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On Wittgenstein's transcendental ethics*

RAJENDRA PRASAD
Opposite Stadium Rajendra Nagar, Patna

Wittgenstein is not as well-known for his contribution to ethics or moral philosophy as he is for his contribution to some other areas of philosophy, for example, to philosophy of language or philosophy of mind. He may not even get a noticeable mention in a book on the history of twentieth-century ethical theory. But it is also unlikely that the little he wrote—and he did write very little—on ethics would ever be considered to be of no consequence.

In some of his early writings he holds that ethics is transcendental. But he does not develop it into a full-fledged ethical or metaethical theory, discussing all or most of the important philosophical things it implies. His later writings do not seem to endorse it or even to consider it as one deserving a serious philosophical scrutiny. His views or remarks relevant to it are mainly available in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (*TLP*), *Note-books* (*NB*), the 1929/30 'A Lecture on Ethics' (*LOE*), published in *The Philosophical Review*, 1965, and *Culture and Value* (*CAV*). Maybe some other, early or later, work of his also contains important ideas pertaining to it. But I shall be concerned only with what he has said in the above works. I shall also not talk about any other view about the nature of ethics held by him which may be found or read into any of his several writings.

References to the works listed above will be given in the body of the essay itself, using the abbreviated forms of their titles already mentioned. Unless otherwise indicated, the abbreviated title of the work concerned and the number of the item quoted, or the number of the page on which it occurs, will be given within brackets at the end of the item in its first occurrence.

My main objective is to give a systematic account, as systematic as I can make it appear, of the various ethical things said by him, so that there may emerge a philosophically or conceptually unified picture of his view that ethics is transcendental. I shall not try to trace its historical development or to locate the differences or inconsistences, if there exist any, among the various ideas, present in the above works, which may be directly or indirectly associated with it.

This view, in its own right, seems to be worth discussing. Even if my picture is not a faithful one of what any Wittgensteinian scholar thinks Wittgenstein's actual position is, it will be a picture of the view that ethics is transcendental. I shall not, however, desist from making a critical or semi-

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This paper is dedicated to the memory of Ludwig Wittgenstein on his birth centenary year.—Editor

critical remark whenever I find it appropriate or called for. Wittgenstein's views on ethics have been discussed by some very competent and insightful scholars, but mostly in a developmental or historical manner. They have also been severely criticized, for example, by Klemke[1], but in a manner which to me seems to be philosophically uncongenial to the spirit of his way of thinking about ethics. Among the writers on this theme, Peter Winch[2] has very elegantly developed in a constructive manner some of the implications and insights of some of Wittgenstein's remarks. I shall not try to do any such thing either, though I shall try to make as clearly visible as possible the ideas implicit in some of the things he has said if required by the objective of my venture.

Ethics and aesthetics are considered by Wittgenstein to be identical. What I say about his views on ethics may also be true of his views on aesthetics. But I shall not at all be concerned with the latter.

Wittgenstein says that ethics is transcendental in the sense that it transcends language or the world. To say that it transcends language and to say that it transcends the world is, for him, to say one and the same thing. Since the world is the totality of facts, to say that it transcends all facts, or the world of all facts, or factual language, is also to say the same thing. His reason, or the primary reason, for the transcendentalness of ethics is that it deals with values and values are transcendental because they exist outside the world. They cannot exist in the world, because everything in the world is accidental while no value is accidental. By 'value' he means absolute or unconditional value, something which is valued not as a means but as an end, as a value in itself, and valued not temporarily but always, i.e. valued in a timeless sense.

TLP: 6.41 runs as follows:

The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: *in* it no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have no value.

If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental.

What makes it non-accidental cannot lie *within* the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.

It must lie outside the world.

It seems obvious that for Wittgenstein there are values, or there is at least one value. That is, a talk about values is not a talk about nothing or about something fictitious or imaginary. Had he believed that there was no value, he would not have said: 'It *must lie* outside the world' (emphasis mine). Even to say that 'the sense of the world must lie outside the world' is to say that the world has sense or value. By 'sense' here he obviously means value. The value which the world has *not only, in fact, lies* but *must lie* outside the world, because all values being non-accidental no value *can lie* in the world.

To say that no value lies in the world is in effect a way of saying that nothing which belongs to the world has any value. But if nothing in the world has any value, how can the world [as a whole] have any value even if that value is said to exist outside the world? How can we then speak of the sense of the world? One may think of invoking Moore's principle of organic unities to wipe off the apparent oddity in saying that the world, whose no part has any value, has a value. But Wittgenstein's world, which is the totality of facts with no [necessary or intrinsic] connection between any two facts, cannot be called an organic unity in Moore's sense of the term. A fact is 'the existence of states of affairs' (*TLP*: 2) and 'states of affairs are independent of one another' (*TLP*: 2.061). A totality is only an aggregation; it is not an organic whole or unity. To call something a totality and to call it an organic whole mean so differently that it would be inaccurate to call a totality an organic whole or vice versa. For instance, a living body, which is ordinarily regarded as an example of an organic whole, cannot properly be called a totality of its constituent parts.

Since the world is the totality of facts, or all that is the case, there cannot be a transcendental fact. But facts are accidental; we cannot say of any fact that it must be the fact it is. Since values are non-accidental, and whatever the world contains is accidental, there cannot be any value in it. Rather, if we assume that there is in it a value *V, V* would become accidental since the world can contain accidental and only accidental things, and *V*, therefore, would cease to be a value. This is what he seems to mean by saying: 'If it did exist, it would have no value.' Being non-accidental, values can be presumed to introduce an element of non-accidentalness in whatever region they exist. If, per impossible, the feat of ushering a value in the world is performed, the incorrigibly accidental character of the world would not let it remain a value by transforming or degenerating it into something accidental.

It means then that the expression 'value-fact' is a contradiction in terms, because values are non-accidental and facts are accidental. It also means that value-judgements cannot be propositions. 'A proposition is a description of a state of affairs' (*TLP*: 4.023). By definition, propositions are logically, inexorably, hooked to facts, or states of affairs, to things which are accidental. Therefore, they have no place in ethics, since the latter is concerned with the non-accidental. 'And so it is impossible', he says, 'for there to be propositions in ethics. Propositions can express nothing that is higher' (*TLP*: 6.42). By 'nothing that is higher' he seems to mean nothing that has, or is, a value. In this regard 'all propositions are of equal value' (*TLP*: 6.4). That is, all propositions are equally incompetent to express any value. He reiterates this point in *LOE*, when speaking of a possible book giving a complete description of [the facts of] the world. He says: 'But all the facts described would, as it were, stand on the same level, and in the same way all propositions stand on the same level' (*LOE:* 6). All the facts stand on the same level in the sense of being bereft of all absolute values; and all propositions are on the same level

in the sense of being about facts, and, therefore, debarred from being about any value.

In saying or assuming that an accidental thing cannot have an absolute value Wittgenstein is not alone. It seems to have been assumed, or taken as unquestionable, by many metaphysicians that anything accidental, impermanent, or contingent, cannot have an absolute value. This seems to be the thinking behind the Advaita Vedāntic claim that Brahman alone, being unsublatable in the past, present and future (*trikālabādhita*), is the absolute value. There seems to be a glossing over the distinction between the concept of reality and that of value in all thinking of this type. If something is accidental or non-necessary, then its *reality* is accidental, i.e. it is accidental that it is real. But from this it does not follow that, if it possesses a value, its possessing that value is also accidental. Its value may be intrinsic to it in the sense that it has it simply because of its being the kind of thing it is, i.e. because of its own intrinsic nature. Its value would then be non-relative, i.e. absolute, because its having the value does not depend on its relation to anything else. There does not seem to be any logical bar to saying that an accidental thing may have a value solely in virtue of its own intrinsic nature. For example, telling a malicious lie is something accidental, but its value, i.e. its being evil, need not be. One may say that it is evil, simply because it is an act of telling a malicious lie, i.e. evil in an absolute, intrinsic sense.

One thing may bother some of us. Admitting that everything in the world is accidental and that values are non-accidental does not entail, prove, or even show that values lie outside the world, because they may not lie anywhere at all. They may be the figments of our imagination. If, on the other hand, one believes that they are not the creatures of our imagination but are objectively real, then the above admission will entail that they lie outside the world, of course, if it makes sense to say that they lie outside the world. Because Wittgenstein was a man of strong ethical views, it is not unwarranted to assume that he believed in the objectivity of values, and, therefore, when his conception of their nature, as involving non-accidentalness, required him to assert that they could not lie in the world, he asserted or concluded that they must lie outside the world.

Wittgenstein says, as already quoted, that 'if there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case'. This is to say that, if there exists any value, it must exist outside the world, i.e. be transcendental. It follows then that, if there is no transcendental value, there is no value.

If a philosopher does not find any good reason for admitting that values are transcendental, he may deny Wittgenstein's consequent and, therefore, deny his antecedent. He may then quite reasonably say that there is no value and consequently nothing which an ethical judgement can predicate, i.e. affirm or deny, of its subject. Since Wittgenstein does not want to say that there is no value, he has to admit that values are transcendental.

One can avoid Wittgenstein's conclusion also if he holds the view that values are not only not factual things, i.e. things belonging to the world [of facts], but categorically different from them in the sense that they are not the kind of things which can be said to exist in or outside the world. To attribute any value to a thing is not to make any factual statement but to express an emotion, to make a commendation, etc. Something like this was done by the Logical Positivists and some other non-cognitivists. Wittgenstein avoids non-cognitivism by according to values a transcendental status.

A non-cognitivist, who is sceptical about the admissibility of anything transcendental, may even use Wittgenstein's transcendentalism as a *reductio* to prove non-cognitivism: if no value can be attributed to anything of the world, then, if it can be legitimately attributed to something, the latter must be transcendental. But there is no good reason to grant that there is anything transcendental. However, our value-judgements do [seem to] attribute values to things of the world. This practice of ours we can make intelligible only by interpreting them as non-descriptive judgements, say, as prescriptions or persuasive expressions, etc.

To rebute the above argument one may try to show that the belief in the transcendental is well founded. But a non-cognitivist may not be deterred even if one succeeds in showing that it is. He may adopt another, a more positive, method to substantiate his non-cognitivist claim. As some non-cognitivist moral philosophers have actually done, he may proceed to establish, by analyzing, for example, the logic of ethical judgements, that the primary purpose of making an ethical judgement is not to give information about some characteristic or feature of anything, worldly or transcendental, but to do something else. Therefore, it does not matter whether or not there is anything transcendental. Even if there is, an ethical judgement is not a judgement describing some characteristic of it, just as it is not one about an empirical thing in whose existence we may have no doubt.

Non-cognitivism, however, goes against, or refutes, if it really refutes, only descriptivism, the theory according to which the primary purpose of an ethical judgement is to describe some aspect or characteristic of its subject. But it seems to me that Wittgenstein's transcendentalism is not any kind of descriptivism. An ethical judgement (or any value-judgement) is, for him, about something transcendental. But it does not describe any feature of it since it does not *say* anything. It only *shows* something. Only that sort of non-cognitivist, or any, analysis, which would establish that the primary purpose of an ethical judgement is not even to show something, may refute him.

One who holds some variety of the error theory may try to avoid transcendentalism in the following manner: we do attribute values to certain things. But no value is an attribute of anything, empirical or transcendental. Therefore, it is erroneous to say of anything that it has a value. This means that every positive value-judgement is bound to be erroneous and every nega-

tive one pointless. When nothing can be said truly to have a value, it is trivial or pointless to say that it does not have a particular, or any, value.

Wittgenstein would look favourably neither at non-cognitivism nor at the error theory. To use an old-fashioned terminology, he is a transcendental objectivist in his ethical theory. For him ethical values, or values, exist but exist outside the world. Taking advantage of his use of such a phrase as 'logical space', we may say that for him values exist in transcendental space. Maybe we cannot say but only show that something has a certain value. Still, showing that it has is not like expressing any emotion, attitude, commendation, or prescription, etc. and certainly not like believing or saying erroneously that something has a certain property.

It may be said that values need be treated neither as transcendental nor as empirical properties. They are rather consequential properties in the sense that when a thing has a certain property, or a set of properties, then on account of, or in consequence of, its having it, we can ascribe to it a certain value-predicate. For example, if an experience is pleasurable, i.e. has the empirical property of being pleasant, then, because of its being so, we can attribute to it the value of being intrinsically good. Its being pleasant is not the same as its being good but the reason or ground for its being judged to be good. To hold this view may be said to hold a view in between transcendentalism and straightforward descriptivism. But it would not be acceptable to Wittgenstein, nor would it be a view different from non-transcendentalism when the latter is conceived as the opposite of Wittgenstein's transcendentalism. Whether attributing a value is considered to be ascribing a consequential property, or expressing an emotion or commendation, etc. an empirical thing, a thing or happening of the world, may be the subject of the attribution. But, for Wittgenstein, no value can be attributed to anything belonging to the world.

There is another reason, not completely unrelated to the above, for Wittgenstein's rejecting the consequentialist status of values. By 'value' he means an absolute, non-relative value, and it seems to me that to a consequential value he would at the most accord only the status of a relative value. That is, it would not be a value in his sense of the term. If an empirical thing E is said to have the value V on the ground of its having the set of properties P, then its having V is relative to its having P. The moment it is deprived of P, or P gets modified in any way, it would be consequently deprived of V, or have V correspondingly modified. Such a V will not be an absolute value, and, therefore, a value.

The obvious implication of not allowing the ascription of any value to anything of the world, then, about the nature of ethics is this: since ethics is about values, we have either to say that values are transcendental and so is ethics being about them, or that it is about nothing in case we do not admit that values are transcendental. Wittgenstein does not think that ethics is about nothing; rather, he thinks it an important truth to say that it is transcendental.

Since ethics is not about anything belonging to the world, i.e. about anything factual, no ethical thing can be stated in a factual or propositional language or in language when 'language' means propositional language. 'It is clear', he says, 'that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental' (*TLP:* 6.421). That is, in transcending the world it transcends language as well.

According to the *TLP* theory of language, 'the totality of propositions is language' (*TLP:* 4.001). Among propositions only factual or empirical propositions, i.e. those which are contingent, say anything. 'The propositions of logic are tautologies' (*TLP:* 6.1). Therefore, they 'say nothing' and are analytic (*TLP:* 6.11). 'Propositions show what they say: tautologies and contradictions show that they say nothing' (*TLP:* 4.461). Contingent propositions do say but they say only factual things, or only *they* say factual things. Therefore, they cannot say anything about values because values do not lie in the world. This means that an ethical judgement, being a value-judgement, cannot be a proposition because it is neither contingent nor tautologous. This is what his theory of language entails and he unambiguously admits it in *TLP:* 6.42 already quoted.

It may be drawn, then, as an obvious inference, that being non-propositional, i.e. being neither contingent nor tautological or analytic, ethical judgements are meaningless, because meaningful language, or language, is, for Wittgenstein, identical with propositional language. Something similar is the conclusion drawn by Logical Positivists, though their theory of language is not the same as Wittgenstein's. They do concede that ethical judgements are emotively meaningful, but that does not protect them from being cognitively meaningless.

Wittgenstein does not say in *TLP* that ethical judgements are meaningless or are meaningful only emotively. It seems to me that his theory of meaning only requires him to call them non-propositional, and his conviction or faith that values, their subject-matter, are transcendental provides him *his* reason for saying that, though they are not about facts, they are not on that account about nothing. But to say anything is to say something factual, and to claim that they are transcendental is not to make a factual claim. Therefore, he holds that we cannot really *say* but only *show* that they are transcendental.

Calling ethics transcendental is not trouble-free, and in *LOE* he seems to be fully aware of it as well as of the difficulties involved in communicating his transcendentalism to the then, or any, audience. In fact, it is highly unlikely for him to have said anything without realizing the complexities it involved, or its problematic nature if it was problematic. Therefore, he must have had what he considered to be very compelling reasons for calling ethics transcendental.

In *LOE*, however, he does not hesitate to declare that all judgements of absolute value, which all genuine ethical judgements are, are nonsensical. He says:

> ... I at once see clearly, as it were in a flash of light, not only that no

description that I can think of would do to describe what I mean by absolute value, but that I would reject every significant description that anybody could possibly suggest, *ab initio*, on the ground of its significance. That is to say: I see now that these nonsensical expressions (i.e. judgements of absolute value) were not nonsensical because I had not yet found the correct expressions, but that their nonsensicality was their very essence. For all that I wanted to do with them was just *to go beyond* the world and that is to say beyond significant language (*LOE:* 11).

The position he takes in these lines is not, though it may seem to be, at variance with the position he has taken in *TLP*. Rather, as will be shown below, it is in effect an elaboration of the latter and makes it clearer or its contours more clearly visible.

An absolute value cannot be described by a significant descriptive statement, and any significant statement claiming to describe it is to be rejected because of its being significant, or rather because of its belonging to significant language, the descriptive language. That it cannot be described is not because of any linguistic deficiency of the describer, i.e. not because of his inability to find suitable descriptive expressions to describe it, nor because of any deficiency in descriptive language itself, i.e. because of its lacking the suitable expressions. It cannot be described because of a much deeper reason, i.e. because in making a judgement of absolute value, in saying that a certain thing has an absolute value, one tries to go beyond significant language which is, for Wittgenstein, the propositional language. A judgement of value is not a faulty, incomplete, or unclear proposition; it is not a proposition at all and it cannot be one. If the limit of propositional language is the limit of significant language, then one cannot go beyond it and still say something significant. To repeat, a value-judgement is not inside significant language and, therefore, being outside it is almost tautologically non-significant or nonsensical. It is nonsensical, not because it fails to fulfil the conditions of sense, but because it is outside the boundaries of the language which has sense. It is an expression of man's urge to go beyond the language which is equipped with the criteria whose fulfilment by an expression makes it significant and non-fulfilment non-significant.

This urge to go beyond, 'this thrust against the limits of language is *ethics*' (*NB:* 13), and there is a tendency in the human mind to make the thrust. For ethics, the propensity to make the thrust, Wittgenstein says, he has a great respect. The ethical enterprise, the enterprise to go beyond the limits of language, is not, therefore, something worth giving up. He compares it with a creature's running against the walls of his cage. If the caged creature can break the walls of his cage, or find a passage in it to go out of it, he will become uncaged, i.e. free. But that he can do only if there is space outside the cage where he can go. According to Wittgenstein's theory of language, there is no linguistic space outside the space of propositional language, since the

limits of the latter are the limits of significant language. That is why he confesses that 'this running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely, hopeless' (*LOE:* 12), but certainly not condemnable.

Even if we decide to interpret Wittgenstein as holding that value-judgements are nonsensical or meaningless, his position would remain very much different from that of the Logical Positivists. The latter might have got the inspiration from Wittgenstein himself to hold that ethical judgements are cognitively meaningless being unverifiable, but for them they are bona fide constituents of language. That is why they are duty bound to satisfy the verifiability criterion of meaningfulness if they are to be cognitively meaningful, and are declared to be meaningless for having failed to do that. To say that they are emotively meaningful is explicitly to admit that they are within the boundaries of language, occupying a part of the building different from that occupied by empirical as well as from the one occupied by a priori statements. It seems to me that it would be more accurate to say that for Wittgenstein ethical judgements are neither meaningful nor meaningless, because the distinction between the meaningful and the meaningless is applicable only to what we say while remaining within the boundaries of language. But because in saying an ethical thing we go, or try to go, beyond the boundaries of language, saying it is not duty bound to satisfy the criterion or criteria of meaningfulness which the other sayings done while remaining within the boundaries of language are. Therefore, the attempt to say the ethical, howsoever hopeless it may be, need not be characterized in terms of meaning or meaninglessness.

Rhees thinks that for Wittgenstein judgements of value do have meaning. 'And it is because of what judgements of good and evil do mean that it is pointless to look for their meaning in any events or facts that might be found by science'.[3] That is, it is because of what they mean that Wittgenstein says that values cannot lie in the world and must lie outside it. It is true that his theory of language does not require him to call them meaningless, and, therefore, in a sense they may be said to be meaningful. But to take this statement strictly would imply that his conception of meaning is ambiguous, or that he holds a dualistic theory of meaning: he holds an empirical proposition to be meaningful in being a picture of reality and a judgement of value in being about something transcendental. But to say all this would imply taking away a large part of the elegant rigour he wants to preserve in the structure of the theory of language presented in *TLP*. or at least undervaluing, or not fully recognizing, his concern for what he is so keen to preserve.

Hudson, on the other hand, thinks that 'where the picture theory of the *Tractatus* is accepted, it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that ethics is 'transcendental' in the sense of meaningless'.[4] On a strait-jacket interpretation of the *TLP* theory of language, judgements of value may be said to be meaningless. But the point of Wittgenstein's calling them transcendental seems to emphasize the fact that they are meaningless only in the special sense of

being non-propositional. It is because he does not want to alter or water down the TLP theory; he not only calls them nonsensical but considers nonsensicality to be their essence (*LOE:* 11-12). By calling them transcendental, i.e. by saying that they transcend the boundaries of language, he implies not only that they transcend the boundaries of meaningful language but also that they transcend the boundaries of meaningless language. His transcendentalism accords to them not only ontological transcendence, i.e. transcendence from the world of facts, but also linguistic transcendence.

A judgement of absolute value is not for Wittgenstein a meaningless proposition or a disqualified candidate for being a proposition. Rather, by its very nature, it is such that it cannot be propositional. It is this unique status of it which *LOE* highlights by saying that in making it one runs against the boundaries or limits of language. Even if the walls of its cage are unbreakable, it is not ignoble or meaningless on the part of the caged creature to thrust against them. It would be a sign of insensitivity not to recognize the dignity of the thrust. That the thrust is hopeless does make it pragmatically, but only pragmatically and not absolutely, pointless or meaningless.

Wittgenstein is no less emphatic in calling logic transcendental than in calling ethics transcendental. But it is also obvious that he would not accord the same status to both, since the propositions of logic are tautologies while the value-judgements which constitute ethics are not. Being non-propositional, the latter cannot be said to be true or false, and, therefore, they cannot be said to be tautologous, contradictory, or contingent.

Logical propositions are transcendental but not in the sense that they are truths about some transcendental objects; they are not transcendental truths. Logic is transcendental rather in the negative sense that it is not about the world. It transcends it in the sense of not being about anything, about any fact, of the world. But, though it does not say anything about the world because it says nothing, it *shows* something about the world. 'The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologous *shows* the formal—logical properties of language and the world' (*TLP:* 6.12). Logical propositions:

> ... presuppose that names have meaning and elementary propositions sense; and that is their connexion with the world. It is clear that something about the world must be indicated by the fact that certain combinations of symbols—whose essence involves the possession of a determinate character—are tautologies. This contains the decisive point. We have said that some things are arbitrary in the symbols that we use and some things are not. In logic it is only the latter that expresses: but that means that logic is not a field in which we express what we wish with the help of signs, but rather one in which the nature of the natural and inevitable signs speaks for itself (*TLP:* 6.124).

Logical propositions, thus, show the logical form of language or of the world, since the logical form of language is the same as that of the world: they show that language is so structured, or the world is such that, certain symbols when combined in a certain manner must give tautologies. Ethical judgements do not do any such thing. They, on the other hand, can be said to be transcendental in a much more substantial sense of being about some transcendental things, i.e. values. But being transcendental, being not about the world, they do not say anything, because to say anything is to say something about the world.

Anscombe interprets Wittgenstein to mean that logical propositions 'like all other propositions shew something that pervades everything sayable and is itself unsayable'.[5] On this interpretation also an ethical judgement does not show what a logical proposition does. It does not show anything that pervades everything sayable. It cannot be said to be comparable with the latter on the [alleged] ground that it shows what a value is, because no value is something that pervades everything sayable, i.e. everything or anything empirical.

