# Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

## JICPR

### Editor D. P. CHATTOPADHYAYA

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## Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

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# *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*

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# Indian philosophy in the context of
# world philosophy

KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

I

If the problem were about Indian culture *vis-à-vis* world culture, it could immediately be split into the following sub-problems:

(*i*) Can Indian culture be understood all by itself, apart from any borrowing from other cultures?

(*ii*) Can it continue without contributing anything, howsoever small though nonetheless specific, to other cultures?

(*iii*) Is there any world culture apart from these different cultures borrowing from and contributing to these mutually different other cultures? Do we, or do we not, mean by 'world culture' the most dominant culture in the world in a particular period of history like, say, the present-day scientific and technology-centric culture of the West?

Each of the three questions (*i*), (*ii*), and (*iii*) can be further subdivided according as each of the cultures concerned varies from time to time. Indian culture, for example, has not remained the same since its earliest days till today, and similarly with every other culture.

Yet, culture, after all—and we mean by 'culture' the culture of a particular people—considered in its specifiable broad features, continues (practically) unchanged for a long period. Cultures are probably the stablest of *historical* phenomena.

But when we come to *philosophy* the story is different. By 'philosophy' we mean specific intellectual formulation of problems, intellectual analysis of the concepts involved in those problems and their solutions through intellectual computation and/or reference to definite presentations intuited sensuously or otherwise. Such philosophy, particularly the problems and the concepts involved, may well be, and mostly are, rooted in some specific culture. But philosophy soon oversteps it in long strides, so that the more it develops as philosophy the more it becomes a world phenomenon in which any man anywhere in the world may participate, the barrier

of language being removed through appropriate translation. This has been the story of philosophy since the earliest days of civilization and intercommunication. This has been possible, however, only so far as the intellectual side of philosophy is concerned and so far also as the presentational side—we mean the direct experience of contents—remains unchanged.

As an intellectual pursuit, and so far also as common presentations are concerned, philosophy is a world phenomenon, i.e. world philosophy. But we have not yet come across any world culture. There have, indeed, been honest attempts—particularly since the middle of the nineteenth century and more and more vigorously since the First World War was over—to appreciate each other's culture; but it has never been an easy task and has not succeeded as it ought to even now. So far as the intellectual side is concerned, quite all right; this is because intellect, at least to a very large extent, is a common . possession of man. All the difficulty centres round immediate experience. Not much, indeed, round sensuous experience: if some people are deficient in or lack some kind of sense experience or if some have some extraordinary sensitive sense-organ or even some sensitivity altogether new, we can straighten the matter through patient research and scientific treatment. But when it comes to non-sensuous intuition, as in mythology, art, religion and the like, it is not that easy to understand others and sympathize with them; and these precisely form the bedrock of culture. Culture is what is *lived* and not, therefore, exhausted in overt perceptions and performances. It is a total attitude to things of the world, viewing and constructing everything in a new light, a new attitude which people of other cultures miss and cannot, therefore, have any idea of, unless, through assiduous study from outside they happen to have some inkling of that.

So there is no world culture in the sense that it is numerically one, a common possession of all peoples of the world; not even an implicit possession to unfold itself differently with different peoples, for the implicit-explicit distinction does not apply to culture. Philosophy, on the other hand, as we have understood it till now,* is one all over the world, if not explicitly defined, at least implicit; because, normally, peoples all over the world have the same intellect, the same logic, and sensuous presentations, too, are practically the same everywhere.

But, although there is no—one may even say there cannot be any—single world culture in that sense, we may still speak of world culture in another sense. It is each people's liberal attitude to admit not only that other peoples may have other cultures, sometimes even cultures that are quite other, but also to see that actually there are such other cultures, and live peacefully with them. This means that we recognize the right of other peoples to have other cultures, even though we cannot immediately make out what these other cultures are or could be. It is, in plain language, the minimal recogni-

*What philosophy proper is we shall soon see.

tion of *humanity* in those people. The only thing that is common to different cultures is this humanity and our respect for it, and this respect has to be genuine. Genuine respect means that other cultures must not be treated from the beginning, as inferior to one's own; it means that to start with we treat all cultures as of equal worth. Not that some of these cannot be inferior to others. But that can be spoken out only after the undeveloped *humanity* of the peoples concerned have been definitely demonstrated. And here, too, there is a *proviso*: one must have the guts to admit, in the same manner, the inferiority of one's own culture if there is any. From this point of view, world culture means, first, the recognition of basic humanity as the mainspring of every culture, though, maybe, not always properly winded. Once however this basic humanity, i.e. the minimal respect for man, is recognized, different cultures cannot but be viewed as alternative developments of this humanity in different historical and geographical perspectives, and history being partly human construction as intrinsically alternative too through to an extent. Anyway, there neither is nor can be *one* world culture; no sort of synthesis, far less a definite hierarchy with one spotless culture at the top and others down the ladder.

The case, however, is not the same with philosophy as we have understood the term till now.

Let us turn now to the first two questions (*i*) and (*ii*) asked at the outset. The questions are about the possibility of one culture borrowing from and/or lending to another culture or several such cultures. As the basicmost culture consists merely of respect for man, whatever else, coming from historical and geographical environs, form its other layers are either its opening out in diverse forms to such environs, varying from place to place and from one age to another, or mere artificial embellishments; and in either case every culture borrows from those environs as much as it lends to them; in the latter case changing them through its innovations. Now, history very largely, and geographical surroundings, in whatever measure, change according as other peoples come to shape the land, whether through invasion or through infiltration or through prolonged commercial and other types of transaction. Very naturally, in such cases, there occurs give-and-take, sometimes in small measures, sometimes in larger dimensions, and sometimes in the form of veritable cultural conquest.

For philosophy, on the other hand, in the sense in which we have used the term so far, there is no possibility, no question even, of such change, such give-and-take, exactly as it is the case with science. Philosophy, like science, is only intellectual understanding—intellectual analysis and formulation—of and theorization about not merely the broad geographical and historical surroundings but even the cultures that have *developed* in such circumstances, and, more than that, often the very basis of all cultures, viz. man in his basic dignity. But let us not forget that philosophy, so far, is only intellectual treatment, and intellectual methodology—logic, if you like—and the facts that are

so intellectually treated in philosophy are the common properties of all, no special preserve of any people. And, what is more, even the basic humanity that constitutes all cultures is one and the same for all peoples. If some peoples are less capable of right intellectual treatment than others, then, in the field of philosophy, they are corrected by those others; and even if they do not feel like willingly accepting those corrections, they, following the better logic employed by those others, will have to admit defeat and correct themselves at least in that intellectual field. Logic, including mathematics, is a universal and yet elaborate method, and no one is permitted to transgress it unless he substitutes some better method; and similarly with sensuous perception (maybe, aided, as required, by extrinsic instruments). Philosophy like science is thus, by definition as it were, world philosophy, and regarding it there is no give-and-take among different people, there being only progressive correction; and intellectual correction, be it noted, is, like perceptual correction, ruthless.

II

If philosophy, like science, is of its own profession, world philosophy or world science, there should be no problem at all like Indian philosophy *vis-à-vis* world philosophy. Just as there is nothing like Indian science as distinct from science that is world science, there should also be no Indian philosophy as distinct from world philosophy.

But—and that is what we like to insist on in this section—philosophy cannot be so easily equated with science. We shall even show that science, too, cannot so easily shed its local character, its allegiance to special peoples always in special historico-geographical situations.

Neither logic nor items immediately experienced need be the same everywhere. First of all, do not even modern people who are so much for the universality of science (and often also for that of philosophy too) speak of, advocate, different types of logic? Logic nowadays is understood as the systematic study (one may even say, building up the system) of a few of those principles which, when down to earth, are first employed as conventions or postulates to construct some self-consistent theory for describing and/or explaining some given situation; and, secondly, where several such theories compete for recognition, to select from among them one that is best working; 'best working' meaning not only that it can be used as successfully as possible in our practical life but also that it fits in best (i.e. does not clash) with any other theory accepted till now; and also that, in case it clashes with all of them but is yet; successfully applicable in our practical life, the whole host of those theories have to be remodelled (if necessary, some rejected) in the light of this one which is most working. So far so good. But what about building a further system of these conventions or postulates themselves, the system, viz. which is called logic? Will not the attempt get hopelessly involved in indefinite regress? Or, if the regress is not to be hopeless, will not the attempt fail to

tell us where precisely to stop in search of a meta study behind another which, in its turn, is meta to still another? And the more serious question that we now ask is: do we, as a matter of fact, proceed a single step behind just a logic of logic? And what is even more, is this 'logic of logic' really one logic of *another* logic? Is it not rather one and the same self-illuminating logic? Anyway, whatever logic we have that way—we mean the systematic study of the method of science—we stick to it. The method in question may fail to explain or adequately describe a phenomenon and may on that ground be discarded, but the *systematic study* of it—the study of full-bodied logic—remains unassailed and unassailable. In that sense, it has to be admitted that there is *one* formal logic everywhere. But, unfortunately, that *one* logic has not interested present day philosophers. They are interested *everywhere* in the best-working *method*, understanding even the so-called systematic study of such method as only a 'meta method' (if we are permitted to use this term). So, what we find is that in modern philosophy, which is really a philosophy of the West—in essence a philosophy (methodology) of science—there is a denial outright of any standard formal logic. This, obviously, permits an unnecessarily wide scope of difference, only hindering the normal progress of sceince. Science, however differing in differing ages and with different peoples, candidly welcomes unanimity which is at least believed to be something accomplishable in no distant future. But not so modern logic where unanimity is at best a distant ideal. Logic, itself a theorization with these moderners, is yet unlike normal sceintific theories in that, whereas scientific theories tend at least to improve on or correct one another, all peacefully different logics hold on to their presuppositions and postulates obstinately. This, in its turn, implies that science, in so far as it professes to use modern logic, is only toying with a fond idea of unanimity; and so with modern philosophy too constructed by means of this logic. So far, therefore, neither science nor philosophy is a *common* achievement, i.e. world science or world philosophy.

We add that there are two other possibilities for logic which equally dismiss the claim that, because science and philosophy employ logic, they are on that ground world science and world philosophy.

Just a century ago, all the logic that was employed by science or philosophy in the West was *either* the Aristotelian inductive logic (however improved on by successive later thinkers) when the concern was with facts or, the old Aristotelian deductive logic (however improved on by later thinkers) in connection with formal consistency. In spite of the moderners we have spoken of, this type of science and philosophy is certainly not extinct; they are very much in the field and have even begun to assert themselves. Does it not show that there is no *one* world science or world philosophy?

Lastly, at least in India, the logic that the old-day philosophy employed was never, at least overtly, the formal logic of the West, not certainly of the typically modern type, nor even the old Aristotelian formal logic (with or without all its later improvements). Indian logic, specially the one that deve-

loped in the hands of the Naiyâyikas—I mean their *annumāna*—was all, in the Humean fashion, just associational passage from one psychological cognitive event, say, the perception of a column of smoke at a certain place, to another cognitive event, here knowledge of another object, viz. of fire there, through an intermediate cognitive event, viz. a sort of remembering, just before that, the universal concomitance—the inductive relation—of smoke and fire, that inductive relation having been perceived just when, long before the present perception of smoke, a column of smoke was perceived along with some fire. There are, indeed, other psychological subtleties involved, viz. the inter-mediation, at the penultimate state, by another knoweldge, viz. of the adjecti-val conjoining of the inductive relation in question with the place, where the column of smoke is now being perceived. This is the typical Nyāya account of inference; and, though other systems of Indian philosophy, barring, of course, the Buddhist, have amended it here or there, the outline account has remained the same: the whole process is a succession of several cognitive states, each such state just giving rise to the next. The whole thing might also be under-stood phenomenologically, but the peculiarity of the Indian account (except, of course, with the Buddhist one) is that there is no obtrusive formal logic any-where. These successive psychological states up to the penultimate one are themselves understood as constituting proof too. The *reason* why the last step of the inference—the conclusion—is to be accepted is precisely that is has been generated by (i.e. has methodically followed) the preceding cognitions, quite as much as a perception is said to be justified by the use of sense-organs (and also mind) that were the psychological prerequisites. In the case of perception, the question as to why I say that the leaf in front of me is green is that I have perceived it with my eyes; and so is the case with inference. The reason why I hold that there is fire on the hill is that I have seen the smoke there, etc. The cause of a cognition is the *reason* too why I accept it, the cause of an event being understood as what uniformly and relevantly precedes it. Whether my acceptance has been a correct acceptance or not is, of course, an additional question, and Indian philosophers have, indeed, answered it differently; but nowhere, except to an extent in Buddhist logic, have they, in answer to this question, resorted to formal logic. The Vedantists, for example, hold that my acceptance *has to pass as correct*, i.e. legitimate, till it is found to have been deceptive; and, though the Naiyayikas insist that such legitimacy has to be established by additional evidence, this furthere vidence, even according to them, has little to do with formal logic, it being enough, they hold, that the acceptance, i.e. the cognition in question, is shown to be effective in our prac-tical life, and such demonstration has per force to be inferential.

So far, there is thus no room in Indian philosophy for formal logic. Those who admit *arthāpatti* (postulation) as a separate method of knowledge may have, one may say, leaned, in whatever measure, toward formal logic; and one may even add that the Buddhists, too, in their *anumāna* through *tādātmaya*, have openly admitted formal logic. But, first, in neither of these two cases is

formal logic elaborate enough; and, secondly—and this is more important here—by far the largest number of Indian thinkers have proceeded with their elaborate philosophies without having recourse to formal logic. Not that they were, therefore, stark empiricists. As just said, some of them admitted formal logic in their account of *arthāpatti*, and the Buddhists were much more for it than any others. We may add, too, that most of the Indian philosophers have clearly spoken of it in their account of *tarka*. But *tarka* has always been under-stood as subservient to the *pramāṇas* like *annumāna*, *pratyakṣa*, etc. and not even as a necessary aid everywhere.

As, thus, there is no *one* world logic, will not *one* world science or *one* world philosophy be a too tall claim, even though both science and philosophy are intellectual pursuits, at least very largely? Should it not rather be said that there are, or at least have been, different sciences and different philosophies, each with a logic of its own? It has to be granted, of course, that science with its logic as axiomatics dominates the present-day world, undoubtedly because of its extraordinary wide coverage and almost unthinkable technological suc-cess; and it is true also that analytic and aggressively empirical philosophy toeing the line of sceince in its ascendency dominated till yesterday. But that does not mean that they will hold the field all the time. Quite a large part of the prestige of modern science derives from its unheard—of technological suc-cess in a short period. But with that progress waning in recent days in various fields and with sweeping success in armament technology coupled with de-creasing reserves of nature and increasing atmospheric and other types of pollution, the prestige of science in recent days is getting slowly but steadily eroded. And, commensurately with that, people in the West are turning back in increasing numbers, from this soulless, if not devilish, science and its hand-maid—that all-intellectual analytic philosophy—to the consideration of man in his authentic being. Steadily through the last three centuries they have re-ceded so very much from genuine humanity that, not surprisingly, in their desperate turn-back they have often stumbled on spurious substitutes. But genuine humanity, too, is back in the field with the phenomenologists, existen-tialists, new Christian philosophy and other sorts of transcendental philo-sophy, and some forms of Marxism too. It is not known what change, if at all, will occur in science itself. But we may presume that it will avoid excesses, seeking only those truths of nature that are calculated to conduce to the real benefit of man, real benefit meaning what tends to strengthen the freedom of every man, his humanity, and not subordinate him to nature, whether to his animal nature or to the stark physical nature outside.

Anyway, on the part of Western philosophy and science it would be a turn-back to authentic man who is at the centre of all cultures and forms as we have already said, as much the minimum as also the maximum of the world culture if that culture is to be absolutely the same everywhere and in every age. And, as this one central culture ramifies itself into diverse concrete forms according as historico-geographical circumstances change, so also is the case with auth-

entic philosophy, the philosophy that represents, that is, offers an intellectual account of each people's culture. That was the philosophy throughout the world, including the West, before the advent of modern science and its brief-holder, the aggressive empirico-analytical philosophy. During the first two centuries of modern Western thinking, philosophy was not, indeed, all empirical, analytical and intellectual: all the philosophy of this period was still genuinely man-centric, though as much in consonance with the newly developing science as possible. We had such philosophy not only with Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant and Hegel, but also with Francis Bacon, John Locke, George Barkeley and David Hume, to mention only the topmost few. But that was possible, only because science, too, of those days had not alienated humanity over-much. This is why in philosophy too, in those days, transcendentalism (technically called rationalism) and empricism (also called naturalism) were not as hostile to each other as they soon turned out to be toward the end of the nineteenth century. The tragedy is that, when in reaction to this soulless philosophy, some people in the West in the twentieth century—I mean the phenomenologists, existentialists and philosophers of like temperament—turned approvingly toward authentic humanity, they, too, asserted it and even developed its details so vehemently against science and 'scientific' philosophy as even to cry down the innocent elementary procedure of science that was none of science's preserves, viz. analysis, inference, theorization, etc. This is why it is not receiving as widespread recognition as it ought to. In India, on the other hand, except, of course, in very modern days, philosophy, centering almost always round authentic man, has, far from avoiding intellectual method, always used it, sometimes even overzealously, not only to (*i*) confirm what these philosophers had authentically felt (i.e. intutied non-sensuously) or had reverentially accepted from masters who had so felt and (*ii*) to demolish contrary views intellectually but also (*iii*) to present what has been so felt as intelligibly as possible, in the form of probable, at least feasible, theories—in plain language, as strong suggestions—just for the purpose of interesting and initiating others.

The point that we are trying to show through these pages is that on the ground of one universal logic we cannot claim that there is, or ought to be, *one* world philosophy or even *one* world science. We have claimed, rather, that there has never been, and there cannot be, one universal logic. This, we have shown, is true as much of Indian philosophy as of the Western.

So also is the case, as we claimed earlier, with what is directly experienceable. Direct experience of the sensuous type may be ideally the same everywhere and in every age, because we in a way participate in such experience—participate in the sense that anybody may perceive the object concerned to the extent that he can talk about it to another and the latter understands, both that way referring throughout to one and the same object. So far there certainly could be *one* world account but on one other condition, viz. that there was one world logic, which latter being absent we come back to the old con-

clusion that there neither is nor could be one world science or one world philosophy. We have also seen that the possibility of one world philosophy (not world science) breaks down on a further ground. It is that the direct experience of authentic humanity in whatever of its aspect or stages is never of the sensuous type, at least none in which everybody can participate. Participation in another's sensuous experience is an easy affair, and, if anything in the instrument of perception is lacking, it can be supplied: we can at least understand how the defect can be mended, thanks to modern science. With regard to non-sensuous intuition, on the other hand, there is no scope even for such understanding. Non-sensuous intuition cannot be studied scientifically except for some sensuous perception in that connection. If one does not have this intuition, we cannot mend the defect, because we do not for certain know what has to be supplied and what removed and, more than that, *how* in either case. Yoga and other spiritual disciplines have, indeed, studied the various steps that lead to particular stages of such intuition. But the Yogins cannot practise this knowledge on others, because they are never sure that, even if those others, their disciples, practise the various steps, they will have the corresponding intuitions (spiritual experiences). There is something absolutely subjective about such intuition. What can at most be said is that, if such and such practices are undergone, it is *likely* that such and such intuitions one may have. It follows that philosophy as metaphysics, based on such spiritual intuition of genuine humanity (consciousness, in the language of the traditional Indian philosophy) through stages, can never be a world phenomenon. There is no possibility of *one* world metaphysics.

III

Let us from now on speak of the possibility of world *philosophy* only and not of world *science*. We have seen that in the normal sense in which the term 'world philosophy' is understood, i.e. in the sense of *one* world philosophy, there has never been, and there can never be, one such. Yet, however, in another sense—and that, too, is nothing unnatural—it is not only intelligible but quite possible too. More than that, it is precisely what we have been achieving these days, thanks to all world cultural organizations. If we cannot have world philosophy, much as it is the case with *one* world culture, people of one particular philosophy or culture may well, on the basis of authentic humanity round which their philosophies and cultures have developed, try to understand other philosophies and cultures which, too, are or were based on the same identical humanity, though they developed in different forms because of different historico-geographical circumstances. Understanding another philosophy or culture is possible because of this basic humanity which is absolutely similar, if not numerically identical everywhere; and once we could be reflectively conscious of this central humanity and from that point of view study carefully the historico-geographical environs of another people, we could

phenomenologically reconstruct that entire culture and, therefore, the corresponding philosophy too—philosophy in the sense in which we are speaking of it here—being nothing but that culture (the entire view of the world—*weltanschauung*) formulated and justified in intellectual language. If we could likewise understand another culture, we could equally study their culture and our culture—their philosophy and our philosophy—*vis-à-vis* one another. If the first point we gain is that we understand each other, the next profit we reap is that we compare our philosophies with each other to see how far we have proceeded in the same line because of similar overall contexts, and how far in different lines because of contextual differences. So far there is no question of undervaluing or overvaluing either. But that question may come next in two justified ways. After careful scrutiny, we may find how far a culture (and, therefore, the corresponding philosophy) has availed itself of the overall and detailed context in which it has grown, and equally how far the context of one such culture is fuller than the context of another, 'fuller' meaning that one context comprehends—and, therefore, exceeds—that another. In either case, the culture (and, therefore, the corresponding philosophy) which avails itself of the context concerned in a larger measure and which, alternatively and in addition, has a more comprehensive context is superior to the other. But we have to be careful and strictly impartial in such assessment; our communal ego must not be allowed to butt in unasked. The task is not difficult, seeing that exactly this way children and unsophisticated people learn a language other than their own. Holding back their communal ego as they naturally do it, they follow the humanity in other people in so far as it responds linguistically in particular ways to particular situations and pick up these responses. They succeed in picking up the responses, only because they are out sincerely to pick these up. And, proceeding in the same sincere attitude, if they find that their own linguistic responses fall short of theirs, they admit without any questioning, that their own language is poorer; and, similarly, when they discover that their language is richer, they do it without any false self-importance. The same thing might be true of comparative assessment of culture and, therefore, of philosophy; for be it remembered again that the philosophy of a people is their culture as intellectually formulated and as a way of self-defence intellectually rebuilt too in the form of scientific theories.

Just, again, as another language can be learned sophisticatedly through elaborate linguistic paraphernalia—through grammar, phonetics, lexicons, etc.—just so can we learn another culture too, which culture, as so intellectually studied, is but the corresponding philosophy. As, now, in such studies intellectual theorization, over and above plain observation, is a must for building up the grammar and other linguistic sciences of every such language, it is not unnatural—rather, it has often been a fact—that every community takes the language it uses as, initially at least, the best even linguistically, and that way satisfies its ego. Not that this initial ego cannot be brought under check. But that either takes time, much mischief being done in the meantime,

or happens only when overwhelmed by the richness, rigour and finesse of another language as happened, for example, with the European linguists studying Sanskrit. So, precisely, is the case with intellectual philosophy. Except in cases of unobstrusive, unself-conscious, spontaneous contact of one culture and, therefore, of its philosophy with another culture and the philosophy of that culture, there is always the possibility of the ego asserting itself. That can be checked, if in such self-conscious study of another culture and its philosophy, one, though self-conscious all the while, just looks disinterestedly at the child in him playing with and talking to, all spontaneously, the people of another culture and its philosophy.

This last is the basic method of *appreciating* another culture and philosophy. And it can be raised to the status of *understanding* that culture and philosophy, if only one learns to appreciate these self-consciously, i.e. to look disinterestedly and intellectually, if you like, at that spontaneous appreciation as a fond elderly person looks at and seeks to understand children playing. Only here the onoloker and the player have to be the same person. And this is no difficult task.

While appreciating another people's philosophy in this healthy manner, our main task should be to see how the *one* basic authentic humanity has developed and diversified itself according to its historico-geographical surroundings. But, in the course of that, we may unconsciously or even consciously imbibe certain features of that philosophy, even though our own historico-geographical circumstances differ. When we unconsciously imbibe them, they, in their turn, affect these historical surroundings, resulting in whatever further amount of cultural change; and the whole process may be further accelerated by the needed change in geography, too, worked out deliberately. This way there occurs mutual give-and-take and consequent development, not unoften decay too. Proper world culture and world philosophy should mean nothing more than this. So, when the problem is 'Indian philosophy in the context of world philosophy' we should understand our task to be to see, first, how the basic concept of man developed in India suiting the then historico-geographical conditions of the land, or, if it did not originate here what original culture was brought to this land and how it took shape initially; secondly, how and in what later circumstances, different from the earlier, it imbibed parts of other cultures, or, if the change in the circumstances was our doing, changed itself spontaneously; and, thirdly, how much and under what circumstances it contributed to the cultures of other peoples, etc. This, however, is a task meant for students of history. Present-day students of philosophy, far less of the traditional Indian philosophy, in our country, are, for whatever reason, incapable of carrying it out. What much they can do is to see how and to what extent present-day Western philosophy can benefit from the traditional Indian philosophy, and contrariwise how much and why this Indian philosophy should benefit from that Western philosophy. Not that the world *minus* India is equal to the West. There are left Soviet Russia, the entire Middle East, China, Japan

and the rest of the Far East and Africa too. But, so far as philosophy (including culture) is concerned, the Marxism of Soviet Russia and of China is after all a Western ideology. The philosophy of the Far East is Buddhism interpersed with Islam and Christianity, and that of the entire Middle East and a large part of the African continent is Islam mixed up at places with Christianity. Of these different philosophies, Buddhism was once wholly Indian, and even now, so far as philosophy is concerned, is in closest affinity with Indianism; Christianity, in spite of its Middle East origin, is now Western; and Islamic *philosophy*, unfortunately enough, is very largely unknown to the Indian philosophic circle. This is why all sginificant talks of give-and-take in modern India concern only Indian and Western philosophies. Western philosophy like its Indian counterpart, whatever form or forms it might have taken through long-continued give-and-take between Christian and Hebrew philosophy on the one hand and Greek and the last lingering Hindu-Buddhist philosophy of the Middle-East on the other, is coupled, of course, with whatever of original philosophy had grown in Europe before the advent of Christianity there. Everywhere philosophy started as culture that developed, in the course of time, systematic self-intellectualization, intellect not yet got separate; and as and when this intellect, still not separate, made its presence felt in larger measure, it came to build a whole superstructure called logic and epistemology, meant primarily to scaffold the basic philosophy of culture (but eventually developing auto-erotically into a boasting second-level study). This explains why logics and epistemologies, professing to be all intellectual, have differed more or less from culture to culture. By 'Western philosophy' we mean all these in all their diversities, particularly as these stand today in their modern shapes, no matter whether we are philosophizing in those ways in Europe or America or even in India.

We cannot, however, treat 'Indian philosophy' that way. Indian philosophy through give-and-take grew, indeed, in a like manner; sometimes developing all metaphysical profundities of life, sometimes building diverse sorts of theoretical science; sometimes buttressing these profundities and sciences with relevant logics and epistemologies worked out; sometimes, again, as intellect narcissistically developing all sorts of intellectual subtleties caring little for whether they are relevant to philosophic contents. However, in whichever line it developed, it was all genuine Indian thinking. Though sick toward the end, it continued to be genuinely Indian till a century and a half back, but was then practically replaced by Western philosophy, more specifically, till a few decades back, by British philosophy with half-digested continental thoughts as catered to us by the British thinkers. Genuine Indian philosophy has since then continued in ever-narrowing streams, or more or less as mechanical intellectual rituals, with pundits swiftly dwindling in number and social recognition. Though even then there has always been a sort of second-hand historical and linguistic study of Indian philosophy, not only in the West but here in India by Indian scholars, it has no real continuity with the old-day living

philosophic thinking. It has turned more or less into a branch of museology. Assuredly, it has an immense value of its own; so many forgotten items of Indian philosophy have come to be discovered, often throwing startlingly new light on so many scholastic issues. But *living* Indian philosophy is not very much in the air now. For the last one hundred years, maybe for some decades more, all our philosophical study has either been wholly in the line of Western philosophy, meaning that some top-ranking thinkers have, during this period, done philosophy exactly as a Westerner has; or what is much better than that but yet falls short of proper expectation, made a sort of comparative study—thorough or sporadic, excellent or otherwise—of the Western and the traditional Indian philosophy; or, not again up to proper expectation, simply studies in detail the old-day Sanskrit, Pāli and Prākṛt texts, exactly as the traditional pundits have been doing but now through the media of both Sanskrit and English. None of these, however, is original Indian thinking of the present days. 'Original Indian thinking' means philosophizing the living culture, and, if the *present-day* living culture of our country is yet largely the traditional culture of the land (though in its downward trend at least for the last three centuries) but with severe dents, even at vitals, caused by the present-day Western culture, genuine philosophizing would be to study, all livingly though intellectually and systematically, whither we are drifting, how far the Westernization process should go, whether a turn-back toward original Indianization is feasible or even desirable and, if so, how precisely to accomplish it. The central problems of this living present-day Indian philosophy should, thus, be basically concerned with the contemporary cultural paradoxes and attempts at this proper solution; and only after this is done should a genuine Indian philosopher of the present days turn toward developing proper Indian epistemology and logic and other types of analysis. Whatever metaphysics, epistemology, logic, etc. are developed by modern Indian philosophers would, then, in the right sense, be 'Indian philosophy in the context of world philosophy'.

Two points need be noted in this connection. Dominant, for whatever reason, all over the world in the present days, Western philosophy was till the other day not under any obligation, except for genuine futurists, to study that way Indian or any other philosophy, 'that way' meaning 'with a view to adjusting the Western culture to the traditional Indian, indeed, to any non-Western culture'. If they yet studied these cultures—and they certainly did a lot of exploration and innovation, though all from outside—they did it out of pure intellectual curiosity and sometimes with a view to establishing the superiority of their own culture, as it was very much in evidence in their religious studies. Evidently, this is true as much of their study of culture as of philosophy. If quite many of them have in recent days turned very seriously to other cultures and philosophies, that is because some serious contradictions in their science (and technology) centric culture and philosophy are getting nakedly evident in spite of all apparent complacence, comfort and affluence. Except for a few

out-of-the-way stalwarts, normally a dominant culture in its commerce with other cultures only pats them.

Indian culture forfeited its dominance some few centuries ago. If in the present day the Westerners are, in whatever number, but in all genuineness, turning toward the light, we should place before them our culture just in so far as we are still *living* it, though living only partly, and also as it has to be *lived*, i.e. in all its genuineness and relevance to modern requirements. This is what Indian culture is in the context of world culture, 'world culture' meaning the most dominant culture of the these days. And what is true of culture is true *pari passu* of philosophy. World philosophy, like world culture, means neither what is common to the different philosophies, for in the process of winnowing out the differences one will have to discard practically everything, leaving only a contentless family resemblance; nor does it mean synthesis in any loose sense of the term unless we have some fair idea from the start as to what much of one has to be sacrificed to accommodate what much of another. Unless that is known, at least intolerable clarity, the word 'synthesis' would be a misnomer. Proximately, world philosophy at a particular period of history means the philosophy which, for whatever reason, is dominant in that period; one, in other words, to which we have somehow to adjust our individual philosophies. Historically, some adjustment, at worst supersession, has to be effected, and whatever remains over is the world philosophy for the next period. But be it noted that there is another trend of history parallel with such 'adjustment or supersession'. It is peaceful coexistence of two or several cultures; coexistence, of course, so far as some relatively basic characters immediately centring round the basicmost notion of genuine humanity are concerned. The nearer such basic characters are to the basicmost the longer the duration of coexistence, and the longer the duration envisaged the more peaceful is the coexistence. Genuine liberals in the fields of culture, philosophy and religion are those who perceive such permanent or long-period coexistence and proclaim these for world peace. Another name of such coexistence is *alternation*—short-period, long-period, or even permanent. There neither is nor need ever be any aggregation of features called from different cultures or philosophies or religions: what much is recommended is that particular groups follow particular cultures, philosophies and religions developing round particular such coexistent features. What is not recommended is that any such particular culture or philosophy should think of lording over the whole world for all time to come. Change over from one such philosophy, culture or religion to another is not, indeed, prohibited; for that is the very motive of building intellectual and other types of bulwark round each such philosophy, culture or religion. Such intellectual and other types of defensive measures are as much for managing that my people do not walk over to other camps as equally to see that others come over to mine. What specifically is forbidden in this connection is for *non-intellectual* methods to be oppressive, to strangle the freedom of choice after one has enough of 'thinking considera-

tion' of one's own culture (philosophy or religion) *vis-à-vis* another's. Even proselytization is nothing unwise or immoral, if it keeps within these confines.

IV

Not underrating in any way historical, comparative and other types of scholarly study of the traditional Indian philosophy, we conclude that the purpose of the study of all genuine, i.e., living and first-level, Indian philosophy in the context of world philosophy should be to adjust livingly, though through the use of intellect too, our Indian culture—we mean as much of the traditional Indian culture as has livingly continued till this date—to the dominant culture of the present-day world, viz. the Western. This, we have already seen, concerns philosophy as metaphysics primarily. And once this is done— and even along with it—we may develop in the same fashion our living Indian epistemology and logic and other types of analysis. I repeat, I am not underrating historical, comparative and other types of scholarly—and even analytic—study of the traditional Indian philosophy. These undoubtedly are of immense value. But what is specially needed in the present days is that type of original philosophizing (*i*) which may, as distinct from Western types of philosophy, be unhesitatingly called *Indian philosophy*; (*ii*) which has, therefore, some living continuity with the traditional Indian philosophy; (*iii*) but which yet expresses itself in a way what modern Western thinkers can follow as some contemporary's living thought; (*iv*) which has, therefore, accepted something from the West, not only the mode of expression but also the thoughts *vis-à-vis* which, i.e. supported by and in contrast with which, as the cases may be, it has developed itself systematically; and (*v*) which, because of its being living thought, i.e. tackling authentic problems, whether of metaphysics or of epistemology and logic, has something genuine to offer to the West.

Such genuine Indian philosophy *vis-à-vis* Western philosophy, though not formulated and developed in the right intellectual language, we found for the first time round about the middle of the nineteenth century with Ramakrishna, Vivekananda, Rabindranath and a little later with Tilak, Gandhi, Vinoba and others. Genuine Indian metaphysics in a stricter intellectual language we had with Sri Aurobindo who also developed sorts of genuine Indian epistemology and logic. A little later, again, we had with Radhakrishnan and Hiriyanna a type of genuine Indian philosophy which was more scholarly rather than original philosophy, though there was no dearth of original thinking in Radhakrishnan. K.C. Bhattacharyya, a little senior to Radhakrishnan, was a cent per cent original Indian thinker who presented and answered, right as a modern Indian philosopher should do i.e. in a way intelligible to Western scholars, almost all the problems of the traditional Indian metaphysics, epistemology and logic; and developed these as much in strict intellectual manner as also like matters of systematic intuition,

everything intuited being presented and developed in commensurate intellectual language. Only, he wrote in a very terse style.

These were among the very few original Indian philosophers of the recent past. As for scholars and comparative thinkers, we had good many excellent of them, including Radhakrishnan and Hiriyanna. S.N. Dasgupta was perhaps the topmost of them.

In modern times, i.e. now living among us, there are not many, unfortunately, who are genuinely Indian. There are many brilliant and outstanding philosophers among us, but somehow either wholly of the Western mould, concentrated on analysis, linguistic or otherwise, logic—particularly sorts of mathematical logic—and like disciplines. Quite many of the living thinkers, again, are excellent scholars in the traditional Indian philosophy and even interpret its fundamentals and other details in terms of Western philosophy. But there are not many Indians who are developing their own authentic philosophies in the strictest possible intellectual language intelligible to the Westerners and round problems which are all authentically their own, i.e. in continuity with the traditional Indian culture and philosophy, but with eyes open to the modern situation, particularly the different Western cultures and philosophies. Only when such thinkers are forthcoming, and not till then, will the concept 'Indian philosophy in the context of Western philosophy' be of any genuine worth and significance.

# Perspectives on quantum reality versus classical reality

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## PROLOGUE

It seems appropriate to begin with germane excerpts from an interesting conversation between Albert Einstein and Rabindranath Tagore on the nature of reality (*Modern Review*, 49, 42, 1931).

EINSTEIN: I cannot prove that scientific truth must be conceived as a truth that is valid independent of humanity; but I believe it firmly. I believe, for instance, that the Pythagorean theorem in geometry states something that is approximately true, independent of the existence of mass. Any way, if there is a 'reality' independent of man, there is also a truth relative to this reality; and in the same way the negation of the first engenders a negation of the existence of the latter....Even in our everyday life, we feel compelled to ascribe a reality independent of man to the objects we use. We do this to connect the experiences of our senses in a reasonable way. For instance, if nobody is in this house, yet that remains where it is.

TAGORE: It is not difficult to imagine a mind to which sequence of things happens not in space but only in time like the sequence of notes in music. For such a mind its conception of reality is akin to the musical reality in which Phythagorean geometry can have no meaning. There is the reality of paper, infinitely different from the reality of literature. For the kind of mind possessed by the moth which eats that paper, literature is absolutely non-existent, yet for Man's mind literature has a greater value of truth than the paper itself. In a similar manner, if there be some truth which has no sensuous or rational relation to human mind, it will ever remain as nothing so long as we remain human beings.

The above dialogue conveys a flavour of delicate complexity and subtle philosophical predilections involved in the deep and broad issue concerning reality. In the present article, we restrict our attention only to certain critical aspects related to the enigmatic nature of quantum reality *vis-à-vis* classical reality with particular reference to the Quantum Measurement Paradox which embodies some of the key features of the problem. There are, of course, other acute paradoxes such as the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox which displays

intriguing facets of the reality issue in quantum physics; however, in order not to make the discussion diffuse, we restrict ourselves within the context of a specific representative paradox.

## CLASSICAL REALISM

'Classical Realism' hinges on notions derived from our everyday experience with the familiar macroscopic world. The basic tenets may be encapsulated as follows:

$C1$. Physical attributes of an individual object have definite numbers associated with them at every instant of time, irrespective of whether or not they are being measured.

$C2$. It is in principle possible to describe fully the causal change in the values of the physical attributes of an individual object, if one has all the necessary relevant data and the values at different instants are uniquely connected.

It, therefore, follows that, according to 'classical realism', an object is at all instants in a definite state characterized by a set of sharp values for all its physical attributes. One can, however, cite examples from the macro-world where straightforward applicability of the above notion may appear to be questionable. A tossed coin, the thrown dice, or a spinning roulette wheel—all have non-sharp attributes during their period of motion. But the 'reality' of the attributes of these objects during motion is never questioned by a classical realist who would refer to the counter-factual assertion that with sufficient knowledge and effort these properties can be known as accurately as we want. Here it is important to stress that this counter-factual statement is at the core of classical realism, and one is permitted to have recourse to it, because it does not lead to any incompatibility with the laws and facts of classical physics. This is in sharp contrast to the situation in quantum physics.

## QUANTUM REALISM

A simple instructive way of discussing the paradox of realism in quantum mechanics is with reference to the Stern-Gerlach experiment for spin $1/2$ particles. Suppose, we have a beam of identical particles of spin $1/2$ prepared

$$\psi = a\,\psi_+^{(Z)} + b\,\psi_-^{(Z)} \tag{3.1}$$

in the state $\psi$ given by (3.1) where $\psi_+^{(Z)}, \psi_-^{(Z)}$ are the states corresponding to spin projection on, say, the $Z$-axis. Now, using the Stern-Gerlach arrangement if one measures the $Z$-component of spin, the probability of getting the value $+(1/2)$ is $|a|^2$ and that of obtaining $-(1/2)$ is $|b|^2$. Here, if one adheres to the spirit of classical realism, one is inclined to contend that each of the particles in the ensemble described by Eq. (3.1) actually 'had' a

definite intrinsic value of its $Z$-projection of spin, and that the measurement process merely revealed what was already the case. However, this outlook is not valid from a quantum mechanical point of view. This can be shown very easily.

For instance, let us choose $a = b = 1/\sqrt{2}$ in Eq. (3.1). Then we have

$$\psi = \left(1\big/\sqrt{2}\right)\left(\psi_+^{(Z)} + \psi_-^{(Z)}\right) = \psi_+^{(X)} \tag{3.2}$$

If one measures the $X$-component of spin of a beam of particles described by above $\psi$, it is predicted that all the particles would have their spin projection $+(1/2)\hbar$ on the $X$-axis. On the other hand, if one assumes that each particle of the ensemble was either in the state $\psi_+^{(Z)}$ or in the state $\psi_-^{(Z)}$ prior to measurement, then since

$$\psi_+^{(Z)} = \left(1\big/\sqrt{2}\right)\left(\psi_+^{(X)} + \psi_-^{(X)}\right)$$

$$\psi_-^{(Z)} = \left(1\big/\sqrt{2}\right)\left(\psi_+^{(X)} - \psi_-^{(X)}\right)$$

it follows that one should expect a probability 50 per cent for the result $+(1/2)\hbar$ and 50 per cent for $-(1/2)\hbar$ along the X-axis. This contradicts what is inferred from Eq. (3.2).

The upshot of the above discussion is the moral that it is quantum mechanically not permissible, even in principle, to assume that each particle belonging to the ensemble described by Eq. (3.2) actually possessed a definite value of spin projection before any measurement was made. This deep-seated feature of quantum mechanics can be construed as implying that the process of measurement 'creates' reality associated with the dynamical attributes of a microphysical object that did not 'exist' prior to the measurement.

In analogy to the characterization of classical realism discussed in the previous section, the concept of quantum realism may be envisaged in the light of the following tenets:

$Q1$. Reality cannot be associated with the unobserved dynamical attributes of microphysical entities. Reality lies only in the existence of the entities themselves, and their innate static attributes such as mass, charge.

$Q2$. The dynamical attributes of a quantum system, when measured, need not all have sharp values at the same time. The classical equation 'reality equals sharpness of all attributes' is no longer valid in quantum mechanics.

The above picture implies a drastic qualitative distinction between the microscopic and macroscopic levels of reality. The standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, viz. the so-called Copenhagen interpretation, inevitably requires this bizarre discontinuity in description, and totally evades the central problem as to how and at what stage the quantum mechanical description at the microscopic level becomes converted into a classical one at the macro-

scopic level. The very legitimacy of the 'cut' is at issue, if one believes (as most working physicists seem to) that quantum mechanics is a universal theory, and one is *prima facie* entitled to extrapolate the quantum mechanical description to the scale of the macro-world. That such an extrapolation leads to an acute conceptual incompatibility with macro-realism is the content of the quantum measurement paradox.

## THE QUANTUM MEASUREMENT PARADOX

The quantum measurement paradox is generated if one attempts to describe the measuremental interaction including the measuring apparatus, within the framework of quantum mechanics. Going back to the Stern-Gerlach experiment, discussed in the previous section, let us consider interaction of the beam of particles described by Eq. (3.1) with the counters placed to detect the particles, which is necessary to complete the measurement process. In this case, we assume that the triggering micro-system is absorbed in the counter, so that it can be regarded as 'included' in the final state of the apparatus (this is actually the case for many realistic measurements). Let the final states of

the counters corresponding to $\psi_+^{(Z)}$ and $\psi_-^{(Z)}$ be given by $\Phi_1$ and $\Phi_2$

respectively $(<\Phi_1|\Phi_2> = 0)$. From the linearity of the quantum formalism it follows that, whatever be the details of the interactions involved, the final state after detection corresponding to Eq. (3.1) must be given by

$$\Psi = a\,\Phi_1 + b\,\Phi_2 \qquad (4.1)$$

This means that after completion of the measurement process, the macroscopic apparatus is left in a linear superposition of macroscopically distinguishable states. In contrast, macro-realism demands that the apparatus must be left definitely in one state or the other, or, in other words, the apparatus should be in a mixed state instead of in a pure state given by Eq. (4.1). The widely quoted famous dictum by Niels Bohr—'We must describe the apparatus classically because otherwise we cannot communicate with one another'—contradicts, at least in principle, the conclusion derived from a straightforward extrapolation of the quantum formalism to the macro-level.

Usually, one attempts to evade this incompatibility by remarking that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish experimentally between the pure state description (4.1) and the corresponding mixed state one. In fact, there have been numerous attempts in the literature to demonstrate that, given the high degree of irreversibility and dissipative coupling with the environment inherent in a macroscopic measuring device, it must be even in principle impossible to tell the difference. However, it is important to emphasize that this observation, even if true, does not 'solve' the basic conceptual problem, i.e. how to go over consistently from a quantum realistic description at the micro level to our ordinary commonsense realism at the macro level. Eq. (4.1)

cannot be a true and complete reflection of reality at the end of the measurement process. It is not sufficient to ensure that the final pure state behaves as if it were a mixture; the real problem is how it actually comes to be in such a mixed state. Moreover, one must take note of the special situations involving squid rings where Leggett[1] has pointed out that the quantum mechanical superposition of two macroscopically distinguishable states pertaining to a squid ring (of macroscopic dimension) can have experimentally testable consequences different from those derived from a classical mixture of these states. It, therefore, becomes much less tenable to claim that, in principle, for all cases the pure state description (4.1) should be empirically equivalent to a corresponding classical mixture. Furthermore, Leggett and Garg[2] have shown that the postulate of macro-realism, in conjunction with the assumption of non-invasive measurability at the macro level, lead to a testable conflict with the quantum mechanical prediction derived from wave function of the type (4.1). This underscores the deep-seated character of the anomaly associated with the application of quantum mechanics to macroscopic situations.

One may be inclined to assert that by some magical process (the so-called collapse postulate 'the notoriously ill-understood feature of the quantum doctrine') the pure state gets converted into a mixture during the process of measurement; but then such a process lies outside the ambit of the standard formalism of quantum mechanics. It has been shown rigorously[3] that this type of transition can occur as a unitary quantum mechanical evolution, provided one takes the limit of an infinite period of time for a measurement and also infinite number of degrees of freedom for the measuring apparatus. While the latter condition is reasonably well approximated by typical macroscopic systems, the time limit is in general not satisfied. One is forced to conclude that there is no causal way permitted by Schrödinger equation that would convert a pure state into a mixed one under conditions pertaining to usual measurement processes.

At this stage, it is necessary to clarify certain points which one may raise regarding the above discussion. In the first place, there is a technical point about the description of the state of the measuring apparatus. When a macroscopic object such as a counter is in a definite thermodynamically characterized macro-state, in practice one does not have enough information about the precise behaviour of its microscopic constitutents in order to assign to it a single pure quantum mechanical state. Rather, we must describe it by a density matrix. This necessity is purely a consequence of 'classical' ignorance, and has nothing to do with quantum indeterminacy. Taking into account this feature in no way alleviates the punch of the quantum measurement paradox; this was incisively argued by Wigner.[4]

Another point which calls for clear discussion is the use of the so-called 'ensemble' interpretation[5] to resolve the measurement paradox. It is often asserted that the wave function does not pertain to an individual system; it describes only the statistical properties of an ensemble of identical systems and

furnishes an algorithm for predicting essentially the probability of various outcomes of the measurements. From this point of view, it is not required that quantum mechanics should account for the fact that a single apparatus is left in a definite macro-state after the measurement process. This outlook is no doubt pragmatic and internally self-consistent, but it is an 'incomplete' description of physical reality even at the quantum mechanical level. Recent beautiful experiments in neutron interferometry[6] have exhibited self-interference effects (pertaining to individual neutrons) whose interpretation requires the notion that the wave function describes an individual particle belonging to a particular ensemble. Furthermore, at the conceptual level, there is the following argument[7] that, since the quantum formalism does not in itself specify which measurement is possible in practice and which is not, the wave function does represent some 'objective' property of an individual system in the following counter-factual sense. The state of a single system is characterized by the results of experiments that one 'might' actually perform on it. Suppose, the state vector is $|\psi(t)>$. Then at any instant we can consider, at least in principle, making a measurement on a single system corresponding to the observable represented by a hermitian operator

$$Q = |\psi(t)> <\psi(t)|$$

The state $|\psi(t)>$ is (up to a phase) the only state pertaining to the single system for which the observable $Q$ yields the result unity with certainty. It is then tempting to infer that the state of an individual system has certain objective property which gives rise to this result in the event that the measurement of $Q$ is actually performed. This, in turn, suggests that it is not logically untenable to demand that one must have, in some appropriate sense, an objective physical description of the state of an individual macroscopic apparatus as a result of the measurement process, and this is what lies at the core of the quantum measurement paradox.

## EPILOGUE

'I think the important and extremely difficult task of our time is to try to build up a fresh idea of reality', says W. Pauli and is quoted by H.P. Stapp in *Quantum Implications*.*

The current understanding of physics gives rise to two radically different pictures of reality at two different levels, micro-reality (quantum reality) and macro-reality (classical reality). The essence of the puzzle lies not in the feature that these two pictures are not derivable from one another, but in the facet illustrated by the quantum measurement paradox that they are mutually incompatible when applied to the macroscopic arena, and that there is no clear-cut prescription as to where quantum reality turns into classical reality. It is, of

*See B. J. Hiley and F. D. Peat (eds.), *Quantum Implications*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987.

course, desirable (to some, including the present author, it appears imperative) to dispense with this peculiar conceptual dichotomy of physics into microscopic and macroscopic phenomena, and try to re-establish a unitary account of the physical world. Niels Bohr had tried to pre-empt the daunting difficulties associated with this problem by advocating the outlook that there exists an 'unanalyzable' link between the observed micro-system and the measuring macro-apparatus. For those, who do not subscribe to this viewpoint, there are three possible avenues:

*A.* Development of a self-consistent causal interpretation of quantum mechanics which treats the physical attributes of even unobserved individual quantum systems as 'real', and in which there is no need for an abrupt break or cut in the way one regards reality at the macroscopic and microscopic levels. Such a possibility has been indicated by the formulation of the quantum potential approach.[8]

*B.* Enlargement of the standard framework of quantum formalism in order to describe the measurement process, including the so-called collapse of the wave function. One such approach has been advocated by Namiki and his group[9] by formulating the many-Hilbert-Spaces theory of quantum measurements.

*C.* The linear superposition principle may be suspected to be inapplicable for the macroscopically distinguishable states of the measuring apparatus.[10] An immediate objection to this idea comes from the notion of reductionism (the behaviour of a complex system can, in principle, be completely predicted if one knows exactly the laws describing the behaviour of its individual constituent parts). However, what is not envisaged by the reductionist outlook is the possibility that there may be new physical effects which manifest only at the level of complex macroscopic systems composed of a large number of microscopic constituents. One cannot logically exclude a *priori* the conjecture that 'complexity' of a system could itself be a relevant variable (depending on the number of its constituent entities) which would warrant the Schrödinger equation to be modified or generalized. For instance, Penrose[11] has suggested that the general relativistic considerations, in conjunction with the second law of thermodynamics and time-asymmetric constraints on the structure of space-time singularities, provide clues to non-linear physical input which may lead to generalization of the Schrödinger equation.

Leggett[12] has emphasized that so far there is no direct experimental evidence of the validity of the quantum mechanical linear superposition principle at the macroscopic level; since this is what essentially generates the conceptual riddle of the quantum measurement paradox, it is not *prima facie* unjustified to adopt the viewpoint *C* stated above. One is then motivated to look for critical experimental tests of the superposition principle involving states of the macroscopic systems. If such investigations are able to provide an unambiguous verdict, it will definitely have a profound implication as regards our conception of physical reality. And it should be exciting to see whether

it glaringly exposes at the empirical level the inadequacy of the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics as a total world-view (which is already indicated at the conceptual level by the very existence of the quantum measurement paradox). Other authors[13] have also argued from different perspectives that there are inherent difficulties in applying the standard quantum mechanical interpretation to general situations occurring in nature, such as those pertaining to the biological systems.

Finally, one is led to wonder whether the ultimate lesson of the 'reality crisis' in physics is that we eventually need to go beyond quantum mechanics. To quote Robert Frost: 'We dance around a ring and suppose, but the secret sits in the middle and knows.'

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# 'Is' therefore 'ought'

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Invoking the distinction between 'brute facts' and 'institutional facts', Hume's law, which forbids the derivation of an evaluative statement from one or more descriptive statements, is sometimes restricted to only those descriptive statements that describe the so-called brute facts.[1] The institutional facts, it is maintained, 'exist within systems of constitutive rules', some of which 'involve obligations, commitments and responsibilities',[2] and when they do so, an 'ought-statement' can be derived from an 'is-statement'. The much-discussed example of such a derivation, given by Searle, is as follows:

(1) Jones uttered the words, 'I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars.'
(2) Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.
(3) Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
(4) Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
(5) Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.

