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Emotion and belief*

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Intentionality as Thought-Dependence: Thinking of and Thinking That

Franz Brentano's celebrated claim that intentionality, in the sense of object-directedness, is a mark of psychological phenomena can be explicated by reference to the notion of thought-dependence. Mental states in general, with the exception of some instances such as sensations and after-images, are directed towards their objects, that is, what the states are about. Mental states are intentional arrows, so to speak, that necessarily hit on their respective targets. Hence the states essentially involve thoughts relating to these targets. And it is these thoughts that secure the object-directedness of states of mind. It is in this manner that the Brentano-thesis has been interpreted in contemporary analytical philosophy. For example, Richard Wollheim defends the thesis by paraphrasing it as 'the thesis that every mental state is identified by reference to a thought: a thought, that is, on the part of the person whose mental state it is' (Wollheim, 1967-68, p. 1).

But the notion of a thought or thought-dependence needs to be made more definite, since there is no indication of whether the thought relating to an object is meant to be simply the thought *of* something or the thought *that* something is thus and so. For the difference between 'thinking *of*' and 'thinking *that*' is highly significant in so far as the nature of mental states is concerned. Clearly, not all thinking *of* is thinking *that,* although the converse is true. For example, if I think that X is F, then it implies that I think of X's being F. But if I think of X's being F, then it in no way implies that I assent to the proposition that X is F. For the state of affairs that I think of may be known to me to be entirely fictitious, so that my thought-process does not involve any readiness to assent to the statement describing the state of affairs. Therefore, 'thinking of' identifies a mental state quite different from the state identified by reference to 'thinking that'. As such, I shall adopt the following interpretation of the Brentano-thesis, offered by Roger Scruton:

> If there is a sense in which all mental states are essentially directed, then they will all involve the thought of an object. We might analyze the notion of 'thinking of' in terms of *entertaining* some proposition about the object. in which case we will have arrived at a conclusion congenial to the fol-

*In this paper, I examine the nature and role of belief in the structure of emotions. Although beliefs are shown here to be a constituent of emotions, it is also demonstrated that they are intentional causes of emotions.

lowers of Brentano, namely that a proposition (on 'intentional object') is involved in every mental state (Scruton, 1972, p. 32).

Introducing the notion of 'entertaining' a proposition is, I think, a significant move in clarifying the thought-dependency interpretation of the intentionality thesis. To entertain a proposition *p* that concerns some object *O* is *merely* to think of *O*'s being thus and so. No existential commitment is thereby made about *O*'s actually satisfying the description given by *p*. Thus, the entertaining of a proposition amounts to thinking about something in a non-judgemental state of mind—a state of mind that allows the thought to occur without involving referential or existential considerations. On the other hand, to think *that p* is generally to assert that something is the case. One is in a judgemental state of mind with regard to the object of thought or the states of affairs represented by *p*, when one thinks that *p*. Judging is a mental act additional to that of entertaining a proposition with respect to the state of affairs that the proposition is about, namely, the act of judging that the proposition is true.

It seems obvious that not all of our mental states involve judgemental thinking. To think about *X* is not necessarily to think *that X* is *F* or *G*, that is, to judge that *X* is *F* or *G*. However, when we *do* think or judge that *X* is *F* (or *G*), it follows that we think of *X*'s being *F* (or *G*) *plus* the fact that we believe there to be an *X* which has the property *F* (or *G*). It is in this sense that thinking *that* something is the case logically presupposes thinking *of* something's being thus and so. And this points to the fact that thinking of something's being thus and so gives us the 'unjudged' or 'unasserted' version of the proposition which is asserted by virtue of the additional mental act of judging that it *is* thus and so. As such, the concept of 'thinking of' has logical priority over that of 'thinking that'. The former is wider in scope in that it covers all intentional states.

So far I have elucidated the distinction between 'thinking of' and 'thinking that' in terms of the concept of judgement and its overt counterpart, namely, assertion. But what is essentially involved in the mental act of judging is *believing*. Believing is a necessary condition of judging, though believing, unlike judging, is dispositional or quasi-dispositional. In judging that something is thus and so, one believes that the proposition in question is true: one gives assent to the proposition. Hence the concept of 'thinking that' embodies the concept of 'believing'; and believing is a propositional attitude contrasted with entertaining or judgementally thinking about something. It is the presence of this doxastic attitude—the attitude of assent or belief to a proposition—which, in some mental states, distinguishes them from other mental states lacking this feature. Thus, 'thinking of' is a logical feature of those mental states that are unattached to the attitude of belief about the truth or falsity of what is thought about, or even the existence of the object of thought.

To put the point made above in a nutshell, not all intentional states involve belief about their objects. Not all thinking is believing, although what is thought in thinking about something is precisely what is believed in believing that the thing is (or is not) the case. For example, if I merely think of a gander chasing a goose, and then think or believe that a gander is chasing a goose, the contents of my thoughts in both cases are one and the same. It is the same proposition that represents both thought-contents. The difference is that in the former case the proposition is held in an attitude of mind indifferent to referential or existential considerations, while in the latter case it is held in an attitude of belief that concerns the truth of the proposition by reference to whether a gander is actually chasing a goose. Indeed, much of our thinking has the character of being indifferent to truth or belief. Hence it would be wrong to try to explain intentionality solely by reference to 'thinking that'. It is in the light of these considerations, I think, that Scruton's suggestion can be defended. Thus, Scruton goes on to say:

> It is by no means clear that all mental states—even if there is some sense in which they are all directed—involve the thought that something is the case. The paradigm of 'thinking that' is believing—a propositional attitude distinct from entertaining. And there seems to be a division among mental states between those which involve an element of belief (such as emotions and attitudes) and those (such as sensations and mental images) which do not (*op. cit.*, p. 32).

We may now broadly compartmentalize intentional states under 'thinking of' and 'thinking that'—merely thinking and believing. There seems to be a logical significance to this division in that 'thinking of' cannot be analysed in terms of 'thinking that', although all 'thinking that' presupposes 'thinking of'. Consider a sophisticated context of thought which can be schematically describable as 'thinking of *X* as *Y*', usually associated with the concept of 'seeing as' made familiar by Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein, 1953, Pt. II) and frequently discussed in the philosophy of perception.[1] For example, in seeing a particular figure in a picture as a woman bathing in a lake, the onlooker as it were thinks of the figure (*X*) as a woman (*Y*) engaged in a particular act, or lying in a particular posture. From this formulation it is not permissible to conclude that the onlooker actually sees (or thinks) *that X* is *Y*. He does not see or think that the picture-figure *is* a woman bathing in a lake; he merely sees or thinks of the figure *as* a woman engaged in bathing. Similarly, if I think of a mannequin as a nude woman, my thought-process in no way admits of legitimate analysis in terms of my thinking *that* the mannequin is a nude woman. There is no sense in which, while having this thought, I literally assert to myself that what I see *is* a nude woman. Thus, thoughts of this kind irreducibly have the 'thinking of' structure.[2]

Thus, mental states having the structure of 'thinking of *X* as *Y*' are to

be subsumed under a mode of thought distinct from belief or judgement. The intentionality of such states is founded on thoughts that do not embody belief. Instead, their intentionality rests on a complex thought which requires a *non-predicative* analysis. In having such a thought, one is not just thinking about *X* but also about *Y*; for it is *X*'s 'being' *Y* that one is thinking about. And it is precisely the complex thought of *X*'s-being-*Y* that one cannot assert to oneself, or come to believe (literally) without absurdity. The thought of *Y* is *unpredicatively* attached to the thought of *X*, which is why it is impossible to formulate the thought in a that-clause. The existence of such psychological contexts, therefore, vindicates the need to divide the intentionality of mental states into 'thinking of...' and 'thinking that..'.

The 'thinking that...' construction allows the representation of states of mind that have the structure of predicational thought, e.g. 'something is thus and so'. This is not to imply that all thinking has the subject-predicate form and are about individuals, but only to indicate that there is a fundamental category of thought, expressed in declarative sentences, which involves reference to individuals and their properties, and has the above logical form. The subject of such sentences designates an object which is thought or judged (hence believed) to possess some property described by the predicate-expression—some property characteristic of the nature of the object. Hence 'I think that *X* is *F*' permits 'I judge that *X* is *F*' or, when the inner act of judgement is expressed in the form of a public utterance, 'I assert that *X* is *F*.'. The thought then is recognized as an 'asserted' thought, and is open to truth-conditional assessment. An asserted thought is, in essence, a thought which is cognized by the thinker to be true.[3] In other words, the thought is believed to be true. Thus, the paradigm of thinking that *X* is *F* is believing that '*X* is *F*' is true, and this reveals the close relationship between the mental disposition of belief and the overt act of assertion.

The Belief-Dependence of Emotions

The foregoing account makes clear that there are mental states whose intentionality is essentially secured by unasserted thoughts. That is to say, the objects that such states are directed on to are identified by reference to thoughts which are not accompanied by the attitude of assent or belief. This category of mental states needs to be highlighted in order to compare and contrast it with another category, whose intentionality is secured by asserted thoughts or thoughts that are tantamount to beliefs. In fact, it is a peculiarity of these mental states that they cannot be represented as what they essentially are without having recourse to the 'thinking that...' construction. The thought embodied in such a state is such that the person, whose mental state it is, holds it to be true or believes that there is a state of affairs in the world to which this thought in some way corresponds. So to identify this state is to refer to the thought *that X is F*, which is tantamount to the belief

that *X* is *F*. Thus, there is no way of characterizing the real essence or identity of such a state apart from referring to the belief that there is something of which some property holds true. It is the suitable belief about the object that determines the 'direction' of this mental state towards the object. And if the belief is somehow removed or altered, that state of mind will also be correspondingly made to disappear or modified. The intentional link between the state and the object will be severed.

It has been the view of many philosophers that emotions are such belief-dependent, judgemental mental states.[4] They argue that the analysis of an emotion necessarily involves reference to the subject's thought or belief about the object of the emotion. And it is this belief that is said to secure the intentionality or object-directedness of the emotion, such that the belief or thought is foundational to the existence of the emotion.

Now, perhaps this thesis is not true, if it is intended to account for the entire range of emotions. For it is not at all clear whether emotions form a natural class, so that each member can be seen as belonging to a homogeneous group. Some philosophers have pointed out that emotions should be taken to form a heterogeneous group, so that they cannot all be shepherded together under one set of classifications as thought-generated, thought-defined or belief-dependent.[5] Furthermore, there are many experiences which are infused with emotional 'charge' or feeling. Consider, for example, the feeling that one has been watching a sunset in a lovely summer evening. One is then experiencing a delightful feeling. It does not seem appropriate to explain the occurrence of this feeling by reference to any belief about the sunset. Similarly, when one feels awe at the sight of an ocean or a mountain, there seems to be no belief that can be cited in the explanation of one's emotional state. Presumably, the same thing can be said with regard to vague and inexplicable feelings of depression or *angst*, which appear to be based on no particular belief.

However, the belief-dependency thesis holds as an explanation of emotions if we make a distinction between emotions *proper* and moods and other affectively charged attitudes. By 'emotions proper' I mean those emotions for which we have common names, as both Taylor (Taylor, 1975, p. 391) and Hanfling (Hanfling, 1983, p. 241) point out. We may think of fear, anger, jealously, pride, pity, grief, indignation, remorse, regret, gratitude as cases of such emotions.[6] And it would not be wrong to say that we account for most of the major human emotions when we go through the ones listed above. The intentionality or object-directedness of these emotions is describable by reference to specific beliefs with regard to the respective objects. The intentional structure of such an emotion is such that without the belief in question the occurrence of the emotion will be unaccountable. I could not feel regretful about myself, if I did not believe that I was the agent of some past misconduct. You cannot be angry with your enemy without believing that the enemy has done some harm to you. A person feels grateful to another person, because the former believes that the latter has done something

valuable or important to him. Similarly, Othello could not have been jealous of Desdemona without having the belief that she was involved in an intimate affair with Cassio. It is in this sense that to attribute an emotion of the above kind and to deny the characteristic belief is to deny the emotion, which means that the appropriate beliefs are foundational to the existence of emotions of this category.

Concerning any emotion of this category, it will be impossible to identify the emotion if no reference is made to the suitable belief the subject holds about what the emotional state is directed on to. If a person *S* feels an emotion *E* towards some object or event *X*, then the explanation of the occurrence of *E* roughly takes the following form: *S* feels *E* because *S* believes (or thinks) that *X* is *F*, where *F* designates some emotion-evoking property characteristically possessed by *X*. Necessarily, *S* believes that *X* exists or occurs, and also believes that *F* is true of *X*. It may be that *F* is not, in point of fact, true of *X*, i.e. that *S* is mistaken in believing that *X* is *F*. Nevertheless, the belief that *X* is true of *F* is a necessary component of the total mental state *E*. Even the belief that *X* exists may be mistaken, when there is no corresponding 'real' object denoted by '*X*'. But the belief that *X* exists also remains as a necessary component of *E*. Thus, the intentional nexus between *E* and *X* is sustained by the evaluative belief that *X* is *F*, combined with the existential belief that the object designated by '*X*' exists. Hence, if *S* discovers or comes to realize that it is not *F* but *G* which is true of *X*, and *F* and G are incompatible with one another, this evaluative belief will be replaced by some evaluative belief appropriate to *X*. In consequence, the original nexus will be broken to give rise to a new intentional nexus. And, similarly, if *S* finds out that *X* does not exist, *E* will begin to disappear or be replaced by some other mental state.

For example, were Othello to be convinced that Desdemona had not been involved in an intimate affair with Cassio and that the apparent evidence to the contrary was due to the machinations of Iago, his jealousy would disappear. Of course, there is no guarantee that the discovery of the falsity of his belief that his wife is unfaithful to him will automatically or immediately result in a state of mind totally unperturbed by the previous feeling. However, given his new belief, Othello can no longer be simply or straightforwardly jealous. At best, the jealousy will soon be over; and, at worst, if the thought of Desdemona's unfaithfulness somehow continues, his jealousy might continue in the form of a perturbed mental state that can be described as pathological jealousy. Thus, the change of the relevant belief leads to a corresponding change in the emotion attached to the belief, which, in turn, requires a redescription of the resultant mental state. The resultant state of mind must be redescribed, because the original state of mind, namely, jealousy, essentially involved Othello's belief that Desdemona was unfaithful to him. He can no longer be said to be jealous, though he may well still be in turmoil.

Thus far the foregoing arguments have been adduced to substantiate the

thesis that the intentionality of emotions, understood in the circumscribed sense of the term, is secured by reference to belief. However, it might be alleged that a person can know that something is the case, yet not believe it, and still feel a particular emotion in spite of the lack of the suitable belief. For example, someone might argue that a young woman can come to know that she has cancer, yet not believe it, but still suffer from anxiety. The question, then, is whether her anxiety is directed towards the cancer. If it is, the apparent puzzle would be: how could she be anxious that she has cancer when she disbelieves that she has cancer? What is it that her anxiety is founded on, if the belief appropriate to her mental state is held to be absent? What secures the intentionality of her anxiety?

Emotional states of this kind are described as self-deceptive emotions. Such cases are complicated and deserve careful analysis. The crux of the problem, in the above example, is how the woman is involved in a complex process of deceiving herself into a state of disbelief about what she knows. For it seems that to know that *p* and still not believe that *p* is tantamount to denying that one knows that *p*. In the face of such a self-contradiction, her case can perhaps be construed as her unwillingness to avow or acknowledge explicitly what she implicitly claims to know. She is unwilling to reconcile her knowledge about her incurable illness with her general attitude to life or her health, namely, the desire to live longer, or to avoid painful suffering.

But, I think, it is not that she really does not assent to the knowledge-claim. Rather, she somehow succeeds in blinding herself to what she already believes to be true. For it is quite plausible to think that her engaging in a psychological strategy to transmute a belief, which threatens her life, into a disbelief is precisely what creates inner tension in her. For a permanent success would imply that the reason for, and cause of, being anxious had been completely eliminated from her mind. The inadequacy of her defensive psychological strategy results in the resuscitation of the buried belief. The belief that she *has* cancer reasserts itself.

But, then, it now appears as though it is the struggle to replace the belief with its opposite disposition, rather than the belief itself, which is the cause of, or reason for, her anxiety. The intentionality of her anxiety seems to consist in a conflict of beliefs or dispositions. If this is true, then, again, we confront the problem of not being able to provide an account of the intentionality of this mental state in accordance with our theory. For no determinate belief would be adduced in explaining the anxiety. Is there any ambivalence about her mental state?

Against this possible consequence, I want to argue that the belief that she has cancer, accompanied by the evaluative belief that cancer will bring an end to her life through painful suffering, secures the intentionality of her anxiety. For her disbelief is less well grounded than her belief; the strength of her belief keeps her disbelief from gaining a secure ground. In essence, her disbelief is her unwillingness to recognize the belief. And the persistence

of her anxiety is due to the persistence and dominance of her belief, which is why her strategy fails to obtain more than a transient success.

The Formal Object of Emotions

To say that an emotion is founded on an appropriate belief is to imply that the belief characteristic of the emotion concerns the object that the emotion is directed on to. But the intentional nexus that binds an emotion to its object deserves elaborate analysis in view of the fact that there are conceptual restrictions on the type of object which each emotion could have. In talking about the relation between emotion and object, one must understand that the word 'object' is being used in a formal or logical sense as opposed to a material or empirical sense, such that the relationship between it and the relevant emotion is itself logical or conceptual. Not just anything can be the object of a particular emotion. For the object of an emotion is the object of an appropriate belief; it is an object specified by the belief as possessed of certain property. Each of the emotions is logically appropriate to certain objects satisfying the descriptions given by appropriate beliefs. Thus, the person having the emotion must believe that the object falls under a certain description characteristic of the emotion. The description uniquely identifies the object of the emotion: one can feel the emotion *E*, only if one sees the object *O* as fitting the description *D*. Since fitting the description *D* is a formal requirement which the object *O* must satisfy for *E* to occur, it is argued that emotions (and actions) have 'formal objects'—a medieval phrase of Aristotelian provenance, recently applied to the discussion of intentionality by Anthony Kenny (Kenny, 1963). Kenny introduces the idea of a formal object through an analysis of actions:

> The formal object of ϕ is the object under that description which *must* apply to it if it is possible to ϕ it. If only what is P can be ϕed, then 'thing which is P' gives the formal object of ϕing...To assign a formal object to an action is to place restrictions on what may occur as the direct object of a verb describing the action (Kenny, 1963, p. 189).

For instance, if one can borrow only what belongs to somebody else, then 'belonging to others' is a description of the formal object of borrowing. If one can strive only for what is difficult to obtain, then 'being difficult to obtain' is the description of the formal object of striving. Whatever it is that can be borrowed must be something which is believed to belong to somebody else. Whatever it is that can be striven for must be something which the agent believes to be difficult to obtain. Thus, the formal objects of actions specify conceptual restrictions on what can be counted as this or that particular action.

Actions are both intentional (thought-dependent) and non-intentional. Even non-intentional actions are specified by their formal objects. Touching and drinking are non-intentional actions, and are specified by their formal objects. Only what is tangible can be touched; only what is liquid can be drunk. But in neither case does the agent have to believe that the object he is touching is tangible, or that the object he is drinking is liquid. And these two activities are not object-directed. Water, for instance, is an object to drink. But drinking a glass of water is not analysable in terms of the drinking being directed on to the glass of water. Similarly, when I touch the pen while writing this sentence, my act of touching is not said to be directed on to the pen. Of course, my *intending* or *desiring* to touch the pen is directed on to the pen. In that case, it is not the pen *tout court* but the pen as intended or desired, as believed to possess some quality because of which I intend or desire to touch it.

Actions that have the property of intentionality are such that they cannot be counted as what they are independently of the agent's belief about their objects. I cannot be said to borrow a car, if I do not believe that it belongs to somebody else. The act of borrowing necessarily involves being in a definite mental state, a state that embodies the thought that the object pertains to someone else. So it is not something pertaining to someone else *tout court* but something *believed* to be pertaining to someone else that is the formal object of borrowing. The formal object of an intentional action is, thus, determined by reference to an appropriate belief. It is the belief which secures the intentionality of the action.

The intentionality of actions parallels the intentionality of emotions. The formal objects of emotions are specified in much the same way in which the formal objects of intentional actions are specified. Just as, for instance, only what is believed to be difficult to obtain can be striven for, so only what is believed to be a valuable achievement or possession of oneself can be an object of pride. Likewise, only what is believed to be good or desirable and believed to belong to somebody else can be envied. Again, *A* can be jealous of *B*, only if *A* believes that *B* has been preferred in some way to himself. Only what is believed to be a great loss or misfortune can be an object of grief. In each case, the formal object specifies and thereby puts conceptual restrictions on the *kind* of object (actual or fictitious) on to which the particular emotion can be directed. An emotion is logically, not just ethically, appropriate only to certain restricted objects—this is, thus, a formal condition which must be satisfied by the emotion in order to be that emotion.

However, to say that assigning a formal object to an emotion places restriction on the kind of object towards which one can have the emotion is not to imply that one cannot, for example, be envious or jealous or proud of anything whatsoever. In point of fact, what is necessary for the possibility of experiencing an emotion is the appropriate belief or thought *that* something is the case. For the restriction, put by the formal object, concerns not the object *per se* but the appropriate belief about the object. For example, although the formal object of pride is the possession of something which

casts credit on oneself, I may take pride in something which does not really cast any credit on myself in that it is not connected to myself. This can happen, if I mistakenly believe it to be connected with myself. You may feel fear at the appearance of a robin redbreast, because you may believe its appearance to be ominous. Likewise,

> It is possible to be envious of one's own fruit trees; but only if one mistakenly believes that the land on which they stand is part of one's neighbour's property; just as it is possible to feel remorse for the failure of the crops in Vietnam if one believes that it was due to the inadequacies of one's own prayers (Kenny, *op. cit.*, p. 193).

The rationale behind the above discussion is that what the formal object designates with respect to an emotion must be understood to qualify only the intentional object, i.e. the object as believed. The formal object specifies a limitation not on the material object of the emotion, but on the thought through which the material object is presented. This also partly explains why one can fear something that actually does not exist, or feel delighted at something which did not really happen or happened in a way different from the way it was thought to have happened. A mistaken or false emotion is an emotion founded on a mistaken belief about its object. Having the emotion is no guarantee that its formal object is always accompanied by an instance of what it designates. For there may not exist any material or real instance; and even if there is one, it may not be as the designation requires it to be.

The above can be contrasted with the description of actions that are not characterized by intentionality. What the formal object of such an action designates cannot but qualify the material object, for the relation between the action and its object is a material (non-intentional) relation. Kenny writes:

> The description of the formal object of a mental attitude such as an emotion, unlike the description of the formal object of a non-intentional action, must contain reference to belief. Only what is wet can be dried; but something which is merely believed to be an insult may provoke anger (*op. cit.* pp. 193-34).

Two interrelated features can be brought to light on the basis of the above elucidation. One is that an emotion is *founded* on an appropriate belief (the feature of intentionality); the other is that the belief is *causally efficacious* in bringing about the emotional state in the subject (the feature of causation). Faced with the need to classify emotions as of particular types, we would invoke the feature of intentionality. For example, we would classify an emotion as one of fear or of anger or of jealousy in terms of the particular type of beliefs involved in each case. And faced with the need to answer the question 'What makes you angry with or jealous of him/her?' we would respond by resorting to the feature of causation. That is, we would say, not just that

he/she has done some harm to us or prefers someone else to us in some respect, but that we believe this to be the case and are emotionally affected *because* of what we believe.

It is pertinent to emphasize that the belief on which an emotion is founded is not just a purely cognitive, descriptive or factual belief—a belief of the kind which is claimed to be involved in a paradigmatic perceptual judgement. Although the initial judgement that the object of the emotion possesses some property characteristics of the emotion contains a factual or descriptive belief about existence, it is also the basis for an evaluation; and it is this evaluation which transforms the initial cognitive and factual attitude into a specific way of viewing the object. For example, if I feel terror at the sight of a raging bull bearing down on me, I am not merely aware of the fact that the object has such and such properties, but realize that those properties constitute the object's being dangerous to my existence. The raging bull is seen *as* a threatening object which can injure or kill me. Likewise, a man is angry because a situation is seen by him *as* offensive or insulting, embarrassed because a situation is seen *as* one in which he has lost face. Thus, the belief or judgement on which the emotion is founded is an *evaluative* belief or judgement, involving an appraisal of the object or situation. As William Lyons points out:

> ...we will only count this emotional state as a case of fear if the person's particular judgements, say, that there is a bomb in the corner of the room and that it is likely to injure or kill him, are judgements which together can be said to fall under the general category or description of viewing the situation as dangerous (Lyons, 1980, p. 78).

This explanation ties up well with the idea of a formal object. For to claim that a person is in the emotional state of fear is to imply that the person must view the object in a certain light, namely, as dangerous, harmful, unpleasant or disagreeable; and that the general category summing up this particular point of view for fear, that is, the category of being dangerous, harmful, disagreeable (a disjunction of this properties) is the formal object of fear.[7]

General Evaluative Belief and Particular Existential Belief

Since to assign a formal object to an emotion is to state the general evaluative category of objects or situations the emotion must be about, it is obvious that no particular object or situation has thereby been assigned to the emotion. It merely states what *type* of object or situation must be for it to be an object of the emotion. Correspondingly, the general evaluative belief, appropriate to the emotion, is not specifically about any particular object or situation

but about objects or situations of a certain kind. A formal object, being an evaluative category and determined by a suitable general belief, is a generalization, a type description. Strictly speaking, a formal object is not an *object* but a concept or conceptual framework which is applied to particular objects or situations. It is an evaluative framework constituted of certain evaluative criteria which are provided by the relevant general belief. The particular object or situation which is made to fit that conceptual framework is, as we might say, the 'material' object of the emotion. Thus, we also assign a material object to an emotion, which means that we refer to a particular spatio-temporal item (given that there is one) that the subject is emotional about.

Take the examples of sadness and envy. A person feels sadness towards, another, if the former believes that the latter is a victim of some misfortune, whether of health or family problem or socio-political pressures of some kind. Then the concept of 'being a victim of some misfortune' sets the framework by reference to which a person's condition is deemed saddening. Thus, we feel sadness towards a poor and innocent village blacksmith when we believe that some despicable vandalism has smashed his workplace, leaving him with no means of livelihood. We see the blacksmith's lot fitting the framework that explains when a situation can be saddening. Similarly, the framework for our finding a fellow human being's life or a specific condition of that life enviable is set by the belief that this person is better off than we are in some respect which is considered good. Thus, the runner-up tennis player envies the champion, because he believes that the champion has obtained something which he failed to obtain, namely, the championship trophy or money and/or the fame.

This distinction between a 'formal object' and a 'material object' of an emotion can be fruitfully used to elicit a corresponding distinction on the side of belief, namely, a 'general (evaluative) belief' and a 'particular (existential) belief' respectively. While the formal object is related to an appropriate general belief in that the latter determines the former, the material object of an emotion also relates itself to a belief, namely, the belief that there exists this particular item onto which the emotion in question is directed. Thus, if Mary is feeling fear at the sight of a wild dog approaching her, she not only believes that wild dogs can harm her in certain ways; she also believes in the actual presence of a particular wild dog confronting her. An explanation of her fear must attribute both these beliefs to her. For her fear not only has a formal object but a material object as well, which figures as an instantiation of the category of objects thought to be harmful or dangerous.

Now, it might appear that the two beliefs are not always necessary for someone to feel an emotion like fear. For there are cases of fear in the explanation of which the relevant existential belief does not, at first sight, seem to be attributed to the subject. Consider the cases of recollection and anticipation. Mary may simply remember a wild dog running towards her and feel fear at that. Or she may, rather obsessively, anticipate an attack and

thereby feel fear. It might then be said that in neither case does Mary hold the existential belief in a wild dog threatening her while she is in her fearful state of mind: only the general evaluative belief about wild dogs is operative in her frightened consciousness, and thus only this belief is logically involved in the concept of fear in general. Hence the conclusion might be drawn that the general evaluative belief about something dangerous or harmful is by itself necessary and sufficient to produce fear.

This argument, however, is fallacious. What the cases of recollection and obsessive anticipation actually imply is not that Mary's fear is founded on no existential belief whatsoever, but that it occurs in the absence of the belief in a currently existing wild dog. In other words, there is an existential belief of a relatively different kind that is operative in the generation of Mary's fear, namely, the belief in the past or possible existence, or appearance, of a wild dog running towards her. The point to be drawn from this is that the general evaluative belief, involved in an emotion, is always in need of some other mental act or state to be actually effective in eliciting the emotion. When it is not accompanied by an existential belief about a currently existing object or an occurrent event, it is accompanied by some substitute thought-process, such as memory or anticipation, that embodies existential beliefs in different ways. This is to say that statements about emotions, generated through recollection and anticipation, entail existential commitments of different sorts than that which is entailed by statements about perceptually generated emotions. We might say that the general belief is ignited when the mental process of recollection or anticipation, involving the belief in past or possible existence of the object, is turned on.

It should be noted that the difference in existential commitments, involved in different modes of emotions discussed above, corresponds to differences in action or behaviour resulting from the emotions. If Mary feels fear at the *sight* of a wild dog running towards her, she will normally tend to avoid the dangerous situation either by running away from the dog or by obstructing its progress towards her, which is to say that her fear will issue in some appropriate immediate action. When such an action actually issues, it can be connected with her belief in a currently existing dangerous object facing her. On the other hand, if she feels fear at the *thought* of a wild dog attacking her, the fear will normally not be accompanied by the desire or motive to engage in the appropriate immediate action mentioned above. But she may be *disposed* to behave in certain ways and undergo some physiological changes that are characteristic of fear. In other words, her fear will be expressed in certain passive symptoms, or in reactions without actions of the appropriate kind. This fact can be connected with the (existential) belief that the wild dog is not currently threatening her, but it was threatening her or could do so in future. But in either case, the evaluative belief remains the same.

There is a further reason why the distinction between general evaluative belief and particular existential belief has a significant conceptual role to

play in accounting for the transformation or cessation of emotional states. For instance, a man might harbour the general belief about a species of animal in a particular forest that such an animal is a devil, which comes to carry people off. Upon encountering a particular animal of that species while wandering by that forest, he would feel afraid that the animal is a threat to his life. But if he could somehow be convinced that this general belief concerning such animals of that forest is nothing but a baseless superstition, he would cease, or at any rate begin to cease, to see the animal, which he believes to be approaching him, as a threatening or devilish object. His existential belief about the animal would no longer be governed by his initial evaluative belief about animals of that species residing in that forest. His existential commitment to the particular object would, so to speak, be free from the existential anxiety which he suffered earlier on. Thus, the kind of influence, which the existential belief would have on the subject, is completely determined by what general belief reigns over it.

The Non-Contingent Causal Connection Between Emotion and Belief

It has been held that a suitable belief about the object of an emotion is not only conceptually necessary for the emotion to be what it is but is also causally efficacious in producing that emotion (Davidson, 1982; Green, 1972; Lyons, 1980; Neu, 1977). So the relationship between emotion and belief has two dimensions—conceptual and causal. The conceptual dimension is the *rational* aspect of the link: the belief on which the emotion is founded is the reason for that emotion. At the same time, it is because of the belief that the subject feels that emotion, the 'because' here being *causal*. Since the same mental phenomenon is being explained in terms of both a conceptual and a causal connection, it is necessary to argue for the idea that causal connections do not preclude conceptual connections and vice versa. It needs to be explained how beliefs can play a causal role in belief-dependent states, even though belief-dependency is generally a matter of the classification and discrimination of mental states and is, therefore, a conceptual matter.

If a relation to a certain belief is a logically necessary condition of an emotion's being the emotion it is, then it will be readily questioned how the relationship between the two can be held to be causal. For the belief is a defining characteristic of the emotion, and hence a constituent of it. But if the belief and the emotion are to be construed as cause and effect respectively, the belief must be shown to be a separate event, an event that can be identified independently of the emotion. This objection is raised by Irving Thalberg, who contends that a causal relation between X and Y presupposes that the two events, X and Y, are independently describable. He states:

> It seems to me that any time you claim one event or condition is a cause or condition of another event or condition, you must be able to gather evidence of the effect which is logically independent of your evidence of its putative cause (Thalberg, 1964, p. 51).

Put in general terms, Thalberg's argument is that if having an emotion necessarily implies having the appropriate belief—a statement which entails that one cannot gather evidence of the emotion (effect) that is logically independent of one's evidence of the belief (cause)—then the principle of logical independence is violated in saying that the characteristic belief causes the emotion in question.

What underlies the above argument is a general philosophical principle, essentially Humean in spirit, that a logical or conceptual connection precludes a causal connection—a principle which has been much criticized in recent philosophy (see, for example, Davidson, 1967; Wilson 1972, chaps. 2 and 3). Against this principle, J.R.S. Wilson puts forward the thesis that causal connection is built into the meaning of certain concepts. He writes:

> Sometimes two concepts are related in that any item which falls under one has a certain relation to some item falling under the other. Thus any item falling under the concept father has a certain relation to some item falling under the concept child; any item falling under the concept cause has a certain relation to some item falling under the concept effect. (Wilson, 1972, p. 25).

This general counter-thesis to the Humean principle has been advocated in more specific terms by O.H. Green, who thinks that Thalberg and others have overlooked the fact that

> ...many descriptions are applicable only where a certain causal relation is supposed to hold. The causal relation is built into the meaning of such descriptions. Where this is the case, the fact that a logical connection obtains will not preclude the existence of a causal connection. For example, a burn is by definition an injury caused by contact with heat; thus, where there is a burn, of course there is contact with heat, but this hardly means that contact with heat is not the cause of the burn (Green, *op. cit.*, p. 38).

Green, then, goes on to argue that emotional words are similarly analysable. For an emotion is partially defined as 'an affective state caused by a thought of a certain sort' (*ibid.*, p. 38). 'Fear', for example, is partially defined as an affective state caused by the anticipation of some danger.

I think that the Green-Wilson argument is persuasive. The conceptual connection of an emotion of a certain sort with a belief of a specific kind

does not preclude the belief's causing the emotion any more than the conceptual constraints on 'fathers', 'effect', and 'burns' preclude their being causally related to 'sons', 'causes', and 'contact with heat'. The causal relation in the case of emotions can be exhibited by analysing the total mental state of an emotion into its constituent parts. Basically, an emotion consists of two units: first, a cognitive-evaluative aspect, which is the aspect of belief; secondly, an affective aspect consisting of certain sensational and physiological states. The affective aspect is generally linked with characteristic behaviours or actions in which the whole emotional state expresses itself. Now the affective aspect or the occurrence of certain unusual or abnormal physiological changes associated with adrenaline flow, blood circulation, respiration, muscular tension, gastro-intestinal activity, secretions—in short, those changes associated with the central nervous system—must be causally accounted for, let alone the behaviours or actions in which the emotion is manifested. Since the belief-component is the only other constituent of the total emotional complex, it seems necessary to refer to the belief in providing a causal explanation of the observable physiological/sensational effects.[8] Thus, even if the belief is a logically essential constituent of the emotion, it is plausible to say that the belief causes the emotion in so far as the affective reaction is elicited by that belief. But exactly how this type of causation operates is the next question we must address.

The most likely suspicion with respect to the feasibility of causation of some affective reaction by a belief is that the antecedent of this network is not an event to be related to the consequent. A belief is not an event but an attitude or disposition (although it could become an event by being an occurrent belief). And for the belief to become an event the subject has to bring it to the threshold of his consciousness, or it has to occur there and persist somewhat like an obsessive thought. However, this is not normally how our emotions are related to their appropriate beliefs. The occurrence of fear, for example, is not so much accompanied by the simultaneous or prior occurrence of the belief that something is dangerous, as it is triggered off by the disposition to behave in a way characteristic of fear when faced with the dangerous object. So the belief is active not as an occurrent state of mind but in the form of a disposition. Yet, not being an event, how can a belief be said to bring about another event?

The above perplexity arises, however, from a failure to recognize the complex belief-structure of emotions. It is true that the evaluative belief need not be a mental occurrence, even when an account of it is given in relation to emotions as occurrent states. A dispositional analysis of the evaluative belief can be correct. But if the evaluative belief, involved in a particular emotion, is to play a causal role in occurrent emotional states, there must be some occurrent aspect to this belief. It seems necessary to posit some factor—psychological or physiological—which actually exists, in some sense, in the subject. In other words, the disposition has some sort of structural or categorical—as opposed to hypothetical or non-actual—base in the subject. Just as, for instance, there is a physico-chemical structural base of a material disposition like brittleness or magnetism, so there must be a dynamic psycho-physiological structure underlying the evaluative belief. It is this dynamic structural base which renders the belief causally efficacious in eliciting an emotion.

But we have not yet fully answered the question of how a disposition actually plays the role of a causal operator in generating a certain emotion. For merely to say that a suitable evaluative belief is the cause of an emotion, in the way brittleness is the cause of the breaking of a glass jar, is not to provide a complete explanation. Although the disposition of brittleness is a causal factor in the breaking of the glass jar, it does not constitute a sufficient condition for the jar to break. Some other condition, such as the jar's falling on a rocky ground, has to be added to produce a sufficient explanation. All we have so far is a necessary condition of the occurrence of the event.

The sufficient condition can be provided, I think, by bringing in the role of the existential belief. The existential belief is always an occurrent mental state, and its occurrence normally triggers off the disposition to feel or behave in a certain way appropriate to the relevant evaluative belief. The relevant disposition is 'actualized' by virtue of a mental occurrence of the instantaneous variety. Thus, the functional role of the existential belief in an emotion is analogous to the role of striking a glass jar by some hard substance in breaking the jar. And it is in this way, I think, that the belief component of an emotional complex is activated to become an event of some sort.

Summary

In this paper, I have tried to analyse the notion of intentionality or object-directedness of mental states by reference to the concepts of 'thinking of' and 'thinking that'. While 'thinking of' is representative of unasserted thoughts or thoughts merely entertained or held in a non-judgemental state of mind, the paradigm of 'thinking that' is believing or asserted thoughts—thoughts that are held in a judgemental state of mind. The distinction is intended to draw a general demarcation between thinking *without* believing and thinking *as* believing. I have explained the intentionality of emotional states of a certain kind in terms of 'thinking that' or belief. Emotions of this category are belief-dependent: they are founded on, and hence identified by reference to, appropriate beliefs. And the appropriate belief specifies what is called the 'formal object' of an emotion. The 'formal object' of a certain emotion is given by a description under which an object or situation must be believed to fall, if it is to be the object of that emotion. This description is about the general evaluative category under which a 'material' object must be subsumed, if it is to be the object of the emotion in question.

In view of the importance and complexity of the belief-structure of emotions, I have drawn a distinction between general evaluative beliefs and particular existential beliefs. The evaluative belief, involved in a certain emotion, consists of an evaluative judgement about the nature of the object, that is, some belief that the object possesses such-and-such emotion-evoking property. The existential belief consists of the judgement or belief that there is such an object or situation possessing the property specified by the evaluative belief.

I then argued for the thesis that the non-contingent or conceptual relation between emotion and belief is also a causal relation. Emotions are not merely defined and classified in terms of appropriate beliefs; the beliefs are also causally efficacious in generating the relevant emotions. Finally, I have explained how this causation actually takes place. Although the evaluative belief is analysable as a disposition to feel or behave in a certain way appropriate to the belief, the existential belief is a mental occurrence that triggers off the disposition and causes a particular type of affective experience. Thus, the belief-component of a total emotional complex, consisting of both the evaluative and the existential belief, provides a necessary and sufficient causal explanation of the occurrence of emotions.

Notes

1. Peter F. Strawson has discussed how the concept of *thinking-of-as* is related to Wittgenstein's notion of *seeing as* (Strawson 1974, pp. 58-60).
2. Metaphorical thinking in poetry also seems to fit the 'thinking of *X* as *Y*' structure. In Blake's mystical imagination, the thought of a finite *hour* evokes the thought of infinite *eternity* ('to see eternity in an hour'); and his mystical vision of the *heaven* occurs at the sight of a *wild flower* ('and the heaven in a wild flower'). What Blake is implying, as it might be argued, is thinking *of* an hour as (or in terms of) eternity, and thinking *of* a wild flower as (or in terms of) the heaven. What he is not intending to imply is thinking *that* eternity is *in* an hour, or heavenliness is *inherent* in a mundane object such as a wild flower. In other words, it might be alleged that Blake's poetic thinking is not to be analysed as predicational: he does not think *that*...but thinks *of X* as *Y*.

   But, I think, this interpretation of poetic metaphor is likely to be misleading, if it is meant to apply across the board. For a mystical poet like Blake might have had metaphysical beliefs of a pantheistic character. He might have believed that there is God or heavenliness in every finite and mundane object in an immanent form. Similarly, it might be a misrepresentation of Keats's thought expressed in his famous assertion 'Beauty is Truth, Truth Beauty', if we reinterpret the assertion as 'Beauty *as* Truth, Truth *as* Beauty'. For he might have held some quasi-mystical theory of the identity between beauty and truth.
3. Michael Dummett formulates the intimate link between assertion and truth in the following way: 'A man makes an assertion if he says something in such a manner as deliberately to convey the impression of saying it with the overriding intention of saying something true' (Dummett, 1973, p. 300).
4. For example, Alston (1967), Bedford (1956-57), Gordon (1967), Green (1972), Kenny (1963), Lyons (1980), Neu (1977), Scruton (1970-71), Shaffer (1983), Solomon (1977), Taylor (1975) and Thalberg (1964).
5. For example, see Rorty (1980), p. 1.
6. O.H. Green makes the same cautious move when he begins his essay with this statement: 'Beliefs of certain sorts are characteristic of the several emotions.' He then adds to the above a footnote remark: 'Application of the term "emotion" is throughout restricted to a range of conative-affective states including embarassment, pity, grief, indignation, fear, remorse, and other quite similar examples' (Green, 1972, p. 24).

   Gabriele Taylor also restricts the belief-dependency thesis to a particular class of emotions (Taylor, 1975-56).
7. So far I have related my discussion of the notion of a formal object of emotion to analytic philosophers only. But the idea that an emotion has a formal object is also to be found in the writings of some representatives of both phenomenological philosophy and cognitive psychology, where the idea has been elucidated in a much more general sense and from a broader perspective. If the formal object of an emotion is to be construed as 'object-as-evaluated' by the person having the emotion, then we are permitted to generalize that our emotional responses to the world of objects and events are determined by, and classified in accordance with, the way we evaluate the various properties possessed by the objects and events. Thus, Jean-Paul Sartre says that an 'emotion is a specific way of apprehending the world' (Sartre, 1962, p. 57). And it is implied that our responding to a certain segment of the world with a particular emotion is due to believing evaluatively that the segment is invested with some specific quality appropriate to the generation of that emotion. 'Emotion is not an accident, it is a mode of our conscious existence, one of the ways in which consciousness understands [in Heideggar's sense of *verstehen*] its Being-in-the-world' (Sartre, *op. cit.* p. 31). In a similar vein of mind, a contemporary psychologist, Richard Lazarus, says: 'Emotion results from an evaluative perception of a relationship (actual, imagined or anticipated) between a person (or animal) and the environment' (Lazarus, 1982, p. 1021).
8. William Lyons suggest that the link between emotion and evaluative belief is to be construed as causal for 'modified Humean reasons'. As he writes:

   > If it is known, as it is, that physiological changes of the type we are concerned with do often follow on the generation or activation of some evaluative disposition in a person, and if in a certain case the physiological changes follow quite directly the evaluation, and if it is known that there is nothing else present in or near the person who is undergoing these physiological changes which might be associated with these changes, then one has good reasons for claiming that the evaluation is the cause of the physiological changes. It is quite simply a matter of the evaluation being the best claimant in the circumstances for being the cause of the observed physiological effects (*op. cit.*, pp. 61-62).

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Husserl's notion of constitution in Heidegger's treatment of care

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In phenomenology in general and existentialism in particular, there is a search for meaning, not for any linguistic meaning but for meaning of the most personal and subjective kind. The whole endeavour of Dasein is directed towards the discovery of meaning, i.e. how such and such is meaningful to me. Dasein discovers meaning not by any empirical means or by experimental methods but by assigning meanings, and Dasein can so assign meaning because it constitutes meaning in so far it is the very source of its meaningfulness. That Dasein is the meaning giver is the heart of Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. The fact that Dasein discovers meaning (by assigning meaning) after having constituted it shows that meaning is given to Dasein as a task and not as a finished product. Thus, Dasein's whole endeavour is directed towards the discovery of meaning. It is perfectly legitimate and absolutely valid to ask what is the meaning of this Dasein which is engrossed in the task of discovering and assigning meaning. The answer is that the primordial meaning of Dasein's Being is expressed in saying 'I am' which Heidegger interprets as 'care'. Following Kant's transcendental regressive philosophical method which has generally been accepted both by the phenomenologists and existentialists, one can say that the meaning of Dasein's Being as care is the a priori necessary condition for there being any meaning at all. Hence care is the foundation of every meaning.

Dasein's fundamental and primordial concern is itself, a concern rooted in Dasein's 'mineness'. Consequently, that into which Dasein searches for meaning primarily is itself, its own existence. Dasein grasps the meaning of its Being disclosed as existing now but suspended between the two poles of past and future which merge into nothingness of the unknown. In other words, Dasein grasps the meaning of itself as existing from one particular point of time to another. Thus, Dasein's whole existence is enveloped or encircled by time which manifests Dasein's sheer finitude. It is for Dasein to appropriate time. By appropriating it, Dasein becomes owned or authentic; and if it does not appropriate it, it becomes unowned or inauthentic. Hence temporality is the criterion of owned or unowned modes of existence. Appropriating temporality means accepting whole-heartedly one's finitude. This acceptance is not out of helplessness but rather a courageous acceptance of oneself, knowing well that one is finite. As a result, temporality (finitude) becomes a source of strength and the origin of one's capacity to assign meaning. Once Dasein appropriates this temporality, strangely enough, Dasein

becomes the author of it and begins to exist by temporalizing itself. Dasein's existence within the domain of temporality is described as 'ahead-of-itself-Being- already-in (the world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within the world)' (Heidegger, 1927). This is care. Care, consequently, is the essence of Dasein's temporality.