Wittgenstein makes a distinction between 'fundamental' ethics and ethics as ordinarily understood. It seems that he would not like to call the latter ethics, and that whenever he speaks of ethics, for example, when he calls it transcendental, he means by it fundamental ethics. As is the case with his treatment of the other related issues, he does not explicitely say what *fundamental ethics* exactly is or what *he* really means by calling ethics fundamental. But the little that he says in this regard clearly suggests that fundamental ethics or ethics properly so called, according to him, does not presuppose the world, and, therefore, does not presuppose the social world or any society. It presupposes only one thing, the subject, the metaphysical or non-psychological I, which 'is not part of the world, but a boundary of the world' (*NB:* 79). He repeats the same point in *TLP:* 'The subject does not belong to the world: rather it is a limit of the world' (5.632).

He asks (*NB:* 79e): 'Can there be any ethics if there is no living being but myself?' and answers in the affirmative in the next sentence: 'If ethics is supposed to be something fundamental, there can.' The lines which follow are very revealing:

> If I am right, then it is not sufficient for the ethical judgement that a world is given.
> Then the world in itself is neither good nor evil.
> For it must be all one, as far concerns the existence of ethics, whether there is living matter in the world or not. And it is clear that a world in which there is only dead matter is in itself neither good nor evil, so even the world of living things can in itself be neither good nor evil.
> Good and evil only enter through the *subject*. And the subject, is not part of the world, but a boundary of the world.

In order that there be ethics, it does not matter whether or not there is a

world of living matter or of living bodies. The world of social beings is only a sub-sector of the world of living matter, i.e. of the world of living beings. Therefore, the possibility of ethics does not require social beings, i.e. beings living in a society or having social relationships. And the world of dead, non-living matter is obviously non-ethical. If all this is granted, then ethics certainly does not require the world; or, we can say, the world is non-ethical; or, as Wittgenstein prefers to say, the world in itself is neither good nor evil. Since 'the world in itself is neither good nor evil' and 'good and evil only enter through the subject', the subject, the I, has to be conceived as not forming a part of the world. This Wittgenstein does by calling it a boundary or a limit of the world. Quite obviously a boundary or a limit of the world cannot be a part of the world. It must, almost tautologically, be outside or transcend the world. Since good and evil are ascribable only to the subject and the subject is transcendental, good and evil also become transcendental, and since ethics is about good and evil, ethics again, almost tautologically, becomes transcendental.

A judgement of value could be either a judgement of relative or a judgement of absolute value, and it is only the latter which is for Wittgenstein an ethical judgement in the proper sense of the term. It is only the latter with which fundamental ethics is concerned. Under judgements of relative value he includes judgements of two types without actually saying that they are of two types. To the first type would belong a judgement, the subject of which has the value the judgement ascribes to it, because it measures or comes 'up to a certain predetermined standard' (*LOE:* 5). '*C* is a good chair', '*P* is a good pianist', or '*R* is a good runner', is a judgement of this type. There is a standard or criterion fixed for calling a person a good runner, for example, and, therefore, when *R* satisfies it we call him a good runner. The criterion of a value consists of a set of properties, the satisfaction of which by an object gives us the logical authority to ascribe the value to the latter.

To the second type would belong such judgements which ascribe to their subjects what may be called instrumental or extrinsic values. In a judgement of this type the subject is a means to something else, and it has the value ascribed to it, *because* it is a means to the latter. We say that money is a good thing, because it is a means to happiness. Wittgenstein's example 'it is important for me not to catch cold' is a judgement of this type. The importance or value of not catching cold consists in not letting those describable disturbances occur to me which catching cold produces. Not catching cold is a means to avoid the disturbances which catching cold produces, and the value or importance it has is derived from its being a means to the latter.

Let us call the first type of judgements criterial and the second instrumental. Both are judgements of relative value in the sense that the value ascribed to the subject in both is relative to something other than the subject. *R's* being a good runner is relative to there being a set of properties costituting the criterion or standard of a good runner and *R's* satisfying the criterion. Similarly, the value of my not catching cold is relative to the value of something other than it, namely, the avoidance of a set of disturbances to which it is a means. But there is a difference between the two cases. A good runner is not a means to anything. A runner is a good runner, if he satisfies the criterion of a good runner, and among the constituents of the criterion there need not be a requirement that he or his running is a means to something else. But the subject of an instrumental judgement must be a means to something else. Otherwise its value would not be an instrumental value, i.e. it would not have any value as a means.

When we say that *X* has an instrumental value *V* because it is a means to *Y*, it is not necessary that *Y* is taken to possess a non-instrumental value in an ultimate sense. What is necessary is that its value is not questioned in the context in which *X's* being a means to it is considered to be sufficient, or necessary, for attributing *V* to *X*. What is crucial to *X's* having *V* is its being related to *Y* as a means to *Y*. But nothing is by itself a means; it becomes one when it is *used* by an agent to achieve what he considers to be achievable by it. It is reasonable to consider *X* to be a means to *Y*, if the available evidence shows a high probability of its leading to the procurement of *Y*. It is an actual means to *Y*, if its use by an agent actually enables him to procure *Y*. It is obvious that one can be obligated to use *X* to obtain *Y*, only if he wants, intends, or purposes to obtain *Y*. The assumption of his being a rational person is, of course, there, since not to use the means to the end one wants to achieve when he is in a position to use it is a sign of irrationality.

The concept of agency, of the agent's intention, purpose, or goal, is thus built into the concept of a means and, therefore, into that of an instrumental value. It is this factor which distinguishes a means from a cause, or instrumental value from casual power. Running fast is a cause of perspiration, but it becomes a means to the latter only when it is used by an agent, say, an athlete, in order to, or with the intention to, produce perspiration. It may be so used, because the agent believes that it is a cause of the latter. But what makes it a means is not its [believed or real] causality but the agent's use of it. The instrumental value of a thing may, therefore, be said to be relative to the agent's intention or purpose as well.

The criterial value of a thing is relative to its fulfilling the relevant criterion by having the set of properties constituting the latter. But it is not necessary that a reference to any agent's intention or purpose be included in the set. It is possible that the criterion of a good runner is fixed in purely objective, impersonal, non-psychological terms. The criterion or criteria of a beautiful human figure may, in a beauty contest, be fixed in such terms to eliminate or minimize the possibility of a judge's verdict being influenced by his personal likes or dislikes. Wittgenstein does not, however, distinguish between what I have called the criterial and instrumental varieties of relative judgements, and perhaps the respects in which I have shown them to differ do not matter for his major claim or claims about ethics or ethical judgements.

For him, then, in any judgement of relative value, whether criterial or instrumental, the value ascribed to its subject is relative to something external to it. But the matter does not end there. Its relativity makes it a mere statement of fact. Every judgement of relative value can be rephrased in the form of a statement of fact. For example, (*a*) 'Catching cold is bad' is equivalent to some such statement of fact as 'Catching cold leads to certain discomforts', and (*b*) '*R* is a good runner' to some such one as '*R* runs a certain number of miles in a certain number of minutes'. Since 'no statement of fact can ever be, or imply, a judgement of absolute value' (*LOE:* 6), a judgement of relative value is not a judgement of absolute value. It cannot, therefore, be an ethical judgement, because the latter is a judgement of absolute value. It is not, properly speaking, a judgement of value, because unless a judgement is one of absolute value Wittgenstein would not call it a genuine judgement of value.

He thus holds that there is an unbridgeable gap between a statement of fact and a judgement of absolute value. Why there *has* to be a gap between the two has not been elaborately discussed by him as an independent issue. But he does try to show how a judgement of relative value differs from a judgement of absolute value. Since the former is a statement of fact, his description or exaplanation of the distinction between the two may be construed as his description or explanation of the distinction between a statement of fact and a judgement of absolute value (or an ethical judgement).

He says that, if an omniscient person who knows every thing about the world writes a big book giving a complete description of the world, the book 'would contain nothing that we would call an *ethical* judgement or anything that would logically imply such a judgement' (*LOE:* 6). It would contain all true propositions but no judgement of absolute value. But to say all this is only to reiterate that to describe or state a fact is different from ascribing an absolute value to a thing. It does not say why or how describing is not evaluating.

Let us now turn to his account of the distinction between a judgement of relative and one of absolute value. The relative judgement '*A* is the right road to *B*', he says, would mean '*A* is the road one has to take, if one wants to reach *B* in the shortest time'. Suppose, we succeed in formulating an absolute judgement and say, for example, that some road is the absolutely right road, or that some state of affairs is absolutely good.

> Then the absolutely right road [he says] would be the road which *everybody* on seeing it would, *with logical necessity* have to go, or be ashamed for not going. And similarly the absolute good, if it is a describable state of affairs, would be one which everybody, independent of his tastes and inclinations, would *necessarily* bring about or feel guilty for not bringing about (*LOE:* 7).

If *X* is absolutely right (or good), then everybody is (*a*) bound to *do* something, (*b*) is bound to do it *irrespective of his likes and dislikes*, (*c*) is bound to

do it *necessarily* (or with logical necessity), and (*d*) to *feel guilty* (or ashamed) for not doing it. It is not difficult to recognize that what ordinarily goes in the name of a judgement of relative value or a statement of fact does not have all of these four features. Therefore, one may think that, by characterizing a judgement of absolute value in the way he does and calling an ethical judgement an absolute judgement, Wittgenstein satisfactorily explains how or why an ethical judgement is to be distinguished from a judgement of relative value. But this would mean too much of optimism, because, as will be shown below, the above characterization is not only highly complex but also not easily comprehensible.

That an ethical judgement must have the four features follows from the way he characterizes what could be called absolutely right or good. The core of his characterization is that to admit or hold that something is absolutely right or good is to *do* something. This is not an unheard-off claim. We know that many philosophers hold this view. But, as we shall see a little later, Wittgenstein himself denies it when he says that the ethical will, i.e. the metaphysical or transcendental will, which alone is the bearer of an absolute value, cannot bring about any change in the world. But the most troublesome factor in the characterization is the incorporation of the element of logical necessity. Necessity and logical necessity, according to the *TLP* theory of language, mean the same thing, and only logical propositions are necessary. But the latter are tautologies. An ethical judgement cannot be necessary in the sense in which a logical proposition is, as it will then be a tautology, and a tautology cannot be an ethical judgement.

He says that, if a state of affairs is absolutely good, then everybody would necessarily bring it about. Whatsoever be its meaning, what 'necessarily' means here cannot be the same even for Wittgenstein, as what it means when, for example, we say that everybody who divides fifty by ten necessarily devides one even number by another. There is no other alternative possible in the latter case. But Wittgenstein implicitly admits the possibility of one's not bringing about the absolutely good state of affairs when he says that one would 'feel guilty for not bringing it about'. If bringing the absolutely good state of affairs is necessary, then one cannot miss to bring it about; and if he cannot, the question of feeling guilty for having missed to bring it about would not arise. Therefore, this necessity cannot self-consistently be taken in an absolutely necessitarian sense.

An ethical judgement, as ordinarily understood, has built into it an element of commitment or bindingness in the sense that one who admits or acknowledges that *X* is ethically right (or *Y* is ethically good) commits or binds himself, in a rather logical or quasi-logical sense, to doing *X* (or bringing *Y* about); or at least to being disposed, prepared, or inclined to do *X* (or bring *Y* about). It may, therefore, be said that *X's* being ethically right is an overriding and conclusive consideration for doing it. It is overriding in the sense that it overrides all considerations which may go against doing it and con-

clusive in the sense that no additional consideration is required to justify doing it. One may think that Wittgenstein really intends to highlight these features of an ethical judgement by exaggeratingly calling it necessary. In what he says in *LOE:* 5, one may read some support for this interpretation. But it seems to me that it would go against some of his most basic ideas about the nature of ethics or ethical judgements.

He says there that, when one finds a person playing tennis badly and tells him that he is playing it pretty badly, the latter may reply by saying 'I know, I'm playing badly, but I don't want to play any better.' At this point the former can very well say: 'Ah, then, that's all right'. But, suppose, he finds a person telling a preposterous lie and says to him that he is behaving like a beast. If the latter replies to him by saying 'I know I behave badly, but then I don't want to behave any better', he cannot say 'Ah, then, that's all right'. Rather, he would say 'Well, you *ought* to want to behave better'. 'Here you have', Wittgenstein says, 'an absolute judgement of value, whereas the first instance was one of relative judgement' (*LOE:* 5).

(*a*) 'Ah, then, that's all right' is, thus, for him, a relative judgement and (*b*) 'Well, you *ought* to want to behave better' an absolute one. (*a*) has been uttered in a non-ethical context, because playing tennis is non-ethical; while (*b*) has been uttered in an ethical context, because telling a preposterous lie is ethical (in the negative sense of being ethically evil). What he seems to bring out by means of these examples is that the obligation to play tennis well is relative to what one wants or aims at. It can be required of him only if he wants to play well for whatever be his reason, i.e. only if it serves some purpose of his. But the obligation to abstain from telling a preposterous lie is not relative to anything. It is rather never right to tell a preposterous lie. The liar cannot extricate himself from the obligation to behave better than the way he is behaving by saying he does not want to, as the bad tennis player can from playing tennis well. This is so, because one's wants, intentions, or goals are not relevant to the normative force or power of an ethical, i.e. absolute value or judgement, while they are to that of a non-ethical, i.e. relative value or judgement.

Consequently, in a rather conceptual sense, as a reaction to the liar's 'I do not want to behave better', it is inappropriate to say 'Ah, then, that's all right' and appropriate to say 'Well, you *ought* to want to behave better'. On the other hand, again in a conceptual sense, it is not appropriate to react to the bad tennis player's 'I do not want to play better' by saying 'Well, you *ought* to want to play better', because playing tennis well is not something which he ought to want to play in an unconditional sense, i.e. because there need not be anything wrong in his not wanting to play tennis well, or better than the way he is, in fact, playing. If playing tennis better is not going to serve any purpose of his, there is no point in telling him that he ought to, or ought to want to, play it better. That is why it is appropriate in his case to react by saying 'Ah, then, that's all right'.

All this amounts, one may conclude, to merely saying that the ethical rightness of an action is an overriding and conclusive reason for doing it. Therefore, to know that something is ethically, i.e. absolutely, right is to have such a reason for doing it. But this is very different from saying that to know what is ethically right is necessarily to do it. The latter is much stronger than the former, and it is this, the stronger position, which is Wittgenstein's. Rather, it seems to me that he would not at all be satisfied with calling the acknowledgement of any ethical judgement an overriding and conclusive reason for any sort of action for the following reasons. Firstly, the claim of overridingness, etc. is very closely linked with the claim that ethical judgements are practical in nature. To hold that they are overriding is to hold that they are action-guiding. But Wittgenstein does not consider them to be practical or action-guiding. Secondly, overridingness does not require that an ethical judgement could be only about a transcendental thing, or that only the transcendental self or subject could be the bearer of an absolute value. An ethical judgement could be an overriding consideration for doing something mundane, and, therefore, a mundane thing could be the subject of an ethical judgement. There is nothing logically objectionable in the latter's being about a thing of the world and still being an overriding consideration. But Wittgenstein is very keen to maintain the transcendental character of ethical judgements. To nothing mundane, according to him, can an ethical value be ascribed, and, therefore, he cannot accept a view which makes it possible to do that. If there were a value ascribable to a thing of the world, it would make the world non-accidental, and that is impossible. Or, it itself would become accidental, being a constituent of an essentially accidental world, and, therefore, would cease to be a value. This, too, is impossible.

His primary reason for saying that a judgement of relative value is not an ethical judgement is that it is, in effect, a mere statement of fact. The majority of modern philosophers would accept the logical difference between an ethical judgement and a factual statement, but perhaps none would on the ground on which Wittgenstein does. For him the former is not a factual statement because it is necessary while the latter is never necessary. That a factual statement is never necessary is also accepted by the majority of modern philosophers and roughly on the same ground on which Wittgenstein does. There is nothing necessary in a fact being what it is and, therefore, nothing necessary in the statement which refers to it (if it is true). Therefore, to prove that an ethical judgement is not a factual statement he has mainly to prove that the former is necessary. Of course, its necessity has to be of a sort different from that of a logical proposition. The later is necessary, because it is true on account of the symbolism or language being what it is or being structured as it is. It is obvious that an ethical judgement is not necessary for this reason, and, therefore, Wittgenstein's not taking pains to show that it is not is not any lapse on his part. However, he has to show in which specific sense it is necessary. But to all intents and purposes it remains, as has been shown in

the preceding discussion, a very scantily argued premise. This fact also makes his claim about the logical gap between an ethical judgement and a factual statement remain unestablished or very inadequately established.

An ethical predicate for Wittgenstein is a non-empirical or non-factual predicate. To say this, too, is nothing very strange. Even intutionists call it non-factual. Moore calls it non-natural and Wittgenstein calls it supernatural. But, though for Moore an ethical judgement is not a factual statement, its subject can be a natural, empirical, or non-transcendental object. An ethical predicate can be ascribed, for example, to personal affection which is a phenomenon of the empirical world. Wittgenstein seems to go beyond Moore in a rather vertical direction. For him an ethical predicate is a supernatural one ascribable only to something supernatural or transcendental. All this is said to happen, because nothing in the world is necessary and all absolute values are necessary. What sort of necessity an ethical judgement, ascribing a supernatural predicate to a supernatural subject, would have is really extremely hard to comprehend, as it transports the concept of necessity to the highly rarefied world of a too abstruse metaphysics.

In *CAV:* 3 he says: 'What is good is also divine. Queer as it sounds, that sums up my ethics. Only something supernatural can express the supernatural.' But even this remark does not help much. To me it does not seem to be saying anything different from his earlier position that ethics is transcendental, or that ethical predicates are supernatural.

If the world has only accidental things and values are necessary, then values cannot be in the world. But Wittgenstein does not say or show why they or judgements of absolute value are to be called necessary. *TLP* does not give any reason for it, and, when he tries to explain the meaning of necessity in *LOE,* he runs, as we have seen, into rough weather. He seems to be very much possessed with idea that there has to be necessity in values. It is also crucial for him that it is there, because necessity of values is the only or main ground on which he calls them transcendental. That is why his not giving a satisfactory or philosophically defensible sense to their necessity makes the foundation of his transcendentalism or transcendental ethics very weak.

But let us assume that an ethical value is necessary in Wittgenstein's sense, meaning thereby that an absolutely good state of affairs would be that which everybody would necessarily bring about and if he does not he would feel guilty. But no state of affairs has, he says, this sort of coercive power. An absolutely good state of affairs is rather a chimera, though we are still tempted to use such expressions as 'absolute good', 'absolute value', etc. Therefore, we have to face the question 'what have we in mind and what do we try to express' when we use them (*LOE:* 7). His answer is that then we make a paradoxial use of language, a use in which we try to say something by means of a simile which is really a simile for nothing.

Wittgenstein mentions three experiences which to him *seem* to have absolute value: the experience of wondering at the existence of the world, the

experience of feeling absolutely safe whatever happens, and the experience of feeling guilty. I shall take up only the first and explain how, according to him, calling it absolutely good necessarily involves a misuse of language.

Let us use 'the experience of wondering at the existence of the world is absolutely good' as an example of an ethical judgement to give to the discussion a clearly visible direction. To wonder at the existence of a thing is to think of it as something unusual or extraordinary, as something so much unlike what a normal instance of it is found or expected to be that it looks like a miracle. This we do when, for example, we come across a dog of extraordinary size. The linguistic expression of wonder necessarily involves a simile, a reference to a thing with which the thing wondered at is compared; and the comparison shows that the latter is similar to the former in some respects but very much dissimilar from it in many other important ones. That is how wondering at the existence of an extraordinary, miraculous, dog is meaningful. But there is *no other*, ordinary, normal or standard world with whose existence the existence of the world wondered at can be compared: we cannot say that it is similar to the ordinary one in only such and such respects but dissimilar from it in many other important ones. Therefore, in saying that one wonders at the existence of the world he is using a simile when it is not possible to fulfil the conditions of the meaningful use of the simile. He is consequently misusing language. To wonder at a thing is also to conceive that it might not have existed. But we cannot imagine the world not existing.

Wittgenstein's conclusion, therefore, is that whenever we try to express an ethical judgement, we try to go 'beyond significant language' (*LOE:* 11). In expressing it we have to use a simile.

> (But) a simile must be the simile for something. And if I can describe a fact by means of a simile I must also be able to drop the simile and simply to state the facts without it. Now in our case as soon as we try to drop the simile and simply to state the facts which stand behind it, we find that there are no such facts. And so, what at first appeared to be a simile now seems to be mere nonsense (*LOE:* 10).

To experience wonder at the existence of the world is thus to see it as a miracle, and any expression of it in language is bound to be meaningless. He says he is 'tempted to say that the right expression in language for the miracle ... is the existence of language itself' (*LOE:* 11). This is a puzzling remark. It seems to me that what he means by it is that the very existence of language, the very fact that language is what it is, *shows* that we cannot express this wonder in language. Language is propositional and can express only facts; it is capable only of conveying natural meaning and sense whereas absolute values are supernatural (or transcendental). But we are tempted to express them in language. For example, when we have anyone of the three experiences, we are tempted to ascribe an absolute value to it. But, since we cannot express

this ascription in a proposition, in trying to express it we are really trying to cross the limits of language and are thus bound to talk nonsense.

We cannot, therefore, give an example of any ethical judgement or any judgement of absolute value for that matter. Any talk about it consequently has to be a mere typothetical one. We can, for example, say only such things: if there is an ethical judgement, it would be different from a statement of fact, necessary, transcendental, etc. We shall, however continue being tempted to ascribe absolute values to certain things and thereby producing nonsense, not because of any linguistic incompetence on our part but because of the essential limitations of language. This temptation arises from the human desire or tendency to say something about the absolute good, and, in spite of its being inevitable, that it would remain unfulfilled or meet with frustration, Wittgenstein considers it respectable.

The three experiences seem to Wittgenstein to have absolute value, though it is not meaningfully sayable that they have. But they may not seem to have absolute value to someone else, and, therefore, may not tempt him to try to go beyond language by saying that they have. In fact, it seems puzzling to say that the experience of wondering at the existence of the world has absolute value. The other two, the experience of feeling absolutely safe whatever happens and that of feeling guilty, do not seem to be in a more advantageous position. Wittgenstein does not say what is there in the three which tempts him to say or think that they have absolute value.

His analysis of the concept of wondering at the existence of the world, as explained earlier, only shows that the concept itself is infected with a paradox or self-inconsistency. This means that to say anything of this sort of wondering, and not only to say that it has absolute value, would be meaningless. The same is the case with the other two. For example, the concept of feeling absolutely safe whatever happens can be shown to be suffering from a similar vice.

> I am safe in my room [he says] when I cannot be run over by an omnibus ... To be safe essentially means that it is physically impossible that certain things should happen to me and therefore it's nonsense to say that I am safe *whatever* happens. Again this is a misuse of the word 'safe' as the other example was a misuse of the word 'existence' or 'wondering' (*LOE:* 9).

The absolute judgement, 'The experience of wondering at the existence of the world is absolutely good', or 'The experience of feeling absolutely safe whatever happens is absolutely good', is thus non-significant, or a case of trying to go beyond significant language, not because it is a judgement of absolute value but because its *subject* is logically defective. It is difficult, therefore, to take either one as exhibiting that ascribing an absolute value to a thing is to misuse language.

Besides, the experience of wondering at the existence of the world may mean an experience of genuine wonder to a metaphysician of a different affiliation, say, to an Advaitin. Suppose, the latter is convinced by his logic and intuitive experience that Brahman alone is real and is a pure unity completely bereft of multiplicity and accidentalness. But he finds himself confronted with the empirical world containing multiplicity and accidentalness, a world which cannot be real but still is found to be there, and he, therefore, wonders at its existence. We may reject his metaphysics of Brahman, but we cannot deny that in the framework of his metaphysics his wondering is genuine or rather natural. His solution that the world is an appearance (*māyā*), meaning by 'appearance' something which is not real but appears to be real, and his explanation—metaphysical and epistemological—of this appearance again may or may not be considered satisfactory. But it is nevertheless true that within his metaphysical framework his attempt to make the wonder intelligible and to make it vanish is a genuine philosophical attempt. His saying that the really not real world appears to be real because of our ignorance about the nature of the really real Brahman and ceases to appear real when knowledge of the latter is attained is an attempt to make the wonder vanish. It is very similar to a scientist's attempt to make us stop wondering at the occurrence of a dark night-like phenomenon during the day by calling it a case of complete solar eclipse. The experience of wondering meaningfully at the existence of anything presupposes a metaphysical framework, and the experience of wondering at the existence of the world need not be meaningless or paradoxial in every metaphysical framework.

