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On 'this is red and this is blue': *Tractatus* 6.3751

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The objective of this paper is to examine a proposition like 'This is red and this is blue' and to find out within the framework of the *Tractatus* the nature of contradiction involved in such propositions. Wittgenstein takes up this problem in the *Tractatus* 6.3751[1], and again in a paper entitled 'Some Remarks on Logical Form' which was published in 1929[2].

As 6.3751 is a comment on 6.375, I quote here both:

> 6.375 Just as the only necessity that exists is *logical* necessity, so too the only impossibility that exists is *logical* impossibility.
>
> 6.3751 For example, the simultaneous presence of two colours at the same place in the visual field is impossible, in fact logically impossible, since it is ruled out by the logical structure of colour.
>
> Let us think how this contradiction appears in physics: more or less as follows—a particle cannot have two velocities at the same time; that is to say, it cannot be in two places at the same time; that is to say, particles that are in different places at the same time cannot be identical.
>
> (It is clear that the logical product of two elementary propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction. The statement that a point in the visual field has two different colours at the same time is a contradiction.)

But before we deal with the problem itself, we have to clear the ground a little.

Contradiction is closely related to truth and falsity. The truth of a proposition necessarily implies the falsity of its opposite or negation and vice versa. And the conjunctive assertion of both is a contradiction. So, first of all, we have to discuss and determine the nature of truth within the framework of the *Tractatus*. The word 'truth' is ambiguous, as it is generally used. The ambiguity of the word 'truth' becomes clear to us, if we look into the meaning of the word in such expressions as 'formal truth', 'material truth', 'mathematical truth', 'logical truth', 'empirical truth', 'religious truth', 'ethical truth', etc. But, in the *Tractatus* it is used with a determinate meaning. Truth-value is a property of propositions. So only propositions can be true or false. How?

> 4.06 A proposition can be true or false only in virtue of being a picture of reality.

But

> 2.224 It is impossible to tell from the [proposition] alone whether it is true or false.

So

> 2.223 In order to tell whether a [proposition] is true or false we must compare it with reality.

This comparison will enable us to know whether the sense of the proposition agrees with reality or not. And

> 2.222 The agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity.

So only a proposition can be true or false. In order to be so, it must be a description of a possible fact; and if there is a corresponding fact, it is true, otherwise false. Whether some of the other uses of the word 'truth' have any meaning in the *Tractatus* we shall see in due course.

As truth-value is a property of propositions, we have to find out what exactly is meant by the word 'proposition' in the *Tractatus*.

Wittgenstein says:

> 3.12 I call the sign with which we express a thought a propositional sign. —And a proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.[3]

Any sentence in the indicative mood is just a propositional sign, but if it has a projective relation to the world, then and only then it is a proposition. 'The cat is on the mat' is a propositional sign; but it is also a proposition as it has a projective relation to the world, whereas 'The good is more or less identical than the beautiful' or 'Red is higher than green' is a mere propositional sign, for it has no projective relation to the world. So, within the framework of the *Tractatus*, the sense of a proposition is confined to some matters of fact. As the picture theory says: it must depict a state of affairs. The so-called propositions which talk about mathematical, logical, ethical and aesthetic truths are not propositions at all. Wittgenstein writes:

> 6.2 The propositions of mathematics are equations, and therefore pseudo-propositions.
>
> 6.21 A proposition of mathematics does not express a thought.
>
> 6.2341 ...every proposition of mathematics must go without saying.

Similarly,

> 5.43 ...all the propositions of logic say the same thing, to wit nothing (cf. 6.11).
>
> 6.42 So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics [as] propositions can express nothing that is higher.

And as 'ethics and aesthetics are one and the same (6.421)', there are no propositions of aesthetics. The propositions that we have in the *Tractatus* are the propositions of the sciences or propositions that talk about the world.

But, in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein talks of two kinds of propositions: elementary propositions and complex propositions. The latter are generally referred to simply as propositions, and are said to be constructed out of elementary propositions.

> 4.21 The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts the existence of a state of affairs.
>
> 2.01 A states of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).

And objects which are simple in the Tractarian sense have also names in the Tractarian sense. So

> 4.22 An elementary proposition consists of names. It is a nexus, a concatenation, of names.
>
> 4.23 It is only in the nexus of an elementary proposition that a name occurs in a proposition.

Thus, an elementary proposition is a concatenation of names that tries to picture a possible state of affairs in which the objects corresponding to the names are in a definite combination in accordance with the projective relation between the proposition and the fact. The complex propositions, or simply, propositions are constructed out of such elementary propositions (cf. 4.51). And as such the truth-value of a proposition depends upon the truth-values of the elementary propositions out of which it is constructed. Thus,

> 5 A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions, [but] an elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself.
>
> 4.41 Truth-possibilities of elementary propositions are the conditions of the truth and falsity of propositions.

Given the elementary propositions, we can construct propositions; and given propositions, we are thus theoretically in a position to analyse them into elementary propositions. Wittgenstein has not said in the *Tractatus* how this analysis is to be carried on, although it is vitally central to the truth-function theory of the *Tractatus*. He has not even, definitely said anything about the names and the so-called simple objects corresponding to them. He was once categorically asked about the nature of the Tractarian objects and to give at least one example of such objects; he failed to give one. Rather, he said that all that he had said about the simple objects in the *Tractatus* he had said as a logician.[4] It is left to other people to determine what they are.

So, we are in a lurch. But as analysis, names and simple objects are quite central to the *Tractatus*, we have to come out of it. To do so we can put a Tractarian question to the *Tractatus* itself. Wittgenstein says:

> 6.211 In philosophy the question, 'What do we actually use this word or this proposition for?' repeatedly leads to valuable insights.

In the same spirit we may put the question: what is this analysis for? What insight do we get? Clearly it is this: we analyse a complex proposition into elementary propositions in order to compare the latter with the states of affairs to determine their truth-value; to find out which elementary propositions are true and which are false, so that we may be in a position to determine the truth-value of the complex proposition which is nothing but the truth-function of these elementary propositions. So, for the determination of its truth-value we analyse a complex proposition into elementary propositions which are nothing but concatenation of names, and compare them with states of affairs which are, again, nothing but the Tractarian objects standing to each other in a definite relation. Theoretically, so far, the analysis and the determination of the truth-value of a proposition look quite simple. But when we reflect on the nature of elementary propositions, names and objects we are again in trouble; for unless we know the nature of these it is nonsensical to engage onself in this kind of analysis, because one might not be knowing how to go on and where to stop. But we have to jump over this hurdle too. Wittgenstein states:

> 4.002 Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it.
>
> It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is.
>
> Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes.

> The tacit conventions on which the understanding of everyday language depends are enormously complicated.
>
> 3.323 In everyday language it very frequently happens that the same word has different modes of signification—and so belongs to different symbols —or that two words that have different modes of signification are employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way.
>
> Thus the word 'is' figures as the copula, as a sign for identity, and as an expression for existence...
>
> 3.324 In this way the most fundamental confusions are easily produced...
>
> 3.325 In order to avoid such errors we must make use of a sign-language that excludes them by not using the same sign for different symbols and by not using in a superficially similar way signs that have different modes of signification: that is to say, a sign-language that is governed by *logical* grammar—by logical syntax.
>
> 5.475 All that is required is that we should construct a system of signs with a particular number of dimensions—with a particular mathematical multiplicity.
>
> 4.1213 ...once we have a sign-language in which everything is all right, we already have a correct logical point of view.

These passages in the *Tractatus* led many philosophers to say that Wittgenstein was here propagating a kind of ideal language in which we have signs for names and relations 'with a particular mathematical multiplicity' corresponding to objects and their configurations that are there in the world. Again, let us notice what Wittgenstein says about everyday language:

> 5.5563 In fact, all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order.

Wittgenstein seems to contradict himself. But he is not, if we take into account the language using competency of man along with its successes and failures. He says:

> 4.002 Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense, without having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is—just as people speak without knowing how the individual sounds are produced.

By virtue of this competency man can use words with or without meaning, combine words to make expressions in an appropriate manner or without that.

The use of this competency is successful when the propositions talk about the world as pictures of the states of affairs, and is unsuccessful if 'we have failed to give a *meaning* to some of [their] constituents' we make use of in the so-called propositions (5.4733). Wittgenstein has enough faith in the ordinary, everyday language; but his objection is against the use of 'the same sign for different symbols' and against the use 'in a superficially similar way signs that have different modes of signification' (3.325). For example, the word 'is' in the following propositions:

(1) Ram *is* honest.
(2) Sloth *is* laziness.
(3) Man *is* an animal.
(4) Dilip *is* an actor.
(5) John *is* the father of David.
(6) God *is*.

Though the word 'is' occurs in each of the above propositions, it has a different kind of logical function in each case.

(1) is a subject-predicate proposition. It says that an individual possesses a certain property, which is symbolized as ϕx.
(2) expresses an identity. It says that the meaning of the word 'sloth' is identical with the meaning of the word 'laziness', and that it can be symbolized as 'x'$\equiv$'y'.
(3) is a class-inclusion proposition. It says that the class of man is included in the class of animals and is symbolized as $a \subset b$.
(4) is a class-membership proposition. It says that an individual is a member of a class which is symbolized as $a \in F$.
(5) is a relational proposition. It says that an individual has a certain relationship with another individual, and that it is symbolized as $R(x, y)$.
(6) asserts existence. It says that a certain individual called god exists and that it is symbolized as $(\exists x).x = \text{God}$.

So I would like to say that for Wittgenstein the ordinary, everyday language is in perfect logical order except when we lose the thread of the logic of language or when we use a sign for different symbols and think that all such uses have similar significance.

Now coming back to analysis, we have to see what kind of analysis we can have within the framework of the *Tractatus*. From the point of view of ordinary grammar, we know that sentences are divided into simple sentences and complex sentences; and, given a complex sentence, we know how to analyse it into simple sentences. But this kind of analysis is not meant in the *Tractatus*, and it may be the case that a simple sentence of grammar may be treated as a complex proposition in the *Tractatus*. For instance, in ordinary grammar the

sentence 'The broom is in the corner' is a simple sentence. But within the framework of the *Tractatus* it might be thought to be a complex proposition, and it may be analysed into 'The brush is in the corner', 'The stick is in the corner' and 'The stick is fitted to the brush in a certain manner'. Each one of these can theoretically be further analysed. But the whole process is found unsatisfactory even by Wittgenstein himself. The purpose of analysis is the attainment of truth. So, from the point of view of truth, we can take another approach and see where we can stop. Suppose 'a' is an elementary propositional sign and 'b' is another. These two elementary propositional signs can be combined into a complex propositional sign like, e.g. $a \& b$. Wittgenstein says: 'The contraction of a symbol for a complex into a simple symbol can be expressed in a definition' (3.24). For our purpose here we need the contraction of the complex symbol $a \& b$. The contraction of the complex symbol $a \& b$ into a simple symbol A can be expressed in a definition like: $a \& b \equiv A$. Def. Suppose, the elementary proposition a is true and the elementary proposition b is also true, so the complex proposition $a \& b$ is true, so its defined equivalent A is also true. In this case, we proceed from the truth of elementary propositions to the truth of the complex proposition. Suppose that symbols like A, B, C, etc. are propositions of our ordinary language, how are we to analyse them into elementary propositions, the truth-values of which determine the truth-values of 'A', 'B', 'C', etc. I would like to say that, if we *know* 'B' to be true, then this knowledge is enough; and we need not bother about the truth-values of the elementary propositions that constitute 'B'. Suppose further that 'B' is the defined equivalent of '$p \supset q$'. We know 'B' to be true. Should we rack our heads about the truth-values of 'p' and 'q'? Not necessarily. For the truth-table for '$p \supset q$' is

	p	q	$p \supset q$
1	T	T	T
2	T	F	F
3	F	T	T
4	F	F	T

in which '$p \supset q$' is true in rows 1, 3 and 4 and false in row 2. If '$p \supset q$' is true, then the truth-value combination of 'p' and 'q' might be of anyone of 1, 3 and 4. But this additional knowledge about the truth-values of 'p' and 'q' does not *add* anything more to the knowledge of the truth-value of 'B'. Similarly, if we know that the proposition 'The broom is in the corner' is true, then the knowledge of the truth-values of the elementary propositions constituting the proposition 'The broom is in the corner' is not going to add a whit to the knowledge of the truth-value of the proposition 'The broom is in the corner'. So, for all practical purposes, we can stop our analysis here and consider the proposition 'The broom is in the corner' to be an elementary one.

Wittgenstein's use of the word 'things' as an alternative to the word

'objects' in 2.01 also suggests this. The so-called 'simple object' is a 'thing', and the 'state of affairs' is a 'state of things' (or properties or relations) as could be found in the process of analysis at the point where we are in a definite position to say that we *know* the truth of the proposition with which we started the analysis.

Knowledge is public, and in that sense truth is also public. If I know a proposition to be true, then the truth of the proposition is not limited to me alone. Others can also know the truth-value of the proposition. If some people say that the truth of an elementary proposition is something private, then they are mistaken. If any truth is private in the sense that I only can know, then it is impossible to have any public truth. In that case, no communication would be possible. It is impossible to have any leap from private to public truth. So, no private truth is entertained within the framework of the *Tractatus* as it talks mostly about the propositions of sciences.

Wittgenstein is concerned with praxis. He is interested in the use and application of knowledge. This can be seen from the following:

> 6.211 Indeed in real life a mathematical proposition is never what we want. Rather, we make use of mathematical propositions *only* in inferences from propositions that do not belong to mathematics to others that likewise do not belong to mathematics.

Thus, analogically, it can be argued that we are not interested in analysis for itself, in an elementary proposition for itself, in an object for itself, or in a name for itself. We are interested in all these to know the world and to do something with that knowledge.

In 'Some Remarks on Logical Form', Wittgenstein says: 'An atomic form cannot be foreseen',[5] i.e. we cannot a priori say that the atomic form is such and such. We can arrive at such forms only by 'the logical investigations of the phenomena themselves.'[6] So, the analysis of a proposition has to go hand in hand with the logical investigation of physical phenomena. This process has to go on till the complete determination of truth. The determination of truth shall determine the end of the process, and we have a set of elementary propositions. Analysis, even in chemistry, is an analysis with a purpose. It is not the case that every time you have to carry on an analysis in a mechanical manner till you reach the so-called atoms. In the *Tractatus,* analysis is an analysis for the attainment of truth. In this process, our beginning is with a complex proposition or an elementary proposition. If it is an elementary proposition, then we get the truth-value immediately. In case of a complex proposition, if necessary, we have to carry on the analysis till we completely determine the truth-value of the given proposition; and at the attainment of the truth-value of a complex proposition we know the elementary propositions constituting the given complex. But, in any case, we need not think that the so-called elementary propositions are somewhat weird kind of things that we shall never come across.

Because of the above reasons I would like to suggest that for ordinary purposes an elementary proposition is in no way different from an ordinary, everyday simple proposition; a name from the ordinary, everyday terms or an object from the objects referred to by ordinary, everyday terms in a proposition, provided we keep in our mind our competency to go against the logic of our language where we can go wrong. Thus, 'This table is brown and this chair is green' is a complex proposition, and it can be analysed into simple propositions: 'This table is brown' and 'This chair is green'. The names shall be 'table', 'chair', 'brown', and 'green', and the objects shall be table, chair, brown and green.

We can now discuss our main problem stated in the *Tractatus* (6.3751). Wittgenstein talks again about the same problem in 'Some Remarks on Logical Form' in which he makes his first definite remark. He says:

> ... here I wish to make my first definite remark on the logical analysis of actual phenomena: it is this, that for their representation numbers (rational and irrational) must enter into the structure of the atomic propositions themselves. I will illustrate this by an example. Imagine a system of rectangular axes, as it were, cross wires, drawn in our field of vision and an arbitrary scale fixed. It is clear that we then can describe the shape and position of every patch of colour in our visual field by means of statements of numbers which have their significance relative to the system of co-ordinates and the unit chosen. Again, it is clear that this description will have the right logical multiplicity, and that a description which has a smaller multiplicity will not do. A simple example would be the representation of a patch P by the expression '[6-9, 3-8]' and of a proposition about it, e.g. P is red, by the symbol '[6-9, 3-9]R', where 'R' is yet an unanalysed term ('6-9' and '3-8' stand for the continuous interval between the respective numbers). The system of co-ordinates here is part of the mode of expression; it is part of the method of projection by which the reality is projected into our symbolism.[7]

Here Wittgenstein talks about how we can have a determinate sense of a proposition by introducing numbers (rational and irrational) for the place occupied by the fact stated in the proposition. Similarly, we can introduce numbers for time, too, into the proposition for a far more determinate sense.

In the *Tractatus* (6.3751), Wittgenstein talks of two colours. But, in his paper of 1929, he talks of two different shades of a particular colour. This change does not affect the position or the problem in any way, because as the colours exclude each other different shades of a particular colour too, exclude each other. The difficulties that existed there exist here too. One shade of colour cannot simultaneously have two different degrees of brightness or redness, a tone not two different strengths, etc.' Wittgenstein says: ... the important point here is that these remarks do not express an experience but are in *some*

sense tautologies[8] (emphasis added). But in the *Tractatus* he writes: Propositions show what they say: tautologies and contradictions show that they say nothing... Tautologies and contradictions lack sense... (4.461).

As the propositions like 'one shade of colour cannot have two different degrees of brightness or redness' say a lot and not that they say nothing, how can we treat them as tautologies as we understand the word 'tautology' in formal logic? Moreover, we have to note the expression 'in some sense' above. Had Wittgenstein thought them to be pure logical tautologies, he would not have put this expression into the sentence. How do we determine that courage and honesty are inclusive, whereas the colours red and blue are exclusive? How is it that we are permitted to say that a particular man is honest and courageous, whereas not permitted to say that a particular place is both red and blue? It is through logical investigation of phenomena (a posteriori) that we come to know about the structure of phenomena which is reflected in language. And this decides what we can say and what we cannot say. If this were a pure, logical tautology like '$\sim(p \,\&\sim p)$', then its contradictory shall be '$p \,\&\sim p$' which is not the case here, for 'This is red and this is blue' cannot be symbolically stated as '$p \,\&\sim p$' but can only be stated as '$p \,\&\, q$' or more appropriately '$Rx \,\&\, Bx$'. The truth-value of '$p \,\&\sim p$' can be said by just looking at it a priori, whereas the truth-value of '$Rx \,\&\, Bx$' cannot be said in a similar manner. Its truth-value is a posteriori, and as such it expresses experience. This may, of course, raise the question: how is it that just by looking at the proposition 'This is red and this is blue' we are able to say that it is a contradiction? This leads me to discuss Wittgenstein's views on completeness of sentences. He states:

> If someone asks us 'What is the temperature outside?' and we said 'Eighty degrees', and now he were to ask us again, 'And is it ninety degrees?' we should answer, 'I told you it was eighty.' We take the statement of a degree (of temperature, for instance) to be a *complete* description which needs no supplementation. Thus, when asked, we say what the time is, and not also what it isn't.[9]

This means that, once we attribute a particular degree of temperature to any particular thing, by that very act we implicitly deny the attribution of any other degree to that particular object. Rather, the thing cannot possess any other degree of temperature at that particular moment, if what we said is true. We need not make it explicit. Our very answer says it.

There are two kinds of universes of discourse—one in which the elements are inclusive in nature and the other in which they are exclusive. Like the following:



Virtue and non-virtue are opposed to each other, and similar is the case with colour and non-colour. But let us consider virtue and colour. Goodness, truthfulness, honesty, courage, benevolence, temperance, etc. are called virtues. Two or more of such virtues can be attributed to a man. In this way they are inclusive, whereas two or more colours cannot be predicated of a particular thing. If one is predicated, by this very act, all others are denied to it. In this sense they are exclusive. The same is the position if we bring in degrees of a particular quality like goodness or of a particular shade of colour like blue. For example, good, very good and extremely good. Very good includes good, and extremely good includes good and very good. Though we generally do not say of a man 'He is good, very good and extremely good' because language may not permit us for stylistic reasons to talk like that, yet we can say the same by saying 'Not merely good, not merely very good, he is extremely good'. But, suppose, there are three shades of blue—B_1, B_2 and B_3. But we cannot predicate all the three shades of a particular surface at the same time, for at a particular moment of time a surface can have only one shade. In another sense also the distinction can be made. All that is opposed to individual virtues shall be treated as non-virtues, but all that is opposed to individual colours cannot be treated as non-colours. They shall be colours. Inclusion and exclusion are extended to these too, so that we can say that a particular man is good but he has no courage to fight out a case; whereas we cannot say that a particular surface is red and not-green, for even here they exclude each other. We come to know of this by a logical analysis of phenomena. *We predicate whatever we predicate, the rest is taken care of by the convention and context.* In an honest society, the following dialogue between a customs officer and a traveller at the customs counter shall be enough.

'What do you have to declare?'

'A watch, a TV set and a camera.'

But, in a dishonest society, in which the customs officers and the travellers are generally dishonest, the above dialogue might not be treated as complete and a further question might be asked:

'And nothing else?'

'No. Nothing else.'

This will complete the dialogue. The question of finding out the truth is left to the discretion of the customs officers.

In connection with the role of completeness in analysis of degrees, Wittgenstein says:

> One might think—and I thought so not long ago—that a statement of degree of a quality could be analysed into a logical product of single statements of quantity and a completing supplementary statement. As I could describe the contents of my pocket by saying, 'It contains a penny, a shilling, two keys, and nothing else.' This 'and nothing else' is the supplementary statement which completes the description. But this will not do as an analysis of a statement of degree. For let us call the unit of, say, brightness b and let E(b) be the statement that the entity E possesses this brightness, then the E(2b), which says that E has two degrees of brightness, should be analysable into the logical product E(b) & E(b), but this is equal to E(b); if, on the other hand, we try to distinguish between the units and consequently write E(2b) = E(b') & E(b''), we assume two different units of brightness; and then, if an entity possesses one unit, the question could arise, which of the two—b' or b''—it is; which is obviously absurd.[10]

Why this absurdity? Let us look into the following number series:

$$1, 2, 3, 4, 5 \ldots n$$

Here n severally includes the numbers previous to it, but not all of them collectively. Such numbers may be introduced into the propositions about the wealth of a man. Wittgenstein's analysis above supposed that the degree of a shade of colour belong to this series. So the absurdity. But in the series:

$$1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32 \ldots n$$

n includes the previous numbers both severally and collectively. Our degrees of honesty which is inclusive in nature belong to this series. But the degrees of a particular shade of colour do not belong to either of these series. Rather, it belongs to a third series:

$$1\text{st}, 2\text{nd}, 3\text{rd}, 4\text{th} \ldots n\text{th}$$

In the case of 2, we can get 1+1, but, in the case of the 2nd we cannot analyse it in that manner; we have only to *show* the place in the series, and once this place is shown the other places are negated. *This place can only be shown. It cannot be further analysed.* (Even cardinals sometimes function in this manner. The policeman, who bears the number, say, 443, occupies the four hundred forty-third place in the list.) So Wittgenstein is right when he says:

> I maintain that the statement which attributes a degree to a quality cannot further be analysed, and, moreover, that the relation of difference of degree is an internal relation and that it is therefore represented by an internal relation between the statements which attribute the different degrees. That is to say, the atomic statement must have the same multiplicity as the degree which it attributes, whence it follows that numbers must enter the forms of atomic propositions.[11]

The internal relation between the degree of different shades of colour is the relation of positions which different shades of a particular colour occupy in a colour-scale of that particular colour, and an atomic statement in which such a degree of shade is attributed shall include the ordinal position it occupies. For example, if E has two degrees of brightness, we have to express it as E(b_{11}), which means E has the brightness of the second place in the colour-scale, and not as E(2b), which misleadingly suggests that E(2b) can be analysed into E(b) & E(b) or E(b') & E(b'') which, as Wittgenstein has recognized, is absurd.

Considering the influence of this position on atomic or elementary propositions, Wittgenstein says:

> The mutual exclusion of unanalysable statements of degree contradicts an opinion which was published by me several years ago and which necessitated that atomic propositions could not exclude one another.[12]

This tension is not a new-found tension but was already there in the *Tractatus* itself which says; 'the logical product of two elementary propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction.' Still 'The statement that a point in the visual field has two different colours at the same time is a contradiction' (6.3751). But one has to see whether there is such a tension or not. In one sense there is tension, in another there is not. Let us, first, consider how there is no tension at all. For that we have to look at the *Tractatus* 4.26. It says:

> If all true elementary propositions are given, the result is a complete description of the world. The world is completely described by giving all elementary propositions, and adding which of them are true and which false.

So far as the set of true elementary propositions are concerned, no two will be contradicting each other or excluding each other. Even in case of the set of elementary propositions with the truth-value added, no such contradiction shall take place. For example, consider the set: Bx(T), Rx(F), Wx(F), Vx(F), Gx(F), etc. Now if we conjunct any two of these the conjunction does not result in a contradiction. But 'This is red and this is blue' is a contradiction as one excludes the other. How? Wittgenstein says:

> It is, of course, a deficiency of our notation that it does not prevent the formation of such nonsensical constructions, and a perfect notation will have to exclude such structures by definite rules of syntax.[13]

The suggested solution does not appear to be the right solution. For however we make a notation perfect and syntax definite, they will have their uses and also

their misuses. Use and misuse are human competencies. For example, consider the word 'this'. 'This' is a demonstrative pronoun. It can be used when something is present. When a coloured surface is present right in front of us we can say 'This is black', and when we say so all other colours are denied. In spite of all this logic, we construct a complex proposition like 'This is black and this is white' in which we have to assume that the two occurrences of the word 'this' refer to the same colour space, whereas, the second occurrence is in fact, no longer a demonstrative pronoun. It has gone on a holiday. It is within the human competency to grant the words holidays. So I would like to say that this is because of the language competency of man. A hammer might have been invented, let us suppose, to drive a nail into the wall. But once it is invented, it can be used (misused?) to break one's head as well as to drive a nail into the wall. Similarly, language was invented to talk about the world, to gather knowledge about the world, so that this knowledge helps man to overcome the limitations that man finds himself in. If we confine ourselves to talk about it truly, no contradiction would ever occur. But the competency is not limited to this alone. We can also talk about it falsely. Not only that, we can combine the propositions in any manner we like. And sometimes in some such combinations we have contradictions.

This contradiction is not a logical contradiction like 'p & $\sim p$', for by merely looking at 'p & $\sim p$' we can say that it is a contradiction whatever p might be, whereas by looking at 'p & q' or 'Rx & Bx' we cannot say that it is a contradiction. We have to ask to which universe of discourse this belongs, and that we cannot determine till we have replaced the variables with constants, i.e. till we have the very contents of the propositions right in front of us. So, instead of calling them simply contradictions, it would be better to call them contradictions a posteriori or factual contradictions or any other better name for that matter. This is, perhaps, the sense that we make out in Wittgenstein's expression 'in some sense'.

Generally, for 'p & q' we have the following truth-table:

p	q	p & q
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	F
F	F	F

But we come to know 'p & q' to be a contradiction a posteriori (factual contradiction) only by virtue of our empirical knowledge that both p and q cannot be true. And because of this the first row, in which both p and q appear as true, the whole row of T's must disappear from the truth-table. 'p & $\sim p$' is a logical contradiction and '$\sim(p$ & $\sim p)$' is a tautology. But if 'This is red and this is blue' is a contradiction a posteriori (factual contradiction), then its opposite shall be: 'Not both that this is red and this is blue.' How should we call it in

order to distinguish if from tautology proper in the logical sense? We have to call it tautology a posteriori (or factual tautology) or by any other name to make the distinction. The truth-table for contradiction a posteriori (or factual contradiction) and its opposite, tautology a posteriori (factual tautology), should stand thus:

p	q	p & q	$\sim(p$ & $q)$
T	F	F	T
F	T	F	T
F	F	F	T

And Wittgenstein was aware of this when he said: '... in the case of certain kinds of atomic propositions described in terms of definite symbolic features certain combinations of the T's and F's must be left out.[14]

Here a question may be raised: how are we to distinguish between 'p & q' which stands for 'This is red and this is blue' and 'p & q' which stands for 'This table is red and that chair is green'? Unless we are able to know this from the symbolism itself, we might be misled while constructing their respective truth-tables. Hence the need for a different symbol. We can have a symbol like '$\hat{\&}$' (capped &) and define it in such a manner that the conjuncts connected by '$\hat{\&}$' shall not be both true, and this will leave out the first row of the truth-table that we normally have for 'p & q'.

In this connection, Moritz Schlick in a paper entitled 'Is There a Factual *a priori*?'[15] says:

> ... when [the empiricism of Logical Positivists] is confronted by an assertion such as 'a surface cannot be simultaneously red and green', it does nothing more than simply and without prejudice make clear the meaning of the assertion. For this is in general the true task of philosophical activity; its problems are solved not by means of proofs which yield fresh knowledge, but rather by the mere process of reflecting on what is actually meant by the sentences which have come to be so puzzling; on what one is trying to say by means of them. And in order to see this, one only needs to realize how these sentences are properly used.[16]
>
> Red and green are incompatible, not because I happen never to have observed such a joint appearance, but because the sentence 'This spot is both red and green' is a meaningless combination of words. The logical rules which underlie our employment of colour-words forbid such a usage, just as they would forbid us to say 'light red is redder than dark red'.[17]

About tautology he says: 'A tautology is naturally an *a priori* truth, but gives expression to no state of affairs, and the validity of a tautology rests in no way upon experience.'[18] A logical tautology like 'Either it is raining or it is not

raining' does not, in fact, say anything about the world, and it can be symbolized as '$p \vee \sim p$'. A logical contradiction like 'It is raining and it is not raining' says both; thus it says nothing and it can be symbolized as '$p \,\&\, \sim p$'. But a proposition like 'This is red and this is green' cannot be symbolically represented as '$p \,\&\, \sim p$'. It has to be symbolized as '$p \,\hat{\&}\, q$' or '$Rx \,\hat{\&}\, Gx$'. This difference in symbolization was, perhaps, noted by Wittgenstein himself, and because of this, perhaps, he did not call such a proposition a simple, logical contradiction, but said *in some sense* contradiction. This fact and the modified truth-table for such propositions give a clear indication that such propositions need a separate class for themselves. Here Kant's conception of synthetic a priori propositions seems useful, but, in this connection, Moritz Schlick thinks that synthetic a priori propositions are 'a logical impossibility'. If that is so, shall we say: $p \,\&\, \sim p \equiv p \,\&\, q$? If we say so, what about the equivalence of their truth-tables?

Before we come to the end of the paper, I would like to discuss also some of the opinions expressed by Edwin B. Allaire in his paper 'Tractatus' 6.3751'.[19] First, he says that Wittgenstein's claim that 'This is red and this is green' (call it 'A') is a contradiction is not inconsistent with the truth-table explication of logical truth.[20] By way of a simple remark it can be said that how much consistency it has can be seen from Wittgenstein's uneasiness in 6.3751 itself and in his 'Remarks on Logical Form' wherein he goes to the extent of suggesting a modified truth-table for such propositions. Secondly, Allaire says that Wittgenstein's claim that *A* is a contradiction is not based on a substance doctrine.[21] Here it can be said that so long as '$p \,\&\, q$' by itself does not permit us to say that it is a contradiction, we have to grant that it is substance based, although by 'substance' I do not mean any kind of weird metaphysical substance. Thirdly, Allaire argues that Wittgenstein's determination to secure a privileged status for such sentences as 'This is red and this is green' was a major motive for his eventual rejection of the *Tractatus*.[22] I would like to say here that the suggested motive was not the real motive for the rejection of the *Tractatus*, if it was a real rejection at all. For, if '$p \,\&\, q$' could not by itself suggest in the *Tractatus* that it was a contradiction, it cannot suggest so in the later philosophy. The real motive for change was in the change of motive itself. The motive-power in the *Tractatus* was *truth*, whereas it was *meaning* in the *Philosophical Investigations*. Rather, the *Tractatus* was an attempt to understand nature which constitutes a part of our knowledge. In it man himself was viewed as a part of nature. But in the *Investigations* Wittgenstein makes an attempt to understand mankind through their meaningful use of language, but that is a subject for another paper. Fourthly, Allaire says that 'the "logical structure" of colour must be explored by analysing the "grammar" of the use of colour-words.'[23] If by 'logical structure of colour' he means (which he does) that the colour-words like 'red' and 'green' are not simple but defined and 'logical structure of colour' is nothing but such definitions, then he is using the expression in a different sense from Wittgenstein's. For, in the expressions such as

'ordinary language disguises logical structure'—'a symbolism which gives a clear picture of logical structure'—'it would be surprising if the actual phenomena had nothing to teach us about their structure'—'the actual logical form of phenomena' Wittgenstein means something different. He means that the world as such has a structure, and we try to map out this structure in language according to the rules of projection. If, on the other hand, he means what Wittgenstein means, then he is putting the cart before the horse. For the logical structure of the world is something basic, something relatively static, whereas language is ever trying to capture this structure—to capture the logical structure of the world in language through the rules of projection. Of course, in this endeavour we do not always succeed. In such cases, either we violate the rules of projection or fail to grasp the structure of the phenomena concerned or take a propositional form to be of a classic kind and think that the structures of phenomena must be similar to the structure of the propositional form, e.g. the subject-predicate form, though, in fact, the structures of phenomena might be quite different from each other. Just by analysing language we may not get the logical structure of phenomena. Of course, Allaire's statement will be true, if and only if we are given with a proposition such that there is a complete isomorphic relationship between the logical structure of the phenomena and the logical structure of the given proposition.

So we may conclude that, whenever we look at a point in the visual field, we see only one colour. We have never come across a point in the visual field which has two or more colours at the same time. It is, perhaps, in the nature of a point in the visual field that it can have room for one colour and only one colour at a time. With more and more observation, we get rid of the doubt, if any, that we might have been entertaining in the mind and reach a stage of certainty about this empirical phenomenon that two colours cannot be in the same place simultaneously. This is the conclusion we reach about the structure of colour by a logical investigation of phenomena.[24] This structure of phenomena is reflected in the structure of language in the form of a rule about the use of colour-words: 'Two colour-words cannot be predicated of the same subject at the same time.' This is what we have called tautology a posteriori (or factual tautology). Not to obey this rule is to state a proposition which shall be considered contradiction a posteriori (or factual contradiction). Thus, the separate status that is needed for propositions like 'This is red and this is green' is a logical necessity because of their irreducibility to '$\sim(p \,\&\, \sim p)$' and '$p \,\&\, \sim p$' respectively. Moreover, we can again say here that we have such propositions only when, by our competency, we send the word 'this' on a holiday, and thus the existence of such propositions shall not affect in any manner the view expressed in the *Tractatus* that the elementary propositions are independent of each other and that their logical product can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction.

Notes and References

1. L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (trans.), London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978. While referring to this book, only the *Tractatus* numbers are given.
2. ———, 'Some Remarks on Logical Form', in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volumes*, vol. 9, 1929, pp. 162-71; reprinted in I.M. Copi and R.W. Beard (eds), *Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966. pp. 31-37. All references are to the latter volume.
3. Wittgenstein explains the nature of the projective relation thus: 'Let us imagine two parallel planes, I and II. On the plane I figures are drawn, say, ellipses and rectangles of different sizes and shapes, and it is our task to produce images of these figures on plane II. Then we can imagine two ways, amongst others, of doing this. We can, first, lay down a law of projection—say that of orthogonal projection or any other—and proceed to project all figures from I into II, according to this law. Or, secondly, we could proceed thus: We lay down the rule that every ellipse on plane I is to appear as a circle in plane II, and every rectangle as a square in II. Such a way of representation may be convenient for us if for some reason we prefer to draw only circles and squares on plane II. Of course, from these images the exact shapes of the original figures on plane I cannot be immediately inferred. We can only gather from them that the original was an ellipse or a rectangle. In order to get in a single instance at the determinate shape of the original we would have to know the individual method by which, e.g. a particular ellipse is projected into the circle before me. The case of ordinary language is quite analogous. If the facts of reality are the ellipses and rectangles on plane I the subject-predicate and relational forms correspond to the circles and squares in plane II. These forms are the norms of our particular language into which we project in *ever so many different* ways *ever so many different* logical forms, ('Some Remarks on Logical Form', *op.cit.*, pp. 32-33). In this connection, I would like to say that our projection of the world in language is not as deliberate as Wittgenstein's account above suggests. But in all essentials it is there and without being much conscious of this we learn how to project the world in language when we learn a language; and this process of learning begins when we utter the first word about the world as a child, when our primitive behaviour gradually gives place to our language behaviour. This process has become quite natural to us, for we are born into a language as naturally as we are born into the world.
4. Malcolm says: 'I asked Wittgenstein whether, when he wrote the *Tractatus*, he had ever decided upon anything as an *example* of a "simple object". His reply was that at that time his thought had been that he was a *logician*; and that it was not his business, as a logician, to try to decide whether this thing or that was a simple thing or a complex thing, that being a purely empirical matter! It was clear that he regarded his former opinion as absurd' (Norman Malcolm, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir*, London, Oxford University Press, 1959. p. 86). Though Prof. Malcolm surmises, 'It was clear that he regarded his former opinion as absurd', is it really absurd? 'Yes' and 'No'—both can be said; for if the *Tractatus* is interpreted as a tract on metaphysics, then it is 'Yes', but if it is treated as expounding a method, it is 'No'. Because looked at in this manner the expressions 'objects', 'states of affairs', 'names' and 'elementary propositions' function as variables, the constants for which are to be obtained from the different sciences. Wittgenstein seems to support the latter interpretation, because as a logician he would be more concerned with the variables than with any metaphysics as such.
5. *Op. cit.*, p. 32.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
14. *Ibid.*
15. In H. Feigl and H. Sellars (eds), *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts Inc., 1949, pp. 277-85.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 281.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 284.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 281.
19. Edwin B. Allaire, ' "Tractatus" 6.3751' in *Analysis*, vol. 19, no. 5, N.S., no. 71, April 1959, pp. 100-05; reprinted in I.M. Copi and R.W. Beard (eds), *Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966, pp. 189-93. All references are to the latter volume.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 190.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 191-193.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
24. L. Wittgenstein, 'Some Remarks on Logical Form', *op. cit.*, p. 32.

Is *karma* evolutionary?

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The doctrine of *karma* has two components or ingredients: (1) *karma vipāka*, maturing of *karmas* and (2) *punarjanma* or rebirth.

Karma vipāka or maturing and fructification of the results of accumulated *karmas* is both genetic, the factor which regulates genesis of souls in various forms of life, and retributory, the happiness and suffering they experience. In fact, the various forms of non-human life, plant, animal, etc. are deemed to be exclusively retributory: they are *bhoga bhūmis*. On the other hand, human life belongs both to *bhoga bhūmi* (retributory) as well as *karma bhūmi* (plane of action having moral potential). It is only in the existence on the human plane that fresh actions, giving rise to *karmic* potential for the future, are done.

Punarjanma or rebirth and *karma vipāka* are the two sides of a coin. It is through rebirth that *karma* operates; on the other hand, *punarjanma* is essential for *karma vipāka*.

Sri Aurobindo attacks both these components of the doctrine of *karma*.

To Sri Aurobindo *karma* is not merely a doctrine of retribution of rewards and punishments.[1] It is not of the nature of 'spiritual-material bribe and menace, the bribe of a Heaven of fat joys for the good and the threat of hell of... fire or bestial tortures for wicked', primarily a 'dispenser of rewards and punishments' and the supreme Being being 'a judge, "father" and school-master who is continually rewarding with lollipops his good boys and continually caning his naughty urchins'.[2] The ordinary current conception of law of *karma* (nay, the traditional conception) is the Mosaic law—eye for eye, tooth for tooth, a merciless *lex talionis*.[3] Such a view reduces the supreme to the status of a strict and honourable accountant'.[4]

Regarding the phenomenon of rebirth,[5] Sri Aurobindo maintains that it is not a mechanical repetition but evolutionary. He contends that 'the bare idea of repeated births as the process of our soul existence with no progressive significance in our pre-existence and our preserving continuity' deprives the doctrine of rebirth of any meaningful content; it can produce only a sense of spiritual futility;[6] rebirth without ascension,[7] without expansion and without some growing up will make it devoid of any meaning. The creation will be devoid of any purposeful end 'if our recurrence is only a repetition...within a few set types' with 'no upward outlet no infinite progression'.[8] He, therefore, asserts that rebirth is an occasion and means for a spiritual evolution, a significant ascension and not mechanical recurrence.[9]

Sri Aurobindo critisizes Buddhism and Advaita from this angle. According to him, Buddhism[10] considered recurrence of birth as a prolonged mechanical

chain, and ignorant desire (*tṛṣṇā*, attachment) as the cause of endless revolving in the cycle of birth and death, and, therefore, the cause of suffering.

Sri Aurobindo attacks the *māyāvāda* (illusionism) of Advaita[11] on the same grounds. It renders cosmic repetition, that is, rebirth as futile, which means that there is no fulfilment of the life process but its repudiation; rebirth is reduced to a constant mechanism of self-deception, life created in a jest or as a play (*līlā*) of the divine, an act of divine caprice. He explains that it is this causeless and purposeless rebirth process which drove the Indians to the ideal of *mokṣa*[12], *nirvāṇa*; 'the discipline of self-extinction', as a means of escape from meaningless but repetitive rebirths. In fact, birth becomes an error of the soul.[13] After, thus, 'demolishing' the retributory nature of *karma* and concomitant belief in *punarjanma* (rebirth), Sri Aurobindo sets out his own views: rebirth is a ladder of the soul's ascension and a succession of mighty spiritual opportunities, the soul ascending from the sleep of matter through plant and animal life to the human frame. So he concludes that rebirth must be and is evolutionary, life a progressive ascending series for the unfolding of the spirit in a constant evolutionary embodiment, an upward gradations of spirit already climbed.[14] It is not transmigration, a haphazard passage of the soul from the human form into the body of a guinea-pig or an ass.[15]

Radhakrishnan,[16] likewise, puts forward an evolutionary theory of *karma*. He maintains:

(*i*) That there is an organic relationship, an inherent bond, between self and the body;
(*ii*) That any self, *ātmā*, cannot inhabit any body, i.e. a soul cannot find embodiment in any form of existence;
(*iii*) That the kind of life after death cannot be completely different from the present one.