Dasein searches for meaning primarily in itself, for it is the source of its own meaningfulness. The context that brightens up the meaning possibilities, the circumstances which emphasize the need to discover meanings, the situation that demands the need to assign personal and subjective meanings is anxiety or dread. In dread Dasein realizes how self-oriented its world is such that the world is totally dependent on Dasein. It is dread that compels Dasein to search for its own meanings. In dread the meaning of the average everyday existence vanishes, leaving Dasein all alone to make its existence meaningful. Dread as the direct experience of and the personal encounter with nothingness makes Dasein realize how alienated it is from every thing else in its world, and yet how everything else in its world depends on it for its meaning. Dasein has to assign to everything its proper place in its world and decide on its use. It is by doing this that Dasein discovers meaning in them. Dread, Dasein's confrontation with itself, is the stepping-stone towards the elucidation of care. Heidegger elucidates care exclusively in temporal terms: ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in (the world) as Being-along-side (entities encountered within the world) (Heidegger, 1927). The expression 'ahead-of-itself' indicates Dasein's tending towards the future. Future is meaningful to Dasein, because Dasein goes forward to it anticipatingly instead of merely waiting for it. The expression 'Being-already-in (the world)' designates the 'having-been' (past) of Dasein. Anticipatively existing Dasein claims itself by coming back to itself, i.e. Dasein comes towards itself futurally in such a way that it comes back upon itself. The character of 'having-been' is rooted in Dasein's genuine future. The next expression of the definition of care 'Being-along-side (entities encountered within the world)' points towards Dasein's present. Anticipation which has 'having-been' inbuilt in it discloses the current 'there' of Dasein, i.e. the character of 'having-been' originates from the future in such a way that the future in union with 'having-been' constitutes the present.

A close look at the elucidation of care shows that the characteristic that stands out predominently in Heidegger's definition of care is the future. It also refers to the compact unity among the various modes of Dasein's temporality. Those who dealt with the notion of time in the past laboured hard to discover a principle of unity which for them was most often a metaphysical necessity. The need to establish the possibility of such a principle of unity arose because of our experience of the multiplicity of temporal dimensions. But this trend of thinking is reversed in phenomenology and existentialism. From Heidegger's point of view, there is a plurality of temporal dimensions, and this is precisely because Dasein exists. That Dasein exists is the only *raison d'etre* for this multiplicity. The multiplicity of temporal dimensions

are modes of Dasein's Being. These modes find their unity in Dasein. Dasein's modes are because Dasein exists. The modes of Dasein are the horizons of Dasein. Dasein moves towards its horizons constantly, for Dasein is never a static substance but an active and dynamic relation. That Dasein's Being is such a relation is what enables Dasein to move constantly to its various horizons. Because Dasein can relate to itself the various horizons at one and the same time, it can eliminate the notions of earlier than and later than, before and after and the like. Consequently, there cannot be any rigid separation among Dasein's future, past and present. Because the future and the past find unity in the existing Dasein (hence the present of Dasein), Dasein can move towards its past or future without bringing in the notion of succession into its experience of time. Then, one can say that care is a unifying existential. Care reveals Dasein as extending itself to the future while being tied down to the past and being distracted by the concerns of its current world. In other words, the awareness of the passage of time and a sense of the encapsulation of the various time-dimensions are integral to the notion of care.

Because the temporal dimensions are modes of Dasein's Being, Dasein's subjectivity, hence Dasein itself, gets permeated to each of its modes. Consequently, as Dasein is characterized by mineness, the modes of Dasein's temporality are also characterized by mineness which in turn strengthens the unity of Dasein's temporal modes. Only if Daseins' subjectivity gets transmitted into its modes can Dasein experience owned time; without this Dasein experiences inauthentic time. In other words, whether it be authentic or inauthentic, time proceeds from Dasein's Being which is care. In Dasein's world, there is no time independent of Dasein. The Being of Dasein as care clearly demonstrates that Dasein cannot be anything other than temporality.

Care designates how Dasein exists; and the elucidation of care, in purely temporal vocabulary, shows that Dasein's existence can be expressed only in temporal terms, because Dasein *lives* its time. Dasein lives time by existing, for Dasein temporalizes itself by existing. In fact, the meaning of Heidegger's much criticized expression—temporality temporalizes itself (by existing)—indicates the way Dasein lives time. By existing Dasein effects, creates, time. From Heidegger's point of view, Dasein cannot live any other kind of existence other than the temporal. Dasein's modes of disclosure—understanding, state-of-mind and fallenness—are summed up in just one expression—temporal existence.

In stating that care is the essence of Dasein and by elucidating it in purely temporal terms what Heidegger wants to say is that man's (Dasein's) primordial condition is temporal. Dasein's before and after (i.e. its birth and death) merge into nothingness, and what is in between is composed of temporal constituents. This indicates Dasein's finitude. Because Dasein's essence is temporal, the modes of Dasein originating from this essence (of Dasein) are temporal. Similarly, because the modes are temporal, the essence which

unifies them must also be temporal. Otherwise, there would be no harmony (unity) between Dasein's essence and the modes. There is no question of existence of the essence or the modes prior to or posterior to one another. What is present is a simultaneity of existence of both the essence and the modes. Because Dasein and its modes are equally temporal, Dasein cannot have an existence other than the temporal; temporal existence is the primordial condition of Dasein. One can say that Dasein is 'condemned' (a Sartrean term to be understood very positively) to temporal existence. Temporality as Dasein's original condition constitutes every other condition for Dasein.

While defining care, Heidegger considers time neither subjectively nor objectively but exclusively from the stand point of Dasein's subjectivity. He points out that the basic mistake of all non-phenomenological and non-existential considerations of time is that they are either subjective or objective. But Dasein which temporalizes itself by existing stands beyond both subjective and objective categories, for Dasein is neither a subject nor an object; it is subjectivity. Consequently, Heidegger examines the temporality of Dasein in the language of subjectivity. It is because of this that Heidegger has been able to overcome the difficulties of both the subjective and objective treatments of time. In other words, the only way to arrive at the notion of lived time, with which all the phenomenologists and existentialists are labouring, is to elucidate time in and around subjectivity. Only by doing so can time be made meaningful. Making time meaningful to oneself amounts to *living* time. By living time I create *my* time, and I create it by living it. The time that I create is my time. Consequently, I cannot but live it. I assign meaning to it in so far as I am the author of it. Because I create my time, I make it meaningful to me. The meaning of my time springs from me, because I am the source of my time.

In what way can Heidegger's dependence on Husserl be articulated in the context of the elucidation of care? Husserl's method of transcendental reduction in its very rudimentary stage is to be found already in the very first section of his *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*. Reduction aims at the ego, i.e. subjectivity, without which no phenomenological enquiry can ever be made. The term consciousness is used in *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* in the sense of 'time constituting' flow of subjectivity. What needs to be understood from this is that Husserl constitutes time in and around subjectivity. Husserl painstakingly describes the notion of constitution which Heidegger assumes to be valid, and applies it to his ontological concerns in a modified way. Heidegger's elucidation of time, in fact, is very dependent on the notion of constitution. Some of Heidegger's claims regarding the temporality of Dasein becomes meaningful only on the basis of the notion of constitution.[1]

In Husserl constitution has the sense of building up a whole by implanting component parts which, in the context of *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*, are called primitive apprehensions or partial intentions.

Partial or primitive apprehensions are temporal phases which are either actually present or held in retention or anticipated in protention. In the flow of consciousness, one part pushes its predecessor, and, in turn, is pushed back by its successor and so forth. In constitution a constant creative stream of partial intentions are added together one upon the other (i.e. retaining) until a complete object arises. Thus, constitution is brought about by the co-ordination and integration of component phases. As an accumulative process, it is a subjective activity deriving from the spontaneity of consciousness.

This notion of constitution has been adapted by Heidegger. But how does he do it? Phenomenologically, Dasein is the concretely existing transcendental ego.[2] Husserl has elaborately discussed the role of the transcendental ego in the constitution process. The very life of the transcendental ego is consciousness flowing in (as) a stream. This is the all pervading self-projecting of the ego. From the ego consciousness flows to its horizons. It is the very dynamism of the ego that flows out of itself into its horizons in the form of a stream. It is a remarkable insight of Husserl that this flow is in terms of temporal phases of now which are either actually existing or held in retention or anticipated in protention. What Husserl does is to identify primitive apprehensions with the very flow of consciousness. Consequently, one cannot be without the other. By doing this Husserl 'subjectivised' time. Because time and consciousness are inseparable and because consciousness is the very spirit of the ego (subjectivity), one can very well say, in a similar manner, that time is the kernel of the ego. Because Husserl identifies consciousness with primitive apprehensions and because he considers consciousness (and therefore time too) to be the very life spirit of the ego, he is in a position to point out that time can be enunciated only in and around subjectivity. Time has meaning, because it is my (i.e. subjectivity's) time.

In Heidegger's philosophy, constitution is brought about by Dasein. That Dasein temporalizes itself (by existing) means that Dasein identifies the flow of its consciousness with the now points, either actually existing or held in retention or anticipated in protention, thus making its consciousness temporal. Consequently, care which is the core of Dasein, can be elucidated only in temporal terms. Dasein temporalizes itself by making its horizons temporal, for its horizons are nothing but the fringes of its self-projecting. They are temporal, because Dasein which projects itself into the fringes is temporal. This is how Dasein constitutes time in and around itself (its subjectivity).

Despite its various modes (now, retention and protention), temporality does have a unity, because it proceeds from one and the same Dasein (subjectivity) encompassing everything about itself by means of the flow of consciousness. Because the flow of consciousness is all-pervading, Husserl points out that the elapsed phases do not disappear from consciousness; rather, they are present in consciousness as retained phases. Similarly, the future is

not something from out of the blue, it is the horizon of recollection. The point to be stressed is that a manifold of temporal phases can be present in our consciousness at one and the same instant.

Following Husserl's description of the unity of temporality, Heidegger also points out that different modes of time do not disappear from Dasein's consciousness. Rather, a manifold of temporal phases united intimately with each other can ever be present in consciousness at one and the same instant. And care reveals such a unity of the manifold of temporality. Temporal phases are the horizons or the fringes of Dasein; and because they are Dasein's, they exhibit their unity in Dasein. These horizons are the results of Dasein's temporalizing of itself.

The transcendental ego, consciousness, intentionality and horizon are intimately interconnected in Husserl's study of constitution. An intentional act is essentially the one which bestows meaning. Every intentional experience has its intentional meaning. Having a meaning is the cardinal feature of consciousness. By identifying the flow of consciousness with the various modes of temporality, Husserl conceives consciousness temporally. Consequently, it can be said that bestowing a meaning is the most important role of temporal consciousness. The transcendental ego constitutes something, because it has been able to discover meaning in that which it constitutes. And it discovers meaning in what it has constituted, because that which it has constituted originates from its 'creative' (Husserl himself did not like the term 'creative') act. Otherwise constitution would turn out to be meaningless.

Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology which emphasizes the interpretation of phenomenon departs from Husserl's phenomenology whose motto is 'to let the facts speak for themselves'. But, in so far as both of them have basically a phenomenological programme, there is this much agreement in their respective approaches to the elucidation of the fullness of the phenomenon of temporality. For Husserl it is the transcendental ego which constitutes meaning. For Heidegger Dasein, the concretely existing transcendental ego, constitutes meaning. Dasein constitutes something, only because it has endowed it with meaning; and because Dasein has constituted something, it discovers meaning in it. In other words, when Dasein constitutes something, it constitutes it as meaningful. One is neither anterior to nor posterior to the other. In the world of Dasein, there are no prefixed meanings. Dasein discovers meaning in temporality by way of constituting temporality.

Notes

1. It is, indeed, true that Husserl has a very elaborate treatment of constitution in his *Ideas*. But Heidegger's 'existentialism', due to various reasons, may not accept the elucidation of constitution as given in *Ideas*. That Heidegger appreciated Husserl's earlier phases of phenomenology follows from the fact that Heidegger edited Husserl's *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* and lectured extensively on various 'Investigations'. Heidegger narrates lucidly all these in his essay 'My Way to Phenomenology'. But *Being and Time* is the most powerful witness to Heidegger's indebtedness to Husserl's phenomenology found in the earlier works. Not only does Heidegger accept them in general but occasionally modifies and adapts them to suit the analysis of Dasein. Consequently, it is to be noted that the notion of constitution by means of which Heidegger elucidates his understanding of care is the one which is found in the 'realist' phase of Husserl which, in certain respects, differs from the treatment of constitution in *Ideas*.
2. Although concreteness and being transcendental are incompatible, one cannot deny the fact that Dasein is transcendental, despite its concrete existence, to the extent that Dasein's Being is the necessary condition for its world and various other modes of Dasein's existing.

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'Rules' and 'Knowledge'*

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Today in western thought there is a dominant view of knowledge which has been emerging since the presocratics. Many philosophical postures, scientific theories, and technological developments over the centuries have given both new impetus to this developing view while also being, in part, the creation of it. In fact, the general epistemological posture to be indicated in this essay is currently so deeply embedded in western thought as to be a part of that 'intellectual subconsciousness' not usually articulated, much less discussed. Yet, when this view of knowledge is brought to our consciousness, it appears as the very foundation of all rational thought, of all knowledge, to be accepted as a 'must be' with no reasonable alternatives. Indeed, it appears that this very view is necessary for any rational discussion—even a discussion of the view itself. Hence, the *only* possible 'modifications' to this epistemological stance are seen as taking place within the broad conceptual framework of the view itself. And, in fact, only recently have persons such as Heidegger, the later Wittgenstein and Polanyi attempted to bring into focus and question the broad framework itself.

The view of knowledge which currently dominates western thought may be characterized by citing several general—and equally as vague—features knowledge is said to have. Knowledge is said to be (1) totally rule-oriented, (2) objective, (3) standardizable, (4) impersonal, (5) instrumental, (6) specialized, (7) atomistic, (8) reductionistic, (9) hypothetical, (10) relative, and (11) amoral. Expanding somewhat, the following observations can be made:

(1) Knowledge is totally rule-oriented in that any knowledge claim can in principle be completely formulated in a rule-governed system. All knowledge claims are part of a 'theoretical' or 'conceptual' framework which in principle is completely expressible as a set of various rules.
(2) Knowledge is objective in that it is publicly confirmable or falsifiable using well-established and mutually accepted methods of confirmation and falsification.
(3) Knowledge is of that which is countable, measurable, weighable by mutually accepted standards, techniques, and instruments all leading to goals of exactitude and certainty.

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(4) Knowledge is impersonal since in principle anyone with the proper mastery of relevant facts, techniques, rules, etc. could know—indeed, would know—whatever anyone else knows.
(5) Knowledge is viewed as instrumental in that its sole purpose consists in solving practical and particular problems of prediction and control.
(6) Knowledge is specialized in various ways, but one of the more important is that the very tools and techniques used in problem solving limit both what is to count as a meaningful problem and as an acceptable solution.
(7) Knowledge is considered atomistic in that there are assumed to be basic, independent, discoverable 'units' out of which, by imposition of various rules, knowledge is gained.
(8) Knowledge is reductionistic in that, given any legitimate knowable subject matter, to know it is to be able to reduce, or analyse it into its constituent 'units'.
(9) Knowledge is considered hypothetical in that any particular knowledge claim, as well as a particular system of such claims, is always open to further testing, analysing, and the like.
(10) Knowledge is said to be relative in that there are no absolute standards of truth and exactitude, and that error is always possible.
(11) Knowledge is considered to be amoral in that the facts in and of themselves are value-free. Neither the world which we know, nor the methods by which we come to know it, have intrinsic value. In the realm of knowledge there are only pragmatic, or instrumental, values.

All of these points are not discussed in this paper. Only the first is. Further, the starting point of this discussion is a particular overlapping area of philosophy and technology, namely, that area where epistemology and computing machinery come together. First Leibniz and then Irwin C. Marin are cited as examples of this stance. Both men appear to view knowledge as totally a matter of calculation given a set of rules. Secondly, by far the greater effort of this paper is to unpack various uses of '*rule*' in order to clarify the general view that all knowledge is rule-oriented. As this effort proceeds, it will become evident that none of the uses of '*rule*' discussed will satisfy the demands of either a Leibnizian or Marinian-like position. The quite general claim that all knowledge is totally rule-oriented either turns out to be false or so hopelessly ambiguous as to be largely useless in the application of empirical research or in the understanding of empirical phenomena. To the extent that 'Marin-like' views are predominant in computer application—especially in such areas as Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Simulation, and Information Science—those applications have serious limitations often not recognized by practitioners in the field. Furthermore, it is not my intention in this paper to present a position to replace the totally rule-oriented view of knowledge. No doubt, such an effort would help to clarify some of my

remarks. But it would also make this paper inordinately long. Surfice it to say for the present that my more positive views reflect the influence of the later Wittgenstein and the philosophical writings of Michael Polanyi. Lastly, in this paper, some brief concluding pointers concerning values and knowledge are suggested—'pointers' because, as I just mentioned, no attempt is made to develop a position to stand in place of knowledge as totally rule-oriented. In one paper it is enough to attempt the therapeutic effort of bringing into serious question one of the chief doctrines of a wide-spread epistemological stance, held not only in philosophy but also in at least some areas of science and technology.

In his 1677 paper, 'A Preface to the General Science', Leibniz maintains:

> Whence it is manifested that if we could find characters or signs appropriate for expressing all our thoughts as definitely and as exactly as arithmetic expressed numbers or geometric analysis expresses lines, we could in all subjects *in so far as they are amenable to reasoning* accomplish what is done in Arithmetic and Geometry.
>
> For all inquiries which depend on reasoning would be performed by the transposition of characters and by a kind of calculus, which would immediately facilitate the discovery of beautiful results. For we should not have to break our heads as much as is necessary today, and yet we should be sure of accomplishing everything the given facts allow.
>
> Moreover, we should be able to convince the world that we should have found or concluded, since it would be easy to verify the calculation either by doing it over or by trying tests similar to that of casting our nines in arithmetic. And if someone would doubt my, results, I should say to him: 'Let us calculate, Sir', and thus be taking to pen and ink, we should soon settle the question.[1]

Three hundred plus one years later, Irwin C. Marin asks:

> How can we generate knowledge from a small set of elements and a set of basic relations between these? Is there a 'minimal generating set' from which all higher level elements can be derived? If so, what is it and from whence does it come? The motivation for approaching these questions is quite simple. If an explicit minimal generating set can be specified, and if it can be realized by computing machines, then an 'experimental epistemology' can be developed which would allow the solutions of any problems of epistemology and which would be able to take advantage of the generating power of electronic computing machines.[2]

Marin further suggests:

> Knowledge is the *specification of form*. Information is a *change in the*

specification of form. A problem is an *incompleteness in the specification* of form. Solving a problem is the *completing of the specification* of the incomplete form. A solution makes explicit, relative to the interpreter and the context of a form, that which was previously only implicit. A solution completes the specification of form to produce knowledge.[3]

Continuing, Marin states his fundamental concern:

> This brings us to the fundamental problem of generative epistemology. Now that we have a concept of what knowledge is, how can we construct sequences which will lead us from one state of knowledge to another? If we identify a problem as a relation between an initial state and a final state, where these states are forms of knowledge, then how do we specify the initializing and terminating states, successor functions, and constraint rules so that we can *generate* a sequence of knowledge forms which with suitable specifications of the limits of the space can be made to converge to a desired form? How do we generate a sequence of forms which we can call a procedure for the generation of knowledge. Can we go further and specify algorithms? Under what conditions?[4]

Although in the beginning of his article Marin is found hoping that 'an experimental epistemology can be developed which would allow the solutions of many problems of epistemology', nonetheless in the penultimate paragraph he states:

> Generative epistemology is a methodology or a know-how of how to obtain knowledge by generating it. In the computer field, and especially in the subfield of programming language, assemblers could be generated from binary code, and higher order languages from combinations of assemblers. Translators or compilers could be similarly generated directly from numerical representations. There is great potential for use in this field as well as in the applied fields of information processing such as artificial intelligence where attempts are made to mimic so-called classes of intelligent response. We can show how sequences of 'intelligent behaviour' can be generated, giving rise to specifying a general purpose intelligent system; and we can show that these sequences can be generated by computer. Other areas of application which require the use of generative representation languages can then employ the computer-realized form of generative epistemology to solve problems relating to, for example, the composition of music, art, and the spoken word, and the generation of English prose and the composition of experimental and observational procedures and their conceptual formulations. Areas of future developments include the generation of basic representations of machines and their realization as computers, and the development of general design languages and their realizations and simulations as machines in the physical domain. Generation using the basic reflection forms of interpretations, contexts, and evaluations (content) will produce general philosophical languages tailored to solve specifically posed problems in any given system of philosophy, and many be realized as a computerized philosophical 'robot'. Finally, the combination of knowledge form all forms—experimental, realizational, reflectional, representational—will yield general integrational languages and their realization as general unifying realization units.[5]

Indeed, Marin does not *specifically* maintain that *all* knowledge claims, *all* rational behaviour, *all* human creativity 'falls under' his proposed generative epistemology; nevertheless, having read the above paragraph, one is tempted to ask: 'What doesn't?' So, with Leibniz, Marin could say 'all subjects insofar as they are amenable to reasoning' are matters of calculations, according to rules. To reason is to reckon; to reckon is to reason! And a strong covert suggestion seems to follow: nothing else is of importance to us. Hence, all knowledge claims, anything that can be said to be known or knowable, any rational action, etc. are, in principle if not actually, locatable in some conceptual framework conceived of as a set of 'rules'. Not just claims about the physical world, but claims about anything at all, said to be known, are totally susceptible to rules. Not only are rocket trajectories calculated by the application of rules but so is human behaviour. And here 'behaviour' is understood in such a broad manner as to include physical movement as well as 'the composition of music, art, and the spoken word' and 'general philosophical languages tailored to solve specifically posed problems in any given system of philosophy'.

An important ambiguity is lurking in the above paragraph. The assertion—'Hence all knowledge claims, anything that can be said to be known or knowable, any rational actions, etc. are, in principle if not actually, locatable in some conceptual framework conceived of as a set of "rules" '—can be understood in at least two ways. Nor are these interpretations necessarily distinct at all points. First, the comment might mean that some phenomenon or another may be describable and or explainable in accordance with some rules which form an 'interlocking' system. By means of such rules a given phenomenon may be related to a whole group of other phenomena. Secondly, the comment might mean that *any* act of knowing or *any* process of coming to know is a rule-following act or process. This second position—held in one fashion or another by such writers as Noam Chomsky, Jerrold Katz, and Bernard Harrison—is completely general. Of course, some phenomena, in rather particular circumstances or in a family of circumstances, may be known by following some rule(s) or another. I do not wish to question *that* claim. My comments are directed against the quite general claim that any act of knowing or process of coming to know must be following some rule or set of rules, and these rules, in principle could be made explicit as descriptive principles of explanation of those acts or processes.

While the view that all knowledge is totally rule-oriented is not claimed to be a sufficient condition for knowing something, it is held to be an essentially necessary one. Thus, if something is not susceptible to some rules or another, that guarantee it is inappropriate in such a case to speak of knowledge. 'Hunches', 'beliefs', 'opinions,' 'guesses', 'intuitions' may be more appropriate terms to use in non-rules-oriented cases—or so one may claim. Even though there is debate concerning the nature of these rules, even though there is not agreement concerning the relation of the rules to what they are applied, and even though there is disagreement concerning the nature of the conceptual framework formed by these rules—even so knowledge is held to be totally rule-oriented. But certainly in attempting to assess such a claim, it must first be made clear just how 'rule' is being used or could be being used.

As Wittgenstein would remind us, 'rule' has a family of uses, some closely related and some not.[6] In broad, but surely incomplete strokes, one may point to logico-mathematical rules, game rules, and institutional rules,[7] to cite a few large groupings.[8] And each of these large groups also forms a family of rules. For instance, the rules of chess are more like the rules of the Truth-Functional Calculus than the rule of baseball, although both chess and baseball are games. Yet, the rules of baseball—a game—are more like institutional rules. For the immediate purposes at hand, however, more specific ambiguities will not be pursued in depth, as discussion is focused on logico-mathematical game, and institutional rules.

To aid in the ensuing discussion, consider the following examples of logical game, and institutional rules respectively:

(1) If 'p. q' appears as a line in a proof, then 'p' may be subjoined as a line in that proof.
(2) In chess, the piece called 'bishop' may move diagonally across any number of unoccupied squares on the board.
(3) In driving an automobile, always stop at a red light.

In considering these examples, contrast (1) and (2) with (3). One could not 'do formalized logic or play chess unless there were rules of logic and chess to be followed. There is no ongoing activity of constructing proofs or playing chess independent of following the rules of logic or chess. The rules cannot be ignored and the activity of logic or chess still continued. One might say that the whole life of the sign called the 'dot' or the physical object called the 'bishop' is created by rules of logic or chess. A move cannot be made unless permitted by these rules. Certainly, one can make mistakes in constructing a proof or in making a move in chess. But here one says 'that move is not permitted *in* the game'. The mistake is, as it were, a non-move—a vacuum in the fabric of the rules, a piece of nonsense unintelligible within the rules of the game. Certainly, the ink mark, may be erased from, or cut out of, this page; the piece of wood, marble, etc. called the 'bishop' knocked off the board of sixty-four squares of alternating colours. But these are not moves of logic or chess. For it makes no sense whatsoever to suggest one can go outside the rules of logic and still construct proofs, or outside the rules of chess and still play chess. Here, of course, one must distinguish between, given the rules, what is logically possible and what is physically possible.

On the other hand, rules of driving such as, 'In driving an automobile, always stop at a red light' do not bear this sort of relation to the activity of driving. They do not 'define' that activity. There were no stop lights in the early days of the automobile. Hence there was no rule: 'Always stop at a red light.' Even so, people then were no less able to drive automobiles. A person can drive an automobile while going outside of the institutional rules governing driving. In fact, the situation, the context, in which one is driving often demands that the institutional rules be ignored so that one may drive all the better. One may, therefore, either follow, or not follow, institutional rules and still be carrying on the activity to which the rule is applicable. One can choose whether in fact to apply the institutional rules or not in those situations to which they are in principle applicable. Such rules may be applied with great rigidity or with a certain amount of laxity depending upon how the driver judges the particular situation in which (s)he is driving. An emergency situation may arise in which one feels it mandatory—perhaps to save a life—to speed to a hospital, running various red lights on the way. Thus, 'Stop at a red light' is superseded by the demands of the particular situation. And 'Stop at a red light' does not apply to all red lights one may see while driving. Traffic stop lights, blinking red lights at railroad crossings, flashing red lights on fire trucks, etc. all count—but not red lights adorning houses of ill repute.

Since institutional rules do not create, as it were, an activity, such as rules of logic and some games do, but rather tend to regulate an activity already being performed, there is always the question of the appropriate application of such a rule to a particular concrete example of the activity in question. Again, consider the example: 'When driving an automobile, always stop at a red light.' Two exceptions to this rule have already been suggested—red lights adorning certain business establishments and an emergency drive to the hospital. But other instances form *a countless number of examples,* which could be suggested: 'If I stop at this red traffic light, I'll be hit from behind by that car tail-gating me', 'I do not need to stop at this blinking red light at this railroad crossing because the light is out of order', 'If I stop for the school bus red lights, the kidnapper will get away', 'I do not need to stop at the school crossing red light because it is after school hours', etc. Here, one proceeds by *not* applying institutional rules in specific contexts which seemingly call for the application of that rule. One, rather, breaks the rules. The rules are broken for the very purpose of doing what is appropriate in a particular case.

Nor could there be any 'rules of application', that is, rules dictating when,

say, it is appropriate to apply, or not, the rules of driving. For one can always cite the same problems of application about *these* rules *ad infinitum*. Nor can it be reasonably suggested that *all possible* exceptions be listed prior to their occurrence, and then built into the rule: when driving an automobile, always stop at a red light of the sort x except in situation y. In activities being carried out and regulated, as opposed to defined, by rules, all of the indefinite large number of exceptions cannot be foreseen nor written down. In any event, a list of a definite number of items, as any list would have to be, which purports to enumerate an indefinite number of any thing is a contradiction. If *all* the exceptions are listed, there is no longer an indefinite number of them. If, on the other hand, it is supposed there is an indefinite number of exceptions, they cannot be listed.

But there is another, perhaps more challenging, problem to be faced in suggesting the exceptions could all be listed and that would alleviate the problem of applicability of an institutional rule. This problem, simply stated, is: 'What counts as an *exception*?' Now, if one is to keep within the totally rule-oriented view of knowledge, this question must be answered by formulating a complete definition, or rule for the use, of 'exception' such that, given any context of its use, there can be no exception to the correct application of 'exception'. 'Exception' must have no exceptions. Yet, this is not the way the notion of *exception* operates in activities being regulated by institutional rules. In saying that x is an exception to an institutional rule, one has to see, to grasp, wherein x is *similar* enough to accepted standard cases for the rule to have been reasonably thought applicable, yet *dissimilar* enough from the standard cases so that, in fact, the rule is not applicable in this particular context. Thus, the very notion of *being an exception* depends on something being similar in certain ways and dissimilar in certain ways not with reference to rules, but to standard cases accepted within certain specific contexts.

Now, one does not here speak of similarity or dissimilarity, *simplicatur*. For, any two, or more, situations can be said to be similar on *some* ground or another, e.g. they all occur in time. On the other hand, any two or more situations are dissimilar, if for no other reason, because they are two or more, and not one. What is, therefore, demanded in addressing the question of exceptions to the rules is *relevant*, or *appropriate*, similarity and *relevant*, or *appropriate*, dissimilarity. Now, in ongoing activities being regulated by institutional rules the notions of *relevancy* and *appropriateness*, like the notion of *exception*, are not spelled out in some rule-like way. What is counted as, or seen as, relevant, as appropriate, in a given situation, or not, depends in large part on what may be called the 'gestalt' in which that particular situation is placed. 'What are the *purposes* involved in doing so-and-so?' 'What *goals* are *intended* to be achieved in doing this instead of that?' 'What *interests* are to be *fulfilled*?' 'What *further* situations are to be *avoided*?' 'What *biological* and *psychological* considerations come into play here?' 'What individual and social *values* are involved in delimiting these goals, purposes, interests?' 'How

is "the world" viewed by the *person*, the *human*, acting in this particular situation?' These are but a few questions pointing towards the gestalt' in which the notions of *relevance* and *appropriateness* have their natural homes and find their great variety of uses in particular cases. Yet, such questions can have no answers formalizable in sets of rules. Hence 'relevant' and 'appropriate' are not rule-governed, nor could they be. In general, what one holds to be relevant or appropriate is not settled by an appeal to some set of rules.

Not being able to give a rule formalization for 'relevant' and 'appropriate', one cannot subsume 'similar' and 'dissimilar' under a set of rules insofar as there is a demand for relevant, or appropriate, similarity and relevant, or appropriate, dissimilarity. That being the case, given the totally rule-oriented view of knowledge, the question of the applicability of institutional rules must remain unanswerable if, indeed, not paradoxical. Of course, there are institutional rules and they are applied. However, the totally rule-oriented view is not able to account for this common human activity of applying rules to particular cases. For the human, much of what has traditionally at least been called 'reasoning' and 'knowledge' proceeds *not* by appealing to formal rules in specific contexts or situations, but rather by seeing, by grasping resemblances and similarities in apparently disparate cases; by seeing, by grasping dissimilarities in apparently alike cases;[9] by appealing to accepted paradigm cases as 'criteria' for judging similarity or dissimilarity appropriateness or inappropriateness. That humans do this and to the degree in which they are able to do so is intimately connected with a gestalt and the assimilation of that gestalt into the human activities of the individual human. The totally rule-oriented view of knowledge is not able to account for this.

Here one *could* take the following line of rebuttal:

> A question with no possible answer is not a question at all. To presume otherwise is to open up the possibility of taking all sorts of metaphysical utterances seriously. What is here being called the 'question of applicability of institutional rules' is unanswerable in principle, and hence, in principle not a question. More generally, this is to argue that what has been called 'knowledge' in the area of activities governed by institutional rules is simply not knowledge at all. One would do better to use such words as 'habit', 'custom', or 'instinct', here. Thus, the totally rule-oriented view of knowledge has not been challenged. What has been shown is a long entrenched misuse of 'knowledge'.

Understanding 'rule' in the institutional sense, the above retort *may* momentarily save the Leibnizian position that all reasonable subjects, all knowledge, is expressible in terms of rules. One simply stipulates that 'rule' is not to be used in any institutional context, in any context of on-going activities performable without rules. In such cases, therefore, 'knowledge', and related words such as 'reasonable', 'understand', is not to be used. Yet,

there appears to be no justification for such linguistic strictures except 'to save the position' of a totally rule-oriented view of knowledge. In any event, the discussion to this point does cast serious doubts on the credibility of some of Marin's questions and promisory notes; namely, that knowledge is generatable in a specific computer programme and that under this rubric is found music, art, and general philosophical languags. Nonetheless, to understand claims being made by the totally rule-oriented view of knowledge, one must look elsewhere than institutional rules for clarification of 'rule'.

Consider game rules. In discussing game rules, one should remember the very large variety of different sorts of activities which are, or have been, called 'games'. There are board games, field games, games requiring no marked-out areas, solitary games, games for two persons, games for teams of persons; games in which physical behaviour is minimal, contact sports, highly rational games; games requiring minimal thought, games having a goal to win; goalless—but not purposeless—games, games without purpose or goal; rule-structured games, games with few, if any rules, established games, games that are made-up as they are being played; games primarily of skill, games primarily of chance, *and so on*. And there are all sorts of combinations of these characteristics.

Several comparisons between games rules and institutional rules have already been drawn. For example, institutional rules function to regulate ongoing activities which form a part of a much wider gestalt. Thus, institutional rules do not serve to create activities, as (some) game rules do, but are applied to activities which can be performed, and in some cases performed better, independently of the rules. Certainly, it may be difficult if not impossible to distinguish in any absolute way between some activities called 'games' and other called 'institutional activities'. Yet, if one looks at a particular game, such as chess, distinctions become clearer. In doing this, however, it is well to remember that to select one specific game as an apparent paradigm is to distort the concept *game*.[10]

As in many games, although not all, the rules of chess do not serve to regulate any game activity which could be accomplished independently of those rules. Once more one must distinguish between activities permissible within the game and mere physical behaviour. Not only do the rules of chess determine what movements are to count as acceptable moves in the activity of playing chess, but they also dictate what is to count as a 'piece' within the game, the nature of the 'field' on which these pieces are to be moved, how the pieces are originally to be placed on that field of play, which 'side' is to move first, the goal of the game, etc. In a word, the complete context, structure, and all possible moves in the game are determined by the rules of chess.

These rules, unlike institutional rules, are rigid. There is no laxity in their application, no judgements to be made concerning whether a rule could be broken and the game still appropriately continued—perhaps even in a

'better way' than if the rule had been set aside. The bishop *always* moves *diagonally*. Decisions and judgements are rather made concerning whether or not to move the bishop and when. There are, indeed, no exceptions to any of the rules. The pieces are either originally set on the board according to the rules, or they are not; the correct side either moves first; or it does not. Hence in chess no 'court of appeals' is needed to determine, given extra-rule considerations, whether a given move is legitimate or not. There are no referees, no umpires, no judges or juries in chess. 'The rules are the rules, and they speak for themselves' one might say.

But all games are certainly *not so completely* rule structured as chess. Consider baseball, for example. In fact, there are all sorts of varying games called 'baseball.' These range from one person pitching the ball for another to hit, through the back sand lot with varying numbers of players on each teams, to professional ball clubs. Unlike 'chess', 'baseball' indicates a broad family of games. So there is no single set of what may be viewed as *the* rules of baseball. For present interests, however, this discussion can be narrowed to professional baseball as played in the United States. In this context, the rule of domestic, professional baseball, like the rules of chess, create an activity. Strictly speaking, there is no playing of *this* game of baseball outside of the rules. So, as in chess, but unlike driving, there is no question of breaking the rules and still playing the game—much less a question of playing a better game in some particular instance than if the rules had been followed absolutely. 'In baseball, when a batter has three strikes, he is out' forms part of the context of the game activity. One simply cannot decide, or judge whether to follow the rules or not *if* the game is to be played.

Yet a telling difference between chess and professional baseball is that the playing of baseball requires someone to referee the game. Baseball requires not only rules providing the context in which game activity is created and carried out but also persons who will judge on plays, settle disputes, clarify ambiguities, etc. A central question becomes: 'Has a player in fact broken a specific rule or not, in such-and-such a play?' Unlike chess, the 'pieces' in baseball called 'players' have a life of their own as certain organisms capable of various kinds of physical behaviour. That physical behaviour is 'translated', in part through the rules of the game, into the human activity of playing baseball. Moving one's arm at a certain velocity and through a mathematically describable arc while holding a 'stick' may be an example of taking a swing at a baseball or conducting the Atlanta Symphony Orchestra. In and of itself that particular bit of behaviour is neither. It is merely behaviour. Such 'translation' or *seeing* behaviour *as* certain human activities requires judgement which does not appear to be totally accessible to rules.

There are, of course, electronic and photographic devices which may help clarify more precisely what behaviour may, or may not, have taken place at a certain moment. And while the results of such devices may enter into many final judgements of the arbiters of the game, and even in some cases, within

the rules, compel one sort of decision—even so these 'photo finish facts' are not the judgements of the umpire on which decisions are based. For the photo is, after all, of a bit of physical behaviour which itself needs to be seen as baseball activity. Consider an extreme, but possible, example. Within the context of a professional baseball game using electronic photo devices to scan and photograph the strike area at the batter's plate, the current batter has two strikes. The pitcher throws the next ball which, as verified by the electronic devices, passes through the centre of the strike zone. Just as the ball is in the strike zone the batter suffers a violent seizure followed by coronary arrest. The electronic photo device produces a picture showing precisely the same physical behaviour as would be shown under more *normal circumstances* if a player were to strike. Considering this example, one asks: 'Within the confines of the activity of playing baseball, has this player now struck out?' Given the outlined circumstances, no umpire would say 'yes' even though the overt physical behaviour, as photographed, *in other circumstances* may well have produced a judgement of 'out'.

Once more the concept of *relevance* becomes centrally important. While the rules of baseball help set the context of game activity, in particular circumstances, they do not set all of the content of that activity. For, after all, unlike in chess, the chief pieces played in baseball are also the chief players, and these human players are capable of all sorts of physical behaviour, some relevant to the game play, some irrelevant, and some quite ambiguous. Thus, some human(s) has to judge which behaviour is relevant and acceptable as game playing activity, which is not, and in cases of ambiguous behaviour make still further judgements. Once again, there cannot be 'rules of applicability' of the game rules. For one thing, human behaviour is so variable and the circumstances in which it can take place so numerous that seemingly no set of rules could determine which behaviour in which circumstances is acceptable as game activity and which is not. At least, from the practical viewpoint, there would always be unlimited exceptions about which decisions would have to be made. And, as previously discussed, one cannot have a list indefinitely long of exceptions. From another viewpoint, such 'rules of application' would themselves need application. Would *they* require 'meta-rules of application' which would themselves need to be applied? And so on and on? No, there simply must come a point where we act, but not by applying further rules. The 'spade turns' on the rock of activity.[11] Game rules *are* applied but within a game gestalt of which the rules of the game are only a part.

If one, therefore, is to clarify the concept *rule*, while also attempting to maintain a totally rule-oriented view of knowledge, it appears that game rules like those of baseball will not do. Perhaps chess is, after all, a better example to use in clarifying the totally rule-oriented view. At least, unlike baseball, chess requires neither physical skills nor referees in the ways baseball does. In chess the players are not the pieces used in the game activity

as they are in baseball. Hence the question, for example, of applying the rules of the game to ambiguous behaviour of the pieces does not arise. Chess pieces never display exceptional, unexpected, behaviour which could be relevant to the activity of playing the game. And this is, of course, a 'logical' remark. Even when human beings are used as chess pieces, none of their behaviour 'counts' except those movements, determined totally by the rules of the game, from square to square and off the board.

Nonetheless a question of the application of the rules of chess arises in other ways. While in chess, there is no board state that does not have a 'best' move to game, yet because of the astronomical number of possible permutations of branching moves the players cannot with certainty realize what in fact, those sequential 'best moves' are. From the viewpoint of the beginner, or moderately advanced player, the problem may be cast in this manner, 'Given the rules and goal of this game what move can I now make to guarantee the most favourable result for me?'—or, in short, 'What ought I to move next?' The very way in which the question is put by the beginner or moderate player, coupled with other considerations such as there being only a limited number of pieces to move on a limited number of squares according to a limited number of rules, *suggests* that one only has to go through all of the possibilities permitted by the rules, eliminating first those prohibited by the board state in *this* case and then selecting from the remaining possible moves the one most likely to lead to a favourable board. The results of *this* selection of a particular move, of course, creates a new board situation such that in turn the player could ask, 'What now?' and begin the 'process of analysis' over again and again until the game ends.

We have been considering the beginner or at best moderately capable chess player. The master chess player, however, does not appear to approach the game from the stance of eliminating initial possibilities by means of some strategy or heuristic rules, and then trying out one-by-one the remaining possible moves permitted by the rules. Rather, the accomplished player attends to the total environment of the game, i.e. to the game gestalt, which is built up like an organic whole out of innumerable experiences—past and present—of the player. To quote a chess master:

> Because of the large number of prior associations which an experienced player has acquired, he does not visualize a chess position as a conglomeration of scattered squares and wooden pieces, but as an organized pattern (like the 'Gestalt,' or integrated configuration, emphasized by Gestalt psychologists.)[12]

Indeed, Hearst here only refers to 'the large number of prior associations [with other games and players] which an experienced player has acquired.' Yet, one might wonder how many master chess players also play a musical instrument, compose music, read poetry, write poetry, paint and/or draw,

and the like. And if any do, what relation, if any, does this have on their gestalt in playing chess, e.g. on this sense of order, symmetry, balance? And these sorts of considerations still do not include other factors such as room temperature, noise level, lighting conditions, etc. Or, perhaps last week the player attended his mother's funeral, or final divorce papers were signed, or he recently won an important match, or.... The considerations become countless, yet all become ingredients in the gestalt of the individual player as he now sits in competition before the board. It is within this integrated *human context* that the master player *sees* appropriate plays, in opposition to calculating plays, at various overlapping developments of the game.

Such a context, the game gestalt, is not amenable to formulation by some set of rules or another. Yet, so it appears, for any game play much beyond that of a good novice, it is exactly out of this context that various possible plays are seen and made. If this is the case, then once more the upholder of the totally rule-oriented view of knowledge is caught in a queer position. On the one hand, chess is often used by supporters of the totally rule-oriented view of knowledge as one of the very paradigms of rationality, of doing something knowledgeably.[13] The master chess player does not guess, does not more or less hopefully move his pieces. The master chess player *knows* what he is about. Yet the situation in fact appears to be the following. While the master chess player, indeed, *does* know what he is about, *does* make rational judgements in developing his game, nonetheless much of this has nothing to do with any apparent appeal to any rules at all. So it now seems that the upholder of the totally rule-oriented assumption of knowledge must either give up the claim that the master chess player in fact *knows* what he is doing, or abandon the totally rule-oriented assumption.

Often proponents of the totally rule-oriented view of knowledge attempt to slip through the horns in this way.

> The master chess player *must* be following some sort of heuristic rules[14] for successful application of the game rules. He is not, however, aware that he is doing this. He has played the game for so long and in so many different circumstances that he has internalized his heuristic rules. These rules have become an active part of his subconscious, and as such the master player follows these rules even more faithfully than if he had to attempt to verbalize them—or could verbalize them—when they are followed. In fact, these rules are now such a part of him, so much a 'second nature' to him that he cannot verbalize them all.

Now, when pressed as to why all of this *must* be so, it is because, after all, the master chess player wins; that is to say, he very often makes correct moves in the sense that his moves *both* follow the games rules *and* lead to winning the game. But he could not make such moves unless he knew how to play the game. Yet, knowing entails following rules. However, in this case the master chess player is not consciously aware of following any rules leading to successful moves. Therefore, these rules of appropriate play are a part of his unconscious.

Of course, the above is an example of circular reasoning.[15] The totally rule-oriented view of knowledge is assumed. To give credence to this view, such examples as chess and game activities of the master chess player are cited as paradigm examples of completely rule-oriented knowledge. But, when pointed out that the master chess player does much of his play by not appealing to any rules, it is then suggested that he must be making use of some rules or another *because* the totally rule-oriented position demands it. Therefore, it becomes evident that the *only* reason it is claimed that the master chess player *must* be following some set of unconscious heuristic rules is because of the assumption itself. Yet, it is just this assumption which is to be substantiated, at least in part, by appealing to chess, the master chess player, and the like.

There are other games which could be discussed in order better to understand what may be meant by someone holding to the totally rule-oriented view of knowledge. For instance, games in which chance becomes prominent as part of the structure of the game itself have not been mentioned. Poker serves as an example.[16] While in chess every board state, given the rules of the game, has a 'best move' to the next positioning of the board in view of winning, this is not so in poker where cards held may be considered analogous to a board state in chess. Here, to proceed, one must bet before the next deal, and bet, in part, on some factors which in principle are not determinable until after the deal.[17] Further, that deal is made from a deck of randomly shuffled cards. A bet is made on what is held in the hands of the opponents *as well as* on what will probably be dealt in the next and subsequent deals. Yet, there are other important considerations in an actual poker game beside knowing the rules and being able to calculate probabilities. For example, there are both the 'poker face' and the 'bluff'. A relatively mediocre hand of two low pairs may be held. But, given the pressure of high stakes, knowing (and this *is* a legitimate use of 'knowing') the 'mental set' of the opponents, having played a great deal of poker with all sorts of people in all sorts of circumstances—given such factors and many more, the bet may be raised and the opponents fold. The good poker player judges when such an action is appropriate, but not by appealing to any set of rules.

There are various sorts of games which could be discussed other than chess, baseball, and poker in order better to understand what one *may* mean when holding to the totally rule-oriented view of knowledge. Nonetheless, in every case where a game does have a set of game rules to follow, one always, sooner or later, encounters questions of application of those rules to particular situations occurring when actually playing the game. Attempting to concoct 'rules of application' for the rules of the game only delay these

questions. These are questions of judgements as to what the game situation now is, questions of what is relevant in deciding the next play, questions of appropriateness of a play in a concrete situation, and so on. Yet, none of these sorts of considerations in game play is amendable to any sort of complete rule formulation. Such activities are not irrational; neither are they totally rule-oriented. Activities are performed, games played out, in an over-arching context, a game gestalt, of which the game rules and strategies are only a part, themselves in need of appropriate application in particular cases.[18] There comes a point when one simply—perhaps not too 'simply' —*knows* how to go on, and does. For, in all cases, rules come to an end in activities. Activities do not come to an end in rules.