Since nothing in the world can have a value, the bearer of good and evil must lie outside its boundaries. This bearer is the will. 'I will call "will", he says, "first and foremost the bearer of good and evil"' (*NB*: 76e). 'Good and evil only enter through the *subject*. And the subject is not part of the world, but a boundary of the world' (*Ibid.*, 79e).

> The thinking subject is surely mere illusion. But the willing subject exists. If the will did not exist, neither would there be that centre of the world, which we call the I, and which is the bearer of ethics (*Ibid.*, 80e).

The subject, which 'I' denotes, is not a part of the world but a presupposition of its existence (*Ibid.*, 79e). The 'I' cannot be made the object of any experience. 'So there really is a way in which there can and must be mention of the I in a *non-psychological* sense in philosophy' (*Ibid.*, 80e). 'The philosophical I is not the human being, not the human body or the human soul with psychological properties, but the metaphysical subject...' (*Ibid.*, 82e).

Ethical values belong only to the subject, and the subject is a willing, not a thinking, subject. By will, therefore, Wittgenstein does not mean the empirical or psychological will which, we may say, one experiences in willed behaviour. The willing subject or will being the presupposition of the world,

the totality of facts, cannot be a part of the world, because a presupposition cannot be a part of what presupposes it.

Several philosophers consider the subject to be a presupposition of the world. But then, by and large, they take it to be a thinking subject. To think of the world as a whole is, they would say, to make it an object of thought. This can be done only by a subject which is not itself an object of thought but rather a pure thinking subject which can think of the world as a whole. But, for Wittgenstein, 'the subject is the willing subject' and the thinking subject is an illusion. If the world being all that is the case can be an object of thought, then it is not unnatural to say that it presupposes a thinking subject. But it is not at all clear how it can be said to presuppose a willing subject.

The willing subject or the transcendental will is not an agent. Acting or participating in the transactions of the world is not any of its business, It cannot participate in worldly affairs, because it is transcendental. If it participated in the affairs of the world, it would enter the world, become a phenomenon of the world, and consequently accidental. It cannot, therefore, introduce any change *in* the world. On the other hand, the workings of the empirical will, what we call actions or instances of willed behaviour, are categorially of the same type as of other happenings in the world and therefore cannot have any ethical value. In the words of Wittgenstein: '...what happens, whether it comes from a stone or from my body is neither good nor bad' (*NB*: 84e).

It is the transcendental will which alone can be good or evil and, therefore, it can be called the ethical will. Since it is a non-agent, a non-participant, its goodness can consist only in something internal to it. It consists, according to Wittgenstein, in a certain attitude towards, a certain way of looking at, the world as a whole. The good will stands at the boundary of the world, not in the midst of the things which compose it, and looks at the whole world, not at any particular thing or event in it, in a certain spectator-like fashion. 'The will is an attitude of the subject to the world. The subject is the willing subject' (*NB*: 87e).

To say that the will is an attitude of the subject amounts to saying that it is a particular way of looking at the world by the subject. The way of looking at the world which makes the will good is to look at it renouncingly. 'I can make myself independent of the world—and so in a certain sense master it—by renouncing any influence on happenings' (*NB*: 73e). The good will is also the happy will. 'The only life that is happy is the life that can renounce the amenities of the world' (*NB*: 81e). Renunciation or happiness is also linked with knowledge. 'How can a man be happy at all', he asks, 'since he cannot ward off the misery of the world?' His answer to the question is: 'Through the life of knowledge. The good conscience is the happiness that the life of knowledge preserves' (*Ibid.*).

Wittgenstein does not say what he means by knowledge. But its meaning has to be such that it pieces together with the concepts of happiness and renunciation. It is obvious that it cannot be knowledge about anything or event of the world, nor about all of its things or events. It seems to me that it is the knowledge that the will is transcendental and that it alone, and nothing of the world, is good or evil. The proper attitude to take, for such a will, towards the world would naturally be the attitude of renunciation or detachment.

The only link between the good will and the world, if we are permitted to speak of a link between them, would then be the attitude of renunciation taken by the will towards the world. Therefore, the world would be to this will what he takes it to be: 'The world of the happy is a happy world' (*NB*: 78e). Since the will looks at the whole world in a certain way, its looking at it would affect the whole world:

> If good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—not what can be expressed by means of language.
>
> In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.
>
> The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man (*TLP*: 6.43).

Since language can convey any information only about facts, how the whole world has been affected by good or bad willing 'cannot be portrayed by language but can only be shewn in language' (*NB*: 73). It is not clear how language can show it. But even to say how language can show it would mean saying it, or saying something about it, however minimal that might be. Therefore, Wittgenstein might be right in not having made the attempt. But it is also obvious that things become quite opaque at this point.

The will becomes the good will or the happy will through knowledge or renunciation. But the concepts of both knowledge and renunciation have their own logic which throws up some important issues. Take the concept of knowledge. Knowledge is always knowledge of something, and it can be said to be required only when a preceding state of its absence or a state of relevant ignorance is assumed. When the Advaitin says that knowledge of the self is, or is the means to, liberation, he assumes the possibility of ignorance about the nature of the self in the unliberated individual. The will, therefore, has to be ingnorant of what it is the knowledge of which it is to acquire in order to become happy. If this knowledge is the knowledge of the will's transcending the world, then it would mean that it has to be antecedently ignorant of its own nature or ontological status. This would be a position roughly similar to the Advaitin's. But then there would be some problems because of Wittgenstein's denial of the thinking subject. Ignorance and its removal by acquiring knowledge can be ascribed only to a thinking and not to a willing subject. Not to will in a certain way is not to be ignorant of something or to will in a certain way to have knowledge of something, though not willing in a certain

way may be linked with some sort of ignorance and willing in a certain way with some sort of knowledge.

The concept of renunciation is, similarly, applicable in a significant manner only when an antecedent state of attachment or involvement is assumed. In point of logic, one cannot renounce something with which it is not possible for him to have any link. The will cannot be involved in the affairs of the world as it completely transcends the world. Then, how can it be asked to renounce the world or to have an attitude of renunciation towards it or towards its amenities? Being the limit of the world, it cannot have any influence on any happening in the world, and, therefore, it is unintelligible to speak of its renouncing any influence on world's happenings.

A non-transcendent, participating will may be required to renounce its participation in the world's affairs, or to continue it but with an attitude of renunciation. The latter possibility is very much emphasized in some sectors of classical Indian ethics. But Wittgenstein does not seem to give any importance to it because of his insistence on the transcendence of the will. The ethical will is the transcendental will, and the transcendental will cannot participate in the affairs of the world. But unless there is some possibility of its getting involved in the latter or of there being at least an illusion that it is involved, it is difficult to understand its renouncing its involvement. If we cannot ascribe meaningfully or intelligibly renunciation or knowledge to it, we cannot also ascribe happiness, since it is said to get happiness through renunciation or knowledge. It would then be difficult even to call it good or evil, though Wittgenstein says that it alone is.

Perhaps he would not resent our saying all this on the ground that such problems are bound to arise when we try to talk about anything transcendental, for our language is not competent to be used in such talks. He explicitly says: 'It is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes. And the will as a phenomenon is only of interest to psychology' (*TLP*: 6.423). The ethical will is unspeakable. The will as a phenomenon, the empirical will, is speakable, but is of no relevance to philosophy or ethics, because, being a phenomenon, it is like any other phenomenon of the world and, therefore, neither good nor evil. All willed movements, we have seen, are, like other events or happenings, accidental and cannot, therefore, have any value.

As ordinarily understood, ethics is concerned with the evaluation of human beings and their actions, intentions, institutions, etc. and ethical life is taken to be a participatory life, a life which participates in the affairs or workings of the human world. That is why neither ethics, nor ethical life, is considered to be transcendental. For Wittgenstein the will alone is the bearer of ethical values and is transcendental. It is the will's transcendentality which makes ethics transcendental. The will becomes ethical not in or by performing actions of a certain type, not by pursuing certain ends or fulfilling a set of obligations, i.e. not by participating in the affairs of the world but by renouncing it. Therefore, to be ethical, in his sense of the term, the will has to transcend, go beyond, or leave behind, the ethical way of living in the ordinary, i.e. participatory, sense of the term. The ethical will transcends the world, and, therefore, it also transcends the worldly ethics, i.e. ethics as ordinarily understood. Wittgenstein would perhaps not accept that as ethics which is ordinarily understood by the term 'ethics', and consider his transcendental ethics alone as deserving the name. But it remains true that his transcendental ethics transcends what we ordinarily call ethics. In transcending to what is ethical in his sense of the term, one has to transcend the world and, therefore, to transcend the ethics of the world, i.e. ethics in the ordinary sense of the term.

A plea for transcendental ethics is thus not very different from one for transcending ordinary ethics. The transcendental will, being beyond the world, is naturally beyond ordinary, worldly ethics. It remains always out of the zone of what is ordinarily ethical, and, therefore, ordinary ethical predicates cannot apply to it. The Advaitin Śaṅkara may not agree to call the liberated self a will; but he admits that in transcending the world it transcends ethics or good and evil, for by ethics he means ethics as is ordinarily understood. Wittgenstein seems to adopt the other way. By not agreeing to accept ordinary ethics as ethics and by restricting the application of ethical predicates only to the transcendental will, he declares that only the transcendental will is ethical and nothing in the world is. But, in effect, his will also transcends ordinary ethics or is beyond good and evil as ordinarily understood.

To reach transcendental ethics is, therefore, not to reach a truer, purer, or higher kind of what is ordinarily understood as ethics. It is to transcend the latter. If a philosopher asserts—but Wittgenstein does not—that by going beyond (ordinary) ethics in developing a non-participatory, renunciatory attitude one reaches transcendental ethics, he may give the impression that in this process one rises above a lower ethics and becomes the recipient of a higher one. But this impression will be dissipated as soon as the ambiguity of 'ethics' in its two occurrences in his assertion is noticed. If ethics has necessarily to do with man's participation or involvement in the affairs of the world as 'ethics' means in the phrase 'ordinary ethics' (or in 'ethics as ordinarily understood'), then only ordinary ethics, and not transcendental ethics, is ethics. If, on the other hand, ethics has necessarily to do with the will's or the self's non-participation or non-involvement in the affairs of the world, then only transcendental, and not ordinary ethics is ethics. Whichever mode of speaking one adopts, neither ordinary ethics is shown to be a lower form of transcendental ethics, nor the latter a higher form of the former.

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The word that became the absolute: *relevance of Śaṅkara's ontology of language*

SOM RAJ GUPTA
Kirori Mal College, Delhi

Language is an instrument for the *zoon politikon*, an instrument of expression and of concealment. It is a factor responsible for man's relationships with others and his alienation from others. And yet even in concealing things from others man shares his life with them. For what he conceals from others, what he would keep to himself is a gift from others; more accurately speaking, it is a gift from what Wittgenstein calls 'a form of life'. For it is in the context of a life-pattern that things get identified through language. In truth, even the kind of identity one has and cherishes is a gift from the *polis*, the form of life one shares with others. Man is a *Mitsein*, a being with others.

But what kind of being is a *Mitsein*, a *zoon politikon*? Men and things get identified in a social culture through language. But language identifies things and creatures through universals. There are pronouns too—pronouns like 'I', 'you', 'this', etc.—to identify phenomena. But such pronouns are inadequate determinants for the purpose of social life. There have to be further descriptions to make a phenomenon get placed in the fabric of meaning constituting a particular form of life. And this fabric of meaning consists of generalities, patterns, categories and universals. Therefore, the identity I come to acquire as a *zoon politikon* is only an abstraction. And abstractions are never truly referential, they are only interpretative. That is to say, an abstraction does not really, genuinely, constitute an existent, cannot take us into the reality of an existent; it can only classify it adventitiously.

In a way Wittgenstein was right when he said that there was no linguistically identifiable experience which was exclusively private. In truth, language has nothing to do with the real existent, it is concerned with the universal abstract. It reduces an existent into an illustrative example of a category, and cannot recognize it as something unique and irreplaceable. Linguistically interpreted, I am a man, a teacher, a fool, a wise man; a mere interpretation, living in a world which is also an interpretation. That I had to be given a proper name is an acknowledgement of the truth that linguistic concepts are unable to encompass me. But a proper name in itself gives no description of me; it serves only as a subject term which makes no sense without predicate terms. It is the predicate term alone that identifies me in society, and predicate terms are abstract universals. Thus, by converting the proper name into a subject term, the *zoon politikon* conceals his awareness of the irrelevance of language to his own real self, but only of that language which is itself a form of sociality and constitutes and is constituted by society. In modern philosophical thinking, language is, by and large, taken in this sense. But there can

be other ways of looking at language. We shall, a little later, speak of an approach to language radically different from the modern approach.

The act of sabotage through the proper noun does not really work. For one context will disown the interpretations valid in another context, and the temporal thrust of life will mock at the so-called stability of concepts and expose them as fragile and indefinite. Who can draw the line between, for example, child and man except a convention? Life, however, does not recognize conventions and interpretations based on them. Some will, however, say: life will not disown interpretation as such but only particular interpretations, for interpretation as such is inseparable from life. Men who are enamoured of historical visions will see life as an endless series of interpretations, even when they may not view it as informed by a *telos*. But there are moments when the 'interpreted' world really gets out of joint. This happens when, for example, Hamlet sees an apparition:

> Angels and ministers of grace defend us!
> Be thou a spirit of health or goblin damn'd,
> Bring with thee airs from heaven or blasts from hell,
> Be thy intents wicked or charitable,
> Thou com'st in such a questionable shape
> That I will speak to thee. I'll call thee Hamlet,
> King, father, royal Dane. O, answer me![1]

What Hamlet comes to call the ghost of his father is an appearance that confronts him as something different from an interpretation. The first line 'Angels and ministers of heaven defend us!' is an expression of dread and fear that seize a man when a phenomenon appears divested of the familiar concepts that obtain in our life as socialities. For the dread is caused not by any sense of personal insecurity (Hamlet is determined to talk to the apparition) but because the apparition does not fit into the fabric of meaning constitutive of Hamlet as a placed, situated being. Hamlet will, therefore, talk to it to save the interpreted world from getting out of joint. But unless and until he names the appearance he cannot talk to it and *polis*-ize it. Therefore:

> I'll call thee Hamlet
> King, father, royal Dane. O, answer me!

Hamlet does not say that the apparition *is* 'Hamlet/King, father, royal Dane', but that *he will* call it 'Hamlet/King, father, royal Dane'. Language may turn out to be as incapable of naming the apparition as weapons turned out (in the earlier Ghost scene) incapable of wounding it, but man as sociality can communicate with it only in and through language and must, therefore, determinate it in and through language. The rapid movement of the verse shows a desperate attempt to fix it linguistically through a proper name

'Hamlet', a common name 'King', another common name 'father', a name suffused with what the English in the eighteenth century called 'piety'. Another common name, 'royal Dane', follows to contrast the dead king with the present occupant of the throne of Denmark. A whole succession of generalities, of functions, of categories are added to give 'sense' to a 'mere name', Hamlet. In one single line, Shakespeare vividly dramatizes man's existential (to use the word in the sense Heidegger uses it) need of language and also its woeful inadequacy, even its irrelevance to comprehend the presence that confronts Hamlet; for we know that it is none of the things Hamlet calls it, that the 'being' who bore these titles is already dead. Yet Hamlet has to call the apparition 'King, father, royal Dane', for without these abstractions *zoons politikon* do not recognize each other. Men in society do not live as *I's*, they live only as *they's*, as petrified abstractions. Language as interpretation is the creator of what Heidegger calls *uneigentlich*, failure of owning oneself up, inauthenticity, and what Sartre calls *mauvaise foi*, bad faith. A being, as linguistically interpreted, disowns his own being, his own self. He is what the gaze of others has made him to be. He is an inauthentic self, an office, not a living being.

The Ghost in Hamlet is not merely a ghost in the popular sense of the term. He also symbolizes the opaque depths that lurk behind every familiar object, every face we daily meet, every stone we daily tread on but notice not. And Hamlet's words, 'There are more things in heaven and earth Horatio,/ Than are dreamt of in your philosophy',[2] show Shakespeare's anguished contempt for all thought that would linguistically encompass the 'given'. Every phenomenon, even the most insignificant, presents a depth which no concept can catch, no amount of predication can ever exhaust. Some will be wary of using the word 'exhaust' in this context, for they will say that no language ever touches those depths: it merely imposes labels on them convenient for a particular society. Every interpretation, they will say, can only be an inauthentic interpretation.

Kant thought that certain categories could adequately capture phenomena. Wittgenstein denied that there were any fixed categories to do that job, but language as such, he thought, did that job in varying ways in different life-contexts. Merleau-Ponty, however, denied that any interpretation in any life-context was adequate for even that life-context. For, whatever the context, life shows in its process the inadequacy of its interpretations; every phenomenon, including man, is burdened with an otherness, with an opaque dimension that refuses to be captured by linguistic interpretations. And these opaque depths are inexhaustible; and even though, for Merleau-Ponty, there is such a thing as progress in knowledge, no phenomenon will ever be exhaustively articulated. Still, he believes, man can dive deeper into phenomena if he does not allow himself to be burdened by inherited concepts and institutions. For man, Merleau-Ponty insists, must realize that every moment the world wears a new face, and he must, each and every moment, be alive,

sensitive and responsive to that face, and must articulate anew that mien—again, each and every moment. Thus, Sartrean good faith is espoused by Merleau-Ponty at intellectual, artistic and interpretative levels. Man must, therefore, learn to be ever *ekstatic* and open-minded. So should societies *vis-à-vis* their institutions. This alone can ensure authentic intellectuality and life. For Merleau-Ponty open-mindedness at the social level is imperative for authentic life at the individual level, because man is a sociality and depends for his authentic life on authentic society. None can plough his individual furrow of authenticity and good faith.[3]

This view almost comes to the point of reposing its faith in future and what may be called creative history. Past interpretations become a burden, present interpretations are inadequate; therefore, let us continue with our authentic alertness. Criticism has justly been levelled against this approach. If phenomena have inexhaustible depths, then the authentic view should be that they are inarticulable.[4] There is no need to build the myth of progress and the partial myth of *telos*. There is another, perhaps, much more important objection. And the objection will/could come from a Freudian. Philosophers (we can imagine him saying) in their addiction to theory forget both desire and death-instinct. Desire does not recognize the reality of the interpreted world because it is—and this is the shocking paradox that even a Freudian may not like to countenance, but which is the inevitable corollary of Freud's theory—the creation of *Thanatos*, of death-instinct. Now this may seem absurdly wrong to some. But let us recall what the Freudian concept of death-instinct is: it is essentially an instinct for repetition of all the past, from the inert matter from which life has sprung to the plant life, to the animal life, the savage life and to all the patterns that life has woven in its history and prehistory. The *arche* is the dominating force and not *telos*, and every man repeats in his life-span all the history and prehistory and, in death, goes back to the dust from which life sprang in the distant past. The so-called conservative instincts are merely particular ways of dying—particular versions of death-instinct.[5]

The real horror is that even interpretative language is the child of *Thanatos*, that it is through linguistic universals, abstract descriptive concepts that creatures repeat themselves and escape from the burden of open-ended *ekstasis*, unchartered and uncertain. Daily I call myself 'a man' as if I were a stable something. In the face of the flow of life, I would believe myself an entity and repeat the concept every moment I become conscious of myself. This obstinate clinging to myself as an interpretation is the work of death instinct, of *Thanatos*. Death-instinct is our *arche*, and our *telos* and our social character are its products. At the deepest level, we are not really constituted by language, we are constituted by death-instinct. Truth is not as 'ordinary' as Wittgenstein would have us believe. Nor is it as 'simple' that it could be equated with linguistic ambiguity as Derrida would have us accept. Truth is a killing conflict, a self-conflict. Death-instinct, as the repetitive

instinct, conceptualizes phenomena, but it also repeats the 'inorganic', the 'inert' in man and mingles him with it. Thus, death instinct is informed by a deadly self-conflict, conflict between interpretation and its negation by the inorganic, the inert in us, the inert that will inevitably triumph in our death. Therefore, the real problem for man is the resolution of this conflict which no 'philosophy' of language can resolve, not even psychoanalysis which also is, in the last analysis, concerned with the verbal and the ideational at the unconscious level. If *arche* has to be explored, it has to be explored to the dark depths of the uninterpreted. In simple words, man has to explore death and his undoing. But exploration involves language and language involves concealment of one's mortality, it involves refusal to own up one's mortality. So, it would appear, there is no way to resolve the conflict. If (as Freud rightly said) we cannot outlive our *arche*, we cannot also refuse to be guided by *telos*. If beauty and harmony are unattainable, madness and chaos are unacceptable. And the force behind this rejection is as powerful, as inexorable, as pitiless as the force that would stick to the *arche*. Is there no way out of the darkness of this modern revelation? Is man really such a hopelessly useless passion, as Sartre declared in grey despair? Modern thought, it seems, has not yet found a Virgil, much less a Beatrice, to lead contemporary man out of this cultural inferno.

It is, indeed, useless in our times to weave any dreams of a heaven or a Hegelian *Geist* or a genuine classless society. Can man accommodate both language and the chaos and death that inhere in it? That is *the* question and not 'to be or not to be?'. It may be desirable, at this juncture, when dreams of collective salvation have been shattered, to perform another *repetitive* act and cast a re-look at *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* where Naciketas explores *arche* to its utmost limits. For it is Death itself that he approaches for the truth of death and the truth of life. And Death teaches that truth not *through* language but *as* language. But let the Upaniṣad speak in its own words:

> Think of what the ancients did, think of what the living do;
> Like corn does ripen the mortal being, and like corn is he born again.[6]

The Upaniṣad does not ask man, as would Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, to forget traditions; it asks him to follow them. That is its way to *eigentlich*, to authenticity, to owning up one's own self. But man is also to remember his affinity with plant-life, with corn. That *arche* he should also own up. For he, too, ripens like corn, 'decays and dies' like it, comments Śaṅkara. And like corn is he born again. The word in the original for what I call here 'man' is *martyaḥ*, the mortal. And a *martyaḥ* negates everything predicated of him. But the *arche* of corn also highlights 'rebirth', but rebirth through and from death. If man participates in his *arche* of plant-life, he will realize the truth of rebirth out of death. In truth, the Vedic concept of *nitya karma*, daily ritualistic piety, calls upon man to participate in the world-process. Acts of

public good, *pūrta,* makes man a participant in the life of fellow-beings, *nitya karma* or *iṣṭa* makes him a participant in the world of nature. *Pūrta* enables man to free himself from the tyranny of language that man uses more to conceal than to reveal himself. His concern and care for others frees him from the necessity of using dissimulation. This freedom enables him to get innocent and to perform the *nitya karma,* the participatory act. *Nitya karma* calls upon man to withdraw from his affairs and participate in the meeting, the *sandhyā,* of day and night in the evening and fade into night with twilight. And he is also asked to go to sleep early with birds and beasts. And as a watchful creature, he must rise up before the russet-clad *uṣas* adorns the east and watch with devoted attention how night gets gently transformed into dawn and dawn into morning. And when the sun rises, let him participate in the cosmic act of awakening. This *sandhyā* man should also watch within himself. Let him, in serene contemplation, watch his consciousness fade into sleep, and sleep into awakening. Let him be awake to the *sandhyā* of sleep and wakefulness, the process of setting and rising of consciousness within him. Only then will his *agni hotra,* evening and morning fire-worship, bear fruit.