The argument seems at once perplexing yet convincing. Surely, there are gaps between its steps which need to be filled in by some added premises in order to make the argument rigorous. Searle himself concedes that in this argument the relation between any statement and its successor is not always that of entailment. But, he claims, in each case it can be made an entailment relation by adding some non-moral and non-evaluative statements. The additional statements being non-evaluative, the purpose of the argument remains undefeated, because it would still derive an 'ought-statement' from 'is-statements'. Searle takes each pair of the successive statements in the argument, and tries to show in each case that the seeming gap can be easily filled in by some non-moral, descriptive-contingent statements. On the assumption that Searle's claim to this effect is correct, the argument does seem to be perfectly valid.

Yet it is perplexing, because one's promising something to someone seems to be as much a matter of fact, and a contingent fact, as one's wearing the clothes of a certain colour or there being a regular change of seasons. Of course, there is a large variety of facts; and if one has to fit the facts into the aforementioned dichotomy of brute facts and institutional facts then promising is an 'institutional fact'. Yet a report of this fact is as much value-neutral (in the sense of being non-committal to any value) as a report of a 'brute fact'. That is, one who reports or records Jones's act of promising does

not, *per se,* take a moral, evaluative stand. So, if a report of a promise is logically independent of moral evaluation or commitment, how can it entail a moral statement? This is the perplexity which the argument under consideration gives rise to.

If the argument is valid (after adding the sort of statements which Searle would allow), the perplexity must be illegitimate. Searle would say that it is based on the misunderstanding (or, rather, non-understanding) of institutional facts, and the consequent wrong insistence on 'a rigid distinction between "is" and "ought", between descriptive and evaluative'.[3] In that case, we will have to have a closer look at the logical relationship between an 'institutional fact' and moral evaluation. However, to see whether the argument is valid and also to see why it appears to be valid in case, it, in fact, is not, we will have to have a closer look at the argument itself. Let us do the latter first.

The first noticeable feature of the argument is that step by step there is a gradual, subtle increase in the moral overtones. It is so gradual that it is hard to see when the statement ceases to be descriptive at all and becomes purely evaluative and moral. The first statement seems to have no trace of evaluation. The second has a sort of moral/evaluative vulnerability. In some situations, the same sentence can serve to express a moral reminder or indignation or the like. But, in the most straightforward interpretation, its character seems to be nearer to 'Jones handed over a book to Smith'. The third statement refers to an obligation, and so its moral content is a little more pronounced; and it is still more prominent in the fourth statement which seems not to report any act of Jones but simply his obligation. The increasing shades of evaluation and decreasing shades of description in the successive steps in the argument would more smoothly pass into the last conclusion, if we add another step after the fourth one, viz. 'Jones is obliged to pay Smith five dollars', because this statement does not appear to have even that much descriptive content as the fourth might appear to some. After this addition the argument would become:

(1) Jones uttered the words, 'I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars.'
(2) Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.
(3) Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
(4) Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
(5) Jones is obliged to pay Smith five dollars.
(6) Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.

A scrutiny of the successive logical transitions in this argument shows the following:

(*i*) Inference of (2) from (1) is obviously invalid. But, as Searle himself points out, two extra premisses of the following type can be added to (1):

(1*a*) Under certain conditions *C*, anyone who utters the words 'I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars' promises to pay Smith five dollars; and
(1*b*) Conditions *C* obtain.

These conditions would be regarding Jone's intentions, seriousness, normalcy, etc. Thus, (1) along with (1*a*) and (1*b*) would entail (2), and, since (1*a*) and (1*b*) themselves are factual and non-evaluative, their addition to the argument would not weaken the claim of deriving 'ought' from 'is'.

(*ii*) However, the argument may as well start from (2), because it seems to be a factual report of an act of Jones, and for the purpose of the present controversy it is an 'is-statement'. The protagonists of Hume's law would not be less discomforted by the derivation of (6) from (2). To make the empirical and factual character of (2) more prominent, we can add temporal reference to it. If we know that Jones promised yesterday to pay Smith five dollars and if we also know that Jones has not yet paid Smith the money then the remaining structure of the argument would remain intact.

(*iii*) There is an ambiguity of conviction with regard to the status of (5) in the inference of (6). On the one hand, (4) and (5) seem to be saying just the same thing, and thus each one of them, unaided by the other, seems capable of entailing (6), if at all. On the other hand, (4) seems to have such resemblance with (3) as (5) does not unequivocally have. This dissimilarity makes (4) look factual in a way in which (5) does not. With this realization in mind, the inference of (6) from (4) looks a shade less convincing than that of (6) from (5).

(*iv*) Just as the entailment of (6) from (4) seems less obvious than that from (4) *through* (5), the entailment of (5) from (3) seems less obvious than that from (3) *through* (4). In this case, the dilemma presented by the similarities and dissimilarities between (4) and (5) is the same as noted in the previous point.

Although the preceding remarks look psychological, they point to a serious philosophical puzzle arising from a seemingly peculiar character of some statements used in the argument, namely, being both factual and moral simultaneously. Searle would maintain that this peculiarity, by offering a meeting point of what have otherwise been treated as contraries (descriptive/evaluative, is/ought), is the basis of the proof against Hume's law. Promising being an institutional fact, although a *fact* nonetheless, and its constitutive rules involving obligations and commitments, its coming into existence entails a moral responsibility on the promiser's part. And this is what the argument incorporates.

However, this solution really does not solve the puzzle. In fact, as pointed out earlier, an institutional fact is as much a fact as someone's wearing a white shirt or there being a regular change of seasons. To contrast promising or baseball-playing (another example of institutional facts, given by Searle) from the so-called 'brute facts' seems wrong since the former are equally

brute. And the statements recording or describing them are as factual, non-evaluative and non-moral as those recording or describing the non-institutional facts. No doubt, there are some distinctions, and important ones, between the institutional and the non-institutional facts. Also, no doubt, some institutional facts so 'involve' obligations, commitments, etc. as no other types of facts involve. Yet, none of these facts gives a ground for validly inferring a moral, evaluative statement from the report of one's having entered an institution or having adopted a moral rule or system. The statement that someone has undertaken a task as moral or undertaken to be morally governed or judged by a certain system or principle is itself not a moral statement. My reporting such a fact *need not* commit me to, or bind me by, any particular moral system or principle, not even to morality as such. By stating such a fact I *need not* take a moral stand myself. And, equally importantly, I may take a moral stand, but it may be contrary to the principle mentioned in my report. I may report that Mansingh promised to kill Yogesh, and, either straightforwardly or by implication, state that Mansingh undertook the obligation to kill Yogesh. Yet, like so many others, I may at the same time believe and maintain that killing any human being is morally wrong. Thus, I may consistently state that, although Mansingh undertook the obligation to kill Yogesh, he ought not to kill Yogesh, and he ought not to have undertaken this obligation. Similarly, I may consistently state that, although Sunil promised (and, therefore, undertook the obligation) to wear a white shirt on his birthday, it is morally insignificant whether or not he wears a white shirt on his birthday.

Not only this, even the promiser need not attach any moral significance, or may attach negative moral significance, to what he promises. Mansingh, while promising to kill Yogesh, might at the same time believe it immoral to do so. Or, Sunil, while promising to wear white shirt on his birthday, might at the same time regard it morally irrelevant whether or not he wears a white shirt on his birthday.[4] Actual instances of people promising things which they regard amoral or immoral are not uncommon, if not abundant.

If these contentions are correct, why does the argument so convincingly give an appearance of being valid? The cause of this appearance seems to lie in a twin semantic mix-up. The statements (4) and (5) are crucial to the argument, and it is these which contain the mix-up. First, there are at least two senses in which the words 'obligation' and 'ought' are commonly used. Let us call them *contractual obligation* (ought) and *moral obligation* (ought). For brevity let us use the subscript *c* whenever we use these words or their modifications in the contractual sense, and the sub-script *m* whenever we use them in the moral sense. The examples of institutional facts and of arguments having descriptive premises and evaluative conclusion, given by Searle himself, are varied and it is surprising that he ignores their important differences. Besides the argument using the report of an act of promise, his other example is of a baseball game in which one can derive '$X$ ought to return to the dugout'

from '$X$ is tagged out a good ten feet down the line when the pitcher fires to the shortstop covering' and the like. Obviously, here the sense in which the word 'ought' is used is not moral. This 'ought' is rather conditional, and amounts to saying something like: 'If you play *baseball*, you have to return to the dugout in the situation described in the premiss(es); otherwise you are not playing, or at least not playing baseball.' No question of morality is involved in this situation *as such*. The 'ought-statement', in this case, refers to a contractual obligation.

In fact, even in the case of promising, we are logically entitled to derive (6) from (5), (5) from (4), and (4) from (3) only in contractual sense. If these statements are to be interpreted in moral sense (as they should be if Hume's law is to be contested), another premiss has to be added, viz. 'Promises ought$_m$ to be kept.' But then the argument would not demonstrate that a moral statement can be logically derived from non-moral ones, because the added premiss is a moral principle.

Secondly, besides the ambiguity of the words 'obligation', 'obliged' and 'ought', the structure of (4) and (5) also contains an ambiguity. It can be used to express both, *but separately*, a moral evaluative statement and a descriptive statement. Each one of them, (5) more naturally than (4), in certain contexts, can be used for saying the same thing as the sentence 'Jones is morally bound to pay Smith five dollars' says. Also, each one of them, (4) more naturally than (5), in certain contexts, can be used for saying what this sentence says: 'Jones adheres to (adopts/belongs to a community which has adopted) the system, according to which he is bound to pay Smith five dollars.' The former is a moral, evaluative statement, and the latter is a non-moral, non-evaluative, descriptive statement. The latter follows from the premises of the argument under consideration, but not the former. The former can follow if we add another premiss: 'If someone places himself under the obligation$_c$ to do $X$ (or, regards doing $X$ as his obligation$_c$) then he is obliged$_m$ to do $X$.' But as this is a moral statement, the argument will not bridge the is-ought gap.

Similarly, (6) would not ultimately follow unless it is modified to say that according to the system which Jones adheres to (adopts/etc.), he ought to pay Smith five dollars. This, by itself, is a non-evaluative statement. Inference of (6), interpreted more naturally as a moral statement, from the given premises is wrong in the same way as the following argument is invalid:

$X$ regards the system $M_1$ as morally binding to him, and $M_1$ contains a moral rule that one ought to do $A_1$

∴ $X$ ought to do $A_1$

The premiss assumed in this argument is 'everyone ought to act according to the moral code one adopts or accepts', and this is not as tautologous as 'one ought to act as one ought to' is.

By making a promise the promiser arouses some expectations in the person

to whom the promise is made. Fulfilling or breaking the promise will have serious repercussions for himself and for the others involved in the situation. All this is subject to moral evaluation. Hence we have the moral principle 'promises should be (ought to be) kept' as we have the principle 'one ought to speak truth', although in both the cases some exceptions are allowed. But, unless this moral principle is treated as a premiss in the argument, (6) in its moral interpretation cannot be validly drawn. It can be validly drawn in its modified, non-evaluative interpretation.

Thus, the apparent legitimacy of Searle's argument is due to the illegitimate conflation of some semantic distinctions and not due to any legitimate conflation of description and evaluation in institutional facts. Nor is it due to the use of any 'special logic' within an institution as Mackie maintains; rather, it is due to wrong use of ordinary logic.

### NOTES

1. John R. Searle, 'How to Derive "Ought" from "Is" ' in W.D. Hudson (ed.), *The Is/Ought Question*, pp. 120-34.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 133.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
4. This shows that the analysis given by J.L. Mackie in *Ethics* (pp. 64-73), in terms of the distinction between speaking of institutions from within and from outside, will not explain the matter, because in the situation in question even the one, who is *ex hypothesi* inside the institution, need not take a morally approving or even moral stand for the act promised. If Mackie is correct, then at least the following will be entailed in Searle's argument: 'For Jones, he ought (morally) to pay Smith five dollars.' But even this does not really follow from the given premisses.

# Evans-Pritchard on persons and their cattle-clocks: a note on the anthropological account of man*

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I

One cannot be a serious student of either philosophy or anthropology if one studies what is technically known these days as 'philosophical anthropology'. The expression 'philosophical anthropology' is a misnomer. There is simply no anthropology in philosophical anthropology. And how much *philosophy* such an anthropology contains is a matter of dispute. Concerning philosophical anthropology, like many others I share the attitude of Levi-Strauss. Referring to Sartre, a philosophical anthropologist of repute, he says: 'With all due respect to Sarterian phenomenology, we can hope to find in it only a point of departure, not of arrival.'[1] One reason why Levi-Strauss departs from Sartre is that 'Sartre, who claims to found an anthropology, separates his own society from others'.[2] And in his separatistic tendency he excels Levy-Bruhl. As Levi-Strauss points out: 'It seems even less tolerable to him than to Levy-Bruhl that the savage should possess "comprehensive understanding" and should be capable of analysis and understanding.'[3] Levy-Bruhl is not alone in calling the savage mind as prelogical; philosophical anthropologists share his views. Seeing the attitude of philosophers towards the savage mind, I made a decision to write on anthropology proper, the kind of anthropology which has two broad divisions, social anthropology and physical anthropology. To restrict myself further, I shall be dealing with social anthropology, the kind of anthropology which was invented by Frazer and which reached its zenith in Levi-Strauss. It is only in this restricted sense that I have made an attempt to give an anthropological account of man. I would also like to show the philosophical implications which are hidden in the anthropological account of man. But in doing this I am certainly not doing the same kind of thing which has been done by the philosophical anthropologists. On this occasion, I would like to coin a new expression. The expression is 'anthropological philosophy'. If one wishes, one can call my discussion as a discussion in anthropological philosophy, for philosophical problems have been drawn from the anthropological issues. So anthropological issues have been given

primacy to philosophical problems. I do not wish to make any claim to be the founder of a *new* anthropology, for anthropology has its roots in the works of anthropologists, not philosophers. Therefore, it would not be very misleading, if my present note is considered as a move in anthropological philosophy.

II

It is not only philosophical anthropology, social anthropology, too, has its own difficulties. The first chair of social anthropology was instituted at the Liverpool University in Britain. And the first occupant of that chair was the legendry figure of anthropology, the writer of *The Golden Bough*, Sir James Frazer. In his inaugural lecture, Frazer remarked: 'The subject was granted recognition just as its object of study—'savages'—was disappearing.'[4] What Frazer means to say is that the academic recognition to social anthropology is so late that by the time recognition came the savages became civilized. And once they have become civilized, there remains no speciman for the anthropological study. Anthropology in such a situation is no better than the subject known as prehistory. It is only prehistory that studies the temporal situation of the savage. What does the word 'savage' mean? This word is distinguished from the word 'barbarous'. As Levi-Strauss points out:

'The origin of the word 'barbarous' probably refers to the confusion of inarticulated bird songs as opposed to the meaningful value of human language; and the word 'savage' which means 'of the forest', also evokes a type of animal life, as opposed to human culture.'[5]

According to Frazer, there are no men of the forests these days, they have become part of our civilization. To falsify the account of social anthropology given by Frazer, Adam Kuper remarks that the subject of social anthropology 'emerged only after the first world war and, as if to contradict Frazer, immediately produced a series of remarkable monographic studies of isolated, preindustrial communities'.[6] So the subject of social anthropology did not disappear, rather it came into existence, or was rediscovered, with the consolidation of the colonial rule. Social anthropology had its colonial strings.

The monographic studies to which Kuper has referred above were produced by Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown and their disciples, and those studies were restricted to the colonies established by the white people of the West. The social anthropology started as some kind of subject which has led the white people to study the coloured people, mostly black and red, perhaps for helping the colonisers to rule the colonies properly by knowing the original occupants of the colonies. The connection between the colonial rule and social anthropology is well depicted by Levi-Strauss. While referring to a

painting in the room of the former president of Ghana, Kuame Nkrumah. Levi-Strauss says:

A painting used to hang in the ante-room of former president Kuame Nkrumah. The painting was enormous, and the main figure was Nkrumah himself, fighting, wrestling with the last chains of colonialism. The chains are yeilding, there is thunder and lightning in the air, the earth is shaking. Out of all this, three small figures are fleeing, white man pallid. One of them is the capitalist, he carries a brief-case. Another is the priest or missionary, he carries the Bible. The third, a lesser figure carries a book entitled *African Political Systems*, he is the anthropologist...[7]

The picture is quite significant. Field studies in social anthropology started with the spread of colonial rule, and, therefore, these studies should have had their death with the end of the colonial rule. Yet they survive, the subject of social anthropology survives. Perhaps the colonial rule survives, we have now the neo-colonial rule. Only the people have changed, not the system. Perhaps the different kinds of anthropological surveys existing in the developing countries are the remnants of the colonial rule.

To express my reactions, I have taken a few pieces of analysis produced by Professor Evans-Pritchard on his study of the Nuer tribe of Sudan. Why have I been attracted towards Evans-Pritchard and not towards any other anthropologist? One basic reason for this is that he is one of the editors of the *African Politcal Systems*, the book that appears in the painting which 'used to hang in the ante-room of former President Kuame Nkrumah'. Further, he has not analysed the cooked-up data, a practice for which social scientists are quite reputed. He has actually taken the field trips, thus following the practice started by Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown. Concerning Pritchard's field studies, Kuper remarks: 'The first modern studies in Africa, by participation-observation, were carried out by Evans-Pritchard...between 1926 and 1936.'[8] Here is someone who lived with the savages. He also made an attempt to depart from the inductivistic approach of Radcliffe-Brown, thus keeping social anthropology as a branch of social science. He stopped its drift towards natural science. So also Evans-Pritchard is not supposed to have accepted blindly the functionalism of Malinowski. He was the product of functionalism, yet he imbibed in him the ideas of structuralism. So he was one of the bridges between Malinowski and Levi-Strauss. Evans-Pritchard is also quite unlike Levi-Bruhl and Sartre who thought that savages were only slightly better than animals, having only prelogical mentality. He allowed savages to have logical mentality, only refusing them to have scientific mentality. His book on the Nuer and his articles published from the University of Egypt in 1930-35 gave new turn not only to the British anthropological studies but also to the Whiteman's attitude towards the black savages. The much discussed issues of these days, popularized by Peter Winch and Levi-Strauss,

whether the savages have any kind of rationality, whether our rationality is a different kind of rationality from that of the savages, whether science is different from witchcraft, etc. had their source in the writings of Evans-Pritchard. Levi-Strauss praises him for combining two trends in ethnological literature, historical and anthropological. According to him: 'Evans-Pritchard always remained attentive to the arbitrary paths which events took in fashioning the particular physiognomy of a society and giving it a unique character at each stage of its development.'[9] Perhaps I am not wrong in my choice of studying Evans-Pritchard.

Evans-Pritchard's participation-observation of the Nuer occurs at an interesting time. Concerning the time of his entry into Africa, Kuper writes:

> When Evans-Pritchard studied the Nuer... the Nuer were just recovering from a brutal 'pacification programme', which had involved bombing their herds of cattle and hanging their prophets, and were in no mood to welcome white visitors. In these inauspicious circumstances Evans-Pritchard first discovered and demonstrated the way in which a political system can exist without rulers.[10]

I am not referring to the fact that the country of the Nuer had no rulers because of bombing. The bombing affected only the cattle and the prophets, there were no rulers to be bombed. I am simply referring to the fact that a white anthropologist is introduced after bombarding the blacks. Had he gone to study the devastation caused by the bombing or to study the political system of the Nuer? What kind of participation-observation would be produced in such circumstances? Evans-Pritchard himself says:

> It would at any time have been difficult to do research among the Nuer, and at the period of my visit they were unusually hostile, for their recent defeat by Government forces and the measures taken to ensure their final submission had occasioned deep resentment...When I entered a cattle camp it was not only as a stranger but as an enemy, and they seldom tried to conceal their disgust at my presence, refusing to answer my greetings and even turning away when I addressed them.[11]

Would the studies in such circumstances be reliable? Can one collect the authentic data? However, my interest is not in the political system of the Nuer or of their political superiors. I would like to draw attention to some non-political isues of anthropology, to show their philosophical implications. The first issue which I have taken for discussion is Evans-Pritchard's analysis of space-time structure of the Nuer thought.

Philosophers are aware of the two opposing concepts of space and so also of time, the Newtonian-Kantian concept and the Leibnizian concept. The former is described as the concept of objective or physical or absolute space.

The same is true of time, that there is objective, physical or absolute time. Leibniz, on the other hand, considers space and time as relative concepts. Space and time are relations between objects and events. There is neither any space nor any time once the world is deprived of objects and events. Evans-Pritchard interprets the Nuer thought in such a fashion as if the Nuer accept the view that space and time are relative concepts, that they do not have any objective or physical existence by themselves. However, Evans-Pritchard's exposition of the Nuer view of space and time as relative is not meant for refuting the Kantian view, but for refuting the view that there is any *social-neutrality* about space and time in Nuer thinking. Nuer have not yet reached the stage of development when human beings start thinking about space and time independently of the social activities. The savage mind is gregarious, it is not *individualistic*. Social activities are the expressions of the gregarious nature. The Nuer thought is a savage thought, it cannot liberate itself from its social strings. So, though time is relative for the Nuer, they neither support Leibniz nor reject Kant. 'Relative' simply means relative to society, relative to social events, and not to all kinds of events. 'Social relativity' is a much narrower concept.

Evans-Pritchard does not declare like Levi-Bruhl that the Nuer mind is prelogical. But his remarks on space and time clearly exhibit that the Nuer mind is superior to the animal mind only quantitatively, not qualitatively. Before we discuss the interpretation of Nuer thought on space and time, we must discuss the ground which Evans-Pritchard prepares for the kind of interpretation given by him. The Nuer are nothing but some kind of animals.

Evans-Pritchard considers Nuer as a nomadic tribe. As he says: 'Nuer are forced into villages for protection against floods and mosquitoes and to engage in horticulture and are forced out of villages into camps by drought and barrenness of vegetation and to engage in fishing.'[12] So the life of a Nuer is not very unlike the life of a migratory bird. I would like to distinguish between 'migratory' and 'nomadic' characteristics. A nomadic creature need not return to its original home, it is a wanderer. As a matter of fact, there is no permanent or settled home of a nomadic creature. But a migratory creature has a settled or permanent home. It comes back to its original home after wandering about for sometime. The Siberian birds which we see in India during winters go back to Siberia, their original home, after the winter is over. It is also very interesting to observe that the migratory birds migrate roughly to the same places where they migrated in the earlier years. It seems that the older generation teaches this lesson to the newer generation. According to Evans-Pritchard, Nuer are migratory creatures in exactly the same sense in which some birds are migratory. As he says:

> Different villages and sections tend to move about the same time and to visit the same pools each year, though time and place and, to some extent, degree of concentration vary according to climatic conditions. Usually,

however, the main dry season camps are formed yearly at the same spots.[13]

The slight space-time variations also occur with respect to the migratory birds. The migratory birds have certainly not reached the stage of conceptualization about space and time. They are not rational creatures, their actions are governed by instinct. These birds do not argue: 'It is the month of December, so let us migrate from Siberia to India.' They just migrate to India, though it is true that their migration occurs in December. So also, while flying over India, they do not argue: 'This is India, so let us establish our camps on this soil.' They just establish their camps on the Indian soil. (Incidently, not only the foreign human beings, even the foreign birds invade India without any interference, and feel at home in this country.) Evans-Pritchard's analysis of Nuer thought concerning space and time shows that the Nuer thought is superior to the thought of a migratory bird, but not very superior to it. Perhaps the difference is in the quantity, not quality.

To show the relativity of space and time Evans-Pritchard has given the structural analysis of these concepts. Since less *space* has been given to 'space', I would like to discuss the Nuer concept of space first. Evans-Pritchard distinguishes 'oecological space' from 'structural space'. This is similar to his distinction between 'oecological time' and 'structural time'. Referring to the latter distinction, he says:

In describing Nuer concepts of time we may distinguish between those that are mainly reflections of their relations to environment, which we call oecological time, and those that are reflections of their relations to one another in the social structure, which we call structural time.[14]

Similar observations have been made about space or distance. 'Oecological distance...is a relation between communities defined in terms of density and distribution, and with reference to water, vegetation, animal and insect life, and so on...' 'Structural distance is of a very different order.... By structural distance is meant...the distance between groups of persons in a social system, expressed in terms of values.'[15] However, Evans-Pritchard himself undermines the distinction between 'oecological' and 'structural'; he ultimately reduces oecological time and space to structural time and space. As he says concerning time'. 'In a sense all time is structural since it is a conceptualization of collateral, co-ordinated, or co-operative activities; the movements of a group.'[16] He gives the same treatment to space. In the case of space too, structural considerations play the final role. What is the concrete shape of argument in favour of the structural space? To distinguish 'structural space' from the 'objective or physical space', Evans-Pritchard says:

The nature of the country determines the distribution of villages and, therefore, the distance between them, but values limit and define the dis-

tribution in structural terms and give a different set of distances. A Nuer village may be equidistant from two other villages, but if one of these belongs to a different tribe and the other to the same tribe it may be said to be structurally more distant from the first than from the second. A Nuer tribe which is separated by forty miles from another Nuer tribe is structurally nearer to it than to a Dinaka tribe from which it is separated by only twenty miles.[17]

Evans-Pritchard is not arguing for the view of Leibniz. He is simply arguing for the distinction between 'social distance' and 'physical distance'. He means to show that the Nuer have the concept of 'social distance' without having the concept of 'physical distance'. There is no doubt that 'social distance' is the function of 'social order', hence is relative to society. Suppose, I am a Sudra and my neighbour is a Brāhmaṇa, then socially I am quite distant from him, but objectively I am very near to him. There is no contradiction between 'near' and at the same time 'far away', if one of them refers to the *physical* and the other to the *social* space. But the issue is whether Evans-Pritchard is right in claiming that the Nuer lack the concept of physical space. Such a concept is possible only by removing the social strings for the use of 'near' and 'far away', 'over' and 'below', i.e. the spatial concepts. Suppose that there is no Dinka tribe interfering in the social life of the Nuer. Both the villages, the one which is separated by forty miles and the one which is separated by twenty miles are Nuer villages. In such a situation, would the Nuer still call the village separated by forty miles as nearer to them than the village which is separated only by twenty miles? Certainly not. Would they then suspend their judgement about the issue? Certainly not, for they know the use of 'near' and 'far away'. Their judgement would be that the village separated by twenty miles is nearer to them than the one which is separated from them by forty miles. And this judgement is free from social strings; it is possible only by having the concept of 'objective space' or 'physical space'. Evans-Pritchard misses the point that the 'social space' is parasitic upon the 'physical space'. Unless one has the latter, one cannot have the former.

Consider Evans-Pritchard's views on time now. He says: 'Oecological cycle is a year. Its distinctive rhythm is the backwards and forwards movement from villages to camps which is the Nuer's response to the climatic-dichotomy of rains and drought.'[18] This is similar to his remark quoted earlier in connection with space. Elucidating this view further he says: 'The concept of seasons is derived from social activities rather than from the climatic changes which determine them, and a year is to Nuer a period of village residence (*ceing*) and a period of camp residence (*wec*).'[19] The oecological time fuses with the structural time. Time is nothing but the migration of Nuer from camp to village and from village to camp. The *divisions* of time are nothing but the serial occurrence of social activities one after the other. As he further says:

In my experience Nuer do not to any great extent use the names of the months to indicate the time of an event, but generally refer instead to outstanding activity in process at the time of its occurrence, e.g., at the time of early crops, at the time of weeding, at the time of harvesting,…since time is to them a relation between activities.[20]

Evans-Pritchard is unhappy over the situation that there are no wrist watches and wall clocks with the Nuer for the measurement of time. As he says:

The daily timepiece is the cattle clock…The better demarcated points are taking of the cattle from the byre to kraal, milking, driving of the flocks and calves to pasture…Thus a man says, 'I shall return at milking', 'I shall start off when the calves come home', and so forth.[21]

What is so wrong about the cattle clock? And what is so great about the wall clock which we use these days in the twentieth century? Of course, the Nuer, too, are a part and parcel of our century; the only difference is that they have not grown, they remain the neolithic people. There is no doubt that the cattle clock for the Nuer is more important than the wall clock for us. The life of the Nuer is impossible without the cattle clock, but we can very well survive without the wall clock.

First difficulty with the cattle clock is that there is not just *one* cattle clock, there are as many cattle clocks as are the tribes (groups). Nuer tribe is different from the Dinka tribe and so many other tribes like Lang, Bor, Rengyan, Wot, etc. Evans-Pritchard has drawn a chart of the Nuer socio-spatial categories on page 114 of his book *The Nuer*. But this chart has been drawn by looking through the eyes of the Nuer. A different chart would be drawn, if one looks through the eyes of the Dinka. And still different, if one takes the help of the eyes of Lang or Bor or Wot. There are as many cattle clocks, as many charts of socio-spatial categories as are the tribes. As Evans-Pritchard says: 'Since time is to Nuer an order of events of outstanding significance to a group, each group has its own points of reference and time is consequently relative to structural space, locally considered.'[22] This clearly shows that there are as many spatio-temporal systems as are the groups. An event which has an outstanding significance for one group has no significance for the other group. The point of reference of one group may be different from the point of reference of the other group. Death of one of the twins may function as a point of reference for the Nuer. But this may be of no importance to Dinka. So each group has its *own* structural space, so also its own structural time. And, as the groups are numerically different from each other, one spatio-temporal system is numerically different from the other spatio-temporal system. There is simply no abstract or objective or unified spatio-temporal system in the Nuerland running through the whole of the Nuerland. It is a land of

the multiple space-time systems. This becomes further clear by the following remarks of Evans-Pritchard; 'The Nuer have no expression equivalent to 'time' in our language, and they cannot…coordinate activities with an abstract passage of time, because their points of reference are the activities themselves.'[23] The activities to which he is referring are such as 'milking time', 'pasture time', etc. The *abstract* time means the *obective* or *unified* time to which one can refer without referring to social activities or with the help of which social activities themselves can be regulated.

There is no harm in having a cattle clock. The difficulty is that there is no Greenwich cattle clock, so that time in other cattle clocks may be adjusted according to the Greenwich cattle clock. The objections of Evans-Pritchard to the cattle clock are not only weak but also artificial. Unless there is an abstract, objective, and unified spatio-temporal system, there is no question of judging that the Nuerland had multiple space-time systems. For example, 'milking time', 'pasture time' and 'byre time' in the Nuer village, if Evans-Pritchard is right, cannot be the same as 'milking time', 'pasture time' and 'byre time' in the Dinka village. The structural space of the Nuer village is different from the structural space of the Dinka village, and, consequently, the structural time of the Nuer village is different from that of the Dinka village. But this implies that there is a spatio-temporal gap between the Dinka village and the Nuer village. (What does it mean? What kind of barriers are required?) The difficulty with Evans-Pritchard's analysis is obvious. Unless the structural time of the Nuer village and that of the Dinka village are part and parcel of the same abstract, objective and unifield time, we cannot refer even to the differences in their structural times. It is with reference to the abstract or objective time that we are in a position to say that the 'milking time' in the Dinka village differs from the 'milking time' in the Nuer village. Unless one has the idea of an abstract, objective unified space-time system, there is no question of his reference to different spatio-temporal systems, reference to structural character of space and time. The question arises whether the Nuer are aware of the distinction between 'objective, unified, spatio-temporal system' and the 'relative, structural spatio-temporal systems'. They certainly are. Evans-Pritchard says: 'Fighting, like cattle husbandry, is one of the chief activities and dominant interest of all Nuer men, and raiding Dinka for cattle is one of their principal pastimes.'[24] So there is really no discontinuity either of space or of time between the Nuer village and the Dinka village. And the Nuer can attack the Dinka, only if they are aware of the movement of the Dinka cattle clock. They must know the Dinka 'sleep time', 'milking time', 'moon time', etc. The Nuer attack the Dinka generally at the time of the dawn. But all this knowledge about the structural time of Dinka presupposes on the part of the Nuer to have the concept of an objective and unified time. It is the objective, unified time that connects the Nuer time with the Dinka time. Unless there is some kind of Greenwich cattle clock, the Nuer cannot attack the Dinka and succeed in capturing their cattle.

Evans-Pritchard has evolved the 'socio-temporal' and 'socio-spatial' categories to clarify the nature of Nuer thought about space and time. He wishes to show that the Nuer thought has not yet reached the conceptual level at which they can distinguish 'abstract, objective and unified' space and time from relative and 'socially dependent space and time'. He attempts to demonstrate that socio-temporal and socio-spatial categories depend on the groups and tribes. But, once he moves to discuss the political structure of Nuer thought, he just forgets about his spatio-temporal categories. Referring to the political structure of the Nuer and Dinka he says: 'The Dinka people are the immemorial enemies of the Nuer. They are alike in their oecologies, cultures, and social systems; so that individuals belonging to one people are easily assimilated to the other.'[25] Then, how can Nuer be 'socially distant' from the Dinka? How can the cattle clock of Dinka differ from the cattle clock of Nuer? The daily activities of the Dinka tribe are governed by the same cattle clock which governs the activities of the Nuer tribe. And the cattle clock in question acquires the character of an abstract, objective, cattle clock. Consider the Nuer socio-spatial categories given on page 114 of *The Nuer*. This chart of the categories makes sense only to those who are aware of the physical geography of the Nuerland. 'Social space' presupposes the knowledge of the 'physical, objective space'. It is not consistency but inconsistency which should be the criterion for judging the significance of the analysis of spatio-temporal categories provided by Evans-Pritchard. The book is full of self-refuting claims.

A few more remarks on time deserve attention. Once time is given the structural dress, certain conclusions cannot be avoided. Thus, according to Evans-Pritchard:

Time has not the same value throughout the year...Life in the dry season is generally uneventful, outside routine tasks, and oecological and social relations are more monotonous from month to month than in the rains when there are frequent feasts, dances, and ceremonies.[26]

On occasions cattle clock runs faster. In the rainy season, its movement is faster than in the dry season. This point becomes more clear from his further remarks about Nuer:

Their points of reference are mainly the activities themselves, which are generally of a leisurely character. Events follow a logical order, but they are not controlled by an abstract system, there being no autonomous points of reference to which activities have to conform with precision.[27]

I do not know what is meant by 'logical but not abstract'. Perhaps he means that the events follow one after the other, i.e. in a succession. If they do not follow in this fashion, then the *sense* of time will not occur. Without the suc-

cession of events even the sense of structural time will not arise. But the Nuer cattle clock functions in a relaxed fashion. During rains its hands run faster than during the drought time. There is an old saying that in the winters time gets cold, it becomes frozen. But then the cattle clock cannot be blamed, simply because sometimes it becomes fast and sometimes slow. Oecological conditions affect not only the cattle clock, a point which is emphasized by Evans-Pritchard again and again, but also our metal wrist watches and wall clocks. Even a school child these days knows that the weather conditions influence metals, and their adjustment mechanism. Clocks and watches are sold which are water-proof, shock-proof, etc. Even the most efficient time pieces like the electronic ones do not give precise time; they, too, sometimes move in a relaxed fashion. The hands of the wrist-watches and wall clocks are no more reliable expressions of the abstract time than are those of the cattle clock. The ideal timepiece that gives perfect time is laid up in Plato's world of ideas. The clocks that exist in this phenomenal world are one and all imperfect. Not only clocks, anything that exists in space-time suffers from imperfection. Unfortunately, the instruments that measure space-time happen to exist in space-time. This does not mean that the wall clock is not better, is not more efficient than the cattle clock. What it means is simply that the differences between wall clock and cattle clock are quantitative, not qualitative. Evans-Pritchard is absolutely right when he tells about the Nuer and their cattle clocks:

[They] have very limited means of reckoning the relative duration of periods of time intervening between events...having no hours or other small units of time they cannot measure the periods which intervene between positions of the sun or daily activities.[28]

There is no doubt that the cattle clock lacks the smaller units like minutes and seconds. Even the hands for hours are lacking. For the Nuer even an hour does not have importance. They are not living in the age of industrial revolution, unless 'industrial' is used in the pre-historic sense. We should not forget that they are neolithic people, and this is not an insult to them but an appreciation of their life of clean values. We have reached the stage of technology in which even a second is slowly losing its importance. We are ready to face the future shock. Time is not far away when even the fraction of a second would have importance. So far as the future is concerned, we are no better than the Nuer. The future generation, if there are no wars to survive, may find our wrsit-watches and wall clocks no better than the cattle clocks of the neolithic people. The Nuer have failed in recording the *ideal* time, so have we.

This is the last paragraph on this issue. According to Evans-Pritchard, Nuer time-dimension is shallow. 'Valid history ends a century ago, and tradition generously measured, takes us back only ten to twelve generations in lineage structure...The tree under which mankind came into being was still standing in Western Nuerland a few years ago.'[29] This is similar to the objec-

tion raised against the origin of the universe according to the Bible. The Nuer hypothesis, like the hypothesis given in the Bible, is false, not self-contradictory. I am reminded of Russell who was ready to provide the hypothesis that the world began only a few moments ago. The only provision one has to make is that it came into existence with the present memories and all possible evidence that it existed millions of years ago. The point is whether we have reached any unobjectionable hypothesis about the origin of the universe. The 'big bang' hypothesis is nothing but a charming myth, it satisfies us that we have found a solution. In quality it is not different from any myth of the Nuer which satisfies them. Of course, this is not to defend the position of the Nuer. This is only a suggestion to look at their view in a scientific fashion. We can at least avoid crude way of rejecting a view.

III

Now I would like to discuss the reactions of Nuer to the twin-birth. These reactions have been brought to notice by Evans-Pritchard in his later book *Nuer Religion*. Perhaps no tribe on the earth gives so much importance to twin-birth as do the Nuer. The Nuer have three fundamental beliefs concerning twins. The first belief is that the twins are not two persons but one. And they believe so in spite of the fact that they find twins as two different individual men. The second belief is that the twins are birds. And the third is a kind of the resultant belief that the twins are closer to *Kweth* (God) than other persons.

I would like to react to all these beliefs of the Nuer. The view of the Nuer on twin-birth may throw new light on the issues of persons and personal identity with which we are so much familiar these days. It seems to me that the neolithic people have to say some very interesting things about our issues. The Nuer distinguish the concept of 'person' from the concept of 'man' as we do these days. And perhaps their foundation for the distinction is stronger than ours. Commenting on the twins Evans-Pritchard says:

When they (Nuer) say 'twins are not two persons, they are one person' they are not saying that they are one individual but that they have a single personality. It is significant that in speaking of the unity of twins they only use the word *ran*, which, like our word 'person', leaves sex, age, and other distinguishing qualities of individuals undefined. They would not say that the twins of the same sex were one *dhol*, boy, or one *nyal*, girl, but they do say, whether they are of the same sex or not, that they are one *ran*, person.[30]

The concept of 'person' is different from the concept of 'man'. The latter refers to the biological species, and, therefore, philosophers take more interest

in the former than in the latter concept. Even the male-female distinction cannot be made with respect to the concept of 'person'. From our point of view, from the view we look at the concept of 'person', Nuer would appear as highly philosophical beings. They are aware of our philosophical issues. In maintaining that the twins are *one* person, the Nuer reject the popular view, accepted by Christianity, that one person is *necessarily* restricted to one body. They also reject the necessity of one person's occupying different bodies at *different* times as is the view of the Hindus. Twin birth is the case of one person occupying numerically two different bodies at the same time. One person *appears* as two men.

The Nuer have not come to accept their view about the twins because of the confusion created by some such a thing as memory-duplicator to which Professor Mrinal Miri refers in one of his prestigious papers on personal identity published in *Mind*.[31] Professor Miri attacks the definition of a person in terms of his memories by taking the help of a memory-duplicator. One person's memories are fed into the brain of the other person by erasing the original memories of that person. So now we have two different individuals having the same memories. If personal identity depends on memory, then there is one and the same person in two different bodies at the same time but at two different places. And this seems to be an absurd position. Most of the philosophers from the West, and some like Professor Miri from the East, would consider this position as self-contradictory. However, if they see the issue with the eyes of the Nuer, they may not find any absurdity or self-contradiction in the view that one and the same person occupies different bodies at the same time. And, not only the memories of these persons differ, even their perceptions differ.

What is of interest to the present experts on personal identity is to see whether it is *rational* or *irrational* to accept that a person occupies more than one physical body. What is irrational about it? For, once 'persons' are distinguished from their 'bodies', there is no irrationality either in accepting that one person occupies only one body or in accepting that he occupies more than one body or in accepting both the alternatives. The issue is not empirical to be decided by empirical means. What would be irrational is the view that the area occupied by one physical body is occupied by another physical body at the same time. Each physical body excludes the other physical body. But persons are not the same as physical bodies, hence the principle of exclusion of one physical body by the other does not apply to them. Suppose that one takes the help of modern science to refute the position of the Nuer. In one's scientific temper one says that there is nothing unusual about the twin-birth. Instead of one ovum, when two ova get fertilized we have the twin-birth. Fertilization of two ova is no more a mystry than the fertilization of one ovum. The twin-birth is as natural a process as is the single birth. But this scientific explanation would not lead the Nuer to give up his view, for he does not reject the view that the twin-birth involves the birth of two men. It is only in the form of two men that one and the same person takes his birth. A Nuer

may even accept that the twin-birth is the result of the fertilization of two ova. If the existence of two men is no objection to the position of the Nuer, how could the fertilization of two ova be any kind of objection to his position?

On every occasion of birth, according to the Nuer, only one person takes birth. Whether a single or twins, the birth is of one person only. Twins are in reality one person, they have taken birth on the same occasion. Appearances are different from reality. What is one appears as two. If you use the jargon of philosophers, you can say that the twin-birth exhibits unity in diversity. It is a case that does not reject science but transcends it. One can understand the Nuer concept of person by understanding two other concepts, the concepts of soul (tie) and the human body. The Nuer believe that the soul is an essential constituent of a person. Once the soul departs from the person, the person is dead. Does the death of a person necessarily coincide with the death of a man? There should be no such necessity. For, if a person is different from a man, then there should be some *exceptions* to the rule that the death of a person brings about the death of a man. If such exceptions do not exist, then the concept of 'person' would coincide with the concept of 'man', and hence one may feel that the philosophers have unnecessarily introduced the distinction between them. The Nuer are more consistent, more philosophical, when they accept it as a *general* rather than a *necessary* truth that the death of a person brings about the death of a man. In exceptional cases a man may survive, eat, sleep, talk, etc. in spite of the fact that his soul has departed to the realm of the ghosts and he is no more a person. Evans-Pritchard refers to such a case in one of the Nuer villages. A man called Gatbough left the village, and did not return for a long time. The village heard the news about his death, so all the ceremonies, including the ceremony of ox-sacrifice which is the last mortuary ceremony, was performed. But Gatbough came back to the village. He was not given reception which is proper to a living person. The village treated him as a 'dead person'. He was a dead person, so he was not allowed to take part in any of the social activities of the village. Referring to the reactions of the Nuer towards Gatbough, Evans-Pritchard says: '...his soul was cut off. His soul went with the soul of the (sacrificed) ox together. His flesh alone remains standing.'[32] This is what Evans-Pritchard says within quotes. He further comments on his quotes:

His soul, the essential part of him, had gone and with it his social personality. Although people fed him, he seems to have lost such privileges of the kinship as pertain to the living and not to the dead. I was told that he could not partake of sacrificial meat because of his agnatic kinship (*buth*) had been obliterated (*woc*) by the mortuary ceremony.[33]

The behaviour of the Nuer is highly consistent. Its consistency can be understood only by understanding the concept of a 'ceremony' and a 'ritual'. They do not have, like us, frivolous attitude towards their ceremonies and rituals.

There is a *causal connection* between the ceremony and the *object* of the ceremony. A ceremony which is meant for the 'departure of the soul' brings about the departure of the soul. We can insist that the soul has not departed only by insisting that the ceremony does not have causal power. But, if it does not have causal power, why perform it? Our ceremonies are frivolous acts, because we have a frivolous attitude towards them. But the ceremonies of the Nuer are not frivolous, and they do not have frivolous attitude towards them.

The actions of the Nuer are quite consistent with their beliefs. The ceremonies connected with the marriage and death of the twins are meant for showing that they are one and the same person. As Evans-Pritchard tells us:

The unity of the twins is expressed, particularly in ceremonies connected with marriage and death...When the senior of the male twins marries, the junior acts with him in the ritual acts he has to perform; female twins ought to be married on the same day; and no mortuary ceremonies are held for twins, because for one reason, one of them cannot be cut off from the living without the other.[34]

The dead twins are treated very differently from the dead men. The Nuer make a distinction between ordinary men and twins, and they express their beliefs and actions accordingly. When a twin dies, 'his soul [according to Evans-Pritchard] goes into the air, to which things associated with spirit belong. He is a *ran nhial*, a person of the above, whereas an ordinary person is a *ran piny*, a person of the below.[35]

The Nuer also believe that the twins are birds, meaning that they have the spirit or the soul of the birds. Twin-birth is not common to human beings. In its issue of Thursday 15 October 1987, the *Newstime* has published some photographs of the twins from the town of Twinsburg, near Cleaveland, Ohio. This town was founded by twin brothers in 1817. The *Newstime*\* gives the statistics about twin-birth, that it is 'one out of 240'. The Nuer were attracted towards this phenomenon as we are today attracted towards it. But multiple hatching of the eggs is not rare, it is common to birds. A mother who gives birth to twins is like a bird laying so many eggs. But the mother herself is not a bird, she is like an incubator. The twins are birds, they are not ordinary human beings. The twin-birth is bird-birth. But this bird-birth is in the human form. It is for this reason, according to Evans-Pritchard, that 'there is no mortuary ceremony even when the second twin dies...because a twin is a *ran nhial*, a person of the sky or of the above. He is also spoken of as *gat kwoth*, a child of the God.'[36] The descriptions that are applied to twins—persons of the sky, persons of the above, children of God—are also applied to birds, perhaps because, as Evans-Pritchard quotes the interpretation of one

\*A daily newspaper published from Hyderabad; see p. 14 of 15 October 1987.

Mr. Jackson, 'the bird can fly in the skies and is accordingly in communication with the Great Spirit'.[37] The connection between twins and birds is amply exhibited by two facts, first, that 'it would be *Nueer,* a grave sin'[38] for the twins to eat birds or their eggs; secondly, 'because, Nuer say, birds are also twins'.[39] The formula that twins are birds and birds are twins expresses faith in the identity of the souls of birds and the souls of the twins. The death of a twin-child is described with the words fit only for the birds. Instead of saying 'he is dead', the Nuer say 'he has flown away'. Evans-Pritchard points out: 'Infant twins who die...are covered in the reed basket or winnowing tray and placed in the fork of a tree, because birds rest in trees.'[40] So also the adult burial of the twins involves so many differences. They are buried in such a fashion as to allow them a chance to fly away.

The Nuer think that the twins are closer to God than other persons, because not all men but only twins are the children of God. Being God's children they have family ties with God. This kind of family tie is allowed to birds but not to other persons. Thus, the three beliefs—the belief in the identity of twins, the belief in the identity of twins with birds, and the belief that the twins are closer to God than the other persons—are closely related beliefs. These beliefs are certainly not absurd. Of course, they are not the kind of beliefs which can be established by scientific procedures. They are not scientific beliefs, and hence the question of testing their truth in a scientific fashion does not arise. But 'being scientific' is not 'being every thing'. The scientific beliefs cover a very small area of the geography of a man's beliefs. Of course, there are no clear-cut boundaries of beliefs. We cannot say that the area *A* is devoted to scientific beliefs, *B* to religious beliefs, *C* to cosmological beliefs, and so on.

IV

I would like to conclude this note with the discussion of the anthropologists' attitude towards the tribal mind ('savage mind' in the colonial language). The views of the social anthropologists like Levi-Bruhl and the philosophical anthropologists like Sartre are clearly the result of their racial prejudices. These views give support to the colonizers who think that the savages deserve only one treatment, i.e. if they are not to be eliminated, then they are to be enslaved and used like domisticated animals. The White settlers in America had only two alternatives for the Red Indians. As Levi-Strauss points out: 'Either the American natives were men, and thus had to be, willy nilly, integrated into the Christian civilization, or their humanity was debatable and they belonged to the animal world.'[41] Some colonizers, mostly from Britain, considered the Red Indians as dangerous animals, and hence started the programme of eliminating them. The best Red Indians are those who are the dead Indians. Unfortunately, the surviving ones, very few in numbers, were

not thought fit to be absorbed in the Christian civilization. So they were kept in the reserved areas, so that their culture does not get mixed up with the culture of the Christian colonizers. (Do animals have culture?) Perhaps it was also thought desirable that their skins must not get mixed up with the skins of White settlers. In order to arrive at the view that the savages are animals (having prelogical and prephilosophical understanding), one does not require the study of anthropology or philosophical anthropology. The colonizers of Africa, America, Canada and Australia were neither anthropologists nor philosophical anthropologists; yet they knew the basic truth about the savage mind that it was not very different from the mind of an animal. The basis of Western capitalism, according to Karl Marx of the *Das Kapital,* depended on the transformation of Africa into 'a sort of commercial preserve for the hunting of black skins'.[42] Concerning the New World of America, he said: 'The mute slavery of the New World was needed as a cornerstone on which the covert slavery of Europe's wage earner was built.'[43] Unless some people remain savages others cannot be civilized, for it is only by destroying the savage that the modern Western man has realized his own reality. And the process of destruction is continuous, for the only reality is the reality of the Western man.

Evans-Pritchard allows logical understanding to the savage mind without accepting that it is scientific. As he says:

A pot has broken during firing. This is probably due to grit. Let us examine the pot and see if this is the cause. That is logical and scientific thought. Sickness is due to witchcraft. A man is sick. Let us consult the oracles to discover who is the witch responsible. That is logical and unscientific thought.[44]

Thus, there is nothing illogical about making an appeal to magic and witchcraft. But this appeal is not scientific. These remarks of Evans-Pritchard have led Peter Winch to compare his views with the views of Wittgenstein.[45] We can think in terms of the alternative modes of rationality. The savages, too, are rational creatures. But their mode of rationality is different from our mode of rationality. Evans-Pritchard even succeeds in discovering that the savages are 'natural philosophers'. As he says:

As a natural philosophy it (witchcraft) reveals a theory of causation. Misfortune is due to witchcraft co-operating with natural forces. If a buffalo gores a man, or the supports of a grannary are undermined by termites so that it falls on his head, or he is infected with cerebro-spinal meningitis, Azande says that the buffalo, the grannary, and the disease, are causes which combine with witchcraft to kill a man.[46]

The echo of Evans-Pritchard is heard in the views of Levi-Strauss when he

says: 'The savage mind puts a philosophy of the finite into practice.'[47] To depict magic as a 'natural philosophy' and to describe the savage mind as 'logical and philosophical' is certainly a very bold step on the part of Evans-Pritchard. But these designations lose all their force, all their respectability, once it is granted that the savage lacks the conceptual and abstract understanding. The Nuer do not have the notions of *abstract* space and time. They lack political and legal institutions. They do not have any kind of government, or system of abstract laws. Their behaviour is not very different from that of their cattle. Like their cattle they are gregarious, nomadic and migratory, and all the time busy in gathering food for their stomach. Of course, the animal life of the Nuer is the result of his fall from the 'age of innocence'. In that age, according to a Nuer myth, 'he does not suffer from hunger, because what later became his stomach lives a life of its own in the bush where it feeds on small insects'.[48] Similarly, 'the male and female organs are also not yet part of man and woman but live apart from them.'[49] Then things changed; the age of innocence was gone. 'Stomach entered into man and he is now always hungry...The sexual organs attached themselves to man and woman so that they are now constantly desirous of each other.'[50] The fall did not stop at this level, it went deeper. The God of the Nuer 'decreed that the Nuer should raid the Dinka and that the Europeans should conquer the Nuer.'[51] Thus started the hunting of the Nuer skins by the Europeans.