Another type of rule an upholder of the totally rule-oriented view of knowledge may be considering is that sort displayed by logic and higher mathematics. Certainly, this appears to be the proclivity of Leibniz. If one considers a particular formulation of, say, the Truth-Functional Calculus and views it from a purely syntactical posture, then the rules become like those of chess and constructing a proof becomes like playing a game—only here a game of solitaire. All moves, all positions, everything which might happen in the game is decidable by appealing to the rules. Nothing is left 'open'; everything is 'closed' by the rules. In such a situation the same problems, already discussed, of the application of the rules at various particular moves in a proof arise. Certain strategies—heuristic rules—can be, and are, developed. But these are limited in their overall success. Even so, *their* application depends on literally *seeing* certain situations *as* this or that, depending the varying contexts in which even the 'same stituation' may be seen. For example, one strategy rule may be: 'When one has a tilde on the outside of punctuation marks, remove.' Here, 'remove it' means roughly: 'Look among the game rules using tildes. Of those that 'fit' this situation, employ the ones causing the tilde in question to 'drop out'.' Of course, heuristic rules are not claimed to yield hundred per cent accuracy. There are cases where a tilde on the outside of punctuation marks is exactly what is needed. Having separate lines '$A \supset (\sim B . \sim C)$' and '$\sim (\sim B . \sim C)$', while wanting '$\sim A$' then '$\sim$'$(\sim B . \sim C)$' is left in that form—assuming the game uses the rule 'Modus Ponens'. But, then, this is grasped by bringing together many factors. Suppose, however, it would be helpful 'to get rid of' the tilde on the outside of the punctuation marks in '$\sim (\sim B . \sim C)$'. Very well, does one wish to assert as a new line '$B \vee C$' or '$\sim B \supset C$'? Or, is '$\sim C \subset B$' more useful? Such questions as these are finally answered not by appealing to rules only, but rather by seeing what needs to be done in terms of all sorts of various and varying patterns, contexts, goals, etc. in particular contexts of game play leading to still further possible contexts. As in chess, no set of rules will finally solve these problems.

But, there are also dissimilarities with chess. In some respects, some of the rules of logic, e.g. the rules of the Truth-Functional Calculus, are like institutional rules. As already noted, the game of chess is something wholly created by the rules of the game. Without the rules there would be no game, no play. Within the rules everything doable is done; everything decidable is decided. On the other hand, as previously discussed, institutional rules do not serve to create activities, but rather to regulate already existing activities. Automobiles were driven long before stop lights were in use as rule-reminding devices. But as more automobiles were driven congestion and accidents also increased. Thus circumstances demanded rules regulating the activity of driving. In a similar but not identical manner, while no formal proofs can be constructed outside of the rules permitting such constructions, certain other human activities—for good or ill—are performed; activities which can be, and sometimes are, regulated by formalized rules of logic. For human beings do argue, debate, reason, reckon without knowing and appealing to formalized rules of logic. Possession of such rules and their use can, therefore, be seen as regulating ongoing human activities in a way the rules of chess do not regulate any sort of behaviour outside of the game itself.

Furthermore, while the rules of chess are invarient, this is not the case, say, with the rules of the Truth-Functional Calculus. There is an indefinite number of ways in which this 'game' may be set up. What appears as rules in one formation will appear as provable theorems in another. What is taken as a primitive rule of transformation in one system may be established as a derived rule of transformation in another system. What counts as primitive signs in one systemization of the Truth-Functional Calculus are now viewed as signs defined in terms of primitives. In a very real sense, and, unlike the rules of chess, one cannot meaningfully speak of *the* rules of logic. There is an infinite variety of sets of rules by which a Truth-Functional Calculus may be formulated. Such various formulations are said to be 'identical' in the sense that any tautology is either provable in a system as a theorem or appears as an axiom of a system. Thus, '"$\sim (p \vee p) \vee p$" is an axiom' may hold for System α but not of System , β while '"$\sim (p \vee p) \vee p$" is a theorem' would then hold for System β but not of System α. Yet, in that '$\sim (p \vee p) \vee p$' is an axiom in one system and a theorem in the other would make these two systems very different, indeed; different in proof construction, in application, in psychological complexity of applying the rules of the system in a particular proof, etc.

While the Truth-Functional Calculus has been cited as an example, similar comments may be made about all areas of logic and mathematics. It is extremely misleading to speak of *the* rules of logic and *the* rules of various areas of mathematics. What is a 'knowledge claim' in one system 'based on' a set of 'rules', may appear as a 'rule' in another system. In such circumstances, the claims being made by a totally rule-oriented view of knowledge are even less clear, for it becomes a matter of indifference, as far as various systems are concerned, as to what is to count as a 'rule' and a 'claim' dependent upon those rules. Even so judgements are made, based

on all sorts of differing factors, as why to use *this particular* formulation of the Truth-Functional Calculus instead of some other; why *this particular* formulation of artithmetic instead of some other, etc. What sorts of justifications can be given for such choices? Many factors can be, and should be, considered here but *not* appeals to any further rules.

In concluding these remarks concerning logico-mathematical rules as a possible clarification of the concept of *rule* in a totally rule-oriented view of knowledge, one more well-established observation is in order. Any axiomatic system sufficient to generate formulae of arithematic is either complete but inconsistent, or consistent but incomplete. If the axioms of such a system are consistent, there is always some well-formed formula, 'F', which is not provable within that system, i.e. 'F' is undecidable within that system. Let 'F' be introduced as a further axiom of the system, and there shall be another well-formed formula; 'F', which is not provable, i.e. which is undecidable. If, on the other hand, it *is* logically possible to prove every well-formed formula of some axiomatic system powerful enough to generate the formulae of arithmetic, then the axioms of that system are inconsistent. That is to say, it will be possible to prove not only one formula, 'F', in that system, but also '$\sim$F'. Certainly, there has been a great deal of debate concerning just what is or is not entailed by the findings of Gödel. It is enough for the purposes of this paper to remember the observations of Ernest Nagel and James Newman:

> Gödel's proof should not be construed as an invitation to despair or as an excuse for mystery-mongering. The discovery that there are arithematical truths which cannot be demonstrated formally does not mean that here are truths which are forever incapable of becoming known, or that a 'mystic' intuition (radically different in kind and authority from what is generally operative in intellectual advances) must replace cogent proof. It does not mean as a recent writer claims, that there are 'ineluctable limits of human reason'. It does mean that the resources of the *human intellect have not been, and cannot be, fully formalized,* and that new principles of demonstration forever await invention and discovery.[19]

Gödel's work does, therefore, show either that given any system of axioms (rules) sufficient to generate everyday statements in arithmetic such a '1+1=2' then there will forever be appropriately formulated claims in that system which are true but not shown to be true on the basis of the axioms (rules), or that there is an essential contradiction in the system itself. So, if any language is rich enough to permit counting, adding, subtracting, and the like, then that language will permit the formulation of true knowledge, claims, the truth of which is not totally rule-oriented in the sense of being fully formalized in terms of the logico-mathematical rules of the system. Only to a point and that point is variable depending on the 'system'

in which one is operating is the Leibnizian dream of 'beautiful results' actualizable. Finding, establishing, justifying what is true is *not* in all cases a matter of calculation according to a set of rules whether these rules be institutional, game, or logico-mathematical in nature. But old prejudices die hard.

And sometimes dying prejudices are given new life. In connection with the totally rule-oriented view of knowledge, a new infusion occurred with the invention of the electronic digital computer, coupled with the development of computer science and technology. The fact that today there are successfully used electronic digital computers gives even greater apparent credence to the totally rule-oriented assumption. Within this computer context, 'rule' takes on new uses. The computer, from one general viewpoint, is nothing more than a concrete instantiation of a formal (i.e. 'rule bound') system used to process 'information' encoded in symbolic terms.[20] Yet, more in particular, when speaking of computers, there is, as suggested by Mortimer Taube, a 'specialized synonymy between "formal" and "mechanical" [which] is not found in the dictionary or common usage...'[21] As far as the computer is concerned, what can be formalized—expressed in terms of a rule—is limited by the physical construction of the machine itself. In fact, 'rules', used in the context of contemporary computing machinery, may be viewed as symbolic representations—maps—of various electromagnetic, or 'mechanical' states of the machine.

First, the notion of *rule,* in the context of computer programming, is not being understood in the same manner as when speaking of 'game rules' or 'institutional rules' or 'logico-mathematical rules'. Rather, one would do better to use 'instructions' instead of 'rules' in speaking of computer programmes. Burrell clarifies this distinction.[22] He argues that instructions are specific-oriented, whereas rules relate to ongoing activities. Instructions lead to the achievement of a goal or product. Rules aid in fulfilling a purpose. Instructions are given to be *followed* step-by-step in order to achieve a particular goal. Rules are *applied* in concrete situations. So, to know x is to be able to formulate a series of instructions which, if followed, will 'yield' x, or 'yield' a situation in which the probability of x is very high. Here, 'followed' is devoid of any anthropomorphic tones. No decision, judgement, understanding is involved—only mechanical (or electro-magnetic) states of the computer.

Thus, for Marin in particular and the computer enthusiast in general, the 'knowledge is totally rule-oriented' view is refashioned into 'knowledge is totally instruction-oriented', We remember Marin writing:

> Knowledge is the *specification of form.* Information is the *change in the specification of form.* A problem is an *incompleteness in the specification of form.* Solving a problem is the *completing of the specification* of the incomplete form. A solution makes explicit, relative to the interpreter and

the context of a form, that which was previously only implicit. A solution completes the specification of form to produce knowledge.[23]

Here, 'specification of form' refers to various mathematical or quasi-mathematical formulae and various definitions which can be incoded to a computer programme, i.e. set of instructions, and such that the empirical variables of these formulae can be 'satisfied' with particular 'empirical constants'. According to the programme, the computer then proceeds through certain electro-magnetic states. Such 'change in the specification of form', i.e. the preceding through various electro-magnetic states, is called 'information'. A problem is represented by a programme not yet run, while solving a problem is running the programme on the computer.[24] The solution to the problem is already 'contained' in the programme, i.e. set of instructions. Only the programme and the computer on which it is run are relevant to the conclusion. No novel factors, no questions of insight, no judgements, etc. are pertinent to arriving at or 'understanding' the 'solution'. The 'solution' is simply the last stage in a series of electro-mechanical states which can be expressed in a notation and 'interpreted' by either a human being or another machine. And so knowledge is now viewed as *completely mechanized* with questions of relevance reducing to questions of 'completing' various sets of instructions by incoding various data at specified locations marked off in the notation by variables.[25] The question of application apparently amounts to nothing more than whether, yes or no, specific data can be input into the variables in certain sets of instructions, i.e. programme, and whether the 'solution' can be then decoded to match a given domain of interest.[26] There is, however, something linguistically odd in asserting: 'Knowledge is totally instruction-oriented.' The oddity is in the conjoining of *having knowledge* with *following instructions*. And it is precisely this attempted linkage which is at the heart of Artificial Intelligence. *Having knowledge* and *following instructions* are not only logically distinct properties (or states) but are also logically incompatible ones.

Here the concept of *logically distinct* must be briefly explored. Consider these examples:

(1) (*a*) being spherical
(*b*) not being spherical

(2) (*a*) being spherical
(*b*) being green

(3) (*a*) being a building
(*b*) being a college

Given anything at all, it cannot both be and not be spherical. The syntactical rules governing the uses of 'not' preclude such a possibility in our language. But such properties as *being* spherical and *not being spherical* are not only logically distinct, they are also logically incompatible because of the grammar of our language. In that *being spherical* and *being green* need not, indeed, usually are not, predicated of the same object; they too are logically distinct. However, there are not logical reasons why some object, say, a beach ball, could not be both spherical and green. That is to say, the semantical rules governing 'spherical' and 'green' are such that they may or may not be both predicated of the same thing. This being so, whether a given object is both spherical and green is a matter which is established, or not, empirically. Properties such as these may be called *topic neutral*. And what is to be said concerning *being a building* and *being a college*? Certainly, they are logically distinct. Many things are buildings which are not colleges. But are these properties logically incompatible or topic neutral. When speaking strictly, one cannot assert of the same thing that it is both a building and a college—even though buildings may house colleges. But the reasons for this do not rest with any syntactical rules of our language, but rather with what may broadly be seen as semantical considerations. Consider the following:

(1) Only those things locatable in space and time, constructed from such materials as brings, mortar, wood, etc. are properly called 'buildings'.
(2) Only organizations or institutions which have students, faculty, administrators, etc. and are engaged in the assimilation, discovery, and transmition of knowledge are correctly called 'colleges'.
(3) No organization or institution is constructed of bricks, mortar, wood, nails, etc. Nor is any organization or institution located in space, although organization and institutions do exist through time.
(4) No building, on the other hand, is constructed for students, faculty, and administrators.
(5) Hence nothing which is properly called a building is also—can also be—called a college.

It is in this way that having *knowlege* and *following instructions* are not only logically distinct but are also logically incompatible. The grammar of our language does not permit these properties to be predicated of one state or process in any strictly literal manner. Metaphors are, of course, often used and to no great harm in most cases. One can loosely speak of a certain building as 'the college of business administration'. One can loosely assert that having knowledge involves following a set of instructions. But such metaphors are not to be taken literally.

Even if such logically difficulties were not present, one may still raise further issues. For example, there apparently is no question of application of a given instruction, or a set of instructions, (i.e. computer programme) to a specific task to be performed. For example, the trajectory of a certain missile is to be calculated. Various mathematical formulae are written in machine operable code along with instructions of steps to be taken in calcu-

lating with the use of these formulae. Into this programme is put specific empirical parameters concerning this missile, e.g. range, destination, speed, weight, initial thrust, etc. Given the mathematical formulae, instructions for sequence of steps to be taken, and the relevant empirical data, the computer calculates a trajectory for the missile. Precisely, whenever this sort of problem is to be solved, this programme, with whatever data are relevant, is used. The only question of application seems to be whether or not a trajectory is wanted. The only question of relevance apparently is to satisfy, with specific data concerning the missile in question, the empirical variables demanded by the mathematical formulae. In this way, applicability and relevance apparently become minimal. Questions such as 'Given the rules of chess, should the queen be moved in such-and-such a way at this particular state of game development?' seem to have vanished.

Yet, we must also realize that even in computer application 'to mundane numerical problems'[27] the whole story of 'knowing' cannot be told entirely in terms of instructions to be followed, in terms of electro-magnetic states to be realized. We may do well to remember Plato's *Phaedrus*. In discussing rhetoric and rhetoricians, the following interchange takes place between Socrates and Phaedrus:

SOC.: Leave the unimportant and let us bring the really important question into the light of day, which is: *what power has art of rhetoric, and when*?

PHAEDR.: A very great power in public meetings.

SOC.: It has. But I should like to know whether you have the same feeling as I have about the rhetoricians? To me there seem to be a great many holes in their web.

PHAEDR.: Give an example.

SOC.: I will. Suppose a person to come to your friend Eryximachus, or to his father Acumenus, and to say to him: 'I know how to apply drugs which shall have either a heating or a cooling effect, and I can give a vomit and also a purge, and all that sort of thing; and knowing all this, as I do, I claim to be a physician and to make physicians by imparting this knowledge to others', what do you suppose that they would say?

PHAEDR.: They would be sure to ask him whether he knew 'to whom' he would give his medicines, and 'when', and 'how much'.

SOC.: And suppose that he were to reply: 'No; I know nothing of all that; I expect the patient who consults me to be able to do these things for himself?'

PHAEDR.: They would say in reply that he is a madman or a pedant who fancies that he is a physician because he has read something in a book, or has stumbled on a prescription or two, although he has no real understanding of the art of medicine.[28]

Only a fool would call someone a physician who possessed only some instructions which bring about certain effects. To have knowledge involves much more than this. Minimally, it also requires the ability to apply appropriately—or not to use at all—the instructions. 'Why? When? Where?' are not answered by appealing to still further instructions.

'Why do we want to determine a trajectory for this particular missile?' (To obliterate enemy ground to air missiles) 'Why are not certain computer-suggested trajectories satisfactory?' (Because they take our missiles over allied territory in a dangerous way.) 'When should we ignore the computer print-out?' (If we have a hunch that our data is wrong, that the computer is malfunctioning, that the enemy is going to do the unexpected, etc.) Such questions (and possible responses) begin to unfold a *human* backdrop or context, necessary to performing the job of creating a specific computer programme for some purpose(s) or other and knowing in some useful sense, the eventual computer print-out of some trajectory of another. While computers may very well be used to manipulate facts according to various sets of programme, the machine does not, nor could it as 'computer' is now understood, set the context of goals and human values in which those facts having meaning for us as human users. Even in the instances of 'mundane numerical problems' there are, indeed, problems of application and relevance. Such problems are resolvable by appealing not to computer instructions, but to a *human* context, or gestalt, of desires, interest, values, etc. Thus, once more it would appear that the dreams of Leibniz and Marin cited at the beginning of this paper are forever that—dreams.

This essay began by characterizing a certain view of *knowledge* that is prevalent in much of contemporary thought. One ingredient of this view is the claim that all knowledge is totally rule-oriented—a claim which is as ambigous as it is widely accepted. Early on in this paper it was suggested that before this claim could be reasonably discussed and possibly accepted, the concept *rule* needed to be examined. Having wrestled with several paradigm uses of 'rule', it appears that none of them surfice for the quite general claim that all knowledge is totally rule-oriented. Now, of course, by fiat one could say, 'By "rule" I mean x,'—for example, 'instruction'—and then stipulate a definition of 'knowledge' and related terms such as 'understand' in terms of x. And many writers in such computer-oriented fields as Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Simulation, and Information Science appear to have relied heavily on constructing stipulative definitions of 'intelligence', 'cognition', 'language', 'games', 'rules', etc. rather than use them as more commonly—albeit in many cases vaguely—understood. Marin is no exception. Often he gives covert stipulative definitions instead of empirical observations or results, confusing the one with the other, while making claims of catholic applicability. Here is the verbal trickster pulling rabbits out of his fiat hat—and stuffed rabbits at that. Certainly, uses of various words may change over times for any number of reasons, new scientific discoveries and

technological applications being some of these. At some future time, it may be appropriate to speak of computers composing symphonies, writing poetry, proving theorems, playing chess, producing philosophical languages, etc. But if such linguistic uses come to pass, this will not only represent experimental breakthroughs in computer technology but also important shifts in the uses of 'computer', 'knowledge', etc. However, as computers are currently developed and used and as terms such as 'knowing' and 'understanding' are currently used outside of specialized areas such as Artificial Intelligence, contemporary computers—hardware and software—give no reasonable support to the completely rule-oriented view of knowledge.

There is a long and equally venerable tradition which maintains a person's knowing something, understanding something, believing something, etc. are all activities of some sort or another occurring in that most private of chambers, the mind. Early behaviourists and others denied this Cartesian view and asserted that knowing, believing, etc. are all quite publically observable events. Yet, common to both of these general positions is the view that, excluding direct intuition or perception, knowledge is a matter of manipulating 'atomic bits' by means of some rules or another. What counts as an 'atomic bit' is different for different writers, as is the case for 'rules'. In this paper only various uses of 'rule' have been persuaded. Nonetheless, in both approaches it is the *individual* being stressed. The *individual* is the one knowing, the one understanding. Thus, concepts such as *knowing* and *understanding* become essentially tied to either the notion of *individual person* or *individual body*.

It is the case that the above comments start with a very specialized concept, namely, that of *individual*. Various widely held epistemological principles and theories reflect this approach. We take as given that the *individual* knowing, understanding, believing, etc. We then ask such questions as: *How* does the individual know, understand, etc. and *what* is now understood, etc. by the individual?' And solipsism always appears close at hand in our questions and answers. However, even as little as this may be recognized, the very concept of *individual*, here being used as *individual person*, is a completely social concept. The notion of *person* is delimited by examining the various sorts of overlapping contexts in which it naturally functions. As a person I have both legal rights and obligations, as a person I enter as a participant into a religious community, as a person I am married, as a person I have and help to create a family life, as a person I know, understand, believe, etc. On the other hand, as a body I am 6′1″, as a body I weigh 180 lbs, as a body I have a nervous system, as a body I can move—though not be said to act—within the area of certain biochemical and physical boundaries. Indeed, as a person I am essentially social or 'public', whereas as a body I am 'private'. The beginning point, the 'start' for epistemology is, therefore, better seen as being social rather than individualistic. Or at least this much is minimally the case: the social view is an alternative to the individualistic one.

If the social view is adopted, then from that stance several essential confusions are found in the individualistic approach so prevalent in Western thought. For example, *individual person* and *individual body* are prone to be assimulated into one another. Then concepts which are properly ascribed to one are illicitly predicated of the other. It is persons who know, understand, believe—and in all sorts of ways, in all manner of circumstances. *Knowing, understanding, believing,* are simply logically incompatible with *being a body* in the same way that *being a building* and *being a college* are logically incompatible. Now, a computer, as the term 'computer' is currently used, is not a person but rather a body.[29] Computers are not said to have legal rights and obligations, computers are not said to marry, computers are not said to be participants in religious communities, etc.[30] Computers are said to be big or small, fast or slow, heavy or not so heavy, etc. Now, if it can be reasonably argued that *persons* and *bodies* are logically distinct, that concepts such as *knowing, understanding, believing,* etc. are correctly ascribable to *persons*, and that *computers* are *bodies* of some sort or another, then it really makes no sense at all to speak of computers knowing, understanding, believing, *etc.* So promises of Artificial Intelligence are examples of important instances of a general stance gone amuck. For if the individualistic stance had not been taken, it is unlikely anyone would have attempted to model human cognitive functions by means of a computer. None of these comments are to deny the usefulness of computers in many particular human activities. However, an instrument used in an activity should not be confused with that activity or even said to be a model of that activity. To type a manuscript is not a model of writing an article, for instance.

Continuing to assume the social stance as the beginning point for epistemological queries, we can now return to the completely general view that all knowledge is totally rule-oriented. In attempting the task of clarifying this view, we examined, in broad strokes, three different types of rules. In each case we ran into various difficulties. One common to all, however, is the problem of application of rules to specific cases. This problem in turn raised further ones of similarity, appropriateness, relevance, and the like. And our discussions appeared to become hopelessly bogged down. As my closing suggestion, I observe that this Gordion Knot cannot be unraveled, but it can be cut. The social stance regarding epistemological issues supplies at least fruitful suggestions of developing positions addressing themselves to questions of similarity, appropriateness, relevance, etc. Beginnings are made in both the later Wittgenstein's 'forms of life' and Polanyi's 'tacit knowledge'. Rules and systems of rules are to be related to these philosophical insights. But this is far beyond the scope of this present paper. However, I do wish to add one suggestion and for now a suggestion only, intended to augment both the Wittgensteinian and Polanyian position. My suggestion is this. The primary feature of a human form of life is that of intrinsic value. Rules are applied in various situations to, loosely speaking, get things done. But why do we want to do this whatever? Because we, as humans, perceive it to be important, to

be valuable. Problems are set, rules applied, solutions found in a multitude of different ways, but always within a normative framework. As humans we set various goals and determine what is to count as satisfactory solutions to problems thwarting our achieving these goals. Now this human activity requires much more than a consideration of pragmatic ends. For pragmatic ends are usually associated more closely with the body as contrasted with the person. Solving our *human* problems is also a matter involving the discovery and articulation of intrinsic values which are more closely aligned with being a person. And this discovery and articulation is not wholly accomplished by following rules and sets of rules. For it is such values which make applicable the rules.

Notes

1. Philip P. Wiener, *Leibniz Selections* (New York: The Modern Student's Library, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), p. 15.
2. Irwin C. Marin, 'Generative Epistemology of Problem Solving' in *Encyclopedia of Computer Science and Technology* (New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1978), Vol. 9, p. 1.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 4
4. *Ibid.*, p. 7
5. *Ibid.*, p. 23-24
6. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, G.E.M. Anscombe (tr.) (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1953), §§ 66-67.
7. D.B. Burrell, 'Obeying Rules and Following Instructions' in Frederick J. Crossen and Kenneth M. Sayre (ed), *Philosophy and Cybernetics* (New York: A Clarion Book, Simon and Schuster, 1967), pp. 203-32.
8. In this paper, for instance, I do not mention, much less discuss 'rules' (laws) of science. However, I contend that many of my general observations concerning the application of rules are also applicable here.
9. I am reminded of Wittgenstein's dictum: 'What is happening now has significance—in these surroundings. The surroundings give it its importance.' p.i., § 583. Certainly, other philosophers, e.g. Plato in the *Phaedrus* and Aristotle in the *Topics*, have also grappled with these and similar problems.
10. It is precisely this sort of distortion which occurs in much of the literature dealing with Artificial Intelligence.
11. Wittgenstein, p. i, § 217.
12. Herbert L. Dreyfus, *What Computers Can't Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1972), p. 17.
13. One's interests, often times reflected in one's profession, will dictate which type of rule is taken as primary, as legitimate, as really, a rule. Mathematicians, logicians, computer scientists and technologists, and many philosophers will have logico-mathematical rules as their paradigms citing games such as chess as instantations of these types of rules. Judges, lawyers, politicians, policemen will cite institutional rules. Coaches, Olympic officials, umpires, and referees will think in terms of various game rules. Such colouring is deep-seated in our thinking, resulting in a narrowness difficult to overcome.
14. Note Marvin Minsky's characterization of 'heuristic':

    > The adjective 'heuristic', as used here and widely in the literature, means related to improving a problem-solving performance; as a noun it is also used in regard to any method or trick used to improve the efficiency of a problem-solving system. A 'heuristic program', to be considered successful, must work well on a variety of problems, and may often be excused if it fails on some. We often find it worthwhile to introduce a heuristic method which happens to cause occasional failures, if there is an overall improvement in performance.

    Cited in 'Step Toward Artificial Intelligence' in Edward A. Weizenbaum and Julian Feldman (ed.), *Computers and Thought* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), pp. 407-08n.
15. Mortimer Taube in his relatively early attack on the claims of workers in Artificial Intelligence, *Computers and Common Sense* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961), points out many examples of such circular reasoning. Unfortunately, Taube's book was largely ignored by both those making spent claims for computer applications in Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Simulation, Language Translation, and the like as well as those governmental officials who expended *huge* sums of money on the basis of such claims. Theories of various sorts often demand, a priori, certain positions to be held. For example, Noam Chomsky will speak of unconscious propositional knowledge. Jerrold Katz speaks of the nervous system as being a rule system. Bernard Harrison confuses rules with instructions and then endows all speakers with them. Even if one were able to make sense out of such claims, there is still no clear empirical support for them, no reason to adopt them except that they seem demanded by a theory one wishes to preserve.
16. And, of course, there are many card games called 'poker'
17. Cheating is here excluded as legitimate moves *within* the game.
18. Cf. *P.I.*, Wittgenstein, § 293.
19. Nagel, Ernest, and R. James Newman, *Gödel's Proof* (New York: New York University Press, 1958), p. 101.
20. The reader may wish to refer especially to Chapters 2 and 3 in Joseph Weizenbaum's excellent book *Computer Power and Human Reason* (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1976).
21. Taube, *Computers and Common Sense*, p. 3.
22. Burrell, 'Obeying Rules and Following Instructions'.
23. Marin, 'Generative Epistemology of Problem Solving'.
24. Or so appears to be Marin's view. See above, especially note 6.
25. See Weizenbaum, *Computer Power and Human Reason*, Chapter 9.
26. 'The lay reader may be forgiven for being more than slightly incredulous that anyone should maintain that human thought is entirely computable. But his very incredulity may itself be a sign of how marvellously subtly and seductively modern science has come to influence man's imaginative construction of reality.' Weizenbaum, p. 13.
27. Weizenbaum, p. 228.
28. Plato, *Phaedrus* (268) in *The Dialogues of Plato*, B. Jawett (tr.) (New York: Random House, 1937), p. 271.
29. The term 'body' is itself highly ambiguous. For example, I can speak of organic bodies like my body, mechanical bodies such as your automobile, and electrical bodies such as computer. Further, what is meaningfully asserted of one of these 'bodies' is not necessarily meaningful when asserted of another. While catchy, it is not at all clear what Marvin Minsky could have literally meant when referring to the human as a 'meat machine'. All sorts of logical confusions at various levels are the price to be paid here for being 'catchy'.
30. In connection with some question raised in this paper concerning computers and values, one may find it profitable to read Ronni Lynne, Rosenberg's *Incomprehensible Computer Systems: Knowledge Without Wisdom* (Cambridge, Mass.: Laboratory for Computer Science, MIT, MIT/LCS/TR-227).

'Desire' in Yoga and Jung

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In recent years the Yoga psychology of the East has been given increasingly serious attention by modern Western psychology.[1] Carl Jung was among the first of the modern psychologists to be influenced by Yoga. In his encounter with Eastern thought, Jung paid particular attention to the *Yoga-Sūtras* of Patañjali.[2] Some of Jung's psychological concepts seem to parallel and probably borrow from Patañjali's Yoga. However, in other aspects of his thinking, jung firmly rejects Yoga—at least in its direct application to modern Western man. It was Jung's view that contact with the East was capable of causing a fundamental change in the modern Western world-view. But this must occur carefully. The West must not mindlessly run after the East after the fashion of beggars, being too ready 'to accept the alms of the East in bulk and to imitate its ways unthinkingly.'[3] If the West is to possess what has taken Indian thought thousands of years to build, this cannot be done quickly, easily or by theft. In Jung's opinion, the inoculation of Eastern wisdom must be allowed to work within the Western mind in such a way that the danger of shallow 'spiritual infection' from the East is avoided, and that the way forward to new spiritual growth on the old Western foundations is opened. Exposure to Eastern wisdom, therefore, is not so much the taking in of new knowledge, but, rather, the encounter with another way of understanding and living life which jars the Westerner loose from his own narrow-minded encapsulation. His awareness of consciousness is expanded, opening the door to experience of the unconscious. Clues are offered to the perceptive Western student as to what sort of things may be discovered within his own consciousness. But, then, he must experience these things for himself.

Jung's encounter with Patañjali's Yoga helped him to enlarge the awareness of his own unconscious, and provided him with clues as to how to better make present its contents. Elsewhere I have examined Jung's general encounter with Yoga,[4] and with Patañjali's notion of levels of *samādhi*.[5] In this paper, we turn our attention to the way in which 'desire' as dealt with by Patañjali strongly influenced Jung.

Citta, Psyche and Desire

Before the conceptions of 'desire' in Jung and Yoga can be compared, the psychological foundations within which desire occurs (*citta* for Yoga, psyche for Jung) must be understood.

Citta is the technical term used in Yoga to refer to consciousness including both the level of awareness and the level of the unconscious.[6] *Citta* has empi-

rical reality, and may be controlled or experimented with in the same fashion as any other material reality. But because the material composing *citta* is of a finer or more subtle nature than the quality of matter in the psysical environment, special scientific techniques suited to the nature of *citta* must be devised. These are the Yoga techniques systematized in the *Yoga-Sūtras* of Patañjali. In ordinary experience, *citta* is experienced as a series of particular mental states (*cittavṛtti*). A thought or *cittavṛtti* for Yoga is understood as a specific shapping of psychic matter or *citta* in the same way as an external object, such as a chair, is a specific shaping of physical matter. In the Yoga view, both are equally real. Jung shared this perception of the reality of psychic matter. As he puts it: 'It seems to me far more reasonable to accord the psyche the same validity as the empirical world, as to admit that the former has just as much 'reality' as the latter.'[7]

Writing his autobiography Jung refers to the turbulent years of confrontation with his unconscious as a period of scientific experiementation out of which his basic psychological insights arose.[8] Influence from the Yoga came in a most welcome form, namely, in providing independent confirmation of what, to that point, had been merely his own experience. The full reality of the psyche, as Jung technically called it, was confirmed by the Yoga conception of *citta* with its long history of psychological validity in Eastern thought. Like *citta* Jung defines psyche as the totality of all psychic processes, conscious as well as unconscious.[9] Although the way in which Jung subdivides the psyche does not completely parallel the various stages in the evolution of *citta*,[10] there is one concept, namely, libido or psychic energy, that is shared by both Jung and Yoga.

From the way he develops the concept, it seems clear that Jung's view of libido is definitely influenced by Yoga. The receiving of support from Yoga for his notion of libido was most important to Jung, for it was this concept that first caused the loss of his friendship with Freud. With the publication in 1912 of his book on the concept of libido, Jung reports that all his friends and acquaintances dropped away, and the book was declared to be 'rubbish'.[11] Jung's view differed from that of Freud in that for Jung libido 'is not the sexual instinct, but a kind of neutral energy, which is responsible for the formation of such symbols as light, fire, sun, and the like.'[12] Jung argues that this neutral energy can be canalized into many different expressions of desire, of which sexuality is an important one but not the only one. Another and perhaps equally strong expression of libido is found in the human experience of creativity.[13] The influences of the Yoga on Jung is very evident here in that, throughout his analysis of the different ways in which the neutral energy of libido has been canalized, Indian symbols dominate the text.[14] Jung's conclusion is 'that the concept of libido in psychology has functionally the same significance as the concept of energy in physics....'[15]

Jung found further support for his view of psyche and its neutral energy or libido in the classical Indian Sāṁkhya-Yoga conception of *citta*. In his

1939 lectures on 'The Process of Individuation', given at the Zurich Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, Jung spent considerable time analysing the Sāṁkhya-Yoga theory of *citta*.[16] Jung's idea of the expression of the psyche as arising or being canalized from a pool of neutral energy (libido) fits very well with the Sāṁkhya-Yoga conception of *citta* as evolving from the latent energy pool of *prakṛti* (non-intelligent matter, one side of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga metaphysical duality). *Prakṛti* is composed of three aspects or substantive qualities (*guṇas*), each of which can be found in an analysis of one's ordinary experience of consciousness: *sattva* which is brightness or intelligence; *rajas* which is energy or movement; and *tamas* which is dullness or inertia. Although each of these *guṇas* keeps its own separate identity, no individual *guṇa* ever exists independently. Rather, the three *guṇas* are always necessarily found together like three strands of a rope. However, the proportionate composition of *citta* or consciousness assigned to each of the *guṇas* is constantly changing.[17] Only the predominant *guṇa* will be easily recognized in a particular thought. The other two *guṇas* will be present but subordinate. Jung found confirmation and support for his concept of libido or psychic energy in the Yoga idea of *rajas*. *Rajas* is energy or movement of any kind. Passionate or lustful activity which leads one astray is *rajas*, as is the spiritual discipline of a saint or the highest thoughts of the greatest philosopher. Thus, in itself *rajas*, like Jung's libido, is neutral psychic energy. The value component is added by the way in which the energy is canalized by the constantly evolving psyche. Just as in Patañjali's Yoga nothing would function without *rajas* (the other two *guṇas* of *sattva* and *tamas* would simply remain static), so also in Jungian theory the dynamic functioning of the psyche, the tension between the piars of opposites and the process of individuation could not take place without the impetus of libido.[18]

Jung describes desire as 'a particular psychological state, a specific concentration of libido, which through overflowing innervations produces a general state of tension'.[19] In Yoga the *rajas* aspect of *citta* produces desires which are given technical analysis as the *kleśas*.

Jung's Understanding of Patañjali's Kleśas

In his ETH Lectures Jung describes *kleśas* as urges, the natural instincive forms in which libido first appears out of the unconscious; they represent psychological energy or libido in its simplest form of manifestation.[22] Although Patañjali confines *kleśas* to the 'afflicting' processes of ignorance (*avidyā*), egoism (*aṣmitā*), attachment to sensuous pleasure (*rāga*), aversion or dislike (*dveṣa*), and shrinking from death or clinging to life (*abhiniveśa*), Jung follows the lead of Tantric Yoga and includes desire for intellectual discrimination as yet another *kleśa*. This last Jung interprets as 'an urge to produce a personality, something that is centered, and divided from other things....It is what one would describe in Western philosophical terms as an

urge or instinct toward individuation.[21] In addition to the more negative *kleśas* of the *Yoga-Sūtras*, then, Jung highlights the very important *kleśa* or desire for individuation, without which one could never develop an individual personality. Individuality is given to each human, animal or plant by the very fact that *prakṛti* had to separate into these many manifestations. This is the root cause of the pairs of opposites. When a whole is divided into parts, such as male and female, says Jung, this causes the polarization which results in energy or libido tension between the opposites.[22] Even though everyone is physically separated out from a common pool in this way, psychological individuation only occurs when one becomes conscious of one's separate existence. As young children or primitive people we identify strongly with the whole in what Jung refers the *participation mystique*, but maturity and psychic integration is realized only when our balanced unity in the centre of the pairs of opposites is achieved. All of this Jung found well illustrated and supported in both the teachings and the practices of Yoga.

Although Jung mentions all of the *kleśas*, he does not seem to appreciate the subtleties suggested by a careful reading of the *Yoga-Sūtra* text. *Rāga*, for example, is the *kleśa* which seems to represent our everyday conception of 'desire'. In *Yoga-Sūtra* (11:7) *rāga* is defined as the sequential attraction to pleasure. Vyāsa's *bhāṣya* expands the intended meaning in terms of *tṛṣṇā* or 'the thirst for and the hankering after pleasure or the means thereof, preceded by a remembrance of the pleasure in one who has enjoyed it....'[23] In his *tīkā*, Vācaspati Miśra makes clear that the psychological process or mechanism implied is simply the *karma-saṁskāra-karma* series (i.e. the previous experience of pleasure has left behind a memory trace which creates in one the predisposition or desire for that same experience of pleasure once again).[24] Similarly, for Jung desire is created by the record of past human actions and is recorded in the collective and personal subconscious.[25] Yoga also includes *avidyā* or ignorance, *aṣmita* or egoism, *abhiniveśa* or love of life and *deveṣa* or aversion; they are all different forms of desire, and, taken together, cause *saṁsara* or rebirth.[26]

Tapas and Active Imagination as Techniques for Dealing with Desire

Tapas is described in the *Yoga-Sūtras* as that which burns up psychic impurities. It is the Yoga or psychological technique by which one, who is afflicted with a mind addicted to materialistic and sensuous goals for the purpose of satisfaction of the common desired (e.g. food, sex, ego-aggrandize ment, etc.), may purify himself of these psychic disturbances (*kleśas*).[27] Jung's understanding of this yogic process runs as follows:

> The Indian conception teaches liberation from the opposites, by which are to be understood every sort of affective state and emotional tie to the object. Liberation follows the withdrawl of libido from all contents resulting in a state of complete introversion. This psychological process is, very characteristically, known as *tapas*, a term which can best be rendered as 'self-brooding'.[28]

In Jung's view, the Yogi practising *tapas* seeks to concentrate his psyche by accumulating libido. This he accomplishes by withdrawing libido from both sides of the psychic opposites, that is, from both external sense objects and interior thoughts.

> The elimination of sense-perception and the blotting out of conscious contents enforce a lowering of consciousness (as in hypnosis) and an activation of the contents of the unconscious, i.e. the primordial images, which, because of their universality and immense antiquity, possess a cosmic and suprahuman character.[29]

It should be recorded immediately that the above interpretation of *tapas* and its goal is significantly different than the explanation found in Patañjali's *Yoga-Sūtras*.

It has been noted above that one of the translations of *tapas* offered by Jung was 'self-brooding'. Jung took this notion from *Ṛg-Veda* (X, 121) which contains the phrase *sa tapo atapyata*, and which the Sanskrit scholar Paul Deussen translated as 'he brooded his own brooding'.[30] In the Vedic hymns, Prajapati, the Lord of Creation, is depicted as the cosmic germ incubating himself in the form of a golden egg from which is hatched the world of diverse forms.

Prajapati's *tapas* or 'self-brooding' was a form of self-incubation which enabled him to penetrate into the unconscious and individuate the many separate forms of the cosmos. In this sense, *tapas* is also a means to creativity. Jung also termed this process 'active imagination'. Just as in Yoga meditation upon an image is prescribed as an aid to *tapas*,[31] so also Jung found the use of an image helpful in cultivating active imagination. One of Jung's earliest descriptions of active imagination occurs in his essay 'The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious'.[32] For Jung active imagination was a therapeutic process opening the way for an exchange of contents, and, therefore, a shifting of the psychic integration between the conscious level of ego-awareness, on the one hand, and the unconscious, on the other. The patient fastens onto an image, which may be external or internal, and allows the workings of fantasy or imagination to operate until a vision, like the visions of the biblical prophets, results. Jung describes the process as follows: 'Not a "vision seen in a dream", but a vision perceived by intense concentration on the background of consciousness, a technique that is perfected only after long practice.'[33] Unlike Patañjali's *Yoga-Sūtras* Jung does not specify a set series of exercises to be followed, for he finds that different patients use different

methods. Jung leaves it to the patient to discover by trial and error the method that is most suitable. Jung's approach is well illustrated in The Tavistock Lectures description of the development of active imagination in a young artist he was treating.[34] The young man tried all sorts of things until he finally hit on the method suitable to himself. He used to take a train to see Jung, and on the wall of the train station was a poster advertising Mürren in the Bernese Alps—a colourful picture of the waterfalls, of a green meadow and a hill in the centre with cows on it. The young artist finally succeeded in active imagination by sitting in the station, staring at the image the poster presented, and imagining himself in the poster walking up the hill among the cows and then looking down on the other side. By 'seeing' what was behind the hill in his imagination, he was able to bridge the gap to the contents of his unconscious.[35]

The reason that Jung was so weary of any set formula, such as the Yoga exercises prescribed by Patañjali, is that he felt the modern Western mind tended to be too tightly controlled by the conscious side—'the cramp in the conscious mind' as he called it.[36] This high degree of conscious cramp or control obstructs the free flow of materials between the conscious and unconscious levels of the psyche. Jung warned Westerners against practising Patañjali's type of Yoga, for he felt that its highly structured and prescribed approach would only encourage more development of the already overdeveloped conscious control of the psyche and so serve to further intensity the 'cramp'. On this point Jung seems to have found the flexible and individualistic approach of Chinese Taoist Yoga more to his liking. In his commentary on *The Secret of the Golden Flower*, Jung comments on the Taoist practice of *wu-wei* (action through inaction) with the following words: 'The art of letting things happen, action through non-action, letting go of oneself as taught by Meister Eckhart, became for me the key that opens the door to the way.'[37] In Jung's view, the most important thing for the West to learn today is the art of just letting things happen in the psyche. This is also the most difficult for the Westerner, since from birth his conscious level is overemphasized and trained to interfere, to help, to correct, to negate and to never allow psychic processes to grow in peace.[38] Jung felt that to overcome this difficulty the West could learn a good deal from the East. From the Indian practice of *tapas*, the aspect of concentrating on an image often proves useful. From the Chinese Taoist Yoga the notion of *wu-wei* or action through non-action, when combined with Meister Eckhart's 'letting go of oneself', is most beneficial. Like the Taoist Chinese figure in meditation with the 'flames' of a single consciousness being split up first into five and then further into twenty-five, personality growth requires dissociation of the previous consciousness so that an expanded consciousness may be achieved.[39]

Jung felt that the use of active imagination would fulfil the same role for the West that Yoga does for the East. It would help the unconscious to reach the conscious mind. Active imagination, says Jung, consists in a switching

off of conscious awareness, at least to a relative extent, so as to make room in our conscious minds for new impressions and ideas. This makes possible the arising of new contents from the unconscious to the conscious level of the mind.[40]

The analysis of Jung and Yoga shows up a clear conflict of views in regard to 'desire'. The goal of Patañjali's Yoga and its practice of *tapas* is to purge out all *karmas* from consciousness, so that no *kleśas* remain in existence. Desire and rebirth cease to be a part of one's experience. The unconscious is no more. Now one is fully conscious. Jung, however, thinks that such an optimistic result is psychologically impossible—an unwarranted extrapolation of the overly intuitive Indian mind. In Jung's view, the most that is possible is that the practice of active imagination may make room in our conscious experience for desires raised up from the personal and collective unconscious. In this way, we may come to know most of our personal unconscious, and have an increased awareness of the desires in our collective unconscious. But no matter how successful we are at raising desires from the collective unconscious, Jung, in true Western fashion, maintains that the desires of the collective unconscious can never be completely purged or known. Although Jung and Patañjali share many common conceptions as to the foundations of the mind, they differ significantly as to the final goal of desire. For Yoga all desires must be completely removed; for Jung it is the creative individuation of many desires of the collective unconscious that signals a mature and integrated personality.

Notes

1. See, for example, *Humanistic Psychology* and recent books (ed. Charles Tart), *Altered States of Consciousness*, Anchor Press, New York; 1972; and *Transpersonal Psychologies*, Harper, New York, 1977.
2. See pp. 1-15 of Jung's lectures on Patañjali's *Yoga-Sūtra* delivered at the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, Zurich, Winter 1938 (ETH Lectures). Unpublished manuscript consisting of notes taken by Barbara Hannah.
3. C.G. Jung, 'Richard Wilhelm: In Memoriam' *Collected Works*, 15, Princeton University Press, Princeton; 1966, p. 58. Henceforward *C.W.*
4. H.G. Coward, 'Jung's Encounter with Yoga' in *The Journal of Analytical Psychology*, 23, 339-57.
5. Harold Coward, 'Mysticism in the Analytical Psychology of Carl Jung and the Yoga Psychology of Patañjali: A Comparative Study' in *Philosophy East and West*, September 1979, pp. 323-36.
6. *Patañjali-Yogadarśanam*, Bharatiya Vidya Prakasana, Varanasi; 1963. The readable, although not always completely accurate English translation by Rama Prasada, has recently been reprinted. *Patañjali's Yoga-Sūtras*, Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, New Delhi, 1978.
7. C.G. Jung, 'On the Secret of the Golden Flower' *C.W.* 13, p. 51.
8. A. Jaffe (ed.), *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*. Vintage, 1965, New York, Chap. VI.
9. C.G. Jung, 'Psychological Types', *C.W.*, p. 463.

