Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

Editor D.P. CHATTOPADHYAYA

Contents

Nozick on social justice

BINOD KUMAR AGARWALA
Lucknow University, Lucknow

I

Robert Nozick has, in his *Anarchy, State and Utopia,* mounted a very power-ful defence of the claim that no welfare rights are consistent with a liberal state. He is quite categorical when he states:

> Our main conclusion about the state are that a minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on, is justified; that any more extensive state will vi-olate person's rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjustified; and that the minimal state is inspiring as well as right (1974, ix).

Nozick makes a good use of the precept that the best defence is the attack. He attacks contemporary defences of theory of social justice, and drives home his point in a forthright manner: 'the state may not use its coercive appar-atus for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid others, or in order to prohibit activities to people for their *own* good or protection' (1974, ix). In the present essay, I propose to examine not his defense of the minimal state or his claim in general that no more extensive state can be justified but only his arguments against the use of state power to achieve social justice.

II

In Nozick's view, to raise the question of distribution or redistribution is itself illegitimate. He claims:

> The term 'distributive justice' is not a neutral one. Hearing the term 'dis-tribution' most people presume that some thing or mechanism uses some principle or criterion to give out a supply of things. Into this process of distributing shares some error may have crept. So it is an open question, at least whether *re*distribution should take place; whether we should do again what has already been done once, though poorly. However, we are not in the position of children who have been given portions of pie by someone who now makes last minute adjustments to rectify careless cut-ting. There is no *central* distribution, no person or group entitled to con-trol all the resources, jointly deciding how they are to be doled out. (1974, 149).

This argument appears to presuppose that one can rectify only one's own mistakes. The question of redistribution will arise, if there is someone who has made the distribution first, although mistakenly. Now the question comes to the mind: can't we intervene in a situation which is not of our own

making? Think of the duty to save the child who fell by himself into the water. Isn't there any responsibility to save the child, simply because I have not pushed him into the water? This responsibility, when not discharged, may not invite punishment, but is censure also out of place here? Even Locke accepted the enforceable duty to help the needy, even though it is not a situation of the affluent's making (Tully, 1982, 131-132). Our epistemic situation, the knowledge that there are others in a certain situation, the knowledge that we can help them out of that situation, the knowledge that they want to get out of that situation is sometimes enough to put us under obligation. Arguing against Rawls, Nozick himself accepts that the problem of justice will arise not only when people actively participate in co-operation but also when 'there are ten Robinson Crusoes, each working alone for two years on separate islands, who discovered each other and the fact of their different allotment...' (1974, 185). The difference is whether the obligation is merely to refrain from doing certain things as Nozick claims or to intervene positively as Locke, Rawls and others claim. Without further argument, it simply cannot be claimed that the epistemic situation does not give rise to obligation to intervene. So, without further argument, it cannot be claimed that there is no responsibility of the government to rectify the maldistribution due to the market on the ground that the government is not involved in the distribution in the first place, even though it knows that the distribution is inequal and it can rectify the inequality.

According to Nozick: 'What each person gets, he gets from others who give to him in exchange for something, or as a gift. In free society diverse persons control different resources, and new holdings arise out of the voluntary exchanges and actions of others' (1974, 149-50). But this claim surely forgets the person in the society, who is left out of the market not out of choice but because of his condition. Think of those who have only their labour to sell, yet no one is ready to purchase it. Market does not ensure full employment. This market society may be a free (?) society, but is it just? Is it really free when some are left only with their labour, while the things on which one can labour is held by others who will not allow him to labour on their holdings as it is not in their interest, given the market situation? So doesn't the question of just distribution arise in the society? Doesn't this raise the question of redistribution?

Nozick, of course, will reply: 'There is no more a distributing or distribution of shares than there is a distributing of mates in a society in which persons choose whom they shall marry' (1974, 150). But the analogy is very unfortunate. This analogy can be used only by someone who has implicitly thought of 'sex' especially the 'female sex', as a commodity. Since we do not distribute or redistribute this commodity on analogy, other commodities also should not be distributed or redistributed.

But the analogy fails. Firstly, when persons choose to marry and this is analysed as an exchange of sexual gratification, no one relinquishes his right over the thing exchanged. When proper commodity is exchanged, one party relinquishes the right over the commodity to the other party completely. Secondly, a commodity can be accumulated, not sex. Lastly, a commodity can be used to hire a labour to produce further commodity, but this does not hold good with sex.

But, let me point out, if sex were a commodity as it is in the case of prostitution, then the question of redistribution will arise there too. Assume that only men are persons and women merely sexual commodity. Then among men the question of fair distribution of this commodity will arise. If some were to corner all the sexual commodity, even without violating any other men's rights, and not ready to allow its use by others who have nothing to give in exchange for it due to their unfortunate circumstances not of their own making, then the question of redistribution will arise.

We need not go even that far. Assume that polygamy is permissible in a society; and if it so happens that all women decide out of their own volition to marry only a few men leaving others high and dry, then naturally the demand will arise for prohibiting polygamy on distributional grounds; on the ground that there are other men waiting to be married, even though women have no objection to polygamy and even if women prefer polygamy in that society.

So Nozick's analogy is simply misplaced. The repugnance in one case is due to thinking of distributing a set of persons (females) to others (males) or vice versa, but this repugnance cannot be and should not be transferred to distribution of commodities to persons, as it is required by Nozick's analogy.

Hence the question of distribution or redistribution cannot be avoided as it is claimed by Nozick.

Nozick has confused the question 'How many mates a person should have?' with the question 'Whom should a person marry?' The latter question must be decided by the agreement of persons concerned. But the former one can never be left to the individual alone. Society does and must regulate the number of spouses or mates a person should have. Whether the family should be monogamous, polygamous or polyandrous is decided by and must be decided by the society. Similarly, the main concern of social justice is the question 'How large a holding a person should be permitted to have?', and not the question 'Which particular holding the person should have?' The latter question is decided by the individual due to consumer sovereignty, but the former one cannot be left to the individual alone but must be decided collectively by the society.

III

Nozick develops a theory of justice in holdings, which does not require any central agency for distribution or redistribution. In his view:

If the world were wholly just, the following inductive definition would exhaustively cover the subject of justice in holdings.

(1) A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding.
(2) A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding.
(3) No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2.

The complete principle of distributive justice would say simply that a distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the holdings they posses under the distribution. (1974, 151).

For acquisition Nozick accepts something like Locke's theory of property. A person is permitted to acquire unowned things by his own labour, provided the situation of others is not worsened to the extent that they are 'no longer being able to use freely (without appropriation)' what they previously could. (1974, 176). For transfer Nozick accepts gift, exchange and bequest as the legitimate modes.

Apart from the principles for acquisition of holdings and transfer of holdings, he also accepts principle of rectification of insjutice in holdings. According to Nozick:

The principle of rectification presumably will make use of its best estimate of subjunctive information about what would have occurred (or a probability distribution over what might have occurred, using the expected value) if the injustice had not taken place. If the actual description of holdings turns out not to be one of the descriptions yielded by the principle, then one of the descriptions yielded must be realized. (1974, 152-53)

How does Nozick defend his principles? As I pointed out in the very beginning, he utilizes the precept that attack is the best defence. So his defence consists of a series of attacks on the principles of social justice. We take up these objections in the next section.

IV

According to Nozick, quite a number of principles advanced as principles of justice are unhistorical end-result principles. One class of unhistorical end-state principle will be current time-slice principle which 'holds that the justice of a distributed (who has what) is judged by some *structural* principle (s) of just distribution' (1974, 153). Example of this type of principle will be utilitarian principle of maximization of welfare of the least well-off. In his view:

According to a current time-slice principle, all that needs to be looked at, in judging the justice of a distribution is who ends up with what, in comparing any two distributions one need look only at the matrix presenting the distributions. No further information need be fed into a principle of justice. It is a consequence of such principles of justice that any two structurally identical distributions are equally just. (1974-154).

Then he claims:

Most persons do not accept current time-slice principles as constituting the whole story about distributive shares. They think it relevant in assessing the justice of a situation to consider not only the distribution it embodies, but also how that distribution came about. (1974, 154)

But it is very surprising that from this he could conclude that information regarding the structure of distribution is irrelevant altogether as his principles make out and which he claims as a virtue in his principles. Even if it is true that structure of distribution is not the 'whole story', yet it does not follow that it is no story.

I think Nozick has failed to keep two aspects of social justice in mind. On the one hand, justice requires that the distribution should not deviate from justified inequality, but, on the other hand, in that distribution what one gets depends on the past actions of individuals. Let me give an example. Suppose, on some end-state principle justice requires that the distribution of Rs. 500/- between two persons be of the form Rs. 300/- to one and Rs. 200/- to the other. Suppose, the two persons are Ram and Hari. Now, it does not follow that it is irrelevant, from the point of view of justice, whether Hari gets Rs. 300/- and Ram gets Rs. 200/- or Ram gets Rs. 300/ and Hari Rs. 200/. Rather, justice requires that who gets Rs. 300/- and who gets Rs. 200/- be decided by the historical principles depending on the past actions of Ram and Hari. This latter question cannot be decided by the end-state principle. If any one were to propose that it is immaterial, from the point of view of justice, whether Ram gets Rs. 300/- and Hari gets Rs. 200/- or vice versa, then he will be wrong. But from this it does not follow that the former question as to how to divide the total of Rs. 500/- is irrelevant or that it, too, must be decided by the historical principles. In fact, as the concern for social justice shows, most people accept that the division of the total social benefit be limited by some end-state consideration. Hence the total picture of social justice will be a combination of end-state principle and historical principles, the former guiding the division of the social product and the latter guiding the allocation of the shares in their division to the people.

That the division of the social benefit and allocation of the shares of the division are two distinct aspects of social justice was obscured to the views of the philosophers. Traditionally advanced views on social justice proposed

principles which, by a single stroke, solved both the aspects. To take an example, consider the principle: to each according to his ability (or need). This principle is a solution to both the problem of division as well as allocation at the same time. Here the division of the social benefit must match the profile of the distribution of ability (or need), and, of course, the shares of this division be allocated to the person with matching ability (or need). Proponents of this view, not having realized that the two problems need distinct solution, failed to give adequate solution to both. Similarly, welfare economists, although grappling with the problem of pure division of the social cake, remained oblivious of the allocation problem as a distinct problem. Because of this they accepted the erroneous view that, so long as the matrix of division is the same, two allocations remain equally just. And now the entitlement theorists like Nozick take the problem of social justice to be the problem of allocation only, and are completely oblivious of the problem of division. This is the reason why he accepts the erroneous view that, through the process of allocation, any division of the social benefit, however, inegalitarian, is just. For a complete theory of social justice what we need is distinct principles for the solution of these two distinct problems.

According to Nozick, all principles of social justice are patterned, which specify that the distribution be according to some 'overall design' as put forth by combination of end-state principle or 'that a distribution is to vary along with some natural dimension, weighted sum of natural dimensions, or lexicographic ordering of natural dimensions' (1974, 156). He claims that justice does not reside in a resulting pattern as against generating principle.

I think Nozick would be right if any one were to advance a patterned principle for the allocative aspect of justice. Due to freedom of choice of occupation and consumption, the allocative aspect cannot be guided by any patterned principle. It is a case of pure procedural justice or a case of non-patterned entitlement principle. But the division aspect has to be solved by some pattern, as entitlement principle is not applicable to this case. But any pattern will not work. No pattern, using the knowledge of natural dimension, can work. So principle of desert or merit are out of place. It must be a pattern that is based on the consequence of the pattern to the society, say, whether it secures a minimum standard of life for all.

Nozick's argument that patterned principle 'treats production and distribution as two separate and independent issues' is not applicable, if the distributive and allocative aspects are kept separate. Here it must be kept in mind that, when Nozick is talking about distribution, he means only allocation, while I am using distribution in the sense of division of the total as explained before. Allocation depends on their participation in production and thereby on what they become entitled to by the principles of entitlement. But the patterned principle comes into operation at the stage of designing the very structure of production, and thereby at the stage when we decide what principle of entitlement is to be accepted.

Nozick probably will not accept this picture of the social justice which I have outlined. In his view:

> ...no end state principle or distributional patterned principle of justice can be continuously realized without continuous interference with people's lives. Any favoured pattern would be transformed into one unfavoured by people choosing to act in various ways; for example, by people exchanging goods and services with other people or giving things to other people, things the transferers are entitled to under the favored distributional pattern. To maintain a pattern one must either continually interfere to stop people from transferring resources as they wish to, or continually (or periodically) interfere to take from persons resources that others for some reason chose to transfer to them (1974, 163).

This rhetorical attack depends on the legitimacy of the liberty to transfer one's possession to others of one's own choosing. Why should this liberty be accepted? Locke assumed it as an axiom without giving reasons. Nozick also does so. Why should we not require that the exchange relation must obtain only between the state and the individual as it is in the socialist society? I have dealt with this issue in greater detail in my earlier essays. (Agarwala, 1984, p. 102 and 1985, pp. 123-24)

Even within the market economy, if only the rental component of one's income is redistributed, then there is no violation of autonomy. Not only that. Liberties which are not absolute can be interfered with to secure equal liberties for others or to prevent harm to others. Now the question is: can liberties be interfered with to achieve social justice? Without answering this question, merely to claim that social justice will interfere with liberty is no argument against social justice any more than it is an argument against liberties.

Nozick, of course, will give many arguments to support his case. One argument against patterned principle of social justice is:

> In considering the distribution of goods, income, and so forth, their theories are theories of recipient justice; they completely ignore any right a person might have to give something to someone...Thus discussion tend to focus on whether people [should] have a right to inherit rather than on whether people [should] have a right to bequeath or on whether persons who have a right to hold also have a right to choose that others hold in their place.

And he says: 'I lack a good explanation of why the usual theories of distributive justice are so recipient oriented; ignoring givers and transferers and their right is of a piece with ignoring producers and their entitlements. But why is it *all* ignored.' (1974, 168).

I think a similar charge can be labelled against Nozick in reverse. Why does he focus only on the producer and not the consumer? I shall let this pass.

Nozick's failure arises due to his failure to ask and solve the question why there be holdings at all. After all the institution of private property with exclusive permanent transmissible rights over things is not a natural phenomenon. If the institution of private property is a proper institutional solution for self-preservation or need satisfaction, etc. then automatically it becomes recipient-oriented. And one can see that the right to bequeath has nothing to do with need or self-preservation, and one can see why the discussion focuses on the right to inherit. If one thinks that holding is not a social institution but just a natural state and persons produce to increase their holdings, then, of course, the emphasis will be on the person who choses what to do with his holdings. It appears Nozick is thinking in the second way. Probably, he thinks that things come to be held by persons.

Another argument that Nozick develops is:

Taxation of earnings from labour is on a par with forced labour. Some persons find this claim obviously true, taking the earnings of n hours, labour is like taking n hours from the person; it is like forcing the person to work n hours for another's purpose (1974, 169).

This argument can be analysed by taking an example given by Nozick himself for a different purpose:

Now suppose that Wilt Chamberlain is greatly in demand by basketball teams, being a great gate attraction....He signs the following sort of contract with a team. In each home game, twenty-five cents from the price of each ticket of admission goes to him....The season starts, and people cheerfully attend his team's games, they buy their tickets, each time dropping a separate twenty-five cents of their admission price into a special box with Chamberlain's name on it....Let us suppose that in one season one million persons attend his home games, and Wilt Chamberlain winds up with $250,000, a much larger sum than the average income and larger even than anyone else has. (1974, 161).

Now Nozick, of course, is interested in asking: 'Is he entitled to this income? Is this new distribution...unjust? If so, why?' But we will ask, and I hope Nozick will not be unwilling to ask himself, whether taking a part of Wilt Chamberlain's income as tax to improve the lot of others is forcing him to labour for others, if only for a few hours. Answer is not so obvious. According to Gauthier, and I think he is right, if Wilt Chamberlain will not play and will decide to retire if he does not get the whole of $250,000 then taking part of that income by tax will amount to forcing him to work (1986, 275). But, suppose, he will be willing to play for anything from $100,000 and above but will not play for less, then surplus $150,000, over the minimum for which he will be willing to play, if taken as tax will not interfere with his decision to play (1986, 275-06). Is he still being forced when such surplus is taken away? Our answer in agreement with Gauthier is in the negative. It is perfectly consistent with the freedom of the person to *force* him to part with the surplus above the minimum for which he will be willing to work for the benefit of others. As David Gauthier has pointed out, this surplus is the factor rent. Since freedom to collect factor rent is no part of the autonomy or entitlement of the individual to use his capacities as he chooses in isolation, as 'the surplus represented by rent arises only through interaction' in the society, it is not wrong to make a person part with that (1986, 276). Not only this. The capacities of persons develop in society. Apart from society, a person' capacities are mere potentialities without any determinate realization.

Nozick claims that the taxation for the purpose of social justice treats 'the man whose happiness requires certain material goods or services differently from the man whose preferences and desires make such goods unnecessary for his happiness'. And he asks:

Why should the man who prefers seeing a movie (and who has to earn money for a ticket) be open to the require call to aid the needy, while the person who prefers looking at a sunset (and hence need earn no extra money) is not?...why is the person with the non-material or nonconsumption desire allowed to proceed unimpeded to his most favoured feasible alternative, whereas the man whose pleasure or desires involve material things and who must work for extra money (thereby serving whomever considers his activity valuable enough to pay him) is constrained in what he can realize? (1974, 170).

Firstly, this charge is inapplicable if only the rental component of the income is taken away as tax. If the income is taxed beyond that, then, of course, what many economists call the leisure substitution for income will take place and Nozick's argument will apply. Nozick himself probably does not give his argument against all advocates of social justice. His argument applies against those advocates of social justice who claimed that a person may avoid the tax by lowering his income to an extent enough to cover his basic needs by substituting leisure. But as I envisage no such leisure substitution is to be encouraged by social justice.

Secondly, neutrality which requires that the liberal state should not favour one conception of life over the other is not absolute. Neutrality is to be maintained so long as the conception of life does not violate the principle of justice, whatever it may be. Rawls was right when he claimed: '...liberalism accepts the plurality of conceptions of the good as a fact of modern life, provided, of course, these conceptions respect the limits specified by the appropriate principles of justice' (1982, 18). The liberal concern for the neutrality arose as a reaction against the classical and mediaval attempt to establish the state on the basis of a conception of good life to be followed by all. But this reaction

cannot be and should not be taken to the extent that no limits can be put on the conceptions of life that persons may espouse. So, the extent of neutrality is decided by the principles of justice and not the principles of justice be limited by neutrality, as Nozick's argument does.

In an argument Nozick claims:

...when end-result principles of distributive justice are built into the legal structure of a society, they (as do most patterned principles) give each citizen an enforceable claim to some portion of the total social product; that is, to some portion of the sum total of the individually and jointly made products. This total product is produced by individuals labouring using means of production others have saved to bring into existence, by people organizing production or creating means to produce new things or things in a new way. It is on this batch of individual activities that patterned distributional principles give each individual an enforceable claim. Each person has a claim to the activities and the products of other person, independently of whether the other persons enter into particular relationships that give rise to these claims, and independently of whether they voluntarily take these claims upon themselves, in charity or in exchange for something. If people force you to do certain work, or unrewarded work, for a certain period of time, they decide what you are to do and what purposes your work is to serve apart from your decisions. This process whereby they take this decision from you makes them a part-owner of you; it gives them a property right in you.... End-state and most patterned principles of distributive justice institute (partial) ownership by others of people and their actions and labour. These principles involve a shift from the classical liberals' notion of self-ownership to a notion of (partial) property rights in *other* people. (1974, 171-172).

To this objection, Dworkin's views are pertinent:

It seems to me, in fact, a great mistake to bring ownership or possession of talents into the discussion at all.... Indeed, the idea of ownership, either of talents or of material goods has, I think, no useful role to play in the abstract levels of political theory, because it is parasitic on rather than generative of basic principles of political and personal morality (1984, 292).

I think Nozick is making a mistake in thinking that the welfare rights are of the same type as the property rights or rights to liberty which are enforceable. I think we need maintain a distinction between justiciable rights and legislative rights. Justiciable rights are rights which can be enforced by the courts on the call of the individual against whom the right lies, be it the state or other individual. Welfare rights granted by social justice are not such justiciable rights. They are the rights to certain legislation by the state legislature,

and the only mechanism justice provides to ensure this is the right to vote and change government by majority vote if it fails to achieve social justice. This distinction is quite explicitly accepted by Dworkin (1982, 269) and implicitly accepted by Rawls when he claims that the rights to liberties and equal opportunities are embodied as rights in the constitution while different principle acts as a guide to the legislature (1971, p. 199). This theory has been in practice in India even before the theory was promulgated. Constitutional practice of India, since it became a republic, recognizes the justiciable rights as distinct from welfare rights embodied in the directive principles of state policy which are not justiciable but fundamental principles for the governance of the state. It will require too much stretching of imagination to see these welfare rights as enforceable rights in other persons.

The flexibility that we have achieved in theoretical understanding of rights makes us recognize even within the market mechanism that property rights of the share holder in the shares of a corporation do not give him a right to ownership of a part of corporate property. Yet, it is unclear why Nozick should think that the welfare rights of people give them part ownership of other persons.

Nozick gives an argument against social justice from consideration of the right to emigrate.

Consider a nation having compulsory scheme of minimal social provision to aid the neediest (or one organized so as to maximize the position of the worst-off group), no one may opt out of participating in it...But if emigration from the country were allowed, anyone could choose to move to another country that did not have compulsory social provision but otherwise was (as much as possible) identical. In such a case, the person's *only* motive for leaving would be to avoid participating in the compulsory scheme of social provision. And if he does leave, the needy in his initial country will receive no (compelled) help from him. What rationale yields the result that the person be permitted to emigrate, yet forbidden to stay and opt out of the compulsory scheme of social provision? If providing for the needy is of overriding importance this does militate against allowing initial opting out; but it also speaks against allowing external emigration (1974, 173).

This argument presupposes as datum the legitimacy of the nation state. But, in my view, this is wrong. The duty of justice is owed not to merely members of a particular nation but to all persons. By confining the operation of social justice within only the national boundaries, liberalism in general and Nozick justice in particular have sought to legitimize an accidental product of history, which is arbitrary from which moral point of view. This legitimizes the parochial advantages which the people of national boundaries enjoy. The only state consistent with justice is the state which includes all persons as its citizens, a state which encompases the whole world, of which nations may be federal

constituents. Once this is accepted, Nozick's argument against social justice fails. Every person may have the right to emigrate to any place of the world, yet he remains within the bounds of justice.

V

So far we were examining Nozick's attack on the doctrine of social justice. Now let us examine his own entitlement theory of justice.

Let us first, take the Lockean proviso in the principle of acquisition, which says that the situation of the other is not to be worsened to the extent that they are 'no longer being able to use freely (without appropriation) what they previously could.' Nozick explicitly gives this weaker interpretation to Locke's condition that there be 'enough and as good left in common for others' (II, Sec. 26) to justify the situation where nothing is left for others to appropriate. The weaker condition presupposes that, due to the operation of the market, others, who would find nothing left for them to appropriate, will still be able to get enough to use to satisfy their need. Nozick writes: 'I believe that the free operation of a market system will not actually run a foul of the Lockean proviso (1974, 182). But economists have realized since long that the free market will not automatically ensure full employment. This is a painful realization of all the third world countries, and it is true of the so-called free Western countries including America. On the face of hard facts, it is baffling to see how one can continue to live with philosophical *naiveté*.

Now let us have a look at the principles for transfer of holdings. He compares them to rules of inference. He writes:

As correct rules of inference are truth-preserving, and any conclusion deduced is itself true, so the means of transition from one situation to another specified by the principle of justice in transfer are justice-preserving, and any situation actually arising from repeated transition in accordance with the principle from a just situation is itself just. (1974, 151).

But the analogy fails. There is an independent criterion to decide the truth of propositions. The adequacy of the rule of inference is decided by looking whether it leads from truth to truth. Now, how does one decide whether principle of justice leads from one just situation to another just situation or not? Don't we need an independent criterion, independent of the rule of transfer to judge the justice of a situation?

Probably, Nozick will like his rule of justice in transfer to be rules of what Rawls calls pure procedural justice, so that there is no independent criterion of justice but only a procedure, an outcome of which is taken as just whatever it may be, provided it is actually followed. In the case of pure procedural justice, simply because a situation could have come out of the procedure is no reason for its enforcement. To be enforceable, the situation must be an

outcome of the procedure when it is actually followed. That Nozick has pure procedural justice in mind is strengthened by his claim:

That from a just situation a situation *could* have arisen via justice preserving means does *not* suffice to show its justice. The fact that a thief's victims voluntarily *could* have presented him with gifts does not entitle the thief to his ill-gotten gains. Justice in holding is historical, it depends upon what actually has happened (1974, 151-152).

Unfortunately, we have not much intuition regarding the pure procedural justice. The clear example that is often cited is that of fair gambling. But it is well known that the outcome of gambling is never characterized as an outcome due to choice of the gambler; rather the predominant aspect is chance and the outcome is characterized as an outcome of chance as to what obtains.

But in the context of entitlement theory of justice, Nozick wants to capture in essence 'from each as they choose, to each as they are chosen', or to say a little more elaborately:

from each according to what he chooses to do, to each according to what he makes for himself (perhaps with the contracted aid of others) and what others choose to do for him and choose to give him of what they've been given previously (under this maxim) and haven't yet expended or transferred. (1974, 160).

Now in the way Nozick accepts the principles of justice in transfer, the differences in holdings will not be merely due to difference in preferences only, rather they will be much influenced by unequal and arbitrary distribution of talent, accidents of birth, unequal needs, etc. So, as in the case of gambling, in spite of the choice involved in placing the bet the outcome is essentially characterized as due to chance, i.e. due to factors beyond one's control, similarly, in the case of the justice in transfer even if the choice of person is involved, it can be characterized as due to natural contingencies described above. Hence to achieve the predominance of choice over chance, the outcome of principles of justice in transfer has to be regulated by some background justice requiring redistribution to nullify the effect of natural contingencies. To repeat in a different way, the natural contingencies give threat advantage to some over the other that interferes with the preferences of people, which, therefore, need to be rectified by background justice requiring redistribution.

REFERENCES

Agarwala, Binod Kumar, 'Private Ownership of Property and Rawls's Theory of Justice', *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, vol. i, no. 2, Spring 1984.

Agarwala, Binod Kumar, 'F.A. Hayek on Social Justice', *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research,* vol. ii, no. 2, Spring 1985.

Dworkin, Ronald, 'A Reply by Ronald Dworkin' in *Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence and Contemporary Jurisprudence,* ed. Marshall Cohen, Duckworth, 1984.

Gauthier, David, 1986, *Morals by Agreement,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.

Nozick, Robert, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia,* New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1974.

Rawls, John, *A Theory of Justice,* Cambridge: Mass. Harvard University Press, 1971.

———, 'The Basic Liberties and Their Priority' *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values,* vol. iii, 1982, University of Utah Press (Salt Lake City), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 18.

Tully, James, *A Discourse on Property: John Locke and His Adversaries,* Cambridge: Cambridge University, Press, 1980.

The distorted tradition

ETYMOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE MISUSE OF SOME PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS IN MODERN INDIAN ENGLISH

STEFANO DE SANTIS
D-38 Pamposh Enclave, New Delhi-110 048

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

Nowadays, in India, English is the language which is primarily being used for studying philosophy and for debating philosophical matters. This fact creates a series of socio-political problems which are very dramatic and far from being solved. In this present study, we are concerned with the etymology of some philosophical terms used in Indian English: it is possible to notice that these terms, being adopted from an alien civilization and being introduced in different thematics, lose their original reference, and their meaning shifts towards something quite different from the original one.

The shifting of meaning is not necessarily a mistake, neither is it always a degradation of the original cogency. This process takes place in the history of every language; we may even say that every literary work uses the lexicon with a new spirit and handles the terms in peculiar associations for the very fact that it is a creation of the mind which enriches the cultural patrimony as well as the language itself. Etymology, as the science of the 'true meaning', not only deals with the 'origins' of a word but is also concerned with its whole history. Modern linguistics is ever more conscious that the meanings of words are not static entities, are not well circumscribed within the allotted field of the language, but rather dynamic bodies which assume value within a live system of associations and contrasts. The limits of a word are elastic, as they change in different times, disciplines and ideologies. This is true, but it is also true that, in a precise disciplinary context, it is necessary to elucidate the concepts through well-defined terms, otherwise poor understanding and confusion may take place. Each scientific discipline adopts its own peculiar set of terms whose meanings are well defined within the specialized field. Therefore, the meaning of a word happens to be quite different, according to different subject contexts (for example, 'alienation' changes connotation in economics, politics, philosophy, psychology, etc.). A number of thinkers have considered 'philology', i.e. the study of the various levels of 'words' in a proper cultural context, to be the most comprehensive study of the civilizations. Others are not so radical, and limit the relevance of philology to a mere introductive study of the historical data. But, even in this latter case, one needs to recognize that philology is the background of philosophy, as the accuracy of the terms is at the base of logics.

The cultural context of a word can be much wider than a single language, because a word may be present in various languages, due to the same lin-

guistic origin or to the exchange of knowledge among different peoples. Such multipresence of concepts is particularly frequent within different cultures which are homogenous doctrinally and are close geographically. In the case of Europe, for instance, the inter-exchange of concepts and values has been taking place to such an extent that we are due to consider its civilization as a unique whole. When we analyse a philosophical concept we can probably assume that we shall find it expressed by the same term in all the literatures of Europe, with only slight differences of spelling. However, this is not always the case, as we can see from the term 'art', where the English one does not correspond to the Italian *arte*, nor to the Latin *ars*, nor to the German *kunst*, etc. that even where there is similar spelling they now have quite different meanings. This happens because those literatures have been developing differently, growing in contact but also in opposition to each-other.[1]

In India, where there was a rich tradition of indigeneous philosophy, English has been brusquely adopted as the hegemonous media of philosophy.[2] The philosophical terms are now sometimes being taken from the English language without proper understanding of their etymology, and being isolated from the European civilization to which they belong they are being adopted in a radically different culture, within different problematics. Without assuming to give any conclusive answer to the problem, we are concerned with demonstrating how great the relevance of such a question is for the cultural development of modern India.

THE LANGUAGE OF PHILOSOPHY

We have mentioned before that every scientific discipline has its own specialized terminology. Philosophy (which should not be considered as one of the 'arts' but rather as the 'art of the arts') possesses its set of specific terms, which strictly belong to it only, but mainly uses terms of common usage.[3] In addition to this, many specific terms 'run out' of the strict boundaries of philosophy and are used by priests, politicians, journalists, etc. in a much more generic way. In order to avoid confusion between the very precise philosophical definitions and the meanings pertaining to common speech, many traditions had been using a different language as the media of philosophical studies. In Europe, for instance, Latin remained the language of culture even after it wasn't spoken any longer in its native land.

The Indian civilization had developed a philosophical language (Sanskrit) which had been codified and structuralized in separation to the natural speech (Prãkrit). Besides minor exceptions, Sanskrit had kept its hegemonic place in the field of philosophical studies until its decadence caused by Western conquerors (first the Islamic and then the British).

In Europe, in the centuries which have been called 'Humanism',[4] there was a huge struggle to free philosophy from the monopoly of the institutionalized Church,[5] and, in order to let all capable spirits take part in the process of

philosophizing, the intellectuals preferred to use the 'common' language. However, it required an enormous cultural effort to transform the 'vulgar' languages into a media capable of high discussions. Monumental dictionaries, encyclopedias and numerous translations of classical texts have accompanied the new literary productions, everything being directed towards the same aim. But in India, the absence of dictionaries and grammar texts of the languages spoken by the people, made the impact of foreign languages much more explosive.[6] The English terms have been introduced by the rulers, and have been learnt by the Indians in the context of colonial education. Without awareness of the etymology of English terms and being dependent on dictionaries only by British scholars, Indians have generally been unable to point out the incorrect equivalences between terms derived from Sanskrit and terms derived from Latin. German and other European philologists came into the picture to widen the horizon of Indian studies, but there has not been any major effort by Indian scholars to study European philology in order to analyse the comparative linguistics from their side.

After independence, free India has dedicated her new energies to implement an Education Policy which has been quite successful in cultivating the hegemony of the English language. Because the English language has been adopted and the vital contacts with mothertongue speakers have been reduced, the lexicon used by the people has become even more limited. We are saying this from a neutral standpoint and with a very deep respect for the Indian civilization, to which we have dedicated our intellectual life and academic career; we feel very sad to see the vitality of Indian thought being impoverished by the usage of poor terminology. With the aim of illustrating better the problem on a firm basis, three keywords have been chosen as samples of Indian-English concepts, and we shall try to trace their etymology. The problems and discussions around these concepts are widely known, so it will be easier to recognize that possible implications and solutions may remain unexplored due to the poor understanding of such foreign concepts. The three terms chosen here are: 'tradition', 'superstition', 'secularism'.

TRADITION

In modern India the two terms 'tradition' and 'traditional' are widely used. The latter is, grammatically, the adjective form of the former, but it generally conveys a different connotation. In India, the word 'tradition' is usually associated with the adjectives 'ancient', 'folk', 'Hindu', etc. and it is generally understood as a synonym of 'cultural heritage'. It usually refers to the complex of doctrines and social practices which repeat the norms and the models of previous times. 'Traditional' sounds as the opposite of 'modern' to Indian ears, conveying sometimes the positive indication of 'good ancient time' but mainly the negative connotation of 'backward', 'out of date'. Both ways of comprehending the concepts are nowadays common in the Anglo-Saxon

world and are quite different from the original meaning, which is better preserved in the countries where the Romance languages are spoken. In order to visualize the concept, properly, let us try to trace its origin and history.

The word 'tradition' derives from the Latin '*traditio*' which is a noun resulting from the verb '*tradere*'. '*Tradere* means to hand over, to pass something on (from somewhere to another place or from somebody to somebody else). In a metaphorical way, *traditio* conveyed the meaning which has been preserved till the modern European languages: the process of receiving customs, values and moral norms from generation to generation.[7] In a wider sense, it also refers to the teacher-disciple relationship, within a specific religio-cultural context. It is very important to point out that the term, in its original meaning, does not refer to 'what' is handed over, but to the process of transmission itself. Therefore, it denotes a dynamic process and not a static one. It is the development itself of a civilization, a conscious and directed progress which involves the integral preservation of the moral values, which are communicated to the new generations in ever renewing forms.[8]

Language terms are not only defined by indicating the similarities to other lexicon entities but also through a system of semantic oppositions and through differentiations from similar terms. It is, therefore, opportune to differentiate 'tradition' from other similar words with which it is often confused: 'customs' and 'heritage'. A custom is usual and generally acceptable behaviour among members of a social group. Any norm of 'behaviour', in order to be 'usual and generally acceptable', must have been developing within the dominant morality and, must have been adopted for a considerable time. New customs are rather 'fashions', unless their continuity has been long enough to become generally accepted. The element of 'continuity' is present here as it is present in the concept of 'tradition', but we may also say that everything social is continuous. How can we then differentiate between what is traditional and what is not? We might say that, in order to be called 'traditional', an institution should be considered in harmony with the original principles on which a society is based, and a constant effort should be present to preserve and continue such an institution. What is really traditional, therefore, is not the institution but the belief in its value. The acceptance of values is also what differentiates 'tradition' from 'heritage', the latter being just a process of handing over a 'property' at the time of the previous owner's death and not a living communication of values as is the case with tradition. When by 'heritage' (a term originally referred only to material properties) is meant the patrimony of ideas and knowledge of a people (such use is not so common in Europe but is normal in India), we have to focus attention on the fact that no 'heritage' becomes 'tradition' unless the values which are at the root of such knowledge are well understood and integrally accepted. A few more words on 'value' are needed here. The 'validity' of a value is nil, if it does not count, i.e., does not make its presence felt. The 'validity' has to be constantly active,

be made felt, otherwise it becomes a vain appearance of an impotent principle. 'Those who say that they [the values] count, without having the authority of making them felt, either are making confusion or are willing to fool.'[9] A value is only there, where it can be chosen. Where the faith is compulsory, there are only ancient norms but no tradition.[10]

If we look at history, we realize that the relationship between the 'transmission of values' and the 'imposition of the norms' is permanent cultural dialectics; and the boundaries between the two concepts are like fronts separating two armies. We may clearly visualize this dynamism, if we observe the alternances of connotations that the word 'tradition' has carried along while proceeding through different epochs and different contexts. In the ancient Roman civilization, 'tradition' meant the maintenance of moral norms of their forefathers, but, in the primitive Christian Church, it referred to the entire process of interpreting and the teaching of the Gospel, regarded as the Revelated Truth and not just the faith of their ancestors. In quite an early stage of the history of Christianity, sharp disputes took place about the different interpretations of the Holy Message; various sects contended the supremacy of their kind of doctrines. To solve the controversies, a separate body of scriptures was established and named the Bible; the books collected in the Bible were considered to be written with direct inspiration from God, and they were the last authority on the matter of Christian faith. Those teachings and interpretations of the message of God, which were in harmony with the Bible, were considered the 'Christian Tradition'. According to the ancient orthodox faith, the Divine Revelation flows into two streams: Bible and Tradition; the role of the Church is the *Magisterium*, i.e. the Master of the Tradition. The Church kept its duty braving the political powers who wanted to bend the doctrines towards their interests, but the power derived from such a role made the Institutionalized Church a kind of oligarchy, mainly concerned with keeping its own privileges. Instead of teaching Christ's message of love, the Church often imposed dogmas and prohibited freedom of thought. The reformers, who initiated the Protestantism, challenged the authority of the Church and rejected the validity of the Tradition; they believed that only the Bible is the word of God, and that individual souls should be free to have a personal understanding about it. Against this position the Catholic Church reinforced the doctrine of the same degree of 'revelation' for the Bible and the Tradition in the Council of Trento (session IV), and it was declared that the Bible had to be interpreted in the light of 'Tradition' (doing so it inverted the primitive faith about orthodoxy, according to which the interpretation has to be in accordance with the Bible). It was probably due to such a pretence of monopoly by the Catholic Church that a dynamic concept like 'tradition' started receiving negative connotations like 'bigotry', 'backward attitude', etc. and, because in the name of 'tradition' the Church was opposed to the new scientific philosophies and the new liberal politics, many intellectuals rejected the whole category of 'tradition' and embraced the new

faiths of 'evolution' and 'progress'. The ages of rationalism and positivism which followed were also the ages of colonial expansion of the European nations that exposed European civilization to contacts with other 'traditions'. In this sense 'traditions' is not at all the plural of 'tradition' but simply means 'customs', however more or less civilized they may be. The evolutionists were quick to give the same status to all these customs simply to deprive the traditionalists of their supposed monopoly, and, at the same time, to put them all in a status inferior to 'science'. This kind of controversy is still going on in different forms in the Western culture.

How did the British export the term 'tradition' to India? What were the connotations given to it? The British Empire grew under the mixed combination of forces coming out from the Anglican protestantism and positivism. Of course, neither the Victorian Christians nor the rational utilitarians were very prone towards having a deep respect for the tradition. But the imperial policy urged them to a formal acceptance of such 'traditions' which were rooted in the cultures of their subjects. Such beliefs were, however, considered to be residues of ancient irrational faiths which would have given way to the 'new, rational and scientific' British education. We believe that this is the main reason why the adjective 'traditional' there sounds very similar to 'Indian', and the adjective 'progressive' sounds so close to 'Western'. The citizens of free India still have the cultural choice between the acceptance of the colonial view which opposes the modern (Western) progress to the ancient (Indian) tradition and a development which takes departure from the values of its own civilization. In the second case, a great tradition would not be lost to humanity.

SUPERSTITION

This is a term that, etymologically, conveys the opposite meaning to 'tradition'. However, in modern Indian context, it conveys a similar meaning, both referring to those customs and beliefs which have been handed down from the ancient times. The difference, between 'superstition' and 'tradition' is felt just as a value judgement: 'tradition' conveys some kind of respect, while 'superstition' implies that the speaker intends to put himself at a distance from what he is referring to. If we understand the original meaning of 'tradition' as a dynamic process, we will be able to comprehend the meaning of 'superstition' as the failure of tradition.

The English word 'superstition' is derived from the Latin *superstitio,* which is a compound made by the prefix 'super' which means 'exceedingly' and the verb 'stare' which means 'to stay', 'to remain'. 'Superstition' is a moral norm which has lost its value, but is still kept alive within a particular socio-cultural context. The transmission of old values through ever new expressions is 'tradition', while the acceptance of old customs deprived of meaning is 'superstition'. The difference between the two concepts is very important for the

European civilization, which is rooted in the belief of history as a linear process.[11]

When the Romans accepted the Christian religion, they did not feel that they were changing their tradition, because they accepted a new kind of theology that gave a new and a more firm shape to the old values. There were people, however, who continued to believe in the old theology and in the old rituals, which were facing deep decadence. They have been said to be sticking to superstitions.[12] Very important discussions have been carried on among anthropologists and philosophers since ancient times about the causes of superstition. The opinion, which had been generally accepted, was that superstition is a kind of intellectual mistake of the emotional mind, which is eager to find explanation to whatever isn't within its comprehension.[13] Superstition, therefore, would be a kind of mental idleness of the 'primitives', and its essential error is stated to be the misplacing of causation. Recently, social scientists have paid more attention to the 'continuity' of irrational norms, and they have pointed out that many institutions are kept alive, not because of the faith in them but because of the 'prestige' which is attributed to them. Conformity to the old patterns of behaviour is achieved through the pressure of social approval, and the guardians of the social norms are never ready to discuss them because they do not want their powerful role to be doubted. The dialectic between 'power' and 'authority', as it has been studied by the post-positivistic sociologists, is very similar to the dialectics we have described within the context of 'tradition': in fact, the traditional values are carried on by the rail of moral authority, while superstition is kept alive by the interest of social power, i.e. prestige.

SECULARISM

This is one of the most widely used and important concepts of modern India; however, its usage is quite ambiguous as it can be noticed by the fact that it is translated into Hindi with two different concepts: *sarva dharma samānatā* and *dharma nirapekṣa*.[14] In order to understand fully the philosophical meaning of 'secularism', it is necessary to study the entire history of the word. In fact, the original meaning of 'secular' is 'relating to time', which does not give us the opportune indication for a proper understanding. 'Secularism' derives from the Latin noun *seculum* which literally means 'century', and as a metaphor indicates the 'non-permanent reality of this world'. The value of this concept has to be understood within the development of Christian doctrines. In the *Gospel,* a contrast is stated between the 'Kingdom of God' and the 'Kingdom of this World'. According to the Christian faith, the 'Kingdom of this World' is the rule of the darkness, the battlefield of the various selfish interests, the seat of the servants of concupiscence. Christ had come to 'save the world' through the sacrifice of Himself, but He did not come to rule, the world, because, as it is written in the Gospel, 'my Kingdom is not of this

world'.[15] The duty of a Christian is said to be to live in this world but not to belong to it; he belongs to the Kingdom of God, and he has to give testimony of his faith through his conduct of justice; but he knows that it shall not be possible to liberate the world from its sins until the end of history.[16] However, in the Middle Age, the political idea of a Christian Kingdom took shape in the foundation of the Holy Roman Empire. The two pillars of the Empire were the Pope who represented the 'eternal' or 'spiritual' authority and the Emperor who represented the 'temporal' or 'secular' authority. Those, who supported the supremacy of the Emperor over the Pope, maintained that the Pope should be concerned only with the salvation of souls, and should leave all human matters to the Imperial authority; those who declared the supremacy of the Pope, were asserting that the 'eternal' authority should always be above the 'secular' authority; otherwise civil law loses its moral reference and becomes only the right of the strongest.[17]

Within different parties, ideologies, philosophies and other cultural streams, these very dialectics have been shaping the European civilization uptil today. In England, where there arose a national kingdom without any ideal link to the Holy Roman Empire, the two authorities were amalgamated into the single person of the king, who was the head of the State as well as the Head of the Church of England.[18] This was a setback for the ideal distinction of powers; but we can observe the same kind of dialectics again active during the rationalistic times, when the British liberals, like the liberals of all Europe, charged the institutional order with more radical ideals; in the name of justice, they opposed those rules, which were theoretically based on religious principles, but were practically founded on economic and political exploitation of the people. Against totalitarianism and bigotry, they called their practical philosophy 'secularism'. When the British took over the role of India, they adopted the policy of fostering divisive forces, and, at the same time, they presented their rule as neutral and pacesetting. They called their government 'secular', i.e. religiously neutral. In order to regain the unity of free India, the new Indian Republic adopted the idea of 'secularism' in the constitution. But the Gandhian ideal of *sarva dharma samānatā* has decayed into the utopia of *dharma nirapekṣa*. Originally, there was indeed, the good intention of making civil authority independent of fanaticism and respectful of every religious faith. But *dharma* does not mean 'religion' but rather 'moral law' or 'eternal law', and a government, which does not try to actualize' the principles of eternal justice in its laws, would be an immoral government. English-educated Indian lawyers and politicians may have found it very difficult to foresee what kind of a cultural reaction an improper translation can produce, because they are used to visualizing the concepts only in an English language panorama. Of course, in Europe 'secularism' never meant separation from the eternal principles but simply an effort to adopt the values in a relative structure, to legislate in a 'temporal' context, to deal with the present reality of man.[19] It is at least improper to try a transplantation of such a

practical attitude into an Indian context by maintaining that social harmony can be achieved only by relieving politics from the moral aspiration of *dharma*. But such is the indication contained in the slogan of *dharma nirapekṣa*.[20]

Certainly, the good intentions behind secular policy have been operating a good deal of pacification during turbulent times, but today it may be opportune to analyze the ambiguity of its formulation in order to clarify the ideologies. It is not virile to renounce principles in order to find agreements. It is more noble to elevate the reference point to the level where the oppositions are solved. This is what Mahatma Gandhi did; but to do so means to leave the 'relative' context and go on to the spiritual level; because it seems the case that 'this temporal world' is the level where oppositions are going to stay. A 'secular' authority should always be aware that it does not possess the capacity, nor the power, to stop confrontations; and it should limit its goals to fix the rules and the conditions, so that contrasts are played in a civil and constructive way.[21]

CONCLUSION

Language is the most comprehensive vehicle of communication amongst persons, and this vehicle is shaped by and functions on the values of a civilization. To change a language necessarily implies a change in reference values, because words are concepts and not just signals. There is no doubt that the perspectives of philosophy have enormously widened in the recent times, thanks to the meeting of different cultures. However, the usage of foreign terms should be done only after an in-depth study about their significance. In India, so far, there has not been a very serious research into the etymology and the historical mutations of philosophical terms. Such a study is a *conditio sine qua non* for authentic intellectual freedom. We can not understand the reason for the Indian people to limit themselves within the framework of English philosophical literature, when they are looking outside their confinements. This fact cannot but be comprehended as a consequence of colonization. In India, the intellectual subordination will persist in the present situation of absolute hegemony of the English language, unless a comprehensive study of comparative philologies is undertaken, because only knowledge can make one free.

NOTES

1. English speakers may be surprised that the two words 'art' and 'technique' once had the same meaning, the first in Latin and the second in Greek: they both meant 'professional ability'. During the Renaissance in Italy, the role of 'art' was elevated to a spiritual level, and it became the goal of the realized man. A distinction between an 'artistic creation' and a 'technical work' was established; the former being an operation which reveals a spiritual wisdom and the latter simply an act of professional skill.

That was a time when the cultures were blossoming around the glorification of human values. Nowadays, in these ages of more practical interest orientations, all glamour is for 'technology'. It may also be interesting to mention that 'art', as used in the context of University Faculties, is derived from a usage prior to Renaissance. 'Art', according to the Middle Age usage, meant just 'profession', and implied such arts as medicine, law, rhetorics, etc. The lower levels of the university prepare students for such professions; the higher levels were meant to arrive at pure knowledge: philosophy.

2. We are using the term 'hegemony' here in the way it was used by the Italian communist philosopher, Antorio Gramsci. Gramsci's categories were thought within the context of class conflict, but apply very aptly also to the East-West relationship, as suggested by Dr. Said in his book, *Orientalism* (Penguin edn).

3. Philosophy cannot be considered as an art, because it comprehends all branches of knowledge, 'humanities' or 'science', indifferently. It is rather a level of thought, when it takes the process of thinking itself as the object of its enquiry. See also note 1.

4. We are referring here to 'humanism' not only as the movement of the rediscovery of the classical Latin and Greek authors, but to the whole process of considering the human being at the centre of the created cosmos. We can notice that many of the scholars who were enthusiastic about the classical literatures were great contributors to the creation of modern national languages.