He contends: 'No human being can take birth in a body foreign to its evolved characteristics.' The organic relation between soul and body 'requires us to assume that the souls will acquire bodies similar to those which they have abandoned at death'. It follows that rebirth of a human being 'in the form of animals or angels becomes an extravagance'. He recognizes that 'it is possible for a man to degenerate into a savage being but he is still a man' and 'rebirth in animal form is a figure of speech for rebirth with animal qualities'. He maintains that, in spite of certain kinship of man with lower animals, the difference between them is fundamental. Release from rebirth is dependent on knowledge and conduct of which only human beings are capable and, if once we enter animal life, they become impossible. How can a soul which has once sunk down to an animal life become ethically deserving? 'The law of *karma* is not to be confused with either a hedonistic or juridical theory of rewards and punishments.'[17] In short, Radhakrishnan maintains that, in the evolution of consciousness through the process of rebirth, self or *ātmā*, once embodied

as a human being, cannot, in subsequent rebirths, suffer retrogression; it cannot fall to a lower form of existence such as animal, plant or worm, etc.[18] It must move towards higher stage of evolution.

Sri Aurobindo's concept of evolutionary *karma* is based on his subjective views about the purpose of the cosmos and of the purpose or significance of rebirth in the divine design of the universe. Radhakrishnan, on the other hand, justifies evolutionary *karma* on apparently objective considerations. It would make for a better understanding of the subject first to consider how far the specific arguments of Radhakrishnan in support of evolutionary *karma* are consistent with the basic and undisputed concepts of Indian philosophy and religion before examining the extent to which the idea of evolutionary *karma* as such can be sustained from the doctrinal literature.

At the outset, it may be mentioned that Radhakrishnan does not define or explain what he means by the term 'self' used by him: is it the *puruṣa* or *ātmā* or only *jīva*? *Jīva* is the phenomenal self, the ego consciousness, the finitized embodied 'soul' which is the experiencing and the transmigrating entity. *Ātmā* or more precisely *ātman* is a transcendental entity which is an *aṁsa* or part of the supreme spirit, *paramātman*. When enmeshed or trapped in the sense apparatus it becomes *jīva*, the ego: *ātmā* enmeshed in a *sūkṣama śarīra* or *liṅga deha* becomes *jīvātmā*. It can be presumed that Radhakrishnan uses the term 'self' in the sense of *jīva*.

According to the Sāṅkhya school of philosophy, there are two primordial, elemental, uncaused categories: *puruṣa* or *ātmā*, (spirit) and *prakṛti* (matter). *Puruṣa* or *ātmā* is *nirguṇa* or qualityless, whereas *prakṛti* possesses the three *guṇas—sattva, rajas* and *tamas*. The soul, whether embodied in the human, animal or plant frame, is *puruṣa*. All the schools of Indian philosophy including Buddhism and Jainism, excluding only the Cārvākas, accept this premise of the two primordial entities. It is through the operation of *tṛṣṇā* (desire), attachment and *karmas* arising out of desire that *puruṣa* or *ātmā* and *prakṛti* interact, and *ātmā* or self becomes embodied in *prakṛti*.

It is, therefore, erroneous for Radhakrishnan to suggest that there is an inherent bond between the *nirguṇa* self and body: the bond is the bond of *karma*. It is *karma* that causes birth and joins the self to the body made of material elements. *Karma nirodha* or suppression of *karma* or *niṣkāma karma*, detached action, i.e. action not motivated by or rooted in *tṛṣṇā*, leads to the dissociation of the self (*ātmā*) from the body (*śarīra, deha*), and is, thus, the cause of emancipation (*mokṣa, nirvāṇa*).

Again, Indian philosophical and religious texts treat life as a unified whole: there are no distinct, separate, differentiated species or genera of human, animal and plant, *ātmans* or selves between which no interchange is possible. This is so because ātmā is *nirguṇa*. As there are no gradations of selves, the self of a being born as a human being can, in another rebirth, be born as an animal or plant. Radhakrishnan confuses interchange with retrogression in retributory forms of existence on the basis of an arbitrary assumption about the existence of gradations among selves.

It should be noted that the doctrine of *avatāras*[19] in which the divine being takes birth as an animal—fish, tortoise and boar—would conclusively establish that birth of a self in lower forms of existence is not an evolutionary retrogression and extravaganza: it is retributory retrogression inherent in the doctrine of *karma*.

The philosophical and religious texts aver (*a*) that the process of rebirth is circular and not evolutionary; and (*b*) that rebirth is not necessarily an evolutionary progression but can also involve regression in the various states of rebirth.

The Upaniṣads treat the universe as *saṁsāra*, going or wandering through, passing through a succession of states of existence: it is not linear and evolutionary implying ascension, progressive growth but rotatory or circular. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (I.6) describes the universe as a *brahma cakra*, the wheel of Brahmā; *Maitri Upaniṣad* (VI.28) says: *avṛtta cakram iva saṁcāra cakram* (wheel of birth and death is a revolving wheel).

More specifically, the Upaniṣads maintain that *karma* is retributory leading to rise and fall in the embodied status of a soul in the planes of existence. The *karmas* determine the *gati* of the soul, its state of existence after death: good *karmas* elevate the soul of a being to the state of happiness of a *deva*, and evil *karmas* degrade it to states of retribution. So the gods, after they have exhausted the stock of merit, return to the rounds in *saṁsāra*: the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (5.3.2) refers to the created beings going to another state from the world and again returning to it (*punaḥ āvartante*); *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (4.4.3) compares the ransmigrating soul to a leech dwelling in a grass blade and catching hold of another blade and withdrawing (*upasaṁharati*) himself from the first blade. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (4.3.7) says: *ātameti...ubhau lokāvanusañcarati* (the self roams between the two worlds—(this and that after death). *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (4.3.36) repeats: *evamevāyam puruṣa ebhyo' ṅgebhyaḥ sampramucya punaḥ pratinyāyam pratiyonyādravati prāṇāyaiva*: (so the person frees himself from the limbs [dies] and returns again [reborn] as he comes to the place from which he started).

On exhaustion of *karmas* all *devas* become human beings; and all human beings become gods (due to their past *karmas*). Again, *Mahābhārata* (12.291. 46-47) explains that persons with *tāmasic* tendencies go to hell, with *rājasic* temperament become human beings; and that those who are *sāttvic* or of enlightened bent of mind go to heaven. Those who commit unmitigated evil become animals (*tiryagyoni*). In *Sāṅkhya-Yoga* the *karmāśayas* determine the *jāti* (and also length of life, and happiness and suffering): the word *jāti* in this context means not only birth but the forms of existence as man, animal, etc. Praśastapāda (a Nyāya-Vaiśeśika) in his *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha* (VI.135) says that a man, who has not attained true knowledge and is under the influence of affections and aversions (*rāga dveṣa*), attains the world of Brahmā, of Indra, and Prajāpati, of *pitṛs* (forefathers) or men (*brahmendra, prajāpati pitṛmanuṣya lokeṣu*) by doing excellent virtuous deeds (*dharmāt prakṛṣṭāt*), that

by doing sinful acts (*adharma*) he is born in the worlds of ghosts and lower animals (*preta-tiryagyoni*); that the performance of both *dharma* and *adharma* causes repeated rebirths in the planes of existence of gods, men and animals and hell (*devamanuṣyatiryaṅnārakeṣu*).

The doctrine of *karma vipāka*[20] in Buddhism, Jainism and Hinduism maintains, *inter alia*, that *karmas* lead to repeated births in the five or six planes of existence. The Buddhist cannonical texts, the *Majjhimanikāya* (3.35) and the *Aṅguttaranikāya* (3.46) state, that after death, bad conduct (*duccaritam*) leads to hell or birth as an animal or a ghost, and that good conduct leads to birth in heaven or as a human being. The *Cūlakammavibhangasutta* of the *Majjhimanikāya* teaches that the *karmas* of an individual determine, after death, his retributive rebirths; that a person who has committed violence and destroyed life, etc. is reborn in hell or as bird, animal or plant. On exhaustion of these *karmas*, it is reborn in other planes, higher or lower, depending on the quality of residual *karmas*. In the *Lakkhaṇa-saṁyutta* of the *Saṁyuttanikāya* (xix), the Buddha points out that the followers of the profession of butchers and those who commit adultery have to suffer in hell (*nirye pacitvā*) on the ripening of their *karmas* (*tassa kammassa vipākena*) for many years, hundred of thousand of years. The *Mahāvastu*[10], describing Maudgalyāyana's visit to hell, states that the Buddha himself saw the coming (*āgati*) and going (*gati*) of beings, their rise and fall (*cyuti upapatti*) in the world. Similar observations are made regarding birth in the world of animals (*tiracchāna yoni*). Aśvaghoṣa in *Saundarananda* (XI.60) observes: *saṁsāre bhrāmyamāna divinṛṣu narake tiryakpitṛeṣu ca* (a being wanders in the world of gods, men, hells, animals and forefathers with reference to his *karmas*). The *Abhidhammatha samghao* (5.14) says that rebirth (*paṭisaṁdhi*) is of four types: *āpaya* (existence devoid of happiness); *kāmasugati* (world of enjoyment); *rūpāvacara* (world of form); and *arūpāvacara* (the formless realm). It (5.93) further explains that the arising of rebirth continues to unfold itself like the rotation of the wheel of a chariot (*paṭisaṁdhā-dayo rathacakkamiva parivattantā*).

The Jaina texts such as the *Bhagavati-Sūtra* (8.9.9) link specific states of existence with specific *karmas*: a person guilty of violence is reborn in hell, a person who has committed fraud, deception or falsehood, is reborn as an animal or plant; whereas a person who practices kindness and compassion is born as a human being. The *Vipāka-Śrutam* narrates stories of retributory rebirths in various existences on ripening of *karmas*. In particular, *āyuḥ karman*, one of the eight types of *karmas* in Jainism, determines the species in which a soul is embodied on rebirth. In the *Kathāsaritasāgara* (ix 122-23) of Somadeva, Suprabha foresees that in seven days he would fall from heaven on the exhaustion of merit and would be conceived in the body of a sow.

The Hindu law (*dharmaśāstra*) givers like Manu and Yājñavalkya specify the various forms of existence in which a *jīva* or living being takes rebirth, such as human being, worm, insect, bird, animal, plant, etc. Likewise, the various Purāṇas deal with *karma vipāka* in the same manner as the law books, viz. the

souls are embodied in different forms of existence of insects, birds, animals, human beings on the basis of their *karmas*. The *Devībhāgavatapurāṇa* (6.10. 17-19) makes it clear that soul of a god could be reborn as a dog depending on the character of *karmas* after its rebirth as a human being after its godly merit is exhausted.

Śaṁkarācārya says unambiguously that rebirth may involve retrogression of a soul, and is not evolutionary or a progressive ascension. In *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* (75) he says that those, who are bound by attachment, come and go, up and down (*āyānti niryāntyadha ūrdhvamuccaiḥ*), due to *karmas*. In *Upadeśasāhasri* (I.12), Śaṅkara says that beings go round and round as a result of *karmas: evamevāhmanādau saṁsāre devamanuṣyatiryaṅ niraya sthāneṣu svakarmavaśādupāttamupāttam śarīram tyajan, navam navam ca anyadupapādadāno janma maraṇa prabandhacakre ghaṭīyantravat svakarmaṇā bhrāmyamāṇaḥ*: thus, in the beginningless world, due to the influence of my own actions, I have been giving up bodies assumed successively among gods, men, animals and the denizens of hell and assuming new ones. I have in this way been made by my *karmas* to go round and round in the cycle of endless births and deaths, as in a Persian wheel...[21] In *Upadeśasāhasrī* (II.1.4) Śaṁkara describes this transmigratory existence as *nityapravṛto saṁsāra cakravadbhṛṣam* going on continually (like a wheel).

Eventually, the law of *karma* was considered to operate within the framework of *yugas* (time cycles) in which virtue and vice wax and wane alternately. While the relative intensity of good and evil varies in different *yugas* (and this is not quite consistent with the doctrine of *karmas*), the thesis of evolution is in itself incompatible with cyclical time.

There is, thus, vast and conclusive evidence in the classical doctrine of *karma* which shows that *karma* is retributory and, that rebirth is cyclical and not evolutionary embodiment of spirit; that it is circular and not linear and progressive, oscillatory and not a ladder of ascension or an upward gradations of spirit.

The above conclusion also finds confirmation outside India in the Chinese[22] understanding of the doctrine of *karma* which says that rebirth is a cycle of birth, old age and death; that *karmas* determine one's future existence in one of the five transmigratory states; that *karma* traps man in *saṁsāra;* and that *karma* is retributory. A Chinese proverb sums the doctrine in these words: 'Sow hemp and you will reap hemp; plant beans and you will reap beans.' Those who are unkind get reincarnated as a dog or horse. In short, the Chinese concept of *karma* was not evolutionary; it was also punitive as well as rotatory.

*See also *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* (187); *nāyāti niryātyadha ūrdhameṣaḥ*: it comes and goes, up and down.

NOTES

1. Sri Aurobindo, *The Problem of Rebirth* (4th edn), Pondicherry, 1978, p. 7. '*Karma* is more than a mechanical law of antecedent and consequences (p. 99).
2. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 108.
4. *Ibid* p. 7. Aurobindo drives homes his point by narrating the following story: 'A rich man had violently deprived another of his substance. The victim is born as the son of the oppressor and in the delirium of a fatal illnesss reveals that he has obliged his old tyrant and present father to spend on him and to lose the monetary equivalent of the property robbed minus a certain sum, but that certain sum must be paid now, otherwise—the debt is absolved and as the last pice is expended, the reborn soul departs for its sole object in taking birth is satisfied, accounts squared and the spirit of *Karma* content. That is the mechanical idea of *Karma* at its acme of satisfied precision' (p. 108).
5. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 37. 'What we see of Nature and of human nature justifies this view of a birth of the individual soul from form to form until it reaches the human level of manifested consciousness which is its instrument for rising to yet higher levels.' See *Birth Centenary Library*, xix, 761, 764; *ibid.*, xvi, 112, 123. Quoted by Robert N. Minor in 'In Defence of *Karma* and Rebirth: Evolutionary *Karma*' in R.W. Neufeldt (ed.), *Karma and Rebirth: Post Classical Developments*, New York, 1968 pp. 26-27.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 37-40.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 43. Again, 'all assumption of form', that is rebirth, embodiment, 'is a constant and yet progressive birth or becoming of the soul, *sambhava, sambhhūti...*' (p. 34).
15. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
16. S. Radhakrishnan, *An Idealist View of Life* (4th imp.), London, 1951, pp. 291-92 and 'Introduction' to *The Brahma Sūtra*, London, 1960, pp. 20-203. He calls rebirth of a human being in lower forms of existence 'an extravagance of rebirth hypothesis'. It is likely that both Sri Aurobindo and Radhakrishnan were influenced by the theosophical belief that the soul is ever involved in an evolutionary process—a progressive movement, collecting and gathering through *karma* and rebirth.
17. *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 219.
18. Radhakrishnan is aware that the Hindu scriptures affirm rebirth in animal form and cites *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (v. 10.7) and *Manu* (1.56). But he explains it away as based on juridical concepts, derived from *karma*, in popular mind. See *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 29 and fn. 1.
19. Sri Aurobindo uses the concept of *avatāra* to justify evolutionary *karma:* 'The successive development which was summarily proposed by the ancient Hindu thinkers, the lower forms of being first, man afterwards as the crown of the Spirit's development of life on earth, has been confirmed by physical science, an aeonic development.' See *The Problem of Rebirth* (4th edn), p. 7.
20. See Y. Krishan, '*Karma Vipāka*' in *Numen*, vol. xxx, fasc. 2, Amsterdam, December 1983.
21. *Upadeśasāhasrī* (ii, 15.52) describes birth and death as a stream *janma maraṇa pravāha.*
22. Yun-Hua Jan, 'The Chinese understanding and Assimilation of *Karma* Doctrine in R.W. Neufeldt (ed.), *Karma and Rebirth*: *Post-Classical Developments*, New York, 1986, pp. 145-68.

Two concepts of justice

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I

Justice relates to one's conduct with one's neighbour. The question of doing justice is pertinent in the context of human beings living in society and in need of transaction with one another. Either one treats some other person justly or unjustly, or is treated by others in any of these ways. Such conducts are about handling and distribution of goods of public utility, i.e. what are considered to be advantageous to all. These include such objects as wealth, honour, opportunities, rights, etc. The concepts of wealth, honour, right, etc. are, however, created by means of definitive rules in view of the values that certain things possess for those who are the prospective claimers of them. Furthermore, a principle of distribution seems necessary either for the reason of the limitedness of the amount of goods available, or because free and indiscriminating distribution of these may lead to administrative or similar difficulties. Of these, Hume[1] has mentioned the first, though the others are often considered important grounds for restricting enjoyment of certain freedom and privileges. However, the expression 'just' has uses similar to the expressions 'right', 'proper' and 'fair'—all these in some way conveying a sense of being reasonable, i.e. we may say, of what ought to be. Thus, the principle of distribution accepted in a particular society shows its moral point of view.

The principle of justice being the principle of rational distribution is obviously based on the idea of equality, i.e. of equal shares for those who are equal to one another. A particular principle of justice seeks to determine the definition of equality—equality in respect of what should count for the distribution of such things for the distribution of which the principle is held. In fact, it appears that the concept of equality constitutes the basic point in all questions of justice and injustice. If we accept Plato's description of justice as giving one one's due, hence not depriving one of what one deserves, it amounts to asserting one's right to equal share of goods with others to whom one is equal in relevant respects.

The two concepts of justice that I shall discuss in this paper hold different opinions regarding what should entitle men to equal shares of what we have described as goods of public utility. The Platonic-Aristotelian theory maintains that the criterion of distribution should be possession of equal merits, while the other proclaims that man's ground for claims to the share of such advantages consists in his being a rational person seeking to realize the plan of his life.

The theories I have chosen to discuss here represent two different manners in which justice has been conceived. The division, however, is by no means

exhaustive. The Platonic-Aristotelian theory may, on the whole, be described as teleological; for it conceives justice as instrumental in a way to obtaining and progressing with welfare and that distribution of advantages should take place according to merit, the worth of one's contribution to this end. Plato particularly proposes a theory of allotment of duties, which is otherwise known as the theory of division of labour on the basis of one's capacity to serve the society. Doing what is just consists in the proper discharge of the task assigned to a person, as it also consists in transaction of goods according to the right rule. On the other hand, Rawls, broadly following Kant, finds that equal freedom of self-pursuit is a basic right of every individual being. A person has claim to as much freedom as is compatible with an equal amount of it for others.

In the following sections I shall first discuss Plato and Aristotle, and then Kant and Rawls. I shall have occasions to refer to utilitarianism both in its classical form and also in a general manner. However, though utilitarianism has its own concept of justice as any normative theory has, the sense in which we are concerned with the problem and the sense in which it is particularly important is one of fair distribution of objects of public advantage. The primary concern, at least of classical utilitarianism, on the other hand, is multiplication of individual units of pleasure.

II

As Cornford has pointed out in his comments on Plato's *Republic*[2], the reason why Plato and Thrasymachus value justice (and also injustice) differently is that they hold opposite views regarding the definition of happiness or living well. Both conceive justice teleologically, while Plato's concern for justice is rooted in his belief in its utility for the well-being of the society, as also of the individual citizen. There is really no difference of opinion between Plato and his opponent as to the meaning of justice—that it consists in giving to a person, and not depriving him of, his due share of pleasures, i.e. the amount of the commonly desired goods he deserves in exchange of the service he has rendered to some other citizen or to the state.

As I have already stated, Plato conceives the principle of justice as one of rational distribution in a twofold way. He recommends, on the one hand, distribution, or rather division of duties on grounds of reason, i.e. according to one's capacity or natural inclination, and, on the other hand, distribution of goods of common advantage on the basis of merits by which he understands the worth of one's service for the purpose of the progress and prosperity of the state. According to him, the individual citizen is just when he adequately performs the task prescribed for him by the rational principle of division of labour and when he maintains the principle of justice in his transaction with others. Thus, in a just society the citizens perform their respective duties, and also receive honour and advantage according to their worth. In

fact, Plato has defined justice as the perspective which is to be taken into account for explaining the concepts of wisdom, courage and temperance. For the virtues refer to the specific duties that men are required to perform for the reason of possessing specific talents, i.e. to discharge of duties according to the right principle.

In the fourth book of the *Republic*[3], Plato also describes co-ordination and well-orderedness that results from observance of justice among citizens in their behaviours with one another as the key principle to the strength of any association formed for common purpose. This is essentially true of the individual soul as well, for which lack of co-ordination would mean destruction of the unity of purpose.

As Plato states it, a preliminary form of justice is necessary for the existence even of a primitive kind of society. While rejecting the social contract theory as an account of the origin of state, Plato argues that human instincts are basically so constituted as to be satisfied in the context of a society based on division of labour among its members. Each individual may have the aptitude to serve some particular purpose in the society; but at the same time he has needs that can be fulfilled only if other members in the society co-operate in rendering whatever service they are capable of.

Plato[4] compares the just man with the unjust in respect of happiness, which results from the pursuit of desires according to the right principle. Not only does the just man know the 'right desires' in the sense of knowing which desires are not illusory, that one is not able to satisfy them or does not deserve a satisfaction of them in any way. The just man should know in addition to this the order of priority among desires, so that he does not become a victim of discordance and frustration. The application of the idea in the context of society bears the same prospect.

Aristotle straightway defines justice as a personal virtue which is supposed to grace one's conduct regarding transaction of benefits. The teleological character of justice is obvious, since the just is primarily the lawful, while the unjust is the opposite. The laws, according to Aristotle, are enacted on all subjects aiming at the common advantage, either of all or of the best or of those who are in power, so that we call such acts just as tend to promote happiness and its components for the political society[5]. Acts recommended by the rightly framed laws are virtuous, and they are capable of preserving and promoting the right kind of pleasure to the right kind of person and thus to the society as a whole. When such virtuous acts concern one's relation to another person, we may say that they are just (the object of such acts being transaction of goods of public utility).

For Aristotle, too, observance of justice means reasonable distribution of what we have described as 'public good'; in other words, what counts as advantageous, concerns prosperity and adversity. By reasonable distribution of it he understands that each person would share the amount of such good 'proportionately' to the amount of benefit he has rendered to others in the

society; and, on the other hand, what comes along with this, maintenance of the balance by the use of rectifying principle, either making good a loss suffered by an individual, or restoring the balance by means of punishment.

In the particular sense in which we are concerned with the concept (and this seems to be how Aristotle is concerned with it), justice relates to questions of distribution of such advantages—honour, wealth, etc. of which equal and unequal distribution is possible among those who are entitled by law to equal shares of them. Secondly, it relates to transaction between contracting persons and to maintaining a policy of exchange of equal values in the matter of transactions, equality both in this and the above matter meaning proportionateness.

However, while considering justice regarding transaction among individuals, Aristotle, in view of the basic selfishness of human nature, describes justice mainly as a retaliatory virtue, as a form of constraint, we may say, against depriving one's neighbour (wickedness), or of having more of pleasure for oneself than one deserves, while bringing upon others more pain than pleasure, i.e. a loss.[6] It appears that the primary concern here, as also elsewhere, is prevention of injustice, while justice consists mostly in restoration of the loss one has suffered. It may also be seen that Aristotle explains justice with reference to such concepts as gain and loss. If gain is enjoying more pleasure or advantage than one gives to someone and loss its opposite, justice as a 'mean' is at equidistance from both of them and consists in giving away proportionately to what one receives. When this principle is abided by in the matter of transaction among citizens of a state, each member of the state has a 'fair', hence the 'right' share of benefits. It may, however, be pointed out that Aristotle has already conceived of the institution of money for the purpose of measuring the value of transactions.[7] He also defines (in the same context) 'proportionate' as being indicative of exchange of equal values. If money remains the medium of exchange, doing justice on the part of a person certainly consists in giving away the amount of it that costs what he has received or its worth.

In his ethical philosophy,[8] as also in his *Politics*, Aristotle refers to the object of distribution as 'pleasure', which suggests some sort of achievement and thus seems to bear a certain utilitarian association, particularly in view of its relation to desire. Hence pleasure is what is advantageous with some qualifications, while wealth, honour and others count as such advantages. But, on the other hand, happiness of an individual is on the whole defined in terms of virtue, though not identical with it, and constitutes the highest perfection of his life. However, while a virtuous life, i.e. a life of justice, is, indeed, what a human being should and also can aim at—and his perfection or happiness essentially means no more than this—practice of justice is not necessarily intended for its own sake.

Aristotle's ethics proposes a moral theory, whereas his *Politics* is devoted to the problem of an ideal legislation that would ensure the virtuousness of

the citizens of the state. Now, the perfection of a thing must be such as it is capable of, and so a man becomes perfect by doing the 'right', i.e. acting on the principle of justice, while in a perfect state, conceived as an association of rational persons, citizens will be wholly just. Still from this there is no logical transition to the proposition that practice of moral virtues is an end to itself, or that in the transaction between man and man it is the mode of transaction which is only important.

III

This somewhat utilitarian and obviously teleological concept of justice may be contrasted with one that believes justice to be valuable for its own sake. Justice, nevertheless, consists in treating equals equally; however, in this kind of theory, men are equal to one another by means of possessing the basic human virtue.

I shall choose for my discussion the theories of justice that are proposed by Kant and by Rawls. While the two theories have a number of similarities, particularly for the reason that Rawls develops his theory to a considerable extent with reference to Kant's basic ideas, Rawls maintains a more liberal definition of what should be taken as the essential human qualities and hence as the basis of men's equality with one another.

It may, however, be noticed that like Kant (and also Aristotle, we already know) Rawls is more concerned with the problem of preventing injustice than with ensuring positive acts of justice. Kant's entire moral philosophy is conceived on the basis of a demand on human action which is derived from the transcendental idea of reason to constitute the true being of man. In fact, the categorical imperative derives its formulation from the principle of pure practical reason, and the different formulas in terms of which it is stated elaborate the conditions for man to be able to exercise his reason. As freedom of man is freedom to exercise his reason, as Kant explains, these conditions, if obtained, would guarantee that man is being treated as free. As we have already stated, the formulas rather seek to define the constraints which a moral act ought to take into account. That is to say, they are designed to show how one ought to behave as *not* to make it impossible for any other person and also himself to act on the principle of reason. The concept of the categorical imperative, as illustrated in the fourfold formula, is understood to have been derived from the concept of reason as such, which, in case of practice, should mean action on grounds that are universally justifiable. One's ability to act on such grounds constitutes one's freedom, and every human being has a fundamental right to be capable of maintaining this freedom. In other words, no body has a right against this autonomy which he must be allowed to enjoy. The last three formulas of the categorical imperative, viz. the formula of the end-in-itself, the formula of autonomy, and the formula of the kingdom of

ends, refer to this concept of freedom, while universalizability appears to be the logical principle of reason, hence, of morality.

While rejecting Locke's utilitarian concept of law, Kant argues that no law has a right to command unless it conforms to the idea of freedom of reason, i.e. is just.[9] (The influence of Rousseau is unquestionably apparent.) He maintains, as we understand, that the concept of justice, which is to be realized in the legislation, must be defined in terms of reason as the presupposition and the basis of equality. The law of the state must be so constituted as *not* to interfere with a man's right to act on the principle of reason, whereas the individual will have to submit to the law only because it guarantees such right. The directive principles to the formulation of rules of law are the same as those that are to be taken into account in determining one's conduct in the capacity of an individual person. However, unlike Plato, Kant seems to believe that the rights of the state have a secondary status in relation to the individual's right to the freedom of his reason.

In his article entitled 'The Sense of Justice'[10] Rawls maintains that the concept of morality, when imposed upon rational self-interested persons, gives rise to certain constraints as are defined by the concept of justice. He refers to Rousseau's definition of the sense of justice (in the course of explaining the meaning of the expression) that the sense of justice is the true sentiment of the heart enlightened by reason, the natural outcome of primitive affection. As I have indicated above, Rawls holds a more liberal conception regarding the specific human virtue which is to form the ground of equal treatment for all human beings. The virtue includes such human sentiments, instincts and interests as cannot be conceived except in the context of a basic demand for justice, i.e. for reasonable distribution of 'public good'. These are the feelings of resentment, indignation, mutual trust, friendship, etc. The sense of justice is the basic possession of what we understand as human nature or is what human nature can develop. Indeed, Rawls goes on to saying that it is by virtue of this basic nature, which is essentially oriented by the idea of justice, that men deserve to be treated as equals, i.e. with justice.

So, as Rawls argues in *The Theory of Justice*, it is on the one hand, by means of their possessing the sense of justice that men are equal to one another and legitimately claim to be treated as such, while, on the other hand, this right to justice must be valid, because it is born out of the essential pattern of human nature. Thus, beings that are devoid of the sense of justice may deserve pity and benevolence but not (*prima facie*) justice. However, it appears that like the 'original position', to which I shall shortly refer, the sense of justice belonging to human nature is a hypothetical proposition, a proposition that should be assumed to be true of every human being, and a man is to be taken as capable of developing this sense when arresting conditions are removed; the removal a just society must ensure.

Indeed, reflective reason intends that equal share of advantages should go to those that are equal to one another. But the basis of equality is not 'merit'

or any sort of achievement. For Rawls finds, and in this he is joined by others,[11] that all these may depend on various contingent conditions which are not equally available to all. The situations that favour and further the development of talents are not such as may necessarily occur. Even the ability to make adequate use of an opportunity varies in proportion to the strength of one's educational, economic and cultural surroundings. The basic equality between men and men only consists in their possessing reason, in seeking to realize the rational plans of their lives, and share of advantages, which amounts to freedom of such pursuit, should be determined according to this concept of equality. Thus, the principle of justice must be so constituted as to take no account of a person's special interests, position, and privileges. Rawls adds that the principle must be such as all rational beings will agree to accept it as one for distribution of advantages when they give up all considerations of their peculiar interests and keep in view only what are common to them as rational beings.

Rawls' description of justice[12] is formal and indeterminate except for the mention of equal liberty and the two modifying clauses that define his concept of 'justice as fairness'. Justice means:

(1) Liberty for each person in the most extensive sense so far as is compatible with the equal amount of liberty for others.
(2) Inequalities are arbitrary except when (*a*) every person in the society is to enjoy a greater advantage as a result of some office having a greater share of power, wealth or freedom, and (*b*) such offices are open to each person in the society.

The ideas underlying these are those of justice as fairness.

Now treating each other as equal requires 'being equals'; in other words, what it comes to be, occupying the point of view of an equal or, as Rawls describes it, the 'original position'. A man in the 'original position' must possess self-interest as well as a claim for justice, but otherwise be in complete ignorance regarding his advantages and disadvantages by social and natural contingencies. The principle chosen from such stands will be the principle of justice, for there will be no ground for anyone to be partial to himself, for he does not know what it means to be so. Rawls finds that the man in the 'original position' will only choose to act in a manner that the minimum justice is assured to all. (A similar situation occurs in case of the 'prisoner's dilemma'.[13]) However, though Rawls conceives of the 'original position' as a logical precondition for fair justice to be possible, the problem of a man in this position seems to be a utilitarian's (in a general non-technical sense, of course) dilemma, if his sole purpose is to assure the least suffering for himself when decision has to be taken under risk and uncertainty.

Rawls contends that the two principles would provide directives to the formulation of the principle for distribution of advantages under any specific

circumstance. Of them, the first is the most important and points at the objective of justice; to recognize each person's equal and utmost freedom to follow the rational plan of his life. Inequalities, however, are allowed only when equal distribution of available resources is either not possible under the circumstances or is of no purpose (as each man's share is so meagre as to be insignificant.) Anyway, more advantage to the worst affected in the society should be assured,[14] so that he may prefer to have the inequalities under the prevailing conditions. Barry[15] objects to Rawls' choosing a society of unequal liberties to one of equal restriction for all. However, his criticism that the first clause of the second principle suggests sacrifice of political rights may be said to be misplaced in view of Rawls' arguments in relation to its second clause that political freedom comprising one's right to vote and to hold any office, is such as one cannot be debarred from enjoying it on grounds of one's social position, colour or pecuniary conditions. Even when historical necessities force us to accept some such restrictions, they can never be ends to themselves.[16] However, it is true that his 2(b), while asserting essential equalities for all even in case some forms of inequalities are introduced, is rather vague. On the other hand, clause 2(*a*), though it looks forward to equal liberty to all as the long-term equilibrium, goes against the spirit of the principal thesis. The main contention of the thesis is the concept of equality, consisting, as we have seen, in a man's possessing a sense of justice, a reason-oriented attitude of self-interested people, which forms the basis of his demand as well as right to be treated as equal with all other men in the matter of sharing wealth and opportunities. What is important in this is his sharing them in the form of a 'right', realizing that justice is obtained.

Kant formulates the categorical imperative as a constraint against the admission of any moral maxim that may treat a human being as anything else than free. The same rule, he says, has to govern the legislation of political laws as well. The attitude is consistent with his belief that freedom or pure practical reason constitutes the fundamental moral proposition.

Rawls, on the other hand, conceives of justice as fairness. It refers to Aristotle's concept of equity. Equity or fairness is the use of true wisdom in application of the general law, so that it fits in the requirement of the particular case while maintaining the fundamental principle of justice and law. But Rawls seeks to adjust in the clause 2(*a*) justice in terms of advantage, when, on his theory, justice is maintained only by proportioning advantages to forms of justice, as answers to one's claim for being treated as equal with others. Though Rawls pledges an improvement upon classical utilitarianism by means of this clause, i.e. by taking into account each person's interests even in case inequalities are admitted, he seems to make a pragmatic concession in favour of a somewhat utilitarian concept by allowing differences in order to ensure advantages.

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Can knowledge occur unknowingly?*

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Knowledge, whether it is a mental activity or a condition which the mind is in, it is undoubtedly a subjective affair which, if it does occur, cannot remain unknown to the knower. But how, when and under what conditions does knowledge become known are questions which create grave concern for the philosophers. In this paper, I shall argue that the so-called problem about knowledge of knowledge is a misleading and muddled problem. Philosophers differ from one another in this matter, mostly because they approach the problem from diametrically opposed points of view and with basically different conceptions of knowledge.

One common way of formulating the problem is this: do I know that I know *p* when I do know *p*? Or, is it possible to know without knowing that I know? Apparently, this question seems very simple. But, actually, there are in this formulation two different questions so indissolubly coalesced together that we often lose sight of this aspect of the problem. When these two questions are distinguished, then it will be clear that there is no necessity that we should answer them in the same manner. These two questions relate to the two ways of approaching the problem. The first one is a question of epistemic psychology relating to the psychological occurrence of knowledge. The question is: when knowledge, in whatever way we may characterize it, does occur psychologically, do we know of its occurrence as such? Or better, does knowledge occur knowingly? I would like to call it a question about knowledge *of* knowledge. The second question is a question of epistemic logic relating to the logical appraisal of a cognitive state as knowledge after or when it has occurred. The question is: supposing I have got knowledge in my mind, then how do I know that what I am having is knowledge and not belief or anything else? This sort of question I would describe as the question about knowledge *upon* knowledge. Now, when thinkers come to discuss the problem of knowledge of knowledge, we must note which line of approach is taken by whom and to what conclusion, though the thinkers themselves may take it up as one single question.

Danto and Prichard, for example, approach the problem from the logical angle. They both are concerned with the question as to how we know that we have got knowledge about *p* when we are actually having it. Danto holds that it is possible to know something without knowing that one knows that some-

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thing. That is, knowledge can go without the knowledge that it is going. Danto's argument is that a man may know this, that or anything, in whatever sense we may take the term 'know'. But he will not know that he is knowing them unless he understands what 'knowledge' is and unless he makes a dissection of his first knowledge about this and that, and becomes satisfied that the required criteria for a cognitive state to be called knowledge are fulfilled. To quote Danto:

> 'Unless we have a correct theory of knowledge, we may have as much knowledge as you wish and yet not know that we have it. In order to know that we have knowledge, epistemology is logically required.'[1]

It is clear that Danto here makes a distinction between two levels of knowledge. In the first level, we have knowledge about tables, chairs, etc. We may call it the psychological level. In the second level, we have knowledge about this knowledge of tables and chairs. We may call it the epistemological or logical level. In this second level, we know that what we have got about tables and chairs is knowledge. Danto believes that this second-level knowledge does not go along with any and every first-level knowledge. This knowledge occurs only to the person who has epistemological expertise. It is this level which we designate as knowledge *upon* knowledge. Danto identifies the question of knowledge *of* knowledge with knowledge *upon* knowledge.

Danto's line of thinking raises two questions. First, must one be well versed in epistemology in order to know that what he has got is to be called knowledge? Cannot an ordinary man bereft of epistemological scholasticism decipher that what he is having is knowledge and not mere belief or something like that? It is not rarely that we hear an ordinary man saying with emphasis: 'I know that that man is a thief, it is not my mere belief.' That means he knows that what he is having is knowledge. Of course, it must be admitted that had he not been made inquisitive either by inward or outward demand to cast a glance at his own state of mind, he would never have got this type of knowledge and made such a declaration as 'I know', etc. All that he would have said is, 'That man is a thief', giving expression to his knowledge of that man as being a thief. When he says 'I know that he is a thief', the statement expresses his knowledge *upon* his knowledge. But this knowledge upon knowledge he has acquired without having any epistemological training.

The second point to be put to Danto is this. Danto holds that a cognitive state which is genuinely to be called knowledge may occur in my mind, but to know that I have got knowledge I must beforehand know what knowledge is. An analogy here comes to my mind. A man may have a diamond in his pocket, but, if he does not know what a diamond is, he will not know that he is having a diamond in his pocket. This is quite justified. But to have a diamond in the pocket and to have knowledge in the mind are not parallel cases. A diamond may remain in my pocket as a diamond without my knowing it

to be so. But can knowledge be knowledge without the knowledge of its being so? Or, better, can knowledge occur unknowingly? This is our central query, and on this matter Danto is silent.

Coming to Prichard, we find that he also takes up the problem from the logical angle. Prichard writes:

> We must recognize that whenever we know something we either do, or at least can, by reflection, directly know that we are knowing it and that whenever we believe something, we similarly either do or can directly know that we are believing it and not knowing it.[2]

Prichard takes knowledge as a condition of the mind which, when the mind is in, becomes directly revealed to us whenever we reflect upon it. We need not collect any other evidence to know that what I am having is knowledge. Mere reflection suffices for this purpose. The order that passes is such: first knowledge occurs → then I simply reflect upon it and then → I know that I am having knowledge. Now, in Prichard's argument two terms are used, 'do directly know' and 'by reflection', which I think do not mean the same thing and cannot go together. If I know anything by reflection, then I cannot be said to know it directly. To know anything directly means to know it by itself without the need of anything else. Its very occurrence makes us know it. But if I have followed Prichard correctly, then his argument entails that if I do not reflect upon what is going on in my mind, then knowledge might have occurred but I might not have known it, i.e. knowledge may occur unknowingly. Danto and Prichard both admit that some additional operation upon knowledge, which is supposed to occur in my mind, is required to know that I am having knowledge. For Danto, it is epistemological scrutiny of the first knowledge after it has occurred, and for Prichard it is reflection upon it when it is occurring. They admit so, because they both approach the problem from the logical angle, i.e. how to get knowledge *upon* knowledge. The psychological question—whether the first knowledge or knowledge by itself can occur in us unknowingly or whether it contains within its very essence an element called *knowingness* about itself which we may designate as knowledge-in-knowledge—is left untouched by both Danto and Prichard. But I think it is this question which constitutes the core of the problem, because the real question at issue is not how I know *whether* I have known, but how I know *that* I have known when I am actually knowing something. And herein lies the justification of the question: can knowledge occur unknowingly?

From the very nature of this question it is evident that the question will be answered differently in the light of the different conceptions of knowledge. Basically, two different conceptions of knowledge are prevalent in philosophy. One is upheld by some schools of Indian philosophy. The other one is the so-called classical definition of knowledge expounded by the Western thinkers. These two conceptions I would like to describe respectively as the

psychological and the logical conceptions of knowledge. As a clarification of this distinction, it can be said that, when a man is psychologically in a state of mind called 'having knowledge', something is undoubtedly happening in his mind. The psychological conception describes what *goes on* in the mind when it is in a knowing state. On the other hand, the logical conception delineates the logical criteria of knowledge, i.e. explicates the conditions which must be fulfilled in order that a subjective state of mind *can be* called knowledge. Now, we should analyse these two conceptions, and try to see what position they take in relation to our central question and their satisfactoriness.

First, we come to the classical definition. The classical definition of knowledge has different versions. But all of them take three conditions to be essential for knowledge. These are: (*i*) belief; (*ii*) justification; and (*iii*) truth. Thus, *A* may be said to know *p*, only if:

(*i*) *A* believes *p*;
(*ii*) *p* is adequately evident for *A*; and
(*iii*) *p* is true.

This definition lays down that, if and only if these three conditions are fulfilled in any cognitive state, then alone can it be declared as knowledge. Otherwise, it would be ranked as a mere knowledge-claim but not knowledge. Ordinarily speaking, whenever I make a categorical assertion such as '*x* is *p*', it corresponds to a piece of knowledge, because my assertion expresses that *x*'s being *p* is reasonably evident to me. But, from the logical point of view, it will be treated merely as a knowledge-claim whose credibility as knowledge proper is to be judged. And the judgment is to be made with reference to both the psychological context as well as the objective content of the claim, namely, the adequate reasonableness of the claim to me and its objective validity. If the claim is allowed or favourably judged on both these counts, then and then only I can be said to have knowledge. So 'to know' means to be endorsed in my claim. Of course, in all cases which pass as knowledge, according to the classical definition, this claim-making and endorsement do not always overtly take place. But underlying every piece of knowledge, which is judged to be such, this process is logically presumed. That is why, according to the classical definition, I cannot say that 'I know', but others will say: 'He knows' or '*A* can be said to know'. Third person utterences are always to be made relating to having knowledge. An analogy here may not be out of place. Suppose, a man claims to be the only heir to his father's property. But whether his claim is real, he himself cannot know, or nobody will admit until and unless the legality of his claim is adjudicated by the court of justice. May be he is judged by the court as valid in his claim. Then he himself will know, and others will recognize him to be the only heir to his father's property. But before the judgment was passed he, as a matter of fact, was possessing all the qualities of being the only heir, and after the judgment is passed he still

remains so. The judgment adds nothing extra to what he is. The judgement only ascertains an extraneous quality, namely, the legality of his claim. But until and unless the ascertainment is made, neither he himself nor others will recognize him as the only heir, though he has all along been actually so. Therefore, 'heirhood' is a matter of legal recognition or endorsement. Now, 'having knowledge' is exactly the same from the point of view of the classical definition as 'being an heir' is, from the legal point of view. Suppose, I am having two cognitive states corresponding to two assertions, e.g. '*x* is *p*' and '*a* is *b*'. Now, psychologically speaking, I feel exactly the same amount of reasonableness with respect to the first as with the second. Psychologically, both the cognitive states are at par with one another having no tint of difference. But I shall be said to have knowledge in the former case if '*x* is *p*' is proved true, whereas in the latter case if '*a* is *b*' turns out to be false, I shall be said to have only a knowledge-claim or belief or something else short of knowledge. But with respect to my subjective condition, I feel no difference between the two states in which I am 'knowing' and I am 'not knowing'. So, 'knowing' is not here treated as a psychological phenomenon. Of course, it happens in the mind. But with respect to the character of its psychic happening, it has no differentiating character from 'not knowing'. Knowledge is absolutely made a logical phenomenon. It is only when the veracity of the claim accompanying a cognitive state is judged to be up to the mark that it will amount to knowledge. Knowledge has become a matter of endorsement or certification.