To remember that one ripens like corn and reappears like corn, to participate in this prehuman *arche,* is to participate in time—not the linear time that men of desire and action would posit, but time as *saṃvatsara,* the year, to use an image from *Praśna Upaniṣad.*[7] Men of desire and action *use* time, men of participation, of *nitya karma,* men devoted to *arche* live time and participate in seasons, in their comings and goings, as they daily participate in the evening, the night, the morning and the noon. They truly ripen with corn and reappear with it; they *repeat* the year-process, live it, interiorize it. For men, who have turned the year into linear time, there is no recurrence of their life. They see recurrence in the year-process, but they find themselves excluded from it, alienated from it. The Upaniṣads, however, remind man that there is, indeed, a recurring process of life and death operating every moment within him also, though he, in his blind passion, pays no heed to it. The Upaniṣads call upon man to pay heed to that recurring process of life and death in himself, to watch with care how the outgoing breath rises within him to die out in the atmosphere, and how out of the death of the outgoing breath arises the incoming breath to die within to rise up again as the outgoing breath. The man who, after performing to perfection the *nitya karma,* after dying with evening and rising with morning, after coming to birth with seasons and dying with them, after waxing with the moon and waning with it, comes to live with his breath and die with it—such a man, say the Upaniṣads (see especially the *Praśna*), the *Bhagvad-Gītā* and Vedānta, will see death give birth to life as clearly as darkness does to light.

What happens to language in this state? Man cannot flow with breath until his thought does not flow with it. That is why in yogic discipline breath is made to flow in equalized measure through the aid of a *mantra* or a name.

The mind is concentrated on the name and both breath and name are exhaled and inhaled in a gentle, equalized rhythm. The *yogi* first actively regulates his mind-breath movement, but a time comes when breath and name spontaneously flow in perfect *sandhi,* unison. At this stage, a deep calm descends upon him, and word-breath comes to occupy his entire attention until a moment comes when the word-breath usurps his human personality. It is at this deeply innocent and tranquil moment that the word reveals itself as reality, but gradually and step by step—the same word that once spread the dark mantle of death on it. And how, then, a word reveals itself as reality, how the name turns into the named is described at many places in the Upaniṣads; but we shall, for constraints of space, concentrate our attention largely on the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* and Śaṅkara's commentary on it. The verses for our purpose are the following:

> The place (word) all the Vedas propound and all the penances proclaim, desiring which seekers go celibates—that very place (word) I speak in brief unto you: it is *aum* (I.ii. 15).

Śaṅkara's commentary:

> The place, the destination, that all the Vedas, without exception, propound, and all the penances proclaim as means would of their end, and desiring which seekers live as celibate students in the abodes of their teachers or adopt other measures that could lead them to the realization of Brahman—of that place shall I speak in brief unto you. *Aum* is the place, the destination you wish to know of. *Aum* is its name, *aum* is its symbol.

> This syllable, indeed, is (the lower) Brahman and this syllable, indeed, is the supreme Brahman. At his desire will either be his—of him who this syllable alone does know (I.ii.16).

Śaṅkara's commentary:

> This syllable, indeed, is the lower Brahman and this syllable, indeed, is the supreme Brahman. Of both is this syllable the symbol. If a man knows this syllable as the adorable Brahman itself, he shall have as his whichever of the two Brahmans he desires to be his. If the supreme Brahman is his goal, it will become knowable; and if it is lower Brahman, it will become attainable.

> This support is the best; this support is the highest. Knowing this support, one gets adored in the world of Brahmā (I.ii.17).

Śaṅkara's commentary:

Of all the supports for the realization of Brahman this support is the best—merits the highest praise. This support is also the lower Brahman, for it relates to both. In the world of Brahmā, the Creator, will he get magnified, adored—he who knows this support. The world of Brahmā here signifies both the supreme Brahman and the lower Brahman. The meaning is: he gets magnified becoming one with the supreme Brahman and becomes adorable becoming one with the lower Brahman.

To understand the meaning of these verses and the commentary, it is necessary to keep in mind their context. Naciketas asks Yama, Death, to tell him about that reality which is other than the righteous, other than the unrighteous, other than cause and other than effect, other than the present and other than the future (I.ii.14). Earlier (I.ii.8), Yama declares Brahman as unteachable except by a seer of the Self as the one and sole reality. When taught by such a seer, the Self reveals itself as admitting of no categories of thought, categories like 'is' or 'is not'. This is how Śaṅkara interprets the verse. And now, when Yama, himself a seer of sameness, finally comes to instruct Naciketas, all that he tells him is a word, a syllable of three letters. No propositions, no predicates are used to enlighten Naciketas about Brahman. Language is uttered but without its referential or interpretative functions. And, mind it, no symbolic interpretation of *aum* is attempted as it is attempted in other Upaniṣads like *Māṇḍūkya, Chāndogya, Praśna* and some others. It is admitted that the word is propounded everywhere in the Vedas. And yet people seek to know it through austerities and chastity—to know this most well-known of the Vedic words! Now, why should they undergo such hard discipline to know the already known? And why should one learn it from a seer of sameness when the word is on everybody's lips? Moreover, this word is called Brahman, both lower and higher. And, adds Śaṅkara, this word is both higher and lower Brahman, because it is their symbol. The Upaniṣad, too, calls it a support (I.ii.17). Logical positivists would get exultant to know all this. Perhaps, they would coin a stronger term than 'nonsensical' to describe this 'nonsense'. For this 'nonsense' is unabashedly deliberate. The word is a place, the word is a symbol, the word is a support, the word is reality, manifested and in-itself! And the word is to be *known*!

The Upaniṣads and Śaṅkara do not, however, accept our claim that we, the users of language and its creatures, really know the truth and reality of language. No one, except great poets and thinkers, has even time to look at words and let them speak to him. An 'unaccommodated' man like Naciketas alone can pay heed to the word. For he has impoverished himself of thoughts and possessions, and has the innocence of one who lives with corn and dies with it and is reborn with it. He has no thought of the morrow and lives from moment to moment. Such a man alone has the tranquillity and the openness required to turn the word as a utensil to the word as an object. And nothing could be more futile than to think of the word in terms of words, to

predicate other words of it. The question, 'What is language?' cannot be answered in terms of propositions. The moment you try to answer this question in words, you will find you have undone language. You may find, for example, that men as users of language constitute language, and you may also, at the same time, find language constituting men. You may find, too, that the same relationship of ambiguity obtains between language and the world. The word 'ambiguity', in this sense, has sustained many a thinker's faith in language. But, honestly speaking, this faith is unfounded. For when I say 'Language is constituted by the world and society', I assume the reality of the world and society as *independent* phenomena, existing in their own right. When, however, I come to examine the reality of the world and society, I find that they do not exist on their own but require language for their being. At that time I assume the reality of language as an independent phenomenon. Therefore the talk that phenomena are constituted by other phenomena is based on uncritically accepted assumptions. The dialectic of otherness has only one legitimate function: it is to reveal its own untruthfulness and prepare man for innocence and wise passivity. Nāgārjuna, I believe, uses the dialectic of otherness in this way. But not deconstructionists, who like to celebrate otherness and confound the world with impasses in the field of ethics, of literary criticism and even of ordinary action.

The way to know language, therefore, is not the way of discourse. The way to know *aum* is the way of impoverishment: you have to impoverish yourself of thoughts and interpretations, of desire and passion and let the word reveal itself to you. One way to acquire this openness, this innocent passivity is the yogic method: to meditate on a name mingled with breath. Though the Upaniṣads, including the *Kaṭha*, do teach yogic method, men like Naciketas are ready, even without the yogic practice, to let the word possess them and usurp them. Thus, when a seer of Ātman as the single and sole reality utters the word *aum* to such souls, they do not meditate on it; they are too tranquil to do that. As a result, the word becomes the sole focus of their attention and consciousness of everything else, including themselves, gets suppressed.

When we, the *zoons politikon*, concentrate on an object, we, the doers, the *kartṛs*, drive out all other objects from our mind. The other objects recede into a vague, undifferentiated background—they collapse into it. But that background constantly tries to force its way into the field of our attention. We cannot easily concentrate our mind on an object because the world, as the excluded background, constantly haunts it. Similarly, a word, too, will be haunted by the rest of the language-system it belongs to and the community where that system operates and the world in which the community flourishes. Thus, a single word will carry within itself all the three co-primordialities—the system of language, the community and the world—but, of course, negatively, as constitutive absences. But what will be the ontological status of a word when it comes to occupy a self-submissive, tranquil and open soul?

The soul which has opened itself to the world does not care to distinguish itself from the world. Only the man of desire and action does that. To the innocent soul that has been purified of desire and action, the world no longer remains the *other*. Such a soul flows out of itself into the world and the world into itself. Idealists have often appeared absurd to thinking people, but only 'irrefutably' absurd, for there is no ontological line that really divides me from the world. The innocent soul that becomes tranquil and passive (*akartṛ*) will not really know where the world gets divided from itself. Visionary poets, suffused with tranquil passivity, poets like Blake, Wordsworth and Coleridge, will bear witness to the truth of these words (especially Wordsworth vide *Prelude*, Book II). The truth of idealism is not the truth of philosophical thinking; it is the truth of innocent passivity. For philosophical thinking, *otherness* is the truth. There was never a consciousness that was conscious of itself and was not constituted by otherness.

Śaṅkara believes that perception of objects is impossible without universals;[8] that phenomena proceed from linguistic universals;[9] that name and the named are one;[10] that when language comes to cease, externality of objects is not perceived.[11] When self-consciousness gets subdued, when man does not remember the word 'I', then the distinction between man and the world is seen as a mere fabrication of ego-consciousness. Thus, when *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* comes to describe the inner self that knows the external phenomena, it does not care to distinguish between the individual self and the universal self, and describes the one in terms of the other.[12] The first letter *a* of *aum* indicates this identity between the individual self and the universal self. This is, however, only one aspect of the identity. When man no longer remains self-conscious, when he forgets the word 'I', he and the world get coalesced and immersed into each other. The real vision of *a* of *aum*, of *Vaiśvānara* or *Virāṭa*, the universal self, takes place when a single body, a single object or a single word comes to usurp the personality of the individual. The word *aum* is heard, and it becomes the sole reality. This happens when the word in question has freed itself from its linguistic system. If an object comes to occupy man this way, then it has freed itself from the interpreted world. Language (in the case of *aum*) and the interpreted world (in the case of an object) do not present themselves even as undifferentiated background, as they do when we ordinarily concentrate on an object. But in this state man is too innocent, too passive even to concentrate. He is simply possessed by the object which uproots him from his status as a placed, situated being. The object becomes everything for him. But will the object remain the same familiar object? Will the word *aum* remain the same familiar word that a twice-born Hindu daily recites in his prayers and greetings? The *Ṛg-Veda* has a different story to tell:

> He who does not know the eternal word of the Vedas, the highest point where rest all the gods—what will he do with the Vedas? Only those who know that word sit here in peace and harmony.[13]

The *Bhagvad-Gītā* says the same thing but not about a word but about a human body:

> Here at one place now behold the entire world with creatures that move and do not move, in my body, O slayer of sleep! And also all else you wish to see.[14]

In one word dwell all the gods and in one body the entire world (and gods, the succeeding verses will add). When man becomes innocent of himself, the entire world comes to reside in him, though 'in him' is hopelessly the language of those who do not know what self-innocence is. But here the beholder gets possessed by a single presence, a single word and a single body with all its constitutive *others*, the society, the world and the unknown horizons that ring that world—all these *others* concentrated in it, shedding off their otherness! This means that interpretative language that creates and multiplies distinctions has deserted the world. A presence which in its articulated and interpreted manifestation carries a world and a community along with it but carries them as its constitutive *others*, that very presence now carries the same world and community with itself but not as its existential contexts, not as its constitutive *others*, but as one with itself. All *dvandvas*, all conflicts come to rest here. But do the world and creatures and gods dwell in a single presence in the same form as they do as constitutive *others* of an 'interpreted' phenomenon? When the burden of otherness is lifted, all *others* come to be de-articulated into *this*, the presence, making that presence pregnant with infinity. In truth, infinity constitutes every interpreted phenomenon but infinity as the *other*. Infinity as the *other* is the world and its uninterpreted horizons. But when interpretation gets done away with, otherness, too, gets done away with; and a particular phenomenon and the world come to coalesce, mingle into each other as it were. For the innocent, pre-predicative being is the abode of awful glory, life and infinity—it is *Virāṭa*, the *Vaiśvānara;* for the 'thoughtful' it is negation, a blank, death or a product of 'mysticism'. Few, indeed, are those who know how, to adapt a phrase from Kabīr, the ocean comes to dwell in a drop.

It should not, however, be imagined that *Virāṭa*- or *Vaiśvānara*-vision presents the end of all kinds of interpretation. For interpretations have been suppressed only at the level of the senses and their correlate, the external world. The suppression of interpretation at the level of the senses transforms a particular into *the* particular-universal presence. When the senses and organs, to adapt the language of *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*,[15] cease to function, or when, to adapt the language of the *Bhagvad-Gītā*,[16] they are offered as oblations to *manas*, mind, the vision of the coalescence of the individual, the cosmos

and what lies beyond the cosmos, the divine (*ādhyātmika, ādhibhautika* and *ādhidaivika*) ensues. *Manas,* mind, is *ekstatic* consciousness: *manas* refuses to linger on the given presence, dwell on it, get absorbed into it; it constantly moves backward and forward. It is informed by *rajas,* as language is informed by *tamas, stasis.* When language stops its *stasis*-tic function, its categorizing function, when, in other words, senses become still (for the senses and language as the principle of *stasis* function simultaneously), the *manas* gets stilled and loses itself in the given presense. There is, however, one temptation for the *manas:* it might start glorifying the theo-anthropo-cosmic presence, might start enjoying it, fearing it, or, like artists, describing it, predicating some awe-inspiring traits of it. This way the mind gets active, loses its innocence and falls back into the riot of the senses. The mind can lose its *rājasic,* its *ekstatic* character only by self-submitting to the presence and getting absorbed into it. Indeed, it must get so absorbed into it that it should not predicate even individual-universe-divinity character of it. This way *manas* will no longer remain *ekstatic,* and the presence will shed off its temporal character and will reveal itself as eternity and infinity; there will remain no temporal *manas* to cognize temporality. And there will remain no temporal *manas* even to cognize theo-anthropo-cosmic presence. For perception of that presence involves, so to say, movement from one term to the other, from the divine to the human to the cosmos; but the agency of *manas* has now been stilled into passivity and it can no longer move from one term to the other. No language remains to delimit it and no *manas* to temporalize it. It is in this self-oblivion, this abyss that the creative source of the world lies. This is the vision of *Hiraṇyagarbha,* the Golden Germ. Thus does *aum* reveal its second letter *u,* the symbol of the creator.[17] The Golden Germ, the shining creator, gets revealed when man has been laid asleep in body, and the mind has been stilled into passivity; when vāk (language as *stasis*) and *manas* (language as *ekstasis*) have merged into *buddhi* (to be explained presently). The mind stilled is the creator of the world and not the active mind which ever remains at the mercy of a 'material' world, its constitutive-destructive *other.*

This state, too, is open to backsliding,[18] but he who will not allow this backsliding to take place, he who will stick to innocence and will not celebrate and exult in his vision but will remain oblivious of himself and unself-conscious, such a man will find even his *buddhi* get stilled. *Buddhi* is the determinating faculty. In association with senses and speech, *vāk,* it determinates material phenomena through the act of linguistic predication. In association with *manas,* it determinates things in terms of pleasure and pain, desirability and undesirability. When the senses cease to function and the *manas* gets stilled, it determinates reality in terms of existence only. It cannot, in that state of innocence, determinate the given eternity-infinity in terms of non-existence, for there will be no ekstatic *manas* to move from the given to the non-given.

Were *buddhi* to get stilled, then, one addicted to intentionality will protest,

even Brahman-knowledge would cease.[19] But even consciousness of Brahman as the sole reality is still consciousness inflicted with intentionality, and is subject to possible backsliding into self-consciousness. Therefore, even this consciousness that Brahman *is* has to go. But this consciousness, *buddhi* purified of the adjuncts of *manas,* senses and language, is not to be eradicated through conscious effort; indeed, it cannot be eradicated through any effort at all. For that means sliding back to the mind-sense self. The intellect, in order to 'reach' Brahman, has to self-submit to Brahman as *IS* and let it, in absolute passivity, possess it and usurp it. Then alone does Brahman, as it really is and not as 'He *is*', become favourably disposed toward man; and then alone does *buddhi* become one with it. It is then alone that *aum* reveals itself as the highest Brahman. Brahman as *IS* is lower Brahman, and Brahman, as it really is, is the supreme Brahman—to which even 'is-ness' is not applicable:

> The Self should be realized as 'He IS', the Self should also be realized as it truly is. To one who, of the two forms, knows that of 'He IS', to him becomes favourably disposed the Self-in-truth.[20]

It may be asked: what about the third letter *m* of *aum,* the symbol of sleep in Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad.[21] Does *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* ignore it? When the mind gets stilled, there remains nothing for *buddhi* to do except to determinate reality in terms of 'is-ness'. In sleep, when the senses and the mind become inactive, there remains nothing except blankness. We can predicate nothing of this blankness except that it *is.* But the 'is-ness' of sleep is an 'is-ness' through exclusion, the exclusion of the dream and the waking states, whereas the 'is-ness' the buddhi contemplates is 'is-ness' through inclusion—inclusion of the sense, world and the mind-world, through a progressive process of inclusion. Some people interpret the path of negation, of *neti neti,* as if it were merely a conscious negation. They do not realize how man can possibly get rid of the act of negation through the act of negation itself. The path of negation is, in every truth, the path of passive affirmation of the 'given'. First, the object—*aum*—is let to reveal itself, without the act of predication through language as *stasis* interfering with the revelation; then the theo-anthropo-cosmic or divine-individual-world presence is allowed to reveal itself as infinity-eternity; then reality is allowed to reveal itself only in terms of 'is-ness'. And then *buddhi* allows itself to be impregnated with *IS,* to be so suffused with it that it loses itself—not into *IS* but into reality in-itself.[22] Self-submission to 'is-ness' turns *buddhi* into Brahman itself. And Brahman, as it is in itself is devoid of 'is-ness'—that *upādhi,* that adjunct, is attributed to it by *buddhi* itself. It is the grace of Brahman as it is in itself that turns *buddhi* into itself, but that grace is vouchsafed to man only if *buddhi* remains self-submitted to 'is-ness'. This paradox should never be lost sight of by those who would equate *neti neti* with conscious negation.

Language conceals reality, but language as the measuring principle, as the act of predication. But there is no way out of language except through self-submission to it. He who self-submits to the word (*aum*) will find the word as reality itself, will become reality itself. Language as the measuring principle is *avidyā*, ignorance; and *avidyā* creates the world of names and forms, *nāma* and *rūpa*, the interpreted world, the world that is *māyā*. When man self-submits to *māyā*, in innocence and without desire, *māyā* reveals itself as Brahman. Thus, the way of negation implies negation of selfhood and self-consciousness and this implies the affirmation of the '*thou*'. It should be of interest to note that the later Heidegger, too, advocated an innocent approach to language, the approach of letting-be, of *Glassenheit*.[23] But innocence, for Heidegger, meant only the shedding off of the principle of sufficient reason, of why and how. He did not contemplate himself being usurped by language. Language, according to him, reveals Being, but not the language man speaks but the language that speaks *to* man. Man has to wait for the linguistic peal of Being in patience and intellectual innocence. This linguistic peal, language the speaker, is Being itself. This should be acceptable to Śaṅkara, but only as a preliminary to the real revelation. For Śaṅkara, following the Upaniṣadic teaching, would not be content with waiting for Being to peal itself. He will ask for self-immersion into language; he will ask us to die into unreal language, and through this death into the unreal, become the real. Waiting for Śaṅkara will not be genuine innocence; only passivity, *akartṛtva*, non-doing, is that. The ontological unreal has to be worshipped as the real if man would reach Being. But this worship should not know itself as worship. Man, the creature of language, of *māyā*, cannot hope to reject *māyā*. He can only surrender himself to it, and then alone will reality take him into its fold. That is the path of wisdom, of *jñāna* in Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara, the path of wisdom which is also the path of devotion, the path of wisdom that disowns all wisdom. The difference between the path of wisdom and devotion is the creation of the naive only.

And the 'impoverished' man is to surrender himself to the word (*aum*) only when it is uttered by a seer of oneness.[24] The seer of non-duality is he whose *buddhi* has become one with Brahman. He is a man who has lost his sense-self, his mind-self, and his intellect-self. Therefore, *aum* that sounds like a word to us is (for the seer) reality itself, Brahman itself. I have bracketed 'for the seer', because there is truly no seer for whom the word is Brahman. It is the word as Brahman that can redeem the open-minded, passively receptive soul. The implication is that when man opens himself to reality, then reality, too, responds to him and obeys his call and incarnates itself as the word. It goes out to redeem the sense-self, the mind-self and the *buddhi*-self. This Vedic thought, later developed, in the *Bhagvad-Gītā*, into the doctrine of *avatāravāda*. In both the versions, self-submission is the way to knowledge and redemption.

In the bewildering confusion of today's world, where philosophy has

become trivial or pessimistic, this thought may be of some value. Heidegger, toward the end of his career, did take a step or two in this direction. But by taking a few steps one does not become a pilgrim unto innocence. Innocence alone, I believe, can save our information-oppressed minds from triviality, from despair and meaninglessness, and, what is more important, from illusions of meaning the 'they' in us always cherishes. By listening to these words of ancient wisdom, by lingering on them in passive receptivity, we could, perhaps, save ourselves from the cruel fate of becoming mere illustrative examples of categories—examples that can easily be dispensed with to save the category in question—the fate that modern civilization and its philosophers (with the exception of pessimists) have so remorselessly inflicted upon us.

Notes

1. *Hamlet*, Act I., sc. 4, 11. 39-45.
2. *Ibid.*, Act I. sc. 5, 11, 166-67.
3. For Merleau-Ponty's views on language and creativity; see Claud Lefort (ed.), *The Prose of the World*, tr. John O'Neill, Evanston, 1973; 'Eye and The Mind' in J.A. Edie (ed.) *The Primacy of Perception*, tr. C. Dellary, Evanston, 1964; Claude Lefort (ed.), *The Visible and the Invisible* tr., Alphonso Lingis, Evanston, 1968.
4. See Vincent Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy*, tr. L. Scott-Fox and J.M. Harding, Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 60.
5. Vide *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, 1920: *The Ego and the Id*, 1923.
6. *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, I.i.16. All the translations of the Upaniṣadic passages and Śaṅkara's commentary are by the author. They are taken from the author's manuscript (in progress) containing a new translation of Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the *Prasthānatrayī* and an elaborate modern commentary.
7. *Praśna Upaniṣad* I, 10-11.
8. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Bhāṣya*, II. iv.9.
9. *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*, I.iii.28.
10. 'Introduction', *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya*, 2.
11. *Ibid.*, *Gauḍpāda Kārikā* IV, 25.
12. *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, 10.
13. I.164.39.
14. XI.7.
15. Vide I.iii.10-11; II. iii. 10.
16. Vide Chap. IV.
17. Vide Śaṅkara at *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, 1-6; and *Gauḍpāda Kārikā*, I. 1-9.
18. Vide Śaṅkara at *Kaṭha*, II. iii, 10-12.
19. 'Introduction', *Ibid.*, II.iii.12.
20. *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, II. iii, 13. The translation is based on Śaṅkara's commentary.
21. Vide 19.
22. Śaṅkara at *Kaṭha*, II. iii. 12-13.
23. For a detailed and lucid account, see John D. Caputo, *The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought*, Ohio University Press, 1978.
24. *Kaṭha*, I. ii. 8, according to Śaṅkara's commentary.

