride of place such that their validity could never be challenged by discoveries about what the case is, including, of course, contingent historical matters, is rejecting morality and could not be putting forth a moral theory. Gilbert rightly, I believe, remarks that such a sweeping judgment about morality and what counts as moral theory not only makes Marx into someone who is rejecting morality but such liberal theorists as John Rawls and, I would add, John Dewey as well. And this is too counter-intuitive to be plausible (G 174-175). Rawls's principles, as well as Dewey's conceptions, as much as Marx's, depend in important ways on controversial empirical claims. Similar things should be said of a utilitarian account like Bentham's and Mill's. Marx's theory pushes farther here than these alternatives. Rawls's account and utilitarianism rests on very general empirical claims, while 'Marx's ethical viewpoint... is much more embedded in and dependent on the validity of particular empirical claims' (G 175). Still, this

is a difference in degree not in kind, and shows that Miller cannot consistently maintain that Marx is rejecting morality without taking it that Mill and Rawls are rejecting morality as well, and that is a *reductio* of Miller's claim.

III

Gilbert also believes, as I do, that Aristotle's differences with us about the justifiability of slavery are not as intractable as Miller takes them to be; they could be resolved by an appeal to relatively theory-independent facts and do not require 'the adoption of any particular modern social and political theory" (G 177). We do not get anything like Kuhnian incommensurability here.

Gilbert, however, goes on to argue, in a way that leaves me somewhat ill at ease, that no doubts about the objectivity of morality would be in order, even if Aristotle and his contemporaries could not be reasonably expected to have come around to our modern views of such matters even if they would come to know the matters of fact we know. Gilbert maintains that it would not matter if we could reasonably predict that they would not see these moral matters roughly as we do. We do not need, he claims, for a reasonable belief in the objectivity of morals to obtain such a cross-cultural consensus. Gilbert believes (*pace* Miller) that with our information base it is reasonable to believe that they would come to share our moral beliefs here, but even if they didn't, Gilbert adds, it would not matter for 'neither scientific nor moral rationality requires consensus' (G 177). But here we need to ask this question: if we do not have the consensus of wide reflective equilibrium and the appeal to considered judgments involved, what then do we base our moral theorizing on? Gilbert speaks in this context of 'empirical moral discovery' (G. 177). But it remains quite unclear what this comes to. It is here where moral realism seems at least to be rather vulnerable.

Perhaps I exaggerate here. Perhaps something of this can be gotten at in the way Gilbert proceeds. Gilbert remarks:

> Aristotle's ideas of justice and a good life *referred* to human capacities for cooperation and freedom. Liberal and Marxian criticisms of Aristotle—for instance, the rejection of Aristotle's theory of natural slavery or of the subjection of women—rest on subsequent *discoveries* about the extent of such capacities (G 177).

But there are still, as Gilbert notes, 'broad continuities between Aristotle's and Modern concepts...' (G 177). There is room for all sorts of empirical argument within broad continuities of conception and room, on relatively straightforward empirical grounds, for some people being right and others wrong. 'For the realist Aristotle's error about slavery' is comparable to

Archimedes misidentification of fool's gold' (G 177). Moreover, Gilbert remarks, we should not forget 'that Aristotle's own definition of the good life is strongly empirical' (G 177). Remember modern realists, unlike G.E. More, do not set out to give analytic definitions. Think here of someone like Hilary Putnam or Michael Scriven.

IV

My concerns about Gilbert's rejection of consensus appeals in ethics to the contrary notwithstanding, Gilbert does make a more limited claim about consensus that seems to me important and correct. Miller, he recognizes, sees the 'notion of universal rationality...as basic to a moral point of view'. (Here Miller's project is very much like Jürgen Habermas in his latest writings.[4] This notion, where everyone agrees about the facts and has normal emotions, requires, on Miller's understanding, complete consensus. But this, Gilbert notes, is a very strong claim indeed. Suppose that during the difficult period of the transition the *vast* majority of people agree that there must be a *suppression* of the remnants of the former bourgeoisie who would seek to destabilize the newly created socialist institutions, and suppose, as is surely not unlikely, that they are a real threat and not just an imagined threat. Suppose, however, a few liberal critics, who had no desire themselves to subvert the nascent and indeed very fragile, socialist institutions, did not agree, preferring instead unrestricted freedom, or at least a less restricted freedom, even though that in such circumstances very well might destroy socialist institutions. That, these liberals claim, is a risk that we should not take in the name of freedom.

It is these very considerations that Gilbert draws to our attention that seem at least to give force to Miller's rejectionist claims. What the above example shows is that in such contexts, not unsurprisingly, we do not get universal consensus. We do not get agreement from all the parties under conditions where they have normal humane emotions, they agree about the facts and they are all being reasonable. But, for the decision, says Miller, to be a morally acceptable one—a decision taken from the moral point of view—there must be such unanimity, otherwise the condition of universal rationality is not met. However, Miller also stresses that Marx recognizes that seriously trying to reason in accordance with that norm of universal rationality would tie the hands of any challenging political group in political struggle trying to challenge deeply the structure of their society. To be serious about proletarian emancipation, and through proletarian emancipation a more general emancipation, is, if we are clear-headed about the class nature of bourgeois society, to reject morality as a humane alternative in political struggle. It is exactly this, Miller argues, that Marx does. But it is just this view that Gilbert is trying to resist.

Gilbert, in turn, responds by arguing that Miller's 'criterion for a moral

view would impugn scientific as well as moral rationality' (G 179). This is particularly evident during the periods of discovery and fundamental scientific change. Scientific rationality, taking a scientific point of view, being acceptable scientifically, does not require consensus.

> Priestley opposed the oxygen theory and Einstein quantum mechanics. No one considers their positions irrational for that time: yet their disagreement with what turned out to be the true theory does not throw scientific method or rationality into doubt. Similarly, the complexity or multidimensionality of human goods, given uncertain results, can lead—rationally—to different moral choices. Yet given further experience and further theoretical argument, there would turn out to be a fact of the matter as to which alternative is better. (Reverting to my earlier hypothetical examples: Even if Archimedes and Aristotle, lacking a full modern theory, had persisted in their original views, fool's gold would still be iron pyrites and slavery still a cruel and inhuman institution.) Contrary to Miller, the absence of moral consensus no more undermines ethical objectivity than lack of agreement on novel scientific achievements undermines scientific rationality (G 180).

This, of course, leads into Gilbert's critique of Miller's argument that there are conflicts over fundamental values concerning which there is no universally acceptable basis for agreement by all rational fully informed persons. However, we should first feel the full force of Miller's claims, claims that are both common enough and plausible. Miller believes that Marx believes and that Marx believes rightly, as do liberal theorists as different as Max Weber and Isaiah Berlin, that over fundamental matters there are not infrequently intractable and rationally irresolvable conflicts of goods. In a period of transition, for example, where socialism was being stabilized, one would get this kind of intractable moral conflict. A strong proponent of free speech, as my above example hints at, could agree 'with a Marxian account of the facts' and still be on a collision course with 'an advocate of the dictatorship of the proletariat' (G 170). To expect full consensus here is unrealistic. There, Miller follows Weber and Berlin in arguing, may very well be intractable moral disagreements.

> Both [liberals and Marxists] acknowledge that in the immediate post-revolutionary era, capitalists would have important political advantages, for instance, the inherited influence of older, reactionary ideas and practices among the masses, or differential organizational skills, arising from the experience and coherence of a comparatively small number of exploiters who seek to *disorganize* the much larger numbers of workers and their allies. To counter these advantages, a dictatorship of the proletariat would have to curtail freedom of speech and association for its

enemies. As Miller emphasizes, a Marxian would justify these restrictions 'to reduce the level of violence and increase access to politics and culture', goods that a liberal would also endorse (G174).

If the restrictions were very extensive and severe, 'a disagreement could arise between Marxians and liberals who affirm a common list of human goods and the same view of the facts' (G 178). Both the communist and the liberal could recognize the intrinsic value of freedom of speech and of material well-being. Yet, the liberal might rank freedom of speech so highly that he would oppose the dictatorship of the proletariat (G 178). Here, during the period of the transition, it is quite possible that equally reasonable people might find themselves clashing over fundamental values and that there would be no rational resolution of their political disputes. That is to say, here it would not be the case 'that each rational person, capable of the normal range of emotions and fully informed of the facts, would reach the same ethical conclusion' (G 178).

V

We have already seen Gilbert's argument for why he does not think Miller is right in claiming that if this is so that the resulting judgment is non-moral and for claiming that, if Marx or a Marxist, all the same, in such a circumstance, defends the dictatorship of the proletariat, they have rejected morality as has the liberal as well when he argues for the overriding importance of freedom of speech. Neither, Gilbert counter-argues, has necessarily rejected the moral point of view.

Still, it is possible that they are rejecting morality. Possibly, but we are not driven to that conclusion even as the most likely conclusion, for it is very easy indeed to confuse disagreements which are at least thought to be disagreements where there is agreement over the facts but disagreement over values with complex disagreements over the facts which in turn sustain disagreements in values. Moreover, it is rather more probable—and here Gilbert is making a point similar to Andrew Collier's—that the liberal and the Marxist have 'a roughly similar view about moral goods' and clash over the facts or—and this, in a broad sense, is also a factual disagreement—they differ about what it is plausible to expect. They differ, that is, about which future scenarios are more probable. What gets cast, particularly in liberal thought, as an ultimate disagreement in values, might very well turn out to be one of these kinds of disagreement instead.[5]

Plain political disagreement, as Collier has also argued, looks like disagreements about either the facts or about what the possibilities are. Think of a dispute between two contemporaries, Georg Luckacs, a Marxist, and Sidney Hook, a former Marxist turned fierce anti-Marxist. Luckacs believes that a dictatorship of the proletariat is the only way to avoid increasingly

destructive wars and a recurrence of fascism. Hook, by contrast, sees the dictatorship *of* the proletariat turning into a dictatorship *over* the proletariat in such a harsh way that it is not very different from fascism where autonomy will be destroyed and productivity will be very low. We are faced, in a transition society, with communism as a unique event and we cannot, to put it minimally, be very certain in advance of the actual playing out of the historical drama as to the outcome. In making a reasonable and morally appropriate judgment about what is to be done, we need, if we can get it, an accurate description of what the present state of affairs is and what the more likely scenarios of the future are. But Luckacs and Hook are certainly going to disagree about both. What I think is evident is that reasonable persons with the normal range of emotions will agree with Luckacs if they think he is more likely to be right about the present state of affairs and the likely outcome of the sustaining of the proletarian revolution. They will, if those are their factual beliefs, positively judge communism. If, instead they think Hook's description is more accurate and his scenario the more probable, they will side with Hook concerning the evaluation of communism.

Contra Miller, and in line with Gilbert and Collier, the more likely situation is one of deep disagreement about the facts: a disagreement about what is an accurate present description and, even more fundamentally, a disagreement about what is the likely future. *The moral disagreement between them is deep, but it is deep because the factual disagreement is deep (entangled, complex, extremely interpretive and the like) and subject, in all sorts of complex and disguised ways, to ideological distortion.* We do not have the non-cognitivist situation envisioned by Miller, where we have disagreements in attitude not rooted in disagreements in belief. For the situations Miller alludes to, isn't it at least as likely that fundamental political disputes will be of the Luckacs-Hook type where the moral disagreement depends on disagreement about the facts (including the empirical possibilities) rather than there being, as Miller pictures it, agreement about the facts and moral disagreement irresolvable by any fact of the matter?

VI

There is a theoretical matter that Gilbert does not mention but which would, I believe, if pursued a bit, strengthen his case. We are speaking here as if we understood what it would be like to agree about the facts (all the facts) and then disagree in our attitudes toward the facts or, if this doesn't come to the same thing, disagree in our evaluation of the facts. Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus* gave us the picture here: we could know everything that is the case—know all the facts—and the problems life would still be before us unresolved: we still would not know what it is we ought to do or what it would be desirable to do. Facts are facts and values, and values and facts by themselves do not determine values.

There is something *intuitively* plausible and—or so at least it seems to me—at least initially compelling about that picture. However, what seems initially compelling may not be all things considered compelling. What has been less noticed is that when we try to think concretely about what it would be like to have all the facts before us and to agree about the facts and agree that these are all the facts there are, we will come to realize that that is just a picture. We have no idea at all of what it would be like to have all the facts before us. We have nothing but a verbal picture here which philosophical convention has stamped into our heads.

Relatedly, and even more to the point: suppose, you and I are deliberating about what it is that we ought to do about some particular matter, say, about whether we, as two chaps working in a meat-packing plant, should go out on strike. We are not in a position to say that now all the facts have been considered and there could not possibly be any further fact of the matter that could be relevant to what we are to do. Indeed, we wouldn't even know what it would be like to be in such a position. We could say, and in some cases quite justifiably, that we had considered all the relevant facts or all the facts worth considering. But, to say the obvious, 'relevant' and 'worth' are plainly evaluative notions: what we are doing is bringing norms to bear in considering facts. We are not simply reading off what facts are worth considering or are relevant from the facts themselves. Less obvious, but even more relevant here, is the fact that it is, where well-taken, a plausible *pragmatic* judgment to say we have considered all the facts worth considering. When we so judge, we cannot, if we are being reasonable, claim that we know that no consideration—no fact or a cluster of facts—could possibly be adduced from a set of facts, not in that set of facts judged worthy of consideration, that would turn out to be relevant, so that we could say, in some firmly non-contextual way, that now we have considered absolutely everything that could possibly be relevantly considered and so no consideration, no fact of the matter, could possibly make a difference to our decision.

Perhaps I could make what I am trying to say clearer if I would go back to the old emotivist distinction between disagreement in belief and disagreement in attitude. Emotivists allowed at least the *logical* possibility of there being disagreements in attitude not rooted in disagreements in belief. But, as Stevenson in particular stressed, we have no way of knowing that our disagreements in attitude are not, perhaps in some fairly indirect and disguised way, rooted in disagreements in belief. We are not in any position to know whether or not there is some deeply embedded presupposition, something assumed by us to be a fact or a cluster of facts, perhaps facts that we so regularly but unself-consciously think in accordance with that, we hardly notice we are doing so, concerning which, if challenged by someone, perhaps from another class or culture, who did not take them to be facts, and, after we took that challenge to heart, and, let us say, finally became convinced of the correctness of that challenge and no longer took them to be facts, then, it very well might turn out that we would no longer continue to make the moral judgments we routinely made before that shift in belief. Here it is very difficult indeed to know that there is a fact of the matter that determines moral belief, for the facts of the matter are so deeply embedded in our ways of thinking that we hardly advert to them as facts. We cannot know that in these seeming intractable moral disputes there is not something like this. We cannot know that we have considered all the facts that there are that could possibly be relevant in the making of any moral decision. (What would it be like to have enumerated them all?) Rather, we reasonably pragmatize our way here. We don't think that we could even know what it would be like to see the sorry scheme of things entire. But this need not give rise to any scepticism for all of that.

VII

What this says against Miller's picture and for Gilbert and Gilbert's Marx is this: we cannot know, for our various moral disagreements, that there can be no fact of the matter which, if adverted to, would resolve the moral dispute in question. We can have no guarantees, *a priori* or otherwise, that a knowledge of the facts will not settle all our real evaluative disagreements: all moral matters that really divide us.[6]

Marx did not think that we could in detail predict what the communist future would be like, and he also thought that it was a good thing that we could not predict that future in such a specific way. But, as we can see from his *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, he did think that he could say some general things about the future communist society. Indeed, it was a fundamental, abiding and pervasive concern of his to be able to delineate the general structure of the future society. Suppose, someone reflects carefully on Marx's account here and concludes that if a communist society ever comes into existence it would be a very good thing indeed, but this person also concludes that bringing it into existence is fraught with danger. Attempts to move toward it, she notes, have not been notable for their success and that attempts to achieve it may frustrate certain evident goods such as freedom of speech. All these things considered, she opts for the liberal welfare state and rejects Marxism. But this, as Gilbert well has it, has 'nothing to do with a fundamental clash over the ranking of human goods' (G 179). What it is instead is 'a species of factual disagreement,' at least in principle amenable to reason (G 179). What is being claimed here by the person sticking with the liberal welfare state is, in one way or the other, empirically testable. And so, of course, is the opposed claim. Reason is not wanton here and it is also the case that, to put the matter minimally, it has not been shown that there is no fact of the matter that could not be decisive here, not, of course, for all contexts in all possible worlds but in this context in our actual world.

VIII

I shall first pull the strands together and then end in the next section with a kind of coda. Even if it is the case, as Marxists believe, that it is continued class struggle, and not an establishment of the rightness of the proletarian cause, that will, when the economic situation is ripe, bring about major and lasting social change, it does not follow from that that Marxists should reject morality in public affairs or anywhere else. It does, however, imply something which is quite different from the rejection of morality, namely, a rejection of moralism which is the belief that we can change the world in a fundamental way by moralizing at it. Even when this comes to making a sound moral case for the world to be different in certain fundamental ways, we still have moralizing if we think we can change the world by so moralizing, though it is, of course, more offensive when the moral claims themselves are without justification and the moralist is making jugdments of responsibility right and left.