A point here comes to my mind. Knowledge, after all, is a mental state and its character of being knowledge must be ascertained on mental criteria. Of course, whether a piece of knowledge is genuine or not is a matter of appraisal, and the appraisal, no doubt, is to be made by testing the objective validity or truth. But does the appraisal raise it up to the status of being knowledge? Surely not. Rather, before the appraisal it must have possessed in its psychological or existential character some such mark which constituted it knowledge as opposed to some other cognitive states which are to be called non-knowledge. Truth is an extra-mental characteristic. This, of course, cannot be treated as a constitutive element of knowledge. Rather, it is to be considered as its adjectival characteristic. It is knowledge that becomes true. Knowledge must first be knowledge in its existential character, then it becomes true or falls short of it.

It is the question of knowledge of knowledge that brings to light the peculiar position of the classical definition. This definition suffers from a confusion between *genuine knowledge* and what is *genuinely knowledge*. Genuine knowledge means right knowledge. Its genuineness consists in its truth, and it is opposed to what is non-genuine, i.e. wrong knowledge. But be it right or be it wrong, both are cases of knowledge in their intra-mental character; whereas what is genuinely knowledge is something which is opposed to some such cognitive states which are cases of non-knowledge, i.e. lacking in some consti-

tutive criteria of knowledge. The classical definition in its attempt to tell us what is *genuinely* to be called knowledge, i.e. its psychological characteristic, supplies us instead with the logical apparatus of finding out what *genuine* or right knowledge is. And in doing so it does another thing. It erases the distinction between truth and falsity of knowledge, because, according to this definition, knowledge, to be so called, must always have truth in it. No knowledge can be false.

Malcolm makes an attempt to save the situation by way of accomplishing a patchwork between two senses of knowledge—strong and weak. In the strong sense, Malcolm argues, a person can be said to know *s*, when in claiming to know that *s* his subjective assurance about the validity of the claim is so strong that he will not allow that there can be against *s* any compelling counter-evidence. But in the weak sense, a person can be said to know *as*, when on investigation *s* turns out to be true.[3] I think Malcolm is in a predicament. On the one hand, he cannot get away from the common faith that knowledge is a mental event, and its being knowledge consists in some mental differentia. On the other hand, he cannot break away from the clutches of classical definition. And that is why he attaches to truth in the weak sense of knowledge. But, rightly speaking, Malcolm's strong sense of knowledge delineates what knowledge *is* genuinely, i.e. its psychological character; whereas his weak sense depicts what genuine knowledge *should be*, i.e. its logical character. True, a cognitive state to be called a genuine piece of knowledge must have two sides in it—an existential or psychological and an adjectival or logical. In its psychological character, it *is* nothing but a belief behind which the subject has ample reasonableness; whereas in its logical aspect it is a belief which has over and above psychic reasonableness, objective validity or truth. But if truth enters into the constitutive characteristics of knowledge, then knowledge must occur unknowingly, because whether the belief has truth or not, the subject, when he is in it, cannot feel, though it may have it. Truth is always to be extraneously assessed. It is a later ascertainment.

Leaving aside the logical conception of knowledge, we now come to the psychological conception which we find in the views of some Indian philosophers, and let us see what position they take up relating to our original question: can knowledge occur unknowingly? According to the Indian view, knowledge is *viṣaya prakāśa*. To know a thing means the thing has been subjectively revealed to me. That is why knowledge is often compared to an internal light. A thing may be objectively revealed before my knowledge about it dawned on me. But when I know it, it becomes subjectively revealed to me or becomes lighted up to me. But a light reveals not only the object but also itself. Similarly, knowledge reveals the object as well as itself, for can anything be subjectively revealed to me without my knowingness of the revelation. A revelation without the apprehension of the revelation is no revelation at all. So when knowledge, say, 'this is pot' occurs, it is not only the pot that is revealed, in that very knowledge the revelation of the pot is also revealed.

And what more, that it is a revelation to me or that it is my knowledge is also revealed. This is the theory of triple cognition or *triputi-jñāna* held by the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas of Indian philosophy. Prābhākaras believe that, whenever an object is known three things are simultaneously known in that very knowledge: (*a*) the object; (*b*) the subject; and (*c*) the knowledge. So *in* every piece of knowledge, there is an element of self-knowledge. Knowledge always occurs knowingly. The Advaitins also believe, in their own way, that knowledge is *svaprakāśa*. Knowledge is known not in another knowledge. But every knowledge is self-revealed—*jñānam svatah jñāyate*.

I would like to conclude this paper with the note that the best answer to our question, 'Can knowledge occur unknowingly?' was given by the *Prā*-bhākara Mīmāṁsakas of Indian philosophy. In fact, the correct verbal representation of my knowledge as well as my knowledge of the knowledge would be the same, namely, '*x* is *p*'. When I say '*x* is *p*', what I assert is not only '*x*'s being *p*' but also that '*x* is known by me to be *p*'. Austin seems to be absolutely right when he says that the descriptive contents of the propositions '*x* is *p*' and 'I know that *x* is *p*' are the same in the sense that the pharase 'I know' here adds no new information. Of course, sometime we make the verbal expression in the other way and say 'I know that *x* is *p*' with an emphasis on the part 'I know'; and in that 'I know' imparts some new information, namely, my knowledge *upon* my first knowledge, that it is a knowing state and not any other. But the first knowledge, whenever it occurs, does occur knowingly. In fact, the distinction between knowledge and object is this: an object can exist as an object either as known or as not known. But a knowledge that occurs but is not known is a misnomer. In fact, to speak of knowledge *of* knowledge is a wrong way of speaking. It creates the impression as if here there are *two* knowledges, the first knowledge occurring unknowingly and then being known in the second knowledge. But, actually, there is here one piece of knowledge—knowing both the object and itself. So the correct expression would be *knowledge-in-knowledge*. Knowledge always occurs knowingly.

Notes and References

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A historico-philosophical investigation of anti-science: the phenomenological encounter

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While the last hundred and fifty years have witnessed unprecedented developments in the sciences, the latter half of this century has also seen the emergence of many anti-science movements, some of which have been very specific articulations of counter-culture movements. This antagonistic response has been a reaction to disasters and holocausts wherein scientific knowledge was used as an instrument of destruction at the behest of either a state or other interests. This has resulted in a polarization of views concerning the nature of science. Whereas some hold that science itself is a neutral endeavour that falls into the hands of exploitative forces, the diametrically opposite view is that science is inherently exploitative and violence is intrinsic to the process of obtaining scientific knowledge as well as to its application. We do not intend to elucidate a system of categories, rationalized by very subtle distinctions that would map all shades of views of the nature of science, or to formalize a spectrum of views from the ultra-left to the ultra-right.

The endeavour here will be to repudiate any attempt to trace the grievances of the counter-culture movement against science to Heidegger's and Husserl's critique of science, for the philosophical import of these grievances are embedded in a widely accepted critique of these two philosophers. And though this discourse has been appropriated by the counter-culturists, Cahoone has shown how this is a distortion of the views of both Husserl and Heidegger, and, in particular, of their perception of science and its role in European culture. But the discourse of Husserl and Heidegger cannot be seen outside the context of the developments within philosophy in the nineteenth century. These developments had to do with the domain of philosophical investigation itself, the dynamic relation between philosophy and the sciences, as well as institutional changes that were the consequence of these developments.

As Cahoone has pointed out, Husserl and Heidegger basically oppose the naturalism of science, and it is attempted here to show that the counter-cultural grievances are essentially corollaries of two principal axioms. Husserl's and Heidegger's attack is narrowly limited to only one of them. Contrariwise, the phenomenological endeavour of both Husserl and Heidegger assumes the validity of science, and is simultaneously dedicated to the formulation of a science of science that subsumes the scientific method.

The Fragmentation of Knowledge or The Demise of Philosophy

Very real debates in the domain of knowledge are often wished away by defining new areas of knowledge that finally emerge as disciplines. Hence real issues arising from a conflict within a given sphere of knowledge in the institutional space accede to a realm where the squabble acquires a intra-disciplinary connotation (Agassi 1977). But our principal concern here is not how a sociology of knowledge explicates the shifting definition of philosophical discourse. What we wish to address here is the evolution of the science-philosophy relationship in the nineteenth century, and its consequences in the latter half of the twentieth century. By the early decades of the nineteenth century, developments in science and the self-image of a (supposedly) secular, neutral science were already calling for the flushing out of the metaphysical from science, which, in turn, came to be one of the major accomplishments (!) of sociological positivism.

The relationship between science and philosophy till this period (though Redner goes as far back as the end of scientific revolution) was one of a 'mutually determining' development (Redner 1986, 37) at which point there arises the perception of science as an autonomous enterprise, having an autonomy that is asserted. With the proliferation of scientific disciplines during this period and the concomitant process of encompassing a widening class of phenomenon and events within the realm of science, philosophy was sent scurrying so as to escape the 'relentless pursuit of the sciences'. The assertion of its autonomy was manifest in science's hostility to speculative interference from disciplines like philosophy (Jaspers 1960, 42). During the latter half of the nineteenth century, physicists of a positivist shade like Mach and Hertz and later the 'young Einstein' purged science of metaphysics thereby ushering in the era of axiomatic functional science (Redner 1986, 65). Having lost out on metaphysics and its claim to being, philosophy in its attempt at a redefinition of its domain of investigation, highlighted its claim to epistemology and the mind (Redner 1986, 20). But the mind was gradually appropriated by psychology, and epistemology in the hands of the neo-positivists was rendered a study of the methodology of science. The last saving act was the imposition of the delusion that 'there are scientific crisis caused by philosophical criticism rather than philosophical crises brought about by revolutionary changes in science' (Bellone 1980, 115). On abandoning this delusion, we observe that philosophy's task is to follow the movement of scientific thought, the oscillation of a scientist's thoughts between an array of philosophical positions. A case in site is that of the fertile discussion on the notions of materialism and atomism, generated on account of the fact that the physicist's notion of matter is at variance with the philosophical. This process has further enriched philosophical discourse. In the light of the above, the efforts of Mach, Einstein, Bohr, Schrodinger, Heisenberg acquire marked importance, for they not only

sought out the philosophical implications of their theories but strove towards philosophical clarification to make physical theories more meaningful.

Philosophy of science in the post-1960s era is quite distinct, for the emergence of the philosophy of science as an autonomous, institutionalized discipline appears to have formally put an end to the era of scientist as philosopher-scientist. The scientist in this situation steps outside his role as scientist to articulate his philosophical leanings or voice social dissent. This does not mean that this schizophrenia is merely the product of disciplinary/institutional fragmentation, though disciplinary fragmentation increasingly distantiates a scientist from society in so far as it reifies disciplines in abstract formalism, but is also the result of an increasingly vociferous counter-science movement that juxtaposes nuclear war, ecological catastrophes, biological warfare with the image of science. This other image of science professes that science is monolithic, masculine (Capra 1983), and effectively marginalizes other knowledge systems and claims. The difficulty with such a claim is that it attributes to science an autonomy and inertia of its own, and is no longer considered an activity negotiated through scientific communities moored in a socio-political milieu. While Jagtenberg accepts Ravetz's classification of science, viz. '(i) pure academic science—derived from nineteenth century German universities, (ii) ideologically engaged science bearer of truth and reason, (iii) useful science—applied directly to practical problems', he qualifies that the appellation useful science probably describes contemporary science, where 'research appears to be directed primarily towards the general objectives of economic development and national security' (Jagtenberg 1983).

To get around the other image of science, there has been a more mystical response from sections of the scientific community, and particularly noteworthy ones from some theoretical physicists. The science-mysticism parallelism drawn up, therefore, attempts to serve as a 'defensive justification for and explanation of the scientific approach', and the enterprise of Capra and Zukav hopes to better the image of science by demonstrating the harmony between modern physics and mysticism (Restivo 1983, 10: 39).

And though in these 'liminal times' there have been serious attempts to confront epistemic and cultural rigidities, there has been an observable shift in the perception of historians and philosophers of science, following the ideational convergence of anthropology and cultural relativism. It has been pointed out by Kohak that one way of reading the movement of modern Western philosophy is its effort to accommodate the 'spectre of the relativity of reason' (Kohak 1986). This process of accommodation acquired particular importance in the post-1940s era, when the European intellectual community woke up to acknowledge non-European civilizations as presence and possibilities. After three hundred years (save for Goetheian and Schopenhauerian romanticism) have we witnessed a concerted critique of the Enlightenment and its Eurocentric implications. However, at the populist level, this epistemological glasnost has offered some third-world scientists the opportunity to

intrude into the ideational space, thus far dominated by Western thought, and where they are offered second-class citizenship. In those cases, where scientists have chosen to ride the high tide of Eastern mysticism, it must be remarked that no new knowledge has been generated so far, and such discourses have but circumambulated the periphery of scientific activity.

Science as Instrumental Rationality

This paper, as mentioned earlier, intends to explore the philosophical terrain of the modern anti-science movement, and thereby determine the boundaries of the movement's critique. Many have found in Feyerabend a mascot to browbeat the scientific tradition, and thereby to voice a critique outside the context in which (it is contended) he bandies his seemingly bizarre views on modern science (Feyerabend 1978). Between the self-professed anarchism of Feyerabend that denigrates the image of the rationality of modern science, and 'Orthodox Marxism' for whom the objectivity of science renders it a 'paragon for Marxist Socialism' are other discourses seeking to transcend these polarities (Rose and Rose 1976, xv).

Any attempt to qualify or delimit these interrogations does not connote that all is fine with science and thereby with technology. And when talking about technology, a great deal of caution is called for. For Habermas points out that science as instrumental rationality is 'inevitably' oppressive (Rose and Rose 1976, xvi); for the critical theorist, Horkheimer, modern science generates new forms of societal domination that seek theoretical justification in positivism (Rose and Rose 1976, 10). These readings raise the question whether scientific endeavour as a totality can be dismissed on this count. If it is argued (and we will attempt to do so) that this is not entirely the case, then any critique of science is not immanent to science but is rooted in a larger network of social activities that subsume scientific activity. We will return to the role of science as instrumental rationality after investigating the positions of Husserl and Heidegger concerning science and scientism.

The Phenomenological Project of the 1930s

The names of the German phenomenologists, Husserl and Heidegger, are normally associated with an interpretation of anti-science, and both are held to be avowed critics of scientism. To trace the philosophical roots of the modern tradition of anti-science back to them is a trifle paradoxical, considering the nature of their enterprise and the projects undertaken by them at a particular juncture of European history *qua* European thought. For whereas one often finds in Heidegger a slight aversion for scientific theories, which in their interrogation of nature reduce things to a relationship of enslavement (Heidegger 1977), Cahoone has demonstrated that for Husserl, Heidegger and Casirrer 'the interpretation of Galileo and Galilean science was imbued with

philosophical and cultural themes which had attained a special status in the 1930s' (Cahoone 1986, 17: 1: 1-21).

To begin with cognizance must be taken of the fact that both Husserl and Heidegger were deeply entrenched in the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century debates on mathematics. Husserl was actually a party to some of the debates during the 'crisis in the foundations' period of mathematics, having aligned himself with David Hilbert's programme of arriving at a consistent formal grounding for mathematics. Besides, he was acutely concerned about the geometrization of mathematics and the relation of geometry to the modern theoretical sciences (Husserl 1978). His own phenomenological enterprise was devoted to conceiving a 'purely theoretical science', which would serve as the foundation for all knowledge, while it remained an 'a priori, purely demonstrative science'. This phenomenological enterprise subjects thought and consciousness ('spheres of being of absolute origin') to the scientific ideal, as a result of which thought and consciousness are rendered subjects of 'pure research' (Adorono 1982, 48). This foundational science would be a science of science, or what Husserl called 'Wissenschaftslehre or theory of science' (Husserl 1978). In his early major work, the *Logical Investigations*, we still encounter Husserl the realist concerned about science and striving towards what has just been called the science of science. Here, Husserl acknowledges that the science of the material world 'seeks to be a means towards the greatest, possible conquest of truth by our knowledge. The realm of truth is, however, no disordered chaos, but is dominated and unified by law' (Husserl 1970, 65) 'and this form of unity has itself a lofty teleological meaning...to advance into the realm of truth or its natural provinces' (Husserl 1970, 90). For Husserl, then, and in the *Cartesian Meditations* in particular, philosophy and 'universal' science share the same ideal and in this capacity he is not concerned with the universality or truth of science, but with its scientificity (Adorno 1982, 53). Husserl's disjunction with science, in spite of his having enshrined his understanding of it in the posture of scientific reliability (Adorno 1982, 36), arises at the moment he delineates the science of matter from mechanistic psychologism, according to which the laws of thought are laws of nature operating in isolation and are the fount of rational thought.

Heidegger is more difficult to understand on this count, for his critique permeates many levels. But what seems to unite both Husserl and Heidegger and to an extent even Jaspers is the role they attribute to mathematics in giving modern science its identity. One of the significant causes Husserl attributes to modern science's great leap forward is the mathematical idealization, on account of which it becomes possible to formalize becoming and not merely being (Kohak 1986, 88). Jaspers points out in the same vein: '...the new science began as a mathematical science of nature, motivated by the revolutionary concept, the universal applicability of the scientific method' (Jaspers 1960, 27). Heidegger does not quite accept the thesis that what separates science before Galileo from post-Galilean science has to do with mathematics

per se. Besides, medieval science is not distinguished from modern science by experimentation (18) p. 248, the accepted histories of science see the fading away of scholasticism and the burgeoning of the experimental tradition as inversely related. What distinguishes this enterprise of science from other activities is that science is mathematical, and not that it uses mathematics. This 'mathematical projection' on to the sciences carries a signification of what can be learned as well as the learning process itself (Heidegger 1978, 251). But in the process he does perceive a qualitative transformation, which, in turn, also provides an indictment of positivism. Herein can also be located the seed of his argument regarding the end of philosophy in the age of technology. The argument itself follows from the interrogation of scientific rationality and its relationship with technology. While scientific rationality is seen as the final accomplishment of the will to dominate that has been present since ancient Greece, Heidegger denounces the manner in which this rationality takes things 'into account' (Prigogine and Stengers 1984, 32). For Husserl the great error of scientific rationality lies in the ontological validity it confers on its mathematical idealizations.

What needs to be stated is that Heidegger's understanding of science must also be seen in terms of the changing consciousness of physicists. This changing consciousness was characterized by the denunciation of mechanistic and materialistic models in the latter part of the eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth century. In other words, was Heidegger voicing something other than what physicists in their own parlance were grappling with throughout the nineteenth century? It has become fashionable to cite how quantum mechanics has dealt a fatal blow to classical mechanics. The history of physics reveals that mechanism had been under attack for almost a century: '...the long labours of classical physics cannot be reduced to a sudden failure occurring sometime between the end of the nineteenth and the first years of the twentieth century' (Bellone 1980). In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this debate did acquire geo-political dimensions; in that there were contending schools of German, English and French physics, the site of which was the emergence of theoretical physics, which Bellone has metaphorically called a 'World on Paper'. Naturphilosophy that arose in Germany in the nineteenth century, Tar points out, did so as a reaction against 'French mechanistic and materialistic philosophies of science' (Tar 1977, 95). These philosophies were exemplified by Descartesian and Newtonian metaphors of matter in motion and the machine. That physicists were breaking out of this world-view is evident in Kelvin and Tait's opposition to Maxwell and Boltzmann:

> The universe of action at a distance is a cosmic clock. Since every event is repeated in cycles, there is no history in such a universe. Everything comes back to itself, every natural process is reversible. But for Kelvin and Tait, the universe is not a cosmic clock. Nothing repeats in the Universe because the universe evolves in time (Bellone 1980, 46).

Shifting philosophical perspectives were already manifest before the much bandied-about revolutions. In fact, the early nineteenth century was the opportune moment for seeking 'empirical and theoretical support for an alternative to classical science' (Prigogine and Stengers 1984, 90). Having outlined the relationship between philosophical responses to scientific theories and the scientific subsumption of philosophical categories, it has been pointed out that the neo-Marxist, in particular, critical theories' dismissal of modern science and technology (Tar 1977, 99) is non-Marxist in so far as it regurgitates anti-science statements of German idealist philosophy, disguised as a critique of 'bourgeois-capitalist society'. The conclusion cannot be drawn that anti-science is a tradition naturally descending from German idealist philosophy; for even Husserl (and the later Husserl is certainly no realist) and Heidegger are not anti-science.

The Relevance of Galilean Science

In 1937, Husserl, Heidegger and Cassirer independently set out on a re-examination of Galileo. In his last years (1934-38) that were particularly turbulent, Husserl seemed convinced about two issues: (*i*) to 'reflect upon the origins of our critical scientific and philosophical situation' (Husserl 1978); and (*ii*) to accomplish this through a phenomenology of human meaning (Kearney 1986, 14). The question that must be asked and to which Cahoone offers an answer is: what did these three philosophers expect to unearth by their investigation? Accordingly, Cahoone holds that they perceived a 'crisis of European humanity and of Europe's philosophical self consciousness... the spirit of modern, post-medieval Europe was inextricably linked with modern science. In each case the search for the modern drove them back to Galileo' (Cahoone 1986, 17: 1-21).

These three scholars, thus, hoped to relocate Europe's lost humanity in the Galilean epoch and Galileo's enterprise. That science did play a humanizing role in this period is expressed in the writings of most thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Comte, for one, held that the old order was not only demolished by the French Revolution, but as much by the fact that the growth of science had undermined its system of beliefs (Greene 1982, 62). The image of science towards the end of the nineteenth century in Germany was far grander than that in Comtean France. For an impoverished, famine-stricken Germany of the 1840s had witnessed a social transformation into a rich country 'with a highly developed middle class and ... more advanced social institutions than their counter-parts in France and England' (Nachmanson 1979). Culturally, science was to serve as a site around which marginal groups could construct 'their own separate philosophy and culture system' (Thackray 1974). In eighteenth-century England progressivist philosophies, peripheral status and science converged to transform the larger culture; and, as Thackray shows, this was catalyzed by the ability of science or natural

knowledge to function as a 'ratifier of a new world order' (Thackray 1974, 9-68).

We are here not really concerned with what Cassirer has to say, for Cassirer views science through the tinted spectacles of a positivist wherein science becomes the final accomplishment of rationality. We have been really concerned with Husserl and Heidegger, for a particular ideology has been foisted on them; but the manifest discourse does not conform to that reading. Husserl sees Galileo's essential contribution to be the mathematization of nature in terms of ideal geometrical entities (Cahoone 1986, 17: 1: 8); while for Heidegger what was important to Galileo and the scholastics preceding him was that their perception of an experiment depended on what 'each thought in advance' about 'the essence of a body and its nature of motion' (Cahoone 1986, 17: 1:10).

But at what point does the Husserl-Heidegger disjunction concerning science become significant? Neither of them differ in their evaluation of science as ideal praxis, but they do not accept the naturalist doctrine (Cahoone 1986) science presupposes. Whereas Husserl acknowledges science's need for a philosophical grounding, he cannot accept science's rejection of anything real that is not 'physically given'; simultaneously, even if science acknowledges the life of consciousness, Husserl finds it untenable that it should do so by naturalizing it as physical reality (Kearney 1986, 16). What is remarkable is that, in the light of the alleged success of the sciences Husserl is seeking to bring some philosophical clarification to logic and pure mathematics (Adorno 1982). On the other hand, Heidegger sees Galilean science to be characterized to the extent that it predetermines natural objects. The ancient and medieval categories of bodies, places, motions, tendencies and things undergo conceptual development into mass, position, inertia, aggregates (Heidegger 1978, 241). This framework of knowledge, as with Husserl, must be 'systematically coherent in the theoretical sense', 'finding the ground for one's knowing and suitably arranging the sequence of such groundings'. For Husserl, the essence of such a science arises from the 'unity in the whole system of grounded validation' (Husserl 1970, 62). Such a perception of scientific activity might appear antiquated today, for in the light of the latest findings of the history and sociology of science one finds that the emergence of scientific theories are not always correlatable with grounded validations; this was nevertheless the understanding of science at that time. However, it must not be forgotten that the conception of science Husserl is attracted to is one based on solid empirical work that is apparently victorious over dialectical and speculative modes. The rejection of naturalism and the epistemological-metaphysical view that 'the natural order' exists independently of consciousness (Cahoone 1986, 17: 1: 6) is not tantamount to denying the role of science, but being what Adorno calls a philosopher of origins Husserl seeks to initiate a phenomenological investigation into the intentionality of knowledge.

Scientific Method and Ideal Praxis

Rationality is not an absolute or invariant, but for a given period is constituted as the 'philosophical formation of basic norms and procedures inherent in the discourse of that epoch' (Redner 1986, 41). In the post-positivistic period, scientific discourses have been particularly influential in defining rationality. This definition has been so constructed that the only form of rationality presently acknowledged is that of scientific rationality which, in turn, is operationalized in scientific research through the scientific method. The phenomenological conception, as evident in Husserl and Heidegger, of ideal praxis relates to the methodology of science, the currently dominant paradigm of scientific rationality. The predilection of these German phenomenologists for the scientific method as ideal praxis is particularly understandable, and their excursion back to the Renaissance and Galilean science is explainable in terms of the indebtedness of this method to the Renaissance. Dessaur has identified four features of this indebtedness, and these have to do with the impartial perception of the world, the desire to explore and examine, a critical sense, and an aversion to doctrinairism (Dessaur *et al.* 1975, 51).

There is no attempt here to define the scientific method. Several epistemic strategies are operational in the activity of scientists; these, in turn, typify cognitive activity and science rather broadly. Like realism the epistemic strategies adopted by scientists are preferable since they provide results. Beyond such blatant pragmatism there exists no proof to demonstrate theoretically the validity or superiority of these strategies over any other (Bunge, 1967). Therefore, like rationality, what is called the scientific method has differed over history. The pragmatic objective of science, therefore gears it to an open epistemology, thereby freeing it of the chains of a binding formalism or the necessity of respecting 'a certain number of conditions which rigid systems mutually exclude' (Paty, 1986). This realistic understanding of science, espoused in no uncertain terms by Einstein, Schrodinger, Bohm and others, runs counter to the positivist attempts as well as to those of the proponents of the Copenhagen interpretation as to what should be the formal structure of scientific theories and what these structures must preclude. Scientific realism commences with the assumption of the fallibility of our ideas and experiences, and through experiment one arrives at an approximate account of real world processes. The role of fallibility is not even remotely displaced by the tremendous consolidation of the theoretical sciences by species of mathematical structures and models, since any progressive theory must outpace empirical falsification (Feyerabend 1960).

In this context of epistemic openness that chiefly characterizes scientific realism lies the very crux of the scientific method as reflexivity. Coming back, therefore, to Heidegger, the 'mathematical projection' of science transcends the mere instrumentality of mathematics. Heidegger demarcates Galilean science from its forerunners in so far as it establishes both 'mathematics' as

heuristic for science (reflexivity) and its instrumentality within the sphere. The physicist Boltzmann was quite enamoured of the strong relationship binding the theory of knowledge with the method of physics: 'Modern theoretical physics has for Boltzmann the following virtue: while reflecting on things, we also reflect on the method by which we think' (Bellone 1980, 98).

Countering Anti-Science

Anti-science essentially voices two distinct objections to what is seen to be implicit within scientism. The first is the axiom of theoretical superiority, according to which scientific knowledge is the only authentic (or at least the best of all) knowledge. Though, at first, the axiom of theoretical superiority should stun in its arrogance, neither Husserl nor Heidegger were particularly repulsed, and their criticism must be seen to belong to an extra-methodological domain of scientific activity, which probably has more to do with the process of scientific activity than with its methodology. To this extent they were quite the products of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Baconian world-view, in that even if they did not hold it entirely inviolate, they did not deem it worthy of demolition or dismissal. In fact, Heidegger writes that the experimental method is an 'irreversible acquisition of human culture', and that the exploration of nature on man's part involves treating it as an independent being (Prigoine 1984, 40).

The second issue of contention for anti-science is the axiom of practical superiority, according to which 'all human problems be they of a technical or ethical nature' are in principle approachable and solvable through science (Thuillier 1986, 205). Anti-science unequivocally rejects the second axiom, for it holds that science is a social activity and like all social activity must be guided by other cultural disciplines. First, on this count both Husserl and Heidegger, having accorded validity to the scientific method and in theorizing about the natural world, seek a distinct grounding for the science of phenomenology to explain consciousness. Within this scheme the scientific method will be reducible to phenomenology, and not the other way round. Hence the phenomenological enterprise collides with the alleged methodological programmatic of scientific reductionism. To extrapolate this issue two questions need addressing within the philosophy of science. The first has to do with reductionism and physicalism in the sciences, and the second is the related question concerning scientism and the humanities.

Reductionism is historically and socially negotiated by the axiom of practical superiority. This is partially on account of the sometimes over-exaggerated success of physics over the past century. These successes are more visible in technological terms (spin-offs from developments in physics) than is obvious on theoretical grounds. The subsumption of several other parts of science (for example, chemistry and parts of biology) under the masthead of physics is reflective of a reductionism that inevitably devolves into physicalism.

This issue is finally reducible to a debate between reductionism and anti-reductionism, a contemporary re-enactment of the mechanism-vitalism controversy. The cause of discord centres around the issue whether 'reality consists of matter in motion or whether it has some non-material psychic components as well' (Sarkar 1979, 39). Husserl's delineation of the conscious from the material has already been discussed, and, though, he distinguished them as separate domains of enquiry, he was looking for a unification.

The second objection concerning scientism is not entirely a consequence of a scientific imperialism in the realm of ideas but a product of a particular symbiosis among several discursive formations. Now, the principle of reductionism was not typical of the sciences, and the sciences were afflicted with one variety: physicalism. Reductionism made its inroads into other areas of Western thought, and positivism happened to be one of these reductionist programmes (Redner 1986, 14). The scientism that percolated into the humanities and the social sciences, then, turn out to be a legacy of Comtean positivism and the theories of social evolution that emerged in the middle and later half of the nineteenth century under the influence of the geologists, evolutionists and bio-sociologists. In fact: 'The first truly evolutionary speculations in modern social theory appeared at the same time as the first transformist ideas in biology' (Greene 1981, 60). Comte for one was deeply influenced by biology and biological analogy, and that it was nature which made 'possible and inevitable man's social evolution' (Greene 1981, 67). However, further discussion of the issue is well beyond the scope of the present paper.

Conclusion

A contemporaneous defence of science must acknowledge that scientific activity has entered a phase wherein increasing examination and retrospection is required, so that it may transcend the present rigidities and epistemic closure that threaten it. This would require re-establishing and re-examining its historical roots and ideational lineage in a non-positivistic and pluralistic perspective. This paper has been one such attempt in examining a more recent discourse with respect to a significant critique of science. It needs to be affirmed that any critique of science must be read within the context of institutions and lobbies that manipulate scientific or technological activity and where the direction of scientific research is chalked out by industrial and defence establishments, requirements of national security, etc. The science that comes to be nurtured by such an industry-defence nexus turns out to be 'monocultural' (taking a metaphor from the ecological sciences). Science, then in the bind of the nexus, is threatened in its journey for charting out new domains and methods of investigation, for any investigation taken up is subordinate to prevailing techniques and devices. Needham has argued that the anti-science movement in the West is a response to science under capitalism and the claims of an absolutist scientism. Under such conditions, only those scientific theo-

ries (including those that have been shelved), conforming to the required instrumental rationality, surface. In this 'fertilization' of techniques and research methodologies, philosophy acquires a subversive role in the 'battle for scientific truth', for it must, as Redner points out, 'continually endanger itself' so as to provide a critical challenge to the prevailing disciplines (Redner 1986, 15). Only, on being exposed to such critical interrogation, can science be exonerated of the dubious transposition of the aberrations of a social order and its institutional baggage on to itself.

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Knowledge as bondage: an unconventional approach

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About knowledge it may be said, without fear of much controversy, that it has almost always been supposed to be valuable. One rarely comes across disparagement or condemnation of knowledge. It is not knowledge but ignorance or *ajñāna* that has been regarded as the root cause of man's misery. Knowledge is coupled with truth, is equated with power and virtue, and is pursued as an intrinsic value. It has even been identified with the supreme goal of man's life—liberation.

But J. Krishnamurti, the seer who walked alone, seems to give a different account of knowledge. Instead of regarding knowledge as freedom, he speaks of freedom from the known. Here are a few of his typical sayings on the subject:

> The worship of knowledge is a form of idolatry, and it will not dissolve the conflict and misery of our life. The cloak of knowledge conceals but can never liberate us from our ever-increasing confusion and sorrow.... Addiction to knowledge is like any other addiction; it offers an escape from the fear of emptiness, of loneliness, of frustration, the fear of being nothing...The mind is frightened of...(the) unknown, and so it escapes into theories, hopes, imagination; and this very knowledge is a hindrance to the understanding of the unknown... Knowledge is essential to technique, as coal to the engine, but it cannot reach out into the unknown.[1]

It is important to be clear about what knowledge is—or what Krishnamurti takes knowledge to be—for our understanding, appreciation, or criticism of his views on this matter. There are various concepts, classifications, and definitions of knowledge. There are the differentiations between knowledge that something is the case and knowing how to do a certain thing, between knowledge as an internal state and as an act, between the nature of knowledge and its tests. The relation of knowledge to truth, belief, and certainty have been frequent subjects of discourse.

Not being a professional or academic philosopher, Krishnamurti rather steers clear of such discussions, though, no doubt, comparisons between his views and classical or modern theories can be made. His approach to the question 'What is knowledge?' seems to be through the question 'How does knowledge arise?' and his simple answer is: from experience, books, other persons, etc. Knowledge is stored in the brain, and is thus connected with memory. It forms an accumulated mass through time. Our thinking is in terms of such piled-up memories, and our behaviour is conditioned by it. In

Krishnamurti's philosophy, the concepts of knowledge, thought, memory, and time are fused or are interrelated, and initial hard and fast distinctions get blurred as the investigation gains in depth. Thus, when knowledge is seen to be an abstract theoretical receptive formulation in consciousness, arising from an external or internal stimulus (say, a pin-prick or twitching of a muscle), and thought as a cognitive response from memory, they appear to be distinct. But when one understands that memory is nothing but a build-up of knowledge, one realizes that thought as a memory-reaction cannot basically be different from knowledge-response to a new situation. Besides, the idea that knowledge is a purely receptive acquisition is an over-simplication. So also is the belief that the brain at birth is a *tabula rasa*. The fact is that the human brain has developed through millenia, and that pure uninterpreted experience is a wish rather than reality. Nobody knows what time is apart from its contents nor whether there can be knowledge or thought apart from brain and memory.

Is knowledge always true? What guarantees its truth? Krishnamurti is not interested in these questions. He is rather concerned with the practical issue: how far knowledge is useful and how far it begets trouble. That knowledge is useful would be readily admitted. We cannot do without knowledge, almost all our daily activities depend on it. For operating any machine one needs knowledge. Reading, writing, speaking—all presuppose it. Without it we will not be able to recognize people, our social life would come to a stop, we will cease to live as human beings. Achievements of science and marvels of technology are evidences of continuous progress of knowledge. Knowledge is a biological necessity.

But there is no end to information. Knowledge, though limited, is capable of endless extension. The retentive capacity of the human brain is limited, and it is not possible for any man to muster all information that is available. However much he may try, he can not know everything. In the matter of storage and reproduction of information, man-made computers can surpass man. So, though man is driven to knowledge by curiosity etc., insatiable urge for knowledge is bound to be self-defeating. In respect of volume, speed and accuracy in the processing of information, man has conceded defeat to machine. Knowledge-management at least, if not knowledge-gathering also, is better done by mechanical devices than by the human brain. Thinking, in so far as it is a response from memory to a given problem, can gradually be taken over by machines for better and quicker result.

Though knowledge is indispensable, the craving and competition for it is not altogether healthy. It has to be understood whether the rush and the struggle for knowledge is, in the end, more enriching or more impoverishing, whether it is beneficial or harmful in the long run. We have roughly seen in what respects knowledge is serviceable and essential. Now, we have to find out if in any way knowledge is an encumbrance and a handicap.

Krishnamurti says:

> Obviously knowledge and learning are an impediment to the understanding of the new... Developing a perfect technique does not make you creative... A mind that is crowded, encased in facts, in knowledge—is it capable of receiving something new, sudden, spontaneous?... There is this extraordinary perversion taking place in the world at the present time: we think we shall understand if we have more information, more books, more facts, more printed matter. To be aware of something that is not the projection of the known, there must be the elimination, through the understanding, of the process of the known... If you are to discover for yourself what is the new, it is no good carrying the burden of the old, especially knowledge—the knowledge of another, however great ... Thus knowledge and learning are impediments for those who would seek.[2]

Krishnamurti illustrates the deleterious effect of knowledge by pointing to the thought and behaviour of so-called religious people. They have read religious literature, have learnt about the lives and experiences of the saints, have attended the discourses given by Mahatmas, and they try to fashion their lives accordingly. They try to imagine or try to feel what the experience of another is; they try to think what God is; they ruminate what they have read and rehearse what they have heard; they memorize verses or passages from sacred texts and go through some religious routine or other, quarrel about salvation or perdition, and their talks and discussions are echoes from their past. Some have visions and experiences, but these also are projections from accumulated knowledge. A Hindu has visions of Rāma or Kṛṣṇa, while a Christian gets glimpses of Jesus Christ. Some in their sincerity turn fanatical, and that gives rise to religious frenzy and communal strife.

Are political people in any better plight than religious people in this respect? Is it not the same old story, *mutatis mutandis*? There is reading of books, propaganda, indoctrination, induction into parties, party discipline and all the rest of the process. One difference may be that acquisitiveness and the lust for power is less submerged and more in the open in this field.

One can give illustrations of the phenomenon from other spheres—business world, social relations, family circles, personal life and so on. But in all areas knowledge, instead of liberating men from fixed ideas, has itself become a prison house, making people prisoners. Instead of getting out of the suffocating enclosure, they build still narrower boundaries within the prison; and are, on account of their knowledge and belief, riddled with dissensions within themselves and in their relation with others. Can we, then, say that knowledge has no role at all in the misery of man?

Why does man cling to knowledge? Is it like the clinging of the child to its mother? A mother gives protection to her child. Does knowledge give protection to man? Surely, it does strengthen and fortify man where technique is concerned—in cooking, building bridges, etc. driving automobiles, running machineries, fighting disease, etc. In prehistoric times it gave man crucial

advantage in the struggle for survival, and in the last few centuries it has increased the physical amenities of man hundredfold. There is no denial of the utility of knowledge in these matters. But every man is not a technician or specialist; nor is a specialist always at his special job. Every man, whether he is an expert in some field or not, has his joys and sorrows, hopes and fears, loves and hates, loneliness and friendship, etc. Why do men in general, outside their professional fields, crave for and depend so much on knowledge?

Knowledge meets the need for safety and security. It warms us, holds out promises, gives encouragement. It provides an easy escape from fear, frustration, and loneliness. I am afraid of death; therefore, the knowledge that the soul is deathless and eternal is soothing. I am torn by conflicts and suffer various deprivations; I find solace in a religious course or political ideology that pledges happiness in the end. I am haunted by a sense of depressing isolation, and I find relief by surrendering to a *guru* or by belonging to a group or by identification with a cause. My life is repetitive, mechanical, boring; and I counteract this by accepting an ideal—*mokṣa, nirvāna* or god—and pursue it. In all this there is subscription to one body of knowledge or another. Knowledge gives psychological security, however uncertain that may be.

If knowledge holds us in captivity, there is no freedom in knowledge or freedom of knowledge or knowledge of freedom. There can only be freedom *from* knowledge. What is this freedom? How is it achieved? Krishnamurti would disallow the question 'how'; for to prescribe a method of emancipation would again be an imposition of knowledge and getting ensnared in its trap instead of seeing through it. There is no path leading to freedom. Or, everyone has to find his own way. To be free, there need be no description of freedom. What is necessary is the understanding of bondage. Mental disorders are said to be capable of being cured by bringing their root cause to clear consciousness. Are we really convinced that knowledge is bondage? To *understand*—not know or believe or have an idea of—the way of knowledge is to go out of the clutches of it. 'There can be freedom from the known', says Krishnamurti, 'only when the process of gathering, the motive of accumulation, is understood.'[3]

The expository part of this essay may be concluded with a quotation from Krishnamurti where he lays the problem bare with vivid concrete illustrations. Does any solution suggest itself in such graphic presentation of the problem?

> My son is dead. That is a fact. To become cynical, bitter, to say 'I loved him and he is gone'—all that is verbalisation...Fact is one thing and the description is another. We are caught in description, in explanation but not with fact. Way does that take place first of all?...You hit me. I have pain. Then I remember it. The remembrance is the word... What happens is: I translate the fact into words 'You hit me...' . The 'I' says, 'A has hit me, how could he, what have I done.' All these are waves of words...Why has the fact become a word? (It gives continuity to the man who receives the pain)...You hit me. There is pain. That is all. Why do I not end it?... Because it (the brain) wants to hit back. If it did not do that, it could say, 'Yes, A has hit me'—full stop.[4]

It remains to say a few words in reflection on Krishnamurti's account of knowledge. I do not feel inclined to compare his view with those of others; like saying, for example, that what he means by 'knowledge' is different from what is meant by the word in the expression 'knowledge of Brahman', or that this expression has affinity in sense with Krishnamurti's 'freedom from the known'. He has every right to formulate his concept of knowledge. One can see that it is not sheer speculation but captures what actually happens in life. Knowledge arises from experience, is stored in memory, conditions our thinking, gives continuity to our being and distorts our vision. Knowledge is necessary in technological and practical matters; but, according to Krishnamurti, it has grievous limitations. Being basically a miscellaneous stockpile inspite of interconnections, it blocks insight and discovery, dissects our being, and spoils our relationship with others.