Choiceless awareness

SANAT KUMAR SEN
Vidyasagar University, Midnapore

This paper is an attempt to understand the meaning and relevance of what J. Krishnamurti, a great teacher and wise man of our time, calls 'choiceless awareness' or 'attention without motive'. These expressions, and the terms 'meditation', 'sensitivity', 'intelligence', etc. in the context of his teaching, mean more or less the same thing. Krishnamurti has narrated repeatedly a story and an incident, which tellingly suggest what such awareness is and what it is not. We may begin with these two illustrations. Here is one:

> There is the story of a religious teacher who used to talk every morning to his disciples. One morning he got on to the platform and was just about to begin when a little bird came and sat on the window-sill and began to sing, and sang away with full heart. Then it stopped and flew away and the teacher said, 'The sermon of the morning is over.'[1]

When awareness is there, talking about it is unnecessary.

The other illustration graphically presents a case of inattention in the midst of talk of attention.

> I remember, [says Krishnamurti], once travelling in a car...with a group of people. I was sitting in front with the driver, there were three behind who were talking about awareness, wanting to discuss with me what awareness is. The car was going very fast. A goat was in the road and the driver did not pay much attention and ran over the poor animal. The gentlemen behind were discussing what is awareness; they never knew what had happened...That is what we all are doing, we are intellectually concerned with the idea of awareness, the verbal, dialectical investigation of opinion, yet not actually aware of what is taking place.[2]

The second example illustrates the point that awareness is not absorption. The other people in the car were absorbed in the discussion of what awareness is, but they were not alert or alive to their environment. Their minds were not open to external happenings or other influences, but were exclusively occupied with one thing. It is like the absorption of the child with a toy. When the toy engages the child, he is unmindful of all other things. Grown-up people also have toys of their fancy or interest—theories, political, moral or religious ideals, pursuit of a cause or of career, hobbies, sex or cinema, and so on. To these they get attached, charging them with emotion. These keep them busy from time to time or for a length of time, temporarily or abidingly.

To call these things 'toys' may be startling or even disturbing, but nor inappropriate in the context. These engage us as does the physical toy to the child. The psychology is the same, though there may be considerable differences in the effects according to the degree of mental investment. Taking the toy away from the child causes no great harm to him. But death of a near and dear one or the collapse of an ideal may shatter a man completely. Further, a child abandons his toy as easily as he takes to it. But to give up an attachment which one has nurtured with infinite care or to relinquish an ideal in which one has taken refuge is not at all easy.

But the point is: awareness is different from absorption of all shades and varieties. The reason is: absorption is self-enclosed, exclusive—it shuts out other things from attention; but awareness is open and borderless—it is vulnerable to any call or movement. It does not take in flatteries in order to keep out insults or vice versa. It is not engrossed with anything to the exclusion of other things. Such engrossment or monopolistic possession is there in absorption and concentration. The two are same, except for minor differences. In the former, perhaps, the exclusive preoccupation is not deliberate—absorption rather captures the mind and there is no struggle to get out of it. But in the latter, a constant struggle seems to go on; one tries to concentrate on something (*mantra*, image or object) but is all the time lured away by other thought, from which one goes on trying to return to concentration. In concentration thus is involved a perpetual battle with distractions. But, apart from such secondary differences, both absorption and concentration involve a narrowing down of the mind; and, therefore, awareness is neither. Krishnamurti says:

> Attention is a state of mind in which there is no contradiction. There is no entity, or centre, or point, which says, 'I must attend'...whereas in concentration there is always the controlling process going on—'I want to concentrate on that page', but thought wanders off and you pull it back—a constant battle going on.[3]

And, again:

> When the toy absorbs the mind there is no attention.... A more complex toy is motive...(which is) a compulsion to action; an urge...based on fear, greed, ambition; a cause that drives you to seek; suffering that makes you want to escape.... Surely, attention has no motive, no object, no toy, no struggle, no verbalization.... Where there is attention, reality is.[4]

Attention or awareness is distinguished from concentration in that it does not exclude anything; it is not exclusive or restrictive; it does not focus on any specific object to the exclusion of others. Now, we may ask: when consciousness is restricted to any one thing, why is it so? Who restricts it? Is it not

because of the presence of some motive desire or interest? A student concentrates on his task, because he wants to do well in the examinations. So do sportsmen, businessmen doctors, engineers, lawyers, administrators, teachers—in fact, all men—when they deal with their specific jobs, because they aim at some result or other. When we have some problem or challenge, theoretical or practical, we seek a way out and apply our minds to it. In doing this the mind concentrates on certain things which it considers relevant, and withdraws from other things. In the conduct of life this is natural and essential.

But it is neither a fact nor is necessary that we always concentrate on something or other. Selective focusing of consciousness requires effort; and it is not possible to be engaged in effort always; to try to do so would be tiring and exasperating. Nor is there any need to do so, as there is no need to have some motive or other always. We may happen to see a brilliant sunset or sunrise, and enjoy it thoroughly, without any conscious purpose or motive behind it. Similarly, the passage of clouds in the sky or an array of birds in flight across it, the play of light and shade in the trees or the distant hills, the rustling of leaves, the music of the running stream, waves in the paddy-field caused by breeze, the movement of traffic on a busy street, a festive procession, the innocent look of a cow, the sadness in a human face, etc.—in fact, everything—can catch our attention and be watched without any end in view. Such observation is choiceless awareness in which there is no seeking and no effort.

There are certain things necessary for the sustenance of human life, e.g. food, clothing and shelter. Man has natural motivation for these necessities and a few other conveniences. However, he does not seek these things only, but develops greed for others as well for which there is no need at all. These are: riches, power, importance, immortality, God-experience and so on. The pursuit of these cravings lead to ruthless competition, conflict, corruption, meanness, anxiety, anger, hate, jealousy, enmity, etc. and inevitable frustration; in a word, sorrow and suffering.

Krishnamurti makes thought squarely responsible for all these ills. For him thought is response from memory to particular situations which pose problems. Memory is the repository of past experiences and knowledge. Thought is fragmentary, since it is a partial response in which the whole of consciousness is not involved. It is never new, since it is always a reaction from memory, and, therefore, uncreative. It is of use only where routine matters are involved, in the practice of daily life, in science and technology, in the field of technique and skill. But it is incapable of dealing with the new, the (as yet) unknown. It operates in terms of images, symbols and concepts. It creates divisions in the mind—between the observer and the observed, the actual and ideal, the *me* and the *not-me*—and is the source of mental conflict. Where thought functions, there is duality, no unity. It breaks up a whole into fragments, the concrete into abstractions. It gives rise to desire and sustains it. It distorts observation by interpretation. It flies from facts into fancies.

It creates the *I*, the Ego, and makes us live in the past and the (pre-fabricated) future, in memory and imagination, in hopes and fears, in words and pictures, but not with what is in the present.

Krishnamurti's tested remedy for the havoc created by memory-thought-knowledge complex in man and human affairs is an insistent call to return to the facts, to what-is in choiceless awareness. This answer may seem too simple for the problem, which is deep, vast and complex. It may be objected: if the solution consisted in simple passive awareness of facts as they are, how is it that the problem of human suffering has persisted throughout the centuries? But saying this is not going into the pros and cons of the case; it may be just voicing a distrust based on unreason (abhorrence of simplicity), or on fear of displacement from habitual preoccupations of thought. It may be retorted: though awareness is simple, to achieve simplicity is not at all easy; truth may be simple, but to face it calmly and quietly, without hope or fear, may not at all be easy. Instead of attending to facts, we seek to run away from them; and in doing so create all sorts of problems. So the only remedy lies in being passively aware of facts and of our attempted escapes.

So one has to be aware, without any choice or judgement, not only of what is happening outside but also of what is taking place inside us.

> If one is not aware of what is happening outwardly [writes Krishnamurti] and one begins to be aware inwardly, then one becomes rather neurotic. But if one begins to be aware of what is...happening in the world...and then from there moves inwardly, then one has balance.[5]

However, there is no absolute division between inner and outer awareness. It is the same movement, like ebb and flow of tide, that goes in and out. It is at one time awareness of mental processes of desire, fear, anger or envy, and at another time of our environment, of how we walk talk or eat, how we treat another, and so on. 'The outer is a reflection of oneself', Krishnamurti says, 'because society, governments...are created by human beings fundamentally the same as oneself'.[6]

Awareness thus is self-knowledge. But self-knowledge does not occur in isolation or withdrawal from the world. One does not have to renounce the world and become a recluse in order to be aware. Awareness is in the understanding the way of life in its everyday setting: its misery, loneliness, despair, hope, fear, the urge to be successful or famous, etc. in a word, life in all its aspects.

> Meditation [says Krishnamurti] is not something different from daily life; do not go off into the corner of a room and meditate for ten minutes; and then come out of it and be a butcher—both metaphorically and actually. Meditation is one of the most serious things; you do it all day, in the office, with the family,... when you educate (your children) to become soldiers, to kill...watching them to enter into this trap of the modern world; watching all that, realising your part in it, all that is part of meditation.... Meditation is not something different from life.[7]

This means that we can know ourselves truly only in relationship; and relationship is not only with other people but also with ideas, with nature and with the things we possess. It is in the mirror of relationship that we can see ourselves as we actually are.

What ordinarily passes as relationship between persons is, in fact, only relation between cultivated images. A husband develops an image about his wife and she also forms her image about him through the years of association and experiences—of pleasure, nagging, insults, domination, submission and all the rest of it. It is the interaction between these images, not between human beings, that is taken as relationship. Krishnamurti says: 'It is only when there is no image that there is love.'[8]

Image-formation depends on motive, and images are recorded in the brain, in memory. Memory is necessary in practical conduct of life, in production of goods, in matters where enhancement of knowledge and information-processing are necessary, as for example, in going to the office, in talking with people, in learning a skill, in the sciences and so on. But if images are nurtured and memories sustained even when useless or harmful, then man's life is disrupted. Motives then lead to sorrow. Krishnamurti asks:

> Is it possible for the brain not to register except that which is absolutely necessary? Why should I register an insult?...Why should I register flattery? It is unnecessary. Why should I register any hurts? Unnecessary. Therefore, register only that which is necessary in order to operate in daily life....but psychologically do not register anything.[9]

In attention or awareness, there is no motive or choice, and, therefore, no image-building. Here there is listening to what is being said, but the mind does not record it as memory. In being fully aware of insult or flattery at the moment, one sees the truth or falsity of it and is free of it.

It fails to spoil relationship. 'Then relationship', says Krishnamurti, 'is the beauty of love without the image.'[10]

Where there is motive or choice, there is no attention. Why is awareness characterized as 'choiceless'? Because in it there is no taking of sides, no preference or avoidance, no acceptance or rejection, no pre-determined direction, no motive to satisfy, no problem to solve; in a word, no axe to grind. To be afflicted with a problem is to be, in whatever degree, in a state of confusion, not knowing one's way about. It is then that there are alternatives, which one weighs and compares as means, and chooses one among them as the most suitable according to one's training and background. Choice implies conflict. To choose is to emphasize one alternative against the others; and

this is done in terms of one's past experience and conditioning. So choice is caused. There is no freedom in choice. There can only be freedom from choice, which, however, does not mean becoming irresponsible. In awareness there is clarity, no confusion and, therefore, no choice. For a man who has clear understanding, there is no question of choice between alternatives. Where there is no motive, no like or dislike for particular actions, there is no choice either. In awareness there may be immediate action, not from choice but in freedom.

Awareness is total or complete attention. When one attends with the totality of one's being, with all one's mind and heart without any division in it, such whole attention is awareness. But ordinarily for most of the time we are inattentive, i.e. we look at things with partial or divided attention. Besides: 'We look at things from prejudices, from verbal and psychological images. So we never see anything completely.'[11] We perceive things with the mind heavily conditioned.

It is important to note that in awareness there is direct and immediate contact with reality as it is.[12] If we approach *what is* with a mind that is loaded with opinions judgements or preconceptions, with verbal or psychological images, with knowledge or thought derived from memory, then we are already prejudiced about it in one way or another. That distorts our perception or understanding. There cannot be true awareness unless the mind is free from all symbols, images and remembrances. Freedom from the known or emptying of the content of consciousness is essential for awareness or meditation to be, for seeing what one actually is. 'Destruction is essential', says Krishnamurti, 'not of buildings and things, but of all the psychological devices and defences?'[13] 'When we are looking at something with complete attention there is no space for a conception, a formula or a memory'.[14]

Since in awareness thought and memory do not function, there is no comparison in it—no explanation, justification or condemnation, no contrast or conflict between actual and ideal, no pronouncement of right or wrong. There is neither seeking of anything, nor rejection. Awareness, therefore, is totally effortless, spontaneous. It is always in the present, instantaneous, a moment-to-moment affair without any accumulation of experience, without any reference to past or future. The mind in awareness becomes completely silent; there is no chattering, because thought has come to an end. 'When the mind is completely aware', says Krishnamurti, 'it becomes extraordinarily silent, quiet; it is not asleep, but highly aware in that silence.'[15] In it the mind is innocent and susceptible. Action comes out of that silence, just as music comes out of the drum as it vibrates to the emptiness within.

It might seem that if in awareness thought ceases and the mind becomes completely still, that would totally paralyse life and make action in the world impossible. But, according to Krishnamurti, this does not at all follow. On the contrary, vast energy is available for action when there is no motive. Action from motive is only a partial reaction from a cause. Choice involves

conflict between envisaged possibilities which means wastage of energy. In choiceless awareness there is no frittering of energy. Total attention expresses itself, if it does, in free consummate action, in which there is no vacillation. Nor is there any regret later, for it is not a memory-reaction. It may not continue in memory either. Wrong response and consequent repentance is possible only when one exercises choice. Where there is no choice, there is no remorse. Awareness, which is intense sensitivity, is not unresponsive to life. It is awakened intelligence, open and sensitive to every movement of life. It is not conditioned by memory, but can use memory in meeting any outward challenge.[16] 'The very seeing', Krishnamurti says, 'is acting, which is the expression of that seeing.'[17]

Awareness or meditation is essentially undivided. It has no centre or circumference. Since it does not compare itself with or mark itself off from anything else, it has no frontier or limit. Thinking is limited, as it can always be added to; but awareness is unbounded. Besides, in awareness there is no cleavage between the observer and the observed, between the 'me' and the 'not-me'. Krishnamurti says:

> One has to understand this basic principle; the observer is not different from the observed, psychologically. When there is anger, there is no I, but a second later thought creates the I and says, 'I have been angry' and brings in the idea that I should not be angry; the division brings conflict.[18]

Since there is no division in awareness, it is not personal or impersonal, not yours or mine; it is rather anonymous. There is beauty and love in it. Krishnamurti says: 'It is only a mind that looks at a tree or the stars or the sparkling waters of a river with complete self-abandonment that knows what beauty is, and when we are actually *seeing* we are in a state of love.'[19]

Though Krishnamurti speaks of awareness as self-knowledge and freedom, he drives home the point that it is not self-awareness, if that connotes a division between self and awareness. There is no duality in it.

> The moment I am aware that I am humble, humility is not. The moment I am aware that I am happy, happiness is not. So if I am aware that I am aware, then that is not awareness; in that there is the division between the observer and the observed.[20]

What does awareness do? What happens when there is awareness? There is learning or understanding, not only of things and processes outside but also of what is taking place within the mind. Seeing of external objects and events is far easier than being aware of the activities of the mind. The mind contains memories, thoughts, urges, anger, fear, frustration, jealousy, duplicity, violence, hope, pleasure, pain, pride, etc.—all running riot and making

man's life miserable. These things are laid bare with their roots in the light of disinterested awareness. Awareness does not do any dissection or analysis, does not interfere or suppress, nor does it pass any judgement on what is revealed before its watchful eye. It attends to all things as they arise without inviting and without rejecting. But the wonder and the beauty of it is that before its benign gaze, mental processes unroll themselves completely; they begin, develop and come to an end without leaving any trace. It is like the flight of the eagle, which takes to its wings, soars into the blue sky and disappears without leaving any mark; or like the natural blooming and withering of a flower. Krishnamurti says:

> Every thought and feeling must flower for them to live and die; flowering of everything in you, the ambition, the greed, the hate, the joy, the passion.... As each fact is allowed to flower, in freedom, in its entirety, the conflict between the observer and the observed ceases.[21]

In choiceless awareness the principle of division and sorrow, separation of 'me' from 'not-me' is obliterated; and there is freedom and joy.

If there is any one thing Krishnamurti's teaching is about, it is awareness. It is, so to say, the key to the solution to the universal problem of sorrow, according to him.

It might, therefore, seem that if one only knew how to be aware, then there would be nothing more (or greater) for him to learn. The question then is: how to acquire awareness. But Krishnamurti disallows this question, because the question is wrong in itself. It is put by the chattering mind, which already having so much knowledge, seeks the further knowledge of awareness and asks 'how?'. 'But', Krishnamurti says, 'when you ask 'how', then there is the division between the observer and the thing observed'.[22]

The question 'how' presupposes that there is some method, some system or some person, laying down the procedure to be followed for achieving awareness. The assumption is entirely wrong. Awareness does not come as a result of going through a step-by-step procedure. It is not a matter of evolution or gradual growth. Seeing or understanding is not a drawn-out process. If it is not immediate, it is nothing. If one realizes that the incessant twittering or buzzing of the mind is corrosive wasteful and meaningless, then the mind can become quiet. But one cannot induce real quietness, cannot set about it by following a prescribed routine. Besides, a repetitive procedure makes the mind mechanical and dull rather than alert and sensitive. Krishnamurti says: 'What is a method, a system?...Method implies a practice; and a mind that practises something day after day becomes mechanical, loses its quality of sensitivity and freshness'.[23] Awareness does not follow any beaten track; it is always new and fresh, and, therefore, full of joy.

We have so far attempted an exposition of the concept of choiceless awareness on the lines of Krishnamurti. It now remains to take a critical look at it.

One difficulty in making criticisms of Krishnamurti's ideas is due to the fact that he speaks mostly from his experiences or acute perceptions of life, and not from speculations. He describes rather than argues, and that also from a comprehensive understanding. He is not an academic philosopher, and it was never his aim to offer an organized system of philosophy. In fact, one of his basic teachings is that truth cannot be organized, because it is not anything static. His independent writings are spread over a period of more than fifty-five years, and many of his later books are from records of his extempore talks and discussions in varying situations. It is, therefore, quite possible to find contradiction in his statements of different times, but such contradictions are more apparent than real. For example, he says: 'Freedom from the content of consciousness, from one's angers and brutalities, from one's vanities and arrogance, from all things one is caught up in, is meditation.'[23] And he also says that meditation 'is a state of freedom, but not *from* anything.'[24] This inconsistency, however, is in the words only but not in meaning. What is meant perhaps is that all psychological troubles come to an end in meditation without there being any resistance or struggle in it. Similarly, the incompatibility between the statements 'the art of seeing ... is not a thing to be cultivated'[25] and 'you can cultivate awareness'[26] is also seeming rather than substantial. The point is that seeing is not a matter of continuity, either you see or you do not; but if you see, you can see again and again, not because of habit of memory but because of mindfulness itself. There is no set procedure to be followed. Practice is always of the old, but every seeing is fresh.

Apart from such variant use of terms which produce difficulty only when juxtaposed out of context, there may be other difficulties in understanding. For example, it may be said that passive (yet alert) awareness is only a figment of the imagination, because no awareness of anything is totally passive, interpretation in some form or other being involved in all cognition of objects. What we know depends on our ways of knowing, on our sensory and mental equipment. The colours we see are determined by the nature of our visual apparatus, the sounds we hear are conditioned by the structure and function of our organ of hearing, and so on. Besides these, the mind has its own characteristic mechanism. So there is no pure passive reception of facts. Hence one may say that Krishnamurti's description and prescription of passive perception is contrary-to-fact and impossible of achievement.

But this objection misses the point. Passive awareness, as spoken of by Krishnamurti, is not incompatible with any scientific finding about the constitution of our sensory organs or with general interpretative function of the mind, if there is any. He only draws our attention to the fact that words, images and interests often distort our perception, vitiate our relationship, and cause universal suffering, which can be avoided. He asserts on the basis of his own experience that it is possible to have perception without words, relationship without images and intense awareness without any pre-set motive

or direction; and he insists that in such awareness there is not only joy but also the ending of much of man-made trouble.

This answer leads to another question. If awareness is a thing of such value, it may be asked: is not this itself a reason or motive for seeking it? Does not Krishnamurti's teaching initiate a desire for awareness? At least, is not that the aim of his talking so much about it? If not, what is the point of his emphasis on it that is evident in his talks and writings? But, on the other hand, if it is sought as a panacea for the self-induced suffering of man, does it remain choiceless any longer?

In the problem obscurely developed above, there are these two questions: first, does Krishnamurti have any aim or purpose in his teaching about awareness? Secondly, if one gets the idea that awareness is a very useful thing in life, is not that a sufficient motive for seeking it? If this latter question is answered in the affirmative, then there arises the problem of doubt regarding the choicelessness of awareness.

The first question may be disposed of with the following observation: If Krishnamurti's aim in his teaching it to rouse other men to awareness, then he runs the risk of disappointment in so far as this aim is not achieved. But it may not have been his aim or it may have been discarded. Yet this would not render his talk pointless. For the point may be in the talk, not in any external result. He talks, because people are interested in his talks; he writes, because his writings come out spontaneously. Whether people realize the value or significance of what he says is quite another matter. It happens that when one makes a discovery, one speaks out of the joy of it, irrespective of whether others appreciate its importance or not.

The second question is based on hitting upon a motive for seeking awareness. About this question, Krishnamurti's answer is unequivocal. What one seeks is a projection of one's own desire. It is an outcome of one's experience and memory—familiar and recognisable. Reality is not this. It is unknown, and hence cannot be preconceived and sought. Awareness is of reality or what-is. So it cannot be sought either. It is when the seeker is not. When there is motive, there is no awareness. The passion to understand is motiveless, desireless. It is not for any pleasure or profit. Motive and desire are born out of one's past experience and knowledge, and they may relate to the future. But understanding is always of the present, not of the past or the future. Therefore, though there can be awareness or understanding of motives and desires, there cannot be motive or desire for understanding or awareness. That is, curiosity, attention, love of truth or the intention to understand is basically disinterested.

> Feeling out the nature of consciousness [says Krishnamurti], learning about it, is without motive; there is no experiencing, or being taught, in order to be or not to be something. To have a motive, a cause, ever brings about pressure, compulsion.... Freedom is not a reaction to bondage; when it is, then that freedom becomes another bondage. That is why it is important to find out if one has a motive to be free. If one has, then the result is not freedom, but merely the opposite of what is.[27]

And, again:

> The will to be free from repression is a hindrance to understanding the truth of it: for will is desire, whether positive or negative, and with desire there can be no passive awareness.... It is truth that liberates, not will or effort.[28]

Another objection to Krishnamurti may be that he seems to make forgetting a virtue rather than a deficiency. He appears to disparage memory and extol forgetfulness. According to him, awareness is of what-is in the present. Of the past and the future, there is no awareness, but only remembrance or anticipation, regret or hope, imagination, speculation, and so on. Man's preoccupation with time as past and future is a principal determinant of his suffering. By questioning seriously the value of registering hurts, insults, etc. Krishnamurti by implication seems to ask us to forget these things. One is likely to gather the impression from him that apart from knowledge useful in matters of technique and practical life, all other experiences are unimportant and have to lapse from memory. When, with the fast increase in information in the modern world, there is a craze for memory, Krishnamurti points—against the current—to the other direction. But it may be objected: first, is not having a good memory always an asset?; and, secondly, is memory a voluntary affair, so that it can be controlled at will, as Krishnamurti seems to assume?