Evans-Pritchard is not alone in suffering from two contradictory pulls—a pull to distinguish the savage from the animal, and a pull to assimilate the savage to the animal. Even the most sympathetic anthropologist, Levi-Strauss, suffers from these contradictory pulls. This becomes clear from his treatment of the Neolithic Paradox. Referring to this paradox, he says:

> It was in neolithic times that man's mastery of the great arts of civilization of pottery, weaving, agriculture and the domestication of animals—became firmly established...Each of these techniques assumes centuries of active and methodical observation, of bold hypotheses tested by means of endlessly repeated experiments.[52]

On the basis of all what he says, he is led to conclude: 'Neolithic, or early historical, man was therefore the heir of a long scientific tradition'.[53] This leads to the paradox. To express the paradox in the words of Levi-Strauss himself:

> Had he (the neolithic man) as well as all his predecessors, been inspired by exactly the same spirit as that of our own time, it would be impossible to understand how he could have come to a halt and how several thousand years of stagnation have intervened between the neolithic revolution and modern science like a level plain between ascents.[54]

Levi-Strauss finds only one solution to the Neolithic paradox:

...that there are two distinct modes of scientific thought. These are certainly not a function of different stages of development of the human mind but rather of two strategic levels at which nature is accessible to scientific enquiry.[55]

The level at which the savage mind operates is different from that at which the civilized mind operates; the former is not a stage of the latter. Levi-Strauss means to say that it would be misleading to say that the civilized mind has developed out of the savage mind, or that the savage and the civilized men are inspired by the same spirit. But, in saying all what he says, Levi-Strauss is certainly not making any attempt to bridge the gulf between the neolithic man and the civilized man. He has widened the gulf. It seems as if the former belongs not only to another *time* but to another planet. On the last page of his book, he comes to the conclusion:

> Certainly the properties to which the savage mind has access are not the same as those which have commanded the attention of scientists. The physical world is approached from opposite ends in the two cases: one is supremely concrete, the other supremely abstract; one proceeds from the angle of the sensible qualities and the other from that of formal properties.[56]

Thus, the abstract and the formal domain is not accessible to the savage mind. The savage has to remain contented with the sensible or the concrete finite world.

Levi-Strauss proclaims the savage as a scientist of the concrete. He has also described him as a philosopher of the concrete. The savage cannot be either a scientist or a philosopher of the abstract. Abstraction is something that lies beyond the capabilities of the savage mind. It is certainly not use but *misuse* of the words 'philosophy' and 'science', if one deprives the words 'philosophy' and 'science' of their abstract implications. How can you call someone 'philosopher' and 'scientist', if all the time you think that he is incapable of abstract knowledge?

Thus, be he an Evans-Pritchard or a Levi-Strauss, no attempt has been made to bridge the gulf between the savage and the civilized Western man. Rather, with the passage of time, the gulf has been widened.

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# Defending the tradition

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I

Richard Rorty in two important books, *Mind and the Mirror of Nature* and *The Consequences of Pragmatism,* has developed an iconoclastic metaphilosophy (philosophy of philosophy if you will) which has struck at the heart of the self-image of philosophy as traditionally conceived, including 'scientific analytical philosophy'. Two distinguished analytical philosophers, Jaegwon Kim and Ian Hacking, have tried, in turn, to defend the tradition. I want here to turn a critical eye on that defence.

Jaegwon Kim, in his critique of Richard Rorty, notes that 'three central themes emerge as fundamental components' of the philosophical tradition that Rorty rejects and sets out to transcend.[1] Kim thinks that it is important that we isolate these three components and inspect them separately. The thing to look for, he believes, is whether they are equally vulnerable. Rorty may give us good grounds for rejecting one of them but not another, and one may be more fundamental to sustain in defending the tradition than the others. The three components are: (*i*) the Platonic doctrine concerning *truth* and *knowledge*; (*ii*) the Cartesian doctrine of mind and; (*iii*) the Kantian concept of philosophy as foundational for the rest of culture.

Kim characterizes them as follows:

(1) The Platonic doctrine is a doctrine concerning *truth* and *knowledge*, according to which truth is *correspondence* with nature, and knowledge is a matter of *possessing accurate representations* (589).

(2) The Cartesian doctrine is the doctrine of the mind as the *private inner* stage, 'the Inner Mirror', in which cognitive action takes place. The Platonic doctrine of knowledge as representation was transformed into the idea of knowledge as *inner representation* of outer reality. The Cartesian contribution was to *mentalize* the Platonic doctrine (589).

(3) The Kantian doctrine is a conception of philosophy, according to which it is the business of philosophy to investigate the 'foundations' of the sciences, the arts, culture and morality, and adjudicate the cognitive claims of these areas. Philosophy, as epistemology, must set *universal standards of rationality and objectivity* for all actual and possible claims to knowledge (590).

Kim agrees, as does Ian Hacking as well, that Rorty's attack is well

directed against both the Cartesian component and the Kantian component.[2] Philosophers trying to defend the tradition or trying to save something from the tradition would, Kim believes, do well to abandon these two components of the tradition as well as the *Queen* of the Sciences conception that goes with these conceptions and to concentrate on (*a*) a defence of a more modest conception of philosophy as the *Handmaiden* of Science and (*b*) to a defence of the Platonic doctrnie concerning truth and knowledge.

Before I proceed with a characterization of Kim's theses there are three preliminary remarks that I think are in order:

(*a*) Kim's remarks would, I think, be echoed by a large number of philosophers who are defenders of the tradition in its contemporary analytic forms.

(*b*) Kim's theses about the Handmaiden conception should be distinguished from his defence of Platonic realism. Someone could be an anti-realist and still accept the Handmaiden conception.

(*c*) I think that at the outset it is crucial to see both how much literally sticking to Kim's Handmaiden conception would fetter philosophy what a *scientific* image it suggests, though it does not, I think, quite entail.

It reigns philosophy in startling ways, because it not only rules out the overseer of culture function but also rules out things like the philosophy of politics, social philosophy, aesthetics, philosophy of law, moral philosophy, philosophy of religion; and it would, as well, make impossible what Alasdair MacIntyre took to be so vital to philosophy, namely, its ciritical role where there are flashpoints at the borders of the various disciplines.[3] Much that has traditionally been coveted by the tradition would also be lost to philosophy. This is something that Hans Reichenbach and Rudolf Carnap might welcome, but it would not be welcomed by most contemporary analytic philosophers and particularly by most post-positivist analytic philosophers. Many would think that, if really taken to heart, it would incredibly and unnecessarily cut down the scope of philosophy, indeed, more specifically cut down the scope of systematic analytic philosophy. (A good bit of the curriculum of most philosophy departments would have to be junked.)

I also spoke of Kim's conception as probably being scientistic. The word 'scientistic' is for me a term of abuse, though it is not *merely* a term of abuse, for it has a descriptive meaning as well as an illocutionary force. I use the term 'scientistic' much as Jürgen Habermas does to mean the doctrine which says that what science—and most particularly the natural sciences—cannot tell us humankind cannot know. It is the belief that the sole mode for knowledge and understanding is science. Nothing else has or can have any genuine cognitive status. Physicists and chemists and the like know something first-order; and philosophers of science, with their second-order talk about the

talk of the natural sciences, know something very modest, comparable to what grammarians know about how language works; but all the rest is emotive flimflam. Logic, where it does not, as applied logic, have that Handmaiden function is a discipline of its own akin to mathematics. There are the logicians (including analytical philosophers of science), and then there are lotus eaters and nothing else in between.

I rather doubt that Kim would, if pushed on this, really want to say anything quite so extreme, but the cluster of things mentioned above is what his essay, sometimes more tightly and sometimes less, commits him to. And this, whether rightly or wrongly, does very severely, indeed extensively, reign in the scope of systematic analytical philosophy.

One could, of course, extend, not far from the spirit of Kim, his Handmaiden conception, and do so entirely in line with current orthodoxy in the tradition, so that the Handmaiden image is extended beyond its being a Handmaiden of science, to being a Handmaiden of the law, of the humanities and the like. Still, *pace* the Kantian overseer conception, such a conception of philosophy does not seek to change science or the law or to critique it or rationally appraise it. There is no place any more for saying: 'I know the legal system has characteristics $x$, $y$ and $z$, but that is an irrational or, in important ways, an inadequate legal system.' At most the philosopher could point out that $x$, $y$ and $z$ forms an inconsistent triad. And this, to give the Handmaiden conception its due, is something that might only be apparent when it is looked at closely. Still, it could not tell us where to go from there. Which predicate do we drop or which do we alter? What are we to do? What would a more reasonable or a more humane legal system look like? There is no room for any of these questions, given the abandonment of the Kantian component of the tradition with its cultural overseer conception, for we can have no such independent standards of rationality or coherence to which we can appeal. The Handmaiden conception, no matter how much it is broadened, will not give us that. Perhaps the Kantian thing is something it is, knowing what we know now, unreasonable to expect. Yet it is also important to recognize that its loss is a considerable loss; a very fundamental promise that the tradition has held out will be seen to be a promise which cannot be kept.

When we give up the Cartesian 'mental turn', we give up the *quest for certainty*. Most of us, touched by the fallibilistic tenor of modernity, do not have any trouble with the abandonment of the 'mental turn'. We have put aside a nostalgia for the absolute. How a rational person could expect anything other than a fallibilistic view of the world seems quite mystifying to us. Even some religious people, since Sören Kierkegaard and Karl Barth, have also learned to live with fallibilism, though, where people continue to quest or thirst for certainty, we expect some irrational hang-up with religion somewhere in the background. The Cartesian mentalistic turn designed to give us certainty no longer grips us. Such a turn seems only to be historically interesting or to generate some quaint puzzles.

However, as I have already suggested, the Kantian component cuts closer to the bone. It is a deeply engrained flattering self-image of philosophers, and it is, indeed, understandable that many people—and not only philosophers—would want such an Archimedian point for assessing and criticizing culture. It is surely understandable that reflective and intelligent human beings would want some standards of rationality and adequacy to assess the condition of our social life and to make judgements about social evolution. But Rorty's narrative puts, to put it minimally, the very possibility of such a critical perspective under a cloud, and Kim and Hacking make no attempt to defend the tradition at this key juncture. Where they do draw their defence lines, and where many other analytical philosophers would as well, is around, what Kim calls, the Platonic doctrine of *truth* and *knowledge*: where truth, crudely put, is correspondence with nature and knowledge is a matter of possessing accurate representations.

II

We have seen how much is given up by drawing the defence lines there. Still, that notwithstanding, something of importance remains; so let us see how Kim defends that part of the tradition. He sees clearly that rejecting the Cartesian component—the mental turn—'is wholly consistent with continued allegiance to the Platonic doctrine of realism' (591). And it is also his conviction—a conviction I do not share for reasons given above—'that rejection of Platonic realism is a much more radical departure than a rejection of...the Kantian conception of philosophy...' (591). It is true, of course, that Platonic realism need not carry in its train *epistemological* foundationalism, privileged representations, or analyticity and necessity.

What is rockbottom in Rorty's critique of the tradition of Platonic realism is Rorty's claim that the notion of correspondence in the correspondence theory of truth is hopelessly metaphysical and without content[4] (592). Kim believes, however, that Rorty, in his deconstruction of realism, is caught in a self-referential paradox. Rorty, in a way reminiscent of Kierkegaard, wants to keep edifying phiolsophy from being itself a view about the having of views and thus being the kind of system—the very having of a view—that it decries. He does not want to get trapped into offering another system whose aim is to show the untenability of all systems.

Rorty's attempted way out of that paradox is to deny, as he does in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, that 'when we say something we must necessarily be expressing a view about something'.[5] But, for this to be possible, we must come to understand that speech is 'not only not externalizing inner representations ..it is *not a representation at all*. We have to drop the notion of correspondence for sentences as well as for thoughts, and see sentences as connected with other sentences rather than with the world.'[6]

Kim takes this to be a *reductio*—a ridiculously high price to pay for 'the possibility of edifying philosophy, or the impossibility of systematic philosophy' (596). To make language, and with it, edifying philosophy, free from all representation, and to make his 'keeping the conversation going' not itself a view (one view among others), Rorty has to try to deprive language, Kim claims, of any *cognitive content*. No assertions can be made in that language, and thus nothing can be denied in it. Nor can any questions be framed, wishes or hopes expressed or exclamations conveyed. All these speech acts presuppose the *assertorial function*—it is rock-bottom—for language, communication, conversation, thought itself to be possible. But the assertorial function is not possible unless language has in some way representational functions. Without representational functions and thus without an assertorial function, we would have no language at all. But Rorty takes the very idea of nuanced conversation to be at the heart of his hermeneutical or edifying way of doing philosophy, and this, of course, requires language; but a language incapable of making any representations at all is not and cannot be a language, for it would not have what is at the basis of all speech, namely, an assertorial function (596). So Rorty's conception self-destructs. Or so Kim claims.

Moreover, Kim goes on to add rather redundantly, if the assertorial function of language goes, it is not just all kinds of philosophical talk that goes but, making Rorty's thesis an incredible *reductio*, all discourse.

The rejection of Platonic realism has wider implications. It makes not only philosophical discourse but all discourses, including scientific discourse, non-assertoric and non-representational. Language in general, not just philosophical language, becomes non-representative. Truth and knowledge in science, too, are matters of social practice and approval, not representation. Science, too, must cease to be inquiry and become conversation (597).

If Rorty's rejection of Platonic realism and his conception of language as non-representational actually committed him to denying that science is inquiry or investigation, that any cognitive activities can be carried out by the use of language, and that language has any assertorial function at all, then I would readily agree that the account was both absurd and self-refuting. It would, if that is so, self-destruct. What I am unconvinced of is that Rorty's views entail these absurdities. I suppose the core of Kim's claim is that, if you take, as Rorty does, speech as not being representational at all, then you must deny that it has any assertorial function, and that we can make any assertions or denials at all. Rorty plainly does not want to accept such a conclusion, and he does not, for a moment, deny, what is plainly true, namely, that we make assertions and denials all the time. Communication would be impossible if we could not do so. Kim's claim is that this absurdity is what

Rorty's account of speech as non-representational actually commits him to. Does it?

I doubt it. In the very passage Kim quotes, Rorty, immediately after saying that speech is not representational at all, goes on to gloss that remark as the denial that sentences correspond to some state of affairs free from linguistic encoding; rather, the case, according to Rorty, is that sentences are linked with other sentences. What we do not and cannot do is to break out of the web of language, and have some *brute-state-of-affairs which is non-linguistically specifiable* for the sentence to correspond to. Rorty is making the familiar point—the point made familiar to us by Quine, Goodman, Winch, and Hanson (if not Kant)—'that scientists do not bring a naked eye to nature, that the propositions of science are not simple transcriptions of what is present to the senses'.[7]

To the response that this claim is far weaker than the claim that speech is not representational at all, we need, if an adequate response can be made to that, a further reading of the claim that speech is not representational. Rorty, in saying that speech is not representational at all, is making the undeniable linguistic point that any specification of a referent is going to be in some vocabulary, and that thus one can only be comparing two descriptions of a thing rather than a description with the thing itself. There is no possible comparison of the description of the thing with the thing itself, for any specification of the thing is going to be in some vocabulary. There are many descriptions that we can and sometimes do give of 'the same state of affairs', but there is no privileged description that can 'just give us the state of affairs as it is in itself'. We cannot get, as Rorty puts it, to nature's own language.

When Rorty says that speech is not representational at all, I take him to be denying that a word-world relation can take place which relates the world to the word in any other way than that portrayed above; but this does not even suggest, let alone entail, that we cannot make assertions. Language games are complex social practices with many different kinds of speech-acts. There are, quite uncontroversially, the speech-acts of asserting, exclaiming, questioning, proclaiming, expressing one's hopes and fears, and the like. There is no need to invoke Platonic realism to explain the assertorial function of language or to bring on some mysterious conception of representation about how words match up with the world. Words are not pictures or anything like pictures. When I assert 'It's getting dark', I, in normal circumstances, surely think it is getting dark. But I either specify getting dark in terms of the linguistic expression 'getting dark', or I specify it in some other English terms or the terms of some other language. Nature does not have its own language; we can never escape a set of conventions here; language never functions so that something being in it points, as if it were an arrow, or points, as if it were a picture, to something which is just there before us unconceptualized naked to our gaze. When I make an assertion and say that

it is getting dark, I get further word-word relations, all of which are embedded in social practices. And where else would these practices be but in the world? Nothing else is even intelligible. Still there is no word-world relationship in my assertion (or present to my assertion) in which there is a just a getting dark that is just there requiring a certain linguistic representation. Commonsense realism is one thing, Platonic realism or metaphysical realism another. The latter doctrines, if not just pedantic ways of stating commonsense realism, are very contentious doctrines indeed. The denial of the former, if not unintelligible, is insane.

III

I want finally to look at another very fundamental defence of the tradition against Rorty's metaphilosophical moves. Let me go at it indirectly. In reflecting on Kim's and Hacking's responses to Rorty, it is important not to lose sight of the depth of their agreement with Rorty on two very fundamental issues. Both Kim and Hacking agree with Rorty that foundationalism is dead, and that it is an impossible dream to try to carry out the Kantian project or (if you will) the research programme of attaining a rational Archimedian point for assessing belief-systems, i.e. whole domains such as science or ethics as well as social practices and institutions. No one, they agree with Rorty in maintaining, can attain such an Archimedian point. They continue, however, predictably, to dislike and reject hermeneutical conceptions of a philosopher's task and Rorty's conception of philosophy as dialogue and conversation. Philosophy, Hacking would have it, involves not initiation but apprenticeship, not conversation but investigation. It is a discipline that can give us knowledge and provide us with crucial clarification of knowledge claims in certain domains and perhaps, as well, of certain determinate beliefs. However, this is not as straightforward as it may appear, and that this is so can be seen from Rorty's response.[8]

Rorty responds that such inquiries into conceptual foundations have not been helpful. It is a research programme that has not panned out; that at best it has been the owl of Minerva, and has usually been a block to creative thought. In their verbal exchange during the symposium, Rorty pressed Hacking and Kim to give an example where an inquiry into the conceptual foundations of *x* ever provided any furtherance of *x* or anything else or even any furtherance of our understanding of *x* or anything else. Hacking did not take up the challenge, but Kim gave as an example the work done in the conceptual foundations of mathematics by Frege and Cantor. But, even if we take this response at face value, it is very interesting that the only example that was given was from mathematics, something which from the start is very conceptual. But, to get anything that would look like a convincing example, we would need to break out of the charmed circle of purely con-

ceptual investigations, and get examples from philosophy, history, politics, the natural sciences, or the social sciences; but no such example or examples were preferred. That I think is revealing. But, even if we stick to Kim's example, we have what in effect is John Rawls's worry about it.[9] What we need to recognize is that only after fundamental work in mathematics was actually carried out did we progress in metamathematics. Again, we see the truth of the claim that the owl of Minerva flies only at dusk.

In fine, in defending the tradition against Rorty, Hacking and Kim have not succeeded in showing how an examination of the 'conceptual foundations' of anything can give us anything of worth. 'Scientific analytical philosophy'. if it is to come to much, must make good the claim that philosophy has some determinate expertise, that it possesses some analytical tools to provide us a knowledge of the conceptual foundations of science, morality, law, and the like which will, in turn, enlighten those practices. Rorty, following Wittgenstein, maintains that these claims of the tradition are hollow. As things stand, that challenge is unmet.

#### NOTES

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2. Ian Hacking, 'Is the End in Sight for Epistemology?' in *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol. lxxvii, no. 10, October 1980, pp. 579-88.
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# Yajña and the doctrine of karma: a contradiction in Indian thought about action

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*Yajña*, by common consent, is considered to be the heart of the Vedas, and the doctrine of *karma* the most distinctively significant feature of Indian thought about action. Yet, it has seldom been seen that the two are essentially in conflict with each other. In fact, such a recent book as *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions*[1] fails to mention *yajña* in its index. Yet, the notion of *yajña* is important not only because it forms the essential core of Vedic thought but also because it was later expanded by an analogous mode of thinking to cover activities, which could not be regarded as *yajña* in the original Vedic usage of the term. The *Gītā* makes the *yajña* almost coterminus with creation.[2] And, though, both in the *Gītā* and elsewhere many other things including the cosmos itself is seen as a *yajña*, the paradigmatic example continues to be the Vedic *yajñas* which are well known in the literature. Besides the varying rituals of the different *yajña* and the diverse purposes for which they may be undertaken, one constant and essential feature in all of them in the perspective of the doctrine of *karma* is the relationship between the *yajamāna* and the *ṛtviks*, that is, the one for whom the *yajña* is performed and those who actually perform the *yajña*. This is the basic distinction on which most of the Vedic, that is, the *śrauta yajñas* are based.* Most of the *yajñas* are *actually* performed by persons who have been specially hired for the job as they are specialists in the knowledge of ritual which is essential for doing the *yajña* for someone else who is desirous of getting some particular fruit through the performance of the *yajña* and who has, therefore, hired them to perform it on his behalf. Further, the performance of *yajña* is a collective enterprise in which different groups of specialists coordinate their ritually prescribed activities to attain the desired result for the patron who has employed them for undertaking it.

The crucial features of the Vedic *yajña* from the view-point of the theory of action, therefore, are the following:

(1) It is an action done by a group of persons *for* someone else who has engaged them for doing that action by paying the fee which is prescribed for the same.

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*It is not clear whether the daily *agnihotra* is a Vedic *yajña* or not. It does not have the usual distinction of *yajamāna* and *ṛtvik* in it. But, as most of the other *yajñas* do require such a distinction for their performance, our argument remains unaffected by it.

(2) It is a *collective* action which can only be done *jointly* by each person doing his separate part assigned to him in the total activity.

(3) The action, though performed by many persons and each contributing separately to it, is still supposed to be *one* action.

(4) The action, though done by many persons, is yet not regarded as *their* action, either singly or jointly, in the sense that the fruit of action does not accrue to them.

(5) The fruit of action accrues not to those who *actually* perform it, but to him who has paid them to perform the action.

(6) The action is always undertaken for the achievement of a desired end, whether in this world or the next. In other words, it is a *sakāma karma*.

The distinction between the *yajamāna,* that is, the person for whom the sacrifice is performed and the *ṛtviks,* that is, the priests who perform the sacrifice, is not clear-cut in the case of all the sacrifices. In the context of the *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, for example, the *yajamāna* himself is technically regarded as a *ṛtvik* in order to complete the total number of *ṛtviks* which is mentioned as seventeen in the Śruti texts relating to this subject. The *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* 3.7.38 seeks to justify this on the basis of *karmasāmānyāt,* that is, the similarity of functions between the *ṛtviks* and the *yajamāna.* But, if this were to be accepted, it would obliterate all distinction between the *yajamāna* and the *ṛtviks* not only in the context of the *jyotiṣṭoma* but of all the other sacrifices.

Similar is the case with the *sattra* sacrifices in which the distinction between the 'priests' and the 'sacrificers' does not obtain as 'all the priests are from among the "sacrificers" themselves' (10.6.51-58).[3] And, for this reason, 'there is no "appointment" of priests' (sūtra 10.2.35, bhāṣya, trans p. 1698); and the services of the priests at the *sattra* are not 'bought' or 'exchanged' for any promised 'fee' (10.2.35-38).[4] It is obvious from the above that normally a priest, that is, a *ṛtvik,* is one whose services are 'bought' or hired for a promised fee. And this, in fact, is stated in the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* 3.7.36 according to which a *ṛtvik* is one who is given the sacrificial fee as mentioned in the *dakṣiṇāvākya.* But, if this were to be accepted, then the *yajamāna* could not be counted as a priest, for he has not been hired for the job by being given the sacrificial fee.

Yet, whatever the problems with respect to these specific sacrifices, by and large we may assume that there is a relevant distinction between the *yajamāna* and the *ṛtviks* in the context of the Vedic sacrifice, and that the latter are hired by the former for the performance of a sacrifice whose fruit he desires to obtain.

Prof. Staal, in his well-known work on Vedic ritual entitled *Agni,* has tried to suggest that renunciation of the fruits of the sacrificial act is itself an integral part of the sacrificial act, and hence it would not be correct to consider it as motivated by the desire for the fruit because of which the sacrifice was undertaken. He interprets *tyāga* as 'renunciation (of the fruits of the ritual

acts)' and the *yajamāna's* statement when the officiating priest, on his behalf, makes the oblation into the fire for one of the gods, for example, Agni, 'This is for Agni, not for me (*agnaye idaṁ na mama)',* taking *idaṁ* to refer to the fruit of the sacrifice itself.[5] It would be more natural to take it as referring to the *dravya,* 'the substance (used in oblations)', which is put into the fire accompanied by the saying of the *tyāga-*formula given earlier. Or, alternatively, it may be taken to apply to the sacrificial act itself as it is supposed to be pronounced at the end of the sacrifice. However, in no case can it be treated as referring to the desired purpose for the sake of which the whole act of sacrifice is undertaken and for which alone it is enjoined. To conflate the *tyāga* of the material into the sacrificial fire with the *karmaphala tyāga* of the *Gītā*[6] and to interpret the former in the light of the latter is to confuse two very different kinds of *tyāga* which have hardly anything in common. Had the two been even remotely similar, the author of the *Gītā* would not have castigated the Vedas in such harsh terms.[7]

Staal, of course, is aware of the contradiction his interpretation forces on the Vedic framework. In his own words:

At this point a contradiction begins to appear, which becomes increasingly explicit in the ritualistic philosophy of the *Mīmāṁsā.* The reason for performing a specific ritual is stated to be the desire for a particular fruit or effect. The stock example *of the Mīmāṁsā* is: He who desires heaven shall sacrifice with the Agniṣṭoma ritual (*agniṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta*). But this fruit is renounced whenever the Yajamāna utters his tyāga formula of renunciation. The effect, therefore, is not obtained.[8]

Prof. Staal has not even asked himself the simple question: 'How can one renounce what one has not got?' For, surely, he does not want to maintain that the *yajamāna* has already got the fruit, i.e. heaven which he is renouncing by uttering the formula.[9] In fact, had he taken seriously the discussion by Śabara in his *bhāṣya* on the *sūtra* 11.1.1 and the others following it where the whole issue is discussed threadbare, he would not have made the statement or at least tried to show why he wants to hold this position in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

We may, therefore, accept that the *yajamāna* engages in most of the Vedic sacrifices in order to attain some fruit, and that he usually employs some *ṛtviks,* i.e. priests, for the purpose. And, even if there be difficulties in determining who is a *ṛtvik,* there can be little doubt that the fruit of the activity of the Vedic *yajña* is supposed to accrue to the *yajamāna* who engages in it and hires others for that very purpose. Yet, this is exactly what is sought to be denied by the hard core of the doctrine of *karma* which cannot but see the Vedic *yajña* as a paradigmatic example of a view of the universe which essentially sees it in immoral terms.

The hard core of the theory of *yajña* is that one can reap the fruit of some-

body else's action, while the hard core of the theory of *karma* denies the very possibility of such a situation ever arising in a universe that is essentially moral in nature. As both the strands lie at the very foundation of Indian thought about action, the contradiction between the two provides that tension which is evident to most students of the subject and which has been documented to a certain extent in a recent book on the subject edited by Wendy O'Flaherty, already referred to earlier. The *Mīmāṁsā-sūtras* themselves are aware of the problem, and, in a certain sense, treat the theory of *karma* in its hard core form as their *pūrvapakṣa*. In *sūtra* 3.7.18, the issue is raised whether all such sacrifices which are done for the sake of heaven should be 'performed entirely by the "sacrificer" himself', or he need do only the Act of Dedication, that is, *utsarga*, and the rest may be done either by himself or others, or only by others who have been hired for the purpose. The reason given for the first *pūrvapakṣa* that it is the sacrificer alone who should do everything is that 'because, as a matter of fact, the result of an action accrues to a person only when he performs the act himself…'.[10] The problem is raised again in the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtras* 3.8.25, 3.8.26, 3.8.28 and 3.8.29. The issue in these *sūtras* relates to the question 'whether the reward that is asked for accrues to the Priest or to the Sacrificer'.[11] The issue is resolved in diverse ways in *sūtras* 26, 28 and 29 respectively. *Sūtra* 3.8.28 resolves it in favour of the sacrificer as it is for his sake that the action is performed. *Sūtra* 3.8.28 argues, according to Śabara, that 'in some cases, the result spoken of accrues to the Priests—i.e. in those cases where the result in question is helpful in the performance…'.[12] *Sūtra* 3.8.29 argues that in case 'there is a direct assertion to that effect, the result is to be taken as accruing to the Priests'.[13]

It is obvious that Jaimini cannot accept the theory of *karma* as propounded in the tradition and formulated so explicitly in *sūtra* 3.7.18 by the opponent, if he has to save the practice of *yajña* as enjoined in the Vedas. A *yajña* is usually a complex affair lasting for days, or sometimes even weeks or years, and requires specialized knowledge of the ritual, i.e. what is to be done? when and how? and with what objects and by whom? It, therefore, cannot be done by any one person alone to whom the fruit of that action may accrue according to the theory of *karma* as formulated by the opponent of the Vedic *yajña*. There are, of course, many human goals which may only be achieved by collective human effort in which a large number of persons co-operate with their different specialized *karma,* and it is not clear how the principle of distribution of the fruit, which is the result of such a collective effort, would have to be formulated in accordance with the theory of *karma*. But, as far as the Vedic *yajña* is concerned, the situation is far different from this, as the problem there relates not to the formulation of the principle according to which the fruit is to be distributed amongst those who have collectively participated in the action, but of the accrual of fruit to a person who has practically not done any action except that of hiring persons to perform the *yajña* for him. This, of course, happens all the time, but it is surprising that it should not

have been seen as posing a problem for the theory of *karma* in the Indian tradition.

The theory of *karma,* it may be said, is itself not quite clear in its formulation. It has been argued recently that, at least in some of its formulations, it permits or perhaps even requires such an interactional interpretation where the fruit of each person's action accrues to, or is shared by, others. The classic instance of this, even in the Vedic times, is supposed to be the *śrāddha* ceremony whereby the ritualistic offering given by the son is expected to help his deceased parents in their abode after death. The same will be true of the notion of pollution, particularly that variety of it which is *caused* by others through their voluntary or involuntary behaviour. Yet, however, appropriate all these examples may be to show that certain kinds of action enjoined by the religious texts in the tradition lend themselves to an interpretation in which one person's action ostensibly affects another, it will not be quite correct to say that such an interpretation forms an integral part of the theory of *karma* or that it is an alternative version of it. It is a fact that human beings appear to affect each other in substantial ways, and that they are supposed to be responsible for their actions as they are considered to have initiated them. The task of a theory here, as in other fields, is to give a coherent, intelligible description of the relevant facts of human action. The theory construction with respect to the facts of human action, however, has another demand inbuilt into it. And this is the demand not for intelligibility in general, but rather or 'moral intelligibility', or rather of intelligibility which may be acceptable to the moral conscience of man.

The theory of *karma* as elaborated in the Indian tradition has, therefore, to be seen not as a description of facts relating to human action, but rather as an attempt to render them intelligible in moral terms. This is the basic difference between the intelligibility of nature and the intelligibility of the human world. The former may be rendered intelligible by postulating the notion of causality amongst phenomena, but that alone would not render intelligible to men the world of men or the human world. The latter is constituted by human actions, and they are always characterized as 'good' or 'bad', 'right' or 'wrong', properties that can never be ascribed to natural events, except in a figurative or instrumental sense. The intelligibility of the human world, therefore, has to be a moral intelligibility, and, in a sense, all cultures and civilizations have tried to seek it in their own way. Religion, in the deepest sense, is a search for this intelligibility, though it is never just that. It would be the difference, then, that a culture displays in the solution of this general problem that would reveal its distinctiveness, if any, in this field.

The solution to the problem of moral intelligibility of the human world in the Indian tradition takes a distinctive turn when, from the intuitively self-evident proposition that the world will be a morally unintelligible world if I were to reap the fruit of somebody else's action or if someone else were to reap the fruit of my actions, it draws the conclusion that in order that the

world be morally intelligible we must live in a 'morally monadic' world. In other words, if 'moral intelligibility' requires that each human being should reap *only* the fruit of his *own* actions then no human being can *really* affect anyone else, however much the appearances may seem to justify the contrary. Nobody can *really* be the cause of my suffering or happiness; nor can I be the cause of suffering or happiness to anybody else. If I, or anyone else, seem to feel the opposite, that is an *illusion* needing to be rectified by cognitive reflection on the presuppositions involved in the notion of 'moral intelligibility' itself. Just as there are 'structural illusions' in the realm of the senses, so also, it is contended, there are 'structural illusion' in the moral realm also. The former are known to everybody; the latter to nobody. Yet, the latter are as, if not more, important than the former as they determine the very texture of human experience itself.

The foundational *avidyā* or ignorance in this perspective, then, would be to regard anything other than oneself as the cause of whatever happens to one, and the first step towards its rectification would be to realize its erroneous character, however well entrenched it may be in one's psyche or experience. But once the rectification is seen as necessary in order to render the world of human action 'morally intelligible', it is also seen that I could not confine my existence to this life only for the simple reason that if I do so I would have to ascribe the advantages or disadvantages that my being born in a particular family with a particular psychophysical constitution endows me with to chance or to other human beings. The only way I can avoid this is to postulate a past life of my own, which would provide the moral rationale of whatever happens to me from the moment of conception to such time when I become capable of moral reflection and voluntary action. Not only this, all the accidental features of my life are to be understood in some such way, if I wish to render the world morally intelligible.

It is, therefore, wrong to think that the hypothesis of a future life or rebirth is entailed by the theory of *karma* as it is understood in the Indian tradition. Rather, it is only the postulation of a past life which is logically required by the theory. The future life is postulated only to round up the theory, as there seems no reason to think why, if there was a past life there should not be a future one also. Similarly, many of the actions one does in this life do not seem to produce any result that one would reasonably expect to get from them. And hence to explain the anomaly and correct it at a theoretical level, one has to postulate both a past and future life so that discrepent facts may be somehow squared.

The demand for 'moral intelligibility' interpreted in a particular way, then, leads not only to the treatment of the facts of birth and death as illusory but also to 'moral monadism' which makes moral life in the usual sense impossible in principle. Normally, one cannot conceive of morality in a monadic universe, for morality implies an 'other-centric' consciousness where one can care for the other, because one can affect the well-being of another, however

marginal it may be. Once the ontological possibility of this is denied, morality in the usual sense becomes an impossibility, and the fulfilment of the moral consciousness in man will have to take a different turn. The drama of morality, then, can turn only inwards, and can be played with respect to one's own consciousness which is felt as being-what-it-ought-not-to-be. The fact of self-consciousness provides the possibility of the 'other' being located in one's own consciousness, while the possibility of the 'is-ought' dichotomy is provided for by the feeling that the state of one's consciousness is not what it can be or ought-to-be. One not only alternates between states of consciousness which are pleasant or painful, depressed or elated, satisfying or dissatisfying, significant or insignificant, fulfilled or unfulfilled; one has also fleeting glimpses of states of one's consciousness which one cannot but feel as higher and deeper than what one normally experiences most of the time. The long Indian quest for a state of consciousness which is self-sufficient, self-fulfilled, self-effulgent, self-validating, and unaffected and unruffled by anything else may be understood in some such terms as these.

This shifting of the moral focus to the arena of self-consciousness results in a self-centric or *ātman*-centric perspective on action, where action is primarily conceived and judged in terms of not what it does to others which, in any case, it cannot do in the theoretical perspective we are considering, but what it does to me or rather to my state of consciousness, the two being identified in this perspective.[14] This may seem and, in fact, has seemed perverse to many people, particularly to those who treat the socio-political nature of man as his essential defining characteristic. The Western tradition, following Aristotle, is the classic example of this,[15] and most Western thinkers find it hard to understand the predominantly amoral or rather trans-moral nature of Indian thought. But the postulation of entities, which are essentially unaffected by others, is not as rare or as idiosyncratic as most thinkers or writers on Indian thought about action tend to make it out to be. The attempt to eliminate all seeming interactions between particles as only apparent and illusory is not unknown to the history of science. In fact, it was one of the most respectable things to do at one time and still remains the theoretical ideal of many scientists. As Pirogogine has argued:

Here we reach one of those dramatic moments in the history of science when the description of nature was nearly reduced to a static picture. Indeed, through a clever change of variables, *all interactions could be made to disappear*. It was believed that integrable systems, reducible to free particles, were the prototype of dynamic systems. Generations of physicists and mathematicians tried hard to find for each kind of systems the "right" variables that would *eliminate the interactions*.[16]

The elimination of seeming 'interactions' for theoretical reasons in the cognitive enterprises is intellectually respectable, and there is no reason why

it should be looked at askance when attempted in non-Western traditions for making the world 'morally intelligible'. Leibnitz's well-known notion of the monad is, perhaps, a transposition into the ontological realm of the notion of a 'free particle' in the physics of his times. But Prigogine's view that this necessarily leads to a 'static' view of nature seems mistaken. What has actually happened is that the centre of dynamism has shifted from the 'external' to the 'internal' and is 'self-determined' rather than 'other-determined', as is usual in most other views about nature. Leibnitz's monads are supposed to be centres of incessant activity, and so is the self in the perspective of the theory of *karma* as conceived in the Indian tradition. It is another matter that the valuational judgement of this activity is predominantly negative in the Indian tradition except perhaps in Kāshmīr Śaivism and certain forms of Vaiṣṇavism. But such a negative judgement is not essential to the theory itself, nor even to the way it has been usually construed in the Indian tradition.

Yet, whatever the turns and twists such a theory may take to explain away the seeming fact of interaction, the theory itself requires an explication not only of the notion of 'action' but also of 'my action'. Can one conceive of 'action' in terms of just 'pure willing' or to use the Sanskrit term, as *saṁkalpa-mātra*, without the resulting or accompanying bodily movements and their effect on the external world which has both living and non-living beings, including other human beings, in it. At a deeper level, the question is whether the notion of 'action' itself does not necessarily imply some 'other' which has to be changed by my action. This 'other' may, of course, be a physical situation or the state of beings other than myself, or my relationship to them or their relationship to me. But if 'action' implies both a psycho-physical world of causality and some criteria of ascriptional identity on the one hand, and an interactive framework on the other, then how can the demands of the 'moral intelligibility' of the universe as interpreted and understood in the theory of *karma* be fulfilled? This, perhaps, is the basic question in the light of which the Indian thought about *karma* has to be articulated and understood.

That 'human action' has both a 'moral' and a 'causal' component has been known to thinkers in the Western tradition, at least since Kant. But Kant posed the problem of morality in terms of 'freedom' and 'freedom' alone, without raising any question regarding the consequences of this 'free' action on oneself or others or both. The problem of reconciling the 'moral' and the 'causal', thus, has primarily been seen by him as an ontological, and not as a moral, problem. By and large, this may be regarded as typical of the Western tradition of thought regarding this problem in general. The Indian thinking, on the other hand, since its very inception in the Upaniṣadic and Śramaṇic times, seems to have seen the problem primarily in moral rather than onto-logical terms. Also, the problem is not posed in terms of the radical contra-distinction between the realm of causality and the realm of freedom, but rather between 'natural causality' and 'moral causality' or causality as

encountered in the realm of nature and the one encountered in the realm of 'moral action'. Freedom is, of course, presupposed by human action, but being 'action' it also implies consequences both in the human and the non-human world. The law of *karma* pertains to the realm of 'moral action' and tries to render the causality that reigns therein 'morally intelligible'.

'Moral action', thus, is seen as necessarily presupposing and involving 'causality' in the natural realm which, however, it subordinates to its own purposes. Yet, this causality also pertains to 'moral action' by virtue of the fact that in order to be 'action' it has to belong to the natural realm. It is, thus, the 'action' component of the 'moral action' which results in consequences for others, both in the human and the non-human world. An 'action', how-ever, has consequences not only on others but also on oneself. The theory of *karma* makes a radical difference between the two. The former, according to it, can have no moral component at all, as no one else can suffer the conse-quences of my action if the world is to be 'morally intelligible'. On the con-trary, in the context of the theory only the latter may possibly have a moral dimension. It is only the moral consequences of my action which have to be suffered by me, according to the theory, and not any and every consequence of my action. I can and do suffer the non-moral consequences of others' actions, just as they can and do suffer the non-moral consequences of my action.

Interpreted in this way, the theory would have to provide criteria for distinguishing between moral and non-moral consequences of action. The one distinction which the theory itself entails is that the consequences of a moral action are those which may belong to oneself alone; and thus if we could find the sort of things that could belong *only* to oneself and to none other, that would provide one clue to the distinction. The 'experiencing' aspect of consciousness seems to be one such thing, as even if we accept the possibility of telepathic awareness of someone else's consciousness, the consciousness that is an object of such a direct awareness cannot but see it as the experience of someone else. In a sense, the situation is duplicated in introspective self-awareness with the difference that one both observes and undergoes the ex-perience, a situation so well epitomized in the two birds of the Upaniṣad, one of which savours the experience, while the other only witnesses the whole thing. The Sanskrit terms, *bhoktā* and *dṛṣṭā*, capture the distinction vividly, and it is the *bhoga* aspect of the *karmaphala* or the fruit of action which cannot but be undergone by the agent alone.[17]

The necessity of postulating the notion of 'agency' or *kartṛtva* for under-standing the notion of *karma* has recently been questioned forcibly by Edwin Gerow in his article 'What is Karma (*Kim Karmeti*)? An Exercise in Philo-sophical Semantics'.[18] However, the discussion is not only too general but also heavily concentrated on the grammatical tradition to be of significant relevance to the theory of *karma* in the moral context with which we are pri-marily concerned here. To say that 'karman is *not* to be found associated with

agents or willing'[19] is merely to say that the term can be, and is, used in such a wide sense as to refer to any and every *vyāpāra*, including even such an event as the falling of a leaf[20] or the blowing of the breeze or anything. But, in such contexts, it should be translated as 'event' or 'process' which has little to do with the notion of *karma*, that is, action with which the doctrine of *karma* is primarily concerned. It is true that the notion of *kratṛtva*, as Gerow points out, has been under attack, specially in Advaita Vedānta, Sāṁkhya and Buddhism.[21] But, firstly, this obtains only at the ultimate onto-logical level. And, secondly, this does not illuminate in any way either our or their understanding of the doctrine of *karma* which all of them also accept or their understanding of the doctrine of *karma* which all of them also accept. That the doctrine of *karma* ultimately applies only to the phenomenal world is a truism for these systems, but so does everything else including all that can be talked about, known, felt or willed in the usual senses of these words. In fact, the whole *pramāṇa-prameya vyāpāra* itself belongs to the world of *avidyā*, according to these schools; and yet, inconsistently enough, they argue against their opponents all the time. Even the author of the *Yoga-sūtras* after declaring *pramāṇa* as *vṛtti*[32] whose *nirodha* is equated with *yoga* cannot resist the temptation of arguing against other positions.[23] The problem of 'saving the appearances' is there for all metaphysical constructions, and it is pecu-liarly so for 'moral action' as it not only presupposes some freedom for the agent[24] and some objective ground for the distinction between right and wrong or good and bad but also a world which behaves in accordance with some predictability, so that action may reasonably be undertaken.

The peculiar problem for the theory of *karma* as developed in the Indian tradition, however, is not the defence of these presuppositions which are com-mon to all theories of moral action, whether acknowledged or unacknow-ledged, but the defence of that which is specific to it, namely, that the conse-quences of moral action can in no case accrue to anyone else except the one who did the action. It is surprising, therefore, that in his discussion of *karma,* Gerow nowhere even mentions this crucial aspect of the issue, specially in the context of the specific Indian discussion of the subject. And not only Gerow but also Bhiḍe whose discussion of the subject he has summarized in his paper so ably, and so well. In fact, the latter on the very first page of his book, *The Karma Theory,* mentions the feeding of Brāhmaṇas at Gayā or Prayāga for the sake of one's ancestors as an example of the widespread belief in the doctrine of *karma* in India today, without noticing that the example he has given contradicts *prima facie* the doctrine as, according to it, nothing that I may do or not do can possibly affect anyone else, including my ancestors.[25]

The hard core problem of the Indian doctrine of *karma,* thus, has hardly been touched on either by Gerow or Bhiḍe, though both of them have many interesting things to say about it in their respective articles. The paradox that 'moral monadism' which is a necessary consequence of the 'moral intelligibi-lity' of the universe construed in a particular way makes morality in the usual sense impossible has hardly been seen by anybody who has written on the

subject. The issue is not between *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* or between maximal and minimal transaction or between the householder and the renouncer as many who have written on the subject contend. Rather, the issue relates to the notion of 'moral intelligibility' itself. Is it or is it not a necessary condition of 'moral intelligibility' that no one should suffer consequences of anyone else's action? The Sanskrit terms for these necessary conditions which any viable theory of *karma* has to fulfil, if it is to make moral sense of the universe, are कृत प्रणाश अकृताभ्यागम् which may be roughly translated as non-perishability of what has been done and non-receivability of what has not been done. But if these conditions are fulfilled, then moral action in the sense of action which is essentially concerned with the good of others rather than of oneself be-comes, in an important sense, impossible. The only way out, as we have al-ready suggested, is to interpret moral action as being essentially concerned with others but only in respect of the *natural* consequences that my action may possibly have on them and not with respect to the consequences which may accrue only to myself, according to the theory. But, in that case, the distinction between the natural and the moral consequences would have to be clearly demarcated in order to reconcile the two contradictory demands being made on the theory.

The idea of *yajña*, as elaborated and expanded since Vedic times, empha-sizes interdependence at both human and cosmic levels; and also lays stress on the fact that only by cultivating a spirit of mutual giving and sacrifice that one may attain prosperity both here and hereafter, and maintain the worldly and the cosmic orders.  But the idea of *karma*, in this context as well as the one elaborated in the context of socio-political thought in India, does not imply that one's actions, good or bad, cannot affect or rather ought not to affect another. (As Bhiḍe says expressly quoting the Vedic text : इत्यन्न चैकस्य कर्मशा: फलमन्यस्मिन सँक्रामायितुं ? शक्यमिति स्पष्टं लक्ष्यते । [26].) But if this is so, then it con-flicts with what is usually understood by the theory of *karma* in the Indian context. That this conflict has been not focally articulated or attempted to be solved in the classical thought on the subject is a fact that can hardly be denied. What is more surprising, however, is the fact that even contem-porary writers on the subject have scarcely shown any awareness of it. The issue is not of an interactionist versus non-interactionist model supposedly typified by Marriott and Potter respectively as the editor of the volume, *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions,*[27] would have us believe. Rather, the issue is how to meet the twin demands of moral intelligibility involving notions of justice, responsibility and accountability to oneself, on the one hand, and the real exposedness to and a genuine concern for others which is almost the *sine qua non* of the moral consciousness, on the other. The possible reconciliation of these two contradictory demands can, as noted earlier, be perhaps achieved through a distinction between natural causality and moral casuality which, in any case, is implied by the notion of voluntary action itself, though in that context it may have to be phrased differently.

But as man himself seems to belong to two worlds, the world of nature and the world of free action where *saṁkalpa, icchā, prayatna* seem to make a distinctive difference to the world, there should be little difficulty in recognizing the two types of causality.[28]

These two types, in a sense, are recognized in all cultures as they articulate the human condition itself. The distinctiveness of the Indian thought on the subject lies not only in construing the notion of 'moral intelligibility' in a particular way but also in seeing that 'moral causality' is still causality and hence binds man, though in a different way. The theory of *mokṣa* is, therefore, elaborated to get rid of this bondage. But it introduces a different dimension to the reflection on *karma* in the Indian tradition. *Yajña, karma* and *mokṣa* provide the three major themes around which Indian thinking about human life seems to revolve. They pull it in opposite directions as there is not only a tension but inherent conflict between them. The theory of *yajña*, the theory of *karma* and the theory of *mokṣa* are elaborate constructions—each multiple in nature—built around these focal concerns of Indian thought. One of the tasks before those who are interested in Indian thought and culture today is to articulate their adequacy and completeness in understanding human life in all the aspects to see if they are possibly reconcileable and, if so, in what way. Beyond these tasks, we have to extend and modify them in such a way as to incorporate into them our own insights relating to the human situation born of our knowledge of diverse cultures and civilizations. The theories, it should be remembered, claim a universality relevant to all human beings anywhere, anytime. We should not become prisoners of the Indologists' attitude which, by definition, restricts them to the Indian world-view only.

## NOTES

1. Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty (ed.), *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions* (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1983). It is not that there is no discussion of the Vedas in the book, but it shows no awareness of the basic issue raised in this paper.
2. *Śrimad Bhagvad Gītā*, 3.10.
3. Ganganatha Jha, *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā in Its Sources,* Varanasi, Benaras Hindu University, 1964, p. 281.
4. *Ibid.,* p. 281.
5. Frits Staal in collaboration with C.V. Somayajipad and M. Itti Ravi Nambudri, *Agni: The Vedic Ritual of the Fire Altar,* Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1984, pp. 4-5.
6. *Ibid.,* p. 5.
    Surprisingly, Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty quotes Staal without giving any inkling to the reader that there is another side to the story and that, according to Staal himself, there is a contradiction in the situation. There could not be a more misleading quotation, and, to cap it all, she does not even give the page number from which the quotation is exactly taken. See Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty (ed.), *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions,* p. 12.
7. See *Gītā*, 2.42-44.
8. Staal, p. 5.
9. There is a more serious contradiction pointed out by Staal later. But, as it does not concern the issue of *yajña* being essentially a *sakāma karma,* we will not discuss it here.

10. Ganganatha Jha, *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā in Its Sources,* p. 630. The Sanskrit original in the *Śabara-Bhāṣya* reads: *Yataḥ svayaṁ prayunjanasya phalam bhavati,* p. 432.
11. *Ibid.,* p. 683.
12. *Ibid.,* p. 685.
13. *Ibid.,* p. 685.
14. A more detailed explication and elaboration of the *ātman-centric* perspective is attempted in the author's *Social Philosophy: Past and Future* (Simla, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1969).
15. The Confucian tradition of Chinese thought also seems to treat man as essentially a socio-political being without however giving rise to the type of socio-centrism which has been such a conspicuous feature of Western thought. Perhaps, the difference might lie in Confucius' acceptance of heaven and his conceiving of man's relationship to it in terms of harmony. In any case, the reasons for the difference in the case of China need to be explored further by competent scholars in the field.
16. Ilya Prigogine and Isabella Strengers, *Order Out of Chaos,* London, 1985, p. 72 (italics mine).
17. There is a fashionable argument derived from Wittgenstein which seeks to prove the impossibility of any such thing in principle, as all language is essentially 'public' in character. The protagonists of the argument forget not only that the 'private-public' dichotomy is in-built in the language but also that there are theories of language which emphasize its unmanifest and transcendent aspects also.
18. *Indologica Taurinesia* (Official Organ of the International Association of Sanskrit Studies), vol. x, 1982, Edizioni Jollygrephica, Torino (Italy).
19. Edwin Gerow, p. 99. Italics author's.
20. *Ibid.,* p. 95.
21. *Ibid.,* pp. 112-113
22. *Yoga-sūtra,* 1.6.
23. *Ibid.,* 4.15-16.
24. The Buddhists do not believe in any agent, but still they have to postulate some sort of continuity to account for the law of *karma* which they accept as much as anyone else in the Indian tradition.
25. *The Karma Theory: Its Origin, Nature, Proof and Implications,* (Mysore, The University of Mysore, 1950). Prof. Edwin Gerow is to be thanked for bringing this important but little-known Sanskrit work to the attention of the scholarly world.
26. Bhiḍe, p. 30.
27. Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty (ed.), *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions.* Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1983.
28. It may be noted that this proposed reconciliation is different from the one suggested by Larson in his article 'Karma as a "Sociology of Knowledge" or "Social Psychology of Process" 'Praxis" by postulating the distinction between '*liṅga*' and '*bhāva*' in the Sāṅkhya context. As *liṅga* itself is the result of past *bhāva,* the basic moral issue is not even faced in the way the problem is formulated. The whole discussion is vitiated by the acceptance of Marriott's formulation that transactionality/non-transactionality is the heart of the theory of *karma.* Mariott sees the whole thing in terms of caste interactions as if interactions within caste or within family were no interactions at all. And what about the interactions between the king and the people or the one between the states? Also, the concept of 'interaction' has been too much restricted to food and other such things as if other transactions between people were not existent. The theory of *karma* is far wider than the restricted terms in which Mariott and others, following him, have framed. it. For Larson's subtle, though tangential, discussion, see Wendy O'Flaherty (ed.), *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions,* pp. 311-16.

# Philosophical and normative dimensions and aspects of the idea of renaissance

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Seldom can one recognize a renaissance while in the midst of it. Usually, it is several generations after the process has matured that we can point to certain historical phenomena and say: there was a renaissance at that time.

But the word itself, in this sense of a historical process of revival of arts and literature, comes from the mid-nineteenth century.[1] Johan Huizinga (1872-1945), the great exponent of European cultural history, popularized the term in his *Men and Ideas*.[2] Toynbee used the Greek equivalent of renaissance, *palingenesia*.