5. 'Church' has various meanings. The most important meaning, in Christian faith, is the idea of the church as the 'mystical body of Christ', the spiritual unity of all the free souls. It also means the Christian community which is united around the celebration of the Eucharist, and also the building where this sacrament is performed. The church as an institution is only the 'bureaucratic' organization of the community, and should theoretically be Catholic, i.e. universal. It should represent not only the Christendom but all the 'men of goodwill'. Of course, as in any institution, sectarian interests prevail upon the ideal vocation.

6. Here we are referring to the absence of grammar books, and not to the lack of this discipline. On the contrary, at a very early stage, Indian grammarians had arrived at a very high scientific level. Many developments in modern linguistics would not have been possible without the 'discovery' of Sanskrit grammar. Unfortunately, this monumental knowledge was confined to *sūtras* and commentaries, lying in the hands of a few scholars but undisclosed to the common people.

7. *Tradere* is constructed similarly to 'transaction', 'transfer', 'translation', 'transport', 'transpose', etc.

8. The word 'development', as it is used in a social and economical context, is a metaphor. It referred, originally, to the 'unfolding' of a paper roll or a letter (the opposite of this word was 'envelopment'). 'Progress' means 'walking forward', 'moving ahead'. The difference between the two concepts was that 'development' indicated a process in which the potentialities were matured and expressed, while 'progress' donated any kind of movement forward, indifferent to the way it was proceeding. According to the evolutionist philosophers, what is temporarily successive is necessarily better, and hence they identify the two concepts.

9. The portion in inverted commas is quoted from the *Encyclopedia*, 1982, Giulio Einaudi Editore, Turin (Italy) at the voice *valore* (=value).

10. Tradition is always communicated through an educational process. We should differentiate education from instruction. *Educere* in Latin means 'to lead out' the aspirations and potentialities of the disciple. Instruction is just a training of abilities, i.e. one can instruct someone on how to drive a car, but he has to educate him on how to respect others' lives. It is possible to instruct someone about religious norms but it is only through education that faith may be aroused in the soul.

11. From Cicero, *ND.* 2, 28, 72: *Superstitiosus, qui totos dies precabatur et immolabant ut sibi liberi superstites essent, superstitiosi sunt appellati, quod nomen patuit latius.*

(See also *Dictionnaire Etymologique de la Langue Latine*, Paris, 1959, A. Ernont et A. Maillet, Librarie C. Klinck, Sieck).

12. The first Christian Roman Emperor, Constantino, in a law of 319 B.C. declared: 'They who are desirous of being slaves of their superstitions have liberty for the public exercise of their worship' (*Codex Theodosianus*, ix, xvi, 1-2).

13. Superstition has generally been considered 'the disposition to attribute occurrences to praeternatural or occult influences and to direct conduct with a view to avoiding mischief or obtaining advantages which such influences are supposed to produce'. 'The superstitious mind, then, is one that is not educated to discern the character of evidence or that has not the patience to suspend judgement in the presence of unfamiliar phenomena.' (Quoted from *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.) It is evident that in such an interpretation, superstition is associated with 'magic'.

14. The second concept *Dharma nirapekṣa* (=not related to religion) was not present in India, but it was formed in order to translate 'secularism'. The Gandhian concept of *sarva dharma samānatā* (=similarity of all religions) was instead well routed in Indian culture.

15. From the Gospel, according to St. John (18-33-38). Pilat asked: 'Are you the king of the Jews?' Jesus answered: 'My kingdom is not of this world. If my kingdom were of this world my soldiers would fight to keep me from being handed over to the Jews. No, my kingdom does not belong here!' So Pilat asked him: Are you a king, then?' Jesus answered: 'You have said it. I am king. For this reason I have been born and for this I have come to this world—to give testimony to the truth. Whoever belongs to the truth listens to my voice.'

16. After what we have said in order to differentiate 'tradition' from 'heritage', it may be interesting to point out that in Christian terms 'heritage' is the 'eternal life'. According to the Christian faith, all human beings, as children of God and brothers of Christ, have the right to inherit eternal life, if they do not alter their status by alienating themselves.

17. We should not believe that the Catholic philosophers were always supporting the supremacy of the Pope on temporal matters also. Actually, the simple idea of making this world into the Kingdom of God is, for the Christian, a heresy. The *Divine Comedy* of Dante Alighieri is a very interesting document of the dispute occurring at the end of the Middle Age. Dante is able to illustrate the need of the supremacy of the Emperor on secular matters and, at the same time, of chanting the supremacy of the spiritual reality over all the contingent things.

18. The separation of the Church of England from the Catholic Church was not caused by a dogmatic controversy but by a dispute of jurisdiction. According to the Catholic faith, marriage is a sacrament, and no authority can separate this holy link if it is validity held. In 1527, the King of England, Henry VIII, attracted by the person of Anne Boleyn, set his mind on the possibility of divorcing from the queen, Katherine of Aragon. The king asked Rome for an annulment of the marriage, but the commission nominated by the Pope found that the marriage was valid. Since in Catholicism there is no divorce, there was no possibility of it being granted. Then, Henry VIII, declared himself as the Head of the Church of England, and he passed an order submitting the clergy to his will. The Archbishop of Canterbury granted a decree of divorce in 1533, and Anne Boleyn became the queen. Rome could not accept a secular king's rule on a spiritual matter, nor the very idea of a divorce. A schism took place.

19. There are a number of political associations which are directly linked with religious doctrines, and, at the same time, are strictly secular. Democratic Christian Party, for instance, is a very powerful force in Europe and in South America (e.g. it holds the Government of West Germany); the principles of these parties are the conventional Christian dogmas being applied to politics. They are secular in the meaning that they are concerned only with the administration of the state, without any pretence

of absolutism: on the contrary they believe in democracy and plurality as the only possible grounds on which to operate.

20. There is an ulterior reason as to why such a slogan is unfit for its goal. The ideal distinction between the two authorities, the eternal and the temporal, may appeal to Hindu minds, accustomed to similar kinds of distinctions; but to the Muslims, the idea of this world as the Kingdom of God is simply a religious dogma. Never and nowhere has Islam accepted secular vision of reality. In Islam, where there is no clergical authority and there are no sacraments, Religion is simply to apply to this world the revelated moral norms. For a Muslim, only God is good. The rest is utilitarianism, materialism and, ultimately, mistakes caused by ignorance or by sins. For a 'true believer', the Gandhian idea of 'similarity among all the religions' may strongly appeal, but 'separation from religion' sounds a blasphemy.

21. We have said that 'traditions' is not only the plural of 'tradition', because the plural means 'cultures', 'customs'. Similarly 'religions' means the various beliefs regarding the eternal reality, but 'religion' means something different. *Re-ligio* in Latin means 'union', and religion is the link which unites the human soul to God. Religion has usually been translated as *dharma*. As the English one, the Sanskrit term, too, has different meanings, according to whether it is singular or plural.' In the singular sense, *dharma* means 'what remains unchanged in the universe' i.e. the eternal law which rules all the mutations in the cosmos. In its plural aspect, the various *dharma* are the various ways of concretizing the moral imperatives and in a cultural way, it also means the 'various religions'. We want to point out, here, that in their plural usage 'religions' and *dharma-s* refer to a similar idea, but in their singular usage they refer to something totally different. There is no equivalence in English for *dharma*, as there is no equivalence in Sanskrit for 'religion'. It has also to be noted that the Gandhian ideal of *sarva dharma samānatā* uses *dharma* in the plural sense. (See also note n. 14.)

Some remarks about ethical universalism

SHIA MOSER
State University of New York at Buffalo, U.S.A.

A few quotations from Hebrew prophecy and from Stoic philosophy may be an appropriate introduction to our discussion.

Isaiah prophesies that in the end of days the nations will say: 'Come ye, and let us go up…to the house of the God of Jakob; and He will teach us of His ways and we shall walk in His paths.' Then 'they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and…nation shall not lift sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more'.[1]

Cicero argues that 'Law is the highest reason implanted in nature', and, therefore, all rational beings, sharing law and justice, 'are to be regarded as members of the same commonwealth'.[2]

We find a similar argument in the *Meditations* of Marcus Aurelius. If our intellectual part and our reason are common, he says: '.. common also is the reason which commands us what to do and what not to do; if this is so, there is a common law,..we are fellow-citizens,..members of the same political community,.. the world is in a manner a state.'[3]

The universalism, expressed in the quoted passages, contains two doctrines, between which, explicitly or implicitly, an intrinsic connection is assumed. There is, first, the belief in a mankind governed by the same moral law, and secondly, the ideal of international harmony. We may thus speak of the doctrines of the *moral* and the *political* unity of mankind.

There are both analogies and differences between the prophetic and the Stoic versions of universalism. In both, as said above, the connection between the two unities is an intrinsic one. In Isaiah, the essence of the prophecy is that *justice will reign all over the world*. From this it follows that all peoples will obey *the same* law, and also that the world will be at peace, because peace is a part of the just way of life. In Stoicism, moral and political unity imply each other, or rather are two aspects of the same state of affairs. Thus Marcus Aurelius, after arguing that we live in the same state because we are under the same law, reverses the direction of the argument and affirms that 'from this common political community comes our…reasoning faculty and our capacity for law…[4] In other words, as rational beings, we are *one,* morally and politically. Another similarity between the prophetic and the Stoic universalism is its wide scope Isaiah prophesies that universal peace will reign also among animals ('the wolf shall lie down with the lamb', and 'the lion shall eat straw like the ox'.)[5] In Stoicism, the same community included *all* rational beings, not only men. We must conceive, Cicero says, 'of this whole universe as one commonwealth of which both gods and men are members'.[6]

There are, however, also differences between the prophetic message and the

views of the Stoics. The peace which Isaiah prophesies *will transcend the existing laws of nature,* even turning carnivorous predators into peaceful vegetarians, whereas, for the Stoic, *life according to nature* requires moral and political unity. On the other hand, unlike the prophecy, Stoicism does not affirm at all that the universalist ideal will be realized in the future. If we draw the distinction between 'is' and 'ought' more sharply than the Stoics did, we should interpret Aurelius as saying that men participate in cosmic reason; therefore, they *ought* to adopt the same laws, and *ought* to regard themselves as members of the same state. Although Cicero maintains that all nations 'love courtesy, kindliness, gratitude' and 'hate and despise...the wicked, the cruel, the ungrateful',[7] he only means to affirm that certain moral principles exist among all peoples and not that they really live in accordance with these principles. If the judgements of men were in agreement with nature, Cicero says 'justice would be equally observed by all', but the great corruption caused by bad habits extinguishes the sparks which nature kindled in us.[8] We are also perverted 'by that enemy which lurks deep within us... pleasure'.[9] As Stoicism does not hold the view that mankind as a whole, or even a great part of it, is morally progressing, it is not inconsistent with Stoic philosophy to assume that the obstacles to virtuous living in general, and to moral and political unity in particular, will never lose their force.

However, this only means that the Stoic version of universalism is inadequate as a basis for a *political programme,* because a programme requires the belief in (at least) the probability of its realization as a result of an effort. But we do not wish to deny the great significance of Stoic universalism. To see this significance one has only to compare the Stoic views with those, for example, of Aristotle. Aristotle does not believe in the political unity of mankind at all, and with regard to moral unity he holds that slaves do not partake of the virtues in the same way as freemen,[10] and he seems to agree with the view that barbarians and slaves are the same in nature.[11] This contrasts sharply with Cicero's Stoic belief that 'there is no human being of any race who, if he finds a guide, cannot attain to virtue'.[12]

Our further comments will be concerned with (*a*) tentative formulations of the two doctrines of political and moral unity; (*b*) the relationships between them; and (*c*) the method of their justification. But, first, a few explanations concerning terminology.

We will use interchangeably 'international harmony' and 'political unity', although the latter expression, unlike the former, seems to suggest an organization of all mankind under one supranational power. 'Political unity' will here mean international harmony, and we will not deal with the question whether such harmony can be achieved without an effective supranational political authority, a world state.

We will also use interchangeably 'the doctrine of political unity', 'a universalist ethics', 'an internationalist ethics', 'the principle of internationalism'.

Some objections might be raised against the use of 'universalism' as an

approximate equivalent of 'internationalism'. It might be correctly pointed out that genuine unity of mankind requires not only *inter*national but also *intra*national harmony, which does not exist in societies internally divided between oppressors and oppressed, exploiters and exploited.

Another objection may be raised from the viewpoint of the animal liberation movement. Real universalism, it might be held, should include the rejection of 'speciesism', that is, of the attitude of neglecting the interests of non-human animals.[13]

I do not wish to argue against the views which might motivate such objections. On the contrary, the problem of social justice *within* societies and the problem of cruelty to animals should be regarded as very serious moral problems. However, it seems to me that there is no harm in using 'universalism' to designate the ideal of harmony and unity between nations, while speaking of 'egalitarian democracy' and 'animal welfare' when we deal with the questions of social justice and the treatment of animals.

For the principle of internationalism we will suggest three formulas, conceived here as almost equivalent.

Formula I: We have obligations towards all mankind, and obligations towards one's nation must be brought into harmony with the universal obligations.

Formula II: The golden rule, that is, the norm. 'Do as you want to be done by', has the same validity in international relations which it has in relations between individuals and groups of the same nation.

Formula III: With regard to all issues which involve an actual or potential conflict between one's nation and other nations, one ought to adopt an attitude of complete impartiality.

Each of these formulas is a moral norm; and, in order for these norms to become a basis for a political programme, the factual proposition should be added that efforts to realize this ideal, or at least to approximate it, will probably be crowned with success in the historically foreseeable future.

Some further explanations are needed to avoid misunderstandings and to meet possible objections. First, what is said here about nations and international relations applies not only to nation states but also to ethnic and racial groups, as well as to exclusive groups of states. With regard to Formula I, it might be appropriate to introduce the distinction between strict and meritorious duties.[14] The difference consists mainly in the greater latitude allowed by meritorious duties, and, in international relations, this distinction almost coincides with the difference between not harming other peoples and helping them (not observing the principle). *Pacta servanda sunt* may be regarded as an instance of causing harm.) Thus, the duty not to inflict suffering on other peoples cannot be overridden by the need to promote the interests of one's own people, even if these interests are legitimate. For example, it is morally wrong for a people to bring about a needed improvement in its standard of living by dispossessing a neighbour. On the other hand, it is

difficult, even from the viewpoint of an internationalist ethics, to determine *how much* assistance the industrialized nations ought to give to the poor ones at the expense of their own standard of living. (We are omitting here the element of self-interest, for example, the creation through assistance of markets for one's own industry.)

The expression 'obligations towards one's nation' is ambiguous. There are universal obligations which are most properly *fulfilled* within one's nation, given the system of nation states. For example, every country has to protect the health of its citizens, to provide educational facilities for the young, assistance for the disabled, and so on. These are *genuine* obligations, but a universalist ethics forbids the fulfilling of them at the expense of other peoples, and, moreover, insists that, *to a great extent*, we have such obligations towards the whole of mankind.

However, by 'obligations to one's nation' one often means the duty to achieve and maintain supremacy over other nations. The universalist denies, of course, that there are such obligations. On the contrary, he regards it as his duty to fight against any domination of others by his nation.

There are national ideals and policies which may be regarded as ethically neutral from the viewpoint of internationalism. For example, national minorities often consider it their duty to preserve their cultural distinctiveness. Such 'ethnicity' has positive and negative aspects, but is not inconsistent with what is essential in a universalist ethics. However, care must be taken not to let it slide over into a chauvinistic disregard of the rights of other nationalities.

A correct application of the golden rule, especially in the area of international relations, requires a very careful determination of the facts. Many, perhaps most, of those who support chauvinistic policies, pay lip service to the ideal of fairness in relations between peoples, but usually tend to argue what that 'they' are doing is different from what 'we' do, that 'we' act only in self-defence, and so on.

Formula III focuses on this need for impartiality. This formula is narrower in its scope than the other two, as it does not deal with the obligation to help other peoples, but, on the other hand, it addresses itself more specifically to the most urgent problem of our time, international conflict. Also more than the other two formulas, it appeals to individuals to transcend the chauvinism of their societies.

The objection might be raised that the suggested formulas leave out essential elements of an internationalist ethics. First, nothing is said in them about international co-operation in solving the *global problems* with which mankind is faced, for example, fighting epidemic diseases, excessive pollution, and similar ills).

Secondly, it might be argued that there is no genuine internationalism without *a feeling of kinship with all mankind*, without 'brotherly love'.

Thirdly, it might be held that an internationalist ethics requires also the

rejection of certain *factual* beliefs, like the belief that some peoples are *innately inferior* to others.

There is no doubt that to achieve international harmony the willingness of nations to attack the general problems in a *co-operative* manner is essential. However, one may assume that societies, which refrain from all kinds of international aggression and, moreover, are generous in the assistance they give to other peoples, will *a fortiori* co-operate in pursuits whose mutual benefit is more immediate. On the other hand, nations may co-operate in such undertakings, but be at each other's throats when a conflict arises between them.

With regard to *feelings* of human brotherhood, it should be pointed out that the principle of internationalism, as an *ethical norm,* cannot make it our duty to have certain feelings, as this does not depend on our will. (The expression to adopt an attitude' in Formula III means to make a decision *to act* in the spirit of internationalism.)

Of course, the importance of such feelings should not be minimized. They may have *intrinsic* value, and, more importantly, they are likely to be a strong motive *to act* in accordance with a universalist ethics.

About factual beliefs, like about feelings, there cannot be a moral norm enjoining us to have them. (Although it may be possible to *cultivate* certain feelings, and make an effort to learn the factual truth.) But there is also another reason why the rejection of certain beliefs, which often cause great harm to international relations, should not be considered an *essential part* of a universalist ethics. It is possible, for example, to think that some ethnic groups will never make a valuable contribution to the culture of mankind, but to insist that this does not give other peoples the right to dominate or to exploit them or to look down upon them, that, on the contrary, we should make a special effort to help them achieve the level of which they *are* capable. Such an attitude, in spite of its faults, should not be regarded as chauvinistic or racist.

Let us now turn to the doctrine of moral unity. In the course of our discussion, we will suggest three *different* formulas for this doctrine. The first is intended to come close to a conjunction, as it were, of the prophetic and the Stoic versions of universalism.

Formula I consists of three thesis:

(a) There is a universally valid moral code;
(b) There is no society, nor is there a large section in any society, that would be *inherently* incapable of adopting this code;
(c) In the future, it will be adopted by all mankind. ('Adopting' means here accepting in theory and practice.)

It might seem that (c) makes (b) superfluous. However, (b) implies that *no change in human nature* is needed to achieve great moral progress. But

there are two serious objections against the suggested formula. It affirms that, at a certain time in the future, *moral perfection* will be achieved by all mankind, and that no further progress in morality will be needed. The doctrine, thus, becomes a statement of religious faith, a belief in a future miraculous state of affairs.

Secondly, this formula states only that mankind is capable of the rule of righteousness and will achieve it, but it does not affirm that *unity as such,* that is, the *sameness* of the codes of all societies, is important. Of course, it cannot be our ideal to have mankind united in *viciousness,* but there may be great merit in unity, even if the same or substantially similar codes have some serious deficiencies.

We, therefore, purpose Formula II. It also consists of three thesis.

(*a*) As in Formula I;
(*b*) There is no society, nor is there a large section in any society that would be *inherently incapable* of great moral progress, of adopting a moral code more closely approximating the valid moral code than any of the present ones;
(*c*) There is, therefore, *a justified hope* that all societies *will* experience considerable moral progress, and that, *consequently,* their codes will gradually converge, and become substantially similar to each other.

The question arises why moral unity is desirable. There are, it seems, two reasons for it. First, as the existence of a universally valid moral code is affirmed, serious differences between codes imply that at least some of them are wrong. In the absence of such differences, they *may* all be right. Furthermore, *consensus gentium,* although not the essence of a valid morality, would give us reason to believe that our morality is not an unenlightened one.

However, the main importance of moral unity consists in its conduciveness to political unity. We are not concerned here with the logical relationships between the two unities as they are assumed, for example, in Stoicism, but with *empirical* relationships. In other words, we are asking how the adoption of the same or of substantially similar moral codes, and, more generally, *sharing the same values,* could be an important factor in reducing conflicts between peoples, and in furthering international co-operation and harmony. (But it is not contended here that moral unity is either a necessary or a sufficient condition of political unity.)

Let us then consider some of the ways in which differences in the values held may contribute to disharmony between peoples.

Whether it is a mere excuse, a rationalization, or a sincerely held belief, imperialists and racists often justify their exploitation and mistreatment of other peoples by regarding them as 'lesser breeds without a law', by attributing to them a lower morality. The imperialist *may be wrong* on one count, and certainly *is* on another. The moral level of the people he wants to domi-

nate may not be lower (or may be higher) than that of his own people, and a really higher morality of a society, *A* as compared with *B* does not give *A* the right to dominate *B*. (A *genuinely international* effort to raise the moral standards of a certain society would be another matter.) But, at this point, we are merely dealing with the moral differences as a *causal* factor in contributing to bad international relations.

Even when differences in morality do not contribute to aggression, they may cause disharmony between peoples by weakening the desire to assist societies in need. The view may be held that *we owe less* to societies in which immoral practices are very widespread. Whether this view is valid or not, such an attitude of the prospective donor societies is likely to evoke resentment on the part of those who need the help.

The fulfilling of international duties, strict and meritorious, may be greatly aided by feelings of kinship with all mankind. But the growth of such feelings is hindered, when some societies look down upon others as morally inferior.

In these examples, the negative influence of moral differences on international harmony has a *subjective* character. It is only through affecting the *attitudes* of the agents that the differences have the detrimental effect. The question may, therefore, be asked whether, from the viewpoint of an internationalist ethics, the emphasis should not rather be on *tolerance* than on moral unity. It should be noted, in this context, that the differences we are here concerned with are not about the very principle of internationalism, as for example, when a society is, unlike its neighbours, aggressively nationalistic. The problem here discussed is how moral differences, *not directly related to international relations,* may have a negative effect on these relations. Thus, the view may be held that by *mutual tolerance* such effects could be avoided not less than by adhering to the same moral code.

We will return to the problem of tolerance, and at this point we will only mention two reasons why the universalist cannot expect tolerance *to replace* moral unity as an important factor in furthering international harmony. First, even assuming that a far-going tolerance is justified, and, *if practised,* could always avoid the antagonisms which arise from differences in moral values, one cannot disregard *the fact* that intolerance is very common. Secondly differences in values may be an *objective* obstacle to good international relations. In discussing the formulas for political unity, we assumed that co-operation in the pursuit of global tasks will follow *a fortiori* from acting in the spirit of internationalism with regard to the obligations of not harming and of helping other peoples. But differences in values may complicate the matter. To take a trivial example. Let us assume that some societies are careless about their health, and badly neglect the fight against contagious diseases and pollution. Then, without any intention to harm their neighbours, they may inflict as much damage on them as by aggression.

These considerations give us also a clue to *the kinds* of value judgements about which it is important to have universal agreement. There are, first,

judgements which can be described as moral in the strict sense of the word, especially those which declare certain types of conduct to be wicked. Disagreements in such matters tend to alienate peoples from each other, to make them feel that they do not belong to the same moral community. Secondly, there are value judgements and corresponding types of behaviour on which all societies have to agree in order to achieve harmonious co-operation in the tasks which have a global scope.

This, however, is only a general description of the values in question. To determine the extent of agreement about values, desirable from the viewpoint of a universalist ethics, we would have to know more specifically when a disagreement will be an objective or a subjective cause of international disharmony. There may be some difficulties even in finding out how serious an obstacle to co-operation a difference in values is, but it is much more difficult to determine how societies will react to differences in values when they perceive these values as moral in the strict sense of the word.

A society may, on the whole, be very intolerant, regarding any deviation from its standards by another society as a proof of great wickedness, and feel itself free from obligations towards, it, or it may be very tolerant. Tolerance may assume various forms, and we will point out two of them. It may be thought that there is some justification in the other society for the types of conduct which we condemn in our own. Or, in spite of condemning the actions of the other society, it may be held that this should not affect our strict and even our meritorious obligations towards it.

One could deal with these difficulties in two opposite ways. The internationalist could strive for a far-going moral unity, such that there will be no disagreement which *might* negatively affect international harmony. Or, instead of asking the empirical question what, *in fact,* will be deterimental to such harmony, lay down rules as to which moral differences *justifiably* reduce our obligations, at least the meritorious ones.

Such solutions seem to me to be wrong. We should not insist on a moral uniformity which will satisfy even the most intolerant dogmatist. On the other hand, the internationalist cannot ignore *all* the negative attitudes arising from moral differences when these attitudes are regarded by him as unjustified. (Besides, internationalists may disagree among themselves in which cases such attitudes are justified.)

One should, perhaps, look for a middle way between these extremes. An analogy might be helpful. When social reforms have to be introduced, standards of a highly enlightened ethics cannot be the sole criterion of the appropriateness of the reforms. On the other hand, it would be absurd to try to satisfy every whim of the individuals of the given society. A certain reasonableness of their demands must be presupposed. The same applies to our problem. We have to take account of attitudes which are not quite justified, but we cannot consider attitudes which are clearly unreasonable.

Of course, the concept of reasonableness is a vague one, and, thus, our

suggested answer to the question of the desirable extent of universal moral agreement also lacks precision.

The opinion is sometimes held that there is a genuine *moral* disagreement only when it subsists in spite of an agreement about all the relevant facts.[15] But from the viewpoint of strengthening international harmony, this is too narrow a conception of moral disagreement. For example, when two societies share the moral belief in promoting the welfare of the present and the future generations and one of them seeks to accomplish this by weeding out the weak in order to create a happier race in the future, these societies do *not* have the same ethics. After all, even some of the Nazis may have been convinced that *the future of mankind as a whole* will be brighter, if certain peoples will be exterminated and German world dominion established.

Both Formula I and Formula II contain the thesis of a universally valid moral code. The question arises whether the sameness of the moral codes of all societies is desirable also when this thesis is rejected. Of the various conceptions of ethics which deny that there is a universally valid moral code, we will consider two: socio-cultural ethical relativism, according to which the validity of a code is confined to the culture in which it is accepted; and emotivism which denies validity, in any objective sense, to all moral statements. We will begin with the latter.

A.J. Ayer's conception of ethics which he espoused when he wrote *Language, Truth, and Logic*[16] is an extreme form of emotivism. Ethical judgements, he says, 'have no objective validity whatsoever. If a sentence makes no statement at all, there is obviously no sense in asking whether it is true or false.'[17]

There seems, however, to be no inconsistency for an emotivist to regard moral unity as desirable. Even if he should adopt a doctrinaire position and refuse to grade moral codes as better and worse, he has to consider the fact, if he is an internationalist, that his is a minority view, and that differences in morality often *do* contribute to bad international relations. But not only can such a position not be held in practice, it is not required by the emotivist conception of ethics. There is no reason why an emotivist cannot evaluate codes as *more or less enlightened,* depending on the truth or falsity of the factual beliefs on which they are based, and on their inner consistency. Neither does an emotivist contradict himself when, for example, he says: my rejection of racism is merely an expression of emotion, but the aversion which I feel towards racism I also feel towards the societies which practise it, and I do not want to further their interests in any way.

With regard to those values, which have to be shared for the sake of harmonious co-operation in the global tasks mankind faces, diffrences in the conception of ethics are irrelevant.

Emotivism, especially in its extreme form, is a clear-cut rejection of the validity of moral judgements on epistemological grounds. On the other hand, both the reasons for the doctrine of socio-cultural ethical relativism and the actual meaning of that doctrine are not easy to determine. We cannot enter

here into a discussion of the various aspects of socio-cultural ethical relativism, and will confine ourselves to a few comments relevant to the problem of the desirability of moral unity.

It should be pointed out that the socio-cultural ethical relativists tend to overstate their case. Ruth Benedict, for example, while speaking about the three cultures of the Zuni, Kwakiutl, and Dobu, says that the ends and means 'in one society cannot be judged in terms of another society, because essentially they are incommensurable';[18] and in the last sentence of the book she speaks about the 'equally valid patterns of life which mankind has created for itself.' This seems to imply that there are no cross-cultural standards, but she is very critical of the dominant trait of Kwakiutl society, namely, rivalry, and of the same trait in American society.[19] Even if one should accept the argument that a way of life as a whole cannot be evaluated because 'every upper has its lower,[20] and there is 'no royal road to a real Utopia',[21] she still clearly assumes that some *elements* in a culture can be regarded as good or bad without further qualification.

A similar *implicit* recognition of the universal validity of some moral principles we find in the relativism of Melville J. Herskovits. He says that 'there is no absolutely valid moral system', and that the 'traditions of a people dictate what for them is right and wrong';[22] but he insists that his relativism, far from implying a negation of ethical codes, 'brings into relief the validity of every set of norms for the people who have them, and the values they represent'.[23] Anthropologists, he says, have found no group 'which tolerates moral anarchy'.[24] However, unless one adopts the principle that in *every* society it is wrong for an individual to act in a way destructive of the well-being of his society, there is no reason to ascribe *validity within a society* to the rules forbidding such actions. Furthermore, it seems to follow that murder, indiscriminate violence, and similar actions are wrong *everywhere*, that is, *simply* wrong.

Let us, however, assume that the relativist denies such implications of his doctrine, and insists that *no moral principle* has universal validity. He nevertheless provides us with a criterion on the basis of which we can judge societies as being better or worse. Such a criterion would be the degree to which the members of a society *abide* by the accepted principles.

It should be noted that the relativism of Benedict and Herskovits has a strong *normative* aspect. They are motivated by the desire for justice in international relations, and they believe that the *ethnocentrism of the powerful,* who *impose* their standards on other societies, is very harmful. It would, thus, seem that this relativism cannot but approve of a universal sharing of values, when such sharing is *objectively* necessary for international co-operation.[25]

Although the desirability of moral unity does not depend on the belief in a universally valid moral code, the absence of such a belief may make an important difference with regard to *the extent* of the desirable unity. This applies especially to socio-cultural ethical relativism. International relations

can be positively affected by moral unity as well as by tolerance of differences. But, from the viewpoint of the relativist, the role of tolerance is *much greater* than it is in an absolutist ethics. It is, however, only a difference *in degree*, as both for the absolutist and the relativist *unity and tolerance* have their roles in promoting harmonious international relations.

We will, then, suggest a formulation of the doctrine of moral unity which dispenses with the thesis of a universally valid moral code, Formula III:

(a) There are no *innate* differences between societies with regard to their perceptions of values, and all societies are capable of adopting substantially similar value systems;

(b) There is a justified hope that those value differences which alienate peoples from each other, as well as those which impede mankind's efforts to solve the global problems, will disappear or at least be greatly reduced in the historically foreseeable future.

The three formulas are different, but do not contradict each other. The second formula does not deny the metaphysical views to which the first is implicitly tied, if only does not presuppose them; and the third formula is completely neutral both with regard to metaphysics and to metaethics.

We will conclude our discussion with a few remarks about justifying the doctrines of moral and political unity. We will, however, not attempt to prove these doctrines, but rather point out *the kind* of arguments the internationalist should use, the *method* he should employ, to support the belief in a morally and politically united mankind.

Unless a universalist is of the opinion that, without certain metaphysical theories (like those of the Stoics, for example) *there is no justification* for his doctrines, he should not employ such theories as arguments. He should rather support the factual propositions in the doctrines by *empirical* evidence, and the ethical norms by an appeal to the *ordinary moral consciousness*. Thus, the belief in the *equal moral potential* of all societies is held by many, probably by most anthropologists;[26] and the view that the various moral codes will in the future approximate each other is made plausible by an increasing uniformity (in spite of the zig-zags) of the cultures of mankind. However, the universalist does not have to insist dogmatically that these views have the same degree of probability as established theories in the natural sciences. The plausibility of these views is sufficient to adopt them as *hypothesis on which we act*. In other words, the *possibility* that differences in moral codes, detrimental to international harmony, will persist, but ought not to weaken our efforts to achieve such harmony.

The most important part of ethical universalism is, of course, the principle of internationalism. Our contention that this principle should not invoke for its justification metaphysical theories, but rather appeal to our ordinary moral consciousness, is obviously in disagreement with the view that *all* ethical

norms need an ontological basis, that is, have to be grounded in a certain conception of nature and of man's place in it. But we do not wish to argue here against a transcendentalist ethics in general but only against the view that a universalist ethics has a *special status*, a *source different* from that of other moral norms.

Such a view is found in Bergson's, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*. Bergson draws a distinction between two moralities. There is a morality which has its basis in the social instinct, and this instinct has always in view a closed society and not humanity as a whole. 'Our social duties aim at social cohesion...they compose for us an attitude which is that of discipline in the face of the enemy.'[27] The obligatory character of these duties 'is to be explained fundamentally by the pressure of society on the individual.'[28]

But the morality of social pressure, Bergson says, is overlaid by a morality which has an entirely different source. This other morality is incarnate in exceptional, privileged persons, who *become an example* for others. It is not merely social but a *human* morality.[29]

It might seem, at first sight, that Bergson's theory is not relevant to the problem of *justifying* a universalist ethics. Bergson speaks about the different *sources* of our duties to our fellow-citizens and to man as man, but justification is concerned with *validity* and not with genesis. One must, however, distinguish between justifying an ethical norm in the abstract and justifying it to people in such a manner that one may hope the justification to become an important factor in *motivating* them to act in accordance with the norm. A moralist may regard a certain value judgement as valid, although he knows that almost nobody has the *moral sensitivity* needed to adopt it. But, in such a case, he cannot expect the norm to motivate people whom he addresses. Therefore, should we agree with Bergson that the existence of moral geniuses—of saints whose love embraces all creatures—is necessary for a universalist ethics and, at the same time, *not agree* with his view that essential progress in the direction of internationalism can be brought about by the influence of such saints, we would have to conclude that there is no hope for the realization of a universalist ethics.

As against Bergson, it seems to me that the internationalist should appeal to *the same* dispositions in us, to which every moralist has to appeal, namely to compassion, a sense of fairness, and prudence.

There is, of course, a great deal of truth in the saying *homo-nomini lupus est* (incidentally wolves have a way of avoiding, among themselves, deadly combat); but there is also compassion among children before they could be influenced by the example of saints. The sense of fairness is not completely absent in international conflicts, but is submerged, as it were, by a chauvinism which inclines people to pay attention to some facts (or alleged facts), and ignore others.

Let us admit that these factors, that is, compassion and the sense of fairness, do not, by and large, have the same force in international relations

which they have *within* one's society. Let us also admit that, with regard to morality in general, the moralist can usually count on our *desire for respectability*, whereas the internationalist has to overcome a moral code which *lends respectability* to a nationalistic ethics, and may brand internationalists as *vaterlandslose gesellen*. However, the argument *from prudence* is stronger here than with regard to other moral norms. A man, who wants to commit a crime, can often be almost certain that there will be no harmful consequences *for him*. It is different in international relations. In arguing for the principle of internationalism, one assumes that the opponents *are concerned* with the welfare of *their* nations. But crimes against other peoples *cannot be hidden,* and history, especially the history of the last hundred years, shows how *temporary* military victories are. Finally, even those who are not attracted at all by the purely ethical aspects of internationalism must realize, that, unless there is a radical change in our attitudes, a nuclear holocaust is likely, which will engulf *their nation* together with others.

NOTES

1. Isaiah, chap. ii, 2-4.
2. Cicero, *Laws*, trans. Clinton Walker Keys, bk. i, chap. vi, vii.
3. Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations*, trans. G. Long, bk. iv, iv.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Isaiah, chap. xi, 6-7.
6. Cicero, *op. cit.*, bk. i, chap. vii.
7. *Op. cit.*, bk. i, chap. xi.
8. *Op. cit.*, bk. i, chap. xii.
9. *Op. cit.*, bk. i, chap. xvii.
10. Aristotle, *Politics*, 1260A.
11. *Op. cit.*, 1252B.
12. Cicero, *op. cit.*, bk. i, chap. x.
13. About speciesism, see Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation*, Avon Books, 1977, p. 7 and *passim*. As mentioned above, in Isaiah's eschatological prophecy, animals, like humans, will live in perfect harmony.
14. See Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, pp. 89 ff. Also H.J. Paton, *The Categorical Imperative*, Harper Torchbook, 1967, pp. 147-48; and Paton's fn., p. 53, n. 1 on p. 137 of the *Groundwork*.
15. See William K. Frankena's *Ethics* (1st edn), p. 92f.
16. First published in 1936.
17. A.J. Ayer, *Language, Truth, and Logic*, Pelican Books, p. 144.
18. Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, Houghton Miffin Company, 1939. p. 223.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 246 ff.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 246.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 249.
22. Melville J. Herskovits, *Cultural Relativism*, Vintage Books, 1973, p. 101.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
25. Herskovits speaks about *harmonizing the goals* of the various ways of life.

26. E.g., Boas and his school. See Franz Boas. *Race and Democratic Society*, Biblo and Tennen, 1966, *passim*. Also 'Unesco Statement on Race' in Ashley Montague, *Statement on Race*, Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 12 and *passim*.
27. Henri Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, Henry Holt and Company, 1935, p. 23.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-27.

Does prescriptivism imply naturalism?*

A. KANTHAMANI
University of Calicut, Kozhikode

A major criticism against Hare's universal prescriptivism is that either it assumes naturalistic premisses (which he denies) or it leads to naturalistic conclusions (to which it does not). The exclusive disjunctive form in which it is given is significant in that it will apply to any form of moral thinking which supports Hume's Law. It is the purpose of this paper to prove that Hare's theory could still be considered as resisting such a disjunction as it is attested to by his latest pronouncements. In what follows, I shall present the main lines of his defence as they are found in his latest essay on moral thinking.[1] There is still a more direct way of countering this criticism by adopting a pun on the thesis, due to Amrtya Sen. Sen's thesis is stated as follows: 'Hare's universalisability is either empty of content or it clashes with moral law.'[2] This amounts to asserting: if it is not empty of content (i.e. not a tautology), then it clashes with Hume's Law. That is to say: if it is naturalistic, then it clashes with Hume's Law. Hare does not vow to clash with Hume's Law. It follows, therefore, that his is not a naturalistic theory. However, I shall stick to Hare's own version of it for the defence.

First, Hare starts with a 'foundationalist' assumption calling naturalism a *semantical* thesis *sui generis*. As such, it is objectionable, because, as a descriptive account of meaning, it can only describe moral words as having a 'fairly constant' meaning (*MT* 82). It is incomplete in the sense that it cannot recognize what may be called the meaning variance of moral words, which partly depends on its prescriptive force. Hare's claim is that his prescriptive theory of meaning could complete it. As opposed to a stronger claim that prescriptivism *can* explain meaning variance, it makes a weaker claim saying that there is inevitably a verbal basis to a moral conflict. At the outset, therefore, such a theory overrules a naturalistic claim which denies any such basis (*MT* 69). On Hare's assessment, this is the most 'fatal' mistake of naturalism. What this proves is that the foundationalist character of naturalism is directly opposed to the foundationalist character of non-naturalism.

A natural corollary of the semantic thesis is that naturalism is analytical in the sense that what it says about moral facts is unrevisable, and, therefore, it is incapable of generating a genuine moral conflict. Thus, naturalism stops short at the first level of thinking in moral theory. Moral conflicts, according to Hare, are to be recognized at the second level, but their resolution should wait for the third level, which is metaethical.[3] Thus, Hare's plea for the conti-

nuance of metaethics has a special justification, because it is introduced to resolve moral conflicts. One may sum up the above points and say that, while the semantical thesis is to be obtained by a 'semantical descent', the meta-ethical level is to be identified with a 'semantic ascent', and, therefore, a separation between them is not called for at least in a sense.

Secondly, Hare's reason for attacking naturalism, as it is understood as a non-semantical (ontological) thesis, is that it commits us to the mistake of psychologizing ethics by objectivizing or descriptivizing the prescriptive properties via a psychology of motivation. Such a realistic account demands that the truth of moral statements should determine their meaning. In contrast to this, prescriptivism leans on empirical intuitions provided by linguistics, and obviates the above need by stipulating that meaning conditions could determine truth. Such a view, therefore, implicitly demands that there should be an account of semantical consequence in Hare's version of practical reasoning, and, therefore, naturally leads to the 'semantic' thesis mentioned above.

Part of the above demand is, however, fulfilled by stipulating that the account of practical inference should provide a pragmatic explanation[4] of the *fact* about the feeling of approval or disapproval (*explanandum*) by means of the *fact* about the reason (*explanans*) for such an approval or disapproval. On Hare's view, neither of the above facts is moral, but they are linguistic (*MT* 217). Further : it is pragmatic[5] in the sense that it arises as a response to the question about the reason asked in that particular moral *context*. Such a question is not directed to evoke the intention behind the act, but it is directed to know facts about language. I shall call the question a 'pro-question' in the sense in which it is delimited by the available information. Hare even goes to the extent of stipulating how one could be rational even under conditions of incomplete information,[6] but still the pro-question may be open to further criticism. This is what exactly Hare means by saying that moral approvals have perlocutionary *force*, freed from its Austinian clippings.

Again, the charge is made by saying that Hare's thesis about universalisibility cannot be derived except from a naturalistic premise about other people, or factual beliefs about other people. Such an accusation, according to Hare, does not take into account the role of the pro-question. Hare thinks that this could be dichotomized into two other pro-questions, and argues that the pro-question that corresponds to other-orientedness is 'What I *ought* to do?' and the pro-question that corresponds to self-orientedness is 'What *shall* I do?' The above dichotomy is justifiable on the ground that they occupy different places in the structure of practical inference. This shows that Hare's theory is more critic-oriented and other-oriented than agent-oriented. It follows, therefore, that the criticism which says that his theory is more agent-oriented rather than critic-oriented got it all wrong.[7] Hare goes to the extent of saying that even the overridingness of one moral choice over the other by which one's own preferences could be altered could be explained (pragmatically)

by using the pro-question. This conveys the central message of Hare's three-level theory as consisting of a thematic transit from the singular prescriptive to the universal prescriptive, just as the welfare economist goes from individual welfare to social welfare. Ethics, understood in Hare's way, becomes a social science via linguistics, and it is not a natural science via a philosophy of action, as it is often made out to be.

Thirdly, Hare's front against naturalism, understood as a form of intuitionism, is based on the objection that it gives a particular epistemological status to intuition. In other words, it claims that,

$$(1) \text{ I intuit } \phi = \text{I } know \text{ it to be true.}$$

On Hare's assessment, this leads to a 'monistic' intuitionism, and it requires to be replaced by a 'pluralistic' intuitionism which allows a certain 'independence' to moral principles. No doubt, intuitionism plays a role in moral reasoning, and that, too, mostly in the form of linguistic intuitionism. It is only under this principle that even a fanatic's universal prescription need not necessarily be construed as 'inconsistent' till it is proved to be so. However, this does not rule out the persuasive power of the fanatic, because it is 'theoretically legitimate' at one level, while its inconsistency is seen at another level. Thus, while Hare accepts the theoretical legitimacy of fanaticism, pure or impure, he cannot agree that it leads to naturalistic conclusions. But it leaves the question about the existence of a fanatic. Hare counters the premise which says that fanatics exist by saying that it is only a fact about language. But the reason why their prescriptives cannot be universalized is that they cannot be open to criticism. Thus, the naturalist overlooks many of the nuances Hare introduces in his case for a fanatic—a case specifically mooted to overcome the problem of moral choice.

A naturalist might argue that the above account may be taken to suggest a moral 'principle of tolerance' and thenceforward to a sort of moral relativism. Such a claim however is false,[8] since it makes no effort to mutually consistent views. On the contrary, Hare's third-level is aimed at resolving conflicts that arise out of such views. Nor will Hare accept a relativistic position (*MT* 159), however compelling the constraint put on his account of rationality by relativists like Brandt.[9] It is interesting to know why Hare rejects relativism. For him it represents another form of 'old-fashioned' subjectivism,[10] and, as such, it has the intuitionistic moorings which Hare rejects. Presumably, Hare thinks that he could reduce it to a form of descriptivism, which is nothing but a form of intuitionism understood semantically. At the same time, Hare has no reason to reject emotivism,[11] even though it ,too, is a form of intuitionism and, therefore, a variety of subjectivism, the reason being that it could be recognized as an inferior form of prescriptivism. Its inferiority is located in not taking us to a form of utilitarianism. Another point that weighs against emotivism is that it allows mutually inconsistent moral judgements, and thus makes it impossible to disagree.

Whatever be the merit of the above ratiocination, Hare's prescriptivism is vulnerable on the following points:[12]

(a) His account of practical inference;
(b) His idea of universalisibility; and
(c) His account of utilitarianism.

To some extent, (a) could be defended along the lines indicated in Section I. Since (b) and (c) are related, the argument is directed against their logical dependence. At the outset, it is conceded that the logical relation could occur either way. The issue about universalisibility is that the necessity it contains could either be identified with factual or logical necessity. The dilemma here is that if it identified with logical necessity, then it clashes with the view enunciated in his earlier book, *Freedom and Reason*,[13] because, there it is deduced as a contingent (synthetic) prescriptive. On the other hand, if it is taken as contingently necessary, then it will yield only naturalistic conclusions. Holding either horn of the dilemma will, thus, lead either to naturalistic conclusions or will involve the breach of Hume's Law. This law is said to have been breached, if either the conclusion thus arrived at is contingently necessary or if it leads further to factual utilitarian conclusions. But, according to Sen, they are also 'empty', because they are vitiated by 'impossibility' results.[14]

Thus, it is argued, that, when the universalized premise is taken in either of the above way factual conclusions about 'utility' or 'prudence' can be deduced. Conversely, if the contingently necessary conclusion is drawn from the rationality-prudence clause, it again leads to a naturalistic conclusion. Either way, the 'lapse' into naturalism becomes very obvious. Further, as the naturalists contend, there is, indeed, a logical way of demonstrating this by taking the premise which introduces the tacit clause about other's prudence as a counter-factual like

(2) If I were so = and = so, then I would choose to do ϕ;

and implying the following consequence:

(3) Imagining myself in his position, I do choose to do ϕ.

Thus, it is argued that (2) represents a property about other's prudence, it is clearly factual, and, therefore, the implied statement is also factual, if taken in the indicative sense. One plausible way of countering this is to argue that the implied statement need not necessarily be taken as an indicative conditional. I state below the reason why this is so, and my reason depends on how (2) should be interpreted. Hare's reason for this is that (2) is not factual because it is only a hypothesis about others. Its counter-factuality could be analysed out, so as to yield a pragmatic element in 'interpersonal comparison'.[15] Even the alleged neutrality between one's imagining about oneself and imagining about others should have an inevitable starting point in one's own

subjectivity. One major shortcoming here is that it would reduce the above conditional into an agentive one, involving problems about self-identity. This might force one to conclude that imagination is to be taken as one aspect of competence to which Hare may not agree.

To some extent the arguments, considered in Section I, go to obviate this, so as to take the sting out of this 'qualified' prescriptivism to which it leads. Now we can claim that, if the foregoing account is correct, then Hare's 'modest'[16] account need not budge even under a 'fluid' logic of preferences. This is what I propose to show in the reconstruction of Hare's type of practical inference, which demands that moral choice follows from prudential choice via counter-factual conditional.

In order to reinforce the above point, Hare suggests further refinement of (2) which is aimed at capturing what he calls prudential choice, and relates this to his definition of what he calls 'autofanatic'[17] (*MT* 95ff.). Accordingly, (2) should be modified to read in the following ways:

(2.1) If I were (now) in that situation, I shall (then) prefer to do ϕ;
(2.2) If I were (now) in that situation, I shall (then) prefer not to do ϕ

Now, (2.1) and (2.2) represent a conflict situation. They are equiviable surrogates of (2.3) given as:

(2.3) If I were (then) in that situation, I would (then) prefer to do ϕ
The surrogates are the result of what he calls the method of 'pure discounting' of the future, and has application to one's own states. Further, he says that in situations of conflict, the choice of either (2.1) or (2.2) must be overriding. On the other hand, if any one supposes that he could override (2.3), then he offers a case of autofanatic. The point of the above discussion is that the prudential choice of one rather than the other is considered in the light of utilitarian maximization of preference. Hare claims that the above considerations far exceed any other account of prudential choice hitherto advanced. If anything, the foregoing account prevents any ordinary interpretation of counter-factuals in moral contexts.