Response to these objections may be given at and from different levels. It may, for example, be said that memory in any case deteriorates with advancing age with the degeneration of the brain; and that it is not always beneficial. Overcrowding in the brain, as elsewhere, may often lead to confusion and disorder rather than clarity. Secondly, though one may not argue for voluntary control of memory, it is a fact that memory depends on interest, and may not persist where interest is lacking. Interest depends upon motives, desires, etc. and may change or fade as a result of change in our ways of seeing things. This happens when understanding dawns. When the grip of motives and desires is loosened, there may be discontinuance in memory of many things, though experiences may go on. Krishnamurti has no quarrel with memory as such, nor is he in love with forgetting as such; but he calls for an end to the sustenance of memory-images which makes one's life miserable and mars one's relationship with others. Such ending can come only through disinterested observation—through choiceless awareness—of the role of images in our lives.

We will conclude this study with the consideration of a related objection

of a serious nature. Just as memory seems to be at a discount in Krishnamurti's philosophy, so also is self-consciousness devalued. Along with relentless insistence on undirected awareness goes the assertion that awareness is not self-aware. This might seem to be stunning, incredible and unacceptable. Is not the call for returning to awareness the cry for self-knowledge and self-observation? Is it not like the ancient appeal 'Know thyself' or *ātmānāṁ viddhi*? Does not attention without motive connote a heightening and deepening of consciousness (awareness)? How can it be un-self-conscious then? Moreover, if awareness be unaware of itself at the time it is there, how can one speak about it later? Krishnamurti's talk about awareness is surely not second-hand. When he tells us about it, he does so on the basis of his own experience. But if at the time of experiencing there is no self-consciousness, how can it be described later, as it is undoubtedly done? Krishnamurti's statement that awareness is not self-conscious, therefore, may well seem to be unreasonable almost to the point of self-contradiction.

What can conceivably be an answer to this criticism? A response from the standpoint of Krishnamurti can be reconstructed on the basis of the crucial point that in awareness there is no division between the observer and the observed. It involves the breaking down of the self—the experiencer. There is no duality in it. The subject-object distinction does not exist in awareness. When there is no self (as distinct from not-self), there cannot be self-consciousness in the sense of consciousness of oneself as distinguished from that of another. Where there is such conscious distinction, whatever else that may be, that is not awareness or meditation. This does not mean that awareness is an unconscious affair or that it irretrievably lapses into oblivion after its moment of occurrence. It leaves its imprint and can surely be described or talked about later, though it is different from its description. Duality emerges at the time of description, all communication through words involve duality. If this is kept in mind, talk about nondual experience or reality would not be misunderstood and may even lead to enlightenment. This may be a reason why Krishnamurti went on talking about it with infinite patience and love.

Notes and References

1. *Freedom form the Known*, (*FK* henceforth) p. 98.
2. *The Flight of the Eagle* (*FE* henceforth), p. 41.
3. *Questions and Answers* (*QA* henceforth), p. 43.
4. *Commentaries on Living*, Third Series (*CL*-III henceforth), p. 148.
5. *The Wholeness of Life* (*WL* henceforth), p. 215.
6. *WL*, p. 216.
7. *FE*, p. 46.
8. *Bombay Talks*, 1967.
9. *WL*, p. 144.
10. *You Are the World* (*YW* henceforth), p. 51.
11. *Second Penguin Krishnamurti Reader* (*SPKR*), p. 241.

12. Cf. 'The 'seeing' is immediate... Seeing is explosive, not reasoned, calculated,' (*Krishnamurti's Notebook*, p. 74). 'It is only when we are without any preconception, any image, that we are able to be in direct contact with anything in life' (*FK*, p. 92).
13. *Krishnamurti's Notebook* (*KN* henceforth), p. 21.
14. *FK*, p. 90.
15. *Beyond Violence*, p. 55.
16. Cf. 'Memory must die psychologically, inwardly, but function only outwardly. Inwardly, there must be death and outwardly sensitivity to every challenge and response' (*KN*, p. 93).
17. *FE*, p. 137.
18. *WL*, p. 142.
19. *FK*, p. 90; cf. 'To be sensitively aware of thought, of feeling, of the world about you... is to explode from moment to moment in affection' (*KN*, p. 204).
21. *KN*, p. 189, cf. 'To understand hidden urges and compulsions, you will have to be aware of them, without choice... then in the pure act of seeing, they will wither away, and you will be without sorrow and so be as nothing' (*KN*, p. 202) 'When anger occurs and there is no observer, no division, it blossoms and then ends—like a flower, it blooms, withers and dies away' (*WL*, p. 142).
22. *FE*, p. 45.
20. *The Awakening of Intelligence*, pp. 423-24; cf. 'It (meditation) is a state of freedom, but not *from* anything. Freedom *from* something is only the cultivation of resistance. To be conscious of being free is not freedom.... Meditation is the breaking down of the experiencer, which cannot be done consciously' (*Commentaries on Living*, Second Series, p. 166).
23. *YW*, p. 150.
23. *WL*, pp. 141-42.
24. *CL*, II, p. 166.
25. *FE*, p. 137.
26. *FK*, p. 94.
27. *CL*, III, pp. 188-89.
28. *CL*, p. 125.

Gaṅgeśa and transfer of meaning

SUKHARANJAN SAHA
Jadavpur University, Calcutta

We shall be concerned in this paper with the philosophical problems that have been considered relevant by philosophers of our tradition in the context of use of words with deviant meaning. It is our plan that we shall discuss mainly the views of the philosophers of Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and Vyākaraṇa schools. The point of view supported here is mostly that of the Nyāya school, though we shall not hesitate to show our appreciation of other views where they appear reasonable to us. The examples that we shall consider are from the Sanskrit language and are mostly the easier but staple ones. These will be presented in Roman script and always with English rendering which has been done keeping in mind an audience not familiar with Sanskrit. It is thus hoped that an Englishman or an American or even an Indian who does not know Sanskrit will be able to follow the trend of arguments. We have not tried to present idiomatic equivalents of such examples from the English language, for this can be done best by the native speakers of English and not by us for whom this is at best only a second language.

The paper contains five sections. The first section is by way of introduction, and the second states the positions of Pāṇini and Patañjali regarding certain cases of use of words with deviant meaning. In the third section, I shall consider the Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya approaches. I then pass on to Gaṅgeśa, and the following section is on the views of Gaṅgeśa and his followers regarding the extension of the thesis of transfer of meaning to verbal inflections and compound words. The concluding section deals with his views on autoreference and transfer of meaning. My aim in this paper is not only to give an account of Gaṅgeśa's position but also to undertake a critical evaluation of his views. I have argued that the points made by Gaṅgeśa concerning application of the thesis of transfer of meaning to verbal inflections, compound words and self-referring expressions are not well-founded. It would have been thus more rewarding, if, instead of undertaking this plan of extension, he would have concentrated more on the staple cases of transfer of meaning, most of which are instances of metaphors.

I

THE HEARER'S POINT OF VIEW AND A PRESUPPOSITION

Language is the vehicle of thought, and we may, if we so like, express our beliefs through language. There are, of course, some philosophers who hold that we cannot have any belief without verbal articulation, and they are of the opinion that, even when we do not express our beliefs through language for

communicating them to others, we talk to ourselves and express them in some sort of inner speech inaudible to others. The beliefs that we thus express are mostly acquired on the basis of perception, memory, inference and similar other sources. Thus, at least in respect of things and their nature, the total system of human knowledge is based on such sources of knowledge, and any item of such a system can be shown to have been acquired by some individual or other on the basis of some of the enlisted sources of knowledge. But what is true of the total system of human knowledge cannot be true of my system of beliefs, for the meagre knowledge that I have about the world is largely based on the authority of other people. Thus, though I had never been to the South Pole, the city of Rome or the Niagara Falls, I know a great deal about the places from the writings and statements of other people who have direct knowledge. And the medium through which such knowledge has been imparted to me is the language I understand. Taking writings as representing silent speech, we can say that we often learn about things as hearers by listening to direct or to silent speeches made by others. Study of language can thus be made not only from the point of view of speakers but also from the point of view of hearers; and this is no less important, for one hears more than what one speaks, since one hears not only what one speaks but also what others speak.

Though the ways of speaking and those of hearing and learning cannot be completely different, they are not also completely identical. At least this is how this has been understood by a great number of philosophers of our tradition, and this is presupposed in my presentation. I shall refer to one feature of such a perspective for the purposes of presenting their examples involving many of the cases of transfer of meaning that I propose to investigate in this paper.

Consider the Sanskrit sentence:

Idam utpalam
This (*idam*) (is) a lotus (*utpalam*).

If the sentence expresses a man's belief regarding a flower he is observing, the belief will be construed as one wherein the property of being a lotus has been ascribed to the thing he is perceiving. The belief based on perception and expressed through this sentence may justifiably be given this predicative interpretation, for I have sensory contact with the property when I ascribe it to the thing. But, if I am not an observer here and if I acquire a belief on the basis of this sentence asserted by a speaker, my belief as a hearer should not be given such a predicative interpretation. In fact, I take the two words of the sentence referentially, and the referent of the first word which has been identified through the property of thisness is taken by me as identical with the referent of the other word which has been identified through the property of being a lotus. The mode of understanding on the part of a hearer is thus taken to be different and the reason seems to be as follows.

Words which are not verbs or adjuncts to verbs or do not behave as connectives or as prefixes or suffixes are such that they share sufficient affinity to merit a common description. In Sanskrit grammar they are treated as names (*nāma*). Now, if in a sentence, e.g. in the one mentioned earlier or in a part of a sentence, e.g. in a compound word, two or more such name expressions occur and if they are used in the same case-ending in case they are all used with case-endings, the type of interpretation we apply to one such name may also be extended to the other accompanying name. Even those, who would like to offer a predicative interpretation to a sentence of the type we are considering, will certainly take one constituent of the sentence referentially. But our parity argument will demand that both the constituents be taken referentially and be treated as co-referential terms thereby stressing upon us the need of extending identity interpretation to such sentences. Backing up such a strategy the supporters of such an interpretation offer a theory of meaning, according to which the meaning of every name word consists of its reference or denotation and a property present in it without which its reference would have failed to constitute its meaning. When a hearer comes to acquire a belief on the basis of a sentence uttered by a speaker, he must be credited with a prior knowledge of the meanings of words used in that sentence. And if meaning consists of the elements noted, the route to the hearer's belief will have to be something like this. As soon as the hearer completes listening to the first word of the speaker's sentence, he grasps the meaning of the word along with its two elements. The process is repeated when he completes listening to the other word, and the hearer then comes to acquire a belief in which the referent of one word as understood by him is taken to be identical with the referent of the other word as understood by him. We are aware that truth is not at stake here, for a belief occurring as under predicative interpretation, if true, will guarantee the truth of the belief occurring as under identity interpretation and vice versa. Our principal interest, however, is to present the problems relating to cases of transfer of meaning and I believe that this can be done by following any of the two possible interpretations. But, as the philosophers whose views we shall be discussing accept the identity interpretation, the plausibility of such an approach has been briefly argued for and is presupposed in what follows.

II

PĀṆINI AND PATAÑJALI

It is believed that Pāṇini who has systematized the rules of Sanskrit grammar in his *sūtras* or aphorisms records a rule involving transfer of meaning in his *sūtra*:

Puṁyogādākhyāyām
[*Puṁ* = a male person or individual/*yogād* = because of association with -*ākhyāyām* = name... i.e. a name that stands for a male person or individual will denote (a female person or invdividual after taking the suffix *is* on it).]

In explanation of this *sūtra*, Kātyāyaṇa and Patañjali have given several illustrations, one of which is presented below following Bhattoji Dikṣit's *Siddhāntakaumudi* and its commentaries. The name *gopa* stands for a male person who looks after (*pāti*) cows (*go*). Similarly, a female person who does the job of looking after cows will be referred to by the word *gopā* (longer *a* in the end) which is a derivative from the root *gopa* and the suffix *ā*. The female person here is by profession one who does the job of looking after cows, no matter whether she is the wife or daughter of a *gopa* or one who does not in any way belong to the social community of the *gopas*. Even where a lady belongs to such a community and also does the job will be called a *gopā* (longer *a* in the end), not because of her belonging to the community but because of her doing the job. Sanskrit vocabulary has room for another word '*gopī*' which also is a derivative from the word *gopa* and the suffix *īś*. The word *gopī* does not, however, stand for any lady not belonging to the social community of the *gopas*. And even when the word is used to denote a lady who belongs to such a community and also does the job of looking after cows, she is so denoted for her belonging to the community and not for her job. Lord Kṛṣṇa who is believed by the Hindus to be one of the incarnations of God was a *gopa* by profession. His relationship with Rādhā and her friends has been elaborately depicted in the great Sanskrit work the *Bhāgavata* wherein Kṛṣṇa has been described as a *gopa* and his consorts as *gopīs*. They were not *gopā-s* but were called *gopīs*, because the ladies belonged to Kṛṣṇa's community. The interpretation of the word *gopī* as given here makes a presupposition to the effect that the suffix *īś* which together with *gopa* yields *gopī* has no denotation or reference and for that matter no meaning of its own. It may be accepted as what is called *dyotaka* or modifier of meaning without itself having any meaning. Granted this presupposition, we can then say that the referring constitutent, i.e. *gopa* of the derivative *gopī* designates what *gopī* stands for. But we have been taught that the usual meaning of *gopa* is a male person who does the job of looking after cows. Given this, in accepting that the meaningful component of *gopī* means what *gopī* actually stands for, we are constrained to admit that this component, namely, *gopa* has not been used here in its usual meaning. A shift in reference is involved here, and this is clearly a case of transfer of meaning. But the important feature to be noted here is that the normal reference and the shifted reference are related in a given manner; and, if they were not so connected, this would not have been a permissible case of transfer of meaning. In defence of this explanation, Patañjali notes a few varieties of transfer of meaning commonly

resorted to in idiomatic speech. The different cases of transfer of meaning noted by Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya* (the Great Commentary) on Pāṇini's aphorism under reference fall into four main varieties which we note below with illustrations from Patañjali and/or his commentators.

The word for the locus being used to refer to its substratum. (Patañjali's own expression for this is *tātsthya*.) Examples given by Patañjali:

A-1

Mañcā hasanti

(1) The word *mañca* usually stands for a platform (raised on columns, perhaps for a theatrical performance): this word has been used here in the plural.
(2) The word *hasanti* which agrees with the nominative in respect of number means '(are) laughing'. Understood literally the given sentence then should mean:

The platforms are laughing.

But this cannot evidently be what has been stated by the sentence. The meaning should perhaps be construed as:

The boys (performing on the platform) are laughing.

If such a construing is considered plausible, the route to it is transfer of meaning of the word *mañca* from platform to the boys (performing on the platform).

Giri dahyate
The hill (= *giri*) is being burnt (= *dahyate*).

The important question here is whether the hill is capable of being burnt. Wood is capable of being burnt, and for that matter any kind of fuel is capable of being burnt since 'capable of being burnt' means that if something is put to fire it will consume the thing reducing it to ashes. Since the hill is of the nature of stone which cannot be consumed by fire in this way, the hill cannot properly be said to be capable of being burnt. What then is the meaning of the sentence under reference? It does perhaps mean: The trees (of the forest on the hill) are being burnt. Once again the route to such a construing is transfer of meaning of the word *giri* from *hill* to trees on the hill.

We shall add a note here on the kind of interpretations different philosophers offer to the type of two sentences under reference, i.e. of sentences

containing a nominative and a verb word indicative of some action or other. Patañjali and his followers, who are called grammarians (*vaiyākaraṇas*) because of their outstanding contributions to Sanskrit grammar (*vyākaraṇa*), interpret both the nominative and verb words referentially and offer identity interpretation to such sentences. The philosophers belonging to the Nyāya school do not interpret the verb word referentially and thus offer a predicative interpretation to such a sentence. We shall have an occasion later to dwell more on this difference. For the following two examples (*B*-1 and *B*-2), however, where sentences are of a different sort philosophers of both these two schools as well as others belonging to other schools offer identity interpretation. This other type of sentence contains at least two words, none of which is a verb; but they agree in respect of number, gender, etc. Such sentences, we have noted earlier, are offered identity interpretation, and the constituent words are all treated referentially. Perhaps one of such words may be taken as having unique reference which is held to be identical with the reference of the other term. This other term need not be taken as having unique reference, and the identity interpretation looks like what Bertrand Russell would offer to sentences containing a definite description and an ambiguous description, e.g. to the sentence: 'The present Chief Minister of West Bengal is a Marxist.' We shall henceforth translate a Sanskrit sentence of this type into an English sentence containing a finite form of the verb 'to be', and this should be understood in the sense of identity just indicated. We now proceed to give an idea of the second type of cases noted by Patañjali as involving transfer of meaning.

The word which would normally be understood and used to stand for a type of things may be relaxingly used to stand for a thing which does not belong to that type but which may share a (very important) property (*dharma*) which everything belonging to that type possesses. (Patañjali uses the term *tāddharmyāt* to characterize such a case of transfer of meaning.) Because of difficulties of offering an English rendition of Patañjali's own example, we shall explain the two examples that Kaiyata has mentioned in his commentary and the last one Kaiyata admits to have borrowed from Bhartṛhari whom he quotes (*Gotvānuṣango*... etc. *Vākyapadīya*).

B-1

Siṁho mānabakaḥ

Mānabakaḥ = The boy observing celibacy after the ceremony of initiation.

Siṁha = a lion

Hence, it apparently states:

The boy is a lion.

B-2

Gaurvāhikaḥ

Vāhikaḥ = An inhabitant of the region referred to in earlier Sanskrit literature as *Vāhlika* and he is believed to be a dull-headed person.

Gau = a cow.

Hence *B*-2 apparently states:

The *Vāhika* is a cow.

Since both *B*-1 and *B*-2 are to be given identity interpretation and since they cannot be given such an interpretation taking all the constituent words in their usual meaning, the word 'lion' (*siṁha*) in *B*-1 is to be taken as standing for a thing having a property or properties which might be shared in common by a lion and the boy under reference; similarly, the word 'cow' (*gau*) is to be taken as standing for a thing having a property, e.g. dull-headedness shared in common by a cow and an inhabitant of the region under reference. The changed denotation, it may be noted, stands related in such cases also to the normal denotation through some relation, viz. the former's sharing some property of the latter.

Patañjali describes the third variety of transfer of meaning as a case of vicinity (*tatsāmipya*) between the normal denotation of a word and the change in denotation. The example he offers is not such that it requires us to offer an identity interpretation, since the words are not in the same case-ending like the words in *B*-1 and *B*-2. We shall explain only the first of the two examples he uses.

C-1

Gaṅgāyāṁ Ghoṣaḥ

Gaṅgā is the sacred river of the Hindus, which originates in the Himalayas and flows through the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Bengal and finally meets the Bay of Bengal. The Anglicized name of the river is the 'Ganges'. The fuller component *Gaṅgāyāṁ* means 'in the river Gaṅgā', the preposition 'in' corresponding to the suffix added to the root Gaṅgā.

Ghoṣa is a surname and has been used to stand for a definite individual who is the head of the family. Therefore, supplying the verb word 'lives' (*C*-1) can be rendered as:

The *Ghoṣa* family lives in the *Gaṅgā*.

But, since no family as we normally understand it can live in the flow of water called the Gaṅgā, this word *Gaṅgā* should be understood here as the bank of the river where a family can live constructing permanent structure which is so essential for settled living. This transfer of meaning from the normal denotation to the new denotation looks acceptable, only because the bank is the closest place in relation to the river.

Patañjali's other example is:

Kūpe Gargakūlam
Kūpe = In the well; *Gargakūlam* = The community of Garga

Patañjali has given us two examples under the last variety of cases involving transfer of meaning. The normal meaning of the concerned word under this variety is such that it is related by way of habitual association (*sahacaraṇa*) to the transferred meaning in which it has actually been used in such a context. Thus, if a particular Brāhmaṇa is in the habit of using a stick in his hand due to his old age, he may be referred to by the use of the word for stick, because, he is in the habit of using a stick.

D-1

Yaṣṭi praveśaya. . . .
Yaṣṭi = the stick; *praveśaya* = usher into

Hence the English equivalent of *D*-1

Usher the stick into. . . .

Evidently enough it is not a stick that is to be ushered into but the person holding a stick is the one who is to be ushered into. Hence the word *yaṣṭi* (or 'stick') has not been used here to stand for a 'stick' but for the person holding a stick in his hand. The route to such a case of transfer of meaning is then through the fact of habitual association. What has been said in respect of *D*-1 will apply also to:

D-2

Kuntān praveśaya. . . .
Usher (*praveśaya*) the spear-s (*kuntān*) into. . . . . .

Here the word *Kuntān* has perhaps been used to induce fear in the minds of children by referring to the owners of sharp weapons like spears with the help of the word for the spear.

III

Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya Approaches

Both Pāṇini and Patañjali might themselves have used other words involving transfer of meaning in contexts other than the ones noted by us. But the ones noted by us are the cases expressly admitted by them as cases involving transfer of meaning, and we have seen how Patañjali assimilates them under different varieties depending on the nature of relationship obtaining between the usual meaning of a word and the new referent of it. I presume that this sort of use of words can be utilized, on grounds of analogy, for stipulating that transfer of meaning can also be extended to sentences; and I would say that this encouraged the Mīmāṁsaka philosophers in offering the kind of interpretation they offer to descriptive sentences of the Vedas. The Vedas contain two types of sentences, the main category being imperative sentences or their equivalents enjoining on those who accept the Vedic authority the duty to be performed or the avoidance of a given course of action. The other type of Vedic sentences which also are very common seems to narrate incidents or assert facts about deities and other things mentioned in imperatives. Sentences of this category are often statements which are taken by the Mīmāṁsakas to be auxiliary to some imperative sentence or other. The descriptive statements of the Vedas are thus taken to have been sung or emphasized in praise or denunciation of the thing whose performance have been recommended or prohibited. The corrollary of such an interpretation seems to be that, even if we ascribe some sort of literal meaning to the descriptive Vedic statements, this meaning is not important at its face value and is not what serves the purpose at hand, namely, leading the agent through emotive persuasion to a prescribed course of action or to avoidance of some prohibited action.

The Mīmāṁsakas do not take sentential meaning to be necessarily the function of word meanings. Thus, treating a sentence in some given context as a combination of words the several meanings of which need not necessarily determine the meaning of the sentence, they can claim for such a sentence a meaning which we would not have been able to arrive at if sentential meaning were regarded as a function of word meanings. This view, they suggest, should not be taken necessarily to imply that the independent meaning of a sentence cannot normally be analysingly traced to word meanings. But, though there is thus a scope in the Mīmāṁsaka view for such an analysis, this cannot always be shown to be apt when in some typically difficult cases a constituent word, understood in its usual meaning or even taken to be a word involving transfer of meaning, fail to yield any acceptable sentential meaning. Thus, the sentence:

C-2

Gabhīrāyāṁ nadyāṁ Ghoṣaḥ

consists of the following three words:

(1) *Gabhīrāyāṁ* (in the deep), this is an adjective in relation to (2) below
(2) *nadyām* (in the river)
(3) *Ghoṣaḥ* (the Ghoṣa family)

The sentence is to be interpreted in the model of *C*-1 (*Gaṅgāyāṁ Ghoṣaḥ*) which we have considered earlier. We have seen that the word 'Gaṅgā' as occurring in *C*-1 is to be taken not in its usual meaning of the river called the Gaṅgā but in a changed meaning as standing for its bank. The word *nadyām* as occurring in *C*-2 should be similarly taken to stand not for a *river* which constitutes its usual meaning but for the river's *bank*. Thus, the use of the word is question involves transfer of meaning. But the difficulty that remains is with the adjective *gabhīrāyāṁ* (1) that has been used along with *nadyām* (2). If it were permissible to interpret *C*-2 as meaning:

The Ghoṣa family (lives) in the *bank* of
the deep (*gabhīrāyām*) *river*.

there would have been no great problem with the adjective word, for in that case it would have been taken in its normal meaning. But such an interpretation presupposes that the same word, the word *nadyām* here, can be understood both in its normal meaning (i.e. *river*) and also as standing for something (i.e. *bank*) that does not constitute its normal meaning. I would like to suppose that the Mīmāṁsakas would not support such a line of interpretation. They avoid such a contingency by holding that the hypothesis of transfer of meaning which we normally take to be applicable only to words has a wider scope of application, since it may be extended, if necessary, to sentential meaning as a whole. In other words, the sentential meaning understood here in respect of *C*-2 need not be taken either as the function of the meaning of the constituent words, no matter whether someone of them may be taken as involving transfer of meaning, or as that synoptic meaing capable of being analysingly traceable to meanings of constituent words, no matter whether someone of them is taken as involving transfer of meaning. On such an interpretation of the Mīmāṁsaka view, the meaning that we grasp first is the meaning of the combination of all words, i.e. of the sentence. In respect of *C*-2 the procedure starts with a consideration of the apparent meaning of *C*-2 as a whole. This, however, ends in failure because of the untenability of this apparent meaning, since the Ghoṣa family cannot live in the deep waters of the river as men are different from fish. Hence the acceptable sentential meaning of *C*-2 is a case of transfer of meaning involving the sentence as a whole, and on such an interpretation there is no need to show any sort of correlation between meanings of words and sentential meaning taken as a whole.