Does saying such things amount to propounding a theory about knowledge? Is this again a body of knowledge, though at another level, equally vulnerable, at par with other competing theories? Krishnamurti would possibly say: no; I am not concocting a theory; I have only drawn your attention to certain pervasive facts; either you see them or you don't; in either case that is the end of it.

But the point is that it is not just seeing one thing but so many things, and that is how doctrines emerge. And it is doubtful if one can learn all by oneself. Books (including Krishnamurti's books) teachers (whether they are called *gurus* or not), discussions, life-problems involving other people and things are relevant. Anyone of such things may not be essential, but all together cannot be dispensed with. So, dependence on external help even in self-enquiry cannot be ruled out.

It has also to be found out whether knowledge really deserves the boycott that is recommended. After all, memory cannot be obliterated at will; and knowledge is memory, and memory grows with experience. My recording is not always done at my discretion. Retentiveness varies from individual to individual. Why should it be had if memory is good? Our ultimate need, no doubt, is freedom. But must it be freedom from the known? May not freedom well coexist with all that is known, giving unlimited scope to the growth of knowledge? It is not knowledge that binds; just as it is not necessarily the case that the ignorant is simple and non-arrogant. Let me put this deliberately in an over-simplified argument form: ignorance is the opposite of knowledge: If knowledge is bondage, then ignorance is freedom. But ignorance is not freedom. Therefore, knowledge is not bondage. If this argument is faulty, where does the fault lie? That would need further discussion.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *Commentaries on Living*, pp. 26-27.
2. 'On Knowledge' in the *The First and Last Freedom*, sec. 4, pp. 154-56.
3. *Commentaries on Living*, p. 26.
4. 'Tradition and Knowledge' in *Tradition and Revolution*, Dialogue 13, pp. 61-63.

Advaita and religious language

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INTRODUCTION

The Problem

In both Western and Indian philosophy, the status of religious language has been criticized in various ways. Distinctions can be discerned and described along lines of description, meaning, interpretation, apprehension, expression, convention, and contrasting perspectives. The sum result of this scholarship is that the very possibility of a philosophical understanding of religious language has been called into question. The purpose of this paper is to show that, because of its radically unique epistemological and metaphysical standpoints, Advaita Vedānta's use and understanding of religious language is not subject to these common criticisms.

Traditionally, religious language has been involved in a 'search for certainty'. In recent times, philosophers have turned their attention to the *use* of religious language, but the foundations of faith demand more than this. As we stated above, certain general conditions must be satisfied in order to render religious language meaningful. The general idea is that, unless some aspect or aspects of religious language are indubitable, the entire body of religious language will be suspect.

One instance of this 'search for certainty' was the philosophy of Descartes. Advaita, too, was concerned with a 'search for certainty' and turned Descartes' *cogito* around. Since Advaita was historically prior to Descartes, surely this is one of history's ironic twists of coincidence. Instead of 'I think, therefore I am', the position in Advaita is, 'I am, therefore I think'. Descartes made the existence of oneself as a thinking being the necessary and indubitable truth from which the rest of his argument proceeded. This presupposition of the *cogito*, however, does not mean that the proposition 'I exist' is in any way a necessary truth. In fact, it makes 'existence' contingent upon 'thinking'.

It is true that an individual cannot, without absurdity, doubt his own existence. And it is necessary to exist in order to form any and every thought, since existence is a precondition for thought. Yet, Descartes' enterprise was an attempt to show that it is a necessary truth that an individual exists as a thinking being.

Descartes wanted to show the indubitability of the proposition 'I think'. Then, given the fact that the proposition 'I exist' is necessarily true whenever one conceives of it, the whole complex of propositions involved in 'I think,

therefore I am' will be indubitable. However, his enterprise failed to accomplish what it set out to do.

Advaita, on the other hand, places its emphasis on the 'I'. Granting the Advaitic definition of the 'I', certainty is gained. Logically, this 'I' cannot be denied or doubted. It is affirmed by the very act of denial. It is the basis of all proving or doubting. It does not presuppose its own possibility but is the very basis of all else. In itself, it simply is, and anyone who questions it must assume it in order to do the questioning.

This goes a long way, because as a truth which is beyond the possibility of doubt it is also a link between itself and ordinary knowledge. Rationalism and empiricism doubted the possibility of such a link. This *Ātman*, however, is not based upon human reasoning. Nor is it necessarily dependent upon scriptural authority. It is the pure experience, the pure actuality. It is always immediately given, though one does not normally enquire into the content of that 'I'.

The word *ātman* refers to the very substantive being of anything whatsoever which is immediately evident. It is not known through any other sign or symbol. Rather, it is the very awareness to which everything else is an object. It is a literal reference to reality which is but a matter of direct experience.

Though the 'I', as the constitutive being of the individual is continually manifesting itself and is known as the content of 'I'-notion, for it to be consciously known a philosophical enquiry is needed. The fruit of this philosopical knowledge is immediate realization, and does not wait for an eschatological verification.

According to Advaita, there is a state wherein problems are no longer settled in any particular way. Advaitins contend that in the lap of wisdom no solution is ever conclusive. This does not reflect 'an uncertainty principle' nor a Mādhyamika dialectic (*catuṣkoṭi*). It means that one must go beyond certainty and uncertainty. Any resolution of a problem is arrived at by the mind, and must, therefore, be of a particular point of view. Mental solutions are presupposition and perspective-bound. What Advaita is pointing towards is that place where all problems have but one 'solution', a place wherein there is no longer any room for contradiction. When the question of a solution or non-solution ceases to arise, whether one says yes or no, then everything is That.

It is by listening to religious language that this wisdom unfolds. What is, Is. That doubts arise is natural. Yet the wonder is, where That is, there is not even room for different presuppositions or points of view to arise. Problems are discussed for the purpose of dissolving doubts. Therefore, there is a usefulness to discussion.

Thoughts, words, language belong to the mind. But in that state where That is, language has no place. All points of view depend on their particular perspective, be they simple or subtle, high or low, trite or profound. Yet, beyond words and all language, nothing holds good. Whether one says, 'there is' or 'there is not'—these are merely words.

Advaita's Solution

Introduction

Our search has not been concerned with merely an intellectual solution. This study is not so much an attempt to compare the various proposed solutions to the problem of religious language as it is to ferret out if there is something within religious language itself which is *sui generis*, legitimate and valid, as well as experiential. Religious language purports to disclose a real experience as well as to express a theoretical truth capable of sustaining a logical, coherent analysis. It is an attempt to say something and to say it about something. The basic question concerning religious language is with its precise meaning. The dilemma of religious language arises as to how this concept is to be intelligibly conveyed. To put it succinctly: *what* is being conveyed and *how*? Supposedly, the objective of religious language is to reveal something meaningful. And yet, supposedly, the subject-matter of most key passages in religious language are generally declared to be ineffable and trans-empirical. How can the relational convey the non-relational? How can the empirical convey the trans-empirical? Generally, one is tempted to think of the absolute or god as an invisible something which is beyond the reach of the senses. And if this is the case, how can one be sure that individuals are not deceiving themselves and being led astray by their own language-use? Sense experience is the time-honoured means of verifying with certainty, and if this avenue is closed due to the particular nature of the objects in question, perhaps religious language is but another example of the Emperor's New Clothes.

Another way of asking about religious language is to question not what sort of language it is, but if any religious language is possible at all. The former presupposes some sort of intelligibility, while the latter questions its very possibility. The emphasis has, thus, shifted from asking penultimate questions to the ultimate question. What is the basis for religious language as a whole? Are its roots tied to a metaphysical system, a revelation, a linguistic convention, an empirical experience? What is it within one's experience which has invited these expressions and which purports to convey or communicate something? The question of religious language is thus: is there something within experience which renders religious language necessary and in relation to which it makes sense?

Historically, the problem of religious language, of answering what is being conveyed and how, has been approached from various angles. The factual, cognitive approach was juxtaposed with the functional, non-cognitive approach in order to facilitate a historical survey. Cognitive discourse revolved around the concept of verification and validity, while an analysis of meaning concerned itself with analytic talk about talk. Traditionally, in the pre-analytic period, religious language was understood to be not only cognitive but also true. In more recent times, analysis have been more concerned with the func-

tion that religious language plays. The various questioners enquired into the factuality, validity, intelligibility, meaning, and use of this system of communication. And from this enquiry two basic alternatives came to be distinguished. Either one could hold that religious language statements are not factually informative, or one could maintain that such statements are factually informative but that an empirically established meaning and process of verification need not necessarily apply to them. The former, the non-cognitive approach, attempts to sidestep the problem of verification, while the latter, the cognitive approach, meets the problem with its own criterion of verification and definitions of meaning. Placing these two paradigmatic Western types of solutions in juxtaposition with the solution proposed by Advaita Vedānta reveals certain basic characteristics and their necessary consequences.

Two Approaches to Religious Language

There seems to emerge two paradigmatic approaches to the problem of religious language. Either religious language refers to an 'other' and the approach to this remote and foreign 'other' is through perception, reasoning, and/or authority; or religious language refers to the very constitutive being of anything whatsoever and as such is self-evident and absolutely certain. The former approach is both conceptual and mediate. It takes its ground in logic and/or revelation, wherein the subject and the object are separate and its statements are at best probabilities. A gap, whether large or small, is postulated between the absolute and the individual. This separation leads to a dualism which is characteristic of all theistic philosophies. In contrast, the latter approach emphasizes both identity[1] and certainty. This approach may be termed experiential and immediate. It is a 'radical empiricism'. It refers to the being of all beings which is immediately evident and immanently present therein. As the subject and the object are identical, absolute certainty is self-established.

It there something within experience which religious language refers to and in relation to which it makes philosophical and experiential sense? As long as religious language is seen as referring to an 'other', difficulties are going to arise in answering this question. Neither speculative thought nor dogma *necessarily* and indubitably are able to cross the gap of duality. It is only in the radical non-duality of the experiencer with the experienced that such statements have a consistent and coherent meaning.

Consequences of the Two Approaches

One of the consequences of placing god or the absolute apart is that knowledge thereof must be hypothetical and conjectural. This knowledge is based on an interaction between the observer and the observed. Yet, an insurmountable problem arises in that the objectification of the 'other' demands neutralization of the subject if this knowledge is to reach certainty as to the true nature

of the phenomena. Absolute objectivity demands that the observer's subjectivity be excluded. Yet, such an absolute integrity of an observed phenomena cannot be preserved within the domain of logical thought which necessarily demands the observer separate from the observed. Philosophy has recognized this fact for a long time, while modern science is just coming to accept it now. 'The observed system is required to be isolated in order to be defined, yet interacting in order to be observed.'[2] This estrangement makes the absolute no better than a postulated entity. And if there is no experiential verification forthcoming, then there is little justification for such a metaphysical postulation. On this basis, it would seem that the modern Positivists have a legitimate reason for criticizing speculative metaphysics.

A possible rejoinder to this objection centres on the assumption that metaphysical entities require physical verification. There does not exist any *necessary* reason why this must be so. It is quite within the sphere of possibilities for a realm of metaphysical entities to exist, complete with its own language, logic, and reason to be. Still, if one is looking for the bedrock of certainty, it would behove one to attempt to satisfy all the challenges that one encounters in a manner acceptable to the challenger. Postulation will never achieve the certainty that personal experience does. And a rejoinder by mere fiat leaves the issue still in doubt.

The Advaitin as well is looking for more than a mere theoretical construct. All of one's epistemological conjectures need to be anchored somewhere. One of the consequential problems that the Western philosophers as well as their Indian counterparts have had to face is how to explain or justify knowledge of the 'other'. While Kant had thought that it was a scandal to philosophy that there was lacking a cogent proof for the reality of the world outside oneself, Heidegger thought the true scandal was not that such a proof was lacking but that it was even looked for. Pushing further, the Advaitin avers that it is a scandal to even look for a proof for the existence of the absolute, because objectification creates an insurmountable problem in attempting to preserve a knowledge of the reality of the empirical world independent of the observer. Sense perception has been found to be unreliable when it comes to understanding the phenomenal world *as-it-is* independent of the knower thereof. For the Advaitin, however, epistemology and metaphysics coalesce in that the absolute is itself conceived to be of the nature of knowledge. Thus: to know is to be. Since the absolute of the Advaitin is involved in each and every experience as the experiencer's as well as the experience's ground and substantive being, it is not open to the charge of being but a hypothetical postulate. The absolute is a fact of direct experience. As long as there exists a distinction between the knower and the known, the object can never be completely known. Therefore, absolute knowledge of an ultimate object can never be achieved intellectually. It is only when the knower and the known are identical that certainty can be established. Thus, to the Advaitin, religious language is not mere opinion, nor theory, still less an expression of feeling. Instead of

being neither true nor false, as the Logical Empiricists might say, religious language is composed of statements which communicate that fundamental fact which makes all understanding and knowledge possible. Therefore, religious language is both cognitive and true.

A second consequence of placing the absolute apart as an 'other' is that experience is down-played and reason becomes extolled. Thought was found easier to manipulate than a god in his far-away heaven. In the West, Greek philosophy was primarily based on deductions from some fundamental axiom or principle and not obtained inductively from experience. And from the time of Aristotle, who placed an emphasis on logical thinking, right through the legacy of the Cartesian doubting-demon which implied that all sense experiences may be dulusory, down to the present Positivistic period, a mechanistic world-view was seen in which reason came to find a predominant place. The mind was extolled, and the world was fragmented. The presupposition was that whatever could be said, could be said clearly and succinctly.

Thus, though religious language in the dualistic systems seems to have originally been a report of divine manifestations of an 'other' such as Moses,[3] Elijah,[4] Mohammed,[5] etc. had, these experiences came to be doubted, reinterpreted, or otherwise explained. The initial experience was reduced to a supreme concept or an absolute object, and thus ceased to be a living reality and ended up as either an anthropomorphic caricature or a mere abstract idea. The experiential meaning dissipated, and thus such statement's significance began to change. Logical thought began to predominate, and thus it is understandable when Descartes reasoned that certainty or self-evident truths can only be reached by logical inferences from self-evident premisses. Yet, the great defect of this line of reasoning lies in the fact that only analytic or tautological truths are certain. God as an 'other' cannot fulfil this linguistic criterion.

Likewise, in Indian thought, with the passing of the Upaniṣadic age of intuition in which the search for truth was interiorized, came the philosophic schools and their growing reliance on reason. Dialectical reasoning and proofs came to be valued more than experience.

Yet, rational knowledge is problematical. It is a product of the intellect's ability to discriminate, divide, distinguish, and conceptualize. It lives by quantifying, classifying, and analysing. And since reason gives only mediate knowledge, it lacks certainty with regards to objects. Its very nature gives it a limited range of applicability. Reason gives but mediate knowledge, and mediate knowledge is dependent for its validation upon the validity of some other knowledge which is its ground. Thus, to search for certainty with reason will only lead to a *regressus ad infinitum*.

The Indian theory of inference recognizes a perceptual basis, i.e. smoke and fire at some time or other must have been perceived as co-present. As well, the Advaitin classifies perception as immediate knowledge by courtesy only. Perception depends upon sense activity which in turn, depends upon

consciousness, and thus it is not independent. There are so many examples of perceived illusions which occur in perception that absolute certainty in regard to the object perceived is never possible. If perception has been known to betray one upon one occasion, there is no certainty that one is not being betrayed again. Probability is not certainty. Therefore, the Advaitin claims that the immediacy of perception is not true immediacy, and that reasoning which relies upon perception cannot give rise to certitude.

At least two problems follow from the consequences that experience is down-played. First, experience is generally equated with sense experience. Yet, the most immediate and certain perception of all, perception of the self, is not mediated by the senses. In actuality, sense experience is not as all-encompassing as is sometimes averred. The general opinion is that god or the absolute does not 'appear' as a direct object of experience but manifests itself through a symbol or object which alone is directly given. Yet, Advaita claims that experience *qua* experience is all-encompassing, and it is precisely the absolute that is a direct object of experience at all times, even though this fact may not be consciously realized. 'The world is an unbroken series of perceptions of *Brahman* and hence nothing else but *Brahman*'.[6] Thus, there is at least one entity which religious language refers to which is suprasensible, though immanently perceptible. And it is obviously fallacious to assert that only what is experienced through the senses can be known to exist. In a dense forest there will be numerous trees which one has neither seen nor touched, and yet whose existence one may be quite certain of. If experience is equated with sense experience, then the question may be asked not only of the appropriateness of concept to content (word to object) but also as to the possibility of mistaken identity. In other words, the possibility of a mistaken personal interpretation can never be totally avoided in regard to the perception of an 'other'. And this leads one to an even greater problem in that there would be no certain method by which to discover that one is thus mistaken.

The Advaitin places utmost emphasis on experience. Personal experience is the foundation of Advaita Vedānta. *Anubhava*, intuitive experience, is the culmination of knowledge.[7] Nothing can be more direct or intimate than experience of one's own self. Its certainty is absolute and can never be doubted without a logical contradiction—thus the Cartesian dictum *cogito ergo sum* has become *sum ergo cogito* (I am, therefore I think). One knows the self as certain, because one is the self. Sense experience, on the other hand, is direct only in the sense that the form of the object experienced is non-different from the experiencing intelligence.[8] As objects come and go, their experience may be sublated by subsequent experiences. But that which cannot but remain unsublated is knowledge of one's own self. Each and every act of perception reveals the self (even if such a revelation is noticed or not).

Another consequence of placing the absolute apart as an 'other' is that one need then go in search of a proof for the existence of this estranged entity. The theistic religions posited a remoteness between god, the world, and indi-

viduals therein. God is thus an 'other'. God is conceived to be a being, a category within the causal scheme which is sought to be known objectively. All the theistic religions have made of god the prime mover, the first cause, one principle among principles, one being among beings. Then, after setting up the ultimate reality as an 'other', remote and strange, the theistic systems attempted to prove the existence of such an entity. The history of the 'proofs for the existence of God' are ample testimony to the futility of such an endeavour. Conceptual arguments from pure reason will never usher in certainty regarding the actual physical existence of anything. As Kant demonstrated, nothing can be ushered into existence by virtue of formal reasoning alone.

For instance, Anselm's ontological argument presupposes that god is apart, and thus stands in need of proof.[9] What is not realized is that this very doubt and the subsequent proof itself are dependent upon the absolute. Without the absolute, no doubt and no proof is possible at all. The reality is a fact of immediate experience on its own authority. Thus, Anselm's argument itself must presuppose a reality whose proof the argument is searching for. The argument contends for the necessity of god's existence whose denial will be self-contradictory. Yet, necessity does not belong to things, but only to propositions. Necessity cannot create actuality.

Nor will it help to reformulate the argument, as Descartes did, by asserting that god must exist, placing an emphasis on existence. Existence is not a predicate which adds to the glories of god. As Kant was to say: 'A hundred real thalers do not contain the least more coin than a hundred possible thalers.[10]

Thus, once a gap has been postulated between god and individuals and argumentative reasoning has been found to lack unconditional certainty, the only alternative left is to introduce a non-rational authority. Then, religious language is turned into a body of true propositions given to humanity by a supreme authority, simply because it is declared so by fiat. Once a split between finite individuals and an infinite god has been accepted, nothing but an act of grace from this unique being of unsurpassable grandeur can close the contingent chasm. Yet, dogma is nothing but an attempt to base something upon an invisible foundation.

It has been seen that the approach of Advaita Vedānta in regard to religious language has not been to disavow experience but to show how it enables one to convey that the individual and the absolute are one. Compare Tillich:

> If the word 'existential' points to a participation which transcends both subjectivity and objectivity, then man's relation to the gods is rightly called existential. Man cannot speak of the gods in detatchment. The moment he tries to do so, he has lost the god and has established just one more object within the world of objects. Man can speak of the gods only on the basis of his relation to them.[11]

Any proof implies that one has more confidence in the process of reason (which the proof employs) than in what it must presuppose. The absolute cannot even be questioned, if it did not exist. It is the presupposition, both logically and ontologically, which cannot be denied. Advaita uses ordinary day-to-day language to convey factual information of the highest import. 'Religious language does not speak about an unknown thing without having recourse to conventional words and their meanings.'[12] And the purport of these words reveals that the absolute is immediately present. As such it is fundamental and prior to proofs which must presuppose it. It can never be denied nor even doubted, for the very act of doubting it is but an affirmation of it. This is not a process of reasoning, nor a declaration imposed by an external authority. It is the basis upon which all reasoning and all authorities, all proofs and all doubts, stand. It is the pure experience of which reference to, and awareness of, is always immediate. All else presupposes this absolute, but it does not presuppose its own possibility. It is pure and simple.

Another consequence of placing the absolute apart as an 'other' is that one's goal is 'to know about' and 'to relate to' this ultimate object. Quantitative thinking comes to predominate over qualitative thinking. Space becomes dissected and time is unrolled. The spiritual journey becomes an actual movement from here to there. Yet, where does the objectified absolute dwell? That being whose centre is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere has no place to live in an objective environment. The problem remains as to how one is to bridge the gap. How is one to know about, and to relate to, an absolute 'other'? The closest (objectified) thought could get to itself would be 'thought thinking itself'. Yet, this is a patent absurdity, for the subject can never become the object and still remain the subject.

On the other hand, Advaita posits the ultimate goal as identical with, and being, the absolute. The goal is not a new acquisition but merely the realization of what eternity is. As such, it is not dependent upon human activity. That which is caused by an action is bound to perish. As the absolute is ever existent (by definition), one is what one always has been.

Thus, between the absolute and human beings there is neither separation nor distance.[13] There is no 'other' and thus there is no gap to be bridged. The purport of religious language is to reveal this entitative oneness. It is a fact which can be immediately experienced by everyone. It requires no indirect reasoning nor transcendental deductions. It is declared to be an accomplished fact (*siddha vastu*), and anyone who questions it must assume it in order to do the questioning.

The Advaitin is not interested in attempting to prove the existence of the absolute. The entire thrust of the Advaitin's solution to the problem of religious language seeks to go beyond proofs. According to Śaṅkara, anything that can be proven by perception, inference, or verbal testimony is limited and, therefore, unworthy of being declared the absolute. The Advaitin's position is that the absolute is a self-established, self-evident fact.

'How can that by which all the *pramāṇas* are established be itself established by the *pramāṇas*?'[14] As the absolute and the individual are declared to be identical, it is not something outside waiting to be discovered but the very constitutive being of each and every individual here and now.

It should be noted here that there is a fundamental distinction propounded by Advaita Vedānta. If this is not correctly understood, inappropriate criticisms may arise. Unlike Plato, who regarded temporal entities as existent images of their essential archetypes, or Bradley who regarded existence as an appearance of reality, or McTaggart who regarded existence as a species of the real, Advaita regards existence as the essential nature of the Reality. Yet, this existence (*sat*) of the Advaitin is not the existence which is meaningful only in an object. *Sat* or pure being is not one being among beings. Existence, as it is usually used in philosophical discourse, is a determinative description, a categorical expression. Śaṅkara is quick to point out that the reality is neither 'existent' nor 'non-existent' in the ordinary sense of those terms. The reality merely IS, and can never be designated exclusively as this or that. As it is merest being, no causal relationship can be applied to it. It was by attributing the reality as one being (even if the greatest) among beings that all theistic systems have found themselves in the inevitable and unenviable position of having to prove the existence of god.

A final consequence is that god as an 'other' must necessarily be transcendent, concrete, definite, the source of all things, the active creator. Its orientation is to difference, to an 'otherness'. It emphasizes the uniqueness of each being and the difference between them. On the other hand, the absolute is taken to be general, the presupposition of every being, the universal-substratum. Its orientation is to identity; to that which all things have in common.

The problem is an ancient one and basically involves the relationship between the impersonal absolute and the personal god. Sometimes it is held that the former represents the supreme object of human adoration and love. Western scholastic terminology calls this the relation between the *ens commune* and the *ens realissimum*. It has also been designated as the way of immanence and the way of transcendence. Both conceptions, however, must be acknowledged to be pointing to the same reality. According to the Advaitin, whether there are faults in either method, which a philosophical analysis may discover, they both undoubtedly point to the same 'something'. Assuredly, their descriptions and points of view differ. It is the purpose of the Advaitin to show how both perspectives can be understood and appreciated within a context of religious language whose content is declared to be the most immediate thing of all—the inner self—and thus is not only abstract but also intimately related to experience. As any experience is dependent upon the self (consciousness), so the immediacy of any perception is dependent upon the greater immediacy of the inner self.

Two Levels of Language

These two paradigmatic approaches to religious language can both be understood and appreciated within the perspective of Advaita Vedānta. Advaita makes a distinction between the absolute and the relative points of view as a consequence of its epistemological realism. Common sense realism holds that whatever is perceived or experienced is real. The question is whether the object is empirically (or apparently) real or is it absolutely real.

Language about the Absolute

When one posits the reality of an 'other', an entire legion of difficulties arises. The history of the proofs for the existence of god and the theory of causality are ample testimony to this, as we have seen earlier. The doctrine of causation, like all other relations falling in the realm of ignorance, is found to be unintelligible. The origin of the world, whether a creation of god or a process of natural evolution, involves difficulties in both cases. Knowledge of an 'other' must be hypothetical and conjectural, and since it is something to be attained, it is also liable to be lost. Paul Tillich went to the extent of saying that atheism is the inevitable result of placing god apart as a stranger. All this we have seen. But there is a further consequence to be explored.

Usually, it is held that an anthropomorphic god is comprehensible but inappropriate as an object of worship or religious belief. An anthropomorphic god usually denotes some sort of incredibly powerful physical being in the minds of its devotees. And a sort of 'cosmic man' has a referent, but such a referent is philosophically and religiously unacceptable. Yet, a non-anthropomorphic god seems to be utterly incomprehensible. Who or what does religious language refer to? Does it refer to anything at all? A non-anthropomorphic reality seems rift with obscure terms which no one understands nor can relate to. In order for one to understand what one is saying when they speak of god or the reality, this referent must have some empirical anchorage which one *can* relate to.

Yet, strange as it may seem, it is my contention that a non-anthropomorphic absolute is more consistent and logical, and can be empirically anchored easier than a theistic deity. This is not a disparagement of a theistic deity but merely a statement about consistency and coherence. It is true that the Judaic-Christian-Islamic god is a non-anthropomorphic infinite individual transcendent to the world. Yet, since this god is, in some way or other, conceived of as an 'other', the above difficulties still arise. A theistic deity is spoken of as possessing all perfections. They are praised on innumerable ways. Yet, no one has been able to prove or demonsrtrate in any plausible sense of these terms, the existence of this 'other'. Flows, inconsistencies, and contradictions mar the doctrines and traditions which have tried. Thus, god is *Deus Absconditus* and should be accepted humbly on faith.

The non-anthropomorphic absolute is charged with being dry and barren, perplexing and unintelligible. Yet, the Advaitin calls it the most empirical of the empirical entities. It is the most elementary, the further irreducible substratum. The causal relation does not apply to it nor is it the result of evolution. Being indeterminate and undetermined, yet it is. It is immediately given and directly experienced as one's own self. One's own self cannot be denied without self-contradiction. It is constitutive of everything and hence is a concrete immediacy. It is immediately felt and not transcendentally deduced; it is an accomplished fact. It must be presupposed for any proof regarding it.

Yet, it is precisely here that the strangeness of the Advatin's thesis appears. Difference and multiplicity are plainly perceived. The testimony of one's sense-organs as well as every type of inferential reasoning declares that distinctions exist. It would appear that the Advaitin is going counter to facts when he seeks to eradicate this perceived diversity and established non-duality.

Suppose, one were to grant for the sake of argument that plurality exists at the empirical level, and that perception and inferential reasoning vouch for the reality of difference. Yet, perception and inferential reasoning are concerned with things empirical—as they understand the term empirical. They have nothing to do with the trans-empirical or the 'radically empirical'. Isn't it a baseless presupposition to presume that religious assertions about the trans-empirical need to be compatible with empirical observances? As Gareth Matthews said:

> This might be a reasonable demand if we had already established that, e.g. geometrical assertions have clear non-geometrical consequences, that physical assertions have clear non-physical consequences, that ethical assertions have clear non-ethical consequences, etc. But in the absence of any such established conclusions, (such a claim) appears to be discriminatory against theology.[15]

The Advaitin posits that there is no conflict between perception and religious language (*śruti*), because they are each valid in their own spheres.

This answer operates from the level of the empirical world. If the Advaitin is challenged that this answer does not establish or prove that non-duality is the reality but merely avoids the challenge, then the Advaitin advances a 'critique of difference'.

The seeds of this critique can be found in Gauḍapāda's doctrine of non-origination (*ajātivāda*).[16] Śaṅkara then took up the thread and elaborated it with numerous arguments relating to change and casuality.[17] But it was with Maṇḍana Miśra that the 'critique of difference' was developed into a full and independent refutation of the reality of difference.[18]

Merely because difference is perceived by the sense does not prove that difference is real. Everyone perceives the sun to be small, but inference contradicts this perception; and in this case one's perception is erroneous. To

ascertain the reality takes an acute analysis and the notion of difference fails to withstand such an analysis. Advaita admits the world-appearance as it appears, but it denies that it is the reality. Since the world-appearance is contradicted at a later stage and ceases to exist, Advaita's dialectics of difference shows it to be an unsustainable notion.

Maṇḍana's argument, simply put, is that perception simply reveals an object. It does not, nor is it able to, distinguish one object from another.[19] And since difference presupposes distinction, if perception does not convey difference, the notion of difference being perceived is wrong. To support this claim Maṇḍana says that the idea of difference involves negation, and that this negation must be preceded by an affirmation. Yet, in perception there are not two functions, i.e. the revealing (affirmation) of an object and the differentiating of it from another object (negation).[20] Perception cannot reveal an object with which it is not in sense-contact. Perception simply reveals an object, and there its work ceases. If differentiation follows, it is not due to perception.

The entire Buddhist philosophy is based on distinctions. Difference is the very nature of everything, and the very manifestation of an object involves differentiation from others. Maṇḍana criticizes this view, and shows how it is logically untenable. The notion of difference involves a relation between at least two things which are different from each other. If this difference constitutes the nature of a thing and is non-different from it, then they will both be identical with their essence and thus identical with each other. Yet, this is absurd—that two different things are identical. Or again, since difference is mutual non-existence, if difference is the nature of an object, then its nature would be non-existent and the object too would be non-existent, which is a *reductio ad absurdum*.

The opponent may contend that difference is real, and does not constitute the nature of an object. But this means that difference is a relation between two entities that differ. Yet, this will land one in an *infinite regress*. Difference will require another difference to prove itself and that difference another and so on.

To argue that difference can be inferred from successful activity is to involve the fallacy of begging the question (*petitio principii*). The differences among two or more objects which is to be proven should not be assumed in the process of the proof. One cannot assume that one can infer from different activities that there is a difference in objects. Difference is difference, whether in objects or in activities; and thus, it, is incumbent upon an advocate of difference to prove difference without assuming it.

Likewise Maṇḍana criticizes arguments which seek to establish difference by invoking time, mutually opposed characteristics like happiness and misery, mutually opposed attributes like permanance and non-permanance, and order.[21] The assumption that difference is real is unwarranted and cannot be proven by perception. Nor can difference be known through non-cognition

(*anupalabdhi*) as the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas say.[22] Neither can it be perceived as the Naiyāyikas posit.[23]

According to Advaita Vedānta's theory of perception, objects are cognized in indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*) as mere existence (*sattā*). This existence constitutes the nature of the objects. Thus, in one sense, objects are cognized as non-different from one another. Since existence is common to all objects, it is impossible to negate one object from another. What constitutes the difference that is perceived is due to ignorance, while the existence which runs through all objects renders them non-different from one another.

The nature of an object is known when its cognition comes through a valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and when this nature is in accord with reason.[25] Difference cannot fulfil these two conditions. Difference is perceived no doubt, but this cognition does not come from perception. Maṇḍana compares the cognition of difference to a cognition of a fire-brand-circle (*alātacakra*). Though there is no circle of fire, it appears to be so. Nor does one say that the circle of fire is real just because it is cognized. Thus, though difference is perceived, the difference among objects is illusory.

One need not become complicated and elaborate in regard to this problem. Any object which is cognized is cognized as a 'this'. The specific character of an object may not be constant, but the 'thisness' of an object is unalterably present. Differences are inconstant and may cause confusion; but the identity or sameness of objects is cognized in 'existence' (*sattā*) and 'thisness' alike at all times, and thus is simple and direct and immediately valid.

Thus, by grounding the incomprehensible, unqualified absolute within each one's own personal experience, it is more than a mere assertion or theoretical concept and is established as an indubitable fact of experience. Any abstraction is an escape from this fact. Though it is customary to regard the impersonal absolute as an abstraction and a theistic deity as something concrete, an analysis tends to reveal that just the reverse is the case. Any 'other' is removed and thus uncertain and partakes of degrees of murkiness, while identity is an experiential fact which cannot be doubted.

A little analysis may make this point even clearer. The Advaitin speaks of two aspects of the absolute. One can identify an 'existent-aspect' (*sattā-rūpa*) and an 'absolute-aspect' (*Brahman-rūpa*). Due to its general nature, existence is apprehended in every cognition. But the absolute aspect is specific and thus not apprehended quite like existence is. Two examples will render this idea clearer. We have already seen that the theory of transformation (*pariṇāmavāda*) explains the cause-effect relation between clay and a pot. But the cause-effect relation between the absolute and the world has to be explained in terms of appearance (*vivartavāda*). In the former case, the clay pot is apprehended. But in the theory of appearance, *Brahman*, as the cause, is not apprehended. Secondly, when one perceives a rope-snake, the general nature of 'thisness' is always perceived while the specific nature is not. Perception will express itself in the statement; 'This is a rope.' The 'this' refers to the rope. The 'this' is

general while the rope is specific. Even when one erroneously perceives a snake (instead of a rope), it is perceived as a 'this' and the specific aspect of snakeness is later sublated upon a correct apprehension of the object. The 'thisness' is never sublated however. In a similar manner, in every cognition, the 'existent-aspect' as 'thisness' is invariably apprehended while the 'Absolute-aspect' is not.

Thus, one may conclude that difference is untenable. One's day-to-day life relies on the idea of difference to function, but that does not establish the reality of difference. Difference is said to be experienced (*prasiddha*) but not to be validly established (*pramāṇa-siddha*). Day-to-day life is possible only by assuming difference, but likewise the idea of difference is possible only by assuming day-to-day life. The problem of mutual dependence arises. Instead of throwing up one's hands in despair, religious language offers one a solution of non-difference in which absolute peace is found.

> The infinite is bliss... he who sees nothing else, hears nothing else, and knows nothing else, attains everything in every way. And on what is the infinite established? On its own greatness or not even on greatness.[25]

Notes

1. *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya* (2.2.28).
2. H.P. Strapp, 'S-Matrix Interpretation of Quantum Theory' in *Physical Review*, vol. 3, 15 March 1971, pp. 1303-20.
3. See *Exodus* (24.9-11) and *Exodus* (19.19).
4. See *I Kings* (18.39).
5. See D.S. Margoliouth, *Mohammed*, London, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1923, p. 269.
6. *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* (521). *Brahmapratyaya śantatirjagadato brahmaiva tatsarvataḥ.*
7. *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya* (2.1.4).
8. *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* (1) p. 25.
9. *St. Anselm's Proslogian*, ch. 3, M.J. Charlesworth (trans.), Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1965.
10. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Norman Kemp Smith (trans.), London, Macmillan and New York, St. Martian's Press, 1958, p. 505.
11. Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, vol. 1, p. 238.
12. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Bhāṣya* (2.1.20).
13. Compare Meister Eckhart, "There is between God and the soul neither strangeness nor remoteness; therefore the soul is not only equal with God but it is the same that He is."
14. *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* (2.37).
15. Gareth B. Matthews, 'Theology and Natural Theology' in *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol. lxi, no. 3, 30 January 1964, 103.
16. See Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā* on the *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad.*
17. See especially *Brahma-Sūtra Bhāṣya* (2.1.15-20).
18. *Brahmasiddhi.* Padmapāda, Sureśvara, and other post-Śaṅkara Advaitins helped develop and contribute to this theme.
19. *Brahmasiddhi*, pt 1. *Āhurvidhātṛ pratyakṣaṁ na niseddhṛ ripaścitaḥ.*

20. *Ibid.*, pt 1, verse 3.
21. *Ibid.*, pt 1.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*
25. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (7.23.1).

On Kaplan's logic of demonstratives

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David Kaplan in his article 'On the Logic of Demonstratives'[1] draws a distinction between 'two varieties of sense: content and character'[2] with a view to rectifying the classical view which he thinks to be 'conceptually misguided'.[3] Content stands for what 'Carnap called an "intension" ',[4] and character is 'best identifiable with what might naturally be called "meaning" '—'characters can be represented by functions from contexts to contents'.[5] What I intend to show in this paper is that the concept of character, the way it has been formulated, is in need of reformulation. But what is more important to realize is that it does not serve the purpose it is supposed to serve. The required explanation can be given without having recourse to the concept of character.

We have noted that the concept of character is an explication of the concept of *meaning*. Proper names, we know, have no meaning in the sense that they are not part of a dictionary entry where synonyms are provided. Dictionaries do not have entries for 'Jack' or 'Jill'. Even if an expression might have a meaning, this consideration is irrelevant in the mode of its use as a proper name. This peculiar feature of proper names is expected to be reflected in the formulation of the concept of character. The content of a proper name varies from occasion to occasion (context to context) of its use, for it is possible for different things to have the same name. However, since character is a function from contexts to contents, reflecting the way contents are determined, proper names are expected to have character, or meaning, contrary to what has already been said.

The occasion and motive for Kaplan for drawing a distinction between content and character is to explain the behavioural distinction between

(1) I am here now

and

(2) Kaplan is in L.A. on 21 April 1973 at 10 a.m.

Kalpan believes that the 'character (meaning) of (1) determines... .

(*c*) In all contexts, an utterance of (1) expresses a true proposition (i.e. a proposition which is true at the world of the context).[6] However, it remains to be seen *how* character determines (*c*).

The difference between (1) and (2) is that, although both are contingent, (1) is analytic and cannot be uttered falsely, while (2) is not. This difference in their behaviour is explained in respect of the difference of their characters. Now, (2) in at least one of its specific uses cannot but be true, for instance, when it is uttered by Kaplan himself in L.A. on 21 April 1973 at 10 a.m. It

is true a priori in the specific use, and may be said to be analytically true in respect of the use. The only difference between (1) and (2) is that (2) may be said to be a priori true only in some of its uses, viz. where Kaplans themselves use it at the specified place and time, whereas (1) is true a priori in all its uses. The difference must be accounted for. However, it cannot be accounted for with Kaplan's distinction between character and content; for character being identifiable with *meaning*, and since proper names are without meanings, invoking the concept of character we cannot explain why with some uses of 'Kaplan' at some specific place and time (2) is a priori true, whereas with most of the uses it is not.

Let us first come to the question why with some uses (2) is a priori true. There is a pragmatic background-setting for a specific use of a sentence of a language. The speaker using the sentence, the place and time of the use of the sentence—all these go into the making of the pragmatic parameters of the use of a sentence. A pragmatic background-setting of the specific use of (2) that we have been discussing is the following:

(a) Kaplan is the speaker in L.A. on 21 April 1973 at 10 a.m. Obviously, the content of (2) is entailed by (a), and, thus, (2) cannot but be true for this specific use of the sentence. If (a) is the background-setting for a specific use of (1), the corresponding content of it also is entailed by (a). It is possible to show that for any specific use of (1), its content is entailed by its corresponding backgraound-setting. That is why (1) is never false. The reason, however, is the same as to why (2) cannot fail to be true in some of its uses.

What I have said amounts to this: if the distinction between character and content is not needed in the case of (2), it is not needed in the case of (1) either. 'Character becomes an uninteresting complication in the theory'[7] even when demonstratives are taken into consideration. The following is an attempt to show the above in a formal way.

Let LD_1 be a language.

$a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n$ are individual constants.

$n_1, n_2, \ldots, n_n$ are names.

If $i, j, k, \ldots n$ are natural numbers $\geqslant 1$,

$P^1_1, \ldots Pi_j, \ldots, Pn_k$ are predicates.

$E_1, E_2, \ldots, E_n$ are expressions.

$a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_n$ are sentences.

Let $\langle U, H, S, T, W, \phi\rangle$ be a model structure.

W is the set of all possible worlds $(w_1, w_2, \ldots, w_n)$.

U is the set of all individuals.

H is the set of all human beings $(h_1, h_2, \ldots, h_n)$.

S is the set of all positions $(s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_n)$.

T is the set of all instants of time $(t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_n)$.

ϕ is a function.

$[E_n \langle h_n, s_n, t_n, w_n\rangle]$ stands for the expression E_n as used by the person h_n at the place s_n at time t_n in the world w_n.

$\lceil\phi(a_n, s_n, t_n, w_n)\rceil$ means the value of a_n in respect of the place s_n, the time t_n and the world w_n.

$\phi(n_n) \in U$.

Let us mention some of the expressions from the object language in quotation marks, assuming that LD_1 includes their names, in order to be conveniently able to show the intended results.

$\phi(\text{'I'}\langle h_n, s_n, t_n, w_n\rangle) = h_n$.

$\phi(\text{'here'}\ \langle h_n, s_n, t_n, w_n\rangle) = s_n$.

$\phi(\text{'now'}\ \langle h_n, s_n, t_n, w_n\rangle) = t_n$.

U^n is the nth Cartesian products of U with itself.

$\phi(Pn_n, s_n, t_n, w_r)$ is a subset of U^n.