A reconstruction of the above argument may take the following form:

1. Hume's Law: 'Ought cannot follow is' (Assumption 1);
2. Circumstances of the kind for ϕ obtain (Assumption 2);
3. ϕ has prescriptive meaning for one as well as for others (prescriptive convention-PC-initial conditions);
4. Prescriptivity of the I (What *should* I do ?);
5. If I were so = and = so, then I would choose to do ϕ;
6. *Ceteris paribus* clause: I prefer to do ϕ or not ϕ, in conflict situations, by 'pure discounting of the future';
7. (6) can now be universalized on other-prudence;
8. Imagining myself in other's situations and preferences, I would be able to choose one rather than the other;

9. Prescriptivity o for others (What I *ought* to do?);
10. Therefore, I ought to do ϕ or not-ϕ.

Steps 1–4 represent the first or *intuitive* level; steps 5–8 represent the critical or metaethical level; and steps 9 and 10 represent the conclusion.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. R.M. Hare, *Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (MT)*, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1981. His remarks against naturalism are found in chap. 4 and 5. See esp. pp. 62-78.
2. Sen's epigram appears in his recent Dewey Lectures (1984) titled as 'Well-Being, Agency and Freedom', published in the *Journal of Philosophy* (1985), pp. 169-221; see especially p. 173 (fn. 14).
3. The most recent attempt to prove moral thinking as a three-level theory is found in Hare (*MT*); See fn. 1.
4. The change from prediction to one of 'explanation' is traceable to Hare's 'What Makes Choices Rational?' (WMCR) in *Review of Metaphysics* (p. 32, 1979), and is of comparable interest to Bas van Fraassen's attempt to construct a pragmatics of explanation in his *The Scientific Image*, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1980; See chap. 5, pp. 97-153.
5. Asking for reason, context, and explanation lies at the core of the method of explanation in Fraassen also; see fn. 3.
6. Hare takes informed choice as *only* necessary and not sufficient, for rational preference; see WMCR, p. 628.
7. E.g., see Harman's 'Relativistic Ethics: Morality as Politics' in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, vol. iii, 1978, pp. 109-21.
8. Hare denies this in *MT*, p. 159.
9. Hare is indebted to Brandt's account of rationality; see p. 214 (*MT*)
10. See the opening remarks of Hare in WMCR, fn. 3.
11. Hare classifies emotivism as a non-descriptive theory, and probably a non-naturalistic but a subjectivistic moral theory, and, therefore, it is inferior to prescriptivism. The relation between emotivism and prescriptivism, in my opinion, needs further study.
12. Here and in what follows, I am indebted to the incisive criticisms made by H.M. Robinson in his 'Is Hare a Naturalist?' in *Philosophical Review*, 1982, pp. 73-86.
13. R.M. Hare, *Freedom and Reason*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963.
14. See especially Sen's 'The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal' in *Journal of Political Economy*, lxxviii, 1970, pp. 152-57.
15. There is clear evidence that Hare talks about moral choice in this way only; see p. 223 (*MT*).
16. Hare's claim to give a modest account appears on p. 191 (*MT*).
17. This new account of fanatics is considerably extended to overcome previous problems. My own account of its relation to auto-fanatic is a modified account of his distinction which appears on p. 95 ff.

Thinking vs thought

STRATEGIES FOR CONCEPTUAL CREATIVITY*

DAYA KRISHNA
University of Rajasthan, Jaipur

The activity of thinking seems not only distinctive of man, but also appears to lie at the very roots of all his other activities. Yet, the activity itself is seldom directly paid attention to, as what we normally know are only its results, that is, thought. And it is with thought that we are usually concerned, the thought of others as embodied in language—the language that we ourselves know. The understanding of what someone else has said and finding fault with it constitutes the largest part of what goes on under the title of intellectual activity in the world. Even a casual glance at the list of publications in, say, *Choice* or any other review journal will confirm this. So will the teaching-and-learning process in any educational institution, where the whole activity usually consists in somebody explaining to students what someone else has said and examining them for their capacity to reproduce what he had said.

In a sense, this is almost unavoidable, for what can be more palpable, concrete, visible, objective than the libraries and the museums in which thought and imagination has embodied itself. And that is also perhaps the reason why the secondary sources always take over and proliferate till they almost bury the primary sources or drive them into oblivion. The shock of a real encounter with the original is well known, but what is not so well known is the still greater shock which one feels when one meets the thinker himself. There is, on the one hand, the encounter with the person which, in a sense, puts all that he had said or written far behind and seems somehow strangely irrelevant to the situation. The *presence* of the person, in a sense, transcends all that he has written and, to a certain extent, even negates it. But that is not what we are interested in here. Rather, it is the person actually thinking before us and the relation of this to his finished thought that we had read earlier in his writings that I am interested in for the present. And the contrast here is almost as great as between the person and the thought that he thinks or the action that he does. Seeing the thought arising, so to say, before our very eyes is to see it in a different way than when one finds it finished, frozen, congealed between the covers of a book. The latter appearance is deceptive, but its deceptiveness is grasped more easily if one has the thinker thinking before oneself, even if it be only for a little while. After one has experienced it, everything becomes fluid once again—tentative, hesitant, provisional—subject to revision and counter-revision.

The truth of what we have pointed out seems so obvious and trivial that one wonders if it even needs to be said. Yet, the perennial disputes regarding what texts really mean is a reminder that the point that we have made, though obvious, is forgotten or ignored most of the time. How much misguided intellectual effort humanity would have been saved if nobody had worried about what the Bible or the Koran or the Vedas really meant. And, as everybody knows, the problem is not confined to the so-called revelatory texts alone or to those misguided ancients who believed in their authority. The so-called moderns are not immune from the disease. The amount of effort that has been wasted on finding what Marx or Freud or Wittgenstein or Hegel really meant is truly astonishing. These names are only illustrative and one may add others, according to one's liking, to the list.

This strange phenomenon of hundreds of able minds engaging themselves in disputing about what someone else has said may be seen as a hangover from those times when the authority of the revealed text was so great and the dangers of unorthodoxy so real that the only way that one could safely say what one wanted to say was to present it as the real meaning of the text whose authority everyone accepted. But the hangover hypothesis can hardly explain the continuance of the phenomenon and its proliferation even in times when the dangers of unorthodoxy have become only marginal in character. Perhaps the *guru-śiṣya* symbiosis or the master-disciple syndrome, along with the *sampradāya* mentality arising out of the inevitable schisms regarding who understood the master best, may explain the phenomenon better. Deeper than these, however, is perhaps the lack of confidence in one's own capacity to think originally, and thus to find crutches in the thought of others who are already acknowledged and established in the field. The cult of masters, past and present, helps to perpetuate this feeling, and the burden of the past and present greats stifles the young and the not-so-young into repeating what others have said and making their own thought respectable by buttressing it from quotes from others, forgetting that one could have easily found quotations for the counter-position also.

A more charitable view of this enormous wastage of intellectual effort is that it seeks to establish a relationship with the past and is not so much a sign of a lack of self-confidence in the power of one's own thinking as the acknowledgement that one thinks on the basis of what others have thought, that thinking is not a monadic activity but rather the achievement of a community of thinkers. But a community can only be of equals where none is afraid of saying what he thinks to be correct or significant or fruitful and, what is perhaps even more important, where none feels that no one else can say anything worthwhile or significant in the matter. The arrogance of knowledge is as much an arrogance as the arrogance of power, and both lead to essential asymmetries which, however real, militate against innovation and creativity. A questioning attitude may prick the pretentions of both, as neither is as certain or secure as it usually proclaims itself to be.

Knowledge, it should be remembered, is usually a knowledge of what someone else has said or a repetition of what is habitually accepted as true by practitioners in a certain domain. The first is just information which may be useful in certain contexts. As for the second, a closer look at the field will always reveal dissidents who are anathema to the establishment. Thus, the distinction between those who know and those who do not is not only relative but also misleading if it is construed as a relationship of authority in which the latter have necessarily to accept what the former say, as they are a disadvantaged group in the situation. This illusion of authority is generated by the relation of dependence on adults which the child has in respect of many things, and is later strengthened by the schooling system where the teacher is supposed to know and the student to learn. However, when a question is raised either by the child or the student, the situation is generally reversed, revealing the ignorance of both the adults and the teachers. One is often surprised at the questions that children ask, but few reflect on the fact that this capacity is soon lost as children grow older. As for students, most teachers do not like questions to be asked in the class or they prefer that only certain types of questions be asked.

To ask a new question is to disrupt the closed circle of accepted knowledge and to open a new vista for thought. Asking a new question is, in a sense, an invitation to look at things anew. But, normally, only certain questions are allowed or accepted within the existing frameworks, and those that depart from them are usually treated as eccentric or irrelevant. But once one sees that a new question is an opening to a new possibility for thought, one will not dismiss it so easily or brush it aside as of no consequence whatsoever. True, one cannot accept all questions as equally relevant or promising, but, from the perspective we are trying to open, one will hesitate to pass such a judgement in an off-hand fashion, and, at a deeper level, see it as one's own limitation rather than that of the questioner. At another level, perhaps, what one has to learn to cultivate is a sensitivity to questions and the ability to think and feel into what lies behind the question.

But if it is the asking of questions that is crucial for thinking, then what we have to ask with regard to any text is not what it says but the questions it asks or rather the hidden questions which lie behind what is said. The whole exercise of understanding will take on a new turn; for now it will be the questions and the problems that shall occupy the centre of attention, and what is said will be seen as a more or less satisfactory attempt at an answer or solution to them. The questions and the problems, however, are seldom there in the open, and many a time it is not clear which questions are being answered or which problems are being solved. Yet, once the attention shifts to the underlying questions and problems, one begins to take part in the thinking process itself, and the answers and the solutions begin to assume a far more tentative character than they generally do when only what is ostensibly said is taken into account. Also, alternative answers and solutions may begin to

take shape, or at least their possibility begin to affect one's cognitive awareness.

What is, however, an even more important consequence of this shift of attention is the overcoming of that theological hangover which has infected so much of cognitive enterprise in all parts of the globe. The exegetical disease, which results not only in trying to discover the real meaning of the text but also in claiming that the master said what one oneself considers to be true, can only be cured if one's basic attitude to the text itself changes. The text, in the changed perspective, is seen as providing an occasion for a dialogue with a person with whom one cannot enter into a personal dialogue for some reason. And the purpose of this dialogue is to help one in the process of one's own thinking, a process that—as we shall see later on—is not a solitary, individual monadic exercise but rather the joint undertaking of a community of visible and invisible persons which ultimately includes, perhaps, the whole of mankind. But to see it in this way is to see it as an unfinished process, unfinishable in principle. For, as long as there are human beings, thinking shall go on; and its stoppage at their cessation will only be like the one that occurs when one gets tired or goes to sleep or dies, that is, accidental in character. Yet, to see it that way is to see that, though the text has seemingly a beginning and an end, this is illusory. And to see it as illusory is to realize that the so-called ending is only a provisional ending, and that the end is really a challenge to us, the readers, to continue or carry the thought further. The 'continuance' or 'carrying' need not be in the same direction, and may even oppose it or move in a direction which is essentially tangential to it.

It may, perhaps, be thought that texts which are explicitly in the form of a dialogue such as the *Dialogues* of Plato or certain parts of the Upaniṣads will not require any such strategy as they ostensibly are doing what we want them to do. Unfortunately, the camouflage in such texts is even deeper, for, though they present an air of open-ended discussion, the questions asked and the replies given are always subtly structured in such a way as to lead to the predetermined conclusion which the author wants to reach. Some of the dialogues of Plato seem to be an exception as, at the end, Socrates confesses his inability to provide an answer to the questions he had asked. Yet, how many times in the course of a Platonic dialogue, one feels like disagreeing with the interlocutor's readiness to agree with what Socrates has said. As for the Upaniṣads, they do not even attempt to provide the atmosphere of a real dialogue, for it is a dialogue between those who have known and realized the truth and others who have not. Not only this, there is at times even the threat of punishment with death if one dares to disagree. The *Dialogues* of the Buddha do not have this covert or overt threat of punishment in them, but as far as authority is concerned they breathe the same spirit.

Yet, in spite of these obvious limitations, the dialogues may provide an interesting take-off point for exploring those possibilities of thought which have been so brusquely or casually rejected in the text. In a sense, the Indian

philosophical texts provide a far greater opportunity for such an exercise than most philosophical texts written in the western tradition as they provide in the very format of their presentation the possible argument or arguments against their position and their reply to them. The counter-positions are, therefore, there in open and the reader is continuously aware of them. He does not have to hunt for them, or try to find them by delving under the surface of the text as is the case with most of the philosophical texts written in the West or in the Western tradition. The suppressed text, so to say, is more exposed in the Indian tradition of writing, specially of the philosophical sort than in most other traditions.

The idea of a 'suppressed text' makes us look at the texts in a different way than is usually done by most readers who are still under the sway of what we have called the theological hangover without being aware of it. No text is, or can be, all of a piece as is usually presupposed. Rather, it is a compromise formation between different pulls, all of which are basically intellectual in nature. The Freudian parallel, though tempting, is fundamentally incorrect as it assumes that the only reason for suppression or rejection can be emotional or moral in character. It is forgotten that there can be purely intellectual or aesthetic reasons for such a situation. It is, of course, true that the Freudian perspective is one of neurosis, but that need not be the only context in which we may think of suppression or rejection. The suppression of rejection in the intellectual context results from the judgement of the relative weightage of the evidence and the argument that an individual entertains, and this, obviously, can differ from person to person. The other factor responsible for this emanates from the over-all judgement of a person regarding the total cognitive world-view which he considers preferable to others. As these other views are many and diverse in character, the so-called 'suppressed texts' of a text are also multiple in nature. Also, as there is always some argument and evidence for them, they are not a nullity, and hence cannot be completely rejected with the assured certainty of truth. Rather, it is a wager that one puts on one's judgement against that of all the others; but one is aware or at least half-aware that they have a possible plausibility which, yet in one's judgement, is less than that which one has chosen. However, the claim is usually an overclaim, for, in that way, one assures both oneself and others of the truth of what one is saying.

The text, in other words, is to be seen as the thought product of someone's thinking and thus having all those characteristics which any product of one's own thinking usually has—tentativeness, incompleteness, provisionality, lack of finality, etc. But this would destroy the illusion created by the appearance of the beginning and the end within a finite number of pages securely bound within the confines of a book. That there is no real end to the thinking process is known to everybody, for one returns again and again to the themes one had written about till death intervenes and puts an arbitrary end to the process. Even earlier, one may lose interest, get tired or incapacitated or find

one has nothing new to say. But these are as accidental or arbitrary as death, with the only difference that one may possibly recover from them. The interest may revive, the vision return, the incapacity be overcome and the creativity flow again. As for the beginning, one knows that there must have been one, but exactly when, one hardly can tell.

But, once the illusion of the beginning and the end are realized, the revelatory attitude to texts will cease also. One can easily see the absurdity of this attitude in the context of the so-called revealed texts of other religions but seldom in that of one's own. And those, who have seen through the revelatory pretensions of all religions, are seldom able to see through their almost universal prevalence in secular contexts also. The tribes of Marxians, Freudians, Fregeans, Wittgensteinians, Husserlians, Chomskians is legion, and one may easily extend the list if one is inclined to do so. The disciples proudly proclaim the final findings of the master, little realizing that each of them has been rejected as untenable by followers of the other group. Hard-core empirical sciences, such as physics, are not immune to the infection as any reader of Popper's *Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics** would quickly realize. Basically, it is not the subject matter which determines whether the revelatory attitude shall prevail or not, even though certain subject matters may be more prone to it. Rather, the attitude derives from the belief that certain persons are nearer the truth than others, and that, as truth is presumably a unique and coherent whole, such persons are nearer to it in its totality. Both the beliefs, however natural, are mistaken. The first is a generalization or rather a wrong translation of the fact that certain people in certain fields seem to know more than others. The second derives from the seemingly harmless tendency to use the term 'truth' in the singular and to conceive of knowledge as a journey towards a fixed destination. To give up these ways of looking at knowledge and truth would not only help in overcoming the revelatory attitude and the theological hangover about which we have talked earlier but also, in its own turn, release the spiritual quest from its imprisonment in these attitudes in all the religions of the past.

The roots of creativity in all fields, including that of thinking, are unknown and perhaps unknowable in principle, at least in the usual sense in which 'knowing' is generally used. Yet, one of the preconditions for creativity to manifest itself is the giving up of the mistaken belief that it is confined only to certain persons or periods or countries or civilizations, and that the rest are only doomed to repeat or approximate what has been achieved by them. The belief that every human being is capable of entertaining a new thought, of asking a new question, of seeing a new problem is almost an a priori condition for fostering creativity and letting it emerge in the life of the mind. This means that people have to be encouraged to ask questions, to see problems and to attempt solutions, and that what they attempt in this regard it treated

*Karl R. Popper, *Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics*, ed. W.W. Bartley, III, London; Hutchinson, 1982.

with genuine respect. Many a time, the person who asks the question, sees the problem and attempts a solution does not know the significance of what he has asked or seen or attempted. It is, or should be, the function of those who can see a little farther ahead, to see the potential directions for thought which are implicit in them. But such a situation can only emerge when people who pose questions, formulate problems and attempt solutions are not afraid of making themselves appear foolish or ridiculous or ignorant. This, however, depends on an atmosphere which is just the opposite of what normally obtains in most institutions devoted to the fostering and development of intellectual life today. There is usually a greater emphasis on the development of the critical ability rather than the creative one, even in the best of them. The first habitual response, therefore, in most people to what has been said is to find faults in it. The centre of intellectual life, thus, lies in the development of the critical faculty in the hope that the exposure of the weaknesses and faults in the contention would lead the person concerned either to give it up or modify it in the light of criticisms made. But the critical response does not merely make the atmosphere full of antagonism and hostility, thus discouraging the relatively weaker members of the group from expressing their views freely; but also makes the proponents stick to their views more rigidly as they tend to identify themselves with them more strongly because of the criticisms made. Also, in such a situation, the questions themselves tend to get determined and restricted by the framework, ultimately leading to what may be called the establishment of different *sampradāyas* or schools, each with a position of its own consolidated over a long period of time in debate with other schools which also have, in turn, consolidated their own positions. The ultimate end becomes the development of defensive strategies which may save the position from any challenge whatsoever.

The fate of these impregnable fortresses of thought, built in theological and non-theological contexts, is well known to all those who are acquainted with the history of ideas in the major civilizations of the world. The security they might have provided to their adherents has been bought at the cost of closing the horizons to thought. Even the adventure of the battle against the opponents has long ceased, as all the questions have been answered and objections met.

The atmosphere for creative thinking to emerge is, thus, radically different from the one that has been traditionally associated with the intellectual seeking of man until now. It is a half-serious, half-playful attempt to explore collectively the various possibilities that spontaneously arise when people gather together to think about something that appears problematic to anyone belonging to that group at that moment. The attempt is to welcome each idea that spontaneously suggests itself to anyone present, and to see in it the possible opportunity for a new direction of thought. But the idea need not be pursued to the bitter end, even when some other interesting idea has suggested itself to someone else. The purpose, ultimately, is not so much to find a defin-

itive answer or solution to the question raised or the problem posed, but rather to see how many directions thinking can take when confronted with a question or a problem. In fact, one's attention need not be confined to the question asked or the problem raised as, in the course of thinking, new questions or problems may emerge which might seem, at least for the moment, even more interesting or more promising.

The enterprise of thinking is usually supposed to be a solitary exercise. Similar is the feeling about creativity. But this is a mistake. When people gather together, something new emerges. This has been known to all religious traditions as well as to those who have known how to manipulate people. But this age-old insight has seldom been used in the context of cognitive thought. The usual seminars, symposia and conferences, whose quantitative explosion in recent times is tending to destroy thinking at its very roots, are perhaps the farthest away from situations in which people gather together to invoke the spirit of creativity which lies in what has been called the *realm of the between*. The invocation of the spirit of creative logos requires, on the part of its seekers, strategies which, though similar in certain respects to those practised in religious and artistic domains, have a radical difference and individuality of their own. The collective adventure in exploring new directions which thinking may take presupposes attitudes amongst its participants which imply an essential openness to thought and ideas and the courage to follow them wherever they may lead. What the *other* says, therefore, is always an opportunity for one's own thought—not in the sense of controverting what he has said or in seeing in it what one always says, but rather in finding in it the possibility of a new direction for thinking which is not only different from what one has usually thought regarding that issue until that time but also beyond what the other person actually meant when he said what he said. What is required, in other words, is conceptual imagination, the ability to think beyond what has been thought.

Imagination, normally, is supposed to be the preserve of the arts. But the capacity to go beyond what is given lies at the root of all innovation and creativity. 'What is not' is, therefore, more important than 'what is' or 'has been'. The latter only conditions or plays a restricting role, but it is neither clear nor certain in what way. The transformation of a limitation into an opportunity is the eternal wonder of the creative genius. But, in the context of concepts, limitations arise from the settled habits of the past which constrain thinking to move in certain grooves only. To break the habit one has to make a conscious effort to think against the grain, and one may develop as many strategies to achieve this as one can think of. The central point in all strategies, however, is a subdued sceptical attitude to the sufficiency of what is given and an openness to everything that suggests the possibility of the development of a new conceptual alternative or even of a new way of looking at old concepts which have ceased to excite curiosity or wonder or even interest by long familiarity and mechanical use. The writers, specially the

poets, have known this for long, but that has been in the context of images, symbols and metaphors. The thinkers do not seem, at least consciously, aware of this in respect of concepts, even though they are the concept wielders *par excellence*. Concepts, unlike images, are not supposed to grow stale and lose their vibrancy and vitality to make thinking alive. But this just is not the case, and one of the tasks of thinking is to infuse new life into old concepts and see in them potentialities not realized before.

One of the simplest strategies, perhaps, is to realize that, though one is aware of concepts in certain contexts alone, there are other contexts and settings in which they occur or may occur also. As most people are usually confined to their own disciplines, they are not aware of the way same or similar or even analogous concepts are used in other disciplines. Reading a work in a different discipline is like entering a new terrain of knowledge, which arouses not only curiosity about the unfamiliar and excitement about something new along with the challenge to understand it, but also an incipient comparative judgement about the way the knowledge-enterprise is conceptually structured in the two different disciplines. In case the disciplines concern fields too far apart, there is, of course, little likelihood of anything meaningful emerging from this incipient act of comparison; but where the fields happen to be closely related there is every possibility of returning with a new feel and fresh look regarding the concepts one is habitually used to.

But, normally within a cognitive culture even different disciplines share a certain way of looking at things or certain ways of asking questions or seeing certain issues as problematic. It is, therefore, only when one undertakes a conceptual journey to another cognitive culture that one really encounters a different world—a world which, because of its different conceptual framework, appears to be no cognitive world at all. It can only be seen as something bizarre, something superstitious, something that one need not waste one's time upon. In the arts, one has already learnt or is slowly learning the perverse parochiality of such an attitude. In religion, one is groping towards an awareness where one may accept, even provisionally, the meaningfulness of others' religion, at least for them if not for oneself. But, as far as cognitive enterprise is concerned, the very idea that there may be different cognitive traditions seems perverse to most of its practitioners today. And this, in spite of current fashions in model-building, on the one hand, and what goes under the name of sociology of knowledge, on the other.

In a certain sense, the claim to knowledge is a claim to truth, and one naturally wonders how truth can be multiple in character. But this is to conceive of truth not only in a crudely 'correspondence' way but also to think of reality as something to which temporality is essentially adventitious in character. Not only this; it also denies in a very fundamental sense the possibility of creativity in the field of knowledge. The ideal of knowledge is supposed to be a perfect mirror, but how can a mirror ever innovate except at the cost of distorting reality? But reality must include the knowing mind as much as

what is attempted to be known, and temporality is as much a character of the one as of the other. The cognitive structures through which the knowledge enterprise is conducted are not, as Kant thought, completely given and static in character. Rather, they are themselves the creations of thinking and one seldom feels very much bound by them. Kant himself was forced to make a distinction between 'thinking' and 'knowing' at one stage of his thought as the 'thing-in-itself' could only be an object of 'thinking' and not of 'knowing' in his system. As for the 'categories of the understanding', it is never quite clear in what sense they may be regarded as objects of 'thinking' or of 'knowing'. In fact, the whole enterprise of transcendental investigation in which Kant was engaged confirms the freedom of the 'thinking self' as much as the 'moral action' does that of the 'moral agent'. But even if it be granted that categories, whether those enumerated by Kant or some others, constitute the very structure of the thinking process when it embodies itself in thought, they still function at a level of such generality that they do not affect the real diversity of cognitive structures across cultures and civilizations.

However it may be, the fact of what we have called 'cognitive journeys across conceptual frontiers' cannot be denied, nor that they can be intellectually as invigorating and rewarding as such journeys usually are. There are, of course, the hazards which all travel generally involves, but then there always are risks which the leaving of safe, habitual, beaten tracks involves. A realization of the limited parochiality of what one had taken to be universal and self-evident is the first consequence of such an encounter. The second is an openness to the possibility of alternatives which one had not even thought of before. The two are, in fact, two sides of the same coin, though the second is more positive than the first.

'Cognitive journeys' apart, one of the simplest strategies for conceptual innovation is to recognize that concepts are not monadic or atomistic in character. They are always related to other concepts, and to change the relationships is to change the conceptual structure itself. If one analyses the conceptual structure underlying some text, one would discover not only the roster of concepts which the author has used but also the way he has organized them. A different organization will result in a different conceptual structure, a different way of looking at things. Hence, one of the simplest strategies for achieving conceptual innovation is to ask oneself in what ways one can possibly change the relationships between the concepts in a significant way, so as to achieve a new way of looking at the phenomenon concerned. In any mapping of concepts, it will be obvious that they fall into clusters in which some seem obviously more closely related than others. Amongst the clusters, some concepts will have a dominating position such that other concepts in the cluster will get their meaning and significance determined by their relationship to the dominant central concept in the cluster. Some concepts may be common to more than one cluster, and, thus, may play a connecting role between clusters. The relationship between clusters may not be obvious

at first sight. It may require conceptual insight to apprehend it. On the other hand, the clusters themselves may not be very clear-cut. If such a situation obtains, the possibility of there being alternative conceptual clusters embedded in the conceptual situation need not be ruled out. In fact, the whole purpose of conceptual mapping in the perspective that we are talking about is to explore the multiple conceptual structures which lie as hidden possibilities amongst the concepts employed in any text. The same considerations apply to what may be called 'differential weightage' which an author gives to the concepts he uses. The number, distribution and frequency of the occurrence of a concept give some idea of its relative weightage in relation to others. However, one has to be careful in using these indicators, and, in any case, they should never be used mechanically.

Ultimately, the devising of strategies for conceptual creativity is itself an exercise in creativity. And, hence, they can neither be fixed in number nor be used in such a way as to ensure the result deterministically. The exercise of the strategy is as much a creative act as its discovery, for, ultimately, it is an invocation of the same mystery and power that lies at the root of the universe and ourselves.

Objectivity and growth of knowledge

MAHASWETA CHAUDHURY
Maharani Kashiswari College, Calcutta

Growth of knowledge, in Popper's view, is the key-concept for the understanding of scientific knowledge. He seems to assume that the development of science is the indicator that epistemology is concerned *only* with objective knowledge and not with belief. In fact, the concept of growth of knowledge appears to replace the role of foundation of knowledge in his philosophy. I shall, first, attempt to present the point mentioned above, namely that growth of knowledge plays an important role in Popper's philosophy by substituting foundation/justification type of problems. Secondly, I shall argue that the concept of 'growth' is problematic and rather vague in the way Popper uses it, although some other philosophers have tried to give a precise account of it in Popperian line. Finally, I shall round up the issue whether we can have an epistemology without a knowing subject, by arguing that, although Popper can be vindicated in his objective theory of knowledge when he speaks about its rationality, its fallibilism and antipsychologism (although a kind of psychologism is compatible with objective theory of knowledge), etc. his requirement of 'knowledge as growing' needs a knowing subject. In other words, Popper has failed to give an adequate account of objective knowledge in the sense that epistemology does not need a subject (in his terms), if he has to maintain that knowledge is growing.

I

'The central problem of epistemology', we have been told by Popper, 'has always been and still is the problem of the growth of knowledge. *And the growth of knowledge can be studied best by studying the growth of scientific knowledge.*'[1] Unlike common sense and subjectivist belief, which appear static and somewhat conservative except when pushed by science, scientific knowledge makes considerable progress with succession of better theories and new discoveries. By studying and probing scientific activities and also how they are different from other activities, we shall have an idea not only of how *knowledge grows* but in a very special sense, also, what *knowledge really is*. For, as we know, in Popper's 'evolutionary' theory of knowledge, there is no firm foundation from which knowledge starts. In knowledge one progresses from uncertain, rudimentary stages to more and more complicated stages of development. As in the real process of (biological) evolution where weaker elements get eliminated and there is survival only of the 'fittest', so in the process of knowledge more progress is achieved by elimination of the

(weaker) theories that cannot prove themselves up to the tests for fitness. The theory that can establish its worth by surviving the severe tests can pass as an acceptable item of knowledge, but only for a while. Knowledge is *tentative*, the worthiness of a theory is not permanent—it may be overthrown (by a negative instance or/and a better theory) at any point of the evolutionary process of knowledge. This is the way that knowledge grows, and the well-known formula of problem→tentative theory→error elimination→theory$_2$ only shows that very well.

The analogy of evolution goes further than this. Knowledge does not grow *only* on human level. So, 'the main task of the theory of human knowledge is to understand it as continuous *with animal knowledge*; and to understand also its discontinuity—if any *from animal knowledge*'.[2] Apart from the somewhat blind innate dispositions of certain expectations, human knowledge, in some significant respects—especially in the capacity of articulation of problems and theories in language and also in the ability to criticize them—far exceeds animal knowledge. To give a fuller account of this human transcendence, Popper has smuggled some abstract metaphysical concepts into his epistemology which might (and already have) provoked a lot of negative criticisms from unsympathetic critics who do not share his intuitions. He paints an abstract world of theories and problems which is objective in the sense of having outgrown its origin (his world[2]) but nevertheless interacts with the world of human beliefs, perception, etc. Growth of knowledge is manifest as a continuous interactive process between these worlds. Formulation of theories and criticisms of them occur (or so presumes Popper) in science. Therefore, by examining and analysing the way of scientific knowledge, one can also grasp the special features that demarcate it from other disciplines. This leads us to see that science is characterized by the method of criticizing, and 'there is nothing more "rational" than the method of critical discussion which is the method of science.'[3] Not only 'criticism', 'growth' also makes science rational. We see that it is 'the *growth* of our knowledge, our way of choosing between theories, in a certain problem situation, which makes science rational'.[4]

In Popper's view, the subjectivist/common sense theory of knowledge misses this dynamic growth aspect of knowledge, no matter whether it tries to formulate it in ordinary language or formalized language.

One might, however, say that growth of knowledge is only an assumption of Popper's epistemology, for he has never raised or answered the question whether scientific knowledge is *really* growing or not, but just derived the criterion for growth from the history of scientific theories. One might also challenge this point by alleging that Popper has ignored history of science in this respect.[5] We shall deal with this specific point later. One point, indeed, emerges from this controversy, that if someone denies that growth of science is 'cumulative', as Popper does, then it is not very clear how he can assume that science has *grown*, unless one regards technological achieve-

ments as a pointer to progress. But, of course, Popper would not regard the latter as a criterion for progress. He would stand for the position that scientific knowledge has grown in the sense that there is an increase in the number and diversity of phenomena brought under scientific explanation, and that there are more and more new problems and tentative solutions being envisaged and formulated in the scientific corpus. Of course, an ethical cultural relativist might still put the normative question: whether Popper's criterion of growth is really desirable in any sense to be called 'progress'!

Now there are two questions which are relevant in this connection. One is the question whether scientific knowledge is really *growing*. The other one is: if it is growing, then how to decipher the criterion of such growth since science does not grow by accumulation? Many philosophers have doubted the validity of the first question and diluted it to the question of meaning. shift or merely change from one framework to another. But Popper has done nothing of the sort. He is not only convinced about the legitimacy of the question but also replies in the affirmative. The second question obviously does not arise for those who deny the legitimacy of the first. But Popper also could not provide any satisfactory criterion of it except tieing it up with his general methodological acceptability requirements such as rationality, simplicity, falsifiability, informative context, verisimilitude, etc. Some of his followers, however, have tried to give a precise criterion of growth, but those attempts also are not successful as I shall show later in this paper.

Let us turn, first, to the claim that scientific knowledge is actually *growing*. It will not be a difficult task for those who maintain that scientific knowledge is cumulative, i.e. it grows by accumulation of information and techniques. But Popper does not share that view of growth. So, he has to show, first, in what sense scientific knowledge is growing and other enterprises are not. Moreover, the adequacy of the criterion of growth needs also to be established.

Popper's theory of growth of knowledge is an antidote to any sort of foundationalism. He opposes *tabula rasa* kind of theory. Advance in knowledge consists, he thinks, of criticism and 'modification of earlier knowledge'[6] The criticism and modification, he says, lend rationality and empirical character to scientific knowledge. Accumulation of observation is not growth of knowledge, the latter is manifest in 'the repeated overthrow of scientific theories and their replacement by better or more satisfactory ones'.[7] Before we discuss the 'three requirements' he proposes for growth of knowledge, it needs to be settled whether actually scientific knowledge *is* advancing, as he thinks, by repeated attempts to overthrow not only some other theory but also by undergoing severe tests. History of science can only tell the real story. The well-known allegation against Popper in this connection points out that Popper is confusing a prescriptive view of science with a descriptive view. What science *should* do in order to progress is not the ground to argue for what it really *does*. Kuhn, for example, agrees with Popper's view that scienti-

fic growth is not cumulative, but disagrees with him about its having anything to do with attempts of overthrowing an existing framework of knowledge. In fact, examples are abounding, he says, to show that overthrow (revolution) is a rare phenomenon; normal science *grows* by more and more sincere attempts to confirm the anoint theory more *firmly* than ever. Feyerabend went much further than this to the extent to hold that advancement in science depends on nothing of the sort that Popper recommends but on extralogical factors like power, propaganda, conceit, even lies. So 'science grows by criticism' is too idealized and misleading a view of science.

Another possible objection to Popper's kind of view that 'scientific knowledge is *growing* and growing by attempts of refutation' is conceivable. The objection is a basic one against the concept of 'growth' itself. Now 'growth' is a normative word indicating a movement of overall development towards a certain goal. Moreover, it is often used in the sense of advancement or progress. These concepts, surely, have a definite moral overtone. Can we claim that scientific knowledge is growing in any of these two senses? One might think about the first that there is a goal for scientific research, namely truth, and we are steadily going towards it. But can Popper say so? His view of truth as a regulative ideal permits only fallibilism, namely the view that we can never achieve certainty or infallible truth. Therefore, although our knowledge proceeds by trial and error, it can never reach truth in any final sense. But Popper has offered a criterion which is more than mere acceptance rule.

Methodology of science, he thinks, should seek preference rules for choosing one theory rather than another. I shall discuss these 'requirements' for growth later. Here I would just point out that the cultural relativist type of objection is vital for Kuhnian concept (or the conventionalist view) of noncumulative but non-rational account of growth of scientific knowledge. But Popper is not vulnerable to that kind of objection, because he has given a criterion of adequacy/preference which can rationally make a choice among theories. Kuhn and the conventionalists do not think that there is a logical way to decide between theories (consider the famous incommensurability thesis), and, therefore, they cannot speak of growth of knowledge in any sense.

The cultural relativist or the sceptic, however, can raise another question which is relevant for Popper's view:—the question concerning the desirability of growth of scientific knowledge. Suppose there is growth of knowledge, they might say; but that does not by itself show that it is desirable. So, why should it be preferable to epistemological equilibrium? Kuhn says, in fact, that a certain epistemological stability is required for scientific research. I think Popper may give two reasons for such preference. First, constant change and growth in the epistemic process discourage acceptance without criticism and, therefore, it combats all sorts of foundationalism which breeds infallibility and certainty as a mark of knowledge. The second reason is moral, as Popper says, 'freedom from dogmatism', i.e. any attempt to thwart change opposes complacence with the existing body of knowledge. Thus, growth of knowl-

edge is essential for adjustment with more and more new ideas. This is a healthy attitude which is important for a liberal outlook about life and society.

Let us see, first, the criterion Popper offers for growth of scientific knowledge before any more critical review. Among the 'three requirements for the growth of knowledge',[8] the first one is called the 'requirement of simplicity'. It requires:

The new theory should proceed from some *simple, new and powerful unifying idea* about some connection or relation (such as gravitational attraction) between hitherto unconnected things (such as planets and apples) or facts (such as inertial and gravitational mass) or new 'theoretical entities' (such as fields and particles).[9]

The requirement, as Popper himself admits, is a little 'vague', for it seems to be related with the further condition that our theories should describe the structural properties of the world unless we regard the structure as mathematical. But Popper thinks that one important ingredient in the idea of simplicity,[10] namely the idea of testability, can be logically analysed. Now the idea of simplicity in this sense assumes the idea of a unified or coherent system of theories that can be compared as to their logical consequences. Notice that this requirement is vulnerable to the criticisms from incommensurability—thesis position: for if theories are incommensurable, then how can they be compared in respect of their simplicity?

The second requirement is that of 'independent testability'. By this it is required that the new theory (if we reckon it as 'progress' from the older one) should be independently testable. The term 'independent testability' is not quite adequate, because by this Popper requires the new theory to *explain* and predict more phenomena 'apart from explaining all the *explicanda* which the new theory was designed to explain'. This requirement is:

(a) *Necessary* because it rules out the possibility of the new theory being *ad hoc* which conforms to the given set of *explicanda*. Popper regards this requirement of a theory, if satisfied, to stand for a potential step forward for its *additional explanatory and predictive* power, besides the given set of *explicanda* of the previous theory;

(b) This requirement also advances the view that a theory has better pragmatic value in the sense that it suggests new problems and new experiments, and also new explanatory theories to solve them.

Both the first and the second requirements 'restrict the range of our choice' to the possible solutions of the problem under investigation. In other words, they provide a basis for theory choice.

The first two requirements, discussed above, are 'formal requirements' to be found by *logical* analysis of the theory. So Popper thinks we need another

requirement which can be found to be fulfilled, or not fulfilled, only by testing the new theory empirically. As he says, it is a 'material requirement', a condition of 'empirical success'. It requires that the new theory should pass some new and severe tests (in addition to the tests already passed by the previous theory). Now it is interesting to note that this requirement is not *necessary* like the other two, although it plays a vital role in theory evaluation. One might say that it is not 'indispensable', for 'many a promising theory can be empirically refuted at the very outset... even a theory which fails to meet it can make an important contribution to science'.[11] Moreover, in a different sense, as Popper says, this 'requirement' is indispensable, for 'if the *progress* of science is to continue, and its *rationality* not to decline, we need not only successful refutations, but also *positive success*'.[12] If 'scientific progress is to continue', then new predictions (such as Dirac's prediction that there will be an anti-particle for every elementary particle or that under certain circumstances planets would deviate from Kepler's laws) must not only be produced, but must also be *corroborated* by 'experimental evidence'. We need the empirical success, i.e. corroboration in addition to refutation (the second requirement); otherwise 'we should have no clue about the parts of each of these theories—or of our background knowledge—to which we might tentatively attribute the failure of that theory'.[13]

Popper also claims that the third requirement is needed 'in order to eliminate trivial and other *ad hoc* theories'. Because the mere fact that a theory is independently testable does not necessarily rule out the possibility of its being *ad hoc,* for by a little stipulation one can make a theory independently testable. So we also require that it should *in fact* pass the tests in question.

The introduction of the third requirement shows Popper's empirical/realistic inclination when one considers passages like 'our aim as scientists is to discover *the truth* about our problem; and we must look at our theories as serious attempts to find *the truth*'.[14] Although no amount of severe tests can assure us of actually achieving truth, the passage above makes knowledge and its progress objective. The third requirement also differentiates Popper's theory from instrumentalism and pragmatism, because the first two requirements can be satisfied by them. The third requirement makes growth of knowledge realistic.

To defend from the possible objection that the third requirement is nothing but a 'psychological advice' about the attitude which scientists should adopt, Popper offers three reasons and shows that it is not so. The first reason is derived (or at least he claims so) from the idea of truth. Successful predictions are possible, if a theory is *true* (apart from also being independently testable). And successful prediction, if not *sufficient,* is at least a *necessary* condition for the truth of a theory. The second reason comes from the idea of truth-likeness or verisimilitude. A theory becomes more and more acceptable (as nearer to truth) as its truth content increases, while the falsity content decreases.

Crucial experiments are decisively important at this stage, because we can only regard the new theory as *better* (or nearer to truth) if it can have some new predictions which cannot be obtained from the old one. This leads to Popper's third reason: increase of verisimilitude is not necessarily needed by a crucial test. We can also have it by making the tests of our explanations independent. In other words, growth of knowledge, i.e. incorporation of our newly acquired knowledge into unproblematic knowledge which, as Popper says, results in loss of explanatory power of our theories. It is not clear why 'consequent loss of explanatory power' should go along with growth of knowledge.

Now, the emphasis on success of a theory's new prediction seems to lend a 'verificational' colour to Popper's third requirement.[15] But then Popper prefers 'whiff of verificationism' to any form of instrumentalism.[16] His theory is nonetheless different from that of the verificationists in seeking not beliefs/theories which are justified or even highly probable, but theories that progress beyond their predecessors in being more severely tested and having more novel predictions. Thus, his thesis is 'that it is the *growth* of our knowledge, our way of choosing between theories, in a certain *problem* situation, which makes science *rational*'.[17]

We can sum up the main features of Popper's criterion of scientific growth in the following way:

(*i*) Scientific knowledge grows by having more empirical content and thus less verifiability and more falsifiability and explanatory power;[18]

(*ii*) Scientific knowledge grows when a theory is not only more testable (falsifiable) in principle, but, in fact, has been tested and not falsified;

(*iii*) Growth consists not only in solving more and more problems but more so in presenting new and new problem situations and asking more new questions;

(*iv*) Growth is as much a historical concept as a problem situation;

(*v*) Rationality constitutes *critical* attitude, so choosing one theory (rather than another) marks the progress of knowledge.

Popper assumes here that a successor theory is *always* more rational than the predecessor. That makes his contention—that scientific knowledge is growing—more meaningful. But one might argue with Popper's own fallibilistic position that, if falsification is not final, then it is possible that a successor theory is *later* found to be false or inadequate than the predecessor theory. In that case, the question of scientific knowledge growing steadily (as Popper thinks) cannot be so easily settled. Popper never mentions this problem and argues for his 'three requirements for the growth of knowledge' in a sweeping manner. One should, however, see that Popper's statements should not better be taken literally, because in various contexts[19] he speaks of growth in general as an outcome of trial and error through dynamic interaction between problems and their tentative solutions. He is not very precise as to related problems concerning this thesis.

The adequacy question of the criterion of progress presented by Popper may be amended and entrenched by a more precise account of his 'requirements'. One prospective candidate for such a task is the concept of verisimilitude or truth-likeness which is incidentally a logical concept. J. Agassi[20] has tried something on that line. The attempt, however, faces further difficulties, and thus fails to vindicate Popper's position.

Agassi distinguishes between a 'early Popper' who finds scientific progress in conjectures and refutations and also in corroboration. This view, however, is found deficient not only by the inductivists but also by many others who have many points in common with Popper. A more objective criterion of progress is found in 'later Popper', and this criterion consists of *increase in verisimilitude*. Progress of knowledge means progress towards truth. But Popper fails to give an exact account of such progress (as criticised by Tichy and Miller). Agassi claims that he can improve upon Popper's account of increase of verisimilitude which can silence his critics. As we see from Popper's account, verisimilitude-increase consists of the combination of an *increase of true* empirical content and a decrease of *false* empirical content.[21] Agassi thinks this definition is still unsatisfactory, because it excludes the possibility of refuting the new theory with evidence not relevant to the old. Examples abound to establish the contrary thesis. So Agassi thinks that the definition should be given in terms of crucial evidence. He holds that Popper's 'later' view, namely 'progress is verisimilitude' can best be interpreted by the following definition of verisimilitude:

'(D) When crucial evidence repeatedly points one way, it is unlikely that it also points the other way'.[22]

Agassi thinks that this definition incorporates both his earlier view (as corroboration of empirical success) and later view (as verisimilitude-increase) of progress, and is also entrenched against the deficiency his earlier view involves, namely the 'verificationist' emphasis. It also blocks any doubt about the truth of (D) (Agassi's (QI), for Popper's theory does not require (D) to be true because it is 'both metascientific and ontic' and, therefore, does not require any particular scientific theory to be true.

Is Agassi's remedy sufficient to rejuvenate Popper's account of verisimilitude and save his metascientific theory of growth? As I understand, Popper's 'criterion of progress' is the central feature of the evaluative process of choosing between scientific theories. Science needs to grow, but growth is not cumulative as the 'inductivists' and the 'justificationists' think. Scientific growth consists of replacement or repeated overthrow of bold conjectures and their replacement by better ones. Now *both* the earlier and the later criteria of progress given by Popper face one question in common to answer: progress to what? An obvious candidate is 'truth', and Popper himself says that he is tempted to answer the question by 'towards the truth'. Truth, again, is a problematic metaphysical concept. Popper's attempt to 'rehabilitate' the concept

of truth (on the Tarskian line) results into a formal account of verisimilitude or degree of approach towards truth. One may bracket corroboration and verisimilitude both as criteria of progress[23] or else regard verisimilitude (or rather increase of verisimilitude) as sufficient condition for progress.[24] But these attempts to save Popper's 'ailing' account of verisimilitude alias progress of knowledge still face some difficulties.[25] One should distinguish between corroboration and verisimilitude regarding an important aspect. The difference between the two is the difference between belief and truth, the former is an *epistemic* item whereas truth is an *ontic* concept. Truth is objective in the sense that a statement may be true whether somebody knows it to be true or not, but belief is something that one holds, changes or drops. Keith Lehrer[26] maintains an internalist account of belief system where individual beliefs are added and dropped *within* a coherentist belief system. Truth remains outside that system. Popper's use of verisimilitude or truth-likeness is very similar to the objective notion of truth. It also resembles Tarski's account in the formal devices he has adopted for defining verisimilitude.[27] As truth is objective to Tarski, so is verisimilitude to Popper. It is objective in the sense of being independent of what we happen to believe. But corroboration is, indeed, an epistemic concept; empirical success is, indeed, not metaphysical either like truth or verisimilitude. When Popper talks about 'criterion of progress', he is surely talking about a metascientific criterion. So corroboration cannot be a metaphysical criterion at par with verisimilitude. Agassi goes ahead[28] to define 'verisimilitude increase as the combination of an increase of true empirical content and a decrease of false empirical content'. This formula is surely different from Popper's in an important way. Popper suggests that the theory T has greater verisimilitude than the theory T^1 if T has a greater truth-content and/or lower falsity-content. Agassi adds (with the good intention of saving Popper's account of verisimilitude) a further condition to this—that this content must be *empirical*. This is far from looking for a purely formal criterion of verisimilitude (which incidentally is a logical concept) or/and growth of knowledge. Agassi has tried to administer 'little dose of empirical content' to make Popper's formal account of verisimilitude and growth plausible. But that will not help. Because verisimilitude is not an epistemological concept, even if the account of verisimilitude does not work it will have disastrous repercussion on epistemological problems. There is substantive truth in the allegation that progress by trial and error is misleading unless we speak of truth as the goal. If there is no truth, it is no good 'learning' by failures. What do we gain by knowing to be certain that we are *wrong*? Again, even if we are *certain*[29] that we are wrong, how can that knowledge (that we are wrong) constitute 'progress' or growth of knowledge.[30] Moreover, 'progress' is a positive concept, a 'success word' in Gilbert-Ryle's terminology. If there is no truth (only truth-likeness), we cannot talk about progress since 'more false' or 'less false' does not make any difference even in non-cumulative account of growth.

II

It appears from the above discussion that although growth of knowledge is the key-concept in Popper's anti-foundationalist theory of knowledge, the concept itself is shrouded with ambiguity and methodological ambivalence. Neither 'corroboration' nor 'verisimilitude' can work as criterion of progress without raising further problems. But nonetheless the account is an objective theory contrasted with other theories[31] which cannot speak of 'knowledge as growing', since growth assumes a non-conventionalist and realist's approach to knowledge.

LAKATOS' 'RESEARCH PROGRAMME' AS A REPLACEMENT OF POPPER'S 'INSTANT RATIONALITY'

Besides the difficulties mentioned in the previous section, Popper's own fol-lower/critic Lakatos has pointed out some other problems and tried to improve upon him. Lakatos' primary objection is against Popper's account of growth of science. In Lakatos' view, science grows by replacement not of *single* theories but of 'research programmes' as a whole (which resembles Kuhn's paradigm to some extent). His other uneasiness about Popper's theory concerns the oversimplified way in which Popper thinks theories are refuted. Lakatos does not share Popper's view that theories are instantly corroborated or refuted.

Both these points made by Lakatos are important, for he agrees with Popper that science progresses objectively, rationally, but fallibly; yet he disagrees with Popper in holding that a theory does not supersede another theory in the way Popper thinks it does. A whole 'research programme', instead, progresses beyond another rival 'research programme' or else degenerates, if crucial evidences indicate to the contrary.