Marxists are historical materialists not historical idealists, though this does not commit them to the absurd belief that ideas, including moral ideas, can have no causal efficacy at all. It is just that major changes in society will not come about from a coming to understand, and a taking to heart, of how things stand, including coming to see how things stand morally. Tactically and strategically, the working class and their allies need to come to have a clear understanding of what the interests of the working class are and what actions, both in the short term and the long term, are likely to make for proletarian emancipation. (If our degree of clarity in the nature of the case here, as Noam Chomsky suspects, cannot be very great, we should still, without paralyzing action, strive to have as clear a picture as we can reasonably get. Practice without theory is blind; theory without practice is moral evasion.) But to gain this emancipation, they will have to come to understand how the capitalist system works, gain an understanding of what will break it (things Marx thought he had shown) and gain the resolve to break it.

They must not in this endeavour get bogged down in obstruse questions about rights, about what is fair and what is just and about what morality requires. It is not that they should be indifferent to moral considerations but that they should not, in the context of political struggle, get themselves entangled in such obstruse and sometimes humanly agonizing reflection. It will dull the native edge of resolution. But a firm acceptance of this does not imply moral scepticism or moral subjectivism or a rejection of morality with the entailed belief that no sound moral case can be made for the proletarian struggle for emancipation. Concentration on it is to be avoided for tactical and strategic reasons and not because of a belief that no moral case can be made. Indeed, the Marxist should believe, and most probably will believe, that, given a certain understanding of the facts (the non-moral facts, if you will), the moral case for socialism is tolerably obvious. It requires the

acceptance of a few moral truisms such as 'oppression is bad', 'happiness and well-being are good' and the like. But these are convictions that, to understate it, are widely shared and are convictions that would remain as considered judgments in wide reflective equilibrium. The reasonable expectation is that retrospectively it can be seen that the proletarian cause is morally justified, *given a certain understanding of the facts.* But what is vital, given the pervasiveness of bourgeois ideology, is a correct or at least an approximately correct understanding of the facts, not further moral reflection, let alone the construction of a moral theory. Given such a factual understanding, the acceptance on the moral side of some moral truisms is sufficient where these are also truisms acceptable to reflective moral common sense and further sustainable by the method of wide reflective equilibrium. Because they can be so sustained, we are retrospectively justified in being for socialism, if we have got our facts and our assessment of the possibilities roughly right. But to say this is one thing, and to say that in struggling for proletarian emancipation we must first construct a moral theory for socialism or make out a moral case for socialism in discursive moral argument is quite another thing again. But none of this implies or sustains the belief, I have criticized in previous sections, that Marxism requires or can even tolerate a rejection of morality.

However, things do not go all the way for the affirmation front at least when it is linked, as it is with Gilbert, to moral realism. We have seen against Gilbert that justification in ethics requires a certain kind of consensus; that we have been given no good grounds for rejecting the Butlerian-Moorean view (conceptual insight I would be inclined to call it) that facts are facts and values are values; that these are fundamental categories of human conceptualization; and that in a proper responding to the world they cannot be reduced one to another or blurred by some peculiar bastard category of 'value-fact', supposedly empirically discoverable. No such moral realism or indeed, as far as I can see, any other kind of moral realism is required for taking the moral point of view or coming reasonably to believe that some moral beliefs are sound. This does not, and indeed should not, involve a rejection of the belief that facts are relevant to the justification of moral beliefs, and it does not involve a rejection of the belief that moral beliefs in determinate contexts are objectively determinate. There is no denial of the power of morality, along with a good knowledge of the empirical circumstances, to provide guidance about what to do.

However, and this is what is crucial here, this involves no belief in anything as mysterious as moral realism either where this is construed as a belief that there are some mysterious empirical 'value-facts', open either to direct or indirect empirical verification, or to intuition as a belief that there are some non-natural qualities or relations direct insight into which will yield synthetic *a priori* truths of the right and/or the good. Such mystification yields no understanding of moral reality. It is utterly unclear what we are

saying when such non-naturalist moral realist claims are being made or how claims here could be nearly as reliable as claims made via an appeal to our considered judgments in wide reflective equilibrium. Why the former could yield objectively justified (if that isn't pleonastic) moral beliefs and the latter not is thoroughly baffling.

This rejection of moral realism should not be taken as an endorsement of the currently fashionable anti-realism or for that matter as an endorsement of a metaphysical realism or that scientistic creature 'scientific realism', though a Marxist, and I am inclined to believe any nonmetaphysically bemused person, will be a *common sense realist* fully convinced that there are sticks and stones and broken bones; and he will, like such different philosophers as G.E. Moore and George Santayana, believe that it is far more reasonable to believe that there are such entities than to believe any of the idealist theories which would deny that there are such realities or sophisticate their reality away by arguing that in some way their reality is mind-dependent or language-dependent. However, all that to the contrary notwithstanding, he *need* not take any position on the logical status of some of the stranger theoretical entities of physics; and he can be quite unwilling to accept any of the rather puzzling conceptions of truth or of how language hooks up with the world held by metaphysical realists. It is not that he will assert their denials either or that he need regard such matters as nonsense. It is just that he will, prudently and wisely, take no interest in such matters beyond commenting the so-called 'scientific realism' is a parasitical hanging on to the scientific coat-tails of science; and that it should not be seen as something that science has a view on.

All that notwithstanding, the Marxist should be a firm common sense realist. But this realism about the physical world (a conception which in reality is pleonastic) has nothing at all to do with moral realism. G.E. Moore was both a common sense realist and a moral realist. But there is no logical connection between his common sense realist arguments in defence of common sense and against idealism and his defence of the baffling claims of moral realism in *Principia Ethica*. (The core of his claims against ethical naturalism could be accepted, as the work of Charles Stevenson and R.M. Hare reveal, without accepting his positive views, i.e. his non-naturalistic moral realism.) Moreover, George Santayana, Axel Hägerström, Otto Neurath and J.L. Mackie were all common sense realists, while firmly rejecting *moral* realism with their non-cognitivist or error-theorist conception of the logical status of values. Such a view, with its implicit naturalistic world-view, goes more naturally with common sense realism than moral realism.

However, whether or not I am right in believing that a more fundamental consideration is that the common sense realism which a Marxist must accept commits him to no theory at all about the logical status of values. He *need* not accept something like Santayana's or Hägerströms' non-cognitivism or something like the Westermarckian-Mackian error-theory, though he *might* accept one or the other of such meta-ethical accounts without abandoning or in any way qualifying his Marxism.

He need have no meta-ethical theory at all or for that matter any normative ethical theory at all, though he should be someone who believes that some evaluations, including some moral evaluations, are more reasonable than others, but to do that it is enough for him to accept certain moral truisms, such as the ones I have mentioned, that would also be judgments which would be considered judgments that would continue to be endorsed in wide reflective equilibrium.

IX

We start, in trying to show how moral claims are to be justified, with firmly embedded considered judgments such as 'oppression is bad', 'torturing people just for the fun of it is vile', 'freedom of speech is a good thing', 'health is good' and the like. We look for the largest consistent set of such moral truisms that we can find that is also compatible with the best possible factual knowledge perspicuously arranged and explained by the best systematic social theory available to us. These moral truisms are, as well, to be made compatible with a small consistent set of general moral principles whose import is clear and which, when reflected on carefully, also become considered judgments that must as well be compatible with the facts and the best established social theories available to us. These general principles explain and help justify the moral truisms, and in turn the moral truisms help justify the moral principles. Moreover, the general principles are used to derive further specific moral principles consistent with all these elements. These specific moral principles will in turn as well guide us in areas where we are presently unsure. Examples would be about what to do about abortion, euthanasia or beliefs about when revolution is justified. The general principles, where taken seriously, will tend to cause a pruning of the membership of the moral truisms in the consistent set. Where the truisms, of which we are the least confident, conflict with these general principles, we may very well amend these truisms or even abandon them. Where a small set of general principles do not explain certain of our most firmly embedded specific considered judgments, we will add to our small set of general principles until we get a plausible general principle or cluster of principles consistent with the rest which does explain them. Should, in this search, it be discovered that among our most firmly embedded and cherished moral convictions in this set of moral truisms, all of which are our most entrenched moral convictions, there are moral convictions which turn out to incompatible with one of these general moral principles, then the general moral principle should be amended; or if no plausible emendation squares with those convictions, it should be abandoned. We shuttle back and forth, as Rawls puts it, until

we get, for a time, the most comprehensive consistent package of such elements that we can gain.

The qualification, 'for a time', is vital, for there is there a firm anti-Cartesian fallibilism, what Pierce called a critical common sensism, that recognizes that that comprehensive coherent package, or for that matter any such package, is not for all time; rather it will in time be replaced, if we continue conscientiously to use that method of wide reflective equilibrium, by a still more adequate coherent comprehensive package (often, perhaps always, one which is basically an amended version of the one that went before it); and this, if we so continue to reason, and as the productive forces develop as the world turns, will indefinitely continue to produce in a progressive development more adequate such packages without ever attaining anything like an Absolute or Cartesian certainty as even a heuristic ideal somehow in the background as the end of inquiry or reflection. This is what it is to accept the through and through fallibilism of modernity—a lesson philosophers have not inconsiderable difficulties in learning or at least taking to heart.

Implicit in this view, as I have stated it, though not in Rawls's very similar view, is the recognition that what are the most fundamental moral considerations are the most deeply embedded of our concrete considered moral judgments—our most intransigently held moral truisms—truisms such as the torturing of innocents without point is vile. These are the moral beliefs in the whole package that we would—and rightly—hold on to most tenaciously. Where any of our philosophical moral conceptions come in conflict with them, our philosophical conceptions should give way.

To this it can be responded that after all my coherentist model of justification is really qualified by a foundationalism, albeit a common sense one. Well, names neither frighten me nor hurt me, and if it is foundationalism, it is hardly like the *philosophical* foundationalism of Cartesianism, Humeanism or metaphysical realism. In moral domains, it is the analogue of G.E. Moore's common sense realism. Moore was rightly more confident of the belief, held in standard circumstances, that here is a hand and here is another (both parts of the external world) than he was of any philosophical argument, no matter how cogently argued, that we could not know that there is an external world. Similarly, we are rightly more confident that it is wrong to torture people just for the fun of it than we can be of any moral theory which tells us we cannot know such things or tells us that we have a general moral principle or a set of moral principles which would show us that such a concrete moral belief is mistaken. If this is foundationalism, it is a funny kind of foundationalism that does not commit one to any distinctively philosophical views whatsoever.

It can be argued, against the method of an appeal to considered judgments in wide reflective equilibrium, that, unlike analogous empirical claims, no initial credibility can be assigned to considered judgments. Moore can

invite the epistemological sceptic who doubts that there really is a pile of stones by the river bed to come and take a look with him. There is nothing analogous I can do faced with the moral sceptic or the nihilist who doubts that we can know that it is wrong to torture the innocent just for the fun to it. There is no just looking and seeing that it is wrong like we can look and see that there is a pile of stones by the river bed.[7] Moral blindness, as critics of intuitionism have made evident, is not analogous to talk of colour blindness and tone deafness.[8] Among other things, the tone deaf or colour blind chap can often be brought to recognize that he is tone deaf or colour blind, but the morally blind person cannot be brought to a similar recognition. But this only reflects the fact that values are values and facts are facts, that in a significant sense values cannot be derived from facts or reduced to facts and, perhaps most importantly, the quasi-end points, to the extent there are any end points at all, are different in moral matters than in scientific matters or more generally factual matters.[9] Considered judgments are to the former what evidence is to the latter. And justification, as Wittgenstein has taught us, comes to an end.

Similar things can be said about initial credibility in factual matters, if someone will be pig-headed enough. Suppose, I say that there is a pile of rocks around the river bend and you doubt that there is such a pile of rocks. I invite you to walk around the bend and see. We do so and I point out the pile of rocks—doing a little ostensive teaching if you will—and you acknowledge that it certainly appears to you that there is a pile of rocks before us and that there is nothing untoward about the situation, but you, knowing the standard epistemological arguments pro and con, still wonder why this gives you any reason at all to believe that there really is a pile of rocks there. There is in such a situation nothing much more that is not question-begging that I can say. Justification has come to an end. In factual matters looking and seeing at some point will play a crucial role, and in moral matters at some point considered judgments will play in an analogous way a crucial role. In neither case can we, at such a point, establish any initial credibility, for any such 'credibility' would have to rely on just what we are appealing to. But, on the one hand, seeing, hearing, feeling and smelling, and, on the other, considered judgments can be secure for all of that.

Marxists and others as well do not need *moral* realism to establish a proper objectivity in morality or to avoid nihilism or a rejection of morality. Our ordinary reflective moral understanding together with a good systematic social theory (a thoroughly empirical theory), which will give us an enhanced grasp of the empirical possibilities and a more perspicuous understanding of the facts, is, if not entirely sufficient, at least the central thing to have.[10] Moral philosophy, if it has any place at all, has a rather reduced place, if my coherentist model is roughly right of how justificatory arguments in moral domains should go. To think we need something more than what can be articulated by using something like the type of coherentist model I have

sketched—I do not speak of the details here—is to suffer from that ancient and persistent philosophical disease: the quest for certainty.

NOTES

1. Richard Miller, *Analyzing Marx* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). Page references to *Analyzing Marx* will be given in the text. For the Marxist anti-moralists, see Antony Skillen, *Ruling Illusions* (Sussex, England: Harvester Press, 1977), pp. 122-77 and his 'Workers' Interests and the Strains in Marxian Anti-Moralism' in Kai Nielsen and Steven C. Patten (eds.), *Marx and Morality* (Guelph, ON: Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy), pp. 155-70 and Andrew Collier, 'The Production of Moral Ideology' in *Radical Philosophy*, No. 9 (1974) and 'Scientific Socialism and the Question of Socialist Values' in *Marx and Morality*, pp. 121-54.
2. Alan Gilbert, 'Marx's Moral Realism: Eudaimonism and Moral Progress' in Terence Ball and James Farr (eds.), *After Marx*, (London, England: Cambridge University Press 1984), pp. 154-83. See also his 'Historical Theory and the Structure of Moral Argument in Marx', *Political Theory*, Vol. 9 1981, pp. 173-205 and his 'An Ambiguity in Marx's and Engels's Account of Justice and Equality', *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 76 (1982), pp. 328-46.
3. References to Gilbert's 'Marx's Moral Realism: Eudaimonism and Moral Progress' will be given in the text.
4. Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie des Kommunikatisen Handelns*, Vol. I and Vol. II (Frankfurt am Main: Sahrkamp Verlag, 1981).
5. This is powerfully argued by Andrew Collier in his 'Scientific Socialism and the Question of Socialist Values' in *Marx and Morality* and in his 'Positive Values' in *The Aristotelian Society Proceedings*, Supplementary Volume LVII (1983).
6. See references to Collier in n. 5.
7. P.H. Nowell-Smith, *Ethics* (London, England: Penguin Books, 1954), P. I and Stephen Toulmin, *An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics* (Cambridge, England: University of Cambridge Press 1950), pp. 10-29.
8. Nowell-Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-60.
9. Kai Nielsen, 'On Deriving an Ought from an Is: A Retrospective Look', *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. XXXII, No. 127 (March 1979), pp. 487-514.
10. See references to Collier in n. 5.

Unity of the physical world and human freedom*

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Is human freedom a part of the unity of the physical world? Or, does it stand apart as a phenomenon by itself? The questions are being debated in philosophy, science and religion down the centuries both in the East and the West, perhaps in all cultures of the world. Affirmative answer to the first question implies some sort or monism, clear or anomalous, while answer to the second question in affirmative leads to the denial of monism which may or may not be dualistic. For the limited purpose of this paper I shall confine my discussion only to pro-monistic and pro-dualistic types of world-views *vis-à-vis* their relation to the problem of human freedom. For the time being, I propose to ignore the place of human freedom in the pluralistic world-views.

The first point to be noted is that our problem, the problem which the philosophers and philosophical-minded theorists encounter, is basically due to the *human* root of the concept of freedom we are talking about. It is easily conceivable that freedom is *not* human. It may be taken as an ontological concept or even a metaphysical category. In fact, some philosophers like Śaṅkara, Kant and, more recently, K.C. Bhattacharya have thought of freedom without making any explicit reference to its human *root*. But no thinker, to the best of my knowledge, could ignore the importance of human freedom in the scheme of his thought. If one's *thought* cannot afford to ignore one's concern with freedom as a problematic phenomenon, it is due to one's own *active* character or *practical* nature. The *problematique* of freedom is essentially a practical issue, and not theoretical. A *critique* of freedom will show, among other things:

(*a*) Scepticism regarding freedom is an abstract theoretical conclusion which has little or nothing to do with our life; and
(*b*) It has no firm foundation or root to sustain its non-ambiguous or non-anomalous character.

By critique I mean the principles of critical intelligibility, and the term is not being used here in justificationist or Kantian sense.