$\phi(Pn_n(a_k, \ldots, a_n)\langle h_n, s_n, t_n, w_n\rangle, s_k, t_k, w_k) = Ti$ iff $\langle\phi(a_k\langle h_n, s_n, t_n, w_n\rangle, \ldots,$
$\phi\ (a_n\langle h_n, s_n, t_n, w_n\rangle)\rangle \in \phi(Pn_n, s_n, t_n, w_n)$.

$\phi(P^1_n\ (a_k, \ldots, a_n)\ \langle h_n, s_n, t_n, w_n\rangle, s_k, t_k, w_k) = \phi(P^1_n\phi(a_k\ \langle h_n, s_n, t_n, w_n\rangle, \ldots,$
$\phi(a_n\langle h_n, s_n, t_n, w_n\rangle, s_k, t_k, w_k)$.

The following are some of the important considerations or results, relevant to our main point, developed out of the sketchy foregoing formal treatment.

(a) $\phi(h_n$ exists at s_n at $t'_n\ \ \langle h_n, s_n, t_n, w_n\rangle, s_n, t_n, w_n) = T$,

because

(a') h_n exists at s_n at t_n

uttered in respect of the above contexts cannot fail to be true in respect of the same contexts. (a) holds, because (a') cannot be uttered falsely in the specific background-setting, in respect of the same background-setting. Thus, (a) holds a priori, and analytically, I believe, although (a') is not a necessary truth.

(b) ϕ ('Kaplan exists in L.A. at t'_1 $\langle$Kaplan, L.A., $t_1, w_1\rangle$, L.A. $t_1, w_1) = T$ holds a priori for the same reason. Thus, (2) cannot be uttered falsely under certain circumstances.

Let us come to (1).

(b') ϕ('I am here now' $\langle h_n, s_n, t_n, w_n\rangle, s_n, t_n, w_n) = T$,

for ϕ('I am here now' $\langle h_n, s_n, t_n, w_n\rangle, s_n, t_n, w_n)$

$= \phi(\lceil\phi(\text{'I'}\langle h_n, s_n, t_n, w_n\rangle)$ is at $\phi(\text{'here'}\ \langle h_n, s_n, t_n, w_n\rangle)$

at $\phi(\text{'now'}\ \langle h_n, s_n, t_n, w_n\rangle)\rceil,\ s_n, t_n, w_n\rangle)\rceil$

$= (c')\ \phi(\text{'}h_n \text{ is at } s_n \text{ at } t'_n\ \langle h_n, s_n, t_n, w_n\rangle, s_n, t_n, w_n) = \text{T}$.

The demonstration that (b') holds follows from (c') which holds a priori, and from semantic rules specifying the extension of 'I', 'now' and 'here' in contexts, and from semantic rules for determining the extension of a sentence in contexts. Thus, (b') holds a priori. Our explanation does not depend on a position taken on the issue of proper names being connotative or not; however, those who take proper names to be non-connotative may find Kaplan's explanation to be objectionable. Our explanation has the added advantage that it is less complicated in so far as it does not make a distinction between content and character. (According to Kaplan's own admission, 'character is an uninteresting complication in the theory' when demonstratives are not

taken into consideration.) It shows that the reason for (2) being true a priori in some of its uses and (1) in all of its uses is the same.

NOTES

1. Kaplan, David, 'On the Logic of Demonstratives' in *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 8, 1979, pp. 81-89.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 85.

Subject-object theories

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Inquiries into the nature of knowledge immediately encounter a distinction between knower and known, often interpreted in terms of subject and object or of the subjective and objective ingredients in experience. Explorations of the nature of subjects and objects have led to the formation of many theories, some of which involve further distinctions between an apparent (or phenomenal) self and a real (or noumenal) self as subject and between apparent (or phenomenal) things and real (or noumenal) things as objects.

The first purpose of the present paper is to provide a comprehensive survey of the kinds of theories which such inquiry generates as possiblities. A novel inquirer may then examine the possibilities and test each in terms of its characteristics to determine which seem needed for a most adequate theory of knowledge.

For this purpose two diagrams have been constructed intended to depict the possibilities:

(1) Regarding theories distinguishing subjective from non-subjective aspects, and also regarding theories distinguishing objective from non-objective aspects;
(2) Regarding theories involving relations between subjective and objective aspects.

Both diagrams are designed to depict distinctions between what is apparent or what is present in awareness-intuiting appearance and what is not apparent or what is inferred as being involved in knowing even though it is not in awareness-intuiting appearance, here stipulatively named as 'real'. (The terms 'apparent' and 'real' may be interpreted as having meanings similar to Immanuel Kant's terms 'phenomenal' and 'noumenal' without necessarily involving all of his views with which they are interrelated and which may thus have additional implications essential to interpreting his meanings. I choose the terms 'apparent' and 'real' as having meanings more familiar to beginners and thus available to those who have not become acquainted with the technical language of Immanuel Kant.) The dotted line in the centre of the diagrams is intended to depict distinctions between subjective and objective aspects present within awareness of appearance, and these are named 'apparent self' and 'apparent object(s)'. The unbroken lines between 'real self' and 'apparent self' and between 'apparent object' and 'real object' are aimed at depicting distinctions between them without implying that the distinctions involve separations

unless separations are explicitly indicated as in the second diagram. The two outside lines are designed merely to describe the limits of the aspects involved.

The first diagram is divided into two parts: the first part is limited to theories claiming to locate and to indicate the location of the subjective aspect of supposed subject-object constituents of knowing; and the second part is limited to theories claiming to locate the objective aspect of supposed subject-object constituents of knowing. Each part lists seven possible theories.

		Real Self	Apparent Self	Apparent Object	Real Object
A. Theories distinguishing subjective from non-subjective aspects	1.		*subjective*		
	2.	*subjective*			
	3.	*subjective*	*subjective*		
	4.	*subjective*	*subjective*	*subjective*	
	5.		*subjective*	*subjective*	
	6.			*subjective*	
	7.	*subjective*	*subjective*	*subjective*	*subjective*
B. Theories distinguishing objective from non-objective aspects	1.			*objective*	
	2.				*objective*
	3.			*objective*	*objective*
	4.		*objective*	*objective*	*objective*
	5.		*objective*	*objective*	
	6.		*objective*		
	7.	*objective*	*objective*	*objective*	*objective*

When a term is depicted as standing by itself, the depiction is intended to be interpreted as a theory claiming that the aspect described is all that is involved in constituting the subjective (in the first part) or objective (in the second part) ingredients in knowing. When a term is depicted as a theory claiming that one aspect involves one or more other aspects in constituting the subjective (in the first part) or objective (in the second part) ingredients in knowing, the terms are joined by a continuous underlining.

(1) The first theory, in the first part, claims that an apparent self or what appears as that which is aware of appearances is all that is needed or is all that exists as the subjective aspect of knowing (e.g. Theravada).

(2) The second theory claims that a real self or that which functions as the agent in knowing is all that is needed or exists as the subjective aspect of knowing. According to this theory, the real self is the knower in which the knowledge is embodied, and whether or not the real self becomes in any way apparent to itself is irrelevant to the actual existence of knowledge (and thus of knowing in the sense of embodying knowledge).

(3) The third theory claims that an apparent self involves a real self or something that is needed or exists as an agent of the act of awareness. This theory may be interpreted as a general theory divisible into sub-theories differing, for example, as to whether the two aspects are to be considered as identicial or as a times divisible (partly or completely) or as having differing priorities in importance as being or enduring or in power for acting.

(4) The fourth theory claims that an apparent object is also subjective in the sense that all appearance or all that is present in awareness of appearance is also subjective.

(5) The fifth theory claims that the only knowing of which we are aware is that which is present when awareness apprehends appearance; so both the subjective and objective aspects of knowledge must be present in such appearance. Although apparent self and apparent object are not identical in the sense that no difference exists between them, this theory claims that each involves the other as a condition of its own existence, since, whenever awareness apprehends appearance awareness involves both an awarer (self as subject) and what appears (as object); for without awareness there can be no appearance and without appearance awareness is aware of nothing. Since the only knowledge of which we are aware is that which appears or that which occurs within appearance, further claims about the need for, or existence of, a real self or real objects are regarded as superfluous and, indeed, as needlessly complicating.

(6) The sixth theory claims that knowledge is of objects and that, although all knowledge is subjective in the sense that all objects known are apparent objects, nothing more is needed to account for them. Whether or not there are real (noumenal, hence unknowable) things is regarded as irrelevant to understanding the nature of knowledge. Whether or not there is a real self or even an apparent self functioning as an agent of awareness or as an awarer is regarded as irrlevant to the nature of knowledge, because knowledge is regarded as consisting entirely in objects known, i.e. objects presently appearing.

(7) The seventh theory claims that an adequate understanding of the subjective aspects of the nature of knowledge involves includes both real and apparent self and apparent and real objects. It claims that real objects must be included because a real thing can be an object of knowledge only by becoming an object for a subject; that it is this becoming an object for a subject

that constitutes it as an object; and that such becoming involves the agency and activity of a subject in endowing it with the objectivity involved, in being an object for a subject. Although we can distinguish both the real and apparent aspects of self and the apparent and real aspects of objects, and although these may be regarded as having differential roles to play in constituting knowledge, all four are regarded as mutually dependent, and in some sense continuously integrated, ingredients in the subjective aspects of the subject-object nature of knowledge.

(1) The first theory, in the second part, claims that knowledge is of objects and that what appears in awareness as objects is all that is needed or all that exists as the objective aspect of knowing objects.

(2) The second theory claims that the real things which become objects of knowledge are the real objects of knowledge and that, unless real things are known as objects, knowledge does not exists. Genuine knowledge is knowledge of real things which become known when they are known as real objects (e.g. Logical Realism).

(3) The third theory claims that real things which become objects of knowledge must also appear as objects in order to be known. No knowledge exists without awareness of objects, and when real things become objects of knowledge they appear as objects and also as real. This theory may be interpreted as a general theory divisible into sub-theories differing, for example, regarding whether the two aspects ('apparent object' and 'real object') are regarded as identical as a times divisible (partly or completely) or as having differing priorities in importance as constituting knowledge.

(4) The fourth theory claims that when real objects are known they not only must appear (i.e. become apparently real objects) but also must involve something to which they appear. Knowledge of apparently real objects occurs only when they appear in the awareness of what is aware of them. Hence an apparent self is involved in the existence of subject knowledge, and is to be regarded as inherent in the unitary apprehension of real objects in such a way that without it, functioning as an ingredient in the knowledge of objects regarded as primarily objective, such knowledge could not exist. Inherence of an apparent self in the apprehension of objects warrants interpreting it as inherently objective.

(5) The fifth theory claims that knowledge involves an apparent subject-object interdependent unity and that nothing more is needed. The unitary nature of such subject-object relationship involves the subjective aspect in the objective aspect of objects whenever knowledge occurs. Again, inherence of an apparent self in the apprehension of objects warrants interpreting it as inherently objective.

(6) The sixth theory claims that an apparent self is all that is needed to account for knowledge, since all objects must appear in a self in order to exist at all as objects. Thus, any objectivity of objects depends for its existence upon its being an object for, and thus an object in, a self. To the extent that an

apparent self is constituted by the objects inherent in it, it functions objectively or as embodying the objective aspects of knowledge.

(7) The seventh theory claims that knowledge involves a real self to which objects appear as well as an apparent self, apparent objects, and real objects, in genuine knowledge. The act of knowing real things is a unitary action involving all four aspects. The four aspects may be distinguished but not separated or isolated from each other. Each may at times seem to function as the dominant ingredient in an act of knowing, but all are essential to its existence as knowledge.

The second diagram lists twenty-three possible kinds of theories intending to interpret the relations between subject and objects in knowing. Unbroken lines indicate that the two or more aspects underlined are to be regarded as involving continuity, interpretable either as identity or as intimate interdependence. The two-headed arrows indicate opposition, often understood as involving polar opposites. Terms standing by themselves are intended to be interpreted either as alone necessary for the existence of knowledge or all that is certain as necessary for knowledge. Question marks indicate that the theory claims uncertainty regarding the existence of the aspects or of their possible contributions to the nature of knowledge.



	Real Self	Apparent Self	Apparent Object	Real Object
15.	*subject* ←			→ *object*
18. 16.	*subject*	*subject*	*subject*	*subject*
18. 17.	*object*	*object*	*object*	*object*
19.	*subject*	?	?	?
20.	?	*subject*	?	?
21.	?	?	*object*	?
22.	?	?	?	*object*
23.	?	?	?	?

The first four theories postulate subject-object interrelatedness interpreted as involving both opposition between apparent self as subject and apparent object as object and their interdependent functioning in constituting knowledge.

The first theory also recognized both a real self and an apparent self, distinguishable but existentially identical, and apparent objects and real objects, also distinguishable but existentially identical in some fundamental ways (combining theories 3 and 3 in the first and second parts of the first diagram—comb. p^1 3 and p^2 3; e.g. Naive Realism, Representative Realism, Critical Realism, Pragmatism, Vaibhāsika).

The second theory postulates both a real and apparent self without requiring the existence of a real object in order to account for knowledge (comb. p^1 3 and p^2 1; e.g. Berkeley, Subjective Idealism, Yogācāra).

The third theory postulates both an apparent and real object and an apparent self without requiring the existence of a real self in order to account for knowledge (comb. p^1 1 and p^2 3).

The fourth theory postulates both apparent subject and apparent objects without requiring the existence of a real self or real objects in accounting for the nature of knowledge (comb. p^1 1 and p^2 1; e.g. Hume, Phenomenalism).

The second group of five theories (5-9) all postulate a real self as subject as essential to the nature of knowledge, but differ regarding the nature of and need for objective aspects.

The fifth theory postulates that a real subject apprehends an apparent object but remains uncertain about whether a real object is needed (comb. p^1 2 and p^2 1; (e.g. Kant).

The sixth theory postulates that a real subject apprehends an apparent object which involves at least some identity with a real object (comb. p^1 2 and p^2 3).

The seventh theory postulates that a real subject apprehends an object integratively involving not only an apparent and real object but also the contribution of an apparent subject in endowing the object with its objectivity (as object-for-a-subject) (comb. p^1 1 and p^2 4; e.g. Husserl, Vatsiputriyas, Sāṁkhya).

The eighth theory postulates that a real subject apprehends an object as an object-for-a-subject, thus involving the subject in the objectivity of the object, without being certain about whether or not knowledge requires the existence of a real objcet (comb. p^1 2 and p^2 5).

The ninth theory postulates that the existence of knowledge requires the existence of a real self which functions or manifests itself as an apparent self within all appearance exists. The appearing of appearances within a self is all that is required for the existence of knowledge (e.g. as in a dream. 'Life is but a dream.'). Any supposed need for recognizing or distinguishing apparent and real objects is regarded as uncertain (comb. p^1. 2 and p^2 6; e.g. Śaṅkara).

The third group of five theories (10-14) all postulate a real object as essential to the nature of knowledge, but differ regarding the nature and need for the subjective aspects.

The tenth theory postulates that a real object can be known by an apparent subject without requiring that the real object be mediated by a distinguishable apparent object, and without presupposing as necessary a real self (comb. p^1 1 and p^2 2; e.g. Vaibhāṣikas, Śautrantikas).

The eleventh theory postulates that a real object can be known by a subject without requiring that the real object be mediated by a distinguishable apparent object, but that a subject involves both real as well as apparent subjectivity whenever knowledge actually exists (comb. p^1 3 and p^2 2).

The twelfth theory postulates that a real object can be known by a subject but also that a real subject appearing as an apparent subject apprehends the object as apparent by endowing it with objectivity through the subject-object relationship. The postulated relationship between the subjectivity of the apparent object and the reality of the real object may involve questions and varying answers regarding any preciseness of this relationship (comb. p^1 4 and p^2 2; e.g. Sellars' Critical Realism, Whitehead).

The thirteenth theory's postulates are the same as those of the twelfth except that it is uncertain whether an apparent subject requires a real subject for its existence and functionism (comb. p^1 5 and p^2 2; e.g. Sartre).

The fourteenth theory postulates the subjectivity of an apparent object as needed for endowing a real thing with objectivity, but remains uncertain regarding whether either a real self or an apparent self or both are needed for the existence of knowledge. It presupposes that the existence of knowledge is already actually implicit when a real object manifests itself as appearance (comb. p^1 6 and p^2 2; e.g. Materialism).

The fifteenth theory is like all theories in the second group in postulating a real self as subject and like all theories in the third group in postulating real

things as objects, but it simply omits all appearances (apparent self and apparent objects) as contributing to the nature of knowledge (of real things by a real self; how such relationship can be considered knowledge remains to be explained) (comb. p^1 2 and p^2 2; e.g. Jainism, Aristotle).

The fourth group of theories (16-18) all postulate continuity of the four aspects that have been distinguished in studying the nature of knowledge, but do so in fundamentally different ways.

The sixteenth theory postulates that all that exists is subjective, and that any distinctions between apparent and real self and apparent and real objects must, thus, occur within such subjectivity (comb. p^1 7; e.g. Spritualism, Idealism, Yogācāra).

The seventeenth theory postulates that all that exists is objective in the sense that whatever exists is there to be observed, and that any observing that is done is also done by the things that exist there. Any distinctions that one may desire to make between apparent and real self and apparent and real things must occur within such objectively real world (p^2 7; e.g. Materialism).

The eighteenth theory postulates not only the continuity or identity of the four aspects as subjective but also as objective and, further, of their subjective and objective continuities as polarly (i.e. partially identically) related to each other (comb. p^1 7 and p^2 7 and g^4 16 and g^4 17; e.g. Hegel).

A fifth group of theories (19-23) is cited here to suggest unlikely possibilities regarding extremely limited postulated. Four of the theories select one of the aspects (19. real self; 20. apparent self; 21. apparent objects; 22. real objects) and postulate that it alone is needed to account for knowledge, and postulate uncertainty regarding the other factors (exemplyfing p^1 2 and 1, and p^2 1 and 2; e.g. 19. Sāṁkhya soul in *kaivalya* omitting the uncertainties. 22. Materialism without knowers. Nihilism). The last theory (23) exemplifies complete scepticism or agnosticism, postulating uncertainty regarding any necessity for any and all of the distinguishable aspects. (If the uncertainties are removed, this type is exemplified by *cit* in the *satcidānanda* of Nirguṇa Brahman).

The foregoing survey of twenty-three possible kinds of theories pertaining to relations between subjective and objective aspects distinguishable in examining the nature of knowledge is oversimple and extremely stylized. Many actual theories involve complications not adequately represented by this classification. It is intended to suggest how a more systematic approach to types of epistemologies may serve as a foundation for a more comprehensive, perhaps more widely acceptable, theory of knowledge.

Reason, rationality and the irrational*

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Since the concept of rationality is intimately connected with that of reason, and since reason, in its turn, is better understood by way of contrast with experience, feeling, faith, etc. I propose to discuss these interrelated and allied concepts along with some of their implications in this paper. The historical controversy between reason and experience in the field of epistemology or between reason and feeling in ethics, and reason and faith in religion is too well known to be dilated upon. The controversy has found the philosophers divided into two opposing camps fighting an endless battle of words in most cases, if I may say so, 'full of sound and fury, signifying nothing'.

Reason was the unfailing guide in the realm of values for Greek thinkers like Plato and Aristotle:

> Life is a series of crises in which we are daily and hourly prompted in different directions, and here reason must be arbiter. In Plato's image of the soul as Charioteer, driving abreast the black horse of appetite and the white horse of passion, it is reason that gives us the intimation when either is beginning to run wild. In Aristotle's picture of the good life as one of judicial balance, without excess or defect, it is again reason, operating not by rule, but by that sense of the fitness of things which produces a work of art, that determines the pattern of conduct[1].

As against this we find in Christianity, at least in an important version of it, an enormous emphasis being laid not on reason but on love and faith, love being pitted against reason in ethical considerations while faith is extolled at the cost of reason as an instrument of divine knowledge. Thomas Aquinas, for example, writes:

> Human reason is very deficient in things concerning God. A sign of this is that philosophers, in their enquiry into human affairs by natural investigation, have fallen into many errors and have disagreed among themselves. And consequently, in order that men might have knowledge of God, free of doubt and uncertainty, it was necessary for divine truths to be delivered to them by way of faith, being told to them, as it were, by God Himself who cannot lie.[2]

Luther goes even to the extreme in his denunciation of reason as 'a whore'.

*Revised version of the paper read at the seminar on 'The Concept of Rationality' held at Lucknow University.

'The devil's bride, *ratio*, the beautiful whore comes in and thinks she is clever'.

> There is on earth among all dangers no more dangerous thing than a richly endowed and adroit reason, especially if she enters into spiritual matters which concern the soul and God. For it is more possible to teach an ass to read than to blind such a reason and lead it right; for reason must be deluded, blinded and destroyed.

'Faith must trample under foot all reason, sense, and understanding, and whatever it sees it must put out of sight, and wish to know nothing but the word of God'.[3] Sri Aurobindo, an eminent contemporary thinker of India, also quite forcefully expresses his views regarding the utter inadequacy of reason in matters supramental. Such are the vituperations against reason found in the history of human thought which make us wonder how at times reason itself is used in the service of destroying itself. Another alternative approach in this controversy has been to attempt at a reconciliation between the two great adversaries by some means or the other. 'Reason', according to this approach, 'is not the great adversary of inclinations and passion: it is allied with man's profoundest passion, the aspiration to be as God'.[4]

What is this controversy all about? Can one make head or tail out of the controversy regarding two hypostatized entities like reason and faith or reason and feeling? Is it in any way significant? Perhaps it may be somewhat illuminating, if we put it in the form of a controversy regarding the relative value of two linguistic habits, both of which, of course, are equally embedded in our linguistic structure and useful in different ways. Perhaps it may be more profitable, if we concentrate on the contrast between how reason-words and feeling-words are put to use, so that we may begin to see that the moot-point all along has been whether one of these usages can be entirely replaced or at least undermined by the other in some important forms of life.

The function that the reason-words perform in our language is evidently very much different from how the feeling-words function. One can speak of his own feelings in a certain matter, and one can even speak of his own faith but not of his own reasons. This is what Socrates wanted to insist upon when he said that knowledge is knowledge through concepts and reason is the faculty of concepts. Once we give up talking in the language of reason, we seem to be hopelessly landed in a world of privacy and inevitably dragged to speak in the language of sophistry. 'Whatever seems to me right is right for me. Whatever I choose to do is virtuous for me.' This seems to be an enormous advantage of the language of reason; it not only promises a break in subjectivity and privacy, subjectivity rather seems to fly in its face. To put it in plain language without metaphor or hyperbole, it is only when rational grounds for holding a belief are available that it can claim the status of knowledge for itself.

But is this true in all cases? Do I not know when I believe that I am in pain where it is redundant and as a matter of fact irrelevant to raise questions regarding the rational grounds of such belief? If I believe that I am in pain, surely I am in pain and I know that I am in pain. Is 'knowledge' the wrong word to use in such cases ? But why should it be wrong to call it knowledge, even if it is not the ordinary variety of knowledge obtained through evidence? When there is no question of evidence, when it makes no sense to ask for or talk of rational grounds in such circumstances, can we speak of knowledge?

Moreover, is it self-evident that all knowledge must be knowledge through concepts, the formation of which is said to be the function of rationality? Is it not possible to have knowledge without conceptualization? Are there not instances of such knowledge as, for example, when I am having a unique experience of which I cannot give any description? It may be what the religious man speaks of as an experience of 'the peace that passeth understanding', the mystic describes as an experience of the ineffable, the Upaniṣadic thinker sets forth as *yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha*. Here, at last, the anti-rationalist seems to have scored his victory over reason, for we have now reached a point beyond the limits of reason. But, again, is it a case of knowledge? Can an indeterminate apprehension be regarded as knowledge? It seems queer, indeed, that someone is said to have attained knowledge while at the same time he is not in a position to tell what it is that he has attained to. We may, no doubt, speak of *Brahmajñāna* or *Brahmānubhava*, not of the knowledge of Brahman. It may be regarded as *vijñāna* in the sense of a unique awareness or realization of course, but it makes little sense to speak of such awareness going wrong or being doubtful which, properly speaking, can only be applied to statements. If I desist from making a statement, how can I go wrong? And if there is no possibility of going wrong here, can it be regarded as knowledge?

It is, thus, that knowledge is very intimately connected with reason; rational grounds for holding a belief is a *sine qua non* for elevating it to the status of knowledge. But, again, is it true of all beliefs? What about religious belief, for example? Can we have rational grounds for holding any particular religious belief? Even if one fights shy of speaking about religious knowledge and is instead inclined only to talk of some religious experience or the other that is ineffable, the question of rationality of certain religious practices and forms of life *vis-à-vis* others stares us in our face. Or shall we say that here there can be no question of rationality or irrationality, there are only different belief systems, different faiths of which any one is as good or as bad as the other? But, in that case, what are we to make of arguments and counter-arguments which are not at all rare in and around religion in spite of a general tendency on the part of some religious believers and thinkers to deny all sorts of argumentation or *tarka*? Certainly, rational criticism and evaluation cannot be entirely out of place; criticism seems rather inevitable when one is confronted with a number of alternative theses in the frame work of religion.

But is rational evaluation the only way of evaluation? Can we not evaluate through our experience, by an immediate encounter with the real, so to say? Again, one has to admit that whatever may be the nature of immediate experience or the encounter, standards of rationality have to be applied while assessing or evaluating a particular experience or encounter *vis-à-vis* similar and very different types of experiences and encounters in case of the others or even in one's own case at different times.

But now the question inevitably arises: what are these standards of rationality? Is there a single, uniform, standard of rationality for all cases in various disciplines or even in one single discipline for all purposes? I do not think that this is so. The framework changes, the perspective shifts; perhaps there is a radical transformation in the whole outlook, and the standards of rationality no longer remain the same; grounds for holding steadfastly to a belief for centuries after centuries are subjected to criticism by fresh standards and may be found to be based not on reason in the long run. And this seems to be the real crux of the problem regarding rationality.

The question is concerned with objectivity and truth, and the concept of rationality seems to be at least as slippery as any other in the field. Swinburne points out that 'the concept of rationality is ambiguous, and that we need to distinguish five different kinds of rationality.'[5] He talks of rationality_1, rationality_2, rationality_3 and so on. The utmost emphasis, however, is laid on rationality_5, one which is, in fact, backed by adequate investigation, and a situation is envisaged where the belief that a prisoner is guilty may be irrational in sense (5), even though it may be rational in the other four senses. What is most important is that a belief be a rational_5 belief, but ensuring that one has a rational_3 belief which is based on adequate investigation according to the believer's own standard is all that one can do towards ensuring that he has a rational_5 belief. Knowledge is valuable in itself, and knowledge involves true belief; what matters, therefore, is that we have true beliefs which can be ensured only if we have rational_5 beliefs. Again, the question is: how to arrive at these true beliefs? According to Swinburne: 'Ensuring that I have a very probable belief is all that I can do towards ensuring that I have a true belief—for a very probable belief is one which is, very probably, true'.[6]

The significance of rationality is, thus, intimately associated with that of truth. Otherwise, by itself, rationality in some of its form at least, is not sacrosanct inasmuch as it may, for all we know, be misleading, to say the least. It is to be noted, therefore, that constant vigilance, diligent enquiry and persistent investigation are the inescapable and the inevitable price to be paid for the sake of knowledge, for getting at the truth which certainly is not self-evident. As Perelman has aptly observed:

> If the absolute validity of the criterion of self-evidence is not granted the difference between truth and opinion is no longer one of kind but one of degree. All opinions become more or less plausible, and the judgments that form the basis of that plausibility are not themselves clear of all controversy. There is no longer any knowledge that is objective or impersonal or, what comes to the same thing, guaranteed by a divine mind. Knowledge becomes a human phenomenon from which error, vagueness and undue generalisations are never entirely absent. Knowledge, always perfectible, is always imperfect.[7]

It is from this perspective that one can understand how even some scientific beliefs could be both rational in some sense or the other and false at the same time. It would make us appreciate why and how the existing standards of rationality may not be helpful in understanding and appreciating progress in science, and why it is that philosophers like Feyerabend[8] should be so very touchy about and averse to what they would regard as the rationalist tradition and its accepted standards. Even if one may not agree with Feyerabend's thesis in all its details and although Newton-Smith's[9] assessment of the same and other allied theories as Boring Interests Thesis (BIT) may not be entirely pointless, credit must nevertheless be given to philosophers like Feyerabend for having drawn our attention to the vagaries of the so-called rationality, to 'the errors-cum-deceptions behind the phrase of "the objectivity of a rational debate" '.[10] Feyerabend argues that all rules have their limits and that there is no comprehensive 'rationality'; it is not his point that we should proceed without rules and standards. From this perspective, again, one would come to see why a strict application of rigid standards of rational cirticism or evaluation befitting one discipline may not simply work, and may rather lead to distortion when we come to evaluate matters belonging to another discipline rationally. Religious theses, thus, may need a more delicate handling, so to say, where standards of scientific rationality as such cannot apply. Ninian Smart has a point to score when he says:

> ...lack of exactness is not properly a defect except in comparison with the maximum possible in the field in question. Consequently, there is no *immediate* need to deny, because religious discourse is not precise like that of mathematics or even physics, that in some sense of 'reasoning' there is reasoning in this field. But the canons of correct reasoning will of course differ greatly from those in other realms.[11]

Popperian ideal of rationality as rational criticism, instead of justification or final, demonstrable knowledge, may not be entirely out of place here, but the preference for a theory, it should be born in mind, is not determined here only by 'the state of the critical debate' in Popperian sense,[12] but by other factors also such as the reaction of the total human personality to perhaps a unique situation.

The above discussion is meant to draw our attention to the various shades and meanings of rationality along with its implications in respect of know-

ledge, truth, etc. 'Rationality' as such is, of course, not foolproof, for so much depends on what exactly we are to understand by rationality, and the context of its application is also no less important. But, at the same time, it will be farfetched and misleading to suggest, as Feyerabend does, that 'rationality is not an arbiter of traditions, it is itself a tradition or an aspect of a tradition. It is therefore neither good nor bad, it simply is'.[13] Feyerabend not only regards rationality as one of the traditions which, according to him, is not in any way binding on us; he goes on deliberately to advocate the cause of the unreasonable, the irrational. 'It is always reasonable', says Feyerabend, 'to introduce and try to keep alive unreasonable views'.[14] Although one can see the point in Feyerabend making such violently paradoxical remarks—for it is certainly true that what is unreasonable according to accepted standards of rationality may after all be a definite instrument of progress in science or in any other form of human endeavour for that matter—yet it will be wrong to suppose that this gives us license to make a fad, so to say, of irrationalism.[15] Far from being superior to rationality, the irrational cannot be at a par with rationality, simply because it is opposed to, and antagonistic to, the intrinsic goal of human beings, viz. the goal of knowledge. Howsoever slippery the path may be, rationality gives us at least the promise to lead us to our cherished goal.

Notes and References

1. Brand Blanshard, *Reason and Goodness*, London, 1961, p. 33.
2. *Summa Theologica*, II-II question 2, Article 4.
3. Luther as quoted in W. Kaufmann, *Critique of Religion and Philosophy*, London, 1958 pp. 217-19.
4. Kaufmann, *op. cit.*, 1958, p. 207.
5. Richard Swinburne, *Faith and Reason*, Oxford, Oxford University Press 1981, p. 33.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
7. Ch. Perelman, *The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument*, J. Petrie (trans.), London, 1963, p. 131.
8. cf. Paul Feyerabend, *Science in a Free Society* (Verso Edn.), London, 1983.
9. cf. W. Newton-Smith. 'The Role of Interests in Science', A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), *Philosophy and Practice* (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958, p. 62.
10. Feyerabend, *op.cit.*, p. 30.
11. N. Smart, *Reasons and Faiths*, London, 1985, p. 172.
12. cf. Karl Popper, *Unended Quest*, London; Fontana/Collins, 1980, p. 149.
13. Feyerabend, *op.cit.*, p. 27.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
15. The case of '*rational* irrationality' where it could be rational to cause oneself to act irrationally, as envisaged in Parfit's thesis, is again, it should be noted, certainly not an apotheosis of the irrational. cf. D. Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 13.

Respect for privacy: western and Indian

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How is respect for persons related to respect for privacy? Is it possible to respect a person and yet not respect his privacy? Conversely, is it the case that we can speak of respecting someone's privacy, only if we respect that person as a person? These are the questions I intend to consider in this paper. First, I shall consider the problem of respect for privacy in the context of modern liberal Western societies. Second, I shall be concerned with the problem of respect for privacy in the context of *traditional* Indian society. In the concluding section, I shall try to explain what I understand by the relation between respect for persons and respect for privacy.

The Western Approach

To claim privacy is to claim that one has a minimum right to immunity from uninvited observation and certain forms of interference.[1] To say that an activity is immune in this sense means that the activity ought not be watched by unauthorized persons. A person claiming privacy is one who seeks to be protected from certain activities that would not have been objectionable, if they were performed on objects or if they were directed towards persons with their permission. Respecting someone's privacy implies an ability to understand how someone's activities are considered to be important by himself, and also an ability to act in such a way as not to interfere with his own way of judging the importance of his activities. To respect a person's privacy is to assume that the person has a right to be treated as a person, as one who is capable of deciding 'for himself'. The question of respecting someone's privacy arises only in the context of an agreement that we ought to value a person for what he is as such.

To claim privacy, then, is to claim immunity from uninvited observation and interference. This suggests that not every interference with one's personal affairs is necessarily to be considered to be objectionable. Some interferences do not result in a loss of privacy. Why is this so? First, consider what is meant by loss of privacy. We lose our privacy when someone does not respect the limits that we have set on knowledge of our personal affairs. Sometimes these limits are set by selecting places outside which we do not want knowledge about ourselves to spread. Sometimes these limits may be set by social conventions which allow people to carry on their private conversation even in public places. The limits that are fixed by social conventions are likely to vary in different societies, so much so that an interference that is objectionable in one society may not be so in another. The loss of privacy is the result of

not respecting certain limits, and the limits are set with respect to three things: first, with respect to the *contents* of that which may be known; secondly, with respect to the *persons* who may come to know it; and , thirdly, with respect to the *context*, which can cover many variations. (The same interference may sometimes be counted as objectionable and sometimes not; the loss of privacy that may be experienced during medical treatment may serve as an example.) It is a recognition of limits with respect to these factors that privacy demands. There is no loss of privacy if restrictions regarding these factors are respected. Neither the amount of information disclosed nor the number of persons to whom it is disclosed will, taken on their own, determine the loss of privacy that may be involved.

Privacy may, thus, be lost when restrictions imposed by someone on knowledge about himself are not respected. But it is possible that, in some cases, the person himself may relax the restrictions that (justifiably) he imposed earlier. This relaxation may sometimes be voluntary and sometimes involuntary. It is voluntary when he willingly changes his mind with regard to his self-imposed restrictions. Confidential reports given to physicians, psychiatrists, etc. are some examples. Privacy may also be given up in another possible way. People making love on stage, for example, willingly give up their privacy. Observation on the part of the spectators, in these cases, rests on a prior permission of the actors themselves. Loss of privacy involves a lack of respect for the person concerned when he does not give up his privacy willingly but is deprived of it forcibly by others, for to deprive someone of his privacy is to show lack of respect for him as a person capable of controlling information about himself. Offensive loss of privacy can occur in many ways. Sometimes, as in cases of enforced confession, the loss takes place with full knowledge of the person who is being deprived of his privacy. In some other cases, the person himself may not know that he is being deprived of his privacy. Listening secretly to some private conversation, either in a private place or in a public place, is one of the instances of objectionable losses of privacy, where persons deprived of privacy are kept in ignorance about their regretted loss.

So far we have considered why loss of privacy is sometimes objectionable and sometimes not. But why is privacy considered to be valuable at all? What is it that one wants to protect from publicity and why? This is a question that receives different answers from people living in different societies. Even among people living in the same society, the answer may vary from group to group, family to family, person to person. Some anthropologists[2] are of the opinion that cross-cultural analysis of different systems of privacy has not systematically been carried out. This comparative neglect, they argue, may be partially due to lack of similarities between modern urban privacy patterns and those found in many of the societies studied by anthropologists. In many 'simple' societies, rules of privacy do not appear to be focussed primarily on the household. Privacy regulations may often be closely connected with broad systems of behaviour, such as kinship and religion. This has been observed to be

true among the Mehinacus of Brazil and the Zunis of the American South-West. The research conducted by J. Roberts and T. Gregor shows that the privacy pattern of the Mehinacus is totally different from the privacy pattern usually accepted in modern individualistic societies. This is probably because of the highly diffused nature of social relationships characterizing such 'simple' societies, as contrasted with the highly segregated patterns of social relationships of larger societies. Privacy patterns may, thus, vary from one society to another. Tribal societies, too, have their own sanctions against intrusions on privacy, but the management and the functions of their privacy are different from those of modern liberal societies. But neither can the functions of privacy in the two types of societies be said to be entirely different from each other. Indeed, if the differences were too wide, we could not speak even of different conceptions of one and the same thing, viz., privacy. Respect for privacy, in both types of societies, serves to maintain an integrated personality in the social setting. (In modern liberal societies, privacy is said to serve other purposes as well, a point that will be discussed shortly.) In tribal societies, sanctions against intrusion are considered to be essential for maintaining basic social relationships. Here the pressure for regulating sanctions against publicity is not so much self-imposed as imposed by others, by society at large. So, for an individual member of the tribe, respecting privacy is a duty that he finds imposed on him. Respect for privacy in modern liberal societies, on the other hand, reflects a slow and gradual internalization of what was previously external. In such societies, respect for privacy is still a social sanction characterized by externality, but at the same time it expresses one's personal recognition of someone else's autonomy. A distinction, at this point, may be drawn between respecting the restrictions *about* privacy (that is to say, respecting that which is supposed to be private), and respecting privacy as such. Respect for that which privacy is about involves recognizing the *limits* set by the person, whereas respect for privacy as such involves recognizing the *person* as one who is capable of setting those limits.

Our discussions so far have asumed that privacy is valuable, but many objections have been raised against this assumption. Edmund Leach,[3] for example, is of the opinion that privacy involves the setting of 'artificial boundaries between men who are like us and men who are not like us'. The distinction between what is private and what is not is one drawn by a person to separate himself from the natural condition of communion. A similar remark, made by Bruno Bettelheim,[4] is that privacy is a sort of defence mechanism to which members of individualistic societies resort in order to hide something about themselves. Privacy, so it is said, is felt as a necessity only by those who have a cause for shame. Some others, like Margaret Mead[5] and Granville Hicks,[6] argue that privacy is the condition of one who prefers being uninvolved in the concern of one's neighbours, that it is a way of shirking one's social responsibilities. For Leach and Bettelheim, privacy is the result of ethnocentricity. Privacy, for them, signifies a fall from a state of

original perfection, the primal condition of social communion. They hope for a future generation which might be successful in recovering the lost perfection. Mead and Hicks, rather, express their lack of interest in privacy as something that can be of any value to man who is a social being.

These doubts as to the value of privacy may be contrasted with attempts to show privacy to be desirable. Privacy is considered essential for maintaining an integrated personality in the social setting. Anthony West,[7] for example, argues that human beings have a social self as well as actual self. Attitudes characterizing the social self are those that comply with the norms of society, whereas those characterizing the actual self are harmonious with individualistic inclinations. Although activities of both these selves overlap, complying with the social standards often creates tension for individuals, who, in order to minimize the tension, try to withdraw themselves into a state where they may be left to themselves. Privacy is said to protect man from the disclosure of those mistakes that damage his social appearance; it enables him to restore his self-respect, if it has been wounded in some harrowing process of social adjustment.[8] The separation between the social self and the actual self in privacy gives the individual a freedom to transgress social norms, a scope for relaxing himself after difficult but unavoidable social encounters.

There seems to be a partial truth in both the above-mentioned attempts, the attempt to depreciate privacy and the attempt to find some justification for it as serving important functions. I do not agree that privacy is merely a sort of defence mechanism adopted for hiding something shameful, because it is far from true to say that our only concern in privacy is with what we are ashamed of. The disclosure of certain private matters might make us feel ashamed, but that does not mean that we seek privacy only in order to hide our shame. But I think there is some truth in saying that excessive seeking of privacy might, in some cases, amount to shirking one's social responsibilities, although it is equally true that the mere lack of desire for privacy does not indicate a high degree of awareness of one's social responsibilities. Similarly, with regard to the views of the second group of writers, I agree that privacy often gives one scope for relaxing after what often turns out to be a tiring day of social encounters, but I do not think that one desires privacy only in order to relax or to escape from social norms. It does not seem to be true that one always seeks privacy in order to separate one's social self from actual self, and that this separation serves simply to lessen the tension that arises from social adjustments. It is doubtful whether satisfaction of the cravings of the actual self can really succeed in lessening the tension. The tension, on the contrary, might increase, if the separation between the two selves is perpetually emphasized. Every social emcounter, every compliance with social norms will be resented, if one is being constantly reminded of the disparity between one's social self and one's actual self. The tension might be minimized, if, instead of continually emphasizing the separation between the two selves,

one actually tries to harmonize them by trying to bridge the distance between their respective desires.

To uphold respect for a person's privacy as a value is not to deny the value of interpersonal relations. Basically there is no dichotomy between desire for privacy and desire for interpersonal relations, not only because one can speak of privacy between two or more persons but also because desire for privacy as such does not suggest any lack of concern for the welfare of others. Desire for privacy does not mean selfishness or lack of concern for social well-being; rather, it is on privacy that the foundation of many social welfare activities is laid. An individual may be able to develop his thoughts only when he is granted a right to privacy, because privacy facilitates self-improvement through contemplation and self-criticism.[9]

The Indian Approach

I now proceed to study the Indian way of looking at the problem of privacy. Since traditional Indian society is characterized by hierarchical interdependence, group solidarity and comparatively less emphasis on personal initiative, it is very easy to draw the conclusion that respect for privacy is unknown in the Indian tradition. It should not be denied that such a conclusion does contain a significant element of truth. With a predominantly holistic structure, Indian society has been somewhat suspicious of the idea of upholding privacy as a value. But traditional Indian society, as I shall show, has always recognized a person's right to privacy in religious matters. Even in certain spheres other than the religious, a person's privacy has been respected.