First about Lakatos' 'research programme'. Realizing that history of science does not always bear out Popper's theory of scientific rationality (the view that theories are falsified by crucial evidence and thus replaced by better theories',[32] Lakatos saw two alternatives.

> One alternative is to abandon efforts to give a rational explanation of the success of science. Scientific method (or 'logic of discovery'), conceived as the discipline of rational appraisal of scientific theories—and of criteria of *progress* vanishes. . . . The other alternative is to try at least to *reduce* the conventional element in falsificationism (we cannot possibly eliminate it) and replace the naive versions of methodological falsificationism charac-terised by a...*sophisticated* version which would give a new *rationale* of falsification and thereby rescue methodology and the idea of scientific *progress*.[33]

Popper has opted for the second alternative and so did Lakatos. And this option leads to Lakatos' 'research programmes' which is methodologically

more 'sophisticated' than 'naive falsificationism'. According to the latter, a theory is falsified by an observational statement. As we have seen already, Popper's criteria require much more than that.[34] Lakatos has adopted the criterion in principle, but has only formulated it in terms of 'series of theories'. A series of theories is *'theoretically progressive'* if each new theory has some excess empirical content over its predecessor. This is tantamount to saying that the new theory will predict some novel facts. A theoretically progressive series is also *empirically progressive* 'if some of this excess empirical content is also corroborated, that is, if each new theory leads us to the actual discovery of some *new fact'*.[35] Notice that this is in conformity with Popperian metho-dology.[36] A 'problemshift', i.e. a series of theories, 'is progressive if it is both theoretically and empirically progressive, and degenerating if it is not'.[37] To Lakatos progress is measured by the degree to which a problemshift is theo-retically progressive, i.e. 'by the degree to which the series of theories leads us to the discovery of novel facts'. Falsification of a theory in the series, how-ever, happens when it is superseded by a theory with higher corroborative content. It is not clear whether the falsifying theory is one within the series or outside. If it is inside, then there is no substantial difference between Popper and Lakatos. If not, then there will be either of the following two difficulties. One is: how does the falsification of a single theory affect the whole series? Does it falsify the whole research programme? Lakatos possibly cannot accept this move, because he does not believe in instant rationality. In other words, he thinks it takes long to reject a research programme even after an anomaly is discovered. The other difficulty is: too much importance given to 'corroborative content' or empirical success/failure lends an inductivist colour to Lakatos' programme which he (along with Popper) abhors. His acclaimed improvement upon that of Popper does not amount to much, if what he re-places or amends is a *series of theories* instead of a single theory. The same is with his claim that only a series of theories can be called scientific/progressive, because a single theory can very well be falsified by observational statements but a research programme or a 'series of theories' can be falsified *only* when a better theory is found. *'There is no falsification before the emergence of a better theory.'*[38] In the main Popperian line, Lakatos' empirical criterion for a series of theories is that it predicts novel facts. Therefore, he claims: '...*the idea of growth and the concept of empirical character are soldered into one.'*[39] The crux of the argument is that *mere* falsification is not enough for rejecting a theory. The important factor is whether the new theory offers any 'excess' information which is crucially decisive. So falsification is not sufficient for refutation of a theory. Science can *grow* without any 'refutations' in this sense. Lakatos' 'naive falsificationist' suggests an oversimplified 'linear growth' of science as if a single theory is continuously in the process of being refuted and replaced. It does not anticipate and recognize possible springing forth of rival research programmes. Opposed to this view, Lakatos holds that proliferation of rival theories plays a much more crucial role in rational theory-choice and

thus in growth of scientific knowledge than anomalies and counter-examples.

Now, proliferation of theories is a significant concept in Lakatosian methodology for its role in progress of knowledge. It is also crucial for differentiating his 'research programme' from Kuhnian 'paradigm' because he thinks (*like* Popper and, strange though, also *like* Feyerabend and *unlike* Kuhn) that monopoly of a single research programme is not indicative of scientific growth and rationality.

> *The history of science* [Lakatos thinks] *has been and should be a history of competing research programmes (or, if you wish, 'paradigms'), but it has not been and must not become a succession of periods of normal science; the sooner competition starts, the better for progress.*[40]

One should not, however, think that a research programme is neither to be abandoned in the middle of an empirically progressive state, if the programme is confronted with vague metaphysical or sceptical proliferation of theories; nor is it to be stuck to until it has exhausted all its heuristic capacity. One, of course, has to face then the inevitable question: when and how a research programme is refuted? In other words, how a research programme would be considered to have *progressed* beyond another if refutation of it is so difficult? Moreover, the stress on 'methodological tolerance' might arouse the suspicion that Lakatos' neo-Popperian methodology is trying to liberalise and dilute the standard of scientific rationality. But Lakatos thinks that 'this suspicion' is unfounded; for he allows 'minor crucial experiments' within a research programme.[41]

Not only does Lakatos differ from Popper in stressing upon 'research programme' rather than a single theory; he also undermines Popper's emphasis on the decisiveness and finality of falsification regarding refutation. In other words, between two competing research programmes, if one is defeated and the other wins, it is possible for the 'defeated' one to make a come back. 'All it needs for a comeback is to produce an $n+$I-th (or $n+k$-th) content-increasing version and a verification of some of its novel content.'[42] Now, even if a 'comeback' is possible in principle, Popper's original requirement for growth/rationality does not hold good or at least is undermined, for by the possibility of comeback the very crucial role given to falsifiability loses ground.

In the context of 'comeback' of defeated research-programme, we also arrive at the question of the alleged 'instant rationality', which Lakatos finds in most theories about sciences and eventually rejects. By 'instant rationality' he means the naive view that scientific theories are refuted and rejected as soon as counter-examples or a rival theory is found with higher content and greater explanatory power. Lakatos opposes this view by arguing that a defeated programme (both an 'old and tired programme' and a 'young and fast developing' one alike) may continue to resist falsification for a long period by *ad hoc* content-increasing strategies.

There is no predictable or ascertainable limitation on human imagination in inventing new, content-increasing theory or on the 'cunning of reason' in rewarding them with some empirical success even if they are false or even if the new theory has less verisimilitude—in Popper's sense—than its predecessor.[43]

Indeed, these are *ad hoc* measures. Popper as well as Lakatos would reject such measures as unscientific 'conventionalist stratagems' (in Popper's terminology) to save a theory. Popper's idealized methodology, however, does not recognize such cases, but Lakatos gives it due recognition; and rightly cites plenty of examples from history of scientific theories to show that these considerations can explain why 'crucial experiments' are realized as crucial only retrospectively. Two well-known examples shall suffice. Kepler's ellipses were recognized as crucial for Newton and against Cartesian motion only about one hundred years after Newton. The anomaly of Mercury's perihelion was always regarded as a difficulty in Newton's programme. Einstein's theory explained it better, and thus turns it into a refutation of Newtonian research programme. Lakatos has laboured at length with plentiful examples to establish his neo-Popperian stand about scientific growth and rationality. He has also tried to combat any conventionalist/sociological approach to science which reduces objective notion of growth and rationality to mere problem of meaning-shift.

To see that Lakatos' theory is an improvement upon that of Popper, two questions should be adequately answered:

(1) when is a research programme abandoned for another?
(2) when is a research programme progressive?

Let us examine the questions, and seek their answers in connection with Lakatos' account of Popper-Kuhn debate.

It may seem apparently to any superficial scrutiny that Lakatos is inclined to tilt in the controversy more towards Kuhn than Popper. But a closer look will show that his 'rational reconstruction' is more than just looking at continuity in science through 'Popperian spectacles'. It is true that in his rational reconstruction Lakatos speaks of the requirement of continuous growth in science which seems to endorse Kuhnian view and undermines the role of crucial experiment (which plays an important part in Popperian falsificationism). But his crusade is only against 'instant rationality' of theory being established by crucial experiment.[44] Nevertheless, he has also rejected the Kuhnian thesis of irrationality of entire scientific programme. There he sides more with Popper than any other philosopher in acknowledging that, although scientific knowledge progresses non-inductively, it is possible to have a rational reconstruction of it. To state briefly:

(*i*) Lakatos agrees with Kuhn (and Popper) that scientific knowledge and its growth is non-cumulative.

(*ii*) When we adjudicate scientific knowledge, it is rather a series of theo-
ries or a whole research programme that should be taken into
consideration rather than a single theory.

(*iii*) Scientific growth is *continuous*, some theories are tenacious.

(*iv*) There is built-in resistance in scientific research programme against
falsification. Anomalies may go along with a programme for a while.

(*v*) Crucial experiments cannot knock down a research programme over-
night ('there is no instant-rationality'). It takes *long* before an experi-
ment is realized as a crucial experiment for rejecting a programme or/
and accepting a rival programme.

He disagrees with Kuhn in maintaining:

(*a*) Scientific growth is rational.

(*b*) It is possible to have a rational but fallible/critical account of growth.

(*c*) Scientific revolution is neither irrational nor a matter of psychology.
It is possible to have a non-justificationist but rational reconstruction
of growth of knowledge. Scientific knowledge need not either be
demonstrable or irrational (to be studied psychologically).

Theories are not incommensurable as Kuhn (and Feyerbend) thinks. As
we see, one might find in Lakatos a Kuhnian Popper or a Popperian Kuhn,
because he rejects Popper's single-theory programme and what he calls 'in-
stant-rationality' method by crucial experiments. On the other hand, although
he accepts Kuhn's basic assumption of evaluating series of theories ('Prob-
lemshift') and its tenacity on the face of threatened falsification, Lakatos
rejects Kuhn's paradigm or a single dominant theory with equal force. Scientific
progress consists, he thinks, in proliferation of rival research programmes,
not in mechanical puzzle-solving for endorsing a dominant theory. If so, then
growth of knowledge does not happen in 'normal science' as Kuhn thinks,
but in the period of 'crisis' during scientific revolution or paradigmatic change.

Moreover, although Lakatos (and also Popper) gives due importance to
scientific community, he shares Popper's view that scientific knowledge grows
objectively by the 'friendly hostile' criticism and thus is fallible but rational.
Consider his comment:

*...my concept of a 'research programme' may be construed as an objective,
'third world' reconstruction of Kuhn's socio-psychological concept of
'paradigm'*: thus the Kuhnian 'Gestalt-switch' can be performed without
removing one's Popperian spectacles.[45]

This is not a critique of either Kuhn or Lakatos; so I cannot go into details
about their differences. For the present context, however, it is important to
note that one difference is great, namely the difference of their attitude to-

wards progress in knowledge. Basically a Popperian, Lakatos discusses 'prog-
ress' and 'progressive' a great deal, and has tried to give a more precise stan-
dard for 'progressiveness' of a research programme. Scientific progress, how-
ever, does not mean much to Kuhn, because loyalty to a scientific theory is
a necessary condition to him for any progress in science.[46] Lakatos, however,
is sympathetic to Kuhn's view, and charitably ascribes to him an account of
progress.

Kuhn seems to be in two minds about objective scientific progress. I have
no doubt that, being a devoted scholar and scientist, he *personally* detests
relativism. But his *theory* can either be interpreted as denying scientific prog-
ress and recognising only scientific *change*; or as recognising progress as
'progress' marked solely by the march of actual history.[47]

The answers to the two questions posed for Lakatos are not yet found in
our discussion. The answer to (2) is easier; it can be formulated in his own
language. Speaking of the methodology of research programme which
predicts novel historical facts, he says: '*Thus progress in the theory of scientific
rationality is marked by discoveries of novel historical facts by the recons-
truction of a growing bulk of value-impregnated history as rational.*'[48]
Lakatos' metacriterion requires empirical as well as theoretical ground for
considering research programme as progressing. Answer to (1), however, is not
very clear. If rational reconstructions 'remain for ever submerged in an ocean
of anomalies' and if 'these anomalies will eventually have to be explained
either by some better rational reconstruction or by some external empirical
theory', when then is a theory/research programme abandoned as such or for
a better one? Where is the line drawn between unexplained anomalies and
genuine counter-examples? If Lakatos has to forego crucial experiment and
'instant rationality', then he should offer a formidable metatheory for rational
theory-choice. Popper's 'requirements' at least clearly indicate when a theory
is abandoned. Kuhn's 'period of crisis' also offers some account. But if
Lakatos wants to keep both 'rational change' and 'anomalies' as permissible
in a research programme, then it is difficult for him to give an adequate
account of rejection of a research programme.

It is not true that Lakatos is unaware of the problem. For him competition
among rival research programmes is essential for progress, and the sooner
competition starts the better. But he realizes that a degenerating problem-
shift is necessary but not sufficient reason to reject a research programme.
He asks (himself): how are research programmes eliminated? '*Can there be
any objective* (as opposed to socio-psychological) *reason to reject a pro-
gramme, that is, to eliminate its hardcore and its programme for constructing
protective belts*?'[49] He also provides us with an answer that a rival research
programme supersedes another, when it 'explains the previous success of its
rival' and also shows a 'further display of heuristic power'.[50] Now 'heuristic

power, is nothing but what Popper calls 'explanatory power' of a theory. For Popper a theory with excess corroboration *only* shows excess explanatory power and therefore, represents growth. Lakatos's use of 'heuristic power' is only terminologically different. He uses it as a technical term to characterize the power of a research programme to anticipate theoretically novel facts in its growth.[51] Virtually, it is no more than or nothing different from Popper's requirement of excess-corroborated content and greater explanatory power. The only noticeable difference lies in Lakatos' insistence that novelty of fact is not an affair to be readily discussed. It takes a long period to realize a phenomenon as factually novel. In other words, Lakatos has given a new emphasis on appraisal by hindsight or looking back at theories.

Despite Lakatos' attempt to provide an 'objective reason', it does not seem to us that he can really defend a realist/objectivist position for rational choice between rival research programmes. Because once he allows 'theoretical pluralism' and denies any decisive role for a crucial experiment, his position is not very far from that of a conventionalist. What else does a conventionalist require? If between two research programmes—r_1 and r_2—the 'hardcore' (i.e. the metaphysical basis) is different but the 'heuristic power' is same, (i.e. they can explain exactly the same phenomena with exactly the same success), how can one then prefer r_2 to r_1? Will Lakatos answer that r_1 and r_2 are equally *true* (which is absurd) or opt for the conventionalist's strategy of foregoing the question of truth-falsity and only accounting by the programme's instrumental advantages over the other? If we should 'protect' a budding research programme '*for a while* from a powerful established rival', then we cannot also claim to have an objective reason for showing progress in knowledge. But the phrase 'for a while' is crucial; it shows that the most powerful programme will win over others. This is a nice package deal packed with liberalized dose of realism with a sprinkling of conventionalist residue.[52]

In concluding this section I shall reiterate the main points so far discussed. I have presented Lakatos' claim to have improved upon Popper's theory of growth of knowledge. The improvement consists of the following:

(1) Popper's falsificationism confuses between a single theory and series of theories. Scientific knowledge progresses not through refutations/corroborations of a single theory but progressive characterization of research programme taken as a series of theories at different stages. Proliferation of competitive rival research programme constitutes progress of knowledge.

(2) Growth of knowledge is *continuous*. There is no experiment which is crucial in the sense that it shows that a programme should be *immediately* rejected. There is no such thing as 'instant rationality'. Theories have *tenacity* even when confronted with threatening falsifying evidences or better rival programmes.

(3) Lakatos' methodological programme is an expanded form of Popperian formula, and its accommodates much more than Popper's original programme. Although more diluted and liberalized, Lakatosian 'progressive problem-

shift' still claims objective character and endorses Popperian view, according to which growth of knowledge is rational change to be discerned by logical standard rather than sociological-psychological factors involving individual scientist or a scientific community as a whole. But there is nevertheless a residual conventionalist element in his rejection of crucial experiment and retention of weaker theories or/and anomalies which, he thinks, can go along for sometime with a research programme. It is tantamount to saying that growth of knowledge is *continuous*. Normal science is not totally *irrational* as Popper thinks, nor is a dominant theory taken over instantly after a paradigm-change as Kuhn considers or after refutation as Popper opines.

(4) Lakatos' methodology can be best evaluated, if we take into consideration the distinction he made between *external history* and *internal history*; and we think that the distinction establishes with a renewed vigour his original Popperian view but with a more conventionalist twist. Our reasons for such a view are based on his (*i*) amended demarcation criterion, and (*ii*) his distinction between 'internal' and 'external history'.[54]

LAKATOS' AMENDED DEMARCATION CRITERION

(*i*) Lakatos' amendment[55] does not reject Popper's criterion totally but only extends it. He has pointed out the inadequacy of Popper's view by arguing that scientific theories (both universal and existential propositions) are not only *unprovable* but also undisprovable. Popper has argued only for the first part.[56] Theories, Lakatos claims, can only be eliminated 'by a *better* theory, that is, by one which has *excess* empirical content over its predecessors, some of which is subsequently confirmed'.[57] But that is exactly what Popper requires for the 'growth of knowledge'. Lakatos' claims that progress is marked by 'verifying instances' (of the excess content) rather than 'falsifying instances' can hardly be called an amendment of Popper's 'third requirement'.[58] Moreover, Popper also realizes the alleged 'inductive whiff' which one may find in this requirement. So, Lakatos' quasi-empirical approach is not entirely different from Popperian approach but only an extended form of that (which Lakatos labels as 'aprioristic'),[59] although, we think, he is right in emphasizing that Popper's idealized version of scientific practice tends to ignore 'that the main problem is to find, if possible, a theory of rationality which would explain actual scientific rationality, rather than to bring legislative interference by the philosophy of science to the most advanced sciences'.[60] Two illustrations from history of science[61] can show that Popper has overestimated the strength of either crucial instance or consistency.

(*ii*) Contrary to Popper's claim that all scientific theories are falsifiable, Lakatos has argued that Newton's theory of universal gravitation is not falsifiable.[62] Even if Lakatos is right[63] in maintaining that Newton's theory is *unfalsifiable*, what it amounts to is nothing more than the claim that it is not correct to say that a *single* theory is falsifiable, and that in evaluation of

scientific knowledge a whole research programme should be taken into consideration. Lakatos criticizes falsifiability as a criterion of scientific rationality, not because he holds a different theory of rationality but because this criterion seems to undermine continuity as a mark of progress.

(*iii*) Lakatos realizes that it is difficult for Popper to maintain fallibilism and a theory of scientific progress at the same time. Because if fallibilism is true, then scientific criticism is also fallible and revisable. Criticism and refutation seem to constitute growth of knowledge for Popper. But how can we even eliminate a theory if scientific criticism is fallible? Lakatos tries to overcome this difficulty by replacing methodological falsificationism through his methodological research programme, substituting unilinear progress (resulting from refutation of a *single* theory) by proliferation of theories or competition of rival research programme.

(*iv*) Moreover, Lakatos endorses Popper's criterion of verisimilitude as an index of progress. He regards verisimilitude as a significant concept, because only by this concept it can be shown that false theories also can constitute progress.[64] Although Lakatos is sceptical about the epistemological value of Popper's 'demarcation criterion', he at once recognizes the real merit of Popper's realist view when Popper 'complements' his logic of discovery with the notion of verisimilitude or approximation to truth measured as the truth-content minus the falsity-content of a theory. But nevertheless Lakatos rightly sees that only metaphysical criterion is not sufficient. To have a methodology that works and recognizes actual progress we need some inductive principle to assure us of some '*signs* of growing verisimilitude of our scientific theories'. In other words, empirical success or corroboration (and not failures) should supplement verisimilitude which is a mere logical/methodological criterion. Popper himself fulfils this task in his 'third requirement'. Popper has been subjected to embarrassing criticisms for this inductive turn.[65] But this shift is very significant for him, because Popper's earlier negative attitude (almost sceptical) towards philosophy has been hereafter changed into a more optimistic tone using 'success words' like 'growth of scientific knowledge', 'truth' rather than 'failures', 'refutations', 'unjustifiable', etc.[66] Our speculation that Lakatos has not totally rejected Popperian demarcation-criterion (but only improved it) is strengthened even more by Lakatos' sociological statement: '...Popper would have started his *Logik der Forschung* with this *positive* solution of the problem of induction, had Tarski's theory of truth come in 1925 (and had Popper arrived at his idea of truth-content and verisimilitude by 1930).'[67] In other words, without the concept of verisimilitude, Popper's demarcation-criterion has bery little epistemic value. Entrenched in some 'hidden inductive assumption', namely corroboration of excess-content, Popper's methodological appraisal can now transcend its apriori and 'analytic' form and be of real cognitive significance. Although Lakatos accuses Popper of not utilizing the full value of Tarski's valuable concept of truth and remaining still a fallibilist (which, according to Lakatos, amounts to no more than a

sceptic), he has nevertheless accepted the main Popperian tenet of verisimilitude as a mark of growth of knowledge but not a sufficient one unless supplemented and reinforced by such 'inductive methodological criterion' as corroboration. As we said before, this is no frightfully original addition or entrenchment.[68]

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL HISTORY

In historiography a distinction is drawn between intellectual history. and sociological history. The first one is 'internal' history and the second one is 'external'. Lakatos calls the former 'primary' and the latter 'secondary'. This is in conformity with mainstream Popperianism. Progress in knowledge is represented by progress in theoretical history and not in sociological history. Theoretical/philosophical reasons are the indices of progress in history; empirical success can only corroborate it.

This distinction made by Lakatos (who is closer to Kuhn in many respects than Popper) magnifies his closeness to Popper, and at the same time takes him away at a great distance from Kuhnian historiography. Because, although Kuhn shares with Popper (and Lakatos) the non-cumulative growth-picture of science, he cannot consistently offer theoretical reasons for marking progress in history. Any theory of rationality of scientific growth involves 'rational reconstruction' of how scientific knowledge has grown. But that kind of reconstruction requires a normative standard. Indeed, the history of science is always richer than its 'rational reconstruction'. There are always some empirical, sociological/psychological theories to explain the residual non-rational factors. But the latter type of theories cannot explain growth of objective scientific knowledge. Internal history or rational history can only provide a norm or a standard to do so. The standard or norm may differ from theory to theory.[69]

External history is theory-laden and can only give an empirical account of the non-rational factors of growth of science but 'most theories of the growth of knowledge are theories of the growth of *disembodied* knowledge: whether an experiment is crucial or not, whether a hypothesis is highly probable in the light of the available evidence or not, whether a problemshift is progressive or not, is not dependent in the slightest on the scientists' *beliefs*, *personalities* or authority. These subjective factors are of no interest for any internal history'.[70] Notice the remarkable resemblance of the passage above with Popper's view of objective knowledge.[71] Rational history of knowledge is selective; it will not take into consideration any factor which is not relevant for its standard rationality.[72] Lakatos of course has supplemented Popper's original theoretical requirements with tolerance for extra-rational factors. 'One way to indicate discrepancies between history and its rational reconstruction', Lakatos says, 'is to relate the internal history *in the text*, and indicate *in the footnotes* how actual history "misbehaved" in the light of its rational recons-

truction'.[73] Just like Popper, Lakatos thinks history, without 'some *theoretical* bias is impossible'—be it looking for hard facts, or crucial experiments or whatsoever. Furthermore, the denial that there are no 'factual' propositions also echoes Popperianism. To Popper all scientific factual propositions are theory-laden. For Lakatos also, an 'internal historian' will not need to take any interest whatsoever in the *persons* involved, or in their beliefs about their own activities.[74] Internal history, in this way, does not take into account the question whose *belief* it is or other extra-theoretical factors for evaluating theory/knowledge which is its counterpart in Popper's 'third world', the world of objective knowledge. External history may concern itself with questions like how certain *true beliefs* are found among certain community or false beliefs dominate some other in another period of history. These are questions belonging to the 'second world', the world of feelings, beliefs and psychological phenomena.[75]

For the sake of brevity, we cannot elaborate the points mentioned above any further. But we hope we have argued sufficiently to show that the distinction between internal history and external history of science establishes my earlier contention, namely that Lakatos' methodological programme is not opposed to Popper's in any fundamental sense. On the contrary, the former is an improvement and extension of the latter.

SOPHISTICATED CONVENTIONALISM OF LAKATOS

Lakatos brands Popper as a kind of conventionalist. By similar arguments he can himself be shown to indulge in a kind of conventionalism and even more so, because he has emphasized the role of decision in theory-evaluation more than Popper. Lakatos shares the conventionalist's intuition about the activistic elements in knowledge and its growth as much as Popper. It is shown in the discussion above. Both Popper and Lakatos join the conventionalists in denouncing the inductivists' tenet that theories are inductive generalizations from observational data. Of course, Popper has rejected Duhemian type of conventionalism which makes some universal theories (which are 'distinguished' by their explanatory power, simplicity etc.) unfalsifiable by fiat. Nevertheless, he becomes committed to some kind of conventionalism when he makes *some singular* propositions unfalsifiable, because it is possible by some relevant techniques which may, at some particular time, make them acceptable to someone.[76] Such propositions can be called 'basic' statements but in no final sense of being incorrigible. So, indeed, it is a matter of *decision* to distinguish the class of 'basic' statements and to separate them from the rest of the class of cognitive statements, all of which are falsifiable. Of course, the basic statements have to rely on some explanatory theory that constitutes the *unproblematic background knowledge*. As Lakatos states, Popper regards 'our most successful theories as extensions of our senses'.[77] It is a matter of convention to ascribe truth-value element to a theory in granting the status of 'obser-

vational' to it. One should not overlook that it is simplistic to think of Popper giving a single 'observational statement' (unless backed by a well-corroborated falsifying hypothesis). He never did that. Neither did he say that when a theory is refuted, it is *proven* to be false. Falsification is much weaker than disproof and never final (to be consistent with fallibilism). But this will eventually lead to an intellectual chaos, since the 'falsified' theory can always be true or can make a comeback. We may also eliminate a true theory and accept a false one. Lakatos realizes this. Popper might also have been aware of it, for he prescribes a method of how to *eliminate* some theories. 'If we do not succeed', Lakatos says, 'the growth of science will be nothing but growing chaos.'[78] 'Methodological falsificationism', as Lakatos calls Popper's view, tries to find out a third alternative to choosing 'between inductivist justificationism and irrationalism'. That is achieved by a conventionalist policy of choosing between some sort of methodological falsificationism and irrationalism. Both Popper and Lakatos realize that decisions play an important role in methodology. This is especially a point on which the conventionalists are most emphatic. Although Popper does not approve of any *ad hoc* explanation and face-saving attempt to protect a theory from falsification, he agrees nevertheless with the conventionalists that theories and factual propositions can be 'harmonized' with each other by the help of auxiliary hypotheses. Duhem recommends such attempts in terms of 'simplicity' and 'good sense'. These vague criteria do not appeal to either Popper or Lakatos.

However, Popper recognizes the point of adjustment in principle, and thinks that the real problem is to distinguish between 'scientific and pseudo-scientific *adjustments*, between rational and irrational changes of theory'.[79] Lakatos thinks that for Popper scientific progress is indicated when a theory is saved 'with the help of auxiliary hypotheses which satisfy certain well-defined conditions'. On the other hand, saving a theory 'with the auxiliary hypotheses' which do not fulfil such conditions represents degeneration. Popper does not approve of the latter type of adjustments and calls them 'conventionalist stratagems'.[80] Although Lakatos endorses Popper's general stand about theory-saving devices as 'stratagems',[81] he does not accept Popper's sweeping view about all kinds of adjustments as wrong. At this point his commitment to Popperism recedes to give place to what I call 'sophisticated conventionalism'.

The reasons for ascribing such a view depend on two considerations: (*i*) Lakatos' stand about crucial experiment; and (*ii*) Lakatos' stand about 'content-decreasing' stratagem to absorb an anomaly into a theoretical framework.

In view of above considerations, Lakatos comes near to 'conventionalism' rather than to Popper's acclaimed 'falsificationism'. Some other considerations, however, make it 'sophisticated'. They are:

(*a*) Traditional ('dogmatic' in Lakatos' terminology) conventionalism does not recognize a single standard of theory-appraisal, and, therefore, can-

not speak of growth or progress of knowledge. But Lakatos' methodology does not only recognize but adumbrates in very clear terms the conditions that make a research programme progressive.

(b) Lakatos incorporates the notion of verisimilitude or truth-likeness in principle into appraisal of competitive research programme, and thus makes a distinction between true and false theories. Moreover, *only* this concept can show that even false theories can constitute progress.

As we see, (i) is the breakaway point of Lakatos from mainstream Popperianism. Crucial experiment plays an important role in Popper's methodology, because it can falsify a theory and, on the other hand, if a theory survives a severe test/crucial experiment, it replaces another theory which does not. Lakatos and the conventionalists do not think either that there are such tests that are crucially decisive or that falsification of a single theory does really matter. However, Lakatos admits (unlike the conventionalists) that a research programme (a *series* of theories) *can* be refuted, but only after a long period. Crucial experiments are most of the time recognized as anomalies and not refutations. They are often regarded as refutations only retrodictively. One should remember in this context Lakatos' significant disagreement with the conventionalists, according to whom refutation does not play any important role in science. In this respect, Lakatos has no doubt in Popper's critical method. His only objection lies in 'instant' effectiveness of crucial experiments. One[82] may, however, say that Lakatos introduces a new element of *time* into the (Popperian) concept of crucial experiment. Besides this, he is equally emphatic about the role of refutation of one research programme by another.

(ii) Lakatos recognizes that it is not unusual for a theory to tolerate anomalies by the way of some *ad hoc* hypotheses for a while. There are plenty of examples in history of science where an anomaly is not only tolerated but tried to be explained by some *extra* assumptions. He finds Popper's 'ban on conventionalist stratagems' too strong:[83]

..for according to Popper, a new version of progressive programme *never* adopts a contest-decreasing stratagem to absorb an anomaly, it *never* says things like 'all bodies are Newtonian, except for *seventeen* anomalous ones. But since unexplained anomalies always abound, I allow such formulations.[84]

The reason for allowing such formulations is that any explanation is a 'step *forward*' if it explains at least 'some previous anomalies' which were not explained by its predecessor. Notice that this indulgent attitude will then allow a research programme to progress notwithstanding some unexplained anomalies, if it can explain at least one anomaly which its predecessor could not. This is, indeed, a very liberal view of growth of knowledge, and is neither fully falsificationist (since it allows anomaly to some extent) nor like the tradi-

tional conventionalist view which allows acceptance of a theory on the face of recalcitrant experiences to a much greater extent. As Quine puts it in his celebrated phrase: 'Any statement can be held true, come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system.' Of course, he rebukes the justificationists also by saying 'conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to revisions'.[85] In other words, the traditional conventionalist contends that, given sufficient imagination and ingenuity, any theory whatsoever (either a *single* theory or a *series* of *theories*/research programmes) can be permanently saved from refutation by some 'suitable adjustments' in the theoretical framework in which it is embedded. Of course, Lakatos does not (nor does Kuhn) accept that refutation can be permanently avoided; he *only* concedes that refutation can be postponed for a while by a slight change in the unproblematic background knowledge or/and the theoretical framework. So Popper has (or at least Lakatos thinks so) overdramatized the role of refutation in the acceptability of theory and growth of knowledge. We can very well have growth in our knowledge, despite 'anomalies' which can easily be explained and tolerated within a research programme.

(a) As we see, notwithstanding his recognition of conventional element in theory-appraisal, Lakatos has a positive account of progress in knowledge unlike the traditional conventionalists to whom theories are matters of convention or usefulness only. To the latter the question of truth-falsity does not arise. 'Growth' is a success-word, implying a normative standard. As there is no absolute norm (like truth or validity), it is difficult to say whether knowledge is growing or what exactly the standard for judging growth is. Not so with either Popper or Lakatos. For both of them verisimilitude or truth-likeness is a regulative norm that can provide a standard of nearness to truth or/and rationality that marks progress in knowledge. So, although they allow a lot of conventional[86] elements in knowledge, the latter is objective, and, therefore, growing towards more informative content by way of raising more and more new problems.[87]

(b) Nevertheless Lakatos accepts verisimilitude or degree of truth-likeness as an index of progress (towards what? truth?) in science, although he is not as enthralled as Popper by Tarski's 'rehabilitation' of objective theory of truth. A thoroughgoing conventionalist does not require an objective criterion like truth to account for progress in knowledge. On the other hand, he might point out that new theories may often be better and more detailed than their predecessors. But often than not they are not always so or not rich enough to deal with *all* the problems for which the predecessor has some answers. As Feyerabend says: 'The growth of knowledge or, more specifically, the replacement of one comprehensive theory by another involves losses as well as gains.'[88] Despite its revised form, Lakatos' methodology betrays its initial concession of conventional elements when he accepts and refurbishes the requirements of verisimilitude apparently to combat 'mob psychology' from philosophy of science. Based on Tarski's definition of truth and consequence-class, Popper

(and also Lakatos) defines verisimilitude of a theory as its truth-content (i.e. the class of true consequences) minus its falsity-content (i.e. the class of false consequences). Thus, a theory T^1 is closer to the truth than a theory T, if the class of the true-consequences of T^1, i.e. the truth-content, exceeds that of T without an increase of the falsity-content. In other words, if T^1 has more truth-content and less falsity-content than T, then T^1 is closer to truth (having more verisimilitude than T. Growth of knowledge can now be measured in terms of verisimilitude of a theory. T^1 has progressed beyond T, because it contains not only *all* the true consequences of T but also less false-consequences than T. The measure of verisimilitude has another apparent appeal, namely it does not only employ the standard of *truth* but also of falsity to measure growth of knowledge.

With the admittance of verisimilitude as a requirement for 'progressive' research programme, Lakatos shakes off his apparently conventionalist garb and emerges as a true Popperian—not merely one with a 'Popperian spectacle'. In fact, he reduces Kuhn's celebrated historiography to 'psychology of science' which is not autonomous. The real, rationally constructed world—the world of ideas—is the world of disembodied science.

> ...*growth of science takes place essentially in the world of ideas, in Plato's and Popper's 'third world'*, in the world of articulated knowledge which is independent of knowing subjects.[89]

Popper's methodology aims at giving an account of this objective knowledge and its growth. Indeed, it does. And so does Lakatos' methodology of scientific research programme. Just like Popper, the latter thinks the third world is the domain of rationality *par excellence*. Whatever is psychological, subjective or irrational belongs to the second world, the world of subjective knowledge. Growth of knowledge is the knowledge of the objective, and, therefore, it takes place only in the third world—the world of ideas, theory and problem. Despite his concern for actual historiography, Lakatos completely disregards the fact that 'the scientist is unfortunately dealing with the world of matter and of (psychological) thought also and that the rules which create order in the third world may be entirely inappropriate for creating order in the brains of living human beings'.[90]

For this oversight Lakatos is as much subject to rebuke as Popper himself is for packing up all kinds of so-called objective items of knowledge into a world which, alienated from the physical world, is the world of belief and imagination. To see the kind of reactions it has caused, we should examine Popper's so-called three worlds, particularly what he calls the 'third world'—the world of objective knowledge. But that is another story.

NOTES

1. K. Popper, 'Preface' to *Logic of Scientific Discovery* (*LSD*), p. 15
2. K. Popper, 'Replies to My Critics' in Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of K. Popper*, p. 1061. Italics mine.
3. *Objective Knowledge* (*OK*), p. 27.
4. *Conjectures and Refutations* (*CR*), p. 248.
5. As done by Kuhn and in a more violent form by Feyerabend.
6. See *CR*, p. 28.
7. *Ibid.*, chap. 10, p. 215.
8. 'Truth, Rationality and the Growth of Knowledge' in *CR*, sec. 5, pp. 240-47.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 241.
10. For a fuller account of simplicity, see his *Logic of Scientific Discovery*, chap. vii; and also M. Chaudhury, 'Simplicity, Is It Decisive in Evaluation of a Theory' in *Calcutta Review*, July 1978.
11. *CR*, p. 243.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 243 (italics mine).
13. *Ibid.*, p. 244.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 245 (italics mine).
15. J. Agassi finds the third requirement unacceptable because of this residual verificationism. See especially his paper in the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 39, 1961, p. 90. Also see *CR*, fn. 31, p. 248, where Popper admits it.
16. As stated in *ibid.*, fn. 31.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 248 (italics mine).
18. *Ibid.* See appendix, chap. 10 for Popper's example.
19. See Popper's 'Autobiography' in Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of K. Popper*, (p. 50), where he says that a musician also *grows up* (in Bach's workshop) through trial and error way of learning. And this growth depends a lot on self-criticism.
20. J. Agassi, 'To Save Verisimilitude' in *Mind*, vol. xc., 1981, pp. 576-79.
21. J. Agassi, *Ibid.*, p. 577 (italics ours).
22. J. Agassi, *Ibid.*, p. 578.
23. As Agassi argues on this line.
24. See I. Niniluoto, 'Scientific Progress' in *Synthesis* 45, November, 1980. The author defends a fallibilist-realist theory of scientific progress: science makes progress insofar as it succeeds in gaining highly truth-like information about the reality. This definition of progress is based upon the notion of verisimilitude.
25. See especially J.N. Hattiangadi, 'To Save Fallibilism' in *Mind*, vol. xcii, no. 367, July 1983.
26. See K. Lehrer, *Knowledge*, Clarendon, 1979, (chaps. 2 and 3) for an account of truth and belief with regard to this distinction.
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Op. cit.*
29. One may also doubt that falsification is final or that our theory once falsified can never come back. See Lakatos, 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes', *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, (eds.), Lakatos and Musgrave.
30. There are suggestions of a possible positive answer to this question. See especially 'A Methodology Without Methodological Rules' in R.S. Cohen and M.W. Wartofsky (eds.), *Language, Logic and Method*, Reidel, 1983, pp. 103-51.
31. Such as Quine's and Kuhn's accounts.
32. Lakatos cites a well-known instance from history of science, i.e. the instance of the perihelion of mercury as an anomaly and its eventual falsification of Newton's theory. It took eighty-five years for scientists to accept the anomaly as actual falsification of Newton's theory.

33. I. Lakatos 'Methodology of Scientific Research Programme' in *Criticism and Growth of Knowledge (CGK)*, pp. 115-16.
34. K. Popper, 'Truth, Rationality and Growth of Knowledge' in *CR*, chap. 10.
35. *CGK*, p. 118.
36. Compare the 'Three Requirements' of Popper, *op. cit.*
37. Lakatos, *op. cit.*
38. Lakatos, *op. cit.*, p. 119.
39. Lakatos, op. cit., p. 119.
40. Lakatos, *CGK*, p. 155.
41. *Op. cit.*, pp. 157-58.
42. *Op. cit.*, p. 158.
43. Lakatos, *op. cit.*, p. 158, fn., 2.
44. Consider: 'There are no such things as crucial experiments. . .' See *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programme (MSRP)*, Cambridge, 1978, p. 86.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 91, fn., 2.
46. See especially T.S. Kuhn, 'The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research' in A.C. Crombie (ed.), *Scientific Change*, London, 1963.
47. Lakatos, *MSRP*, p. 136, fn. 1. First two italics are original, the third mine.
48. *Op. cit.*, p. 133.
49. I. Lakatos, *MSRP*, p. 155.
50. *Ibid.* 155.
51. *Ibid.*, fn. 3, p. 155.
52. Professor D.P. Chattopadhyaya has brought to my notice in this connection that Lakatos has a background of having an early association and training with Duhemian Braithwaitian school of thought.
53. I. Lakatos, 'Popper on Demarcation and Induction' reprinted in *Philosophical Papers* of K. Popper, vol. 1, eds. J. Worrall and G. Currie, pp. 139-67.
54. I. Lakatos, 'History of Science and Its Rational Reconstruction' in *MSRP*, pp. 102-38.
55. I. Lakatos, 'Popper on Demarcation and Induction' in *The Philosophy of K. Popper*, p. 248-50.
56. I. Lakatos, *CGK*, p. 103. But this is not entirely correct. Popper is also aware, that 'no *conclusive* disproof of a theory can even be produced'. See his *Logic of Scientific Discovery* (sec. 9), p. 50. See also Lakatos's admission of it in *CGK*, p. 100, fn. 2.
57. I. Lakatos, *MSRP*, p. 250.
58. K. Popper, '*Conjectures and Refutations*' chap. 10. Also see H. Sarkar, 'Popper's Third Requirement for the Growth of Knowledge' in *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 19, Winter, 1981.
59. I. Lakatos, *MSRP*, p. 251.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 252.
61. Cited in *CGK*, sec. 3(C).
62. I. Lakatos, 'Popper on Demarcation and Induction' and H. Putnam 'The Corroboration of Theories' in Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of K. Popper*, vol. 2.
63. See Popper's remarks in 'Replies to My Critics', *Ibid.*, where Popper argues that both Lakatos and Putnam are not right.
64. Consider especially Lakatos' remark in connection with verisimilitude: 'It became possible, for the first time, to define progress even for a sequence of false theories'. See *MSRP*, p. 156.
65. His own student Agassi calls him even a 'verificationist'.
66. Compare the difference in the expression: 'The main problem of philosophy is the critical analysis of the appeal to the authority of experience' *Logic of Scientific Discovery*, (sec. 10, 1934) with Popper's later statement, 'Growth of Scientific Knowledge is the central problem of philosophy'. This comparison and the quotations are due to Lakatos in *MSRP*, p. 156, fn. 4.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 158.
68. If we take Popper's 'third criterion' of growth into consideration.
69. See Lakatos, *MSRP*, chap. 2, sec. a, b, c, d, for exposition of four theories: (*i*) inductivism; (*ii*) conventionalism; (*iii*) falsificationism; and (*iv*) his own method of scientific research programme.
70. I. Lakatos, *MSRP*, p. 118; italics are mine.
71. Compare especially chap. 3 'Epistemology without a Knowing Subject', *OK*.
72. Of course a sociologist of knowledge or/and an anti-theorist like Feyerabend might find that sociological or/and extralogical factors are equally relevant for science. Feyerabend shall go even further to admit only the extra-logical for growth of science.
73. I. Lakatos, *MSRP*, p. 120.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 119, fn. 1.
75. The well-known trichotomy of W_1 (material world), W_2 (the psychological world) and W_3 (the linguistic world of objective knowledge, i.e. of theories, problems, etc.) is mainly due to K. Popper. Lakatos also recognizes and endorses the distinction. See *op. cit.*, p. 119, fn. 2.
76. K. Popper, *Logic of Scientific Discovery*, sec. 27.
77. I. Lakatos, *MSRP*, p. 23.
78. I. Lakatos, *ibid.*, p. 24.
79. I. Lakatos, *ibid.*, p. 33.
80. See *Logic of Scientific Discovery*, sec. 19 and 20. Lakatos also calls similar adjustments in informal mathematics as 'monsterbarring', 'exception-barring' stratagem. See his *Proofs and Refutations: The Logic of Mathematical Discovery*, eds. J. Worral and E.G. Zahar, CUP, 1976.
81. As apparent from the footnote above.
82. As Kuhn comments that Lakatos's real objection is not against refutation itself, but that it takes *long* to refute. See Kuhn's Reflections in Lakatos and Musgrave (eds), *CGK*.
83. Although Lakatos criticizes Popper's ban on conventionalist stratagem as both 'too strong' and 'too weak', the former accusation is more in conformity with Lakatos' general methodological stance. See Lakatos, *op. cit.*, fn. 5, p. 94.
84. I. Lakatos, *MSRP*, p. 94 (the last italic mine).
85. W.V.O. Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, chap. 11, Harvard, 1953.
86. For Popper only basic statements are conventional, whereas Lakatos regards universal statements also as conventional.
87. Popper's criterion is discussed in sec. i above. See his *CR*, chap. 10. For Lakatos' criterion, see his *MSRP*. Especially consider the conditions for a 'progressive problemshift'.
88. P. Feyerabend, 'Consolations for the Specialist', *CGK*, p. 219.
89. I. Lakatos, *CGK*, pp. 179-80.
90. P. Feyerabend, 'Consolations for the Specialist', *CGK*, pp. 218-19.

Gettier's principle for deducibility of justification*

SANDHYA BASU
Rabindra Bharati University, Calcutta

The principle for deducibility of justification which Edmund Gettier[1] took for granted in constructing his counter-examples to the JTB definition of knowledge is as follows. For any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q. Fred. I. Dretske[2] questions this principle. He argues that, though Gettier's application of the principle to his proposed counter-examples is unobjectionable, the principle itself is not true. In the first part of the paper, I shall examine this view.

In the opening paragraph of his paper 'Reasons and Consequences,' Dretske comments:

> The principle itself *does appear* to be one of those obvious truths which can stand on its two own feet; indeed, it is the sort of principle about which one is inclined to say that to deny it is to reveal a serious misunderstanding of the nature of justification. Nevertheless, I think it is false, and I also think that a proper appreciation of *why* it is false will give one a deeper insight into the nature of justification.

To make his point Dretske takes help of a number of illustrations which, he argues, instantiate the antecedent of the above hypothesis (that is quantified) but fails to instantiate the consequence thereof. Let us take some of these illustrations. In order to be justified in believing that the widow is limping, one need not be justified to the same extent or to the same degree that the woman is a widow, although the latter is correctly deduced from the former and believed on that ground by the subject. Again, I am not prevented from being fully justified in believing that the apple is rotten without being to the same extent or to the same degree justified in believing that it is an apple which is rotten, though the latter is known by me to be a consequence of the former and accepted on that ground. Again, one can have a reason to believe that the church is empty without having a reason to believe that it is a church which is empty, although the latter is a known consequence of the former and believed by the subject on that basis. In all the above cases, the emphasis put

on a part of a sentence changes from what we are originally justified in believing to what is deduced from it.[3] Our justification for believing that the widow is limping might simply be that we see her limping, while our justification for believing that she is a widow might be that somebody told us so. A good reason for believing that the church is empty might be that the person concerned made a thorough inspection of it and did not find anybody there. This, on the other hand, is not a reason at all for believing that what is empty is a church. On the basis of the above, Dretske proceeds to make his main point which goes as follows. The operators, 'justified in believing that', 'has reason to believe that', 'knows that' like all epistemic operators are semi-penetrating operators. Their degree of penetration is greater than that of the non-penetrating operators like 'it is strange that', 'it is a mistake that'. But the degree of penetration is less than that of the fully penetrating operators like 'it is true that', 'it is necessary that', etc. An operator O is said to be a fully penetrating operator, if it is such that whenever it operates on P it necessarily operates on every necessary consequence of P. In other words, if P entails Q and if $O(P)$ entails $O(Q)$, then O is a fully penetrating operator. For example, if it is necessary that P, and if P entails Q, then it is necessary that Q. On the other hand, an operator O is called non-penetrating if it fails to penetrate to some of the most elementary consequences of a proposition. For example, it may be strange that 'Susan married Stewart' but not at all strange that 'Someone married Stewart'. The epistemic operators occupy an intermediate position. They are penetrating in a trivial sense. If, for example, S knows that the coffee is boiling, then he (must) know that it is coffee which is boiling. If h is a logical consequence of f, then h cannot be false if f is true. Hence any evidence, sufficient to ensure the truth of f, is sufficient to ensure the truth of h as well. But in the more significant sense, in the sense of 'what the person himself thinks he knows or would say he knows', the epistemic operators do not penetrate to some of the known consequences of a proposition. Dretske here specially refers to the 'presuppositional consequences'. To quote him:

> ..there are certain presuppositions associated with a statement. These presuppositions, although their truth is entailed by the truth of the statement, are not part of what is *operated on* when we operate on the statement with one of our epistemic operators. The epistemic operators do not *penetrate* to these presuppositions.[4]

I fail to agree with Dretske so far as this view of epistemic operators is concerned, and I am not convinced by him that justified belief is not fully closed under known logical implications.[5] Let me try to state the reasons behind my disagreement one by one. The first reason is that I do not understand Dretske's distinction between the trivial sense and the significant sense of penetrability of epistemic operators. The sense in which he calls the epistemic operators penetrating seems to me to be the significant sense. We are not concerned

here with what it would be appropriate to say or with what the person would say he knows; we *are* concerned with what the person knows or is justified in believing. The question of saying or claiming comes, if at all, at the next stage.