The very concept of the physical world needs careful explication. The physical world, or what we call the physical world, has in it many 'things'

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which none, neither the man in the street nor the scientist, would ordinarily agree to designate as physical. The examples which readily come to my mind are such *mental* phenomena as memory, thought and imagination and such *vital* phenomena as growth, decay and death. If the said mental and vital phenomena are kept outside the purview of the physical world, the unity of the physical world is somehow compromised, if not abandoned altogether. If, on the contrary, the above-mentioned types of phenomena are somehow accommodated within it, the resulting world-view is said to be vitiated by what is called *reductionist fallacy*. The reductionist position, though not very easy to spell out, is somewhat like this. The peculiar characteristics, which are ordinarily ascribed to the vital phenomena like growth and decay or the mental ones like memory and thought, are explicable in physical terms, e.g. states, powers, and motion. The anti-reductionist, whether he is a dualist or a pluralist, does not contest the possibility as such of constructing a coherent reductionist world-view. What is more, he may even be prepared to accept the former's basic methodological precept, viz. in scientific explanation the necessity of explaining *many* in terms of *few*, at times even *one*, is welcome, if not imperative. While this response seems sound in principle, one can hardly help the uneasy feeling in him regarding the advisability of constructing theory of mind, including not only thought and imagination but also freedom, in terms of physical causal powers, their motion, complex transformation, etc. The uneasiness, rightly understood, is grounded in some persistent intuitions. One, who is not theoretically committed this way or that, may be ready, for example, to accept the physicalist explanation that human memories consist of complexly related traces, or joint effects, of the concerned person's previous sense-perceptions. But it is gravely doubtful whether one would be prepared to accept the physicalist account of human freedom as the concerned person's *reflective ability* to 'see' the subjection of his initiative and enterprise as complexly determined by the laws of nature. Apart from the complexity of the said theory, it is difficult to resist the thought that a heavy load, almost a 'mysterious' one, is being put on the expression 'reflective ability'. Can a human body, construed exclusively in physical terms, be credited with the capacity to 'see' itself clearly and 'follow' its relation with the physical forces and laws of nature? Is not the said capacity or ability of body itself subject to those laws and forces? If so, how can the recognition of its law-governed connection be logically taken as stable and unerring? If it is so, to 'whom' it is so? Are we to postulate a *sākṣī puruṣa* (witnessing self) *a la* Śaṅkara or a transcendental self *a la* Kant which is claimed to be abiding and self-evident? If it is conceded that this reflective ability or capacity is as fallible as any other information that man is credited to have about himself and his relation with the rest of the world, does not *freedom* turn out to be illusory?

If the physicalist insists that the givenness of freedom in experience has nothing peculiar in it and that it is as questionable and corrigible as any

other piece of empirical information, we are obliged, by implication, to accept freedom as an object of a sort and something negative in character. In that case, freedom may not be known or experienced as an ordinary physical object. And, one might add, it is grasped either as an inevitable part of a natural process or as a temporary suspension of it, as an absence of a *law*-enjoined constraint. In either cases, one has to admit that freedom, born and grown in the womb of Nature and its laws, is an illusory empirical phenomenon. I.e. it does not and cannot exist on its own right. Since in the physicalist scheme of thought there is no transcendental way out or an escape-route, the same empirical illusion has to be taken as real, despite its inescapable illusoriness as an independent phenomenon. Given his physical body and subjection of whatever he does and all that happens in him, mental as well as vital, human freedom can hardly be given an ontological status which is quite apart and above his psycho-somatic existence, quite unrelated to the space-time segment wherein his physical body is situated. In brief, human freedom is a complex physical phenomenon. But this conclusion seems to militate—persistently militate—against our normal intuition of freedom.

Of freedom our intuitions are not identical. Different philosophers, primarily as different human beings, have found that their intuition, if that is the word we are keen to use, differs rather widely. This is evident from the conceptualization of their own intuition of freedom. Some of them 'intuit' freedom as *absence of constraint* and some as *ability to initiate* some thought or action, behavioural or internal. Some philosophers 'intuit' freedom in the form of an almost *inexplicable spontaneity* of body and mind. Another view of freedom is that it is the *recognition of an all-pervading nomic necessity*. The first view may be attributed to naturalists like Hume and Mill. The second one is associated with the names of Descartes and Kant. Leibniz seems to be a propounder of the third view. Spinoza, Marx and Einstein, to my mind, are the chief exponents of the fourth view.

The physical level and the human level of the world have some interesting parallels and analogies between them. Called upon to deal with these parallels and analogies across the *different* levels of world, one has to be very careful and critical. Let us first take up the pair of terms attraction/repulsion. In the world of physics, attractive and repulsive forces are common phenomena. The concepts of gravitation, inertia and space-time are central to the understanding of the behaviours of attracted and repelled physical bodies. But when the said pair of terms is used in the human context, the underpinning connotations of the physical concepts of gravitation, inertia and space-time assume a different, perhaps somewhat metaphorical, character. The attraction that obtains, say, between the sun and the earth, is obviously different in nature from that which works between the mother and the child or between the lover and the beloved. In spite of the difference, there is a clearly intelligible analogy between the former and the latter, the physical

and the human, imports of the term 'attraction'. At the human level, perhaps we will prefer the expressions 'drawn *towards*' 'driving *away*,' or 'revulsion'. Disanalogy between repulsion and revulsion is clear. The repellant forces may be, not necessarily, physical. The *feeling* of revulsion seems to have an element of value judgment in it. The 'repulsed' may or may not be an object of revulsion. The limitations of the analogy are not so clear in the cases of 'attraction'/'repulsion', on the one hand, and those of being 'drawn towards'/ 'driven away', on the other. Even, in the latter case, the distinction between 'repulsion' and 'driving away' is not that unclear. The later term presupposes, or at least suggests, a doer or an agent. No such presupposition or suggestion is attached to 'repulsion'.

My examples may be more or less inaccurate and, to the proportionate extent, unsuccessful in making out the point I have in view. For the efficacy of the expressions as examples are language-bound. The bodily expressions of man, especially those seen in *familiar* social context, prove to be very efficacious, i.e. more specific in their meaningfulness. Though all types of expressions are context-bound and, therefore, more or less ambiguous, I think the ways of minimizing the ill-effects of ambiguity are less evident in the language of body, including speech acts, than in the written or printed language. It is interesting to study the reasons why even the language of science, ordinarily regarded as precise and well-defined, is found, on scrutiny, to be vulnerable to the ill-effects of meaning-shift and the resulting ambiguity. For example, the meanings of 'gravitation', 'inertia' and 'space-time' are not same in Newton's absolutistic system and Einstein's relativistic one. The non-availability of context- or system-invariant meanings raises many problems, some of which have bearing on the subject of this paper.

If ordinary language resembles *family*, scientific language forms *system*. The familial relations obtained between different parts of language, written or uttered, are flexible, somewhat indefinite in their reference, and rich in their connotation, whereas the expressions of system-bound language are relatively definite, often operationally defined, lend themselves to logico-mathematical formalization, and rigid in their intra-structural or intra-systematic relation. The crucial two expressions of this discourse, namely, 'unity' and 'human freedom' are not of the same family. At least that is my linguistic perception. While 'unity' has received systematic scientific attention and been given rigorous definitions, the same cannot be said about 'human freedom'. The offered definition of 'unity' in terms of consistency has not proved universally acceptable. Even then one should note the point that, in spite of Gödel's disturbing finding regarding the theorem of incompleteness and the virtual abandonment of the programme of the Unity of Sciences launched in 1930s by the leading lights of the Vienna Circle, '*unity* of science' as a research programme remains still alive at least in the weak Lakatosian sense. In marked contrast to 'unity', 'human freedom' is a very nebulous and yet a very rich expression. I have already indicated some *different* and time-honoured meanings of 'human freedom'. Given the difference of those meanings of the expression, it is not easy to assign a definite place to it in the *unity* of the physical world, unless, of course, one thinks, 'unity' itself is subject to the law of semantic vagaries. Knowing well that every scientific world-view is bound to be questionable and corrigible, its author tries his best to make it as true as his powers permit. Some or other aspect of the great scientists—Kepler, Galileo, Descarte, and Hooke—from whom Newton learnt most was partly refuted or corrected by him. For example, Kepler's views on the laws of planetary motions, the 'magnetic character' of the Sun and 'the natural inertia' of moving bodies leading this to rest in the absence of the motive force were not acceptable to him. Galileo's assertions that the acceleration of falling bodies is constant at all distances and that the moon has no influence on the tides of the ocean proved also inconsistent with his findings. The Cartesian hypothesis that the planets are moved around by all-pervading ether in huge vortices and that atoms do not exist are rejected by Newton. Finally, Hooke's view that the centripetal inverse square force acting on a body produces orbital motion with a speed inversely proportional to the distance from the centre of the force is rejected by Newton. Also he rejected the existence of 'centrifugal' forces affirmed by Huygens. He introduced a concept of 'centripetal' force.

Newton draws a clear distinction between mass and weight. Mass, being a measure of the body's resistance of acceleration, undergoes a change in its state of motion or at rest. This is its inertia. Of bodies mass is also a measure of its response to a given gravitational field. Naturally, the question arises: what is the relation, if any, between a body's (inertial) resistance and its (gravitational) response to a gravitational field. For the sake of its systematic unity, Newton's inertial physics (*Principia*) was obliged to prove experimentally the constancy between inertia and gravitation.

Within the framework of Newton's absolutistic mechanics it was not easy to find a satisfactory answer of the above question. The scientist himself was evidently aware of it. He characterized his work as 'the mathematical principles of philosophy'. According to him, 'the whole burden of philosophy' was to reach the First Cause of the System of the World.

> From the phenomena of motion to investigate the forces of nature... from these forces to demonstrate the other phenomena...expounded in ... first and second books... In the third book I gave an example of this in the explication of the System of the World... by the propositions mathematically demonstrated in the former books.... In the third I derived from the celestial phenomena the forces of gravitation with which bodies tend to the sun and the several planets....I wish we could derive the rest of the phenomena of Nature by the same kind of reasoning from mechanical principles, for I am induced by many reasons to suspect that they may all depend upon certain forces by which the particles of bodies, by

> some causes hitherto unknown, are either mutually impelled towards one another and cohere in regular figures or are repelled and recede from one another. These forces being unknown, the philosophers have hitherto attempted the search of Nature in vain; but I hope the principles here laid down will afford some light either to this or some truer method of philosophy.[1]

It is clear from the above quotation that, in spite of his consistent adherence to the mechanical world-view in the celebrated Cartesian-Galilean tradition, Newton is interested in explaining all 'phenomena of Nature', including those of life and mind, in terms of matter and motion, space and time. Whatever happens in the external world or, speaking in more general terms, the structure of the physical world is known by us as filtered through our sense-experience. However precisified it might be by experimental devices, both in view of the futility of the search for the First Cause of natural phenomena and the undeniable difference or gap between the world as it is and the same as available to our body-mind complex, one feels obliged to fashion one's theory of scientific knowledge. Following Galileo, Newton draws a distinction between the primary qualities, such as extension and inertia, which lend themselves to mathematical measurement and formulations, and the secondary qualities, such as colour, taste, sound, which are sensations in the brain induced by the primary qualities. Man's mind is situated in the brain or sensations to which (encoded) motions are transmitted from external objects by the nerves and from which (decoded) motions are re-transmitted to the muscles.

This important distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities has been fully exploited, as we know, by Locke in his theory of knowledge.

Like Galileo, Newton was also a deeply religious man. But, given his basic concepts of mechanics, he did not know how to account for the causes of all motions including those of (what we call) will. He was painfully aware of the limitations of 'the power of the entire human intellect'.[2]

Additionally, he was handicapped by his methodological decision not to use hypothesis which cannot be experimentally tested. By implication, this methodology led him to a sort of empiricism which was not to his scientific *realistic* taste. At the same time, his religious inclination and admitted limitation of all scientific findings were responsible for his frequent reference to God as the First Cause of the world of phenomena. This is bound to remind the discerning reader of Locke's dualism and, perhaps, more pronouncedly, of Kant's attempt to vindicate God of religion without giving up the basic framework of the Newtonian physics.

Newton's predicament on this basic issue is evident from Book III Part I of his *Principia*.

> All these things being considered, it seems probable to me that God in the beginning formed matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable particles of such sizes and figures with such other properties, in such proportion to space as most conduced to the end for which he formed them; and that these primitive particles being solids, are uncomparably harder than any porous bodies compounded of them; even so very hard as never to wear or break in pieces; no ordinary power being able to divide what God himself made one in the first creation.[3]

It is interesting to note that in terms of hard, unbreakable, and impenetrable particles and their motions Newton originally proposed to explain everything not only physical but also chemical, vital and mental. His commitment to the law of parsimony prevents him from invoking different causes for different sets or levels of (natural) phenomena. Consequently, he speaks only of God as the First Cause. Even of God he speaks cautiously to the effect that His efficacy is known to us only through Nature.

> For so far as we could know by natural philosophy what is the First Cause, what Power He is for us, and what benefit we receive from Him, so far our duty towards Him, as well as that towards one another, will appear to us by the light of Nature.

Thus, Newton draws a clear line of distinction between the natural and the supernatural. If his axioms or laws of motion, which are essentially natural and could explain to his own satisfaction all the natural phenomena, it is not clear why the notion of the supernatural (God) had to be invoked by him at all. So the task of secularization of physics was left unfulfilled by him.

The unfulfilled task gave rise to two distinct trends of thought;

(*a*) To show that the laws of Nature are supreme in every sphere—material, vital and mental; and
(*b*) To show that the 'seemingly supreme' laws of Nature all work together for the realization of a unified end under the guidance of a Supreme Intelligence.

Newtonian revolution, especially its crux—universal gravitation—was received lustily and approvingly. Jean-Sylvain Bailly, the noted historian of science of the eighteenth century, observed: 'Newton alone, with his mathematics (*Geometrie*), divined the secret of Nature'. Like many other scientists of his time, he made a distinction between the Newtonian system as mathematical and as a true natural philosophy. Those who, like Maupertius, accepted it only as a mathematical system of calculable phenomena, were not willing at all to consider whether it is 'in accordance with or contrary to sound Philosophy'. Their interest was evidently to secularize Newton's physics and ignore altogether its tenuous thread of connection with the supernatural.

Bailly himself maintained that it was more than a mere mathematical system, a system of natural philosophy or physics. To Laplace Newton's universal gravitation was a 'great principle of Nature'. In support of his pro-naturalistic view, Laplace expresses doubt about all those hypotheses which are not founded upon and testable by facts. According to many French materialists of the time, Newtonian gravitation is a single law which enables us to put together all natural phenomena in a most intelligible way and dispense with the notion of God.

The distinction between 'natural system' and 'philosophical system' became clear for the first time in the modern age in the system of Copernicus. In his Foreword to Copernicus's *magnum opus*, Osiander states that an astronomer is called upon to perform two duties: (*i*) to 'compose the history of the celestial motions through careful and expert study'; and (*ii*) to 'conceive and devise the causes of these motions or hypotheses about them'. He is of the view that the scientist cannot in any way get to the 'true causes' and that he will have to remain satisfied with 'whatever suppositions enable the motions to be computed correctly from the principles of geometry'. Copernicus's helio-centric hypothesis is merely a hypothetical device to connect in the best possible coherent manner the astronomical data available at the time. While as an astronomer Copernicus was required 'merely to provide reliable basis for computation', the question of truth was left to the philosopher and it is only through revelation that this truth can be grasped. Clearly, as Popper has rightly pointed out, Osiander was offering an instrumentalist interpretation of the Copernican revolution. Since it proved inconsistent with the received geo-centric hypothesis of Ptolemy, officially approved by the Papal authority, Osiander tries to interpret it as one more 'probable' and 'simple' hypothesis designed to bring together 'a huge treasure of very skilful observations.'[4]

Copernicus's Preface and Introduction to his great work are also marked by an understandable ambivalence. At times he gives the impression that his view is merely hypothetical and not revealed truth. But he also submits, though with deep scholarly humility, that his hypothesis is in best possible accordance with the available astronomical data. Copernicus uses the word 'philosophy' as the pursuit of truth and refers to his acquaintance with the works of Pythagoras, Plato, Cicero and many other philosophers propounding different views regarding the motions of the earth. In the name of 'freedom of imagination', he hoped that he too 'would be readily permitted to ascertain whether explanations sounder than those of my predecessors could be found for the revolution of the celestial spheres on the assumption of some motion of the earth'. He claims to have written his work on astronomy 'for astronomers'. He seems to suggest that the philosophers, not sufficiently familiar with astronomy, might consider his work inconsistent with the authority of Scripture. Evidently, he was annoyed at least with some philosophical studies in the 'movement of the world machine created for our sake by the best and

most systematic Artisan of all'.[5] Copernicus took upon himself several difficult tasks simultaneously, namely, (*a*) to defend the Scripture; (*b*) to reject the received astronomical theories of the time; and (*c*) to uphold 'freedom of imagination'.

Obviously, it was difficult to show the ways, within the limits of sense-bound reason, one could perform all the above tasks. Deeply influenced by the spirit of Copernican Revolution and Newtonian mechanics, Kant, as we all know, proposed to bring about a comparable revolution in the theory of scientific knowledge. To start with, he submits, *a la* Copernicus, that his view is nothing more than a hypothesis. In this respect, he evidently departs from Newtonian methodology, hypothesis *non-fingo*. But, later on he claims to have proved that his view is 'proved, apodeictical and not hypothetical'. Further, he acknowledges his debt to Copernicus in respect of not relying entirely on sense-representations. In support of his non-empirical (not anti-empirical but pro-transcendental) method, he argues that 'the invisible force (Newtonian attraction) which holds the universe together... would have remained for ever undiscovered if Copernicus had not dared, in a manner contradictory to the sense but yet true, to seek the observed movements not in the heavenly bodies, but in the spectator.[6]

Kant's true spectator is the transcendental self and not the empirical or embodied self. It is not available in and through sense-perception and as object. Its transcendental 'subjectivity' has no objective co-relate which could be logically claimed to be its 'expression' or 'reflection' (*ibid.* B156, B430). Neither sense-representation nor thought of our body provides any cue to what the transcendental self, the freest self, is like. Neither the method of 'observational astronomy', i.e. 'sensibility', nor that of 'theoretical astronomy', i.e. 'intelligibility', attributed to Copernicus and Newton is of any help to know the self. 'Twisting of words... merely sophistical subterfuge', Kant warns us, will not do here. Understanding and reason, including the use of the former 'even in the Newtonian account of the structure of the universe', cannot take us beyond the realm of objects or phenomena and to the self as it is, i.e. noumenal self (Cr.P.R.A. 257/B313).