10. Jung includes within the psyche 'personality or soul', 'persona', and 'anima' as functional complexes ('Psychological Types', *C.W.* 6, pp. 463-70); whereas in Yoga *prakṛti* as *citta* evolves into *buddhi, ahaṁkāra, manas, jñānendriya, karmendriya, tan-mātra*, etc. See *Sāṁkhya Kārikā of Iśvara Krishṇa*, (trans. J. Davies), Susil Gupta, Calcutta; (2nd edn, 1947).
11. *Memories, Dreams, Reflections, op. cit.*, p. 167.
12. C.G. Jung, 'The Concept of Libido' in *Symbols of Transformation.* See *C.W.* 5, p. 139.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 141
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 121-31; 147-52 and 160-70
15. *Ibid.*, p. 131
16. See 'ETH Lectures' IV to VII, Summer Semester 1939, *op. cit.* Although Jung's interpretation of the *Yoga-Sūtra* text is generally faithful, one mistake which he makes is to equate *citta* with conscious-awareness only (p. 140). As I have pointed out Patañjali definies *citta* as including both the conscious and the unconscious levels—in other words, the total of what Jung calls the psyche. Of course, there are variations within Indian thought itself. Śaṁkara, for example, in his Advaita Vedānta reinterpretation of Patañjali's Yoga restricts *citta* to the unconscious level only.
17. *Yoga-Sūtras, op. cit.*, II: 18 *bhāṣya.*
18. 'ETH Lectures', *op. cit.*, p. 144. It should be noted that Jung also appeals to the creative impulse inherent in the Advaita Vedānta conception of the absolute as Brahman; and identifies this creative principle with his concept of 'the life force', reminiscent of Henri Bergson's *elan vitale*. See C.G. Jung, 'Psychological Commentary on Kuṇḍalini Yoga', *Spring*, 1975, p. 2.
19. 'Psychological Types', *C.W.* 6, pp. 199-202.
20. 'ETH Lectures', *op. cit.*, p. 11.
21. 'Psychological Commentary on Kuṇḍalini Yoga', *op. cit.*, p. 2.
22. 'Psychological Types', *C.W.* 6, pp. 202-04.
23. *Yoga-Sūtra* (II: 7) as translated by Rama Prasada.
24. For the *karma-saṁskāra-karma* cycle, see *Y.S.* II:12-15 and IV:7-9.
25. C.G. Jung, 'On Psychic Energy', *C.W.* 8, pp. 50-52.
26. *Y.S.* II:3.
27. *Y.S.* II:I, *bhāṣya.*
28. 'Psychological Types', *C.W.* 6, p. 118.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
30. 'Symbols of Transformation', *C.W.* 5, p. 380.
31. See the various kinds of *samprajñata samādhi*, yoga focused on an object or image, in *Yoga-Sūtras* I: 43-47. In Patañjali's system, this is contrasted with the more advanced yogic achievement of objectless or *asamprajñata samādhi* described in *Yoga-Sūtras* I: 50-51. Evidently Jung rejects this latter category of *samādhi* as a figment of the overly intuitive nature of the Indian mind.
32. C.G. Jung, 'The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious' in *Two Essays in Analytical Psychology*, *C.W.* 7, pp. 219-21.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 220.
34. C.G. Jung, *Analytical Psychology: Its Theory and Practice*, Random House, New York; 1968, pp. 190-92.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 191.
36. See, for example, On 'The Secret of the Golden Flower', *C.W.* 13, pp. 16-17.
37. On 'The Secret of the Golden Flower', *C.W.* 13, p. 16.
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Ibid.*, See section titled 'Phenomena of the Way', p. 29f.
40. *Approaching the Unconscious, op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

Michael Polanyi's aesthetics: a phenomenological study

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The philosophy of Michael Polanyi presents us with a framework within which the relationship between man and his discoveries, his object of knowledge and creation can be seen in a new light to enable us to overthrow the positivistic perspective of human knowledge and ensure its personal dimension. Knowledge, for Polanyi, can be accounted for in view of man's faith and commitment, intellectual passion and existential urge to bring forth the universal intent in his discovery. This dimension is of some fundamental importance as it brings the free human individual with his creative competence closer to the world, makes him responsible for it, and generates a commitment in him to discover the so far unknown forms of reality within the world. This specific output of Polanyi's philosophical programme is quite in consonance with his statement that he turned from physical chemistry to philosophy in reaction to the scientific outlook producing a 'mechanical conception of man and history in which there was no place for science itself' (as a free human enterprise).[1] The alternative framework of knowledge proposed by him has great relevance not only to philosophy of science—an alteration of which was the initial thrust of his writings—but also to philosophical anthropology,[2] philosophy of art and, for that matter, to contemporary culture as a whole. In this paper, I propose to focus on Polanyi's theory of art in terms of a notion of intentionality envisioned in his concept of personal knowledge and its underlying structure. For this purpose, I wish to proceed by giving (*i*) a brief out line of Polanyi's epistemology of personal knowledge in terms of its salient features, so that a (*ii*) new mode of intentionality can be envisaged to explain not only our achievement of meaning at the level of our interaction with impersonal objects but also (*iii*) the nature of meaning be-spoken by the works of art. This paper will, in this sense, attempt to give an interpretative and critical study of Polanyi's approach to art. I call this study 'phenomenological' as it concerns the phenomena of art in the irreducibility of their meaning and coherence, accomplished through the dynamics of personal knowledge. We shall also see that this dynamics entails a concept of consciousness, the intentional acts of which consist in self-transcendence to be sought in a meeting or dialogue between man and world. Aesthetic intentionality comes under the purview of this notion of consciousness.

Salient Features of the Epistemology of Personal Knowledge

A Critique of Objectivism

While Polanyi does not deny the objectivity of our knowledge, he assigns a new meaning to it and frees it from the clutches of objectivism. Objectivity of any knowledge-claim is on a par with its universality, which can be achieved only through a personal commitment of the knower. For Polanyi science is impossible without a presupposition of the existence of something hidden from its view. The knowability of it is a faith to be pursued. This faith leads the scientist to commit himself to discover it, to unveil its structure, and depict it with clarity, precision and proof. The commitment situation is formed by the scientist's search for the hidden reality and it controls the entire knowledge-process. The questions concerning truth and falsity, validity and invalidity, percision and imprecision, clarity and ambiguity are all meaningless, if we do not relate them to a commitment situation and point to the right or wrong steps of science in its way of discovery. As Polanyi remarks; 'A passionate comprehension necessarily appreciates the perfection of that which it comprehends',[3] The relation between man and world in the perspective of human knowledge is not to be seen in a psychologistic, subjectivistic or objectivistic fashion. It is animated by human personality stepping out to the unknown, and thereby widening its own horizon and enriching its own identity. Subjectivism is not the alternative of objectivism. A proper critique of objectivistic, positivistic, and impersonal approach to human knowledge can be accomplished, according to Polanyi, by spelling out its 'personal co-efficient' persisting in every form of human knowledge. This co-efficient, as Polanyi contends, bridges 'the disjunction between subjectivity and objectivity', and 'implies the claim that man can transcend his own subjectivity by striving passionately to fulfil his personal obligation to universal standards.'[4] An important contribution of Polanyi is that he rejects any ontology of the subject or the object in this regard. If 'ontology' means a *theory of what there is*, then such ontologies themselves are based on some ontical assumptions. But these assumptions cannot be used to give an one-sided version of knowledge and reality. 'What there is' can be systematically theorized and put into some propositions. But this would be an abstraction devoid of any relation to the very act of theorizing and systematizing. The concepts deployed in a theory will then be without any foundation. Polany's concept of knowledge does not leave aside the dynamic aspect of it which thrives through a constant interaction between the knower and the known, knowing and being. Its ontological import lies, first, in a transcendence of any dichotomy of the two into a reality in an active, animate manner, and, secondly, in guiding us to comprehend something real. The way the personal being of man is tied up with reality in the formation of knowledge as a meaningful and coherent achievement is further

envisioned by Polanyi in terms of what he calls subsidiary and focal awareness.

Subsidiary Awareness and Focal Awareness

Knowledge, for Polanyi, is an action which requires skill. Its articulation is a skilful shaping of a coherent meaning performed by subordinating a set of particulars as clues or tool to it. All acts of knowing are constituted by three interrelated factors: (*a*) the *person* (*b*) who integrates *subsidiary clues* (*c*) to *focus* on a *coherent meaning*. We become aware of these clues subsidiarily within our focal awareness of the coherent entity that we achieve. To cite an example given by Polanyi:

> When I receive information by reading a letter and when I ponder the message of the letter, I am subsidiarily aware not only of its text, but also of all the past occasions by which I have come to understand the words of the text, and the whole range of this subsidiary awareness is presented focally in terms of the message. This message or meaning, on which attention is now focussed, is not something tangible: it is the conception evoked by the text. *The conception in question is the focus of our attention, in terms of which we attend subsidiarily both to the text and to the objects indicated by the text.* Thus the meaning of a text resides in a focal comprehension of all the relevant instrumentally known particulars, just as the purpose of an action resides in the co-ordinated innervation of its instrumentally used particulars.[5]

Similarly, when one plays a musical instrument to perform a composition which is a coherent entity, one's *focal* target is to achieve that coherent entity, i.e. to present the audience with the composition as a whole, though, during the performance, one is *subsidiarily* aware of the particular clues like the right movement of fingers on the instruments, pitch, etc. which lead the process of performance to the consummation of a piece of art. As Polanyi says:

> Subsidiary awareness and focal awareness are mutually exclusive. If a pianist shifts his attention from the piece he is playing to the observation of what he is doing with his fingers while playing it, he gets confused and may have to stop. This happens generally if we switch our focal attention to particulars of which we had previously been aware only in their subsidiary role.[6]

They are mutually exclusive, but they cannot be divorced from each other. None of these two kinds of awareness is reducible to the other. Each of them has to be given its due to account for the entire knowledge-process. The relation between the two is accountable in terms of the extension of the per-

sonal being of the knower through the subsidiary clues to form the knowledge into a coherent whole. The person integrates and indwells these clues to form knowledge. The subsidiary clues are treated by Polanyi as extensions of our bodily equipment. Such an extension is a dynamic factor which involves certain change in our being. The entire knowledge-situation is activated by this dynamism—the movement of the personal being from its own locus through the subsidiary clues to the focal target. Thus, the concepts of subsidiary and focal awareness give a personal dimension to human knowledge, and point beyond the traditional bifurcation of the subject and the object in epistemology. We can conceive of a meaningful knowledge only by keeping it under the purview of human personality:

> The theory of personal knowledge offers an interpretation of meaning. It says that no meaningful knowledge can be acquired, except by an act of comprehension which consists in merging our awareness of a set of particulars into our focal awareness of their joint significance. Such an act is necessarily personal, for it assimilates the particulars in question to our bodily equipment; we are aware of them only in terms of the things we are focally observing.[7]

The Tacit Dimension of Knowledge

Our knowledge of the subsidiary clues is always in terms of that we become aware of focally. But our knowledge of those clues themselves in the process of knowing is ineffable and prelinguistic:

> When arts of knowing are explained by maxims, these never disclose fully the subsidiarily known particulars of the art, so that the powers of articulation are already restricted at this stage....This ineffable domain of skilful knowing is continuous in its inarticulateness with the knowledge possessed by animals and infants, who also possess the capacity for reorganizing their inarticulate knowledge and using it as an interpretative framework... We may say in general that by acquiring a skill, whether muscular or intellectual, we achieve an understanding which we cannot put into words and which is continuous with the inarticulate faculties of animal.[8]

Inarticulate intelligence which gropes its way by plunging from one view of things into another and which, therefore, is *preverbal* and *a-critical* can be detected, according to Polanyi, among human infants and animals very easily.[9] But what is more important is that Polanyi proves this to be the foundation of our articulate, explicit knowledge. In his *The Study of Man*, he starts with a logical oddity which man faces when he tries 'to discover knowledge that will stand up, by itself, objectively' and 'the moment he reflects on his own knowledge he catches himself red-handed in the act of upholding his knowledge'. Polanyi says:

> He finds himself asserting it to be true, and this asserting and believing is an action which makes an addition to the world on which his knowledge bears. So every time we acquire knowledge we enlarge the world, the world of man, by something that is not yet incorporated in the subject of the knowledge we hold, and in this sense a comprehensive knowledge of man must appear impossible.[10]

To offer a solution to this Polanyi brings about the notion of *tacit knowledge* as preceding our knowledge which is usually 'set out in written words or mathematical formulae'. The vain pursuit of reflecting ever again on our own reflection to catch hold of our knowledge 'objectively' ends here with the distinction between tacit, unformulated knowledge and explicit knowledge, because, 'we may say that *we always know tacitly that we are holding our explicit knowledge to be true*'.[11] Here Polanyi comes up with his concept of truth. He says: 'P is true' declares that I identify myself with the content of the factual sentence P, and this identification is something I am doing, and not a fact that I am observing.[12] This tacit component prevails in every experiental perspective of man. We always move from the level of our knowledge of what we are doing and how we are doing (which is unformulated, tacit) to the level of our awareness of what we have achieved (in an explicit, formulated shape). To confirm that which we have known we either go back recapitualating our process of knowing or put it to some other test. In either case, we indulge in a kind of action which itself cannot be put into an explicit linguistic formulation. This entire perspective of human knowledge is summarized in Polanyi's statement: '*We can know more than we can tell*'[13] The recognition of the tacit component of human knowledge makes us realize that we are not confined to the *metier* of formulated, systematized, and articulate domain of knowledge. Knowledge has a depeer dimension where our personal being is actively involved.

Towards a New Mode of Intentionality

To this brief introduction to Polanyi's epistemology we should add his warning against a tendency to identify the pervasive substructure of all intelligent behaviour that he calls the unformulated tacit dimension of knowledge with subconscious or preconscious awareness or with the fringe of consciousness.[14] This warning can be justified by recalling, first, what Polanyi himself said about the subsidiary awareness which goes through a process of tacit integration:

> The relation of subsidiaries to that on which they bear is a logical relation similar to that which a premise has to the inference drawn from it, with the great difference that the inferences arrived at here are tacit. Subsidiary awareness can be fully conscious, as that of a pointing finger or a pair of

> pictures viewed in the stereoscope, though in other cases our consciousness of subsidiries may be on a very low level and may be altogether subliminal. Such is the case, for example, when sensory clues inside our eyes and inner ear are integrated to a percept. Such variations in their level of consciousness in no way affect the functions of subsidiary elements in contributing to an act of tacit knowing.[15]

Secondly, 'pre-reflective' is an appropriate adjective for the tacit way of knowing rather then 'pre-conscious' or 'subconscious', because, though we are very much conscious of our acting tacitly to form the subsidiary clues into a coherent meaning, we do not stop to reflect upon it. The conscious process at this level is more akin to 'non-thetic' or 'non-positional' in Sartrean sense of the terms.[16] Tacit knowing is a doing of our own. To be aware of it is 'an essential part of our existence as sensuous active persons'.[17] Thirdly, according to Polanyi, all the tacit operations of mind 'consist in comprehending experience, i.e. in making sense of them.'[18] For example, a man unequipped with any map enters a new land to explore it. In his fumbling progress through a hitherto uncharted domain, he tries to make sense of every bit of his discovery and then record it with indications to be decoded by future explorers. Now such an active participation of human person cannot remain cloistered in the preconscious or subconscious. On the contrary, to do full justice to this foundational aspect of our knowledge and to show that it is intrinsically tied up with our being and becoming and not with the knowing subject or knowable object alone in isolation from one another, Polanyi stipulates the notion of 'understanding' by which he means *comprehending* or *making sense* of our experience from tacit to the explicit level through the tacit operations of our consciousness. Thus, experience, for him, becomes a unified phenomenon without any split between the knowing subject and the knowable object. This gives us a new insight into the nature of human intentionality. Polanyi's reflections on knowledge is in several senses important for and relevant to the questions concerning phenomenological notion of intentionality. What we *intend* to know is for him a major constituent of knowledge. It signifies the role of consciousness in a directional or projective sense. From this point of view, the intentional acts of consciousness have a definite non-psychological character as they start with a trust in the existence of something to be known or discovered, something that exists as independent of consciousness. With his intellectual passions man pours himself into new forms of existence, and aims at a correct shaping of knowledge gained in each form. The task of knowing something is thereby regarded as a pre-existent one: 'The sense of a pre-existent task', says Polanyi, 'makes the shaping of knowledge a responsible act, free from subjective predilections.'[19] Thus, man *meets* the world, not from any unconscious or subconscious depth, but from the depth of his fully conscious state, his personality. Polanyi calls it a *fusion:* 'It seems reasonable to describe this fusion of personal and the

objective as personal knowledge.[20] With a professional phenomenologist the objective status of a thing to which the intention may not correspond becomes a problem when we consider the intentional structure involved in assertive judgements, not otherwise. The 'object' intended, for Husserl is 'real' only in so far as it is real for me. This problem can be avoided by taking a Polanyian approach to it, because, for Polanyi, meaning is not to be taken for granted; meaning is an achievement through our doing with what is real. The real is independent of me, and I trust it to be so. My interaction with it is a kind of 'meeting' which makes it real not only for me but for everyone by assigning a meaning to it.

The modes of intentionality that we are generally acquainted with in the writings of Husserl and Sartre are still under the sway of subject-object dichotomy, and so unable to account for the experiential forms where the observable or knowable has a conscious or quasi-conscious role to play. The basic purpose of phenomenology was to bridge the gulf between thought-oriented approach and reality-oriented approach seizing both the subject and the object in the intentional network. But this network fails to get rid of the disjunction between subjectivity and objectivity. In Husserl, we find that the support for all intentional acts of knowing and the knowable entity is 'transcendental Ego', and the knowable is relative to it via the intentional acts. Ultimately, for Husserl, the entire structure of intentionality becomes parasitic upon such a formally segregated concept: 'I must loose the world by epoch, in order to regain it by universal self-examination.'[21] In Sartre, 'the transcendence of the ego' signifies the relativity of consciousness to object. Though his conception of consciousness as having no other substantive dimension than a non-thetic and non-positional one is closer to our day-to-day existence, its streaming down into *en soi* or object-in-itself shows Sartre's emphasis on objectivity rather than subjectivity. However, the primacy of either subjectivity or objectivity debars us from entering the *reality as a whole* and having an undistorted and unbiased self-perception in the process of knowing. Polanyi's theory of knowledge warns us against any such split between our experiencing ourselves and the world. It points to a concept of consciousness in and through *understanding*. What it intends is the knowable, but indefinite and inarticulate till now, waiting for knower's interference. This intention is not the private whim of the knower. It involves his trust in an objective, independent, and impersonal existence of something to be known. His noetic activities are initiated by this belief. To speak from Polanyi's standpoint, a complete phenomenological suspension of the world for a right knowledge of it is, in fact, a hindrance to such knowledge. Husserl was right when he vouched for the difference between judging as 'meaning—and as a rule, merely supposing—that such and such exists and has such and such determinations', i.e. the judgement (what is judged) as 'a merely supposed affair or complex of affairs; an affair or state of affairs, as what is meant', and, contrasted with this, a 'preeminent judicative meaning, a

judicative having of such and such itself' which he called 'evidence'.[22] This is what he identified with scientific intuition. For Husserl evidence is 'experiencing' of something itself. But steeped in Cartesianism he made this experiencing 'a mental seeing of something itself'.[23] According to him, no judgement can be accepted as scientific '*that I have not derived from* evidence'.[24] This is the basis of objectivity in science from Husserlian standpoint; it becomes purely reflective. But the structure of tacit knowing tells us about a more primordial from of intuitive capacity which is sensuous in character—like a 'hunch' guiding us to discover something through steps that are unspecifiable. As Polanyi says:

> ...in the structure of tacit knowing we have found a mechanism which can produce discoveries by steps we cannot specify. *This mechanism may then account for scientific intuition, for which no other explanation is known so far. Such intuition is not the supreme immediate knowledge, called intuition* by Leibniz or Spinoza or Husserl, but a work-a-day skill for scientific guessing with a chance of guessing right.[25]

This chance leaves us in a bit of uncertainty. The object of knowledge is not entirely *my* intentional constitution. There is always a risk of failure, a chance of delusion which shaıpen our intellectual passion for correction, validation and perfection:

> The anticipation of discovery, like discovery itself may turn out to be a delusion. But it is futile to seek for strictly impersonal criteria of its validity....To accept the pursuit of science as a reasonable and successful enterprise is to share the kind of commitments on which scientists enter by undertaking this enterprise. You cannot formalize the act of commitment, for you cannot express your commitment non-commitally.[26]

In Polanyi's framework, a perpetual exteriorization of self through subsidiary clues as bodily equipment and an interiorization of the world giving it a semantic dimension go together; it is not a suspension or bracketing out of the world but taking a plunge into it which is more important. Here the intentional network of human knowledge consists not in the primacy of *noesis* over *noema* or its reverse, but *in a continuous to-and-fro relationship*; in the function of understanding which Polanyi expands 'into that of what we *intend*, what we *mean* or what we do.'[27] The intentional acts of consciousness begin with an intellectual passion to discover—from proximal, interiorized particulars to the integration of a coherent, distal whole. This is the functional import of tacit knowing. The bearing of particulars on a total pattern producing the phenomenon of pattern constitutes the *phenomenal* aspect of tacit knowing. Thirdly, the particulars bear on what they *mean*—the coherent whole which they signify. This is its *semantic* aspect. And, as this

whole of parts is something *real* whose significance in many respects ranges beyond the specifiable particulars or even beyond the presently visible outline of the whole, there is an *ontological* import of this structure of knowing.[28] Thus, the pretheoretical and the theoretic mode of understanding are combined in Polanyi's epistemology. When the latter becomes alienated from the former, knowledge is reified into a set of explicitly formulated systems. This epistemology integrates the knower with the known, the articulate with the inarticulate, the unmeant with the meant. One may call it an integral view of knowledge and reality.

We have seen how meaning is achieved through tacit integration. This takes place at different logical levels of our relation with the object concerned. The level which we have discussed so far is that of the relation between a personal knower and the impersonal object. Polanyi calls it 'fusion'. We have called it 'meeting'. 'Meeting', of course, has an interpersonal connotation which cannot be characteristic of our relation with an object. But, if by 'object' we mean something which is meant, then we do not really have any interaction with any object at the tacit level. Our knowledge of objects which are objects in the sense of having been meant is preceded by our tacit awareness of that which is not yet meant. We can call it a 'meeting' in the sense that here the visionary act of the experiencing person is submerged in the experience itself. The assertion of the experience in terms of a conceptual framework at an explicit, verbal level becomes a discovery presenting the discoverer with an elation of mind, a satisfaction of his intellectual passion. Now this relation with an object is, for Polanyi, such that here the object is placed at a lower logical level than the knower. He calls this relation as 'I-It' relation. He contends also that there are knowable entities of higher categories. When we pass on from the tacit or preverbal level of awareness to a verbal or explicit level, we make the passage with an implicit faith in the existence of others who have the same rational competence to understand it and participate in our shaping of knowledge in the same way. We seek the universal validity of our knowledge with this basic faith of man in man. And when we approach man himself for our anthropological knowledge, we translate this basic faith into a more articulate fashion, i.e. in terms of a mutual recognition of each other's autonomy, rationality, freedom and responsibility. This is the level where 'mutuality prevails to such an extent...that the logical category of an observer facing an object placed at a lower logical level becomes altogether inapplicable. The I-It situation has been gradually transformed into an I-Thou relation.'[29] At this level, it is not only the knower who intends the known, but the known, too, intends to know the knower and offers himself to be known. The play of intentionality changes here. Through the act of addressing the other as 'Thou', I also become addressible as 'Thou'. The 'Thou-orientation' resolves the subject-object dichotomy into a phenomenal sphere of dialogue and meeting between two personal knowers. The meaning that we achieve here is not by reifying the

experience of meeting into the impersonality, facticity, and objectivity of the assertion made in the context, but by intensifying the very experience of meeting. But, for Polanyi, even the objective assertions regarding the meant entities cannot be completely dissociated from meeting and indwelling as the discovery of meaning is based on it, and the discovery itself becomes a 'celebrated fact' in its relation to the intellectual passion.

Hence we can talk about 'meeting' and 'meaning' at two levels and in two senses:

(*a*) Meeting in the sense of indwelling of the personal knower in the impersonal object leading towards achievement of meaning at the explicit verbal level in an impersonal fashion; and

(*b*) Meeting in the sense of indwelling of the personal knower in another person leading towards achievement of meaning at the explicit level but in terms of a dialogical agreement and in an open-ended fashion.

Accordingly, human intentionality alternates between (*a*) and (*b*). But, as Polanyi would assert, the difference between the two is more a matter of degree than a real one. The concept of intentionality, as we have tried to spell out within the context of personal knowledge, is such that it signifies not merely intention *toward* but a participation *with*. There is an act of communion involved in such an intentional act. In both (*a*) and (*b*) there is a measure of companionship between the knower and the known. In (*b*) it is more intense. The achievement of impersonal meaning that we have talked about in (*a*), however, is also dependent upon a personal act, a personal mode of establishing and asserting it. In some way or other, a dialogue between man and world, man and man constitutes the basis of meaning. The word 'meaning', according to Polanyi, describes the entity toward which the person is pointed or directed. As Bruno V Masno describes it: 'By interiorizing or pouring ourselves into or dwelling in objects as subsidiaries directed toward a focal purpose, one makes them mean something.' And the functional relation of the subsidiary to the focal target 'involves the intentional or vectorial quality, the outward displacement of meaning. This intentional act is an act of self-transcendence, for the meaning act uses the experience of a person's senses as clues which transcend this experience by embracing a vision of reality beyond the impression of the senses.[30] Polanyi always tries to assert a continuity between meeting-and-meaning in senses (*a*) and (*b*) as cited above, and he classed both our knowledge of other human beings and our aesthetic awareness under (*b*)—the I-Thou form of awareness—as a sign of transition from natural sciences to the study of humanities: 'The difference is only a matter of degree: indwelling is less deep when observing a star than when understanding men or works of art. The theory of tacit knowing establishes a continuous transition from the natural sciences to the study of humanities.'[31] But he seems to stress this continuity more

from the standpoint of the participant, and in terms of the nature of the participation than from the perspective of the object. These two perspectives, of course, cannot be set aloof from one another. Polanyi's own approach to knowledge and reality demands them to constitute a unified field. To avoid proneness to any one of them, I have laid greater emphasis on the concept of 'meeting' and a concept of 'meaning' evoked in terms of meeting. We shall see that a concept of intentionality, based on meeting through a tacit integration of man's being with reality, may serve as an important clue to our understanding of aesthetic experience and aesthetic meaning.

Aesthetic Experience and Meaning

Aesthetic experience can be discussed from the standpoint of the artist as well as the beholder. But their roles overlap. The Greek meaning of *aesthesis* provides a basis for aesthetic experience in the open availability of feeling and perception. The common factor shared by the artist and beholder is a creative and visionary approach to reality. This involves the entire being of a person in terms of an integration of the subsidiaries as our bodily equipment and directionality of our consciousness to a focal target through imagination and interpretation. Polanyi's concept of 'bodily equipment', however, is very important in this regard as it shows the outward displacement of our being in a very conspicuous manner and implies a notion of intentionality in a mutually relative context where the personal man and the object interact with each other. It somehow resembles what M. Merleau-Ponty says regarding the role of body in the realm of art:

> It is by lending his body to the world that the artist changes the world into paintings. To understand these transsubstantiations we must go back to the working, actual body—not the body as a chunk of space or a bundle of functions but that body which is an intertwining of vision and movement.[32]

The creative and visionary approach to reality manifests also our capacity for feeling and sensation in a way which goes deep below the common surface of things. The originality and greatness of a work of art consists in grasping the origin, the roots of both ourselves and things. Originality here means, as Heidegger would put it, 'that from which and by virtue of which a thing is, what it is and how it is'.[33] Polanyi seeks it in the realm of relation, so that not only the root or origin of art as such and the art-objects but also the change in our being, brought about by our reliance on and integration of subsidiaries and movement toward the achievement of a coherent entity, is accounted for at a meta-level, i.e. in a discourse. It justifies the need for a participation on the part of the artist. He discovers the world in a special way, and by discovering it he discovers himself too.

The art-object, too, after assuming a shape, plays a quasi-conscious role. It stands over against us and invites interpretations. We shall see that Polanyi opposes art-objects to mere indicators (words, maps, etc.), and identifies the former mainly as symbols and metaphors or, generally, as meanings contrived by men. Now such meanings are exemplary in nature in the sense that they are found and inexhaustible by interpretation. It is interesting to note what Professor Sundara Rajan says on this point:

> The exemplar has a meaning-content which, however, cannot be exhausted by any specific contextualization of it. Its content transcends all such specifications and serves to suggest ever more fresh and novel specifications. Because of this latent or tacit dimension, an exemplar cannot be grasped in the manner of an objective congnition; rather it is to be 'comprehended' and not known as a contextualized instance.[34]

Sundara Rajan's way of expressing the notion of 'exemplar' sounds quite like that of Polanyi's notion of meaning as symbols and metaphors. Polanyi, however, stresses the 'lively' aspect of such exemplars to the extent of acknowledging a Thou-character in them. In any case of creation, enjoyment and interpretation, Polanyian framework shows relationality as the essential ingredient of the world of art. It becomes a dialogue, if by 'dialogue' we do not mean a sheer exchange of words but also a kind of communion.

Besides the availability of feeling and perception, an organization of them is of utmost importance for the constitution of aesthetic experience. For the artist the material for creation is not yet organized. For him 'the vast territories of space and time must still be marked *terra incognita*. He takes a plunge into it, gropes for a moment in his stream of consciousness to arrest it as an image. In the words of Herbert Read:

> The sensibility plays lightning over these dark abysses, and in the flashes gets a brief glimpse of the lineaments of this unknown: the brief glimpse that is the artist's intuition, and which he then strives to communicate to us by the symbols he invents. That is the moment of originality—the moment in which we are made to realize the ethereal shimmering texture of music, 'the shapes that haunt thoughts' wilderness' in poetry, the 'beauty wrought out from within upon the flesh' of a painting.[35]

This is the preconceptual basis for the organization of feeling and perception. Polanyi compares it with our contemplative experience.

From Polanyi's standpoint, what Read calls a 'brief glimpse' is a discovery —the outcome of a search like that of an explorer in an unknown land. The nature of this discovery, however, differs from a scientific one in that it is a contemplative experience which dissolves any conceptuals framework. According to Polanyi, this framework lies as a screen between ourselves

and the observable. Contemplation 'stops our movement through experience and pours us straight into the experience; we cease to handle things and become immersed in them.'[36] He adds:

> And as we lose ourselves in contemplation, we take on an impersonal life in the objects of our contemplation; while these objects themselves are suffused by a visionary gleam which lends them a new vivid and yet dreamlike reality. It is dreamlike, for it is timeless and without difinite spatial location. It is not an objective reality; for it is not the focus of an intelligent perception anticipating future confirmation by tangible things; but besides merely in the coloured patches of various shapes which the things present to the eye. Correspondingly, the impersonality of intense contemplation consists in a complete participation of the person in that which he contemplates and not in his complete detachment from it, as would be the case in an ideally objective observation. Since the impersonality of contemplation is a self-abandonment, it can be described either as ego-centric or as selfless, depending on whether one refers to the contemplator's visionary act or to the submergence of his person.[37]

This is how Polanyi describes the contemplative communion of the religious mystic, and places art between science and worship. 'Music, poetry, paintings: the arts—whether abstract or representative—are a dwellings in and a breaking out which lie somewhere between Science and Worship.[38] Here Polanyi is unclear whether the impersonality of contemplation is selfless or ego-centric from his own viewpoint. On this point, I wish to recall the synthesis that I have tried to make between the knower's visionary act and his dwelling in the object which he intends to know—the synthesis that has been my endeavour through the concept of 'meeting'.

Meeting may be more or less intense. But it serves as a 'touchstone of reality'; brings it forth in terms of a comprehension of both the participation of the subject in the world as existence and the appearance of the world in the subject as experience, as a complete unsegregated whole in a sphere between them. 'Meeting' always signifies a *between-ness* where it is neither the self nor the other which is important in itself. It is their *coming together* which is important in an ontological sense. The transition from this level to a semantic level is to be understood in consonance with the former, so that any split does not take place between 'meeting' and 'meaning'.

In case of aesthetic experience, the art-object remains as a meaningful entity but in an open-textured manner. It has its own space and own time. 'We think of it as something that has a 'life' of its own, so to speak.,[39] Some recent Indian scholars of aesthetics have compared this experience with love which involves us deeply in a personal encounter with a presence.[40] We can conceive of this encounter at two levels:

(*a*) The artist delves into an opacity, creates an image both from something which he is not and from within himself through a communion between the inner and the outer. This is the pre-semantic level.
(*b*) When the art-object assumes a shape, it is left open to the beholder for further communion as a requisite for appreciation and interpretation. This is the semantic level.

Here we have a special use of the term 'semantic' which is different from mere 'indication'. Polanyi generally spoke of indicators as words which point in a subsidiary way to that focal integration upon which they bear. Some words, of course, can be replaced by road-songs, telling the way, or by maps or drawings by engineers or by mathematical formulae which serve subsidiarily as indications, as denotative words do. These indicators, (words, maps or mathematical formale, etc.) are of no intrinsic interest, 'while that upon which they bear is the part of the operation that claims our intrinsic interest'.[41] They function within a *from-to* relationship, in which the focal target is seen from self as a centre: '...the self is never carried away in indication; it is never surrendered or given to the focal object...indications are always self-centred'.[42] Polanyi contrasts this form of semantic meaning with that which consists in a selfgiving or surrender. For example, a *symbol*—say, a flag,—as an object of our focal awareness:

> ...is not merely established by an integration of subsidiary clues directed *from* the self to a focal object; it is also established by surrendering the diffuse memories and experiences of the self *into* this object, thus giving them a visible embodiment.... Instead of being a self-*centered* integration, a symbol becomes rather a self-*giving* one—an integration in which not only the symbol becomes integrated but the self also becomes integrated as it is carried away by the symbol—or given to it.[43]

Metaphors, like symbols, form another set of semantic meanings which, too, consist in a self-*giving*:

> As in the symbol, so in the metaphor; the subsidiary clues consisting of all those inchoate experiences in our own lives that are related to the two parts of a metaphor—are integrated into the meaning of a tenor and a vehicle as they are related to each other in a focal object (a metaphor).* The result is that a metaphor, like a symbol, carries us away, embodies us in itself, and moves us deeply as we surrender ourselves to it.[44]

Thus, according to Polanyi, there are three kinds of semantic meanings: indication, symbol, and metaphor. His concern is more with the artificial meanings, contrived by man and manifested as symbols and metaphors, as

*By 'tenor' Polanyi means the subsidiary element, and by 'vehicle' the focal object.

he intends to establish that these meanings—the coherent entities—which we know as Michaelengelo's *Moses,* Beethoren's *Ninth Symphony* are irreducible and real side by side the meanings which we know as natural:

> In order to hold these meanings securely in reverence they seem to him to demand, contemporary man, therefore, needs a theory of these meanings that explains how their coherence is no less real than the perceptual and scientific coherences he so readily accepts. He needs to see how his personal involvement with these meanings is necessarily and legitimately part and parcel of the reality they actually have, that his personal involvement is not at all a reason to regard them as mere subjective fantasies. These meanings will then not seem to be mere appearness to him. They will seem to be in truth what they 'are'.[45]

Polanyi classes the phenomena of art with this group of meanings. 'The work of art', as he says, 'is a "something"-a "reality" with powers of its own'.[46] Our consciousness is directed to it, and participates in its life in the process of integrating its parts in our vision of it. As he maintains, the meaning of a poem 'is formed by the integration of its formal pattern with that part of its content that can be expressed in prose.'[47] Its prose content is incompatible with the artificial speech of a poem. 'Nevertheless, we succeed in integrating these incompatibles—the artificial pattern and the prose content—and by doing this we produce a joint meaning which is the meaning of the poem.'[48]

> [The poet] produces from his own diffuse existence a shape circumscribed in a brief space and a short time—shape wholly incommensurable with the substance of its origins. Then we respond to this shape by surrendering from our own diffuse memories of moving events a gift of purely resonant feelings. This total experience is wholly of a novel entity, an imaginative integration of incompatibles of all sides.[49]

Now, for Polanyi, this achievement of meaning on the part of the artist gets dissociated from the personal life of its maker and starts *living* for other personalities:

> A poem can form no part of a poets' *usual* personality. Thus the formal structure of a poem, which has so much of the poem's meaning in it, forms a blockage, insulating the poem from everyday affairs and so also from the poet as a private person. When entranced by a poem, we repeat its words through our lifetime; strictly speaking, it is *the poem* that speaks to us, not the poet.[50]

We enjoy a work of art in itself, not for the satisfaction of any of our personal mundane desire. We accept its suggestions and clues, and integrate them

by our imagination for sharing its meaning; we live in this meaning rather than the meaning it would have for us in our ordinary 'interested lives'. A work of art, from this stance, is 'virtual' rather than factual or utilitarian.[51] Our relation with it consists in a play between our imaginative and interpretative approach to it and the emotions and associations evoked by its so-called sensuous form and content.

In experiencing an art-object, uptake and interpretation are always based on a meeting—a dialogue between *I* as a spectator and *thou* as an art object. It is in this sense that the art-object has a quasi-conscious role to play and the mode of intentionality differs in such experiential spheres. This is why Polanyi holds that aesthetic experience consists of a communion which is more akin to religious mystical experience: '...artistic creation and enjoyment are contemplative experiences more akin than mathematics to religious communion. Art, like mysticism, breaks through the screen of objectivity and draws on our pre-conceptual capacities of contemplative vision.'[52] From the general epistemological perspective of Polanyi, the tacit dimension of knowledge is more vivid in this realm, and the logical level of the object is approximated to a higher category—a *thou* rather than to an *It*. The meaning that it acquires after going through a meeting is, therefore, not tangible: 'The greatest art does not communicate a fixed meaning so much as nurture a growth of imagination and thought. It nourishes, challenges and delights.'[53] What specific emotions and associations will be evoked by a work of art is not known a priori. It communicates through communion. This preconceptual, tacit apprehension of a work of art—in its creation and enjoyment—is not only the basis for its articulate understanding, it pervades throughout our interpretative activities centering around it.

The thesis of intentionality that I have tried to construe in the context of Polanyi's epistemology and his thought in general keeps us in the track of meeting-meaning meeting'. The directionality of consciousness to something and its participation with it in terms of a tacit integration, indwelling in and interiorizing of the clues as proximal terms of our existence and bringing or understanding the image as a meaningful, coherent entity indicates this intentional structure. While creating or appreciating an art object we rely upon the subsidiary clues like manipulation of notes, modulations of the voice, techniques taught by a music master, accompaniments, etc. and strive to articulate and understand the composition as a coherent, meaningful entity. We indwell and interiorize these clues into our personal being as a whole—its past, present and future—with respect to the integration of a distal whole—say, a musical composition. There is a movement of our consciousness through the proximal terms, i.e. our bodily equipments to the distal whole by cultivating our relation with them. According to Polanyi, while these clues are enlivened by us, the distal whole, too, has 'life' of its own. Hence the outward displacement and movement of consciousness is not toward any *It* but to a *Thou*. Aesthetic awareness and meaning, therefore,

cannot be called subjective or objective but dialogic. In view of our study of Polanyian aesthetics, art becomes a dialogic constitution.

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Respect for persons and self-respect: Western and Indian

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The Western Approach

The claim that every person ought to be respected as such has received considerable attention in much contemporary moral thought of the Western tradition, although the problem is not wholly new and dates back at least to Kant. The concept of respect for persons is bound up with a characteristically modern liberal version of the concept of a person. If being a person means being an autonomous individual capable of deciding for oneself, to respect a person as a person is to recognize him as one who is capable of acting autonomously.

What are the characteristics of a person that underlie the claim to respect for persons? It may be clear what characteristics are in question if we are speaking of showing respect to a person for some specific merit that he has acquired. We can speak of respecting a person for his success as a scientist, as a doctor, as a writer, and so on. 'Respect' in this sense amounts to 'admiration'. But the question about the characteristics underlying respect for persons gives rise to many complexities, for when we are speaking of showing respect for a person as a person, we are thinking of how we ought to treat him as a moral being. This is because it is difficult to isolate any specific task that a person as a person should perform. What we are asking is: why should we respect a person as a person? But to ask that question is to assume that to be a person as such is to be of some value. So, to ask, 'Why should we respect a person as a person?' is in effect to ask, 'What makes someone a person?'

A person, in the Western philosophical tradition, is considered to be one who is (at least potentially) capable of exercising his reason. This concept of a person as an embodied rational agent is found in its purest form in Kant. A person is one who can decide for himself, who can formulate his own plans and purposes, and who can also act in accordance with his own decisions. The distinctive endowment of being a person, on this account, is the ability to be self-determining. To be a person is to have the capacity to will freely as a rational agent. It is also to have the capacity to govern one's conduct by rules. It is the ability to guide oneself by adopting rules that are valid for all men.

The problem of respect for persons—the problem as it occurs in modern Western philosophy—dates back, as has been pointed out above, to Kant.

For Kant respect for persons is something that is inseparable from respect for law. A rational agent is considered to be autonomous inasmuch as he is capable not only of acting in accordance with principles but also of determining the very principle according to which he is acting. An autonomous agent is one who gives the law of his action to himself. 'Autonomy of the will is the property the will has of being a law to itself.'[1] If the law in accordance with which the agent acts is not self-imposed, the individual must be considered to be acting heteronomously. A law that is based on an object of desire cannot, according to Kant, be the ground of moral action. A will is moral only when it is subject to a self-imposed law. To respect a person as a person, according to Kant, is to treat him as an end in himself and not as a means. 'Act in such a way that you always treat humanity whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.'[2] What is it about a person that makes him an end in himself? To say that a person is an end in himself means that he has a dignity that is conferred on him by that of the moral law, a law that is self-imposed through the autonomous activity of the rational will. A person is an end in himself because he is a rational agent acting in accordance with self-imposed laws. To treat a person as an end in himself is to show 'reverence' to the moral law. For Kant, respect for a person is thus respect for the moral law. His concept of moral law is inseparable from his concept of an autonomous rational being who gives that law to himself.[3]

What precisely does treating a person as an end in himself consist in? To treat a person as an end in himself is to respect the autonomy of his will. One person can be said to respect another as a person, if he recognizes the other as an individual capable of acting in accordance with reasons that he has deliberated upon. Two persons can completely disagree with each other on a particular issue, and yet respect each other as persons. They can do this in spite of the differences in the judgements that they make, if they agree to disagree, that is, if each recognizes the other as capable of deciding for himself. *A* might disagree with what *B* thinks, and yet respect *B* as a person in so far as *A* considers *B* as capable of making his or her own judgements. If the same is true of *B*'s attitude towards *A*, the case turns out to be an example of mutual respect. It is what has been called 'autonomy respecting autonomy'.[4] In the full Kantian theory, to respect oneself as an autonomous individual is also to respect others as autonomous individuals, though this may not be true of all other positions. 'Nothing less constitutes full recognition of the autonomy of another rational agent; nothing more is compatible with maintenance of one's own autonomy.'[5]

To respect a person as a person is to consider him as an individual who has his own point of view. Anyone who treats individuals as if they do not have a right to their own say on various issues, as if one can solve their problem without consulting them, is showing lack of respect for persons as persons.[6] This lack of respect can be shown in different ways. Since a person is only

able actually to exercise his autonomy in situations that leave room for making decisions, appraisals, choices, etc. he can be shown lack of respect as a person if he is not allowed to be in such situations so that the possibility of exercising autonomy is severely restricted or even eliminated altogether. If an individual is treated in such a way that he hardly finds any opportunity to make decisions 'for himself', he is being denied the respect to which he is entitled as an individual capable of making his own judgements. This way of showing lack of respect to a person as a person can be distinguished from those cases where there is a positive interference with a person's exercise of his autonomy. Individuals, in these latter cases, do find themselves in situations that leave room for exercising their capacity for self-directions, but also find that capacity to be positively frustrated. In both types of cases, persons are not respected as persons: in the former type of case, an effort is made to crush the very awareness of being an autonomous individual by way of refusal to consult the individual himself in shaping the pattern of his life; while in the latter type of case, the individual does get an opportunity to exercise his autonomy, but he is still not respected as a person in so far as an effort is made to nullify his capacity for self-direction. Not all cases of preventing a person from making decisions 'for himself' amount, of course, to showing a lack of respect for him. For example, one may sometimes have to make decisions on behalf of children or very old people. To make decisions on their behalf does not mean that one refuses to consider them as individuals, either potentially capable or previously capable of having their own points of view. Making decisions on their behalf would rather mean a recognition of their present incapacity to judge what is good or bad for them. Moreover, such decisions might be made in view of the distinction often drawn between 'the past of a person's life which concerns only himself and that which concerns others'. A refusal to decide for others in such cases can mean what Mill in his book, '*On Liberty*', calls 'selfish indifference'. Respect for a person's autonomy does not mean an attitude of 'selfish indifference which pretends that human beings have no business with each other's conduct in life'. There can be other similar cases where frustrating others' actions does not necessarily mean undermining respect for them as persons. Thus, there can be situations where one respects one's opponents, or, for that matter, even one's enemy, while still trying to frustrate or even kill him. This can be true of situations ranging from sport to war.

A distinction may be drawn between the concept of the *individual* and that of the *person*. The concept of the individual is wider than that of the person. The distinction between 'individual' and 'person' is that between the individual as an empirical agent and the individual as an autonomous moral agent. By an empirical agent is meant any being to whom states of self-consciousness and corporeal characteristics are attributable. An autonomous moral agent, on the other hand, is one who is not only capable of exercising self-conscious choice and of making important decisions on his

own, but who is also capable of taking responsibility for what he thinks and does, and, above all, is able to recognize others as similarly autonomous. The distinction between 'individual' and 'person' has further complexities. To see someone as a 'person' is to see him as detachable from this or that role that he is expected to perform in the society to which he belongs. This awareness of people as detachable from the roles they are expected to perform does not seem to be present in the same degree in all societies and at all times.[7] The word 'person' was derived from the Latin word *persona* which originally meant a mask through which the sound of actor's voices used to come out. Later it came to mean a role in a drama (*dramatis persona*) and then a social role. The individual, for the Romans, was then, more than a name or the right to a role: he was a person in the eyes of the law. A person came to be considered as one who was capable of exercising legal rights, and exercising legal rights was considered to be a privilege which neither women nor slaves could enjoy. A significant addition to the Roman notion of person was made when the Stoics introduced the notion of the individual as a moral agent. Later still, the notion of a person was greatly enriched by the Christian emphasis on a person as a bearer of rights in the moral community. The modern concept of person has thus a long history of slow and gradual growth: it has developed gradually through many centuries.[8]

To respect a person as a person is to value his self-reliance or capacity for self-direction, and to treat him not as a mere set of roles. If neither of these ways of regarding a person are encouraged in a society, respect for persons as persons cannot be said to be accepted as a value in that society. The question of respect for persons as persons only becomes significant when the individual capable of making his own value judgements is recognized as something valuable.

To respect a person as a person one has already to have respect for oneself as a person. This is not to say that a person has to cease respecting others as persons if his own self-respect is once destroyed. Let me try to clarify this point.