As a technical term, renaissance at first meant only that transitional period in Europe between medieval Christendom and the modern period, transition from late medieval to early modern. The process began in northern and central Italy in the fifteenth century and spread to the whole of Europe. It began as a revival of European arts and letters. The dead classical Greek civilization, philosophy and arts came back to life. Plato and Aristotle, largely forgotten by Europeans, had come back earlier into European culture through Latin translations from the Arabic by Muslim scholar-scientists like Avicenna (Ibn-Sina, 980-1037) and Averroes (Ibn-Rushd, 1126-98) of Cordova. But medieval Christendom had transmongrelized Plato and Aristotle by co-opting them into a Christian theology which wove dogmatic truth out of purely mental secretions.

## THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE

The universities played a major role in the revival of classical learning. Paris and Oxford were the two most flourishing universities of the time. The Council of Constance (1414-18) set the stage for the university professors to show off. For the first time, a Catholic Church Council decided to invite non-bishops as experts (*peritus, periti*). The ostensible purpose of the council was to unite Latins and Greeks who had separated from each other in the period after 1054, and to end the quarrel between the three rival Roman Popes—John XXIII, Gregory XII, and Benedict XIII. Jean le Charlier de Gerson (1363-1429), the Rector of the University of Paris, played a major role in settling disputed questions by clear reasoning and logical marshalling of facts. At the Council of Florence (1438-45), the learned Greek Emperor John Paleologus and the scholarly Greek bishops made a big impression on the Latins.

Both in church and among the intellectuals, particularly in the universities

of Italy, the study of Greek language and classics brought many changes. The corruption, intrigue, division, and power struggles of the papacy made people look elsewhere for guidance and illumination. Constantinople fell in 1453 to the Turks. The renaissance, which was already well under way in Italy, attracted many of the Greek manuscripts and art treasures, which were being taken out by refugees from Byzantium. The Italian city states enjoyed comparative peace and gave refuge to the fleeing scholars, manuscripts and art treasures. Pico della Mirandola (1463-94), who had studied in Bologna and other Italian city universities, and knew not only his Greek but also Hebrew, Aramaic and Arabic, brought out Platonic ideas in an Italian mould. The Italian cities and their universities played the central role in creating that unusually nebulous phenomenon called the renaissance, which is at once a historical process and an attitude towards life, each interacting with the other, generated by the break from papal authority, from the authority of church and dogma, by the new attitudes towards property created by the Franciscans and by John Wycliffe and Jan Huss, the shift from other-worldliness to this world; the search for fame rather than immortality induced by the classics; the move from speculation and tradition to empirical investigation; the emphasis on self-cultivation rather than self-effacement; the affirmation of the body and its needs over the restraining standards of an ascetical spirituality; the striving for success and wealth rather than justice or concern for the poor; the stress on individual freedom and human autonomy; the exaltation of human needs and aspirations as the final norm.

The Italian Renaissance, followed by the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century, soon spread to all parts of Europe. Our purpose in this paper is to isolate or identify certain common or normative features of a renaissance, which we can do only by briefly looking at other similar historical processes.

## OTHER RENAISSANCES

Arnold Toynbee refers to two other renaissances in Europe itself—the Carolingian Renaissance of the eighth and ninth centuries, and the Italian Renaissance or Resurgence (*Resorgimento*) of the nineteenth century. One could speak also of an Islamic Renaissance in the Abbasid Caliphate of Baghdad (1257-1517) as well as of the Indian Renaissance of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In China one could speak of the Confucian Renaissance (T'ang Dynasty in A.D. 622), or Yung Lo's Chinese Renaissance in the fifteenth century (Ming dynasty).

When we look at all these renaissances, one sees the difficulty of formulating a definition of renaissance. We can only say that it is a historical process where an ancient culture is revived in such a way as to provide a great creative impulse to the inheritors of the culture.

We shall now proceed to specify certain features that seem common to these renaissances.

## THE REGENERATION OF CULTURE: ARTS, LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

It seems obvious that behind the revival of any society, which becomes aware of its past in such a way as to make it culturally creative, there is a renewal of an ancient culture, the revival of a language and a form of art.

In the case of the Italian Renaissance, clearly art and literature were the first areas to feel the impact of the rising tide of creativity. There was a certain gradual abandoning of accepted standards in art and architecture. The Gothic style of architecture gave place to the neo-classical. The ethereal and otherworldly medieval painting was replaced by a more realistic, more man-affirming, more succulent style of renaissance painting.

Art is a more revealing activity of man's inner aspirations and perceptions than philosophy or economic theory. In the middle ages of Europe, the fine arts were preponderantly used to decorate places of worship. Painting, architecture, sculpture and music show how a society perceives reality, and that perception is the source of their real value. Changes in thought and literature go hand in hand with these, but appear clearly only after the arts have changed.

The Mediterranean Romanesque and the medieval Gothic styles of architecture are both indicative of human attitudes. The Romanesque is solid and square, reflecting the immobility and traditionality of the society. The Gothic is magnificent, dynamic, angular and thrusting towards heaven with a powerful tower and roof. Europe's aspiration to be great, its asceticism as a source of spiritual power which helps it to ascend up to heaven, and that powerful ambition to climb up to the top position which goes with it, are reflected in the Gothic architecture.

The transition from Romanesque to Gothic in Europe was a precursor of the Italian Renaissance. The round arch was replaced by the pointed one. The solid masonry of the Romanesque gave place to a soaring, dynamic thrusting cage of structure and the presence of large quantities of ribbed glass. Solidity and symmetry, characteristic of a more static society now gave place to grace, height and thrust, of lightness and exultation rather than a sombre pensive piety. Intellect was now inspiring stone, thrusting it upward. It was parallel to the developments in philosophy and theology, where logical thought was thrusting upward to catch the secrets of heaven. For the Abbot Suger, the father of Gothic architecture, the glory of light and colour, the gleam of gold and stone and glass, the jewels on the walls and the windows expressed what he verbally set forth on the doors of the Abbey Church of St. Denys:

The resplendent work is bright, but may this shining work enlighten our

minds, so that they may pass through true lights to the True Light where Christ is the true door...the weak mind rises to truth by means of material things.[3]

The Gothic architecture, which was itself an expression of a rising tide of people's aspiration for spiritual realities as well as for greatness and glory, became then the means of reinforcing and promoting those aspirations. The cathedral constituted a kind of sermon in stone, a bible for the illiterate, solid lessons in theology.

This seems to be the necessary characteristic of a renaissance as it builds up new forms of art, music and architecture, which both express people's aspirations, and also inspire those aspirations to go higher. It seems to be a pre-condition for a renaissance—this development of powerful new forms of art, architecture and music, arising from the people and inspiring them in turn.

The picture we have traced in architecture can be found also in painting and music in the Europe of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In fact, the very best in European classical painting comes from this period—Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519), the master of the High Renaissance, Michael-angelo (1475-1564), and Raffael (1483-1520).

## THE PAST-FUTURE DIALECTIC

A second common feature of all renaissances is the dialectic between looking back with pride to a glorious past and a looking forward with bright hope to an equally glorious future. In Italy, the fifteenth-century renaissance and the *risorgimento* of the nineteenth century were both attempts to revive the golden age of the ancient Roman Empire in a contemporary context.

Toynbee says that an excluisve preoccupation with a glorious past is counter-productive. Equally non-productive is the futurism today so rampant in the West, which has no interest in the past except as a base for extrapolation. Neither archaism nor futurism would do:

Our enquiries into the nature of futurism and archaism have led us to the conclusion that both fail because they seek to escape from the present without rising above the mundane time-stream.[4]

The looking back with pride is today present in such nations as Italy, Greece, Turkey and Iran—looking back to the glorious Roman, Byzantine, Turkish and Persian empires. But a mere intensification of the studies of the past will not induce a renaissance. Modern European civilization is a product of the renaissance of the fifteenth century, which did involve the revival of classical studies in Greek and Roman literature, art, music and architecture, but there was certainly more than academic or popular studies involved in the process of a renaissance.

It was the opening out of the trade routes, the improvements in navigation and warfare techniques, and the formation of the Italian city states free from the control of the church, which along with other factors, gave the people a bright hope and the energy to start all over again to build a brave new world.

The importance of the past should, however, not be minimized. While it is ineffective by itself, its motive power in combination with other future-oriented factors is enormous. Only when the social and economic conditions for creating a flourishing society are present, the revival of art and the studies of the past can stimulate a society to begin a genuine renaissance. If the Indian Renaissance of the nineteenth century failed, the reason was that we were at that time imperially enslaved, and the social-economic conditions for building a new society were not present.

## THE LITERARY INPUT AND OUTPUT

In a survey of eight different renaissances, Toynbee comes to the conclusion that a common element in all of them was the revival of an ancient language and the creation of great libraries.

The Assyrian universal state of Ashurbanipal (seventh century B.C.) was greatly helped by two giant libraries of clay tablets of Sumerian and Akkadian classical literature. Ashurbanipal (Asura-vani-pala) was himself a great scholar-emperor, who attracted scholars and literary persons around himself. This community and the two libraries had a major role in the short-lived Assyrian Renaissance. Unfortunately for us, however, both the renaissance and the two libraries came to a bitter end with the sack of the Nineveh in 612 B.C.

The Byzantine Renaissance of the tenth century A.D. was made possible by a literary revival, a collection and study of ancient classical Greek literature. Again, Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus who ruled from A.D. 912 to A.D. 959, was himself a great scholar who promoted a literary renaissance and wrote a scholarly treatise on how to run an empire.

Yung Lo (fifteenth century A.D.), the Second Emperor of the Ming Dynasty in China, assembled a library of 22,877 books, which again was a major factor in the Ming Renaissance in China.

Even in the fifteenth century Italian Renaissance of Europe, the work of the popes in assembling libraries and organizing scholars played a major role, though Pope Nicholas' (1447-1455) library had only 9,000 volumes. The Carolingian Renaissance was certainly inspired by the revival of learning, inspired by Theodore of Tarsus (*ca.* 602-690, Archbishop of Canterbury), the Venerable Bede (673-735), and Alcuin of York (735-804). The smothering of learning by the Barbarians from the North practically extinguished the lamp lit by Charlemagne.

From our Indian viewpoint, it is useful for us to consider what happened in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when the foundations of modern

India were being laid. The debate in the British Parliament gives an admirable survey of the two options before the colonial masters.

One option is typified by William Carey, the British cobbler turned scholar-missionary.[7] His belief, which he implemented with relentless effort and unparalleled skill, was that India could be revived only by making our Sanskrit classics available to the Indian people in their own modern tongues. The College of Fort William was established in 1800 for promoting such learning. Its curriculum of study then included Arabic, Persian and Sanskrit, in addition to English; it also included Bengali, Marathi, Hindusthani, Telugu, Tamil and Kanarese; and the Greek, Latin and English classics, as well as modern languages of Europe. Dr. Gilchrist was Professor of Hindusthani; Lieut. J. Baillie taught Arabic; Mr. H.B. Edmonstone was Professor of Persian. William Carey was the teacher of Bengali and Sanskrit. On the side, Carey collected butterflies and other biological specimens of Indian flora and fauna, and translated not only the Christian Bible but also the Hindu epics and the *Gītā* into Indian languages. Carey spoke idiomatic Sanskrit fluently. He edited and published the *Ramayana of Valmeeki, in the original Sanskrit, with a prose translation and explanatory notes* in 1806-10 which opened the Hindu epics and other literature to the Western world leading to literary and philosophical revivals in nineteenth-century Europe. His monumental work, *A Universal Dictionary of the Oriental Languages, derived from the Sanskrit, of which that Language is to be the Groundwork*, appeared in 1811. He edited the Sanskrit texts of *Hitopadeśa, Daśakumāracarita*, and Bhartrihari's works. He also translated the Bible into Bengali, Oriya, Maghadi, Assamese, Khasi and Manipoori. His Sanskrit translation of the Bible appeared in 1811-18, as did the Hindusthani version. He also produced translations in Marathi, Punjabi, and in all the Rajasthani dialects (Udayapuri, Jaipuri, Ujjaini, Bikaneri, and so on). He initiated the first non-English newspaper, the Bengali language *Samachar Darpan* (1818). Carey played a significant role in the crusade against *sati* which was started by Raja Rammohun Roy. He was seriously involved in the movement against the abandoning of female babies to drown in the sea at Sagar and also against the institution of slavery. He was the founder of the Agricultural and Horticultural Society of India. He introduced printing and paper manufacture in India.

To summarize William Carey's option then, we could list his desire to

(a) Promote learning in general, particularly in languages and sciences;
(b) Provide access to Indian classical literature and arts;
(c) Make possible the knowledge of non-Indian civilizations and cultures also; and
(d) Help Indians know their own religious heritage as well as other religions.

Opposed to this was another British view—that of Alexander Duff—which,

according to the present writer, still prevails in Indian higher education and stands in the way of a genuine Indian Renaissance. Alexander Duff was also a British (Scottish) missionary and, in fact, the successor of Carey. He came to India in 1830, then twenty-four years of age. His tireless work laid the foundations of our national educational system—the British Indian Education Charter of 1853 and the 1854 Educational Despatch of Lord Halifax. Duff came to the view, shared by many Western-educated Indians, that our national heritage was an obstacle to our progress in modern science and technology. He conceived Western liberal education as a 'mine' that would 'undermine' the resistance of India's 'superstitious' culture. The debate in the British Parliament concerned with which of these two options should prevail in British policy in India. The 1835 decision to develop higher education through English was recognized in public as the advice of Thomas Babington Macaulay, but that advice came originally from Alexander Duff. Sardar Panikar says:

> Macaulay believed that, once the Indian people became familiar with Western knowledge, Hindu Society would dissolve itself...In the modernization of India, this system of education played a decisive part. But what it failed to achieve was either the undermining of the Hindu religion or the dissolution of Hindu society.[8]

Even now we are tardy in realizing, says Panikkar, how deeply our nation has been deformed and distorted by this system of education about which we sometimes foolishly think that it was a failure. The educational system has not merely destroyed much of the creativity of the nation; it has created an elite which is so deeply enslaved by a particular way of thinking that it cannot even recognize its own bondage. We still think that a scientific secular temper will save us. We still think of Western norms as standard. And, even in looking for a renaissance, we look for light from the West.

There is no doubt that in India today we have a literary output that is quite large and fairly high in quality. But this literature in Indian languages lacks the vitality of the nineteenth-century Bengali novelists who introduced the literary form of the novel into India, or of the Bengali poets like Tagore. Our literature largely lacks a perception of our own identity as Indians, and does not encompass our varied past in such a way as to give us inspiration and hope.

The literary output that leads to a renaissance should:

(a) Give us an understanding of our past which inspires us to find a new identity for our people through creative efforts;
(b) Give us a vision of the basic goals worth pursuing in life in literary forms that communicate at a deeper level than the discursive; and
(c) Create such a national unity, at the level both of the leading classes

and of the languishing masses, as would lead to resurgence of economic, social, and cultural creativity.

This capacity depends on the input that is behind a literary output; what we have is predominantly British-American thought and a little Marxist thought. We need a greater openness in the matter of literary input to other contemporary cultures—Spanish, Arabic and Chinese, to cite some examples; and we need also a more powerful and creative input from our own classical past.

## THE EXTERNAL STIMULUS

Every renaissance has been spurred it seems, by an external stimulus, usually the experience of being overrun by alien peoples or at least the fear of the enemy at the doors, followed by national victory. Toynbee is, of course, very eloquent on this point. The 'contact between civilisations in space' can have either disastrous consequences for one or both, or can prove stimulating to either. In his survey of encounters between mutually contemporary civilizations, Toynbee devotes major space to the contacts of the modern West with Russia, Orthodox Christendom, the Hindu world, the Islamic world, the Jews, the Far-eastern and Native American cultures; and he finds certain common features in all these encounters.

(1) The contacts are mainly 'middle class', and the Western middle class is the bearer of so-called 'modernity' to the middle class of other cultures, who become 'an artificial substitute for a home-grown middle class—a manufactured intelligentsia.'[9] The difference between the homegrown European middle class and its manufactured artificial substitutes in non-Western societies is that the home-grown variety is at home in its own culture, whereas the manufactured varieties are not. The latter are exotic—'products and symptoms, not of natural growth, but of their own societies' discomfiture in collisions with an alien Modern West. They were symbols, not of strength but of weakness.' Therefore, these non-Western imitation middle classes have a love-hate (*odi et amo*), relationship to the original, which was itself a symptom, 'the measure of foreboding of its inability to emulate Western middle class achievement'. Toynbee cites as an example our own 'Sikh Khalsa that had been called into being by a decision to fight the Mughal ascendancy with its own weapons'.

(2) It is usually after the overrunning of one civilization has ebbed and flowed or advanced and receded, that the major influences on each other begin to take place. But the first reaction is to take on some of the more aggressive characteristics of the aggressor in order to repel him, as happened to our Sikhs and Maharattas in reaction to the Mughal invasions. This can take the form of military aggressiveness, or alternatively, spiritual, intellectual and ideological aggression, and more often a combination of the two. But the best learning from each other takes place after the initial aggression and counter-aggression have somewhat abated.

(3) There is also the possibility of a pacific and isolationist response to aggression. This was the early Chinese and Japanese response to the Western aggression of the Portugese. Tibetans and Burmese have tried the same with much more persistence. Success in such pacific-isolationist resistance is rare, and even in these rare instances, rather pathetic in their very success.

(4) It is also fascinating to observe that sometimes the aggression may defeat itself by its own internecine conflicts. The Portugese, the French, the Dutch and the British fought each other in their bid to dominate India, and each suffered from this conflict. Even today there is not only the conflict between America and Western Europe on the one hand, but even more important, between Western Marxism and Western liberalism on the other. The victims of aggression often seek to cash in on these internal squabbles of the aggressor.

With all these nuances, it is correct to say that the second (second only to a cultural-literary revival) most important requirement for a renaissance is a creative encounter with an alien culture, civilization and values. The victim culture may reject many elements of the aggressor culture. Gandhi himself rejected the acquisitiveness, the aggressiveness, the love of affluence and comfort, and the gratificationist approach to life and life-fulfilment, which elements are central to Western culture. But neither were the Indian people willing to follow Gandhi, nor could Gandhi prevent the massive overrunning of our culture by Western culture. In fact, was not Gandhi himself a product more of the encounter of cultures than of the Indian culture by itself? What about Raja Rammohun Roy or Bankimchandra Chattopadhyaya?

At this stage, we need only to affirm the need for an external stimulus in the renaissance of any culture. Detailed study can help us isolate certain necessary features for a creative encounter of cultures, but this paper cannot attempt such analysis. We have had the stimulus of Western liberal culture for at least four generations and of Marxist culture for two. We have fought little against these cultures; we have too readily absorbed many of their unexamined assumptions. Perhaps a new encounter at greater depth with these two cultures may spark off some creativity.

## THE CHALLENGE TO THE SPIRIT

Great changes in society are seldom the consequence of exclusively political and economic factors, though these invariably play a major role. We need accept neither the monistically Marxist interpretations which try to attribute everything to the political economic structure, nor need we like some Western thinkers (e.g. Christopher Dawson), assert the primacy of the spiritual over the political-economic.[10] The two are inseparable.

For a proper understanding of the fifteenth-century European Renaissance and its spiritual roots, a brief survey of Western political-economic antecedents is made. European civilization understands itself as Graeco-

Roman in its foundations while Germans, Celts, Franks, etc. are suffered to add mainly only to the superstructure. The Roman Empire particularly, especially as it took over from the crumbling ruins of Alexander's Greek Empire, is regarded by many as the heart of European civilization. The Roman Empire grew from a little peasant state in Central Italy to a wide domain uniting all the west—west of Persia and India. But the characteristic of this empire was organization, law and engineering, not any great philosophy or spiritual vision. Romans lacked the philosophical genius of the Greeks, but compensated for it by harsh military discipline and efficient, almost ruthless, political planning. It was this road-building, wall-erecting Roman culture that spread from Libya in North Africa to Northumbria in Britain.

If there was anything spiritual in the Roman Empire, it came from the Greeks (mainly through Neoplatonism and Stoicism) and from the Semitic-Greek Christian Church. Gradually, the Roman Catholic Church became the bearer of this spiritual element in the Roman Empire, giving it both cohesion and spiritual vigour. The new peoples of what is today Western Europe got their tutoring in Hellenic philosophy and Semitic Christianity through the Latin medium of the Roman Church. The organizing centre of these new northern peoples was the Frankish Kingdom (the greater part of present France, Belgium, Western and Central Germany), which saw itself as a revival of the Roman Empire.

The Carolingian Renaissance was the product of a dynamic alliance between the Frank Reich and the Roman Church. The coronation of Charlemagne, the Frank Emperor, on 25 December, A.D. 300, symbolized this alliance, and is at the heart, consciously or otherwise, of European identity.

The basic Carolingian idea was that of a Universal Christian Empire, a society of Christian people, guided by a spiritual authority (the Roman Catholic Church) which was also universal and transcended nations and kingdoms. This was the basic idea also behind the later European Renaissance in the fifteenth century. Dante (1265-1321), the greatest of medieval European poets, was inspired by this idea, which originally had to do with Augustine's Kingdom of God. Dante's basic idea is in the Latin work *de Monarchia*, written around 1313, which deals with a universal monarchy and a universal pope assuring the temporal and spiritual welfare of all peoples in this world and in the next. Unfortunately for Europe, though she got pretty close to success in the idea of a universal pope, the idea of a universal monarchy, born in Carolingian times, still remains a dream. Today theocratic internationalism has given place to its two secular alternatives—an international society with liberalism as its creed or one with Marxism as the spiritual-ideological cement.

It is an important point to debate. Does a renaissance require a religious universalism or can it spring even from a secular commitment? Our own nineteenth-century Indian Renaissance created various types of religious

universalism. The Brahmo Samaj, a product of the Indian Renaissance, advocated Upaniṣadic universalism.

For Toynbee, there are only four roads open to a civilization which finds the main road of comfortable and easy progress blocked by social catastrophe or military defeat—archaism, futurism, detachment and transfiguration. Of these, the first three he regards as *culs de sac*: only transfiguration through rebirth can lead 'right onward'. Both transfiguration and detachment are examples of the transference of the field of action from the external macrocosm to the internal world. The difference between detachment and transfiguration is that the former is a withdrawal without real return, whereas the latter implies withdrawal *for* return. Neither detachment nor transfiguration, however, lead immediately to the creation of a new civilization, for it is civilization as the City of Destruction from which one withdraws into the forest or desert.

Toynbee is convinced that

> Nirvana is not the terminus of the Soul's journey; it is merely a station on its route. The terminus is the kingdom of God; and this omnipresent kingdom calls for service from its citizens on Earth here and now.[11]

Or, to speak in Chinese philosophical language, a civilization has to go through the *Yang* phase of destruction; which then leads to the *Yin* phase of detachment. It then could lead again to a creative *Yang* phase of transfiguration and renewal.

It is this creative *Yang* phase which Toynbee calls the true renaissance—in Greek *palingenesia* or being born again.

> If *palingenesia* does not mean the attainment of Nirvana either, it can only mean the attainment of another supra-mundane state to which the image of birth can be illuminatingly applied because this other state is a positive state of life—though one in a higher spiritual dimension than the life of This World.[12]

The spiritual element for a renaissance cannot then, according to Toynbee, be simply renunciation of the world or detachment from it. It should have a dialectic of withdrawal and return. But Toynbee is perhaps unfair in depicting *nirvāṇa*, *brahmajñana* or *brahmasiddhi* as pure detachment and withdrawal. It is true that these concepts have often been so interpreted by Indian teachers themselves.

*Nirvāṇa* is not an exclusively Buddhist term. The *Gītā* speaks often of *brahma-nirvāṇa* or *nirvāṇa* from the *kṣhara* in order to find fulfilment in the Brahman. Almost all modern interpretations of Mahāyāna and the Advaita insist that withdrawal from the world is for the purpose of eventual return to it with a different consciousness, with a non-attached relation to people

and things. *Nirvāṇa* refers only to the attainment of that kind of consciousness with attitudes and relations which go with such a consciousness.

There is little doubt, as Prof. S.L. Malhotra has clearly shown in his book, *Social and Political Orientations of Neo-Vedantism*,[13] that at least neo-Vedantism, if not its classical variety, is absolutely committed to the service of others in this world. He feels, however, that this commitment, when rooted in an idealist view about the perfect man, does not lead to a practical programme of action for transforming the socio-economic structure.

The same is true of Buddhism at its best. Buddhists, too, would insist that the Bodhisattva has to come back to the world to lead all into Buddhahood.[14]

As Prof. T.M.P. Mahadevan said in his welcome address to the All-India Seminar on Indian Philosophy and Social Concern (Madras, 1966): 'The charge that there is no place for social concern in Indian philosophy has been answered as often as it has been made.'...

The concept of *mokṣa* or *mukti* is the 'primary concern of all the schools of Indian philosophy, orthodox, theistic and non-theistic, with the exception of Cārvakā materialism.'

*Mokṣa* is release from saṁsāra, from the time-process and from embodiment, but once released the *mukta* has no ego and no selfishness. Freedom consists in overcoming the distinction between 'mine' and 'not mine'. The *varṇāśrama dharma* aims at gradual liberating of the individual from his selfishness and attachments. The virtues that one cultivates in moving through the various estates or *aśramas*, like *ahiṁsā*, are active virtues.

Prof. Mahadevan's arguments, including his reference to Śaṅkara's concept of *lokasaṅgraha* (world maintenance) in the *Gītābhāṣya* (3. 20), supported by Prof. S.K. Sen and others in the Indian philosophical Annual for 1966,[16] are convincing to a point. Śaṅkara defines *lokasaṅgraha* as remedying the deviations of the masses (*lokasya unmārgapravṛtti nirvāṇam*), and for Buddhism, too, the task of the Bodhisattva is to take straying people back to the way. But neither of these lines gives much of a basis or orientation for political-economic structures and values. *Dharma* certainly is not the sphere of political ethics or social morality; it relates to *mukti* or *mokṣa*, and not to *artha* or *kāma*. *Dharma* does relate to the duties of a monarch, but has to be seriously strained if it has to be applied to the political-economic structures of a democratic society. In the *Rāmāyaṇa* one finds the values of husband-wife, paternal-filial and other personal relationships depicted and illustrated. In the *Gītā* the ideal of action without attachment (*niṣkāmakarma*) is gloriously described and exemplified. Even *Manusmṛti* tells us about *aparigraha, indriya nirodham* and *rāgadveṣakshayam*. *Saṁyama* and *satya* are also social values. But are they not personal values, *puruṣārthas*, which cannot provide sufficient basis for a political economy?

I am not suggesting, as Toynbee does, that the Christian notion of the Kingdom of God provides a better basis for modern democratic societies

than that provided by traditional Indian philosophies. I am simply raising a point about which Sri Aurobindo seems to have been somewhat conscious, when he says in his *Essays on the Gītā*:

> Thus Nirvana is clearly compatible with world-consciousness and with action in the world...Action in the world is not inconsistent with living in Brahman; it is rather its inevitable condition and outward result...[17]

The end result of all the arguments is:

(a) *The ātman* who realizes the oneness with the Brahman can no longer be interested only in oneself, for the realisation of one's own oneness with the Brahman includes the realization that all is one, that all is Brahman, and that oneself is one with all;

(b) While this realization liberates one from the false consciousness of one's own separate existence, it does not cut one off from other people and from concern for their realization of the same truth.

The key question today in India is: is this a sufficient framework to provide the impetus for a real renaissance in India today? My own conviction is that it is insufficient on the following grounds:

(a) The Advaita-Vedantic view, especially in its neo-Śaṅkarite version, is today shared only by a small minority, mainly Brāhmaṇas, in India; it is an elitist philosophy;

(b) This view, while it has something important to say to all humanity, does not commend itself to non-Hindus (as well as to a large majority of Hindus), and cannot unite the nation for a creative effort;

(c) This view does not provide the basis for artistic creativity or proffer new orientations for a political economy;

(d) This view has not come to grips with the myriad questions that face our society today in the social-economic, political and cultural realms resulting from the impact of Western civilization and the urban-technological culture.

The present writer would recognize the necessity of religious-spiritual elements which will provide the condition for renaissance in India or elsewhere. Sometimes the religious-spiritual element may take the form of an ideology—even a secular ideology—which insists on calling itself materialist. Finding the right ideological spiritual spur seems a *sine qua non* for a renaissance.

In our present cultural context, appeal to only one aspect of our religious heritage (Śaṅkarite Vedanta from the eighth century A.D.) may not provide that spur. It will have to be a more comprehensive spiritual element that

comes out of our truly classical past, the time of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, the time of Buddha and Mahavīra, the time of Aśoka and Kaniṣka. The heritage I am speaking of is not monolithic or uniform; its milieu is enriched with intrusion of Greek, Persian and Central Asian ideas which have been stimulating for fresh creativity. It is pluralistic, but not permissively pluralistic in the Western liberal sense. This pluralism involves furious but learned debates. It is not placid or unfeeling; on the contrary, the debates are impassioned and spring out of life-concerns, out of the concern to find meaning and significance for life.

In the case of the European Renaissance, the spiritual ferment came from the questioning of the spiritual authority of the Church establishment, rejecting its values, its world-view and its dogmas. The spiritual spark came from a conflict of cultures—between the church culture of medieval Christendom and the humanistic culture of a revived Graeco-Romanism.

Both cultures were aristocratic. In the church culture, the feudal lords and the upper clergy dominated. In the humanist culture, the men of letters and their royal or bourgeois patrons dominated; it was the culture of the courts and the salons. In the beginning the latter was also religious, inspired by prophetic Christians like Savanarola and Erasmus. But the religious bond was at best tenuous, and by the eighteenth century, the culture of the courts and the salons in France became anti-clerical, anti-religious, secular. But it had a spiritual energy in its very anti-religious fury, for it was fighting against the dark and dehumanizing forces of religious fanaticism and superstition.

It was this secular-spiritual animus that dominated the second expansion of Western Europe into the world in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries giving rise to the colonialism/imperialism of Holland, France, and Britain. The spiritual energy of a secular humanism created the tremendous literary, musical and philosophical output of Western Europe (Goethe, Shelley, Beethoven, Mozart, Hegel, Kant, just to mention some sample names) as well as its science and technology. Except perhaps in Britain, where sectarian religious movements (Methodism, Congregationalism, Presbyterianism) absorbed and expressed some of that spiritual energy, in Europe in general the Enlightenment became a sort of powerful counter-religion. The spiritual forces, unable to find an adequate religious expression in the Catholic or the Protestant (Reformed and Lutheran) traditions which were too scholastic, authoritarian and largely anti-cultural, made up a quasi-religion as reflected in the Declaration of the Rights of Man. Its creed was trinitarian: 'I believe in man; I believe in reason, and I believe in progress.' In the place of God, man—bourgeois, male and dominant—was enthroned. The place of Christ the logos was taken by the unreasonable faith in the logic of reason; and in place of the Holy Spirit, Europe exalted the inexorable forces of progress, through enlightenment and education, through science and technology, through political 'democracy' and economic liberalism (*laissez faire* or

socialist). The Napoleonic inter-*regnum* helped only to put the finishing touch to the demolition of medieval Christendom.

The banner of a universal culture with the spiritual power of liberation behind it was then taken over, especially after the First World War, by the English-speaking peoples of America and Britain, France paying a secondary role mostly in Africa. The profits of empire fed the scientific-technological revolution. The First World War also saw the destruction of the three great military empires of Prussia, Austria and Russia. But it also saw the unresolvable conflict between three new forces—the British-American, the German National-Socialist, and the rising Soviet-Bolshevik powers, which led to the total disruption of European unity. The eruption of the conflict did not destroy the spiritual energy of Europe; it went into an expanding Socialism and a neo-colonialist liberal capitalism.

The end of the spiritual energy is symbolized in the current questioning and erosion of the three articles of the liberal creed—belief in man, belief in reason and belief in progress.

We in India have to ask the question: are we trying to harness our spiritual energies to these three ideas of Western liberalism in order to produce an Indian Renaissance? Our first modern Indian Renaissance in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not put its faith in that creed; it was aborted because India was not free to pursue it. Our second modern renaissance, initiated by Gandhi and led by Nehru, came to adopt this liberal creed, especially after the death of Gandhi. I myself am convinced that our second renaissance is already aborted, and does not have in it the energy to activate our flagging national spirit. We can talk about a scientific temper or a humanistic temper, but both remain equally alien to the deepest levels of our Indian consciousness.

We have not yet found our way to that deepest level in order to stir up our national creativity. Several conditions are necessary for triggering an Indian Renaissance that can be sustained for a few generations. The most difficult of all, it seems to me, is to touch the source-springs of the spiritual creativity of our people.

### THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS

Toynbee speaks of the need for a saviour, a guru of some kind, who catalyzes the renaissance. Not a totally lonely soul, but a guru, with or without a sword, but definitely with a creative minority unquestioningly committed to him.

Now in our Indian situation such gurus are certainly not rare commodities. In fact, there are few countries which have such a liberal supply of guru-with-followers as ours has.

Toynbee thinks that it has necessarily to be a saviour with a sword, who knows also when to sheathe his sword, which is very difficult: 'The would-be Saviour of a disintegrating society is necessarily a saviour with a sword, but

the sword may be drawn or sheathed.'[18] But the would-be saviour can also be one with a time-machine, a space-time omnibus in which he transports the consciousness of the people backwards and forwards in time. It can also be a philosopher masked as a king or, in some cases a man who claims to be God.

It is essential that the guru should be linked to political-economic power, which functions as a sword in modern times. Gandhi was such a guru, a pacifist with power, a swordless terror to his enemies, a saviour with a team of *celās;* but he was cut off while independent India was still an infant. The *celās* have not been able to carry on the guru's dynamism and movement.

Perhaps times have changed; we should no longer look for a single guru; we should look for a team which can accept each other's leadership and in which no one attempts to attain personal prominence. But such a team would have to be different from the brainwashed intellectual elite of our time—pale and inauthentic shadows of the Western elite of by-gone days. We will need people who know the people of India, are close to them in thought and attitudes, and yet can rise above mass frenzies and passions to guide the people along the path of sanity and service to others. Such a team must at the same time be at home in the ancient cultures of India, and energetic in the effort to create a new future for India. They should react passionately against the intellectual and spiritual castration undergone by the Indian intelligentsia in the past 150 years. They should have the literary resources to get back to our rich heritage and present it to the people in terms which make sense to them in their struggle for justice and dignity. They should also be open to all the cultures of the world and to all of human history. They should have special sensitivity for the suppressed and marginalized aspects of our heritage, especially Adivasi, Harijan, Jain and Buddhist cultures, as also the Muslim, Christian, Sikh, Parsi and even Jewish elements in our culture. The team should have competence in science and technology, and must also have awareness of the philosophical and social problems connected with modern science/technology. They should be in touch with the leading economic, social and political forces in India without being their prisoners or tools. They should also have the spiritual power, drawn from religious or secular sources, to pursue the vision without fear and, when needed, to lay down their lives for the people.

## NOTES

1.  *The Oxford English Dictionary* tells us that the English word for 'Renaissance' was first used in A.D. 1845, and that Mathew Arnold changed the spelling to 'Renescence'. In French the word was, according to Toynbee, first used by E.J. Delehuze (1781-1863) to describe 'the impact made by a dead Hellenic civilisation on Western Christendom at a particular time and place, namely Northern and Central Italy in the late medieval period'. See Toynbee, *A Study of History* (abbr.), vol. ii, p. 267, New York, Dell, 1965; 3rd printing 1971. Michelet also used the expression 'Renaissance' to refer to the rebirth of Europe.

2.  Johan Huizinga's *Men and His Ideas* was published from New York in 1959 and London in 1960.
3.  Suger, *De Consecratione ecclesiae S. Dionysii.* ed. & tr. E. Panofsky, pp. 47-49. Cited by David Knowles and Dimitri Obolensky in *The Christian Centuries*, vol. ii, London, New York, 1969, p. 390.
4.  Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vol. i, p. 297.
5.  *Ibid.*, See *A Survey of Renaissances*, vol. 2, chap. 10, xxxiv.
6.  For details of his writings, see N.H. Baynes and H. St. L.B. Moss, *Byzantium*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961, pp. 230ff.
7.  See George Smith, *The Life of William Carey, D.D., Shoemaker and Missionary* (2nd edn.), London, John Murray, 1887.
8.  K.M. Panikkar, *Common Sense About India*, London, 1960, pp. 22ff.
9.  Toynbee. *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 207ff.
10. '...the making of Europe and the successive changes of Western culture are *mainly* the result of spiritual and intellectual forces which are not political in origin, though they have their consequences on the political plane.' See Christopher Dawson, *Understanding Europe*, Doubleday Image, New York, 1960, p. 173.
11. Toynbee, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 603-04.
12. *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 604.
13. See S.L. Malhotra, *Social and Political Orientation of Neo-Vedantism*, S. Chand & Co., Delhi, *et alibi*, 1970.
14. See, for example, K. Venkata Ramanan, *Nagarjuna's Philosophy*, Harvard, Yenching Institute, pp. 328-30. Reissued from Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1978.
15. T.M.P. Mahadevan (ed.), *Indian Philosophical Annual*, vol. ii, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, 1968, p. 4.
16. See note above.
17. Shri Aurobindo, *Essays on the Gita*, Pondicherry, n.d., p. 226.
18. Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 607.

# Explanation-explication conflict in transformational grammar

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## TOWARDS A THEMATIC ANALYSIS

Every scientific programme evolves through a set of themata: the general strategies of ordering reality. These general strategies or themata indicate a new line of inquiry which is called by Gerald Holton a thematic analysis of science.[1] The thematic analysis of science provides a third dimension called the Z-axis along with the two other dimensions, the empirical and the analytic, to the total fabric of science. This third dimension is primarily concerned with the fundamental presuppositions, notions, terms, methodological judgements and decisions pertaining to science which are, as Holton claims, 'neither evolved from, nor resolvable into, objective observation on the one hand, and formal analytical ratiocination on the other'.[2] They constitute, according to what he says, the thematic origin of science.

The present paper is mainly concerned with the thematic analysis of the scientific programme initiated by Chomsky in linguistics. It, thus, involves a critical examination of some of the central presuppositions, methodological decisions, and judgements of transformational grammar (henceforth, *TG*).

One of the overpowering themes of the Chomskian scientific programme is the notion of mentalistic explanation. Chomsky claims that his theory is scientific in every sense of a theory of natural science. Its main objective is to explain the innate linguistic knowledge of the native speakers, i.e. linguistic competence. The notion of grammatical explanation in language *L*, thus claimed, involves a notion of causal-mentalistic explanation.

This paper critically examines this Chomskian claim. Its primary concern will be to show that there is a genuine confusion between *explanation* and *explication* in the conceptual framework of *TG*.[3] The steps of the arguments assumed in this paper are the following. First, it argues that *TG* theory is not a scientific theory, because it fails to fulfil the canons of scientific methodology. Second, the grammatical explanation, as offered in *TG*, cannot be interpreted as causal explanation. In fact, arguments will be given to show further that Chomsky's attempt to construe grammatical explanation as causal explanation commits a category mistake.[4] These arguments finally lead to our proposed view that *TG* does not explain but explicates the speaker's knowledge of language. This is a major theoretical shift which calls for a reconstruction of the so-called scientific foundation of *TG*. An attempt will be, therefore, made to argue for an alternative foundation to *TG*. It is only in such a

reconstructed foundation that *TG* can be shown to be a system of explication like that of formal logic.

## THE CHOMSKIAN SCIENTIFIC HEURISTIC

In the Chomskian scientific heuristic, *TG* explanations are construed as natural scientific explanations where events are explained with the help of a set of causal laws. The notion of *TG* explanation, thus, conforms to the particular model of explanation known as Deductive-Nomological model[5] (henceforth, *D-N* model) proposed in the positivist philosophy of science.

The *D-N* model proposed by Hempel and Oppenheim states that explanation and prediction are two structurally similar notions. In both cases, we deduce a sentence referring to a particular event from a whole, consisting of one or more sentences referring to general regularities and one or more sentences referring to particular events called antecedent conditions. Predictions drawn from the sentences referring to regularities or universal hypotheses are tested in terms of logically independent evidence. That is to say, the relation between antecedent conditions and evidence is not logical but empirical, i.e. is based on observation. When a prediction turns out to be true, it conforms to the statement of general regularity used in making the prediction. Because of its reliance on laws and theoretical principles, this model is able to give a systematic account of scientific explanation and prediction. The claims made by the laws and the theoretical principles can be so extended that they will also cover the cases which remain to be examined.

The general form of the *D-N* model, thus, assumes the following structure.

The *explanandum* represents the description of that which is to be explained. For this purpose, we can think of any example such as: 'The fact is that a certain fluid has turned into a solid' [or] 'The fact is that a certain person called Shomik has become ill.' Any aspect of the world which is problematic may call for an explanation, and this particular problematic state of affairs, therefore, constitutes the explanandum of an explanation.

The *explanan* constitutes laws or law-like propositions in the light of which the problematic phenomenon represented in the explanandum is comprehended. For example, 'Water turns into ice at a temperature below O° C' [or] 'Children who are below five become ill, if they come into contact with the cold virus.' The purpose of these laws or law-like generalizations are to give reasons which make it evident why things are as they are and cannot be otherwise.

The *antecedent* or *boundary* conditions form part of the explanan. These conditions present the factual data about the things which are to be explained, so that one is sure of the fact that laws of the explanans do apply to the object of explanation. Thus, given the two above examples of explanandum, we cite the following boundary conditions for each case. For the first case, they are, 'That fluid is water' and 'The temperature has fallen to O° C'; Whereas, for

the second, 'Shomik is a child whose age is below five' and 'Shomik has come into contact with the cold virus' may be stated as another set of boundary conditions.

Any sound explanation must fulfil the four conditions which the *D-N* model has laid down. First, the explanan must entail the explanandum; second, the explanan must contain general laws which are necessary for the deduction of explanandum; third, explanan must be capable of empirical test; fourth, the empirical condition: the explanan must be true. These four conditions, of which three are logical and the fourth one empirical, equally apply to prediction. In the above sense, the *D-N* model represents the general pattern of explanation. It captures the essential features of explanation and prediction that are common to all sciences. It, thus, provides the basis for the unification of sciences which embodies one of the central conceptions of positivism.

The explanatory force and the predictive capacity of the *D-N* model relies on laws holding with some sort of necessity that allows inferences from antecedent to consequent. The necessity involved is a causal necessity which is absent in any accidental generalizations. But what is the nature of this necessity that distinguishes causal laws from accidental generalizations? Over the nature of this necessity the philosophers of science differ widely. According to one group of interpretation, the necessity that distinguishes laws from accidental generalization is a logical necessity, while the other group suggests that it is a physical necessity. The philosophers of science belonging to the second interpretation, uphold a view known as realism in science. According to it, the primary function of laws are to describe the workings of the real objects and structures in the world. The laws, thus conceived, describe the underlying generative mechanisms that are responsible for the observed features of the world. Over the cognitive status of theoretical terms or entities the realists assert that, though the theoretical terms are observationally inaccessible to us, they nevertheless do describe the properties and power of real objects, structures, and processes. This is how the realists offer a solution to the problem of the status of law required for *D-N* explanation.

Chomsky and the theorists of *TG* adopted this framework for their model of grammar. Accordingly, in their framework a sentence *S*, which is construed as an event *e* following the Hempelian thesis, is explained by a deduction of '*e* occurred' from a set of boundary conditions and laws. Construed in this manner, grammatical explanation may thus be, said to assume, as Botha[7] shows, the same structure of the *D-N* model. This implies that grammatical explanation consists of:

(1) The explanandum that contains a sentence representing the problematic grammatical phenomenon. For example, the fact is that the native speakers of English find, to use Chomsky's sentence, 'I disapprove of John's drinking', ambiguous.

(2) The explanan representing the law shows why the sentence concerned must necessarily have the property which they have. The *TG* law proposed for

this is: a sentence becomes ambiguous, if the grammatical rule assigns more than one deep structure to it. To put it in Chomsky's words:

Sentences have at least as many semantic interpretations as they have distinct deep structures. In the grammar of English the sentence *I disapprove of John's drinking* is assigned two different deep structures: One of these determines a 'fact that" interpretation, while the other determines a 'manner in which' interpretation. (The transformations deriving from these two deep structures one and the same surface structure obliterate the differences between these deep structures.) Thus, the sentence in question is ambiguous.[8]

(3) The antecedent conditions represent the data about the structural properties of the sentence under consideration. This will make the grammarian sure that the sentence will fall under the scope of the formulated laws. In the present context, the following two conditions may be regarded as antecedent conditions:

(*i*) In the grammar of English two different deep structures are assigned to the sentence, 'I disapprove of John's drinking.'

(*ii*) Between the two one determines a 'fact that' interpretation, the other determines 'a manner in which interpretation'.

The acceptance of this model is found in various writings of Chomsky. The following passage from *The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory* may be cited as a clear evidence of this:

A grammar of a particular language can be considered to be a complete scientific theory will seek to relate observable events by formalizing general laws in terms of hypothetical constructs, and providing a demonstration that certain observable events follow as consequences of these laws. In a particular grammar, the observable events are that such is an utterance and the demonstration that this observable event is a consequence of the theory ... consists in stating the structure of this predicated utterance on each linguistic level, and showing that this structure conforms to the grammatical rules or laws of the theory.[9]

The idea expressed above clearly indicates the methodological bias of Chomsky's research programme. Chomsky's acceptance of the *D-N* model and his subsequent claim that linguistics is a natural science is an evidence of his neo-positivistic stand.

On the question concerning the necessary character of law, Chomsky shows his full conformity with the realist philosophers of science when he claims that grammatical rules (or laws) are psychologically real, because they

describe the workings of the underlying mental mechanisms that are responsible for speakers' utterances of sentences. This is how *TG* offers a causal explanation of speech in terms of mental mechanisms that underlie speech. The central concern for Chomsky, therefore, is to formulate the principle of mental mechanisms and to explain the facts of linguistic communication by showing that they are observable consequences of such mechanisms. This 'causal conception of mentalism', to use the expression of Katz, is in no way different from the hypothetical postulation in theory construction in science. As Katz summarizes:

Let us suppose that the linguist constructs a theory by inferring hypothetically the characteristics of the mechanism underlying linguistic communication. His inference begins by positing a mechanism of which the observable events of linguistic communication are causal consequences. He invents a theory about the structure of this mechanism and the causal chain connecting the mechanism to observable events, to explain how these internal causes produce linguistic communication as their effect. Now it is clear that the linguist, though he claims that his theory describes a neurological mechanism, cannot immediately translate the theory into neurological terms ... But ... this failure to have a ready neurological translation means only that he cannot yet specify what kind of physical realization of his theoretical description is inside the speaker's head. Since linguistics and neurophysiology are independent field, it does not matter for the linguist what kind of physical realization is there.[10]

The underlying mental mechanisms or the internal causes that produce the linguistic communication as effects have been identified by Chomsky as linguistic competence that incorporates the representation of innate linguistic knowledge, i.e. linguistic universals. The postulation of linguistic competence is a necessary requirement of the causal explanation of linguistic communication. Without this such explanation becomes meaningless, since the causal chain from the observable phenomena leads back to nothing but a convenient fiction. Chomsky, therefore, says that adequate explanation of linguistic facts will not be possible unless one has to postulate an innate system of linguistic knowledge with which a child is born. He argues that it is in the nature of the syntactic rules that they require the postulation of such knowledge. The general pattern of the argument may thus be stated as follows. The set of rules of a correct grammar *G* is a theory that explains the grammaticality of the grammatical sentences of a natural language *L*. To learn the grammar of *L* is to learn that *G* is true of *L*. This means construction of *G* as a theory of *L*. But a child cannot construct *G* solely on the data available to him in his experience. The only plausible explanation, therefore, is to argue that the general form of *G* is already known to the child before his experience.

The expression 'the general form of *G*' used above is what Chomsky

calls the universal grammar (*UG*) which is a system of rules like subject-specified condition, bound anaphora, etc. They are not acquired through experience; and hence they are innate in man. This makes it obvious that knowledge of language or linguistic competence of man with which Chomsky is primarily concerned cannot be identified with a capacity or ability to do something, or a disposition of some kind. It is, on the other hand, a mental state having a structure consisting of a system of rules. This is, indeed, what is described by Chomsky as the realist interpretation in linguistics. As he says:

> The 'realist interpretation' of linguistic theory is assumed throughout, and it is argued that the competence attained by the normal speaker-hearer is represented by a transformational generative grammar, which determines the representation of each sentence on the levels of phrase structure and transformational structure. These representations are then employed in the use and understanding of language, and provide the basis for the more general theory of language that will be concerned with meaning and reference, the conditions of appropriate use of language, how sentences are understood, performance in concrete social situations, and in general, the exercise of linguistic competence in thought and communication. The principle of this theory satisfy the schematism brought to bear by the child in language acquisition. They define the linguistic universals that constitute the essence of language (as distinct from accidental properties or properties determined by the exigencies of language use) and thus can be taken as one fundamental element in the characterization of the innate language faculty.[11]

## Towards a Methodological Critique

In the above I have briefly described the essential features of the Chomskian scientific heuristic. I have tried to indicate through Chomsky's own statement his acceptance of *D-N* model as the basis of his grammatical theory. Chomsky's theory can, thus, be claimed to be a scientific theory at par with the empirical theories of natural sciences. A theory in this conception can be shown to be scientific, if it follows the heuristics of the *D-N* model. But this seems to be too simplistic. The question is: can the scientific character of Chomsky's theory be established on the basis of the resemblance that exists between his theory and the *D-N* model? This is a methodological question which demands an inquiry into the very foundation of Chomsky's theory. Considered from this light, Chomsky's characterization of his theory as scientific raises certain fundamental problems which need to be examined carefully.

I start my discussion with three general questions: what do the covering laws of the *D-N* model explain? What is the nature of these explanations? How are these laws tested and verified? These are some of the questions which

one must answer in the context or *TG* to establish the point that *TG* explanations do not qualify as explanations of the *D-N* model.[12]

The laws of the *D-N* model are concerned with the explanation of natural events or phenomena. 'Metal expands when heated' is an example of such a law. The natural events or phenomena which it explains are the individual case of metal-heating resulting in expansion. If a *TG* is to be interpreted as a law in such a definition, what must be the natural events or phenomena which it explains? Are they the individual utterances made possible by a language? The theory of *TG* explicitly excludes utterances from the study of grammar and includes them only in an overall theory of linguistic ability which has linguistic performance as a major component. It is admitted that study of the inter-connections between actual utterances and the grammar, which models the competence only, is still at a very elementary stage. Some critics of *TG* hold that, given the particular kind of organization that the *TG* theory has, it will never advance beyond the elementary stage. They argue that a fruitful theory of language must be based directly on linguistic behaviour.[13]

If, then, utterances are not the natural phenomena to be explained, what are? Chomsky sees them as the intuitive linguistic judgements of the ideal speaker-hearer, judgements which pertain to the grammaticality, meaningfulness, ambiguity, contradiction, analyticity, etc. of sentences in the language. As it is obvious that such judgements are not events in the sense in which they are understood in the *D-N* model (i.e. do not have spatio-temporal coordinates) and are also subject to variation from individual to individual,[14] their inclusion in the *TG* theory as events or natural phenomena to be explained must be set down to a metaphorical extension of the word 'events'. This is sufficiently clear from the quotation from Chomsky above, where we are asked to believe that 'that such and such is an utterance' is an observable event of a language!

However, one could probably accept the metaphor Chomsky uses, if no further compromises were asked of him, but, as often happens with lies, one metaphor leads to another and we are soon enveloped in a thick mist of metaphor making any sighting of reality impossible. For, if intuitive judgements are events, what must be the nature of the statements which purport to 'explain' these events? This is the second of our questions asked above. In the *D-N* model, such statements are statements of regularities' which, on the basis of the extensive confirmation they receive, are called 'laws'. However, the possibility of falsification is not ruled out, and the law could cease to be a law in the stated form. Do intuitive judgements admit of falsification in the same sense? Chomsky insists that what the grammar describes are not 'summaries of behaviour' or a description of regularities only:[15] they are rules which describe the native speaker-hearer's knowledge of his language.[16] As such, they are infalsifiable by definition. What is falsifiable, Chomsky will argue, is an individual 'candidate' grammar, so that the place of laws in the *D-N* model is taken by grammars. But that is precisely where the problem lies. Natural

laws are falsifiable, because they are descriptions of regularities; and a 'regularity' may be violated, but grammars, not being statements of regularities, are inviolable, as they also must be if they are descriptions of the speaker-hearer's knowledge. This leads us to the third of our questions. What can violate a grammar if it is already a description of knowledge? Anything that does not describe the knowledge correctly and accurately is not a grammar. A grammar is, thus, by definition correct. It is another matter that it may not be the most elegant or economical grammar, but that is not the issue. No 'events', even if understood as intuitive judgements, can falsify, i.e. confirm or disconfirm, the grammar. What kind of 'law', then, is this grammar? Or, are we being asked to assume a metaphorical understanding of term 'law' as well?