This formulation of the problem of knowing the Beyond is essentially Newtonian in its inspiration. That the genuine scientific inquirer encounters serious problems in getting to what lies beyond the reach of senses and also refuses to submit itself to their searching scrutiny was clearly anticipated by Newton. But unwilling to cut off his world-views into two halves, phenomena and noumena, the latter stuck to his unitary world-view ascribing its origin and intelligibility to God, the First Cause. Kant, in contrast, committed to secularize his pro-Newtonian world-view, rejects the causal proof of God's existence and tries almost desparately to discover both origin and intelligibility of the world of science or, to use his own expression, the empirical world, in the structure of *human* understanding. But his studies convince him that understanding is affiliated to and works under the transcendental

unity of apperception, essentially a function of the transcendental self, essentially a surrogate of a God-like principle. The universal and necessary character of scientific understanding—understanding of this or that individual, is basically grounded in the said unity. The relation between human understanding and the latter, notwithstanding Kant's all ingenious arguments,[7] remains unclear. The unity of the empirical world seems to be a gift of the transcendental unity of the self, i.e. 'I think' principle. The lack of clarity in the relation between the said two unities, one might say, is a euphemism for the dualism between things-in-themselves and things-as-they-appear, the dualism in which Kant lands us in his (unsuccessful?) bid to secularize the unity of the physical world and, simultaneously, to vindicate human freedom. It is difficult to see how Kant succeeds in carving out a place for freedom in the causally governed world of science (A 538-558/B 566/586). To say, as Kant does, we are, at the same time, citizens of two worlds. As embodied beings we are subject to the laws of Nature, *but* the self in us transcends our bodily bounds and frailities.

Apparently, Kant himself does not feel satisfied with his attempt to solve the problem of freedom-in-Nature and returns to it in *Critique of Judgment*. In our aesthetic judgments, especially in the purposiveness of Nature, he finds an *affinity* between the sensible and the supersensible, between the empirical and the transcendental. This affinity between the two realms is admittedly not to be taken as their *unity*. That is, without giving up altogether his dualism of *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant in *Critique of Practical Reason* and *Critique of Judgment*, in moral and aesthetic forms of experience, seeks to grasp some *practical* principle of unity. Aesthetic experience is not basically cognitive in its orientation. '[J]udgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment and beauty is not a characteristic of the object, considered in itself.'[8]

Its reference to object is oblique, metaphorical or 'confused'. Aesthetic experience is essentially 'agreement of the representation of the object in the imagination with the essential principles of judgment in general in the subject.' One feels deeply moved by the beauty of Nature, and initially one might think that the basis of this aesthetic feeling is grounded in the 'mechanical' forms of Nature itself, i.e. realistic. But, on scrutiny, Kant finds that the apparent purposiveness of Nature that enables us to form freely beautiful objects out of its otherwise mechanical structure is grounded *apriori* in ourselves. Kant highlights 'the *ideality* of the purposiveness in the beauty of nature.' Beautiful art wells out of our 'genius' and 'must not be considered as a product of understanding and science', i.e. not cognitive. The fact that Nature lends itself to be freely formed, rather transformed, into art objects by human imagination is construed by Kant as an evidence of the work of the transcendental self (in us) which alone is free and capable of exercising that freedom for creative, as distinguished from cognitive, purposes.

Kant's effort to find a place for human freedom in what is called physical

world seems to have clearly failed. Except in not-cognitive terms of *affinity*, he could not bridge the gap between the empirical and the transcendental realms. And there, too, the unity of the former was founded in the latter, in the apperception of the free self.

To break the deterministic spell of Newtonian mechanics, the physicist-philosopher who, to my mind, made very significant contribution is Mach. In his *Mechanics* (1882) he attacks both Newton's concepts of absolute space and time, and Kant's concept of things-in-themselves. For, he points out, these concepts are metaphysical in the bad sense, and have nothing to do with human experience which is essentially 'sensation'. Newton's definitions of mass and force are circular. We know matter only through its effects on our senses, and we define density only as mass per unit volume. To avoid the Newtonian circularity, he offers his own fundamental principle of dynamics. When two bodies act on each other, e.g. by their mutual gravitation, the ratio of the accelerations produced by them on each other is constant, and depends only on something in the bodies which may be called mass.

Besides Mach the other scientists who contributed significantly in the nineteenth century towards the transformation of the Newtonian mechanics into new Einsteinian physics are Faraday, Maxwell, and Hertz. The phenomena of electricity received a new,—field-interpretation. The lines of electrical force were depicted as a gravitational field. The concept of field proved very promising. One might say, as Einstein and Infeld did, 'the first success of the field description suggests that it may be convenient to consider all actions of currents, magnets, and charges indirectly, i.e. with the help of the field as an interpreter.'[9]

The new physics aimed at translating the language of classical mechanics into that of field. It was found that the changing magnetic field is accompanied by an electric field. Maxwell's equations may be said to be the laws representing the *structure* of the field. According to Einstein, Maxwell's findings are 'the most important event in physics since Newton's time'[10] The electromagnetic field of Maxwell proved *really*, not merely theoretically, a picture of the physical world. Maxwell's equations truly *describe* the structure of the electro-magnetic field. Field represents energy. Changes in energy spread out in space with a definite velocity and produce wave. The velocity of an electro-magnetic wave was found to be equal to the velocity of light. According to the classical relativity principle of mechanics, if the laws of mechanics are valid in one coordinate system, then they are also valid in any other coordinate system moving uniformly relative to the first. But if two coordinate systems move non-uniformly, relative to each other, then the requirements of the classical laws of mechanics are not satisfied. In classical mechanics, coordinate systems were assumed as inertial systems. But in new physics the classical concept of *inertia* itself comes under fire. The basic two assumptions of new physics are: (*i*) 'the volocity of light in vacuo is the same in coordinate systems moving uniformly, relative to each other': and (*ii*) 'all

laws of nature are the same in all coordinate systems moving uniformly, relative to each other'.[11] Given these assumptions, we are led by the relativity theory of Einstein to an 'awkward' situation, namely, we are obliged to believe that two events which are simultaneous in one coordinate system may not be so in another. Given the relativity of the coordinate systems to space-time continuum, the concept of *simultaneity* itself undergoes a significant change. Even the 'best clocks' placed in different coordinate systems will not keep and show 'the same time'.

Relativity physics departs from classical physics in several other important respects. In classical physics one finds two separate concepts of matter and energy and two laws of conservation. In relativity one encounters only one concept, that of mass-energy. Secondly, it dispenses with the classical concept of an absolute time. The old laws of mechanics turn out to be invalid if the velocity of moving bodies approach that of light. Besides, its validity is claimed to be universal, i.e. in all domains of physics, in all coordinate systems. But even the general theory of relativity, which gives a very deep and simple analysis of the space-time continuum and makes spectacular use of the concept of field, seems to be unsatisfactory in one important respect. It is yet to unify field *and* matter. A *pure* field physics is still a research programme and not an established theory.

Quantum physics poses a challenge to this proposed undertaking. Some physical quantities, of matter and electricity, for example, are found to be discontinuous and vary only by jumps. Thompson (1897) showed that electrons, like mass, vary discontinuously. Planck (1901) devised a Quantum Theory, according to which radiation is not continuous and has to be dealt with individual units or atoms. Bohr was first (1913) to apply Planck's quantum theory to the problem of atomic structure, to the movement of planetary electrons. Bohr's atomic model aimed at explaining not only observed facts but also unobserved, i.e. observable, radiation or radio-active particles from outside. Heisenberg's quantum mechanics (1925) was based only on what could be observed, i.e. on the radiation observed and emitted by the atom. Schrödinger showed (1926) that material points consist of, or are nothing but, wave systems and that it was mathematically equivalent to Heisenberg's theory. Next year (1927) Heisenberg and Bohr found that the more accurately they tried to determine the position of a particle, the less accurately could the velocity or momentum be specified, and *vice versa*. The resulting uncertainty in one's knowledge position, multiplied by that in one's knowledge of momentum, was, approximately speaking, found to be equal to the quantum constant h (unit of action). There is nothing in the physical world corresponding to the concept of simultaneous certainty of position *and* momentum. Eddington called this finding *the principle of indeterminacy*, usually known as *the principle of uncertainty*, and attaches to it an importance equal to that of *the principle of relativity*.[12]

In his characteristic manner, Einstein liberally praises quantum physics

towards the emergence of which his own contribution is rightly rated very high. He marvels at 'the splendid agreement' between it and experimental findings. He notes its further removal from the old mechanical view and exclusive concern with probabilities governing 'crowds and not individuals'. Evidently he is not satisfied : '. . . quantum physics. . . [is] still. . . based on . . . two concepts: matter and field. . . [This] dualistic theory. . . does not bring our old problem of reducing everything to the field concept even one step nearer realisation'.[13] According to Einstein, the aim of all physical theories is the same, viz. to 'try to find our way through the maze of observed facts, to order and understand the world of our sense-impressions'. Although he claims that 'our ways' are 'freely invented', recorded history shows time and again that scientific inventions, including the *revolutionary* ones, are deeply influenced by the past findings in the field, both successes and failures. If we are to believe Einstein himself, all proclaimed revolutions are evolutionary.

To do away with the dualism of the quantum mechanics Einstein's last 'free invention', as we all know, was 'Generalised Theory of Gravitation' wherein he claims: 'After long probing I believe that I have now found the most natural form for this generalisation, but I have not yet been able to find out whether this generalised law can stand up against the facts of experience'.[14]

There is a widespread view that the classical mechanics, together with its attending determinism, is inconsistent with human freedom. This sort of determinism has been characterised by Popper as '*prima facie*'.[15]

The expression '"*prima facie*" determinism', is likely to lead one to believe that there is a hierarchy of determinism. If Newtonian mechanics, as developed by Laplace, means one sort of determinism, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that relativistic gravitational field theory also implies determinism, though of a different sort.

According to the Laplacean form of determinism, given complete and precise information of a particular state of the world and the laws of nature, it is possible to predict accurately its all future possible states. To quote him on the point:

> We ought. . . to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its anterior state as the cause of the one which is to follow. Assume. . . an intelligence which could know all the forces by which nature is animated, and the states at an instant of all the objects that compose it. . . for [this intelligence] nothing could be uncertain; and the future, as the past, would be present to its eyes.[16]

The information required for the necessary prediction pertains to the initial conditions of the concerned states, namely, their positions, masses, velocity and directions of the movement. It is difficult to imagine how a human being

or, for that reason, even a Laplacean determinist-scientist, could possibly master all the information required for accurate prediction. Asked by Napoleon how his system of celestial mechanics could do without the notion of God, he is said to have affirmed that it was a *hypothesis*. Obviously, the Laplacean demon was neither Godly nor human. This scientific world-view seems to have no place for human freedom in it. And this scientific view, though over-optimistic in its character, can hardly be regarded as truly human. The Darwinian theory of evolution strengthens this deterministic outlook. But some working scientists remain unconvinced of the correctness of this view which according to them, could not give a satisfactory account of human freedom. For example, as stated by Einstein: After long probing I believe that I have now found the most natural form for this generalisation, but I have not yet been able to find out whether this generalised law can stand up against the facts of experience.[17]

The case against determinism depends upon the nature of the formulation of what is meant by determinism. The determinism with which Kant and Laplace, for example, are concerned are primarily, not exclusively, scientific and physical. But we are familiar also with another sort of determinism which may be characterized as psychological. The names of Hobbes, Spinoza and Hume are closely associated, of course in different ways, with this view. The first two thinkers had developed their views before the Newtonian form of physical determinism was made available to the world of learning. Needless to add, Hume's version of psychological determinism is different from both Hobbes's and Spinoza's, and is primarily theoretical in character. It is interesting to note that each one of these thinkers, though *theoretically* committed to one or other form of determinism, is *practically* a strong defender of freedom. Hobbes is of the view that human will is 'necessarily caused' by other things, of which we, because of their complexity, are often unaware. He finds no fundamental difference between the process of causation in the natural world and that in the human world. Spinoza, on his part, recognizes no fundamental distinction between passion, affection and will. The difference between them is basically a matter of clarity. If the vast and complex causal nexus in which the said phenomena figure is grasped clearly and distinctly, the phenomena would exhibit the same basic character. Since we are not able to trace the physiological and physical causes of our psychological phenomena,—passion, thought, will, etc.—we are often inclined to believe that these are more or less autonomous. In other words, our lack of knowledge of the causes of the concerned psychological phenomena prompts us to conclude that these are more or less autonomous or free. Obviously, this conclusion is invalid. Our inability to follow cognitively the *continuous* causal nexus (of Nature) in which our psychological phenomena are phases does not logically entitle us to pronounce them as real, discontinuous and autonomous.

This argument against psychological determinism may be formulated

even more strongly and positively. If this version of determinism is accepted, nothing psychological, not even our decision and choice, could be regarded as *of* this or that agent. This consequence of the doctrine of psychological determinism is bound to have grave repercussion on human responsibility, accountability and theories of punishment. Obviously, none of the psychological determinists would be prepared to defend the view that, since one's action is causally determined by one's will and one's will by some other things, one is not morally or legally responsible for what one does or abstains from doing. This makes two things clear: first, as mentioned earlier, psychological determinism is mainly a theoretical, not practical, doctrine; and secondly, freedom of will and action is not entirely unrelated to 'other things'. In order to vindicate the 'autonomy of will', one is not logically obliged to construe that it is uncaused in every sense. The controversy, often designated as "determinism *versus* freedom", may be advisedly redesignated as 'determinism *and* freedom'. To answer the question whether physical determinism has nothing to do with human freedom or the former is antithetical to the latter, one is required, to start with, to spell out the senses or forms of 'determinism' and 'freedom' to which one stands committed. For example, the realm of determinism and that of freedom may be separated and then joined together either by a transcendental doctrine of pre-established harmony (of the Leibnizian form or by an empirical doctrine of post-established harmony (of the Teilhard de Chardin form). Both these forms, it is to be noted, aim at reconciling the causal character of human decision with its claim of rationality, and of belonging to this or that human agent. It is also of interest to note that in the recent years writers like W.V. Quine, J.J.C. Smart and Donald Davidson are also engaged in reconciling the notions of causality and rationality without diluting the importance of human freedom and responsibility.

Popper's rejection of scientific determinism has two main components in it. First, he points out that the tenability of scientific determinism, even in its limited form, depends upon the presupposition that the system within which the proclaimed determinism works is *closed*, i.e. insulated from and impervious to external—extra-systematic—influences or forces. This presupposition, cosmologically speaking, is unsound. True, for heuristic purpose, *systems* are studied in isolation. But that does not mean the systems themselves, whether physical or social, are really isolated. With reference to human or social systems, this point may be established more clearly and convincingly. Popper's second argument in favour of indeterminism is positive and strong. Here he highlights the significance of human *creativity*.[18] What makes creativity possible, the factors underlying creativity, can hardly be characterized causal in the scientific sense. Though we as embodied human beings are placed in and subject to the laws of the physical world, we are not deprived of our ability, i.e. the freedom to chose, decide and act. The limits of this ability are not to be ascribed to physical determinism

but to our relation with the worlds of physics, physiology, and sociology.

Popper's theory of human freedom and its relation to physical determinism has been spelt out both from the physical, the psychological and the 'transcendental points of view.'[19]

He speaks of 'three Worlds'. 'World 1' stands for the world of physics,—the world of land, ocean and physical fields of forces; 'World 2' for the world of psychology,—of sensation, imagination, volition, thinking, etc.; and the 'World 3' is populated by the products of the human mind,—theories, problems, books, journals and libraries, etc. It is to be noted that these worlds are ordered in the scale of abstractness/concreteness. The 'World 1' is most concrete and the 'World 3' least concrete. Speaking from the other end, one might say: 'World 1' is most abstract and 'World 3' least abstract. In between the extremes stands 'World 2'. Physicists like Alfred Lande and philosophers like Quine and Smart maintain that only 'World 1' exists. The collateral psychological theory is behaviourism or the 'identity theory' which tries to show the identity of the mental experiences with brain processes. According to Popper, each one of these worlds is *causally open* to the rest. It means that the physical world is *interacting* upon the mental world and also the 'World 3'. This can be said of each world. The process of interaction is multilateral, mutual and open-ended. But Popper takes pains to point out that, in order to interact on the physical world, the mental world needs more abstract and durable resources of 'World 3'. 'World 3', ordinarily but not necessarily, interacts with 'World 1' via 'World 2'. Human freedom is primarily a phenomenon of 'World 2', but the conditions of its preservation and enlargement,—language, social, political and legal institutions, etc.—are to be found in 'World 3'. At the same time, it is to be pointed out that 'World 2' cannot survive without 'World 1'. For, its physical sustenance is derived from the latter. In a way 'World 2', sustained from below by 'World 1', aims at its elevation to 'World 3' and its preservation and enlargement there. Science and technology, ideas and opinions, etc. of 'World 3' causally interact upon both 'World 2' and 'World 1'.