The concept of self-respect, like the concept of respect for others, has two aspects. Self-respect, in the first instance, might be understood in the sense of 'admiration'. Self-respect, in this sense, is an attitude that a person might think it right to withold from himself if he does something that ought not to be done. There is another sense of self-respect in which self-respect means valuing oneself as an autonomous agent. A loss of self-respect in both these senses is compatible with continuing to respect others as persons. I can lose respect in my own eyes, if I fail to do something that I think I ought to have done, and still continue to respect others as persons. I can also cease respecting myself as an effective autonomous agent, and still continue to respect others as such. Drug addicts, for example, might cease to respect themselves as autonomous beings. We may contrast with these cases those where respect for other persons *is* seen as closely related to self-respect. I

respect others as autonomous beings capable of deciding for themselves, because I respect the value of my own autonomy and my responsibility for making my own decisions. This should not be taken to mean that as an autonomous individual I am never critical of myself: the truth rather seems to be that the capacity for self-criticism is essential for the development of autonomy. Self-criticism has to be distinguished from self-depreciation. A self-critical person is basically one who does not consider his own reality to be a sort of 'finished product' or something incapable of further modification or change. He does not think of himself as incapable of making any false judgement. A person with the habit of self-criticism is not unwilling to submit his own opinions to further reflection and consideration, if such reconsideration are seen to be necessary. A person who depreciates himself differs from the self-critical person in lacking a sense of his own value. The former suffers from a lack of self-confidence. He may sustain a bad image of himself because of a lack of confidence in his own abilities, in the worth of his own life-plan. (A person who willingly sustains a bad image of himself has to be distinguished from one who is indifferent to the spreading of rumours of his own conduct by others: in the latter case a strong sense of one's own value might be present.) It is self-depreciation and not self-criticism that is incompatible with self-respect. Self-respect will necessarily be considered as one of the fundamental values in a society where autonomy or the capacity for self-direction are highly appraised.

To come back to the question of the development of a person *qua* person, or rather the 'emergence', if such a term be permissible, of the 'person' out of the 'individual'. Persons cannot respect each others as persons, if they do not have a sense of their own potential value as individuals capable of making their own evaluations, of deciding by which principles they ought to guide their own conduct in relation to themselves and to others and so on. The development of individuals as persons is also not possible, if the seeds of such a development are not already sown in the language that they use, that is to say, if the *concept* of a person is not already developed and available to them. Individuals can develop as persons, only if they can *think* (or come to think) of themselves as persons. Respecting oneself as well as others as persons is something that individuals gradually learn from the social environment in which they grow up. In certain exceptional situations, the self-development of this or that individual as a person might be prevented, even in a society where the concept of a person has developed, if he is persistently discouraged from seeing himself as autonomous.[9] In spite of the availability of the concept of person, such an individual might be incapable of applying it to himself, if its availability is counterbalanced in his particular case by some sort of positive discouragement of autonomy. As R.S. Peters rightly points out:

A man develops as a person as this concept of himself and of others

[develops]. . . To ask him therefore whether persons ought to be respected is rather like asking a man whether he ought to be afraid of a dangerous situation; for the concept of respect is necessary to explicate what is meant by a person.[10]

Peters further argues that, even if respect for persons can be shown to be logically bound up with the possession of the concept of a person, the question as to why, in practice, every person must respect himself as well as others as persons is not thereby answered. To answer that question, he says, it has to be further shown that respect for persons is a necessary condition for participation in any rational discussion about what ought to be done. Unless all concerned are regarded by themselves and each other as capable of making decisions 'for themselves', of asserting their own points of view, their participation in any such discussion turns out to be impossible. A person cannot, in this view, discuss any issue with others, if he is not prepared to take into account their points of view and interests. So far as the possibility of any discussion is concerned, the question of whether persons ought to agree or disagree with one another with respect to the particular content of their judgements is not of vital importance; what is important is the attitude of willingness to listen to what others have to say about the topic of discussion. It is only by showing such an attitude that one can satisfy the expectations that are highly cherished by every person as a person, the expectations that he be free to express his point of view and that his interests and claims will not be subject to any partial or prejudiced treatment. However, I am inclined to think that Peters has gone too far in considering respect for a person as person as essential for participating in any type of discussion whatsoever. It is perfectly possible for someone to discuss with others in order to learn how better to enslave or destroy them.

Respecting a person as a person, as I have earlier noted, may be seen as treating him not as a mere set of roles. This point has been emphasized by Bernard Williams in his essay 'The Idea of Equality',[11] To respect a person as a person, he argues, is to treat him not as a mere player of this or that role. To respect a person in this sense one has to draw a distinction between regarding a person's life and his actions from a technical or professional point of view, and regarding them from the person's *own* point of view, that is to say, regarding them from the point of view of what these actions mean for him. This means drawing a distinction between considering a man solely under this or that title, and considering him as *one who has* that title. Respecting a person as a person means avoiding any policy that may suppress or destroy his consciousness of himself as one other than a role-player. The distinction between the concept of a 'role-player' and that of a person who is supposed to be a person *before* he is a role-player can give rise to many knotty issues into a discussion of which it is not possible to go within the scope of this paper.[12] What I wish to emphasize here is that one can talk about roles only with

reference to the concept of a person as one who is capable of performing a role; who is capable of recognizing the role as a relation demanding a typical action, whether he is or is not capable of an explicit recognition of himself as the person performing the role. Inasmuch as it is the 'person' within the role-player who is capable of recognizing the role as something that demands a typical action, respecting a person as a person will mean giving due recognition to this aspect of his personality and regarding it as something valuable.

The Indian Approach

We have seen that in Western liberal societies to respect a person as a person is to value his self-reliance and to treat him not as a mere set of roles. A person is said to lack respect for persons as persons, if he does not recognize self-reliance as a value. But what if self-reliance as such is not considered to be essential for having self-respect or respect for others as persons? The role played by self-reliance in determining self-respect or respect for persons may be interpreted in different ways in different societies. To someone brought up in an individualistic society the link between self-respect and self-reliance might seem to be obvious, but it might seem less so to one who has grown up in a society that attaches great importance to interdependence. The entire issue seems to boil down to this: how far, in traditional Indian society, is dependence on external authority supposed to be detrimental to self-respect?

To answer this question one needs to take a close look at the 'bifocality' that is supposed to be at the heart of the traditional Indian view of the individual.[13] The individual, on the one hand, is seen as free and immortal. On the other hand, he is regarded as being doubly conditioned by his membership of a particular caste and by the operation of the law of *karma*. Although there is an obvious contrast between these two concepts of the individual, the Indian tradition, it is suggested, has different ways of harmonizing the two. If an individual conforms to his duties and obligations as a member of a particular caste and family, he accumulates merit that serves to release him from rebirth. Alternatively, he may follow the path of meditation, which is supposed to bring detachment (*vairāgya*) and to pave the way for liberation from the chain of rebirths. Yet another way of harmonizing the tension is to step out of all caste and family restrictions altogether and become a renouncer.

The traditional Indian approach to the concept of respect for persons and self-respect presents a picture that shows various heterogeneous elements to be at work. The traditional social framework does not encourage individuals to value personal autonomy and self-responsibility. It is a framework where personal initiative and decision are replaced by a tendency to conform to authority, where responsibility is more responsibility related to the due performance of various roles rather than one that is exercised on the basis of

personal choice and decision. Caste rules, sect rules, etc. regulate the lives of people in minute detail, and conformity to such rules is highly praised as a virtue. An individual does exercise his capacity to choose, but the scope of his choice is narrow and usually restricted to economic, rather than to social matters.[14] An individual's freedom is also restricted by the older members of his family. Deference to parental authority is considered to be one of the most significant virtues. The individual's freedom of choice is also greatly reduced in the sphere of sexual and marital relationships. Rules governing the practice of both caste endogamy and caste-exogamy put considerable restrictions on the choice of partners. The practice of negotiated marriages hardly leaves any room for exercising one's freedom in choosing partners. Restrictions about the termination of marriage are similarly severe.

> Traditionally a high-caste wife could neither divorce nor desert her husband and a man, though free to add to the number of his wives, was not supposed to divest himself of any woman he had married unless she was guilty of adultery or any other serious offence which brought dishonour on her husband.[15]

(This traditional attitude towards marital relationships has undergone considerable changes through the impact of Westernization. A point also worth noting in the present context is that attitudes towards marital relationships tend to be more flexible in the lower castes. The scope of exercising freedom and initiative in choosing partners increases as one goes down the social hierarchy.)

Although the traditional Indian social framework tends to discourage personal autonomy and decision in many ways, it does not necessarily undermine self-respect. One's own self does not cease to be valuable to oneself through sheer dependence on external authority. If *dharma* consists in due performance of one's duties and responsibilities fixed by tradition, a person does not lose respect in his own eyes when he shows what will be called a lack of personal autonomy in Western liberal societies. If a person's value to his own self is judged in relation to the network of duties and responsibilities that have been laid down by tradition, he cannot be said to lose self-respect by performing what, *ex-hypothesi*, he is expected to perform. On the contrary, it is the reverse that is true: a person might cease to have respect in his own eyes, if he failed to conform to the traditional pattern of values. The 'self' of 'self-respect' in the traditional Indian context is not the autonomous individual capable of making his own decisions without any appeal to external authority, but the individual who acts in conformity with the traditional pattern of values.

So much for the relation between autonomy and self-respect. But what about the relation between self-respect and role-playing capacity? Is the person who respects himself capable of considering himself apart from his

role-playing capacity? Answering this question would have been easy if role-related duties were the only kind of duties recognized in the Indian tradition; but not all the duties that an individual is expected to perform are specific duties relating to that social role. In addition to the specific duties of *varṇāśramadharma*, there are general duties (*sādhāraṇa dharma*). The former set of duties is relative and varies from one individual to another in accordance with the particular station in which he is placed, while the latter is absolute inasmuch as it does not apply to an individual as a member of this or that particular caste but to any individual as such. To any individual *as such*? Then, caste society, perhaps, does not always encourage treating an individual as a mere set of roles? It is true that, in contrast to the absolute duties, relative duties have been more rigidly codified in the law books, a fact that has given rise to the claim that there is no universal moral code for the Hindus. But it is also true that the epic literature of *Mahābhārata* is one of the most authoritative sources of instruction on absolute duties. Compared to *varṇāśramadharma, sādhāraṇadharma* is vaguely outlined, but that does not diminish the importance of *sādhāraṇadharma* in guiding the moral conduct of individuals. Virtues like non-violence, truthfulness, honesty, restraint from greed and selfishness, kindness, etc. are recognized as universal. Making room for duties that an individual has to perform apart from his capacity of playing this or that social role is a necessary condition for the recognition of the value of treating a person as a person, if for no other reason than that a recognition of this value implies a recognition of the corresponding non-role-bound duties.

Just as the recognition of an individual as someone more than a mere set of roles was not absent in traditional Indian society, so also a readiness to allow an individual to exercise his autonomy was not entirely absent. Both the conformist and the non-conformist flourished in the Indian soil. The readiness to allow an individual to exercise his autonomy found expression not only through the institution of renunciation (*sannyāsa*) but also through the speculations and discussions taking place between different schools of philosophers, or between different philosophers of the same school. If an individual's right to express his own opinion, or to criticize those of others, was not at all acknowledged, it is difficult to see how philosophical debates could ever form a part of the Indian tradition. Unless respecting a person as a person in the sense of being prepared to listen to what he thinks and feels was recognized as a value in traditional Indian society, Indian tradition could not have witnessed the growth and development of philosophical speculations. The high frequency of moral debates in the epic literature of India indicates that such debates must have indeed been a part of people's lives. A character such as Draupadī lives in our minds as an embodiment of protesting womanhood.

Again, respect for persons as persons cannot be regarded as unknown in a tradition that speaks of the human soul as being guided by its own light[17]

or of human beings as incapable of being subordinated to any higher reality.[18] In *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, there is a well-known conversation between a king and a sage regarding the guidance that a person needs in the course of his life's journey. The king asks: 'What light does a human being have to guide him through his earthly journey?' The sage answers: 'He has the light of the sun.' The king, not being satisfied with the answer, again asks: 'And what will guide him when the sun has set?' 'The moon' is the next answer. Other answers which follow are 'fire' and 'speech'. When all these guidances fail, it is the man's own soul that offers him guidance. 'The soul is his light, for with the soul as his light one sits, moves around, does his work and returns'—this is the final reply that the sage makes to the king's questions. In the epics and in the *Purāṇas* as well as in serious secular literature, the ideal of humanity is highly appraised. Human life is full of miseries, and yet it is highly desirable, because it is only through a human life that a final liberation can be attained. Human existence is the only gateway to liberation.

As a member of caste society, an individual is, indeed, expected to conform to the traditional pattern of values, but he is also expected to make his own judgements if he is faced with doubts, confusions and perplexities.[19] It might be objected that, for the most part, respect for a person's autonomy is recognized in traditional Indian society merely as an 'ideal', and that few or none try to make it a reality. This objection, no doubt, is true to some extent. I have already emphasized the 'bifocality' which is said to characterize the traditional Indian view of the individual. But however restricted an individual's freedom might be in caste and family affairs, it cannot be denied that he is allowed to exercise his autonomy to a considerable extent in certain religious matters. It is true that even here, his life is studded with performance of various traditional rituals, but it is also true that he enjoys considerable freedom in worshipping his chosen deity.

> ...every Hindu is free to worship his or her own chosen deity...The relation between man and supernatural powers is regarded as a basically private and individual affair, and even in the most orthodox communities a person's attendance or absence at temple services is not a matter of comment or gossip.[20]

Some Western Indologists have remarked[21] that child discipline in the Indian tradition is characterized by a prolonged transition from infancy to independence and by a negligible emphasis on self-reliance. The Indian child, it is said, learns about his environment more by observation than through systematic parental instruction. The traditional Indian family is thus taken as tending to discourage the growth of individual autonomy. But the same lack of systematic parental instruction in 'sustained disciplined effort to achieve distant goals' can also be seen as a positive encouragement of

individual autonomy, since by not excessively interfering with the child's activities, we are leaving him to explore and discover for himself. Hence what appears as indifference and lack of encouragement of freedom from one point of view may appear as respect for uniqueness and autonomy from another. What is noteworthy is the similarity between the traditional Indian pattern of child discipline and the 'growth' model of education followed by many modern Western countries. The 'growth' model insists that the child should not be 'moulded' from without but should be allowed to 'grow' from within and learn by himself.

NOTES

1. Kant, *The Moral Law*, Hutchinson, London, 1953, p. 80.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
3. R.S. Peters, *Ethics and Education*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1966. p. 209.
4. David P. Gauthier, *Practical Reasoning*, Oxford University Press, London, 1963 p. 119.
5. *Ibid.*
6. R.S. Peters, *op. cit.*, p. 210.
7. *Ibid.*
8. M. Mauss, *Sociology and Psychology*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1979.
9. R.S. Peters, *op. cit.*, p. 211.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 213.
11. B. Williams, 'The Idea of Equality', in *Philosophy, Politics and Society* (ed. P. Laslett and W.C. Runciman), 2nd Series, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1962, p. 115.
12. For a discussion of these issues, see my 'Persons and Roles' in *Darshana International*, Vol. 25, No. 2, April 1985, Moradabad.
13. S.N. Ray, 'Variations on the Theme of Individuality: Hinduism, the Bengal Renaissance and R. Tagore' in *Visva-Bharati Quarterly*, Vol. 41, May 1975-April 1976, pp. 182-83.
14. Christoph von Fürer-Haimendorf, *Morals and Merit*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1967, p. 152.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 154.
16. The view that the Indian tradition recognizes the individual in the model of the renouncer has been upheld, among others, by L. Dumont. See his article 'World Renunciation in Indian Religions' in *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, No. IV, 1960, p. 44.
17. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4. 3-4.
18. *Mahābhārata* as quoted in S. Radhakrishnan and P.T. Raju, *The Concept of Man*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1960, p. 9.
19. *Ibid.*, *Āpaddharmaparvan*, 140-43.
20. Christoph von Fürer-Haimendorf, *op. cit.*, p. 155.
21. R. Lannoy, *The Speaking Tree*, Oxford University Press, London, 1971, pp. 85-99.

Disagreement in philosophy

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From Descartes onwards it has been quite common with philosophers with an introspective bent of mind (having in their minds the agreed results obtained in science and mathematics) to speak of the irresolvable disagreement in philosophy, and to treat it as a malaise which afflicts philosophy. In this way, the position that philosophers disagree or that disagreement is built into philosophy has come to assume the standing of a firmly established fact; few have ever thought of the need of subjecting it to scrutiny. However, in what follows, it is the scrutiny which we propose to undertake. This will be done with special reference to Morris Lazerowitz. The reason for our so doing is that, as far as we know, no one among contemporary philosophers appears to have been more concerned than Lazerowitz with this alleged disagreement. As a matter of fact, the invaluable philosophy he has instituted in the name of metaphilosophy is directed, almost entirely and specifically, to providing an explanation of the supposed disagreement.

The position can be critically approached in a number of ways. For example, one, assuming that philosophy is always fraught with disagreements, may well ask (as Watkins[1] does) whether these disagreements are necessarily a malaise. One may also ask whether the disagreements attributed to philosophy are peculiar to philosophy and strictly confined to it. But our approach to the position will be different. We are going to question it at a more basic level. That is, we are going to investigate whether there is any sense at all in which philosophical utterances may be said to be in disagreement with one another. Do philosophers really disagree?

Lazerowitz has not investigated this problem in detail. However, he does not deny the importance of the investigation. In a letter, he writes as follows:

> ...one point you make is too important, however, to delay. This is whether philosophers can be said to disagree. I have remarked on this but in much too cursory a manner. If I may quote one passage: 'With Moore philosophy gains sobriety and the appearance of rigour but loses most of its dramatic appeal; and it is taste and nothing else which dictates which we choose in philosophy, the extravaganza of metaphysics or the sobriety of common sense with the semblance of science. We may well say with Hume 'Tis not solely in poetry and music that we must follow our taste and sentiment, but likewise in philosophy'. But you are right, of course, I do not

> state this sufficiently clearly nor do I elaborate it nearly enough. In philosophy there are preferences for opposing semantic innovations....[2]

He says something to the same effect also in his '*Cassandra in Philosophy*': 'It would seem that the validity of a philosophical argument...is determined by preference.'[3]

Unfortunately, the lines quoted do not make things as clear for us as we would have desired. If we have not grossly misunderstood him, in saying this, Lazerowitz appears to understand disagreement in terms of our differences in respect of taste, sentiment and preferences. But in so doing, if one may say so, Lazerowitz is perhaps making a 'holiday use' of the word 'disagreement'. To explain the point. Suppose that I prefer coffee to tea, while my friend prefers tea to coffee, or that I admire Gandhi, while my friend does not. Such are not exactly the occasions where I and my friend may be said to disagree when I assert that drinking coffee is injurious to health, while my friend asserts the opposite, i.e. drinking coffee is not injurious to health. 'Agreement', 'disagreement', and their equivalents, are, in fact, cognitive words; and as such they are explainable only with reference to truth-value,[4] and not with reference to taste, sentiments, etc. A situation which can be rightly called one of disagreement arises only when the same proposition is at the same time called true by one and false by another.

So the question whether philosophical utterances can rightly be said to be incompatible with each other hinges ultimately on whether they can rightly be said to have a truth-value; in other words, whether it would make sense to call them true or false. Lazerowitz's position on this point is quite clear. He says: '...a philosophical theory is not the kind of theory which has a truth-value.'[5] And further: '...metaphysical theories have no truth-values and the controversies about them are not debates over whether they are true or false.'[6]

Thus, Lazerowitz denies truth-values to philosophical utterances: philosophical utterances, according to him, can neither be said to be true nor said to be false. But the position, as we can see, tends to spell disaster for Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy itself. Unfortunately, Lazerowitz, however, does not appear to be fully aware of this.

First, we have argued that statements, over which philosophers can be meaningfully said to agree or disagree, must be such that they can meaningfully be said to be true or to be false. The notions of agreement and disagreement are understandable only in terms of truth or falsity. This means that statements which cannot meaningfully be said to be true or false cannot, for that reason, also be meaningfully said to be compatible or incompatible. Now, if there is nothing basically wrong with this position, then it would follow that, in denying truth-values to philosophical propositions, Lazerowitz has unconsciously committed himself to the position that there can never be any disagreement about them. And, in that case, Lazerowitz's

metaphilosophy, essentially an attempt at explaining philosophical disagreements, will have no job to do: it will lose all of its supposed relevance. Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy, in this sense, turns out to be self-annihilating.

Secondly take the utterances of which Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy itself is made. What exactly may be the logical value characterizing them? Can they make claim to being true? Taken as philosophical utterances, as *we* would be inclined to do, in his view they certainly cannot, because philosophical utterances, according to Lazerowitz, are not such as can be said to be true.

But Lazerowitz may escape this consequence by denying philosophical status to his metaphilosophical utterances. And this is perhaps what he is inclined to do. For he seems to look upon his metaphilosophical theory virtually as an empirical hypothesis. Consider the kind of expressions he uses in talking about his theory: 'The *hypothesis* I am going to formulate..,[7] 'Regardless of whether..the *hypothesis* I'm going to put forward',[8] and so on. And the hypothesis, according to him, is *empirical* in the sense that it is backed by factual claims about 'the unconscious'. 'It is now possible', writes Lazerowitz, 'to establish them or disestablish them [conjectures about the unconscious significance of philosophical utterances], for there does exist a science of the unconscious. *The unconscious no longer is an unknowable, a Ding-an-Sich.*[9]

However, taken as an empirical hypothesis, it gives rise to the question: what tests has Lazerowitz conducted or proposed to ascertain its truth or falsity? The answer to this is far from encouraging. Thus, one critic, while reviewing Lazerowitz's *Structure of Metaphysics,* says:

> ...one is amazed to find that there is hardly any evidence of empirical methodology being used throughout the whole book. There are no data, either statistical or clinical on which the theory is supposed to be based... the hypothesis belongs to the well known field of psycho-analytic theories and, whatever may be the limitations of the verificational methodology in that field, there certainly is a methodology to test the various hypothesis put forward in that field. It is inconceivable that Lazerowitz does not know the fact, yet it is equally strange that a serious thinker should formulate an empirical hypothesis and not try to test it.[10]

Lazerowitz is not altogether silent about the question of the justification of his hypothesis, that is, his metaphilosophical theory. Asking himself '...what right do I have to think that it is correct...?[11] he says: '...in answer to this question, perhaps the best thing I can say is that the position has "clicked" for me, that I *see* that it is correct, if not in every detail, then at least in substance.'[12] He continues: 'The hypothesis I am going to formulate meets the intellectual need of facing and explaining this fact, and to put the

matter subjectively has clicked intellectually for me.[13] But 'clicking', as one may say, is not enough for the establishment of empirical hypothesis.

Anyway, in fairness to Lazerowitz, it should be mentioned that his remark that 'the position has clicked for me'[14] is not the only thing he has said in defence of his metaphilosophical hypothesis. He also tries to derive credibility for his hypothesis from an explanatory efficacy it is supposed by him to possess. He thinks that it explains 'the chronic condition of philosophical differences of opinion'[15]. As quoted above, he says that it 'meets the intellectual need of facing and explaining this fact....[16]

Explanatory efficacy is, indeed, one thing which contributes to the credibility of a hypothesis. This is a recognized fact. So, what we have to examine is the explanatory relevance or efficacy Lazerowitz claims for his metaphilosophy.

Any claim to such effect as that a particular hypothesis or a theory explains a fact makes sense, only when the fact it claims to explain is really there to call for explanation. Talking of explaining a particular fact, when no such fact is there, makes no sense. The fact which Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy makes a claim to explain is, as he explicitly states, the endless disagreements in philosophy. But do philosophers really disagree? Is it really a fact that there is anything in philosophy which may count as disagreement in the true sense of the term? We have already argued that, in consciously denying truth-values to philosophical propositions, Lazerowitz has, in fact, been unconsciously led to deny that there is, in reality, disagreement. Disagreement presupposes truth-values; and there is no disagreement without them.

The problem that will occupy us now is whether, without leaving Lazerowitz's own framework, we can restore truth-values in some way to philosophical propositions, so that the alleged disagreements among philosophical propositions may turn out not to be a myth, and the invaluable philosophizing he does in the name of metaphilosophy is not in consequence irrelevant. To put the matter in another way: can we find any ground for saying that philosophical propositions can sensibly be said to be true or false, so that we may also have a ground for maintaining that philosophers may sensibly be said to disagree and that, therefore, Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy has a genuine fact to explain.?

The crucial point for us here to be clear about, we think, is this. What is it that makes Lazerowitz commit himself to the position that philosophical propositions do not have truth-values.? The answer is not hard to find. It lies mainly in what is called the 'third layer' of his 'three layer' analysis of a philosophical theory. The position which constitutes the 'third layer' links up philosophical utterances with the non-cognitive functioning of our mind, mostly with wishes (and sometimes also with emotions). It is held by Lazerowitz consistently. To state the position in his own language:

> ...his [the philosopher's] utterances give expression to unconscious fantasies...[and] an unconscious fantasy like a dream functions as the substitutive gratification of wishes.[17]
>
> ...joined to these is a third and less accessible layer, a complex of unconscious fantasies.[18]
>
> A philosophical theory consists...lastly, of an unconscious fantasy or cluster of fantasies of importance to our emotional welfare.[19]
>
> The great importance of the utterance to the philosopher makes it safe to compare it with a dream...: like a dream it is fundamentally a wish fulfilment.[20]

The lines quoted above make it plain that in Lazerowitz's mind philosophical utterances or theories, like dreams, are closely linked up with wishes. This, in turn, makes him feel that the body of utterances that constitute philosophy is a part of our conative discourse as distinguished from the discourse which is cognitive. Once committed to the view that philosophical utterances are a cross-section of conative utterances, Lazerowitz seems to find it mandatory to hold that they are not amenable to any appraisal in terms of truth or falsity; for truth and falsity belong strictly to cognitive discourse.

However, the passage from the 'third layer', i.e. that philosophical utterances have their roots in our unconscious wishes, to the position that they do not admit a truth-value is not, perhaps, as straightforward as it would appear to be at first glance. There is, we feel, some degree of clumsiness about it. Admitting that philosophical utterances are rooted in our unconscious wishes, it does not follow that they are unconditionally conative, and, therefore, necessarily devoid of truth-value. Utterances may be linked to wishes in two senses.

First, we may speak of utterances as linked with wishes in the sense that they are *straightforward expressions of* some wishes in our mind. Examples of such utterances are: 'Had I the wings of the dove!' 'If I were a multimillionaire!' and the like. Such utterances constitute conative discourse *par excellence*. They are essentially immune from characterization in terms of truth-value: no one, in fact, calls them either true or false.

But, that an utterance is linked with a wish may also mean that it is in some sense *caused* by the latter. And this, as we understand it, is the sense which Lazerowitz has in mind when he speaks of philosophical utterances as wish fulfilment. That is to say, in calling a philosophical utterance an 'unconscious fantasy' or 'wish fulfilment', or in comparing them with dreams, all that he has in mind is the idea that philosophical utterances have, in some sense their cause in our unconscious wishes. But for an utterance to be conative in this sense is very different from its being conative in the sense of being a direct expression of wishes. The latter excludes its having a truth-value, but the former does not. Being caused by wishes is not incompatible

with a statement being true or false. One may well call it true (if it is so), or false (if it is so).

To illustrate the point, let us take what I dreamt last night. I dreamt that I had become the Prime Minister of India, that I had gone to the United States on the invitation of President Reagan, that I held a very crowded press conference which had been telecast all over the world, and that for my performance I was being showered with praises from all corners of the earth. Take the sentences. The dream is composed of:

(*a*) I have become the Prime Minister of India;
(*b*) I went to the United States on the invitation of President Reagan;
(*c*) I held a press conference;
(*d*) My performance in the press conference was very good;
(*e*) Praises are being showered on me.

As I am not actually the Prime Minister of India, the sentences are all expressions of my unconscious wishes. But that does not stand in the way of their being called false as they are, in fact, false.

As a matter of fact, along with every statement that is undeniably truth-valued may well go some wish in our mind. For example, when I say to somebody 'I am thirsty', I may well be supposed to be expressing my *wishes* in order that my hearer will listen to me, and that he will give me a glass of water. My statement, though motivated by my wishes, is to be called true, if it is really true.

Lazerowitz makes no distinction between an utterance which directly expresses a wish and one which is caused by a wish. He seems to have modelled the latter after the former. And that possibly is one thing which has debarred him from granting truth-values to philosophical utterances, and thereby, eventually, made him unwittingly liquidate the very logical basis of the alleged fact of their disagreement, i.e. the very thing which his metaphilosophy centres around.

Thus, the psychological information about philosophical utterances contained in Lazerowitz's 'third layer' may well be accepted as true, without it being logically obligatory to say that philosophical utterances have no truth-values. Philosophical utterances may, in fact, be true or false. So there is no need to deny the factual feature of disagreements of philosophical utterances and, for that reason, to deny the relevance of Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy. But are they true or false in the sense in which utterances in science or those in mathematics are said to be true or false? This, however, is a very different issue which we need not discuss here.

But one may ask: what about the acceptability of the position embodied in the 'third layer' itself?

For one thing, the position is emotionally disturbing to philosophers. Hospers in his paper, 'Philosophy and Psychoanalysis',[21] refers to the 'violence of the reaction' to the position when it was presented by Lazerowitz at a conference in New York University. And the reaction is, in a way, emotionally not justified.

The position that philosophical utterances are the fulfilment of unconscious wishes, is apparently an attempt at using the psychoanalyst's arsenal to debunk philosophy. And this is unlikely to please philosophers. They see in it, not only an attempt at understanding the glory of their professional achievements but also an act of betrayal, that is, a colleague of theirs crossing his professional boundaries and leaguing himself with the psychoanalysts.

It is not that Lazerowitz does not anticipate such a reaction. Referring to this position, he writes in his *The Structure of Metaphysics:*

> ...Freud describes three great 'outrages upon its naive self-love' which cultured mankind has had to endure in the last few hundred years. And if the present hypothesis is correct in its general outline, a special group of intellectuals, who have prided themselves on being impersonal seekers after truth [are exposed] as the dupes of games they unconsciously play with language.[22]

Theoretically also, the hypothesis of a 'third layer' is perhaps more vulnerable than that of the other two layers in Lazerowitz's three-tier analysis. And this is one reason why critics[23] generally have chosen this as a convenient target of their attack.

The source of our own unhappiness with it, however, is that it tends eventually to liquidate the very reality of philosophical disagreement which Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy has to presuppose for the justification of its relevance.

There is another objection which also should not go unmentioned. While fraught with dangerous consequences, it dilutes Lazerowitz's metaphilosophy, which is philosophy, with psychoanalysis, which is not philosophy.

It may, however, be mentioned here that, in Lazerowitz's own eyes, this layer is far less important than the other layers in his analysis.

> Yet Mr. Lazerowitz maintains that this is not the main point he is interested in making. He has even indicated that he would be willing to drop this part of his theory if it raises too many additional problems.[24]

During a discussion, Lazerowitz said something substantially to the same effect.[25]

Despite all this, the position embodied in the 'third layer' is not altogether without sympathizers. It continues to derive support of some kind from the writings of such philosophers as J.O. Wisdom,[26] Alice Ambrose,[27] John Hospers,[28] Margaret Chatterjee[29] and others.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. 'Word-Magic and the Trivialization of Philosophy' in *Ratio*, Vol. 7, 1965.
2. *Vide* his letter of 21 March 1984 to Professor M. Chakravarti.
3. The Katherine Asher Engel Lectures, Smith College, 1983, p. 13.
4. Cf. M. Chakravarty, 'Proofs in Philosophy' in *Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 45th Session*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1971, p. 170.
5. *Philosophy and Illusion*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1968, p. 83.
6. *The Structure of Metaphysics*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1955, p. 25.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 58 (italics ours).
8. *Ibid.*, (italics ours).
9. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
10. Daya Krishna, 'Some Considerations on Morris Lazerowitz's *The Structure of Metaphysics*' in *Mind*, LXVII, No. 226, 1958, p. 258.
11. *The Structure of Metaphysics*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1955, p. 57.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Philosophy and Illusion*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1968, p. 109.
18. *The Language of Philosophy*, D. Reidal Publishing Company, Dodrecht, Holland/ Boston, 1977, p. 174.
19. *Studies in Metaphilosophy*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1964, p. 217.
20. *The Structure of Metaphysics*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1955, p. 227.
21. *Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method and Philosophy*, New York University Press, New York, 1959, p. 336.
22. See *The Structure of Metaphysics*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, p. 226.
23. Daya Krishna in his article 'Some Considerations on Morris Lazerowitz's *The Structure of Metaphysics' Mind*, p. 243; J.W.N. Watkins, 'Word Magic and Trivialisation of Philosophy' *Ratio*, Vol. 7, 1965; Brand Blanshard, 'Review of *Philosophy and Illusion' Metaphilosophy*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1970, p. 184; and J.L. Cobitz, 'Metaphysics as Wish Fulfilment', in *The Philosophical Review*, LXVII 1958, p. 76.
24. Victoria Dodd Reed, 'Some Methodological Considerations of Morris Lazerowitz's Examination of Metaphysical Statements (an unpublished dissertation), Massachusetts, 1967, p. 88.
25. Discussion taperecorded by Mercy Helen.
26. Lazerowitz's interpretation of Metaphysics, in *Philosophy and Its Place in Our Culture*, Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, New York, 1975, pp. 193-95
27. 'Philosophy, Language and Illusion' in *Psychoanalysis and Philosophy* (eds.), Morris Lazerowitz and Charles Hanly, International University Press, New York, 1971, p. 14.
28. 'Philosophy and Psychoanalysis' in *Psychoanalysis, Scientific Melhod and Philosophy* (ed.) Sidney Hook, New York University Press, New York, 1959, pp. 336-57
29. 'Subversion and Inversion' in *The Language of Philosophy*, Allied Publishers, New Delhi, India, 1981, pp. 79-96.

'Ontological-commitment' in the context of the Buddhist thought

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If history repeats itself or not, I do not know. But it seems to me that history of philosophy does have a knack of doing so. It happens, I suppose, because there are some perennial problems of philosophy which continue to appear from age to age in one form or the other. One such problem is the problem of 'ontological-commitment'. Philosophers have always bothered their heads about the question of 'what there is'. Towards the beginning of the present century, it was, however, felt that this question had more properly been taken care of by science through its many branches such as physics, chemistry, botany, zoology, biology, physiology and psychology. But soon the scientists became conscious of the limitations of science[1] and some of them themselves turned philosophers.[2] It was realized that science was not free from speculation, and that its theories and concepts, being at best constructive descriptions,[3] could not represent a counter-factual language.[4] The problem, thus, remained in philosophy, but assumed a new form in so far as it had been thought that the question was mainly that of the meanings of the words used by the scientists, philosophers and the common men, and could be decided through linguistic analysis. It is in this form that the problem has been debated for the last three decades.[5]

In a similar form, it appears to me, the problem was discussed in the context of the Buddhist Thought. It is well known that the Buddha answered only in silence (or refused to answer) the ontological questions such as the following:

(1) Is the world eternal?
(2) Is the world not eternal?
(3) Is the world finite?
(4) Is the world infinite?
(5) Is the soul one thing and body another?
(6) Is the soul the same as the body?
(7) Does the Tathāgata exist after death?
(8) Does the Tathāgata not exist after death?
(9) Does he both exist and does not exist after death?
(10) Does he neither exist nor does not exist after death?[6]

The Buddha used his great power of reason and eloquence not for propounding any transcendental metaphysics but for expounding the ills of life—their causes and conditions, their cessation, and for suggesting a way to bring

them to an end.[7] It led to a variety of interpretations of his thought and person. If there are some scholars who say that 'his philosophy, partly expressed and partly implicit', may be called 'positivism', 'phenomenalism' and 'a kind of empiricism',[8] there is one who points out that to say so is to misunderstand both positivism and the thought of the Buddha.[9] The Buddha, according to him, had been an 'empirical mystic' with 'rational gifts'.[10] If there is one who considers the Buddha an agnostic,[11] then another scholar seems to go to the length of taking him to be an annihilationist.[12] Professor T.R.V. Murti, referring to 'the practical', 'the agnostic' and 'the negative' as 'specimens of the incorrect reading of Buddhism' observes; 'These and similar interpretations do not accord with the teaching of Buddha and the doctrines of the Buddhist Schools. We can not have a way of life which does not imply a Philosophy, an ultimate appraisal of reality.'[13]

I do not disagree with it, but I would humbly point out that it is not possible for us to say definitely that the Buddha was committed to this or that specific standpoint on ontology in so far as he did not draw the implications of his own teachings. It cannot be easily denied that his own attitude was intensely practical. Take, for example, his view as represented in Poṭṭhapāda Sutta (*Dhīga Nikāya*) where, speaking on various speculations on the character of the soul, he says that the word *attā*, too, is a word like milk, butter, ghee, curds, past, present, future, etc. a mere name, a mode of speech, a label or title in common use, an expression which is used by Tathāgata also but without being misled.[14] One would not be far wrong, if one sees in such a view an anticipation of Russell's theory of 'incomplete symbols' which treats the words in common use (as, for example, table, chair, pen, paper, etc.) as mere logical constructions.[15]

There is no gainsaying that, while propounding a way of life, Buddha did make (or is reported to have made) many statements, both positive and negative, which were of a high (and suggestive) philosophic import. From the point of view of drawing their implications, we may divide Buddhism into three phases which I shall call here as the primary phase, the middle phase and the final phase. I propose to cover under them, Theravāda, Sarvāstivādī schools of Buddhism such as the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika or the Abhidharmikas, and the Mādhyamika (*Śūnyavādī*) school of Buddhism. I do not include the Yogācāra (*Vijñānavāda*) school in the scheme, because I feel that the yogācāra school did not arise so much from an interpretation of the teachings of Buddha as from a dissatisfaction with the Mādhyamika philosophy.[16]

The Theravādians lay emphasis on the statements denying substantiality of things while drawing the implications of the *Buddha-Vacana*. The first phase is, therefore, marked by a negative interpretation.[17] The two doctrines that receive their attention the most are Anātmavāda (the doctrine of no-self, i.e. *anattā*) and Anityatāvāda (the doctrine of impermanence, i.e. *anicca*). To give but one example, the cosmos (*loka*) is spoken of as 'without God (*anīssara*)', 'impermanent (*adhuva*)', and 'completely lacking (*ūna*) in any

transcendental substance' in the *Majjhima Nikāya*.[18] The dialogue between King Manender and Sage Nāgasena on the denial of a self is too well known to be quoted here.[19] It is particularly the denial of the self on the part of the Theravādins that has irked some scholars very much. George Grimm, for example, considers the whole of *Tripiṭaka* a great falsification, 'a killing of the Buddha-idea by its professed guardians'.[20] There is no need to feel perturbed, I think, if one properly understands the emphasis on denial of the self (or, for that matter, of anything) as merely a continuation of the non-committal attitude evinced by Buddha on ontology. Besides, I am in full agreement with the advice given by Stcherbatsky that 'whosoever wishes to understand Buddhism must fully realise the decision and vigour with which this doctrine (Anātmavāda) is professed and defended.'[21]

As regards the middle phase, the thinkers belonging to it paid more attention to the affirmative statements made by the master. The Buddha, while steering clear of absolute-being (*śāśavatavāda*, eternalism) and non-being (*Ucchedavāda*, annihilationism), did affirm becoming.[22] 'The becoming of all that is', in the words of Dr. Radhakrishnan 'the central fact of Buddhism.'[23] The doctrine of dependent-origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*), which was developed by the Buddha in order to explain 'becoming', has been hailed by a historian of Indian philosophy as 'the foundation of all the teachings of the Buddha.'[24] The Buddha explained 'becoming' in accordance with the doctrine of dependent-origination in the following words: 'This being, that arises (*asmin sati idam bhavati*)'. Now such an expression implies the existence of past (and future) besides the present. On being asked whether the past (and future) does exist or not, the Buddha is reported to have given a vague, yet affirmative, answer: 'All is (*sarvasti*).'[25] His being vague and affirmative, it may be pointed out, are well within his general non-committal attitude and his intention to avoid further discussion.[26]

A further quiry as to what he means by *sarvasti* brings forth the answer from the Buddha: 'Twelve *āyatanas* are.'[27] The Sarvāstivādins, picking up the suggestion of the Buddha, worked out an ontology of a radical pluralism of *dhammas*, 'the items of becoming', classified variously as twelve *āyatanas*, eighteen *dhātus*, five *skandhas*, etc.[28] For a 'dhamma' as defined by Stcherbatsky is an '*ultimate entity*, the conception of which, in the domain of matter, excludes the reality of everything except sense data and, in the field of mind, of everything except separate mental phenomena'.[29] Now, if we accept this definition of *dhamma* the Sarvāstivādins do stand committed to an ontology. But, I think, we are not bound to accept such a definition of *dhamma*, once we pay attention to the two developments in the thought of the Buddhists belonging to this phase. In any case, not all the Sarvāstivādins are staunch realists. Some of them do lean towards nominalism. For if the Vaibhāsikas consider even the *nāma-kāya* as real as *dravya-dharma*, then the Sautrāntikas are not prepared to grant the *nāma-kāya* a status other than that of mere verbal, sound.[30]

A word *paññatti* has been used in the Pāli Suttas as standing for names and concepts which are mere designations in common use without referring to anything ultimately real.[31] *Paññatti* is spoken of as a *saṅketa dhamma*, because of its being regarded significant only through convention, in *Abhidhammattha-Sangaho*.[32] 'Defining a *dhamma* which is paññatti, the *Dhamma-Sangani*',[33] according to P.S. Jaini, 'says that which is an appelation, that which is a designation, an expression, a current term, a name, a denomination, the assigning of a name, an interpretation, a distinctive mark, a phrasing on this and that *Dhamma* is a *dhamma* called Paññatti.'[34] P.S. Jaini, again, informs us that 'the *Atthasālinī*[35] says that this is a unique *dharma* which covers all *dharmas*, all *dharmas* come under its scope'.[36] If such a view of *dhammas* is taken by some Sarvāstivādins, then, according to them, the *dhammas* would not be ultimate entities but mere conventional names.

Another consideration that shows that not all the Sarvāstivadins regarded the *dhammas* as 'ultimate entities' can be discerned in the view held by the Sautrāntikas about dependent-origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*). Candrakīrti, the famous Mādhyamika scholiast, quotes a view of some philosophers in his *Mādhyamika-Kārikā-Vṛtti* on *pratītya-samutpāda*, which purports to show that the formula 'this being there that arises' (*asmin sati idam bhavati*) cannot be explained on the hypothesis of a simultaneous existence of all the *dhammas*. Causality, according to it, could be explained only in terms of the relationship between perceived appearances and inferred or supposed realities.[37] Both Poussin[38] and Stcherbatsky[39] identify this view with that of the Sautrāntikas. The *dhammas* on this view do not turn out to be 'the ultimate entities' 'but evanscent appearances' connected with some ultimate entities, which are only inferred to be and are never known directly.

The final phase of drawing the implications of the Buddha's teachings, namely, the Mādhyamika School of Buddhist philosophy, goes the whole hog and does not stop short at or emphasize this or that particular aspect of the *Buddha-vacana* as well as the *nirvacana* (silence). Nāgārjuna, the chief exponent of the school, perfected a dialectics through which he showed that the wisdom of the Tathāgata (*prajñā* or *parama-Prajñā*) could not be bound down to any particular view (*āṛṣṭi*), for 'every thesis, according to the *Mādhyamika*', in the words of Professor T.R.V. Murti, 'is self-convicted and counter-balanced by an antithesis.'[40]

By a thorough criticism of the various views Nāgārjuna shows that it cannot be maintained that there are things with their properties, things without properties or properties without things;[41] that there are five elements[42] or that there are five *Skandhas*;[43] that there is a self apart from its states, states apart from the self, or they are together with an intelligible relationship.[44] His dialectics makes him declare the self as a false appearance;[45] the notions of birth, persistence and death as illogical;[46] the distinctions such as between subject and object and their relationship—or between a doer (*kartā*) and an action (*karma*), and the result of action (*karmaphala*) as baseless.[47] It is not possible to prove conclusively that there ever was a Buddha, a *dharma* or a *sangha*.[48] Even the four noble truths and *nirvāṇa* are mere words having no basis in reality.[49] Finally, it may be observed on behalf of the Mādhyamika, that anyone who describes reality through any of the four known categories (*catuṣkoṭi*) of 'being', 'non-being', 'both' or 'neither' is bound to be wrong.[50] Every thing being inexplicable, nothing could be described as existing or non-existing, mind or matter, conscious or unconscious.[51]

Thus, it happens to be the case that 'the *Mādhyamika* does not have a thesis of his own. He does not construct Syllogisms and adduce arguments and examples of his own.'[52] Considering the 'rejection of all theory as the highest wisdom,'[53] the Mādhyamika addresses himself to the task of picking holes in the arguments of the opponents.[54] In his case, therefore, the question of any commitment, ontological or otherwise, does not arise.

The Yogācāra Buddhists may, however, protest against the thoroughly noncommittal attitude of the Mādhyamikas. For they may point out that in the very recognition of the absurdity of any view—or in the construction of any subject-object duality—we undeniably affirm the existence of consciousness, mind knowledge or thought.[55] Besides, they say consciousness is self-revealatory (*ātmasamvedanameva sadaiva jñānam*).[56] One may deny an object of cognition apart from cognition or an act of cognition apart from cognition, but how can one deny cognition itself which is self-luminous beyond the distinction of the subject and the object[57] The Yogācāras, thus, again bring about the problem of an ontological commitment in the purview of the Buddhist thought.

Notes

1. J.W.N. Sullivan, *The Limitations of Science* (Mentor Series).
2. Among the numerous such scientists one may mention the names of Sir Arthur Eddington and James Jeans.
3. Cf. L.S. Stebbing, *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, seventh edn, London, 1963 pp. 395-9.
4. There are some philosophers these days who would deny that we possess any such language.
5. P.T. Geach, A.J. Ayer and W.V. Quine were the participants. For example, in an interesting symposium 'On What There Is', held at the joint session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association at Edinburgh in July 1951. See *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume*, xxv, pp. 125-60.
6. See, *Majjhima Nikāya Sutta* 63 (*Dialogues of Buddha* by Rhys Davids, Vol. 1, pp. 426-32), Sutta 72 (*ibid.*, pp. 483 ff); *Dhiga Nikāya, Mahānidāna Sutta* (Vol. II, p. 86); *Samyutta-Nikāya. Vacchagotta Samyuttam* (Vol. III, pp. 257 ff). *Avyākata Samyuttam* (Vol. IV, pp. 374-403); *Aṅguttara-Nikāya* (Vol. IV, pp. 67 ff).
7. See, Oldenberg, *The Buddha*, pp. 127 ff; Dale Riepe, *The Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought*, p. 128.
8. S.C. Chatterji and D.M. Datta, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy* (fifth edn), Calcutta, 1954, p. 142.