If the plausibility of the above interpretation is conceded, the Mīmāṁsakas, we suppose, may like it very much to admit cases of transfer of meaning involving a sentence as a whole in respect of the descriptive or narrative statements of the *Arthavāda* section of the Vedas. Let us consider in this connection the following Vedic sentence from the *Arthavāda* section (which follows after the injunction: *Indrāva svāhā*):

Indraḥ sahasrākṣaḥ
Indra = a Vedic deity
Sahasrākṣaḥ = one with a thousand eyes

The apparent meaning of the sentence is then:

(The deity) Indra is (a god) with
one thousand eyes.

The Mīmāṁsakas who do not believe in the existence of personal gods will not accept the above as the intended meaning of the sentence in question, the reason being that such a thousand-eyed Indra does not really exist, for deities, according to them, are in reality aptly and rightly pronounced sounds. Therefore, the given sentence should be understood as a sentence *in praise of* Indra a rite concerning him being involved here. We suppose that this change in meaning is not traceable to specific meanings of the constituent words of the concerned sentence. It is then a case of transfer of meaning from the apparent meaning of the sentence (the meaning which cannot be taken to be true) to some other sort of meaning of the sentence as a whole. On the hypothesis under consideration, the term *Indra* which is of the nature of sound stands for itself, and as this evidently has no eyes the referent of 'Indra' cannot be held to be identical with anything having thousand eyes. Perhaps the meaning of the other component *Sahasrākṣa* (the thousand-eyed) has to be understood differently involving what is called transfer of meaning. But, alas, this cannot be done in the Paṇinian or Patañjalian way, for no kind of relationship can be shown to obtain between the normal meaning of the thousand-eyed and the one that may be supposed here to fit in with the meaning of the other component of the sentence under consideration. Even if some such relationship may be imagined here, that will not certainly look natural. How then are we to understand the meaning of the sentence? One might suppose that such Vedic declarative statements have only a kind of emotive meaning inasmuch as it helps the agent in deciding in favour of the performance of the rite in question. But unless the agent takes the statement to be true, though in reality it may not be so, it is difficult to see how the statement may help the agent in taking his decision. If then the agent believes a statement to be true, he can do so by understanding its meaning as something capable of being true. It might perhaps be suggested that the emotive meaning attached to a declarative statement is independent of its cognitive meaning, and in this sense such emotive meaning is not the function of the meanings of constituent words. But, if emotive meaning is independent in such a way, such a meaning

attached to different declarative sentences should be the same in all cases; and the declarative statement (d_1) appended to an injunction (i_1) should be able to replace the declarative statement (d_2) appended to the injunction (i_2) and conversely. Let us consider the following declarative sentence (which is appended to the injunction (i_2) *Vāyavyāṁ śvetam ālabheta bhūtikāmaḥ*):

Vāyurvai khepiṣṭhā devatā (d_2)

If the sort of emotive meaning under reference could really be defended, we shall have to suppose that *Indraḥ sahasrākṣaḥ* (d_1) and may replace (d_2) and may be appended to (i_2) and (d_2) may be appended to *Indrāya svaha* (i_1). But the Vedas will not certainly permit this.

According to the followers of the Nyāya school who believe in the existence of personal gods, Indra who is normally taken to be the king (*Devarāja*) of gods is the referent of the word *Indra*, and he is believed, on the authority of the Vedic statement under reference, to be a god (perhaps the only god) with thousand eyes. The statement is thus believed to be true in its apparent literal meaning. What is important here is that the point at issue is not the theory of gods but the theory of meaning. The Nyāya philosophers would thus like to point out that the type of meaning the Mīmāṁsā philosophers offer to the Vedic sentences in question in conformity with their theory of gods cannot be approved from the point of view of *theory of meaning*.

A different follower of Mīmāṁsā philosophy may submit here that gods, according to Mīmāṁsā, are not sounds, even if they are aptly and rightly pronounced. He may put forward the hypothesis that words for gods do not refer to sounds but represent the natural forces. Thus, Indra stands for lightning, and Vāyu for air. Given this theory of gods, *Indra* understood as lightning can be said to be thousand-eyed if we interpret the term *Sahasraksaḥ* (the thousand-eyed) in some other way, say, as the source of light. In other words, this term involves transfer of meaning from the thousand-eyed to the source of light. Similarly, *Vāyu* in *Vāyurvai khepiṣṭhā devatā* will, on this hypothesis, be understood to represent the natural phenomenon of air, and the meaning of the word *khepiṣṭhā* which is 'giver of quick result' can fit marvellously well here if the word is understood as involving transfer of meaning to represent velocity, the most important feature of air.

The followers of Nyāya cannot raise serious objections against the revised Mīmāṁsā position from the point of view of theory of meaning; they do not, of course, support such a position as they are believers in personal gods. But their attitude, we have seen, will certainly be different towards the other kind of Mīmāṁsā position even from the point of view of theory of meaning. They would prefer to go to the extent, if necessary, of dismissing a word in a given sentence as a meaningless component in that context if its normal or transferred meaning does not fit in. But such a fact of a word's not fitting in would not be interpreted by them in favour of transfer of meaning of the

sentence as a whole. Thus, in C-2 (*Gabhīrāyāṁ nadyām Ghoṣaḥ*) the word *gabhīrāyāṁ* (in the deep ...), according to Gaṅgeśa's followers though not according to him, would be regarded as a meaningless sentence-constituent, since the noun word to which it has been tagged is understood through transfer of meaning as representing the bank (of the river). One might say that if the noun word *nadyām* (the root word of which is *nadī* = 'river') is understood not simply as the *bank*, which being land cannot be deep but as the bank of *the river*, then the river of which that bank is the bank can be understood as deep; and there would be no necessity of dismissing the adjective *gabhīrāyāṁ* as a meaningless constituent here. The Nyāya philosophers are ready to concede the possibility of the hearer's understanding, from only the noun word 'river' (i.e. *nadī* as contained in *nadyām*), of (1) the *bank*, or (2) the *bank of the river* or even perhaps, (3) the *bank of the deep river* depending on what the hearer claims to have actually understood. But, since (1) is a part of (2) and also of (3), the hearer's understanding in anyone of the three possible modes must be through transfer of meaning of the word 'river' (*nadī*) from its normal meaning *river* to *bank*. If more is understood as related to the bank, e.g. the bank being understood as the river's bank and not as the bank of, say, a lake, or as the deep river's bank and not as the shallow or dried-up river's bank, it would be wrong to suppose that such a richer understanding is the cumulative effect of the several acts of understanding of (*a*) the usual meaning of the noun word and (*b*) the transferred meaning of the noun word here; or of these two and (*c*) of depth as pertaining to (*a*) on the basis of the adjective word and the noun word. The same word, according to our construing of Nyāya, cannot be understood differently in a given context of its single use. The Nyāya philosopher wants to stick to the demands of discipline in the theory of meaning and would not allow over-permissiveness. Even where the hearer's understanding is in the mode *the deep river's bank*, the adjective word makes no contribution towards this composite meaning, though the hearer might have been influenced by this word in fixing or guessing the speaker's intention. But fixing or guessing the speaker's intention is not meaning.

Our construing of the Nyāya position may elicit adverse reactions from a section of the followers of Nyāya; for, according to a modest version, understanding the meaning of the phrase *gabhīrāyāṁ nadyāṁ* through transfer of meaning in respect of the noun word would be one not simply about the bank but about the river's bank—the former being (1) and the latter being (2) of the three possibilities noted in the preceding paragraph. And if (1) is rejected as a possibility and (2) is what we get through transfer of meaning, then, as the river is very much a constituent part of the synoptic content of my understanding, the adjective word can be said to have been understood in its usual meaning; and this usual meaning can be taken to have been understood in the sentential understanding of the hearer as related to a part of the transferred meaning, namely, to the river. On such an interpretation (which

is represented as the theory of *ekadeśānvaya*), the supporters of the moderate version of Nyāya would argue, we can show the usefulness of all the words, since what counts as the usual meaning of the adjective in question finds its way in some form in the understanding of the meaning of the phrase and, therefore, also in the understanding of the sentence as a whole. Our reply to the objection raised is as follows.

It would be wrong to suppose that in order to be a useful sentence-constituent, a word has to have meaning, that is, has to have a reference identified through some property. Though it is quite acceptable that to be meaningful is also to be useful, it cannot be said that to be useful is also to be meaningful—meaning being understood here in the sense just noted. Thus, the sentential connective and/*ca* (a *nipāta*) in

Saḥ dhanavān jñānavān ca
He is wealthy and wise

is very much useful but not meaningful in our sense of 'meaningful'. (If some-one holds that *ca*/and has some meaning and if he is bold enough to suggest that such a sentence-constituent may have meaning even in the sense under reference, our counter-example would then be prefixes called *upasarga* which, according to at least Gaṅgeśa, does not have meaning.) Furthermore, if the adjective *gabhīrāyāṁ* is treated as meaningful, then it should be so understood as related to the noun that the two are treated as co-referential terms. This follows from Nyāya's commitment to identity interpretation in respect of two name expressions used with the same case-ending. If this commitment thus stands, then as the noun word here is taken to refer to *the bank*, the referent of the adjective (= a deep thing) cannot be understood as identical with the referent of the noun word. We, therefore, conclude that the adjective in this context cannot be taken to be meaningful, though we do not deny that it may prove to be useful to the hearer in fixing the intention of the speaker.

Our argument, we hope, has been able to show that we can do without the theory of transfer of meaning in the realm of sentences, and its scope is restricted only to the level of words for enabling us to arrive at acceptable sentential meaning in relevant cases. We also accept the Pāṇinian and Patañ-jalian stipulation that, if we are to arrive at any sentential meaning involving transfer of meaning in respect of any sentence constituent, then this transfer from the usual meaning to the new meaning must conform to the rule that the two are related in some manner, and this is taken to be known to the hearer in question. In fact, in his *Sahacaraṇādisūtra* (*NS* 2.2.62), Gautama, the founder of the Nyāya school of philosophy, approvingly mentions all the four Patañjalian varieties of relationship involving the usual meaning and the transferred meaning, though he adds a few more varieties to Patañjali's list. The example he presents are from idiomatic speech, and the relation-

ship he shows as obtaining between the two concerned meanings does not appear to be unnatural. But Gautama's recognition of the fact that the rela-tionship between the usual meaning and transferred meaning need not be confined only to the four types admitted by Patañjali encouraged Gaṅgeśa after a gap of some 1200 years to apply the theory of transfer of meaning to certain trickly linguistic problems as well as to some vexed problems of auto-reference.

IV

Gaṅgeśa's Plan of Extension

Gaṅgeśa's plan of extension of the thesis of transfer of meaning includes among others two very important topics, viz. (*a*) the problem of meanings of verbal inflections and (*b*) that of compound words. For a better understanding of Gaṅgeśa's position, it would be advisable to discuss his basic attitude towards the general problem of transfer of meaning. This will be followed by two subsections on verbal inflections and on compound words. The last sub-section is by way of a short review of Gaṅgeśa's plan of extension.

(*a*) *Introductory*

According to Gautama and Vātsyāyana, the two founders of the Nyāya system of philosophy, the meaning of a sentence-constituent called a *pada* or a word is constituted by three elements, namely, the individual the word stands for, its (structural) form, and its universal. The Nyāya philosophers accept the Vaiśeṣika ontology, according to which not only substances but also qualities and actions are regarded as individuated entities in which appro-priate universals inhere. And, since (like substances) qualities and actions cannot be said to have any structural form, primary meaning of a word standing for such an entity, later philosophers of the school hold, must then be consti-tuted by the particular quality or action and its universal; and, if a third element has to be admitted at all, the relation of inherence as obtaining bet-ween the two may be regarded as such a third factor.

The more serious problem is, however, how to identify cases of such a primary sort of meaning which is called *śakti* in Sanskrit. Thus, when a word is found to have been used in more than one sense, should we treat such senses as equally independent and basic? In other words, should we treat such cases as ones involving homonyms? If it is a fact that people normally use a word in two or more meanings or senses and the children learn the different senses—the familiar example in Sanskrit being *Saindhavam ānaya* (Bring *saindhava*), when the word *saindhava* may stand for either mineral salt or a horse of a special kind, then the word is a homonym or a *nānārthaka* word—a word having different (*nānā*) meanings (*artha*). But if it is the case that people do not learn the meaning of a word as having different senses,

then, if the word happens to be used by a speaker to refer to a thing which does not fall within its normal meaning but which may be related to its normal meaning in some way, and if this is known to us, it will be a case of transfer of meaning. The problem arises, however, when we encounter cases of words which people normally use in different but related ways and the children also learn the meanings accordingly. Let us consider the example of colour words in Sanskrit.

It has been recognized by the grammarians of the Sanskrit language that colour words have some vagueness in their use inasmuch as a colour word may mean either a coloured thing or the colour itself the thing possesses. They have, however, offered linguistic criteria for determining whether in a given context a given colour word stands for a colour or for a coloured thing. Thus, when a colour word is used as an adjective qualifying a generic word for colour, the adjective colour word will certainly stand for that specific colour. Consider the following:

Nīlaṁ rūpaṁ bhāti
(The) blue (=*nīlam*) colour (=*rūpam*) is shining.

Here the colour word *nīlam* has been used in the neuter gender for preserving its agreement with the noun word *rūpam* which also is in the neuter gender. But if specific colour words are used independently, i.e. not as adjectives qualifying any generic word for colour, then such colour words, it has been stipulated by the grammarians, will be used in the masculine gender, e.g. in the sentence below:

Nīlaḥ na raktaḥ
Blue is distinct from red.

A problem arises in respect of use of a colour word in association with a word for a physical object where also, according to Sanskrit grammar, there should be agreement regarding number, case and gender between the two words of such a context, e.g. in the sentence below:

Utpalaṁ nīlam
The lotus is blue.

Since philosophers of our tradition offer an identity interpretation in such a case as was noted by us earlier, the colour word *nīlam* does not stand here for blue colour itself. It stands for the blue object instead. The important point to be noted here is that such a use of a colour word is not infrequent, and people use colour words in this way as well as for referring to colours themselves and the children learn such uses form their childhood. Should we then say that colour words behave like homonyms as they stand some-

times for colours and some other times for coloured objects? We cannot offer an affirmative answer to this question, since it goes against our common sense. The Nyāya philosophers tender the following interpretation for the cases under consideration.

The fundamental point the Nyāya philosophers emphasize is that two meanings of the same logical type cannot be said to be involved here. But, if two independent meanings are not involved here, which one of the two, viz. the colour and the coloured object, is to be regarded as primary? Usage by elders and learning by children are neutral in respect of both, since, if we were to depend on these factors, they would equally support both the alternatives. But, as this would not be a palatable situation and as we shall have to decide in favour of a single alternative, we shall have to offer some justification here. The Nyāya philosophers follow a general methodological criterion to the effect that other things remaining equal of the two competing alternatives the one that is consistent with the principle of parsimony is to be preferred. Now, if we accept the alternative that a specific colour word, say, 'blue' (*nīlam*) stands for the coloured object, i.e. the blue object, then such an object can be said to constitute the meaning of the word in virtue of possessing blue colour. But, as there can be different shades of blue colour, and if we accept the Vaiśeṣika ontology which stipulates that like substances having (blue) colour the colour itself is a particular, the colour that belongs to the blue object is never numerically the same for any two blue objects. If we thus accept that the blue objects constitute the normal meaning of the word 'blue' (*nīlam*), then the property (the possession of which would justify our applying the word to a substratum of such a property) would be too many in number. But let us consider the other hypothesis, according to which the different blue colours constitute the meaning of the word 'blue'. If these colours are what constitute the meaning of the word, they can be so regarded because of the fact that these instances of blue colour all possess the universal of being a blue colour. On this hypothesis then, we achieve some sort of economy in respect of the feature, the possession of which would justify our using the word for things that possess that feature. This hypothesis is then more in keeping with the principle of parsimony. If, thus, colours are taken to constitute the normal meaning of colour words and if coloured objects cannot be regarded as constitutive of such a meaning, then, when colour words are actually used for coloured objects, we use these words in that way through a sort of transfer from the normal meaning to the new reference; and this we could do, because colours inhere in those objects.

(*b*) *Verbal Inflections*

Ākhyāta inflections are special suffixes that are added to the verb-root to make it eligible for use as a finite verb constituent in a sentence. Unless the verb-root takes up those suffixes it would not be idiomatic and grammatical to

use it as a finite verb in a sentence. This is true not only of the inflectional language like Sanskrit but also, to some extent, of the language I am writing in now. Thus, consider the sentence:

I am writing (an article in the English language).

The root verb here is 'to write' which does not find a place as it is in the sentence we are considering. The finite verb 'am writing' is here a combination of two-constituents, the first one ('am') of which stands for time as well as for number and person of the referent of the nominative word. The second constituent is a transformation of the root verb, and it contains marks of agreement with the preceding constituent. Hence the grammatically idiomatic finite verb component in its totality contains the root verb and certain verbal marks. Let us now consider the following Sanskrit sentence:

Saḥ vidyālayaṁ gacchati
He is going to school
He (*saḥ*) is going (*gacchati*) (to) school (*vidyālayam*).

The finite verb *gacchati* (which is a transitive verb) is a transformation of the root verb *gam* ('to go') when it takes up the suffix *ti*. Since the root *gam* can take up other suffixes in the context of other sentences, the meaning of the finite verb must be a function of the meaning of the root which will be constant and the meaning of the suffix it takes up in a specific case of its use. In the case of the sentence being considered by us now, the suffix *ti* indicates a variety of things, e.g. the time of the performance of the action indicated by the root verb, the number of the person performing the action, the relationship between such a person and the speaker of the sentence—the relationship which is captured by the concept of *puruṣa* or personhood of the discipline called grammar. But the most important feature of the finite verb, according to the philosophers of the grammatical school of our country, is that the finite verb embodies the concept of agency, and it is construed as an expression that stands for the voluntary agent performing the action. The finite verb is the most dominating constituent of the sentence; the other constituents are assigned only an auxiliary role in the sentence inasmuch as their utility lies in their agreement and relationship with the most dominating constituent of the finite verb of the sentence. The meaning of the sentence under consideration, according to this view, is that the agent performing the act of going to school is identical with the referent of the word *Saḥ* ('He') and not that the latter is identical with the former, their logical equivalence notwithstanding. The followers of Nyāya do not agree with the grammarians on this issue of the dominating element. According to them, the question of such an element has to be decided after taking into consideration all types of sentence. Since all (Sanskrit) sentences do not contain the finite verb, it should

not be regarded as the most important or dominating element of the sentence. On the contrary, the followers of Nyāya argue, all sentences contain at least one name word in the first case-ending—sentences with finite verbs being no exception, since in paradigm cases where sentences are in the active voice the nominative of the finite verb must be a name word in the first case-ending.

Even if the foregoing argument is granted, there is no bar to holding that the finite verb be understood referentially and verbal suffixes be interpreted as standing for agents performing some action or other. The followers of Nyāya hold that, since the finite verb is not the dominating constituent of the sentence, there is no necessity in treating it referentially for taking its referent as identical with the referent of the nominative. Furthermore, had it been a name expression, its agreement with nominative would have entailed identity interpretation of the sentence and referential interpretation of the same order for the finite verb. Such an entailment lacking, the followers of Nyāya take some freedom in the matter of offering interpretation to the verbal suffixes that transform the root verb into a finite verb. They utilize the principle of parsimony in the determination of meaning of verbal suffixes in question in the manner of determining the meaning of specific colour words. It may be recalled that such words are taken to stand basically for colours and not for coloured objects. Similarly, if parsimony so demands, the meaning of the type of verbal suffixes called '*ti* and others' (*tingantavibhakti*) should not be the agent but should be identified with that factor which makes an agent a free agent. If the verbal suffixes are taken to stand for the agents, the agents will constitute the meaning of the suffixes in question because of the fact that they possess volition which makes them agents. But volition is something private and subjective, and my volition is not your volition. Hence this internal property of volition being innumerable in number, what fixes the reference of the suffix is numerically many, though these many states are all states of volition. Alternatively, however, these states of volition may themselves be taken to be what the suffixes stand for, and on this alternative the property, the possession of which makes the volitional states the meaning of the suffixes in question, is the single property of being a state of volition, i.e. the universal of volitionhood. Therefore, compared to the former hypothesis the latter one achieves economy in respect of the reference-fixing property inasmuch as, while on the first view it is innumerable in number, such a property is only one on the second view.

Let us at this point note down the points of similarity and contrast between specific colour words and the verbal suffixes in question. Specific colour words are actually used by people sometimes for specific colours and sometimes for coloured objects. Parsimony argument favours the view that colours constitute the primary meaning of colour words, and when colour words are actually used for coloured objects they come to be so designated through transfer of meaning. So far as verbal suffixes in question are concerned, the situation is slightly different, since it is not the case that people

actually use them sometimes for agents and sometimes for volition. These are merely two logical possibilities in the sense that, if agents are taken to constitute the meaning of the suffixes, the sentence containing a finite verb has to be offered identity interpretation; while, if it is volition which is to be taken to constitute meaning, then such a sentence has to be offered predicative interpretation, transfer of meaning not figuring in the situation in any way. Since usage is not the deciding factor here and as each one of identity and predicative interpretations can be shown here to be equally plausible, for a decision parsimony principle may thus be legitimately employed in fixing the meaning of the sentence-constituents under reference. The implication of this parsimony argument, however, is that on this hypothesis we shall have to offer only the predicative interpretation. But such an implication would have been unacceptable, if the sentence-constituent in question were a name expression; for the rule goes like this: in the realm of understanding ensuing upon hearing a sentence, between the referents of two name expressions understanding must be by way of identity. That is why, though a colour word stands for a colour, we are to treat it as designating the coloured object through transfer of meaning in case the other concerned word stands for a physical object with which the referent in question is to be taken as identical.

How then does transfer of meaning come in when such identity interpretation is inapplicable to verbal inflections as contained in a finite verb? The following sentences are some of the typical examples of transfer of meaning involving verbal inflections:

(*a*) *Ratho gacchati*
The chariot is going (moving).
(*b*) *Ghato nasyati*
The pitcher is disintegrating (getting broken into pieces).
(*c*) *Saḥ jānāti*
He is knowing (knows).