The doctrine of causal openness of the said three worlds is an anti-thesis of Laplacean determinism. The latter reduces man to a complex machine, a reminder of the Cartesian notion of animal. Given the present position of quantum mechanics, one is obliged to reject the Laplacean determinism, but rejection of determinism by itself is not enough to vindicate human freedom. Human freedom, unlike God's, is subject to the conditions and restrictions imposed, directly or indirectly, by the three worlds. Boundless freedom, freedom in *vacuo*, is not what is available for man. Being a part of the world (s) he cannot completely rise above the same. The most convincing proof of human freedom for Popper is the *creation* of the works of art or music, for example. Popper likes to introduce himself as a pluralist and not a monist. This is perhaps mainly prompted by his intention to dissociate himself from

reductionism of different forms, physicalism and panpsychism. There is nothing wrong to speak of different worlds in more or less metaphorical sense in order to fend off reductionism. That spirit is welcome to me. But once it is insisted upon that these worlds are literally different, then one is called upon to explain their interrelation in detail. In that context, merely to resort to the notion of 'causally open interaction', as advocated by Popper, is perhaps not enough. For we have to explain not only the aspects of the different worlds brought under the forces of interaction but also to make our views clear as regards those aspects which, at a particular point of time, are not subject to the forces of interaction. In other words, we cannot give a *connected* and *unifying* picture of the universe consisting of *different* worlds within it merely in terms of 'causally open interactions.' True, Popper reminds us of the essential *incompleteness* of the scientific picture of the universe. Even if we assume, as I do, the obligation to give a *connected,* though *incomplete,* picture of the world, it remains undischarged. It is a demand both of common sense and of that consciousness of ours which craves for a 'meaningful world-view'. Views on the worlds 1, 2 and 3, unless meaningfully connected, can hardly be regarded as world-view.

It is not at all surprising that epoch-making scientific discoveries, whether these are called revolutionary or evolutionary, have their almost inevitable spill-over effects on other spheres of culture, morality, and religion, etc. On the contrary, it is instructive to recall that the scientific findings, inconsistent with the received moral and religious, views and practices, have almost always given rise to serious debates—stimulating, acrimonious, and, at times, even leading to persecution and inquisition. The cultural impact of the theories of Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Darwin, Einstein, Bohr and Heisenberg, etc. exhibits at least three different trends. First, one group of interpreters defends the great scientific discoveries trying to show their compatibility with the received religious and political views. These compatibilities are ordinarily known as 'conservative'. Secondly, another group of interpreters interprets the same in the best possible secular spirit, i.e. without being unduly influenced or intimidated by the contemporary religious and political cultures. Some members of this group prove 'conservative' and some others 'reformist'. The third group consists of incompatibilists and even 'revolutionaries'.

That even the 'revolutionary' scientific views are more or less culturally 'neutral' and thus lend themselves to different interpretations may be illustrated from the story of science of the recent past. Besides Popper, two other distinguished scientists, Eddington and Fock, have offered strikingly different, if not opposite, interpretations of Einstein's relativistic physics. A.S. Eddington, it is well-known, thought that the new physics paved the way to religious belief, philosophical idealism and free will. He was clear-sighted enough to understand that Einstein's views have no *direct* bearing on the said three "values" to which he himself was deeply committed. His popular

works[20] show that there was a systematic ambivalence in his attitude towards science as a scientist and to his own value-commitment as a scientist. As a Quaker his commitment to "the world of the Spirit" is not populist or extravagant. At the same time, he often reminds us that there is another whole realm beyond that of science. In contrast to Eddington's pro-religious view, Vladimir Aleksandrovich Fock, a competent scientist and an official Marxist, gives a different interpretation of Einstein's physics. In the thirties when in USSR the relativity theory and quantum mechanics were being criticized primarily for ideological reasons, Fock came out in strong defence of the new scientific views. His authentic and 'internal' Marxist commitment did not stand in his way to recognize the merits of the new physics. But he wanted to purge it off its 'idealistic' elements. He was convinced that, given time and further research, the new physics would be found to be consistent with the Marxist view of science, dialectical materialism. In some respects he wanted to modify the Einsteinian notion of the coordinate system. Infeld tells us that Fock's theory of harmonic coordinate systems was found unacceptable to the leading physicists of his time.[21]

One might say that it was perhaps a misfortune for Fock that, while he really was an appreciative critic of Einstein, his Soviet colleagues criticized him for his appreciation of Einstein in spite of the 'idealistic' aura of the latter's physics. The two different interpretations of the new physics given by Eddington and Fock illustrate, among other things, the point that at the level of *philosophical interpretation* the same scientific theory, however rigorously formulated it might be, could be presented in different, at times even contrary, ways.

Time and again Einstein explained the relation of his scientific view to religion and other human values. His own view on the point appears to me very insightful and relevant. According to him, science as science has not much to do with man's such value-commitments as freedom and religion. Of course, if truth is regarded as a value the story turns out to be quite different. The scientist is firmly committed to it. However, it is to be remembered that the logical notion of truth-value (truth/falsity) is not axiological or value-loaded in any ordinary sense. One's commitment to relativity theory or quantum mechanics does not *ipso facto* entail acceptance or rejection of the commonsense view of freedom or that of God.

Einstein first refers to two views of God, scriptural and moral. The God of scriptures is often conceived as object of fear or source of favour, the giver of reward and punishment. This anthropomorphic view of God is not to his taste. He relatively prefers the moral or social view of God. This is the God who protects, loves and cherishes the life of man, individual as well as collective. He consoles man in his days of sorrow and suffering, sustains him amidst the ups and downs of life, and preserves the souls of the dead. This social or moral view of God, though appreciated by him, Einstein, left to himself, is in favour of another variety of religious experience. He speaks of

this 'third stage of religious experience', the elements of which could be found in the traditional forms of religion mentioned earlier. This most preferred form of religious experience is marked by what Einstein calls a 'cosmic religious feeling'. He finds its traces in the Psalms of David and the teaching of Buddha. Interestingly enough, he finds this 'highest kind of religious feeling' in men like Democritus, Francis of Assisi and Spinoza. In his view, 'the most important function of art and science' is 'to awaken this feeling and keep it alive in those who are receptive to it'.

Einstein finds no antagonism between science and religion, provided, of course, one takes religion in the sense explicated earlier. Man's moral disposition and action should be based on sympathy, education, social relations and needs. One's morality should not be based on fear of God's punishment or expectation of his favour. Religion, rightly understood, i.e. as a cosmic feeling, kindles and sustains the spirit of scientific research.

> . . . I maintain that the cosmic religious feeling is the strongest and noblest motive for scientific research. . . . Only those who realise the immense efforts and . . . the devotion without which pioneer works in the theoretical research cannot be achieved are able to grasp the strength of the emotion out of which alone such works, remote as it is from the immediate realities of life [and practical results], can issue.. . . Only one who has devoted his life to similar ends can have a vivid realisation of what has inspired these men and given them the strength to remain true to their purpose in spite of countless failures. It is the cosmic religious feeling that gives a man such strength. A contemporary has said . . . that in this materialistic age of ours the serious scientific workers are the only profoundly religious people.[22]

The doctrine of a personal God interfering with the course of natural events, the operation of natural laws, is clearly unacceptable to Einstein. But he is logical enough to realize that it cannot be *refuted.* What is not scientifically established cannot be disestablished by science. Science as such does not give or deny us freedom. Rightly administered, it does surely promote the spirit of freedom and enlarge the scope of freedom. Wrongly administered or applied, it dampens the spirit of freedom, and reduces the area of freedom. Promotion of science needs freedom of expression and unrestricted communication. Though it is psychologically acquired and secured in a sense, freedom cannot be preserved and promoted except through cultural and, particularly, political institutions. True, sympathy and scientific thought broaden and deepen our *inward* freedom, yet the latter's preservation demands some institutional support and guarantee.

The philosophical implications of quantum theory are being discussed both by the scientists and the philosophers for the last sixty years or so. Besides Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli and Dirac have also taken active

part in this discussion. The discussion is marked by a number of confusions and exaggerations. Eddington, as I have pointed out, is strongly inclined to interpret the new physics, comprising the relativity theory and the quantum theory, as not only consistent with but also conducive to the growth of a religious view of life. Dirac, on the other hand, is strongly opposed to the religious interpretation of the new development in physics. It seems Bohr in some respects is inclined towards him. But, Heisenberg's position appears to be different both from Bohr's and Dirac's.[23]

Dirac had little or no interest in the idea of God, who maintained that it was simply a 'product of the human imagination'. He echoed Marx when he observed: 'Religion is a kind of opium that allows a nation to lull itself into wishful dreams and so forget the injustices that are being perpetrated against the people.[24]

Pauli speaks of a 'spiritual framework based largely on religious values and ideas'. These values and ideas are more or less shared by the members of a given society. Its substance is conveyed through parables and images, and are not, therefore, very clear and distinct in their meaning. Yet, one might say, as Pauli himself does, the spiritual framework is symbolic of 'the entire wisdom' of the concerned society. The belief of the believer is not to be taken in any strict or rigorous sense. It is open to question and correction; and that explains why new scientific discoveries tend to affect the accepted religious beliefs and values, including human freedom. The separation between knowledge and faith that is brought about by the 'new science' often proves temporary. The 'emergency' that follows 'scientific revolution' provides only a temporary relief to the 'tough-minded' scientist. With the passage of time and the restoration of cultural normalcy, the sense of relief enjoyed by the scientist tends to disappear. New religious ideas and values reappear. A scientific culture devoid of any religious idea and value seems 'horrible' to Pauli. It is almost inconceivable and rooted in a 'vulgar' view of science.

Pauli is inclined to accept Einstein's notion of God as orderliness evident everywhere in Nature. It has nothing to do with the personal God of any religious tradition. One might say, at this stage, that this notion of religion is easily detachable from science and that its relation with the latter is not clear at all. To say, as Einestein and Pauli do, that the *subjective* character of man's response to the *objective* orderliness of Nature gives the impression that religious and moral values are merely a matter of *personal* taste and without any objective basis. In fact, this is Heisenberg's own question to Pauli. Pauli's answer sounds negative. That is, he is not prepared to accept the position that his or Einstein's views on religion and values is purely personal. He invokes Bohr's concept of *complementarity* to explain and defend his position. The scientist's image of Nature is not a faithful picture of it : it is 'an abstract extrapolation...that has no counterpart in Nature'. This is one side of the totality of Man-Nature relationship. Complementary

to it is the idea of 'a pure subject of knowledge. . . that confronts no object'. This idea of a witnessing self (*sākṣī puruṣa*) of (what he calls) Asiatic philosophy also appears to Pauli as 'an abstract extrapolation, corresponding to no spiritual or mental reality'. In between these two extra-polated extremes, the Natural and the Spiritual, Pauli, following Bohr's complementarity concept, finds a 'middle course'. Simultaneously, conscious of the different forms of religion and remaining committed to his professional perception of truth, the scientist can, and, in fact, does develop a wider world-view which is populated both by facts and values.[25]

When Heisenberg communicated this discussion between him, Pauli and Dirac to Bohr in Copenhegen, Bohr 'jumped to the defense' of Dirac. He commends Dirac's rejection of the idea of a personal God and love for clarity of logical language. Quoting Wittgenstein, 'whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent', Bohr appreciates Dirac's impatience with the unclear language of religion. He also confesses that the idea of a personal God is 'foreign' to him. But then he speaks something very interesting on the difference between the language of religion and that of science. The former is close to poetry and is, therefore, bound to have images, parables and even paradoxes within it. To think, as we are inclined to do, that science is concerned with objective facts and poetry with subjective feelings is too simplistic and 'too arbitrary'. Simply because religion and poetry are primarily concerned with subjective feelings, one must not think that the poetic and religious modes of experience are not expressive of 'genuine reality'. Bohr is clearly opposed to the idea of 'splitting this reality into an objective and subjective side'. This approach, according to him, is alien both to the spirit of relativity theory and the quantum theory. He points out that 'simultaneity' contains a subjective element. The untenability of the objective/subjective distinction becomes even more clear in the quantum theory. One can still use the objectifying language of classical physics up to a point. But one has to recognize that to make predictions without reference to the observer or the means of observation, i.e. dispensing altogether with the 'subjective' factor, is just not possible. Given this stituation, Bohr feels justified to observe that 'every physical process may be said to have [both] objective and subjective features'.

In response to Heisenberg's specific question whether modern physics provides a solution to the problem of the freedom of will, Bohr's response is clear and negative. He argues to the effect that the quantum theory does neither vindicate the freedom of will nor prove divine intervention in the process of Nature. This whole attitude is based on misunderstanding and confusion. The psycho-somatic process leading to action from motivation is complementary to the process of Nature which the scientist describes in terms of statistical laws, i.e., in terms of groups or aggregates. The scientist's way of looking at natural events and the philosopher's way of looking at human actions are different but not contradictory. Bohr believes that 'our

different ways of looking at things must fit together in the long run, i.e. we must be able to recognise them as non-contradictory parts of same reality, though we cannot yet tell precisely how'. In support of his view he refers also to the *complementary character of causal language and teleological language* in the field of life-sciences. The causal and the teleological description of biological phenomena, though mutually exclusive, are 'not necessarily contradictory'. He maintains that 'we have good reason to assume that quantum-mechanical laws can be proved valid in a living organism just as they can in dead matter'.[26] Bohr's position shows that, in fact, he differs from Dirac's radical position, appreciates the meaningfulness of the language of religion and that of poetry, and yet, as a scientist, feels the necessity to be cautious against the possibility of slipping into the populistic pro-religionist, almost divine-interventionist, interpretation of the new physics. Religionism is to be distinguished from religiosity.

The basic problem which seems to disturb both the philosopher and the scientist is how to draw a coherent theoretical picture of the nature of reality as a whole with a place for human freedom and other values in it. The question may be reformulated in this way: how to *accommodate* freedom and other values in the scientific scheme of natural things? The ratianale of this question owes its origin to the assumption that matter and motion, scientifically speaking, are of such a nature that its causal dynamics seems to negate human freedom by reducing consciousness to a mere epiphenomenon of the physiological system and the phrenological processes. Following Piaget, David Bohm reminds us that it is from the roots 'mod', meaning 'measure', and 'com', meaning 'together', that we have to understand the true significance of the term 'accommodation' which is 'establishment of a common measure.'[27]

Accommodation of freedom and other values in the scientific image of the physical world is supposed to entail 'showing' how the referents of these terms could be *fit* together, cut to a *pattern* and conform to the same set of *rules*. The new physics, called upon to accommodate (to the extent it was possible) the findings of the classical physics in it, had to *adapt* itself to the latter. In the process many elements of the classical physics, as pointed out by Bohm and others, had to be either abandoned altogether or reformulated differently in the new scientific image of the world. This was an imperative for *assimilation* (literally meaning *digestion*) or understanding of the new physics. The scientist's primary task is assimilation and the secondary one accommodation. When he lays bare the 'way' in which he performs the said two tasks, the scientist helps us to understand the new science. It has been rightly pointed out that the scientist's understanding of the world, the totality of reality, is analogous to *artistic perception*. I would like to add that it has a striking similarity also to the *artistic mode of creation*. The artist, like the scientist, also fits different elements together in order to create a meaningful whole. Both of them follow certain rules, however simple or complex they might be. *Unruly* activity never produces either science or art.

Though reality as a whole, i.e. the totality of law-governed things of Nature, is not cognitively available to any human being, one has no good reason to believe that it is not *knowable*,—knowable in principle. Everything we know know in relation to other things and the degree of the former's relativity of existence to the rest is *measurable*—measurable again in principle. In practice everything known scientifically is more or less an abstraction. The complexity of relations and the flux character of reality in which a scientific object—be it an individual or a kind—is 'found' make it impossible for us to grasp it in its concreteness. By implication, then, Bohm argues, one has to accept that one has to remain satisfied only with the relative truth about every scientific assertion. The whole reality within which different cognitive domains and different abstractions and their *relative truth* are available is in itself absolute and concrete but not a possible object of knowledge. The basic reality, i.e. the totality of matter in the process of becoming, is gradually unfolded before, and presented to, us through an inexhaustible series of abstractions of 'approximate validity, in limited contexts and conditions, and over periods of time that are neither too short nor too long.'[28]

From what is being said one might think that there is no objective truth or validity of any scientific assertion and that it is due to the relativity not only of the object of scientific knowledge but also that of the scientist as knower. But Bohm rejects the pessimism underlying this view.