9. Dale Riepe, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-24.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 123, fn, 28.
11. A.B. Kieth, *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 63.
12. Oldenberg as quoted by E.J. Thomas in his *History of Buddhist Thought*, p. 127.
13. T.R.V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, London 1960, p. 37.
14. *Imā kho citta, loka-samaññā, loka-niruttiyā, loka-vohāra, loka-paññattiyo, yāhi Tathāgata Voharati aparāmasamti. Dhīga Nikāya*, 1. p. 202; cf. P.S. Jaini, 'The *Vaibhāsika* Theory of Words and Meanings', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, University of London, Vol. XXII,1959, pp. 99-100.
15. See L.S. Stebbing, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-58, 502-5.
16. In most of the books dealing with the history of Buddhist philosophy, the order in which the schools are discussed the Yogācāra school is treated next to the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika and before the Mādhyamika. Looked at from a particular point of view that procedure, too, is logical.
17. Cf. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 676 ff.
18. *Majjhima Nikāya* II, 68.
19. See Treckner (ed.), *Milindapañha*, pp. 25ff.
20. *Die Wissenschaft des Buddhismus* (Leipzig, 1923), note in p. 2, quoted by M. Winternitz in 'Self and non-Self in Early Buddhism', *Jha Commemoration Volume*, n.1, p. 457. Such has been the view of Mrs. Rhys Davids too, according to Winternitz.
21. See *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, London, Vol. VI, 1931, p. 873.
22. Cf. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 1, pp. 365 ff.; Oldenberg, *The Buddha*, p. 240.
23. S. Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, p. 368.
24. Chandradhar Sharma, *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, p. 72.
25. Cf. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word 'Dhamma'* London, 1923, p. 5.
26. See P.T. Geach in symposium 'On What There Is', *op. cit.*, sup. n. 5, pp. 128-9 (on 'everything' being a vague answer to what there is); see also Ayer, *ibid.*, p. 147 (where he observes: 'The denial of being is, in Philosophy, the prelude to explanation; the affirmation of being more often a refusal to provide one').
27. Cf. Stcherbatsky, *op. cit.*, sup. n. 25.
28. See *ibid.*, for an exhaustive list of the *Dhammas*; Warren, *Buddhism in Translation*, p. 158; Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*, p. 41.
29. Stcherbatsky, *op. cit*, p. 6.
30. See *Vibhāṣā Prabhā Vṛtti* (Commentary on *Abhidharmadīpa of Vasubandhu*, ed. P.S. Jaini, Tibetan Sanskrit Series, Patna) on *Kārikā* 142.
31. Cf. P.S. Jaini, 'The Vaibhāṣika Theory of Words and Meanings' in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, London, Vol. XXII, 1959, p. 99.
32. *Sayam paññatti vinneya loka-saṅketa-nimmitā.* See *Abhidhammattha-Sangaha* of Aniruddha, VIII. 36.
33. *Mātikās*, 128-30.
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37. *Mādhyamika-Kārikā Vṛtti* (or *Prasannapadā*) of Candrakīrti (ed. L. De la Vallee Poussin), p. 5.
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39. *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, Leningrad, 1927, p. 86. n. 1,
40. T.R.V. Murti, *op. cit.*, 1960, p. 136.
41. *Mūlamādhyamika-Kārikā*, vii.
42. *Ibid.*, IV.

43. *Ibid.*, V.
44. *Ibid.*, VI, 10.
45. *Ibid.*, x. 16, XVIII, 1, 4.
46. *Ibid.*, XI. 2, 8.
47. *Ibid.*, XIV. 3, XVII. 33.
48. *Ibid.*, XXIV.
49. *Ibid.*, XVI. 4-10; XXV. 4-16.
50. *Ibid.*, XIII. 8; See also T. Suzuki, 'The *Awakening of Faith in Mahāyāna* (*Mahāyāna Shraddotpādakaśāstra* of Ashvagosha retranslated from the Chinese translation of Paramārtha), Chicago, 1900, p. 59.
51. T. Suzuki, *Ibid.*, pp. 111-12.
52. T.R.V. Murti, *op. cit.*, p. 132.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
54. This is the task of a philosopher according to St. Thomas Aquinas; also cf. W.V. Quine, 'on what there is symposium', *op. cit.*, (sup. n. 5), p. 159.
55. Cf. T.R.V. Murti, *op. cit.*, p. 319; cf. also *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi Vimśatikā* (ed. S. Levi, Paris, 1925) *Vṛtti* on *Kārikā* 1.
56. *Tattvasamgraha-Pañjikā* of Kamalaśīla, Kārikā 1899, Gaekwad Oriental Series XXX, Vol. 1), p. 559.
57. *Nānyo nabhāvyo buddhyā'sti tasya nānuvhāvyo paraḥ. Grāhya grāhaka vaidhuryāt svayam saiva prakāśate* in *Sarvadarśanasangraha* (ed. Vasudeva Shastri, Abbyaṅkar Bhandarkar Research Institute, Poona), p. 12; cited from *Pramāṇaviniścaya* of Dharmakīrti.

Time, self and consciousness: some conceptual patterns in the context of Indian thought

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A survey of ideas regarding time, self and consciousness would certainly indicate that the earliest concern for these issues was expressed by philosophers and theologians of different traditions. It can be seen that systematic intellectual effort was directed towards raising relevant questions and formulating appropriate responses already at an early date in history. This gave rise to widely divergent theories. Since then the process of reconceptualization has not by any means lost its vitality. It is all the more reinforced as these issues gradually became concern for other disciplines as well.

The conceptual patterns to be discussed in this paper are based on original texts of Brāhmaṇism and Buddhism, the two major traditions of Indian thought. Reference will be made to certain schools representing these two traditions in order to indicate the variety of viewpoints in the treatment of these issues.

It may be observed at the outset that, if an analysis of the different conceptual schemes in the Indian context shows preoccupation with soteriology as an ultimate concern, it equally demonstrates that this has not blocked a free philosophical exploration of ideas. On the contrary, it triggered an enormous interest in these issues, and has inspired profound search into the various aspects of the questions—metaphysical, psychological, epistemological, etc. This comes to the forefront as we examine closely the inherent philosophical tensions between Brāhmaṇism and Buddhism that kept on provoking reformulations of views through centuries of confrontation. To place the ideas in the traditional framework it is fruitful to take note that Brāhmaṇical soteriology, despite the internal variations, unanimously maintains that only *ātmavidyā*, i.e. knowledge of the self, can give salvation. The Buddhist tradition, on the other hand, with its deep involvement in the quest for *nirvāṇa* claimed that the greatest hindrance to this pursuit is the adherence to the notion of a permanent , identical self.

It is not, therefore, arbitrarily that Brāhmaṇism and Buddhism continued to be known as *ātmavāda* and *anātmavāda* respectively, one affirming and the the other denying the ultimate reality of *ātman*. This basic contrast finds expression in a substance versus modal view, one inducing a search for an unchanging core, the other seeing it as everchanging or as a process.

However, it is significant to note that a philosophical formulation of a theory of self or no-self needs to be supported by specific interpretations of time and consciousness.

Let us take a closer look at the question in dispute. The term 'self' is one amongst the most cherished of all metaphysical terms which is still not obsolete. Disregarding for the moment philosophical sophistications concerning the nature, constitution or other eventual complexities of the idea of self, let us turn our attention to the phenomenon which is of basic importance in this connection, viz. 'I'-consciousness. This forms the nucleus of our mental life. It is central to our awareness of ourselves that in the midst of and in spite of the flux of thought-processes we retain the peculiar quality of sameness and identity. 'I'-consciousness is accounted for differently by philosophers of different persuasions, but the presence of this phenomenon as an integral component of our experience is never questioned. There are many statements by philosophers, from East and West, which one could cite in support of this. The French existentialist philosopher, J.-P. Sartre, for instance, expressed this wittily: '...no one says, perhaps I have an ego.' Similarly, Vācaspati Miśra, an outstanding figure in the history of Indian thought, also remarked: 'For no one is there any doubt whether I am or not, nor does any one maintain the contrary of I am.' This, in brief, can be testified by all. However, far from being a simple matter, this indisputable fact turns out to be a perennial problem that haunts the philosophical mind.

Various views can be found in the Brāhmaṇical and the Buddhist philosophical traditions concerning this subject. Preoccupation with the study of diverse aspects of consciousness has a long history in India. Let us mention a few examples of the typical philosophical inquiries. Questions are raised regarding what forms the basis for the sense of 'I', whether self and ego are equivalent concepts or not; does consciousness belong to a self or are self and consciousness one and the same? There also arise such questions as to whether 'I' -consciousness is always consciousness of an object, i.e. whether intentionality is a basic feature of consciousness or not? Are consciousness of an object and consciousness of consciousness simultaneous happenings or do they involve a temporal sequence? One could multiply such examples. The answers to these questions are worked out both on Brāhmaṇical and Buddhist premises. It can be observed that closely connected with this sort of inquiry is the investigation concerning time. It becomes evident as one proceeds that a theory of consciousness, with or without reference to an abiding self, involves specific attitudes to time.

The conceptual models of self or *ātman* that specific schools of philosophy in the Brāhmaṇical tradition operate with can be seen to be intimately related to the different interpretations of 'I'-consciousness on the one hand and the various views about time on the other.

Equally fascinating is the rejection of the idea of a permanent self on the part of the Buddhist philosophers. They accounted for the notion and cognition of 'I' in accordance with the theories of consciousness which they developed. In this connection, it is especially important to observe that the idea of an abiding self is rejected essentially on a premise where a view of

time as instant is conceived in a radical manner—that at no two instants anything can remain identical.

But before we deal with this Buddhist theory, let us take a review of some conceptual patterns from the Brāhmaṇical tradition concerning time, self and consciousness. Despite their common allegiance to the exegetical texts of the Upaniṣads which focused on the idea of immutable *ātman*, the Brāhmaṇical schools worked out distinctly different theories of self retaining the central insight. Their views about time and consciousness also vary.

To the Indian realists belonging to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools, an analysis of phenomena such as memory, recognition, the knowledge-situation itself or moral and soteriological strivings indicates the reality of self. It is the very basis of 'I'-consciousness, the word 'I' having absolutely no other referent. This is a category of thought which cannot be dispensed with but at the risk of leaving experiences unexplained, unaccounted for. The metaphysical view of self as a distinct ontological entity, i.e. as apart from the body, the sense-organs and the mind, gradually takes shape. Consciousness belongs to the self as an attribute to a substance.

This idea of the self is worked out in a conceptual structure which operates with the notion of absolute time. It is interesting to note that in this system of metaphysical pluralism self and time are on a par ontologically, figuring in the list of entities to which no beginning or end can be ascribed (*nitya padārtha*). There is, of course, a plurality of selves whereas time is unitary. All pluralistic usages of time are explained as merely conventional. The absolute, indivisible, all-pervasive time is the frame of reference for all that is contingent, i.e. to which any beginning or end or both can be attributed.

The self, thus, is not in time. Consciousness, as has been mentioned earlier, is conceived in this system as a quality which inheres in the self. It emerges when there is a collocation of mind (*manas*), the sense-organs (*indriya*) and the object (*viṣaya*). Thus, consciousness is contingent, hence temporal in character, i.e. it has a beginning and an end in time. This, however, does not affect the non-temporal character of the abiding self.

The notion of objective time is vital to the system. Their theory of causality, conceptions of change, origination and anihilation are worked out on a premise of objective time. The theory rejects the view that time is a subjective construction.

The treatment of the issues of time, self and consciousness in other Brāhmaṇical systems does not follow this pattern.

The Saṁkhya-Yoga conceptual structures put forward a more profound view on the question of self while rejecting the idea of an empty time. The idea of *puruṣa*, the principle of consciousness, reflects the Upaniṣadic concern for an immutable self where no distinction is sought between self and consciousness. Here we encounter a complex notion of a principle of egoity (*ahaṁkāra*): 'I'-consciousness is no more simply referring to the self, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools maintain, but is a composition of two heterogenous

components. It is seen as an interplay of the two principles of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. In other words, 'I'-consciousness is recognized as an empirical subjectivity, deriving its support from a principle of transcendental subjectivity and anchored as well to the ever-changing, insentient *prakṛti*. The dichotomy of these principles is also reflected in their interpretation of time-experience. There is no absolute time in this system. Time is to be understood as intertwined in the movement of the *prakṛti*, the dynamic principle of matter. It is in the concept of *prakṛti* that Sāṁkhya combines time and matter. It is worth noting that all change is ascribed to *prakṛti*, which by very definition is insentient, whereas that which is aware of change is a principle which in its essential nature is free from all mutations. In other words, that which changes cannot be aware of itself as changing, it is insentient (*jaḍa*), whereas that which is aware of change is a principle which remains constant.

With regard to the movement inherent in *prakṛti*, Sāṁkhya makes a distinction between the homogenous (*sadṛśa*) and heterogenous (*visadṛśa*) modifications. This is thought-provoking as it has direct implication for the question of time. The idea is that the three *guṇas* constituting *prakṛti* do not combine in the primordial homogenous movement. This may be said to represent time in its transcendental aspect. The creative movement, however, implies a combination of *guṇas* which bring forth heterogenous evolutes. It is only with reference to this heterogenous movement that the time-phases of past, present and future are meaningful. This is the empirical aspect of time.

The Yoga school contributed its own specific theory of discrete time. This brings forth the idea that the ultimate temporal datum is the instant. It is the instant alone which is objective. Since no two instants can be said to exist simultaneously, all ideas of temporal sequence (*karma*) or collection (*samāhāra*) of instants are nothing but conceptual constructions.

Now we shall examine a last example from the same tradition, viz. the system of Advaita Vedānta, where Brāhmaṇism is said to have reached its profoundest understanding of the self. This remarkably complex conceptual understanding of self is based on a refutation of the intentional and egological structures of consciousness. The position agrees with Sāṁkhya in maintaining that 'I'-consciousness involves an intermingling of heterogenous elements. A distinction is made between the concepts of self and ego, the ego is reduced to the status of not-self.

The system not only rejects the reality of absolute time but also refuses to grant ontological status to any principle of change like the Sāṁkhya *prakṛti*. Self and consciousness are not distinguished, i.e. self is consciousness. Consciousness is ever constant (*kutastha*), it is the contents that alter. Startling is the final philosophy of self which claims that the (true) self is the self of all. It is non-dual, i.e. knows of no 'other' to itself. It is being *par excellence*. This idea, worked out with great philosophical acumen, does not deny a plurality of egos on the empirical plane. The self is described as 'unsublatable in all three times' (*trikālabadhya*). It is that about which it cannot

be said it is not, it was not or it will not be. One arrives at a notion of being as timeless.

To summarize, in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika structure time and self are independent of one another, but both belong to the same ontological category. In Sāṁkhya-Yoga, *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are two independent categories but both are ontological. In Advaita Vedānta the category of time *qua* change is merely empirical, metaphysically appearance. *Ātman* alone is the non-dual reality. In all cases, despite the variations in their understanding of time, self and consciousness, it can be observed that self is always conceived in such a manner that it remains outside the influence of time (*kālaprabhāvamukta*). Self or *ātman* is the pivotal concern of the Brāhmaṇical tradition. Apart from these views, already mentioned, the tradition knows also of other conceptual models concerning self.

With the advent of Buddhism that idea of permanent self, in all its different forms, was subjected to a severe critical analysis. The Buddhist tradition decried the notion as having no foundation in reality.

It is possible to trace the development of the no-self view, in its various versions, through the principal phases of Indian Buddhism. The view 'all that is, is without self' (*sarvam anātman*) is a natural sequel to the idea 'all is impermanent' (*sarvam anityam*), mentioned already in the sermons of Gautama Buddha, the founder of the tradition.

At first the idea is seen as an effective moral tool for the cultivation of detachment, for abandoning 'I'-ness and 'my'-ness (*ahaṁkāra, mamakāra*). Soon the impact of the idea becomes evident on such areas of inquiry as epistemology, psychology, metaphysics. The Buddhist philosophical literature contains elaborate and complex analyses which aim at a refutation of the idea of self, and thereby all that is held to be unchanging, by common sense as well as philosophical theories. The Buddhist universe of discourse also introduces a set of concepts which could interpret, connect together and explain coherently, a whole range of human experiences without any reference to the category of the permanent, of which the most cherished stronghold is the idea of self.

It is, in this connection, that the Buddhist understanding of time plays a crucial role. The attempt at a precise formulation of the idea of universal impermanence leads to the important Buddhist theory of universal momentariness (*kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda*) which says 'all that is real is momentary in character' (*yat sat tat kṣaṇikam*).

The Sautrāntika school rendered an invaluable service to the cause of no-self theory by providing a logical device. Maintaining causal efficiency (*arthakriyā-kāritva*) to be the criterion which distinguishes the real from the fictitious, these Buddhist philosophers arrived at a sharp and novel formulation of the ideas of being and time. The objective is to demonstrate that time as moment and being as momentary ontologically coalesce. The so-called permanent entity is shown to be fictitious. This is the radical Buddhist conception of

universal flux, where a separation of the moment and the momentary is attributed to an arbitrary linguistic convention. This is projecting a world-view where nothing is exempt from change.

Consciousness also conforms to this rule. There can be no place for any permanent, persisting, unchanging self in the chain of conscious-moments. In fact, the point that is stressed is that neither within the bodily and mental phenomena of existence nor outside them can be found anything that in the ultimate sense could be regarded as a self-reliant substance or ego. In short, it is a total rejection of the substance-view. 'There are only groups of separate elements, physical and mental which are interrelated, which form themselves and unform themselves.' This is implied by the doctrine of the five aggregates (*pañcaskandha*), to which I will refer again. These are, briefly, some ideas from the realistic phase of early Buddhism. In the idealistic phase, however, appears a more complex theory of consciousness (*vijñaptimātratā*) which added richer perspectives to the question of ego and allied issues.

The drastic implications of the no-self view lead to controversies. The polemical literature puts in relief the philosophical tension. The Brāhmaṇical philosophers clearly perceived that this Buddhist idea of being as momentary was incompatible with any theory of abiding self, the principal concern of the tradition, and, therefore, challenged the idea. *The idea of permanent self could be reinstated only if the Buddhist interpretation of time were rejected.*

The Buddhists in their turn considered the idea of *ātman* as an unwarrantable assumption—logically absurd, psychologically superfluous, ethically and soteriologically even an obstacle. An abandonment of the stereotyped course of thinking in terms of a permanent self naturally leads to reformulation of concepts along a novel line, hitherto unexplored. This also acted as an impetus to a rethinking and a restatement within the fold of the Brāhmaṇical tradition. Rapid growth of ideas ensued under pressure of disputes and dialogues, creating an intense awareness of philosophical issues.

There is a vast polemical literature. It is, indeed, philosophically stimulating to pursue the record of controversies. Leaving aside the exchanges with the Brāhmaṇical schools where the idea of self serves as a bond of unity amongst otherwise varied systems, let us turn our attention to the disputes amongst the Buddhist philosophers themselves.

As soon as the view of permanent self or soul is stamped as erroneous and these terms are taken to be merely nominalistic, having no referent in reality, it is followed by a scrutiny of human personality. There emerged, as I have mentioned before, the doctrine of *pañcaskandha*. This focuses on the conception of an individual as nothing other than an aggregate of elements, there being no underlying unifying principle. The difficulty of such a position is felt also within the Buddhist tradition. The Vatsiputriyas, who equally claimed themselves to be Buddhists, advanced a theory called Pudgalavāda. This merits attention as it represents a view which sought to do without the

postulation of a permanent subject but felt the need for a unifying principle without which, they thought, mental life will be chaotic.

However, this principle of individuality (*pudgala*) was found unacceptable by the Sautrāntikas as well as the Vijñānavādins, as it was not compatible with the notion of momentariness. The Vatsiputriyas launched the idea in order to save the unity of mental life which otherwise would be reduced to a plurality of psychical factors, which are momentary. To the extent that *pudgala* could be viewed as distinct from the aggregate, it could not be strictly considered as momentary. They were therefore labelled as pseudo-Buddhists. The record throws light on the problems of time and identity.

Mention must be made of the dialectical awareness that dawned in the second phase of Indian Buddhism, in the school of Mādhyamika. It not only saw the limitations of the substance-view but also of the modal-view advocated in the first phase of Buddhism. What is especially interesting for the present discussion is their careful examination of the views of self and the views of time (*ātmaparikṣā* and *kālaparikṣā*). What is attempted here is to demonstrate that not only the idea of permanent self but also the idea that there is nothing underlying the flux of consciousness is unsound. Similarly, the idea of absolute, unitary time and that of time as instant are shown to be both equally untenable. In fact, the use of dialectics is made in order to expose the inevitable contradictions inherent in any theory, and thereby to expose all claims of speculative metaphysics as dogmatism.

Some philosophical issues discussed in the idealistic phase of Indian Buddhism deserve special attention as they are particularly significant for a study of time and consciousness. It was in this phase of Buddhism that the school of Yogācāra Vijñānavāda developed an elaborate theory of consciousness, throwing light on its different aspects.

One of the ideas that came to play an important role was that consciousness of an object and consciousness of consciousness are invariably apprehended together. In other words, there is no temporal sequence involved. This was held to be the very presupposition of knowledge. To know is *at the same time* (moment) to be conscious of knowing. But for this view of self-awareness (*svasaṁvedana*), no satisfactory account of the epistemological situation can be given. If, on the contrary, it is assumed that one conscious-moment would require another to make itself known to itself, it would inevitably lead to the fallacy of infinite regress.

Lastly, I will refer to a philosophical dispute amongst the philosophers of the same school. The issue in question was whether the absolute, non-dual consciousness in the state of *nirvāṇa* can be said to be momentary. The great master of the school, Vasubandhu, described it not only as blissful (*sukham*) but as immutable (*sthiram*). This position, as has been observed by many, comes precariously close to the Advaita Vedānta stand. The later advocates of the same school found Vasubandhu's interpretation unacceptable. They insisted on the idea that momentariness is a basic feature of consciousness,

empirically as well as transcendentally. In other words, the idea of an immutable consciousness is rejected not only in the context of *saṁsāra* but also in *nirvāṇa*.

A global review of the principal theological traditions tacitly indicates their preoccupation with the ideas of time, self and consciousness. Concepts and symbols, doctrines and mythologies express this concern. There are various ways of playing with these ideas. The most familiar is the idea of the self as transcending, overcoming time. In this connection, it may be observed that the Buddhist position is an exception to the general pattern.

The versatility of Indian thought is demonstrated in the diversity of conceptual schemes, which exemplify the variety of responses to the soteriological challenge. If Brāhmaṇical tradition is a witness to the various ways of confirming the reality of self (*ātman*), in its extreme form even by denying change *qua* time any ontological status, as in the case of Advaita Vedānta, the Buddhist soteriology carves out a novel way where the notion of an abiding self is abandoned and the temporality (momentariness) of consciousness is affirmed. In the later phase of Yogācāra Vijñānavāda, as has been mentioned, even in *nirvāṇa* consciousness is said to be momentary.

Given the intense preoccupation with these questions in the Indian traditions, it will, indeed, be fruitful to place these ideas in an inter-cultural context. This will add, it may be hoped, richer perspective to the ongoing intellectual exploration of these controversial issues. It remains to be seen whether an awareness of the contributions of major philosophical traditions across cultures will inspire a new direction in philosophical inquiry about these themes and provide a more substantial basis for an encounter of religions.

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8. Guṇa, a technical term difficult to render into English. Cf. My *A Study of Time in Indian Philosophy*, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1983, f.n., p. 45.
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14. The idea of identical self (or soul) is, generally speaking, central to define. Since for the Buddhists there is no permanent self underlying the succession of momentary conscious units, the Indian materialists (*Cārvākas*) insisted that the Buddhists should further accept that this consciousness is an epiphenomenon; that this life is the only life with pleasure as its highest goal; and that death alone is 'salvation'. The Buddhists reject this position. Their soteriology operates with the notions of rebirth, *karma*, etc.

The other European science of nature?*

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The Problem and the Framework

Allow me to begin by explaining that, being of middle age now, I belong to that generation which was still in school when independence and partition came upon us. We were too young to have participated in the national freedom movement, but we were old enough to have had some definite expectations of what was to come afterwards. We had all taken science increasingly seriously, and we thought then that, as we built up our own culture as well as politics, there were at least two major programmes our national elders would be committed to: that in importing things from the West we would be selective, and not indiscriminate; and that we would adapt our imports—both material and cultural—to India rather than adapting India to them.

If this programme appears on a retrospective look to have failed, and I for one think that it has, then surely one has to face the question of whether it was wrongly conceived in the first place, and not merely fix the blame for who has failed us. Could it be that there are things or whole fields that we have to take as given, and to try and absorb indiscriminately?

I would like to try and narrow down this kind of enquiry to certain specific issues. Perhaps the chief thing that we are expected to take as a whole in India and the Third World is the field of science, beginning with what we are taught in schools as certain knowledge, which is knowledge that is clear, definite and agreed upon by the consensus of experts. For instance, nowadays all children the world over are taught in school that the earth is round, and they are all given the same proofs for it. These proofs are scientific proofs which do not include artistic, aesthetic, ethical or utilitarian considerations. I do not suggest that for anyone to reject this is to return to teaching that the earth is flat. What I am concerned with is asking whether a more important question might be: 'Is the earth a living creature or not?' Is it a living creature like Mother Earth, or is the latter expression a purely metaphorical one? If the earth is a living creature, then we have to discuss it in the context of a theory of what life is, what living creatures are, and what implications this view has for our active attitude to the environment.

The discourse of nature or what we call science is not self-explanatory, whatever the general positivist assumption might be, but requires the discourse of culture or the culture of discourse to complete it. Therefore, I am assuming that, apart from or along with its content, the particular manner

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of forming a question, and the form of the right answer expected, really define and constitute the scientific and cultural universe in which a particular age, nation and class thinks and lives. To concretize such questions is, therefore, to define a particular viewpoint toward history. If we can come to grips with these questions in India today, we shall have to make up our own mind independently as to what has happened in modern European culture, which constitutes the chief source of our imports in the world of knowledge, and to decide whether there exist alternate non-dominant traditions and underground tendencies which could redefine the official history handed down to us.

One possible framework for our search would be to divide the history of modern European culture into three periods or phases: the first period of creativity or the Copernican Age (1500–1650); then the period of institutionalization (1650–1800), when scientific organizations and scientific journals really got established in Britain, France and Germany; and, thirdly, the period when this pattern of organization and system of thinking were diffused throughout the world under colonial rule (1800–1950).

One may, then, look for certain events or certain individuals from each period through whom one could discover and demonstrate tendencies that have been ignored by the established histories. For instance, around 1500, instead of restudying Copernicus, I looked for someone who would be as modern but perhaps in some other sense, i.e. linked to what has been called the radical Reformation as well as the Renaissance and, say, the peasant war in Germany beyond the Alps. It turned out that the perfect candidate was Paracelsus (1493–1541), who is already known to be important in the history of chemistry and medicine and also involved in the history of magic, but whose importance in the history of religion and politics is yet to be discovered. I now believe that it is possible to show that there existed a Paracelsian revolution just as much as there was a Copernican revolution, but the first was underground and connected, on the one hand, with the peasant war in Germany, and with some definite ideas of non-violence, right in the middle of the Wars of Religion, on the other hand. To put it another way, the radical European underground was not just a political movement; it also had equally a scientific and a religious aspect. In religion people like Paracelsus were represented by the Anabaptists and they were forcibly suppressed, and I mean forcibly, although they were completely non-violent and believed in non-violence as a creed.

Similarly, later around 1800, the Paracelsus tradition was revived and updated from the German underground by the philosophy of nature and the scientific writings of Goethe, as I shall try to explain, and his themes were subsequently developed on the right by Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* as well as on the left by Engels' *Dialectics of Nature,* both of whom have been systematically denigrated by apologists of the official methodology of Copernicus, Galileo and Newton. I will, therefore, try and answer the question posed by this seminar at the beginning in the affirmative but on the ground of science

itself rather than of philosophy; and argue in defence of Goethe that in his alternative experimental science, he was being neither (*a*) a materialist nor (*b*) an idealist but pursuing in his non-dualist way (*c*) the illuminationist gnosis, and illustrate my thesis in some detail rather than in general.

At the Centre: The Human Body

As is well known, Goethe (1749–1832) was a versatile genius, and, apart from being a great poet, did great scientific work in optics, botany, etc. The dominant science tradition has responded by dividing the latter into two parts: (*a*) natural history, the part that is 'descriptive', as in his botany and plant morphology, and which has eventually been absorbed into the scientific mainstream minus his philosophy; and (*b*) natural philosophy, the part that Goethe would himself state as specifically physics, which is mainly his study on optics and the theory of colours, and which is now considered as mostly wrong. It is most kindly supposed to be of interest only to people who are really concerned with his literary work, as a mistaken extension of his poetic imagination to the wrong field.

But let us, for this one moment, take his work on optics seriously as *physics,* not only as literature or metaphor. Goethe himself said that there had been greater poets than he in the past—there were equally great poets living contemporaneously, like his friend Schiller, and doubtless there would be still greater poets to come—but that he was the only man of his century who knew the truth about colour, and yet no one would recognize his superiority to Newton. I propose to take his statement seriously, and invite you to see where it leads us.

Those who are of the empirical habit of mind might first like to set up these two experiments with a prism and verify the two results, the Goethe spectrum and the Newton spectrum, as shown in Fig. 1. The latter is also familiar from our school physics. If there were a simple polemic between the two views, it would be with the Newtonian claiming that the Goethe spectrum



Fig. 1 Hues of the light and the dark

was really two Newton spectra muddled up, and not really a physical phenomenon by itself, with the Goethe school possibly making precisely the same claim in reverse that the Newton spectrum is a mixture of two Goethe spectra. But the underlying belief of the follower of Newton is that white light is a real physical phenomenon, while darkness has no physical reality. A light or white band breaking up into a spectrum of monochromatic constituents is a physical phenomenon, while the Goethe view of the apparent inverse, the dark band on a white background, is a kind of optical illusion, useful only for artists.

Those who are of the opposite, philosophical habit of mind would be better advised to start with the question whether the two spectra are both models of reality, or are they models of our knowledge of reality, models of truth? Or can there be still a third possible solution?

The answer will help us to explain that what Goethe wanted to demonstrate was that the light and the dark are neither two disconnected realities nor linear opposites in the way that they had been assumed to be; they are both simultaneously physical and psychological. To make his argument at all intelligible, if not to prove it, we have to assume that the underlying structure of his universe of the discourse of nature is that the sensible world consists of three parts: the medium, which is a kind of matter that fills space, and another part consisting of two segments, the light and the dark, each of which is the condition of the other. The whole is perceived or assumed to be related, I think, in some such way, i.e. understanding the struggle and the unity of opposites as non-linear, as shown in Fig. 2.



Fig. 2 The unity of opposites

We are to imagine the human eye situated at two different positions successively: the first where it looks at the light through a darkened medium and the other where it looks at the dark through a lightened medium. Now, there is no argument in Goethe's *Theory of Colours** that would assume that the light and the dark directly, physically affect each other. His argument, as

*This English version of the original German was published in 1840.

I understand it, is rather that the two *simultaneously* affect material media, which also function to hold them apart, and that it is their simultaneous action of opposition and mediation that produces an effect on the eye which we call colour. This interpretation is also borne out by some epigrammatic poems that Goethe wrote around the same time as his book on colour. I have, therefore, represented the phenomenon in Fig. 2 visually by showing the light and the dark along two axes at right angles to each other, and in relation to the medium and the eye.

Goethe does say plainly that the two basic physical colours are the yellow and the blue. Eye-1 will see yellow because it looks at light through a darkened medium, and Eye-2 will see blue because it looks in the opposite or other configuration, viz. at the dark through a lightened medium. I suppose that this also explains why we speak in the English language of the yellow press, a medium that obscures the light, and of blue movies, a medium that illumines the dark. The final consequence of all this is that nature opens the structure of its whole system of discourse to the eye through the language of colour.

I hope that it will be obvious that Goethe has, in fact, taken Newton's *unilinear* spectrum, where the colours are laid out serially and quantitatively from the ultra-violet to the infra-red in relation to wavelength and frequency, and has now transformed it to curve back upon itself, rejoining its two ends through the colour that he calls *purpur*, pure red or magenta, to form the circumference of a circle or a ring of hues. He encloses the whole colour range around its natural percipient, the human eye (Fig. 3). Goethe places at the centre of his scientific concern not something from physics (the purely material and objective) nor from psychology (the purely mental, subjective or



Fig. 3 Thesis, antithesis and synthesis

artistic) but from where they join, that is, the human body. I think that the human body was for Goethe the best experimental laboratory, the perfect locus of the interlocution of man and nature, since it is that part of the external world which mind can know subjectively and also simultaneously that part of the self which one can know objectively oneself. Fig. 3 represents a transformation of the phenomenon of colours from the view of the official Copernican tradition into that of the radical Paracelsian tradition.

The Theory of Colours

Let us now come to the structure of the exposition itself in Goethe's book, *Theory of Colours*, which consists of two parts, each with three chapters. The first chapter is on the eye of the subject; it is physiological. The second chapter moves from the subject to the object; it is on physics. And the third chapter is on the chemistry of colours, pigments fixed in the object. In a Newtonian scheme, on the other hand, the exposition would be somewhat differently arranged. The successive chapters would ascend in the order of complexity of the phenomena; and so physics would come first, chemistry next and physiology last. We have only to see the arrangement of most school syllabi and textbooks to recognize this official sequence of matter, life and mind, whether one ascends the ladder by emergence or descends it by reduction. The Goethe scheme, I want to emphasize, puts first the human agency of knowledge. Prism or no prism, laboratory or no laboratory, we do, in fact, perceive natural phenomena through the agency of the human body and the senses. It is logical and sensible, according to Goethe, to study first this instrument which mediates between mind and the world.

For example, in the very first chapter, Goethe develops the concept of the after-image of colour. Such after-images occur according to the three diametrically opposed pairs of colours on what he called the colour circle (Fig. 3). If one looks fixedly at pure red and then shuts one's eyes, one will see green and vice versa. The same rule applies to the pair of violet and yellow, and to the pair of blue and orange, which likewise reciprocally evoke one another in the eye. Here the primary opposition is not so much physical or psychological as physiological.

The second chapter on physical colours, with its focus on the image in the medium, is the hardest to swallow for Newtonians, and it is thus violently controversial. I have tried to explain its fundamental opposition of the blue and the yellow in Fig. 2, which is the best that I can do in defence of Goethe.

The third chapter needs to be read with some knowledge of early modern alchemy, since this is the third dimension that Goethe brings to his opposites in the chemistry of colour. The yellow and the blue, when simply combined 'raw', as it were, will produce green, the colour of harmony (Fig. 3, bottom). But if the two are separately 'cooked', both will approach magenta or pure red, the colour of their true reconciliation (Fig. 3, top). This colour, to which

Goethe gave the name *purpur*, often wrongly translated as purple, is the one through which he rejoined the two extreme ends of the unilinear Newton spectrum. *Purpur* or pure red, Goethe said, includes, either in actuality or in potentiality, all the other colours. In early modern alchemy, e.g. Paracelsus, the white put into the furnace passes through yellow and orange to become the majestic red, master of all colours, 'the oriental king' or the rising sun (I suppose).

The interesting thing to notice here is that the triad of the Goethe spectrum, represented by the upright triangle, is made up of elementary colours—1, 2 and 3—the polar opposites of yellow and blue resolved or reconciled into a third: thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Then occurs the vital new process from colour 3 to colour 4 that I can only describe for the time being as the process of reflection, the pure red reflected through the eye into green, and after reflection it is further elaborated into two more complex colours, colour 5 (orange) and colour 6 (violet), which complete the triad of the Newton spectrum, represented by the inverted triangle of colours—4, 5 and 6. The elementary triad of Goethe (Fig. 1a) and the complex triad of Newton (Fig. 1b) are thus interwoven by metaphor and metonymy as neighbours on the colour circle as well as preserving the nature of physiological opposites through the eye, so that the numbers allocated to any pair of colours add up to seven, as you can see.

The new suggestion that I am making here is that the relationship between the two interwoven triangles, the Goethe triad and the Newton triad, in some way represents the relation between the macrocosm (the elementary) and the microcosm (the complex). The relation is not at all that of correspondence as it is called in the cosmological literature, which is the theme of similitude, but here it is the relation of reflection, which is made up equally of similitude and difference, so that the microcosm is not the macrocosm writ small, rather it is the macrocosm reflected and elaborated and reproduced or completed. This process of reflection clearly abolishes the distinction between metaphor and metonymy. Every pair of neighbouring simple colours is itself intervened by a complex colour, so to say, and every neighbouring pair of complex colours has between them a simple elementary colour. The two triads, thus, certainly resemble one another perfectly, yet each is also the perfect inverse of the other, and both processes are formed around the eye of the beholder and also objectively in the external world.

The second part of the book of colours also consists of three chapters, but there is a moment of change between the two parts, which is indicated in a quasi-occult way by the numbering of the sections, which stops at this point, but is also indicated in the writing. The fourth chapter explains Goethe's general theory of the phenomenon of colours, in so far as it is explained at all in the book. Chapter five elaborates on the phenomenon through knowledge of the sciences and the arts, including, of course, the crafts, e.g. painting and dyeing. Chapter six concludes with the significance of colour in culture, religion and psychology, morals and aesthetics. At first sight we are puzzled

as to why the author should explain his general theory of colour in the fourth chapter. The rational philosopher would have surely put it logically at the beginning. The empiricist would have arrived at it apparently by induction at the end of the book. But Goethe has put it at the moment of reflection, when he moves from the elementary to the complex, the macrocosm to the microcosm, the sciences of nature to the sciences of culture. The whole arrangement of the sciences around the central human subject is an alternative to the Newtonian, and proceeds by the method of opposition and mediation, by thesis, antithesis and synthesis, and by reflection, elaboration and reproduction or completion, as I have summarized in Fig. 4. The penultimate paragraph is a rather veiled reference to the religion of Jesus and Mary, which I hope to take up on some other occasion, and which was opposed to the religion of Newton, who would have nothing to do with Mariology and in whose many unpublished writings on religion Christology is now known to be the weakest point.



Fig. 4 The book of colours

Without going too far afield, I shall simply mention that a similar structure of observation, comparison, description and explanation is evident in Goethe's botanical studies, *Metamorphosis of Plants* (1790). The life-cycle of the simple annual plant is in six stages which begin with the seed splitting into its two opposite parts—the one going up to the light and the air, the stem, while the other goes down to the dark and the earth, the root. The first part again splits into the male and the female, the vertical (stem) and the spiral (leaves), reunited at a higher level in the flower, and producing finally the fruit and again the seed or the bud. The simple elementary triad here is that of the archetypal plant, consisting of the stem, the leaf and the flower, as, say, children draw it in a flower pot. Then comes the moment of reflection of the archetypal individual, who can never reproduce himself, into the concept of the plant as a species, through what Goethe calls the life-force at the centre). The moment of reflection is followed by elaboration in the fruit and final reproduction of the seed that completes the annual cycle. Here, again, the growth of the archetypal individual and the reproduction of the species are opposites in a sense, and yet they are perfectly interwoven in the temporal sequence of the life-cycle of the plant. Here, also, is the unity as well as the struggle of the light and the dark with the world of bodies, the elementary and the complex, etc., but with the rhythms of expansion and contraction in succession taking the place of contrasts and mediations in simultaneity as in the case of colours (Fig. 5).



Fig. 5 Reflection, elaboration and reproduction or completion

An Other Tradition: The Radical Underground

After having taken you through Goethe's work on the theory of colour in some detail, I should like to revert to some general considerations relating to 'other' modes of thought in the study of nature. Very often we read in the established histories of science that what chiefly characterized the early modern period in European thought (1500-1650), culminating in the so-called scientific revolution, was that people went over from a theological to a mechanical model of the universe, and only later on did they discover or rediscover the organic properties of the cosmos as a whole, and still later will they find its spiritual quality for study. I am not persuaded that this is how it happened in history; and to test an alternative hypothesis I had selected the Paracelsus tradition and Goethe, who has always been represented as an organicist by his critics as well as defenders, and have chosen to present his physics *contra* Newton rather than to present his biology or what he called 'zoonomy'.

I think that the best way to put it is in the form that the official scientific tradition of Copernicus, Galileo and Newton was always dualist as between the subject and the object, the thing and the sign, the light and the dark, matter and spirit. It compulsorily ascribed to the one a purely physical existence, which belonged to the external world and the study of which was simple, experimental and systematic; while it ascribed to the other a purely psychological existence, which belonged only to the human mind, culture, history or society and the study of which was, therefore, complex, humanistic and subjective. In the same period, the European underground, on the other hand, without in any way denying the opposition of mind and the world or the thing and the sign, always looked for the third scientific solution, which would have the characteristics of both terms although being itself neither of them, e.g. the human body as between mind and the world or the reading of symptoms (semiology) as between the thing and the sign. The underground of science should also have taken up the study of material culture or instrumentalities or labour as the point of conjunction of man and the environment in the way Goethe talked of practical gardening or the techniques of dyeing and painting, but I have not yet found that case. The official science saw only two possibilities as between any two things: (*a*) homogeneity and (*b*) heterogeneity, i.e. either the two were together and the same or else they were both separate and different. But for the underground counter-science there are also two other logical and empirical possibilities to be considered, i.e. two things might be separate but similar (competition), or the two might be different but together (complementarity). I have shown this mode of thought as underlying the truth of Goethe's theory of colour (Fig. 3), and I am unable to understand why it should be discarded from our science as non-mathematical, organicist or humanist thinking. It is simply another system of science (Fig. 4).

If the unstated positivist charge against my kind of exposition is that the colour magenta, *purpur* or pure red, through which Goethe reunited the qualitative and quantitative, is not to be found in the Newton spectrum or the rainbow or in the rest of official physical nature, but only among plants, animals and artists, then Goethe's advocate should plead guilty. Goethe clearly stated that the rainbow or the Newton spectrum is deficient in pure red, and one may add, just precisely because this colour belongs to that part of the world where the light seen through the dark (Fig. 2, Eye-1) is put together with the dark seen through the light (Fig. 2, Eye-2). If this sort of mediation or conjunction does not occur in official physical nature, then life and culture must be allowed to complete that nature rather than being confined to the dualism of either continuing it or contradicting it.

Let me conclude the defence with the general statement that the function of light in the cosmology of the underground was threefold, and there were perhaps in all three candidates for it. *Lux* in the radical Reformation of Servetus had the same functions as the *Logos* in the gospel of Saint John, or as the *Pneuma* or breath of the Neoplatonists. Light represented the mediation

of spirit versus matter or gravity, just as the word represented the mediation of thought versus deed, or as breath represented the mediation of the inside versus the outside. The three functions of light were the multiplicative (source of magnitude), the communicative (motion or change) and the mediatory (conjunction of opposites). This position is already clearly defined by Grosseteste at Oxford (1175-1253), whom some have wrongly tried to annex as the remote ancestor of Newton, who always stuck to his attempt to reduce light to the locomotion of mechanical points (corpuscles) against all comers, e.g. the wave theory. The same cosmological background and the full experimental method are to be found in al-Hasan ibn al-Haitham (A.D. 965-1039), al-Shirazi (1236-1311) and his pupil al-Farisi (*d.* 1320), whose work or approach was probably known directly in Paris and indirectly at Oxford.

This exposition will help to explain, at any rate, why Goethe would have nothing to do with the view that light travels in straight parallel lines, either approximately in nature, as in the arrival of sunlight on the earth, or exactly and precisely, as nowadays in the laboratory laser. I think that Goethe insisted, on the contrary, that light travels as a sphere expanding from or contracting to a point, according to the inverse square law of propagation, so that every ray or segment was like a cone and not a pencil. His physics of light was, therefore, concentrated on the study of the image in the medium, the unity of the subject and the object, like the rainbow of al-Farisi and al-Shirazi, and he was at pains to try and show that the whole space illumined by the sun through even the largest window is only the image of the sun, formed inverted except in its dead centre, plus the size of the opening. He said that, if we take square apertures of any size we like for the experiment, we shall find that the image on the opposite surface at a distance of nine feet from the aperture will be on every side about one inch larger than the aperture, which nearly corresponds with the angle of the apparent diameter of the sun.

On the other side, and to bring the argument up to date or to the mid-twentieth century, I must mention the standpoints of Einstein and Heisenberg, the latter of whom has directly expressed himself on the Goethe versus Newton controversy. Einstein for long years wanted to reconcile the material mechanical theory and the field theory or the wave theory of light, but strictly on his Newtonian terms, i.e. while maintaining that all scientific theories are models of reality or nature rather than only models of our human knowledge of it, models of truth or culture, as if these were the only two possibilities and their dualism were sacrosanct to the exclusion of any third possibility. This ambition of Einstein proved impossible to carry out time and again in physics and philosophy. I was, thus, advised to appeal instead to Heisenberg, the pillar of quantum physics and the uncertainty principle, etc. Alas, I found that he explicitly opined that it is the very unity of Goethe's theory of colour that is unacceptable to the modern western physicist. My conclusion, then, is that the radical European underground wanted to study the phenomenon of

(*a*) light, (*b*) the word or (*c*) breath as the archetypal unity of the thing and the sign, object and subject, macrocosm and microcosm, expressing their relations of competition as well as complementarity or the dialectics of correspondence, whereas the official science was determined from the beginning up to the end never to recognize any cosmological theories of the unity of matter, life and mind or of nature and culture, but to allow as scientific only theories of their simple heterogeneity or equally simple homogeneity as a set of things or signs, an essentially untrue and disastrous choice of the structure of discourse.

The primacy of the political: towards a theory of national integration

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The Primacy of the Political: Two Classical Formulations

Kauṭilya opens his *Arthaśāstra* with an analysis of the four sciences and their functions in human life.[1] Prior to him, there were attempts to reduce their number to three or two or even one; but Kauṭilya recognizes the autonomy of each one of the four. The four *vidyās* are *ānvīkshikī* (philosophy) *trayī* (the sacred scriptures), *vārtā* (economics or the science of wealth) and *daṇḍa-nīti* (the science of polity). We are told that each one fulfils an essential function. Thus, *ānvīkshikī* benefits men by providing reasoned judgements on the potency or otherwise of the other sciences (philosophy as metatheory); it steadies the mind in weal and woe, and fosters proficiency in speech and action. The sacred canon is beneficial, since it establishes the four castes and the four orders in their respective duties. Vārtā has an obvious importance, since it is the science of wealth for the subject and revenue for the polity. With regard to the science of polity, Kauṭilya finally says that it is the means of acquiring and preserving the other three.[2]

In this analysis, we may note, how politics is assigned a certain primacy without, however, reducing the others to it. Its role is seen in terms of fulfilling man's complex interests. At the same time, by being co-ordinated with the others, it also gains a normative position in the scheme of life.