The second reason which is rather strange is that Dretske, while remaining aware of the distinction between presuppositions and consequences, does not appear to realize its importance in the present context. Dretske, for example, says that 'it is coffee' is a presupposition of the proposition 'the coffee is boiling'. Then, again, he says that Gettier's principle is wrong, because it cannot be applied to such consequences. Of course, he remarks that neither Gettier nor Lehrer ever apply the principle to such cases. Let us try to be clear on this point. Gettier's principle is not meant to be valid of presuppositions. Hence the fact, if it is a fact, that it is not valid of the presuppositions of a belief cannot be adduced to prove its falsity. Let us not forget that presuppositions and consequences are very different from each other. They do resemble in that the truth of either is a necessary condition of the truth of the proposition in question. But their differences cannot be ignored here. The falsity of the consequence entails the falsity of the proposition, whereas the falsity of the presupposition creates a truth-value gap for the proposition. This draws our attention to the most relevant difference. The presupposition of a belief is no part of the believed content, whereas the consequence of a belief is, in a sense, a part of the believed content. This difference has an important consequence for an analysis of a belief-sentence. If Dretske holds that 'This is a church' is a mere presupposition of the sentence 'The church is empty', then the latter sentence has to be interpreted in one particular way. But then Dretske's purpose will not be served. If, on the other hand, to serve Dretske's purpose the sentence is interpreted in such a way that 'This is a church' becomes a deduced consequence of the belief 'The church is empty', then Dretske is able to raise his objection but with no success. This becomes obvious when I argue that the whole issue of penetration and non-penetration turns on the interpretation of the belief-sentence under consideration. The sentence 'S is justified in believing that the church is empty' can be doubly interpreted, and Dretske, it seems, is taking undue advantage of this double interpretation. S may believe and be justified in his belief about the emptiness of a church, and may not be justified in believing that it is a church which is empty. But can we ascribe the justified belief to S that the church is empty unless S himself is justified in believing that it is a church which is empty? The precise question that we want Dretske to answer here is: what is the content of this belief? How is the belief being reported? If the content of the belief is that the church is empty then we are committed to a *de dicto* interpretation of the belief-sentence. That is, in reporting the belief we are using the description 'the church', and thus we are committing ourselves to the view that the object of belief is conceived by S under this very description. This means that the description 'the church' occurs essentially in the sentence 'S

is justified on believing that the church is empty'. This is just the opposite of what Dretske thinks. If the said belief were a mere *de re* belief, i.e. just a belief about something (may be some building) that happened to be a church, then we can easily report the belief in terms of any other description *salva veritate*. Surely we cannot do that.[6]

What Dretske should have realized is that his *de re* interpretation of the belief-sentence does not serve his purpose at all. For then 'This is a church' does not follow from 'The church is empty'. If it does not follow, the conditions for the application of Gettier principle do not obtain; and hence this case can no longer be offered by Dretske to prove the invalidity of the principle. So Dretske requires a *de dicto* interpretation, for it is only then that the entailment holds. But, unfortunately, this interpretation is destructive for Dretske; for, on acceptance of this interpretation, we cannot escape the conclusion that the reason to believe that this is a church is a part of the reason to believe that the church is empty. Our simple point is that we cannot allow Dretske to sail in two boats at one and the same time; i e. taking a *de re* interpretation and claiming that entailment holds and that the principle for deducibility of justification is wrong.

Thus, I am inclined to the conclusion that Dretske is not justified in questioning Gettier's principle. It seems to me wrong to say that, in order to have a reason to believe that the apple is rotten, I do not have to have *any* reason to believe that it is an apple. Truly speaking, Dretske himself seems to be somewhat hesitant on this point. For he always says, for example, that there is nothing preventing me from being fully justified in believing that the apple is rotten without being *to the same extent or to the same degree* justified in believing that it is an apple which is rotten. Why these qualifications—'to the same extent', and 'to the same degree'? Is Dretske not absolutely sure that the justification of a belief is independent of the justification of its known logical consequences? Perhaps not. And even if he is, he cannot assure us.

II

Irving Thalberg[7] challenges the same second principle of Gettier's, and thus hopes to complement Dretske. A thorough analysis of the counter-examples, argues Thalberg, reveals that they are not instances of JTB, because justification cannot be transmitted to them from their premises.

Gettier's first counter-example is analysed by Thalberg in the following way. Smith and Jones have both applied for a certain job. Smith has strong evidence for believing the following two unrelated propositions:

(1) Jones will get the job.
(2) Jones has ten coins in his pocket.

By help of a pluralized form of PDJ (Gettier's principle), observes Thalberg, Gettier argues that Smith is justified in believing:

(3) Jones will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.

From this again Smith correctly deduces the following proposition which he believes and is justified in believing:

(4) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

Gettier tells us that (3) is false, (4) happens to be true; but Smith cannot be said to know that (4) is true, for to the utter surprise of Smith it is Smith and not Jones who is selected and unknown to Smith, Smith is carrying ten coins in his pocket.

Thalberg first questions the passage from justified belief in (1) and (2) to justified belief in (3). His principal argument refers to the rules of probability calculus. The probability of a conjunction is always less than the probability of its conjuncts, provided the conjuncts are unrelated to one another. It may be the case that (1) and (2) barely satisfy the minimum standard of justification, and, as a result, their conjunction (3) does not come up to the standard of justification. Consequently, Smith's belief in (3) would be an unjustified belief.

Thalberg next questions the passage from justified belief in (3) to justified belief in (4). Smith is justified in believing (3) which is a singular proposition, true only about Jones. How can we pass from this to justifiably believing a general proposition like (4) which can be true in many different circumstances? Thalberg argues that Smith could be said to have some reasons to believe the general proposition, if the president made the declaration that a man with ten coins would be hired or if Smith himself discovered that the company always considered the candidature of people having ten coins in their pockets.

Let us pass on to Thalberg's treatment of Gettier's second example. Smith has good grounds for believing that (P) Jones owns a Ford. Smith disjoins this with an arbitrarily selected proposition (Q). Brown is in Barcelona, out of a number of others like 'Brown is in Brest-Litovsk'. Brown, we are told, is Smith's friend, but Smith is completely in the dark about Brown's whereabouts. PDJ tells us that, since Smith's belief in (P) is justified, he is also justified in believing (T) Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona which he accepts as a result of this deduction. But it so turns out that Jones does not own a Ford, but quite unexpectedly Brown is in Barcelona, and thus Smith is luckily saved by the evidentially unsupported disjunct (Q). But Smith does not know that (T) is true. Thalberg thinks that Smith even lacks justified belief here. This can be very simply shown by pointing out that (P) could be disjoined even with the negation of (Q) and Gettier's PDJ would ascribe Smith a justified belief of P or not (Q) as well. But is it not absurd to hold that both $P \lor Q$ and $P \lor \sim Q$ are equally justified beliefs? Thalberg's point seems to be that, when the question of justifiably believing comes, one does not disjoin P with any and every proposition (though such a move is perfectly permitted by the rules of logic). One chooses some disjunct in preference to

others, a disjunct which one has some reason to choose. His words are enlightening here:

> In everyday life we often move from justified belief in a proposition to justified belief in a disjunction of it with another proposition when our evidence suggests that in case the first proposition turns out to be false, the second is more likely to be true, and conversely.[8]

Unfortunately, Gettier's case is not of this type. Hence it is not a case of justified belief at all.

We have so far given an exposition of Thalberg's view. Let us now see how far the view is acceptable. Let us first concentrate on the first example. Thalberg says that Gettier *tacitly* assumes *PDJ* in inferring (3) from (1) and (2). This is slight distortion of fact. Gettier in his paper begins with the conjunctive proposition (3). And he says that Smith is justified in believing this proposition for the president of the company assured Smith that Jones will be selected and that Smith had counted the coins in Jones's pocket ten minutes ago. Of course, it is true that this proposition is a conjunction of two propositions which are not separately mentioned by Gettier. So this is a minor point. The important point is that there is no reason to suppose that Gettier is unaware of the rules of probability calculus. But they have no relevance in the present case. Thalberg unnecessarily imagines that the conjuncts here are barely justified and that the conjunctive proposition is not justified. Gettier clearly says that Smith has *strong evidence* for the conjunctive proposition.

In any case, Thalberg's main target is the passage from justified belief in (3) to justified belief in (4). According to Thalberg, (3) is a singular proposition whereas (4) is a general proposition. Now the question is: what is the nature of this general proposition? Is it a universal proposition or an existential proposition? Thalberg seems to waver in answering this question. Sometimes he says that (4) is to be read as 'whoever gets the job has ten coins in his pocket'. On some other occasions, he says that the subject phrase 'the man who will be hired' can apply only to one person. For example, we find him saying:

> I am not ignoring the fact that it (4) contains a grammatical subject phrase 'the man who will be hired' which can apply only to one person. I use the word 'general' to bring out the fact that (4) can be true in many different ways, whereas (3) can be true just when Jones is hired and has ten coins. My criticism is that Smith has no evidence to justify him in expecting any of the other situations that would make (4) true, i.e. someone else is being hired instead of Jones.[9]

In his later paper Thalberg clearly speaks of existential generalization in this case, but then, again, he slips into 'whoever'. That Thalberg is not clear on

this point is also displayed by his suggestion that Gettier seems to hold that possession of ten coins in the pocket is a necessary condition of being hired. One can argue like this only if one interprets (4) as a Universal proposition:

$$(X)\,(HX \supset Tx)\text{—whoever } X \text{ might be, if } x \text{ is hired}$$
$$\text{then } x \text{ has ten coins in his pocket.}$$

Gettier never meant or implied this. Proposition (4) is a uniquely existential proposition. The definite description 'The man who will be hired' applies to one and only one unique individual. So, here the passage is from singular reference to unique reference. Now, the all-important question that Thalberg wants us to confront is: are we justified in believing (4) on the basis of our justified belief in (3)? Thalberg thinks not; we, following M.K. Hooker,[10] think yes. Thalberg fails to realize that the uniquely existential proposition, given a Russellean analysis, is a case of justified, belief, if (3) is a case of justified belief. As Hooker clearly points out: (3) can be interpreted as 'Jones is identical to the man who will get the job and Jones has ten coins in his pocket', and (4) can be interpreted as 'There is one and only one man who will get the job and he has ten coins in his pocket'. Surely, Smith is justified in believing the latter on the basis of the former.

We also differ from Thalberg, so far as the second counter-example is concerned. The rules of probability theory tell us that, if we are justified in believing a certain proposition, then we are also justified in believing its disjunction with another proposition, provided the disjuncts are not related with each other. Surprisingly, Thalberg shows no interest in the rules of probability in this context, though he explicitly used them in repudiating the conjunctive example. In the present case, Smith is more justified in believing 'Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona' than he is in believing simply 'Jones owns a Ford', for there are more chances of his being right about the former than about the latter.[11]

The above arguments are perhaps not enough to allay Thalberg's uneasiness. In the last part of his paper 'Is Justification Transmissible Through Deduction?' Thalberg sums up the situation by saying that Gettier's counterexamples appear to be genuine counter-examples to so many epistemologists, because of their unawareness of the distinction between evidential justification and strategic justification. In the first example, Smith is strategically, and not evidentially, justified in believing that the man who will be hired has ten coins in his pocket, for here we have mere chances of being right than in 'Jones will be hired..'. In the second example, Smith is strategically, and not evidentially, justified in believing the disjunction, for it is strategically prudent to tack on a disjunction. Thalberg admits that we want some strategically wise method to hit upon the truth as often as possible. But once we hit upon the truth what becomes important is our evidence in support of the truth, and the method of reaching the truth becomes unimportant. To possess knowledge it is neither

necessary nor sufficient that we follow a prudent method. The Gettier's counter-examples illustrate how even optimum strategies do not yield knowledge. Thus, Thalberg concludes that Gettier has not been able to produce instances of evidentially justified belief which are not cases of knowledge. This also shows that evidential justification is not transmissible through deduction.

So we are now confronted with a very difficult task of deciding who is right: Gettier or Thalberg? What is the fate of *PDJ*? I am inclined to conclude that, though we have discovered some loopholes in Thalberg's reasoning, we have seriously to consider his distinction between evidential and strategical justi-fication. Gettier's counter-examples highlight this distinction. If this distinc-tion is of any value the *JTB* definition cannot be accepted as it is. We have to unpack the concept of justification. Hence *PDJ* in its original form cannot be accepted.

If this is plausible, then shall we revise our view about Dretske's attack which we discussed in the first part of the paper? And what shall we say about Thalberg's own conviction that he is complementing Dretske? The view that epistemic operators are semi-penetrating operators seems to be correct in the sense that these operators do not penetrate to some of the consequences of a proposition. If Dretske says simply this, then he is right. But we object to his argument on two grounds. On the one hand, the examples he chooses are not examples of non-penetration, they are rather plain and simple cases of pene-tration. On the other hand, Dretske's remark that, though *PDJ* is not accept-able, Gettier's application of the principle is unobjectionable is totally mis-guided. Thalberg will surely disagree with Dretske, for if he has shown any-thing it is that Gettier's cases are cases of non-penetration.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. In 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?', *Knowledge and Belief*, ed. A.P. Griffiths, London: Oxford University Press, 1976.
2. In his papers 'Reasons and Consequences', *Analysis*, 1968 and 'Epistemic Operators', *Journal of Philosophy*, 1970.
3. For example, in the sentence 'The widow is limping' the emphasis is on 'limping', whereas in the sentence 'The woman is a widow' the emphasis is on 'widow'.
4. 'Epistemic Operators', *Journal of Philosophy*, 1970, p. 1015.
5. It may not be irrelevant to refer here to a similar view on the subject upheld by Robert Nozick in his *Philosophical Explanations* (Harvard University Press, 1981). Nozick's main concern, however, is knowledge, not justified belief. Though he does not commit himself to the view that justified belief is a necessary condition of knowledge, he explicilty defends non-preservation or non-closure of knowledge. This non-preservation is a consequence of the fact that two necessary conditions of knowledge display this feature. When S is the subject and P is the proposition known and M is the method via which S arrives at his belief that P, these two conditions are as follows: (1) If P were not true and S were to use M to arrive at a belief whether (or not) P, then S would not believe via M that P; (2) If P were true and S were to use M to arrive at a belief whether (or not) P, then S would believe via M that P.

What we want to say against Nozick is that the necessity of these two conditions is questionable, and hence, even though they might fail to satisfy the closure principle, knowledge may not fail to do so.

6. While talking of *de re* and *de dicto* belief, though I have had in mind Quine's distinc-tion between relational and notional belief, I did not explicitly mention that. My friend Dr. Amita Chatterjee thinks that my position could be more clearly explained by help of Quine's distinction. S's belief that 'the church is empty' will be relational when S believes the emptiness of the church. This is once again a transparent context for the church, and we can say without difficulty $(\exists x)$ (S believes that x is empty). The notional belief, on the other hand, has to be canonized as S believes that $(\exists x)$ (x is empty).
7. In his two papers 'In Defense of Justified True Belief' in *Journal of Philosophy*, 1969, and 'Is Justification Transmissible through Deduction?' *Philosophical Studies*, 1974.
8. '*In Defense of Justified True Belief*', p. 802.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 799.
10. See M.K. Hooker's 'In Defense of the Principle for Deducibility of Justification' in *Philosophical Studies*, 1973.
11. J.T. Saunders also refers to this fact in his paper 'Thalberg's Challenge to Justification via Deduction' in *Philosophical Studies*, 1972.

Study of society and polity: scientific and philosophical

D. P. CHATTOPADHYAYA
Jadavpur University, Calcutta and
Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi

It is really difficult to answer the question, often raised in the concerned text-books, on the nature of society and polity in some such form as 'whether it is scientific or philosophical or both'. To raise this question at the very beginning of social studies is more confusing than illuminating or helpful. Unless one knows *what* politics or economics, for example, is about and *how* it conducts its analysis of the subject-matter, one is not in a position to answer the question. Only when one has gone through the matter and method of an academic discipline, one feels qualified to undertake the responsibility of satisfactorily explaining its true nature.

However, for some pedagogic reasons we frequently find that the authors of the fundamental studies on such subjects as economics, politics, sociology, anthropology, social (or cognitive) psychology, introduce their subject matters by briefly describing their contents and methods. To use the terms 'contents' and 'methods' in plural is deliberate. Social and political scientists are not unanimous regarding the nature of the subject-matter of their disciplines. Nor identical are their views regarding the methods to be followed. There is an empiricist tradition, closely associated with the names of Hume, Comte, and Mill, which highlights the *unity* of all scientific enquiries, naturalistic and humanistic. Their position is very clear and simple. As branches of knowledge, physics and chemistry, politics and economics cannot possibly defend their scientific claim unless their method of studying their subject-matters is identical *at bottom*. This position is generally designated as methodological monism. To be cautious, one should mention here that the scopes and boundaries of the disciplines now known as chemistry and economics, for example, have been undergoing historical changes over the centuries. What we mean by *sociology* today was assimilated under anthropology by Kant. At an earlier stage of his life, Comte preferred the term *social physics* to *sociology*. Locke, Hume and Adam Smith were not used to draw any fundamental line of demarcation between ethics and economics. Similarly, one might point out, Kautilya's *Arthaśāstra* did not recognize any fundamental distinction between politics, economics and statecraft. Methodological monists find no special point in trying to define sharply the scope of the different cognitive enquiries. For, according to them, the tenability of the scientific claim of these enquiries is largely, if not exclusively, dependent upon our success in ascertaining the causes of the events or phenomena which constitute the subject-matters of the concerned disciplines. That is, empiricist-minded authors are disposed to

define science primarily in terms of *causality*—cause-effect relationship. Some of them go a step further, and insist on using the concept of *operation* or *measurement* or both for the purpose of defining what science is and demarcating it from what science is not. In brief: causality, measurability and operationalism are among the basic concepts used, or, at any rate, presupposed by empiricist social and political writers.

To clarify the point, Schumpeter, in course of his discussion on the scope and method of economics, having raised the question 'is economics a science?' pertinently observes that 'the answer to the question . depends...on what we mean by 'science'.

> ...in everyday parlance as well as in the lingo of academic life. . the term ['science'] is often used to denote [illustratively speaking] mathematical physics. Evidently, this excludes all social sciences and also economics. Nor is economics as a whole a science if we make the use of methods similar to those of mathematical physics of defining characteristics (*definiens*) of science. In this case only a small part of economics is 'scientific'. Again, if we define science according to the slogan 'Science is Measurement', then economics is scientific in some of its parts and not in others. There should be no susceptibilities concerning 'rank' or 'dignity' about this: to call a field a science should not spell either a compliment or the reverse. For our purpose, a very wide definition suggests itself, to wit: a science is any kind of knowledge that has been the object of conscious efforts to improve it.[1]

While the mathematical physicist is mainly interested in *provability*, Schumpeter's basic *definien* of economics is *improvability*. What it entails is noteworthy. A scientific enquiry is endlessly improvable in the light of new factual and logical findings. All new facts relevant to the determination of validity or truth-value of a particular scientific hypothesis are not necessarily discovered by observations and/or experiments. Other new findings are due to the use of statistical, logical or mathematical techniques. Extending the significance of the pivotal roles played by (*a*) the empirical concept of improvability and (*b*) 'specialised techniques' of fact-findings and of interpretation or inference (analysis), Schumpeter explicates the point by adding (*i*) science is 'refined commonsense', and (*ii*) science is 'tooled knowledge'. From this explication another point of importance which emerges is this: science refines, improves or precisifies commonsense. *Precisifiability* like improvability is recognized as mathematical mark of science. Another point suggested by Schumpeter's expression of 'tooled knowledge' is also noteworthy. Economics is not to be taken merely as a descriptive or narrative discipline. Positively speaking, specialized techniques have a definite role to play in economics.

Has economics anything to do with ideology? An answer, affirmative or negative, to this question informs us of the author's view on the related question whether economics is or is not a science. Instead of saying 'economics

is science', some economists like Milton Friedman and Richard Lipsey will say: 'It is a *positive* enquiry.' According to them, economics is concerned with facts and what follows from facts. Ideology, in contrast, is concerned with public policy, political or economic, which is basically normative though indirectly or tenuously related to facts. A favourite theme for the positive economists is: Economic theory cannot...ever show us what we ought to do, but only what will happen if we do certain things. The uses and the limitations of economic theory in dealing with matters of public policy is.' His main argument is that economics, like other sciences, is based on and verified by evidences; but the policy matters dealt with in the works on economics are essentially matters of valuation and decision. Lipsey's conclusion is: '...that many hotly debated issues of public policy are positive and not normative issues, but that the scientific approach to such positive issues is very often ignored.'[2]

Evidently, Lipsey is following the empiricist tradition marked by the supremacy of evidence over theory, dualism between fact and value, verification by prediction and minimization of the significance of free *individual* choice. In search of rationality of human behaviour, economic or otherwise, the positivist takes a group or class of individual human beings, and not individuals as such, as unit of his enquiry. True, he does not think that individuals act capriciously or irrationally. But to ascertain the rationality of their behaviour, he insists, one has to approach it at an aggregative or macro level.

From a set of related considerations some sociologists like Daniel Bell and political philosophers like Michael Oakeshott arrived at similar conclusions. The are opposed to the policy decisions not based on 'hard facts' or 'solid experiences'. According to them, experience is the most reliable guide of life. When human ideas and hopes soar much above facts and empirical evidences, they turn out to be ideological, if not utopian. The ideologue, more or less alienated from experience and dispositionally an intellectual, tries to understand different views primarily not in terms of their *content* but their *function*. In this connection, one is likely to recall Marx's stricture against the philosopher that he only interprets the world and does not ordinarily undertake the social responsibility of changing it. In other words, some practical thinkers like Marx assess and evaluate ideas in terms of their function or use-value and not tenability or truth-value. It is to be mentioned here that Marx is not a positivist, although he maintains that ideologies, rooted in the material conditions of life, are essentially superstructural. Ordinarily, the Marxist associates a particular ideology to a particular class, bourgeoisie or proletariat, for example. Unlike superstructural disciplines, the sciences which are concerned with the material things and processes as such, physics and chemistry, for example, are not generally characterized by Marxists as bourgeois or proletarian. But, in the history of some Marxist countries, one comes across some 'radical' phases when one even hears of 'bourgeois physics' and 'bourgeois biology'. The point of similarity between the positivist and the Marxist which deserves careful attention is that both of them are disinclined to divorce policy

issues altogether from the factual ones. The autonomy claim of values like *good* and *right* is rejected by them. But the value-fact dualism of the positivist is discounted by the Marxist. This is to be understood with reference to their methodological difference. The Marxist defends dialectical method, and criticizes methodological monism in the form it is defended by the positivist. But this difference between them must not make one blind to another point of similarity between the positivist, who is the modern disciple of the traditional empiricist, and the Marxist, who wants to reconcile dialectically rationalism with empiricism and naturalism with humanism. And that point is their common willingness to learn from history, historical experience. While the positivist favours a descriptive or narrative view of history, taking the fabric of history as a whole, the Marxist opts for a dialectical interpretation of history. To the latter, history is the history of class struggle marked by *decomposition* and *recomposition* of every given *composite* state or stage. And to substantiate this thesis he chooses facts selectively and not *as a totality*. However, the Marxist insists that his selection is representative and fair, and not preconceived or excessively theory-oriented. This shows his commitment to realism and materialism and opposition to 'idealism'. The positivist is always criticized by him because of the former's alleged alliance with the idealist.

The Marxist view that knowledge or thought—be it scientific or humanistic—has its social determinants was in a way an anticipation of what we call sociology of knowledge these days. As against Hegel who regards thought as autonomous, if not sovereign, Marx maintains that closer scientific investigation of the contents of knowledge reveals their function or aim. Economic conditions and interests are said to be primarily responsible for shaping the nature and even validity of knowledge. Whatever is produced by men—economic or intellectual, substructural or superstructural—is rooted in the material conditions of life.

Empirical observations must...bring about empirically and without any mystification and speculation, connection of the social and political structure with [economic] production. The social structure and the state are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals, but of individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other peoples' imagination, but as they *really* are, i.e. as they operate, produce materially, and hence as they work under diverse material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will.

The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with material activity and material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, and the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as a direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental production...politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc....Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc.— real, active men, as they are conditioned by the definite development of

their productive forces....If in all ideologies men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a *camera obscura* this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.
In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven.[3]

The point to be noted here is that, according to Marx and Engels, the determining conditions of knowledge are not *necessarily* their validating conditions. What makes different forms of knowledge and values possible does not *ipso facto* establish their validity. Knowledge is no mirror of sociology—social conditions. Nor axiology, science of values, is a mirror of sociology—its social conditions. The Marxist is neither a foundationalist, nor a believer in a genetic theory of knowledge and value. He always emphasizes the role of *dialectical intercourse* between men and their material conditions of living, especially the productive ones, and that of practical test of what is historically claimed to be knowledge and value. The historical and the changing character of all forms of knowledge, including hard sciences, and norms of action including morality and ideology, need not be interpreted as liberal concession to relativism and scepticism. As against the empiricist, the Marxist refers in this context to his firm commitment to realism. It is in and through practice—continuous practice, not so much of individual men as of classes of men—that *real* situation is ascertained, and speculation and imagination are rejected or retained after necessary correction. For the Marxist the genetic or the germinal process of science and philosophy, though important, is not so decisive; the more important is the terminal process of collective and practical test.

This view of Marx brings out clearly the process or the historical character of human sciences and ideologies. Besides, it also tries to show the sociological or the public character of human knowledge and values. Knowledge is not to be taken as a private or merely psychological affair. Even if it is admitted in a limited sense that there is an element of privacy or psychology in our knowledge, this is not to be given any decisive importance. For, in that case, we fall prey to the slogan of 'autonomy of epistemology / axiology'. The clear implication of the slogan is dehistorization and decontextualization of what man produces theoretically and practically. Another related implication of this view is the continuity of the causal moorings or social determinations of human productions, material as well as intellectual. Needless to say, without compromising his basic position the Marxist cannot accept this implication of a view otherwise foreign to him.

The critic may assert that Marx's emphasis on *practice* pushes his position close to, if not identifies it with, that of the instrumentalist or the pragmatist. But the pragmatist is a firm believer in the importance of the *outcome* of practice. He is a consequentialist. To him the concept of *success* is a surrogate for that of *truth*. Truth hardly turns out to be anything more than a claim to

be substantiated by practice. The affinity between pragmatism and Marxism cannot be denied. But, at the same time, one has to admit that Marx's accent on realism and materialism saves him from the excesses of constructivism or empiricism associated with the views of James and Dewy. A sympathetic perusal of both the positions reveals the truth that realism and pragmatism are not quite antagonistic. In recent times, the point has been persuasively argued, among others, by Ernest Nagel. He takes pains to establish the compromise view that instrumentalism, a close ally of pragmatism, and realism are not essentially different. Their difference is basically a matter of language, formulation and traditional affiliation. There is no compelling reason to maintain that the realist has successfully grasped 'hard reality', whereas the instrumentalist has got stuck up with 'mere appearance'. Nor there is any sound reason for supporting the view that the realist is a dealer in 'objective values' and the instrumentalist has to remain content only with 'likes and dislikes', 'attraction and repulsion'. Writers like Nagel point out that even the realist has to postulate and make use of theoretical entities which, in a way, is indicative of his inability to 'mirror' reality, to capture it picturesquely. Further, the distinction between the realist and the descriptivist ethics or axiology, on the one hand, and the emotivist and the prescriptivist one, on the other, is not that fundamental as it is often made out to be. The observations of Nagel on the point are eminently sensible:

A defender of either view [realism/ instrumentalism] cannot only cite eminent authority to support his position; with a little dialetical ingenuity he can usually remove the sting from apparently grave objections to his position. In consequence, the already long controversy as to which of the two is the proper way of construing theories can be prolonged indefinitely. The obvious moral to be drawn from such a debate is that once both positions are so stated that each can meet the *prima facie* difficulties it faces, the question as to which of them is but 'correct position' has only terminological interest.[4]

The Naiyāyika, the logical realist, defended a comparable position long back. Among different senses of cognitive truth he highlights two: (*a*) adequacy of cognition to the nature of its object; and (*b*) consistency with the practice or practical experience of the people. A cognition may be said to be true, if it is found to be adequate to the nature of its object. This view, though unmistakably recalls realistic correspondence theory of truth to one's mind, is not in any way incompatible with the notion of consistency with the experience or practice of people (*lokavyvahāra/lokāyata*). The point may be clarified by an example. When it is said that water quenches thirst, the truth of this statement, expression of cognition, consists in the correspondence between it and the thirst-quenching quality of water. But the *realistic* account is not inconsistent with a complementary pragmatic account to the effect that this

statement is true, because by drinking water all people find that their thirst is quenched. The same state of affairs may be viewed as *factual* and reviewed as *experiential*. By 'internalizing' or by indicating the experiential co-relate of the relation between a statement and a state of affairs, one does not dilute its realistic character. Nor, by 'externalizing' in language or proposition, the relation between experience and what is experienced its experiential richness or concreteness is compromised. It is difficult to see the discrepancy between the said two accounts.

Meaning of action and recorded experience are articulated in a given historical context or situation. Sometimes it has been said that the richness and complexity of meanings of human language—written, uttered or used in some other ways—cannot be properly grasped without reference to appropriate *form(s) of life*. The empiricist and the Marxist, with their favourable disposition to natural sciences, try to show that the objects of social studies are not entirely different from those of scientific ones. Their difference is only one of degree, i.e. quantitative, and not of kind, i.e. qualitative. Following Hume[5], Mill maintains that the philosophy of social studies is not essentially different from the philosophy of science. Their methods of investigation are basically same. 'Logic of the moral sciences', strictly speaking, cannot claim a peculiar position for itself. Until and unless it can be shown that 'moral sciences' are branches of science itself, it will be a sad state of affairs in demanding rectification and improvement of the former and thus to enable it to have the dignity of the latter. Both Hume and Mill think that the intelligibility or the meaningfulness of social phenomena is derivable from causal laws. Laws or regularities, known or knowable, are the basis of scientific investigation of social studies. Whatever happens is due to the operation of some constant laws, which may not be readily available with us. In other words, the uniformities of nature provide the basis for understanding social phenomena. Consistently with empiricism it is held that the said uniformities may be a matter of *assumption*, i.e. need not be given in any experience as its object. Mill explicitly recognizes the complexity of the problems attending the understanding of human nature and its workings. Having conceded this much, he insists that, even if the objects of moral (or social) science cannot be grasped with *certainty* in terms of the available regularities of nature and mind, the same may be rendered intelligible marked by more or less *probability*. The programme of establishing the unity of psychological laws, which are more complex than physiological and natural ones, should not be ruled out. On the contrary, Mill seems to think as a naturalist that he is obliged to accept this programme as scientific and rational. In this respect, Mill's position, in spite of his protestation, is reminiscent of Comte's, for which he shows great regard.

The position of Mill has been revived and defended with considerable sophistication by contemporary logical empiricists like Popper[6] and Hempe[7]. Admittedly, there is significant difference between Popper's version of empiricism, characterized by heavy dose of realism and rationalism, and Hempel's,

which stands closer to the position defended by his two senior colleagues of the Vienna Circle, Carnap and Reichenbach. The attitude of the logical empiricist to the psychological empiricists like Mill and Hume stems out from the former's inability or indifference to recognize the importance of mathematics to the development of scientific method. In this connection, the caustic observation of Reichenbach is noteworthy.

> The reproach of having studied scientific method in an over-simplified model that neglects the contribution of mathematics to physics should go not to Bacon but to the latter empiricists—in particular to John Stuart Mill, who, 250 years after Bacon, developed an inductive logic which scarcely mentioned mathematical method and is essentially a reformulation of Bacon's ideas.[8]

The professional familiarity with the modern mathematical logic and philosophy of physics has undoubtedly qualified the logical empiricist to point out the inadequacy of Hume's or Mill's treatment of mathematics. But it would be perhaps historically unfair to say that the so-called psychological empiricist entirely neglected the philosophy of mathematics. In fact, their views on scientific method, especially probability logic, show their firm commitment to quantitative method. Even to social sciences they wanted to apply, wherever possible, the principles of empirical test and measurement.

One can justifiably argue in favour of Hume and Mill and point out that it is due to the thinkers like them that the reading public could see for themselves that the method of natural sciences has definite relevance to the subjects of social studies. What is more, they themselves made significant contributions to social studies like history, political science and economics. In contrast, the logical empiricists like Carnap and Reichenbach, who were prolific writers, kept themselves so busy with their works on scientific method and logic that they hardly cared to write anything specifically on the method of philosophy and social sciences. One might even critically suggest that they were so convinced of the universal acceptability of scientific method in all branches of human knowledge that they did not care to address themselves separately to the problems of social sciences. Writers like Popper and Hempel, somewhat in the tradition of Hume and Mill, do recognize the *peculiar* problems of social or human sciences. Even if their suggested solutions are largely scientific, i.e. heavily inclined to the method of natural sciences, they have taken immense pains to show why they are justified in their approach.

The philosophers of science, called upon to explain social phenomena, are generally inclined to regard their objects, i.e. *explananda*, in the analogy of the facts of natural science. This is contrary to the widely shared belief that social facts consist of human actions and their underlying intentions and dispositions. However, this is not to deny the relatively independent existence of societal facts. Social facts, compared to natural ones, are 'soft'; they are in-

fused with human will and are modifiable by it. But some social scientists are unwilling to accept this distinction between natural facts and social facts. For example, Durkheim's recommendation is: '*consider social facts as things.*' According to him, this is 'the first and most fundamental rule of sociological method'.[9] Unless social facts are regarded as things, their studies cannot assume the prestige of sciences like physics and chemistry. It is true that man cannot live and adapt himself to his environment without forming some *ideas* about it. Ideas of matter and motion, objects of natural sciences, may be true or false. Ideas of money and marriage, objects of social sciences, may also be true or false. What determines truth or otherwise of these ideas are not themselves ideas but facts. Following these lines of arguments, Durkheim proposes to purge the mind of the social scientist off the subjective character of the objects of social sciences. Social reality, according to writers like him, cannot be substituted for reality itself. In this connection, he refers to such social disciplines as ethics and economics and such notions as value. Subjectivism, associated with the notion of value, tends to weaken the claim of social sciences, and degrade them to the level of art. In order to vindicate the scientific or 'thing' character of social facts, one has to recognize their imperviousness to the influence of human will.

> Indeed the most important characteristic of a 'thing' is the impossibility of its modification by a simple effort of the will. Not that the thing is refractory to all modifications, but a mere act of the will is insufficient to produce a change in it; it requires a more or less strenuous effort due to the resistance which it offers, and, moreover, the effort is not always successful. …[Social facts] are like moulds in which our actions are inevitably shaped… [Factual] necessity signifies clearly…the presence of something not dependent upon ourselves. Thus, in considering social phenomena as things, we merely adjust our conceptions in conformity to their nature.[10]

Recognition of the facthood of scientific objects need not necessarily commit one to the extreme view sought to be defended by Durkheim. At least Popper and Hempel have not followed him in this respect. Some of the methodological prescriptions of Durkheim are bound to be rejected by Popper, viz. (*a*) 'all pre-conceptions must be rejected'; (*b*) 'primacy of facts over theories'; and (*c*) 'the defining characteristics of social objects should be as external and objective as possible'. It seems that Durkheim is wedded to a sort of fact-fetish. He often confuses objectivity with externality. On many occasions he conflates the notions of 'hard fact' and 'well-established theory'.

Popper's view of social sciences does not suffer from the sort of infirmities found in the writings of sociological positivists like Durkheim. Though fiercely opposed to psychologism or subjectivism, Popper is not prepared to regard the objects of social sciences in the analogy of those of natural sciences. Time and again he reminds us of 'human actions and their underlying intentions

and dispositions' as the basic subject-matter of social sciences. True, he refers in the same breath to societal facts as well. Even these facts are not like 'things' of Durkheim, for the Popperian facts are very much open to and modifiable by human will. But the similarity between Popper and Durkheim can be gathered from their common commitment to methodological monism, i.e., both subscribe to the view that the objects of natural and social sciences have to be understood and explained in terms of the same method. In order to avoid the 'idol' of positivism, both emphasize the ways and means of making explanations and proofs of social sciences acceptable to *other*, and, if possible, to all persons. Popper is not terribly enamoured by the method of *verstehen* which attaches special importance to the understanding or thought-experiment of the first person, relegating relatively the importance of the second and the third persons. *Verstehen* by itself can hardly be recognized as a respectable method. As a heuristic device it undoubtedly has its role to play in an otherwise comprehensive methodology. Popper thinks that the claim of *verstehen* as a method squarely rests on the confusion of *familiarity* with *intelligibility*.

The question to be asked here is: does an intelligible account need validation? Ordinarily, it is assumed that what is intelligible is *ipso facto* self-certified, and, if a piece of behaviour is intelligible, we do not raise the question whether this intelligibility is right or wrong. Max Weber draws a distinction between two senses of *verstehen,* interpretative understanding: (*a*) nomological and (*b*) psychological. In his polemical paper, 'Critical Studies in the Logic of the cultural Sciences', he joins issues with Eduard Meyer on the nature of theory and method of history.[11] Referring to historical positivists like Ranke, it is pointed out by Weber that they wrongly think that the result of 'intuition' is so firm and dependable that it need not be made a subject of further explanation or inquiry. The historian's 'empathy' or 'sense of the situation' is mistakenly commended as unquestionable. While Weber does recognize the necessity and importance of such psychological acts as 'understanding' and 'interpretation', he is not prepared to accept the same as automatically valid. For, he thinks, 'the logical value of historical knowledge' gets diminished if the hidden nomological components behind the psychology of explanation of framing hypotheses are not duly recognized. Recognition does not mean explicit statement of the same. But the 'rules' of interpretation and the 'categories' of understanding need to be borne in mind and, on demand, explicitly stated.

[Historical positivists] confuse the psychological course of the *origin* of scientific knowledge and 'artistic' form of presenting what is known, which is selected for the purpose of influencing the reader scientifically, on the one hand, and with the *logical structure* of knowledge, on the other....[Both scientific knowledge and historical knowledge] arise intuitively in the intuitive flashes of imagination which are then 'verified' *vis-a-vis* by facts, i.e.

their validity is tested in procedures involving the use of already available empirical knowledge and they are 'formulated' in a logically correct way.... The dry approach of logic is concerned only with this skeletal structure for ...the historical exposition claims 'validity' and 'truth'. The most important phase of historical work...the establishment of the causal regress, attends such validity only when, in the event of challenge, it is able to pass the test of the use of the category of objective possibility which entails the isolation and generalisation of the causal individual components for the purpose of ascertaining the possibility of the synthesis of certain conditions into adequate causes.[12]

Weber's analysis of historical explanation evidently recognizes the distinction between 'context of discovery/origination' and 'context of justification/falsification'. *Verstehen* method, though closer to the context of discovery/origination, should not be identified with it. Epistemic discovery or origination *per se* does not guarantee the validity of what is being discovered in intuition or 'intuitive flashes of imagination'. It seems that the primary sense of the Weberian *verstehen* is inventive or hypothetical, i.e. intended to capture the 'subjective' aspect of the social event—the meaning of human action from the actor's point of view. It is not the only, perhaps not even the most important, sense of *verstehen* with which Weber is concerned. Rightly understood, interpretative understanding and causal explanation are mutually complementary. The former is *preparatory* in character and the latter *confirmatory*. But, in order to preserve the scientific spirit of his inquiry, Weber points out that at no stage of confirmation using rules or generalization, one can be sure that social reality has been exhaustively and conclusively grasped, leaving no room for further questioning or correction.

At this point it is better that we pay attention to the distinction drawn by Weber between historical understanding and sociological understanding. Eager to capture the subjective meaning of the actor's action, the sociologist addresses himself to 'an ultimate concrete empirically graspable reality'. '(U)nderstanding sociology [thus] sunders itself from all normative sciences such as jurisprudence, logic, ethics, and esthetics, and sciences that desire to determine a 'valid', 'correct', or 'true' meaning in their objects.'[13] The selective approach of sociology, engaged to capture the unique and selective aspects of social reality, brings sociology close to history and shows its 'extra-scientific' character. But, at the same time, the role of *verstehen* as a means of cognition and causal attribution exhibits its 'pro-scientific' character. Yet Weber draws an important distinction between the 'historical' and the 'sociological'. While the former 'is primarily interested in fathoming important individual connections', the latter 'is concerned with the *typical*, creates typal concepts and seeks *universal rules* for the ever-recurring and ubiquitous course of social action'. There is a systematic tension, not ambiguity, between the empirical scientist in Weber and the historical scientist in him.

This sort of tension one finds also in the writings of Popper on the methodology of social sciences. On the one hand, he speaks of the necessity of using *model* for the purpose of social explanation, and, in the same breath, he affirms the requirement of testing it against inexhaustible findings of the concerned social reality. Mainly to avoid the mistake of psychologism Popper proposes zero (geometrical co-ordinate) method. From psychology to geometry is undoubtedly a long way. It sounds particularly strange, because this method is being suggested for *social* sciences. Marked for the complexity and concreteness of social phenomena, how, one might ask, Popper's zero method could prove promising in their case? The answer seems to lie along this line. The social scientist is engaged in the construction of model, not mainly because it *mirrors* the concerned social reality, the *explanandum,* but because it enables us to get closer to it, to approximate it. This role assigned to model is undoubtedly modest. The point to be noted is that model, like *verstehen,* is a mere heuristic device. If *verstehen* leads to or smacks of psychologism, one might observe critically, then model-construction method is basically aprioristic. That zero-method is somewhat aprioristic in its orientation is not likely to be contested by Popper. But he is certain to remind the critic that, once the explanatory model is made answerable to social facts and findings, the critical part of apriorism loses its teeth. The point which is not being explicitly stated here is Popper's anti-inductivism, i.e. his well-known view that the starting point of our knowledge is some hypothesis or conjecture and not 'raw' experience. Even the very possibility of raw experience is denied by him. If the denial is seriously meant, one is perfectly within one's logical rights to raise the question: 'Why the devil of psychologism is portrayed in a larger-than-life size form.' If the antidote to psychologism is inherent in psychology or *human* experience itself, the danger to be avoided need not be exaggerated. Once this critical point is accepted, the resort to apriorism underlying the zero-method appears somewhat unwarranted. What seems even more questionable is this: social scientists, by and large, are not interested in importing and using geometrical method in their inquiry. For example, Spinoza's use of geometrical method in expounding his ethical position has scarcely earned him appreciation. On the contrary, he is often being accused of unnecessary methodological artificiality. The Popperian might intervene at this stage and observe in self-defence that Spinoza's basic ethical theorems were not made answerable to social facts and findings. The same apriorism bias is discernible also in Kant's ethical writings. While both Spinoza and Kant are opposed to the use of anthropology in ethical inquiry, the Popperian might argue to press his point viz. Popper's method does not oblige him to be aprioristic in the same sense. In contrast, he favours the idea of testing models against the available anthropological data. The basic data which Popper always refers to are individual human beings, their intentions, dispositions and actions.

Popper's formulation and explication of the zero-method is so designed as to rebut the anticipated criticism against 'methodological essentialism' often

closely associated with apriorism. The apriorist does not take the trouble of spelling out the 'internal texture', the warps and woofs, of social reality. Implicit is the assumption that because of their clarity and distinctness they are so intelligible that they need no spelling out. This essentialist assumption is questioned by the empiricist or the 'methodological nominalist' in Popper. His accent on individuals, their intentions, actions, etc. is meant to show the primacy of the *descriptive* character of social sciences. This is a corollary of anti-essentialism or methodological individualism. The essentialist tries to construct social theories in terms of some such essences as spirit, reason, *nous, logos, geist,* taking them as primitive and without trying to clarify them in terms of something else, which is concrete and empirical. To the falsificationist, i.e. who is engaged in falsifying and not justifying a theory, this approach is understandably unacceptable. Against the methodological individualist one might legitimately raise the point that his 'individuals' are not as concrete as he tries to make them out. After all, the individuals of the *model* situation are, as required by the zero-method, *perfectly* rational. It is on the basis of the assumption of their perfect rationality that their *actual* behaviours, or the extent of the deviation of the said behaviours from the *ideal* ones, are estimated and described. Evidently, the assumption of perfect rationality is unrealistic. 'The perfectly rational man' is an ideal construction, somewhat like an 'essence'.[14]

In fairness to Popper, it has to be admitted that Popper did anticipate the above objection against his position. To quote him:

> ...model is of an abstract or theoretical character, and we are liable to believe that we see it, either within or behind the changing observable events, as a kind of observable ghost or an essence. And it destroys them because our task is to analyse our sociological models carefully in descriptive or nominalist terms, viz. *in terms of individuals,* their attitudes, expectations, relations, etc. a postulate which may be called methodological individualism.[15]

Popper tries to avoid the essentialism ascribed to Aristotle by him. For example, when it is said that man is *essentially* rational, its correctness, given the Aristotelian *definition* of man, cannot be questioned even if he behaves irrationally. In other words, behavioural irrationalism and essential rationalism may well go together. Popper attacks this obviously untenable position by his methodological individualism, which according to him, does not entail denial of societal facts like bank, university and market. But societal fact is *not* an essence of the Aristotelian sort. It is basically institutional in character; a species of social facts; the latter include many objects like action, need or utility which are not societal.

Popper's explanation of his position, however, does not satisfy Winch. He is not prepared to accept the Popperian view 'that social institutions are just explanatory models introduced by the social scientists for their own pur-

poses.'[16] Winch's main objection against the Popperian position is that its externalistic and purely methodological approach ignores the true character of social institutions. Following the later Wittgenstein, he finds himself unable to accept the scientific method to which Popper is committed. Social institutions are not simply invented by people for explanatory purposes'. They are there *interwoven* with the lives of the people. The interwoven character of individuals and social institutions are indicative of what may be called a set of very complex and changing *internal relations*. The ideas and actions of the individuals constituting social institutions are *essential* to the latter. The *physical* property of the earth, gravity, for example, by which the scientist explains the behaviour of a falling body is *external*, i.e. *not essential*, to the scientific mode of explanation. In contrast, when one speaks of marriage, for example, as a social institution, its 'life' consists of lives at least of two persons, husband and wife. The roles of these two persons and their own concepts about the same are *essential* to the very nature of marriage as a social institution. To put it differently, social institutions like marriage, family, etc. are 'independent' of how they are methodologically construed and used by the scientific-minded philosophers like Popper and Hempel. Winch likens social relations to the 'exchange of ideas' and not to 'interaction of forces'. He is critical of Popper who, under the undue influence of the method of natural sciences, apparently fails to take due note of the 'internal relations' which characterize social institutions and processes. The philosophers of his persuasion forget that science itself is *a* form of life among many other forms of life.

One may or may not agree with Winch in respect of his claim that without 'internal relations' we cannot *understand* social institutions. Internality of relations between the members of a family may make it very difficult, if not impossible, for us, the outsiders, to understand what is *going on* in between the members of the family *as* members of family. In other words, if the point of internality of family relation is seriously insisted upon, one wonders whether it would be possible for us to draw a line of distinction between our understanding and *mis*understanding of what is going on within the family. The whole issue may be reviewed in the light of controversy on the nature of relation, which went on for quite a long period early in this century between realists and idealists. The question debated was whether relation was internal or external. One is also likely to recall in this connection Bradley's view that the relational understanding is inherently self-contradictory. We need not revisit this otherwise interesting historical controversy, for the sort of internality of relation which Winch, following Wittgenstein, is speaking of has something distinctly new about it.

The later Wittgensteinean relates understanding to a particular form of life, and, in order to de-mystify this notion, places it under the governance of *rules*. To explain a particular action or social event, it is said, it has to be viewed in the light of its appropriate form of life. Even after the concerned action is

related to what is called its appropriate form of life, the question may be raised whether it has been *rightly or wrongly* related. The other relevant question about the matter pertains to the determination of the *appropriateness* of an explanatory form of life. It is perhaps relatively easy to tackle the second question by stating, for example, that the very problematic nature of an action which needs explanation itself suggests its appropriate form under which the *explanandum* is to be placed and attempt should be made to grasp it. As regards the first question, the situation seems to be more difficult. It is not easy to determine the rightness or wrongness, the correctness or otherwise, of the explanatory relation between an action and its appropriate form of life. In order to solve this problem, one is advised, as is evident from Winch's writings, to make perceptive use of rules as suggested by Wittgenstein. Form of life is not amorphous, structureless or boundaryless. It is said to be rule-governed. Every form of life has its own rules; though very complex, they are in its very nature. However, it is not all easy to determine or decide to what extent the rules of a form of life may be *legitimately* applied. The question may be raised from another angle, viz., how one can be more or less certain about the boundary conditions within which the application of the rules are legitimate and beyond which it is not so. The analogy of game, which is often invoked in this case to clarify the situation, does not seem to be of much help. There are certain games like chess, hockey, cricket, etc. which are well-defined, and their defining authorities are also well recognized. But there are certain other games like 'science' and 'art' which are not very well defined. Though science is ordinarily regarded as very well defined, scrutiny reveals that it is not so. We are often told of some such things as 'there is no *logic* of scientific discovery', 'one has to draw a line of distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification/validation.' These are indicative of the inadequacy or insufficiency of what 'method' or 'rules' of science can possibly deliver to the researcher or the searcher of truth in science. The case is undoubtedly more complex—immensely complex—in the case of art, especially fine arts. In these areas, the newly initiated or learner is straightforwardly told by the master that arts, which involve creativity, are just not teachable. For example, it is not easy to determine which figure of speech should or should not be used in a particular piece of poetry and at which particular place of it. The great poets themselves differ about the necessity or advisability of use of different figures of speech in poetry. Examples may be multiplied. But that is not called for. The crux of the problem may be put in this way, rather in a negative way: because of the alleged unteachability of fine arts should we understand that there is no point, for example, in being an apprentice for a budding artist in the studio of a master artist. Is art apprenticeship a pointless exercise? The answer to the questions, most probably, will be NO. And that shows that by living together the same form of life the budding artist can learn something, something even of creativity, from the master artist. By implication, this shows there are some hidden, almost imperceptible, rules of

teaching and learning operative in the relation between the learner and the teacher.