> In our point of view, we admit that... all things do actually colour and influence our knowledge; but we admit also that nevertheless there still exists an absolute, unique and objective reality... ['relativity is absolute'] ... The essential character of scientific research is ... that it moves towards the absolute by studying the relative, in its inexhaustible multiplicity and diversity.[29]

Bohm's theory of hidden variables aims at disproving the claim that the last word on the journey in search of a non-existent causal substratum of reality has been pronounced by the quantum theory. There is no last word in scientific research. The chance factor operative in objective reality does not rule out its basic lawfulness. No strong ground is provided by the quantum-mechanical co-relations for disbelieving that there *is* a sub-quantum level marked by orderliness. The dualistic ontology of the quantum mechanics need not be taken as a very definitive and conclusive position. Bohm claims to have found out a 'deep' order in reality which is consistent with *causally* determinate and continuous movement of relativistic physics, on the one hand, and probabilistically predictable (but causally 'indeterminable') and continuous movement of quantum mechanics, on the other. His claim is tentative and qualified in very many ways. The sub-quantum order of Bohm is called 'implicate' or 'enfolded'. Space and time are not dominant factors in this

deep implicate order. The relationships of the dependence and the independence of different elements in this order are not primarily intelligible in terms of spatio-temporality. In this order or totality is rooted the explicate or unfolded mosaic of the physical, life and psychological spheres. Frankly speaking, when Bohm observes that matter, life and consciousness are all different *projections* of this implicate order, it is not clear what he really means. At least one thing seems clear, namely, the order he speaks of, though may lie beyond the reach of human experience at a particular point of time, is very much a part of scientific research programme. This order is not metaphysical in the bad sense. When he observes, for example, that the totality of all that is a coherent whole and that matter, life and consciousness are all its mentally available abstractions, one gathers, maybe wrongly, the impression that the implicate order as such is undefinable. The difficulty is that, if this impression is to be believed, it ceases to have much of its scientific value. There is nothing wrong in affirming *metaphysically* that the deepest or the highest reality is undefinable or inexplicable. The problem arises in respect of determining the relation between the 'implicate' order and its 'explicate' or empirically displayed counterpart. For the scientist this question is very relevant, and he is professionally obliged to offer a "proposal" which is, at least indirectly, testable. Instead of clarifying the issue Bohm intrigues us by some of his 'metaphysical' observations. Referring to the nature of the enfolded-unfolded universe as the ground of everything that is, he writes:

> At any particular moment in [the] development [of such views as Bohm's which] may arise will constitute at most a *proposal*. It is not to be taken as an *assumption* about what the final truth is supposed to be, and still less as a *conclusion* concerning the nature of such truth. Rather, this proposal becomes itself an *active factor* in the totality of existence which includes ourselves as well as the objects of our thoughts and experimental investigations. Any further proposals on this process will... have to be viable... [marked by] a general self-consistency as well as consistency in what flows from them in life as a whole.[30]

The train of reasoning, following which Bohm comes to the conclusion 'that the explicate and manifest order of consciousness is not ultimately distinct from that of matter in general', is difficut to understand for a person like me having no professional familiarity with theoretical physics. But my task in the paper is very modest. That is to *conceptualize* the findings of scientists and particularly the presentations of the same by them. As a philosopher I do not think myself competent to pass judgment on the scientific tenability or otherwise of their conclusions. But it seems to me that Bohm's account of 'the enfolding-unfolding universe and consciousness', though very ingenious, is not easy to follow. For example, it is not at all clear to me how from the 'bottomlessness' of the explicate order one can positively affirm

that it is grounded in, or, at any rate, affine to, consciousness. From the other end, i.e. matter-energy, one can, with equal plausibility, raise the question as to how the material stuff of the universe 'melts' into, or comes out of, consciousness. In the wake of the rise of Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy, we heard of the exciting finding of 'de-materialisation of matter'. Some ardent believers also spoke of the hidden spiritual character of reality. Left to myself, I, as a gradualist, am inclined to believe that matter, life and consciousness are affine, if not integral, aspects of one and the same larger unity. It is one thing that for complex, almost inscrutable, cultural reasons one is inclined to *accept* a particular image of the reality as a whole, and it is a quite different thing to be rationally and critically persuaded of the *truth* or validity of the cherished image. I agree with Bohm that the scientist is always engaged in exploring the possibility of striking a deeper and simpler picture of reality than the one that is available at a particular point of time. In that sense, I entirely endorse the 'proposal' or provisional character of his implicate order.

The graded and affine properties of matter, life and consciousness have been emphasized by the evolutionist, both of the pro-naturalist and of the anti-naturalist persuations. I have examined their views elsewhere.[31]

The evolutionist views may be studied under three heads, namely, naturalists like Darwin, pro-naturalists like Teilhard de Chardin and anti-naturalists like Sri Aurobindo. I am painfully aware that my proposed classification of evolutionary views is overlapping or fuzzy. Even the naturalists like Darwin and Marx attach great importance to the concepts of creativity and consciousness. Secondly, Chardin is a pro-naturalist, to start with only, and he ends up with a sort of anti-naturalism, highlighting the supremacy of consciousness. But he takes pains to point out that the seemingly anti-naturalist phase is marked by 'compression' or encapsulation of consciousness and consciousness is 'experession' or decapsulation of natural forces.[32]

I find a strikingly similar sort of arguments running through Sri Aurobindo's *magnum opus*.[33] His view has been often characterized as divine materialism. The highest form of consciousness, the Divine, is said to be there in matter in an inconscient form. The materiality of matter is not to be taken in any absolute sense. He affirms that there is no antagonism or even hiatus between matter, life, mind and supermind. These are terms, 'abstract' phases, of an unbroken continuum. When one studies Sri Aurobindo and Teilhard de Chardin, one is clear that one is being introduced to the conceptualization of one's world of experience in general or philosophical terms. True, this conceptualization should be answerable to scientific findigs and subject to refinement in terms of the same. But these enquiries are primarily philosophical in the contemporary sense. For example, when Sri Aurobindo says that matter is *involved consciousness* or that consciousness is *evolved matter*, he is not founding his views on experimental findings. In other words, philosophical conclusions are not surrogates of the scientific ones. Far from that,

but not quite unrelated to that. The philosopher wants to present an *intelligible and coherent* world-view wherein the general views of such macor-phenomena as matter, life and mind occupy very important positions. From the other end, one might point out that he is not looking into the micro-level properties and relations of material, vital and mental phenomena. But he is logically called upon to show the consistency or, at any rate, lack of inconsistency between different levels of the above-mentioned phenomena. The philosopher gives us a *speculative map* or hypothesis trying to connect different kinds and levels of phenomena. Maybe that his speculation is influenced by, or partially based upon, culturally available learned views. But the value of philosopher's speculation mainly consists, for the interim period, in providing coherent theoretical frameworks to be taken up and tested by practices and scientific investigations. Some people especially religious and aesthetic-minded ones, seek and find in them 'pure' intellectual and emotional satisfaction.

The work of the theoretical physicist or the cosmologist is strikingly similar to that of the philosopher. My reference to the works of the scientists like Einstein, Heisenberg and Bohm, on the one hand, and philosophers like Sri Aurobindo and Chardin, on the other, is intended to show, among other things, that both types of thinkers are equally *concerned* with the issues of securing place for human consciousness and freedom in the physical world. But their concern is followed up by them in different ways. Admittedly, these ways are complementary and not antagonistic. For otherwise their findings and arguments could not present us a coherent and intelligible world-view.

Though the concern of the philosopher and the scientist is identical at the highest level, one's expectation from the latter is of a more rigorous and demanding sort. While Sri Aurbindo's evolutionary metaphysics may be accepted as a metaphysical hypothesis *or* rejected on the ground of non-availability or inadequate availability of scientifically tested evidences, one is not ordinarily prepared to accept this metaphysical sort of disjuncts, i.e. either/or (equivocal) formulation of a view. When Bohm, for example, tells us that the different world-views themselves, in spite of their difference, are 'active factors' in the flux of reality shaping its course, I, for one, do not feel very enlightened. Intellectual toleration and preparedness to consider the different world-views is, of course, welcome. But the *critical* attitude is expected of us both in philosophy and science. One has to draw a distinction between the more correct and the less correct views, between good, bad and bogus science and philosophy.[34]

There is no denying the fact that, in the name of vindication of human consciousness and freedom, lots of cheap and intellectually pernicious stuff are gaining currency. 'Oriental wisdom' is often being invoked in this context and put to various sorts of use, good, bad and indifferent. Buddhism, Yoga, Taoism and Confucianism are being 'freely' interpreted to suit the

intellectual palate of the confused seeker. When I mention these aberrations of modern science and modern philosophy, this is no stricture against the speculative adventure of the professionally responsible scientists and philosophers. Some adventures of consciousness are bound to be speculative, to start with.

I hope it is clear by this time that the main aim of my argument is to vindicate (a particular notion of) freedom (not yet spelt out) which is not inconsistent with the findings of modern physics. At this stage, it must, however, be affirmed clearly that it is not the task, certainly not the primary one, of the philosopher of religion and morality to define his position on freedom taking the cues from science. It is evident from history that scientists differ between themselves not only from epoch to epoch but also within every epoch. If the moral thinker is required to play second fiddle to the dominant scientific theories of different, at times even contradictory, sorts, his view will be suspect in the eyes of every critical thinker. What I am trying to understand and spell out is the relation between *freedom* (and not *theories* of freedom) and (the scientific images of) the physical world. To try to make our experience or intuition of freedom an adjunct to the changing scientific *authorities* is to go against the very *critical* spirit of science. The authority of science is certainly not expected to be like that of this or that theological order, i.e. dogmatic, scriptural and uncritical.

I may be told that what I term experience or intuition of freedom is itself theoretical and, further, that even experiences and intuitions differ from person to person. In a sense this contention is perhaps true. Without an element of theorization our intuitions and experiences are not communicable, comparable and criticisable. But this sense of our experience of freedom seems to me secondary. The primary sense of freedom is perhaps unquestionably primitive. In this sense freedom is the basis of our communication, comparison, criticism and similar other characteristic human activities.

The influence of Nature on us, on our freedom, can hardly be denied. Not only the forces of Nature *determine* us *practically* but also the theories on those forces have their practical *influence* on us. In other words, the impact of theories of science on human mind is both theoretical and practical. We are influenced by theories in different ways, directly, i.e. psycho-somatically, and indirectly, i.e. through technology and institutions resulting from theories. If we bear in mind the efficacy of the silent forces of *environmental instruction* on us, we would be able to realize that, in the long run, technological and other institutional influences, on the one hand, and theoretical ones, on the other, tend to *converge* on us—on our body-mind complex. The relation between the two sets of influences is essentially *dialectical*. And as a result of that, their areas of convergence often turn out to be points of departure, *divergence* and take off at a new level, higher or lower, depending on various other attending conditions.

The relation between man's freedom and his environment is not simply

causal, i.e. one-to-one, type. It is complex, i.e. many-to-one *and* one-to-many type. For example I, as one, am free in civil society, i.e. among many. Metaphysically speaking, one's freedom is 'grounded' in many enabling 'conditions' spread over the world and, in turn, the 'consequence' or 'effect' of the former on the latter, though invisible, is undeniable. One-to-many and many-to-one characters of freedom are more 'visible' in the social world. Metaphysical or cosmological elements of this view, many-in-one and one-in-many, may be found in the Upanisads and Leibniz's monadology. In a sense freedom is, indeed, unitary and indivisible.

Freedom is both 'compressed' *in* the human body and 'expressed' *by* it. The body has its compressive-holding powers and expressive-articulative competences. For example, music, dance and use of language, properly analysed, show that these experienceable 'performances' have their enabling 'hinterlands' or competences *within* us which are enriched and strengthened by sense-experiences. These 'hinterlands' are pointers to, and glimpses of, freedom, — ground of our psycho-somatically retainable and exercisable competences.

Negatively speaking, primitivity or unspeakability of freedom does not mean that it is transcendental or 'beyond' and, therefore, has to be postulated in the Kantian fashion or metaphysically posited in the Vedāntin way. In a very important sense it is *in* us, as human phenomena *in* the world, notwithstanding the subjection of the world to the laws of matter-energy. This sense *primarily* is practical. No practical experience of freedom can exhaust all its possibilities or explore all its horizons. So an element of transcendence, i.e. inexhaustibility or boundlessness, is there in every experience of freedom. But that does not mean that this experience is experience of 'something' which is itself beyond the world, i.e. transcendental in the strong sense.

The last point which I like to mention but do not propose to elaborate here is this. The practical primacy of freedom—experience of freedom—explains, to a great extent, why in our choice of contesting theories not only of science but also those of values, including freedom, we are influenced more by practical considerations than by anything else, theoretical reasoning or methodological criteria. For, neither the 'unity of the physical world' nor 'human freedom in it' is a once-for-all given, i.e. unhistorical, phenomenon. The world with man situated in it is not a *static totality*. Human personality is not an *inert unity*. Both are *dialectically* shot through and through by history, by change, i.e. the flux character of reality. My reference to one-to-many and many-to-one relations and the dialectical character of the same is intended to emphasize the dynamic unity of the world and human freedom as phenomena. These are really and literally *phenomena* in the sense that their 'truth' keeps on appearing to us ceaselessly and without end. This open-endedness of the world and human freedom has to be seriously understood. The basic flaw of the mechanical world-view is that it is causally and historically closed and 'open' only to an 'external' and hypothetical God and his

intervention. The same criticism, in a slightly different manner, may well be levelled against the absolutism of the pro-Hegelian variety. In the latter case, too, reality is construed as *absolute* and given once for all. Strictly speaking, Hegel's Absolute knows no history in it and even its transition from the stage of 'abstract idea' to 'concrete spirit' is only seemingly historical. History does not add to it anything new nor can impoverish it in any way. Its intelligibility is not historical. On the contrary, history is said to owe its intelligibility to the unity or totality of the Absolute. In this connection, Marxian dialectics and David Bohm's view of ever-unfolding universe appear to me very insightful.

Notes and References

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Notes and discussions

BAD FAITH: A HUSSERL-SARTRE DIVIDE ON CONSCIOUSNESS

In his study of consciousness, Sartre not merely begins from Husserl's notions but always formulates and articulates something of his own in the most original and creative fashion. Sartre's elucidation of bad faith is an example of this. Sartre's treatment of bad faith clearly shows his divergence from Husserl's understanding of consciousness. The notion of bad faith in Sartre's philosophy, in fact, gives an insight into the very source of difference between Sartre and Husserl. Bad faith, indeed, is the *root concept* in Sartre's phenomenological ontology. A major part of Sartre's inquiries in *Being and Nothingness* is a study of the interaction between human consciousness permeated with bad faith and concrete situations.

It is, indeed, true that no where in his phenomenological inquiries does Husserl ever declare that human consciousness is an ideal state of existence. But he follows unquestionably a tradition which specifically holds that consciousness is the most distinctive of all human states.

That which is central to Husserl's treatment of consciousness is his notion of the transcendental ego. The transcendental ego is the matrix or the source of consciousness. The function of the transcendental ego consists in bestowing meaning and unity to the multiplicity of acts and the manifold-directedness of consciousness such that devoid of the transcendental ego there would only be streams of impressions bereft of significance. The transcendental ego, due to intentionality, synthesizes various aspects, perspectives and stages of an object, making it into a single integrated whole. The elucidation of intentionality in terms of its in-born dynamism and inherent forward thrust is the most striking character of Husserl's philosophy.

An important insight that Husserl has while expounding the notion of consciousness is that the flow of consciousness is always in terms of the temporal structures of now, retention and protention. 'Now' is not an unextended mathematical thin-edged moment; it is such that it grows into the future and the past. It is a moment whose thickness encloses within itself both the past and the future, a moment which gnaws both the past and the future. Phenomenologically, this is expressed by saying that the present is given along with its 'horizon'. The now-phase constantly undergoes transformation for it flows back and sinks in time into the past. The flowing back and sinking gives rise to 'retention'. The now itself is the crystellization of an expectation. 'Protention', the moment of expectation, is due to the very tending character of consciousness. With the help of a large number of ex-

amples, chosen especially from the domain of music, Husserl demonstrates that expectation belongs to the very essence of an impression of the present and this element of expectation is present in every act which is perceived as a temporal event.

In spite of the multiplicity of the modes of temporality, Husserl manifests his philosophical ingenuity by asserting the unity of temporality. This is because he holds that every act of memory contains intuitions of expectations whose fulfilment is in the present. Husserl's point is this: a manifold of temporal phases intimately united with each other can ever be present in consciousness at one and the same instant. This is what later on appears in this paper as a 'crack' in the unity of consciousness.

Sartre's view of consciousness is very different from this. He considers consciousness to be a gap, a fissure, a degradation or an impoverishment of the fullness of being which is the Being-in-itself. Thus, Sartre sets himself against many philosophers especially those in the idealist tradition.

It is a basic phenomenological principle that when one is conscious of something, his consciousness is directed to that something, viz. the object. Consider, for example, a dancer. While dancing, the dancer's attention is directed to the various aspects of the dance: the music, the steps, the reaction of the audience, all of which constitute the dance in its totality and the sum total of the dancer's consciousness converges upon the dance. On the basis of this example Husserl would accept that, despite the unity and directedness of consciousness, there is a *crack* in the (unity of) consciousness (of the dancer) due to the scatteredness of consciousness. This scatteredness is a matter of both inner diversity and dispersion.

But what is the state of consciousness in bad faith? In the very unity of consciousness, due to its scatteredness, Husserl at the most accepts a crack. But bad faith brings in not just a crack but a total break or a gap within consciousness and Sartre calls this break or gap a fissure. This break or gap or fissure comes about because bad faith by definition accepts 'the combining of an idea and its negation'. In it something is known and veiled, recognised and hidden, accepted and rejected, i.e. there is an inbuilt contradiction within consciousness and this is due to the very presence of bad faith in it. Sartre builds up the whole of his phenomenological ontology upon this internal division. The fact that Sartre has been able to envisage the possibility of consciousness permeated by bad faith and that he could give a content and meaning to it clearly shows that he has carried forward the phenomenological notion of consciousness a great deal. The rest of his phenomenological inquiries, which are an application of his idea of consciousness permeated by bad faith to concrete situations as given in *Being and Nothingness,* has his notion of bad faith as the crux which entirely activates and permeates not only his concept of consciousness but also that of human existence in general.