The traditional Indian scepticism about the idea of considering privacy as a value is basically the same as that shared by such Western social psychologists as those whose views we have discussed earlier.[10] To retreat to privacy is sometimes supposed to be a way of separating oneself from the 'natural condition of communion', a way of building up 'artificial' barriers between oneself and others. One's life within one's own society, so it is thought, should be kept as 'open' as possible to others. A desire for privacy is supposed to imply a desire to conceal something from the attention of others, which, again, is supposed to imply that the person seeking privacy has done something wrong. In traditional Indian society, loyalty to caste duties and family duties is supposed to be in the foreground. A society that sets high value on group loyalty finds it difficult to recognize privacy as something that an individual has a right to enjoy. To claim privacy may be to claim something that is detrimental to general welfare. If a person is to remain loyal to his group, he is not supposed to construct a barrier between himself and other members of the group. This 'openness' can be seen to be at work in many ways. Social visits, for example, are frequently casual: usually no one minds dropping in without making any previous appointment. Unsolicited advice is less likely to be seen as an encroachment on one's privacy. In small localities, children of

different families playing together may pass freely into one another's homes without this being taken as an intrusion on other people's privacy. Children of one family might quite easily be supervised by other families of the same locality without anyone giving much thought to any possible intrusion on one or the other family's privacy. Examples of lack of privacy in domestic life are not difficult to find: the customs, so common in many Western societies, of, for example, knocking at the door before entering into another person's room, of keeping doors closed or curtains drawn are not always strictly followed.

So much for the lack of privacy. In what sense can traditional Indian society be said to recognize privacy as a value? Earlier, in our discussion about privacy, we have noted that the question as to what ought to be protected from publicity does not always receive the same answer from people living in different societies. The concept of privacy has a different content in different cultures. Societies that appear as primitive and lacking in privacy by modern Western standards have their own severe sanctions against intrusions on privacy. (Among the Mehinacus of Brazil, for example, there are severe sanctions against women entering the men's house, against any casual intrusion on anyone else's residence, against freedom of movement during maternity and adolescence.) Privacy has both 'personal' and 'public' aspects. One can speak of individual privacy, family or household privacy as well as of community or group or collective privacy.[11] Privacy, in its collective sense, is not unknown in traditional Indian society. Information between members of 'in-groups' is open; any deliberate concealment of information from other members of the 'in-group' is condemned. But the same information will be protected from publicity to 'out-groups', and in this respect the 'in-groups' are closed to the 'out-groups'.

Rights to 'personal' privacy too, in some sense or other, are duly recognized in traditional Indian society. Of these, one which Indian society shares with most other human societies is privacy relating to bodily exposure, sexual activities, activities relating to excretion, etc. Public expressions of various kinds of intimacy, kissing and hugging in public places, for example, are strongly disapproved of. Indian society also recognizes 'family' privacy. This is shown, for example, in the distinction made in many styles of traditional domestic architecture between *antaḥpur* or *andar* (inner part of a house) and *bahirbātī* or *sadar* (outer part of a house). The former is, so to speak, the Indian's 'castle' of privacy to which he can retreat at will, if, that is to say, he can afford it. This is also closely linked to traditional Indian society's recognition of women's need for privacy. That, in its turn, is linked to the seclusion of women practised in certain parts of India. But however mixed and tangled the motives behind such practices are, it cannot be denied that there is, in traditional Indian society, a considerable overlap between the concept of seclusion (which may imply enforcement) and that of 'legitimate' privacy.

It is true that domestic privacy in nuclear household units is much greater than privacy experienced in the extended families. But traditional extended families, too, have their own ways of safeguarding personal privacy. As Alan Westin puts it (speaking of traditional societies in general):

> ...even here there are usually rules of avoidance, based on the kinship system, to govern who speaks to whom and which relatives may be in the same room with each other. These avoidance rules have the effect of ensuring certain levels of psychological privacy in the midst of crowding.[12]

In traditional Indian society, a person's right to privacy in religious matters is duly recognized. This is closely related to the respect for a person's freedom to worship his chosen deity. An individual is allowed to exercise his autonomy to a considerable extent in certain religious matters. It is true that, even in religious matters, his life is studded with performances of various traditional rituals, but it is also true that he enjoys considerable freedom in worshipping his chosen deity. Every Hindu householder is expected to perform a number of daily rites, including prayer, worship, offerings, and to chant secret hymns and prayers if he has received initiation (*dikṣā*) from a *guru*. A person can be sure that no one is going to intrude on his privacy, if he expresses his desire to communicate with god. Any gesture indicative of such a desire will help him build up a barrier between himself and his surroundings. This way of retreating to a religious privacy has been considered by some[13] to be a remarkable way of relaxing oneself, of 'repairing one's energies'—a way of relaxing that has been institutionalized in many societies. The Yogic tradition, the tradition of renouncers, asceticism, etc.—all strongly suggest that traditional Indian society has not failed to recognize respect for privacy on a higher spiritual level. Respect for privacy has also been recognized in spheres relating to various kinds of creative work. Arguably, the classical Indian tradition of literature, philosophy, music, painting and other fine arts could not have developed, if respect for a person's privacy was unknown. The development of each of these needs 'peaceful leisure', a leisure that would leave a person free to carry on with evaluation of his own thoughts, planning, anticipatory activities, etc.; and such leisure is likely, at the very least, to be difficult to secure in circumstances where there is no respect for privacy at all. That writers and artists need privacy (often called in this context 'creative loneliness') has been emphasized in many studies and autobiographies.[14]

Concluding Remarks

How is respect for persons related to respect for privacy? In a sense, respect for privacy is closely related to respect for persons: to show lack of respect for someone's privacy is, to some extent, to deny that the person concerned has a right to protect his body and mind from undue outside interference. To deny

privacy to someone is to deny not only that he is a person responsible for his own mind and body, capable of making important decisions for himself, but also that he has a 'moral right to shape his destiny'.[15] That respect for privacy is closely related to respect for persons is shown by the way in which the degree in which we respect someone's privacy normally increases in proportion to the degree in which respect for his personhood increases. Our attitudes towards infants, for example, pass, so to speak, through a 'pre-personal' or 'pre-privacy' stage. In contrast to the situations where our respect for privacy is closely related to our respect for personhood are those where we continue to respect a person as a person in spite of withholding, temporarily at least, our respect for his privacy. These are the situations where persons, with whose privacy we are concerned, themselves give up their own privacy, or where their *prima facie* right to privacy may be overridden by other more urgent considerations; cases of actors performing love scenes on the stage or people in need of medical treatment have already been mentioned as possible examples. But, apart from these situations, respect for privacy is closely linked with respect for personhood. Privacy is essential for the growth of personal autonomy and self-evaluation. That a person might find his autonomy to be at stake if his privacy is intruded upon can easily be seen when one considers how certain cases of nervous breakdown and suicide may result from the giving of publicity to certain information about the persons concerned.[16] Privacy is also essential for the development of various personal relationships.[17] Love, friendship, trust, etc. require an atmosphere of privacy for their development. None of these can develop if individuals are not recognized as free to restrict, in greater or less degree, their contact with the outside world.

Notes

1. S.I. Benn, 'Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons' in J. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds.), *Privacy*, Nomos 13, New York, Atherton Press, 1971, p. 2.
2. J. Roberts and T. Gregor, 'Privacy: A Cultural View', *Privacy*, *op.cit.*, pp. 199-200.
3. E. Leach, *A Runaway World?*, London, The British Broadcasting Company, 1968, p. 46.
4. B. Bettelheim, 'The Right to Privacy Is a Myth' in *Saturday Evening Post*, 27, July 1968, p. 9.
5. M. Mead, 'Our right to privacy' in *Redbook*, 124, April 1965, p. 16.
6. G. Hicks, 'The Limits to Privacy' in *American Scholar*, 28, Spring 1959, p. 192.
7. Anthony West, 'Secrets: Why You Need Them' in *Vogue*, 15 August 1967, p. 127.
8. Alan P. Bates, 'Privacy—A useful concept?' in *Social Forces*, 42, May 1964, pp. 432-33.
9. cf. Irma Kurtz, *Loneliness*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1983, p. 39.
10. Leach *et al.* See notes 3-6.
11. Alan P. Bates, *op.cit.*, p. 432; also Alan F. Westin, *Privacy and Freedom*, London, The Bodley Head, 1970, p. 13.

12. Westin, *op.cit.*, p. 16; cf. also William J. Goode, *The Family*, New Jersey, Englewood Cliffs, 1964, pp. 53-54.
13. Alfred R. Lindesmith and Anselm L. Strauss, *Social Psychology*, New York, The Dryden Press, 1956, pp. 213-17.
14. W.C. Middleton, 'The Propensity of Genius to Solitude' in *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, 30, 1932, pp. 325-32.
15. J. Reiman, 'Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood' in *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, no. 6, Fall, 1976, p. 39.
16. Westin, *op.cit.*, p. 34.
17. Charles Fried, *An Anatomy of Values*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970, p. 140.

Public and private morality*

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When we talk in terms of public morality and private morality, a sort of ambiguity stares at us. This ambiguity is indeed less obvious at the level of common sense, since we often use these terms in every-day life without much difficulty in understanding their import. Difficulties, however, start arising when we want to grasp conceptual differences between the two. To many 'publicness' is so ingrained in the semantic core of the term 'morality' that no intelligible view of morality is possible unless it is public. Concepts like 'rule', 'principle', 'law', 'norm', 'criterion' or 'standard' are obviously 'public' in the technical sense. Still, 'public' and 'private' morality have legitimate uses in our every-day transactions, and hence an attempt to determine the nature and scope of these terms would be desirable. There is, of course, the possibility that such an attempt may hopelessly destroy even the minimal clarity, which is available to us on account of the usages that these terms have.

In the absence of any definite and universally agreed upon distinction between the two, what follows may only be considered an exploratory attempt to specify the meanings that these two phrases have and also the respective nature, scope and extent of public and private morality along with their inter-relation. There is, of course, some risk of smuggling my own predilection and idiosyncracies into such an attempted distinction. But this may, to a large extent, be inevitable. In philosophical discussions in general, attempted clarification or description of a term often presupposes a set of theoretical assumptions within which it makes some sense. In ethics, in particular, the distinction between what something is claimed to mean and how it should preferably be used is often more difficult to decide. We ourselves are often unsure whether what we are saying is description of actual senses and meanings certain terms have or we are only making some covert prescriptions and recommendations concerning what ought to be meant by them. The situation becomes all the more piquant when issues concerning sociology or psychology of morals interpenetrate with some meta-ethical problems.

I

Before saying anything in connection with the distinction and relation between

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public and private morality,* I would begin with saying a few words regarding the view which does not treat the term 'private morality' meaningful and may rather hold it as a contradiction in terms. This may be deemed obvious in the light of the meaning of the term 'morality'. It is often understood as a set of rules or principles which regulate or determine human conduct. These rules or principles are taken to be applicable to one's group, community or society which may vary from a small and definite group to the entire humanity. The development of morality is often characterized, among other things, by gradual enlargement of this reference group. Conscious acceptance of generalizability principle is also a mark of a more evolved state of morality. Thus, morality becomes a totality of rules and criteria or norms of man's behaviour within community life. It defines men's duties and obligations to each other as well as to the society. This also brings out the feature of morality as a form of social consciousness in which moral rules and conventions of the society are reflected. Such an interpretation of morality is, indeed, valid as far as it goes, but surely it is not an adequate description of morality. There is a subjective side to it to which I shall refer soon. The above description, however, deepens the contrast between the terms 'morality' and 'private'. Apparently, the difficulties that confront the concept of 'private language' may also (in a somewhat different form) seem to beset the notion of private morality. Various reasons, mostly too familiar to be elaborated, may be advanced against the acceptance of 'private morality' as a meaningful term. 'Morality' (in the present context) is often understood to mean the totality of rules, principles, standpoints and attitudes concerning rights, duties, interests and obligations on the one hand and various conceptions of right and wrong, good and bad, virtue and vice on the other. 'Rights' as justifiable and generally recognized claims, duty or obligation as self-transcending and essentially others-directed, reference to some rules and regulations in our conceptions of right and wrong and the built-in reference to generalizability or universalizability in our concept of 'good' and 'value' are but a few random instances of what is meant by morality. And all this may make the qualifying word 'private' preceding the term 'morality' appear infelicitious. The genesis as well as practice of morality presuppose a social context without which the application of moral rules and principles becomes rootless or at least suspect.

I have said above that such a view of morality does not reveal the complete truth. There is another side to it which emphasizes the personal and the subjective elements in morality. The moral rule or principle is nothing but a ritual unless backed by personal commitment, approval, conviction or ideals whereby one chooses between alternative and often competing value-systems. Without these psychological attitudes and dispositions morality would be devoid of the action-guiding force that makes morality practical. A mere cognitive or rational view of morality fails to explain why a man decides to be moral or plans his actions according to his moral principles. Though mere feelings and emotions reduce morality to one's whims and caprices, without them it would lack the personal concern, conviction, seriousness, tenacity or even faith which make it possible for a man to remain moral at the cost of personal gain or comforts. Any attempt to locate morality on either side of the divide gives a truncated view—a view which makes it either formless or contentless, either lame or blind, either impracticable or not worth practising. It must be located, to use a picturesque metaphor, in the twilight zone.

*At the very outset, it must be noted that the term 'morality' is not used here in the sense in which we talk of 'morality of an action' wherein it means the quality of being right or wrong, good or bad. Preceded by adjectives like 'public' and 'private', it is semantically closer to 'morals'. However, its exact sense is expected to become clear as we proceed with the text.

I shall now try to face the question: 'what is meant by public and private morality?' This obviously involves two distinct questions, and so I shall try to clarify myself first regarding public morality and then follow up by a very brief discussion of private morality.

In one sense, the question 'What is public morality?' has been answered by several present-day writers with respect to what are called situational, contextual or professional ethics. These studies mainly concentrate on medico-legal, socio-political or socio-economic issues. Under these categories we include problems like abortion, euthanasia, bribery, other forms of corruption like nepotism, favouritism or discrimination on the basis of race, colour and religion. In the United States, the Vietnam war, the Watergate scandal and recently what the journalists call, the Irangate (or Iran-Contra) scandal have aroused a keen public interest because of the larger moral principles and public interests involved therein. In India, the Postal Act which empowers the government to intercept and censure letters in the so-called public interest raises similar issues. The alleged kickbacks in the Bofors deal is another example. Dowry and dowry deaths are also felt to be the subject which bothers public conscience and may be readily accepted as proper issues falling under this category. Similarly, a variety of other specific issues affecting a large number of people are taken up under medical ethics, legal ethics or business ethics. But I am presently concerned with a different sort of problem. I am particularly interested in finding some general and pervasive features which can serve the purpose of at least roughly marking off the boundries of public morality as against private. I cannot expect it to be done very neatly, because no such firm line of demarcation can be drawn between the two. Some tentative suggestions can still be made.

In the minimal sense, public morality is concerned with those issues and problems where others' rights are respected or violated. Such a concern about others is often built into the views of ethics or morality found in the writings of men like Kurt Baier, Toulmin and others. In his book *The Moral Point of View*, for example, Baier holds that a man has a moral point of view only if he agrees that rules and laws must be good for everyone alike (cf. pp. 207-08). Toulmin's position in *The Place of Reason in Ethics* also favours such an

approach. Toulmin's two-tier model of ethical reasoning makes conformity to the duties in one's own social code of conduct final and irrevocable till an ambiguity or conflict arises where the concerned code is unabe to issue a clear injunction. In such a case, the principle of general fecundity is appealed to. Such a modified version of deontology as well as that of teleology shows greater inclination towards public morality. Rule-utilitarianism in general has mainly shown sympathy for such an approach. The minimal concept of public morality that is being suggested here is primarily based on the recognition of common interest and obligation. Such a view of morality enjoys to a great extent certain sanctions by the society. I shall return to the role of social sanctions later when I try to show how harmony between public and private morality can be effected. Various natural social institutions play a significant role in the development of our concern for public morality. It is in the background of social institutions that many of our injunctions, prohibitions and permissions for a large class of actions become significant or justifiable. Rituals and customs, becoming a part of our consciousness, also help us in developing a sense of identification with the community or society of which we are an inalienable part. Utilitarianism, through its insistence on the maximization of general good or well-being, takes the stand which is wholly in consonance with what I mean by public morality. It rests more on one's accountability before others and on our attempts to promote the welfare of, what Bentham and Moore called, the sentient beings. If we look at the list of virtues that are generally characterized as moral, some of these come under the purview of public morality. A few can be named here. These are, for instance, as follows: social co-operation, benevolence, altruism, charity, gentleness, impartiality, concern for others' feelings, fairness or justice. Some of these have been institutionalized through certain socio-political forms.

Turning to private morality, it essentially consists of one's own commitments, convictions and total responsibility for all that one chooses, decides upon or undertakes. It is not without any significance that we talk of one's accountability to oneself. Mill's insistence on conscience as the most important sanction of morality or Butler's attempt to put conscience on the pedestal of the highest moral authority are attempts to show that morality is essentially one's own acceptance of certain rules and norms with the sole concern for one's uprightness. Virtues like courage, self-control or temperance, sincerity and integrity are the ones that determine the boundaries of private morality. Theories of ethics which make self-realization and self-development the central concept of morality put a higher premium on the personal or individual element in one's moral development. Nietzsche's concept of will to power, when seen as a prescription for self-overcoming, is often seen as a diabolic attempt to project the aggravated self as the nucleus of moral development. Kierkegaard's stress on the concrete individual and his existential dialectic leading to the irrational choice as an act of faith provide *par excellence* the paradigm case of the most exaggerated sense of private morality. What counts

as the most crucial feature in this approach is the role of moral agent around whom morality revolves. It is the Kantian insistence on the right mode of willing or good motive, honesty to oneself or avoidance of bad faith in the Sartrean sense which is the supreme principle of morality. Private morality need not be understood as an 'internal morality of an intimate personal relationship'. It is complete and successful internalization of the most general and basic principle(s) of morality.

Besides, our employment of the term 'private' with reference to morality may also mean either or both of the following:

(*a*) Acceptance of or acting on a criterion which essentially is private in the sense of its being adumberated as a result of one's own creative choice without any consideration of its conformity or non-conformity with the prevalent social mores and conventions. To this extent it may also be independent of any consideration of social approval or disapproval. Such criteria or values are the individual's own creations in the Sartrean sense, though these do not preclude the possibility of their acceptance by others.

(*b*) A moral criterion may be applicable to private contexts, e.g. suicide, euthanasia or marriage, which may be decided upon on grounds of an individual's right and freedom to decide the cause of his/her own life. Such cases often bring about a complex battery of arguments which draw both from public and private norms and considerations.

II

Having made an attempt to outline some relevant features of what we can term public and private morality, I shall now try to say something about the way in which the two are related. What has been said above encourages me to hold further that public and private morality are not be to contradistinguished but juxtaposed. Indeed, what makes the complete harmony between the two problematic is the fact that at times there arises some conflict between the two. Hence the aim of moral development is to overcome this tension to the maximum extent possible. Public morality is essentially an extension of private morality without which we can never arrive at a cogent and consistent view of public morality. A particular concept of man and his relation to society would surely be needed to achieve this harmony. Constant inflow and outflow to and from either are needed to reinforce both public and private morality. On the one hand, a strong sense of commitment to onself and to public good is a necessary prerequisite for public morality. On the other hand, unless the norms of public and social morality are adequately internalized, there may not be adequate justification for all the elements of private morality.

If public and private morality express two totally conflicting and completely divergent attitudes, it may appear futile and pointless to attempt to

arrive at some sort of *tour de force* conciliation between the two. What is necessary is to see whether both are at bottom motivated by some similar fundamental attitudes and convictions. The unresolved conflict between the two may tear us apart by creating a schizophrenic state of personality. That public morality must be underscored by convictions and commitments which belong to the realm of private morality is evident from the fact that self-interest is not always best served by public morality. One has often to stand firm not only against external pressures and forces working against the adherence to moral principles, but one's own temptations and impulses are sometimes a greater force to reckon with. When no war goes on against the external foes, the battle against oneself may still be continuing. Kant attempted to supply an effective weapon to mankind in his concept of duty through which man can overcome the unruly impulses and instincts. The dictum that 'kingdom of heaven is within you' or the assertion that the greatest battle is always fought inside man's self are metaphors which seek to illustrate the same point. Most of the religions for this reason warn us against the sources of sin and evil that lie in us and which, if not controlled, can subvert any moral system. Neitzsche was speaking in a religious vein when he was asserting that the highest manifestation of will to power is man's capacity to overcome himself. The ideal for him is not brute physical, military power; rather it is the moral power or the force of one's own being which is the acme of will to power.

But at the same time the necessities of social life require that our own principles and policies, besides meeting our own approval, should also meet public approval. The practical precept that it is not enough to be just or fair but that one must also appear to be just and fair is not devoid of relevance. It highlights the need for private morality to try, as far as possible, to conform to the demands of public morality. There is no inconsistency in holding that, though morality is a social phenomenon, it is rooted in an individual's sincere acceptance and approval of the principles which ought to govern interpersonal transactions. Morality may be understood as a person's principled reaction to interpersonal situations, arising out of his well-structured or ill-structured picture of good life. One's adherence to a set of moral principles is a more or less deliberate resolution to live one's life in one way rather than the other. But man's life must be seen within the context of a social structure and arrangement. Social relations define a man, and, a man's life therefore, is always, to use the existentialist phrase, a *mit-sein*, a 'being-with-others'. Hence one's decision to live in his own way has to co-exist with similar decisions of others, and one would obstruct others' rights to do this only at the cost of getting one's own obstructed. From one's sincerity and honesty to one's own principles, and thereby to oneself, a positive concern for others is not a far cry.

The same conclusion appears to be readily available to us from the nature of rights and duties and from the reality of social institutions. This, I presume, has been argued and shown with adequate cogency that rights and duties are

not merely reciprocal but both have their origin within social dynamics. Without, therefore, arguing for it, I shall almost dogmatically assert that an important aspect of morality, both in the public and private senses which I have tried to delineate, can often be seen as a set of socially recognized rights and duties. Rights as legitimate claims must be recognized as such before anyone can be said to have them. The fact of recognition or acceptance by others makes it imperative that at least two persons must be involved to make the concept of right viable. Of course, we only say that we have such and such rights but the underlying implication is too obvious to be stated. The act of acceptance or recognition need not be explicit. It may be a part of one's social ethos and may be unreflectively accepted. But this does not suppress the fact that rights must be recognized. And when we assert our rights, we also assert *eo ipso* that someone (either an individual or a group/community/society) ought to recognize or accept them. Similarly, an obligation or duty is what one owes to another. Anyone who is said to have a duty is considered to be under an obligation (in some sense) to someone towards whom he has a duty. Duty to others in this sense is a primitive concept, and duty to oneself is parasitic on the former. Thus, it can be said that, when I speak of my rights and duties my rights are what others owe to me while my duties are what I owe to others. This binds everyone with everyone else at least in a given society.

Once we try to determine what can be called the moral domain, the need for harmony between the private and public aspects of morality becomes more evident at every level. It may not be possible in this paper to deal with most of the aspects of moral life, but I shall refer to only a few issues to make my point a bit clear. In addition to what has been discussed above, I would merely mention in brief the significance of ideals and their role at individual as well as social levels, the role of social organization in realization of the ideals, and the function of sanctions.

One of the most obvious ingredients of the moral domain is the presence and overriding nature of the ideals. These ideals are supposed to take full control of our deliberations and choices in moral situations. They take priority over our desires and caprices. In case of any conflict between 'I ought' and 'I desire/want', the former is expected to take precedence over the latter. Moral philosophers, like Mill, who have tried to keep as close as possible to the facts of human nature, have gone to suggest that 'desirable' is only 'I desire' in conjunction with the universalizability principle. What 'I desire' is morally justifiable if it is at the same time what everyone ought to desire. It may appear to be a variant of Kantian principle that a subjective principle of action, in order to be moral, must meet the requirements of an objective (rational) principle. Kant, of course, advocated it as a formal requirement, whereas Mill was exploring the possibility of an empirical generalization. Nevertheless, both were trying to arrive at the same result.

Our adherence to ideals also requires us to have a reasonably adequate knowledge of what they mean in practice. Moral ideals are not merely orna-

mental curios in our intellectual drawing-room. They are accepted to be practised in the real life-situations. And since our living is in the midst of others, the co-operating and communicating individuals, the practical requirements involves *empathy* with others. The recognition of others as equally important and participating members of one's community overrides the vicissitudes of personal caprices. The principles of benevolence (not necessarily altruism) and fairness may be shown to be rooted in the above consideration.

More importantly, we are also pleasantly aware of the positive role which social institutions or organizations play in our realization of these ideals. Various limitations, prohibitions, pressures, approvals or disapprovals determine the boundaries of moral behaviour within a society by establishing a sort of order and communication among its members. There is no pre-established harmony between private and public interests or public and private good. This can, of course, be realized by the internalization of values and virtues through the process of social interaction. It requires a particular form of social arrangement to minimize the conflict between private and public interests. An unjust, non-egalitarian and exploitative socio-economic order is bound to deepen such a conflict. A just and egalitarian society, on the other hand, facilitates the process of internalization of social norms and values, because it would cognitively and emotionally predispose individuals to identify themselves with most of the fellow beings at least in their society. But, on the other hand, the ideals constitute the justification for the existence of any form of social organization. Social institutions require certain rules which must be observed, duties must be performed and rights and obligations are to be acknowledged. All this presupposes individual's acceptance of and commitment to certain ideals. Apart from concern for others' interests and welfare, some people accept self-respect or self-esteem as an extremely important feature of a moral problem. It may suffice here only to say that this is, of course, a consequence of the ultimate justification of one's actions in one's own eyes. Accountability to oneself or a sense of authenticity and genuineness marks the real moral temper, and distinguishes it from mechanical observance of rules and customs. This is the soul of what I mean by private morality. In public morality, as William James has argued in his *Will to Believe and Other Essays* (1897), 'the guiding principle ... is simply to satisfy at all times as many demands as we can'. Perry, like James, also tries to bring about *concurrence* on moral differences and issues. For Perry moral conflict can be resolved 'when and only when, the wills of all are so attuned that each is content with a situation in which provision is made for all' (*General Theory of Value*, 1926, p. 672). Perry's ethical theory is, indeed, an attempt to highlight the problems of public morality more comprehensively than those of private morality. His principle of 'inclusiveness' of maximum interests culminates in his concept of *harmonious happiness*.

To conclude, morality must be seen as lying between the two models of ethical life—one presented by Kierkegaard and the other by the utilitarians.

Kierkegaard's lonely, though concrete, individual cannot find himself in tune with the real problems of social life and is unable to find a way out of himself, and reach out to others in a reciprocal, participative enterprise which is what moral life is. Nor is the moral life one of cool calculative deliberation based on an algorithm of gains and losses of pleasures—a view which at least seems to be present in some formulations of utilitarianism. To find a more appealing model and more effective solution, one may look towards Marcel or Buber. Or, going back into ancient thought, one may find it in the Buddhist concept of *karuṇā*. The all-encompassing compassion in this sense may cut across the superficial barriers between individuals and can satisfy the demands of one and all without any disharmony.

Private good and public welfare should not be seen as an unholy alliance between prudence and external moral requirements. Though all policies must be based on morality, morality in all cases may not satisfy the demands of an effective policy. 'Honesty is the best policy' is not one of the basic or even a substantive moral principle, though it may be an aid to acceptance of honesty as a virtue for non-moral reasons.

The tension between private and public spheres of our moral life continues along with a growing realization on the part of the individuals that there is a private domain of our decisions, choices and actions which, though not necessarily at variance with public good, must be jealously guarded and should not be unnecessarily interfered with by others. Rather, social progress depends on the recognition of a considerable domain of the privacy of moral decisions. Marriage, birth control or surgical operations are the instances where individuals' consent is essential, though they have wide social repurcussions. To what extent the society or the state should take upon itself the right to interfere in private domain is a question which has always been a major point at issue between the protagonists of the open and the closed societies. On one end of the pole lies the hell of totalitarianism and on the other the abyss of anarchy. The principle of mean is as golden as ever.

Sartre on pre-reflective consciousness

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In Sartre and in phenomenological literature generally, consciousness is seen to *require* an object to become manifest. Thus, in itself, consciousness is considered incomplete. Sartre describes it as a 'vacancy', a 'lack', and even a 'nothingness'. Consciousness 'takes a point of view' in relation to its object, towards which it is also said to be 'directed'. The object is *external* to consciousness. Consciousness is the subject which knows the object. Thus, when I look out of the window and see the mountains in front of me, I have what Sartre calls the 'unreflected' awareness of the mountains. But this notion of consciousness as unreflected awareness of an object external to it is again incomplete. To complete it we have to account for the fact that 'consciousness is consciousness through and through'.[1] Sartre accounts for it by adding to the notion the characteristics of self-awareness. The unreflected consciousness, he says, is simultaneously conscious of itself. The latter consciousness he calls 'the pre-reflective consciousness'. Thus he says:

> ...the necessary and sufficient condition for a knowing consciousness to be knowledge of its object, is that it be consciousness of itself as being that knowledge. This is a necessary condition, for if my consciousness were not consciousness of the table, it would then be consciousness of that table without consciousness of being so. In other words, it would be a consciousness ignorant of itself, an unconscious ... which is absurd.[2]

The claim made here concerning the knowing consciousness, then, is to the effect that it is always and necessarily conscious of itself.

(1) The pre-reflective consciousness, however, is said to 'immediate and non-cognitive'.
(2) By calling it non-cognitive Sartre indicates that 'consciousness' appearance to itself is neither like perception nor like reflection.

We cannot treat this relationship on the model of subject-object relationship involving factual knowledge of anything. Rather, consciousness is aware of itself, as it were, *inwardly*. Thus he says:

> The reduction of consciousness to knowledge in fact involves our introducing into consciousness the subject-object dualism which is typical of knowledge. But if we accept the law of the knower-known dyad, then a third term will be necessary in order for the knower to become known in

> turn, and we will be faced with this dilemma: Either we stop at any one term of the series ... In this case the totality of the phenomenon falls into the unknown...Or else we affirm the necessity of an infinite regress (*idea ideae ideae,* etc.), which is absurd.[3]

In the present paper, I would first forward arguments to defend claim (1) and to support the argument given by Sartre for claim (2). I would then offer an explanation of how it is possible for consciousness to be aware of itself non-positionally, and what exactly it involves.

For the claim (1) it is generally agreed among critics that Sartre's argument as it appears above is unconvincing. For, quite simply, a consciousness which is 'ignorant of itself' need not be unconscious, since it may be conscious of other things. Indeed, *ex hypothesi,* it is already conscious of something which it 'posits' as an object and which it knows. It is only unconscious, or better, not conscious, of itself. Thus, Danto says that Sartre's 'only one, very condensed argument in support of his claim ... is exceedingly poor and over-looks the essential point about consciousness, namely that it is always about something'.[4] However, Sartre is putting forward an important thesis here which could easily be undermined by a quick dismissal of the above argument. First, I do not think that Danto is justified in saying that the above argument is the only one offered by Sartre. He has others too. One such argument can be adduced from the consideration of what he says about 'reflective consciousness', i.e. the consciousness which retrospectively reflects upon a past consciousness.

> For example, I want to remember a certain landscape perceived yesterday from the train, it is possible for me to bring back the memory of that landscape as such. But I can also recollect that I was seeing that landscape.[5]

The fact that such recollection is possible shows that when Sartre perceived the landscape from the train he must also have been aware, simultaneously, of seeing the landscape. In general, if one can recall having been in a certain perceptual state, then, since memory is a *causal* notion, he must have been aware of being in that perceptual state at the very time of being in that perceptual state.

Another argument to show that the pre-reflective consciousness exists simultaneously to the unreflected consciousness can be found in his oft-quoted example of counting cigarettes in a case:

> If anyone questioned me ... 'What are you doing there?' I should reply atonce, 'I am counting'. This reply aims not only at the instantaneous consciousness which I can achieve by reflection but at those fleeting consciousness which have passed without being reflected-on, those which are

> for ever not-reflected-on in my immediate past. Thus ... it is the non-reflective consciousness which renders the reflection possible; there is a pre-reflective cogito which is the condition of the Cartesian cogito. At the same time it is the non-thetic consciousness of counting which is the very condition of my act of adding. If it were otherwise, how would the addition be the unifying theme of my consciousness?... it must be present to itself, not as a thing but as an operative intention which can exist only as the revealing-revealed ... to use an expression of Heidegger's.[6]

The above argument shows quite clearly that, in a serial activity such as of counting, one is all along pre-reflectively aware of the conscious acts involved in counting. Moreover, it also shows clearly that, in so far as one is reflectively aware of oneself as the one who is counting, one must already be so aware immediately and non-cognitively. Self-knowledge cannot be the result of reflection alone, of consciousness upon itself, in the manner of Descartes' *cogito.* However, it must be admitted that such arguments are limited in scope. The first one above, for example, shows the existence of the pre-reflective consciousness only in those cases in which we are able to recall experiencing a mental act. And the second one is limited to serial acts. What Sartre needs to justify his position is a general argument to the effect that *all* knowing consciousness, whether or not one can recall them, *must* be simultaneously non-cognitively aware of itself. Sartre wants to say that, if a knowing consciousness is ignorant of itself, then there is something absurd. I wish to argue that, with certain qualifications, Sartre can be seen to be right in essence.

In order to see this clearly, we must spell out what is involved in the notion of a knowing consciousness. But, first, it is important to remember that Sartre is considering only the knowing consciousness. Thus, both—a consciousness which is not knowledge and knowledge which is not consciousness—fall outside the scope of this discussion. 'Not all consciousness is knowledge (there are states of affective consciousness, for example), but all knowing consciousness can be knowledge only of its object'.[7]

Now, consider the case of a visual perception in which John comes to know that there exists a maple tree in such and such place. He may have noticed a lot of other things about the tree. But first and foremost his knowing consciousness signifies knowledge of the existence of the tree, which, in turn, involves consciousness of its spatio-temporal identity. For this consciousness to have the status of *knowledge,* it will not be considered sufficient that it were simply causally efficacious in appropriate circumstances; rather, it will be considered necessary that it rendered it possible for the subject to use his knowledge, subsequently, intentionally. Thus, the knowing-conscious-episode must at least put the subject *in a position* to be able to utilize his knowledge in future self-consciously or minimally in case of a human subject to enable him to make a claim to the effect that he possessed that knowledge. Thus, it would be very odd if John, other things being equal, if need arose, could not, *in*

principle, possibly tell what he knew. It would be odd in a way in which it will not be odd to say that John knew *X,* but he did not *know* that he knew it.

For the above useability requirement to be met, John must be, *in principle,* able to make appropriate recall of his knowledge of the existence of the maple tree. But since his recall is to be self-consciously utilized, John must also appreciate that what he recalls is his knowledge which he came to acquire on a certain occasion, even though he may not be able to recall the details of the occasion. That is, John must be able to say, as it were, in his heart: 'I remember the maple tree.' But this type of recall implies that what he remembers is *seeing* the maple tree in such and such place. And this, in turn, since 'memory' is a *causal* notion, implies that John must have been aware of seeing the maple tree at the time of seeing the maple tree. If this were not so, John's knowing consciousness will be treated on a par with a *mere* event, which may be causally efficacious in a variety of ways but which could not put John in a position to remember a personal experience. Thus, in order to be a knowing consciousness, it is necessary that one must be simultaneously aware of the act which results in knowledge, even though in actual fact one may never recall it. This is Sartre's claim (1). And, further, it is clear that here the talk of awareness of the knowing consciousness does not necessarily imply a positional awareness of it, as it is contended in claim (2). A non-cognitive awareness of the act constituting the knowing consciousness is sufficient to account for the causality of the memory of the experience in question. That is exactly the sense of 'pre-reflective consciousness' required by Sartre. He asks, 'what is this consciousness of consciousness?' and makes it quite clear that is not to be identified with 'an *idea ideae* in the manner of Spinoza'. Unfortunately, however, when Sartre spells out the contents of the pre-reflective consciousness, he seems to err. For he says, as noted above, that the knowing consciousness should 'be conscious of itself as being that knowledge'. That is, the content of consciousness' consciousness of itself consists of being a certain sort of knowledge. This would naturally be interpreted to mean that the pre-reflective consciousness has propositional content. That is, in being conscious of itself *as* a certain state of knowledge it knows *that* such and such is the case about an individual consciousness, namely, itself. At any rate, according to the critics, the analysis of the pre-reflective *cogito* yields only this interpretation, and, therefore, suggests only a reflective self-awareness. However, we need not be driven to this conclusion. The notion of the non-cognitive self-awareness is an important discovery of Sartre. What required to be explained is what exactly it involves. That is, the question which Sartre's treatment of pre-reflective consciousness raises is: 'In what sense can the consciousness' intuitive, non-dualistic knowledge of itself be called self-knowledge?'

When consciousness is pre-reflectively aware of itself, Sartre suggests that consciousness has an immanent self-consciousness. But the thesis that in self-apprehension consciousness apprehends itself *as* being a certain knowing consciousness seems to suggest a subsequent reflective consciousness. This is

particularly so, because it does not make sense to talk of consciousness' being aware of itself *as an X* until the *X* has actually come into being. If the pre-reflective consciousness is to deliver the unreflected consciousness to itself 'as the being which we have to be', then the latter has to be delivered as a 'given'. To avoid this conclusion, we have to redefine the contents of what is delivered to self pre-reflectively.

The obvious implication of the above criticism is that the pre-reflective consciousness should not be conceived as revealing self-identity, involving, as it were, a judgment about itself of the form 'I am this knowing consciousness'. It should be conceived as a self-awareness which does not *deliver* to itself the contents of its identity in terms of being a particular state of knowing consciousness. The pre-reflective consciousness must be aware of the knowing consciousness and thus, *in fact,* be aware of an aspect of itself, but without identifying itself in terms of knowledge, without *knowing* itself to be *a such-and-such.* In this sense, consciousness is a mere presence to itself. But, surely, it will be thought, there must be *some* content *delivered* to self to merit it being considered a case of self-knowledge. The mere fact that consciousness is, in fact, aware of an aspect of itself without knowing it to be so is not sufficient to count for self-awareness. There must be something 'realized' as *revealed* to consciousness in its exposure to itself. What is this something? I wish to contend that consciousness' presence to itself is delivered to itself simply as 'being-consciousness'. In this, consciousness is not aware of *a* being or its own being *as thus and so.* Its non-cognitive awareness is realized as a consciousness of *being per se,* simultaneously to its presence to its object, which is realized as the knowledge of the object. This consciousness is an intuition devoid of any personal identity. That is, consciousness is aware of the knowing consciousness without knowing that it is so. In consciousness, awareness of itself, all that is delivered to itself is *being without content,* without identity. That is, the specifically pre-reflective dimension of consciousness represents simply the consciousness of being, which is, in fact, *presence* to its unreflected dimension without the knowledge of the contents of that dimension. It is a consciousness of being without beginning and without end and without identifying itself with itself in its aspect of the unreflected consciousness. Thus, strictly speaking, there is no pre-reflective *cogito.* The pre-reflective consciousness does not involve, as we have seen, a recognition of identity of a state of consciousness, bringing in reference to the concept of *person.* And, in any case, the latter notion is not the same as the notion of consciousness.

This interpretation also conforms to Sartre's conception of consciousness as non-ecological. For self-awareness reduced to the consciousness of being without identity has no *I* inhabitating it. A judgment about self may, indeed, be made instantaneously in reflection, giving rise to an ego exemplifying the self-concept expressed in the form 'I am this knowledge, this consciousness'. But this cannot represent the pre-reflective dimension of consciousness.

Perhaps, this point is further clarified in answering the other important

question concerning how it is possible for consciousness to be aware of itself non-positionally. In answering it, I wish to draw a distinction between 'conceptual' and 'non-conceptual' consciousness by reference to the Kantian notion of 'experience'. According to Kant, for experience, in the proper sense of the term in which it involves knowledge, to be possible, a 'manifold of intuitions' has to be subsumed under a concept.[9] Thus, for the qualitative contents of a perceptual awareness to be converted into awareness involving knowledge, it has to be organized in terms of a concept. Normally, the upsurge of consciousness is instantaneously conceptualized. But there is no logical difficulty in imagining a being whose consciousness at the primordial level never gets conceptualized. Perhaps, an infant's consciousness is normally like this. In such a case, one's awareness will not yield *knowledge* of the object one is, in fact, aware of, but it could still be causally operative in a variety of ways.

Thus, it is possible to drive a wedge between a bare perceptual awareness and conceptual consciousness. The upsurge of consciousness in its purely phenomenological aspect is obviously a function of causal exchange between the object of consciousness and the conscious being. That is, it is not a product of thought. Rather, it is the other way round. The ability to form concepts to fit the qualitative contents of experience presupposes consciousness. Consciousness is something which *happens* to a being, while in conceptualizing the mind is *active*. Whatever may be the mechanism involved here, it is clear that the emergence of consciousness, in itself, is an impersonal affair, which becomes knowledge only when it is thought of under a concept.

Now applying the taxanomy sketched above, we can see that the pre-reflective consciousness is possible as a non-conceptual awareness of a knowing consciousness. Since it does not posit the unreflected consciousness, it cannot be described as 'the consciousness *that* I am this knowledge'. It is simply a non-conceptual apprehension of the unreflected consciousness without delivering its contents to itself in terms of konwledge. In general, any conceptualized perceptual state of consciousness must, at the same time, be a non-conceptual awareness of itself. But, in the latter respect, its delivered content amounts to simply being-consciousness. If this analysis is correct, it somewhat modifies Sartre's well-known contention that 'the only mode of existence for a consciousness is to have the consciousness that it exists.'[10] We now see that consciousness exists, more appropriately as a consciousness of being without any explicit reference to itself, simultaneously to the consciousness of its object. It is only in reflection that it can know itself as *consciousness*.

Notes and References

1. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, Hazel Barnes, (trans.), London, Methuen & Co., 1972, p. xxxi.
2. *Ibid.*, p. xxviii.

3. *Ibid.*
4. Arthur C. Danto, *Sartre*, London, Fontana/Collins, 1975, p. 59.
5. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Transcendence of the Ego*, F. Williams and R. Kirkpatrick (trans. with Introduction) New York, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, n.d., p. 43.
6. *Being and Nothingness*, p. xxix.
7. *Ibid.*, p. xxviii.
8. *Ibid.*
9. See his *Critique of Pure Reason*, A51/B75.
10. *D'Imagination* (7th edn), Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1969, p. 126.