## Towards a Category Mistake

The above discussion makes it apparent that the rules of grammar do not explain the grammaticality of sentences. The connection between the rules of grammar and the grammatical string is, therefore, said to be non-explanatory. Accordingly, to say that $S$ is grammatical is not to say that an event $e$ has occurred. '$S$ is grammatical', on the other hand, is entailed by the rules of $G$. Entailment is a relationship which cannot be confused with that of explanation. The significance of this distinction has been made explicit with the help of simple algebra by Michael Levin.[17] Thus, following his example, to say that $Y - X^3$ and $X = 3$ entails that $Y = 27$ does not amount to saying that $Y = X^3$ and $X = 3$ *explain* why $Y = 27$. The entailed claims, such as, $Y = 27$, or, in our case, $S$ is $G$, are the results obtained by certain formal deductions. They do not state that any event has occurred. The notion of 'grammaticality', thus conceived, involves a different interpretation. Hence to say why $S$ is grammatical is to show how $S$ is derived from G or is generated by $G$. This consists of proving that $S$ is derivable from the rules of $G$ in the same way in which proving a theorem $X$ consists of showing how $X$ follows from certain premisses. This is possibly the only interpretation of the why-questions that Chomsky has in his mind when he says that what $G$ explains is the linguistic intuitions of the native speakers.

The conceptual distinction drawn above between entailment and explanation shows that the grammaticality of a sentence $S$ is to be distinguished from the causal mechanism that produces the utterance $S$. The former involves a formal deductive relationship defined by a grammar $G$, whereas the latter involves a causal explanation which seeks to show how certain mental processes are responsible for the production of $S$.

These two specify the two different domains as having two distinct jobs, so that one cannot be taken for the other. A failure to distinguish this will lead to a category mistake. Chomsky, as Michael Levin argues, is a victim of a similar mistake. He has failed to make any such distinction clearly, since he

believes that grammars are psychologically real, and they do, therefore, explain the innate linguistic knowledge (or intuition) of the native speakers. For Chomsky, as we know, the study of the grammaticality is ultimately a causal inquiry. But this is where the category mistake is committed. The reason is simple. The explanation of innate linguistic knowledge, as I have indicated earlier, is a different inquiry, and it, therefore, requires a different premise that does the whole explanatory job. This consists of showing how linguistic communication is a causal consequence of this innate knowledge, something that grammar is not competent to do. But, on the contrary, in Chomsky's writings one will frequently come across such remarks like: 'We can use the rules of English grammar to explain why a person understands a certain sentence to be ambiguous.' Once again two different tasks are involved here, and they are the following. The rules of grammar show how a given sentence becomes ambiguous in the light of the formal properties of the sentence. An ambiguous sentence, as Chomsky has shown, presupposes non-equivalent derivations. Accordingly, the explication of an ambiguous sentence offers multiple structural descriptions of the same sentence. These multiple structural descriptions correspond with multiple senses attached to sentence by the speakers. Thus, a native speaker can recognize the ambiguity of the sentence, such as: 'Flying planes can be dangerous.' Correspondingly, two different structural descriptions are assigned to the sentence. However, the rules of ambiguity say nothing about the mental mechanism by which a speaker of English understands them to be ambiguous. In order to do this, one requires to show that the speaker executes certain processes which are isomorphic to the generation process. The first task involved is a logico-grammatical study, and the second is an empirical study involving a causal explanation. Now, to claim that the first one performs the job of the second is a category mistake which Chomsky has made.

## The Non-empirical Nature of Grammar: Towards a New Foundation

The above arguments call for a major theoretical shift in the conceptual paradigm of *TG*. It is a shift from the conception of the empirical nature to the non-empirical nature of grammar. In this new conception, the preoccupation of *TG* is with the native speaker-hearer's intuitive judgements regarding grammaticality, ambiguity, and such other features; with the notion of a correct sentence and not with utterance events in space and time. The difference is a significant one. 'Correct sentence' is a normative notion, as shown by Itkonen.[18] A sentence is correct or incorrect not in relation to what people actually say or do not say. The rules decide when a sentence is correct or incorrect. The relation between rules and the sentences (or non-sentences) of the language is a necessary one. In that sense, the rules cannot be falsified. A set of rules can be rejected as being not the set of rules for a language when

it is found that it does not distinguish between sentences and non-sentences as native speakers do; but that does not falsify the rules, it only shows that the data are not pertinent. In other words, there is no clear notion of counter-example or counter-evidence which could make precise sense of falsifiability as in the case of natural sciences.

Any attempt to define correctness in terms of space and time will essentially mean reducing the question to whether it is possible to define correctness in terms of what one does as a matter of fact. That such a move is not permissible is generally accepted philosophically. The reason is that man, in contradistinction to inanimate things, can do anything according to his intention. He can say, for example, anything, correct or incorrect, and accordingly he can react also, normally or abnormally, to what is being said. Grammar, therefore, instead of investigating utterances and reactions to them, investigates the normative linguistic knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of the rules which determines the correctness of sentences. It explicates the speaker's pre-systematic knowledge of language. According to this reconstructed position of *TG*, there is an important methodological level where grammar as a synchronic description of language is similar to logic and is different from other natural or quasi-natural sciences.[19]

Grammar, construed as a system of explication, consists of transforming non-empirical truths of the intuitive kind into non-empirical truths of the formal kind. Thus, explication as a process may be said to have two stages. The first one is identified with the speaker's atheoretical knowledge of language, such as, a native speaker of English knows that 'Snow is white' is a correct sentence. This is an instance of an intuitive, non-theoretical, and non-formal knowledge. The second stage is a theoretical one, where the grammarian characterizes this sentence as necessarily correct with the help of his constructed system of formal rules. A grammar may be, thus, conceptualized as a logical machine, where the given sentence is an input and the formal description of the sentence as correct is the output. The task of grammar is, therefore, formally to characterize all and only intuitively correct sentences as correct.

What presents the *TG* theorists from seeing the non-empirical nature of grammar is their failure to see the distinction between native speaker-hearer's a theoretical knowledge of the rules of his language and the linguist's theoretical description of these rules. The theoretical-atheoretical matrix indicates not only the two different types of knowledge but also the two different ways of knowing. Accordingly, the nature of the sentences (viz. atheoretical and theoretical or scientific sentences) expressing these two modes of knowledge and the way we know them become radically different. The atheoretical sentences are intuitively known to be true and are not amenable to scientific testing, whereas theoretical sentences being the descriptions of atheoretical knowledge are subject to empirical testing, falsification, etc. Their truth-claims are decided by some objective methods of science. In his John Locke lectures, Hillary Putnam brought out this contrast by citing a simple case.[20] Thus,

Putnam says that a person who is a bilingual in Hebrew and English such as he himself, knows that the sentence '*Shemen* means oil' is true; but he cannot test it by the empirical methods of science. This simple fact led Putnam to draw the conclusion which asserts the primacy of atheoretical knowledge in human sciences. As Putnam observe:

> It seems to me that a certain version of scientism in the social sciences collapses right here. The idea that what we *know* is co-extensive with what we can check 'publicly' following well-understood paradigms of scientific testing does not even fit some of the *Simplest* facts we know, such as the meaning of the words in a foreign languge.[22]

But Putnam asks: how is it possible to have a knowledge which is not subject to scientific testing? His answer is that this knowledge is an instance of 'practical knowledge', i.e. one's knowledge of his own actions. His model sentence '*Shemen* means oil' is an atheoretical norm sentence, and his notion of 'practical knowledge' corresponds to native speaker's intuitive knowledge of language.

What follows from the above discussion is that the notion of atheoretical knowledge assumes a central importance in a normative science like grammar. It is a precondition for theoretical knowledge. Thus, a linguist writes the grammar of a language (i.e. theoretical knowledge) on the basis of the native speaker's knowledge of correct sentences (i.e. atheoretical knowledge). In this conception the speaker's linguistic competence (i.e. the intuitive knowledge of the rules of language) falls in the category of atheoretical knowledge. This atheoretical knowledge has a deeper epistemological significance. The atheoretical knowledge is constituted of the actual and the possible. The actual is that which is empirically known or is understood in terms of observation. The possible, on the other hand, is that which is necessary for our knowledge of the actual. The necessity which it exercises is the a priori necessity, and, thus, they are the transcendental preconditions of knowledge. Chomsky identifies this knowledge with speaker's knowledge of the universal rules of language and claims that they are innate in man. Chomsky's postulation of innate linguistic universals may be questioned on several grounds, yet one cannot deny the necessity of formal a priori conditions of language. Without postulating the innate linguistic universals one can still justify the necessity of a priori conditions of language. The justification of this view can be given in the light of one of Husserl's suggestions. For Husserl[22] facts and 'essence' are inseparable in experience. Facts cannot be understood *per se*. It can be understood only in the light of eidetic law that defines its essential meaning-structure. Linguistic facts in this sense presuppose a necessary a priori structure. Thus, Chomsky's universals may be understood as eidetic a prioris of the kind discussed by Husserl.

These two levels of knowledge, atheoretical and theoretical, are not two

polar opposites. There is a constant mediation between these two levels of knowledge. The theoretical knowledge, which is in a sense the description of atheoretical knowledge, is not possible unless one has a sufficient understanding of the atheoretical rules of language. This two-level character of knowledge is the basis of the social or human sciences. As Schutz[23] points out, the thought objects constructed by the social scientists on the basis of theoretical knowledge are the second-order constructs. That is to say, they are the 'constructs of the constructs made by the actors in the social scene.' The constructs of the first-degree are made by the agents, and the constructs of the second-degree are made by the social scientists in order to grasp the social reality.

In a grammatical investigation, the grammarian starts his analysis with the rules which make the sentences correct. In other words, he builds his own analyses—phonological, syntactic and semantic—by a set of rules. These analyses depend on his knowedge of the rules, i.e. of the correct sentence of the language. From his own knowledge he is able to see, for example, why the invented sentence. 'It is easy to please John' is correct, while the sentence 'It is eager to please John' is incorrect.

It is the rules of language pertaining to such sentences that form the starting point of a grammatical description. The next phase in the grammatical description is to go beyond the initial sentences and to make generalizations which would account for an indefinite number of sentences. The various types of ambiguities exhibited in the surface structure of sentences can be explained on the basis of certain generalization or hypotheses expressed in terms of definite types of deep structure and transformational rules.

What is the nature of such hypotheses and how do they differ from the atheoretical rules known to the speaker? As we have seen, the atheoretical rules are infalsifible, i.e. their truth and falsity are known with certainty. The theoretical rules, i.e. the grammatical hypotheses, on the other hand, are subject to rejection, i.e. their truth value is not known. These rules, which are constructed by the grammarian, are not the intuitively given correct rules: hence there is always the possibility that they may be invalidated. The theoretical description offered by *TG* for the atheoretical knowledge is not normative. If I utter an incorrect sentence, such as 'Likes Rina music', I violate a norm. The *TG* rule for this is that the subject *NP* should precede the verb. This rule is used for the description of something which is normative to us, but the theoretical rule in itself is not normative. Therefore, it is always possible that this particular description may be invalidated on the ground that it is not an adequate description of the speaker's atheoretical knowledge. Consequently, an alternative grammatical hypothesis may be proposed in place of the previous one. Chomsky overlooks this point, because he believes that his theory refers to psychological reality, and thus he gives a realist interpretation to his theory. His mistake is that he fails to see the distinction between formalization and the basis of it, i.e. the speaker's atheoretical knowledge of the language.

## GRAMMAR AND EXPLICATION

What, then, is the nature of the theoretical rules of *TG*? What is their function? We have tried to show that *TG* descriptions are basically concerned with the notion 'correct sentence in the language *L*'. In other words, they are concerned with the analysis of the intuitively known rules and rule-sentences relevant to the concept of correct sentence. A grammar is defined as a formal system whose function is to specify a set of sentences and to provide structural descriptions for each of them. It is only through such structural descriptions that we are able to show the grammatical relations exhibited in the sentences. An adequate transformational generative grammar is capable of generating all grammatical sentences of a language and those grammatical sentences alone. That is to say, on the basis of a finite set of rules it can generate an infinite set of sentences and assign structural descriptions to each of them. It is this finite system of rules which constitutes the basis of the recursive definition of the notion 'sentence of *L*' or 'grammatical structure of *L*'. A grammar *G* is a generative device in which for each sentence there must exist at least one derivation which is considered as the terminal string in *G*. Secondly, a string of elements in the vocabulary of *L*, if it is not a sentence of *L*, then it does not have any derivation in *G*. The derivation themselves are like derivations in formal logic; in fact, they are what Itkonen calls extended axiometic systems of some sort.[24] As such their function is not very different from that of derivations in logic, viz. to provide explications for some intuitive notion. In logic the notions involved are those of a valid proposition, a valid formula, etc. whereas in grammar it is the notion of a correct sentence. The function of explication in both is to transform presystematic intuitive knowledge into theoretical knowledge.

There are two components in explication. One is the intuitively known concept called *explicandum,* which is described in the corresponding explicandum expressions; the other is the replaced or reconstructed concept, i.e. the explicatum described in the corresponding explicatum expressions. Explication consists in changing the explicandum expressions of ordinary language into explicatum expressions of formal language. The explicandum expression is identified by the criterion of adequacy. The criterian of adequacy is constituted of those sentences which are known to be necessarily true and in which explicandum expressions occur as an essential feature. For example, Arthur Pap[25] shows that in the explication of the concept of propositional knowledge the explicandum expression can be identified with the aid of the following sentence which is intuitively known to be necessarily true: i.e. if *a* knows that *p*, then *p* is true. The task of explication consists in transforming the intuitively known necessary truth into a formal kind which clearly exhibits the inner structure of the sentences.

If the new explicatum sentence is formally true, then it satisfies the criterion of adequacy. The important point to be noted in this connection is that

the criterion of adequacy which is used for the purpose of identifying the explicandum is now satisfied by the explicatum. In such a case, the explicandum and explicatum are similar.

When one is checking whether the explicatum satisfies its criterion, it can be said that one is engaged in testing the explicatum. It is obviously not empirical testing. Testing here means to see the consistency and the completeness of formalization.

The one which satisfies the criterion of adequacy best will be regarded as the best among the rival explicatum expression. As Itkonen demonstrates, a *TG* description can also be regarded as a method of explication where atheoretical (i.e. the presystematic or preanalytic) knowledge is the explicandum which is replaced by the explicatum—the theoretical knowledge. The explicandum here is the knowledge of a language *L* comprising a knowledge of the rules of correctness for sentences in *L*. The explicandum is identified with the help of the rule sentences, which, since they are intuitively known to be necessarily true, should be regarded as the criteria of adequacy. The explicatum in the linguistic explication, on the other hand, is the grammar of *L*. The grammar of *L* is the theoretical description of language.

The most important feature that distinguishes linguistic explication from other forms of explication, according to Itkonen, is that a grammar whose function is to generate all and only correct sentences does not speak about sentences but *shows* them, i.e. it makes derivations that show the structures of the sentences of *L*. Linguistic explication is, therefore, not synonymous with philosophical explication. In philosophical explication, analysis is the goal of explication, whereas, in *TG* explication, analyticity is guaranteed at the outset.

Given the fact that the grammar of *L* is a formal system with axiom symbol *S* and a set of rules for derivation, it is a necessary truth that a grammar of such type will generate such and such sentences having such and such structural descriptions. In logic the object linguistic *modus ponens* sentence of the form $p\,(p \supset q) \supset p$ is analytically true, so also is the corresponding metalinguistic sentence *q* which is derived from *p* and $p \supset q$. In *TG* the sentence, $(NP \rightarrow \text{the} + N,\ N \rightarrow \text{man}) \rightarrow$ the man, is a formally necessary truth which is arrived at through a series of derivations. If this sentence is formally necessary true sentence, so also is the corresponding metalinguistic sentence, i.e. the grammar consists of the rules:

$$R_1: NP \rightarrow \text{the} + N$$
$$R_2: N \rightarrow \text{girl},$$
generates 'the girl' (adopted from Itkonen)

The standpoint represented above with regard to the nature of linguistic explication finds its support in the official interpretation of *TGG*. Thus, Chomsky in one of his earlier writings clearly stated the explicatory nature of a TG description:

... we assume intuitive knowledge of the grammatical sentences of English and ask what sort of grammar will be able to do the job of producing these in some effective and illuminating way. We thus face a familiar task of explication of some intuitive concept in this case, the concept 'grammatical in English', and more generally, the concept "grammatical"[20]

This passage which expresses the main intention of our paper also indicates a confusion in the very foundation of *TG*. In consideration of Chomsky's claim that *TG* is a scientific theory, this passage seems to be, indeed, conflicting with his basic methodological position. This paper, therefore, undertakes the investigation of going into the explanation explication conflict in *TG* theory. The basic dilemma in *TG* theory is that while, on the one hand, its proponents claim that it explains the native speaker's knowledge of language, a proper thematic analysis, on the other hand, shows that what *TG* theory actually does is to explicate the speaker's knowledge of language. This is the source of the explanation-explication conflict in *TG* which calls for a radical interpretation of Comsky's framework. The present investigation, by offering such a new framework, claims to have been able to established that, contrary to the received view, *TG* does not explain but explicate the speaker's knowledge of language or, more precisely, the notion of correct sentence.

### Notes and References

1. G. Holten, *Thematic Origins of Scientific Thoughts*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvad University Press, 1972.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 57.
3. Cf. E. Itkonen, *Grammatical Theory and Metascience*, Amsterdam, John Benjamins, 1978; 'Transformational Grammar and the Philosophy of Science' in E.F.K. Koerner (ed.), *The Transformational-Generative Paradigm and Modern Linguistic Theory*, Amsterdam, John Benjamins, 1975; 'The Use and Misuse of the Principle of Axiomatics in Linguistics' in *Lingua*, 38, 2, 1976.

   I have been influenced considerably by E. Itkonen's work. Hence my indebtedness to him and to his work will be found in various places of this present paper.
4. Cf. M. Levin, 'Explanation and Prediction in Grammar (and Semantics)' in P.A. French, T Uehting and H.K. Wettstein (eds.), *Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1979.
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8. N. Chomsky, 'Problems of Explanation in Linguistics' in R. Borger and F. Goffi (eds.), *Explanation in the Behavioural Sciences*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970.
9. N. Chomsky, *The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory*, New York, The Plenum Press, 1975, p. 77.
10. J. Katz, 'Mentalism in Linguistics' in J.F. Rosenberg and C. Travis (eds.), *Readings in the Philosophy of Language*, New Jersy, Prentice-Hall, Inc., p. 370. Katz has changed his position on mentalism radically. The view quoted here is his early views. Presently,

he no longer believes in mentalism. He developed his own theory which he described as Platonism in linguistics, i.e. where sentences are regarded as abstract objects. See his work *Language and Other Abstract Objects*.

11. See N. Chomsky, 'Introduction', *The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory*, New York, The Freeman Press, 1975.
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20. H. Putnam, *Meaning and Moral Science*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978.
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23. A. Schutz, 'Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences' in M. Natanson (ed.), *Philosophy of Social Sciences*, New York, Random House, p. 242.
24. E. Itkonen, *The Use and Misuse of Axiomatics in Linguistics*. The similar view is also held by Robert Wall in his *Introduction to Mathematical Linguistics*, New Jersy, Prentice-Hall, 1972.
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# Re-understanding Indian philosophy

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In what sense can philosophy be Indian? The question may suggest that the so-called Indian philosophy is fundamentally different from other brands of philosophy, for example, from Western philosophy. I have no doubt that some people seriously think so; but if what they seriously think is also seriously taken note of, then it will mean that, just as some kinds of plants grow in tropical regions and not elsewhere, similarly some kinds of philosophy grow in particular regions. This may further mean that there are types of philosophy such that one is totally different from the other; that each type makes an organic whole; that, even if in a type we may be able to distinguish the parts, the parts together form a whole; and that the commonness of parts between one type and another type cannot be treated together on the basis of one commonness. This may also mean that each type is like a seed; that it grows not only in a particular atmosphere but also in a particular ethnological pattern. Indians being of Aryan race the Indian type belongs to Aryan pattern and, in a similar way the Greek, the Barbarian, the Roman, the Anglo-Saxon and the Mongolian patterns can be distinguished. Carried further, it signifies that, if there is *cāturvarṇya vyavasthā*, then there will be one particular type of philosophy and way of life, integral and prescribable to each *varṇa*, which is sometimes very seriously thought of by those who talk of *svadharma*. It also implies that philosophy by its nature must be pluralistic, i.e. there would and ought to be varieties of philosophy from the point of view of the need and aptitude of the units in human society.

It is also possible to think that, when we talk of Indian or Western philosophy, we may not think of the logical patterns of philosophy but may think of cultural patterns; that what we call philosophy may be regarded as merely the manifestation or abstraction of the cultural patterns, although this may not mean that philosophies would be watertight compartments, that is, there would not be any communication between philosophy of one pattern and that of another pattern. Of course, it is possible to think that there could be varieties of philosophy even in one cultural pattern and similarities of philosophy in different cultural patterns, because no two men might be alike in the same cultural pattern, while two men of different cultures could be alike in thinking and may have common sympathy and understanding. It is possible, e.g. to think that British philosophy is empiricist, whereas the continental philosophy is otherwise; that by and large the British philosophers would not believe in innate ideas like the continental philosophers who may accept them. But even amongst the continental philosophers there may be critical thinkers

like Kant, who may accept something of the empiricist tradition and may build a structure of critical philosophy on the same.

Sometimes by using the term Indian philosophy I may also mean the philosophy expounded by Indian philosophers. 'Indian' in such a case would not be an adjective of philosophy but would be a case of transferred epithet inasmuch as it would qualify the writers and not their thought. I have a feeling that, when we talk of Indian philosophy, we have largely such usage in our mind, though other usages need not be completely ignored. I have also a feeling that, when one talks of Indian philosophy, one uses it in the sense of some assorted accumulation of various individual, cultural thought also. When, for example, one talks of 'British philosophy in mid-century', one does not necessarily talk of one particular pattern, though it is possible that the thought may move in one direction on account of the culture, region, and time. I feel that, although I have tried to clarify several possible usages about Indian philosophy, it is much better to keep the matter open and should not postulate that Indian philosophy means this and not that, because the term Indian philosophy is vague and its use is ambiguous and open.

However, when I am talking of Indian philosophy, I shall not talk of the more modern thinkers like Aurobindo and Gandhi, and shall also not concern myself with the interpreters of the old systems like Vivekananda and K.C. Bhattacharyya or Radhakrishnan, Mahadevan and Murthy. I shall rather try to open and understand the issues once again.

Generally, when we talk of classical Indian philosophies, we talk of them as systems. What is systematic about them? Do they have some common axioms? Does each 'system' have any separate and additional axioms or postulates? Let me try to understand the basic common assumptions and separate independent assumptions of each such system.

First, any attempt at philosophizing is man's attempt at understanding reality or the world. This makes it epistemic. Understanding the world may also mean understanding one's own self and understanding other individuals. It may also refer to the norms for understanding and norms for the behaviour. Most probably time would not interfere with this concept of philosophy, although time may bring about a greater development or depth-dimension to this concept of philosophy. Essentially, man's concept of philosophy would arise by way of introspection or retrospection on his experience which he has gradually acquired through experiencing, and human history would tell us that this human experience develops from crude experience to a less crude experience. Basically, the crudity or rawness of human experience must remain as it is, although this experience could be chiselled and polished in the course of development. I, therefore, feel that all the Indian philosophical systems must be understood against the anthropological background, and their basic nature must be epistemological.

Let me clarify what I want to say. A man in Vedic time as now could talk of the world or reality. But neither is the vedic concept of reality a perfect

concept for the man today, nor was it so for the man of Vedic age. Horizons of our world have gradually widened; still the enhanced world remains finite only, and the residue of the reality hidden from us is far greater and far deeper than the one that was experienced or understood either by the Vedic man or is experienced or understood by the modern man. Nevertheless, the relationship between man and the world and man's ability to understand the world remains the same. Thus, I would say that all the so-called systems of Indian thought made three assumptions:

(1)  There is world which exists in its own right;
(2)  There is a knower who is a part of the world but who is treated as separate from the world; and
(3)  The knower can know the world.

These presuppositions are bound to be at the back of any philosophical investigation, and, therefore, there should not be any surprise if they were at the back of the so-called systems of Indian philosophy. But each system had to make a few other presuppositions on account of the difference in the subject-matter. For example, at least in the early Pūrva Mīmāṁsā, the theoretical questions, such as what the world is and what a knower is do not seem to assume a prominent role; for Pūrvamīmāṁsā had almost dogmatically (and practically) assumed varieties of things and men, and its problem was to organize a theory of action. The things were for enjoyment, and men were for enjoying. (This was also the presupposition of Sāṁkhya.*) Mīmāṁsā had accepted the superiority or inferiority, that is, hierarchy, of men, and had also accepted the limitation of human power which was supplemented by the super-natural power. It had imagined that the supernatural power helped or deferred human action, and had also believed in the dichotomy of body and soul; for, it could distinguish between a dead body and a living body, and had imagined that a body was dead when the living element in it had left it and gone elsewhere. If the living element went elsewhere, it followed that (*i*) it could go and (*ii*) that it must be living and so always be living, that is, it must be immortal. They had also imagined that different material things could be classified under different classes; and if the different particulars could be classed under one class, then there must be the deity of that class controlling the particulars. This concept seems to be at the back of Platonism also, with the difference that Platonism gives us passive 'inactive' concepts. If you imagine the deities of the concepts, you also get a 'solution' of how the concepts could be used by man; for it is the deities which help man voluntarily or through invocation to act in a particular way. All such things find a place in Greek or Hindu mythology, and are very usefully worked out in the epic like the *Mahābhārata*. But in the theory of Mīmāṁsā many of these things

*Saṁghāta parārthatvāt* and *Puruṣosti bhoktṛbhāvāt*.

are just assumed and therefore the problems which arise in Pūrvamīmāṁsā are primarily non-theoretical. There we are concerned with the relations amongst men and women or man and different men, since these relations are based on *varṇa, jāti,* and *āśrama.* They are also based on the notion of hierarchy, and thus certain axiological norms are either presupposed, suggested, or justified. Pūrvamīmāṁsā is also concerned with the praise of superhuman power, and it dogmatically assumes soul, immortality of soul, and rebirth. These concepts are necessarily required for Pūrvamīmāṁsā for explaining actions and prescriptions of actions. For all these activities analysis of concepts and language also became necessary and made room for prayer, *praśaṁsā, arthavāda,* and interpretation. Basically, therefore, a system like Pūrvamīmāṁsā is not a system of knowing what there is. It is primarily concerned with how men ought to behave, though only in a traditional society, and it is only secondarily that metaphysical problems like those of the existence of soul, rebirth, *karma* etc. and very important philosophical problem like that of analysis emerge. In such an activity, there, indeed, will be a development of thought. But such a development of thought will be for defending the tradition, not for prescribing a change. Pūrvamīmāṁsā thus, becomes a defender of orthodoxy.

The trouble with Pūrvamīmāṁsā was that its assumptions were taken as the thesis of the system; and people forgot the distinction between the thesis of a philosophical system and beliefs of a system. Of course, there can be infinite number of theses in a philosophical system, and the uncritical beliefs of a belief system of a certain class can also become the propositions in a dominating philosophical system. The reason for this is that almost every society has a certain belief system as also a pattern of rituals. This pattern of rituals is solemnized within that society; and, if the society begins to dominate over a more enlarged society on account of establishing a supremacy over other societies, then the code of conduct and the system of rituals of the dominating society becomes a system of norms, not only for the dominating society but also for the enlarged society. When this happens, the beliefs in the belief systems also become the intuitive truths and become propositions of the philosophical systems. This intuitive transformation requires an authority which is supplied either by the sacred books or by the uncodified accepted pattern of norms. Naturally, one forgets that the sacred books are written by men in the society. They come down to us now by way of tradition where the authorship becomes mystified and is attributed to God, or the codified or uncodified norms assume the status of *mantras.* All this has taken place in Pūrvamīmāṁsā, although it should be realized that a similar process has taken place in other philosophical systems also. It may further be noted that such a process is bound to take place even in a system which may be regarded as unorthodox.

Like the assumptions of Pūrvamīmāṁs, Sāṁkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Uttaramīmāṁsā must also have their assumptions, although, I am afraid, that some

of the assumptions of Pūrvamīmāṁsā might have been either the common assumptions of other systems or might have been integrated with other systems at some other stage. For example, let us take the question of disembodied soul. This assumption seems to have been either integral to different systems or was incorporated into those systems. Similarly, the propositions about *karma* also seem to have been incorporated into other systems, and these incorporations made the other systems Vedic. The assumption of *karma* theory, for example, seems extremely unnatural to the Buddhist way of thinking. But the cultural grafting of two philosophical systems made it possible. Similarly, the assumption that there is soul seems to be inconsistent with the Uttaramīmāṁsā system. But to any serious student of Advaita Vedānta today this assumption seems to be so basic that it has become an intuitive proposition for the Advaitic system. In fact, such adoptions and integrations of the thesis of one system into the thesis of another system seem to be either the basic function or basic mischief of any historical method.

What are the basic assumptions of Vedānta, Sāṁkhya and Vaiśeṣika systems of thought? Unlike Pūrvamīmāṁsā school, the basic thought of these schools appears to be theoretical. It makes an inquiry into: What is real? What is universe? What is reality? Advaita begins with *Brahmajijñāsā,* Vaiśeṣikas enumerate the *padārthas,* and the Sāṁkhyas give a classification (or maybe a division) of the world into *prakṛti* and *puruṣa.* The questions which these systems ask are: what is truth? what is death? what is *jīva*? With such inquiry the concepts of *mokṣa, apavarga* or *kaivalya* appear to be *prima facie* inconsistent, although these three concepts are almost organically connected with these systems. The inquiry about *mokṣa* does not seem to be connected with what is true or what is real. As inquiry about *mokṣa* is basically anthropocentric, practical inquiry relates to why there should be a *rendezvous* of the two inquiries, the theoretical, i.e. basically scientific and cosmocentric, and the practical which has a significance for man only. Nevertheless, historically this has happened. In fact, in the case of Sāṁkhya as in the case of Buddhism, the inquiry starts with a practical question: how to get rid of misery? This rendezvous makes an assumption that the knowledge of what facts are will also lead to the ultimate emancipation of man. This seems to be a common assumption of all these systems over and above the theoretical assumptions. It is surprising that such an integration of practical and theoretical questions did not take place at least in the early development of Pūrvamīmāṁsā. The Pūrvamīmāṁsā assumption of *svarga* has; in fact, nothing to do with the inquiry into what is true or real. It seems to be a simple and clear acceptance, whether it is an assumption of soul or *yajña, karma, punarjanma* or *svarga.* The step from theory to practice, as in the case of Advaita, Vaiśeṣika, and Sāṁkhya, seems to be very interesting, and this makes me think that there must be a code of rituals, maybe a crude code, for the adherents of these systems and so also for the followers of Cārvāka. It will be interesting to see

how there was a transition from the practical to the theoretical and again to the practical questions.

Coming to the theoretical question, the first and intuitive assumption of all the above systems is that there is world. This may be variously named as *Brahman, samghāta, sat,* etc. To say that there is world is to set an outer boundary to what we know. To say that there is world is not to say whether it is one or many. To say that it is one or many will be a further assumption or specification, and will depend on our comprehension and our power of discrimination. It will have to do with the theory of knowledge, and it will not be a basic assumption. Thus, if these further assumptions are made, it means that we have already taken into account the theory of knowledge. Thus, to me all the three systems do not just talk of 'what is real', they are also concerned with 'what we know' of the real.

The term world or its equivalent Brahman (and not *jagat*) does not stand for any demarcated specific whole within which you can demarcate parts. It is merely the general apprehension that there is some thing (indeterminate) which exists in its own right. But to say that there is world is different from saying that there is some determinate thing as the object of our apprehension. When I say that there is some determinate thing, I have, in fact, something in my mind which is more than what I say, for example, I definitely project that determinate thing against the background of the world. I also understand that there is 'I', the knower, who is outside of and different from that determinate thing. This 'I' is also projected or understood against the background of the world, and so when I say that there is something determinate my saying has also taken note of my perceiving, seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, or even tasting. But none of this happens when I am saying that there is world. The world is not projected against the background of another world, nor am I outside of this world. Since I am included in this world, I may not be conscious of my separate existence; nor would I use perception as a means of knowing this world, for perception requires discrimination, demarcation. When I say there is world, the world is indeed there. But the knowledge arises in some mysterious manner, and this is not perceptual knowledge. Whether it is to be called *śabda* or intuition or something else is a different matter. But it is necessary to recognize that the way things are distributively known is different from the way the world as a whole is known. It is necessary to understand this distinction before we begin to understand properly the *padārthas* of the Vaiśesikas, on the one hand, and the Brahman of the Vedānta, *prakṛti* (and *puruṣa*) of the Sāmkhya and *śūnya* of the Buddhist on the other hand. When the Brahman is 'known', it is not the same thing as the knowing of the Vaiśeṣika *dravyas*. This also brings us to another important point in knowing. Knowing different *dravyas* and knowing different *padārthas* are also not of the same kind. In any theory of knowledge, this sensitivity of 'different knowings' must be properly felt and realized, otherwise we are likely to be led into some kind of rigid format which will really be anything

but knowing. I have a feeling that in the hands of the Pandits and also the Western Orientalists the feeling of the sensitivity is either lost or reduced.

I shall take an instance from Sāmkhya system. It has for thesis three propositions (amongst others): (*i*) there is *prakṛti;* (*ii*) there is *puruṣa*; and (*iii*) there are many *puruṣas*. What is the relation of these propositions to one another? To say that the propositions (*i*) and (*ii*) are true: is it equivalent to saying that there is dualism? Is it equivalent to saying that *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* have the same status? To say that there is *prakṛti* and there is *puruṣa*: is it inconsistent with the proposition that there is *prakṛti only*? To say that there is *puruṣa* and to say that there are many *puruṣas*: is this an inconsistent position? To say that there is *prakṛti*: is this proposition of the same kind as (*a*) there is world; (*b*) there is a table; (*c*) there is *padārtha*; (*d*) there is honesty or dishonesty, etc.?

I think most of the modern thinkers on Sāmkhya have not handled the problems which Sāmkhya has raised with due sensitivity. I shall try to point out how these propositions may be held consistently together, and thereby point out that Sāmkhya theory may after all mean something very different from what we have been told by our medieval traditional or modern traditional Pandits.

That there is *prakṛti* may either look like a proposition that there is matter, or it may look like a proposition that there is a law or rule. It may also look like a proposition that there is (one) concrete thing or one existent reality. It is necessary to understand that, although these propositions look alike, they mean different things. When we say that there is one concrete world, we are talking about the concrete world as a whole. When we say that there is matter or everything is matter, we are not talking of the concrete world as a whole; we are talking of some common element. Thus, for example, after looking at different stones or different metals we may say: all that is stone or metal. Or we may abstract some common element in the varieties in the fashion of Nyāya and talk of some commonness. For example, we may talk of mass in all the things or spatial character of all the things. While talking of *prakṛti*, if we are talking of concrete reality, we would talk of living and non-living reality. In that case, we would talk of two different real objects or even concrete objects or class of objects; but even then only one kind of reality would be taken into account. But if we are talking of some common element, then it will not be possible for us to count it in additive terms. Again, if the world of experience is, for example, abstracted into living and non-living or conscious and unconscious, and, if we are thinking of *prakṛti* as only unconscious, then we shall not be able to talk of unconscious elements in additive language. In the same way, *puruṣa* can be talked of either as a concrete thing or some kind of abstract notion. Perhaps either the philosophers of Sāmkhya have not used or handled these different things delicately or the critics of Sāmkhya have purposely misused the concepts in the style of *chala* or *vitaṇḍa*. Let us see how a consistent philosophy or

philosophies under Sāṃkhya can be constructed or reconstructed using these different notions which are supposed to be basic to Sāṃkhya.

I shall present four models of such constructions:

*Model* 1. *Prakṛti* is conceived as a sum total of concrete reality except the human beings or self-conscious living beings (which may include the vertibrate animals). In this case, we may talk of *prakṛti* in the same way as we talk of earth or planets and may include concrete objects like metals, stones, trees, and animals except men (and higher vertibrates). In such a case, we can talk of *prakṛti* as one and *puruṣa* as many.

*Model* 2. We can think of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* as conceptual division of the total reality where the *fundamentum divisonis* will be either consciousness or unconsciousness. In such a case, the body of the *puruṣa*, for example, will have to be classified under *prakṛti*, and livliness of entities like men, animals, and trees will have to be classified under the concept of *puruṣa*.

*Model* 3. The concept of *puruṣa* will be the same as in Model 2. Nevertheless, *prakṛti* will not be regarded as abstract but as concrete reality which will consist of all things in the world including the bodies of living beings. This will mean that *prakṛti* is one and *puruṣa* also is one (under this hypothesis it is possible to think of many *puruṣas* also). And, although we can distinguish *puruṣa* from *prakṛti*, it will be consistent to say that there is no *dvaita,* for *puruṣa* will have no structural existence. It will not exist in its own right, it will exist as dependent on *prakṛti*. It will really be a certain manifestation of *prakṛti*.

*Model* 4. It is possible to think that *prakṛti* is one in the sense that it is concrete, and it is also possible to think that there is disembodied consciousness as a logical abstraction; nevertheless, it should be possible to think that as a special variety what we call *prakṛti* is inseparably connected with consciousness such that each particular that is formed becomes unique and, therefore, many. They become living conscious persons.

Many more models can be presented, but I desist myself from the temptation of enumerating all of them. I am satisfied with just pointing out that in the course of history these different models could be simultaneously held in different compartments of mind, and that in the understanding of Sāṃkhya vision explanations under different models were partly collected and grouped together. For example, if we say that *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* were abstract notions, then it could be an analysis of reality but could not be the genetic basis of reality. Similarly, if we think that twenty-five *tatvas* about which the Sāṃkhya talks were the logical principles (*tatva*-principle), then it would be absured to think that the concrete reality came out of purely logical principles. In both the cases, logical analysis is mistaken for genesis (*sarga*). Sometimes, giving an account of *prakṛti's* creation, mistakes would creep in if proper interpretation is not given of sentences such as *buddhi* arises out of *prakṛti*, *ahaṁkāra* out of *buddhi* and tanmātra out of *ahaṁkāra*. Now, if one is referring

to the process of knowledge, then such passages would be meaningful. But, if it is regarded as a real process of creation or physical division, then references to *buddhi* and *ahaṁkāra* as intermediate steps between *prakṛti* and *tanmātra* are not required. One could think of *prakṛti* itself as giving rise to *tanmātras* and also to *mahābhūtas*. But, if *prakṛti* is interpreted as an abstract principle, then this is not possible. Abstract principle cannot give rise to any concrete reality, whether it is conscious or unconscious. And, if the world manifestation is both conscious and unconscious and if it arises from one thing, then one would have to think of the primordial object or reality having both the aspects, conscious and otherwise; and could certainly think of *mahat* as such an object, and *sarga* of Sāṃkhya could start from *mahat*. The logical division of *mahat* into *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* would, in that case, be of logical and not of physical significance. The consistency of Sāṃkhya system or Sāṃkhya vision will have to be validated against the touchstone of how we conceive of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. Again, let us take the problem of *kaivalya*. When we talk of *puruṣa's kaivalya* or *artha*, (I have a feeling that *puruṣārtha* is primarily a concept of Sāṃkhya system and artha is the primary *puruṣārtha*), we will have to talk of *puruṣa* as a concrete living object. He will be an embodied *puruṣa*. He will have to be a person. Only then we would be able to talk of 'his' emancipation. *Puruṣa* as an abstraction does not really require emancipation. It is always segregated. All concepts are only *kevala*. But, in such a case, *prakṛti* as an abstraction will also be *kevala*. Such an abstract *puruṣa* will not be subjected to birth, death, etc. (*janana,* maraṇa, karaṇa). The concept of rebirth (and *karma* also) would not be even relevant if *Puruṣa* is taken merely as an abstraction.

To be brief, Sāṃkhya vision which has come down to us consists of several layers, and we will, skilfully have to separate these layers in the fashion of a good archaeologist or a geologist. For Sāṃkhya vision is a criss-crossing of several visions, and what we now perceive in Sāṃkhya text is a foggy picture of the depth where we are not able to differentiate between the nearer and the distant parts of the depth.

Just as ethical problems arise only for a man in society, i.e. only when he recognizes the existence of other men, similarly ethical problems arise only for a person who has body, not for consciousness pure and simple. In fact, all our actions, desires, wishes, pains, and pleasures are for a person with body. If this is not recognized, we would be committing a fallacy which may at times be subtle and at times gross. For example, if the husband is to be of any use for the fulfilment of one's (i.e. *ātman's*) desire (*ātmanastu kāmāya patiḥ priyo bhavati*), then that *ātman* should be with body. It is not a disembodied soul which has urges, for the urges are manifested in and through the body. The bodiless *ātman* does not have sex, although the terms *jīva* and *ātman* are of masculine gender and *ruh* and soul of faminine. When we talk of any action, the first presupposition is that it must be an action of an embodied soul. It appears to me that many a time this particular fact is not paid

heed to, and interpretation of passages in the classical philosophy is given in such a way that a muddle or confusion is created. If ethical problems as also the problems concerning action are to be considered in Sāṁkhya, then the first thing that is to be recognized is that in this context *puruṣa* means an embodied self-conscious being. It is only in this way that we can understand plurality of *puruṣa* in Sāṁkhya. It is only of the embodied *puruṣa* that we can talk in terms of *janana, maraṇa* and *karaṇa*. They occur at different times and at different places. Sāṁkhya here accepts the concept of time. *Ayugapat pravṛtti* or non-simultaneous or successive occurrence is a temporal concept, and it is accepted in Sāṁkhya. Similarly, there is the concept of individuality or *ahaṁkāra*. This ahaṁkāra is of two types. This is also mentioned in the Sāṁkhya system. This *ahaṁkāra* gives (*a*) personality to the consciousness and (*b*) differentness to things or *samghāta*. This individuality (*ahaṁkāra*) requires that each consciousness should be bordered out. This cannot be done unless it is 'imprisoned' by body. Although I am using the terms consciousness, 'imprison', and 'body', I am using them only figuratively; otherwise, there is every chance of our thinking that there is disembodied consciousness which also exists in its own right. When consciousness is determined by space, time, and matter, it becomes a person; it gives identity to the self; and it is this self-identity which is important for action, as well as social and moral life. It is necessary to know that the problem of *ahaṁkāra* is the same as the problem of self-identity or personal identity, and this can be determined in the case of an individual—a conscious individual—in two ways. From his own side it is determined by his awareness of 'I' or I-consciousness, i.e. the consciousness has its spread-out and control only in the area of his body which is determined by space and time. As an embodied person, it has common features with other embodied things, which have no consciousness and which are not controlled by the object itself. When others look at this embodied soul, they find his separate individuality as distinguished by (*ayugapat pravṛtti*) non-simultaneity and positions at different places. Things have both *ayugapat pravṛtti* and *parārthatva*: for an embodied consciousness there is *ayugapat pravṛtti,* for other people there is *parārthatva*, and for the person himself there is *svārthatva*. This makes one individual different from another individual and one thing different from another thing. Sāṁkhya has brought this out by bringing in the concept of ahaṁkāra. Without *ahaṁkāra* and the concept of discrimination, our knowledge that we are different from one another and also that things are different from one another will not arise.

One thing more. Sāṁkhya starts with man who is an individual. It is not the *puruṣa* of a conceptual nature. The conceptual *puruṣa* cannot be many. Such *puruṣas* are manifestations of *prakṛti* only. Conceptual *puruṣa* cannot be an existent. *Puruṣa* made out of *prakṛti* on account of *cidichāyā* alone can be many. In fact, we have to think of many *puruṣas* if we are talking of the individuals in the world. It is they who have both *janana* and *maraṇa*—birth

and death—and they have also consciousness. It is such *puruṣas* who will also have pain and pleasure; and if at all there is any ethics, it is for such *puruāṣas*.

What is the *puruṣārtha* of these *puruṣas*? What do they want? Sāṁkhya answers that, once these *puruṣas* are recognized, the world is divided into *saṁghāta* and *puruṣa. Saṁghāta* is *prakṛti* where consciousness (of macro level) is not noticed. It can be regarded as material, although it may take variety of forms. It has no ethics, it is to be enjoyed by others—*saṁghāta parārthatvāt. Puruṣa*, on the other hand, is an enjoyer. He is an enjoyer of *saṁghāta*, and, if it is accepted that *puruṣa* is also a *saṁghāta* on account of his having a body, he not only enjoys an ordinary *saṁghāta* but also enjoys 'other' *puruṣas*' which account for the social communication as well as sex activity. For women also in this language would be *puruṣas*. Man includes woman.

A belief system may also play a part. It is possible that the beliefs in soul and its immortality, and rebirth, *karma,* may enter here, and we may think of *sarga* now, not in a logical way but in a Mīmāṁsā way, i.e. as a matter of beliefs. The beliefs persist. And, if the implications of the beliefs are to be refuted, they will have to be refuted by a deeper understanding of reality. Knowledge alone gives us this deeper understanding of the reality. It would tell us that the only *puruṣārtha* is to know the limitations of the empirical *puruṣārthas,* to know that *puruṣa* as such is only a concept and not an existent. *Puruṣa* in us is only the 'shadow' of this concept of consciousness. As soon as this is done, the dance-drama will come to an end. And, just as the dancer returns to the greenroom after performing the dance-drama, so also we would realize that the *sarga* is only due to ignorance. Not that it does not continue, but (in a different way) now the whole thing becomes meaningless. This is the *kaivalya,* the loneness, recognition of the purposelessness of the pseudo union of the *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. As soon as this is realized, one would know that there is neither rebirth nor *karma* nor *svarga,* for the *puruṣa* as an epiphenomenon would not exist. And this would also be the recognition of the fact that what we call misery is only a necessary accompaniment of the empirical world.

The Advaita system of Vedānta has been the most accepted philosophy in India for the last several hundred years. It is supposed to be the interpretation of Upaniṣads, and so it is accepted as a very orthodox philosophical thought. However, to my mind it appears that, in order to understand the basic tenets of Advaita, it is equally necessary to understand the background, at least the logical background, which has given rise to Advaita way of thinking. This background is supplied by the Pūrvamīmāṁsā, Sāṁkhya, and Buddhism. The main tenets of Pūrvamīmāṁsā are the following:

(1) The Vedas must be accepted as infallible.
(2) The Vedic sentences basically give us prescriptions and injunctions, i.e. what we must do and what we must not do. These prescriptions

and injunctions, at least for the members of the higher class, are centred around the rituals connected with sacrifice.

(3) Man must always act, for action is prescribed in the Vedas.

(4) A man who is living is divisible into two parts, the body and the soul. Our soul being the agent of action has freedom and responsibility to act.

(5) The soul exists in its own right. (Contrary to this it is also believed that soul requires body to act.)

(6) The action exists in its own right and modifies or gears the soul to action. The circle of action is not complete during one's life period. So the soul and action exist beyond death. Therefore, in order to fulfil the actions or suffer the consequences of action, the soul takes rebirth.

(7) It also has to pay for the actions in the other world, either in the heaven or in the hell.

(8) Each action or the object of the action has a deity, and a man must please the deity through sacrifice.

It also takes for granted inequality in society, thanks to *karma*, and provides a justification for *cāturvarṇya* and also for *jāti vyavasthā*. It would naturally believe in many souls which would remain as souls. And so philosophy would either be the philosophy of society of men or it will be the philosophy of society of souls.

In a way, Advaita like Sāṁkhya and Buddhism tried to raise a banner of revolt against this system. The Pūrvamīmāṁsā school thinks that there are several souls. Advaita points out that each soul gets its identity only so long as it is limited by a certain body. It illustrates this from the example of *ākāśa*. We can talk of particular space in a particular pot, but spaces are not many. It is only one space limited by different pots. Similarly, different *jīvas* cease to be *jīvas* as soon as they are considered in the context of the whole reality. Advaita Vedānta suggests that when we are talking of consciousness or *caitanya* we cannot talk of *jīvas*. It is not possible to talk of *this caitanya* and *that caitanya*. As soon as we begin to talk of *caitanya*, the individuality which characterizes *jīvas* is lost; in fact, there is a subtle inconsistency involved in talking of *jīvas*. We get, the plurality of *jīvas* on account of what Sāṁkhya calls *ahaṁkāra*. This *ahaṁkāra* determines the identity of *jīva* from within, but, if a third man is to know the *jīvas*, there must be specificness of the *jīvas* knowable to the third man. To me it appears that this cannot be done unless the third man knows or imagines spatio-temporality regarding the *jīva*, and this is not possible in regard to a 'disembodied *jīva*'. It is difficult to imagine a disembodied *jīva*, and so when we so imagine we somehow imagine it with some kind of 'etherial body' which is really inconsistent with our own assumptions. What we do is that we isolate the consciousness from the usual body and then reinforce it with another body. A better hypothesis, therefore, is to think that when the body is destroyed the individuality itself

is destroyed. This may happen either at the time of death or when the *linga-deha* or subtle body is destroyed. But when the body is destroyed, will the consciousness persist? Here, Advaita will resort to another kind of argument. It is based on *satkāryavāda*. If consciousness is experienced as effect, then it must also exist as cause. It cannot come into existence as an accident. It must be there right from the beginning. And so even after the individuality is lost it must be potentially present. In fact, it must constitute the cosmos. Furthermore, what we call individuality may itself be a play of consciousness. When we talk of individual consciousness, consciousness is taken as something that is subjective. When the individuality is lost and consciousness is conceived to be still persisting the question arises as to whether such consciousness can really exist outside the bounds of spatio-temporality. To me it appears that Advaita is not clear on this point, that is, it may allow spatio-temporality and even matter occupying space and time in its thesis. The matter will be charged with consciousness. In fact, like the quantum physics the reality can appear as matter from one point of view and consciousness from another. It is not the body that is denied to consciousness; it is only some gross body, that gives self-consciousness which is denied. It is not that it does not come into existence but that which comes into existence perishes. The self-consciousness comes into existence but 'perishes' into the ocean of consciousness, and liquidates itself into that. The self-consciousness in a body gives subjectivity. It is this realization that the subjectivity eliminates itself into the cosmos (i.e. the consciousness that is objective), which provides the thesis that I am Brahman (*ayam ātmā brahma* or *prajñānam brahma*). This realization is equivalent to saying: I am not, the Brahman is. There is no identity between 'I' and Brahman. 'I' simply do not exist when there is a realization that there is only Brahman. Saṅkarācārya in *Ṣaṭpadī* has very clearly stated that *taraṅga* is *samudra* but *samudra* is not *taraṅga*. This means that a self-conscious being cannot be without body; that it is the self-conscious being who can have aspirations which can be mundane or supramundane. It is with these aspirations that the concepts of *karma, dharma* and *svarga* are connected. It is with these that the concepts of birth and death are connected. If this self-conscious body is denied or if it is realized that the self-conscious body comes into being and is destroyed in the course of time, all problems which Pūrvamīmāṁsā raises would vanish. This, I think, is the main thesis of Uttaramīmāṁsā. Sāṁkhya aids this thesis, for it is in Sāṁkhya that *puruṣa* or consciousness is taken out of what they call union of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. When *puruṣa* is taken away from *prakṛti*, it is no more *jīva*; and such *puruṣa* cannot have any aspirations of either doing anything or achieving anything. Both *karma* and *karma-phala* are denied to him, for they are of no significance to him. The concepts of *svarga* and *naraka,* as also birth and rebirth, become redundant. Nevertheless, all these concepts find their shelters in the Uttaramīmāṁsā doctrines and also in Sāṁkhya and Buddhist doctrnes. This makes the whole thing complicated, and no clear view is arrived at. It should be remembered

that the naive uncritical belief of a common man is that there is a disembodied soul, although it is accepted that such a disembodied soul has also a microscopic body. This belief is perpetuated and presupposed in the Pūrvamīmāṁsā thinking. Sāṁkhya points out that we can legitimately accept disembodied consciousness as a concept existing in its own right, because consciousness or sentience is a fact of experience. But only such disembodied sentience would be inactive. This is indirect admission that, when we distinguish body from consciousness or matter from consciousness, we have started or initiated the process of abstraction. But to say this is not to say that consciousness or sentience is unreal. Whatever is experienced in the form of effect must be potentially present as cause or in the form of cause also. There is a difference between sentience or *puruṣa* of Sāṁkhya and *jīva* of a tiny or micro-living being. A *jīva* cannot exist unless it is a complex of matter and sentience, for it is this complexity which gives it self-consciousness or self-identity. It is this argument which is carried forward by Advaita. Instead of using the word, *jīva*, it prefers using the word *ātman*. *Jīva* is an empirical existence. It is not segregated from body. Perhaps, when one talks of *jīva*, the emphasis is on sentience. But it should not mean that the sentience exists in its own right. The operation each *jīva* is strictly within certain bounds and is comparable with space limited by a certain pot. The model is of *chatāvacchinna ākāśa*. This limitation gives it its identity. But the sentience like space is not unreal. It is to be presupposed as real, and would constitute the very nature of reality or Brahman. Sentience is not *mithyā*. The ontological status of sentience is not denied in the context of Brahman. But its manifestation in the form of individual is different from the general status of sentience. It is not regarded as a function of the body; nevertheless, it is regarded as inseparable from body so long as body exists. But, when body perishes the separate existence of the individual sentience also perishs, although the sentience as such does not perish. This position does not allow the persistence and influence of *karma* over either the sentience or the individual beyond a certain point. The sentience, when it is manifested as a complex, takes the form of awareness, and so paves the way for epistemology. Cārvāka would differ here on one point. He is likely to say that sentience does not persist beyond death, for it is the function of the body, function of the four *mahābhūtas* when they came together in a unique and particular way. But both Cārvāka and the Advaitin should agree that in a living body the function of the sentience should be epistemic, and also that it should act and behave as agent and controller of the body. Everything that the body does would appear now as being directed by the agent; and, in a way, though within limits, the function of the *jīva* and the function of this agent would be similar. This agent would be called *ātman* or *ahaṁ*, and he should be responsible, along with the several other *ātmans*, for the construction of *jagat* and *prapañca*, the 'human' universe. This agent would never have a cognition that it dies, although, as a matter of fact it does perish; and so, if one is not careful enough, the trap for identifying the *ātman*

with *jīva* would always exist. To me it appears that this has happened again and again, and so *ātman* is many a time confused with *jīva*. But the concept of *ātman* is not the same as that of *jīva*. What *ātman* indicates is merely the *sākṣitva*; it is merely the linguistic expression of that *sākṣin* which means mere presence of sentience.