In *Being and Nothingness* Sartre does not examine Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself independently of each other but rather the relationship and

interaction between them. It is a basic assertion of Sartre that the for-itself is ever permeated with and saturated by bad faith. From Sartre's point of view there can be no for-itself devoid of bad faith. It is such a key concept in *Being and Nothingness* that Sartre would not have been able to arrive at his characteristic notions of human freedom, human body and concrete human relations unless he conceived consciousness as inescapably imbued with bad faith. Consequently, the query he asks in connection with bad faith is the Kantian transcendental question, viz. how is bad faith possible. It is, he points out, 'an art of formulating contradictory concepts which unite in themselves both an idea and its negation'. For example a cowardly man who declares himself to be very brave in a dangerious situation unites in himself two contradictory notions of being brave and of being a coward. Consciousness itself is the source of bad faith because it simultaneously has to be both what it is and not to be what it is. It could be said that bad faith is a kind of lie to oneself. In it one hides a displeasing truth or presents as truth a pleasing untruth. Bad faith, therefore, has the appearance of falsehood or an attitude of negation to oneself. It can also be said that the presence of the other and his judgments upon oneself are a source of bad faith. Consequently, in bad faith there is a feeling that I am something for somebody. Sartre concretizes the notion of bad faith in his literary works. A large number of examples can be elicited to instantiate this contention. Roquentin and Anney in *Nausea,* Mathieu in *Roads to Freedom,* Electra and Aegistheus in *The Flies,* the characters of *No Exit,* Franz of *Altona,* and very many others display various attitudes in bad faith like the cafe waiter and the girl who goes out with the boy as described in *Being and Nothingness.*

Sartre's initial leanings towards idealism are well known. He, in fact, once remarked that it took him thirty years to liberate himself from the influence of idealism. Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason* pointed out that although we are in a position to construct a theoretical system of pure reason, we do find that we can always argue with the help of analogous arguments to a point which is the opposite of the original position, i.e. given such and such a metaphysical thesis, we can construct and defend an exact antithesis. In other words, reason is bound to argue against itself and contradict itself if it goes beyond possible experience. While confronting this problem, Hegel's solution was that such contradictions are intrinsic to the development of thought and reason. Hegel puts self-contradictory thoughts to a constructive use in his dialectic of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. In the elucidation of bad faith, Sartre's strategy seems to be akin to Hegel's. In so far as 'bad faith is the art of formulating contradictory concepts', as in the case of the thesis-antithesis distinction, it could be said that Sartre's notion of bad faith has Hegelian roots. As Hegel made use of contradictions constructively, Sartre also makes a creative use of 'elements' inbuilt in bad faith. But there are differences too between Hegel and Sartre in this con-

nection. While the Hegelian contradictions occur in the abstract sphere of thought and reason, Sartre's contradictions exist in the domain of consciousness. It must be added that in our every day lives contradictions often take the form of ambiguities. While the Hegelian contradictions give way to a synthesis, Sartrean contradictions do not involve any such synthesis; one has to *live* these contradictions or ambiguities.

Although the understanding of bad faith as an ethical consequence of temporal existence seems plausible, it needs to be said that this is not an adequate account of it in sofar as it does not pay any attention to the ontological deficiencies of the for-itself which Sartre examines in detail. The ethical implication of bad faith can arise only from the consideration of it as an existential problem. In other words, the ethical interpretation of bad faith does not tackle it from its very roots. In order to account for the ontological deficiencies of Being-for-itself, to which Sartre pays a lot of attention while elucidating the concept of bad faith, bad faith needs to be looked at as an 'existential' problem. The distinction made between existential and ethical problems is not an attempt at *polarization,* for ethical problems themselves could be considered as existential problems in a certain sense. The consideration of bad faith as an existential problem lies deeper than considering it solely as an ethical problem. The ethical stands on the ground of the existential. Although all existential problems are not ethical, it seems correct to assert that the ethical problems do have existential roots. To consider bad faith as an existential problem is to look at it as a lack or a rift or an absence of coincidence within consciousness. The very definition of consciousness as 'not what it is and it is what it is not' points to this rift or gap within consciousness. Sartre speaks of different kinds of bad faith: one which arises from the inappropriate relation between one's transcendence and facticity and the other which originates due to the noncomplementality, i.e. a lack of genuine reciprocal relationship between the for-itself and Being-for-others. Sartre examines these two cases in detail while he studies the behaviour of the girl who goes out with a boy and the line of action of the cafe waiter in *Being and Nothingness.*

It must be noted that Sartre seems to waver occasionally while examining the applicability of bad faith. On the one hand he treats it as a purely contingent feature of human existence which can be eliminated and he, in fact, appears to envisage the possibility of emancipation from it on the basis of self-recovery (*Being and Nothingness,* p. 116, footnote 9). But on the other hand his association of it with that of living out a role almost turns it into an inevitable feature of human existence. It must be added that Sartre's elucidation of the for-itself as 'not what it is, and it is wht it is not' always brings in the possibility of lack of coincidence within oneself which, in fact, is bad faith. In other words, the definition of the for-itself as 'not what it is and it is what it is not' means that to exist as a for-itself human reality has to have this rift or gap. So, within the frame work of *Being and Nothingness* the elimination of bad faith seems impossible because it is ingrained in the very structure of the for-itself. One might even say that the only answer to the problem of bad faith consists in *living* it. If human reality has to be a for-itself, it has to bear the burden of bad faith, i.e. human reality is ever 'condemned' to bad faith.

Throughout *Being and Nothingness,* Sartre affirms strongly the temporality of consciousness. One can raise a query here asking is the possibility of bad faith a temporal problem? There can be no for-itself devoid of bad faith. Consequently, the temporality of consciousness is, in fact, the temporality of consciousness permeated by bad faith. While there cannot be a consciousness devoid of bad faith, according to Sartre, there can be no bad faith unless there is consciousness such that the temporality of consciousness is the temporality of consciousness saturated with bad faith and, therefore, bad faith does not have a temporality other than that of consciousness. Though there is no identification of consciousness with bad faith, one can not be examined independently of the other; one is inseparable from the other.

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RUSSELL'S MUCH-ADMIRED ARGUMENT AGAINST NAIVE REALISM

In a frequently quoted passage, Bertrand Russell argues as follows against '"naive realism", i.e., the doctrine that things are what they seem':[1]

> Naive realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, shows that naive realism is false. Therefore naive realism, if true, is false; therefore it is false.[2]

Among those who have admired this passage is Albert Einstein, who describes Russell's 'overcoming of naive realism' as 'marvelously pregnant'[3] and praises its 'masterful formulation.'[4] In his recent survey of contemporary philosophy, A.J. Ayer quotes it and seems to endorse, or at least mention without dissenting from, Einstein's admiration.[5] In view of this chorus (or at least duet) of approbation, and in view of the fact the arguments thus pithily expressed have a way of achieving something like the status of philosophical proverbs, it is perhaps worth inquiring how good an argument it is. In order to do this, it will be necessary, first of all, to set it out explicitly and then to disentangle it from another argument Russell[6] also presents with which it could easily be confused.

Minimally regimented, the much-admired argument, as I shall call it, looks like this:

(*i*) Naive realism leads to physics./ Premise
(*ii*) If physics is true, then naive realism is false. /Premise
(*iii*) If naive realism is true, then it is false. /from (*i*) and (*ii*)
(*iv*) Naive realism is false. /from (*iii*)

The argument which could easily be confused with the much-admired argument is a different argument against naive realism, although the two have in common not only the conclusion but premise (*ii*) as well. If we add to (*ii*) the premise

(*v*) Physics is true,

we have a different and obviously valid argument for (*iv*). This argument, which I shall call the argument from physics, is at best hinted at just before the passage Einstein, Ayer, and I have quoted from *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*; Russell states it rather more clearly, albeit in a carefully qualified form, in *My Philosophical Development* in a passage which Ayer quotes. Ayer's version of the argument from physics is this:

> If the attitude of common sense is represented by naive realism, the theory that we directly perceive objects much as they really are, then Russell's opinion of common sense was that it conflicted with science: and in such a context [sic] he thought science ought to be given the verdict. 'Science,' he said, 'is at no moment quite right, but it is seldom quite wrong and has, as a rule, a better change of being right than the theories of the unscientific. It is, therefore, rational to accept it hypothetically.'[7]

The main difference between the much-admired argument and the argument from physics, of course, is that the former does *not* require as a premise any claim about the truth or rationality of physics. It may seem that avoiding commitment to a premise like that is avoiding commitment to seomething that practically nobody would be inclined to challenge; but part of what makes the much-admired argument admirable is precisely that it does not simply beat naive realism over the head with the deliverances of contemporary science, but rather purports to show that naive realism refutes *itself.*

As Ayer puts it: 'As for naive realism, Russell goes so far as to suggest that it can be logically disproved.'[8] That it can be 'logically disproved' evidently means more in this context than merely that its denial is the conclusion of a logically valid argument with true premises, which is the most that the argument from physics, whatever its merits, could be. Thus, the much-admired admired argument, purporting to show that naive realism is false *because even if true it is false,* might well be epistemically worthwhile even if one had already been convinced by the argument from physics.

How admirable, then, is the much-admired argument? That it is clever

is beyond dispute, and its cleverness consists largely in invoking to justify its last step a principle (that 'if *A*, then not-*A*' entails 'not-*A*') which is a close relative of the *consequentia mirablilis.*[9] This principle, though somewhat surprising (if not actually miraculous), is readily derivable in several ways from (almost) universally accepted logical principles. I take it, then, that in the present context the last step of the argument is not in quetion.

This brings us to the inference of (*iii*) from (*i*) and (*ii*). If (*i*) and (*ii*) can plausibly be regarded as true, and if they entail (*iii*), then the much-admired argument will indeed be worthy of admiration. Now of these two premises, (*ii*) is the one which the much-admired argument and the argument from physics have in common. So nothing that can be said about it will apply uniquely to the much-admired argument. Though by no means unquestionable, it is at least plausible, in the light of the way in which contemporary physics describes the fundamental building blocks of matter, that physics *is* incompatible with the naive realist's view 'that grass is green, that stones are hard, and that snow is cold'.[10]

What, then, of (*i*)? It is perhaps not clear just what the claim that naive realism leads to physics amounts to on its face, but it is clear what it *must* amount to if, with (*ii*), it is to entail (*iii*) in the way Russell thinks it does, and that is:

(*i*) If naive realism is true, then physics is true.

Only if (*i*) is understood thus will it be possible to invoke the principle of hypothetical syllogism (that 'if *A* then *B*' and 'if *B* then *C*' entail 'if *A* then *C*') to infer (*iii*) from (*i*) and (*ii*) in the way Russell plainly intends.

But what reason is there to accept (*i*')? I can think of none, nor, sofar as I can see, does Russell offer any. What he *does* say amounts to a defence of a quite different claim. The only claim he makes which can plausibly be construed as a defence of (*i*) is this:

> We all start from 'naive realism', i.e., the doctrine that things are what they seem. We think that grass is green, that stones are hard, and that snow is cold. But physics assures us that the greenness of grass, the hardness of stones, and the coldness of snow, are not the greenness, hardness, and coldness that we know in our own experience, but something very different.[11]

This passage might well make plausible some such claim as

(*i*") If naive realism is *believed* to be true, then (later) physics is *believed* to be true.

This is also, of course, a natural way to understand Russell's actual words that 'naive realism *leads to* [my emphasis] physics'. But it is plain, I think,

that (*i*") does not entail (*i*') nor does it appear that it can be used in any other way along with (*ii*) to justify (*iii*).

Our verdict, then, must be this: construing (*i*) so as to make it plausible—that is, as (*i*")—renders the move to (*iii*) in the much-admired argument invalid, while construing (*i*) in such a way as to validate that move—that is, as (*i*')—renders (*i*) itself implausible. The much-admired argument fails.[12]

NOTES

1. Bertrand Russell, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* (London: Pelican Books, 1962), p. 13.
2. *Ibid.*
3. Albert Einstein, 'Russell's Theory of Knowledge', *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, (Vol. I) Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 281.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 282.
5. A.J. Ayer, *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Random House, 1982), p. 33.
6. Russell, p. 13.
7. *Ibid.* The quotation from Russell is from *My Philosophical Development*, p. 17.
8. Ayer, p. 33.
9. See William and Martha Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 172-73.
10. Russell, p. 13.
11. *Ibid.*
12. I should like to thank an anonymous referee for the *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research* for helpful comments.

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Book reviews

MARGARET CHATTERJEE: *Gandhi's Religious Thought*, The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1983 reprint (paperback), £8.95.

The book under review is an achievement,—a product of hard work, ability and not a little heroism in the way of thinking. It is rich and intense all along; and there are quite a few crystals of sense that keep it aglimmer, emitting not mere light, but the impulse to pause and to think on one's own. I wonder if I could do half as well with its just 181 pages and its discipline of having to wade to thought everywhere through a welter of facts. But this is my *overall* view. It holds, I am happy to say, in spite of my failure to go with a definite tilt of the author; and so, because to be true to the work's net impression I would like this review also to end on a note of acclaim, let me begin by indicating what I do *not quite* like about the book.

The subject is well chosen. We have for long been needing a whole book on it. But anyone who turns to the present work for separate chapters of neat and systematic writing straight on what Gandhi has himself written and spoken on the basic elements of the life of religion—say, faith, God and prayer—is bound to be a little disappointed. The book pays much more attention to the factors that bestirred and shaped Gandhi's religious thought than to what its own positive content is. Such an allocation of emphasis may well help us see the roots and distinctiveness of the thought in question, but it is also likely to detract from fulness of concern with what Gandhi's religious thought (in the end) turns out to be. Gandhi has himself written at fair length on quite a few regulative principles of the good life, and on some problems that beset religious thought; and if this writing (I have here in mind, in particular, his essays on the eleven vows, from *Satya* to *Sarvadharma samānatva*, written in Yervada Mandir) is not given the attention it deserves—and much more frequently than is done, always brilliantly, in the book—perhaps even a fair measure of adequacy cannot be claimed for one's account of *what* Gandhi's religious thought is, as against *how* it comes to be what it is. Whatever be one's approach, 'analytic conceptual' or any other (p. 174), the defect that makes me uneasy can hardly be slurred. True, Gandhi does not get '*bogged down* in the debate as to whether God is personal or impersonal' (178, my italics); but he does explain, if not very clearly, *why* one cannot summarily reject either alternative (*In Search of the Supreme*, ed. V.B. Kher, Vol. I, 15-20). How is such thinking ignorable in a book on Gandhi's reli-

gious *thought* in favour of just a hint as to what he shares with Vivekananda (p. 178), J.S. Mill (p. 180), Gutierriez and H.D. Thoreau (p. 175); or as against the mere intimation that 'it was from Motihari, district Headquarters of Champaran, that Gandhi wrote in reflective, almost poetic vein to his old friend Hermann Kallenbach... (p. 149) and that (according to Gandhi) economic disparities lie behind communal conflicts (p. 181)?

The author believes that the 'analytic conceptual approach...is singularly inappropriate in considering a man such as Gandhi', and so she prefers to use 'a method aimed at identifying essential structures of thought' as they arise and develop in the context of history. She also resolves and wants us not to 'hunt in Gandhi's thought for standpoints which seem to provide some kind of "answer" to current philosophical and theological controversies' (p. 174).

Now, I am not sure if the approach here rejected can be quite kept back in case one seeks to identify the *essential* structures of thought. But be that as it may, my net regret is that whereas the author's penchant for fact and history has led her to record quit a few such details as seem quite unrelated to Gandhi's religious thought (thus see: 'It was early on the morning of 6 April that the historic procession reached the shore', p. 70; 'he has periods of rest in Almora and Agra', p. 165), her aversion to the 'analytic conceptual approach, (p. 174) deprives us of the possible benefits of her attention to Gandhi's own *writing* on quite a few such matters as are of moment to him as a man of religion, say, the following, though (see the pages referred to in brackets) she is no doubt generally aware of their value as emphases:

> the *knitting* of faith, 'anāsakti' and prayer in fasting which he sometimes spoke of as a longing to merge in the divine essence (p. 171-72); the *surpassing closeness* of Ahimsa and truth as means and end (p. 74); the Name as it instils the heart (p. 12); godward tendance of the body (p. 72); (religious) humility as the highest knowledge; and the import of the first *mantra* of the *Ishopanishad* which he acclaims as the quintessence of Hinduism (pp. 35, 70).

Gandhi's writing on these subjects is not everywhere clear—I think here specially of his brief but intense essays on Truth and Ahimsa (*The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, ed. Shriman Narayan, Navajivan, Vol. I, 213-19); it *needs* analytic attention; and so I feel unhappy at the neglect. Nor does the book probe Gandhi's own *living* for views (that may be implicit in it) on the details I have listed.