The *identity* of what is transmitted from the teacher to the learner, what is communicated by one to another cannot be determined abstractly, i.e. in isolation or in *vacuo*. It is within a concrete form of life that this identity of the transmitted or communicated content has to be found out or shown.[17] The person who first discussed the point extensively, though perhaps not very analytically, is Wilhelm Dilthey, the noted historian-cum-philosopher.

Such words as *rule*, *ruly*, *unruly*, etc. are very important for understanding Wittgenstein's notion of rule-governed form of life. Though from *Tractatus* to *Philosophical Investigations* is a long journey, a journey from picturesqueness to fuzziness, from rigidity to flexibility, yet the 'spirit' of science which was markedly there in the first work did not disappear at all from the other work. By *the spirit of science* what we mean is that the eagerness of the thinker or the theorist to *prove* or *show* the *first person's* experience has nothing peculiar or private about it, and that it could be presented to the second or the third person as well without losing the richness of its content. The importance of *rule* and *rule-following* becomes evident in this context, putting all persons—first, second and third—logically or epistemologically at par.

The threat of psychologism, real or imaginary, has been disturbing both the later Wittgensteineans and the followers of his earlier incarnation, i.e. logical empiricists. Writers like Winch and von Wright[18] are philosophically more aware of the inadequacy of scientific method as ordinarily understood in the context of social studies, while logical empiricists like Popper and Hempel are convinced that, with suitable modification, scientific method is adequate to tackle the problems of social studies. To set the record straight, it may perhaps be mentioned in passing that von Wright will not like to be bracketed with Winch, who, he thinks, is unnecessarily preoccupied with the concept of rule, a reminder of the influence of the earlier Wittgenstein on him: nor would Popper like to be clubbed with 'positivists' like Hempel, for he thinks that the latter is not sufficiently sensitive to the problems associated with *individuals* in social studies. Probably it may not be wrong to say that what brings Winch, Popper and Hempel together, notwithstanding their well-known differences, is their common opposition to psychologism, subjectivism and privacy of (first person) understanding, *verstehen* method of Dilthey, for example. They, somewhat unduly disturbed by the ghost of psychology, invoke and solicit the help of laws, law-like generalizations and rules. The same cannot be said about von Wright. In spite of his close association with Wittgenstein and his writings, his view on social studies has been deeply influenced, first, by the problems of practical reasoning and, subsequently, by the hermeneutic ideas of the writers like Charles Taylor and his (European) continental colleagues.

Logical empiricists' preoccupation with methodology largely prevents them from doing justice to the substantive issues of social studies, from going into

their details. Popper's scholarly studies in Aristotle, Plato, Hegel and Marx may be cited as an example against the point. Admittedly, he has gone into the details of their writings. While I agree that this point is true to some extent, the discerning reader is not likely to miss the heavy methodological orientation of Popper's work.[19] The basic concepts—historicism and holism—used by Popper against the above-mentioned past masters, his 'enemies', are largely methodological. He maintains that all of them did believe, in some form or other, that the process of history is law governed and predictable, which, by implication, minimizes the role of freedom and creativity of individuals in society. Apart from historicism, they have been criticized because of their alleged methodological holism, which, in brief, states that social phenomena have to be understood in terms of wholes like class, nation, state, and not in terms of individuals. To Popper's mind, this view of theirs also compromises the importance of efforts and actions of individual human beings in history and society. There is no denying the fact that Popper has extensively quoted lines and paragraphs from the writings of the concerned thinkers to butteress his thesis; but, later on, the supporters of 'the enemies of open society' have also extensively quoted them in favour of the past masters and argued to establish the point that Popper's criticism of them is less than fair, that his references are often out of context and that his approach is marked by a scissor-and-paste bias.

While the basic point against logical empirisists seems to be more or less valid, the critic is required to be cautious in pressing his point further against them. For Mill, in spite of his commitment to inductive methods, speaks of the peculiarity of moral (i.e. social) sciences and necessitating circumspection and imagination in application of the otherwise sound canons of induction. His distaste for deductive logic called 'ratiocination' by him is well known. He thinks that it is of no use for the purpose of discovering new things. His aim is to demolish Kant's claim preferred in favour of intuitionism in the contexts of moral beliefs, logic and mathematics. Even bearing his commitment to induction in mind one has to take note of his realization that it is not adequate to deal with the problems of social sciences. The main reason underlying his caution voiced against induction is the complexity or composite character of causal collocations operative in the social life. To do justice to the complex nature of social causes, he advises the rejection of the 'geometrical or abstract method' and adoption of the 'physical or concrete deductive method' and the 'historical or inverse deductive method'. The second method is said to be used by political economists, and the third one deployed for establishing laws of historical change based on certain universal principles of human nature.[21] While the second and the third methods of Mill are likely to sound a concordant note in the minds of the modern logical empiricists, the latter are unlikely to endorse his not-so-hidden psychologism.

It is not easy to ascertain the exact position held by Mill on the nature and method of social sciences. At different places he seems to defend different

approaches. Sometimes he explicitly speaks of the necessity of taking induc-
tion as abduction, i.e. as a non-demonstrative method of confirming and
corroborating causal generalizations. His *Principles of Political Economy* pre-
sents no specific account of methodology, nor is it sought to be related to his
views expounded in *Logic*. It is no surprise that Whewell and Jevons, following
Kant, criticized Mill and defended the hypothetico-deductive model of scien-
tific explanation. The most disturbing feature of Mill's method seems to be his
instrumentalist view of laws, both natural and social, which are said to be
nothing more than 'inference-tickets' enabling one to infer particular from
particular. Jevons criticized him that his induction does not provide a type
of logical inference but merely a marriage between 'the hypothesis and
experiments'. It is not only Popper but many other contemporary philosophers
of natural, life and social sciences who have pointed out the inadequacy and
eclecticism of Mill's methodology. For example, Medawar observes: '...the
chief weakness of Millian induction was its failure to distinguish between the
acts of mind involved in discovery and in proof.'[22] That by laws alone new
facts, particularly in social sciences, cannot be discovered *and* proved is now
being increasingly realized by empiricists, and this realization is reflected in
their recognition of the liberal roles of description and narration in social
sciences. For example, Hempel admits that empirical laws can enable us to
have at best a *sketch* of social explanation and not explanation in its full-
fledged form. The generality of laws is bound to have a straight-jacketing
effect on constructed explanation. To minimize this miseffect the explainer
has to introduce more and more of descriptive details in the initially proposed
explanation sketch.

The scientifically acceptable explanation-sketch needs to be filled out by
more specific statements; but it points to the direction where these state-
ments are to be found; and concrete research may tend to confirm or infirm
those inductions.... The filling out process required by an explanation
sketch will in general effect a gradual increase in the precision of the
formulations involved; but at any stage of this process, those formula-
tions will have some empirical import....[23]

Hempel's concept of explanation-sketch is noteworthy for two reasons. First,
it recognizes the importance, besides laws, of description (of concerned initial
conditions). Secondly, it points out the *essential incompleteness* of every
empirical explanation. The incompleteness is twofold: the laws involved in
any explanation are too numerous to be specifically mentioned and the initial
conditions have to be chosen *slectively*, leaving many of them out of the
explanatory account. The result is what Hempel calls 'explanatory closure'.
    The basic idea underlying the concept of explanation-sketch may be found
in Popper's conception of situational logic. According to Popper, the causes
as recognized by social studies are in fact *situations*.[24] While, in social sciences,

the *generality* of laws or *regularity* of law-like statements are of prime import-
ance, in social studies, in contrast, it is the *specificity* of the circumstances,
i.e. initial conditions, attending the action or event to be explained that
receives the main attention of social scientists. Logically speaking, the expla-
natory conditions cited by them are *not sufficient*. The sketchy or incomplete
character of social explanation is because of this non-satisfaction of the logical
requirement of sufficiency. Speaking from the ontological point of view, one
can always say that explanatory conditions are limitless, boundless and in-
exhaustible. In between any *two* statements which describe explanatory social
conditions, many other, logically infinite, number of statements can be added
or inserted, increasing thereby the explanatory power of convincing character
of the concerned explanation. The point has been persuasively argued, among
others, by Danto[25] and Munz.[26]
    Popper's concept of situational logic has been influenced by Weber. In some
of his earlier writings, Weber gives the distinct impression of his commitment
to the methodological unity of natural and social sciences. At that time the
basic concept he made use of is *ideal type* which is the logical predecessor of
Popper's *situational logic*.[27] In his later writings, he shows his eagerness to
preserve the peculiar or unique character of social event, configuration and
constellation of human actions and institutions. He criticizes the naturalist
bias to highlight the role of laws in social sciences.

Firstly...the knowledge of social laws is not knowledge of social reality but
is rather one of the various aids used by our minds for attaining this end.
Secondly,...knowledge of *cultural* events is inconceivable except on a basis
of the *significance* which the concrete constellation of reality have for us in
certain *individual* concrete *situations*. In *which* sense and in *which situations*
this is the case is not revealed to us by any law; it is decided according to
the value-ideas in the light of which we view 'culture' in each individual
case.[28]

Recognition of the primacy of the importance of uniqueness or concreteness
of social phenomena is the main point on which the anti-naturalist social
scientists differ from the pro-naturalist ones. Perhaps this difference may be
further refined by pointing out:

(a) That some social scientists, who recognize the importance of the *con-
crete* character of social phenomena, remind us, at the same time, of the
logical necessity of recognizing the role, though secondary, of laws or
generalizations; and
(b) That there are others who emphatically deny the very role of 'abstract
laws' in the structure of explanation of the 'concrete' social events.

In the former category one might count Weber and the authors of the

conceptions of *situational logic* and *explanation-sketch* and in the later category are found such writers as Dilthey, Croce, Collingwood, Oakeshott and Dray.

The issue to be settled between the different, if not rival, claims is whether the difference between 'scientific' explanation and 'humanistic' explanation is a matter of degree or of kind. The pro-naturalist predictably affirms that, in order to be scientific, all inquiries and explanations have to follow certain definite methods and rules. Though at times this claim is formulated, as we have noticed earlier, in somewhat modest form, its basic point is never given up. Ambivalence on the issue has been expressed earlier by Hume and Mill, particularly the former, on the ground that justification of scientific explanation, if asked for, cannot be conclusively provided in terms of 'theories'; ultimately, the decision on the matter is to be obtained from 'practices'. Implicitly, what is conceded here is the inadequacy of law-based and theory-oriented explanation and, what is more positive, the necessity of recognizing the importance of the verdict of *practical* experience.

Of late, this point, i.e. inadequacy of 'scientific' method in the field not only of human sciences but also of natural sciences, has been highlighted by some such so-called methodological anarchists like Feyerabend and Kuhn. In a sense, they also endorse the classical empiricist's accent on *practice* or *sociological* verdict for the purpose of deciding the validity or otherwise of a view or explanation. The tough-minded philosopher of science feels alarmed by this ultra-liberal or anarchist methodological stance, for he thinks that this brings the question of validity perilously close to social or at best professional acceptability. The larger question at stake on the point is whether logic or methodology can unilaterally deliver the last verdict regarding the validity of an explanation or a conclusion presented by human or even natural sciences. The submission, which is being implicitly made here, is that by scientific method or logic what we do or can possibly achieve is *theoretical* formulation and legitimization of our *practical* consensus or decision. Given this view, the traditional distinction between epistemology and sociology of knowledge tends to get blurred. The sociologist of knowledge or the methodological anarchist does not feel at all disturbed when this argument is pressed against him. His response is rather clear and basically *historical* in character. Nothing in the realm of natural and social sciences, no explanation whatsoever, he argues, has enjoyed perpetual lease of life. Theories and explanations, however respectable and seemingly of permanent standing they might be, are questioned and modified in course of history in the light of new findings or reasonings or both.

The primacy of practice in determination of validity of the conclusions of social sciences has been defended from another point of view, which is marked by both (conservative) empiricism and a sort of (philosophical) idealism. For example, Oakeshott finds that for the purpose of understanding human conduct theoretical abstractions—scientific, psychological or sociological—are of dubious help. The 'goings-on' in ethics, jurisprudence, economics, etc. can

hardly be rendered intelligible by the 'engagement of understanding' equipped with scientific apparatus. The two 'instruments of science' often engaged in improving our understanding of human actions and beliefs, etc. are psychology and sociology. Some psychologists fashion their theories in the idioms of neuro-physiology, biology and genetics, and hope to achieve a degree of precision found in physics and chemistry, for example. There are some others who propose to go, introspectively or psycho-analytically, into the goings-on of the human psyche. But this exercise turns out to be more metaphorical than real. What is basically relied on is *external* evidence or co-relate of internal or ghostly events. The outcome of this psychological enterprise is suspect. Motives of actions or the reasons for beliefs cannot be inferred from psychological causal mechanisms. The actions and utterances of *reflective consciousness* cannot be understood in terms of 'their' underlying psychological process. To think that it can be is a categorial confusion. 'Human conduct, an exhibition of intelligence, cannot be understood as a response to what. . .are declared to be 'psychic needs'; beliefs, actions and utterances cannot be, or be the effects of. . ."ego function".[29] An external account of the deliverances of reflective consciousness is bound to be abstract and misleading.

Evidently, Oakeshott attaches great importance to the concept of reflective consciousness and its deliverances or articulations. If egology from 'within' cannot capture their richness and concreteness, sociology from without cannot perform the job either. For sociology is also committed to *theorize* human conduct 'abstractly' in terms of relatively durable conditions under which it is placed and studied. The relations between human beings, though socially conditioned to a certain extent, have in them a *reflective surplus* which is not amenable to the network of the attending conditions and their supporting postulates or presuppositions. The sociologist's main mistake consists in conceiving society in the analogy of a scientific *system*. The so-called structure of society is nothing but a theoretical construct. Its 'functions' are the results of theoretical networking of *discrete* human actions, beliefs, etc. In brief, sociology cannot present anything more than an *idealized* picture of concrete social life marked by its ceaseless reflectivity and its expression in practices. Oakeshott is strongly opposed to abstract theorization. The theorist is basically a 'prisoner' of his creation, and can hardly capture and 'imprison' social reality within it. Imaginatively exploiting Plato's metaphor of the cave, Oakeshott likens his *reflective* theorist to an escaped prisoner, an escaped cave-dweller who having gone out of the cave can get back to it and tell the dwellers of their imprisonment, the nature of their position in the cave. In other words, when a *conditional* understanding becomes reflectively aware of the conditions under which it is placed and is working, the effects of the conditions on it get weaker and weaker, and, consequently, the concerned understanding becomes more and more unconditional and free. If Oakeshott's line of reasoning is correct, then both psychology of society and sociology of knowledge are of little use in social studies. What we need most and can rely

upon best is reflective method; the error and abstractness of its explanation may be corrected and concretized by further reflection.

One might critically point out that Oakeshott's fierce defence of reflective method, methodologically speaking, is extremely conservative. In order to defend autonomy of our inquiries into social sciences or to use his expression 'understanding of human conduct', we are always obliged to fall back upon our own resources available within the understanding itself; and in that case the needs of predictions or reflections which are not infrequent in social studies like economics and history can hardly be met. Reflection throws us back or takes us to what is already there or given in us in the forms of experience, expectation, tradition, habit and valuation. Any doubt about them, if Oakeshott's argument is sound, is either a result of theoretical abstraction or excursion which is in most cases pointless, or it has to be removed only by further reflection or experience. In any case, to avoid *mis*understanding of human conduct, we are obliged to remain close to, if not immersed in, experience. Oakeshott may point out that our social experience is reflective, i.e. not blind, and, therefore, it can turn on and also against itself. This self-critical character of the claim of experience is not very clear. Secondly, 'engagement of understanding', unless it has an inherent power of *dis*engagement within itself, it is difficult to say how it can prove effectively critical of its own workings and achievements. If, on the other hand, allowance is made for *dis*engagement, it is implicit that some concession is being made to the investigative demand for abstraction and at least the minimal form of formalism. In his eagerness to avoid the extremes of psychologism and sociologism, Oakeshott is landed in a concept of understanding which has to be uncritically presupposed or, one might say, is only uncritically available.

Reflection is there in social studies not only methodologically but also substantively. That reflection as a method is of use to the understanding of human actions is rooted in the fact that social studies are substantively concerned with human actions. Human actions are meaningful as performances of, and, therefore, attributable to some intelligent agents. Implicit in the notion of agency are (*a*) *intelligence,* (*b*) awareness of the situation around him, and (*c*) the presence of other intelligent persons (*d*) in the situation. Once we recognize these basic aspects of social studies, it would be easy for us to appreciate Hayek's view that the data of social sciences are *subjective* in character.

> In fact, most of the objects of social or human actions are not objective facts in the special narrow sense in which this term is used by the Sciences and contrasted to 'opinion' and they cannot at all be defined in physical terms. As far as human actions are concerned, the things are what the acting people think they are.[30]

Following this view Hayek is prepared to recognize 'a thing' as cosmetic, if it is regarded so by the other concerned people, although we may regard it other-

wise. Thus, a thing becomes a social datum. Strictly speaking, we cannot get into the 'minds' of other people, and we are obliged to 'interpret the phenomena in the light of our own minds...[and] (t)his account of interpretation of human actions may not be always successful, yet it is the only basis on which we ever understand what we call other peoples' intentions, or the meaning of their actions'. The basic point to which Hayek draws our attention is: without assuming mind like ours around us or we cannot speak intelligibly about it. Even if the mind we propose to speak about differs from ours, this difference can be meaningfully expressed in language or behaviour only on the assumption of the similarity between the concerned minds. Evidences pertaining to other minds are admissible on the assumption that these are expressions of some other agents' minds *like* ours. If some minds turn out to be altogether different from ours and the categories used by them are found to be absolutely alien, then their actions would appear meaningless and bizarre to us, confounding our understanding.

Hayek finds that the said *subjective* character is evident from the data both of history and social sciences. Historical understanding is based on the community or similarly of the categories of understanding used by historians and those whose actions are data of history. In the absence of this community or similarity of categories of understanding, 'history ceases to be human history'. The same may be said of the nature of economics.

> All this stands out most clearly in that among the social sciences whose theory has been most highly developed economics. And it is probably no exaggeration to say that every important advance in economic theory during the last hundred years was a further step in the consistent application of subjectivism.... The history of any particular community indeed shows that as human knowledge changes the same material thing may represent quite different economic categories.... Unless we can understand what the acting people mean by their actions any attempt to explain them, i.e. to subsume them under rules to connect similar situations with similar actions, are bound to fail.[32]

Hayek, himself a distinguished economist, has been evidently influenced by the views of other economists like Ludwig von Mises, who maintain that economics, like ethics, is a praxiological inquiry. This view clearly clashes with the nature of economics defended by the positive economists like Friedman and Lipsey mentioned earlier. Hayek thinks that those social scientists who have blindly followed the method of natural sciences in the field of social sciences are counter-revolutionaries, and their works have proved counterproductive. In this respect Hayek's view stands very close to Oakeshott's. But it is very doubtful whether Oakeshott would endorse the subjectivism championed by economists like von Mises and Hayek. Even Popper who is otherwise an admirer of Hayek is unlikely to support the subjectivism of

praxiological economists. This will be clear from his preference for zero-method or situational logic. But the abstractness and externality which characterize Popper's and Hayek's approaches are sure to be rejected by Oakeshott, for neither of them feels drawn towards the reflective method of him.

Understanding is always shadowed by the possibility of misunderstanding. In a sense, one might say, misunderstanding is almost inherent in understanding if the object of it is human action. To speak of absolute certainty in the context of one's (or one society's) understanding of another (society) sounds rather dogmatic. Neither Popper (philosopher) nor Hayek (economist) nor Oakeshott (political theorist) is unaware of the possibility of cognitive uncertainty attending factual claims of different social studies, but their remedial prescriptions—remedy for almost unavoidable scepticism—are different. It is not clear to one how von Mises may be criticized both as an apriorist and a defender of *verstehen* method at the same time. To quote his view to the effect that 'the ultimate yardstick of an economic theorem's correctness or incorrectness is solely reason unaided by experience' seems to be somewhat out of context. The affinity of Hayek's view to von Mises's on the point is an added point to be taken into account. While it is pointed out[33] that neither Carl Menger nor Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk is the main patron saint of the modern Austrian School of Economics and that the school's orientation is primarily due to Hayek, the above criticism becomes additionally suspect, both historically and conceptually. The critical reference of Samuelson on the point to Menger, Robbins, Frank Knight and von Mises in the same breadth does not improve the situation in the least. One may be prepared to accept the historical verdict that some theories are refuted, that others simply fade away or are forgotten and that von Mises's belong to the second category. But the question of testing theories by verification or falsification remains a live or kicking issue. Hayek's criticism of scientism and methodological holism shows, among other things, his awareness of the need of testing, continuously testing, economic theories. This attitude is quite alien to apriorism ascribed to him and his mentor von Mises. Except in respect of his consistent opposition to subjectivism, Popper's commitment to falsificationism, as an antidote to apriorism, is too well known to be spelt out in details. Oakeshott's prescription is meant for using both against apriorism and crass empiricism. His method of reflection and 'adventure in self-enactment' aim at removing misunderstanding or improving the quality of understanding, eliminating abstractness, imprecision, etc.

To satisfy the critic or the interlocutor regarding the correctness or otherwise, traditionally speaking, two broad possible ways out are constantly mentioned. One may be called rationalist-holist, and Hegel may be cited as its chief exponent; the other possible method of combating scepticism is associated with empiricism, the chief forms of which are verificationism, falsificationism and operationalism. According to the Hegelian, nothing short of the

whole (social) reality can completely eliminate our uncertainty about a part of it. The interim exercise which we are called upon to undertake in order to get out, at least partially, from social scepticism is to be engaged in understanding, exploring the possibilities of understanding, or 'adventure in self-enactment'. These concepts are closely associated, as noted earlier, with the names of Croce, Collingwood and Oakeshott. While the first two writers, following Hegel rather closely, speak of the possibility of capturing or grasping historical or cultural universals through human thought, Oakeshott is more cautious about the point, and that is perhaps due to the influence of native empiricism on him.

The Hegelian, i.e. rationalist-holist, method is not the only, perhaps not even the most acceptable, answer to social scepticism. The other method which now seems to be more respectable now is empirical testing, accepting some 'bits' of experience as too basic to be questioned. The basic building-block of verificationism, falsificationism and operationalism is identical, viz. belief in the existence of some incontrovertible deliverances of experience. If the Hegelian basic building block is monolithic, i.e. *whole* itself, the empiricist's main building block is some statements variously characterized as 'basic', 'simple', 'protocol', etc.

Of late, the third way out, way out of social scepticism, is being suggested by the exponents of the hermeneutic method. Some of them, Charles Taylor,[34] for example, draw their inspiration partly from Hegel and Dilthey and partly from the writings of such thinkers as Gadamer,[35] Paul Ricoeur and Habermas. Broadly speaking, they are in favour of the method of interpretation, reinterpretation, of human actions and events—the basic stuff of social reality. To them the object of social studies are like a text or text-analogue, which needs interpretation, re-interpretation, for eliciting, their inexhaustible meanings.

To illustrate the significance of the notion of meaning we may advisedly turn to political science, a leading social study of the time. But before that let us have a look at what 'meaning' means in the social and political contexts. It is essentially predicated of human action, individual or collective. Meaning of every action has two basic aspects, subjective and objective, i.e. *how* it is viewed by the agent himself (or agents themselves) and *how* it is viewed and reviewed by other human beings. The question of *how* is of primary importance and that of *what* (of action) is of secondary sort. Action is like a text. The question like 'what it is about' cannot be answered without mentioning or implicitly assuming how it is being interpreted and for whom. The science of interpretation or hermeneutics has, of course, some or other object before it. But it should not be taken in an 'essentialist' and 'absolutist' sense. There is nothing fixed or permanent about it. Because of its openness to interpretations, interpretations by different human beings and for different human beings, it undergoes changes and modifications. But to ascertain the correctness of the intended meanings of the interpretations the latter are required to be *coherent*, free from contradiction. To put it more modestly: the

expressions used for interpretation, notwithstanding their minor or seeming discrepancy, must convey a *sense*. Implicit in the notion of '*a* sense' is the notion of the *situation*. Unless the interpreters, the rules of interpretation and the persons to whom the interpretation is addressed are in the same situation or *form of life*, the act of interpretation and its result are likely to prove unproductive.

In India one finds that the Vedas have been interpreted differently. To some these are hymns—beautiful poetry; to some their import is basically religious; to some other interpreters these hymns are seminal philosophy, lending themselves to different or alternative interpretations. The founding fathers of the six (*āstika*) different systems of philosophy claim to have followed the teachings of the Vedas. Their claims make no sense unless it is assumed that the same texts may be differently interpreted. Some sociologists of knowledge like Kosambi suggest that underlying the figures of speech of the Vedas lies an account of Aryan migration from the Central Asia to the Indo-Gangetic valley. Some writers like Sri Aurobindo have tried to bring all these interpretations together and present them as a coherent spiritual whole.

In Europe it is perhaps Vico who in his *New Science* tried first to spell out the importance of interpretation in order to deconstruct and reconstruct the ancient texts of the main two European epics, *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. It is of considerable significance to recall that Vico was presenting his *New Science* in the heyday of Newtonian Science (1728–44). The certainty ascribed to natural science, Vico pointed out, is not to be found in any human science. By implication he affirmed that, if natural science is claimed to be certain, it cannot be simultaneously claimed to be human as well. For man, be he a natural scientist or a social scientist, cannot totally disengage himself from his work, theoretical or practical. All sciences, natural and human, are always open to new interpretations.

The question to be explored is: where in the quest for certainty rationalism and empiricist fail, can hermeneutics succeed? The answer depends on how we define the aim of interpretation offered by the hermeneutician. If the aim is formulated in a modest way, admitting that man cannot create or produce anything more certain than he is about himself, the problem perhaps gets dissolved or at any rate diluted. In fact, this is how Vico defined the aim of his new science of interpretation.[36] What we should try to achieve in and by interpretation is clarity and coherence of understanding. There is no end to this clarity and coherence; these may always be increased.

Political science as a social study is concerned with the nature and function of polity or the state. Various conceptions of the state have been framed. The most important ones among them portray it either as *societas*, civil association, or *universitas*, purposive association. The former have been highlighting the individuality and uniqueness of the subjects and their purposes; the latter ones emphasize the unity of the purpose of the human *association* as a *whole*, as a *unitary* whole. According to Oakeshott, the modern European political

consciousness is polarized and working under the tension generated by the said two basic conceptions of the state. Left to himself, he finds no basic antagonism between the two. Such paired concepts as capitalism/socialism, left/right, liberal/conservative, etc. make hardly any sense to him. He is rather inclined to believe 'that hidden in human character, there are two powerful and contrary dispositions, (aligned to two different conceptions of the State), neither strong enough to defeat or to put to flight the other'.[36] In other words, the duality of self and societal whole are said to be native to human nature. Obviously this view of the state clashes with the Hegelian view on the nature of the state. According to the latter, the state has a life of its own; it is a living and moving spirit. By implication it undervalues the importance of the individual. The point has been critically highlighted by such thinkers as Hobhouse, Popper and MacIver. To quote the last-named on the point:

…viewed as an interpretation of the unity of nature of the State, [the Hegelian] conceptions, expressed in terms of a single mind or person or organism, are exposed to fatal objections. In the first place they confuse the State and the community…[secondly], it is a logical error to seek to interpret the unity of a whole as though it were exactly correspondent to the unity of its members or components…the practical danger of this illogical identification lies in the mystical interpretation of the end or purpose of the social system.[37]

It is clear that MacIver firmly maintains that purposes can be truly ascribed only to *individual* human beings and *not* to corporate bodies or legal persons like the state or association. The individualistic undertone of the view is unmistakable. Extending this view further in the direction of individualism one gets to the notion of the 'minimal' state defended, among others, by Nozick. He says:

…this morally favoured [minimal] State, the only morally legitimate State, the only morally tolerable one…is the one that best realises the utopian aspirations of untold dreams and visionaries…the minimal State treats us as inviolate individuals who may not be used in certain ways by others as means or tools or instruments or resources; it treats us as persons having individual rights with the dignity this constitutes.'[38]

The conception of the minimal state is opposed not only by Marxists but also by welfarists, who find that the minimal role of the state, under the present day circumstances, is clearly a stance of neutrality in favour of the economically and politically stronger sections of the people. As the result of neutrality or the minimal intervention of the state in a situation, where unequals are locked in a battle of interests and wits, the pooerer and the weaker turn out to be the main losers or malficiaries. It is on this ground that some writers like Rawls and Taylor, who are not socialist, favour a more positive role of

the state. One of the principles of justice (Difference Principle) advocated by Rawls is that, when the opportunities available to all people are not equal, the state is morally called upon to intervene *most* in favour of the *weakest*, *more* is favour of the *weaker*, and so on. Apparently, this principle is violative of the principle of equality associated with the popular notion of democracy. But the questions remain: should the state treat unequals equally? If it does so, does it weaken or strengthen democracy?

The point may be raised at this stage: whether the political scientist, true to the basic tenets of his discipline, is expected to raise the question of ought or value in social sciences. The demand for value-neutrality, on scrutiny, seems to be unreflective and unfounded. It is a legacy unwittingly taken over by the political scientist from the method of natural sciences. This is rather disturbing when natural sciences themselves are being increasingly interpreted today by many writers like M. Polanyi, N.R. Hanson and P. Feyerabend as basically humanistic in their inspiration, if not in execution as well. Though many among the social scientists enthusiastically come forward to undertake the responsibility of freeing political science from value-considerations, they fail to discharge their proclaimed responsibility. Rightly understood, the undertaking itself is misconceived. The issue has been persuasively argued by Taylor:

...(T)he supposedly culture-free political science which models its independence of history on the paradigm of natural science, is in fact deeply rooted in Western culture. What is worse, its roots are in one of the warring tendencies in Western political culture. So that it is not only unaware of its origins but also deeply and unconsciously partisan. It weighs in on behalf of atomist and instrumentalist politics against the rival orientations to community and citizen self-rule.[39]

It is clear that Taylor's concept of culture is value loaded. But one is not persuaded of the correctness of his conclusion that the demand for value-free political science is rooted only in Western culture. In every country of the world today one witnesses the 'warring tendencies'. In this respect the export and import of ideas and ideologies between the East and the West are rather unrestricted. If at present Western ideas and ideologies are proving more influential in the world, this is more due to economics than to anything else. Taylor's reference in this context to 'non-moral and non-responsible uses of power, as a part of 'traditional Indian reflection on Statecraft' seems rather misleading. The Indian word for *political science* is *rājnīti,—rāj* stands for king or ruler and *nitī* for principle. So it is difficult to comprehend why politics should be construed as non-moral in the Indian context. It is true that often the Indian word used for politics is *rāṣtranīti—rāṣtra* meaning state. Even the term *statecraft* does not convey the intended sense of *rājnīti* or *rāṣtranīti* or *rāṣtradharma*. Principles or morals (*dharma*) are in most cases undoubtedly culture bound. But the value-components of culture inject an ele-

ment of transcendence in culture. And that makes exchanges and transactions between different cultures possible and easy. Only in a very limited sense political science or for that reason any social study can be value free. Every culture has its own values or ideals. But that does not mean those are peculiar to a particular culture. Many different cultures share more or less the same overlapping sets of values. Justice, equality, fraternity are *recognised* by different peoples, although for different historical or ideological reasons they may not practise or follow the same in an identical manner. In the context of sociology, a sister discipline of political science, it has been pertinently observed that 'the only clear and indubitable sense in which sociology can be value-free is that in dealing with value-facts the sociologist should never suffer his own valuations to intrude into or affect his presentation of the valuation which are registered in the facts themselves.'[40] While the pertinence of this observations need not be questioned, one wonders whether one can actually suspend one's valuation while dealing with 'value-facts'.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. J.A. Schumpeter, *History of Economic Analysis*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 6-7.
2. Richard G. Lipsey, *An Introduction to Positive Economics*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972, p.8. See also p. xiv.
3. Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, ed. and introd. C.J. Arthur, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1976, pp. 46-47.
4. Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974, p. 141. See also chaps. 6 and 13.
5. David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*. ed. Charles W. Hendel, Ind.: Indianapolis, 1955; sec. iv, vii.
6. Karl Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957.
7. Carl G. Hempel, *Aspects of Scientific Explanations*, New York: Free Press (Collier-Macmillan), 1965.
8. Hans Reichenbach, *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy*, Berkely: University of California Press, 1951, p. 84.
9. Emile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, New York: Free Press (Collier-Macmillan), 1966, p. 14.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.
11. Max Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*. trans. & ed. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, New York: Free Press, 1964.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 176-77.
13. Marianne Weber, *Max Weber: A Biography*, trans. & ed. Harry Zohn, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975, p. 677.
14. D.P. Chattopadhyaya, *Individuals and Societies: A Methodological Inquiry* (2nd edn), Calcutta: Scientific Book Agency, 1975, chap. 1.
15. Karl Popper, *op. cit.*, sec. 29.
16. Peter Winch, *The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973, p. 119.
17. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953, pp. 1, 225, 237.
18. G.H. von Wright, *Explanation and Understanding*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press,

1971 pp. 27, 48, 135-45; see also his (privately circulated) *An Intellectual Autobiography*, 1973, pp. 9-10, 27, 33.

19. Karl R. Popper, *Open Society and Its Enemies* (2 vols.) London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1944.

20. In this connection, one is referred to the writings, among others, of I.C. Crombie, Charles Taylor and Maurice Cornforth.

21. Mark Blaug, *The Methodology of Economics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 69-73.

22. P.B. Medawar, *The Art of the Soluble: Creativity and Originality in Science*, London: Penguin Books, 1967, p. 133.

23. Carl G. Hempel, *Aspects of Scientific Explanation*, New York: Free Press (Collier-Macmillan), 1965, p. 238. See also pp. 423-24.

24. Karl R. Popper, *Open Society and Its Enemies*, vol. ii, p. 97. See also Popper, 1957. p. 145.

25. A.C. Danto, *Analytic Philosophy of History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965, p. 241.

26. Peter Munz, *Philosophical Quarterly*, pp. 199-202.

27. J.W.N. Watkins's 'Ideal Types and Historical Explanation' in H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck (eds.), *Readings in the Philosophy of Science*, New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1952, pp. 714-16.

28. Max Weber, 1949, pp. 80-81.

29. Michael Oakeshott, *On Human Conduct*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975, pp. 22-23.

30. F.A. Hayek, *The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason*, New York: Free Press (Collier-Macmillan), 1964, pp. 26-27.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

33. Blaug, *op. cit.*, 1982, pp 90-93.

34. Charles Taylor, *Philosophy and the Human Sciences*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

35. H.G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, New York: Cross Road, 1982.

36. D.P. Chattopadhyaya, 1975, pp. 127-28.

37. R.M. MacIver, *The Modern State*, London: Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 451-53.

38. Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974, pp. 333-34.

39. Charles Taylor, 1985, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

40. R.M. MacIver and Charles H. Page, *Society: An Introductory Analysis*, London: Macmillan. 1971, p. 617.

Time and identity

A.W.J. HARPER
University of London, London

Any event x occurring within a certain time span may not only be identified and named, but may retain that identity indefinitely through a series of subsequent events. Any particular individual event, as, for example, an athletic contest (the Olympics), a battle (Trafalgar) or a natural phenomenon (Vesuvius), which has already suffered actual occurrence and which may be said to have lasted for either a relatively short or long duration, may thus be readily designated by means of a suitably applicable symbolism, employed by common consent, as this or that particular event.

If, however, having named a given event, we now symbolize this same event by yet another name, the first identity of that particular event is not thereby impaired as long as we are agreed that the symbolism assigned is to refer synonymously and interchangeably to one and the same event. In fact, in order for the event itself to be identified as an individual and actually existing event, it must at least be identical with itself, shown in symbols as $Ix = x$ or simply Ixx. To employ a second variable y along with x in referring to the event and now to symbolize the event as Ixy need not in any way change the identity of the event. While Ixx is read as 'x is identical with itself', Ixy is read as 'x is identical with y', where we designate the same and original event by means of the variable terms x and y which differ only in outward form but are understood to be identical and synonymous in meaning.

Repeated reference to the original event through time will not destroy the identity of the event, and the recall of any known event at a given moment may, on the other hand, tend to confirm it in the mind of the individual concerned. Suppose, the event which we have designated as Ixx is identical with itself at some attributable moment m. We might then go on to say that we can also know this event Ixx at moment n or at moment o, or we could know the same event Ixy at m, n or o, or Ixz at m, n or o and so on. Our symbolism is such that it gives assurance that in every case the identity of the event itself is preserved, whatever new guise it may be asked to assume. But, since it is more convenient to make use of number subscripts in depicting events in a time series, the event Ixx (or Ixy) may be referred to as identically the same event remaining in existence through its accompanying time moments m_1, $m_2...m_N$, so that the event in question may be thus identified through any selected range of moments.

While any identified event may exist throughout some specified time range, the converse does not hold; that is to say, a time moment identified as such cannot remain uniquely identified or identical with itself throughout a subsequent series of events which are themselves associated in a time series. For

I shall try to make clear that it is not possible for any allegedly given one-time moment to retain its separate identity throughout further experienced time instants or moments.

If we take any given time moment and attempt to identify it in a symbolism, calling it m, this one-time moment, in order to be specified as one individual moment, must at least be identical with itself; in symbols this may be shown as Imm. From what we have said above, any identity should be able to bear its synonym, enabling us to identify the moment in question by some other agreed-upon symbol, as, for example, m_1 or m_2. Since both m and m_1 (or m_2) will now symbolize as well as synonymize this one-time moment, we should be allowed to identify the moment by writing it as Imm_1 (or Imm_2) as well as Imm. In employing two or more different terms for the one-time moment which we claim to have selected, we changed our symbolism in form only, but in so doing should not in any way have altered the identity of the original time moment m. Imm is read as 'the time moment m which is identical with itself', and Imm_1 is read as 'the time moment m which is identical with the time moment m_1', where m and m_1 are synonymous terms representing the originally specified time moment.

But this will not do. For we have one-time moment identified both as Imm and Imm_1, where m_1 is not only a symbol in synonymy but happens to be also another new time moment. The result is that we would have two different time moments identified as one and the same time moment, a situation which we should hardly find acceptable in ordinary human experience. Although we might have imagined that the moment Imm could retain its original identity Imm through Imm_1 and beyond, it has nevertheless failed to do so, and, if it cannot hold such identity, it apparently has none to hold. The identity designated as Imm fails to identify when taken in synonymy, because when we attempt to fulfil this requirement we obtain not only the originally selected moment designated as m but also the moment m identified as other moments m_1 or m_2 as well. The series $Imm_1...m_N$ would call for one and the same moment to endure through all different moments to infinity; and if this sort of thing obtained in experience, all the time-events of reality would seem to occur together and to last endlessly. Our attempt to secure the identity of the original time moment as such would necessitate our saying that all extended time moments should become parts of one-time moment, specifying that the moments we ordinarily take to be successive should oelong to some one moment. Again, we may say that we cannot identify one-time moment synonymously without merging all other moments into the originally selected time moment. For purposes of identification, any one individual time moment will not endure throughout time as one and the same moment. Time may assist in the formation of things and events, but it possesses no individuating form of its own.

If we are satisfied that what we have usually called time moments cannot be identified, there, therefore, can be no succession of time moments; if any

one moment cannot be fully identified it cannot be succeeded by something else where there is nothing identifiable to support the succession. Ordinarily, we think that we experience time moments in succession, but what is more likely is that we experience a given complex of separable identities, such that for any one of them a changeless identity must necessarily be assumed. Any experienced present moment may conceivably shelter an infinity of moments which the finite human consciousness is powerless to probe or, indeed, even fully to appreciate, so that we can never hope to consider as an entity, or capture into the terminology of a symbolism, whatever it is that we claim to experience as individuated time. Any attempt to do this results in the fact that we have not expressed the time of subjective experience at all, but it means rather that we have employed the universal language of an epistemology whereby, in place of a private experience, we find ourselves in possession of a prime semantic device, which may be utilized to signify the scope of the variables of an expressed schema or formula.

Entities which are considered to be cumulative, whether they are things or processes, lend themselves to symbolization and also to synonymization, whereas the time which knows no boundaries has no such capacity. It might also be noticed that, since any symbol that purports to represent an entity must be assumed to remain the same symbol throughout the various written or spoken instances of that symbol, not only the thing which inheres in time but also the symbol that is employed to represent the thing may be assumed to have an identity of its own which time by itself can never possess. Time that is experienced, we have maintained, can never be meaningfully identified, whereas the more substantial entities of our experience can be so identified at the expense of time. Time is anonymous, and, if expressible at all, will be expressible in terms of only a token symbolism.

The foregoing has attempted to show that no moment is able to retain its identity either co-extensively with itself or successively in time, so that no time moment, therefore, may be said to endure in or through time itself. Further, if time itself or any part of time lacks identity save according to its immediate presence among presently given and intuited phenomena, time itself as experienced can never be said to be intuited except as it is given in accompaniment with whatever intuition may be given in the presentation of some object. Psychologically, experienced time can be represented in no other way except as it appears in association with something that is already present, nor can time be meaningfully symbolized except as it is annotated in conjunction with symbols that are already given. Any symbol which may be assigned to time has no significance beyond something other than time that is taken to have some kind of existence which persists, even though this permanence must be assumed to be outside of time altogether as well as within the scope that is designated by time; otherwise we could have no sameness or stability in the objects which we have come to perceive and to know. Designated time in the employ of a symbolism would thus seem to be selective not of the object

itself but only of the scope of whatever it is that freely delimits an object in its possible or actual realization.

We are, therefore, justified in saying that time, because it cannot be identified in separation from something which endures sufficiently to allow some form of substitution, must itself be inexpressible. Any function of time in so far as it may be given significantly in communicable discourse is thus reducible to little more than the expressive function of language, or more specifically, to an undefined primitive term or prime universal indicative only of the range of variables under consideration. The time operator may be selective of scope or suggestive of ordering, and is utilized as a basic criterion underlying even those terms of language that serve to qualify and to quantify. Time is suggestive of no reality, of no real or distinct entity; and although it may be used in a sentence as a grammatically autonomous term and even though we profess to experience time in consciousness as something that is significant to experience, it can never be represented other than formally. Within the framework of meaningful language, time's symbol is an expression expressing nothing and has only purely formal rather than objective reference. Epistemologically, time turns out at best to be a term having only syncategorematic properties, serving in a kind of eponymous capacity to other terms and to symbolized events, suggestive of a range that is potentially both unspecified and limitless.

The grammarian has so thoroughly indoctrinated us with a plurality of tenses that we find ourselves repeatedly employing a grammatical construction to render a philosophical or scientific thought, with results that can only be somewhat confusing for progress in any kind of theorizing. The physical sciences have all but abandoned expressions according to past, present and future; and logic and mathematics speak a tenseless language. The need is almost imposed upon us, therefore, of carrying on our philosophical deliberations in one tense only, that is, in nothing except a tenseless present.

In summary, we cannot identify, remember or represent time moments as such, although we do recall and identify previously intuited events which may be said to prevail by means of a time accompaniment. Any time other than an expressive 'intercessory' time cannot be identified within the limits of the conscious knowing process. Moments of time do not endure or co-exist in time, and one moment does not follow upon another in succession; time division does not occur, save to accommodate in extension those entities that are assumed to enjoy a fixed and durable state. We must, therefore, say that time can only be known as it is given along with some thing, event or process. Linguistically, time has found a perennial survival value due to its usefulness in punctuating the words and phrases of ordinary discourse. Time's principle, as one of pure formality, acts in its capacity of free contingency to a world of possible and actual existence, and cannot be represented apart from some specified range, of which it is the determiner. Although no one-time moment may co-exist with another, time is not so absolute in its nonidentity as to

preclude, on the one hand, a timeless eternity, or, on the other hand, the existence of recognizable time limits imposed upon a range of symbols signifying identity and permissiveness of synonymy, so long as it is understood that the time moments are only indicative of a differentiation which attaches to that which is already identified in existence. Whereas time represents a permanency that is without identity, the permanence that permits of self-identity assumes the status of an entity which endures throughout some time determination. In its role as a formal semantic device, time is an indispensable factor in effecting a first and formal approach toward those integrative principles that operate upon a fragmented world which nevertheless must continue to survive through all the various forms of change.

Fragmentation, meditation, and transformation: the teachings of J. Krishnamurti

J.S.R.L. NARAYANA MOORTY
Monterey Peninsula College, California, USA

I

Born in Madanapalle, now part of Andhra Pradèsh, in 1895 to Brahmin parents, Jiddu Krishnamurti, along with his brother Nityananda, was handpicked, raised and tutored by Annie Besant and Leadbeater, the leaders of the Theosophical Movement at that time. Initiated into the rather fanciful dogmas of plans of existence and spiritual masters from the past, Krishnamurti was heralded as the new world teacher, and Annie Besant paved the way for the appearance of the world teacher by the creation of an 'Order of the Star of the East'. But suddenly in 1929 Krishnamurti broke away from this Theosophical mould and dissolved the Order, declaring that an individual can only discover truth for and by himself, and that organizations and teachers cannot lead him to it. In 1931 he is said to have attained '*samādhi* in Ojai, California. Since then, for more than half a century, he talked as a free-lance teacher to international audiences, publishing his talks and a few writings, and helping to organize educational institutions for children, for he believed that the best time to help people learn about living was when they were still young. He died in Ojai, California, in the early hours of 18 February, 1986 from cancer of the pancreas and of the liver.

Krishnamurti is not regarded by many as a philosopher in any official sense; scarcely any academic work even on Indian philosophy mentions his name. He is rather considered a teacher in the sense that the Buddha, Lao Tzu or Confucius are considered teachers. His teachings have become popular, and his talks have drawn world-wide audiences. Now, after his death, it is time to take stock of his teachings and assess their significance.

II

At the centre of Krishnamurti's teachings is his concern for man and his problems. The condition of man, present as well as past, is one of sorrow, turmoil, strife and conflict. There is suffering, destruction, war, famine, starvation, and conflict between races, religions, nations, groups and individuals everywhere. Violence exists within and without man. Man has tried various solutions for his suffering: religious solutions—seeking a lasting, permanent refuge in God—political reforms, revolutions, moral codes, wars (to end wars), various self-improvement techniques, and escapes of different sorts (alcohol, achievement, work, entertainment, etc.). None of these has solved his problems fundamentally. Either they only change the surface of the prob-

lem or they provide temporary and piecemeal solutions, but they have not changed problems at their roots. Religions and religious teachers, too, only supplied escapes from day-to-day living without helping man understand it.

Krishnamurti asks: is there a lasting and fundamental solution to man's problems? He concludes that the fragmentation of man is the source of his problems. Externally man is fragmented by belonging to different nations, groups, races, etc. and men identified with these segments conflict with one another. A similar fragmentation occurs internally within the consciousness of each individual. The consciousness becomes identified positively with some object which has given him pleasure in the past, or negatively with that which has given him pain in the past. Each of these fragments of consciousness becomes a centre (which is the self) and opposes itself to other fragments, acting as if it were an active and independent entity, on its own, utilizing all the mental abilities and functions the person possesses. A person, for instance, is positively identified with Hinduism and negatively with Christianity and Islam. And, as contents of consciousness, these fragments conflict with one another within the person. Then the fragmentation appears externally as conflict between groups or individuals, because they share certain identifications. For Krishnamurti, the problems of the world are nothing more than the projection or reflection of the problems within man. Man's violence in the world is an outward expression of the violence within him. For example, a person is afraid, insecure within, having a need to prove himself, and he or she expresses this outwardly by being violent, bullying his peers, or by dominating others.

The fragmentation of man is made possible by the human process of thinking. Thought is responsible for most of the problems of man as well as for the fruits of human civilization. If we understand thought with Krishnamurti as the ability humans have to use and manipulate symbols by abstraction and generalization, this ability gives us the facility to respond to situations *as if* they are present, although they are, in fact, absent. Often an image of an object or a situation is used as a symbol to represent to ourselves the situation we have experienced in our past. Thus in our thought we can, without having actually to manipulate a situation, combine and recombine elements of the situation according to our wishes, and attempt to produce them in the actual world. Because of the functions which thought bestows on us, we are able to rise well above the level of merely animal existence to build enormously abstract and complex structures of civilization which include art, architecture, literature, medicine, science, and technology.