Approaches to the theory of *puruṣārthas*

HUSSERL, HEIDEGGER AND RICOEUR*

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It is almost a truistic mode of description of human life in Indian philosophy to say that there are four basic aspirations of human beings, namely: pleasure (*kāma*), wealth (*artha*), righteous conduct (*dharma*), and liberation or emancipation (*mokṣa*). The four *puruṣārthas*, as they are called, are said to be distinctive or typical pursuits of human life effort. The doctrine of the *puruṣārthas* has a certain surface simplicity or obviousness about it. One's first reaction is to take it as an empirical representation of human values. But when one responds to this in a naturalistic or descriptive manner, one encounters a number of puzzling features of the doctrine.

The first difficulty has to do with the flexibility of the categories; *kāma* or desire, for instance, ranges all the way from sensuous appetites to what Kant would call pure or disinterested delight or the intellectual pleasures of Plato's *Philebus*.[1] Any felt-satisfaction, any experience of well-being could be seen to exemplify one of the modes of pleasure. If, on the other hand, one seeks to restrict the range of pleasure and confine it to what one may call gratification of impulses, taken purely as impulses, then there is nothing in human nature which may be called a mere instinct or impulse. As Plato points out, the purely sensuous without the admixture of the intellect is hardly human.[2] In all our desires there is a certain mediation, a certain complexity, such that human pleasures are qualitatively distinct from animal gratification; one of the aspects of differentiation is the mediation brought about by language. Hence, if taken in isolation or abstraction, pleasure is infrahuman; but, taken in all its complexity and mediations it seems to cover everything. In the one case it is not even a part, and in the other case it seems to be the whole of human existence. In this extended sense, one could say that there is only one *puruṣārtha—kāma puruṣārtha*.

Similar remarks apply to *artha* also. Taken in a very restricted sense, it seems to convey only material possessions and their production. But obviously this unduly restricts the meaning of wealth in the sense of a life asset. Taken functionally, any asset which enhances the power of man could be said to be wealth. After all even material possessions become wealth only in this functional sense; as Marx would say, use value is the condition of possibility of exchange value.[3] But taken as life assets or what in welfare economics is term-

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ed human capital, then all powers and talents could claim to be *artha*. Here, again, in the extended sense, *artha* seems to be signifying a totality.

The case of *dharma* and *mokṣa* are rather different. Should we take the moral point of view as limited to relationships with others, and thus leave out the context of self-formation and self-discipline? But without this personal context of the formation of the self, without this inwardness, relationships with others or social relationships may be mere ritualistic conformity or legalistic forms. The moral as moral seems to require this inner orientation. But once we widen the context of the moral by taking into consideration the dimension of relationship to the self, i.e. once the moral is seen as self-formation, then the boundaries between *dharma* and *mokṣa* seem to be blurred. Emancipation is precisely a mode of this self-formation.

But the emancipatory orientation poses another problem also for us, and, in order to grasp this aspect of the matter, we can note an asymmetry between *mokṣa* and the other *puruṣārthas*. What could be said to be the goal of the emancipatory interest? If by a goal, we mean an object or an externality, emancipation is precisely the overcoming of all such externalities or objectifications. It is not directed to a thing, object or condition as, for example, *kāma* and *artha* seem to be. The goal here or, to use Husserlian terminology, the noema of the emancipatory interest can only be seen in terms, not of objects to be possessed but as a mode of being; *mokṣa*, it could be said, is not *having* but *being*.

But is this true only of *mokṣa*? Is it the case that there is a fundamental rift, a radical separation in the domain of the *puruṣārthas*, such that some of them are in the mode of having and others in the mode of being? The consequence of accepting such a radical contrast would be that *mokṣa* would be totally disconnected with others; the mode of being would be accessible only by a repression of having. One could perhaps give a foundation to such a separation in terms of Heidegger's contrast between the ontic and the ontological;[4] one could say that the other *puruṣārthas* are ontic pursuits while *mokṣa* is an ontological illumination—a self-understanding rather than a worldly activity.

But where does one place *dharma* now? If it, too, is ontic, *mokṣa* would appear to be beyond the conceptual horizons of the moral; but if so, why is it said that a moral preparation, a discipline of one-self or moral formation of oneself is a *sine qua non* of emancipation?

Deeper still, is this radical separation of *being* and *having* adequate to the phenomenology of desire, to take the polar contrast as a test case? In this connection, Kant's remarks on the subjectivity of pleasure are illuminating.[5] In Section 3 of the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant remarks that the feeling of pleasure is purely subjective. In judging something to be pleasant we are in no way, according to Kant, concerned with the object but only with the mode of our subjectivity. In our terms, pleasure is not a having but a mode of being. To find something as pleasurable is to be in a certain mode of relationship,

and it is this mode of being in the world which is the object of desire. As Hegel remarks, in all desire there is the issue of recognition. Similar remarks apply to the other two also. *Artha*, too, is not merely the object produced but a certain mode of relationship to such objects. It is to be in the world in the form of a labouring and productive consciousness and will, what Marx would call being as *praxis*. The goal here, too, is a certain relationship, a certain *vis-à-vis* relation to the world. It is in this sense that it could claim to be a life orientation. Similarly, the moral is all the more clearly, a mode of being rather than a facticity. The moral is a point of view, an orientation of understanding and will as much as their consequences; the intention, too, is a constitutive element of the moral, even if one were not to go all the way with Kant and hold that it is the sole determinant.

It appears that all of them are properly described as orientations or human positions rather than mere externalities. This characteristic of being integral modes of being or forms of life can also be seen in terms of the fact that each of them is capable of mobilizing all the faculties or powers of men. In the orientation of desire, for example, there is a distinctive and typical formation of perception, of thought and understanding, of effort and will and, of course, of feelings. Similarly, each of these perspectives has its own typical modes of conceptual framing, its characteristic language. This totalizing characteristic of these life orientations suggests that we must think of them, not as separate interests but as formative powers that shape the totality of human nature. In the terminology of Heidegger, which would become increasingly salient as we proceed, we may describe them as modes of *being in the world*.[6]

Husserlian Introduction: The Noesis and the Noema of the *Puruṣārthas*

As an introduction to the theme of the *puruṣārthas* as modes of being in the world, we may begin with a phenomenological introduction to these formative orientations. The justification for looking at the theory of the *puruṣārthas* from the point of view of Husserlian phenomenology is the fact that in each one of them there is, as our previous discussion has suggested, an intentional structure. In the phenomenon of desire, for example, there is a modulation of the desiring subject, a certain characteristic style of consciousness directed upon a certain feature or features of the world, which, in that gaze of the desiring consciousness, appear as the objects of desire; in the terminology of phenomenology, it is in this intentional relationship of desire that the object of desire gets constituted. Similarly, the productive, wilful, task-sensitive orientation grasps objects as *artha*. In the two other modes also, we may discern a similar attunement of consciousness and a certain experienced significance or meaning which is accessible only through that modality of consciousness. It is the intentional structure of the *puruṣārthas* that makes possible the application of the noetic-noematic analysis of Husserlian phenomenology.

Husserl's analysis of the structures of the life-world is guided precisely by this principle of noetic-noematic correlation.[7] His analysis proceeds in two inter-connected steps or stages. First, Husserl describes certain basic structural features of the life-world with the intention of showing the type of meaning or experiential significance, the type of objectivities possible in that domain. This may be called the *noematic pole* of the analysis as the purpose now is to exhibit the type of objects involved in that kind of experience. Husserl calls the object as intended, the *noema* of the intending act.[8] Secondly, in so far as any and every noematic feature or aspect is presented by way of specific acts, which are correlated with it, the analysis turns to the subjective or the *noetic pole*.[9] Here Husserl describes the complex connections and combinations of the various acts of consciousness by which the noema are constituted. The important point to note about the phenomenological method is the correlation between the noetic and the noematic analysis. This correlation can be described in the form of two principles of correspondence. The first states that to every significant aspect of the noema there corresponds a certain specific subjective mode of appropriating that significance. The second principle of correspondence states further that such modes of meaning can be grasped only by the appropriate forms of noesis; and further that for every distinction at the level of the noema there is a corresponding and founding distinction at the level of the noesis. It is this principle of correspondence which leads Husserl to say that the object is constituted in and by the intentional consciousness.[10]

Using this framework in the context of the theory of the *puruṣārthas* allows us to raise a number of significant issues. Taking the example of desire, we may formulate some of these issues as examples of what can be done within the framework. What is the noesis of desire? Remembering that the noetic pole is itself a complex manifold of a variety of acts, we could spell out that question in greater detail as below: what are the modes of perception, of feeling and understanding which make up the noesis of desire? What mode of combination or synthesis is involved in organizing these acts into the unity of desire? In this synthesis of desire, which is the dominant element? Is it the feeling or the understanding? How are we to understand noetic dominance and subordination? Is this dominance itself reflected in the experience of desire or is it something hidden in desire which only a later theoretical analysis can discover in it? If it is given in the experience of desire itself, how is it recognized? If, on the other hand, it is discoverable only *post facto* by another type of consciousness, is it the case, as Hegel would argue, that desire postulates a self-consciousness which, however, falls outside of it?[11] When we remember that similar issues may be raised with regard to each one of the *puruṣārthas*, we can come to see the range of possibilities that a phenomenological framework opens out for us.

Turning to the noematic side of the situation, we can ask: what specifically are the structures of desire? How does the desiring consciousness apprehend

the objects? How do such objects appear within the horizon of desire? And when they do so, what significance do they acquire? What kind of valuational meaning is invested in the object when it is appropriated by desire? How is this unity of the meaning of desire reflected in the multiplicity of objects of desire?

But even more important than these noetic-nometic inquiries are the questions of correlation and correspondence between them. It seems to me that one of the most important gains of using a phenomenological frame of reference is that, within this kind of conceptual map it is possible to describe the unity of the manifold made possible by the principle of correspondence. There are two main directions in which, under the guidance of the correspondence principle, we may explore this unity. On the one hand, we may ask: how does the world appear to a desiring consciousness? What aspect or dimension of reality is disclosed in the intentionality of desire? On the other hand, we may also ask: how does the desiring consciousness appear to itself? What aspects or dimensions of subjectivity are revealed under the exigency of desire? The first set of questions asks, in effect, what the world must be like if it is to be the object of desire; while the second set of questions asks what the subject or the self must be like if it is to be capable of desire. Taken together, the two questions enable us to pose the basic issue of the status of desire *vis-à-vis* the world. It is in this sense that phenomenology can serve as a threshold to the question of the *puruṣārthas* as modes of being in the world. Similarly, in the second context of productive activity, an ontological as well as an anthropological dimension of analysis is opened out. Thus, the world appears as a value created by labour, a domain of objects which acquires the significance of life assets; while the subject appears as a productive, value-creating being of *praxis*. In the context of the moral also, on the one hand, we have the presentation of the subject as an ethically formed will and intention, as a moral character formed by habits of right action and modes of practical reason, capable of a peculiar *sui generis* recognition of the authority of the moral law; on the other hand, to such a morally formed consciousness the world appears as a *dharmakṣetra*, a domain of obligations, and other subjects appear as members of a moral republic. And, lastly, in the context of the emancipatory interest also, on the one hand, we have the subjective modality of a consciousness experiencing the need for transcendence, of a certain orientation in thought and feeling towards the surpassing of facticity and situatedness; and, on the other hand, there is the disclosure of a possible mode of existence beyond these ontic contingencies, a disclosure of the ontological in the very mode of the ontic itself.

It, therefore, appears that in every one of these orientations, the principle of the noetic-noematic correlation reveals the subjective as well as the objective, the anthropological and the ontological dimensions of human existence. The conceptual framework of these orientations, therefore, presents the idea of the *puruṣārthas* as modes of being, as forms of man's being in the world,

as Heidegger would say. With this idea of modes of being, we may cross over the threshold and consider the existential understanding of these life-orientations as structures of the Dasein.

Heideggerian Introduction: *Puruṣārthas* as Modes of Being in the World

Heidegger analyses the basic structures of man's being in the world into three component forms: *situationality, understanding* and *discourse*. Situatedness is the mode of being concerned with what one is and has been; understanding is the mode of being concerned with what one can and will to be. The former is one's 'facticity', i.e. the concrete circumstances and contexts in which one finds one-self, the latter is one's 'projection' into the future, into the set of possibilities which one can choose to realize. Discourse brings together and articulates facticity and projection.[12] It is this articulation by discourse that gives unity to the mode of being in the world. Heidegger claims that these structures are universally present in all human existence; as such they are properly called 'ontological' rather than ontic, which stands for the particular and variable aspects of human life.

The framework of Dasein analytic may be useful for our discussion of the *puruṣārthas* also from two points of view. First, in terms of its emphasis on understanding, or what Heidegger calls *verstehen*, and secondly in terms of discourse; *verstehen* or understanding is the way of appropriating the specific existential significance of a situation. Connected with the theory of *puruṣārthas*, we may now work out a specific hermeneutics of the *puruṣārthas*, a distinctive mode of understanding and interpreting each one of these life-orientations. In *kāma*, for distance, a specific and unique way of understanding the human condition is available, which makes accessible a specific meaning of ourselves in the context of desire. Similarly, corresponding to each one of the *puruṣārthas*, there is a distinctive mode of *verstehen*, a specific style of making sense of the situation peculiar to that point of view or perspective. In this sense, the *puruṣārthas* are four forms of the hermeneutics of Dasein, ways of man's self-understanding.

This self-understanding is spelt out by way of a discourse or forms of language appropriate to it, such that in the second aspect, the *puruṣārthas* appear as forms of language, each articulating a distinctive perspective, each regulated by a distinctive conceptual framework and categorial distinctions specific to it. The concept of a mode of being understood in Heidegger's sense, therefore, equips us with the ontological, epistemological and semiotic correlates of the theory of the *puruṣārthas*, i.e. if we look upon the *puruṣārthas* as modes of being, we can explore the existential grounding (situatedness), the specific forms of understanding (*verstehen*) and the peculiar mode of conceptualization and description (discourse) characteristic of each.

The preceding discussion has been governed by one sole objective: to

articulate approaches to the theory of *puruṣārthas* by way of some of the methodological concepts and principles of Husserlian phenomenology and Heidegger's fundamental ontology. In the next section, I shall take a further step along this line, and consider how certain issues emerge when we explore these hitherto untried possibilities; I shall attempt, in the immediately following part, to show why a transcendental approach to the theory seems attractive; and, in the next stage of the discussion, I shall try to explore three modes of such a transcendental approach to the theory of the *puruṣārthas*—the phenomenological theory of transcendental reduction in Husserl, the fundamental ontology of Heidegger, and the existential hermeneutics of Ricoeur.

II

The Unity of the *Puruṣārthas* as Transcendental Synthesis

One of the results of the preceding discussion has been the suggestion that the four *puruṣārthas* are to be seen in relationship to each other, such that, while having its own specific autonomy, each, nevertheless, is oriented to the others and that it is precisely this relationsip to the others that makes each one of them a distinctively human orientation. Prof. K.J. Shah has expressed this relationship among the *puruṣārthas* in a particularly insightful manner, which I propose to use as setting the parameters of our discussion. Prof. Shah remarks that *kāma* without *dharma* and *mokṣa* would be merely animal lust, *artha*, without the others mere greed, *dharma* in isolation from the rest mere ritualism, and *mokṣa* in abstraction from the others escapism. I interpret this as saying that the relationship to the others is constitutive of each one of them as a distinctive human possibility of living in the world. It is this idea of the synthetic unity of the *puruṣārthas* that I wish to explore in the present section. We may begin the discussion by formulating two regulative questions:

(*i*) What exactly is the nature of this synthetic unity of the *puruṣārthas*? This calls for a description of the mode of relationships among the *puruṣārthas*;
(*ii*) How could we explain the possibility of such a synthetic unity? This asks for the explication or ground of connection among the elements.

In the terminology of the critical methodology, the first may be called the transcendental exposition, and the second, the transcendental deduction of synthetic unity of *puruṣārthas*.

To begin with the description first: it is easy to see that the relationships among the *puruṣārthas* cannot be thought of as strong logical entailments. But it is more important to note that the connections are also not *de facto*

associations. While they are weaker than logical entailments, they are stronger than mere empirical conjunctions. That the relations among the *puruṣārthas* are not strong entailments can be seen by way of a brief consideration of two extreme positions—the Stoic and the Cyrenaic. The Stoics pushed the idea of relationship between happiness and virtue to the extent of declaring that happiness is identical with virtue; that hence only the good man can be happy, and that he is happy even when he is being roasted alive in bull of Phlaris. On the other side, some of the extreme Cyrenaics held that pleasure is identical with goodness, and that a man can be good only when relishing some enjoyment or the other. What is common to these extreme positions is that by asserting a strong connection between pleasure and goodness, they effectively negate the significance of one of the terms in the identity. With the Stotics, the category of pleasure is dismantled, while with the extreme hedonists it is the category of the good that is rendered void. Pleasure ceases to be what it is in human experience if it is identified with the good; nor is the good what it is if it is reduced to the pleasant. But, at the same time, the two cannot also be regarded as unconnected. This is shown by the fact that men in all countries and cultures have found the happiness and prosperity of the wicked to be philosophically disturbing, calling out for some kind of a theodicy. The connection of the good with happiness could, of course, be given different formulations; I shall consider only two examples. Aristotle in the *Nichomachian Ethics*[18] connects pleasure with virtue at two points in his account of moral learning. For him, we learn to be good and virtuous by imitating good and virtuous acts. But this impulse towards imitation can get a foothold on us, only if we are, in some sense, predisposed to find pleasure in the contemplation of virtuous acts. This natural association of virtue with pleasure is what makes moral learning possible. This process of moral learning leads to a stage of character formation, in which we find pleasure in doing what we ought to. The end-result of moral education is the formation of a character which finds delight in doing good. What is significant about Aristotle's analysis is the conceptual link that it establishes between the good and the pleasant. This linkage with pleasure does not, of course, reduce morality to pleasure, nor does it elevate the pleasant to the good; in Kantian language, we must avoid two mistakes—sensualizing the good (the temptation of hedonism) and intellectualizing the pleasant (the temptation of Platonism). A similar connection (although more hidden) between pleasure and the good can be seen in Kant also. On the surface, however, such a statement may appear to be wildly implausible, for, as it is usually said, Kant's moral theory radically distantiates the good from all desire and impulse. But the point I am trying to make appears in a different area of his moral theory, i.e. in his distinction between the moral will and the holy will, and similarly in his distinction between the moral good and the total good. When Kant describes man as having only a moral will and not a holy will, two things are implied. First, it is implied that the human will, in order to be moral, has to contend against inclination and impulse—the mark of

human moral life is struggle against desire. But there is also a more subtle and positive implication. If moral action in the phenomenal world is to be possible, then the recognition of the moral law must determine the will as a motive, and this, in turn, would be possible, only if the very recognition of the moral law were to give rise to a feeling of respect. Now, when a man carries out his moral obligation, this performance of duty for the sake of duty, is nevertheless attended by a *sui generis* delight; this is a part of what Kant calls the noumenal causality of the will. This delight is distinctively human, for it is possible only for a finite rational will which is capable of apprehending the moral law by way of a feeling of respect. Similarly, Kant claims that, although the moral will is not determined by the idea of happiness, yet, in the conception of the total good for man, there is a necessary place for happiness. His often misunderstood moral proof for the existence of God is based on the insight that there must be a necessary relation between morality and happiness, although happiness is not the ground of morality. There is, Kant seems to be suggesting, something incoherent about an ultimate and final divorce between happiness and the good life. Such a radical divorce marks the frustration of the concept of the good life taken in its wholeness.

In different ways, both Aristotle and Kant seem to be emphasizing some kind of necessary relationship between goodness and happiness. In our terminology, such arguments may be understood as part of the case for the synthetic unity of the *puruṣārthas*. We may now spell out four aspects of this synthetic unity, each one expressing the totality from the point of view of one of the *puruṣārthas*. Thus, from the point of view of *kāma*, we can say that happiness is the scheme by which value appears in human experience. From the point of view of *artha*, we can say that the achievement of value has a consequence for the human mode of adaptation to the world, in the sense that the embodiment of value has to be founded on a material change of the situation. From the point of view of *dharma*, we can say that achievement of value takes place in a moral context of inter-personal recognition of legitimacy. And, finally, from the point of view of *mokṣa*, we can say the manner in which value is recognized is in terms of its growth promoting functions, i.e. a value is recognized as that which enhances the integrity and freedom of the self. These four aspects of the synthetic unity, thus, give expression to the medium, the basis, the context, and the manner of pursuit of value; each aspect is possible, only because it is an element in a structure made up of the others; and the totality of the four aspects signifies the organized structure of human aspiration. It is this feature of organized structuration that I am calling the synthetic unity of the *puruṣārthas*.

But what exactly is the nature of this unity? What kind of relationships bind the *puruṣārthas* together in this complex manifold? What is the modality of their integration? To these questions, the preceding discussion provides a clue to the idea of a synthetic unity, which, coming as it does with echoes of Kant, suggests that the connections between the *puruṣārthas* can-

not be merely logical or analytic connections, nor merely empirical associations. They have the kind of necessity which synthetic a priori connections have in the Kantian scheme. A synthetic a priori judgment is not necessary in the logical or analytic sense, for the negation of such a judgment is not a self-contradiction. But, nevertheless, in some sense the negation is inconcievable. Similarly, to say there is no delight in doing what one ought to is not a self-contradiction, but I suggest there is a *prima facie* inconcievability about it. But in what sense is it inconceivable or incoherent? Here, again, the Kantian clue may be helpful. Kant explains the peculiar validity of synthetic a priori judgments in terms of their transcendental subjectivity. It is because they follow from the constitution of experience by the mind that they have the validity they have as conditions of possibility of experience. In other words, the synthetic a priori principles are the expressions of the transcendental synthesis which is the ultimate ground of the possibility of experience. Using this Kantian framework, we may say that the necessary connection among the *puruṣārthas* is a consequence of a similar transcendental synthesis; if the transcendental ground of knowledge or cognition is the transcendental unity of apperception, here we can describe it as the transcendental unity of the will; only we must note that these two are different characterizations of the same transcendental ground, i.e. human reality. (It is in these terms that we can say that the three questions—what can I know? what ought I to do? and what may I hope for?—are to be answered in terms of the fourth question: what is man?)

I suggested a while back that the synthetic unity of the *puruṣārthas* may be formulated in a foufold way with respect to the *medium*, the *basis*, the *context* and the *manner* of human aspiration. Any object or state of affairs, if it is to be thought of as desirable, as something worthy of our aspiration, must appear in the medium of the pleasant. This is how one may understand Mill's point that the ultimate ground for saying that something is desirable is that we can desire it. As I understand it, this need not involve reducing the good to pleasure, but rather what is meant is that any value must appear to men in the schema of the pleasant. It is through the medium of the language of desire that all values appear to us as values; in other words, all values appear to men *sub specie felicitas*. In this sense, felicity is the schematization of the good. But valuation also involves an impulse to bring about its realization, to change the existential situation in a manner called forth for its actualization. This readiness to change the situation is possible, only if we have the power to work purposefully upon the facticity of circumstances. Hence the capacity for praxis understood as purposeful transformation of the material foundation of life is the basis of value aspiration and value choice. To recognize something as a value is to recognize it as worthy of being brought into existence, and for human beings this embodiment of values presupposes a power for bringing about material changes, i.e. productive activity. Thirdly, to regard something as a value is to look upon one's claim to it as legitimate in the context of

interpersonal relations. Every valuational claim, hence, tacitly assumes a moral context of recognition by others. In this sense, the context is the field of moral relations between human subjects; and, finally, to recognize something as a good is to look upon it as promotive of the growth of the self. It is to look upon it as liberating us from the bonds of internal and external limitations, as a release of our potentialities for selfhood. The manner of recognition of value is, thus, the emancipatory mode.

It is, of course, true that one may be mistaken in the specific claims made in each one of the above contexts. Thus, it is possible to be deluded about each claim. In other words, the will may suffer a diremption, a fault, in the sense of making a wrong choice. We shall see at the end that this propensity to mistaken choices or what Ricoeur calls the fault, raises certain serious issues regarding the finality of the transcendental point of view. But for the present, the point I am trying to make is that the conceptual framework within which alone there can be human recognition of value includes these categories. It is within this scheme that aspiration and choice of the good are rendered intelligible. It is in this sense that this scheme is the condition of possibility of human aspiration. For something to appear as an object of aspiration, it must be processed through these moulds.

But if the above argument explicates what is involved in recognizing something as an object of human aspiration, we can now turn to the other side of the picture, and ask: how should we conceive of man as a subject of aspirations? In analogy with Kant's procedure, if the first could be called the objective deduction, the second can be called the subjective deduction. The objective deduction tells us how we must think of the world, if it is to be the locus of human aspiration; the subjective deduction tells us how we must think of man, if we are to think of him as the subject of aspiration.

Now, to perceive an object within the schema of pleasure is to anticipate a feeling of well-being in its presence. This anticipation of feeling is possible only for a being endowed with sensuous imagination. It must be imagination, for it is a projection; and it must be sensuous, for it is projection of a feeling. Similarly, to be capable of praxis is to be capable of objective means-end and causal thinking, and this involves what Kant calls theoretical understanding. To claim and acknowledge demands of moral legitimacy in the context of interpersonal relations involves orienting ourselves in terms of a moral consensus. This, in turn, involves the faculty of practical reason; and, finally, to look upon objects of choice as promotive of the growth of the self and to think of values in the manner of self-realization is to be capable of self-consciousness and self-identity. Thus, summing up the results of what we have called the subjective deduction, we can say that to be a subject of aspiration a being must be capable of sensuous imagination, theoretical understanding, practical reason and self-consciousness, and such a being can only be man.

Eidetic Reduction as the way to the Synthetic Unity of the *Puruṣārthas*

The preceding discussion can be summed up by saying that there are necessary connections among the *puruṣārthas* which are non-analytic. The question now takes the form of the mode of access to such synthetic necessary truths. In addition to this, it might also be remembered that we began the entire discussion by noting the almost endless variety of types under each one of these orientations; we saw that under the category of the pleasant, for example, there is an enormous empirical diversity of kinds of the pleasant. Given this empirical diversity of each one of these values, the proper nature or essence of these seems shrouded in the empirical complexity of the kinds. By what mode of apprehension can we suspend in thought this empirical diversity of manifestations and grasp the proper essence or *eidos* of these phenomena. It is to be hoped that the very language in which the questions have been formulated may suggest the direction in which we may expect to find the answer. The two questions which frame our inquiry at this stage are:

(*i*) What is the method of accessibility to the essence or nature of these four orientations understood in their pure types?
(*ii*) How do we grasp necessary but non-analytic connections among these pure essences?

The questions belong to the domain of the discovery and validation of essential truths, and as such, the methodology that suggests itself would be the phenomenological method, for the basic objective of the phenomenological method is precisely the evidencing of such essential truths. More specifically, the method that becomes relevant at this stage is the method of *eidetic phenomenology*. We may, therefore, begin by recalling the salient features of this method. We may begin by way of an account of why a methodological shift from Kant to Husserl becomes necessary at this stage of the argument. The Kantian framework has given us the notion of the synthetic unity of the *puruṣārthas* as the controlling idea of the entire discussion. From our point of view, the great help of the Kantian programme has been this recognition of necessary connections of the non-analytic kind among the four life-values. But when we ask about the mode or manner in which such synthetic necessities are to be discovered, i.e. when we ask about the mode of access to the Kantian insights themselves, or, in other words, when we ask, not how knowledge is possible but how critique is possible, then the Kantian programme is not so resourceful. The kind of inquiry that is involved in the access to synthetic a priori principles is called transcendental reflection by Kant, but he does not spell out the methodological pre-suppositions and procedures of such reflection. The question about the possibility of critique itself may be called the metacritical question; my point is that in Kant himself there does

not appear to be any explicit recognition of the issues posed by metacritique. Not that there are no clues at all. There is, of course, the remark that the transcendental is concerned not so much with the objects as with our mode of knowledge of objects in so far as it is a priori.[14] This, I suggest, offers us two clues. First, in so far as the a priori is connected with necessity, transcendental reflection is the search for synthetic necessary connections; and, secondly and more importantly, Kant is here suggesting a shift of focus from objects to the mode of knowing objects. Since the access to all objects is consciousness, the shift involved in transcendental reflection is a shift from the natural standpoint (the domain of objects) to consciousness as the universal medium of access to all objects.

If we understand transcendental reflection in this sense, as involving a shift of focus from objects to consciousness, the connection with the phenomenological orientation becomes clear, for phenomenology is precisely the theory and practice of such a shift from the natural standpoint to consciousness as the universal medium of access.[15] The phenomenological programme also is concerned with synthetic necessary connections, which Husserl calls eidetic truths, i.e. statements about essences and their necessary connections.[16] The principle of intentionality itself may be offered as one of the most important eidetic principles. Husserl calls such essential cognitions intuition of essences. But describing it as an essential intuition should not mislead us into thinking that it is some kind of an occult or mystical procedure. On the contrary, there is a methodological discipline for the grasp of such eidetic truths—this methodology is what Husserl calls the eidetic reduction.[17] A reduction is a displacement or shift in attention, and the awareness of essences and their relations can be had only after two such displacements have been gone through. The first is the shift of attention from objects to consciousness. We must, Husserl tells us, reverse the style of consciousness characteristics of the natural standpoint in order to focus attention on consciousness and its intentional structures. This shift is involved in the first epoche or bracketing which Husserl calls the transcendental reduction.[18] The transcendental reduction suspends the entire domain of objects, and gives us access to our subjective conscious life. Once we have gained access to this domain, we can perform the second epoche—the eidetic reduction. We now focus not on the instance as presented to consciousness but on its essential structures and attributes. By means of various phenomenological techniques, of which imaginative variation is the most important, we are able to grasp essential truths about phenomena—these are the eidetic truths discovered by phenomenology. In the context of our own problem also, we formulated four such principles which could claim to be eidetic statements about human aspiration. From this point of view, we can say that the most important contribution that phenomenology can provide us is what we may call the eidetics of the theory of the *puruṣārthas*.

From Phenomenological Eidetics to Existential Analytics in the Theory of Man

As we have seen, eidetic analysis can provide an account of the structural relationships among the four life-values. But however valuable they may be, such eidetic investigations have a serious limitation from our point of view. The limitation arises from the presuppositions of the method of eidetic analysis. We saw that eidetic reduction follows upon the transcendental reduction taken as the suspension of the natural standpoint. This presupposed epoche of the natural attitude involves a disconnection of consciousness from the natural, taken-for-granted world of everyday experience and action. This epoche opens up a new realm for cognition, but for us the epoche has another consequence also. Among other things, a theory of *puruṣārthas* must include a theory of human will and choice. Now, the phenomena of the will in general make sense only in terms of a relation to the world. The epoche would, as it were, immobilize the will by suspending the bond between consciousness and the world.

However, the response to this difficulty cannot take the form of adding a theory of the will to a Husserlian theory of consciousness. From the perspective of Husserl, consciousness is free precisely because of its capacity for disconnection from the natural world. Given this understanding of freedom, any mundane power which is essentially involved in the world, such as the will, must necessarily appear as determined. Hence, within a philosophy of consciousness, the will would be denied its specific autonomy, and with this the whole theory of the *puruṣārthas* seems threatened. The issue, therefore, is a moment of crisis in our inquiries, and hence the response to it must touch fundamentals. The response must, I suggest, begin with the fundamental principle of the phenomenological approach, the thesis of intentionality of consciousness. Within a philosophy of consciousness, the principle appears as absolute in the sense of a foundational principle. But within a philosophy of existence, the principle would be understood as a consequence of man's being in the world. Hence for Heidegger consciousness is always a consciousness of, because man's mode of existence is essentially world-oriented. The description of the essential structures of this world-orientation of human existence is what he calls the *analytics of Dasein*. In a sense, the phenomenological method is preserved, for here, too, the concern is with the grasp of necessary structures; and, like in Husserlian phenomenology, these structures are accessible only by way of a fundamental reorientation, a shift of the style of attention. In other words, I am suggesting that within Heidegger's thought there is a functional analogue to the epoche in Husserl—this analogue is the shift from the ontic to the ontological.

However, what is important for us to note is that this transformation from an eidetic phenomenology to an existentialist ontology opens up aspects of experience such as the phenomena of will, moods, feelings, which would

otherwise have been under the ban imposed by the epoche. It is because Heidegger takes intentionality as a mode of being in the world that it is possible for him to redescribe the direction of consciousness to the world as *concern*.[19] With this he is able to bring into his analysis phenomena of the will such as resolve, commitment, refusal and guilt.[20] These categories form part of the conceptual framework of a theory of human aspiration and choice. But it is necessary to remember that the level of concern with human nature in Heidegger is not the concrete level of anthropology but the ontology of human existence. Heidegger expresses this in terms of the distinction between fundamental ontology and anthropology which is really a distinction between two levels of understanding human life—the *existential* and the *existentiell*.[21] The former is the concern of the philosopher and the latter that of anthropologist. The two are not two separate phenomena but are rather two levels of discourse about the same human reality. If so, it should be possible to set up a scheme as of interpretation between the two levels. The possibility of setting up a hermeneutical connection between the philosophical and the anthropological levels leads us on to a final consideration of Ricoeur's existential hermeneutics.

From Transcendental Philosophy to Anthropology of Transcendence

The reorientation of the phenomenological method in Heidegger allows us to introduce aspects of human will and choice. Accordingly, notions such as commitment, authenticity, freedom, resolve and guilt become relevant concerns. But it must be noted that within the limits of Heidegger's framework the controlling principle is the distinction between the ontic and the ontological. It is this principle which structures the meanings of the existential categories. The ontic is the level of everyday life of facticity, of the empirical, concrete and contingent level of beings, whereas the ontological is the fundamental structure of being as being. Heidegger's basic theme is that man is at once ontic and ontological.[22] He is ontic in the sense that he is a being in the midst of and with other beings. But he is also ontological in the sense that he alone can raise the basic issue of the meaning of Being, and also in the sense that it is in man's comprehension of other beings that the Being of all other beings is said to be disclosed[23]. It is this disclosure of Being in man's freely willed comprehension that Heidegger means by freedom.[24] Freedom, now, is an ontological notion, standing for the disclosure or revealedness of Being. Similarly, choice, too, is given an ontological sense as a resolve to always abide in the light of this ontological disclosure and not to let oneself be lost in facticity of the ontic. Authenticity is the result of such a choice, and guilt is the surrender of this possibility.[25] The point that I am trying to make is that all these notions are given an ontological sense in terms of the basic distinction of Heidgger's philosophy.[26] On the one hand, these categories pertain

to the structure of the will, but, on the other hand, the will as a motivating force operates in the domain of the ontic; in Husserlian terms, the will is a mundane power. Choice and decision are effected in the world of everyday life, but certain choices taken at this level may conceal man's true or essential nature and project him, for himself and for others, as purely a being among other beings. In other words, certain modes of thinking, feeling and acting, certain life-styles and plans may be repressive of his own possibilities, while other choices and resolves may permit the disclosure of truth (in passing, we may note that for Heidegger the basic sense of truth as aletheia is precisely disclosedness of being). Both the possibilities of disclosure as well as of concealment are rooted in what a man does, and how he does what he does in the ontic world of everyday concerns. If so, the particularities of his conduct and mode of life in a certain context may be interpreted in the light of what they signify at the ontological level of his proper essence or being. The existentiell may be seen as a symbol of the existential. Now, to understand the concrete details of a life-style in the symbolic sense is to offer an existential interpretation of cultural life. We are, therefore, on the threshold of what Ricoeur calls existential hermeneutics.[27] My final suggestion is that Ricoeur's hermeneutic programme offers a way of linking a transcendental philosophy of man with anthropology.

One of the important claims of Ricoeur's theory of interpretation is that a symbol as contrasted with a sign, is essentially pluri-vocal, i.e. a symbol has two levels of meaning: a literal meaning and another meaning which is symbolic meaning based on the literal.[28] It is because of this double-level nature of meanings that symbols call for interpretation to exhibit the relations between the two levels of their meaning.[29] We may perhaps take one step beyond what Ricoeur has actually said, and hold that literal meaning is ontic and the symbolic ontological. If so, a symbol lays claim to a mode of transcendence. The basic objective of existential hermeneutics is precisely to respond to this claim of transcendence.

Ricoeur distinguishes two types of such response which he calls the hermeneutics of trust and the hermeneutics of suspicion.[30] As I understand it, the hermeneutics of trust would hold that the ontological is a genuine possibility for men, and that it is present as a stratum of meaning in the ontic, i.e. the concrete details of life exhibit a latent potency, a certain aspect of transcendence. Hence transcendence is an implicit promise in the everydayness of mundaneity itself. But, according to the hermeneutics of suspicion, the claim to transcendence is merely a projection of a frustrated worldliness, rooted in specific contexts of needs, impulses and demands. To understand the symbols of transcendence is, thus, to reduce them to these empirical or natural origins. The hermeneutics of suspicion is a reductive interpretation, while the hermeneutics of trust is an amplifying interpretation of culture; the watch of the one is nothing, but, while that of the other is something more.

When one seeks to apply the hermeneutical programme to the theory of

the *puruṣārthas,* the debate focuses on the understanding of *mokṣa.* If we review the basic idea of the present essay, namely, the synthetic unity of the *puruṣārthas* from the point of view of hermeneutics, two possibilities seem to present themselves before us. The notion of synthetic unity suggests that, in so far as each one is constituted as a human value by its relationships to the others, there is a 'moment' of *mokṣa* or the emancipatory concern in each one of them, and that it is this indwelling presence of the emancipatory interest that co-constitutes it as a *puruṣārtha.* On the other hand, a reductive interpretation would deny precisely this constitutive relation of *mokṣa* with the other life-values. For such an understanding of life, transcendence is a projection, and has to be explained in a causal-functional rather than in a constitutive sense. But what is common to both kinds of programme is that they see the relation between the anthropological fact and the human essence as a hermeneutic relation of symbolization. They look upon the empirical details of cultural life as requiring interpretation and a mode of understanding. It is because they emphasize this hermeneutic dimension of life that they can inspire forms of anthropological discourse.

In the domain of the theory of *puruṣārthas,* we can classify forms of anthropological theory into two broad types; the first I propose to call *anthropologies of pseudo transcendence.*

Of such theories, we can mention three sub-types. According to the first, the emancipatory ideal is explainable in terms of the dynamics of desire and its vicissitudes. The conception of a state of freedom from bondage is to be understood as a human response to the inevitable frustrations of desire. Psychological anthropology in general and psycho-analytic anthropology in particular, of the type of Geza Roheim's, suggest themselves in this context. A second type of theory would see the emancipatory ideal as implicated in the real struggles over material power and forms of economic relations between men. Such a view would look upon the ideal as grounded in the struggle over the real issues of power and privilege. Conflict theory in general and Marxist anthropology in particular, would exmeplify such an understanding. Or esle one could, in Durkheimian fashion, see the idealities of religion as reflecting the collective demands and requirements of social existence.

As against these three modes of pseudo-transcendence, the fourth possibility may be called the *anthropology of transcendence.* According to it, the emancipatory drive is as genuine a human fact as other drives and impulses, and it is a constitutive element in all human achievements.

While the first three forms of anthropological theory could be identified within the traditions of the discipline, with regard to the fourth, the project of an *anthropology of transcendence* can only be described as a possibility. It is, of course, quite likely that elements of such an anthropological sensibility may be present in other theories, but as an explicitly formulated research programme, it does not exist as yet. The formulation of such an anthropological research programme may involve a massive rethinking of almost all the tradi-

tional themes and concerns of the discipline. One may have to develop a symbolic theory of material as well as ideal culture, a symbolic theory of socialization and institutionalization, a symbolic theory of exchange as well as of communication, a symbolic theory of politics as well as of religion, a symbolic theory of science as well as of magic. Besides, one must also devise methodologies for interpreting these various symbolic orders and their conflicts and convergences. But pending the availability of such an *anthropology of transcendence*, do we leave the field clear for the theories of pseudo-transcendence? Which of these possibilities prefigure, not the existing shapes of the discipline but its proper form and destiny? What is the eidetic truth of the discipline of anthropology itself? If one were to look at this final issue from within the perspectives of the present attempt, one may make a few surmises. There seems to be a coherence between the *anthropology of transcendence* and the transcendental point of view, which has been the basic framework of the present essay, whereas the other forms of anthropology, in the final analysis, would, it seems to me, have to call into question, precisely, this transcendental point of view. If that is so, then the issue of which is the valid form of anthropology is partly a philosophical issue; more specifically, it is an issue about transcendentalism and naturalism as philosophical possibilities. This is not to reduce anthropology to transcendental philosophy but merely to say that it is the glory and misery of anthropology to be caught in the cross-fires of the biggest philosophical battle of all times.

Notes and References

The present essay is a fuller statement of the transcendentalist approach to the theory of the *puruṣārthas* suggested in my article 'Puruṣārthas in the Light of Critical Theory', *IPQ*, Pune. However, it also differs from the previous attempt in one or two respects: (*i*) the connections among the *puruṣārthas*, now called the synthetic unity of the *puruṣārthas*, is given a somewhat different exposition and explication; and (*ii*) more importantly, in the present essay, I situate the discussion in certain varieties of transcendental theory such as Husserl's phenomenology, Heidegger's fundamental ontology and Ricoeur's existential hermeneutics. The transcendental character of these positions is presupposed here. For this, please see my article 'Reflection and Constitution in Kant, Hegel and Husserl *JICPR*, vol iii, no. 1, 1985 and also my book *Towards a Critique of Cultural Reason*, ICPR and OUP.—AUTHOR.

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Reflections on ideas of social philosophy and Indian code of conduct

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English language which we in India often use for serious academic discourse makes us assume, sometimes unquestioningly, the validity of English usages without any reference to the context of thought processes which helped those words and phrases to acquire a certain relevance. Perhaps a similar attitude persists when, for example, translating 'Logic' as 'Nyāya' we choose to disregard the wide coverage the word 'Nyāya' enjoys dealing with both 'syllogism' and 'justice', and thus offering a frame of reference missing in 'Logic'. These differences appear to be slight but are in reality highly significant, because linguistic usages are expressions of culture. The culture (i.e. traditional India) which places the code of conduct at par with the rules of inference is trying to posit human situational constraints quite differently from another (the Anglo-Saxon culture, for example) which keeps 'logicality' carefully separated from 'morality'.