Further, though we may agree that Gandhi himself never tried consciously to relate his thinking to 'current philosophical and theological controversies', one cannot help wondering why the present work does not try to determine the relevance of Gandhi's thought to some perennial problems of religious philosophy, such as those of human freedom—and of evil and

suffering—as against God's omnipotence and goodness. Gandhi has himself written on these problems; and because I find the author feels free to indicate how his thought bears on the socio-political problems of today (see pp. 161, 176), I wish she had done the same in respect of at least some chronic irritants of religious reflection, partly because she *could* do it very well (see here the ease with which she explains, strictly in relation to Gandhi, how the scientific outlook may fertilize the religious impulse, p. 130). I admit that Gandhi's thought is viewed in relation to 'religious pluralism' (p. 177). But such relating is a little too infrequent in the book. And as for the positive content of its subject, the author, I repeat, does not seem to worry really enough. To illustrate, in chapter IX—which is quite a short one, of just eighteen pages—it is only when more than ten have been devoted to outlining the 'context in which Gandhi thought of liberation' took shape (p. 162) that the author 'turns to a direct dealing with the subject of the chapter, that is, Gandhi's 'rethought' view of *mokṣa*. I readily see the wisdom of the author's emphasis that 'the context of Gandhi's saying must always be noted'. Indeed, it would otherwise be impossible to square the utterance here cited—'Religion is a personal matter which should have no place in politics' (p. 163)—with the following other words of Gandhi himself on the same subject: 'Politics bereft of religion are absolute dirt, ever to be shunned' (S.R. Tikekar: *Epigrams from Gandhiji*, Publications Division, 1971, p. 133). But I cannot somehow shake off the impression that, at least at some places, overniceness in detailing the context improperly curtails the room for a sustained interpretation of Gandhi's religious thought *as he himself projects it*, never in abstraction, I may add, from real life and experience.

Yet, to look once again at the ninth chapter, I hasten to add that from p. 166 onwards—and particularly on pp. 166-67—the writing is so packed with scholarship and insight that one may feel like apologizing for discontent with the earlier pages. The thoughtful reader, indeed, will here be delighted by some penetrating remarks on the Indian notion of *mārga* (pp. 166-67); the need for a pooling of insights, for the religious consciousness is after all a *human* phenomenon (p. 167); Gandhi's many channels of 'inner regeneration'; two senses of the 'cave' which, as he says, never deserts him (p. 168); and the inadequateness (to Gandhi) of what some regard as the highest grade of spiritual freedom, the one that is found in 'the man who can get all he needs from the sight of the sky within' (pp. 171-72).

Truly, there is a great deal in the book which can both charm and instruct the reader. The 'Foreword' by John Hick (editor of the prestigious series: *Library of Philosophy and Religion* in which the present work appears) is illuminating. It lists four ways in which Gandhi's thought is relevant today, ending with the truthful observation that Gandhi exhibits a viable style of contemporary sainthood (p. 11). The book's other end, its conclusion, is just as unerring in seizing the essence of Gandhi's view of religion. It is also a needed emphasis *and* a highpoint of beauty in the author's own sensitiveness:

> What Gandhi's religious thought offers is. . . a challenge to think through and live through the breadth and depth of opportunities for sharing, whether worldly goods or those deepest intimations which are the warp and woof of the inner life. So understood, religion can once more become a binding force. . . which goes beyond national frontiers and which sees no barrier between one community and another. Religion envisaged as a way of life of the caring individual who participates in a multi-faith community, striving non-violently to establish a just society, would be close to the conception of the founder figures, saints and seers of the different traditions. (p. 181)

This is no projection by Gandhi himself of his own view of religion; it is a sure and swift summing-up *by the author* of what religion is for Gandhi in the wholeness of his thinking *and living*.

Such moments of writing, I admit, somewhat soften my charge of inadequate attention to Gandhi's own expression of his thought in (mere) writing. Yet I cannot help adding that the way Gandhi's view of religion is here formulated, true though it may finally be, does not *seem* to square with his own statement: 'Religion is after all a matter for each individual and then too a matter of the heart' (*In Search of the Supreme*, Vol. I, p. 22), and that the relative discord suggests—what may be pressed as something that the author purposely avoids—that Gandhi's diverse utterances on the same subject—say, faith or prayer—be considered together, and the core of coherent meaning, if any, laid bare.

To turn now to the body of the book, the author reveals not only impressive scholarship, but a very sensitive awareness of our religions, folklore, mythology and philosophy; and, I must add, of many little details of the older Indian way of life (see pp. 89-90, 103, 171). But her endeavour to view Gandhi's thought as against the traditions of his country is also ably buttressed by a painstaking attempt to relate it to the flux and detail of daily circumstance.

It would, indeed, be wrong to assume that the author's regard for the context of Gandhi's thought is everywhere excessive. For instance, I find that an account of Gandhi's *āshrams* is quite well related to the thought that it is in the 'with' that we may find 'the deepest confirmation of the "within" ' (p. 149). Similarly, the perceptive remark—concerning (I believe) the very basic drive to be religious—that

> Gandhi's reaction to imperfection is not to long for a putative state when all imperfections will have been overcome, but to set about the pursuit of perfection of what is nearest at hand, that is, himself and his immediate surroundings (165)

is straightway and aptly illustrated by means of an account of the tours that Gandhi took in 1929; and, again, an utterance of his on man's signal

ability to harmonize (daily) *dharma* and life's overriding end is given a quick, if oblique look of truth by letting the momentous (as of permanent religious value) trip in, so to say, along with a mention of what is but of immediate concern:

> The Meerut Conspiracy trial had started and plans for the Salt Satyagraha were yet to be formulated. It was a year of activity on many fronts for Gandhi, including *the completing of his commentary on the Gita* (p. 165, *my italics*).

What is more, this brief account is itself made to bestir the suggestion that the utterance in question (on 'Man's signal ability') appears distinctive if seen against the traditional Indian tendency to heighten the *difference* between the mundane and the transcendental.

But features of the author's general manner are not the work's only source of value. I have been charmed by its many sayings that either hint at a subtle distinction or invite attention to such details of Gandhi's life and thought as are not always noticed. They are, however, so numerous that I can only list the more striking ones of them, maybe with some changes to save loss of sense:

> Spiritual growth not in terms of a still point within the soul, but in the form of widening sympathies...service (pp. 10-11); 'an eschatology of transformed relationships (preferred to the) eschatology of transformed consciousness'; '...Man (for Gandhi) as the servant not Lord, of the created order' (p. 175) '(Gandhi's desire) to be reborn as an untouchable—an extraordinary preference according to traditional lights' (p. 174); 'conversion not in terms of credal allegiance but of...reaching out...changed relationships' (p. 49); the possibility of turning to good account...the fact that man must suffer...(as against) the traditional belief that suffering was at all costs to be got rid off' (p. 79); individual suffering of an isolationist kind vs. the suffering heroism of a group of *satyāgrahis* (p. 80); the ideal as not the Holy Family but as the capacity for long-suffering 'found in the human family' (p. 91); the *Satyāgrahi* as a religious type (p. 92); the exhilaration of non-violent combat (p. 108); the trusteeship idea as suggesting a pooling of religious insights of the various faiths (p. 129); Gandhi's 'this-worldliness' as self-purification rather than as *abhyudaya* or pursuit of material prosperity—the traditional view (p. 165); and the myths of India and stories to be *lived* rather than as mere pictures to be *used* (p. 179).

In every case however, I have checked, such expressions are well knit with their context; and so I spoke, in the very beginning, of the work's intenseness too. Yet though it forbids hasty reading, the writing is nowhere

unclear. It is, in fact, as a rule watchful. A quite fair instance of how close and alert thinking may be made to deliver a very true distinction occurs on pp. 104-05. Here, seeking to indicate how the 'Jain and Advaitic themes... strive for predominance in Gandhi's mind', the author concludes: 'Gandhi... believes in the oneness of all that lives...but..unity (for him)..is *shown* in the way we live rather than merely *known*' (p. 105).

But for a confluent drawing of distinctions and embracive attention as a rapid yet reasonable sweep over wide matters of both sense and spirit, and also in respect of sheer penetrativeness, the following passage stands out, though it does not tug at the context:

> ...The sense of touch...for Gandhi, in a long life of service, was a matter of great complexity, ranging from touch as the gate of temptation, to the cause closest to his heart as a Hindu, the removal of untouchability. The inner voice calls upon him to exercise a healing touch, whether it be in economic relations (the Ahmedabad fast)...or/the...endeavour to bring about communal harmony.... Touch...in (his) personal life (is) canalised in a life-long interest in the nursing of others, expressed very explicitly in his valuing of manual work...his habit of walking supported by two younger volunteers...and his consciousness of the everlasting arms... underneath.... There is a sense in which the various powers become internalised for him. Seeing becomes inner voice, touching means being touched by divine grace. But Gandhi does not stop here. (He is not a contemplative mystic).... The life of service needs the enlisting of all our powers....If there is a tendency to dichotomy in (Gandhi's) thought it is that between soul and body (rather than mind and body).... But this is tempered by the need to keep the body in good working order if one is to be a fit instrument for service. The seeing of man's life as a totality (for which sanction can be found in the Gita's stress on the possibility of combining the various *mārgas*) does not exclude recognition of the extent to which man, because he is a thinking and above all *feeling* human being experiences inner struggle....Hackneyed though it may sound, and Gandhi's speeches were always full of proverbial wisdom some of which is of late Victorian vintage, God helps those who help themselves.

Writing such as this is, of course, no mere analysis of language. But it *is* all along thoughtful. I find this is true even of the parallels the author freely draws. They are nowhere glib. Consider the following, for instance:

> '...If there are defects of understanding, there are also limitations of the heart too' (p. 131).

The emphasis follows a convincing *illustration* of how reason may fail to move us, and is followed by a ready statement and *reasoned* defence of

Gandhi's 'conclusion that all religions were...imperfect (too), because they were interpreted...sometimes with our poor hearts' (pp. 131-32). Again, with admirable insight, the idea of imperfection is itself at once used as a clue to understand Gandhi's concurrence with a key *Gita* emphasis on an attitude that some types of good men share: '..The *yogi, jnāni* and *gunātīta* look with an equal eye on all...for...there is (a kind of) equality in imperfection...in all human efforts to develop' (p. 133).

Against this impressive conversance with Indian thought (and way of life), some of the errors I find in the book surprise me. *Abhudaya* (p. 165) should be *abhyudaya,* to match the Hindi word, अभ्युदय; *samājik* (155), *sāmājik*; and *tanpoora* (157), *tānpoorā*. In chapter II where a well-known saying of Tulsidas is cited (as translated, p. 22) 'road' should have been 'root', the line in question being: दया धर्म को मूल है Two clear printing mistakes are: 'much more to it *that*' (137), and 'each of the words...*are* significant' (160); and the absence of Pyarelal's two volumes, *The Early Phase* and *The Last Phase* from the work's 'Select Bibliography' and 'Further References' is not a happy omission.

None of these defects is, however, serious. But there *is* a little instance of rather casual thinking which disturbs me. The author suggests that Gandhi 'makes *no distinction* between religion and politics' (p. 31, my italics). She repeats: 'He did not *differentiate* between religion and politics' (p. 119, my italics). But, I ask, if this *is* so, how can we make sense of Gandhi's of following words: 'My politics and all other activities of mine are derived from my religion' (Tikekar, *Epigrams from Gandhiji*, p. 132)? Luckily, however, the author corrects herself on the very next page: 'There is...a further warrant for Gandhi's refusal to *separate* religion from politics' (p. 120, italics added).

By and large, indeed, the book is well thought out and of great value to those who would like to *improve* their understanding of the subject from the author's chosen point of view. It is a picture of the process that makes Gandhi what he is: the synergy, the daily give-and-take of thought and real life as he gets closer to God through the very human way of love.

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JOHN COTTINGHAM : *Rationalism*, London, Paladin Granada Publishing Ltd, 1984, x+177 pages, £ 2.50.

A study of rationalism along with empiricism constitutes two great pillars of Western philosophical thought. Dr. Cottingham's book is a selective reference work dealing with the origin of rationalism in the classical background—in Plato's apriorism, and Aristotle's account of demonstrative knowledge. It continues with an analysis of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz,

and contrasts them with the empiricism of Locke and Hume. It also furnishes the views of Kant as the synthesis of the heterogeneity of rationalism and empiricism. Along with Kant, it deals with Hegel's philosophy as an important landmark in the development of rationalist thought. But almost one-third of the book is devoted to the logical positivists' attack on rationalism, the emergence of neo-rationalist ideas (for example in Chomskean linguistics), and the role of reason in modern ethical theory. And finally, it looks at the contemporary debate between rationalists and relativists in the philosophy of science.

Taking into consideration the conceptual synthesis concerning rationalism that Dr. Cottingham has so painstakingly collected, arranged and presented, he should be congratulated. His claim to provide a critical survey of philosophical rationalism from Plato to the present day, and at the same time, to avoid the hazards of oversimplification and unnecessary technicalities by the general readers and specialists respectively is right and the effort of Dr. Cottingham in this direction is commendable.

Notwithstanding this merit of the book, I, however, want to draw attention to two very serious shortcomings of the work. If the shortcomings of these kinds are attempted to be removed successfully either in the future editions of the work, or in the forthcoming works of this kind, at the hands of either the present or other authors, posterity will certainly profit from them.

First, Dr. Cottingham is correct in saying that rationalism is a commitment to reason, 'to follow the argument where it leads' (p. 3). Now the thrust of philosophy is hardly subserved by enumerating and tabulating merely chronologically the rationalist ideas involved in various philosophical systems from Plato to Noam Chomsky. Had it been shown, as it had been the case, the logical continuity to what in appearance was a mere historical sequence, it would have been a substantial claim to the willingness to follow the argument where it leads to. Speaking more precisely, the dogmatic pretensions not only of rationalism but also of empiricism shown in the transcendental dialectic of Kant's first Critique requires sufficient analysis. Kant's critical investigation of the capacities of both 'reason' and 'sensibility' amid the two conflicting trends of rationalism and empiricism is what constitutes the landmark in the development of Western philosophical thought. In this context, it is not correct to say that 'The title *Critique of Pure Reason* initially suggests an anti-rationalist stance' (p. 84). In fact, Kant introduces the idea that Critique must first take shape of self-critique. It is the idea of a self-critique that is pursued even in the title *Critique of Pure Reason*, for here, 'reason' is both the subject and the object of critique. On this basis, Kant brings out the antinomies involved in the concept of 'reason' and it gives rise to the development of Hegel's dialectic (this issue will be made clear in the next shortcoming).

Secondly, Dr. Cottingham is correct in saying that 'Hegel was largely ignored by the philosophers of the English-speaking tradition for almost a

hundred years' (p. 91) and it is with the efforts of T.H. Green, Bradley and McTaggart that 'Hegel's philosophy gained an extraordinary popularity' (p. 93). In this context, the author has also dealt with the term 'dialectic' in its historical perspective—from Plato's *Republic* to Hegel's *Phenomenology* (pp. 91-101). But how Hegel's dialectic resolves Kantian antinomies between finite and infinite, simple and complex, causation and freedom, etc. has not been shown by the author. The author regards Hegel's Phenomenology as an important landmark in the development of rationalist thought (p. 99). But how the limit-riddled constitution of 'reason' in its theoretic countenance as expounded by Kant is overcome by Hegel has been ignored by the author. Moreover, in the process of analysing Hegel's dialectic, the author has not discussed any of the laws of dialectic except saying that it is 'triadic' (p. 95). The author has, however, devoted sufficient pages (pp. 102-20) in dealing with logical positivism whose 'programme was nothing less than, in Ayer's words, to destroy the foundations of rationalism' (p. 103). But the fact of the matter is that Hegel's dialectic presents a counter-thrust to any form of positivism (from Hume to the present-day logical positivism). The author is, however, completely silent on this issue too.

In spite of such shortcomings, it will have to be unanimously accepted that Dr. Cottingham has presented an original and illuminating interpretation of rationalism: examining the attack on rationalism by Moritz Schlick, Rudolph Carnap, Otto Neurath and A.J. Ayer (pp. 102-20). His attempt to analyse the neo-rationalist ideas of Noam Chomsky as a revival of the rationalist tradition of Cartesian era concerning language as 'species specific'—unique to homo sapiens (pp. 120-26) provides a prominent sphere in the direction of which rationalism is developing today. The author contends rightly that 'Chomsky's position concerning language is remarkably similar to that of Descartes regarding the fundamental divide between animal behaviour and human language'. (p. 126). The author's analysis of Hume and Kant in the context of the role of reason in modern ethical theories (p. 128-40) is indeed commendable. And finally the contemporary debate between rationalists and relativists in the philosophy of science makes the work still more comprehensive. We, therefore, wholeheartedly recommend the book to teachers, researchers and students of history of Western philosophy in general and rationalism in particular.

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RAGHWENDRA PRATAP SINGH

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

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LAKATOS AWARD

The closing date for the second annual Award, of £10,000, in memory of Imre Lakatos is April 15th, 1987.

Details from: Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE.

Mark envelope 'Lakatos Award'.

An Announcement

The Academic Centre of ICPR regularly sends the lists of library acquisitions to the Heads of Philosophy Departments in various universities and also some Research Institutions for circulation among the teachers and scholars. Generally the lists are dispatched within the first week of every month. If any Philosophy Department or Research Institution desires to receive these lists and is not already receiving the same, it may kindly inform

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Journal of Indian Philosophy

Editor

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Indian philosophy has attracted a small audience in the West for many years, but it is only recently that western philosophers have shown any general inclination to join it. The *Journal of Indian Philosophy* encourages this inclination and has been able to stimulate creative activities among orientalists and philosophers along with all the various combinations that these two classes can form. Contributions to the journal are bound by the limits of rational inquiry and avoid questions that lie in the fields of speculative sociology and para psychology. In a very general sense, the method is analytical and comparative, aiming at a rigorous precision in the translation of terms and statements. Space is devoted to the works of philosophers of the past as well as to the creative researches of contemporary scholars on such philosophic problems as were addressed by past philosophers.

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