Man, who is the embodied sentience, asserts his freedom over the universe and makes further constructions over it. These constructs or constructions begin with naming, and continue with more and more elaborate and complicated forms. The variety, however, is characterized by the same sentience. And, if sentience is accepted as the general feature of this universe, then the real stuff of all this universe will be sentience. But in its appearance it will look otherwise. This difference will be partly due to sentience taking a form other than that of sentience or due to man's giving it different forms. Now, it is possible that the nature may be matter characterized by sentience or the nature may be sentience itself, though it is very queer to understand it in this sense. It is easy to understand or misunderstand matter characterized by sentience as sentience itself. But one thing is certain: if Vedāntic position is accepted, then the sentience cannot be eliminated; and it also will have to be admitted that man will give it different forms. This will be *lokavyavahāra*. This will be the combination or copulation of *satya* and *anṛta,* and will be the extended reality, the social reality, which in its own right will be nothing but the sentience or the primordial stuff with which we have started. In a sense, we can say that the primordial stuff is real and all constructs over it are unreal, because, although there is potentiality in the original stuff to take these forms, the forms are only constructs of man. They are real forms but can be regarded as appearances, and thus it becomes possible to think that the whole world that is constructed is māyā or illusion. Whether originally intended or not such a position has been taken up by Advaita in one of its interpretations. Constructions may be imaginary or real; distinction between the two has to be made and yet they will be nothing but constructions. What is important to note is that, whereas it is possible to think of *jagat* or constructed world as *mithyā* or illusory, it is never possible to think of *ātman* in the same way. It is always real, for it is non-different from the primordial stuff. In the constructs themselves, there are several belief systems playing their parts. The belief system of birth-and-death cycles and *karma* is one kind of belief systems. The belief system with which we live and communicate and transact with others or try to educate others is another, and the belief system connected with dreams and supernaturals is still another. That in our life several belief systems arise does not mean that they have the same status. Some belief systems are to be disposed of instantaneously, and some of them are required for our communication with others. If we discard the belief system, which lays emphasis on heavens, *karma,* and rebirth, it does not mean that we will have simultaneously to discard all belief systems.

Although all epistemological investigations begin with and presuppose

consciousness or sentience as an element in experience, an element of experienced world cannot be denied. What can be denied is that consciousness *qua* consciousness is a separable unit in the complex that is, the experienced world. How consciousness as such can exist unless it has some form, comparable either to the form of matter or energy, is the problem. What we experience is sentient matter and not sentience. But, once sentience is separated from the other part of the experienced world, it is easier and possible to think that the other part does not exist; what exists is the sentience alone. The argument for holding such a view is that, if matter can exist in its own right, why cannot sentience exist in a similar way? In fact, it is this argument which has been forwarded or is supposed to be forwarded by all idealists including even the epistemological idealists who take for granted the knower as independent of the body. This is also the argument attributed to Advaita. The question, however, is whether such sentience *qua* sentience can exist without space and time, i.e. without spatio-temporal properties. Even those who talk of sentience *qua* sentience have to supply some kind of microscopic spatio-temporal body for such sentience. But, once one starts with the argument that sentience can exist without a body, one can also regard the world as nebula of sentience; and one can further hold that at some stage spatio-temporal and material properties emerge from sentience and limit the sentience. It is this limitation which may give rise to a manifest self-consciousness which is only potentially present in the sentience, i.e. although existing, it is only in a hidden form. Once one makes this assumption, one is thinking of sentience as a whole. One cannot think of sentience in a pluralistic manner; one must think of it as a common substance just as a materialist conceives of matter as a whole as a common substance. This concept of sentience is justified by man's concept of the whole. Let us imagine that the world consists of several inseparable elements, one of which is sentience. As soon as one thinks of a whole which cannot be separated into several independent parts, one has no other alternative but to imagine the world in terms of being sentient, i.e. sentience is characterized as the whole. Once we assume that the world is a unity, it is natural to think that the world is sentient and that it appears to be manifold on account of spatio-temporal limitations, i.e. *samvṛtatva* or *paricchinnatva,* which also is one of the manifestations of sentience itself. But, instead of having unitary or holistic concept of the world, if one thinks of the world as a name for the manifold, then it is possible to think of a variety which may consist of both sentient and non-sentient elements, and the sentient element would not be segregated from its spatio-temporal body.

However, once one accepts sentience as an element in the world or once the world is accepted as a manifestation of sentience, the way for epistemology, not only of knowledge but also of beliefs, has been paved. It then becomes possible for one either to construct or imagine some belief systems, particularly when one goes further and further away from reality. One thus constructs a theory about *karma* and thinks that one must always be active such

that one *karma* must lead to some other *karma;* and also that *karma* requires an agent too, for its performance. Therefore, the agent of *karma* must also be immortal; that it must exist beyond the point of death so that the rebirth must be possible; and that there must be heavens and hades. All these are make-belief systems. If one is self-conscious, one can know through knowledge that they are make-belief systems. And once it is so known, all the systems of make-beliefs will simply evaporate. But, so long as one is ignorant of their make-belief character they will go on haunting one as real. Our social beliefs perpetuated by Pūrvamīmāṁsā are of this make-belief nature. These naive beliefs are shattered only when one knows that as a knower one is capable of creating them. That which is created by our make-beliefs can be destroyed by knowledge. If something is a part of physical reality, it cannot be so destroyed by knowledge. I think the main propositions of Advaita theory tell us that propositions of Pūrvamīmāṁsā are the creations of a make-belief system. Of course, while asserting this, the Advaitin also creates certain other make-beliefs, viz. that the world is a unitary whole; that the world is an illusion, i.e. everything is a make-belief. And somehow *karma, jīva,* etc. though believed to be make-beliefs, still persist as real beliefs in some other chambers of our mind and peep into Uttaramīmāṁsā system. On account of such further beliefs, I think, some of the basic and important propositions of Advaita Vedānta are lost to us, and we again fall in the trap of Pūrvamīmāṁsā which starts controlling our mind.

# On Marx's conception of rationality

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Some time ago, Roy Edgley complained that even scholars such as Colletti and Althusser 'cling to conceptions of Science that reveal the stubborn power of bourgeois ideology and in doing so fail to appreciate the real depth of Marx's philosophical revolution, a revolution that reshapes...'epistemological concepts of knowledge, rationality, logic and science itself.'[1]

My attempt in the present paper will be to explore the nature of this revolution by focusing on just one of the concepts Edgley mentions: the Marxian notion of rationality. This attempt, I might add, is motivated by a profound dissatisfaction with mainstream Anglo-American thought and the fate that the concept of rationality has met at its hands.

If the social sciences have been offered any paradigm shift at all comparable to the revolutions that have shaken the foundations of the natural sciences, it was that offered by Karl Marx. That this revolution has not yet transformed men's thinking about the social process is perhaps just a pointer to the fact that so much more is at stake in the paradigms accepted by social scientists, so much greater the ideological pressures because so much closer are they to the fate of humanity as a whole. There is ample evidence in the literature generated even by Marxists and Marxologists that the old established ways of thinking die very hard.

In exploring the difference between Marxian and conventional epistemology (whether of the empiricist or the idealist variety), it will become clear that Marx's notion cannot be viewed as one alternative amongst the numbers available that either plead for universalism, pluralism or relativism, that debate instrumental *vs.* absolute rationality or that simply advocate sociologism, irrationalism and anarchism. We are, indeed, in the realm of incommensurables.

The empiricist revolt against rationalism cannot be seen as merely an epistemological one despite the best efforts of empiricists to assimilate the realm of ontology to that of epistemology. We in the profession recall the period—the longest period—when metaphysics became a bad word and 'ontology' and antiquated one. This is because rationalism is itself so much more than an epistemology: 'The Real is Rational', so Hegel claimed. In rejecting rationalistic idealism, empiricism, as is well known, created its own variety of subjective idealism eschewing all questions of the objective real and centering all its interests in the question, 'What can be known?' At the hand of phenomenalists and sense data theorists reason became the many little reasons that men might have in carrying on their day-to-day affairs.

And this pluralist atomism is bound together by no cementing agent other than abstract formal logic. In this perspective, clearly no question regarding the nature of a substantive rationality can make sense. Metaethics supplants questions about the rational life which has, indeed, become unintelligible to minds conditioned to an understanding of the rationality of action as a means-end relationship. Habermas puts it thus: '...a theory which confuses control with action . understands society as a nexus of behavioural modes, for which rationality controls but not by a coherent total consciousness.'[2]

I will not go into the implications of the atomistic ontology underlying empiricism; this has been done before. My concern is to focus on the distinction that is constantly assumed to exist between the methodological/explanatory notion of rationality and the substantive/normative one. The positivists, indeed, behave as though the latter sense does not exist or at least is outside the jurisdiction of scientific enquiry. But that this position cannot be held consistently is now well recognized. The untenability of the fact-value dichotomy in (at least) the social sciences is almost beyond question. Still its implication for a new direction to social enquiry have yet to be made explicit. When this is done, I think it will generally be seen that a return to Marxist theory or at least metatheory or something very like it becomes unavoidable. For, in Marx's writings, the tension between rationality as a methodological postulate of human action and as a substantive concept and the goal of human existence does not exist. Nor is there room for either the pluralism or the relativism that have plagued the concept at the hands of mainstream (both positivist and idealist) philosophers of social science. That the fusion and (not merely the external relationship) of fact and value in Marx's thought has not been fully comprehended even by Marxists is witnessed by statements such as the following by John Mepham:

If there is an epistemological break in Marx's work it is not one which results in the elimination of normative discourse. The problem, however, is to investigate the relation between the normative and the theoretical in Marx's different works or more generally to investigate the different functions and effects of the normative in different kinds of discourse.[3]

In Mepham's view: '...these normative themes...stand in a certain relation to the cognitive themes which are dominant in *Capital*. The question is, what is this relation?'[4] Mepham does not himself answer this question, but the statement and, indeed, the very question that follows itself reveals the lack of positivist thought. It is not just that Marx does, whereas positivists do not, entertain normative considerations in elaborating his theory of knowledge, and that thus the problem for us is to see how he manages to 'relate' the two. Marx himself never perceived this 'problem', and could hardly have been concerned by the fact that no purely cognitive theme occurs in his works including *Capital*. For Marx, as Mepham himself notes, not knowl-

edge in the abstract but 'knowledge of societies and of nature, control over the forces determining human lives, and the satisfaction of historically developed human needs, are ends in themselves'.[5] This is the most crucial consideration in any reconstruction of the Marxian notion of rationality.

It is natural if not actually rational to begin with Marx's Hegelian antecedents. After all Marx's early training was in the school established by the philosopher of reason himself. Hegel's famous claim that what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational may, indeed, be interpreted in ways that Marx rejected outright. But, on any interpretation, the Hegelian belief in the ultimate actualization of the rational had an undoubtedly deep influence on Marx's own thinking. That so much ink has been poured over the question of Marx's rejection of Hegel only reflects the more fundamental and very fierce controversy between scientism and humanism in the social sciences. At least protagonists in the debate appear to equate, if not to identify, the rejection of Hegel with Marx's scientific period and acceptance of the latter with a period of philosophical humanism (the young Marx).[6] But Marx's rejection of Hegel was certainly not of humanism *per se*. Rather Marx castigated Hegel for his abstractionism; his rejection was that of apriorism inevitable in philosophical idealism and of the notion of a static human essence. What Marx rejected, then, was a spurious humanism that contained no reference to concrete historical man. Althusser, indeed, rejects this distinction between unreal and real humanism; he rejects 'real humanism' even if it 'presents itself as the humanism that has as its content not an abstract speculative object, but a real object'.[7] In Althusser's words:

The recourse to ethics so deeply inscribed in every humanist ideology may play the part of an imaginary treatment of real problems. Once *known*, these problems are posed in precise terms: they are organizational problems of the forms of economic life, political life and individual life. To pose these problems correctly and to resolve them in reality, they must be called by their names, *their scientific names*.[8]

The very concept of man, says Althusser, 'seems to me to be useless from a scientific viewpoint, not because it is abstract but because it is not scientific.'[9] To criticize Althusser for the circularity in his argument is less to the point. The real fallacy to be highlighted is the supposition in Althusser's writings that the 'new' method of scientific rationality, through which the later Marx developed his theory of society, of the forces of production, the relations of production, of the superstructure and of ideology is value-neutral and free of the notion of man. Althusser certainly has over-stated the case for scientific rationality in a manner that many non-Marxist (positivist) thinkers would hesitate to do. But let us see how Marx himself used these notions, and whether his usage underwent a radical change as his theory 'matured'. In 1845, Marx made statements such as: 'Reason has always existed but not

always in rational form.' That he was not referring even at this stage to a Hegelian abstraction but to the concrete real is evidenced by his further insistence that 'it is not enough that thought should seek to realize itself; reality must also strive towards thought.' And, 'theory itself becomes a material force when it has siezed the masses'. Marx's reflections on rationality were at no point of time concentrated on the rational *per se,* nor on the task of constructing rationalist systems. His prime concern was the investigation of rational and *ipso facto* irrational forms of social and political relations as when he noted that 'since the proletariat is the recipient of the concentrated irrationality of society, it follows that its emancipation is at the same time the emancipation of society as a whole'.[10] Again, with reference to the modern state, Marx said:

> ... the political state (even where it has not yet been consciously imbued with Socialist demands) includes in all its modern forms all the demands of reason. But it does not stop at this. It assumes reason as universally realized. Hence it finds out that its ideal determination is always challenging its real preconditions.

Marx's understanding of rationality, then, was anything but instrumental; it was substantive to the core; yet, being historical, it was not essentialistic. It would, however, be far too simplistic to perceive this as the only or even the major difference between him and mainstream Anglo-American thinking on the subject. For Marx never merely opposed the rational to the irrational, never merely condemned the present and advocated a further utopian society. His thought encompassed much greater subtleties than that. Indeed, it was his unique manner of perceiving the relation between the rational and the irrational that distinguishes and distances him from all other ways of viewing the problem of rationality. His was no static absolutist conception as that of those social scientists who uphold Western scientific civilization as the acme of the rational form of life. Nor, as hardly needs demonstration, was he a relativist tolerent of different forms of life and *weltanschauungen* as is currently fashionable with the more 'enlightened' circle of sociologists of knowledge. The characteristic way in which he approached the problem both in substance and method is perhaps well brought out by a comparison with that of Weber. Marx, no less than Weber, was acutely aware of the rationalization of modern capitalist society. He saw that at the phenomenal level a fully articulated system of political economy existed, both in theory and in practice, which displayed a set of internal relations and a conceptual structure that was clearly not irrational in any immediate or obvious sense. As he said: 'The categories of bourgeois economy are forms of thought expressing *with social validity* the conditions and relations of a definite historically determined mode of production ...'[11] (italics mine). But, whereas Weber (howsoever reluctantly) bowed down before the modern age, and resigned

himself to the iron cage, for (as he saw it) this organization represented the quintessence of the rationalization of human existence, Marx refused to see the true flowering of capitalist society as the end-point of history. For this reason, it was not even a historical phenomenon to be bemoaned. This effloresence alone, Marx believed, can beget the fruits of socialism. Thus, phenomenal success only shrouded its essential self-destructiveness. Marx's major criticism against the vulgar economists was of their superficial perception of reality which 'stems from ... the fact that it is only the direct form of manifestation of relations that is reflected in their brains and not their *inner connection*'.[12] In contrast to this, Marx urged that 'the object itself must be studied in its development, there must be no arbitrary divisions, the rational (*vernuft*) of the thing itself must be disclosed in its contradictoriness and find its unity in itself'.[13] Indeed, in the larger historical scheme, Marx emphasized again and again the rationale of the capitalist state, for only in bourgeois society does total alienation, the *sine qua non* of the revolutionary consciousness, exist. The stage of capitalism is for Marx not necessary in the sense of being deterministically inevitable, but is a necessary precondition and precursor of the socialist state. Therein lies at once its phenomenal rationality, its fundamenal irrationality and its historical rationale. This position is not merely an alternative to Weber's. They are in an important sense incommensurable positions. For Weber the rationalization of life in modern capitalist society is to be identified with the fruits of science; hence he saw no possibility of reversing this process. In Weber's words: 'Scientific work is chained to the course of progress.' By progress, of course, Weber referred to the possibilities of modern rational technology, 'the mechanized petrification', which he saw as the fate of the times. Weber had no philosophy of history. All development was for him truly contingent; at best certain elective affinities could be discerned between ideas and social structure. It is significant that for Weber history has come to an end with modern capitalism, whereas for Marx history, the true history of man has not even begun. Yet Weber cannot, as Marx does, provide any theoretical justification for the position he takes (hence his close connection with the schools of phenomenology and ethnomethodology). For Weber, indeed, there can be no concept of the ideological consciousness, no dislocation between appearance and reality. As Ted Benton points out: 'It is not possible within Weber's conceptual position to pose the possibility of an objective and scientific employment of the various techniques and criteria for "interpreting" cultural objects which he discusses'.[14] But the lack of such criteria implies that any interpretative sociology cannot distinguish the false from the veridical and thus leads inexorably to the sort of relativism that later becomes explicit in Winch's work, though the latter embodies a societal relativism whereas Weber's is individualistic. All this stands in sharp and strong constrast to Marx who saw the problem of understanding social reality at two levels: the phenomenological one and also the deep structural one. What appears in the garb

of rationality and validity at the former level must nevertheless be histori-
cally understood and explained. It might well then be exposed in all its
contradictoriness as a moment in the dialectical process rather than as the
eternal nature of things. Thus Marx writes: '... from the moment that the
bourgeois mode of production and the conditions of production and distri-
bution which correspond to it are recognized as historical, the delusion of
regarding them as natural laws of production vanishes.'[15]

Clearly, every ideology striving for universality contains its own rationa-
lity. Thus, the concepts of wage and, indeed, the system of wages, the ideas
of value and of individual freedom and equality, cohere in a manner that
gives rise in theory to political economy and in practice to the entire socio-
economic capitalist structure of which theoretical economics is the 'true repre-
sentation and valid account.' Only after scientific analysis are the mechanisms
of the subversion of reality revealed, the structural dynamics exposed. What
needs emphasis here is that the naive dichotomies of true/false, rational/ir-
rational have no place in Marx's dialectical thought. Yet he never succumbs
to cognitive relativism. There is always another level at which the rationality
of any system can and must be historically situated. To take an example from
the Marxian critique of individualism, Marx does not merely criticize the
abstract idea of individualism of classical economics but also explains its
apparent acceptability and analyses its origins and historical character. He
states: 'Man originally appears as a species being, a tribal being, a herd
animal ... Exchange itself is a major agent of this individualization ... Con-
temporary civil society is consequently the realized principle of individua-
lism ...'.[16]

Again, writing on the trinity formula Marx says:

... it is natural for the actual agents of production to feel completely at
home in these estranged and irrational forms of capital-interest, land-
rent, labour-wages, since these are precisely the forms of illusion in which
they move about and find their daily occupation. It is therefore just as
natural that vulgar economy, which is no more than a didactic, more
or less dogmatic translation of everyday conceptions of the actual
agents or production and which arranges them in a certain rational order
should see precisely in this trinity, which is devoid of all inner connec-
tion, the natural and indubitable lofty basis for its shallow pom-
pousness.[17]

Not only this, Marx also accounts for the perpetuation of such an under-
standing, for as he continues: 'This formula simultaneously corresponds to
the interests of the ruling classes by proclaiming the physical necessity and
eternal justification of their sources of revenue and elevating them to a
dogma.'[18]

Thus, Marx's critical thought is theory and metatheory in one breath.

That, indeed, is its salient feature. Conventional epistemologies, such as
empiricism and idealism, are not just incorrect, they are misconceived, since
they see all theory as a collection of dead facts. Though Weber possessed some
very important insights into the relations that exist between sectional interests
and ideas and socio-economic structures, he finally capitulated to positivism
in uncritically accepting Western science and the capitalistic mode of pro-
duction as the inevitable, final, universal and most rational. In spite of his
deep and abiding interest in history and his keen historical studies, he aban-
doned the very notion of history. The end of *Protestant Ethic* reads as though
time (at least in the Western world) has now come to a standstill. He was far
from seeing either science or capitalism as moments in the historical process;
the most that he could say is that they are its culmination. His epigones and
those of the positivist school have followed suit. Thus, Winch has talked
about Wittgenstein, of the rationality of different forms of life—religion be-
ing one of them, science another—but has not cared to probe the structural
factors underlying such forms. In consequence, he is forced to an all-out
relativism. I have written elsewhere on the Popperian notion of rationality
which is as empty and formal as Winch's is pluralistic and overabundant
with content. Here I only wish to emphasize its utter incommensurability
with the Marxian notion and, indeed, to show its total inadequacy in the
presence of the Marxian conceptual scheme. In spite of his frequent protesta-
tions against the label of positivism, Popper's philosophy of social science
rigidly adheres to the fact/value dichotomy. Nowhere is this clearer than in
his delineation of the concept of rationality and the rationality principle
which he sees as the cornerstone of social scientific explanation. His great
insistence on seeing it as a formal explanatory principle, as a zero-principle
as he puts, it seeks to rob the notion of all normative content. But he accom-
plishes this only at the expense of rendering it totally ineffective. As Roy
Bhaskar puts it, in criticizing the manner in which the concept is used in
contemporary positivist social science, especially neo-classical economic
theory: 'Rationality, purporting to explain everything, ends up explaining
nothing. To explain a human action by reference to its rationality is like ex-
plaining some natural event by reference to its being caused. Rationality
is in this sense, a presupposition of investigation.'[19] One is reminded of a
similar emasculation of 'action' by Parsons decade or two earlier.

Marx's major contribution as opposed to this must be seen in his identi-
fication not only of the rational with the real but also of the rational with the
just. He saw no need to feel shy of the normative and evaluative connotation
of the term even as he used it and its antithesis irrational as an explanatory
notion. Morals and method cannot be kept apart, if one's method is, in fact,
directed at analysing critically the prevalent social structure with a view not
only to understanding it but also to changing it. What is more, Marx saw that
it is not enough to explain the social structure and damn all current social
theory. *Since theory is itself part of the structure*, it, too, must be compre-

hended within a larger explanatory system. In fact, many of his comments apply indifferently to the capitalist system and the economic theory that represents it. They are both the participants and the product of the same consciousness. Thus, Marx speaks of the capitalist, the worker and the economist together when he says: 'In the eyes of the capitalist, the worker, and the economist (who cannot conceive of the work process outside the process of capitalist appropriation) the material elements of the labour process appear in virtue of their material properties, as capital.'[20] And, later, in a passage that starts with reference to the economist and shifts its argument almost imperceptibly to the perspective of the capitalist, Marx says:

These errors are explicable in terms of the hold that capital exercises on the economists. Infact, the exchange of a lesser quantity of objectified labour against a larger quantity of living labour appears as a single and unique process without, in the capitalists eyes, any intermediary: does he not pay for the labour only after it has been valorized.[21]

Thus, the rationality of the explanatory model is intrinsically connected with that of the social system. Marx stressed the isomorphism between theory and its object. But he saw more. He saw the transitory nature of the object even as he theoretically analysed it. Hence he also perceived the limitations, the transient validity of the theory that mirrors its object. Thus, all ideology is both rooted in reality, and yet will be overcome by it. And this transformation will take place both at the level of theory and the object of knowledge (a good example of such a phenomenon/concept is the fetishism of the commodity) transforming both the material base and consciousness with it.

But the Marxian concept of rationality does not differ from the classical and neo-classical concept only in the dialectical nature of its realization, important though this difference is. For Marx's search for the rational was not merely methodological and epistemological; inspired by Hegelian philosophy it was much more than that. As Giddens has pointed out:

The words 'free' and 'rational' are as closely associated in Marx's writings as they are in that of Hegel ... To be free is to be autonomous, and thus not impelled by either external or internal forces beyond rational control ... In this way acceptance of moral requisites is not the acceptance of alien constraint but is the recognition of the rational.

This most important emphasis of Marx's thought has tended to get lost in the voluntarism/determinism debate. Writer after writer has wanted to take sides on the question whether Marx was a sociologist or a revolutionary, scientist or philosopher. For Marx himself this would be a fruitless debate of notion if not an unintelligible one: he addressed himself to the totality of human situation.

Marxist epistemology does, indeed, closely involve ethics in more ways than one. First, Marx showed that all ideas including the ones that govern the moral code are a function of the economic (with broadest sense) structure of the societies in which they thrive. Secondly, he himself offered an ethics, the ethics of revolution at the same time as he offered a science of society. There are no incompatibilities here.

### NOTES

1.  R. Edgley, *Issues in Marxist Philosophy*, vol. iii, p. 10.
2.  Paul Comerton (ed.), *Critical Sociology: Selected Readings Adorno, Habarmas, Marcuse and Neumann*, p. 332.
3.  See J. Mepham, *Issues in Marxist Philosophy*, vol. i, p. 158.
4.  *Ibid.*, p. 159.
5.  *Ibid.*
6.  See Louis Althusser, *For Marx*, p. 343.
7.  *Ibid.*, 242.
8.  *Ibid.*, 247.
9.  *Ibid.*, 243.
10. Karl Marx, *Early Works*, pp. 58-59.
11. Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. i, 1938, p. 47.
12. See 'Letter to Engels 1867' in *Marx-Engels Correspondence*.
13. Easton and Guddat (eds.), *Writings of Young Marx*, p. 43.
14. T. Benton, *Philosophical Foundation of the Three Sociologies*, p. 126.
15. Karl Marx, *Theories of Surplus Values*, p. 429.
16. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, pp. 395-96.
17. Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. iii, p. 505.
18. *Ibid.*
19. See Roy Bhaskar, *Issues in Marxist Philosophy*, p. 115.
20. See D. Mehellan, *Selected Writings*, p. 510.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 511.

# Reason in criticism

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In this paper I shall be ranging rather widely and loosely over issues which are relevant to answering the questions: To what extent is a critic, in passing judgements on works of art—such as 'This is good because it possesses these qualities ...' 'This is better than that because it has ...'—committed to a set of principles of criticism? And if he is so committed, what is the nature of the justification of such principles? Actually, it is impossible to deal very satisfactorily with these questions without going into many issues involving the nature of aesthetic concepts and aesthetic experience—the concept of *rasa*, for instance, or the idea of the representation of an emotion in a work of art, etc.; and from most of these issue I shall have to prescind, which is perhaps unfortunate. But I may as well state here, with a brevity excusable by limitation of space and by the obviousness, as I think, of the truth in this matter, that it *is* a legitimate and, indeed, an essential activity of the critic to make value judgements. Granted this, it is a question of what he is committed to in making them.

To many people the way in which generality enters into criticism has seemed straightforward. Thus, take the following passage which I consider typical:

> Whenever two things are compared in judgement, they are estimated in relation to some common property or properties which one thing is alleged to possess in a greater or equal degree than another. When any work is judged to be better than another it is always and inescapably judged to have greater value in respect of some property $P$ which it possesses in greater degree than that other. And all statements that a work is good or not good involve such comparisons with some implied class of other works of art. And whenever such a judgment is made the property $P$ is assumed to be an essential element in the excellence of works of art, a contributing factor in whatever it is we mean by beauty. It becomes a norm, standard of criticism.

I shall not mention the name of the author of this passage; also I shall ignore the effortless lapse into fallacy in the last two sentences where the author concludes that any property that is relevant to any evaluation is relevant to every evaluation. As for the rest of the passage, it may strike one as trivially true; but it depends on how much is made of it. The author feels entitled to conclude that 'a theory is latent in every act of appreciation'. The word 'theory' is likely to give trouble here; one could take it in a very weak sense,

so that someone, who holds that a certain work was good becuase it possessed property *P*, was thereby committed to the 'theory' that under certain circumstances *P* was a good-making property. Taken in a stronger sense, as it is often done by aestheticians, it is plainly false. To praise a work for its delicacy is not to be committed either to the view that delicacy is always a virtue in a work or that it is a necessary property of good works; or to be committed even to the view that there is a theory of art in which delicacy takes its place among other qualities, if by 'theory' we mean something comprehensive in which the various elements stand to one another in some fairly close and complex relationship.

Nonetheless, even though someone may produce a large number of judgements on art without its being obvious that there is a 'theory' or general view of art implicit in them, it is unlikely that anyone deeply interested in a given art form will not make judgements which do have such implications. A critic, who contents himself with an evaluative vocabulary that is not clearly susceptible of considerable degree of systematization or even of some hierarchical arrangement, will not be of much help. It can even be said that some such arrangement is inevitable. Thus, supposing he confines himself to terms like 'delicate', 'playful', 'vigorous', 'elemental', 'colourful', and so on, he will have to face the question: 'Why do these qualities make you judge works favourably?' To a question like this he will perhaps have to produce some such answer as 'They are pleasing', and in spite of the limpness of the reply, it will show that he *has* a general view of a kind, with 'pleasing' as the key term, and a number of pleasure-producing properties ranged below, so that while a certain pretty specific evaluative term will not, by itself imply a general view, it will have to be subsumed under a more general term which does. And the most general term under which it is subsumed must be, in the widest sense, an 'affective term', i.e. it must refer to responses which are produced by a work's having such a property. Thus, it is no good moving, in one's system of aesthetic values, straight from 'This is elemental' to 'This is aesthetically good.' Without also having some such principle one's system would be left hanging in the air, and it would be unintelligible that one should make aesthetic judgements at all. It looks, then, as if anyone who makes judgements is committed to some theory in a suitable sense of that term. Does this mean that a critic should *state* what his general principles are, even if they are no more nourishing than 'Works of art, to be good, must produce pleasure' and attempt some kind of vindication of them? This may seem to be the normal conclusion to draw. Let us look at a very unambiguous expression of this view in modern British thought and a practising critic's reply to it. This is the fairly well-known exchange between Wellek and Leavis. About Leavis' range of critical judgements on English poetry Wellek says:

> I could wish that you had stated your principles more explicitly and defended them systematically. Allow me to sketch your ideal of poetry, your

> norm with which you measure every poet: your poetry must be in serious relation to actuality; it must have a firm grasp on the actual, the object, it must be in relation to life, it must not be cut off from direct vulgar living ... (further norms are listed) ... the only question I would ask you is to defend this position more abstractly and to become conscious that large ethical, philosophical, and of course, ultimately aesthetic *choices* are involved.

In his reply, Levirs refers to Wellek's phrase 'your ideal of poetry, your norm with which you measure every poet' and comments:

> That he should slip into this way of putting things seems to me significant, for he would, on being challenged, agree, I imagine, that it suggests a false idea of the procedure of the critic. Words in poetry demand a kind of responsiveness that is incompatible with the judicial one-eye-on-the-standard approach suggested by the phrase. The critic—the reader of poetry—is indeed concerned with evaluation, but to figure him as measuring with a rod that he brings up to the object and applies from the outside is to misrepresent the process. The critic's aim is, first, to realize as sensitively and completely as possible this or that that claims his attention: and a certain valuing is implicit in the realizing. As he matures in the experience of the new thing he asks, explicitly and implicitly: 'Where does this come? How does it stand in relation to...? How relatively important does it seem? And the organization into which it settles as a constitutent in becoming 'placed' is an organization of similarly 'placed' things, things that have found their bearings with respect to one another, and not a theoretical system or a system determined by abstract considerations ... Of course, the process of making fully conscious and articulate should, as the critic matures with experience, represent a growing stability of organisation (the problem is to combine stability with growth).

This, though it is weighty and persuasive, may leave one feeling that, though it gives an admirable account of how man forms and develops his taste, the fundamental challenge, which concerns the justification of one's judgements, still remains unanswered. For two people's tastes could develop in the way that Leavis outlines, yet their 'maps or charts' might still differ widely—this is, in fact, what happens the whole time. What then? (The resolution of such a conflict, it seems, could only come about by moving from the admired works and the reasons given for admiring them to a discussion of these reasons themselves to the elaboration of a critical system, which would in fact, somehow involve showing what are and what are not valid reasons for praising a work and why they are or are not valid.) But can such a resolution be achieved?

Suppose, one admits that one's critical principles *are* capable of abstract formulation. What is the nature of the support that we can offer for the result-

ing abstractions? We cannot, it should be obvious, regard a statement of the kind 'Those works of art are good which possess property $P$' as a generalization, because it is not clear that we can independently characterize a work as good, i.e. independently of the general statement. It is not as if we proceed 'This work is good and possesses $P$', 'That work is good and possesses $P$', etc. so any work possessing $P$ is good. Works are good, *because* they possess $P$. And yet, it will turn out, it's no good producing such abstractions and trying to defend them at a general level without reference to particular works. It is the difficulty of grasping that we must hold these two positions together that may lead people to hold one and reject the other. To take the first of them. The explanations of the critic are not like the hypotheses of the scientist, because the latter are advanced as generalizations to be refuted by counter-instances. It is, I presume, safe to say, without distorting the modern conception of science, that, finally, all the general statements of the scientist are such that they can be refuted by a sufficiently powerful counter-instance or a set of counter-instances which are characterizable independently of the hypothesis being refuted. But there is not a clear parallel to this in aesthetics as in ethics. And yet one does not want to say that one does not arrive at one's values—both in ethics and aesthetics—through encountering and pondering particular cases. But there are important differences between the situation in morality and that in art. One may be told 'It is wrong to do that' and have it made clear to one that it is not only this particular action but this *kind* of action that is wrong: notoriously, one is given rules of thumb as a child without their point being made clear to one. That one does learn moral values in this way is because it is vitally important that people should behave in certain ways, before they are able to appreciate the justification of the injunctions. In art the situation is different: one's taste develops through encounter with a number of individual works from which something like a scheme of values gradually emerges, if it does; one is not educated in art by being told, e.g. to admire certain things and disapprove of others in the hope that one will understand the point of these admirations and disapprovals later: such a procedure will be evidently absurd. Speaking very broadly, one might say that both in morality and in art, there is ultimately a tie-up between likings, desires, etc. on the one hand, and 'values' on the other, or between expressions of one's feelings about things and one's evaluative judgements. In morality, if we bring these together, it is first of all, by learning that values may not be related to one's likings; in fact, this is the inevitable way in which we learn the moral language. We might say that we learn the language of wanting, etc. and the language of duty and goodness to a large extent in separation; and some people never succeed in bringing them into a satisfactory relationship. To repeat the main point here. We are taught rules and principles first, and understand their relevance, their relation to satisfactions, later, if at all. But in our training in art the procedure is more of the following kind: confining ourselves for the sake of simplicity to literature, we, first of all, read

stories and poems, and find ourselves getting certain sorts of pleasures from them; and at this stage there is little use for an evaluative vocabulary which serves a separate purpose from the expression of liking, etc. It is only after a very considerable amount of reading when we find that the pleasure we get from some works is much more intense than others, that some works are moving while others are merely exciting, that in some we find new things each time we go back to them while others wear thin, and so on, that we begin to have a serious use for an evaluative vocabulary. And as some people never succeed in relating moral language to the language of wanting etc. so many people never manage to tie up the language of liking, enjoying, etc. with the language of aesthetic value.

The way, then, in which aesthetic taste develops is one of the factors which make it difficult to think sensibly about the nature of principles of criticism. But let us look, for a moment at the critic's obligation in relation to his principles. Is there something rather silly about getting him to state them in general terms? When a critic evaluates a work on the basis of certain qualities that he thinks the work has, it is not merely that the works that he admires embody qualities which he has determined upon as being valuable; and that these qualities could, therefore, be considered abstractly in respect of their entitlement to play a key role in a system of critical values. It is only through reference to a given set of works which are taken to manifest the quality concerned that we shall be able to grasp the proper force of the critic's terms. Suppose, the critic uses the term 'True to human nature'. It is obvious that we have some idea what the phrase means; otherwise, the process of illuminating a work of art by applying it and illuminating it by reference to the work would be viciously circular. In fact, the process is a spiral one: we are directed to features of the work by the use of such a phrase, but it tends to operate only, in the first place, as a rough and ready guide to the more specific analysis that the critic proceeds to. Thus, a critic may begin by telling us that the body of works that he will be talking about is distinguished by a wonderful reverence for life and marked moral and spiritual intensity. To expect the critic at this point to expand on these phrases and to defend their use as criteria would be to miss the point, since it is not clear precisely what is to be defended. It is only after we read his analyses of the work that he is concerned with that we can give the phrases much force. And at that stage, but not before, the question may be put: do these criteria stand in need of defence and vindication? It might seem that they do, for someone might say: 'I understand more fully than I did before what the position of the critic in question is, and I also understand the dangers of treating it in the abstract, etc. But I am afraid I do not agree with his criteria; I admire, as the critic does not, a certain lightheartedness, a certain 'irresponsibility about life'. It is because of disagreement of this kind that the demand for general statements of principle arises, because it is not clear how one can defend one's position unless one

does state it explicitly; but it is not clear how one is to do this without being misleadingly vague. Is there any resolution to this?'

It might be thought that this appears as a difficulty because of a confusion—a confusion about what is good *qua* art and what art is good for. For example, someone might say: 'I do not deny that, from many points of view, the *Rāmāyāṇa* is much more important and vauable than a set of modern novels, like, say, those of Tagore's; but there is no question which is the finer as a work of art. What is likely to have confused people, so that they tend to deny this, is that we often find, mixed in with art, much moralizing and spiritualizing, etc. and people who are not artistically given take the sugar for the sake of the pill.'

One perhaps sees the point of such a line of argument, but the question remains as to what right such a person has to stress those features of a work of art that he does. Is not he, too, overlooking an enormous amount? If he agrees that some works which others praise may be more important for human welfare, say, than those he praises, why not admit that they are the greater works of art? The following position is a possible one: that someone should admit that he gains immense insight—moral and psychological—from *Rāmā-yaṇa* (which he counts as a work of art) but still prefers, say, Tagore's *The Last Poem* as a *literary work*. He would admit that a work of art could be the vehicle of truth, but it is not as vehicle of truth that he esteems it. In this case, he would admit that something that is a work of art produces better results than another work of art, but claim that it is not *qua* work of art that he primarily admires the former, so that aesthetically speaking he prefers the latter. The situation here is complicated by the fact that a work can be flawed by, say, explicit moralizing—the moralizing is sometimes good but out of place. But it would be a mistake to infer from this that, whenever we derive moral benefit from a work of art, it is not as a work of art that it has benefited us. And this will have to be substantiated by a demonstration of what a literary work is. It can be shown that there are methods of enlightening us morally and psychologically that are achievable only in works that are literary (are works of art), and this may, indeed, be regarded as the supreme task of literature. It may be claimed, that what makes the work an artistic work is what enables it to convey moral and psychological insights. The attempt here is to weld together the aesthetic and the moral, so that one cannot have one without the other. An obvious reply is possible: though such insights can be effectively presented in this way, so can other things be: there may be artistic presentation of moral and psychological truths; but there is artistic representation of other things too. What then? To this the reply may be that, when art is giving us the former kind of insight, that is most valuable; what else it does is no doubt enjoyable, etc. but not as valuable as this. And a reply to this could be: but this is to assess art by a criterion outside the aesthetic, to confuse what is good art with what art is good for. And to this one might say: if it is admitted that art can illuminate us psychologically, etc. then

nothing is more important than that the other experiences it can vouchafe are clearly of comparatively little moment. Let us contrast, e.g. football: apart from providing us with something like a *sui generis* pleasure, the pleasure of scoring goals in the most elegant and skilful way, say, football can also be good for building muscles and character; now it could be true that football was better for achieving the latter (let us call them the 'external' ends) if it was not at its best internally: perhaps elegance and skill carried to a certain point are connected with spitefulness and with such economy of movement that one's muscles do not get much chance to develop. In which case there will be two separate sets of criteria by which to judge a game of football: of course, the game might have been devised in the belief that it fulfils both sets of criteria simultaneously, so that assessing a game internally will give one the answer to the question what *good it did*. But it is far from clear that this is so; certainly it need not be. There is plenty of room for manoeuver here for both sides. The room is provided in these ways: the term 'art' is used so loosely that one can play around with it to some considerable extent, without one's tinkering seeming objectionable. The ways in which we delineate the range of works of art are extraordinarily fluid. Two kinds of moves may be made by those with strongly exclusive aesthetic theories. The first one leaves the loose use of 'art' as it is, and then establishes criteria for good and great art. It is not particularly interested in what is properly called 'art' but in what is important within the class. On occasion it may be said of a particular work 'This is not art at all', because it falls abjectly enough short of the theory's standards, but that is of no great moment. The second one gives an account of art in such a way that many of the things at present called works of art will be excluded: this tends to be the way of theorists like, e.g. Tolstoy. Each kind has its attractions and drawbacks. But, either way, considering the immense varieties of phenomena which normally are included under the head of 'art' and the immense varieties of responses that they evoke, there is a natural tendency on the part of those who are opposed to a given set of criteria for judgement to say: 'By what right do you consider yourselves entitled to exclude so many works which are normally considered art from that title, and also consider yourselves justified in setting up criteria of greatness or goodness in art which gives no chance of being great to many works which by *other* criteria are good or great?'

There is some force in this: the term 'art' is used so loosely, the responses evoked are so various, that it may not be very sensible to try on the old trick about 'only that is truly art which ...;' or 'only, works of art which fulfil the following criteria are great'; if you do try these lines, you will be accused of narrowness, arbitrariness and dogmatism. The trouble is that 'art' has sufficiently honorific associations for people to want to award it to certain kinds of thing that they specially care about. Nonetheless, the best thing might still be to overcome the urge to reserve 'art' or even 'great art' for certain works which one most admires, since it will always lead to more or less

unprofitable battles. Be as permissive, almost, as any one wants you to be in using the term. But then argue about the value of given kinds of art, and this applies within art forms too. The difference may seem to be a trifling one. But, I think, this suggestion will lead to more fruitful controversies. If some- one objects to your excluding Tagore, for instance, from the great tradition of Indian poetry, see whether he is saying: (a) on your criteria he should be in; in that case it will be a matter of comparing his works in detail with those which do constitute your 'great tradition'; or (b) your criteria might perhaps be useless or perverse, since they exclude Tagore; in that case it is a matter of evaluating the criteria.

So now, faced with (b), we are back again to the crucial question. I may be allowed to be a little charitable to myself and say that the point of the lengthy detour to be back to it is perhaps that we shall not be tempted to approach it in a certain common way, i.e. as an issue about the distinction between what art is in itself and what art is for. The earlier part of the essay has shown that it is no good trying to tackle the question of opposing criteria until we have seen them in action, until a critic has shown to us what he means by them. But where do we go from here? It seems to be that the dis- cussion is bound to become, at this stage, moral—in perhaps a wide sense of that term—that is, concerned with what things make us better men, and with what things are most valuable in themselves. That this is so here in discussion of aesthetic criteria and not so in the case of, say, games, is be- cause it is demonstrably the case that many works of art do evoke responses which are in the area of the moral: they both evoke feelings which are inti- mately connected with our moral being and present us with psychological and moral truths and falsehoods. This much cannot be disputed. In what ways they manage to do this is another matter. But, since they do it, there can be no escape for the critic who is concerned with the fundamentals of his task from confrontation with very wide moral considerations. That is, at least with very many works of art, there can be no adequate characterization of what they are, what qualities they possess, which does not evoke the use of moral terms. Some critics may feel that any work of which this is true is automatically to be considered as 'improper' art, or as only incidentally artis- tic. If they wish to say that, they may. The question then becomes one as to the comparative worth of 'pure' and 'impure' aesthetic experiences.

To summarize, I have not shown how disputations about aesthetic criteria can be resolved, but only how they necessarily lead to debates in the wider field of the moral, or of general evaluation of ends. Also, I have implied, though neglected to deal in explicit detail, that the understanding of critical criterion is to be gained by seeing what works the critic considers most worthy of attention, and how one relates them to one another in quality. It is by experiencing the works he stresses, and seeing what the point of his emphases is, whether or not one agrees with him, that one comes to understand more fully why he has the view of art that he does. His paradigms can be said both

to create his standards or criteria and to embody them. It is through them, the paradigms, that one realizes what kinds of demands can be made on art, what one can expect of it, even if, in reflecting on them and seeing what standards they provide us with, one comes to realize that some other works might do the same kind of thing better. This intimate relation between a critic's principles and paradigms means that the only profitable kind of dis- cussion about principles is by constant reference to the paradigms, appeals to re-experience them and see if what one finds there is not what matters most.

# Rediscovering Indian philosophy: a review of *The Birth of Meaning in Hindu Thought**

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> 'When a discipline reaches perfection, it does not cease to exist for the world; it is the world that ceases to exist for it.'
> —DAVID B. ZILBERMAN

I

How is it possible for philosophy to engage in a constant methodological-metaphilosophical dialogue with itself without those usual irrelevancies of the space and time of its occurrence which have proved too distracting to the critical mind in other contexts in the past? We can no longer afford to postpone the transcendental task set in this question where it is either Indian semantics or Indian philosophy which may matter most. Addressing itself to such a task, as it does, the posthumously published volume under review was written by the late David B. Zilberman (1938-1977), who did most of his scientific work in philosophy in Russia before becoming an immigrant in America in the Fall of 1973. Thus it was written for the methodologists and philosophers of science, epistemologists, metaphysicians, linguists, logicians and philosophers of language, among others. A many-faceted methodologically oriented work, it focuses on Indian semantics, Buddhism and the principal systems of Indian philosophy—*Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā* and *Vedānta*—among others, in those very aspects which have had to wait such a long time to become a subject of *rediscovery*. In particular, one should here think of the method(s) they must have employed for self-construction—and therefore of the possible cross-cultural methodological affinities—but which remained, for one reason or other, hidden in their very organization. Both in its aim and method of bringing those *methods*—with far-reaching methodological affinities—to the surface, as the very principles of their generation and operation, this is a work of its first kind that has appeared in a field it itself shapes. For the systems chosen become the very material of Zilberman's newly proposed 'modal methodology' as he calls it. It is of course intended to be of a universal application in the direction of 'reforming the whole idea of philosophy' as an object for a new 'science', viz., 'the science of philosophy' (p. 1). Thus it is 'one which allows the investigator to identify the proper modus of his involvement in a cultural tradition, precisely in the "metaphysical point" of change of the frame of reference' (p. 304). In the present case, then, *its* sensi-

tivity to the changing frames of reference dictates the choice of the material
for treatment, viz., the kind of framework(s)—in-the-making in the six systems
(= *darśanas*) of Indian philosophy, as also those of Pāṇini and Bhartṛhari in
Indian semantics. The choice is also explained by considering how much
Zilberman had been fascinated (see the references and the bibliography of
his selected works, pp. 361-65) by their whole family, by the Sanskrit langu-
age and, above all, by India as a whole. One should here think of India, with
him, as the land where Buddha was enlightened and Śaṃkara lived and
taught, as also the land where he himself 'mentally left his heart, his soul, and
to which he dedicated most of his works' (see Ellena Michnik-Zilberman's
excellent Introduction, xxi). True to his commitments, he continued working
on the *upamāna-khaṇḍa*, Gangeśa's treatise on analogy, along with the book
under review, until he breathed his last. As Ellena Michnik-Zilberman tells us
(Introduction, xx-xxi), shortly before his death in an accident (July 25, 1977),
he had planned for a research stay in India for the period 1978-1979. With
his work (1988) at last being made available to us through the *Boston Studies,*
thanks to the unsparing efforts of the Editor, Robert S. Cohen, and his col-
leagues, the more serious student can *now* subject his/her own methodologi-
cally oriented metaphilosophical understanding of Indian philosophical sys-
tems to the searching appraisals of an appropriate kind. But this is a task
which is not so easy as it is generally thought to be. For here much will
depend on what kind of *hermeneutic distance* from the target one is able to
choose according to one's mastery of the original texts.

Let us, then, ask, with Zilberman: How (or in what sense) is such an
understanding possible? The difficulties and the challenges of philosophizing
as thinking on the type of thinking called Indian philosophy have been hinted
at in an analogous question which Surendranath Dasgupta had posed as
early as 1922: In what sense is a History of Indian Philosophy possible?[1] If
at all this was intended to remind us that, in order to be possible, history of
*philosophy* demands *its* constant presence as a totality of events (= texts)-in-
the-making, we seem to have hardly made any progress since that time. For
more recently, some scholars[2] have complained about a lack of an attempt to
formulate a 'real' history/theory of *development* of *its* divergent systems, of
their genesis, growth and mutual interaction. Is history of philosophy just
a matter of formulation? Why is it no longer clear to us, as it was before,
what we are asking for? There have been, of course, attempts by the con-
temporary scholars, interested in this development, to trace their *origin* to the
socio-political conditions of their time and place, depending everytime heavily
on the kind of *externalist stance* (whether the sociological or the Marxist-
materialist) of the individual scholar himself. But their principal failure can
be found, I think, in their incapacity to recognize the inherent poverty of the
externalist stance generally. No approach based on *it* can achieve even its
limited aim of understanding the genesis of a philosophical system/text-in-
the-making *without* a clear metaphilosophical commitment to surpass its

actual historical movement. For, is not all philosophical history philosophy
speaking about itself? What is, then, puzzling and in need of explanation is
this: our methodological and metaphilosophical approaches, if any, when
employed to critically interpreting and developing the traditional *modes* of
philosophizing in India have failed us repeatedly for reasons yet to be diagnos-
ed by us. Where we may have been simply lacking such approaches altogether—
a case of failure in *hermeneutic stance*—we have been simply thinking of
their history as an *object* of investigation among other objects, completed and
finished once and for all, as if we have not been aware at all of the challenge
of rediscovering them not once but repeatedly. We were reminded of this
challenge long ago by Surendranath Dasgupta when he said that the *discovery*
of their important features, as also 'a due appreciation of their full signi-
ficance, may turn out to be as important to modern philosophy as the dis-
covery of Sanskrit has been to the investigation of modern philological re-
searches. It is unfortunate that the task of reinterpretation and re-valuation
of Indian thought has not yet been undertaken on a comprehensive scale'.[3]
Only a philosophy deeply aware of its every presence and every movement
could engage itself in such a meaningful, though difficult, task. It is in this
sense, then, that Zilberman's work will demand that attention from the spe-
cialist which it truly deserves as the first systematic attempt to meet a very
old challenge with a sophistication and spontaneity which characterize philo-
sophy when it responds to its own presence as thoughts/texts-in-the-making.
In what follows, I shall elaborate this point, while leaving the more difficult
task of rethinking the principal themes, with Zilberman, to the more serious
reader himself/herself.