The Nichomachian Ethics of Aristotle describes politics as the master science. He begins by saying that every art and every inquiry, just as every action and every pursuit, aims at some good. In this sense, the good is the end at which all things aim. But since there are many arts and sciences, their ends are also different. Some of these ends fall under others, and their respective arts and sciences are also subordinated to those other arts and sciences. These latter may be called the master arts and the master sciences. Then Aristotle suggests that there must be some ends that we choose for their own sake, for otherwise the process would go on to infinity, and desire and action would become empty and vain. Hence there must be the chief good. The science concerning the chief good will be the master science, and Aristotle adds that politics seems to be of this nature.[3]

When we look at contemporary political theory in the light of these two classical formulations of the primacy of the political we find that the concepts of the state and the nation have only a marginal place in these formulations.[4]

This is paradoxical, for it is only in this period (i.e. post-Second World War) that a number of new nations and states in Africa, South-east Asia and Latin America have emerged from their colonial subjugation. These societies have been studied intensely by Western social scientists from a certain perspective or point of view, from the angle of under-development. The theoretical paradigm that has articulated their perceptions and governed their policy recommendations has been the paradigm of modernization. There has been a neglect to focus directly and primarily upon the political problem facing these societies. While the issues of economic growth and social modernization have been emphasized, the political problem of national autonomy and national integrity have been bypassed. There has been an overemphasis on technological and economic growth to the neglect of the political development in both the modern liberal-democratic as well as the Marxist approaches to the study of these societies.[5]

This neglect of the political question is due to the modernization paradigm or the framework itself which is basically apolitical. This paradigm suggests that political development would follow and can only follow socio-economic modernization. Societies ought to be modernized before nations can be built. If so, it is the social question of growth and development rather than the political question of nation and nation building that becomes primary.

The theory of modernization is no mere policy recommendation offered to the so-called developing societies. Although it is formulated in the context of an objective value-neutral conception of science, it is not too difficult for us to identify the world-view behind such a theory. The theory is essentially a contemporary variation of the idea of progress. Progress, in this mode, is seen as arising with the emergence of modern science in Europe. The value of science, in this perspective, is seen in three ways: firstly, as giving us power over phenomena; secondly, as giving us knowledge of means to serve our ends; and, lastly, as an example of a certain attitude and temperament—the so-called scientific temper. It is in the context of modern science understood in this threefold way as knowledge, power and rationality that the idea of progress is made possible. This culture of scientific rationality came to full flowering in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. The practical flowering took the form of the Industrial Revolution. This, in turn, led to the growth of the political institutions of modern democracy, on the one hand; and to the rise of rational, technical, administrative and bureaucratic apparatus, on the other, which shapes the basic forms of modern culture as secular, scientific and egalitarian.

In such an understanding, the role of politics and of leadership is seen as subservient to this historical sequence. It is not that there is no place for politics in this scheme; rather, the point is twofold: (*i*) politics is subservient to science; and (*ii*) politics is seen in terms of its functionality or otherwise for the development of the social potentialities of science. This understanding of politics as functional is far distant from the classical conception

as the master science concerned with the good life. It is also quite different from the conception of the political act as concerned with the choice of ends.

But it is not merely that the modern perspective of what may be called 'functional politics' is different from the classical conception of politics as an ethos or a way of life. The more important point is that the modern perspective is blind to a certain aspect of the reality of the present world-situation, namely, the prevailing pattern of global domination by some of the Western powers. In the context of this political stratification, the theory of modernization has two consequences:

(*a*) It shifts the focus of our attention away from the *global* to the *regional* levels. The concept of growth and development puts the emphasis on what is happening or not happening within a system, rather than on the global context of these systems.

(*b*) At the level of action and policy programmes, the prescriptions of the paradigm create an elite within the system, which is nevertheless linked to the metropolitan centres of the world. In this way, the centre-periphery relation between nations or states is reproduced within the society.

By thus internalizing the relation, the political aspect of the situation is shaded out, and the political consequences of domination are translated into the language of social and economic backwardness. The consequence of this change of the levels of discourse is that the concepts of nation, national autonomy, national integration and national leadership become marginal.

If we are to have a proper understanding of the reality of our situation, we may have to delink the theory of nation building from the theory of modernization. We may have to have a different understanding of (*i*) the linkages of the state with other groups and segments within the society, and (*ii*) linkages of the national state with other systems outside. The first dimension of our task would ultimately lead us to a different model of the state-society relationship, and the second would move us towards a new understanding of internationalism. Together, they would give us a new conception of the sovereignty of the state. Under the influence of the contemporary social science perspective, it is often suggested that the concept of sovereignty in particular and the whole style of thinking in terms of nation states in general have been outmoded. Hence a reconsideration of such issues at a basic philosophical level may have to be guided by a return to the classical principle of the primacy of the political. But this does not mean that we emphasize institutions and political forms of the modern states. On the contrary, it is within the framework of modernization theory that merely the political forms of democracy, dictatorship, etc. are considered as possible carriers of the developmental process. But the principle of the primacy of politics, as suggested by Aristotle and Kauṭilya, has a very different understanding of its nature; poli-

tics here is seen in terms of the choice of the good. It is also a part of the classical perspective that the domain of political judgement and action has to do with decisions affecting the future; politics is concerned with what ought or ought not to be done by the community for preserving or safeguarding the good life for its members. As Kauṭilya in particular expresses it, daṇḍa-nīti is concerned with achieving what is not gained, preserving what has been acquired, developing what has been preserved and distributing what has been developed in accordance with justice.[6] For the classical form of thinking, politics is concerned with the choice of preferred futures. It is this classical conception of politics that seems to be more adequate to the present-day realities and problems of the new nations. In this manner, the new forms of political thinking that we are searching for have an important continuity with the classical traditions of political thought. For both Aristotle and Kauṭilya, the political problem *par excellence* was the search for a legitimate authority, which would protect the social order and the arts of life. This continues to be the basic issue of politics, but yet we today must approach these fundamental problems in two new contexts: (*a*) the autonomy of the new nation states in the context of encroaching dominance; and (*b*) the internal integrity of the state *vis-à-vis* various groupings and regional and ethnic pressures and pulls.

The new form of national identity and autonomy that we are seeking, unlike the older forms of nationalism, does not isolate the nation from various forms of contextual dependency; on the other hand, for this way of thinking, the phenomena of linkages becomes all important:

(1) Linkages between national and international levels of state and nation building;
(2) linkages between political, economic, social and cultural factors in the search for national identity; and
(3) at the theoretical level, linkages between the first two levels.

In the above, I have suggested that perhaps a certain reorientation of the focus in political theory towards the classical paradigms may be of substantive as well as metatheoretical interest. This is, of course, not to deny the complex methodological and epistemological difficulties of such a study in contrast. But, immediately, I am more concerned with the possibility of new understandings that such a study may give us. I suggest that the advantages of such a classic-oriented study of contemporary reality and contemporary theory may be threefold: theoretical, practical and philosophical.

Theoretical

The Western tradition of political thought is in itself an immensely variegated domain of differing perspectives and outlooks. One particular contrast or opposition within it is so striking and compelling that it consciously or unconsciously dominates our understanding and judgement of the Western tradition as a whole—the contrast between the liberal and the Marxist perspectives. The differences between the two are so great and compelling that we are likely to pass over the elements of commonality or affinity between them. The similarity at the level of basic presuppositions becomes more easily visible when we approach both the traditions from the classical point of view. I shall attempt to illustrate this point in some detail.

It is well known that the basic principle of Marx's critique of Hegel's political philosophy was the emphasis on the primacy of the social processes over the forms of the state. It is, indeed, the inversion of the relationship between state and society in Hegel that forms the major point of Marx's critique.[7] Marx formulates the primacy of the social over the political order and further elaborates the social primacy as the primacy of the economic condition. As we have already seen, it is precisely the primacy of the economic growth in particular and of the processes of development and modernization in general that constitutes the basic thrust of the contemporary theories. On this point both of them converge as against the classical principle of the primacy of the political order. Thus, the convergence between the polar opposites become visible when we use, as it were, a classical filter.

Practical

But the bare possibility of some theoretical illumination is not the only advantage that that classical form of thought may brings us. I have already suggested that the classical perspective may help us to comprehend some aspects of contemporary social and political reality of the developing societies. I wish now to elaborate a little on that suggestion.

Our thinking about social and political issues may hope to gain effectiveness in so far as such thinking has both relevance and adequacy. By the relevance of our thinking, I mean the recognition of the basic issues or problems. It is the capacity to discern the roots of our difficulties. By the adequacy of our thought, I mean the comprehension of interrelationships of the basic problems. Relevance has to do with the content of our inquiries, whereas the adequacy of our thinking refers to the form of inquiry. It is, of course, to be recognized that the distinction between form and content is only a distinction, and not a separation. But taken as a distinction, it is a useful one, for it alerts us to two kinds of ineffectiveness which may come over our thinking. Firstly, our thinking may fail in relevance, in which case our socio-political investigations may be marked by superficiality. Secondly, it may suffer from lack of form, and in that case it may be disoriented. The adequacy of our thought refers us to the orientation of our inquiry, and this is given by the form of our investigations. From this point of view, the classical mode of thought affords us a discipline in this kind of integrative and holistic thinking. Classical thought is characterized by a strong drive towards

systematic perspective. From this point of view, the very fact that the classical theory does not make sharp boundary distinctions between what is positive and what is normative, as well as the fact that the economic, social and political are not kept rigidly apart in terms of disciplinary boundaries is a virtue and a help for us. I am suggesting that methodologically the classical perspective is a training ground for our interdisciplinary understanding. It is this connective and integrative character of classical theory that may provide the dimension of from, and thereby give our understanding the feature of adequacy.

But apart from such a methodological function, the classical perspective, in the specific case of the problem before us, has another substantive contribution also to make. I have already suggested that we may have to structure our thinking in terms of the principle of the primacy of the political. I have also suggested that, if we think in terms of this principle, we are likely to focus on the issue of the choice of ends. As against this, the contemporary theories of modernization and political development reduce the field of our political deliberations. In these perspectives, politics is subservient to large-scale historical forces and trends, with regard to which the question of the choice of preferred future appears as a vain attempt to evade the determinism of these macro forces. The classical perspective, which formulates the issue in terms of deliberation about the good for the community, is a most welcome and needed antidote to the paralyzing effect of modern theory.

But such beneficial consequences are likely to follow, only if the strategy and procedure of such comparative studies are properly considered. In order to provide a framework for such a discussion of comparative methodology, we may distinguish three kinds or levels of comparisons: comparisons at the level of specific themes or ideas or concepts which may be called *thematic comparisons;* comparisons at the level of issues or problems, *problematic comparisons;* and, finally, comparisons of the whole network of presuppositions or frameworks, *paradigmatic comparisons.*

While comparisons at the level of specific themes or concepts is the most popular mode of comparison in social and political theory, there is a second and more sophisticated form of comparisons, i.e. at the level of problems or issues. In order to illustrate the power and limits of such comparisons, I shall take certain aspects of Professor Saletore's study of the *Arthaśāstra.*[8] But before proceeding to do so, I would like to emphasize that Professor Saletore avoids atomistic comparisons; for example, it is not with Machiavelli but with Aristotle that he compares Kauṭilya.[9] But here he emphasizes the different problems that the two thinkers faced. His thesis is that Kauṭilya's basic problem was the consolidation of the state, whereas Aristotle was concerned with political decay or forms of degeneration of the polity.[10]

It is, of course, well known that Aristotle's theory of the decay of states is in terms of the principle of rule. He classifies politics in terms of the rule of

the one, of the few and of the many; and on this basis, he classifies healthful and corrupt forms of each.[11] Thus, we have:

Rule of the one———Monarchy———Tyranny
Rule of the few———Aristocracy———Oligarchy
Rule of the many——Polity————Democracy.

Aristotle's classification, we may say, is in terms of stresses and strains placed on the principle of sovereignty. The principle of rule is the form of the state, and this form is embedded in various types of social patterns, human habits and potentialities which may be regarded as the matter. The basic principles of form and matter, which are the presuppositions of the Aristotelian framework, are being utilized in the discussion of political change. Matter, in the Aristotelian scheme, is the factor of resistance or obstacle to the realization of the form, and it is this which leads to the corruption of states.

But the *Arthaśāstra* has a structural or systemic perspective on the problem of political change. Kauṭilya develops such a perspective in the theory of the *prakṛtis* or the elements of the state and their heirarchical ordering. One possible ordering of the *prakṛtis* suggested by Kauṭilya's discussion is the following:[12]

The Sovereign
|
The Officials
|
The Rural Domain
|
The Urban Domain
|
The Treasury
|
The Army
|
The Ally

In the context of the theory of the elements, Kauṭilya makes three methodological remarks.

(1) The vulnerabilities peculiar to each will produce a specific kind of instability for the polity as a whole. Hence a typology of forms of political degeneration becomes possible.
(2) However, the stability and health of the polity depends not only on the excellence of the elements but upon the nature of the interrelationships between them.
(3) This interrelationship has a certain order or heirarchy, i.e. the excellence of the preceding element can compensate for the deformations of the succeeding element, provided the other elements are neutral.

When we set the frame work of Aristotle and that of Kauṭilya side by side, we can see a difference in their respective principles of organization. For Aristotle, the patterning principle is the philosophical categories of matter and form, whereas the perspective of Kauṭilya is that of the structural principle of a system of interrelationships; his paradigm is that of an organized multiplicity. It is this form of thinking that is relevant for us, for it is this issue of a proper organization of a multiplicity that is the fundamental task before us. It is used by Kauṭilya as the spirit of his detailed inquiries; given this, it was not necessary for him to state it abstractly, whereas we have to reconstruct the form of his thinking. What was for him a principle of thinking has to become for us an object of thought.

But the articulation of the paradigm is the first or methodological task; there is a second, more difficult, epistemological issue also that we have to consider, and that is the problem of paradigm incommensurability. Different theories are embedded in different frameworks and conceptual matrices that determine the meaning of the basic categories of the theory. In the light of this context-dependence of theories, it is claimed that, while we may be able to articulate the different paradigms, we cannot adjudicate between them and formulate criteria of paradigm choice.

The problem of incommensurability which is arising here is a highly complex one, and has been hotly debated in the current controversies in philosophy of natural science.[13] I shall not go into some of these logical and methodological complexities; I, shall only make a few remarks concerning paradigm choice in political theory.

We may say that a paradigm *A* is preferable to another paradigm *B*, if it has the following features: the methodological and conceptual principles recommended by the paradigm *B* are less than what is demanded for the satisfactory solution of the problem as defined by the paradigm itself. We may call this paradigm incompleteness and may explain it as follows.

A paradigm or framework is said to constitute the problematic of the theory as well as suggest the methods held to be necessary for their solution. The basic problem of modernization theory is to explain the processes involved in the transition from the traditional to the modern position as defined by the framework itself. For our present purposes, we need not raise a question about the characterization of traditionality, nor need we raise awkward questions about the unidirectionality of the model. But accepting its definition of the problem, we can remark that such a theory of change requires two sets or kinds of principles:

(1) Principles of change which would give the factors or forces that bring about change and also their configuration or composition; and

(2) Principles of stability which preserve or maintain the developed state.

In the language of the *Arthaśāstra*, we require principles of aquisition of what has not been gained and principles of preservation of what has been acquired.

These two sets of principles are fundamentally different; the first set is likely to have a dominant techno-economic component, whereas the second is likely to have a political-cultural force. Current versions of development theory do not, it seems to me, sufficiently recognize the duality of principles.

But a more serious theoretical weakness is what may be called paradigm instability. Paradigm *A* may be said to be characterized by instability, when the application of the methods prescribed by the paradigm to the problems as defined by it, nevertheless, generates anomalies or, more strictly, theory—generated puzzles. Here, again, an example from the theory of political development may help. Sola Pool has been particularly concerned with the likely tensions between participation and political stability in the new nations; he has noted that an increase of the demands for participation, which is a necessary part of democracy, may introduce pressures on the stability of the political institutions.[14] Hence paradoxically, a lowering of levels of participation may be necessary. The puzzle is that democracy as end may best be served by non-democratic means.

If both paradigm incompleteness and paradigm instability can be shown, then paradigm choice becomes a possibility. It is, therefore, possible to clear the road-block of strong incommensurability as far as is required for our present purpose. But we have yet to reckon with another source of difficulty. Even when comparisons and contrasts are entertained between classical and contemporary theories, the contrast is very often stated in a misleading manner. For example, it is often said that traditional societies seek control, whereas modern societies are expanding. Change is said to be the basic value of these modern formations. This contrast is expressed either by the metaphor of cool societies and hot societies or more abstractly by way of the contrast between positive and negative feedback systems. But while such contrasts may be useful for certain purposes, they are likely to fail to bring out the fact that the issue of control is a necessity for all social systems. The difference between modern and traditional social systems is more properly expressed by way of the differences in the forms of control they adopt. More specifically, they differ in how control at one level or context affects the possibilities and patterns of control at other levels and contexts.

The Problem of Control: The Classical Formulation

The *Arthaśāstra* is explicit in its recognition of the importance of economic process in the form of a fundamental human goal or *puruṣārtha* described as *artha*. This recognition is not merely at the level of practice or policy, but even in the conceptual framework itself, this aspect is given theoretical recognition. *Vārtā* is one of the *vidyās* which is regarded as the theoretical base of the science of social life. But the *Arthaśāstra* also clearly recognizes the problem of control, not only at the practical but also at the conceptual or theoretical level. A good deal of the text is devoted to a detailed discussion

of the institutional regulation of trade and commerce. Although, within the conceptual framework of the *Arthaśāstra*, *vārtā* is a basic human value, yet it is recognizable as a *puruṣārtha*, only if it is sought in relationship to both *kāma* and *dharma*. Only in the context of these other two can *artha* be recognized as human value. This model of relationships among the *puruṣārthas* may be called the discursive model of human action, for in discourse a term is significant only in the context of other terms. While the element depends upon the whole, the whole is the articulation or structured organization of the elements. An activity, e.g. the economic, becomes significant only in the context of other activities, and the total form of life is a structure which is made of these various elements in relation. Here, also, the elements and the whole are reciprocal.

The Problem of Control: The Modern Formulation

For modern social systems, resource management by way of technology is said to be the basic form of adaptation, and, in this context, wealth is seen in terms of resources. The category of resource is an abstract mode of relationship to the world.[16] Wealth can be seen concretely as a use value, i.e. in terms of satisfaction of desires. In this mode, *artha* is related to *kāma*. But seen abstractly as a resource, it is amenable only to a technical logic of measurement; the only question is that of the increase or decrease of the quantum of such generalized energy. Hence the prime technical question of increasing available energy becomes all important. But the peculiarity of the technological perspective is its potentiality of inversion, which may be called the *ecocidal asymptote*.[17]

The notion of the *ecocidal asymptote* can be explained as follows: the pattern of technical exploitation can be plotted in the form of two curves; one represents the rate of depletion of natural resources, and the other represents the rate of its utilization. Both are stimulated by technology. This means that as we are using up more and more of the resources, we are needing them more and more. It is this inimical process that may be called the *ecocidal asymptote*. The problem of control in the modern system is the question of mastering this build-up towards crisis.

The Problem of Schismogenic Control

Modern sociological and political theory has been concerned with competition and reciprocity, almost ever since its beginnings, in individualistic, utilitarian and liberal points of view. In these discussions attention has been focused upon the disintegrative consequences of competition. Durkheim, in particular, had stressed the pressure exerted upon the social fabric as a whole by the pursuit of self and group interests, and he had argued that there was need for a mechanism which would counterbalance the centripetal forces of competition by the integrating forces of complementarity and reciprocity.

Increasingly, Durkheim came to see the solidarity of the social order as bound up with the balance of these forces; and he argued that, since the element of competitive relationships had been introduced by the modern sanction of self-interest, it was not possible for the modern social order to go back to the simple pattern of social solidarity which he termed 'mechanical solidarity'. At the same time, modern society, as much as traditional society, is in need of control and regulation of divisive forces. Only what is now different in the case of modern societies, is that the forms of integration and the patterns of solidarity have to be more complex. Reciprocity seemed to him to be the countervailing power to competition, and he saw the stability as well the growth of the modern society as increasingly dependent upon the working out of the interplay of these forces.[18]

Durkheim's basic idea was that symmetrical competitive relations are centripetal; they work outwards to fragment the social order. We, therefore, need complementary relations which would hold the groups together. But, in recent years, Gregory Bateson has questioned this assumption in his theory of schismogenesis. He suggests that both symmetrical and complementary relationships have a divisive, schismogenic potential.[19] Using the Durkheimian idea of elementary forms of relationships, we may speak of the elementary forms of symmetrical and complementary schismogenesis. As an example of the first, we may mention the competitive pursuit of self-interest, the conflict generating potential of which is so clearly evident. But what is surprising is that even complementary relationships have a divisive function. Take, for example, the classic forms of sexism and/or racism. For the relationship to be called complementary, we assume that both the parties (individuals/groups) have internalized and accepted the norms of inequality.

Under such circumstances, one would ordinarily expect that such a reciprocity would stabilize the relationship, and it is true that they do not lead to the ascending spiral of claims and counter claims typical of symmetrical relationships. But, in their own way, they lead to schisms. While they may not take the form of conflict and contestation, they lead to isolation and withdrawal. This happens, because the male expects further and more thorough going forms of compliance. The acceptance of inequality at one point tends to proliferate similar claims at other points, and, in general, subordination is demanded not merely at the level of outward compliance and action but also in the inner realm of ideas and feelings. The male demands the surrender of the woman in her subjectivity. The patterns of thought and feeling of men and women tend to develop in different ways; one half of life becomes a dark continent to the other. In this way, if symmetrical schismogenesis fragments the social order by means of conflict, complementary schismogenesis splits the cultural order by means of isolation and withdrawal.

If divisiveness and the potentiality for schisms is found both in symmetrical and complementary relationships, then the answer to the problem of control

of schismogenesis cannot be seen in the simple idea of invoking complementarity to counter balance the divisiveness of symmetry. In other words, the problem of control of schismogenesis must be seen in terms of switching from symmetry to complementarity and vice versa. The divisive potentialities, inherent in each of these contexts, require to be regulated by the other. Symmetrical schismogenesis, which affects the interactional context is to be regulated by the cultural norms of complementarity, whereas complementary schismogenesis which leads to subcultural isolationism and breaking off contacts has to be counter balanced by institutionalized forms of symmetry at the interactional level. The general pattern of schismogenic control lies in the capacity of the system to switch codes. If learning is the process of regulating behaviour by codes, then the capacity to switch between codes may be called *meta-learning*. The point to note is that the counterbalancing element is introduced at another level. It is obvious that the attempt to introduce both the elements in the same context would randomize interaction. Control of schismogenesis, therefore, requires a twofold differentiation: (*i*) differentiation between symmetrical and complementary codes; and (*ii*) differentiation between levels of interaction. The capacity to make this double differentiation is what may be called *meta-learning*. This, in turn, depends upon the clear demarcation of different levels in such a manner that the discrimination of one level or function does not isolate it or absolutize it. The discriminated elements are yet held in relation to each other. By this method of differentiation within unity, the various elements and their corresponding functions are held in systematic interconnection, thereby representing the social order neither as a blank unity nor as an unrelated multiplicity. On the contrary, the representation of social life takes the form of an ordered multiplicity. The ordered multiplicity of a system may be called *logical-typing*, for the notion of a logical type suggests both the differentiation of levels and their interconnectedness. Typal differences are functional differentiations and not ontological separations. The possibility of meta-learning depends upon the complexity of logical typing. Where logical typing is low or minimal, the field or domain of meta-learning is restricted; and hence the possibility of schismogenic control also is low. We, thus, reach a theorem regarding social control, namely, that there is an inverse correlation between degree of logical typing and extent of schismogenesis.

It is in the light of this theorem that the distinctions, made in the *Arthaśāstra*, suddenly acquire a contemporary relevance. First of all, there is the stage setting distinction of the four *vidyās* as different from each other and yet needing each other. At another level, namely, in the context of the *puruṣārthas*, the author illustrates logical typing in his claim that *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma* are distinct, but each needs the other to be a *puruṣārtha*. At a more general level, the *Arthaśāstra* regards the preservation of the social order as an organized multiplicity as the chief function of political rule. Since fragmentation can occur both at the interactional level (symmetrical schismogenesis) as well as at the cultural system level (complementary schismogenesis), the mechanism of control must belong to a logically different level. In this manner, from within the discussion of social conflicts, we again reach the principle of the primacy of the political. But the political system can function as a control system, provided it can preserve the logical typing of the social order, and thus guide the process of meta-learning.

Hence, within the conceptual framework of the *Arthaśāstra*, the sovereign becomes the decisive element, and, accordingly, in Chapter I of Book VIII Kauṭilya upholds the view that the element of the sovereign is the basic constituent of the polity.[20] The excellence of this element is said to compensate for the defeciencies and inadequacies of the other elements, while the excellence of the other elements would not be of any avail in the absence of the excellence of this element. Within the conceptual world of the *Arthaśāstra*, the sovereign being the supreme element, the question of its control by any other element does not arise. But this does not mean that the *Arthaśāstra* propagates the doctrine of the absolute power of the king. Absolute power makes sense only as unlimited or unrestrained exercise of a personal will. This, it may be remembered, is Aristotle's conception of a tyrant. But the sovereign of Kauṭilya is not an example of personal rule in this sense. The fact that the sovereign is not bound by any other element does not mean that he is unregulated. In fact, the *Arthaśāstra* recognizes two kinds of regulation as far as the sovereign is concerned. Firstly, the exercise of sovereignty, *daṇḍa śakti*, is under the regulation of the *dharma śāstras*. This is recognized by Kauṭilya as a central feature of the theory and practice of right rule. The basic political act is seen as preserving the social order. The point of contrast here is with Hobbes; not the creation of social order out of a disorderly state of nature, but the protection and preservation of the order prescribed by the *trayī*; and under *trayī* Kauṭilya includes *smṛti* as well as *itihāsa* (historical tradition). The control of the exercise of political power by *dharma* is seen in two ways—as regulation and as discipline. Regulation refers to the norms and standards in accordance with which action is to be performed. *Dharma*, in this sense, provides the standards of political action. But Kauṭilya adds another aspect to the role of *dharma vis-à-vis* political action, when he prescribes two kinds of discipline to the sovereign—natural and pedagogic (artificial). Natural discipline is the control and restraint of passions and impulses. Pedagogic discipline is the cultivation of mind and character. As an important aspect of this process, which Hegel would call *bildungs prozess*, is the study of *dharma*. Here *dharma* is said to be both an external standard and an internal force. But there is a second way also in which an element of self-control can be discerned, and that is in the way in which the notion of *dharma* is understood in the classical tradition. *Dharma* or righteousness, we are told, is to be seen from four points if view—as revealed by scripture (*śruti*)—as cultural tradition (*smṛti*), as the exemplary conduct of good and wise men (*sadācāra*), and as tested and approved by one's own sense of propriety (*ātmatuṣṭi*).

In the framework of the *Arthaśāstra*, the sovereign element is seen as the political. i.e. as a human element. This detail is significant, for the control of a human element can be easier than the control of an abstract historical process or tendency, such as technological growth or industrialization. In the contemporary perspective also, there is a sovereign element; but it is not seen in political terms but more as a process, a long term tendency (the laws of motion of modern society). The control of such an abstract force is far more difficult than the mastery and regulation of a human factor.

As we have already seen, within the framework of the *Arthaśāstra* the basic duty of the sovereign is to preserve and protect the social order. But while this has been emphasized by almost all critics and commentators, it seems to me that another aspect of Kauṭilya's thought has not been given the kind of theoretical importance that it deserves. For merely preserving the social order without providing for what I have called meta-learning would only lead to the failure to control the schismogenic potentials of the natural order. Meta-learning, as we saw, is the capacity to switch codes. The *Arthaśāstra* is cognizant of this issue in the form of the necessity of *āpadharma*. A few points about this may be noted:

(1) *Ápadharma* is always regarded in the context of the sovereign's duties and not in the context of his powers and privileges;
(2) it is always seen in terms of reverting back to the normal order.
(3) the mechanism of *āpadharma* is contrastive, i.e. where the normal pattern is in jeopardy, the antithetical code of norms is prescribed as *āpadharma*.

We may think of the two social formations that we have been concerned with, namely, the classical and the modern, as having two different orientations altogether—justice and efficiency. Accordingly, we may speak of them as justice-sensitive and efficiency-sensitive systems. When we describe a system as justice-sensitive, it does not mean that it is necessarily justice-achieving, just as an efficiency-sensitive system need not be efficiency achieving. More importantly, the concepts and categories of justice and efficiency have to be located in terms of the specific conceptual spaces of the two paradigms. With these in mind, we may turn to a brief consideration of the internal strengths and external weaknesses of such a justice sensitive system.

The Notion of Cultural Climax

In describing the internal achievements of such a system, we may begin with an ecological analogy, the notion of a biotic climax.[21] This notion refers to the tendency of biotic communities in an eco-system developing in their specific ways and forms towards a stage of optimal diversity of life forms in a stable equilibrium. As the environmental scientists use this concept, the following aspects are emphasized:

(1) In the movement towards climax, two kinds of processes are indicated.
(*a*) forces acting upon the biotic forms in their progress towards the final stage, and forces acting upon them to keep them in stable equlibrium.
(*b*) The nature of the final stage is seen in terms of the optimum number of stable inter relationships with each other sustained by the eco system and, functioning in turn to preserve the stability of the eco-system.

On the basis of this idea of a movement towards organized diversity, we may analogously think of the notion of cultural climax as the stable reproduction of a variety of different cultural life styles in the polity. Like biotic climax, cultural climax also would depend on two sets of forces: (*a*) forces of development of different communities and associations; and (*b*) forces of integration of the diversity thus achieved.

But, unlike in a natural eco-system, these two forces in the political order cannot operate as natural tendencies or laws, but must function in the form of principles; they are not laws but rules or maxims of state craft. Accordingly, the *Arthaśāstra* formulates these maxims as:

(*i*) Acquisition of what has not been gained;
(*ii*) preservation of what has been acquired;
(*iii*) development of what has been preserved; and
(*iv*) the distribution of what has been developed in accordance with justice.

The capacity to achieve cultural climax in this sense seems to be the inner strength of such a political order. The function of the political order is the preservation of the social order understood as a richly textured fabric of diversity. Here the political order does not eliminate all other zones and spheres of authority and practices. But, on the other hand, it is also clearly seen that the state cannot just be one of these associations or organizations. Both these ideas—the idea of the monopolistic state and that of a pluralistic state—are modern notions. In the *Arthaśāstra*, the modern idea of pluralism is sidestepped by the recognition that all other social groups and associations can preserve their vitality only by way of political culture. Hence the political system has a certain primacy, but this primacy has to be seen, not in terms of its monopolistic role but in terms of its integrating function. It is this idea of the primacy of the political system in terms of its integrative capacity *vis-à-vis* all other social groups and orders—the idea of the political order as a system functional for the goal of cultural climax—which lies behind our discussion of a contextual understanding of the nation state.

But when such a social formation is subjected to an efficiency-sensitive system, there occurs a profound disorientation within the system itself; the basic principle of its vital functioning is the political principle. Only in so far as this is intact can such a system function effectively in its proper role.

But with political domination, it is this principle that is weakened; as a result the social formation loses its supreme guiding or steering mechanism, and cultural diversity degenerates into social decay.

In this situation of stagnancy, two broad kinds of response may be open to us:

(1) We may attempt to transform the social system into an efficiency-sensitive type. Broadly speaking, this is the path advocated by those who stand for modernization and economic growth; or
(2) we may take up a political orientation and attempt to overcome the subsystem status. In action, this takes shape as the political path of nation building and national integration.

It is not that either of these two points of view totally neglects the other; for example, from the perspective of modernization theory, the political task appears to be in a certain relationship to the economic task. It is held that, when adequate levels of economic growth and social modernization have been reached, the political problems are capable of being solved efficiently; and that, short or such levels being reached, the raising of such issues would function only in a reactionary manner to cloud the issues. But from the point of view of the second, i.e. the political path, the primacy of politics becomes fundamental; social health is seen as dependent upon how we meet and respond to the issue of the integrity of the nation and its unity. From this point of view, the issue is not an affair of ideological sentiment but a vital precondition for the success of our efforts at the social and economic levels.

It is in this sense that the two orientations bring us back again to the fundamental theoretical point of contrast of the classical and the contemporary perspectives. In the beginning of our discussion, the contrast appeared to us in a historical context. But, in the course of the discussion, we have come to an option between two responses to the present situation, and here again the principle of the primacy of the political appears but this time as a plan of action.

Conclusion

We have already remarked upon the anti-political animus of a good deal of contemporary social theory. But behind all these forms of anti-political tendency, the common idea is that social co-operation is the antithesis of political domination. The search was for the secret principle of order which lay in society rather than in the state. It was at the hands of Marx that this sentiment gained its most powerful articulation.[22] The state, according to Marx, had established the monopoly of power and authority by destroying the autonomy of social groupings like guilds and other communal structures;

it had drained away the loyalties from these primordial associations to itself, and in this way the political order had generalized itself. But the effect of this upon society was disastrous. Society was dissolved into atoms of isolated individuals; community and association were deprived, and the individual was left in naked isolation. The political dimension, therefore, must be transcended.

I do not want to suggest that the modern fear of the state is altogether ungrounded; nor that the search for community is spurious. I am more concerned with the consequences of this anti-political theme in modern thought. Rejection of the state in thought does not mean the elimination of the reality of state power but the closure of a certain form of understanding. The 'state' is a category which permits us to think in terms of a generalized perspective on social life as a whole. The rejection of the state, therefore, is a curtailment of our understanding; but this conceptual blindness, paradoxically, leads to the greater power and coercive role of the political system in our lives. But this is only superficially a paradox; for if we pause to reflect, we can come to see the logic behind it. Not to focus upon the state means that a way of thinking about political phenomena is shut out of our consideration. Notions like loyalty, obligation and general authority—these are all parts of a framework of this style of understanding. To be freed of these categories means that we will not be able to raise fundamental questions about the nature of political power. And, in the absence of such questions, the exercise of power becomes rampant. At the level of political theory also, there is the phenomenon of the return of the repressed. Freud tells us that, when the repressed returns, it returns in many disguises. So also here the political phenomenon reappears, not in the clear light of the idea of the state but in a myriad of social forms, in a fragmented manner. Political categories are applied to social formations and groupings, to cultural institutions and forms. One talks of the politics of the university, of business firms and even of art academies. Merely administrative and organizational roles are spoken of in terms of political leadership. This fragmentation and indiscriminate use of political categories and forms of thinking blur the all important distinction between what is political and what is social, between the common good and special interests. This blurring leads to a dangerous equation of the organization with the political, structure, and invests particular groupings and associations with an additional normative halo; on the other hand, it reduces the state to a mere administrative machinery.[23] There is, therefore, a tragic Aristotelian peripeteia here; the search for community beyond political politicizes these communal bonds.

The chief reaction of these anti-political tendencies of modern thought is directed against the general nature of classical political theory. Classical theory, first of all, presumed to be general in terms of scope—the political element was seen as inclusive of the whole of society. This inclusiveness of the political element was contrasted with the parochial and local character

of family, clan, local community, etc. Secondly, the generality of traditional theory was also seen in terms of the generality of function. Responsibility for the welfare of the whole of the society was regarded as the distinguishing political function. Thirdly, classical theory presumed to be general in the sense of demanding a general loyalty, a *sui generis* obligation to the social order as a whole. Fourthly, the universality of political obligation was based on the presupposition that an individual member of the political order had a competence to think and act as a citizen. It was believed that man had a natural basis for recognizing and acknowledging such claims of an overriding obligation. Fifthly, classical theory also believed that the *majestas* or the authority of the political order was distinct from personal charisma or societal influence. Sovereignty belonged only to the political.

Contemporary sensibility is a disciplined repudiation of all these five claims; its framework is contextualism. Human actions can be understood only in terms of milieu. The political claim to universality can only be a pretence, and the task of political science is to reconstruct the actual social and organizational networks behind the pretence.

It is against this overwhelming drift of modern social thought that we have to invoke the classical principle of the primacy of the political. We may distinguish two contexts or levels at which this principle can serve us. As a principle at the analytical level, we have used it as a principle of differentiation between classical and modern theory. But as a principle at the substantive level, it suggests the following kinds of consideration:

(1) The political order has primacy over all other societal associations in the sense that the ordered pattern of relationships between social forms depends upon the political order. In other words, at the institutional level, the primacy of the political order means the primacy of function. It is the political function *par excellence* to preserve the social order as an organized multiplicity.

(2) Secondly, the performance of this function presupposes that the good which the political order aims at cannot be identified with any specific interest or partisan good but must be seen in terms of the good of the whole. But the good of the whole is not an exclusive good or value which is prescribed for every part; the common good is not one among the values and thus competitive with them. The political good must be seen as an ordered realization of the perfection of the elements to the extent to which they are capable. In this sense, the primacy of the political order takes the form of the primacy of the political good. It is primary not in the sense that it overrides other values and other goods, but in the sense that it is the condition of the possibility of an ordered pursuit of all other goods by the parts.

(3) The third sense of primacy of the political order is that the obligations which arise in this context are primary, not again, in the sense that they compete with or cancel other kinds of obligations. The primacy of political obligation does not stand for the content of any specific or special duty; it is rather the prescription of a certain form in which other societal obligations are to be recognized and accepted. The primacy of political obligation suggests that personal and group loyalties of different individuals and groups must be responsive to each other; that the claims of the parts be related to each other and allow themselves to be modified and constituted as rights only in this process of mediation. In other words, special interests are transformed into rights, whether of the majority or the minority, only when they are claimed in such a manner as to preserve the organized diversity of the society as a whole. The obligatoriness of the whole is the medium in which other claims get a public recognition.

(4) The fourth sense of the primacy of the political order means that the individual members of a political community have a distinctive capacity as citizens to recognize the three preceding meanings of the primacy of political obligation. This sense of primacy means that the political obligation is the distinctive attribute of individuals. Of all other social powers and attributes, the capacity to recognize the authority of the common good and also to act in the name of the common good is of the most primary importance. This sense of primacy may be called the primacy of political competence, and it consists of (*i*) the capacity to think in items of the common good and (*ii*) also to act in the name of the common good. The first presupposes a capacity to transcend one's specific situation in thought, while the second presupposes a similar capacity to transcend situational limitations in action.

Summarizing, we may say that the principle of the primacy of the political order involves (*a*) functional primacy, (*b*) normative primacy, and (*c*) imperative primacy. All these three meanings of primacy are grounded and made possible by the primacy of political competence. Hence the fundamental point is the description of man as having a specific and *sui generis* capacity to understand his life with others in terms of the common good. This is what may be called political culture in the classical sense, and it is rooted in that which most clearly distinguishes the human from other forms of life, i.e. language. For a proper understanding of the nature of the political culture, language rather than behaviour, is crucial; for it is in discourse that situational transcendence is first made possible.[24]

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Notes and discussions

SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN HAPPINESS*

I

The question of relating human happiness to our knowledge of reality is very significant as day by day we are becoming increasingly concerned with both of them. Knowledge and happiness are undoubtedly the twin *telos* of human life; we certainly want to achieve both. As a rational being man tries to acquire more and more knowledge; he also has in him a craving for happiness. Our will-to-knowledge is not meant only to make good our lack of happiness. Rather, we often try to make use of knowledge as a means of increasing our happiness.

Being situated as we are in an unprecedented age of scientific and technological advancement and, in addition, in the process of getting ourselves ready to enter into the twenty-first century, we do now feel the need of inwardizing our consciousness, of searching within ourselves and to raise the basic question whether will-to-knowledge and the received knowledge have really succeeded in giving us true happiness and perfect peace of mind. Perhaps the time has come not to be obsessed with the received world *out*look(s) and to seriously develop a new and refreshing *in*look. One must put the question to oneself whether the usual set of cognitive achievements and happiness can possibly go together. Are they complementary to one another or contradictory?

The deliberations over this crucial issue are not only interesting and useful but also deeply intriguing, for one feels that, like some other perennial philosophical problems, it cannot be tackled in a clear-cut way. It yields no definite answer or solution. At any rate, we are yet to receive an answer that will satisfy all of us. Is knowledge a bliss or curse or neither? How to formulate the issue in an understandable and answerable way?

II

The problems pertaining to the relation between knowledge and happiness may be raised at various levels leading to several allied questions. Some of the latter may perhaps be put in the following way:

(*a*) Why men are engaged in the pursuit of knowledge at all?
(*b*) What is knowledge *proper*?
(*c*) Is it *humanly* possible to attain *proper* knowledge?

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(*d*) Are we clear about what is happiness? Is it a state of mind or of body or of both? Whether physical comforts and material prosperity are necessary for our true happiness and, if so, to what extent?
(*e*) Can happiness be measured? Can one's happiness be compared with another's? If so, how? What is the standard or criterion?
(*f*) Does acquisition of knowledge contribute to human happiness? Or,
(*g*) Is it the case that the more we know, the more we become aware of our limitations, incompleteness, frailties and fallibilities of all that we have gathered as knowledge?

Possibly, each one of the above questions can be discussed at the individual as well as the social levels.

III

Man as *home sapiens* is not satisfied only with the gratification of his animal instincts. He wants to *be* more than what he *is*. The more and more he wants to know about his own body, about the world he finds himself placed in and regarding the society which he lives in, the more and more he feels intrigued by what he does not know about all these things. He is struck by the beauty and mysteries of the universe he inhabits. He is concerned with his own ontological status. What about his conscious existence which makes him what he is, and also makes him strive to *be* what he is not (at least not yet)? This restless pursuit of knowledge, this inherent inquisitiveness distinguishes man from other animals. We share many passions and drives with other animals. But the activities of endless questioning spirit, using symbols, knowing, imagining, creating new ideas, communicating what we feel and know make us unique and differentiate us from other animal species. We have many springs of action commonly with other animals; it is only by symbolically processing and reflecting on our information and communicating the same that we cease to be mere animal and elevate ourselves to the status of human being. Knowledge acquired and extended *for its own sake* is the specific quality that makes us human. Not only we seek knowledge for its own sake; we often use it as an input for survival in the struggle for existence also. Knowledge of what we are and of the world wherein we are enables us in very many ways to situate ourselves in our environment—both natural and cultural—to our advantage.

Acquisition, expansion, precisification and application of knowledge have helped man in the process of transition from primitive animalism to savagery, from savegery to civilization, to culture and the higher reaches of spirituality. This inquisitiveness has also resulted in the progress and development of more and more sciences, and in the invention of complicated technological devices. Knowledge has certainly given us some power and mastery over many natural and other phenomena. It has provided better conditions for human happiness by supplying newer methods to combat poverty and disease.

Yet, in spite of all these positive aspects of knowledge, the more we know the world the more we become sceptical about the correctness of the available information. The question haunts us: 'Can knowledge on its own account make us happy?' Modern science, the paradigm of knowledge, has undoubtedly given us enormous, interesting and useful information about almost all things around us. But has it given us enough of information regarding our own nature? What is the nature of our very being? How are we related to our environment? Is it a part of our very being? Are we a product or byproduct of the evolution of this vast environment or both? By what are we really environed? Will knowledge make us virtuous? Is it borne out by the recorded history of mankind, its arts and sciences? What credible evidence have we at our disposal to believe that knowledge will make us free and happy?

IV

The question of happiness is no less puzzling than that of knowledge. We all earnestly seek happiness, though probably not knowing what it is really like and how to attain and retain it. Happiness, it appears, is something inexplicable and almost indefinable. Though we can describe some of its components and delineate many of its conditions, happiness itself remains as elusive as ever. Philosophers, we know, take pleasure in dealing with such abstruse concepts, and, as such, even in the Greek period, we find various explications of the term 'happiness'. Happiness has been understood as referring to 'good fortune', 'supreme joy of bliss', 'general satisfaction with life' (as supported by Democritus), or 'possession of supreme good' (as emphasized by Aristotle). Most of the ancient and classical discussion of happiness centered mainly round the concept of *eudaemonia*. Satisfaction was not regarded as the raw material of happiness; it was considered its consequence. The distinctive feature of their philosophy was that only one way of life can give durable satisfaction; and that is the religious way of life, the life of contemplation, (and renunciation?), all other conditions being too fleeting and futile.

In the contemporary period the term 'happiness' has received more experiential and existential interpretations:

(*a*) Happiness is a rather pleasant state involving 'goalsetting and goalstriving with ego involvement on the part of the individual (Cassel, 1954).
(*b*) Happiness is the purposeful release of energy towards a meaningful goal (Hutschnecker, 1964).
(*c*) Happiness appears as an overall evaluation of the quality of individual's own experience in the conduct of his vital affairs. As such happiness represents a conception abstracted from the flux of affective life indicating a decided balance or positive affectivity over long periods of time (Wessman & Ricks, 1966).

(*d*) Happiness is a lasting, complete and justified satisfaction with life' (Tatarkneuicz, 1975).

(*e*) Happiness is integration (of identity), fulfilment (of needs) and extension (contrary to alienation) (Schulz-Hageleit, 1979).[1]

I have quoted none of the above definitions to show that it is adequate and acceptable to me. My purpose is to show the transition from the classical to the contemporary interpretations. Unlike the classical thinkers, the contemporary writers are more and more concerned about the physical and social components of happiness. Happiness is undeniably regarded as a state of mind; but as mind is 'located' in body, i.e. embodied, one cannot isolate mental happiness from bodily happiness totally. We can never experience mental states as completely detached from its attending physical conditions. Body is the locus of all conscious experiences. So consciousness manifests itself in and through the perceptual activities, which are partly physical. And happiness, even if recognized as a state of mind, is not independent of its somatic locus.