But we humans not only *use* thought, but also *identify* ourselves with the symbols which thought manipulates. This is, indeed, how we fragment our consciousness. Thought creates a wholly different way of experiencing and relating to our world than when we experience the world without it. Each situation, after it is initially experienced by us as pleasant or unpleasant, leaves a residue in us in the form of an image. The remembrance of the situa-

tion in the form of its image, however, is not just a replaying of the situation. I, the thinker, finding the situation as pleasant or unpleasant, in that very moment turn it into a goal to be achieved or a prospect to be avoided. In fact, the thought of the situation as something to be desired or to be avoided is simultaneously also the awareness *of myself* as someone lacking the desired goal or being threatened by the undesirable prospect. Because of this thinking, the division between the thinker (myself), the thought, and what is thought of is already created. Thought, as Krishnamurti puts it, creates the centre of the I, the space around it, and the distance between the thinker and the thought. Time, with its psychological distinctions of past, present, and future, exists only through such a division. Each time thought creates an I, we tend to assume (although without sufficient reason or evidence) that it is the same I operating in all situations of thinking. Each time a single identification occurs, it claims to be the whole of myself. Thus begins a life of search for pleasure and avoidance of pain, the pleasure principle which governs all our lives. (It is interesting to note here that for Krishnamurti thought is a material process which is based on memory recorded in the brain cells. When the organism dies, thought dies with it.)

We cannot even imagine happiness except as represented through images, An imaginary situation is often regarded as even more real than the actual, of which it is a surrogate. For instance, the *idea* or *image* of sex is often more exciting to us than the actual act of intercourse. Because of this identification process, we are willing to regard even mere symbols like a flag, the constitution or a nation as real entities; and are prepared to fight for them, consider their safety as synonymous with our personal safety, and defend them even at the risk of our own personal lives. Similarly, we are willing to sacrifice thousands of real men for the sake of our ideas of mankind, race or God, not realizing that the latter are only abstractions.

Even more fundamental than all the conflict that thought creates in us through the division between the thinker and thought is the tendency in us to believe that our true happiness can only be found in achieving all the endless goals we are conditioned to by the process of identification, as if it always lies in something outside of us. Contrary to what experience sometimes teaches us, we also believe that we cannot be happy without seeking or striving for happiness. We always feel inadequate in comparison with the goals which we hope will fulfil us. But this happiness is never completely attained as thought keeps recreating our past, thereby creating further goals to be sought. Even if it is attained, thought, by contemplating such happiness, by even recognizing it as such, must turn it into a further goal. For one of the requirements we have for our happiness is that we recognize that we are happy, so as to be certain that we have it. This recognition is thought which, therefore, never occurs without turning the happiness we are aware of into a further goal. In the very act of recognizing, contemplating, and cherishing our happiness, we wish its continuance and furtherance. Because of its very nature,

thought cannot end this goal-setting and goal-seeking process. Thus, thought is the ultimate source of all typically psychological problems as well as the social, religious and political problems of man: problems of insecurity, loneliness, boredom, depression, fear, personal and interpersonal conflict, group conflict, and so forth.

Collectively and individually, all our attempts to change, either by self-improvement, political or social reform, or even revolution only change the surface of a problem, its superficial symptoms, without touching the substructure, the disease, which is the root of the problem. Reform only creates a need for further reform. Revolution only creates another status quo. And self-improvement can only create a need for further improvement. These are never-ending tasks.

Krishnamurti advocates a revolution, not in the external, outward structures man has created, but in the very centres of the psychological structures which constitute the self of man. Fundamental changes in man cannot be brought about from outside, by force, or by conforming to an authority. They can only occur effortlessly when one dispassionately observes the total psychological field of man as it operates in everyday life. Krishnamurti calls such observation meditation. Only through meditation is there a possibility for man to act creatively, harmoniously and spontaneously. Only then can there be true happiness which does not create a need to seek further happiness. A man who is free from his past will be able to use thought to aid his survival in the world, yet not be driven by it through identification and the consequent self-centredness.

III

If most human problems are a consequence of the fragmentation within man, then it follows that the way to end human problems is to end conflict within him. Can this be done without generating further conflict? Can one end conflict instantly without the effort which implies resistance, and, therefore, further conflict? Krishnamurti's answer to this question is to offer what he terms choiceless awareness or meditation. This is an awareness in which one passively observes not just what one likes or dislikes to see in a conflict, but all the elements involved in it. In thus becoming aware of all the fragments of a conflict, he becomes other than them, unidentified with them and therefore, totally free from them.

An example would be helpful here: I have a habit of smoking and the scientist or the doctor tells me that I ought to quit smoking, because if I keep the habit I might get lung-cancer. I am afraid of dying and of cancer, so I want to quit smoking. But my old habit of smoking keeps forcing me to smoke. Now, I have a conflict between wanting to smoke, because smoking gives me (or has given in the past) pleasure, and wanting not to smoke, because I am afraid smoking will cause cancer, and, therefore, my death. How do I resolve

this conflict? First, I stop avoiding the problem and attempting to escape from it through various means. I also stop all programmes of self-improvement and behaviour modification, etc. for I realize none of them touch the core of the problem. I turn my attention to the problem, the conflict, itself. I become aware of myself, my desire for smoking, the particular pleasures I get from smoking, the pleasant physical sensations, the feeling of masculinity, etc. on the one hand, and of my fear of death, of the loss of life or my body, of pain occurring through cancer, of the fear of being disabled, of being a burden to or being dependent on others, of the fear of being left alone, and so forth. I observe whatever are the *concrete* contents of my problem, all the elements of my conflict.

I must observe these without attempting to change the facts I am observing, for to try to change them would introduce further conflict into the situation, the reason for this being that then I am still operating under the conditioning (or identification) of wanting to smoke but being afraid of the consequences (these are actually two sides of the same coin). To be so aware of the contents of one's consciousness, there must be no residue of identification left in the observer, no 'knowledge' through which one observes, no particular point of view from which to observe, no plan of action or conclusion to be arrived at, and hence no attempt to change, or even judge, accept or condemn what one observes. According to Krishnamurti, it is identification which creates the division or separation between the observer and the observed. In meditation there must be no division or separation between the observer and the observed—the observer must become the very observed. Meditation, says Krishnamurti, is attention in which there is no 'registration', and in which there is total understanding.

Meditation, for Krishnamurti, is not a prayer to some unknown deity or the concentration on a *mantram*, but the passive observation and the resultant emptying of the contents of one's consciousness. This observation Krishnamurti also calls the 'awareness of the structures of daily living.' It is not an attempt to improve oneself or achieve some superior experience or state of mind; it is looking at the very instrument which creates havoc in one's daily life, causes conflict, misery, self-alienation, and the isolation of oneself from one's fellow men and the world.

This separation between the self and other, between man and the world is also the catalyst for man's religious quest. For most of what we call religious quest is born out of attempts to escape the turmoils and meaninglessness of daily life and the feared oblivion of ultimate death; out of a search for some ultimate meaning in life which is either a search for an ultimate pleasure, or merely an escape from deep-rooted conflicts and frustrations. True meditation, for Krishnamurti, then, is to turn one's attention away from this other world to life in this world, and to become aware of how divisiveness, conflict and problems are created by each of us in this world. When we are free from divisiveness or duality, we don't have to seek God or the Other, we *are* the

Other. (In fact, the more we seek God, or ultimate happiness, the further we are from It.) The meditative mind is what Krishnamurti calls the silent mind.

IV

In the 'total' awareness of meditation, Krishnamurti claims, the observed (that is, one's conflict, fear, anger, desire for pleasure or whatever one is observing) undergoes a transformation. The result is that one is not only free from the particular conflict—in the case of smoking one is free from both the desire to smoke and the fear of the consequences of smoking—but, if one does this right, from all conflict whatsoever; for all human conflicts are basically one conflict, all problems are one problem, namely the human being living in fragmentation, seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. The result is an integration of the individual, which is a blossoming of harmony, creativity, and spontaneity, uncorrupted by the conditioning of the mind which has made him compulsively mechanical.

In meditation one is 'dead' to the many hurts one experiences in day-to-day life. Fear of death, for Krishnamurti, is not as much fear of the 'unknown' as fear of the loss of the known, the known being the self, the many things with which one has identified oneself. Death otherwise is part of living. 'Dying' from moment to moment to the things one experiences in life is essential to renewal, spontaneity, and creativity.

It is in meditation the state of mind called love can take place. Love, for Krishnamurti, is not a sentiment or feeling. It happens when a person actually touches the other, where one is related directly to the other, without interposing the images of the other from the past. It is a state of mind where there is no fear, no bargaining, no self centred calculation. It freely gives without asking for anything in return. Love cannot be cultivated; it happens when one is free from the self-centered motivations and images which interfere between self and other.

Creation can take place, according to Krishnamurti, only in the silent meditative mind. Creativity does not consist of producing novel things as much as a state of mind in which the new is born. It happens only when one is free from the known, when one travels on uncharted seas, as it were.

Reason and logic alone will not discover truth. Meditation, being total awareness, is that 'intelligence' which 'sees 'the truth of things. Reason and logic may translate what intelligence sees into ideas and words. Ideas and words, however, are not themselves intelligence. Intelligence is not personal. It is not yours or mind's. It is not conditioned.

V

So far one might get the impression that Krishnamurti's teaching is purely descriptive, negative and pedagogical: he may seem merely to describe, ana-

lyse, and diagnose human problems. About the many 'positive' notions—such as, meditation, love and creativity—he only tells us mostly what they are not. And the main mode of his communication with people is one of teaching: almost everything he says is in the form of prodding the listener to discover ('to see together', as he would put it) the truths he is pointing out, to arrive at the 'positive' by rejecting the negative or realizing its falsehood or illusoriness. But we get a different impression from his Notebooks and more recent dialogues of his, particularly those with the physicist, David Bohm,* in which occur what might seem to the listener to be 'positive' or speculative elements in Krishnamurti's thought.

Krishnamurti says that there is not only the sorrow which individuals experience, but a sorrow of a deeper kind which perpetuates itself in spite of man's efforts and his abilities to learn. It is not that your thought or my thought makes images in us, but there is a universal, impersonal process which produces images in individual men. To understand and become free from the deeper sorrow, a deeper meditation, a deeper awareness is required to delve into that which 'the mind has not touched before'. Beyond the 'energy of compassion' which is generated in meditation, there is something else which Krishnamurti calls the sacred or the source.

VI

DIFFICULTIES IN UNDERSTANDING AND APPLYING KRISHNAMURTI'S TEACHINGS

(1) Suppose a person listens to Krishnamurti's teachings, understands them and tries to adopt them. What is he apt to find? He starts observing his thought processes 'choicelessly' as it were, observing, say, his fears, hostilities, and resentments. Then he finds himself judging, criticizing justifying what he sees. Thus, he realizes that he is not after all choicelessly observing himself. Then he tries to observe his judgements and criticisms choicelessly. His mind makes still more criticisms about himself or goes on seeking some other goal. He soon realizes that he is still not in a state of 'choiceless awareness', for his mind seems constantly to be bickering over the objects of his observation and choosing to take sides. If he thinks he is choicelessly aware, he thinks he 'sees' that his fear or anger is after all due to his identification with a certain object or ideal, having resulted from his seeing that the object or ideal has been threatened or flouted. He relinquishes his attachment to the object or ideal, and his anger or fear may now, in fact, go away.

Or he sees that his meditation has not brought him the 'success' it is supposed to have brought, and he is back again in the process of looking now at his dual disappointment of not being choicelessly aware and still harbouring unpleasant fear or anger. For he now thinks that the reason why he is not

*See *Wholeness of Life*, Harper, 1979, pp. 129-34.

free from his problem is because he has not been dispassionately aware of the problem. One of those times, say, when he is occupied by other thoughts or by the seeking of other things or out of sheer exhaustion from doing this meditation over and over again, he may be relatively free from his problem. But the problem is likely to recur either in the same area another time or in a different form or in another context with the same object or with another object. He may get insights into his problems, even feelings of release, ecstasy, and freedom. But he finds these insights and feelings are all relative, piecemeal, momentary and temporary. Nothing fundamental seems to have changed at all. The process of thought, the process of seeking goes on relentlessly, creating further restlessness, tension, and conflict in his life.

What has gone wrong? Why can't people just understand what Krishnamurti says and adopt it to solve their problems? It seems all so logical. Is it something that what they are doing is all wrong. or is it that there is a problem with Krishnamurti's teaching? Krishnamurti would now point out to the listener that he is still seeking the goal of 'solving his problems', and as such he is still trying to change what he is looking at; therefore, he is not dispassionately or choicelessly observing.

Since trying to change himself and his world is shown to be both an endless and conflict-creating task, suppose now that the listener wishes to accept whatever he and his world is. Can he succeed? He cannot, regardless of whether he seeks such a success or not. For in the very attempt to seek the goal of accepting what he is, he changes (or wants to change) what he is; or else why does he seek it, if he is already accepting it? On the other hand, he cannot accept whatever he is unless he tries to do so. At least that is the only way he can understand the 'idea of accepting', namely, as a goal which he is not yet the embodiment of, which is desirable to be sought after, and, therefore, something he should attempt to seek by whatever means he has at his disposal. If he does not seek the goal, he does not, in fact, have it, because he is actually in the state of not accepting himself. But, as we said above, if he now seeks it, he is once again in the state of not accepting himself. In other words, the listener finds himself in a no-win, double-bind, totally frustrated state of being. He finds he exists irrevocably in the state of not accepting himself which, he is told, is the root cause of all his problems. (Is this not why he seeks his goals, hoping to be happy and never being completely there?) He is now wondering whether he has ever, in fact, been choicelessly aware of himself; whether he was perhaps not free before from his specific problems for such as reasons exhaustion, distraction or simple forgetting.

Krishnamurti might now point out a third alternative to the above dilemma of either seeking or not seeking. He would suggest that the listerner should be passively aware of this dilemma, or he might say that he should accept his state of non-accepting without attempting to change it. Either way the listener is now bound to make either of these into a goal and get caught once again in a vicious circle. All his 'non-doings' are in reality only 'doings', and all his

'doings', i.e. attempts to become passively aware, are in reality 'non-doings' of passive awareness, i.e. they are only active seekings of goals.

As a matter of fact, Krishnamurti and his listener seem to speak two different languages or logics of the mind, if you wish; and there seems to be absolutely no communication at all between them, at least when he speaks of choiceless awareness. Contrary to appearances, Krishnamurti does not offer meditation as a means to attaining some superior state like 'bliss' or the 'silent mind'. In fact, it is not something you do to get anything, especially not the fundamental solution to human problems. He simply lays down the necessary conditions for meditation: the things we should not do to meditate. But this does not mean that we can do something positive to satisfy those conditions: how, for instance, can one observe oneself disinterestedly, dispassionately, when whatever one is composed of interests? Krishnamurti wants us merely to observe whatever we are. And we automatically turn that teaching, along with whatever else he says, into a goal and/or a means to achieve it. We don't seem to have any other way of understanding him or 'doing' what he seems to suggest. Or else, why would a person repeatedly read Krishnamurti's books or go to listen to him?

Perhaps Krishnamurti is aware of these paradoxes;* perhaps he wishes his listener to continue in the futile efforts to understand and apply what he says until he totally exhausts himself and becomes so frustrated that his mind does not move any more. Then, perhaps, what he is seeking is already there, as his mind no longer makes any attempt to seek anything. But if such a state happens, it is most likely only momentary; and then once again the listener may be caught in the snares of seeking, perhaps this time of some other goal. Perhaps we have to go on like this until we are disillusioned about all goals, until we are, as traditional Indian philosophy puts it, detached from or renounce all of them; or until all the conditioning (karma, if you wish) we have acquired all our lives has been slowly but completely defused.

(2) Another way to express the above difficulty is as follows: one of the tenets of Krishnamurti's teaching is that truth cannot be discovered by reason alone. 'Intelligence' 'sees' truth. It is not clear what this 'total seeing' or 'understanding' consists of. It is not anything we are ordinarily familiar with. For ordinarily seeing or understanding consists of what Krishnamurti would call one fragment looking at (or knowing) another fragment from its own point of view. Krishnamurti, on the other hand, is talking about a different kind of understanding, an understanding of the whole which is not in turn from the point of view of another fragment. We don't know what this is. We can only accept on faith Krishnamurti's word for it, namely, that it exists and that it works in the way he says it does. If we don't know what it is, how then can we use it?

(3) Another difficulty in understanding Krishnamurti's teaching is his

*See Sect. V, para 2.

insistence that it is possible to use reason and thought for purposes of survival and not use them for creating the centre called the self through identifying with various items of our past experience. Thought is what enables us to envision past situations as possible future situations in order to draw out in imagination their consequences. But it is not clear how we can separate the two uses: it may be possible in some cases, but is it in all cases?

How could you, for instance, envision yourself going to school, taking courses, getting the grades you need to get, choosing a career, and yet not be identified with any of these, be happy anticipating the success of the career, or unhappy imagining its failures, and as a result form a self? Similarly, how could you, for instance, envision the possibility of being mugged in a dark corner (based on your own or others' past experience) and not feel the fear, but just take the precautions? To envision the possibility you have to imagine yourself being in that situation, and to do that you should feel *as if* you *were* in that situation. How could you do that and yet not feel the fear?

One possible answer to this question is that when you are free from the centre called the self, you are just incapable of envisioning hypothetical possibilities. If so, your abilities to reason logically from the past are hampered to such a degree that you cannot be said to use reason for survival purposes at all, but are reduced to the survival level of animals which can only respond to immediate and actual needs of hunger, sex or danger. You wouldn't be able to envision the possibility of getting a college degree or a job.

A second possible answer is that you just don't envision repeatedly the same possibility and thus create by day-dreaming, fantasizing or worrying a continuous desire or fear for yourself that constitutes a problem. In such a case, your self is created each time you envision a possibility, except it is a short-lived, momentary self. In this case we still have the opposition between the self and the other, and the duality and conflict that go with it. In fact, it is hard to imagine even theoretically how we could avoid the formation (if this is, indeed, how it is formed) of a self through time, given our abilities to imagine possible future situations on the basis of the past and given our need in day-to-day life to plan for such situations for matters of survival. It appears that the so-called psychological survival is only a logical extension (and a more efficient one) of physical survival, and that no hard and fast line can be drawn between the two. If the self is already formed, although only a momentary self, then do we use Krishnamurti's meditation repeatedly to become free from it? Is this perhaps the meaning of what Krishnamurti says when he talks about dying from moment to moment to the experiences that happen to us each day? If it is, then meditation seems to be more a way of living rather than a means to achieve a fundamental solution to our problems by a transformation in ourselves. It would be a way of living in which we have to conquer the same territory over and over again until we die, much like the Sisyphus in the myth. But this certainly does not seem to be what Krishnamurti intends.

A third possible answer is that somehow we can envision situations, yet not be involved in them in any fashion, and, therefore, not create the self. This is probably what Krishnamurti intends us to believe, but how is this possible? Why would I want to choose to go to college or make a career if I don't feel that I will have a reasonably successful and happy life in doing that? If it is just my survival, why can't I survive digging ditches? Why should I go through a complicated college training?

(4) If the state of freedom Krishnamurti talks about consists of just limiting ourselves to the present, then it seems as if we would have to forego many areas of human achievement and enjoyment. For then there would be no such thing as knowing that we enjoy, for that is the product of the movement in mind between the past and the present. And it is doubtful if anyone would be interested in this sort of freedom if he knew that there is no knowledge present in this 'blissful' state of liberation. He might not want to trade for it his present life which consists of a mixed blessing of pleasure and pain. If Krishnamurti is trying to show us the fundamental fallacy we commit in our thinking that our happiness consists in satisfying our desires, in fulfilling ourselves from things outside of ourselves, then the alternative he offers seems no more attractive. A state of non-seeking of which we have no knowledge, may seem to be no better than a state of seeking, of which we are conscious and which sometimes results in gaining what we seek.

(5) One might be sceptical about the teaching of Krishnamurti as regards the solution of collective human problems: what if I am transformed if the whole world remains the same? What good does that do to human problems? How does it matter if one man is transformed here and there? Krishnamurti replies by saying that, when I change, it is not just an individual that is changing but 'the human being' is changing. That means the possibility of transformation is once again realized. And, maybe by a fiat of faith he would say that this is bound to create a ripple effect in the rest of mankind, yourself being an example or some kind of leader. But when one is not yet transformed in oneself and when the problems-at-large and the problems-in-oneself go on as usual untouched, then surely one is doubly frustrated with the whole teaching. But Krishnamurti comes back with the comment that this scepticism is all based on the eagerness to change, which is only bound to compound human problems instead of solving them.

VII

Does all the above discussion mean that we should no longer be interested in Krishnamurti's teachings, and that we should go back to our normal living of pleasures and sorrows, of seeking and disappointment? Unfortunately, however frustrating his teachings may seem, we cannot go back to our normal living. Once we have seen, maybe because of Krishnamurti's showing us, the futility of seeking happiness through the illusory goals outside of ourselves,

there is no way we can go back to that kind of living. For the mere reason that Krishnamurti's teachings represent the possibility of an end to our continual search, to our seeking for some unknown and unattainable happiness, for those who are struck with what traditional Indian philosophy calls the 'disease of existence' (or of becoming—*bhavaroga*), considering these teachings or something of the sort may be the only choice left, however difficult and indeed even impossible it may seem to understand them. Unfortunately (or fortunately), logical arguments and objections have little effect on this issue. As Krishnamurti would put it, if human beings saw the necessity or the urgency of something, they would make what might seem impossible possible.

If Krishnamurti's teaching is not meant to ask us to do anything, then in what sense is it a teaching? Is it merely a description of our state of being and an invitation to observe it? One is here reminded of how Krishnamurti constantly emphasizes that one must come to the 'positive' via the 'negative'. He and many other philosophers, each in his own way, try to bridge the gap between the empirical and the transcendent: Krishnamurti points to the positive by emphasizing the negative. He shows how all our problems are based on an illusory search for an illusory happiness of an illusory self, and says that by realizing the false as the false the false will automatically be transformed into the real. (Only he is not very consistent in this negative approach, for he uses all these positive notions such as 'total understanding', 'choiceless awareness', 'the immeasurable', 'the source', and 'the other'. Nāgārjuna is perhaps the only consistent philosopher in this respect. He is content in showing the contradictoriness of all that the mind has wrought, including the notion of *nirvāṇa*.) Others bridge the gap by teaching, in addition to their positive philosophies explaining the relationship between the transcendent and the empirical methods of meditation, devotional, prayer, etc. Krishnamurti points out the futility of such methods by showing that all they can do will ultimately strengthen the very illusory self one tries to become free from. One here also thinks of the Mahāyāna Buddhist *sūtras* like 'Heart' *sūtra* (*prajñā-pāramitā hṛdaya sūtra*) which contains paradoxical statements as to how all the empirical is empty of reality, yet how the reality which is 'emptiness' is nowhere else except in the empirical; but contains no advice, precepts or principles to practise on. The person who recites these *sūtras* reminds himself, in each movement of his activity, of the ultimate emptiness of his actions, and how there is practically nothing he can 'hope' to achieve thereby, for he applies these intuitions to his 'hopes' too and realizes their ultmate 'emptiness' as well. Krishnamurti might as well be advising us to remind ourselves in each of our conflicts that it, too, is the result of our conditioning, except that he would ask us to 'see' the specific identifications involved. If any change or transformation ever happens in the individual, it may not be because of his 'doing' or 'not doing' anything. It may be that the conditions are 'ripe' for the transformation to occur, or it may be that the 'transcendent' (if there is such a thing) chooses the individual for no apparent reason

or cause and transforms him. In any case, there may be nothing that the individual can do to *make* the transformation happen.

Should we say, then, that it is futile to listen to people like Krishnamurti, because they are not really offering us any goodies? Such listening may have its own value. If it does, well, the value is nothing we can measure or touch with our hands or minds. Whether or not a person listens to teachers of this sort depends on his own predilections, background, life-crises and so on, but there is nothing one can hope to 'gain' from teachings like these.

Teachers of this sort have always appeared and will always appear on earth. Their teachings show us a different possibility for human nature, whether we can make sense out of them or not, and as such they are a value in themselves. They need no other justification.

VIII

How is Krishnamurti's teaching different from any other religious teachings? In particular how is his meditation different from meditation upon a *mantra* or 'just sitting' meditation as is practised in Zen Buddhism? First, the difference is in his diagnostic approach: Krishnamurti speaks to the modern man in his idiom and gives common sense psychological explanations as to how human problems arise. Not that the notions of identification, conditioning, etc. are new in Indian philosophy—one could find similar ideas, say in the philosophy of Sāṃkhya-Yoga. His descriptions of formation of desire and how suffering arises from them are also similar to Buddhist descriptions in the 'twelve-fold wheel of becoming'. His refusal to indulge in any speculative metaphysics (although not very consistently executed) and his belief that the human personality or ego is illusory and a mere 'put-together' are also ideas, parallels for which one can easily find in the Buddha's teachings. The idea of man's suffering being a result of his 'dualistic' existence (based on the conflict between the self and the other) is not unfamiliar to students of Vedānta and Buddhism. But he puts all these ideas together so clearly that for the modern mind his descriptions and analyses of human problems seem insightful, challenging and fascinating. Particularly, his analysis of human thought is revealing: how it is responsible, on the one hand, for the superiority of humans over animals in terms of survival, and how, at the same time, by being a vehicle for man's identification with items from his past experience and the consequent self-centeredness, it is responsible for man's typically human problems.

What is also unique about Krishnamurti is that he can relate all these ideas to his discussion of the means to attain freedom of how in meditation the means cannot be different or be separated from the ends. If freedom from the self is the end, it is also the means, or simply there are no means to this freedom at all in any ordinary sense (this may be frustrating to his listener, but be that as it may). Perhaps the same ideas are conveyed in the *Bhagavad Gita* in the notion of 'selfless' or 'disinterested' action, but the ideas are made much more clear in Krishnamurti's teachings than ever before.

INDIGENOUS ENDS AND ALIEN MEANS:
A FOOTNOTE ON INDIAN RENAISSANCE

The concept of renaissance is intertwined with the concept of revival of the old value, pride in the old heritage and culture, and going back to the country's own ancient and indigenous root. The idea and process of indigenization are not peculiar to one country or continent. Indigenization of culture in one form is evident from the history of Europe. One notices it in the fourteenth century as a humanistic movement in Italy led by the classical scholar and poet Petrarch. He affiliated the 'age of darkness' to the extinction of Roman antiquity, and called for a revival of its study. Italian Renaissance also aimed at the extension of Roman culture to the whole of the continent. Emphasizing the latter point, Jacob Burchardt said that the revival of antiquity and its union with the genius of the Italian people could alone help in the extension of Roman culture to the Western world. Thus viewed, the impulse for the revival of antiquity was part of the expression of the creative genius of man.

It is commonly believed that there is a parallelism between Italy's going back to the classical past in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and Indian Renaissance that took shape in the nineteenth century. India's interest in her past was roused by foreign subjugation and rule which found expression mainly through English education. In the nineteenth century, English education directly influenced the educated class, while the masses were confused so far as it trickled down into their lives. The influence was so profound that it almost transformed the form of life of the people of India. The young Indians were eager to get rid of the fossilized Indian culture. Through English education they found a new identity of their own selves, and many of them went to the length of embracing Christianity. During this inflow of Western culture, intellectual and spiritual elites like Raja Rammohun Roy, Swami Dayanand Saraswati, Bankimchandra, Ranade, Swami Vivekananda, Rabindranath, Sri Aurobindo and Sri Ramkrishna tried to change the perspective. They initiated the people to imitate antiquity and revive creative impulse. Perhaps for this perspective, Sri Aurobindo likened Indian Renaissance to the Celtic Renaissance of Ireland.

In this short note, I propose, first, to delineate my arguments in support of the thesis that renaissance in general, and Indian Renaissance in particular is a purported attempt to revive the past culture and assimilate it in a creative manner to the achievements of the present. Then, I would assess how far Indian Renaissance is a *creative* synthesis of the cultures of the two worlds, Eastern and Western.

The problem of *re-enactment* of the past is connected with the problem of *understanding* the past. Understanding is contemporaneous, and its structure and capacities are shaped by the influences of the culture of the period to which the subject belongs. This is a reflective description of understanding a situation. If one denies it, then one cannot avoid the fallacies of the absolutist rationalist and sceptic empiricist. The former holds that the rational man has a privileged access to the meanings and aims of the activities of other persons of the past. The latter denies altogether the possibility of one's access to the past, other place, other time and other mind. I do not find any satisfactory reason in support of the privileged position of the rational man. Nor do I think that culture-oriented understanding, though a hindrance to the primary understanding of the past, makes history impossible. My point is that all factual accounts are theory-oriented, subjective and even personal. It is true that the objective interpretation of history is more popular than the subjective one. But popularity or otherwise of a view is no argument for its soundness. It seems to me that the supporters of the objective interpretation of history are over-ambitious. They believe in the possibility of almost photographic reproduction of the past in the present social milieu. It shows that the protagonists of Indian Renaissance aimed at the *creative* synthesis of the divergent values of thoughts and actions of East and West in every sphere of society—social, political, religious, and economic.

The understanding of the cultural heritage of India in the nineteenth century was shaped by the enlightening and confusing influence of foreign subjugation. The foreign rule, no doubt, exposed the people of India to the world beyond the seas, and made them aware of many a thing which was not known to them. But the influence proved so overwhelming that the people of India, exposed to the Western ideas, failed to maintain the balance between the two cultures —one that came upon them from the West and the other that was rooted in their own soil. The educated Indians were persuaded by the works and ideas of Mill and Bentham's utilitarianism, positivism of Comte, British liberalism and constitutionism. Accordingly, they could not 'see' the past in its original light. In fact, this is a general limitation of the sense-based intellect of man which can hardly rise above contemporary thinking and convention. Hence the pioneers of Indian Renaissance spoke in favour of the purported synthesis of Indian antiquity and Westernized India rather than negation of the latter.

In the nineteenth-century British India, quite a large number of English-educated young Indians emulated their 'masters' by seeking employment in the administrative services. This gave birth to a new class—the lawyers, doctors, engineers, professors, civil servants, etc. They sought administrative employments to secure better status in the society and improve the condition of the society at the same time. They took it for granted that, equipped with new education and hardened by rigorous apprenticeship of administrative work, they would soon be occupying strategic positions in the British Indian Government. But their hopes were shattered when, under the control of British

rulers, many of the young Indians were deprived of their honour and freedom. The process of work, instead of being dominated by the 'worker', dominated the latter who felt alienated from the process itself. And this feeling of alienation was intensified with the devaluation of the 'worker' that reduced him to a mere object. It was perhaps this feeling of alienation which initiated the young Indians to go back to the antiquity and free India from foreign subjugation. But as understanding is essentially contemporaneous, the revived Indian past, in spite of the utmost efforts for its indigenization, turned out to be alien to them.

COMPONENTS OF RENAISSANCE: THE PURPORTED ASSIMILATION OF TWO CULTURES—EASTERN AND WESTERN

Political

The presidency towns of Bengal and Madras reflected the light of English education to emphasize the dark side of the British rule in India.

In 1851 British Indian Association was started in Calcutta by social luminaries like Rajendralal Mitra and Ramgopal Ghose, and about the same time Bombay Association in the western presidency was started by Dadabhai Naoroji and others. In the 1870's young leaders of Bombay were also actively engaged in establishing provincial political associations such as the Poona Sarbojanin Sabha which was founded by Mahadev G. Ranade. In 1867 Hindu Mela was formed in Calcutta by Rajnarayan Basu and Ramgopal Ghose. Madras Mahajan Sabha was formed in 1880, and in 1883 S.N. Banerjea and others formed Indian Association. In 1885 Indian National Congress was formally established in Bombay under the presidentship of W.C. Bonerjee. To promote the cause of national progress, Indian National Congress decided to introduce representative institutions. But the idea of 'representative institution' did not have indigenous root. It showed the real impact of West on India's political field.

Educational

The educational institutions that were formed in new India did not represent antiquity but bore similarity to the Western patterns of the same. Higher education that was introduced in India in the nineteenth century was an imitation of the English educational system of the past. In 1817 Hindu College in Calcutta and Elphinstone College in Bombay were established. In the year 1857 the universities of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay were founded. Aligarh Muslim College was established in 1876 and Allahabad University in 1887.

Religious and Social

Unwilling to be swept away by imported foreign ideas, the religious teachers

like Sri Ramakrishna and Swami Dayananda preached the old ideas in new idioms so as to persuade young men of wider social milieu. Many Hindus were repulsive towards the rigidity of the social customs and practices of Hinduism. They were attracted towards Christianity and some notable conversions took place in Bengal. Raja Rammohun Roy made an attempt to modify Hinduism on the basis of reason and social reform, and started Brahmo Samaj. Brahmo Samaj influenced the rising middle class of Bengal, but as a religious movement was primarily representative of the Westernized educated few.

Dissatisfaction with the rigid social forms of Hinduism also arose elsewhere in India. The slogan, 'back to the Vedas' of Swami Dayananda Saraswati, 'Luther of Hinduism', called upon the Hindus to reject the corrupting medieval excrescences of their faith, including idolatory, the caste system and infant marriage. He initiated a return to the original purity of Vedic life and thought, which would give India the capacity and strength to resist foreign invasion and subjugation. Swami Dayananda's reformist society took root most firmly in Punjab at the start of the twentieth century.

About the same period there lived in Bengal the essentially religious man, Sri Ramkrishna. He had a broad outlook and exerted great influence on English-educated youngmen who veered around him. He laid stress on the essentials of religious faith and philosophy, and seemed to represent all of them in his own person.

Swami Vivekananda, who took immense pride in India's spiritual culture, stood as a bridge between the past of India and her present. The doctrine of Vedanta appeared to him in rational harmony with the scientific investigations of external nature. He was impressed by the Vedantic ideas of solidarity and divinity of man. So he tried to go back to the Vedantic past but with a modern flexible orientation. Vivekananda had a boundless faith in the masses and reprehended the 'touch-me-notism' of the upper caste. The progressive components of his thoughts were highlighted by his utterance: 'The only hope for India is from the masses. The upper class is physically and morally dead'. Perhaps, he was the first Indian to advocate the ideal of socialism.

The religious fervour of Swami Vivekananda stirred Sri Aurobindo. Sri Aurobindo's familiarity with the modern ideas of the West and the discerning historian in him made him realize the truth that in the political and social sphere of our country we must try to reconcile the demands of the time-spirit (*yugadharma*) with the spiritual identity of India (*svadharma*).

Another religious movement, Theosophy, that deserves special mention in this context, was represented by Annie Besant.

It was through these components of renaissance that a new vision and reorientation in thought and action were flowing in, and modern India came into being during the second half of the nineteenth century.

The most important feature of Indian Renaissance is marked by two seemingly opposed processes of alienation and of indigenization. In all fields—administration, education and economy—one observes the side-by-side

existence of these two opposite tendencies. Even in the abstract area of philosophical thought, the discerning scholar hardly fails to notice the emergence of a hybrid variety of culture. In the field of administration and government, we find intermixture of the British system with the left-over elements of Moghul administration and some other local variants of the same. In the area of economic production, we find the rise of heavy industry, e.g. textile and jute, aided by the railway network. The influence of the British industrial revolution and capitalism started making their perceptible impact on the Indian scene.

Certainly, some of the feature of the new development were welcome for the transformation of a rigid society into a mobile, flexible and modern society. But when the basic impetus of modernization is provided by alien forces and forms of life, the yearning of a society to go back to its old, undying and indigenous roots proves elusive or somewhat directionless. Indigenous end cannot be attained through alien means. Indigenization and alienation do not go together. Alien ideas and institutions undoubtedly helped the India of the nineteenth century to be reflectively aware of its rich historical heritage, but this reflection was not sufficiently critical. In the main it was imitative. And as a result of that, the main ideas and institutions, which we could build up in this century, are marked by their foreign feature.

Through renaissance we had expected to achieve a creative synthesis of the East and the West. But achievements failed far short of this expectation. It ended up in an *imitative* synthesis marked by a creative fringe only in few areas, e.g. literature, music and dance. Our masters could hardly draw a genuinely *creative* inspiration from our own rich old heritage.

Rabindra Bharati University,   MINAKSHI RAY CHOUDHURI
Calcutta

TOLERANCE IN INDIAN CULTURE AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS

Tolerance of diversity of race, language, religion, customs, habits and even the idiosyncracies of the different ethnic groups inhabiting the Indian subcontinent is the distinctive trait of the culture that they have evolved down the ages. In the present age when easy and quick modes of transport and circumstantial compulsions bring people of divergent cultures together, it is quite natural for them to feel affinity towards each other or at least to tolerate each others' existence and proximity. But in ancient India, where vast distances full of natural barriers separated one end of the country from another, it was extremely surprising that a person living, for example, on the northern tip of the country like Kashmir should hanker to make pilgrimage to shrines located in the southern tip like Kanyakumari whereby he hoped to make effective

contact with his southern brethern. It is well known that the institution of pilgrimages to sacred places purposely established in the distant and salient corners of this country by our cultural ancestors was intended to bring the farflung Indian communities together at least once in their life time. So even if some unfortunate ancient Indian could not undertake the arduous pilgrimages to the distant parts of the country throughout his life, consoled himself by offering daily prayers to the rivers mountains and deities pertaining to those parts and also remembering the inhabitants of those parts. Thus, a cultural unity pervaded the multitudinous diversity of the Indian people spread over a vast geographic expanse of this country. Underlying this unity was the conscious and sometimes subconsciously religious idea of the universal brotherhood or the unity of mankind also deteriorated giving rise to fissiparous tendencies all over the country. The sense of unity thus lost has not been scientific and technological devices.

The survival of Indian Culture from immemorial antiquity to modern times—a period which approximately covers a span of not less than 5000 years is a unique phenomenon in history. No other culture except that of ancient Egypt could claim as hoary an antiquity as the Indian and yet the Egyptian Culture and many others which came into existence long after it have all passed into oblivion. The vitality of Indian Culture that has enabled it to survive the ravages of time is attributed to the virtue of tolerance that it had continued to foster among the Indian people, down the ages. Such a view derives justification from the fact that most of the other cultures like those of Egypt, Greece, Rome, etc. disappeared mainly because of the growing intolerance and mutual squabbles of the people of these countries. But opinion is divided on this question as there are those who decry tolerance as one of the most serious drawbacks of Indian Culture. They naturally attribute the present decadent condition of the Indian people mainly to their tolerant attitude towards everything under the sun. This is even described as fatalism which is supposed to make the average Indian a firm believer in destiny and the futility of human endeavour.

Before we consider the question whether tolerance had played a useful role in the evolution of Indian Culture in former times and is also relevant to its proper growth today, it is necessary first to answer an important question, namely, whether there is such a thing as Indian Culture at all. If a modern Indian were asked by a foreigner why he calls himself an Indian he would very likely be at a loss to give an appropriate reply. There is no distinctively Indian religion, or way of life or languages or dress or art on learning which a modern Indian may care to devote himself to. First of all, it is usually disavowed by knowledgeable Indians themselves that India has any cultural heritage worth preserving today and secondly, whatever legacy of the past there is so diversified that it cannot be claimed as their own by Indians all over the country. For example, absolutely nothing seems to be common between the native of an eastern city of India and his opposite number living in

a distant western city. No common thread except perhaps the political one which brings all Indians under the overall governance of a central authority, seems to run through the life of all Indians. On top of this, if we take into account the general tendency of the average Indian today to imitate the west in every aspect of his life, we may be hard put to it to explain if anything like Indian Culture is in existence today at all. The imitating tendency may be taken to be an indication of some kind of general inferiority complex which must have been firmly entrenched in the Indian mind. Why should this be so if the age old Indian Culture can hold its own against the corroding bewitchment of western culture?

To this question there are two replies. First, we should like to maintain that no particular creed, religious practice or group of customs need be regarded as the essentials of Indian Culture. As the celebrated philosophical verse of the poet Puspadant praising Lord Śiva says whatsoever paths the ordinary mortals, according to their varying tastes and aptitudes adopt for seeking the lord, by each and every one of those paths is we attainable as the sea is accessible to the water; of all the rivers running towards it. So if no common denominator to the vast variety of prevalent Indian styles of life is to found we need not, therefore, think that Indian Culture is on the way to extinction. In the ultimate analysis it is only by a certain attitude to life and the world that the Indian has all through history nurtured consciously or unconsciously, that his culture stands distinguished from all other cultures.

Secondly, we should like to urge that the predominant element of the western culture, namely its scientific and technological developments are proving, for the moment a very powerful and overwhelming influence on Indian Culture as on other cultures too. It will take some time and a great deal of joint effort of great visionaries of the past like Tagore, Gandhi, Vivekananda, etc. and the best of spiritual missionaries of today to enable Indian Culture to fully absorb the impact of science on it and then reassert its spiritual and even secular supremacy over it. We need despair of the amorphous cultural existence of the Indian of today.

Coming back now to the concept of tolerance, it is necessary to make clear that tolerance is both a great virtue as well as an abominable vice. In both these aspects tolerance has had its impact, favourable and adverse on Indian Culture. As a virtue tolerance manifests itself in activity intended to promote and encourage all individual diversity that is at the back of creativity. Tolerance of this kind is positive and expansive. It is this aspect of tolerance of the Indian mind which again and again expressed itself in the early epoch of Indian history when innumerable hordes of foreign aggressors entering India in order to conquer and subjugate it were themselves fully conquered by the Indians partly by their physical prowess and partly by their spirit of active tolerance. Whatever beneficial elements of culture these alien hoards of Greek, Bactrian, Hunnish, Scythian, etc. marauders brought with them were directly taken over and assimilated by Indian Culture. But the primitive, crude and superstitious

elements of the alien culture were not simply thrown overboard. They were rather subjected to a process of gradual sublimation and transformation so as to make them fit for incorporation in the fold of the Indian Culture. It is because of this fact that the deities like Gaṇeśa, Śiva, Narasiṁha and so on of prehistoric antiquity and Radha, the later day divine consort of Lord Kṛṣṇa and many other divinities had been installed in the Hindu pantheon. Innumerable instances of the direct assimilation and transformation of beneficent and malevolent ingredients respectively of alien cultures by the indigenous culture are available which show how powerfully active positive influence of tolerance has been in ancient time in India.

The other and opposite side of tolerance finds expression in such degenerate traits of character as fatalism, callous indifference to important changes taking place in the environment, eclectic tendencies, submissiveness, indiscriminate acceptance of the good and the bad and so on. Indian history from eight century onwards till the emergence of the Maratha supremacy in the seventeenth century is replete with instances of the gradual ossification of the creative spirit of the Indian people who meekly submitted to the overpowering influence of the meretricious culture of the alien aggressor. Those who attribute to tolerance all evil in Indian life as we find it today are unaware of the distinction between the positive and the negative aspects of this quality that we have drawn and illustrated above.

Let us now turn to the philosophical foundations of tolerance which has been the inalienable mark of Indian Culture all through its vicissitude. If we survey the broad spectrum of the six major orthodox schools and the two heterodox schools of Indian thought we find that the two schools of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika along with the Vaibhāsika school of Buddhism do not provide any rational bases for the concept of tolerance as practicable in day-to-day life. In the case of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy the reason for their inability to provide metaphysical support for the concept of tolerance is that they are mainly distinction oriented. Their very purpose is to highlight the mutual distinctions; of the fundamental categories of reality. Even the ultimate objective of existence as they have propounded. It is the realization of the distinction of each individual self from everything else with which it is ordinarily confused. Not that similarity and identity of categories and concepts are not envisaged in these schools but it cannot be denied that their emphasis is on distinction. This is why every entity fundamental or otherwise is supposed in these schools to be definable mainly by its own being, taken to be its exclusive nature. Common nature of things are rarely resorted to define entities of any kind. It is obvious, therefore, that according to these two schools the expensive social relation of tolerance obtained between different human beings which provides the infrastructure of Indian culture is more or less a creation of imagination and not a piece of reality. This fact is thrown into greatest relief in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of the ultimate destiny of the human soul. It is maintained that after having attained liberation the soul is completely

divested of all its distinctive human attributes even including knowledge and remains in almost a stone like self-contained state without even its own awareness. Naturally, if it is to be the highest condition of the self, its worldly condition need not be quite other and less self-contained than this.

Turning from these schools to the Vaibhāsika school of Buddhism for a philosophical basis for our concept, we find that this school is more exclusive in its outlook than its orthodox counterparts. Reality for Vaibhāsikas is of the nature of an utterly discrete and absolutely self-contained and self-defined momentary entity. All generality and the relations on which they are supposed to be based are creations of imagination. Relations are imposed by our constructive imagination on the utterly discrete elements of reality. Liberation consists in getting rid of these illusions of relations and the structures based on them. Even the self is such an illusory structure based on the falsely-imagined relationships of the so-called mind and mental states. So in the ultimate state even the self has to disintegrate into its elements and then what are left behind are nothing but the momentary self-contained bits of reality. In conformity with this conception of reality and the ultimate destiny of the human self the Vaibhāsikas have upheld the ideal of *Pratyekabuddhas*. This means that every spiritual aspirant has to attain first individual buddhahood before attaining final extinction. The individual *buddha* is expected to strive for his own spiritual perfection unmindful of the spiritual condition of any of his fellow beings. The reason for this exclusiveness of his spiritual effort is that even if the aspirant is eager to help his fellow beings he cannot do so. He is what he is. Unless he forefeits his own nature and jumps out of it to make contact with other beings he cannot be of any help to others. Thus the Vaibhāsika by stressing the self-contained character of all reality has completely constructed any mode of communication between any two entities.

Next we come to Sāṅkhya and Yoga. These schools do not deny relations like Vaibhāsikas nor do they reject common nature and characteristics of things. They are real because they really come into being as a result of the evolutionary process of matter. The self in the empirical state thus somehow really enters into relationship with the world consisting of his fellow beings and the common objects. But this relationship and the worldly life arising out of it an engendered by it is treated as *Vikara* or Bondage of the self. It is fall from its pristine purity of exclusiveness for the self. Therefore, in the ultimate state each self is supposed to withdraw itself completely from all its associations with the not-self, and fall back upon itself. Keeping in view this ideal of the self-contained state of the self which we are all supposed to attain while liberated, it cannot be maintained that even Sāṅkhya and Yoga have cared to provide a metaphysical basis for the concept of tolerance.

The school of Mīmāṁsā has very little to say directly in support of the concept of tolerance. Of course it advocates the category of identity-in-difference in some form. In order to explain the nature of the relationship of sub-

stance and its attributes and action. But when it comes to the relationships, social, religious, cultural, spiritual and so on of human beings with each other, Mīmāṁsā does not stress the directness and intimacy of them. All relationships amongst human beings are mediated through the influences of *karma*. What binds together human beings in different groups is nothing but their respective *karmas*. Once these *karmas* are dissipated by expiatory penances as also by the enjoyment and suffering of their consequences each human being is deprived of his associations and relationships completely and thrown back on his own individual resources. Thus Mīmāṁsā too is as unhelpful in explaining the relatedness of human existence as Nyāya and Buddhism of the Vaibhāsika type are. We are now left with three important schools of thought, each one of which has tried to explain the concept of tolerance in a unique manner. Let us take first the Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Rāmānuja. As we know quite well the category of relation holds a prominent place in this school. The model formulated for correctly envisaging this category by Rāmānuja is that of the relationship of the living body and its inspiring soul. There cannot be a more intimate and internal relationship than that of the body and its soul. The idealistic counterpart of this relationship, namely the one called 'internal', is just a pale reflection of it, for it does not embody the intimacy obtaining between the body and the soul. God is said to be the soul of the world as well as the selves inhabiting it. Each individual, therefore, may consider this relation, with another individual on the model of this basic body-soul relationship. Unfortunately, Rāmānuja has been caught on the horns of a dilemma while explaining the relation of God with the world and that of the world and the selves in it. If the relation of all objects including the selves with God is so close, then the mutual relationship of the objects in the world, the different selves and the selves and the objects in the world must also be as close and intimate, but if this contention were to be maintained then the objects of the world would have to be reckoned as the body of the selves. Not only this, even the selves would have to be viewed as related mutually in the relation of body and soul which would result in the differences of the souls being reduced to the level of substance and adjective. Thus, Rāmānuja has to concede in some form or other the unity of all selves, which would militate against the basic postulate of his philosophy that the selves are different from God, different from the world and also different amongst themselves.