In traditional literature of philosophy, we do not find any phrase which can be freely translated as 'social philosophy'. We have *Dharmaśāstras, Arthaśāstra, Kāmaśāstra,* all dealing in part with social issues—some more concrete than the others. There have been theorists ready to compare Kautilya's *Arthaśāstra* with Machiavelli's doctrines. This is no place to comment on that issue excepting to make note of the fact that *Arthaśāstra* offers a political philosophy and not a social philosophy in the proper sense of the term. Political doctrines fostered by a situation of crisis in any culture might reveal certain universal characteristics. We would turn to consider that specific issue in course of our discussion of the *Bhagavadgītā* which is, indeed, a treatise on social philosophy, if there is any in India.

'Social philosophy' is a loan phrase. The usage has had a relevance in the Western context. References to 'social philosophy' have been fairly prevalent in English treatises till 'sociology' more or less broke loose from the grip of philosophy, and asserted its separate identity as a social science discipline. Whatever other uses it has been put to, the term 'social' as a qualifier of 'philosophy' in its present form has definitely helped its users to differentiate 'individual' (private) from 'society' (public) and, these two units are distinctly definable in philosophical discourse. In fact, 'individual vs. society' spurred on a great many debates in modern times. This is perfectly permissible in the Western context where philosophical ideas and social facts could be seen evolving through phrases of sometimes gradual, sometimes sudden, change and restructuring. That our volumes of history of philosophy paid scant attention

to the social fabric in and through which Indian systems of philosophy developed indicates a major area of difference between our approach and the Western approach to individual and society of a given time. Let me clarify this point with reference to the Western approach before I turn to Indian milieu.

Much before the period described in history as the age of enlightenment during which nearly every thinking person in the West came to believe that reason and science (and not religion) would advance human progress, the spirit of science began gaining ground, increasingly challenging the authority of old tradition represented by the Chruch. Russell in his *History of Western Philosophy* describes how 'the first irruption of science' marked by the first publication of the Copernican theory in 1543 was to become influential in the seventeenth century through the works of Kepler and Galileo. His observations on 'the temper of mind' produced by the new authority are relevant in the context of our discussion. To quote a few lines:

> The authority of science ... recognised by most philosophers of the modern epoch, is a very different thing from the authority of the Church, since it is intellectual, not governmental. *No penalties fall upon those who reject it*; no prudential arguments influence those who accept it. ...There is yet another difference from ecclesistical authority, which declares its pronouncements to be absolutely certain and eternally unalterable: the pronouncements of science are made tentatively, on a basis of probability, and are regarded as liable to modification[1] (emphasis mine).

The above observation sheds enough light on the wide divergence of post-seventeenth-century social climate from the preceding one in the West, thereby making it amply clear how different the former must have been from the traditional Indian mood. This is not to suggest that Western approach to problems of philosophy prior to 'irruption of science' had much in common with traditional Indian approach. There has always been, as we shall have occasion to point out later, difference in priorities and conceptual frame of reference, but that is not our direct concern here. We are to make note of the Western atmosphere directly leading to the growth of individualism often associated with extreme forms of anarchism. The connection between individualism and anarchism, however, is not of necessity, even though, following Russell's lead, it is granted that Italy during the Renaissance had no social stability, because the rejection of scholastic philosophy and ecclesiastical government inevitably led to a total rejection of all discipline. Individualism continued to influence modern Western philosophical thought when 'northern Renaissance' of a much later period took over England, Germany and France; but anarchic tendency was gone. This phase of Renaissance, entangled with Reformation 'less brilliant and more solid than its Italian progenitor, less concerned with personal display of learning, and more anxious to spread learning as widely as possible[2] set the model for nineteenth-century Indian thinkers exposed to

Western education under colonial rule. We keep acknowledging our bond by our continued use of More's *Utopia* (1518) as a text in social philosophy which carries the temper of a time when moderate reform was a major demand. But our idea of a 'Renaissance man' continues to be greatly coloured by 'personal display of learning' and brilliance. It may also be noted how, disregarding the passage of time between *Utopia* (1518) and *Social Contract* (1762) modern social thinking in India blends the ideas of 'natural man' and socially planned, perfect utopia—recent instance of which can be found in Amlan Datta's *The Third Movement* (Kamala Lectures, 1982, Calcutta). This blending has its origin in the nineteenth-century 'Bengali Renaissance'. The idea contained in Rousseau's romantic statement 'Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains' gripped the imagination of liberal nineteenth-century Bengal which had also had the reformatory zeal and eagerness for spread of education coupled with the vision of an isolated utopia. Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941) epitomizes these characteristics; in him, too, we find an attempted balance of 'rationality' and emotional 'sensibility' as well—an issue over which the Western theorists fought for more than hundred years.

Developments briefly referred to above in the history of social thought in modern India are directly related to English education which helped create an intellectual climate favourable for the growth along these lines.

Traditional Indian discourse does not admit of any meaningful opposition between 'rationality' and 'sensibility'. The issues evolving out of 'individual vs. society' dichotomy are also missing here. Pure consciousness—not to be equated with 'rationality'—stands in contrast to and yet keep shining on the patterns of lifes' emergence, continuation and extinction. 'Action' as a concept provides the crucial point of contact between these levels without which human experience would have remained incoherent and incomprehensible. The reason behind the fact that 'all the systems regard philosophy as a practical necessity and cultivate it in order to understand how life can best be led', and that 'it became a custom...with an Indian writer to explain, at the beginning of his work, how it serves human ends (*puruṣārtha*)[3] lies in the Indian acceptance of human condition as given. Whatever is 'given' provides us with a motive for action. In Indian metaphysical rhetoric, the given (human condition) is a stage for action. Other living beings (almost like non-living objects suffering from weather and friction) exist only to suffer passively. Only human life has the possibility of going beyond passive endurance and engage in action. Irawati Karve in her interpretation[4] goes on to explicate these ideas rather effectively. In the eastern part of the country, especially among Bengali bāuls and devotee-composers like Ramprasad Sen[5], we hear resonance of this note harping on the urgency of 'cultivating' one's own self, because human condition is a rare occasion offered to improve one's performance, life being a continuous performance. The performer is, in a sense, alone offering a solo performance, though restrained and regulated by the stage which is an inescapable presence, because without the stage there would have been no performance.

T.M.P. Mahadevan commenting on relative value of individual in social and spiritual context rejects the idea that the Indian mind is individualistic and argues:

> ...the individual cannot realize his ends without the help of society...His pursuit of *mokṣa,* spiritual freedom, too, rebounds to the benefit of society, since the self that is sought to be realized is not the empirical ego but the supreme spiritual self which is the substrata of all beings.[6]

In support of his position, he quotes from *Mahābhārata*:

> One individual may be sacrificed for the sake of protecting a family; one family may be forsaken for the sake of protecting a village-community; one village-community may be forsaken for the sake of preserving society; and for the sake of (realizing) the self, even the earth may be forsaken.[7]

What one can perhaps meaningfully add here at the end of this quoted passage is that: thus forsaking the earth (world) the person, in fact, brings about more value and significance to the understanding of the world stage where the drama of life is enacted by acting-selves.

Any discourse (resembling social philosophical treatises discussed above) originating in Indian tradition is expected to view the performing agent as embedded in the set and scenary (i.e. objects and events) on the stage of the show. The *gestalt* permits differentiation of the figure from the ground, the possibility of which is demonstrated in the *Gītā* (without, of course, any use of *gestalt* terminology) when a distinction is made between 'action' and 'activity', the latter being the performance which is 'tied to the bodily passion due to want of light (knowledge).'[8] The exterior is taken to form a part of the interior when the actor, not free from desire, is in bondage. The bonding comes not only from social constraints but also primarily from the narrow limits of personal self. The kinship group, compatriots and other similar collectivities appear indispensably valuable to the person's identity who hardly exists without a sense of belonging to the community. At this stage, the role and the rules of the performance are both given to the person, and there is no scope for choice. Any exercise of choice is considered ill-advised, because personal choice cannot be truly a free choice when the interior, real self is yet to find its autonomy. This code stands in sharp contrast to any coded system consistent with the dictum: 'Man is born free.' On the other hand, this does not mean that slavish resignation of any form has been extolled as a virtue in Indian theory of social action, though Gandhiji's interpretation of the *Bhagavadgītā* may be construed to confirm such misapprehension.

Gandhiji interpreting the *Gītā* observes:

> One who seeks *mokṣa* behaves as society's servant. To win *mokṣa* means to merge in the sea. To attain that state means to be one with an infinitely vast sea. We are but germs in society. That word 'germs' signifies our subordination to it. We are, in truth, free in such subordination. Our duty is what society assigns to us. ...The definition (of *swadharma*), then, is that one must do the work assigned to one by one's superior. From this, we shall by and by rise to a higher stage.[9]

But it is possible to read something very interestingly different in the *Bhagavadgītā's* message. Gandhiji himself does so in his interpretation to which we will have opportunity to refer later. Let us now turn to K.T. Telang who describes the *Gītā* as a 'non-systematic work'. Observing that some of the teachings of the *Bhagavadgītā* compare rather well with Buddhistic tenets, he goes on to suggest further comparisons in the following words:

> Suppose our ancestors to have been attached to the ceremonial law of the Vedas, as we are now attached to a lifeless ritualism, the Upanishads and the Gītā might be in a way, comparable to movements like that of the late Raja Rammohun Roy...they attempt, as Raja Rammohun attempted...to bring into prominence and to elaborate the high and noble aspects of the old beliefs.[10]

Telang and many other commentators have already shed light on 'the high and noble aspects of the old belief' referred to above. I would restrict myself to the consideration of those aspects which deal with the person conducting himself in and through social events.

The text of the *Bhagavadgītā* as a discourse may appear to be 'non-systematic' as Telang observes. It can be argued, however, that this non-systematization makes the *Bhagavadgītā* singularly effective in presenting the societal as well as the autonomous personal aspects of the human actor at two different levels. The narrative verse runs through these levels touching both the leader and the led, changing their position, engaged in a dialogue. The subtle account of leadership is worth noting. A chariot in motion defines the relationship between Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa at the beginning of the narrative. Who leads a chariot when it is not self-driven? Not the charioteer but the owner-occupier of the chariot. Kṛṣṇa is the charioteer in the service of Arjuna, the-owner-occupier-prince. Kṛṣṇa follows Arjuna's command, and takes him where he wants to go. This is how the chariot with Arjuna reaches the battlefield waiting to stage the fierce show of fighting at the appointed hour next day. Arjuna is, of course, soon to be led and not lead Kṛṣṇa (as the reader of the *Gītā* finds out), because, by virtue of his infinite self-control, possession of knowledge and wisdom and power (described as divine), Kṛṣṇa is a natural leader, no matter how he chooses to serve his friend Arjuna permitting the latter to play the leader for a while. The *Gītā* does not elaborate on the qualities of leadership. One finds it revealed in the person of Kṛṣṇa who, through the dialogue

and discourse, succeeds in arousing the spirit of free decision in Arjuna, helps him to take on his true role as a leading warrior in the battlefield. This information seems to have been lost on us, Indians, because, in their eagerness to extol Kṛṣṇa as the divine teacher, eminent commentators and interpreters let some narrative details slip by. The fact that Kṛṣṇa, while talking to Arjuna, never gives up his position as the charioteer is of crucial importance from the point of view of role-structuring in the social set-up. The 'role' Kṛṣṇa chooses to perform at the service of Arjuna at the war front is different from, if not somewhat contrary to, what he does in the *Gītā*. When Arjuna wishes to be moved away from the front; Kṛṣṇa reacts to it not as a charioteer but as a friend, comforting Arjuna who is overcome by a temporary spell of depression. He remains true to his role of the charioteer holding on to the reins, and changes his friendly utterances into a long discourse as to various courses of action open to persons like Arjuna facing a difficult task of decision-making, thereby assuming the role of a leader which is not exactly the same as that of a friend. Kṛṣṇa's performance shows how different roles can be taken over simultaneously at the personal level, though societal rules restricting role-assumption remain pretty rigid. It also demonstrates how crisis brings out true leadership qualities. Arjuna, the appointed leader by virtue of his being the chief warrior, has none. Kṛṣṇa leads Arjuna into recovering his proper frame of reference but does *not decide* for the appointed leader (i.e. Arjuna). As a true leader, Kṛṣṇa is persuasive and not coercive. This spirit of persuasion pervades the discourse confirming Telang's suggestion that the *Gītā* stood for the rejection of ritualistic rigour and irrational inhibition .

The text of the *Gītā* does not deal with social structures with any degree of precision or elaboration. Kṛṣṇa emphasizes the need for clear vision based on reason which can be acquired by the person following paths of Yoga (commitment). A person can commit himself to the path of knowledge, or to the path of mastery in action, or to the path of emotive devotion. If no such commitment develops, the person is likely to be under the spell of confusion not only about his own identity but also about the objects and events perceived by senses as belonging to the external world. The *Gītā* describes in detail the extent and the impact of this confusion. To quote only a section:

> The man who ponders over objects of sense forms as attachment to them; from (that) attachment is produced desire; and from desire anger is produced; from anger results want of discrimination (between right and wrong), from want of discrimination, confusion of the memory...from confusion of memory loss of reason, and in consequence of loss of reason he is utterly ruined. But the self-restrained man who moves among objects with senses under the control of his own self, and free from affection and aversions, obtains tranquillity.[11]

Any reader of the *Gītā* is aware of self's indestructibility. The body may be

destroyed or ruined, but the 'embodied' cannot be touched by forces of destruction. Yet, the *Gītā* says that reason can be lost to 'a sensible man's' personal being and ruin him. In response to this utterance, Arjuna could have raised the question about the origin and nature of human reason, but he does not do so. The *Bhagavadgītā* is not meant to be a full-fledged logico-philosophical discourse. The narrative begins with an implicit recognition of the fact that human beings, endowed with the senses and faculties of locomotion, reasoning and imagination, are to go about their vocations within a given frame; after making some suggestions as to how their lives can be 'reasonably' spent in active participation in continuing flow of events. It concludes with a note of acceptance of what life has to offer. Human life offers a great deal of stress and strain. It is easy to find in the text that Arjuna's stress originates in his own social perception. References to castes and social institutions are made by Arjuna himself in his first (despondent) speech emphasizing family and kinship as very basic units of society. Civil war is evil, because these units are destroyed and sanctity of family is lost in war. When Kṛṣṇa argues that Arjuna's observations are 'words uttered in delusion', he bases his argument on the stated distinction between the body and the true being of the person, the latter almost invariably translated as 'soul'. It is possible to see through the text slightly differently, if the word 'soul' is replaced by self (individuality). Kṛṣṇa, then, can be understood as pleading with Arjuna that he is deluded to have equated individual (personal) bodies with individual self (individuality); that the latter continues to remain active in the chain of social process. Personal bodies perish; actions leave their indelible mark in the history of individuals much of which is never to be known. It is not for the person to anticipate or aspire to taste the fruits of his own bit of action which is inevitably transforming him into an individual (self) unless, through his own failure to act in accordance with his true nature, the person (remaining confined within the narrow walls) perishes with the (personal) body.

It is of interest to note that Kṛṣṇa does not utter a word about social ties, kinship obligations, and similar commitments. He says that Arjuna should not grieve over death, 'for to one that is born, death is certain and to one that dies, birth is certain'[12]; but whether or not this rule applies equally to civic bodies and social structures is not made clear. What Kṛṣṇa says instead is: 'That source of things, O descendant of Bharata! is unperceived, their middle state is perceived; and their end again is unperceived. What (occasion is there for any) lamentations regarding them?'[13] The utterance appears to suggest that unless the beginning and the end are clearly viewed and considered carefully there is no point in hoping to control the course of events or predict the outcome of any action. Yet, 'duty' which comes to occupy the central place in the *Gītā*'s social theory is, indeed, geared to the present. There is no suggestion that 'present' is of little importance. On the contrary, persons are urged to make best possible use of the present by engaging in action. Action is what the present demands, argues Kṛṣṇa.

That the *Gītā* emphasizes actions being generated from qualities inherent in the nature of the person has been discussed at length by all commentators, but that it permits a scope to develop a chain of reasoning linking up the person to the first 'choice' made by him early in his life has not been brought to any clear focus. Gandhiji's commentary is an exception which may now be quoted:

> 'In fact, he (Arjuna) had fought often enough in the past. On the present occasion, his reason was suddenly clouded by ignorant attachment. He did not wish to kill his kinsmen. He did not say that he would not kill anyone even if he believed that person to be wicked. Sri Krishna...therefore, tells him 'you have already committed violence. By talking now like a wise man, you will not learn non-violence. Having started on this course, you must finish the job'. If a passenger travelling in a train running at a speed of forty miles an hour suddenly feels aversion to travelling and jumps out of the train, he will have but committed suicide.[14]

Gandhiji elaborates on the earlier action of Arjuna rather than on his 'choice' which is behind Arjuna's present predicament. Following Gandhiji's interpretation we can go a step further and note that Arjuna, since his childhood, aspired to win the favour of his teacher, Droṇa, who gave him perfect military training. He became known as the most well-bred, valiant fighter in fulfilment of his personal ambition. His own choice to become a prize-fighter for his people inevitably led him to the battle field. The war was not something imposed on Arjuna, it was his own making. Carse's observation can appropriately be quoted: 'Before I can have an enemy, I must persuade another to recognize me as an enemy. I cannot be a hero unless I can first find someone who will threaten my life...'[15]

The aim and the object of the *Gītā* can thus be seen as helping people (persons) in society to look through the inconsistencies in their statements and actions. This offers us a dynamic social theory of action with no provision for a romantic utopia. The code of conduct is not merely a body of injunctions. It appears to be so, if one takes into consideration only the 'utterances' while searching for 'the message' and not include the 'messenger' in his role-assumption in the context of personal (social) relationship as well. The full 'message' (if we must call it a message) covers both, the appreciation of which adds to our understanding of the text. Denuded of its mystical component and accepted as a significant social manifesto, the *Gītā* assumes a less didactic and more analytical form to its reader. Viewed in this way, the *Gītā* helps us to appreciate the composite character of social reality. Society is composed of individuals (persons), each impelled by passions and narrowly limited compassion which can be bridled and better directed through personal effort and reasoning. None of this effort and reasoning is capable of changing the world of objects and events which goes its way. The only change that can be brought

about is in the personal sphere through self-control and realization of the true potential of individual self by conscious (self-oriented) action. The choice of the path for a proper search of inner truth (i.e. true self-identity) is a matter of deliberate choice open to the person. Kṛṣṇa does talk about one path being better than another, but this is done in a spirit of discussion. A question can, of course, be raised here as to the import of Kṛṣṇa's suggestion that Arjuna should 'come to me as (your) sole refuge' forsaking all his duties. Telang hastens to make it clear in his translation that 'duties' referred to here are socially prescribed rituals which entangle rather than release the individual self from the narrow confines of a given role. It may be observed here that 'me' in this context might stand for none other than the wider and more meaningful 'individuality' which is, ultimately, the refuge of the narrow self minimally conceived as 'I' by children and adolescents. 'I' in search of 'me' is quite understandable in social milieu of our country even at the level of folk-culture. A social theory harping on that cord is likely to make perfect sense. The question however remains: why should a person, making a choice of a certain way of life (as Arjuna seems to have made) be made, through persuasion, to run the whole course of action and face the consequences of his wrong choice against his better judgment. Here comes the *Gītā* with its thesis about the futility of human deliberations which, though apparently conscious, are, in fact, rationalizations made under the spell of unconscious forces beyond the control of the self. It is a self-deception when a person chooses a course and forgets about the choice in times of crisis. Indian social code of conduct takes a committed stand against it. This stand is more or less authoritarian having universal application. The basic stand, as it is, does help the political authority to run the politico-military administration smoothly, provided (and this is an important Indian provision) the political leadership remains true to its principles too.

Notes and References

1. Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*, London, George Allen and Unwin (3rd imp.), 1948, p. 512.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 533.
3. S.C. Chatterjee and D.M. Datta, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy* (5th edn), Calcutta, University of Calcutta, 1954, p. 12.
4. Irawati Karve, *Hindu Society: An Interpretation*, Pune, 1961.
5. Ramprasad Sen, maker of '*Rāmprasādi*' style of composition—deep as well as simple—was a devotee of Kāli (*Śakti*). He was a singer-composer of eighteenth-century Bengal. One of his songs that merits special mention in this context runs: *Mon rey kṛsi kāj jānonā/Emon mānab jamin roilo patit ābād korely pholto sonā* (O my mind, untrained in the work of tilling/This rich human-soil, now lying fallow, were to yield gold with cultivation.)
6. T.M.P. Mahadevan, 'Social, Ethical and Spiritual Values in Indian Philosophy' in Charles E. Moore (ed.), *The Indian Mind*, University of Hawaii, 1967, pp. 152-72.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

8. K.T. Telang (trans.), 'The Bhagavadgītā: With Sanatsujātyā and the Anugītā' in *Sacred Books of The East*, vol. viii, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1965.
9. *M.K. Gandhi Interprets the Bhagavadgītā*, Delhi, Orient Paperbacks, p. 301.
10. Telang, *op.cit.*, Introduction.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 50-51.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
14. Gandhi, *op.cit.*, p. 13.
15. James P. Carse, *Finite and Infinite Games: A View of Life as Play and Possibility*, New York, The Free Press, 1986.

Obituary note

PROFESSOR JARAV LAL MEHTA

Professor J.L. Mehta, who passed away in Boston early in July 1988 at the age of 76, was by common consent, one of the most scholarly thinkers in India in recent years. His erudition extended not only to the German philosophical tradition, of which he was a keen student, but also to Indian philosophy; he spent his last few years teaching Indian thought, both philosophical and religious, to American students. He died so to say in harness, while he was still engaged in that task. To all those who had the privilege of meeting him and of discussing philosophy with him, it was always a memorable sort of experience.

Professor Mehta was born in a distinguished family of Gujaratis settled in Varanasi, and after his education in Varanasi, including his post-graduation at the Banaras Hindu University, he started his teaching career in Jaipur, before shifting to Banaras Hindu University as a Lecturer. He soon rose to be a Reader in Philosophy and later a Professor in the Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy at that university, from which he retired somewhat prematurely, to join as a Professor in the Centre for World Religions at Harvard University. He retired from this position also a few years ago, but has been teaching casually there, and participating in seminars and conferences elsewhere in the world. He became a fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung during 1957-58, studying contemporary German philosophical trends at the Universities of Cologne and Freiburg-im-Briesgau. From this time starts his interest in Phenomenology, *Existenzphilosophie* and Hermeneutics. He came into personal contact with Martin Heidegger at Freiburg, and Heidegger spoke very highly of Professor Mehta's attainments. Later, he went to Yale University in 1964-65 as a Whitney-Fulbright Visiting Lecturer, and he was elected Visiting Fellow at the Branford College, Conn. The result of his keen interest in phenomenology and *Existenzphilosopie* was his outstanding book *The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger*, which won him a foremost place among the scholars of the contemporary German tradition. Heidegger himself thought that this was one of the best introductions to his thought in any language other than German. It was published first by Banaras Hindu Unisity in 1967 and later at New York in 1971 in a new and revised form. Although Professor Mehta wrote some more essays and papers, he was most well-known for this scholarly work.

Before the publication of this book, the thought of Martin Heidegger had been most inaccessible to the English-speaking public. It is acknowledged that this thinker is the most difficult of all thinkers of the German tradition, including Hegel. Even to the German student, his language presents a most

formidable barrier to understanding. Although Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* had made Heidegger somewhat famous in Europe before the Second World War, most of the writings of the decisive phase of his philosophy appeared only after the early fifties. Moreover, the political cloud over Martin Heidegger during the Second World War and immediately after it (when the American army occupying and administering that part of Germany where Heidegger resided, forbade him from teaching at Freiburg), distanciated him from many English-speaking philosophers. It was highly creditable, therefore, that Professor Mehta could study the thought of this great thinker from first-hand sources, being a scholar also in German language and literature.

In this work, Professor Mehta treats Heidegger's thought not as a closed system, but leading to further development. Heidegger, according, to Mehta, only points the way, and it is open to further development by other thinkers, who may be convinced by it. The first part of Mehta's work is one of the best introductions to Heidegger's philosophical development. Later, Mehta comes into grips with the main problems posed by *Sein und Zeit*. The exposition of the thought of *magnum opus* of Heidegger is masterly and for the first time presents in English language, a detailed and precise exposition of the structure and main argument of this great work. The last part of this work by Mehta is an attempt to understand the later phases of Heidegger's thought. Heidegger is known to have changed his position in his later thought, especially in his books, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, What is Metaphysics?, What is Philosophy?*, the two-volume work on *Nietzsche* and other works, all of which are extermely difficult to read and understand and more difficult to translate. It is in this context that I regard Professor Metha's work on Heidegger a most positive achievement for a non-German-speaking student of the contemporary German tradition.

Professor Mehta treats Heidegger within the great intellectual tradition of the West—as a part and parcel of the *philosophia perennis*—rather than a deviation from it. The basic problems of the nature of man's being and his existence, the nature and significance of the external world, the nature of ultimate Being and truth and above all the structure and categories and structure of our thinking through language are as much central to Heidegger's thought as they are to perennial philosophy. Mehta shows the significance of Heidegger's thought in showing the limitations of Western ways of thinking. Greek thought on the one hand is responsible for such limitations, and on the other Greek thought itself shows a way out of these limitations.

One of the last major works by Mehta was his brief monograph on the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo, which was again published by Banaras Hindu University. This was based on Annie Besant Memorial Lectures which Professor Mehta delivered and were listened to with great interest and fascination. And one of his last public appearances in India was at the International Congress on Phenomenology sponsored by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research early this year, when he subjected the language of the Ṛg-Veda

to a phenomenological analysis. Professor Mehta's exposition was always lucid, and the choice of words of his speech was simple and non-rhetorical; in this he reflected more his training in an English-speaking atmosphere, rather than the German. George Schrader, with whom Mehta was associated at Yale University, regarded the work on Heidegger as 'the work of a capable and mature thinker' representing 'a fine piece of critical scholarship', and 'written with remarkable clarity and penetrating understanding of Heidegger's thought'.

The loss of such a serious scholar to Indian philosophical circles is quite formidable. Professor Mehta is irreplaceable as one of the most outstanding students of the European tradition. To his close friends, his death is a serious loss to intellectual fraternity, with which Professor Mehta associated himself upholding the values of being an outstanding student, a teacher and a friend.

Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi N.S.S. RAMAN

Book reviews

JOHNSON J. PUTHENPURACKAL: *Heidegger: Through Authentic Totality to Total Authenticity* (A unitary approach to his thought in its two phases), Louvain Philosophical Studies 2, Louven University Press, 1987, xviii+342 pages.

This is a remarkable thesis on Martin Heidegger. Remarkable in its form and in its content. The form reveals a great lucidity of thought. The author never lets the reader get lost behind him. The author introduces his subject well, develops it clearly and brings out definite conclusions. There is a great mastery of the German language and an equal mastery of the English in which the thought of Heidegger is transposed. Not only each chapter is well structured but the whole thesis has a great unity and comprehensiveness.

The content of the thesis is remarkable also. First, there is the presentation of the First Heidegger mostly based on *Being and Time,* and then how he underwent a change. The great achievement of the second part of the thesis is that the physiognomy of the Second Heidegger is culled, not just from one single work but from a variety of works; and the features which are gathered form, finally, a coherent picture of the philosopher who is considered to have been, in this period, most elusive and uncertain.

Thus, Part I and Part II give us the presentation of Heidegger I and of Heidegger II respectively. It would be too long, and it is unnecessary, to give the content of these two complementary philosophies. But the author adds his own interpretation of what is being achieved by each philosophy. If we let ourselves be guided by the recommendations of Heidegger, we would achieve, in the light of his first philosophy, an *authentic totality*, i.e. we would have really explored all that can be explored from the point of view of man; in the light of his second philosophy, we would have achieved *total authenticity,* because we would have consented to let ourselves be guided by the light of being. This attitude makes us most authentic, because we allow ourselves to become 'the shepherds' of Being, which, in the view of Heidegger, is our deepest vocation as men.

Part III of the book is a more personal contribution of the author to the study of Heidegger, because he does not only show how Part I and Part II are interlinked but studies the more difficult question of 'the authentic thinking of the Divine' and launches finally into a 'Critical Appraisal' of Heidegger's total philosophy.

In the mind of the author, Heidegger is truly a great philosopher. We are far from the ridicules which the young A.J. Ayer was not hesitating to heap on Heidegger in the thirties. We are far from the distorted presentation of Heidegger as an atheist, which was fairly common earlier, mostly in the light of his first philosophy. Heidegger is now the philosopher who transcends the

whole Western tradition of philosophizing and who comes closer to a world philosophy, which is not without affinity with the philosophies of the East.

It is remarkable that the author, who has conceived such a great admiration for the philosopher he studied so carefully, is able to have also some blunt criticisms of his shortcomings. Chapter III of Part III points out several serious shortcomings in Heidegger's outlook, for instance, his poor study of intersubjectivity, his neglect of the bodily condition of man, his little attention to love, loyalty, friendship, co-operation, joy and fellow-feeling.

More puzzling is the final timid criticism raised by Johnson Puthenpurackal, a discrete wonder as to whether one can dispense, so much as Heidegger did, with conceptual thinking. So far the author had gone along with Heidegger in his criticism of the Western tradition and his advocacy of preconceptual thinking. But, now, he raises a doubt which I, too, had been harbouring all along. Heidegger's dismissal of Western philosophy looks to be cavalier and simplistic. A same criticism cannot apply to Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Hegel and Bergson. I had begun reading the book under review with the hope that it would remove my inability to go along with Heidegger's philosophy. I attributed this to the fact that my information on Heidegger was incomplete. I must say that the book gave me a fair acquaintance with the intricacies of Heidgger's thought. But, unfortunately, it did not convert me to the view of Heidegger on being. I am still unable to see what that Being is which is not an entity, and yet is supposed to make itself present in all entities, to supply meanings to our minds and to nourish them into total authenticity. I still have the impression that Heidegger himself is the victim of a too easy dismissal of what Aristotle and the subsequent Christian tradition had added to the incomplete insights of Plato. I am afraid that the 'step back' which Heidegger takes towards the alleged Being is 'a step, not on a firm ground but on what is only the analogical notion of Being, formed legitimately by our minds when they try to understand Being as a whole. The passage to a First Real Being, as the one of god, looks to me much less dogmatic than Heidegger's enhancing of an obscure 'Being'. But Johnson Puthenpurackal is not to be blamed for this shortcoming. It is the shortcoming of Heidegger and, thus, another matter than the review of this book, which will stand for a long time as one of the best presentations of Heidegger's philosophy.

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JÜRGEN HABERMAS: *The Theory of Communicative Action,* Vol. 1, translated by Thomas McCarthy, Beacon Press, Boston, 1981.

I greatly admire the magnum opus: *The Theory of Communicative Action* where different streams merge into one wide river. And who does not admire

a vast canvas of thought beaming with profound insight, ingenuity and creative imagination? But at the same time I am really hemmed in by some of Habermas's basic themes—his distinction between *communicative* and *strategic* action, his idea of *communicative rationality* that draws heavily on *universal pragmatics* and his compromise between transcendentalism and empiricism. And I suspect that everything does not go well perhaps, that all the wrinkles have not been ironed out, that at least some weakness lies coiled in the heart of Habermas's edifice—like a worm.

First, his distinction between *communicative* and *strategic* action, Habermas, as we know, understands the tradition of Marxism as reinterpreted by Lukaćs and the Frankfurt school, and he introduces a paradigm of *communication* as a supplement to Marx's paradigm of *production.* But his idea of *communication* is, however, anchored to the Marx's disjunction between *force* and *form,* between *forces of production* and *relations of production* (i.e., the institutional forms in which productive activity is carried out). And his internal critique of Marxism is premissed upon this distinction between *forces* and *relations.* Marxism does not see the tremendous implication of this distinction in its proper perspective. On the contrary it subsumes fores and relations to the same concept of *production* and thus overlooks the real distinction between instrumental and communicative action. It, therefore, fails to see that the phenomena of ideology, domination or violence occur only in the level of the relations of production or in the level of communicative action. Thus without giving the sphere of communicative action its due it is not possible to account for the very phenomena that Marx analysed viz., domination, dissimulation and liberation. That is why Habermas takes great pains to develop the categorial framework and normative foundations of his social theory in the form of a general theory of communicative action. 'If we assume that the human species maintains itself through the socially coordinated activities of its members and that this coordination is established through communication—and in certain spheres of life, through communication aimed at reaching agreement—then the reproduction of the species also requires satisfying the conditions of a rationality inherent in communicative action'.[1]

Habermas, however, wants to bring out the significant of *communicative* action mainly against the background of *strategic* action. He distinguishes between these two kinds of action in the following way. Communicative action is action oriented to understanding, while strategic action is purposive-rational action or action oriented to success. In the words of Habermas: 'The model of purposive-rational action takes as its point of departure the view that the actor is primarily oriented to attaining an end (which has been rendered sufficiently precise in terms of purposes), that he selects means that seem to him appropriate in the given situation, and that he calculates other foreseeable consequences of action as secondary conditions of success...We call an action oriented to success *strategic* when we consider it under the aspect of following rules of rational choice and assess the efficiency of influencing the decisions

of a rational opponent...By contrast, I shall speak of *communicative* action whenever the actions of the agents involved are coordinated not through egocentric calculations of success but through acts of reaching understanding. In communicative action participants are not primarily oriented to their own 'individual success; they pursue their individual goals under the condition that they can harmonize their plans of action on the basis of common situation definitions'.[2] Now this accent on communicative dimension of social action leads Habermas to an analysis of language—not to language as a syntactic system but to language-in-use or speech. 'If we were not in a position to refer to the model of speech, we could not even begin to analyse what it means for two subjects to come to an understanding with one another. Reaching understanding is the inherent telos of human speech'.[3] Obviously Habermas is glued not on Chomskyan model but on Austinian model. And he prefers to elucidate communicative action, nay the distinction between communicative and strategic action in terms of the structure of speech act. Taking clue from Austin he makes a distinction between *illocutionary* acts and *perlocutionary* acts. The constitutive feature of illocutionary act consists in *expressing meaning*, while *intention* is the constitutive element of perlocutionary acts or of strategic action in general. What the speaker means is analytically given in his illocutionary act, but the case is completely different with perlocutionary act. Perlocutionary acts are 'a sub-class of teleogocial actions which must be carried out by means of speech acts, under the condition that the actor does not declare or admit to his aims as such'.[4] Habermas now holds that communicative action can be explained or elucidated only by illocutionary acts. For illocutionary act has some fundamental rules constituted by certain *validity claims*. These validity claims constitute the rational force or essential conditions of speech acts. Now the essential conditions of speech acts are also the essential conditions of communicative action. And this explains why communicative action can be elucidated by illocutionary acts alone.

Let me elaborate the above point in brief. The fundamental question of formal pragmatics is to explain the communicative competence of the speaker, i.e., to explain what it means to understand an utterance. 'We understand a speech act', according to Habermas, 'when we know what makes it acceptable'.[5] The acceptability or the essential conditions of speech acts are the making and vindication of four validity claims: intelligibility, truth, rightness and truthfulness. In other words, the successful performance of a speech act essentially requires that in issuing an utterance the speaker claims that what is said is comprehensible or intelligible, that the propositional content is true, that the performative component is quite correct or legitimate, and that what is believed is expressed sincerely. Similarly, the audience understands the utterance by generally assuming that the speaker is sincere, that he takes what is said to be true, etc. These are the conditions that relate to communicative action. Hence we should have to give the necessary conditions of speech acts (illocutionary acts) in order to illuminate the concept of communicative action.

This also underlines the fundamental distinction between communicative and strategic action. In both the communicative (illocutionary) use of language and the strategic use of language intelligibility condition is fulfilled; but it is the making and vindication of three other validity claims that give strength to communicative action as opposed to strategic action.

Yet what is charming on the face creates problem for me. If we understand Habermas well, a perlocutionary or a strategic act does not belong to the very structure of language, it is rather constituted by the speaker's non-declared intention. The same utterance can be employed to perform both communicative and perlocutionary (strategic) acts. It is only the non-declared intention that alters an apparently communicative act into a strategic act. This contention of Habermas, however, shakes me with a feeling of uneasiness. Well, when do I perform an illocutionary act? According to Habermas, I perform an illocutionary (communicative) act when I really mean what I say, and when what I mean is analytically given in my illocutionary act. Here any question of the speaker's intention does not come into picture. But the situation differs when I perform a speech act with some concealed intention. I may make an utterance insincerely, i.e., with the intention (non-expressed) of doing otherwise than what I mean. Or, I may make an uttreance where I mean what I say but with an ulterior motive though it is not disclosed. In both the cases the acts that I carry out by means of speech acts, are, according to Habermas, strategic or perlocutionary. But since (as Habermas informs us) an illocutionary act is included in a perlocutionary act, do I make validity claims even when I perform perlocutionary (strategic) acts? Habermas cannot give assent to it, since that will undermine the distinction between communicative and strategic acts. He would say that when I perform a speech act insincerely, any question of making validity claims does not make any sense. The same is true even when I perform a speech act sincerely but with an ulterior motive. For, here also I am not completely truthful.

Now if Habermas continues in this way, things will begin to smell badly. For then everything will turn on the speaker's actual intention whether he will be truthful or not or make validity claims or not, or whether his performed speech act will have rational force or not. This means that the rational force does not belong to the structure of language; it depends on the intention of the speaker. Thus the original zeal of Habermas to build up communicative action from an analysis of the structure of language ends rather in a whimper. All acts, no matter whether communicative or stragetic, are in the long run matters of attitude or intention. And this puts an end to the formal distinction between communicative and strategic acts in the way in which Habermas would like to construe it.

Similarly I am not much elated by his idea of *communicative rationality*. Habermas constantly draws our attention to the communicative dimension of social action. Action refers to everyday contexts of social interaction, and every social interaction is communicative interaction. This accent on commu-

nicative dimension necessarily provokes an analysis of language—of language not as a syntactic system but of language as the basic medium of communication. Habermas argues that communication is the logically primary use of language, since all languages have a universal core: some dialogue constitutive universals. Thus when we learn to speak a language we master them and, therefore, acquire communicative competence. Our communicative competence is not just a matter of being able to produce grammatical sentences. In speaking we relate to the world about us, to others, to our own intentions, beliefs or desires, and make different claims concerning the validity of what we say. Thus we make claims concerning the validity of what we say in relation to the objective world, and this is thematized in *constative* speech acts; or we make claims concerning the rightness or appropriateness of norms of action, and this is made explicit in *regulative* speech acts; or we make sincerity claims in regard to the manifest expressions of our intentions and beliefs, and this is thematized or made explicit in *expressive* speech acts. Habermas claims that a speaker relates himself to all three worlds by performing *one* speech act. For a speech act has three components—the *propositional,* the *illocutionary,* and the *expressive* components. The propositional component (as emphasised in constative speech acts) is correlated to the objective world and to the truth claim. The illocutionary component (as emphasised in regulative speech acts) is carried with the aid of a performative sentence (...I promise to you...etc.), and it is committed to the social world and to the rightness claim. The expressive components (as emphasised in expressive speech acts) is correlated to the subjective world and to the truthfulness claim. Thus all the validity claims are raised (explicitly or implicitly) with every speech act. Each of the validity claims can be contested and criticised, defended and revised. And it is possible to reach consensus or agreement about the disputed claims by way of argument and insight. This rationally motivated mutual agreement is based on reasons or grounds rather than on coercion and force. And it is this experience of achieving mutual understanding/agreement in communication unadulterated by force and coercion that gives content to the idea of communicative rationality.

I would like to make some brief comments on the assumptions supporting the idea of communicative rationality. First, the idea of communicative rationality assumes that all the validity claims are necessarily raised with every speech act. But what is the ground for this presumption? Do I, for example, make any truth claim when I am telling a joke? Again, is not sincerity condition suspended when we are engaged in collective bargaining? Or, do we make any rightness claim when we say, 'It is not raining today'?

Again, communicative rationality hammers on *agreement* based on an analysis of the social use of language oriented to reaching understanding/agreement through unconstrained use of reason. But is it true that speakers can be said genuinely to agree only when this agreement is induced by the

force of argument? Is it not true that this agreement can be induced also by the feeling of compassion or by emotional commitment to a common goal? Obviously, Habermas pays little attention to the total man as a sensuous needing, wanting, feeling being. Again, rationality can be a constitutive feature of knowledge, but it cannot be a defining characteristic of social communion. In fact, human communication has such a rich and complex spectrum that only the general and unforced consensus cannot be the measuring-stick for all forms of social communication. Not all inter-subjective relations in the medium of language conform to the single pattern of Habermas. We should not be lured by any kind of essentialism.

Further, communicative rationality depends heavily on *universal pragmatics.* But this universal pragmatics relies on dubious work in linguistics. And Habermas accepts pragmatic universals without seriously addressing himself to the problem associated with linguistic universals. Besides, the claimed universality of the structures Habermas singles out is not characteristic of communication in all cultures. Now if formal pragmatics, as Habermas claims, is an empirical-reconstructive science, and if the structures of communicative action and discourse are 'to be found with significant frequency only in certain spheres of certain (Western) cultures at certain (modern) times', how then can we defend the view, as Thomas McCarthy significantly asks, 'that those structures are universal-pragmatic features of communication as such'?[6].

Last but not the least, Habermas intends to make a compromise between the transcendental perspective and the historical (empirical) perspective. On the one hand, orientation to understanding, agreement and rational consensus is central to the concept of communicative rationality, and this forms the universal or transcendental presupposition of communication. On the other hand, communicative rationality is embodied in history and society at least partially so that it can act as a goal for action. In this sense, communicative action is the product of a certain specific historical development and social milieu. But how are these two account related? And which has priority? I suspect that there remains in Habermas an unresolved tension between the transcendental and the empirical-historical.

But what I have said above does not, however, come in between the great value that the book has as a path-breaking work. Indeed, I never fail to agree with the observation made in *Times Literary Supplement* that this books is 'a substantial study that displays all the rigour and systematicity, the vision and originality, which have justly earned Habermas the reputation of being the foremost social and political thinkers in Germany'.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. *The Theory of Communicative Action*, p. 397.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 285-86.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 287.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 292.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 297.
6. Cf. 'Rationality and Relativism: Habermas's overcoming of Hermeneutics', in J.B. Thompson and D. Held (eds.), *Habermas Critical Debates*, Macmillan, London, 1982, p. 65.

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