II

Zilberman's study in the traditional systems of Indian semantics and epis-
temology has a clear and original methodological-transcendental orientation.
This may be expressed by means of a number of general principles of funda-
mental strategic importance to it, such as the following:

1.  The elementary plurality of cultural universes and forms of thinking
    must be admitted if appropriate methodological reflection on them is to
    be possible at all (pp. 299-300).
2.  No culture should be approached as an *object* for investigation, among
    other objects. On the contrary, every culture should be made a subject
    of study by application of modal methodology.
3.  As a corollary of (2), every type of philosophical thinking should sooner
    or later come under the purview of such a study as a metaphilosophical
    inquiry.
4.  The time and space of occurrence of a type of thinking, as a culture-in-
    the-making, will never tell us how unique it (in its character) is when
    taken in relation to others.

5.   It is, on the contrary, a correct understanding of *its* results which will give a clue to understanding its origin, but not *vice versa* (p. 8).

All of them (there may be many more) are applicable, according to Zilberman, in the case of Indian philosophy. And this is of particular importance to us as philosophers, the historical, archaeological and comparative researches in this field in this century notwithstanding. For here we have, among other difficulties the historians have recognized from time to time, yet to form a clear idea of its place in a sound typology of thinking based on the recognition of a pluralism of cultures full of intra-cultural and cross-cultural interactive possibilities. If there is, then, a central doctrine at work here, it is this: 'We must abandon in principle the way of approaching cultures as *objects* for investigation. We should try modal methodology...' with a 'a three-dimensional understanding of what culture is, how it is possible, and why it is inevitable from a particular point of thinking' (pp. 304-305; see also pp. 306-307). This transcendentally oriented methodology can be seen at work in a wide range of problems and themes which Zilberman has raised and organized (chapters 1-9) into the very material for the level and sophistication of his own philosophical thinking. For example, in chapter 2, we find him grappling with a set of interpretative tasks such as the following:

(*i*)  What is the Ṛgveda Saṃhitā as a whole, by using which methods, was it made as a whole?
(*ii*) What are the accomplishments of the grammarian Pāṇini as the propounder of the structural-normative method in ancient Indian linguistics?

In this style, each of the nine chapters unfolds itself into the other. Zilberman develops well-argued answers to questions of fundamental methodological and interpretative significance. He then traces them to the original sources (texts) themselves in fulfilment of his aim of working out an original interpretation of subjects as rich in range and depth as the following: The Hindu Systems of Thought as Epistemic Disciplines; The Birth of 'Meaning': A Systematic Genealogy of Indian Semantics; Dialectics in Kant and in the *Nyāya Sūtra; Nyāya* Gnoseology; *Advaita Vedānta;* Is the *Bodhisattva* a Sceptic?; Hindu Values and Buddhism; Understanding Cultural Traditions through Types of Thinking; and The Family of Hindu 'Visions' as Cultural Entities. The novelty of his method of interpretation is gradually revealed to us first in the types of question being raised and then in the kind of detailed treatment they receive. The aim which remains central to his design is to find an answer to the larger question: What made Indian philosophy *then* Indian? Here it should be understood as a question concerning the very *nature* and *possibility*, and not the beginnings, of Indian philosophy. The methodological priority of the transcendental task set in this question can no longer be ignored, even by those who have been pre-occupied with the following historical-genetic question: What was specific for the beginnings of 'philosophy in India'?

How and when did it begin? Where it has become necessary for him to raise questions of philosophical identity of Buddhism or of *Advaita Vedānta* or of other systems of classical Indian philosophy on the one hand and to rediscover achievements such as Pāṇini's grammar on the other, Zilberman's modal methodology shows, by the very power of its application to specific cases, the serious limitations of comparative philosophy. This is, then, one reason why one must keep asking, with him: What made Indian philosophy *then* Indian? What made it possible? Why is it irreducible, notwithstanding all sorts of its reductive comparisons with traditions of philosophical thinking in the West? What gives it, then, its unique structural identity across the different historical periods in which it seems to have unfolded, spreading itself in so many systemic variations on recurrent philosophical themes? Who amongst us, whether in India or in the West, may not have been, at one time or other, deeply disturbed by these foundational, though oft-misunderstood, and at times ill-formulated, questions? Yet many scholars have taken its Indianness, in a trivial sense, for granted. Accordingly, they have looked for their task more and more in the question of the legitimacy of the term 'philosophy' in an Asian context—and that too in the *genetic* context of the beginings of 'Indian philosophy'. On the other hand, there are those who would be too willing to reconcile themselves with one or the other of the following positions:

(*a*)  That unlike philosophy in the West, Indian philosophical systems have developed answers to all philosophical questions including those which interest the Western critical philosophical mind (p. 330).
(*b*)  That their content can always be restated in a language which is more familiar to the Western traditions (p. 330).
(*c*)  That they are essentially philosophies of life intervowen with the mokṣa/ nirvāṇa oriented other-worldly, religious world-views (p. 330).

There may be hosts of other types of questions lying deeply and unsuspectedly hidden in the structural identity question above. Some of these may have been superficially touched in our own time just because they are themselves premised on the alleged power of these systems to flood you at any time with ready answers to all conceivable philosophical questions, whether they concern consciousness, cognition, life before and after death, immortality of the soul, or *mokṣa/nirvāṇa*, whichever way preconceived. But we are surely in for a shock if we have been in a long slumber because we have never asked ourselves where exactly the familiar approaches to Indian philosophy must fail. Fail they must, because, first of all, they are unable to touch the real issues of interpretation for lack of an appropriate methodological orientation. Secondly, there have been complexities of a peculiar sort, largely bedevilling the recognition of Indian philosophy by the West, which have to do with what Zilberman admirably identifies as a problem of proper *hermeneutic distancing* (pp. 1-70, 330-49).

For the first time, then, we find Zilberman grappling with either the structural identity questions, taken in their proper methodological dimensions, or those setting transcendental tasks of reinterpretation. Never before has this methodological challenge, Indian philosophy has *always* posed to the serious modern scholar, been faced and met as boldly, or in such *hermeneutic depth,* as in the volume under review. There may have been no real turn, significant or revolutionary, in the tradition of Hindu thought in recent times. But we find ourselves today in a different situation. There is a reason to pause and to recognize, in the work of Zilberman, a novel approach already set on its way to rediscovering and reshaping its material in Indian philosophy. As a consequence, what we should expect is a transformation of the very *task* of understanding *it* into a methodologically and transcendentally oriented *hermeneutic scenario* of new possibilities and new challenges including those that await the historian of philosophy.

With his eyes set on the so-called 'root' texts (sūtras) of different philosophical traditions in India, Zilberman focuses on root-questions such as the following: What is the *Veda*? What role did the *Vedic* texts play in the very 'design printed upon the matter of Indian philosophical culture?'—(see p. 19). The creativity and originality of his methodology, in the Indian philosophical setting, shows itself, then, in the very task he has set himself. In his own words: 'I have employed my thought in a *certain way* to investigate how various different philosophies (not philosophers!) employed theirs to establish the principles of organization of their own thinking activity with respect not only to thinking, but behaviour and culture in general.'—(see Preface, p. xiii). What is remarkable is that this has been possible in our troubled times of which one could say, with Zilberman, the following: '...the history of philosophy is not at an end...its *genuine* history has simply not yet begun' (p. 2). But is this not also true of its methodology? Where it is the rich heritage of Indian philosophy which we would like to see properly anchored to its methodological self-awareness, the answer is in the affirmative. How reassuring it is in this context, then, to be told at last that *it* 'was not what it was because it was Indian ... On the contrary, it is that exceptionally and uniquely *primarily textual character* of it that constitutes its "Indianism" ' (Preface, xiv).

Wherein lies, then, one may oversimplifyingly ask, Zilberman's major achievement? This question calls for a detailed and critical appraisal of his work. I shall here refrain from undertaking such a difficult task. It should suffice here to say two things. First, Zilberman's work is remarkable for its choice of a proper *hermeneutic distance* from the object(s) it has made its philosophical subject in the original tradition of Hindu thought. And this is in itself a considerable methodological achievement where scholars have either failed or at best been less fair to the nature of their undertaking. Secondly, and as a consequence, it is able to focus on the methodological problems of understanding the method of philosophizing to be found in different variations in this tradition. It is here that it employs its strategy of working backwards, as it were, from the endresults to the origins. Proper *hermeneutic* 'distancing' from the primary text(s), taken as prior, is, as Zilberman declares, what is lying at the center of this tradition, or its six variations called six *darśanas*. It is, then, the methodological and epistemological priority of the text which had originally set the stage for philosophizing (in India) as thinking on text in a particular way. No historian of philosophy, who is true to his commitment, can afford to ignore this. It may be trivially true to say or imply that this traditional mode of philosophizing is deeprooted in us as Indians, in our mentality, as it were. But this should not have been allowed to close our own eyes to the possibility of querying the nature of that *hermeneutic* depth and distance which alone could be liberating for us by making us rethink and rediscover what Zilberman has aptly called the principle and the mechanism of its design (p. 9).

#### NOTES AND REFERENCES

1.  Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, Cambridge University Press, 1st edition, 1922, p. 62. Thus speaking of its principal systems, he wrote: '...it is hardly possible to say correctly at what time they began, or to compute the influence that led to the foundation of so many divergent systems at so early a period'—viz., the period of the composition of Upaniṣads.

2.  For example, K. Satchidananda Murty, *Philosophy in India: Traditions, Teaching and Research*, ICPR and Motilal Banarsidass, 1985, pp. 45-47.

3.  Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, Cambridge University Press, 1922, p. viii.

# Discussions

## SELF, NOT-SELF AND THE ULTIMATE—ŚAŃKARA'S TWO-TIERED DEFINITION-CUM-DESCRIPTION REVISITED

The major thrust of Śańkara's approach to the problem of self, not-self and the ultimate is presented in the *catussūtrī* (being his commentary on the first four *sūtras* of the *Brahmasūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa). His aim is to construe the *sūtras* so that they are consistent with the Upaniṣads (at least as he reads them). Śańkara is at heart a metaphysician: his concern is to explain the existence of the world in terms of the *ground* that makes its being possible. He confronts the problem of the *many*, i.e. the world comprises many things and beings, and is convinced that the world of multiplicity can be defined in terms of a one, which, following the Upaniṣads, he calls Brahman or the absolute. Śańkara believes that a critical reflection on the one can give us positive knowledge of the world and of our self. The conception of the one that can be arrived at through self-reflection on the inner self, or true self, he took to have been already accomplished in the Upaniṣads. Thus, all that was left for the metaphysician was to show what this conception involves, and indicate the limitations of trying to fathom ultimate reality through rational analysis.

With these prefatory remarks we can now examine Śańkara's investigations. Śańkara commences his reflections by commenting on the first *sūtra*. The *sūtra* reads: *athāto brahmajijñāsā* (now, therefore, the desired enquiry into Brahman) (*BSB*. I. 1.i).[1] The suggestion is that there is some need to look at the claim that Brahman is the ultimate nature of reality or that which is really *real*. (Presumably the existential anguish and inquisitiveness aroused by some preliminary reflctions and disciplinary practices have not been fulfilled, and, therefore, there is a need to enquire further; this is the *raison d'être* of the enquiry.) The question is next put: is Brahman known or unknown? If known, then there is no point in going any further; if unknown, then we need first to ask: is enquiry possible? How is it possible to know Brahman? Is Brahman knowable at all? Within the learned tradtitions there are conflicting opinions about the nature of ultimate reality. Some say it is the self *in* all; others that self *is* all and there is no other; others still say that there is, apart from the individual self, the Lord (*Iśvara*), who is omniscient and omnipotent; others that the Lord is the self. Yet, others believe that ultimate reality is non-existence or nothingness (*abhāva*). People tend to accept one or other position without proper enquiry, and base their judgements on fallacious reasoning and unsound scriptural evidence. It is, therefore, all the more important to enquire into the matter with the aid of incontrovertible arguments.[2]

The key to the solution that Śańkara provides to this problem is in the

particular conception of the self that he develops and argues for. He begins with a quasi-Cartesian appeal that if there is one thing we are certain of and about which there is indubitable awareness, it is the existence of the self. Everyone is aware of the existence of his or her own self, and everyone has the consciousness 'I exist'. Any attempt to deny or doubt this implies a doubt about the doubter's own existence, and this is logically impossible, as improbable as a 'hare's horn'. Somewhat like Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* (I think therefore I am), Śaṅkara's 'I exist' is meant to be a methodological criterion for indubitable knowledge and the possibility of transcendental experience (i.e. its possibility is not merely at the level of thought, which is, though, the starting point). If the denial of 'I exist' leads to self-contradiction, then it has more than an existential status; it is, as it were, a category without which there can be no conception of a thinker, a doubter, in short, a being endowed with consciousness. Thus, the 'I' is there of necessity. For Śaṅkara the 'I' in Descartes' dictum would survive the *cogito*, the residue of which is simply the 'I' or 'I am'. This 'I' is not an object of knowledge distinct from the knowing subject, rather it is consciousness in which the subject-object distinction has been obliterated or overcome: it constitutes the self's intuitive apprehension of itself *qua self*. The 'I' indicates the continuity of consciousness; but while in the Cartesian assertion it amounts to no more than a psychological continuity (for it is a cognitive assertion) for Śaṅkara the assertion strikes at a much deeper ontological level.

It may be objected that this is not how we ordinarily experience our self: our experience of the self is either as bodily consciousness, or the 'soul' endowed with various attributes, or the mind attached to senses, or a momentary bundle of impressions with no lasting substance as their locus, or as the void of nothingness. Śaṅkara is aware of these conceptions.[3] But he wants to argue that all these are results of false or alogical identification of the true self, as the subject of experience, with various levels of empirical experience. The latter are categorically distinct from and incommensurate with the true nature of the self. The nature of the self, for Śaṅkara, is pure undifferentiated consciousness, and it is *sui generis*, i.e. it is self-generated and self-existent.

Śaṅkara has obviously gone further than Descartes, and further than Kant for that matter, in identifying the locus of 'I exist' not only as a 'thought-form' without which no intuition is possible, and as the ground of all knowing, but also in identifying the self as the gateway to the possibility of transcendental knowledge, i.e. (in this context) the knowledge that does not involve subject-object differentiation. The self is not merely the *condition* of knowledge (as for Kant), it is also knowable as pure undifferentiated consciousness. Its uniqueness further lies in being self-illuminating (*svayaṁ-prakāśā*), that is, it knows itself, a *knownness* it does not share with the 'knowledge' of phenomenal objects or the facts of 'atomic' nature. (Transcendental intuition does not depend upon sense-experience or empirical content for its understanding, as it would in Kant's theory of knowledge.)

Now Śaṅkara believes that the foregoing analysis gives him the concept of the unique and absolute as a determinate, but at the same time, undifferentiated and undifferentiable content. To him this is the sort of *knowledge* we should be looking for in trying to understand the scriptural utterances about Brahman. But since Śaṅkara believes that he has arrived at a conception of the infinite and absolute, he also believes he has arrived at the conception of the absolute as Brahman. The absolute does not tolerate differentiation within itself, neither from anything supposed to be of its own kind, nor from anything supposed to be of a different kind. Thus, Śaṅkara is happy to affirm in his investigations the insights of the seers of the Upaniṣads that led to the pronouncement: *ātman is brahman*.[4] Could Śaṅkara say any more on the nature of ultimate as he has come to understand in his enquiry? That is, can Śaṅkara give any descriptions of it, or speak any more about it than merely to indicate that it *is*?

The answer to the question just posed is, No. The reason for this is that descriptions are descriptions of the empirical contents of consciousness, and language only applies to things that can be differentiated from one another, and from members of its own class by qualifications that identify the particular qualities of each (even if by virtue of their differential spatio-temporal location). Thus, the content of the absolute is indescribable and unspeakable, save perhaps by a process of negating all possible descriptions and false identifications that one thinks might be appropriate and applicable to what is ultimately ineffable. For instance, by a systematic negation of all the alogical identification of the self through *neti neti* (not this, not that), we may arrive at an understanding of a content in the absence of any positive description. But Śaṅkara does not stop with this negative process; he goes further, and speaks in terms of possible 'secondary' descriptions with the use of metaphors and analogies derived from empirical experience. I want to say that it is here that the apparent rigour of Śaṅkara's absolutism begins to show its difficulties. We should like to explore this issue further.

## NEGATIVE DIALECTIC

What Śaṅkara is getting at is that, if there is an appearance of something mistaken for something other than what it is (a rope is mistakenly thought to be a snake), then by negating the appearance we can arrive at the *ground* of the appearance. If someone reports seeing a snake where a coil of rope has been placed, then, by negating every description in terms of the predications used in reporting the experience, it can be shown that the experience involved false objectification and a mistaking of something that remains undescribed and unexplicated, but which is the true content of the experience. Thus, by negating the appearance the non-contradicted data or 'reality' is disclosed. So also with the phenomenal world as a whole and Brahman. It appears that the phenomenal world is made up of many distinct things. But

we can show that this appearance-state is contradictory and so can be negated. Does this mean, however, that Śaṅkara actually wants to reduce the phenomenal world to that of mere appearances and illusions? And are the antinomies and contradictions in the phenomenal world so immense that he wants to say Brahman is the only content of the philosophic knowledge that withstands contradictions? What is the exact relation between Brahman and the world according to the cosmology that Śaṅkara seems to be keen on evolving here? Is the world utterly *unreal*, a mere empty abstraction that subsists on the equally empty subject-object distinction, capable of description but incapable of existence?

Before we go any further we must make one or two points about Śaṅkara's conception of the self and the usual arguments against the self in the broad Indian dialectic. The self in its Vedic heritage and at least in the Brāhmaṇical religion of the sacrifice was the microcosmic correlate of the sacrifice. The Mīmāṁsā or the foremost exegetical school on the defensive for orthodox Brāhmaṇical practices postulated the existence of eternal individual 'souls' that are recipients of the sacrificial rewards of acts. Śaṅkara has clearly rejected this notion of self in rejecting the orthodox predilection towards ritual acts and their rewards. If Śaṅkara says that all knowledge is of *vastu* or 'thing'[5] and the self is such a *vastu*, the identity asserted is not with the recipient of sacrificial rewards. For Śaṅkara is clear that true knowledge of self has nothing to do with acts, nor with non-acts, nor otherwise, nor is it dependent on the subject of any moral command.[6] Problems of personal identity aside, Buddhist dialectic took place in the context of three ways of asserting self in the broad orthodox tradition, viz. Sāṁkhya onto-psychology of the *puruṣa*, the eternal, unborn, original spirit-self temporarily in union with *prakṛti* or matter-nature; the Mīmāṁsā belief in the eternality and plurality of souls; and, last but not least, the Nyāya or logical system's belief in 'atomistic' self, or self as constituted of immutable, indestructible, atomic particles that confer personal identity as well as survive death of the body.

Now, it would be difficult to find any residue of these notions of the self in Śaṅkara's metaphysics. For, in not acknowledging the separability of self from Brahman and proclaiming the identity of the individual self (*jīva*) with *īśvara*, he implicitly negates the individual self and asserts the transmigration of one and only one self, namely, *īśvara*. This resultant view of the self is tantamount to no-self, i.e. an individual substantial self is rejected but not necessarily the *fore-* and *post*-grounding of the continuity of its ontological identity. Thus, Śaṅkara could equally assert with the Buddhists that there is no self, while recognizing the need for empirical sense of the self for psychological identity, but which has no real claim to self-existence. The Buddhists, however, would reject Śaṅkara's identification of the self with the self-existent Brahman, for Buddhists do not accept anything to be self-existent in their preference for a co-dependent-origination thesis.

It would be useful also to consider Rāmānuja's response to Śaṅkara's

position on the nature of the self. Rāmānuja (eleventh century A.D.) disputes with Śaṅkara on the possibility of pure undifferentiated consciousness; rather, he maintains that consciousness is always 'intentional', i.e. consciousness *of* something, even if it is the consciousness of the self.[7] But to Rāmānuja the self (*ātman*) is in some sense individuated, although, in another sense, the self is non-different from Brahman. But the non-difference does not preclude the possibility of differentiation of the self and the absolute in a rather unique relation (unlike, however, the subject-object distinction in ordinary experience). If the world is conceived as the 'body' of Brahman, then the self is to our body what Brahman is to the world, and *vice versa*. But consciousness is never of the self, divorced, as it were, from bodily subjectivity just as Brahman is never apart from his 'body' as a mode of his being. Thus, Rāmānuja tends towards a more personalized absolute, and his conception of Brahman begins to answer to the theistic descriptions of God.

Thus, in Rāmānuja's rival thesis, consciousness is objectifiable to the extent that the self is *both* not different, and different, from Brahman. If consciousness did not possess this objectification capacity, then there would be no differentiation whatsoever, and no possibility of a world as we have it. Thus, consciousness is both empirically and transcendentally sedimented in differentiation, in the minimalist sense. Rāmānuja denies, therefore, that there is ever a possibility of complete identity between self and Brahman without admitting a partial difference. The difference, though, is not radical, it does not amount to a dualism between self and Brahman, but it is a less rigorous denial of dualism than Śaṅkara's. As is well known, Rāmānuja's version is called Viśiṣṭādvaita or one that seeks to qualify and delimit the more radical consequences of non-dualism or Advaita. The Brahman of Rāmānuja has real attributes, indeed those that come close to the attributes of a loving and caring deity, towards whom the individual or believer could direct his or her devotion. To Rāmānuja this is not an 'accidental', much less a conventional definition of Brahman, rather it is an 'essential' definition. This is to be contrasted with Śaṅkara's definition, which allows of no such descriptions at the essentially *primary* level, but only at the *secondary* level. What Śaṅkara means by this locution and whether he succeeds, in retrospect, from securing his Brahman against the descriptive assaults, so to speak, of Rāmānuja will be our concerns for the remainder of the paper.

## ŚAṄKARA AGAINST GOD

We now turn to second *sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa, which reads:[8] (Brahman is that) from which the origin etc. (i.e. the origin, subsistence, and dissolution) of this (world proceed). Various interpreters read this *sūtra* as though it were establishing a cosmological argument. One version of this argument invokes the analogy of manufacturing a pot; the appeal is to causality. Another

version might appeal to the 'billiard ball' paradigm of causality, wherein the motion of the ball is traced to the pool cue, and the motion of the cue to some person using the cue. The person using the cue is also an effect of some other cause. Likewise, in the cosmos, every motion, change and becoming is an effect of another finite cause until we derive a series of causes. But, since an infinite regress of causes is inconceivable, it becomes necessary to postulate a 'first cause', which is without a cause itself.

How does a first cause assist the difficulty of an infinite regress situation? It is said that, since this first cause is conceived to be infinite, it gets us out of the difficulty. If we were to stretch our imagination and try to conceive of a cause greater than the first cause, we possibly could conceive of an existence that is the greatest perfection possible. And this is possible it must be necessary. Some call the being God, others call it *pradhāna* or *prakṛti*.

Now Śaṅkara retorts with a series of arguments that is intended to demolish any such interpretation of the *sūtra* in question. I will merely summarize them. For a start, Śaṅkara does not think that we can say about the world as a whole what we can say about objects in or of the world. Could we be sure that the world is an effect, that it is created and will cease to exist? What is wrong with conceiving a finite cause for a finite effect as the world in this account is? Perhaps a spontaneous emergence (i.e. from its own self-nature) could have been a possibility. Finally, to those who argue that such an infinite cause is a personal God (*īśvara*), why must we suppose that it necessarily has to be a personal God? Could this cause not be non-intelligent *pradhāna*, or atoms, or non-being, or a being subject to transmigration?[9] Of course, there have been variations on the cosmological arguments outlined here, and there have been others since Śaṅkara's time (particularly in the West and the Islamic East). Śaṅkara would reject all these on the ground that they are speculative, and are not able to give any argument as to why a temporal and contingent world must of necessity have a non-temporal, infinite cause; for him the consequent of the argument does not follow from the antecedent.[10]

The most powerful argument that Śaṅkara advances, somewhat paradoxically (for it does nothing for his rejection of a personal God), is against the Sāṁkhya view, according to which the world proceeded from the interaction of two primal and irreducible principles, one inert or inanimate, the other intelligent or animate, namely, *prakṛti*, which is also called *pradhāna*, and *puruṣa*. *Prakṛti*, or 'matter-nature', is inferred from the need to posit a ground for finite things which seem to be alike in most general respects: they must, thus, have a common source for their being. *Puruṣa* or 'spirit' is the passive intelligence inferred from the need to posit the source of motion and 'inspiration' by which the inert *prakṛti* evolves into things as we know them to be. When the equilibrium of *prakṛti* is upset by the proximity of *puruṣa*, matter-nature transforms into the universe of gross and subtle objects. But the *puruṣa*, being passive, has no direct part in the evolution of

the world. The effect (world) is, as it were, already in the material cause, namely, *prakṛti*. And by its own constituent feature-forces (*gūṇas* or innate tendencies) matter-nature is able to evolve from atomic substances to the highest active intelligence; here *puruṣa* is merely the *efficient* cause and *prakṛti* or *pradhāna* the material cause.

The inference used in the Sāṁkhya account is basically analogical, and Śaṅkara questions this. He argues that a basically non-intelligent thing, which, without being guided by an intelligent being, spontaneously produces effects capable of sub-serving the purposes of some particular person is nowhere observed in the world.[11] In other words, the arrangement of the world is unintelligible on the assumption that a non-intelligent primal matter-nature is virtually its sole cause. That *puruṣa* is intelligent seems to be of no real consequence for Śaṅkara, presumably because *puruṣa* lacks the status of a *being*: thus, Śaṅkara's worry is how an inert existent could organize itself without an intelligent and active being. He is not impressed by the proximate inspiration that *puruṣa* is supposed to be able to provide: for really does a lump of clay in the presence of an intelligent (but passive) being suddenly begin to organize itself into a pot? Śaṅkara may have no objections if we wanted to talk about possible worlds, or the potentiality of *prakṛti* organizing itself into a number of different universal systems, but that is not the same as giving an account of the actual or real world. What accounts for this causal leap, as it were?

The second worry that Śaṅkara has is that the Sāṁkhya, while being committed to a similar version of causal theory as he is, seems to be drawing the wrong implications. Sāṁkhya is committed to a theory of causation known as *pariṇāmavāda* (a version of *satkāryavāda*). According to this theory, an effect will not follow a cause if it is not already *in* the cause. In other words, the effect must be pre-existent in its (material) cause, and, therefore, it cannot be something radically different from the cause. But Śaṅkara thinks that that would weaken the Sāṁkhya position even further, for it does not then allow the *puruṣa* to be even the efficient cause (since the *puruṣa* is not coeval with *prakṛti*, being categorically apart). And, without an active intelligent agent, Śaṅkara cannot see how the Sāṁkhya account can be complete.

Now has Śaṅkara, in arguing for the necessity of an intelligent agent, talked himself into a theistic version of the first cause argument? Not really, for Śaṅkara could argue that the cause he is looking for need not be identified as the producer or 'creator' (which would necessitate a temporal sequence). Instead, the cause could be the sustainer of the contingent world where the cause and effect are co-temporal, or at least co-existent (as *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are in the Sāṁkhya account). Thus, if Śaṅkara can bring the two principles together into some one overarching modality and attribute active intelligence to *puruṣa* while retaining the *satkārya* causality, then he can give an account which does away with the necessity of a 'creator' God altogether. The one is then both the material *and* efficient cause, and 'emanates' the world by

virtue of its own transformation. Śaṅkara, in fact, arrives at some conception like this.

Before, however, Śaṅkara proceeds any further, he considers the Nyāya argument for existence of God which itself is based on moral grounds, namely, the necessity to account for the dispensation of fruits and actions we enjoy as a result of our previous merits and demerits. Unless there is a divine and omniscient being, how could we conceive this to be possible? Śaṅkara is not persuaded by this argument either, for he is very well aware that the theory of *karma*, which assumes an impersonal universal law that, as it were, is operative in nature without the necessary intervention of a divine being. Every action is productive of an effect or result or is at least a condition for its recurrence either in form of the same action or its rebounded, delayed, effect. The actions of human beings are no less subject to this condition. Śaṅkara, nevertheless, does attribute the role of dispensation of *karma* to a divine being—possibly as the intermediary and negotiator where 'grace' is also applicable—albeit, to the God or *īśvara* in his secondary definition, and not to Brahman as such. However, since the Nyāya thinkers do not make such distinctions in their account, they are content to rest their case in respect of the moral consideration.

Likewise, for the ontological arguments of the kind that the Vaiśeṣika system advances, and which resemble some of the more recent ontological arguments we have known in the West. For Śaṅkara, all that the ontological arguments can demonstrate is the possibility of a creator, but the mere force of possibility does not lead to the conclusion of the *necessity* of God's existence. The category of such a being is not established, since it lacks both a definition and description. That being so one cannot predicate the property of existence to God. What is intriguing, however, is that, while Śaṅkara is adamantly against the acceptance of any arguments that establish the necessity of a 'creator' God or a personal God, he reads the third and fourth *sūtras* in a way that Brahman *is* attributed with the origination, sustenance and dissolution of the world on the grounds not of argumentation (or any of the standard *pramāṇas*) but on the authority of the scripture of Śruti.[12] Has Śaṅkara not conceded to the existence of a 'creator' such as he was pressed to deny when considering the Nyāya and other theistic arguments? Consider this also in light of his insistence against the naturalist (Sāṃkhya) and physicalist (Vaiśeṣika) cosmogonies that without an intelligent and conscious being the inert primal matter of *prakṛti* could not be thought to organize itself into a creative order. Śaṅkara has placed himself in a situation where he has to accept much of what he argued against. But we have to understand this conundrum in the context of what Śaṅkara sets out to do. He is not so much against the other views as against the *grounds* on which the views are proposed. In the last resort, the authority for any view should be the scriptures, or better, 'revelation' embodied in them. Secondly, Śaṅkara is not going to accept the literal reading of the second *sūtra* (which gets taken up in the sub-

sequent two *sūtras*), and which is derived from *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (III. i), but in a figurative sense. However, for the present, let us assume that he reads the text as presented here.

Even then, according to the *satkāryavāda* theory we mentioned earlier, to which Śaṅkara subscribes, the world as the effect is not apart from the cause, since the effect is *pre-existent* in the cause. Since Brahman is said to be intelligence *par excellence,* Brahman accounts for the complexity of the arrangement, order and activity of things of the world. Thus, he says: 'Brahman is that cause from which this world not only originates, but also subsists in it and is dissolved in it.'[13]

Now, if the statement has any force, then Śaṅkara has to confront a problem that arises for any pantheistic and substance theory of God, and that is the problem of the immutability of God. Basically, since things in the world involve change and are contingent, would this fact of contingency not imply change in Brahman? Further, if we take Śaṅkara to be suggesting that Brahman is the primal substance from which objects (*bhūtavastu*) of the world emanate or are 'created', then Brahman *as a substance* must also undergo change and transformation. A plurality of substance necessarily implies differentiation in the ultimate reality conceived of as a substance. Unless, of course, either the ultimate reality is conceived of as an indeterminate and abstract whole or the relation between the world of existents and the ultimate reality is regarded as absolutely contingent (as that implied in the one and immaterial God of the Old Testament and the world), we cannot avoid this 'difference'. And, if any substantial relation is denied, then how would one explain the dependence of the world on Brahman for its sustenance? Does Brahman stop playing host to the world once the task of creation is over? If not, and if the world continues to have its being in Brahman, then, like Spinoza's substance-God, everything that is true of the world is also true of Brahman. Is Brahman affected by all that its ontological 'parasite' undergoes or is involved in?

Hegel ventured the observation that Brahman (of the Hindu tradition) is essentially conceived of, not as a spirit or as the Judaeo-Christian personal God, but as a purely abstract, impersonal principle without self-consciousness, and whose being is potential not actual; and that because of this the world of particulars can have no part in it, rather they are entirely 'outside' it, alien and independent of it, never in any true sense being created or sustained by Brahman. Hegel is both right and wrong; but Hegel overlooked that, just as he himself deploys a sophisticated dialectic to overcome contradictions in the order and structure he creates out of a seemingly chaotic and disjointed world, Śaṅkara also resorts to a form of dialectic. And this dialectic involves him in reconciling his abstractly conceived cosmology to a theistically conceived Brahman in the first instance, because he wanted to obviate the kind of charges laid against him above, in this case, by the Buddhists. Śaṅkara also wanted to argue for an indeterminate and undifferen-

tiated one, without presupposing either dualism or the nothingness of nihil-
ism. Nor did Śaṅkara want to accept creation *ex nihilo*, a position that may
be workable alike in the Judaeo-Christian and certain non-theistic traditions
(such as in Tao).[14] That being so, how could Śaṅkara have a Brahman that
at once 'creates' the world of substance from its own being, sustains it, re-
trieves it into itself, and yet does not undergo any modification or trans-
formation, and is not held responsible for the moral degeneration of the
inhabitants of the world?

Śaṅkara attempts to resolve this dilemma by proposing to describe Brah-
man in terms of two definitions of Brahman, one primary, the other secondary;
and it is in terms of these that we should read much of what has been dis-
cussed already. The primary definition called here *svarūpalakṣaṇa*, is given
in terms of the *essential* description. The secondary definition called *taṭastha-
lakṣaṇa* is given in terms of the *modal* or 'conventional' (*accidental*) des-
cription.

According to Śaṅkara, the *sūtra* that we have considered, which speaks
of Brahman as the cause of the origin, etc. of the world, conforms to the
latter definition, while the former definition is found in the texts that des-
cribe Brahman as *sat-cit-ānanda* or Being-Consciousness-Bliss. Now the
*essential* definition is one that does not necessarily predicate any properties
of the thing being defined, but gives a description of its essential nature,
that which it uniquely *is*. For example, when we say that God is a necessary
existent, we are not predicating the property of existence to God, for God's
existence is, by definition, his *essence*. And, when we say that God is omni-
scient, omnipotent and transcendental, again we are not predicating pro-
perties that are apart from God's being; these are identical with God's being.

Likewise, when Brahman is defined as *sat, cit* and *ānanda*, Śaṅkara takes
them *not* to be three different descriptions or three properties predicated of
Brahman, but rather as the unitary essence of the undifferentiated absolute.

Accordingly, Śaṅkara's thinking is that we can talk of Brahman as the
'cause' without modifying the definition in its essential form, for what we
are talking about is the undifferentiated *ground* on which the world is de-
pendent. Causation of the world, then, belongs to the secondary definition,
along with the properties we might want to predicate of the world. Thus,
contingency, change and activity are aspects of Brahman by virtue of the
'conventional' or modal definition. We, thus, have two 'truths', but they
are not mutually contradictory, since they are at categorically different levels,
one more primary than the other. To be sure, there *is* a hierarchy here as is
evidenced in the locution about the 'primary' and 'secondary' qualifications.
But the distinction, according to which the 'grading' is being made, is some-
what reminiscient of the distinction Plotinus speaks of between the *meonto-
logical* (from *mē ōn*, 'non-being') and the ontological (as having conscious-
ness, mind, will and transcendental self) as distinct from the cosmological
and ontological distinction. Moreover, the primary level is completely auto-

nomous, for only the secondary is conditioned by the primary, and not the
converse. Śaṅkara finds this device a convenient means of locating his theistic
predilections (or, indeed, the theistic orientation of much of Hindu thought
with the exception of the Pūrva Mīmāṁsā), which he earlier used against the
Sāṁkhya, Vaiśeṣika and *nothingness* theories. Thus, there is a real world,
it is constituted of divine substance; and, on the other hand, there is a divine
all-knowing and caring *īśvara* who dispenses 'grace', according to the indivi-
dual's *karma*. And the same *Īśvara* collects essences of sacrifice performed
simultaneously in different spatio-temporal co-ordinates, and so on. Thus
also the retention of the all-pervasive *Īśvara* solves the problem of discerning
two identical terms in the same space-time co-ordinate. Unlike *sat-cit-ānanda*,
none of these descriptions of Brahman, however, is literal or definitive. But
there are still problems with regard to the precise relation between *Īśvara*
and the world, and between *Īśvara* and Brahman. These are questions, how-
ever, that cannot be gone into fully in the space we have left.

To be brief, it is well known that the descriptive category of *māyā* is in-
voked to answer these questions. *Māyā*, in turn, is explained in terms of
*adhyāsa* or alogical identification, often rendered simply as 'superimposition'.
*Adhyāsa* is said to occur when an accidental adjunct is placed over something
else. That which is covered over or concealed, thus, appears as something
other than what it is. For example, when the 'snake-image' is superimposed
on a coiled rope, or when a mother-of-pearl is mistaken for silver, or perhaps
when a clear crystal takes on the coloured hue of the adjacent lamp. Nothing
has been added to the ground or substrate of the objects superimposed upon,
save in some fortuitous sense. The phenomenon of *māyā* is said to work in a
somewhat similar fashion in the cosmic process. *Māyā*, in Śaṅkara, although
inexplicable, remains an overarching epistemic notion, which does not ne-
cessarily entail in the 'illusory-making' of every particular experience. In
this regard, Śaṅkara was a realist. He took every empirical experience to be
of real state of affairs, unless there was an actual error (of the rope-snake
sort). A false or an erroneous experience stands to be falsified by a true ex-
perience: what remains unfalsified or uncontradicted alone is *true*.

It follows that, although the world, from one level, is an appearance,
from another level, namely, from within itself, it is, literally, every bit real.
Even God is real. But God has a relatively more special status than the world
itself has, although the two are not separate. *Īśvara* is the accidental modi-
fication of predominantly the *cit* (or consciousness) description of Brahman.
Further, there are two aspects to this qualification of *Īśvara qua* Brahman.
In the first aspect, *Īśvara* is one with the world of appearance (often termed
*Hiraṇyagarbha*). This is the immanent Lord, and may further appear as
Viṣṇu, Śiva, Brahmā and a multiplicity of gods and goddesses. In the second
aspect, *Īśvara* is the witness of the world (*Sākṣī*): it is the supreme cons-
ciousness, for which it depends upon Brahman, for it is Brahman that 'lends'
the world intelligence and self-consciousness without in any way qualifying

itself or undergoing change. *Īśvara* as the universal witness-consciousness also remains detached from the world of appearance, presiding over it, as it were from afar. Śaṅkara is emphatic that, despite the greatness of *Īśvara*, Brahman should not be defined in terms of the properties of *Īśvara*, for there is a *transcendence* that *Īśvara* does not exhaust in its being.

This last point is worth noting, for the differential status given to *Īśvara* in Śaṅkara's metaphysics has divided him from Rāmānuja and most other Vedānta philosophers. In a well-known passage in the *Īśā Upaniṣad*, it is stated: 'Whatever is subject to change in this universe is all-enveloped in one who is the Ruler (*Īśā*) of this universe. By renunciation of the world alone, enjoy the inner self.' Śaṅkara comments on this: 'This changeable world of names and form seem identical with the Absolute truth (*paramārtha satya*)– the self (*ātman*). Consequently that conception has to be discarded.'

### CONCLUSION

We have seen that as far as Śaṅkara is concerned there is Brahman alone; that the self (*ātman*) is a term synonymous with that; and that the self does not subsist in *Īśvara*. Nor are there individuated selves or 'souls' (*jīvas*). There is, on the contrary, only *one* 'soul', and that 'soul' is the universal *Īśvara*. Thus, it follows that there is only one transmigrating entity (if we think of the soul as the only thing that transmigrated). However, this does not mean that individuals do not exist or that their respective *karmas* are not capable of determining their own retribution, rebirth and dispensations. The individual is basically a structure of layered entities (*māyākośas* or *skaṇḍas*), each with its distinctive body-complex—mind, psyche, senses and karmic dispositions from previous existences; but the spirit that inhabits each is one and the same generic spirit, namely, *Īśvara*. And this 'identity', Śaṅkara believes, is epitomized in the Upaniṣadic dictum: *tat tvam asi* or 'you are that'. Clearly, also, Śaṅkara's secondary definition of Brahman belongs to *descriptive* metaphysics, and could be said to be open to the criterion of falsifiability; but his primary (*svarūpa*) definition belongs to *revisionist* metaphysics, and, therefore, is not open to falsifiability in the same vein, and, therefore, could not be said to be falsifiable. If this is the case, then Śaṅkara has entered an epistemological *cul-dè-sac*; for a basically unfalsifiable proposition cannot itself falsify another (to be sure, falsifiable) proposition. In such a situation, Śaṅkara would be forced to retract his primary definition as being in any sense *primary*. There is here a lesson for any metaphysical discourse or disquisition that relies upon the talk of *pāramārthika* or the 'highest' level of (infallible) truth.

### Notes

1. *BSB-Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of Śaṅkara in *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* (*Catussūtrī*) with commentary *Brahmatattvaprakāśikā* (in Hindi) by Viśveśvara Siddhānta Śiromaṇi, Vidyanatha Sanskrit Granthamala 137, Varanasi, Vidyabhavan, 1966. For the convenience of the English-reading audience, I have, in places, used Thibaut's translation and given appropriate references to this work in the course of the discussion. See George Thibaut, *Vedānta-sūtras with the commentary by Śaṅkarācārya*, pt. I, Sacred Books of the East Series, vol. xxxiv, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1904; reprinted in Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1973, p. 9.
2. *BSB*, trans. George Thibaut, pp. 13-15.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
4. *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, vi; *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, ii, v. 19 and iv, 10.
5. See passage in *BSB*, I. ii 1. (pp. 18-19) 'All options depend on the notions of man; but the knowledge of the real nature of things does not depend on the notions of man, but on the thing itself. Likewise for Brahman, which is a substance... There cannot be doubt...such as "is this a post, or is this a man".' *na vastu-yāthātmyajñānaṃ puruṣabuddhyapekṣam, kiṃ tarhi, vastutantram eva tat, na hi sthāṇāvekasmin sthāṇurvā puruṣo'nyo veti tattva-jñānaṃ bhavati, tatra puruṣo'nyo veti mithyājñānam. sthāṇure veti tattvajñānaṃ, vastutantratvāt, evaṃbhūtavastuviṣayāṇāṃ prāmaṇyaṃ vastutantram; tatraivaṃ sati brahmajñānamapi vastutantrameva, bhūtavastuviṣayatvāt.* (Varanasi edn, pp. 66-67).
6. *Ibid.*, I.1.iv. *Jñānaṃ tu pramāṇajanyam, pramāṇaṃ ca vathābhūtavastuviṣayam; ato jñānaṃ kartumakartumanyathā vā kartumaśakyaṃ kevalaṃ vastutantrameva tat, na codanātantram, nāpi puruṣatantram, tasmānmānasatve'pi jñānasya mahadvailakṣaṇyam* (Varanasi edn, p. 133).
7. Rāmānuja in *Śrībhāṣya: Vedānta-sūtras with Rāmānuja's Śrībhāṣya* (being his commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*), trans. George Thibaut, Sacred Books of the East Series, vol. xvxxviii, Oxford, Oxford University Press; reprinted in Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1976, pp. 44 ff.
8. *BSB*, I.1.ii, the translation is Thibaut's.
9. *Ibid.*, I.1.ii, p. 15
10. It should be noted that the arguments we are considering begin to be developed further not under the third *sūtra* as such, but towards the end of the fourth *sūtra* (George Thibaut, pp. 45-47), and more fully in later sections, for example, under the fifth *sūtra* (George Thibaut, pp. 47-53), and the eighteenth *sūtra* (pp. 70-71). For Rāmānuja's response, see his *Śrībhāṣya*, pp. 151-61.
11. *BSB* i.1.v, pp. 47-53, i.1.xviii, pp. 70-71.
12. *Bhāṣya* on *sūtra* 3, George Thibaut, p. 20: 'Through scripture only as a means of knowledge Brahman is known to be the cause of the origin, etc., of the world'. On the fourth *sūtra*: 'That all-knowing, all powerful Brahman, which is the cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world, is known from the Vedānta—parts of Scripture.' p. 22ff.
13. Under second *sūtra*, (George Thibaut), pp. 18-19.
14. See Robert C. Neville, *The Tao and the Daimon*, Albany, New York, Suny Press, 1983.

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## COMMENT ON PROFESSOR DAYA KRISHNA'S PAPER 'THE MYTH OF PURUṢĀRTHAS'

The very title of the paper 'The Myth of Puruṣārthas' is challenging and also a little frightening. The paper needs to be read very carefully as it is full of

sharp and meaningful criticism of the traditional theory of *puruṣārthas* cherished for ages. Prof. Daya Krishna's almost every sentence is so provocative, so challenging that it would require a long article, nay a whole book, to answer him. He finds ambiguity, incompleteness and an inherent contradiction in the Indian theory of *puruṣārtha*. He puts the *puruṣārthavādin* on the defensive. He, however, does not seem to mean that the very theory of *puruṣārtha* is null and void, but he provokes the student of *puruṣārtha* to make a rational analysis of the traditional theory and to reformulate it, if necessary, and not just accept it as given.

In the texts there is a lot of discussion regarding the *puruṣārthas* and a variety of meaning given to the terms. This gives a wide scope and opportunity for the student of *puruṣārtha* to choose the correct meaning. So, it is quite possible that what I understand of the *puruṣārthas* may be different from the way Prof. Daya Krishna construes them. We will touch some of his criticisms in brief.

Prof. Dayakrishna's objections to the traditional theory of *puruṣārtha* may be summarized as follows:

(*i*) There is overlapping and confusion in the use of the four terms, specially in the term *kāma*.

(*ii*) What is the sense in saying that one ought to pursue *artha* and *kāma* (that is, *artha* and *kāma* are used in a prescriptive sense), as people are already doing that?

(*iii*) *Mokṣa* is 'usually supposed to transcend both *dharma* and *kāma* and thus occupies an anomalous position amongst the *puruṣārthas*, for it is never clear whether this transcendence should be understood as a negation or fulfilment of the other *puruṣārthas*'.

(*iv*) 'Only that should be designated as a *puruṣārtha* which can be realized, at least to some extent, by human effort.' As such, *mokṣa* cannot be called a *puruṣārtha*, for *mokṣa* transcends all effort or activity. In other words, the objection is that attainability by self-effort is inherent in the very meaning of the term *puruṣārtha*, whereas *mokṣa* cannot be attained by effort or action; in fact; action is bondage and detrimental to the attainment of *mokṣa*. Moreover, it can be further argued in line with Prof. Dayakrishna that *mokṣa* is not only not attainable by activity, but is also a state of absence of activity. In this sense, too, *mokṣa* does not seem to be a value worth the name.

(*v*) The list of the four *puruṣārthas* is not exhaustive and conclusive; we cannot subsume under any *puruṣārtha* the ideal values like 'knowledge or social reform or political freedom or the end of exploitation and repression, or even such a thing as creation of beautiful objects'.

(*iv*) As a corollary to this, Prof. Daya Krishna is very particular in pointing out that 'the life of intellect' or the 'independent life of reason' is a

separate value; it cannot be categorized under any of the *puruṣārthas*. For example, when in a lively seminar we discuss, analyse, and understand some theory and get joy in this process, is it not an independent value, different from the four *puruṣārthas*? Prof. Daya Krishna concludes that 'the oft-repeated traditional theory of the *puruṣārthas*, thus, is of little help in understanding the diversity and complexity of human seeking which makes human life so meaningful and worthwhile in diverse ways'.

(*i*) To begin with the reference to the overlapping and confusion in the use of the four terms. Charles Malamoud in his paper 'On the Rhetoric and Semantics of Puruṣārtha', too, refers to the ambiguity and overlapping among the four terms. But, whereas Charles Malamoud does not seem to be perturbed over this, Prof. Daya Krishna emphasizes the need of rethinking and reformulating. He is right in so far as precision of language is a prerequisite of any serious study. It is probably for this reason that the Jaina advises to use the prefix *syāt* in every logical sentence, and the Naiyāyika uses *avacchedakāvacchinna*' in order to free language of ambiguity. But we should not forget that absolute precision is needed in the logical language only. When we come to the problems of common parlance, ambiguity is sometimes not only indispensable but it may even serve a useful purpose. For example, we find in actual life an overlapping and co-mingling of *artha*, *dharma* and *kāma* (and also *mokṣa*). One penetrates the others, and we cannot also say that the four are just one and the same; and hence ambiguity in describing them. Thus, ambiguity here may be taken as a *bhuṣaṇa* (merit) and not a *dūṣaṇa* (demerit).

(*ii*) Prof. Daya Krishna raises an important question as to whether the term *puruṣārtha* should be understood in a descriptive sense or in a prescriptive one. The answer is very simple. The term *puruṣārtha* is the correct Sanskrit substitute for what we call 'value' in English. Value is a normative word; it means not only what man aspires to achieve but also what he ought to aspire, or, in other words, what is also good or right to do. When this is accepted in the case of *puruṣārtha*, then Prof. Daya Krishna asks: what is the sense in saying that one ought to pursue *artha* and *kāma* since people are already doing that? The answer is that the question is not what a man naturally pursues or not, what should be enlisted under the 'ought', irrespective of its actually being done or not. There is a positive 'ought' where an act, like the altruistic one, is a virtue; but there can also be an 'ought' in a negative sense where an act, even if it is not a positive virtue, is at least free from being vice, and, therefore, one has a right to do it; in other words, it has got clearance from the side of *dharma* or morality. *Artha* and *kāma*, apart from being positively useful, have at least the clearance from morality, and one has a right to pursue them. Moreover, there is one more reason why *artha* and *kāma* should be brought under the 'ought'. Many people may think (and they do

think) that pursuit of *artha* and *kāma* is detrimental to the spiritual goal. As a result, such people may consciously or unconsciously repress the desire for *artha* and *kāma*. This may further lead to disintegration of personality causing psycho-analytic problems. Therefore, in order to make the human persuit of life perfectly healthy and well balanced it becomes obligatory that *artha* and *kama* be listed under the category of 'ought'.

The *Īśāvāsyopaniṣat* actually warns against the above mentioned danger. It says: 'Those who worship *avidyā* (that is, indulgence or *pravṛtti*), enter into darkness; but those who indulge only in *vidyā* (that is, renunciation or *nivṛtti*), enter into still more darkness.' Therefore, a healthy balance is suggested, and so the same Upaniṣad further says: 'He who comprehends *vidyā* and *avidyā* both together, crosses mortality with the help of *avidyā*, and attains immortality with the help of *vidyā*'. Thus, the Upaniṣad clearly states that the pursuit of *artha* and *kāma* is not only not ignorance, but is also helpful in attaining perfection.

(*iii*) The main trend of the Indian tradition considers *mokṣa*, which transcends *śreya* (*dharma*) and *preya* (*artha* and *kāma*), not as a negation of other *puruṣārthas* but as their fulfilment. We can also notice in the Indian tradition a particular trend which takes *mokṣa* as a negation (*nivṛtti*) of the material values. The metaphysics behind this particular idea is that the world of matter is an illusion covering the real nature of the self, and it must be discarded in order to attain the self. But this negativistic trend is a later development; it *certainly* does not exist in the Vedic tradition. Not only the Tantras, whose explicit aim is to advocate a very very positive philosophy, but also the Vedas favour a positive life of fulfilment. Nowhere in the Vedas (including the Upaniṣads) we find negation of the world and the worldly values. In fact , the Upaniṣad discourages the idea of renouncing the worldly values and taking to renunciation completely. We have already noticed that the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣat* favours a synthesis of *vidyā* (*nivṛtti*) and *avidyā* (*pravṛtti*). The *Chhāndogyopaniṣat* unequivocally admits that *mokṣa* (self-realization) is also a state of fulfilment of the material desires. It says: 'He, who seeks the *ātman* and knows it, attains all the *lokas* (worlds) and all the *kāmas* (desires)'. The negativistic philosophy of life is incongruent with the mainstream of the Indian tradition, it is really a side-current. The emergence of this negativistic trend can be explained as a device to counterbalance the attitude of extreme indulgence in the world.