From Rāmānuja we turn to Śaṅkara in whose philosophy of Advaita, we come upon an absolute rejection of all empirical reality among with relations of every kind included in the latter. The real is absolutely unrelated and *Akhaṇḍa* or impartite in which even the empirical selves lose their reality. It would, therefore, seem that Advaita is more exclusive in its outlook than even Vaibhāsika, but as a matter of fact this philosophy has provided berth for every type of reality in its scheme. At the top of the hierarchy, so to say, of realities upheld by Advaita there is Brahman, but empirical reality of every grade even including the apparrently real illusory content has its own proper

place in this hierarchy. Complete denial or rejection of the empirical comes only at the end but before the end point is reached we have every right to affirm the relative realities of the objects corresponding to the experiential level we occupy. So in a sense everything is real according to Advaita though in a relative sense. Brahman alone is real in the absolute sense. Thus, the whole game of human existence with all the relationships, social, political, religious, spiritual and so on sustaining the latter, find its proper place in the world picture that Śaṅkara has formulated for us. We can, therefore, say that this is the philosophy which truly represents the spirit of tolerance pervading the cultural outlook of India according to which not only an India born person is an Indian but every human being is entitled to be regarded as an Indian provided his mind is imbued with the spirit of tolerance towards his fellow beings.

The philosophy of Mādhyamika is an another attempt to vastly enlarge and activate human beings. But even the lowly creatures of the world are embraced within its scope. The ideal upheld by this philosophy for mankind to strive for is that of the Bodhisattva whose greatest ambition is supposed to be the attainment of the perfection of all virtues including that of tolerance. With the help of these virtues the Bodhisattva is supposed to occupy himself through innumerable lives in so ameliorating the condition of each and every creature in the world that ultimately they too attain the goal of salvation along with him. This is certainly an extremely edifying account of human existence at its best. But it is doubtful whether the metaphysical doctrine of Śūnya as devoid of all categories can really support it.

Nagpur University, Nagpur   N.S. DRAVID

Obituary Notes

PANDIT BADRINATH SHUKLA:
A PERSONAL TRIBUTE

The death of Pt Badrinath Shukla on 22 November 1987 has removed one of the most outstanding personalities in the philosophical world of India. Amongst traditional scholars of Indian philosophy in Varanasi, he, along with Pt Pattabhiram Shastri, was the most towering personality universally acknowledged for his unrivalled scholarship, ability of understanding the arguments of his opponents and the capacity to think on his own even within the traditional framework of Nyāya, of which he was an acknowledged master for almost half a century in this country.

I first heard of Pt Badrinath Shukla from Dr G.C. Pande, the outstanding scholar of Buddhism, who had gone to Benaras on a U.G.C. Project for eliciting reactions of traditional Indian philosophers to questions concerning issues closely related to contemporary philosophy. The team consisted of Dr G.C. Pande, Prof. Sibajiban Bhattacharyya and Prof. Narayana Shastri Dravid. All of these persons were well acquainted with the Western tradition of thought in philosophy. They also had a deep knowledge of the Indian tradition and were fully conversant with the language of philosophy in classical India, that is, Sanskrit. Dr Pande and Prof. Dravid could also converse in Sanskrit fluently. On his return from Benaras, Dr Pande told me about how he was struck by the personal intelligence and learning of Pt Badrinath Shukla amongst the pandits of Benaras whom he had met. Thereupon we invited him to deliver a series of six lectures on behalf of the Department of Philosophy, University of Rajasthan, which he kindly agreed to do.

That was my first encounter with Pt Badrinath Shukla, and it has always been unforgettable. Shuklaji's six lectures on the subject were in Hindi, and he spoke on a subject which very few of us knew anything about. But the lucidity and clarity of his exposition was so extraordinary and his ability to make difficult things simple and intelligible was so great that all of us not only enjoyed the lectures immensely but also felt for the first time that there was a whole realm of traditional learning in the field of philosophy which we had been ignoring in our idolatrous regard for Western thinkers and those trained in the Western tradition of philosophizing.

One of the rare things about this lecture series, delivered in Hindi on a philosophical subject little known to the audience, was that all those who attended the lecture on the first day continued to attend it on all the subsequent days also—a rare feat, indeed, which one hardly finds even with the best of academic scholars either in philosophy or any other subject. One of the things that struck me most about Pt Badrinath Shukla even then was his ability to understand an objection even before it had been clearly formulated and his attempt to answer it till such time as the person who had raised the objection felt satisfied by the answer.

After that early acquaintance I had the rare privilege of working with him

on the various projects of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, particularly those relating to the 'Revitalization of the Indian philosophical tradition', in which he played a part which perhaps no other person could have played in this country. The whole idea of having a continuous dialogue between traditional and modern scholars of philosophy, which was initiated by Prof. M.P. Rege at Pune, got going only because of the presence of such outstanding scholars as Pt Badrinath Shukla and Pt Srinivas Shastri, who ensured that the week-long experiment in bilingual dialogue at Pune was not only immensely successful but also inspiring enough to embolden us to repeat the experiment in other fields and carry it on a continuing basis.

The joint meeting held by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research and the Rastriya Sanskrit Sansthan at the Ministry of Education to consider what could be done for revitalizing the classical Indian tradition in philosophy, took a decision to form a committee under the leadership of Pt Badrinath Shukla to suggest detailed measures to be taken up later. The committee decided that besides having dialogues in different fields of knowledge with classical scholars, the fields of Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and Kashmir Śaivism should be given special attention, as classical scholarship in these fields was rapidly declining. It was felt, therefore, that it was absolutely essential that a meeting of traditional scholars in these domains be held, so that they may interact amongst themselves and also consider how to develop the subject in modern times. Under his inspiration and guidance meetings on Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and Kashmir Śaivism were held at Sarnath, Tirupati and Srinagar respectively. At the Sarnath meeting, Shuklaji gave his now famous lecture on *Dehātma-vāda* within the Nyāya framework which aroused widespread curiosity amongst traditional and modern scholars alike. For the first time there was a feeling amongst modern scholars of Indian philosophy that here there was a thinker who could strike new paths within the traditional framework, a possibility that had been considered as closed long ago.

For the last four or five months Shuklaji had been unwell and hence had not been able to be with us, specially at the dialogue on *Current Issues in Linguistics* at Bhubaneshwar and at the Summer School on Modern Logic and *Navya-Nyāya* at Wai, to both which he was eagerly looking forward.

Very few people know that Shuklaji was not only an outstanding scholar of Nyāya but also wrote commentaries on the great Jain philosopher, Haribhadra Suri, and also on *Mārkandeya Purāṇa*. This only shows the range of his wide interest in the Indian tradition. Most recently he had written a review of Prof. K. Satchidananda Murty's lectures on Vedānta, a review that was appreciated by Prof. Murty himself as showing an extraordinary understanding of what he had written.

Shuklaji's death has removed not only a great scholar and a profound thinker but also one of the few persons in the country who could build a bridge between the traditional pandits in the field of philosophy and the modern university-based Western-trained philosophers in the country. He was

respected not only by the pandits amongst whom he had unrivalled eminence but also amongst modern philosophers in India who felt that in him there was a person who tried to understand sympathetically and appreciate what they were trying to say on philosophical issues; and that thus he provided the common point where the two traditions could meet in a mutually respectful atmosphere to interchange ideas on philosophical issues of common interest. His loss seems almost irreparable, though we hope that there will be other pandits to take his place and carry on the work which he had so fruitfully started.

Rajasthan University, Jaipur and *Indian Council of*   DAYA KRISHNA
Philosophical Research, New Delhi

PROFESSOR MIHIRVIKASH CHAKRAVARTY

On 16 September 1987, the University of Hyderabad was shocked to hear the sad and sudden demise of our beloved Professor Mihirvikash Chakravarty. He leaves behind his wife, a son and a daughter.

Professor Chakravarty was born in October 1932 in West Bengal. On completion of B.A. (Hons.) in 1952, he received a cash award for securing first position from Krishnanagar Government College. He also received Pratap Chandra Mazumdar Medal of the University of Calcutta for securing the highest mark in Philosophy of Religion. After obtaining his master's degree in philosophy at the age of twenty-two, he began his career as Lecturer in Philosophy under the Government of West Bengal. Later, he joined North Bengal University. From there he moved as Reader to Central University of Hyderabad. In 1985, he became Professor which he continued till his death. His philosophical interest covered problems of epistemology, metaphysics, metaphilosophy, philosophical psychology and methodology.

As Research Fellow (1955-57), he wrote for the Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner, a dissertation on the Metaphysics of Bertrand Russell. In 1962, a dissertation entitled 'What is Philosophy? An Analysis of the Question' was written by him for the Premchand Roychand Scholarship of Calcutta University. In 1971, as a Guest Fellow at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, he produced a dissertation on the Classification of Questions.

His major contribution to philosophical knowledge lies in his work, *Metaphilosophical and Model Philosophical Questions* which was published in 1972 by Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan. It discusses the precise nature of the relation of metaphysical questions to

the model philosophical ones with the idea of finding their relative place in the map of philosophy. He was, perhaps, the first member of the philosophical community who raised and discussed this issue and initiated what has been called 'tertiary' or 'third-order' philosophy. The late Professor Kalidas Bhattacharya, in his foreword to the book, observed: 'Sri M. Chakravarti is one of the finest analytical thinkers of our times in India. He writes in a beautiful lucid style, and yet his analysis are as profound and penetrating as they could be.'

He was greatly committed to philosophical activities, and wrote about twenty articles which were published in various journals from 1958 onwards. In 1980, he presided over the Epistemology and Metaphysics Section of the Indian Philosophical Congress at Bhagalpur University. This apart, he delivered special lectures on the invitations of eleven institutions and universities. In 1977, he was invited for participation in a seminar of the International Society for Metaphysics held in Jerusalem. Unfortunately he could not attend it.

Professor Chakravarty was profoundly interested in the welfare of students, and guided them in their research work. It was under his guidance seven students received their Ph.Ds. and four obtained their M. Phil. degrees.

On the administrative side, his contribution was also noteworthy. He functioned as the Head of the Department of Philosophy, North Bengal University, for about two and a half years from 1968. In the University of Hyderabad also, he held the same post for about six months from 1981, and again from 1983 for about two years. He was the consultant editor of the *North Bengal Review*, the research journal of the North Bengal University. In 1977, he organized a national seminar on 'The Analytical Heritage in Indian Philosophy' in the University of Hyderabad.

A gentleman by nature, he was a man of high principles. He was kind, unassuming and honest. His departure is a great loss to the philosophical community in India.

University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad   MERCY HELEN

Book reviews

VATTANKY JOHN, S.J.: *Gaṅgeśa's Philosophy of God*—Analysis, Text, Translation and Interpretation of Iśvaravāda Section of Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* with a Study on the Development of Nyāya Theism (Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1984), xx+422 pages, Price not stated.

A book on Indian philosophy by an Indian Jesuit is not rare. Recently there are several of them, and when they are based upon Sanskrit scholarship they are bound to be interesting. The present book is particularly significant, because, despite its explicit theological overtone, the author has chosen a very important school of classical Indian philosophy, that of the late Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, called simply Navya-Nyāya (New-Logic), and added an explanatory translation of a very difficult and technical text—a short section of Gaṅgeśa's monumental work *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Gaṅgeśa in this section (called *Īśvaravāda*) has a theological interest. His goal here, as he says in the first two lines, is to establish God, as creator of the universe on the basis of a sort of cosmological argument, based specifically upon an inference, which shows that the universe must have a creator because it is a created reality. A pot is created (produced) by an agent, the potter; similarly, the creation of the universe must have an agent, God. Elsewhere, I have called it 'the Potter's model' for our conception of God.* This is not creation *ex nihilo*. The clay and other materials and accessories must be there for the potter to produce the pot. The material atoms, the ingredients of this material universe, must likewise be present for the agent, God, to create what he creates. Besides, God has to depend on the *adṛṣṭa* of the creatures (see below).

The book contains an elaborate introductory study of the development of Nyāya theism beginning from the *Nyāyasūtra* to Gaṅgeśa (Part I). The first section of Part II consists of an analysis of the text of Gaṅgeśa on *Īśvaravāda*. This synoptic view is certainly helpful for the readers as a preliminary to the actual translation and the explanation that follows. The Sanskrit text is given in Nāgarī script. Translation is given on the same page with the text. A separate (last) chapter is devoted to explanation and annotation of the translation (called by the author 'commentary') in a systematic manner.

The first part seems to be very useful for researchers in the field. Dr. Vattanky has started with the brief, cryptic observation of Akṣapāda, and given next the interpretations by Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara of this observation (the three *sūtras*). He then refers to the Buddhist attack on Nyāya theism using such well-known authors as Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, Jñāna-śrīmitra, and Ratnakīrti. Credit must be given to Dr. Vattanky for singling

*Bimal Krishna Matilal, *Logical and Ethical Issues of Religious Beliefs*, Calcutta, 1982.

out Dharmakīrti as the most important critic of the Nyāya arguments for God. He translates several verses of Dharmakīrti and analyses them systematically. He also notes rightly that the later Buddhist authors simply developed some of the points already mentioned by Dharmakīrti. I wonder on how many occasions the same truth holds, viz. on *apoha*, on perception, on inference, on *ātman*. Dharmakīrti formulated the most important arguments for the Buddhist, and his successors only elaborated the points already made by Dharmakīrti in a succinct manner.

Here I wish to note one lacuna. On the Buddhist side, there was a text (which might or might not have preceded Akṣapāda, and which was attributed to Nāgārjuna) that attacked the theistic thesis that God (Lord Viṣṇu) is the sole creator of the universe. Thus, the atheological argument of the Buddhist might have gone back to the days of Nāgārjuna. Dr. Vattanky does not seem to show any awareness of this text (see Stcherbatsky, *Īśvara-kartṛtva-nirākṛtir Viṣṇor ekakartṛtvanirākaraṇam nāma*, called *A Buddhist Philosopher on Monotheism*). It is a small polemical work, perhaps not written by Nāgārjuna himself, for the colophon says that it was done by Nāgārjuna but written down by one of his disciples. But, in any case, one can attach some historical importance to it.

Dr. Vattanky has arranged the Nyāya authors chronologically. He shows how Vācaspati tries to answer some of the objections of the Buddhist. Here I agree with Dr. Vattanky regarding his contention that Vācaspati had both profundity and subtlety. Many 'lost', forgotten Nyāya authors are mentioned in the later Buddhist texts: Śaṁkara, Vittoka, Trilocana and Narasiṁha. Dr. Vattanky has done well to pay attention to them. But it is rather odd to see that these authors are mentioned after Vācaspati, while Dr. Vattanky explicitly recognizes Trilocana as the teacher of Vācaspati. The most important of the Nyāya authors must have been Udayana, and Dr. Vattanky has rightly devoted a number of pages to discuss Udayana's views, especially his *Nyāya-kusumāñjali*, on which at least two important recent works have been based (one is G. Bhattacharya's *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theism*, Calcutta 1961, and the other is G. Champarathy's *An Indian Rational Theology: Introduction to Udayana's Nyāya-Kusumāñjali*, Vienna 1972). After Udayana, came Vallabha and then Śaśadhara and then Gaṅgeśa. Gaṅgeśa had a tough and technical style. Dr. Vattanky's commentary helps to follow the general trend of the argument.

Many issues are raised throughout the book. I shall conclude by making a brief comment on one particular issue. Dr. Vattanky focuses upon the interpretation of the three 'theistic' *Nyāyasūtras* 4.1.19-21. He refers to the interpretations of W. Ruben and G.S. J. Bulke in the footnote, and argues against the view of Ruben and Bulke that there is a contradiction in the *sūtras*. Perhaps, there is really no obvious contradiction here, but I notice again a serious lacuna in bibliography. In 1957, D.H. H. Ingalls wrote an important article on these *sūtras* called 'Human Effort versus God's Effort in the Early Nyāya

(*NS* 4.1.19-21)' published in *S.K. Velvelkar Felicitation Volume* (ed. S. Radhakrishnan), where Ingalls discusses almost all the points covered by Dr. Vattanky in this context. Although Dr. Vattanky would, perhaps, disagree with many points made by Ingalls, it would have been interesting to see this article discussed and criticized. (Incidentally, there is probably a misprint in the footnote, p.5, for Vātsyāyana does not state the law of *karma* under *NS* 3.2.5 ff, but under *NS* 3.2.61-72.)

Akṣapāda does not give the causal or cosmological argument in the way it has been stated later. The problem is imbedded in the context. He discusses the viwes of the eight disputants (*prāvādukāḥ*) regarding the 'material cause' (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) and origin of the universe. This discussion is interposed between the examination of the *prameyas* called *pretyabhāva* (rebirth) and *phala* (result). If we accept Vācaspati's *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* as our guide, we have to say that in *NS* 4.1.10-13 there is an examination of *pretyabhāva* (rebirth), and then between *NS* 4.1.14 and *NS* 4.1.43 eight views of the *prāvādukas* are discussed, followed by the examination of *phala* (result) in *NS* 4.1.44-53. This is how both Vātsyāyana in the early period and Viśvanātha in the later period divided the *sūtras*. This division contradicts the alleged division of sūtras with regard to the 'four opinions' given by Dr. Vattanky on page 5. I am a bit surprised by this, since Dr. Vattanky depends upon Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara for formulating a reasonable interpretation of the *sūtras* and criticizes Ruben who rejects Vātsyāyana's interpretation in many cases. *NS* 4.1.11-13 cannot be taken separately in order to give a rival opinion of the *prāvādukas*, for they form part of the examination of *pretyabhāva*.

My intention here is not to locate such discrepancies or inaccuracies all over. I believe the problem of wrting a book like this is enormous, and main focus of the book is worth commending. On the problem of God, therefore, only the following can be gleaned from Akṣapāda, as far as I can see. One disputant says that God is the 'cause' ('material cause', perhaps, since Vācaspati in *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* says *x-upādāntā-prakaraṇam*) for the origin of the universe, for we see that human action (effort?) is without fruit (sometimes?). The next sūtra says: no, for without human action there will be no fruit. The third resolves: that cannot be an evidence, for human action is even prompted by 'that (God). Plainly speaking, this might have meant that the usual view that things are caused because God causes them to be is modified through a caveat to the view that things are caused by human (action) effort, but such effort is also prompted by God—hence a theistic conclusion. Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara outline a more complex and sophisticated view (combining it with the law of *karma* and *adṛṣṭa*) which leads also to the same theistic conclusion.

It is interesting to note that, in the theism of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara the role of God comes to prominence as someone who bestows on people the fruits of their actions. But the objection that if God alone were the cause of the world then human action would be fruitless is answered by claiming that

God produces the world but not without dependence upon the *adṛṣṭa*, the 'unseen' fruits of human action. This, therefore, further limits God's independence or freedom as a creator in the Nyāya theory. God does not create *ex nihilo*, and nor is God responsible for the creation of varieties and unevenness in suffering and enjoyment of the creatures, for he has to depend upon the nature of their action in order to distribute their reward and punishment (in the form of pleasure and pain). This point, however, seems to run counter to what Dr. Vattanky seems to claim on p. 11 that God of the Nyāya system stands supreme over the inexorable law of *karma*.

I believe the book has ambitious goal, and the author has made an honest attempt to reach this goal. The very nature of such a book raises many expectations and problems. Dr. Vattanky has tried to fulfil some of these expectations admirably. Particularly, he has remained faithful to the original title of the book. Gaṅgeśa's contribution to the field is his main concern, although he aims at comprehensiveness in the earlier part of his book. Anybody interested in a Navya-Nyāya text would find Part II most useful.

All Souls College, Oxford   BIMAL KRISHNA MATILAL

ALEX WAYMAN: *Buddhist Insight* (edited with an introduction by George R. Elder), Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1984, p. 470, Rs. 150.

Alex Wayman has contributed extensively to the field of Tantric Buddhism. He is also well known for his work on *Śrāvakabhūmī* of Asaṅga and the Tibetan text *Lam Rim Chen Mo* of Tsoṅ-kha-pa. The book under review contains twenty-four articles by Wayman, which pertain to non-Tantric Buddhism. These have been edited and placed under five groups by George R. Elder, who has also written an introduction to this anthology.

The essays included in this book cover a wide range of topics. They are not uniform in style or worth, and hence, it is difficult to pass any judgement on the collection as a whole. The editorial introduction has sought to trace some thematic unity among the papers in the different parts of this book, and we will refrain from doing the same work over again. It is not also possible to evaluate all the papers within the span of a review. In what follows, we will indicate the contents of this book, comment on some of these papers, and then conclude with some general remarks.

Part I of this book, entitled 'Buddhist Practice', contains four papers: (*i*) Buddha as Saviour; (*ii*) Ancient Buddhist Monasticism; (*iii*) Aspects of Meditation in the Theravāda and Mahīśāsaka; and (*iv*) The Bodhisatva Practice according to *Lam Rim Chen Mo*. Part II entitled 'Buddhist Doctrine', consists of eight papers: (*v*) The Sixteen Aspects of the Four Noble Truths and Their Opposites; (*vi*) The Mirror as a Pan-Buddhist Metaphor-Simile;

(*vii*) The Buddhist Theory of Vision; (*viii*) Dependent Origination—the Indo-Tibetan Tradition; (*ix*) Nescience and Insight according to Asaṅga's *Yogā-cārabhūmī*; (*x*) The Twenty Reifying Views (*Sakkāyadiṭṭhi*); (*xi*) Who Understands the Four Alternatives of the Buddhist Texts? and (*xii*) The Intermediate-state Dispute in Buddhism. Part III, entitled 'Interpretative Studies of Buddhism', contains three papers; (*xiii*) No Time, Great Time and Profane Time in Buddhism; (*xiv*) The Role of Art among the Buddhist Religieux; and (*xv*) Secret of the *Heart Sūtra*. Part IV, entitled 'Texts of the Asaṅga School', contains three papers; (*xvi*) The *Sacittika* and *Acittika Bhūmi* (Text and Translation); (*xvii*) Asaṅga's Treatise, the *Paramārtha-gāthā*; and (*xviii*) Asaṅga's Treatise on the Three Instructions of Buddhism. Part V, entitled 'Hindu and Buddhist Studies', consists of six papers: (*xix*) Two Traditions of India—Truth and Silence; (*xx*) The Hindu-Buddhist Rite of Truth—An Interpretation; (*xxi*) Significance of Dreams in India and Tibet; (*xxii*) The Significance of Mantras, from the Vedas down to Buddhist Tantric Practice; (*xxiii*) The Goddess Sarasvatī—from India to Tibet; and (*xxiv*) The Twenty-one Praises of Tārā—A Syncretism of Śaivism and Buddhism.

Wayman's fascination for the works of Asaṅga and Tson-kha-pa is evident in many of these essays. Most of Asaṅga's works now survive in Tibetan translations, and Tson-kha-pa's works were originally written in Tibetan. Wayman has made ample use of these Tibetan sources. Pāli and Sanskrit sources have also been utilized, and, among the Sanskrit works, those of ancient masters like Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu have been used extensively. By contrast, the works of Dignāga and his successors like Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, Prajñākaragupta and Jñānaśrīmitra (who claims that Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and Prajñākaragupta belong to the spiritual lineage of Maitreyanātha, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu) have been touched only scarcely. Wayman has, however, used the works of Candrakīrti and Śāntideva, both of whom were staunch critics of Dignāga and his followers. Thus, the works of some illustrious Buddhist philosophers have been ignored, even though they contain valuable material relevant for some of the essays. In some cases, for reasons best known to Wayman, the Tibetan versions of some texts have been used, even though they are extant in Sanskrit (e.g. pp. 101-14, p. 179).

The papers in this volume bear ample testimony to Wayman's erudition and the wide range of his interests. They are not, however, of equal value. In the opinion of the present reviewer, Part IV of this book is extremely useful for students of Buddhism. The papers in this section present to the reader some important texts of Asaṅga. Asaṅga is a key-figure in the Yogācāra school of Buddhism, and a close acquaintance with his works is essential for a proper understanding of Mahāyāna Buddhism. The last article of the book, which contains the text of a Tārā-stotra, is also valuable for similar reasons. Many of the papers in Part I and Part II are interesting because they raise new problems, and often challenge the views prevalent among students of Buddhism. Thus, the first paper discusses how far the Buddhist notion of

Buddha as a saviour is consistent with the 'Buddhist emphasis on individual responsibility and enterprise'. The second paper challenges the prevalent view that the schism in the Buddhist Sangha and the subsequent appearance of different sects was due to disputes about *Vinaya* rules, and suggests instead 'that various *Vinaya* lineages were in Buddhism from the beginning and that the separation into Buddhist sects was due to doctrinal and not *Vinaya* disagreements'. The third paper tries to establish that the use of *Kasinas* in meditation as suggested by Buddhaghosa, the renowned author of *Visuddhimagga*, may actually be a corruption of Buddhist pracatices. The tenth essay institutes a close comparison between the treatments of the reifying views (*sakkaya-ditthi*) as found in the *Samyutta-Nikāya,* the *Patisambhidāmagga* and the works on Nāgārjuna on one hand and the *Jñānaprasthāna*, Vinītadeva's commentary on *Vinaya* and the *Mahāvyutpatti* on the other; and then tries to determine how disagreements about the list of such reifying views developed gradually. Such examples may be multiplied *ad nauseum*. The trouble with many of these papers, however, is that while they deal with interesting problems, the manner in which these are discussed leaves much to be desired. Three factors are primarily responsible for such a state of affairs:

(*a*) The profusion of material at times obscures the chain of reasoning, and under such circumstances, a reader may lose the wood in the trees;

(*b*) The conclusions do not always seem to follow from the given data; and

(*c*) The style of Wayman is often ponderous and clumsy, and much of the clumsiness is due to awkward English renderings of Sanskrit terms.

Thus, while the reader may be impressed by the erudition of Wayman, he may at the same time be unable to follow the drift of his argument at many vital points. We note here only a few examples of somewhat queer renderings of important Sanskrit terms.

(*i*) In the first paper, Wayman speaks of Buddha's double nature, viz. 'perfect in clear vision and walking' (p.2). The portion quoted here is supposed to express the meaning of the Sanskrit term '*vidyācaranasampanna*. It is evident that *vidyā* has been translated here as 'perfect vision', while *carana* has been translated as 'walking'. We need not enter here into a dispute about the translation of *vidyā*. But the translation of *carana* as 'walking' is, to say the least, rather odd. Wayman himself seems to be aware of this oddity, as is evident from the following passage:

...the Chinese *sastra* takes the *carana* part as practices, while I render it more literally as "walking" to indicate the wanderings during which the Buddha taught his Doctrine that was established in the clear vision (p.3.).

Our humble submission is that the Chinese rendering is much better, and the

so called 'literal' translation adopted by Wayman is not of much help. For one thing, the expression *vidyācaranasampanna* is not the epithet of Buddha alone—it has been used in other cases, where no amount whatsoever of 'walking' is hinted at. We can recall here a well-known verse in Sanskrit:

Vidyācaranasampanne brāhmane gavi hastini/
Śuni caiva śvapāke ca panditāh sama-darśinah//

But no such difficulty crops up if we understand by *carana* practice or conduct, because it applies equally to Buddha and the Brahmin mentioned in the verse quoted above. Besides, 'walking' is not the sole 'literal' rendering of *carana*. Let us take a well-known Buddhist expression: *ehi bhikso, cara brahmacaryam.* Should we, following Wayman, translate it as: 'come, Oh monk, walk celibacy?'

(*ii*) In the same paper, Wayman has translated *Catuhśataka* (Chap. XII, Verse 1), the first hemistich of which runs as follows:

Śankustho buddhimān arthī
śrotā pātram itīryate/

Wayman has translated it as:

The hearer who is upright (like a post) has discrimination (*buddhimat* = the native insight) and strives, is called the 'vessel' (p. 20).

We fail to see how *buddhimat* can be translated as 'the native insight'. Even if we admit that the word *buddhi* stands for 'the native insight', what would be the meaning of *matup,* which has been added as a suffice to the word *buddhi*? Again, *pātra* (along with *bhājana*) can mean a 'vessel', but it can also mean 'some one worthy of...' or 'competent', and from the context of the verse it is clear that Āryadeva, the author of *Catuhśataka*, is speaking here about the competent hearer, who can do justice to the doctrines revealed to him. Some analogous expressions are *krpāpātram, śraddhābhājanam*, etc.; and by translating such expressions as 'vessel of mercy' or 'pot of reverence', one can only add to the confusion of the reader.

(*iii*) The first *pāda* of *Manu-Samhitā* (Chap. II, Verse 100) reads as:

Vaśe Krtvendriyagrāmam

Wayman translates it as:

Keeping the village of the senses in subjection...(p. 56).

We do not know what to say about such a 'literal' translation of *indriyagrāma*.

Grāma does mean a village, but it can also mean 'collection' or 'totality'; and, in the case under consideration, Manu is speaking of keeping *all* the sense-organs under control. Analogous expressions like *guṇagrāma, svaragrāma,* etc. are quite abundant in Sanskrit, and one can at best produce a comical effect by translating such expressions as village of good qualities' or 'village of musical notes'.

(iv) On p. 59, Wayman translates *Prātimokṣa-sūtra* (Verse 16 of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya*) as follows:

This *prātimokṣa* (Liberation-Onset) is like the bridle of a hundred sharp nails on the difficult-response mouth of the horse-like mind driven by incessant effort.

In a footnote to this translation, Wayman remarks that this translation is based on the Tibetan version, as the text given in A.C. Banerjee's edition of *Prātimokṣa-sūtra* is not quite satisfactory. He also remarks:

According to the context of the verse's citation, the "difficult-response mouth" means the spiritual guide's speech endowment (*vacasā'bhyupetam*) of *Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra* XVII. 10. The "hundred sharp nails" are presumably the "one hundred karmas" of the work *Mūlasarvāstivādanikāyika-śatakarman....* The teacher who has gone through these *"karmas"* is said to have these as a bridle on his mouth, capable of answering the difficult questions of the disciples, while his mind, like a horse, is spurred on. Vinitadeva explains the "hundred sharp nails" as the "points of instruction" (*śikṣā-pada*), which might signify the 150-odd prohibitions of the *Prātimokṣa-sūtra* or might conceivably refer to the "one hundred karmas" (pp. 59-60).

A close comparison of the translation with the subsequent remarks may lead to a number of problems. First, why should a mouth capable of answering difficult questions be called a 'difficult-response mouth'? Second, how could someone speak of such a 'difficult-response mouth' that belongs to a 'horse-like mind'? Third, why should a bridle with 'hundred sharp nails' make a mouth capable of *answering* difficult questions? Fourth, why should this bridle act on the mouth of the spiritual guide *alone*, when the *Prātimokṣa-sūtra* is supported to be recited and followed by all members of the *Saṅgha*, irrespective of their status? All such tricky issues suggest that something is wrong somewhere.

(v) In the seventh essay, a section of *Sṅags Rim Chen Mo* is translated, where the rite of eye-ointment is described. The first few lines are as follows:

[The guru] places in a gold or silver vessel the golden eye-ointment consisting of butter and honey. While the disciple imagines on his eyes the syllable PRAṂ, (the guru) applies (the eye-ointment) with a probe (*śalākā*) reciting

OṂ VAJRANETRA APAHARA PAṬALAM HRĪḤ ("Oṃ! Remove the film that is on the diamond eye! Hrīḥ")...(p. 160).

We cannot understand how Wayman (whom the editor eulogizes as the 'scholar's scholar') could translate the sentence *Oṃ vajranetra apahara paṭalam hrīḥ* as 'Oṃ! Remove the film that is on the diamond eye! Hrīḥ'. First, the word *vajranetra* occurring in this sentence is in the vocative case, the word *paṭalam* is in the accusative case, and they are separated by the verb *apahara*, which is in the imperative mood. Thus, one cannot in any way construe the 'film' to be *on* the 'diamond eye'. Besides, Wayman himself says on p. 161 that the 'diamond eye' belongs to *Mahāvajradhara*. In order to make any sense of the incantation, we must take the word *'vajranetra* as the result of a *bahubrīhi* compound, which would mean 'one who has a diamond eye', i.e. *Māhāvajradhara*. This alone can fit with the vocative case used in the incantation. We do not know how such a simple thing could escape the attention of Wayman. One may, however, find some solace in the proverb *munīnāñca matibhramaḥ*.

A reader willing to take such irritants in his stride may find this book useful, because in many of his papers Wayman has at least identified and demarcated areas of research where fruitful work remains to be done. In an ever-expanding discipline like Buddhistic studies, such a service should be appreciated by all serious students of Buddhism, and the editor deserves their thanks for presenting these papers in a handy volume.

University of Calcutta, Calcutta   PRABAL KUMAR SEN

R. SUNDARA RAJAN: *Towards a Critique of Cultural Reason,* ICPR Series in Philosophy of Natural and Social Sciences, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1987, xii+144 pages, Rs. 85.

The author intends to map an unchartered terrain of cultural reason. The compass which he is trusting is the Kantian project of Transcendental Critique. The book does not aim at a full-fledged Critique but rather at a prolegomena to a future Critique of Cultural Reason. By 'Critique' Sundara Rajan means 'relentlessness of reason in the service of an Idea'. He goes on to say 'Critique is not merely criticism but a total complex manner of a re-consideration of what we are and what we know, of what we say and what we do; it is an examination of ourselves as we are in the light of what we ought to be'.

The problematic of the Critique dates back to the Greek period and holds a central position for Kant and Marx. They all address themselves to the

question: what is the relationship between theory and practice. For Kant this question becomes the question: how can Pure Reason become practical. Kant's conclusion seems to be Pure Reason can be practical but cannot become directly political. For him politics is relevant only in the realm of the moral. Sundara Rajan suggests that it is the exclusion of productive activity that 'moralizes' Kantian politics. Marx transforms the Kantian Critique by introducing a historical dimension—we witness an attempt to transform an epistemological critique into political praxis. Sundara Rajan sees both the Kantian and the Marxian approach to theory and practice as inadequate or defective. He finds reason to believe that his Critique of Cultural Reason could have a remedial effect.

The trouble begins when the theory-practice relationship is interpreted in a single dimension. Sundara Rajan specifies three distinct dimensions of the relationship, viz. theory *of* Action, theory *for* Action, and theory *in* Action. Of these three dimensions the third, i.e. theory in Action plays a pivotal role, it can mediate the other two forms of relationship between theory and practice, in other words, it has an integrating function. Theory in action refers to the meanings embedded in action—communicative practices. Sundara Rajan holds that as a matter of fact men are capable of expressing meanings at two levels—the signific and the symbolic—these are the two levels of the semiotic process. The level of significance deals with contexualized situation specific meanings, whereas, the symbolic is that aspect of meaning which has a certain universal or general range of significance. These two levels of the operation of meaning interpenetrate. Since this is the fact for the explanation of which the entire Critique is being worked out we need to be very clear about this distinction. An illustration may be helpful: Sundara Rajan writes, 'To give a crude example of the signific symbolic dimensions of the meaning process, in the discourse of the family, the terms "father", "mother", and "child" operate both at the signific and symbolic level. As signs they evoke the specific individuals talked about in the discourse, but such terms also move on the symbolic level, representing certain archetypal meanings, available in the cultural tradition, of father, mother and child. As symbols, these terms evoke certain generalized images and complexes of meaning which have a cultural location'. He goes on to say that, 'when such terms function as symbols, they may, therefore, be called symbols of transcendence. I am noting that from this point of view culture is the domain of symbols of transcendence'. The two levels of meaning pervade all human understanding and are given different labels in different contexts. The author variously refers to them as follows: in the context of meaning we get the two levels of the significant and the symbolic, in language there is *langue* and *parole*, with respect to comprehension the two levels are that of determinate judgement and reflective judgment, in philosophy they are the levels of finitude and infinity and there is the dichotomy of data and concepts. In every case the decontextualized aspect of communicative practice is the result of finite transcendence. Like Heidegger Sundara

Rajan holds that the ontological structure of man is fiinite transcendence. Consequently, philosophy is seen as a concern with how man can make his own empirical character a medium or vehicle of transcendence. He makes bold to say, 'the destruction of these symbols of transcendence (culture) is the destruction of that in life which is what life is for'.

The cause of the Marxian malady, according to Sundara Rajan, is the suspicion of the symbols of transcendence. Of the two levels previously mentioned, Marx treats the level of contextualized meaning or significance as basic. Culture, or the realm of the symbolic, is approached from this level. Marx sees the symbolic as a masking consciousness. The mask is seen as a legitimization of specific interests. Any decontextualized meaning is therefore a suspect. Thus, the hermeneutics appropriate to the study of ideological consciousness is the hermeneutics of suspicion. Sundara Rajan explains, 'such a hermeneutics builds a distrust, a suspicion of decontextualized meanings, not merely as a mood or moral value, but as the very principle of its method to understand truly is to be suspicious of these presumed disclosures; we may call it methodological suspicion'. The preferred Marxian stance is one of positivistic self-understanding or some form of scientism. Sundara Rajan sees a Kantian antinomy developing at this juncture—'if we embrace the scientific reduction then, lacking a grounding, the very possibility of science has to be taken as it were on trust'. A similar observation was made by Sartre in his *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. The charge is that, what the Marxists say is in some way true but they lack the subjective authority of being truthful. This is seen by Sundara Rajan as the 'nemesis of Marxism'.

It is in this context that the Critique of Cultural Reason is prescribed as a remedy. Sundara Rajan believes the new Critique will reconceptualize ideology and that the specific cultural and political issues can be reposed promising a greater measure of penetration and insight. The Critique tells us that 'culture cannot be comprehended solely by way of a sociology of knowledge approach'; 'it can be comprehended only by way of a trust in its symbols' and not by a suspicion of symbols. To begin with we must acknowledge that sign and symbol are not separate substantive entities, but functional differentiations within the life-world (semiotic process).

Sundara Rajan first tries to explain the process of finite transcendence in the context of meaning, here he deals with the forms of meaning displayed in literature, religion and codes of morality. Next he focuses his attention on finite transcendence in the role of practice—the entire complex of formative forces in history. Here he faces a stumbling block, we recognize it as the same obstacle which faced Marx. In Sundara Rajan's words 'we have to explore the possibility of a similar transcendence at the level of practices. But there we encounter a certain barrier which we did not face at the previous context, now the hermeneutics of suspicion intrudes and implants a certain doubt about the possibility of such situational transcendence'. At this point the entire inquiry takes a critical turn. Instead of asking the question how can

these barriers be overcome, it is taken for granted that, as a fact, 'men inter-
pret themselves and their experiences in terms of culture'. The question now
asked is: what are the conditions under which we could make such a possi-
bility an intelligible one? Based on the trust of an epistemic promise Sundara
Rajan gives his inquiry a critical turn and says, 'for now, we are not con-
cerned with the object itself (the actuality of context transcending act) but
with the mode of our understanding it'. Henceforward the inquiry becomes
transcendental. Sundara Rajan writes, 'the inquiry is transcendental in the
sense that it asks for the grounds of possibility of a certain given phenomenon,
namely that the human subjects are capable of expressing themselves at both
levels is shown to be essential for the possibility of culture and hence the
transcendental inquiry, at this stage, shapes itself as the Critique of Cultural
Reason, patterned after the Kantian critical programme'.

It is taken for granted that sign and symbol are functional differentiations
in the same life-world. Sundara Rajan says, 'this notion of a functional differ-
entiation within the semiotic process may be made clearer if we approach it
by way of the notion of an exemplar'. This notion figures as a key concept in
the Critique of Cultural Reason. Of the many characterizations of the exemp-
lar we shall mention only two: first, an exemplar is inexponable in the Kantian
sense and secondly, an exemplar embodies both the contextualized and the
decontextualized aspects of meaning. Being inexponable the exemplar suggests
varying interpretations, 'the meanings of such exemplars pulsate and get re-
structured in different combinations...an exemplar has a certain design in the
sense that there is a principle of integration of its unfolding thematic content;
but this principle or formula of design...cannot be formulated in a set of defi-
nite formulae...yet this principle is comprehended in a peculiar mode of
judgment. The need for a peculiar mode of judgment is necessitated by the
complex nature of the exemplar. On the one hand the exemplar 'is rooted in
a certain specific situation or context and it also reveals aspects of its contextu-
alized situation' on the other hand, an exemplar is not only a signifying but
a *symbolizing form* and therefore also represents a transcendental claim.
Sundara Rajan feels that we can on good Kantian grounds speak of a faculty
of cultural comprehension. It is the mode by which we comprehend the organic
unity of an exemplar. He says, 'the peculiar and humanly specific competence
which I have called comprehension...is a way of understanding totalities...it
is a kind of cognition which seems to be involved in expanding the horizons
or frontiers of knowledge'. The vehicle of this comprehension is reflective
judgment. Reflective judgment is the medium of the critique's concern with it-
self. It is self-grounding, it grounds itself not directly as it were, but by
uncovering the foundations of science, morality and religion. 'Critique
...results in a body of synthetic a priori principles which together constitute
the framework of experience and thought? Critical judgment is not
subjective in the sense of being arbitrary, it is objective in the sense of
being universal pattern of human reason in its investigations.

The explanatory paradigm being used by Sundara Rajan in the context of
politics and culture is the paradigm of Political Judgment. He concludes his
discussion by comparing this paradigm with the paradigm of Action and the
paradigm of Knowledge. The paradigm of Action is attributed to Aristotle
and in more recent times to Marx. In this paradigm the primary emphasis falls
on the agent and the primary political question is the question of power, its
preservation and transformation. The paradigm of Knowledge is attributed
to Plato. Politics for this paradigm is a body of knowledge of principles and
the Statesman is the seer. In contrast 'judgment', in the paradigm of Political
Judgment 'is neither knowledge nor action'. It is reflective and in that peculiar
sense, 'disinterested; at the same time it is subjective and hence does not claim
the necessity and objective force of knowledge'. Politics is analogous to 'an
art, looked at from the point of view of the critic and spectator, rather than
from the point of view of the creator'. Sundara Rajan goes on to say that this
'critic is no more an elitist expert, he represents the universal faculty of reflective
judgment of taste'. Sundara Rajan also believes 'that this paradigm of [poli-
tical] judgment may perhaps be closer to a philosphical democratic theory
than either the paradigm of Action or the paradigm of Knowledge', these
closing remarks are highly provocative and I am sure any Marxist would like
to take issue.

The Critique of Cultural Reason reads as a tidy closed system. After pa-
tiently following the intricately interwoven arguments in favour of the judg-
mental approach to finite transcendence, the bogy of the skeleton reappears.
At the end one would like to ask again: has the hermeneutics of suspicion been
silenced? Let us go back a little. The question under consideration was: 'what
is the presice relation of theory in Action?' and we were offered two alter-
native answers—the Marxian answer which interprets theory in the light of
practice and Sundara Rajan's answer which treats theory and practice as an
organic whole. We also have Sundara Rajan's suggestion that, 'when the pro-
ject of such a Critique of Cultural Reason is sought to be inserted into Marx-
ism, a number of very complex repercussions both at the level of theory and
the level of action are likely to arise...I believe that such an attempt may allow
us to reconsider the entire problematic of the dialectic in the methodology of
Marxism'. I doubt Sundara Rajan's solution would be acceptable to the
Marxist. To begin with they would question the very starting point adopted
by Sundara Rajan for whom 'the *questio facti*...is that men are capable of
expressing meanings at both the signific and the symbolic levels', and this is
corroborated by man's use of exemplars. The two questions which the Marxist
will raise have been pre-empted by Sundara Rajan. The questions are: can
there be situational transcendence at the level of practice; and are there such
exemplars? Neither question has been directly confronted, instead what we
get is a series of postulates, such as, 'culture is distinctive of *homo sapiens*',
'man is not so much a rational animal as he is a judging animal', and that,
'politics is an affair of judgment'. Now if this *questio facti* be accepted then

the Critique of Cultural Reason which is invoked on the basis of a transcendental argument fits perfectly. But is this not the prerequisite of all transcendental arguments—that the relationship between the explanandum and the explanans be unique and the explanation be consistent. The Critique of Cultural Reason fulfils both requirements and therefore, the only way to counteract it would be through external criticisms.

The book has an index but no bibliography. The Index is not always helpful, because the page numbers for each entry are not exhaustive and many important terms have not been included. The thesis is well argued. While reading the book one experiences the exhilaration that an original piece of philosophical work arouses. One may or may not agree with the contentions but surely one cannot ignore them.

Jadavpur University, Calcutta   SHEFALI MOITRA

DIALOGUE

Articles

Mill on Liberty of Self-Development /
WENDY DONNER

Dire le droit n'est pas le faire. A propos
des limites du pouvoir judiciaire /
JOSEPH PESTIEAU

Aristotelian and Cartesian Revolutions
in the Philosophy of Man and Woman /
SR. PRUDENCE ALLEN, R.S.M.

Commentaire sur le texte de Sr Prudence
Allen intitulé « Aristotelian and
Cartesian Revolutions in the
Philosophy of Man and Woman » /
JOCELYNE ST-ARNAUD

Response to "Commentaire sur le texte
de Sr Prudence Allen par Jocelyne
St-Arnaud" / SR. PRUDENCE ALLEN,
R.S.M.

Nominalisme occamiste et nominalisme
contemporain / CLAUDE PANACCIO

Cohen, Exploitation, and Theft /
DOUGLAS EHRING

Critical Notices/Etudes critiques

La logique illocutoire de Searle et
Vanderveken / FRANÇOIS LEPAGE

Kierkegaard: A Non-Cognitivist? /
JOHN J. HARTLEY

Out on a Nuclear Limb / DOUGLAS P.
LACKEY

Interventions

Book Reviews/Comptes rendus

Redacteur francophone: François Du-
chesneau, Département de philosophie,
Université de Montréal, C.P. 6128,
succ. A, Montréal, Québec H3C 3J7

English-language editor: Michael
McDonald, Department of Philosophy,
University of Waterloo, Waterloo,
Ontario N2L 3G1

♃ CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME 13, 1987

SCIENCE, MORALITY AND FEMINIST THEORY

EDITORS:
Marsha Hanen and Kai Nielsen

Marsha Hanen	Introduction: Toward Integration
Alison M. Jaggar	Sex Inequality and Bias in Sex Differences Research
Annette C. Baier	The Need for More Than Justice
Alison Wylie	The Philosophy of Ambivalence: Sandra Harding on *The Science Question in Feminism*
Sandra Harding	Ascetic Intellectual Opportunities: Reply to Alison Wylie
Marilyn Friedman	Beyond Caring: The De-Moralization of Gender
Virginia Held	Non-Contractual Society
Sibyl Schwarzenbach	Rawls and Ownership: The Forgotten Category of Reproductive Labour
John Exdell	Ethics, Ideology, and Feminine Virtue
Kathryn Morgan	Women and Moral Madness
Steven Burns	Moral Sanity or Who Killed Boy Staunton
Barbara Houston	Rescuing Womanly Virtues: Some Dangers of Moral Reclamation
Susan Sherwin	Feminist Ethics and In Vitro Fertilization
Christine Overall	Surrogate Motherhood
Sheila Mullett	Only Connect: The Place of Self-Knowledge in Ethics
Ann Ferguson	A Feminist Aspect Therapy of the Self
Lorraine Code	Second Persons
Kai Nielsen	Afterword: Feminist Theory - Some Twistings and Turnings

This Supplementary Volume is **free to individual and Student SUBSCRIBERS to CJP** Volume 17, 1987.

Indian Council of Social Science Research

PUBLICATIONS

Survey of Research

(i) Accounting theory, (ii) Demography, (iii) Economics, 7 vols.
(iv) An Economic, (v) Geography, 3 vols., and (vi) Management,
2 vols. (vii) Political Science, 4 vols., (viii) Psychology, and
(ix) Public Administration, 2 vols., and Public Administration 1970-79.
(x) Sociology and Social Anthropology, 3 vols., and Second Series
3 vols., (xi) Second Survey of Research in Psychology, 2 pts., and
Social History of India. (xii) Physical Geography.

NASSDOC Research Information Series : Serials

1. Acquisition Update (Monthly). 2. Bibliographic Reprints
(Irregular). 3. Bibliographies on Tap (Irregular). 4. Conference Alert
(Quarterly). 5. Paging periodicals (Bi-monthly). 6. Samajik Vigyan
Samachar (Monthly) (In Hindi). 7. Social Science News (Monthly).
8. Social Science Research Index (Irregular), etc.

Journals

(i) *ICSSR Journal of Abstracts and Reviews:* Economics,
(ii) Geography, (iii) Political Science and (iv) Sociology, (v) Indian
Dissertation Abstracts, (vi) Indian Psychological Abstracts,
(vii) Research Abstracts Quarterly.

Other Publications

(i) Gandhi Bibliographies (English, Hindi, Sanskrit & Urdu),
(ii) Annotated and Classified Bibliography of Indian Demography,
(iii) National Register of Social Scientists in India, (iv) Social
Information of India: Trends and Structure, (v) Law: The Crisis of the
Indian Legal System, (vi) Religion Society and State, etc.

For details of other important titles please contact:
The Director,
National Social Science Documentation Centre
(ICSSR)
35 Ferozeshah Road
New Delhi 110 001 (India)
Telephone: 385959, 384353, 381571, 383091