The embodied being, again, is a situated being. We live in a society—we experience our environment—with all its glories and follies, whatever they may be. Often we accept them, often we challenge them, but our life and happiness cannot ignore them. Though we harp often on the psycho-physical and socio-cultural conditions of human happiness, we deeply feel that all these, even taken together, are neither necessary nor sufficient for making us happy. Somebody may be 'happy' in spite of all his physical or social disadvantages, while some other with all such fulfilments may feel the pangs of loneliness and alienation. If happiness is our destination, the journey towards it is unending and the roads are mysterious and often unmappable. Though we know about many mysteries of the world, happiness still remains systematically ambiguous. This ambiguity is partly rooted in man's ontological duality. For man takes at times his basic identity as mental/spiritual and at some other times as physical/material. At times he enjoys his being in receiving from without, i.e. in being recipient or patient; at times his joy consists in giving his surplus of being, in creating from within, i.e. in being agent or creator.

V

If such be the nature of happiness, can we claim that our pursuit of knowledge—knowledge as science—has been successful in widening the horizons of our happiness? Modern science has certainly succeeded in dispelling (at least partially) the gloom of ignorance and poverty. With its allied technological developments it has certainly increased our physical comfort and material attainments. On the other hand, we cannot deny that we have become more and more dehumanized and alienated. In a modern technocratic society man is being treated as a machine; he has been reduced to a

practico-inert (to use the Sartrean terminology). We suffer now-a-days from the 'threat of an infinite loss'—the loss of our own individuality.

In the name of acquisition of knowledge we are becoming pawns in the game of positivism and scientism. Bertrand Russell in his essay on 'Useless knowledge' comments:

> 'Life, at all times full of pain, is more painful in our time than in the two centuries that preceded it. The attempt to escape from pain drives men to triviality, to self-deception, to the invention of vast collective myth.'[2]

The world at present is full of specialized, dogmatic scientists, each incapable of viewing human life as a whole. In order to escape from such dehumanization and disintegration, what is needed is not this type of partisan and piecemeal view but

> '...such knowledge as inspires a conception of the ends of human life as a whole: art and history...and some understanding of the strangely accidental and ephemeral position of man in the cosmos—all this touched with an emotion of pride in what is distinctively human, the power to see and to know, to feel magnanimously and to think with understanding.'[3]

Even in this age of science with its all-encompassing impact, voices of protest can be heard from various corners. Realization has been slowly dawning upon us that we are not following the true path to wisdom and happiness. Some of the significant contemporary revolts against such dehumanizing scientism can be found in Kierkegaard's attack on Hegelian essentialism, Nietzsche's struggle for creativity, Dilthey's insistence on historical hermeneutics and Husserl's critique of the crisis of 'European' science. All these great and sensitive minds feel concerned that techno-economic process has come into force whereby beings are being gradually transformed into things, into pieces of reality, which pure science can calculate and technical science can control. Man has become a commodity. Whatever he produces, even what he himself is, is measurable in terms of money. Cash nexus relation is fastly replacing man's affection for man, man's concern for nature and its non-renewable depleting resources.

The crisis of *European* science is not really the crisis of the concept of science as such or knowledge as such and of its basic rationality. The crisis of science is primarily due to its non-involvement with the concrete lived-experience. The concept of knowledge as redefined on the model of positivistic factual sciences has receded so much further from its original, i.e. *human*, starting point that it has lost contact with its main spring or source. Hence, by 'crisis', Husserl primarily implies that the self-understanding of man in his relation to the universe has lost its genuine meaning, and fails to determine his unique and authentic position in the world. To quote him on the point:

'Scientific, objective truth is exclusively a matter of establishing what the world, the physical as well as the spiritual world, is in fact. But can the world, and human existence in it, have a meaning if the sciences recognise as true only what is objectively established in this fashion and if history has nothing more to teach us than that all the shapes of the spiritual world, all the conditions of life, ideals, norms upon which man relies, form and dissolve themselves like fleeting waves, that it always was and ever will be so, that again and again reason must turn into nonsense and well-being into misery? Can we console ourselves with that? Can we live in the world, where historical occurrence is nothing but an unending concatenation of illusory progress and bitter disappointment?'[4]

Man, in this mechanomorphic age, is certainly unhappy, alien, disintegrated and empty. Emptiness and loss of meaning are expressions of the 'threat of non-being' (to use an expression of Tillich) to our spiritual life. There is a science of medicine to cure our sick body, but there is no rigorous science of spirit to heal our unhappy soul. Modern science has given more and more comforts to our physical existence, but it has not succeeded in removing our anxiety of fate, death and suffering, as the inescapable inevitabilities of human life. To say that science was never meant to do all these jobs is to redefine the scope of it narrowly. It was conceived as the purest and truest form of knowledge answerable to all rigorous tests, theoretical as well as practical, logical as well as experimental. Besides, knowledge was expected to lead us to the light of virtuous life. Knowledge or science is not something merely provable and clear. It was solicited for making man wise and endlessly improvable. Primacy of practice was its basic intended orientation. It has now turned out to be a mere *techne* in most cases. Its claim as *episteme* has in effect become secondary or tertiary.

The failure of modern science, science as the paradigmatic pursuit of knowledge, is no stricture against knowledge as such. Misuse or abuse of it is no argument against its possible good uses. Knowledge, reflective knowledge, takes man to his roots, to the spring of his all cognitive and moral enterprises; replenishes his wasted resources, and redefines his right place in the world. Even in pain and suffering that *place* makes man happy in the depth of his being. While our body, subject to the laws of nature, may feel pain, become ill and undergo punishment of various sorts, joy and delight of existence may remain and last undimmed. Our embodiment does not mean slavery of consciousness to the failings and frailties of body. Firmfoot on the earth, knowledge can burn bright and remain lit like a leaping flame looking above in search of happiness, dispelling the darkness beneath, around and within it.

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PROFESSOR MATILAL ON SOME TOPICS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Professor Matilal in his book, *Logic, Language and Reality*,* has discussed so many problems, examined so many alternative interpretations, and suggested so many solutions that it is impossible to mention all of them in one paper. I shall, therefore, select arbitrarily only a few topics for discussion here.

I

On the question of Greek influence on ancient Indian logic (pp. 1-8), Professor Matilal has convincingly refuted Vidyabhusana's theory that Indian logic was greatly influenced by Aristotle's works. He successfully drives home that superficial similarities between Indian logic and Aristotle's cannot, in any way, minimize points of fundamental difference between them. In course of his argument, he notes two significant features:

(*i*) The subject-predicate form of proposition in Aristotle's theory and the property-location form in the Indian tradition. Although Matilal discusses in detail the location of property and location (pp. 112-28), still the main point of difference which is relevant here seems not to have been emphasized by him. A universal statement like 'All *A* is *B*' is interpreted in Aristotle's theory as *B* being predicated of all *A* where there is only one predication; whereas in Nyāya it is interpretated as expressing a cognition of the form whatever has *A*-ness has *B*-ness where there are two properties to be located. This Nyāya theory, therefore, agrees more with the modern Western theories that a general term can occupy only a predicate place, and that, therefore, in 'All *A* is *B*' there are two predicates.

(*ii*) A second point of difference which is noted is the function of the minor term in Aristotle's syllogism and the *pakṣa* in Nyāya. Matilal rightly points out that in Aristotle's syllogism only general terms are used. So all the propo-

*Bimal Krishna Matilal, *Logic, Language and Reality* (Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1985).

sitions in a syllogism are general propositions, universal or particular, whereas, in Nyāya demonstration, the *pakṣa* is a singular term.

Though this is usual in affirmative demonstrations, in negative demonstrations the conclusion is generally interpreted as universal. For example, in 'earth is different from non-earth, because of smell', *earth* which is the *pakṣa* is interpreted as covering all earthen things; this is why there can be no *sapakṣas* but only *vipakṣas* in this case.

We may also note here that in *later* Nyāya a distinction is made between the co-presence of the limitor of the property of being a *pakṣa* and being limited by this limitor. In many cases, only the first interpretation makes the inference valid; but, in some cases, both the interpretations are permissible. The second interpretation of the conclusion would make it a universal proposition.

We may note here some more points of fundamental difference.

(*a*) There is some controversy about the structure of Aristotelian syllogism. According to Lukasiewicz, 'All Aristotelian syllogisms are implications ...' (*Aristotle's Syllogistic*, p. 20); whereas, according to von Wright,

> No conclusive support can be found in the original text, as we have it, *either* for the view that the formulation with 'therefore' *or* for the view that the formulation with 'if-then' and 'and', is *the* (historically) correct one (*Logical Studies*, pp. 20-21).

But the Nyāya demonstration is one compound sentence consisting of five part-sentences (*avayavas*) which are, however, all asserted.

(*b*) One point concerns the function of examples in Nyāya demonstration. An example, which may be either positive or negative, is an established case. If no examples at all are to be found as in the conclusion 'everything is momentary' where everything has become the *pakṣa*, and is, therefore, a debatable case, nothing can be an established case acceptable to both the parties to the debate. The inference is invalid, because it is non-conclusive. This also shows why induction in the usual sense of Western logic, involving generalization from observed cases, cannot be admitted as an *inference* in Nyāya.

From

(1) Some observed men are mortal
(2) ∴ All men are mortal

cannot be validly inferred, for 'all' includes the cases already established in the premises, and thus the inference commits the fallacy of partial *siddhasādhana*. What can be inferred is

(3) All unobserved men are mortal

where the cases of observed men have been excluded from the conclusion. Nyāya, therefore, does not regard generalization as a process of inference at all. This problem is usually treated as that of the ways of ascertaining *vyāpti*.

In Aristotelian syllogisms, which, to be valid, have to have only formal truth, there is no need for examples. A Nyāya inference, being a process of knowing, as opposed to merely consistent thinking, must be materially true. Hence the importance of an example, of an unproblematic established case, admitted by both the parties to a debate.

(*c*) Another fundamental point of difference between Aristotle's theory and Nyāya theory is that Aristotle's theory of syllogism presupposes processes of immediate inference like conversion, obversion, etc. which are not present in Nyāya. We may note here why any process like obversion is not possible in Nyāya. In Aristotle's theory, from

(4) All *A* is *B*

we have by obversion

(5) No *A* is not-*B*,

where the predicate is a negative term and the quality of the proposition, too, is negative. But Nyāya does not admit two types of negation in the same sentence. As Matilal says; 'Negation is always construed as term-negation. Sentential negation is usually transformed into term-negation of some kind or other' (p. 112). Thus, 'No *A* is not-B' would be interpreted in Nyāya as '*A* is not-not-*B*' which will be dealt with as a case of double negation and not as obversion in Aristotle's sense.

(*d*) There is another point of fundamental difference between an Aristotelian syllogism and a Nyāya demonstration. A Nyāya demonstration is conclusive, because in its four members all sources of true cognition are brought to bear on the conclusion which is the fifth member. Thus, the 'strength' of demonstration (*parama-nyāya*, inference *par excellence*) lies in being supported by all the ways of knowing admitted in Nyāya. In Aristotle's syllogism, there is no scope for such 'confluence' (*sambhava*) of different sources of knowledge. As Matilal himself says: 'Thus all the *pramāṇas* become helpful in nyāya' (p. 23).

It is also to be noted that the difference between inferences for one's own sake and for the sake of others is unknown in Western logic including Aristotle's logic. Inference as a process of knowing does not involve words which are needed only to communicate the knowledge to others. To this difference in purpose is due also a difference in structure. Inference for one's own sake involves four steps, while inference for the sake of others (demonstration) involves five steps; there cannot be any step corresponding to *pratijñā* in the former. It would perhaps be more proper to compare and contrast Aristotle's syllogism with inference for one's own sake in Nyāya, rather than with demonstration.

(*e*) Another point concerns the distinction between arguments and pseudo-arguments (pp. 23-29). 'In ultimate scrutiny *nyāya* stands for those inferences as rest upon, i.e. are not at variance with, perception and verbal or scriptural testimony' (p. 24). But the question is not raised, 'What happens in those cases where perception gets corrected by inference, as, for example, in the

case of perception of the earth as having a flat surface?' It seems that not only Nyāya but all schools of Indian philosophy seem to regard perception as the highest kind of knowledge. This is in sharp contrast to the Greek tradition where perception has been generally regarded as the lowest kind of knowledge, and is sometimes regarded as mere opinion. This difference in their attitude to the worth of perception as knowledge or as a source of knowledge makes Indian logic and Greek logic fundamentally different. This is why Aristotle developed his logic as a science of formal truths or truths of reason which are superior to truths of perception, while Indian philosophers, and even mathematicians, never recognized the importance of formal truth at all.

von Wright, however, makes a distinction between formal truth and *logical* truth which is proved in an axiomatic system,

> 'It seems to me much more to the point to say that *the notion of logical truth is unknown to Aristotle*. This is not necessarily to blame Aristotle of ignorance. It is an interesting question, to what extent logic can be developed independently of the idea of logical *truth*.'

It means that Aristotle did not have any idea of an axiomatic system of logic. The point that I am trying to make is that, in Indian philosophy, there is neither the concept of formal truth nor the concept of an axiomatic system in which logical truths are proved.

It, thus, appears that Vidyabhusana's contention that Nyāya theory of inference was 'greatly' influenced by Aristotle's theory is based on noticing only superficial similarities between them.

II

Matilal is right when he says that 'an error combines two elements of reality that are not so combined in reality' (p. 98). It is necessary, however, to examine in detail the usual Nyāya definition of *apramā*, and compare and contrast with that of *pramā*. A cognition which is true or false has an object which is complex, and can be analysed into a property and a possessor of the property. A cognition having *that* as its qualifier of (in) a that-possessor is *pramā*; and a cognition with that as its qualifier of (in) (absence of that)-possessor is *apramā*. Thus, an error or a false cognition is ascribing a property, which is manifested in the cognition as its qualifier, to a locus lacking that property. It may appear that, according to Nyāya, the cognized structure which is an epistemic unity is different from the real structure of property and its possessor. It should be noted here that the two terms *a* and *b* of a relational whole *aRb* are *both* real. As Matilal says, 'An error combines two elements of reality which are not actually so combined' (p. 98) and even the *R* is also a real relation; what is not real is that *a*, *R* and *b* form the unity *aRb* which is the object of the erroneous cognition. So it may be argued

that the difference between a true cognition and an erroneous cognition lies in this that, while the objective complex *aRb* is real if it is truly cognized, it is not real when it is erroneously cognized. This may lead to the mistaken idea that the complex *aRb* has to be regarded as a unity independently of the cognition. But the Navya-Nyāya theory is that *aRb* is cognized as a unity, simply because all the three elements—*a*, *R*, *b*—are related, though by different relations, to one cognition. Thus, *aRb* is an epistemic unity corresponding to which there is no unity as a separate reality over and above the three elements. This Navya-Nyāya theory is contrasted with the Mīmāṁsā theory which states that, in the so-called erroneous cognition, there is no one cognition to which all the elements are related; there are really two cognitions, say, a perception of this, and a memory of silver, when we *say* that we have a false cognition of an objective unity 'this is silver'.

III

About *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* Matilal says:

> 'In simple language, although this cognitive state has a content...it is not expressible in words. Again, the content of this cognitive state does not admit of any philosophic analysis because it is only our inner perception... that gives us the datum for such an analysis, and it has already been stated that the non-judgmental cognitive state does not admit of such inner perception.'

From this he concludes that 'since all this amounts to saying that non-judgmental cognitive state is never *known* to us, one can very well entertain doubt with regard to its actual occurrence. To answer this doubt, Navya-Nyāya gives the following argument...' (p. 211).

But this conclusion does not follow; for, even though the non-judgmental state is not itself an object of introspection and the object cognized in this cognition cannot be denoted or referred to by any word, it does not follow that this type of cognition cannot be *known*.* As a matter of fact, Navya-Nyāya philosophers establish the existence of non-judgmental cognition by inference. Matilal calls this inference 'argument' to dispel doubt about the existence or actual occurrence of non-judgmental cognition. But 'arguments to dispel doubt' are *tarkas* which are not *pramāṇas*, i.e. they cannot yield any knowledge. This has led Matilal to conclude that this type of cognitive state is not *known*. This goes against the Navya-Nyāya position that it is known by inference.

IV

Matilal has discussed in detail Jagadisa's distinction between the concepts of significant word and significant sentence. This distinction is clear, for, accord-

*Due to Dr. Karuna Bhattacharya.

ing to Jagadisa, only a sentence can produce the cognition of a connected meaning, while no word by itself can do so. This Nyāya theory of isolated word-meanings is opposed to the Mīmāṁsā theory of word meanings of related structures. According to Jagadisa, no isolated word can ever mean a connected or relational whole which can be meant by words occurring in a sentence. Thus, Nyāya rejects the doctrine that words must mean in the same way whether singly or occurring in a sentence. According to Nyāya, words occurring in a sentence have mutual expectancy which is that order among words whose meanings are connected or related in a whole. Thus, expectancy is a syntactical relation which is determined by semantical fitness. Because words forming a sentence have this sort of expectancy, which they do not have when they occur singly in isolation, words in a sentence can mean a related structure. But, for this words have to be related to each other in their semantical aspect. Jagadisa introduces the concept of *sārthaka śabda* to emphasize the special role which word-meanings play in a sentence. We have already stated that, according to Nyāya, a sentence produces the cognition of a related structure. But, because of the special way in which relations are conceived in Nyāya, a related structure meant by a sentence is neither a fact nor a proposition but is simply a compound object, a qualificand qualified by a qualifier. Thus, according to Nyāya, there is no syntactical or semantical difference between a compound term and a sentence. A compound term like a stem with its suffix will produce a qualificative cognition of a related whole. The stem and the verbal root are classified by Jagadisa as 'the inflectable word-base, or the lexical item (*prakṛti*)' (p. 392). Although the word-base has its independent isolated meaning, it can produce the cognition of a relational whole, not merely when it is actually followed by its suffix but is cognized with belief that the suffix is the qualifier of the word-base. In the cognition of the connected meaning, the meaning of the word-base is not to be qualified by any qualifier; and the meaning of the suffix is the qualificand which is qualified by the meaning of the word-base. As the word-base, cognized as being followed by the inflection, produces cognition of a qualificand qualified by a qualifier, and as the qualifier has to be cognized prior to the qualificative cognition, the qualifier is cognized independently of the qualificand. So Matilal is right when he says that 'a word-base contributes its meaning to the sentence-meaning in an independent way while an inflection contributes its meaning in a dependent way' (p. 393). Because of the Navya-Nyāya theory that word, in the first declension, means the chief qualificand (*mukhya viśeṣya*), a nominal base in the first declension produces a cognitive meaning with the meaning of the word-base as the chief qualificand. If, however, a word-base is in any other declension, then the qualificative cognition which is produced will have the meaning of the word-base as the qualifier and the meaning of the inflection as the qualificand. Thus, the compound word '*ghata*+*am*' will produce the cognition of objecthood of the jar, where objecthood is the chief qualificand.

V

It is a pity that the rich content of the book should be marred by the nuisance of several printing errors overlooked by the publisher's editor. A few of them only with their correct forms are listed below:

p. 24, fn. 2; *pratyakṣāgamāviruddham* should be *pratyakṣāgamaviruddham*.
p. 31, line 5: 'Vat I *Purvavat*' occurs, whereas in the last line there is 'Gaudapada: (a) same as Vat I (a)'. It shows that in line 5 also there should have been 'Vat I (a) Purvavat'
pp. 83-84: '(say a pot or a horn) qualified by a non-resident property (say, *potness* or occurrence in hare)'; '*potness*' should read 'cotness'; so also in the next line and next page, line 6; 'just as pot-limited-by-potness' should be 'just as pot-limited-by-cotness'.

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Book reviews

RICHARD GOTSHALK: *Bhagavad Gītā*—Translation and Commentary, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985, xvi+245 pages, Rs. 100.

The author recognizes the human background and the national ethos associated with the *Gītā*, and prepares the Western mind to 'participate in a specific way in the knowledgeable leading of the poem...'. Much reliance has been placed upon what is already conveyed in the works of Radhakrishnan, Gandhi and Desai, Besant and Das, Aurobindo and Zaehner.

The work is well organized and is highly informative, beginning with an elaborate 'Introduction' as to how one should try to understand the original text, which has come to us in the form of poetry. Following the 'Introduction' is the 'Translation', covering the original, verse by verse. The author uses spacing 'to group certain verses together that are not visually grouped in Sanskrit but which seem to represent natural articulation in the flow of conversation and thought within each chapter (*adhyāya*, chapter or reading, lesson, study).' The author consolidates the translated material in his 'Commentary' which is followed by 'Notes to the Translation' and 'Notes Concerning Text'. Various views of authors, both classical and modern, are included in the 'Notes'. To make the work more comprehensible to the Western reader, there is a 'General Index of Themes and Ideas' followed by an 'Index of Epithets for Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa'. At the end there is a 'Subject Index to Commentary' to facilitate easy access to concepts which the reader may wish to reach.

The author rightly expresses the fact that an English rendering of a work like the *Gītā* is bound to acknowledge the poetic character of the original as integral to the meaning intended by the original author. As he himself states, he has been guided by 'the notion that in a translation sacrifice of anything of the poetic character of the *Gītā* must concern the level of speaking, not that of meaning.' For the benefit of the reader he states what he means by 'speaking' and 'meaning' as follows:

(1) At the level of speaking (reading and reciting) there is the very sound of the words in Sanskrit, there is the meter through which the sounded words are connected in certain patterns, and there is the division of the connected units into verses (*ślokas*); and
(2) At the level of meaning, there is the narrative character of the presentation, and with this, a certain grandeur and forcefulness of language reflecting who is speaking, the occasion for the dialogue, and the content of the conversation.

The author tried as much as possible to keep interpretation to a minimum in spite of the fact that translations are bound to reflect some interpretation or other. To compensate for this kind of distortion, the author has pressed into service the explanations given by as many authors as possible. The original work is made available to us by Vyāsa as a form of a narration by Sañjaya of the dialogue that took place between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna. The author gives a sketch of the antecedents pertaining to the dialogue between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna, and also reminds the reader that one should bear in mind the indirect character of the work in understanding and interpreting the work.

The author, while commenting on the initial depression of Arjuna, makes an observation which brings to surface the role of the divine teacher in contrast to an average companion who tries to help a victim when he is in total confusion.

> In that strengthening Arjuna is not being restored to what he was, but is being brought into a movement forward which, if carried through, will bring him to grow beyond what he was by bringing him into his active efforts in an altered form (p. 80).

Arjuna's initial refusal to fight, using his own philosophical understanding of *dharma,* as against what Kṛṣṇa was planning to teach him is discussed in detail. A number of misconceptions about the *Gītā* as a philosophy of war are ruled out in this discussion. The analysis about acting from the locus of the ego as faulty and the subsequent rectification of Arjuna's faulty thinking is tracked throughout the commentary from different perspectives. Even a reader, who is introduced to the *Gītā* for the first time, will be impressed by the author's clear exposition and differentiation of certain seemingly identical concepts.

The author has taken pains to express the subtle distinction between classical *Sāṁkhya* and the *Sāṁkhya* taught by Kṛṣṇa. 'Kṛṣṇa's voicing of *Sāṁkhya* teaching in its relevance to Arjuna is articulated into three phases, which involve three levels of thought' (p. 85). The first phase is identified in II.11–25, the second phase in II.26–30, and the third phase in II.31–30. In the third phase Kṛṣṇa is said to have prepared Arjuna to accept a positive action-oreinted line of thought. The author maintains a continuity of thought throughout the book, which reflects the efforts taken by Kṛṣṇa in changing the attitude of Arjuna from non-action to positive action through a systematic exposition of different paths.

The 'Notes' maintain the spirit of the work with explanations from different points of view, and here and there the author tries to bridge the gaps with the implied Vedāntic concepts. The suggestions are constructive and thought-provoking opening new possibilities. A complete study of the notes alone by itself reveals that the author is at pains to give as much information as possible by attempting to provide an adequate picture of different views from the Vedas, Upaniṣads and other scriptures.

The concluding remarks at the end of the commentary remind the reader once again about the fundamental character of the *Gītā* in a nutshell as follows:

> It is a dramatic whole which takes shape in the initial phase of that movement of Arjuna's growing awareness and understanding which is meant to bring eventually into the fulfilment of his life and existence. Within itself its own movement begins with an Arjuna apparently firm and resolute, and ends with an Arjuna again apparently firm and resolute. Outwardly there is perhaps no noticeable difference; but inwardly, an eternity has passed... (pp. 137-38).

The work is not entirely free from the limitations common to translations by Western authors. To cite an example, such usage as 'Thick Hair' or 'Fair Hair', while addressing Arjuna or Kṛṣṇa, may appear to be faithful translations, but being proper names, they do not warrant any translation. They only leave a bad taste in the mind of the devout reader of the *Gītā.* 'Kesava' simply means 'beautifully haired', 'thick growth', 'of the nature of sustainer, creator and destroyer'. Even granting that translation of such terms is accepted, the translator has to exercise his discrimination in choosing a particular meaning only after a careful examination of the different meanings associated with a certain term relevant to the context.

The author could have avoided translation of proper names, which would be in line with his intentions of being faithful to the original.

The author states (p. ix): 'Song in its form was added to the drammatically appropriate place in the main epic story by the end of the second century B.C.' When the determination of the period of either the Mahābhārata war or the actual composition of the epic is a controversial issue, he hastily takes an unauthoritative stand in deciding the date of the work.

The author refers to Yoga as originally belonging to the 'non-Vedic tradition' which was 'later assimilated into the Vedic tradition' (p. 88). Whether the Sāṁkhya and Yoga belong to the non-Vedic or pre-Vedic traditions is open to much controversy. In the absence of adequate evidence, he could have avoided making such a statement.

In the use of abbreviations the author could have followed a single consistent pattern. He uses 'R' for Radhakrishnan as well as for Rāmānuja, leaving the reader in confusion. Adding to this confusion, he uses 'RK' for Radhakrishnan in some places. If the author had given a list of abbreviations, he could have at least avoided inconsistent use of abbreviations.

Leaving aside a few minor deviations such as those mentioned above,

the book may prove useful to students, scholars and those interested in studying the *Gītā*.

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ANTHONY KENNY: *The Logic of Deterrence*, Firethorn Press, 1985, 101 pages.

Anthony Kenny has written a lively little book dedicated to the proposition that the strategy of nuclear deterrence is both morally and practically unacceptable. The alternative Kenny proposes is a unique kind of limited unilateral disarmament, which he defends in the last three chapters. *The Logic of Deterrence* has several virtues. Kenny writes with lucidity and economy; the book goes straight to the centre of the paradoxes that make deterrence theory interesting. Kenny gives a critical account of contemporary Roman Catholic thinking on the subject, which has become significant factor in the public debate. And Kenny is unbendingly fair to those with whom he disagrees, presenting their arguments forcibly and never doubting their good intentions. Unfortunately, the book is compromised by its very brevity. The argument moves too swiftly, controversial premises are inadequately defended, and central arguments are fallacious. Finally, Kenny fails to provide a cogent argument for his conclusions.

The trouble starts at the beginning. Kenny is not a pacifist; he believes there can be a just war. He denies there can be a just *nuclear* war. When is war just? Kenny writes:

> War, then, must be waged in order to right a specific wrong... One has this right only if war is taken up as a last resort... There must be good hope of victory: if not the wrong which occasioned the war will not be righted thereby. The good to be obtained by the righting of the wrong must outweigh the harm which will be done by the choice of war as a means. Again, the harm done in war-making shall be no more than is necessary for achieving the legitimate goal of the war. Finally, if a war is to be just. . .the rules of war must be observed in the combat itself (p. 9).

The most important condition of a just war, Kenny adds, is that 'it should not involve the deliberate killing of the innocent' (p. 10), the class of which he defines as all those who are not engaged in harming one's own forces. Soldiers who have surrendered are innocent, civilian munitions workers are not. The undesired death of innocent civilians as a side effect of destroying a military target does not violate this principle. What is plainly excluded is 'the deliberate massacre of civilian populations. . .as a means to victory' (p. 11).

This is the Roman Catholic doctrine of the conditions for fighting a just war, according to Kenny 'the only conditions under which the international community can rationally accept war' (p.10). Reviewing Western defence policy from the 'massive-retaliation' of the Eisenhower presidency to attempts at more selective targeting under the Reagon presidency, Kenny claims that every strategy directly targets cities at some stage of retaliation (though he acknowledges this is specifically denied by the Reagan administration). Inevitably millions of 'innocents' would be deliberately killed, including vast numbers of people who could not bear any responsibility for the acts of their government. This is murder pure and simple, and 'murder is never justified' (p. 22.)

Murder, Kenny argues, needn't involve the intention that someone will die. 'A death which is foreseen but not intended can amount to murder if the killer's action demonstrates. . .a reckless disregard for human life' (p. 24). If we destroy a city to take out a radar installation, we may well have committed murder: 'Disproportionate civilian casualties can make an attack on a military target as murderous as an attack on a city' (p. 25). But, Kenny argues, nuclear attacks on military targets would involve nearly as many civilian casualties as an attack on the enemy's population. Even a single use of our lowest-yield weapon on the battlefield would involve crossing the 'firebreak' between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, involving an unacceptable risk of escalation to Armagedon. Consequently, *any* use of nuclear weapons against military targets would involve civilian casualties wholly out of proportion to the military goal to be achieved, and would be as liable to the charge of murder as deliberate assaults on cities. Both large-scale and small-scale nuclear warfare violate the traditional criteria of the just war.

But what of the criteria themselves? Are they valid? They deserve more scrutiny than Kenny affords them. An immediate consequence of the laws of war, as Kenny presents them, appears to be that the Jewish residents of the Warsaw ghetto were unjust to take up arms against the Nazis. For there was no hope of victory. One way or another they would be murdered and the wrong being done them could not be righted. Further, where victory is impossible *any* harm one does in war-making is greater than victory requires, for it cannot contribute to victory. Yet, surely, these people had a right to die fighting, even though they were wronged just as much when killed in combat as if they had died like sheep.

Consider also these scenarios:

(1) We are a nation of 100,000 and we are attacked by *B*, who wishes to establish hegemony. On account of our mountainous terrain, we will win easily if we fight. However, *B* informs us that, if we take up arms, he will simply shift the assault to *C*, another nation of 100,000 who (we know) he will easily defeat. The good to be attained, if we fight, is that 100,000 people will stay free, while the harm which will be done by the choice of war as a means is

that 100,000 people will lose their freedom. It seems to be a consequence of the laws of war that it is wrong for us to repel the attack, for the good attained does not *outweigh* the harm which is done by the choice of war as a means. Yet, surely, it is not wrong to defend ourselves, nor would it be wrong if there are 110, 000 citizens of *C*.

(2) We are a nation of 100,000 unjustly attacked by *B*. We can repel the attack only if we bomb *B*'s railroad lines which the leadership of *B*, with callous disregard for its own people, has built atop the nation's dikes. If the dikes give way, the harvest is destroyed; and 70,000 innocents will starve. It is worse that 70,000 die than 100,000 are subjugated, so we ought not to defend ourselves. And if 100,500 will starve and *B*'s aim is to exterminate us, we still ought not to defend ourselves.

Yet surely the deaths of these people are primarily the responsibility of *B*'s leadership, and this makes a moral difference that the rules for a just war ignore. For *B* wantonly and recklessly puts the tracks on dikes, and then unjustly attacks us; and we are entitled to defend ourselves. The laws of war do not adequately count the moral assymetry between aggression and defence, nor do they recognize the full force of the right to self-defence, especially against annihilation. If we subscribe to them, do we not invite our adversaries to place military installations in population centres, so that we cannot defend ourselves 'justly'? And are we not held hostage to any tyrant who threatens to inflict equal or greater harm on others than the harm we would suffer if we surrender? Finally, are we not simply *entitled* to defend ourselves against unjust invasion, striking the minimum military targets to win, sparing the innocent as best we can, *even though* this causes as much harm to those on the other side as it prevents on our side or more? The laws of war do not count the fact that leaders of a country have a *special* duty to their countrymen to preserve their lives and freedom, which they do not owe to the innocents of the aggressing nation.

(3) Idi Amin has ten nuclear-tipped missiles, which we cannot find. Yesterday he incinerated San Francisco, and he informs us (I am writing from an American perspective) that every day he will destroy another American city. But his political situation is tenuous; if we destroy one city of 10,000, the Ugandan people will rise up and overthrow him. A consequence of the laws of war is that we ought to sit back and await incineration, for the alternative is to kill the innocent deliberately. Perhaps this is right, but it is awfully hard to accept. It does seem to matter morally that this is a desperate act of self-defence against gratuitous genocide. It also seems to matter that we kill innocent Ugandans instead of innocent Sudanese; killing the latter seems worse, even if it would somehow end the assault. Why?

Let me hint at an answer. Consider the case in which a tyrant threatens to kill ten children, one each day, unless I go out and kill an innocent child. I agree with Kenny that it is not permissible for me to save the children (or

even my own life) by these means. Contrast the case in which the tyrant is killing *my* ten children one by one, and I can force him to stop only by killing one of *his* children. It is not so clear that I ought to let my children die. It may be permissible to defend an innocent who is in my care by means of which I ought not to defend myself. And it does seem to matter that the child I kill stands in the same relation to the tyrant as the children he is killing stand to me. Something like the Golden Rule may be operating here. In affirming the maxim, 'let another man's children die', the tyrant puts his own children at risk. If there is something to this, the leaders of a country might justifiably defend the innocents in their care against ongoing genocidal assault by deliberately killing a small number of innocents in the aggressing country, if this would stop the slaughter.

(4) We are fighting a just war against an emperor who, while murderous toward us, is terrified of terrorist assaults on his own population. We have two options other than annihilation. We can bomb a critical military installation, killing 300 innocents unintentionally but crippling the war effort so that the Emperor will have to sue for peace. Here the civilian casualties are warranted, given the extraordinary importance of the target. Or we can deliberately kill 100 of these innocents, in which case the emperor will sue for peace straight away. The laws of war dictate that it is permissible to bomb the installation killing 300 civilians as a side effect but wicked to kill deliberately 100 of the same people, *even though* this will save 200 lives. This seems crazy. These 100 innocents will be blown up unintentionally, if they aren't blown up intentionally. They will die, come what may. Can killing them intentionally be so much worse than killing them unintentionally that this warrants taking the lives of 200 additional people who don't have to die? And if killing a relatively small number of non-combatants will save the lives of large numbers of *soldiers* on both sides, young draftees less responsible for the war than most innocents, shouldn't we spare the larger number? Can it really be just to kill more people than is needed to defeat the enemy? (Note that the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki are sometimes justified on the ground that they saved the lives of untold numbers of Japanese civilians as well as Japanese and American soldiers who would have died, if the war had continued). The laws of war appear to drive too large a wedge between justice and humanity.

Kenny's argument would be more persuasive, if he considered some of these questions. Doubtless his answers would be illuminating. One wishes, too, that he supplied more defence for some of his factual claims. On account of the terrific numerical advantage of Soviet armour, artillery, and troops deployed in Eastern Europe, NATO reserves the right to use tactical nuclear weapons to repel a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Kenny writes: 'Defenders of this policy often concede that the use of tactical nuclear weapons would not serve any military purpose in the sense of bringing victory closer in the actual battle engaged' (p. 29). This is puzzling. Why wouldn't

low-yield weapons destroy advancing armour concentrations? Kenny is silent on this point, and he gives no references. Nonetheless, let us suppose that Kenny's factual claims are true and the laws of war valid. That is, let us suppose that any use of nuclear weapons is murderous in itself or would escalate to something murderous straightaway, and that the murderous use of weapons is wicked. Does it follow that the strategy of nuclear deterrence is wicked too?

The validity of the inference is controversial. Kenny writes. . .there are those who defend the possession of nuclear weapons as a deterrent while agreeing that the use of them in all circumstances must be wrong' (p. 38). This group appears to include Pope John Paul II, the Catholic Bishops in the United States, and Britain's Cardinal Basil Hume. As the point of deterrence is to avoid war, the strategy of deterrence is permissible, though a nuclear strike against civilian targets is not. As Kenny puts it: 'Use is forbidden, deterrence is permissible' (p. 45). Is this a coherent position?

We might keep nuclear weapons as a deterrent, even though we were resolved never to use them. Of course, if the enemy knew of our resolve, the weapons might not deter. 'Those who wish to defend deterrence while opposing use therefore have to be prepared to maintain that it can be legitimate to threaten what it would not be legitimate to do' (p. 47). Is this defensible? Kenny affirms the principle that it is wrong to intend to do what it is wrong to do. Surely, this is true *ceterus paribus,* but might not the intention to respond with nuclear weapons to a Soviet first-strike be a special case? After all, it is our duty to prevent nuclear war. Supposing our intending to retaliate will prevent nuclear war from happening, isn't out intention permissible, though what we intend is not? Kenny responds by quoting Bishop B.C. Butler.

> There is certainly a logical fallacy in the above suggestion. For it is impossible to intend to respond to a situation which you are certain will never arise. No one can intend to do what he knows he will never have occasion to do. . . Hence, if deterrence were certain to succeed permanently, it could continue as a policy, though there would be no intention of translating it into act. Unfortunately, such certainty, as is generally admitted, is not attainable.*

Kenny concludes: 'This reply seems to be decisive against those who maintain that it is morally acceptable to have a conditional intention to do something which they agree to be morally unacceptable' (p. 49). Apparently, the controversial intention is not possible. So much for that.

This is one of the central arguments in Kenny's book. Kenny might have devoted more attention to the 'decisive' reply which seems fallacious. Consider the operative statement:

**The Times*, London, 9 February 1983, p. 49.

> It is impossible to intend to respond to a situation you know will never arise.

This is ambiguous: 'intend' might mean 'have the intention' or it might mean 'form the intention' (that is, 'decide'). On the second reading, the statement looks true: if I know a situation will never arise, I cannot *decide* to respond if it does. Knowing that I will never be given a million dollars, I cannot form the intention to give half of it to charity if it is given. However, on this reading the statement does not pertain to the decisions involved in framing a strategy of deterrence. Suppose, my terrorist neighbour proposes to bomb my house, where I live with my ten children. If he does, I know that one of the survivors will probably bomb his house, where he lives with his ten children. Also I know that, if I form the intention to retaliate in just this way, he won't attack'. Consequently, I decide to retaliate if he attacks. Note that, *at the time* I decide to retaliate if my neighbour attacks, I do *not* know that he will never bomb my house. Indeed, there is a clear and present danger that he is about to do just this, against which I need to take immediate precautions. Therefore, the statement does not entail that I cannot *decide* to respond if my neighbour attacks.

On the first reading, the statement reads: 'If I know that a situation will never arise, then necessarily I do not have the intention to respond to it if it does'. It is worth distinguishing this from another principle: 'If I know that a situation *can* never arise (that is, it is physically impossible), then necessarily I do not have the intention to respond if it does.' This looks true. Given what I know, it cannot now be the case that I have the intention to retaliate if assaulted by unicorns. Of course, the attack by my neighbour is a situation which I know most certainly *can* arise; it will, indeed, arise if ever my intention to retaliate if he attacks wavers. Note that *what* I intend thereby (the content of my intention) is that any physically possible future which becomes actual will either be one in which I am not attacked or one in which I am attacked and retaliate. This isn't idle (like the intention to retaliate if assaulted by unicorns), for there are physically possible futures which don't satisfy it. Happily, my having the intention insures its satisfaction by deterring attack. This hardly makes the intention irrational; to the contrary.

Sufficiently disambiguated to be seen for what it is, the principle that it is impossible to have the intention to respond to a situation you know will never arise looks false in the case we are considering. I decide to retaliate if my neighbour attacks, because I know my having this intention will dissuade him from attacking. As we have seen, this is a decision I can make: the attack is a clear and present danger, and the response I propose is within my power. Once the decision is made, I *have* the intention to retaliate if attacked. As I know I won't be attacked so long as I keep the intention, I naturally resolve

never to abandon it. Hence, after I make the decision, I have the intention to retaliate if my neighbour attacks, and I know he never will. There is nothing irrational about this at all. The 'decisive' reply is mistaken.

We have been assuming that the policy of deterrence actually deters nuclear war. Does it work? Kenny grants that the policy works at instilling fear, but doubts that it is what has kept the Soviets from attacking. Indeed, the West's nuclear weapons may *increase* the risk of war, providing an incentive for a Soviet strike to remove them. Further, there is the risk of nuclear war starting by accident on account of negligence, computer malfunction, or faulty data. But Kenny also believes that, setting moral issues aside, the strategy of deterrence is irrational *regardless* of risks and probabilities. He deploys a version of Pascal's wager to show this:

> Pascal maintained that we ought to believe in God because the penalty for not believing in him if he existed amounted to infinite loss, while the penalty for believing in him if he did not exist was merely a degree of modest but unnecessary self-discipline. Similarly, the worst case outcome of deterrence, namely nuclear devastation, is so much more catastrophic than the worst case outcome of disarmament, Russian domination, that the course which leads to it should be avoided no matter what the relative probabilities of the two outcomes of the different strategies (pp. 65-66).

Kenny concludes that 'the Pascalian policy is appropriate wherever the evils in the worst case outcome are incommensurable in scale. . .' (p. 66). As nuclear war is vastly worse than Russian domination, deterrence is irrational regardless of risks and probabilities.

This is to misunderstand Pascal. The wager, indeed, shows that it is irrational not to believe in God (supposing God rewards and punishes as Pascal assumes) *regardless* of risks and probabilities. But it is worth seeing why. According to Pascal, if I believe in God and God exists, I win eternal happiness, and if God doesn't exist, I lose nothing; for the modest discipline involved in genuine belief is at least as much a benefit as a nuisance. But if I don't believe and God exists, I lose eternal happiness (Pascal never mentions Hell); and if my belief is true, I win nothing, not even the satisfaction of knowing I was right. Therefore, belief puts me in a situation where there is everything to win and nothing to lose, while non-belief puts me in a situation where there is everything to lose and nothing to win. That's why probabilities don't matter.

Everything changes when we suppose that the option with the incommensurably bad worst-case outcome has a best-case outcome, which is substantially better than that of its alternative. To take a somewhat different scenario. Suppose that if you believe you get fifteen years' hard labour whether God exists or not; while if you don't believe you get a million dollars if God doesn't exists; and you burn in Hell forever if He does. Supposing the odds

are 1,000,000 to 1 that God doesn't exist, it is hardly irrational to gamble that God doesn't exist, *even though* the worst-case outcome is incommensurably worse than that of the alternative. Kenny is simply mistaken in concluding that the Pascalian policy applies whenever the evils in the worst-case outcomes are incommensurable. Probabilities become relevant when we suppose that the option with the incommensurable bad worst-case outcome also involves a good worth winning, and probabilities increase in relevance as that good increases in relation to that of the alternative.

If deterrence works, we win nuclear peace, freedom, the absence of large-scale conventional war, and, finally, negotiated multilateral disarmament. Hence the policy of deterrence does not put us in a situation in which there is everything to lose and nothing to win. Therefore, the Pascalian policy does not apply: probabilities matter. If deterrence probably will work and the chance of a holocaust is remote, it is far from plain that it is irrational to choose deterrence over the virtual certainy of Russian hegemony represented by unilateral disarmament, supposing this precludes the possibility of nuclear war. Also, it is a mistake to assume, as Kenny appears to, that Russian hegemony would not become something lethal once the West is disarmed.

The brand of unilateralism Kenny sponsors is designed to avoid both hegemony and holocaust, and to provide an effective incentive for the other side to disarm too. The West must 'credibly' renounce the actual use of nuclear weapons; dismantle its existing weapons systems in an orderly fashion; simultaneously strengthen its conventional forces in a way that is unambiguously defensive; *but* retain much of its submarine-based nuclear force 'until Soviet response to these steps presents a realistic hope of complete nuclear disarmament on both sides. .' (p. 71). The retention of the strategic submarine force provides an incentive for Soviet disarmament as well as a check against nuclear blackmail or outright invasion, for the other side cannot be *certain* that the weapons will not be used in a crisis. Nonetheless, as, we have sincerely and credibly renounced our willingness to use them, we no longer intend to commit murder.

Of course, there is considerable tension between maintaining a deadly nuclear force and the credibility of renouncing its use. Why, the Soviets might well ask, are you maintaining missiles if you really are determined never to use them? Kenny acknowledges that the other side is more likely to read our intentions from our capacities than our rhetoric. And if the Soviets do believe us, why would they give up a tremendous military and political advantage for the sake of eliminating weapons they believe we would probably never use? Wouldn't the first piece of blackmail on their agenda be that we destroy our submarine fleet? Would we have the political will to court incineration for the sake of preserving weapons we have resolved never to use? And how exactly would the submarine fleet deter invasion by the awesome conventional and tactical nuclear forces ranged against us?

Submarine-based missiles can't target invading armour or mobile SS-20s; and if we escalate to fixed targets inside the Soviet block, we will be blown off the face of the earth. Both sides would probably view the use of these missiles as gratuitous national suicide. Further, we would strive to *persuade* the Soviets that the missiles will never be used if they invade. Risky business. Kenny is keenly aware of many of these questions, and he forcibly argues that the tensions are only apparent. I leave it to the reader to judge the success of this effort. The book closes with a brief but informative critique of the Strategic Defence Initiative.

The Logic of Deterrence is good reading for anyone who wants to catch up on the moral controversy over nuclear deterrence or learn an intelligent case for unilateral disarmament. A book written well about a matter of this much importance deserves the couple of hours required to read it. It is a model for the philosopher who aspires to write about matters of life and death with decency.

JIM STONE

K. SATCHIDANANDA MURTY: *The Advaitic Notion*, Sringeri: Sringeri Sarada Pitham, xx+54 pages.

Here is a small book on Advaita by an outstanding exponent of Vedānta. It contains a strong and sustained defence of Advaita by one who does not claim to be an Advaitin. The choice of arguments in support of doctrines subsidiary to Advaita cannot be improved upon. Select portions of Advaitic texts like *Advaita-siddhi, Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya, Saṁkṣepa-śārīraka,* etc. have been judiciously employed to yield the grand Advaitic conclusion. At the same time, by properly defining the scopes of empirical testimony and scriptural testimony or intuitive experience Professor Murty seems, perhaps unwittingly, to have accommodated Dvaita too in the non-dualistic scheme he so succinctly and forcefully and yet unattachedly delineates. While defending Advaita, he has done well in castigating the attempts of many contemporary scientists and non-scientists alike to provide scientific justification for the Advaitic conclusions. Advaita transcending the sphere of *śruti* or intuitive experience renders itself vulnerable to all kinds of objections.

Having gone through this well-documented book, it is quite refreshing to read the following line by Professor Murty in the preface: 'For over forty years I have been a student or teacher of Advaita Vedānta but while it fascinates me I am not sure that I have an Advaitic vāsanā.' But the intellectual catholicity displayed in the able defence of Advaita, although on traditional lines, cannot but be viewed as an unconscious manifestation of the *vāsanā* which Professor Murty very frankly disavows.

Nagpur University, Nagpur N.S. DRAVID

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

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