So far as *dharma* (morality) is concerned, it is naturally and spontaneously present in the state of self-realization (*mokṣa*), for the self by its very nature is good or benign (*śivam*). In fact, the self is the true (*satyam*), the good (*śivam*), and the beautiful (*sundaram*)—all in one.

Thus, we see that *mokṣa*, which in itself is a spiritual value, synthesizes the moral value or *śreya* (*dharma*) and the material value or *preya* (*artha* and *kāma*). And as happens in every synthesis, the synthesizing principle stands at a deeper level, transcending the terms synthesized. Some of the

traditionalists categorize both *dharma* and *mokṣa* under *śreya*; but this is obviously wrong, for *dharma* alone is *śreya*, and *mokṣa* is a synthesis of both *śreya* and *preya*. *Dharma* is moral value but *mokṣa* is spiritual value; and the beauty of spiritual consciousness is that the two apparently conflicting terms —the truth and the beauty, or the good and the pleasant, or the good of oneself and the good of others—become one in it.

(*iv*) It is true that the Indian tradition holds that *karma* leads to bondage and that *mokṣa* transcends *karma*, and at the same time it is also held that *mokṣa* requires vigorous self-effort. This position may seem to be confusing and apparently self-contradictory, but it is really not so. It contains a deeper and subtler truth which needs to be understood carefully; the proper understanding of the nature of *karma* and self-effort as envisaged in the Indian tradition will make the point clear (there is no room here to show convincingly that *karma* is bondage and yet *mokṣa* which transcends *karma* requires self-effort; this may be discussed in detail elsewhere). *Karma* is a highly technical term, and it should be noted here that all activity is not *karma*. The self which is attained or realized in *mokṣa* is not something new to be created as a result or consequence of any action, but is already existent (*bhūtavastu*); it is only covered or obstructed, and the obstruction needs to be removed in order that the self is attained. When the obstruction or covering is removed, the self shines of its own accord. So a vigouous spiritual effort is needed in this direction. Prof. Daya Krishna contends that *mokṣa* does not involve self-effort, and anything that is not achieved by human effort is not a value. It is true that anything not achieved by human effort is not a value, but it is not true that the attainment of *mokṣa* does not require effort. Of course, the effort here is in different direction, it is the effort of clearing the path or removing the obstruction. It is like the effort of opening the window so that the light of the sun illumines the room of its own accord.

It is not also correct to think that the state of *mokṣa* is devoid of activity. The Advaita Vedāntic scholiasts conceive *mokṣa* as a state of passivity and inaction, but we do not think this is a correct interpretation of the Upaniṣadic *mokṣa*. There is spontaneous activity in the state of self-realization or *mokṣa*. This idea is implicitly present in the Upaniṣads and is fully developed in the Tantric philosophy. In Tantrism the self or consciousness is conceived as a dynamic force, and the very dynamism of consciousness is called *śakti* or *kriyā* or *spaṇḍa*. Since the activity of consciousness is naturally in the form of thinking, it is also called *vimarśa* (*vimarśa* literally means thinking). (The 'life of intellect' or the 'life of reason', mentioned by Prof. Daya Krishna, is a form of *vimarśa*.)

This *mokṣa* is not an other-worldly and after-death value but something which is the ground of all-round success in our life. In every walk, of life, the power to work efficiently and beautifully comes from the self just as all the electric power which lights the bulb and moves the fan, etc. comes from the power house. Śrī Kṛṣṇa makes it clear in *Bhagavadgītā* (10.41) that the entire

power, glory, illumination, and beauty that we experience in the empirical life—all comes from the self. Therefore, the more we are in line with the self, the more power flows. Thus, a man of self-realization will be, say, a better philosopher, a better scientist, a better teacher, a better leader, a better businessman, a better manager, and so on and so forth. We succeed in giving beautiful performance in life in accordance with the degree of self-realization we have achieved.

(v) Values like 'social reform or political freedom or the end of exploitation and repression' are part of our duty, and, as such, come under the category of *dharma*. Here it is necessary to clear one confusion regarding the meaning of the term *dharma*. *Dharma* should not be equated with the Vedic injunction. The primary meaning of *dharma* is morality, and it is only secondarily that it is meant to be the Vedic injunction. In olden times, some of the thinkers accepted the divine law as moral standard; when the question was raised as to how to know what a moral act was, they answered that it was what the Vedas enjoined. But this position may not be acceptable to a rational thinker. The Buddhists and the Jainas did reject Veda as the criterion of *dharma*. Even Advaita Vedāntins do not accept the Veda *in toto*. It is only the Mīmāṁsaka who identifies *dharma* with the Vedic injunction. Our point is that the primary meaning of *dharma* is the moral act and not the Vedic command.

In the Indian tradition, *dharma* is understood in a very wide sense. The Veda identifies *dharma* with the moral law (*rta*) which sustains the world. That is why *dharma* was later on defined as that which sustained life (*dhāraṇāddharmaḥ*). Following this line of understanding, *dharma* is also conceived as what we call duty both at individual and the social levels. The *Gītā* explicitly and emphatically advocates this. It becomes our duty (*dharma*) to fight social injustice or to end slavery and exploitation.

(vi) The most pungent objection of Prof. Daya Krishna against the *puruṣārtha* theory seems to be that knowledge and aesthetic creativity are the most desirable values, and they cannot be fitted into the traditional model of *puruṣārthas*. In order to understand the answer to this objection, we must first understand the essential meaning of *mokṣa*. *Mokṣa* has negative and positive meanings. Negatively, *mokṣa* or *mukti* means freedom or release of the self from limitations or obstructions. (The literal meaning of *mokṣa* or *mukti* is freedom or release.) When the self is freed from the obstructions, the real nature of the self is revealed, and so the positive meaning of *mokṣa* is attainment or realization of the real self. When the obstructions are removed, the power, the beauty, the illumination, and the *ānanda* of the self are released and have free expression. Self-realization may vary in degree, and, therefore, self-expression may also vary in degree accordingly.

If we understand *mokṣa* in the above sense of self-realization and self-expression, it becomes clear that knowledge (or any kind of illumination) and aesthetic creativity are part of self-realization, although in lesser degrees.

That is why aesthetic or poetic enjoyment is said to be a 'cousin of the Brahman-bliss' (*brahmānandasahodara*). When we have the spontaneous knowledge or understanding of anything as a spark of flash in the mind which is called *pratibhā* in the tradition of the philosophy of Grammar and Tantra, it is nothing short of self-realization, as the illumination and beauty of the self flow freely in the proportionate degrees of self-realization. When we express ourselves in the free artistic creativity, it is the realization of the freedom of the self in the proportionate degree of self-realization. Thus, when we enjoy the *ānanda* of knowledge or reason in a lively academic seminar, or when we create and enjoy a beautiful piece of poetry, it is the released consciousness or the self which is having its free expression.

Thus, we see that the model of *puruṣārtha* is nearly a perfect one, incorporating within itself all possible values. All the values worthy of human seeking can be categorized under three heads, namely, (a) the material value (*artha and kāma*), (b) the moral value (*dharma*), and (c) the spiritual value (*mokṣa*). *Mokṣa*, the spiritual value, synthesizes within itself the moral and the material values. To categorize values in this way is neither reductionism nor an oversimplification, it is really the most appropriate way of doing so. Following is the model:

### THE MODEL OF PURUṢĀRTHA

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | Artha ⎰ | *Preya* | Material value |
| 2. | Kāma ⎱ | | |
| 3. | *Dharma* | *Śreya* | Moral value |
| 4. | *Mokṣa* | Synthesis of *Śreya* and *Preya* | Spiritual value |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | *Artha* | Means-value (means to *kāma*) *Artha* may be regarded as an end-value if it is construed as symbolizing the fulfilment of the physical needs which are different from desires. |
| 2. | *Kāma* | End-value |
| 3. | *Dharma* | End-value |
| 4. | *Mokṣa* | '*The*' end-value (underlying all the other values) |

Although *artha* has means-value, yet it is so important and so indispensable that it has been given an independent status in the scheme of values. However, *artha* may be regarded as an end-value, if it is meant to represent the fulfilment of the gross physical or bodily needs like food, shelter, etc. Gross physical or biological 'needs' are certainly different from 'desires' which are more mental or psychological and, therefore, subtler and more refined. In this sense, *kāma* may be regarded as higher to *artha* in the value hierarchy. *Dharma* is still higher, for *artha* and *kāma* can be sacrificed in favour of *Dharma*.

*Mokṣa* is the highest value, as it transcends all the other values and synthesizes them within itself. It is *the* value, underlying all the other values. And since the synthesizing principle transcends the synthesized terms and stands at a deeper level, *mokṣa* should be regarded as belonging to an order different from that of the other *puruṣārthas* and yet incorporating them all within its bosom. It may be noted here that the principle which synthesizes and incorporates others within itself is not one of them; it transcends them and stands at a deeper level like the thread which penerates the flowers and weaves them into one garland, the thread itself being different from and deeper than the flowers.

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## CAUSAL EXPLANATION, DEDUCTION AND PREDICTION

The present paper will be devoted to a discussion of the nature of causal explanation. In order to clarify the issue I concentrate upon the problem of the logical character of scientific explanation. Then I move on to a closer consideration of the relation of explanation with prediction.

"Explanation" is an ambiguous word. What is expected in a "why?" question is intellectual satisfaction of one kind or another, and this can be provided partially or completely in different ways. And what gives partial or complete satisfaction to one person may give little or none whatever to a person of a different stage of intellectual development. An explanation has its two aspects —explanandum and explanans. Explanandum means the statement of the problem or phenomenon to be explained; by explanans we mean the class of those statements wherefrom the explanandum can be derived. The explanans fall into two subclasses; one of these contain statements which state specific antecedent conditions; the other is a set of statements expressing general laws or hypotheses. An event can be explained by subsuming it under or relating it to appropriate general laws. The term "event" has various shades of meaning but the term in which a scientist is interested is said to be explained if it is deducible from some statements of its initial conditions and a set of laws.

A type of explanation commonly encountered in the natural sciences has the formal structure of a deductive argument in which the explanandum is the logical consequence of the explanatory premises. Accordingly in explanation of this type the premises state the sufficient condition for the truth of the explanandum. This type has been exclusively studied since ancient times. To ask for an explanation why a given patient has suffered from a disease is normally to call neither for clarification of the term "disease" nor for a listing of the symptoms upon which the medical treatment of disease is to be based, nor for a theory of disease, but rather for an analysis of those antecedent factors in the situation responsible for the patient's falling ill. Such causal diagnosis has generally been taken to be a matter of connecting the

event to be explained with other events by means of general principles obtained through experience though not *demonstrable* on the basis of available informations. Hume denied such a necessary connection of matters of fact and held that in causal explanation of any event there is nothing more involved than contingently connecting it with its antecedent circumstances through principles of conjunction induced from past experience. Modern thinkers have largely upheld the view that explanation of events proceeds by way of trying to connect these events with others through general principles based on, though not demonstrable by, experience. Instead of talking of "the cause philosophically speaking" they have tried to reconstruct *causal explanation* as a pattern of deductive argument, in which the premises describe particular conditions and formulate general principles, and the conclusion describes the event or events to be explained. It is true that a deductive explanation is commonly called a "causal explanation" and in this case the conditions referred to by the singular premises of the explanans may jointly be called a cause of the explanandum. There are however deductive explanations in which some of the initial conditions occur later than the explanandum and in these cases it would not be proper to call the former a cause of the latter. The modern reconstruction of causal explanation as a form of deductive argument has been defended, among others, by Popper and Hempel.

Karl Popper suggests that to give a Causal explanation of an event is to deduce a statement which describes it, using as premises of the deduction one or more universal laws, together with certain singular statements. For instance, we can say that we have given a causal explanation of the breaking of a certain piece of thread if we have found that the thread has a tensile strength of 1 lb. and that a weight of 2 lbs. was put on it. If we analysise this situation we find several constituent parts. On the one hand there is the hypothesis, "whenever a thread is loaded with a weight exceeding that which characterises the tensile strength of the thread then it will break," a statement which has the character of universal laws of nature. On the other hand we have singular statements which apply only to the specific event in question: "the weight characteristic for this thread is 1 lb; and the weight put on this thread was 2 lbs." It is from this universal statement in conjunction with the statement of initial conditions that we deduce the particular statements "This thread will break."[1] Thus, Popper considers the statements both of universal laws and initial conditions "necessary ingredients of a complete causal explanation." The *initial conditions* describe what is usually called the "cause" of the event *in question*, i.e., the fact that a load of 2 lbs. was put on a thread with a tensile strength of 1 lb. was the "cause" of its breaking and the prediction describes what is usually called the, "effect", i.e., this thread will break.

Hemple's account in "The Function of General Laws in History" is similar in this regard. He is of opinion that the explanation of an event of some specific kind A at a certain place and time indicates the causes or the determining factors of A. And the assertion that a set of events have caused the

event amounts to the statement that in accordance with certain general laws a set of events is *regularly followed* by an event of the kind A. Thus, the scientific explanation of an event implies three steps of the process of explanation. They are: (i) a set of statements asserting the occurrence of certain events at certain times and places, (ii) a set of universal hypotheses such that the statements of both groups are well-confirmed by empirical evidence and from the statement of two groups, and (iii) the occurrence of event can be logically deduced. An explanation of a particular event is often correctly conceived by specifying its *cause* or *causes*. In connection with this problem Mill states that "An individual fact is said to be explained by pointing out its cause that is, by stating the law or laws of Causation of which its production is an instance."[2] The causal explanation implicitly claims that there are general laws, $L_1$, $L_2 \ldots L_n$, is terms of which the causal antecedents of the event to be explained could be regarded as necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of the latter. To argue thus is to claim that the relation between he causal factors and effect is deductive nomological in character. It is a sort of deductive subsumption under principles or general laws. But the converse does not hold good. For there are deductive nomological explanation which would not normally be counted as causal.

The logical structure of a scientific explanation shows that to explain an event is to deduce the explanandum as a consequence of a set of explanans possessing greater generality. But, logic is not sufficient to account for the whole story of knowledge situation. Deductive pattern of explanation does also increase our knowledge in the sense that the fact to be explained was not explicitly contained in its class from the beginning. Epistemically explanation consists in a synthetic or a constructive operation and not merely a deduction of a fact out of a given class. A scientific explanation is free from objectionable circularity if it helps to connect hitherto unconnected specific facts, while the deductive part of the hypothetico-deductive procedure may be said to be "tautological" or "analytic" (in the sense in which the *denial* of the conclusion strictly implies the denial of at least one of the premises) but it is not circular (in the sense that the conclusion itself is the sole basis of the inductive probability of the law-like premise). The important point is that a scientific explanation in order to be regarded as causal must contain a causal law in it. The essence of a causal explanation consists in having at least one causal law among the class of its major explanans. And to test whether a generalization is causal or not prediction is called for.

One important corollary of the deductive pattern of explanation is the thesis that explanation and prediction share identical logical structure. The structure of a deductive explanation and prediction conforms to what is now called the covering-law-model.[3] It consists in the deduction of whatever is being explained or predicted from general laws in conjunction with information about particular facts. In empirical science prediction consists in deriving a statement about a certain future event from (1) statements describ-

ing certain known conditions and (2) suitable general laws. Thus a predictive argument can be construed as a deductive argument of the following form:

$$\begin{cases} \text{Predictors } L_1,\ L_2,\ L_3 \ldots L_n \\ \text{(Explanans) } C_1,\ C_2,\ C_3 \ldots C_n \end{cases}$$

Predicted (Explanandum)

On this formulation $L_1, L_2, L_3 \ldots L_n$ are general laws and $C_1, C_2, C_3 \ldots C_n$ are statements expressing particular occurrences and jointly these premises form the explanans and the conclusion E is the explanandum or statement of the predicted event. Since the explanans logically imply the occurrence of the explanandum, we may assert that the explanans can be used to predict the explanandum if the laws and the particular occurrences adduced in its explanans has been taken into account at a suitable earlier time. Predicted argument of the form has been defined by Hempel as a deductive-nomological prediction. And the customary distinction between prediction and explanation, as Hempel thinks,[4] is based upon a pragmatic consideration. Hempel would be inclined to say that in an explanation of the deductive-nomological variety the explanandum which may be past, present or future is taken to be "given" and a set of laws and particular statements is then adduced which provides premises in an appropriate argument of this type,

$$\begin{cases} L_1,\ L_2,\ L_3 \ldots L_n \\ C_1,\ C_2,\ C_3 \ldots C_n \end{cases}$$

conclusion/deduction/prediction/postdiction

Whereas in the case of prediction it is premises which are taken to be "given" and the argument then yields a conclusion that an event conforms the pattern of the predictive inference. This characteristic makes explanation and prediction mutually exclusive although they sometimes coincide. But the thesis of the identification of explanation with prediction is subject to some critical reflection.

Scientific explanation may be oriented towards the past, while prediction is always oriented towards the future and before we can decide whether explanation and prediction have the same logical structure, we have to ascribe whether the natural laws of our world do in fact permit inferences from the present to the future as well as from the present to the past. It is possible that a set of laws governing a given system should permit unique deductive predictions of later states from given ones, and yet not yield unique deductive retrodictions concerning earlier states; conversely a set of laws may permit unique retrodiction but no unique prediction. But this is by no means 'the' same as to say that such laws, while permitting explanation, do not permit prediction. The laws which make predictive argument possible may as well be used for future explanatory purposes. Although these laws permit unique predictions do not always permit unique retrodictions. Thus the

objection under consideration misses its point because it tacitly confounds explanation with retrodiction.

In an article Scheffler has subjected the idea of the structural identity of explanation and prediction to a critical scrutiny.[5] He holds that a scientific predictive statement may be false whereas no explanation is false. This remark is interesting but not correct. For every scientific explanation is open to test or questions. On this assumption we cannot distinguish explanation from prediction. Our suggestion is not that there is a basic discrepancy between explanation and prediction but that the requirement of truth for scientific explanation is restrictive.

Explanation being general may accommodate the logic of prediction within its fold but it has to be borne in mind that every prediction is not explanatory. There are trivial predictions—too trivial to be regarded as explanations. Certainly there are cases when we can successfully predict some phenomenon but cannot provide any explanation of it. Suppose we find that whenever cows lie down in the open fields during day time, it is followed up by rains within hours. In such cases we are in an excellent position for prediction, but scarcely we could offer explanation of the latter in terms of the former. It appears that explanation requires something more than prediction and to this point Scriven's suggestion is such that the understanding of a phenomenon often enables us to forecast it, the ability to forecast it does not constitute an understanding of a phenomenon; of course, there is a distinction between explanation and prediction. But before making such a distinction we should be aware of the distinction between scientific prediction and forecast. Popular prophecies do not depend on laws whereas scientific predictions do. Hence the differences are much less important than the similarities in the cases of both scientific prediction and scientific explanation. In effect, we are in both cases providing a series of comprehensible statements that have a wide range of logical relations to other statements.

The above considerations may shed some light on the relation of scientific explanation with prediction. An explanatory argument is also predictive one. In predicting something as yet unknown one deductively infers if from particular facts and relevant laws. But can it be held with equal plausibility that a predictive argument always offers a potential explanation? In the case of a deductive nomological prediction an affirmative answer can be produced. But there are certain sound predictive arguments of non-deductive type as well which cannot be used as affording potential explanation. It is because of the absence of general laws in the structure of those arguments that they cannot play the role of explanation. It is the characteristic of an explanation, though not necessarily of all predictions, that it presents the inferred phenomena as occurring in conformity with general laws.

Let us admit for the moment "deduction" is in the very core of the meaning of scientific explanation Physics is acknowledged to be the most advanced science for its theories, explanatory and predictive, are put forward in the most

rigorous form. Still there is a problem: why explanation of events in science must be deductive? It is at times claimed that no science really answers the questions as to why any event occur at all and things are related in certain way and not otherwise. Such questions could be answered only if we were able to show that the events which occur must occur and that the relations, which hold between things, must hold. For the purpose the necessary and sufficient reason for the occurrences have to be shown. It is also thought that the task of a natural science is to describe conceptually the sequence of observable events, and that natural science cannot explain or account for the *existence* of such occurrences. Science, therefore, presents only what is comprehensible or conceptual *description*, and not *explanation*. But this again is questionable because the argument assumes that there is just one correct sense in which "why" questions can be raised, namely, the sense in which the proper answer to it is a *proof* of the *inherent necessity* of the proposition. There are in fact well-established uses for the words "why" and "explanation" such that it is entirely appropriate to designate an answer to a "why" question as an explanation even when the reply does not supply reasons for regarding the explanandum as intrinsically necessary. Although the universality of the deductive pattern is open to objections, it is hardly disputable that many explanations in the sciences and most comprehensive systems of explanations are of this form. But why? If the generalizations and individual statements of fact are accepted as true, then because of the essential relation the connection must be true. This is the virtue of a deductive model of explanation. Once such terms as "must", "guarantees" are clarified then it becomes understandable why deduction alone justifies conclusion. And since this deduction in most cases uses causal laws in order to deduce the conclusion, so in most cases this deduction assumes a model of explanation that is inevitably causal and shares the same logical structure as that of prediction.

Causal explanation considered as answers to "why?" question gives rise to various complications. It is not expected to be answered by detailing all the events which together make up a total cause. The formal explanation would be to produce the necessary and sufficient conditions for the explanandum. A fact which is conceived to be indispensable for the origination of another is also to be regarded as a cause in respect of the latter. A cause in science is the minimum conditions required to account for satisfactorily any example of an observable effect. A causal condition of any event is any condition which is such that had it not occurred, given only those other conditions the event could not have occurred. If this is so, then it at once follows that the cause, that is the totality of those necessary conditions, is also sufficient for the occurrence of the event in question. Once one has enumerated all the conditions necessary for the occurrence of the given event the totality of conditions will at once be sufficient for its occurrence or such that no further conditions will be necessary. A given set of conditions was sufficient for the occurrence of a given event would mean that those conditions were such that all of them having occurred

the effect in question could not fail to occur. Thus explanation in terms of a cause requires an answer which is both one of a set of events which together form a sufficient condition and one which in the presence of the rest of the set of events is a necessary condition and we express these necessary and sufficient conditions in the form of the premises of a causal explanation.

The identification of causal explanation with prediction has been stressed by the thinkers like Feigl, Popper, etc. If by the word "cause" we mean that which makes intelligible the occurrence of a thing or that which is necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of an event, then it can unhesitatingly be claimed that it is essential for some cases of deductive pattern of explanation. Predictability is not necessarily the meaning of causality; it is a criterion of causal as well as non-causal determination. A predictive argument can be and is construed scientifically in a deductive model and such a deductive model, in most cases, leads to a causal model. In effect, it would not be unfair to say that the identical relation betwen explanation and prediction rests ultimately upon a serious confusion.

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# Book reviews

DAYA KRISHNA (ed.): *India's Intellectual Traditions: Attempts at Conceptual Reconstructions*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research in association with Motilal Banarsidass, New Delhi, 1987, xxvii + 200pp., Rs 75.

There has been much talk of 'indigenization' but no real attempt at practising it. It is in this context that an 'Interdisciplinary Group' was formed at Jaipur and the present work embodies some tentative results of 'The Jaipur Experiment'. The purpose of the enterprise was to seek 'a conceptual articulation of the intellectual tradition in different fields of knowledge in order to use it creatively for extending, deepening and enhancing knowledge in these domains' (p. xiii). 'The task...is neither exegetical nor historical... Rather, it is to discover the intellectual idiom of the past, or to vary the metaphor, to take possession of the intellectual patrimony which is ours by right and use it to advance the cognitive enterprize of mankind today' (pp. xiii-xiv).

An obvious objection to the usefulness of this enterprise could arise from the widely current opinion, which regards all past intellectual structures as dated and parochial, and holds that only contemporary thought has universality and relevance today. On this the editor pertinently remarks: 'The self-proclaimed universal character of these so-called modern conceptual structures in the field of knowledge...is a myth believed in only by those who have been trained and intellectually socialized in them' (p. xiv).

Apart from the objections of the sceptics, the project has to face an inherent difficulty. The educational structure of our country, as devised by the British and largely continuing to day, segregates modern from traditional Indian disciplines. As a result, those who are creatively engaged in contemporary issues have been largely cut off from any adequate contact with the Indian tradition. Indian social scientists, thus, are acquainted with the Western tradition only. What is more, they also tend to imbibe British attitudes towards the Indian tradition. Traditional scholars, on the other hand, tend to live in the past, and do not make any attempt to face contemporary reality in the light of the tradition they study. Deliberately fostered dialogues between traditional pundits and modern scholars have been suggested as a means to bridge the gulf between them. For various reasons the value of such dialogues has been rather limited so far, but if they could become self-sustaining and spontaneous it would be quite different. The technique of 'creative encounters with the texts' has also been suggested as a methodology to be adopted. It is certainly a most valuable suggestion. Perhaps the creative application of traditional concepts to current problems should be the natural concomitant of the creative interpretation of texts.

The first paper in the collection is by Dr N.K. Singhi and has a special

reference to the *Arthaśāstra*. It points out that a comparison of Weber's approach to bureaucracy with that of Kauṭilya would be feasible and possibly useful. The paper, however, concentrates on raising methodological questions. Perhaps some of these could be followed up in Dr Singhi's department itself in terms of actual research projects. Prof. A.M. Ghose analyses Manu in greater detail in the next paper.

Dr K.L. Sharma has written on 'Hermeneutics in the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtras* of Jaimini', and has been inspired by K.L. Sarkar's work of 1909. Indra Deva and Srirama write on 'The Articulation of Juridical Concepts in Later *Smṛtis*'. Both of these papers should be of interest to the students of law. Unfortunately, the modern study of law as well as politics in India has been almost exclusively tied to the changing framework of contemporary institutions understood within uncritically borrowed theoretical viewpoints, liberal or quasi-socialist. The prevailing attitude may be described as syncretic and pragmatic, which does not favour any sustained or radical theoretical reflection. By and large modern Indian academics can hardly be accused of having been so dissatisfied with current ideologies as to seek to develop some original political or legal theory. In the absence of a creative questioning of current ideologies, it would be in vain to expect a creative use of the past. This failure is particularly striking in the context of the fact that India has passed through far-reaching social and political changes in the past two centuries. Even the thought and practice of Gandhiji have failed to inspire our academic tradition.

The remaining papers deal with different aspects of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. R.S. Bhatnagar writes on 'The Conceptual Structure Underlying the *Nāṭyaśāstra*'. Mukund Lath contributes a paper on 'The *Nāṭya* as Conceived by Bharata', K.J. Shah has a paper on 'The Theory of *Rasa*: Its Conceptual Structure'. Prof. V.Y. Kantak has written on 'The *Nāṭyaśāstra*: Dramatic Mode'. K. Krishnamoorthy has contributed a paper on 'The Conceptual Structure of *Dhvani* in Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka*', and R.B. Patankar on 'Madhusūdana Sarasvati's *Śri Bhagavad-Bhaktirasāyana*'.

The papers are undoubtedly stimulating and of high quality. Prof. Kantak's paper shows some changes since he published a similar study many years ago. Prof. Shah's comments on *nirveda* in the contemporary context are striking and deserve a fuller treatment. Prof. Krishnamoorthi has already published a good deal on similar lines. Prof. Patnakar has made some interesting suggestions, but they need to be argued further.

Of the three parts of the book, the first curiously couples the paper on the *Arthaśāstra* with that on Jaimini. The second part consists of the two papers on the *Smṛtis*. The third part has six papers on the *Nāṭyaśāstra* and allied topics. This is obviously the most considerable part of the book. Perhaps it could be interpreted to mean that, in the sphere of the performing arts or aesthetic theory, traditional ideas and standards continue to have a relatively larger hold. It is more likely, however, that it is the accidental result of the

way in which the 'Jaipur Group' has been formed. In any case, even in this section the papers are elucidatory or interpretative of certain old texts or ideas. They do not in most cases seek to creatively adapt traditional concepts to contemporary issues. In this, like most of the other papers in the collection, they continue in the main the existing mode of scholarship rather than break away from it.

In seeking to interpret past ideas, the authors may be said to have contributed significantly to the history of ideas in a broad sense or to general philosophical or critical reflection in a loose sense. However, in the context of the avowed aim of the book, the important question is whether they have sought to add to the present state of the modern disciplines to which their papers should be relevant. Some papers certainly make an attempt to relate themselves to modern issues. The papers of Prof. Singhi, Kantak and Shah illustrate this. Other papers are content to comment on the terms and ideas occurring in past texts. Apparently, not all the contributors have understood the 'structure of ideas' in the same way. Nor is this surprising.

In view of the necessarily tentative and fragmentary character of the work, it would be useless to point out lacunae. Nor will it be relevant to consider alternative interpretations of the texts. It will, however, certainly be relevant to consider whether the results of these essays in any way further the basic programme of the project.

As already mentioned, the paper of Dr Singhi suggests a research project which would undertake comparative evaluation of Weber and Kauṭilya on bureaucracy. Dr K.L. Sharma's paper on Mīmāṁsā hermeneutics is, on the other hand, of the nature of summary elucidation. Perhaps this would inspire him to proceed further with a creative encounter with some text, Mīmāṁsist or otherwise. Prof. A.M. Ghose attempts in effect a philosophical-cultural evaluation of *Manusmṛti*. One may recall that fairly extensive revisions of traditional ethical-social ideas were attempted in a philosophical vein by savants like Tilak, Dr Bhagavan Das and Motilal Shastry. The present empiricist temper of the social, sciences has, however, completely eclipsed any interest in such attempts for the time being. The question, therefore, is whether some interpretation of the *Smṛtis* can be made the basis of any empirically testable programmes. Alternatively, one would have to debate the relative relevance of the two types of social philosophy in question.

The paper of Indra Deva and Srirama on the juridical concepts of the later *Smṛtis* is a genuine contribution to ancient legal history, but its emphasis is institutional. In a period of rapid institutional change as today, one rather needs to recapture, if possible, the basic values and principles involved in legislation, in case anything is to be directly learnt from tradition.

In the papers belonging to the third part of the book, while those by Prof. Kantak and Shah have a contemporary reference, the rest seek to throw light on some salient features of the ancient tradition. Somehow, they do not take note of the 'flaming walls of the world of taste' within which all criticism

lies. The fact is that aesthetic theory like social theory has a far-reaching dependence on practice and social history without reference to which their concepts remain opaque. Concepts as *lakṣaṇas* represent attempts at articulating a vision of the *lakṣya*. Terms, definitions and classifications come alive only if they are connected with their underlying vision. The creative encounter with texts must, therefore, become a creative response to the vision from which they spring.

It is worth noting that the areas of the intellectual tradition chosen for exploration in this work are not areas of 'pure' cognitive enterprise but areas of reflection over practical or imaginative creativity in which the dimension of historicity needs to be specially tackled. These areas also retain a crucial significance for us today in view of the process of social change in which we are involved. The book under review, thus, represents a most laudable attempt, and one can only wish that the 'Jaipur Group' persists in its effort and attracts more and more people. As the leader of the experiment, Prof. Daya Krishna deserves to be congratulated. The road ahead, however, remains long and the journey arduous.

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*Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, edited with introduction, translation and annotation by R. BALASUBRAMANYAN, Madras University, lii + 428pp., Rs 70.

*Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, whose translation with annotation is under review, is a treatise of seminal importance in the philosophical literature of Advaita Vedānta. Its author Sureśvara was the immediate disciple of Śaṅkara, and was one of the four *ācāryas* whom Śaṅkara installed as the head of one of the four seats of spiritual guidance established by him in the four quarters of India. According to tradition, Sureśvara the *sanyāsin* was Maṇḍana Miśra, the great Mīmāṁsaka and householder, who was defeated in a debate by Śaṅkara and converted by him to the Advaitic point of view. Scholars like P.P.S. Sastry, Suryanarayana Sastry, etc. were heatedly arguing for and against Sureśvara's identity with Maṇḍana in the early decades of this century.

As its title *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* indicates, the treatise is primarily concerned with the establishment of the thesis that only by a total renunciation of *karma* or voluntary action, even including the scripturally enjoined ones, can the ultimate goal of human existence, namely, liberation, be attained. Only knowledge, which cannot go together with action, can lead to liberation. Considering Sureśvara's former affiliation with and staunch advocacy of the activistic viewpoint of Mīmāṁsā, his subsequent repudiation of action as the means of liberation is very significant. To Śaṅkara's Advaitism goes the credit of bringing about a revolutionary change of outlook in the whole sphere of Indian philosophy by means of which empirical reality, in which

action prevails, is sharply separated from the spiritual realm which is preempted by knowledge and knowledge alone. All non-Advaitic philosophies tow the line of Mīmāṁsā in holding action or some variant of it (like *upāsanā*) as essential, by itself or in conjunction with knowledge, for liberation. Śaṅkra was alone in boldly maintaining that action is not only not necessary for but is even positively obstructive, at a certain stage of man's spiritual development, to his attainment of liberation. This view is clearly elaborated in the four chapters of *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, which range over many related topics of Advaita Vedānta.

The Radhakrishnan Institute of Madras University has done yeoman's service to the cause of Advaita Vedānta. Sureśvara's commentaries on Śaṅkara's *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and *Taittirīya Upaniṣads*, the former in bare textual form and the latter with translation, annotation and a long and illuminating introduction by Prof. Balasubramanyan himself, were published some years back by the institute. The present work is a successful culmination of the academic venture started long ago by the former director of the institute, late Prof. Mahadevan. With his commendable command of the English medium and by his skilful handling of the technical Sanskrit of the original text, Prof. Balasubramanyan has been able to avoid two pitfalls into which many a translator of philosophical Sanskrit into English invariably falls. The first pitfall results from attempting to reproduce exactly the structure of Sanskrit expressions in their English translations, which, more often than not, renders the translations quite unintelligible. The second pitfall results, on the other hand, if a free translation of the Sanskrit text is attempted without attention to its subtle meanings. Prof. Balasubramanyan's translation is literal and yet fluent and lucid enough for even a beginner in philosophy to follow. Two excerpts from the book will illustrate how felicitous the translation is:

यस्माद्रजस्तमो मलोपसंसृष्टम् चित्तं कामबडिशेनाकृष्य विषयदुरन्तसूनास्यानेषु निक्षिप्यले, तस्मान्नित्यनैमित्तिककर्मानुष्ठानेनापविद्धरजस्तमोमलं, प्रसन्नमनाकुलं समाजितस्फटिक शिलाकल्पं बाह्यविषयहेतुकेन च रागद्वेषात्मकेनातिग्रहबडिशेनानाकृष्यमाणं, विधूताशेषकल्मल प्रत्यङ्मात्र प्रवणं चित्तदर्पणमवतिष्ठते ।  (p. 50)

> Since the mind is tainted by the impurities of *rajas* and *tamas*, it is attracted by the bait of desire and is placed in the slaughter-house of countless sense-objects; but it becomes pure and tranquil like a well-washed crystalstone, when it is cleansed by the performance of daily and obligatory deeds, and the impurities of *rajas* and *tamas* are removed from it. Then being free from all impurities it is not attracted by the powerful bait of desire and aversion which are caused by the external objects, and remains like a clear mirror, inclined only towards the inward self.

स्वतन्त्र:सिद्धात्मचैतन्यप्रतिबिम्बिता   विचारितसिद्धिकात्मानवबोधोत्थेतरेतरस्वभावापेक्षसिद्धित्वात् स्वतश्चासिद्धेरनात्मनो द्वैतेन्द्रजालस्य ।
न स्वयं स्वस्य नानात्वं नावगत्यात्मना यत: ।  नोभाभ्यामप्यत: सिद्धमद्वैतं द्वैतबाधया ।।(p. 106)

Since the not-self in the form of the false appearance of duality does not exist by itself, since it exists involving reciprocal dependence, and since it is caused by the ignorance of the self, the ignorance which arises because of lack of inquiry and which is superimposed on the self-established self which is of the nature of consciousness, it follows:

Since the plurality of the world is not established by itself nor by the self which is of the nature of consciousness, nor by both, non-duality is therefore proved by the sublation of duality.

The second of the above two passages is a bit complex, but the English renderings of both are quite straightforward and easy to follow. There is not the slightest deviation from the import of the text in the translation.

In regard to the commentary of Jñānottama on *Naiṣkaryasiddhi*, which Prof. Balasubramanyan follows for the purpose of elaborating subtle and difficult points in the text, it has to be said to his credit that he has nowhere misrepresented Jñāttama nor has he fathered his innovations, which are very few on the latter.

The translation is preceded by a sufficiently-long introduction which is a kind of supplement to the almost booklength and a very perpicacious introduction which has been appended to Prof. Balasubramanyan's earlier work dealing with Sureśvara's *Vārtika* on *Taittirīya-bhāṣya*. Undoubtedly the two introductions together give a detailed account of Advaita philosophy. The list of the main topics, discussed in the four chapters of the book, which is given after the introduction, immensely adds to the value of the translation.

*Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* is a difficult work. The present edition, in which the textual content is fully conveyed by its English rendering, will appeal to all serious students of Advaita Vedānta both inside the country and abroad.

*Nagpur*                                                    N.S. DRAVID

N.K. DEVARAJA: *Humanism in Indian Thought,* Indus Publishing Company, New Delhi, 1988.

R.L. NIGAM: *Radical Humanism of M.N. Roy: An Exposition of His 22 Theses,* Indus Publishing Company, New Delhi, 1988.

Recently, published two new titles, mentioned above, are welcome additions in the growing list of books on the history and development of humanism. Humanism, in fact, has a very long bibliography for, in a sense, it has a very broad canvass. Etymologically humanism is 'of' or 'about' man and so everything concerning man and his milieu may be branded as humanism. The presence of 'ism' reminds us of other analogous ideologies, such as communism, socialism, anarchism, psychologism or scientism. As an ideology, humanism clamours for the rights of the human being for self-preser-

vation and self-development. But even then this claim is not new or novel. Time and again, this claim has been reiterated by thinkers of all ages and countries.

Ordinarily when we think of the origin and development of humanism, we consider it in terms of its western version. We associate the resurrection of the humanistic ideals since the days of Renaissance and Reformation in the modern period. This 'humanist age' is characterized primarily by (a) revival of classical literature, (b) promotion of secular ideas, (c) assertion of individual independence, and (d) reliance on reason and scientific method as the best way of attaining truth, etc. Man endeavours to liberate himself from all bondages of theology and tradition. Humanism, stimulating a new human self-esteem and craving for self-development, reasserts the Protagorean principle that 'man is the measure of all things'.

Such ideals, though rejuvenated in Europe since Renaissance, are always present either implicitly or explicitly in all cultures and countries. We are thankful to Professors Devaraja and Nigam for drawing the attention of the humanists of the world to the presence of similar humanistic trend in classical and contemporary Indian thoughts.

One of the main points that emerge from the comparison between the eastern and the western versions of humanism is that while in the west humanism arose as a reaction against the supremacy of religion, in the past the development of humanism is thoroughly integrated with the development of religion. Humanism *qua* humanism is not in the centre of the Indian tradition. Rather religion permeates the Indian culture and service to man becomes significant as service to God.

In his *Humanism in Indian Thought* Professor Devaraja appropriately commences his discussion with its metaphysical roots present in the Upanishadic-Vedantic thoughts. He mentions that in the extensive literature of the Upanishads, the Indian mind first reveals its awarness of the problem and destiny of man by combining philosophic-religious insight, with mystical utterances. But while we await to find examples and elaborations of such importance of man in the Vedic and Upanishadic literature, Devaraja, curiously enough, writes (which seems almost contradictory to what has been said earlier in page 33), 'throughout their reflection, however, their attention continued to be directed on things outside the human world which circumstance prevented them from specifically raising the questions concerning the nature and destiny of man himself. The universe as conceived by them does not assign any importance to man.' (p. 35) In the very next sentence Devaraja describes 'on the other hand, the earthly life constitute the central concern for the Vedic Aryans.' Finally, he himself answers his query as 'should this latter attitude towards life be called humanistic? Perhaps not, for it is neither rooted in, nor supported by the peculiar world-view entertained by them.' (p. 35)

It seems that the author in his search for the metaphysical roots of

humanism in the classical Indian literature becomes somewhat perflexed with its apparently transcendent all-pervasive, impersonal mysticism. What, I think, we should realize is that it is this impersonal, traditional, mystic-cosmic humanistic ideal that can raise the boundless love and compassion for all beings to their proper dimension and invest the perduring ontic self with the essential mystery of the transcendent being. The *Isa Upanishad* begins with an invocation to Brahman as the absolute and all-comprehensive. Out of the fulness of Brahman comes into existence this universe with all its beings. Every being, every man is a part or fragment of this Brahman. Indian Vedantic humanism is rooted in such identity of part and whole, the Atman with Brahman. On the other hand, we know that *'atmanam viddhi'* or 'Know Thyself' is the dictum of Indian Philosophy, but this self is not necessarily the self which is transcendent, ascetic or a-social, this self is also practical, moral and social. Hence the problem of man and his inter-personal relationship often comes to the mind of the Indian thinkers.

Professor Devaraja has aptly indicated the humanistic implications of the Upanishadic view of the soul or self; for example, that the individual soul is unborn and immortal; that the law of *karma* holds a supreme position even in the theistic systems, etc. What is very significant among all these implications is the concept of *jivanmukti* or the possibility of attaining liberation in life. This shows that the achievement of highest perfection and fulfilment does not necessarily involve the denial or transcendence of earthly existence. Here the author only mentions but does not elaborate why Vaish-navism, Christianity and Islam deny the possibility of such highest fulfil-ment within the spatio-temporal order. It would have been much more illuminating if he would have compared the humanistic trend of the Hindu tradition with other important religions of the world. Besides, any account of humanism in Indian thought should also discuss the role of man in Islamic religion specially, as it is being followed by large number of Indians. However, the author remains silent about the Islamic tradition and the presence of humanistic ideals therein.

Of course, Professor Devaraja has dealt with the Buddhist religion in details and his discussion of the humanistic elements of Buddhism is quite significant as it clearly shows how Buddhism, without being theistic, preaches man to be moral. *Nirvana*, the final goal of life, may be attained by being disciplined and ethical. Buddhism lays down principles or code of conduct for all men and women. The main principles are contained in the delineation of the eightfold path itself, which leads one to *Nirvana*. Man, through his inner purity, contemplation, abolition of ego-sense and intense urge to help all creatures, can overcome earthly sufferings. Absolute compassion, wisdom and salvation for all are identified in Buddhist morality which has its in-fluence not only in India but also in different parts of Asia. In this context the author could have pointed out the inspiration of Buddhism in the develop-ment of humanitarianism and socialism in many Asian countries like Japan,

Indonesia, Vietnam, etc. Besides promoting the virtues of forbearance, mutual accommodation and co-existence, Buddhism also marks the spirit of socialism and service for the have-nots. In this context we are reminded of R.K. Mukherjee's book entitled *The Way of Humanism,* where he discusses how Buddhism always disfavours private ownership of property and opposes attachment to goods and mundane values on the ground of the ephemerality of life. Mukherjee states: 'The absolute enlightment and compassion of Buddhist humanism have great possibilities for the social transformation of South and East Asia as the Buddhist Vedanta becomes truth in human rela-tionship and social action.' (*The Way of Humanism,* Academic Books, Delhi, 1968, p. 205)

After discussing the religio-philosophic tradition of ancient India that tends to furnish the metaphysical basis for humanism, Professor Devaraja throws light very appropriately on the prevalence of such humanistic trend in modern and contemporary Indian thought. Since the dawn of the present century there flourished many important thinkers in India who dedicated their lives for the benefit of humanity in general and India in particular. The names of Raja Rammohan Roy, Ishwarchandra Vidyasagar, Rabindranath Tagore, Mahatma Gandhi, Sri Aurobindo, Iqbal and Vivekananda often come to our mind and we should respect and recapitulate their contribution for the upliftment of our country. Among all these progenitors of modern India, Devaraja chooses only four, namely Tagore, Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and M.N. Roy and discusses their views, often mentioning about some others in the context.

Professor Devraja describes Tagore and Gandhi as the two religious humanists and Nehru and M.N. Roy as the two secular humanists. Though the author describes Tagore and Gandhi as Vedantins in their religio-philo-sophic outlook (p. 89), it cannot be denied that they are not religious in the same sense. It would have been more appropriate to designate Tagore's philosophy as spiritual for his religion, unlike its popular conception, is pri-marily the religion of man. We often confuse between devoutness and spiri-tuality and forget that one can be spiritual, without being earnestly religious. In fact, the author quotes a very significant passage from Tagore's *The Re-ligion of Man* where this attitude is manifested clearly: 'The idea of the hu-manity of our God, or the divinity of Man, the Eternal, is the main subject of this book.' (p. 91) This passage immediately reminds us of Feuerbach's hermeneutico of religion in his *Essence of Christianity,* where Feuerbach rejects the conventional 'speculative theology' and emphasizes the 'esoteric' content of religion which reveals the truth about real man. Promoting this trend Engels remarks: 'Nothing exists outside nature and man and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence.' (Marx and Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow p. 333) Almost in the same spirit, Tagore stresses on the finite-infinite nature of the individual. In some philosophies (e.g. in Hegelianism and in Young-

Hegelianism) we notice either the descending or the ascending movement of the God-Man relationship. Tagore does not start from the one and either ascend or descend to the other. He thinks that the *Brahman* or the ultimate can be perceived only through human personality. We can know him and please him only through this medium. In this world amidst human surroundings our actions are the best prayers to the Almighty. We care for human personality and human personality is the divine personality. In his conversation with Einstein, the poet said: 'My religion is the reconciliation of the superpersonal man, the universal human spirit, in my own individual being.' (Appendix, *The Religion of Man*.)

In contrast to Tagore's approach to life which was primarily aesthetic, Gandhi's approach to religion and life, as rightly pointed out by Professor Devaraja, is predominantly ethical. For Gandhi, moral life is one with spiritual discipline and is inalienable from religion. Being both religious and pragmatic, Gandhi wanted to apply the basic moral principles in the practical life of the human being. The basic moral virtue, *ahimsa* or non-violence should lead to *satyagraha* or non-violent actions in the society. Here the author could have mentioned about the movements that Gandhi did organize in order to uplift the conditions of the harijans and to remove caste distinction or similar other unjust, inhuman practices from Indian society. However, the author aptly describes how Gandhi's great contribution to humanism consists in conceiving and practising a religion that centres around man and his life in this world.

Then Professor Devaraja draws our attention to some of the Indian humanists of the present day. He discusses about the ideals of Jawaharlal Nehru and M.N. Roy. Devaraja designates their ideas as 'Secularist Humanism'. It is true that unlike Gandhi and Vivekananda, they were atheists, yet it should not be missed that they believed, like Tagore, in the religion of man. In fact a true humanist is one who always feels for man, works for man and loves and adores man above all.

Even though it may be debated whether Nehru can be regarded as a humanist or a politician primarily, yet it is indubitable that he devoted all his life to the service of his countrymen. It is evident that Nehru worked primarily for the freedom and development of the Indian people. But we must not forget that he was always sympathetic to the suffering and protested against exploitation of men even of the different parts of the world. He was a man of ideas, that stirred his people and gave a new hope to resurgent India. His love for humanity emanates from his interest in the history of human civilization.

We notice that both Nehru and Roy supported the need of human freedom and were uncompromisingly opposed to Fascism. Another interesting point is that though both Nehru and Roy became very much influenced by Marxian ideas in their earlier life—they broke away, if not from Marx, but from Communism in their later lives. From that one should not suppose, however,

that Nehru and Roy would like to sail in the same boat. Rather, they differed from the Marxist ideology in their own distinct ways and in the process interpreted humanism from their own different prospectives. While Nehru wanted to develop his philosophy of man from an aesthetic, culture-bound, international standpoint, Roy developed his New or Radical Humanism from a cosmopolitan, pragmatic revolutionary point of view.

In spite of his strong political acumen, imaginative ideas and interesting political career, M.N. Roy remained more or less an obscure figure in Indian politics. This is partly due to the abstruse nature of his thought and writings. In order to unveil the mystery and confusion that often surround the ideas of M.N. Roy, it is necessary to have detailed analysis and expositions of his ideas. This need has been partly fulfilled by Professor Nigam, who in his recent book entitled *Radical Humanism of M.N. Roy*, has given a detailed exposition of the twenty-two theses formulated by Roy. These twenty-two theses, incorporating the fundamental principles of Radical Humanism, were formulated in the form of condensed statements and it was extremely necessary to analyse and explain them in order to clarify their tacit dimensions. Nigam's exposition of the twenty-two theses would certainly help us in getting a clear conception of Roy's philosophy of Radical Humanism. Nigam clearly indicates his intention to draw attention of those who may feel interested in Roy and his thought, 'particularly of the new generation to the fact that the twenty-two theses which encapsulate that thought would need hard, sustained work to either accept or reject them.' He rightly feels that to be casual of them would be most unfair and he himself undertakes this task of analysing and explaining Roy's ideals.

The twenty-two theses, formulated by M.N. Roy, though significant, may appear ambiguous and confused. Nigam himself admits that due to such ambiguity of Roy's principles, Radical Humanism is 'getting obscured under a thickening cloud of confusion.' Such confusion arises out of several factors. One of these factors, the author describes, as 'parallelism' (p. 27). While explaining it, Nigam mentions that Roy's ideas are not the product of speculation, but of contemporary experience or what he calls 'the crisis situation'. It seems that the author would place the responsibility of the said 'confusion' mainly on the then situation itself. By 'parallelism', Nigam possibly refers to the alternative suggestions offered by different thinkers to come out of that 'crisis situation'. In philosophy or in politics such alternative standpoints are quite common and welcome too and it is not clear why and how such parallel conceptions (or ideologies) would act as hindrances in understanding the ideas of Roy's philosophy. Roy's conception of 'humanism' or 'decentralization' may differ from that of others but that is not at all unusual; only one needs to have a clear picture of Roy's ideas in order to differentiate them from that of others and to evaluate the ideas properly.

It seems to me that the ambiguity that we find in Roy's philosophy is due to the impact of different socio-political trends on Roy's thought. He became

influenced by various ideologies of the period, e.g. he became interested in the doctrines of both Marx and Gandhi; he became influenced by the development of science and technology—yet he sought to preserve the basic values of human life; though he gave emphasis on material or economic aspects, he was equally keen on preserving freedom and morality. Accepting Nigam's terminology, we can say that all these 'parallel' tendencies fascinated Roy and it became somewhat difficult to synthesize or harmonize them in one coherent system.

Professor Nigam's exposition of the twenty-two theses are lucid, detailed and informative. In many cases his expositions clarify the ambiguities that were present in the theses due to their condensed form. Nigam seeks to inter-relate not only the various theses but he also discusses the related issues of the then socio-political milieu. His exposition becomes illuminative and interesting as it connects the political ideologies with the philosophical prin-ciples. But a student of philosophy may feel that in some cases Nigam's expositions are a bit simplicistic. His elucidation of the famous Marxian dictum 'Man is the root of mankind' may be mentioned here. Nigam rightly describes how, according to Marx, man is the product of his circumstances and taking this clue how Roy's Radical Humanism declares that 'rising out of the background of the physical universe, man incorporates the best of creation. If there is any creative power, that is in him; it can operate only through him...' (p. 151) Nigam comments in the context 'that to be radical is to start with and from the root and that root is man, supreme, sovereign, creative.' (p. 191) That man is the 'ultimate reference' or is the main centre of all thought and action is the basic principle of any or every form of humanism and it is not clear (at least not from the above statement) wherein lies the claimed 'radicalism' or novelty of Roy's Radical Humanism. Besides, the author could have mentioned that Marx's statement in his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* practically reversed the Hegelian assertion that every-thing, including man and nature, is the creation of Absolute Spirit. Marx did not refer to any supernatural power or deity as the source of mankind. An intense anthropocentricism is expressed in the Marxian dictum 'man is the root of mankind'. However, Professor Nigam's exposition deserves special attention as it brings to light many of the relevant issues. His introductory article on 'The Theses in Perspective' certainly illuminates many facets of Roy's life and thought.

Here we can mention that Professor Devaraja's account of M.N. Roy's philosophy in his *Humanism in Indian Thought*, simple and short though it is, may help an inquisitive scholar as a good introduction to Roy's Radical Humanism, who may then turn to Nigam's exposition for detailed infor-mation.

The primary objective of the two books under review, as I have pointed out earlier, is to draw attention to the contribution of the Indian thinkers

in the development of humanism and this task has been adequately served by the two authors. We are indeed grateful to the authors for their interest, acumen and insight into the history and development of humanism in India.

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