In all the three Sanskrit sentences the finite verbs occupy the last position and the verb-roots and suffixes are as follows:

(*a*) (*Ratho*) *gacchati* = *gam*+*ti*
gam = to go (to move)
ti = verbal inflection for present tense, third person and singular number
(*b*) (*Ghaṭo*) *naśyati* = *naś* + *ti*
naś = to disintegrate
ti = as in (*a*) above
(*c*) (*Saḥ*) *jānāti* = *jñā* + *ti*
jña = to know
ti = as in (*a*) above

The three sentences above show the same verbal inflection *ting*. But we can introduce other sentences with the same and/ or other verb-roots but with other verbal inflections differring in number, mood, person and tense. The important point, however, is that, though all such inflections sometimes share something in common or differ among themselves in respect of the features noted in the earlier sentences, they all share a negative affinity. And this affinity consists in their difference from name words and also from verb-roots. Now, verb-roots, in paradigm cases, stand for some action; that is why they are called *krīyāpada* [action (*krīyā*) words (*pada*)] in Sanskrit]. If we remember what was arrived at earlier in the preceding paragraphs of the subsection, the verbal inflection in paradigm cases stand for the agent's volition, for no other sentence-constituent stands for it; and a sentence containing a finite verb of the type under consideration does certainly indicate that the action reported in the sentence is a voluntary action. But, though this is true of paradigm cases, this does not hold good of the verbal inflection as contained in the finite verb component of the sentences (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*). Thus, the nominative word in (*a*), viz. *Ratho* (the chariot) and this in (*b*), viz. *Ghato* (the pitcher) both stand for inanimate objects to whom we cannot surely ascribe a state of volition. What meaning, in addition to those relating to number, mood, person and tense if these are to be taken as associated with verbal inflection, are we to postulate in respect of the verbal inflection in question? In respect of the inflection in (*a*), it must be something that is present in the chariot, say, the processes (*vyāpāra*) conducive to its movement. So far as the same in (*b*) is concerned, it must be something present in the pitcher. Since the verb word stands for destruction (disintegration) which is a kind of non-being, the counter-positive of this is what the nominative of the sentence stands for. Therefore, what is indicated by the inflection and what we ascribe to the referent of the nominative in question is this fact of being a counter-positive under reference. In respect of the inflection in (*c*), the problem is that the referent of the nominative is a person who is capable of having volition. But, since the verb *jñā* (to know) does not stand for any act (not even a mental act) according to the Nyāya, what is ascribed to it is not volition. Perhaps, the subjecthood of the state of knowledge in question is indicated by the inflection and is what is actually ascribed here. Thus, we see that the verbal inflection in (*a*), (*b*) and (*c*) stand for three things, all different from volition which constitutes the normal meaning of the similar inflection in paradigm sentences of the right sort. These, then, clearly afford examples of transfer of meaning involving the verbal inflection in question.

(*c*) *Compound Words*

A compound word is so called, because it contains more than one word. One might, however, say that a compound word is not only a combination of words but is itself a word. Thus, the grammarians of our country hold that a

compound word is itself a word, though like a sentence it is a combination of words. They point out that such a compound linguistically behaves like a word, because it takes upon itself non-verbal suffixes before being used as a sentence-constituent. (In the jargon of Sanskrit grammar, a compound word behaves like a *prātipadika* inasmuch as a *subanta* suffix has to be added to it before the compound could find a place in a sentence.) There are many rules and modes of compounding words, and there are cases of compound words whose referents are certainly different from the those of the component words forming the compounds. Thus, the referent of a compound belonging to the type called *Bahuvrīhi* is necessarily such that it does not in any way coincide with the referent of any of the components of such a compound. Since it is here presupposed that meaning includes the referent, though it may have additional elements, one may suppose that the meaning of such a compound is not the function of the meanings of its components. Taking such cases as basic, the grammarians hold that compound words have independent meaning which is not to be treated as the function of the meanings of the component words. (In the nomenclature of Sanskrit grammar, the *samāsa* [compound word] is a *pada* [word] having *rudyartha—ruḍi* [= conventional—not etymological]+*artha* [meaning].)

The views of the grammarians on the nature and meaning of compound words have been opposed by Gaṅgeśa, and, according to him, a compound word, notwithstanding its appearance as a word, should not be treated as a word; and its meaning is very much the function of the meanings of the component words. Towards the end of his great work *Tattvacintāmaṇi* he has presented us the results of his research on these issues, and his programme was to offer solutions to all relevant tricky problems concerning compound words. Because of difficulties of rendering the rules, modes and functioning of the various types of compound words in Sanskrit, I shall present below in generalities my construction of his position explaining towards the end how transfer of meaning is relevant in determining the meanings of compound words with only two illustrations. So far as the English language is concerned, compound words are not much in use compared to Sanskrit. Therefore, if we present the varied examples Gaṅgeśa and his followers have discussed, these will not only be uninteresting but also be unintelligible to the non-Indian audience.

Philosophy, like other branches of knowledge, is interlinked with disciplines that come close to it, and it is no wonder that concerning meaning philosophy is greatly dependent on the discipline called grammar or linguistics. In fact, what we take to be meaningful is only this or that linguistic entity. In spite of its dependence on linguistics, philosophy has to preserve autonomy and independence even in the realm of investigation into the nature of meaning, if the analysis that seems to be philosophically tenable appears to be overthrown by linguistic considerations. Thus, the supporters of Nyāya theory would argue that notwithstanding its appearance as a word a compound

word, philosophically speaking, ought not to be regarded as a word; it should rather be treated as a sentence. It is, ineded, true that like other sentence-constituents it linguistically behaves like a word. But it is equally true that, at the semantic level when we explicate the meaning of a compound word, what corresponds to a compound word is a phrase or a clause which, given some presuppositions, may be treated as a sentence. In fact, even in the terminology of Sanskrit grammar, the expression that explicates the meaning of a compound word is called a *vyāsa/vigraga-vākya* or a sentence (*vākya*) disjoining (*vigraha*) the components of a compound. Keeping this in mind and treating a compound word as something that corresponds to such an explicating expression, we can legitimately say that in spite of its appearance a compound word is in essence not a word but a sentence or at least something that resembles more a sentence than a word in respect of its fundamental semantic features. The first of the two points of the grammarians can thus be countered, and regarding their second point a supporter of Gaṅgeśa can put forward the following points.

We have recorded earlier that, according to the Nyāya, the meaning of a sentence is the function of the meanings of the sentence-constituents. Therefore, if a compound word is to be treated as a kind of sentence, then its meaning cannot be conventional meaning which, by definition, does not correspond to the meanings of its components. The grammarian's view that the meaning of a compound word is conventional meaning (*ruḍyartha*) can be understood better, if we consider a few cases of words which are recognized by both the grammarians and the Nyāya philosophers as having such a meaning. There is a view about name words in Sanskrit according to which a name is basically a derivation from a root verb and appropriate verbal suffixes that can transform a root verb into a noun or its equivalent. Once such an expression is obtained or if we allow that there may moreover be intrinsic name expressions, there is scope for obtaining further name expressions. Thus, 'Pārtha' is a derivative from the name expression 'Pṛthā' and a non-verbal suffix, and the resulting derivative stands for a son of Pṛthā. Pṛthā was the mother of the great heroes of the Sanskrit epic the *Mahābhārata*, and they can all be referred to as Pārtha, though normally it is only Arjuna who is so referred and not any of his other brothers, namely, Yudhiṣṭhira and Bhīma. Similarly, the word *paṅkaja* is a derivative from *paṅka* (mud) and *ja* (grown from) and its etymology authorizes one to apply the derivative to any mud-grown plant or flower. Thus, both lotus and lily can be equally called *paṅkaja*; but people usually apply the word only to a lotus. When the etymological meaning is thus arbitrarily restricted, the word would be regarded as one having conventional meaning. There are many words which behave like homonyms and are used in some cases in their etymological meaning and in others in conventional meaning that has nothing to do with the etymological meaning. Thus, when the word *udbhid* is used to denote a special type of Vedic rite and the word *maṇḍapa* is used to stand for a pandal-

like structure, such meanings have nothing to do with their etymological meaning. In such cases, the words are taken to have conventional meaning, although these words may also be used in their etymological meaning. Now, the question is what type of meaning we should ascribe to compound words.

So far as non-compound words are concerned, we notice a restriction which is missing is the realm of compound words. The number of verb-roots and that of the usual name-yielding verbal suffixes are limited. Therefore, the words that are derivatives from such roots are not too many. And, even if there are words which are intrinsic name expressions or if they have a verbal origin at least at a later point of time when people might have forgotten their verbal origin, the entries belonging to the vocabulary must not be such that a native speaker would not be able to master them and to have knowledge about their meaning. If such knowledge is missing, a hearer would not be able to understand the meaning of a sentence containing an unknown word. We can thus presuppose that we do have previous acquaintance with the words mostly in use, and this enables us to construe the meaning of the sentences containing known words. But we often encounter new compound words, and we can easily understand their meaning if we know the meaning of the component words. For illustrative purposes, we shall try the following upon our non-Indian readers:

(1) *Labaṇa* = saline; *ambu* = water
raśi = huge deposit
Labaṇa-ambu-raśi = ?
(2) *Āyas* = steel; *cakra* = wheel;
nibha = like
Āyas-cakra-nibha = ?

I hope that, though I have not given the meaning of the two compound words, the readers will be able rightly to guess their meaning. These two words occur in the first verse of Canto XIII of *Raghuvaṁśam* of the great Sanskrit poet Kālidāsa:

Dūrād-ayaścakranibhasya (2) *tanvī-tamālatālivanarājinīlā/*
Ābhāti belā labaṇāmburaśe (1) *rdhārānibadheva kalaṅkarekhā*

I remember that we had no difficulty during our college days in construing the meaning of the verse, though we encountered these words for the first time in our life in this verse only. Consider again

(3) *Sāgar* = sea; *jal* = water
Sāgarjal = ?

We believe our non-Indian readers know the answer to the question, and every Bengali also can rightly guess the meaning of the compound even if he

finds it for the first time, as I perhaps did, in the beginning line of Rabindranath Tagore's beautiful poem 'Sāgarikā' : *Sāgarjale* (3) *sinān kari sajal elochule/bashiyāchile upal upakūle*

Our argument can then be stated this way. If an expression has to have conventional meaning, then we shall not be able to construe the meaning of the sentence containing such an expression, if this conventional meaning were not previously known to us. But, though we had no previous acquaintance with a compound word we can construe the meaning of the sentence containing it e.g. in the case of the sentences presented above provided we already known the meanings of the components. This semantic argument then lends support to the hypothesis that compound words are sentences, and the meaning of compound word is the function of the meanings of its components. A note of clarification would perhaps be in order here regarding the nature of sentencehood that we attribute to compound words. There is a sense, according to which a sentence expresses a complete thought. A compound word by itself does not express a complete thought, and is not thus a sentence in this sense. It is a sentence in the sense that an understanding of its meaning involves grasping a relationship between meanings of its components. So far as a non-compound word is concerned, our understanding of its meaning includes awareness (*i*) of the referent designated by it, (*ii*) of the attribute the possession of which will qualify a thing as the designation of the word, and (*iii*) of the fact that this attribute belongs to this referent. Something more than this is involved in the understanding of the meaning of a compound word, or such a process must be repeated at least twice and then a separate relationship must be understood as obtaining between the referents of the components of the compound. An understanding of such a type is very much essential for understanding the meaning of a complete sentence. This is not only necessary but would have been sufficient for giving the title of sentencehood to a compound word, if it were not functionally auxiliary to some co-constituent of a bigger sentence of which it is a part. At the level of thinking, the thought involved in the understanding of its meaning is tied to a wider mode of thought and thus not an unrelated and independent act of thought. It is thus understandable why the expression verbalizes a complete thought. We would, however, prefer to state it thus: a compound word surely expresses a thought, though it does not set forth an independent act of thought.

If a finite verb is a member of a sequence, the sequence is a sentence, and this is admitted to be so in Sanskrit and many other languages. But in Sanskrit sentencehood will be accorded to a sequence that does not contain any finite verb but includes name expressions taking upon them appropriate nonverbal suffixes called *subantavibhakti*, no matter whether the name expressions are in the same or different case-endings. We have explained the presuppositions behind such a view with appropriate illustrations in the first two sections of our paper. The acceptability of the principle of identity interpretation has

been shown therein by stipulating that a sequence lacking a finite verb but containing two or more name expressions in the same case-ending (and in respect of such an independent sequence such a case-ending will have to be the first case-ending) will have to be accorded identity interpretation. We shall now restate this condition slightly differently. If a sequence lacks a finite verb and contains name expressions not used with different case-endings (and this should take care of name expressions used in a sequence without any case-endings), the sequence will attract identity interpretation. Since a compound word does not contain any finite verb or components with case-endings, it will then attract identity interpretation. Gaṅgeśa undertook the programme of demonstrating the acceptability of the condition in question with reference to different types of compound words admitted in Sanskrit grammar. But he could do it by utilizing wherever necessary the hypothesis of transfer of meaning, and we shall illustrate only two such cases.

The first of the two examples is a compound word of the variety called *Tatpuruṣa-samāsa*, while the second belongs to the variety called *Bahuvrīhi-samāsa*. The first one is

CW-1

Rājapuruṣa

Rāja = King and *puruṣa* = man

while the second one is

CW-2

Citragu

Citra = brindled (spotted) and *Gu* = cow

Rājapuruṣa stands for king's men, while *Citragu* stands for neither of the referents of its components as the compound is a *Bahuvrīhi* one where this shall necessarily be the case. If *Citragu* were a compound of the type called *Karmadhāraya-samāsa*, it would have stood for a brindled or spotted cow. But taken as a *Bahuvrīhi* compound it stands for the owner of a brindled cow. In fact, one of Kṛṣṇa's family was named *Citragu*, perhaps because a brindled cow is a rarity and he had one, or others wished that he would become the owner of a brindled cow.

We shall now explain how transfer of meaning becomes relevant to the construing of the meaning of the compound words. So far as *CW*-1 is concerned, it attracts identity interpretation, according to the condition laid down in the earlier paragraph. Therefore, the referent of the first component (*Rāja* = King) has to be understood as identical with referent of the second component *puruṣa* = man, and here it is understood that this referent is different from the *king*. Hence such is the case here that they are not identical; and the way out is not to treat someone of the two components in its normal meaning. Since the compound does not stand for the *king*, the first component should not be taken in its usual meaning; therefore, the component should be interpreted through transfer of meaning to stand for one related to the *king* (i.e. for one in the employment of the *king*), if what it stands for is to be taken as identical with the referent of the other component.

So far as *CW*-2 is concerned, there are considerable difficulties about its interpretation. We have noted earlier that this compound belongs to the variety called *Bahuvrīhi*, and in respect of such a compound neither the referent of its first component nor the referent of its second component coincides with the referent of the compound. Hence, although otherwise *CW*-2 may qualify to attract identity interpretation, it would not lead to an acceptable construing of the meaning of the compound which, we have noted, stands not for a brindled (*citra*) cow (*gu*) but for the owner of such a cow. Let us recall at this point our earlier discussions about the two possible lines of interpretation of *C*-2 (*Gabhīrāyāṁ nadyāṁ Ghoṣaḥ*) regarding the meaning and/or usefulness of the adjective word *Gabhīra* (Deep) when the noun word *nadī* (river) with which the adjective word is associated is taken to stand for the bank. Since the Ghoṣa family cannot be said to have built its house upon the flowing volume of water which constitutes the normal meaning of the noun word here, the noun is to be taken to stand for the bank (of the river). But as the bank cannot be deep, according to one interpretation, the noun word stands for the river's bank (and not simply for the bank) through transfer of meaning. On the model of such an interpretation, the last component *gu* of the compound word *Citragu* shall have to be taken to stand through transfer of meaning for the owner of a cow. Once this is permitted, by taking the first component *Citra* (brindled) as referring to a brindled animal we can invoke the principle of identity interpretation for treating the thing the referent of the second component owns as identical with something brindled, and thus the compound word can yield a sort of sentential understanding about identity as obtaining between the referent of the first component and a thing (i.e. the cow) to which the contextual referent (i.e. the owner) of the second component appears to be related. In fact, Gaṅgeśa himself has offered such an interpretation to *C*-2. According to him, the adjective *Gabhīra* and the noun *nadī* are taken in their normal meaning as representing a deep river by treating the two as co-referential terms. Then, upon finding that it is difficult to construe the meaning of the sentence by taking *nadī* in its normal meaning only, transfer of meaning is taken recourse to. This will be applied to *Citragu* also. But such a line of interpretation permits taking a word in its normal meaning and also in transferred meaning. It may be recalled here that some followers of Nyāya do not consider it permissible to offer this sort of construing of sentential understanding (called *ekadeśānvaya* in the Nyāya literature). For such a group of the followers of Nyāya, the last component alone should be taken as sufficient to give rise to the idea of the owner of a brindled cow, not through the efficacy of the component's normal meaning but through transfer of meaning.

(d) A Short Review

I would like to undertake here a short review of Gaṅgeśa's strategy and to assess the consequences of this review for the acceptability or otherwise of the general hypothesis of transfer of meaning. Let us endorse Gaṅgeśa's arguments for the position that it is the agent's volition and not the agent himself that constitutes the meaning of a verbal inflection, as well as for the view that the compound word is not a word but is to be treated as a sort of sentence. It is conceivable that one may accept these negative points but may not endorse the positive solutions Gaṅgeśa offers to some of the tricky problems in the field by extending the hypothesis of transfer of meaning.

We have already presented a few cases of finite verbs the roots of which do not indicate any action on the part of the referents of the nominatives. It was, therefore, argued that the verbal inflection that transforms the root verbs into finite verbs in such cases cannot here mean any act of volition. We have also considered the Sanskrit equivalents of the finite verbs in:

(1) The chariot *is moving*.
(2) The pitcher *is* disintegrating
(3) He *knows* ....

and have seen that the Sanskrit verbal inflection *ti* is involved in all these cases. Though in paradigm cases this inflection or any of its kind may stand for volition, this cannot be the case here; for the referents of the nominative in (1) and (2) are incapable of volition, while in (3) the root verb does not stand for any action and thus there is no scope for volition here also. It is generally accepted that (*a*) the verbal inflection involved in (1) stands for certain processes conducive to the action indicated by the root verb, and (*b*) that involved in (2) means the fact of being a counter-positive (*pratiyogin*) of the non-existence reported by the concerned root verb, and (*c*) that involved in (3) means the property of being the subject of the cognitive state indicated by its root verb. It has been proposed by Gaṅgeśa and his followers that, as the normal meaning or a verbal inflection like *ti* or any of its kind is constituted by volition and as the instances of the smae in (1), (2) and (3) do not have this meaning, these instances here mean, through transfer of meaning, what they actually stand for in such cases. We have seen that the referent of a sentence-constituent that we arrive at through normal meaning and that we propose to arrive at through transfer of meaning must stand related preferably through some sort of relation enlisted by Patañjali and others including Gautama, and this fact of being so related should also be known to the unsophisticated hearer. Can we, the sophisticated intellectuals, really specify the kind of relation that can be imagined to obtain between volition on the one hand and each of the three distinct things that we propose to accept as the transferred meaning of the concerned verbal inflection in (1), (2) and (3)? And, if it is hard for us to specify this, it is surely too much to claim that the unsophisticated hearer has the ability to do so rightly. It is, indeed, true that the things of the universe are related in infinite ways either directly or indirectly. But being related is not enough here, the fact of being so related must also be known to arrive at the transferred meaning. What then is the way out here? We would like to propose that, as every member of the linguistic community can naturally understand what the verbal inflection in the concerned cases does actually stand for in each instance of its use and as these are actually different in different types of cases of its use, the verbal inflection should be accorded the status that we attribute to a name word regarded as a homonym. If we thus treat the concerned verbal inflection as a homonym, it would not be necessary to invoke here the hypothesis of transfer of meaning.

Let us now shift our attention to Gaṅgeśa's treatment of compound words allegedly involving transfer of meaning. We repeat again that we accept Gaṅgeśa's negative thesis that compound words are not really words having conventional meaning but are, in fact, sentences of a sort capable of generating understanding involving relationship. We have explained how, in the Nyāya view, the hypothesis of transfer of meaning becomes relevant in construing the meaning of some of the compound words, and we have illustrated this with reference to *Rājapuruṣa* and *Citragu*. The critical points that we would like to make here are quite general. But we would do so with reference to these very two compound words, and we propose to take up the compound *Citragu* first.

When we have attributed sentencehood to a compound word we have stipulated that the thought being expressed by a sentence-like compound word is not a complete or independent thought but a thought which forms a part of a complex thought. It is natural to presuppose here that as a compound word, like a sentence, is a combination of words, the thought expressed by a compound must, like the thought expressed by a full-fledged sentence, be about two things appearing related to each other in a given way. In the case of the thought expressed by an ordinary sentence, the terms of the relationship must be presented to us by the separate sentence-constituents whose combination is the sentence here. Extending the analogy to sentence-like compound words we should hold that the act of thought represented by a compound word must be about a relationship, the terms of which should be presented to us by the separate words that make up the compound. If this stipulation is acceptable, it would be very difficult to accord sentencehood to the compound word *Citragu*, at least on the version of it that has been defended, for the thought taken to be represented by the compound is treated to have been represented by the last component alone.

On this interpretation, the thought involved in 'the owner of a brindled cow' is the gift of the component *gu*, the other component *citra* contributing nothing towards the thought. This awkward situation can be avoided by

accepting the hypothesis of partial relationship (*ekadeśānvaya*) as obtaining between the one having the property of being brindled represented by the first component *citra* and *cow* which forms only a part of *the owner of a cow* that we arrive at through transfer of meaning by the last component *gu* of the compound. But we have earlier noted the difficulties of such a view, the foremost being that the principle of identity interpretation which must be observed in respect of compound words has to be given up here inasmuch as the referent of the last component, i.e. *the owner of the cow* cannot himself be taken as brindled. It might, of course, be suggested that, if we allow that we can arrive at *the owner of the brindled cow* through transfer of meaning of the last component, an act of thought about a relationship can be shown to be involved here even on the interpretation that the first component does not contribute its share towards the meaning of the compound. One need not thus bother whether this thought has been represented by a single component or by a combination of such components. But such a view implies that the meaning of a compound word is not the function of the meanings of the components—the compound then having only a conventional meaning. But this implication looks more close to the views of the grammarians which were rejected earlier.

We may now shift our attention to the other compound word *Rājapuruṣa*. It was argued earlier that the compound attracts identity interpretation. The principle of identity interpretation was suitably modified to make it applicable to this and similar other cases, and regarding this principle and its application we propose to make the following point. In the first section of the paper, it has been argued that, in the context of a hearer's sentential understanding ensuing upon hearing a sentence (or of a part thereof) containing two name expressions used in the same case-ending, the sentential understanding must be taken to be about identity between the referents of the two name expressions. We are not challenging this principle of identity interpretation here. But let us ask the question whether any arbitrary discrete concatenation of name expressions not used with any case-endings will attract the principle of identity interpretation, and we suppose that the answer will evidently be in the negative. If, thus, such a concatenation does not attract identity interpretation which a combination of name expressions in the same case-ending does and in different case-endings never does so, we shall have to explain these facts by holding that use of the same case-ending is responsible for attracting the principle. The principle was modified to suit the compound *Rājapuruṣa* by inserting a negative clause thus: if two name expressions are such that they are not used in different case-endings, then the combination will attract the principle of identity interpretation. But the difficulty with this negative formulation is that it will make the principle applicable not only to any arbitrary concatenation of name expressions without case-endings but also to compounds like *Citragu* and other similar ones. Such consequences are clearly unwelcome. How to offer a satisfactory explanation?

We would like to propose that, so far as meanings of compound words are concerned, the members of a linguistic community who can rightly use such words or can correctly guess the meanings of these when used by others must be credited not only with the knowledge of meanings of components of the compounds but also of the ways of how such compounds are formed. Unless this familiarity is presupposed a Gaṅgeśite also cannot explain: (*a*) why in the case of a compound like *Rājapuruṣa* the first component is to be taken as one in the king's employment and then such a referent is to be taken as identical with the referent of the other component; (*b*) why identity between the referents of the components of *Citragu* cannot be said to capture the meaning of this compound; and (*c*) why identity interpretation is to be offered in respect of nīlotpalam. Our suggestion then is this: we arrive at the meaning of the compound words by putting before our mind the explicating sentence showing the component words of the compound in disjunction but with necessary case-endings. In our opinion, compound words are abbreviations for the corresponding explicating sentences, their difference being that the explicating sentence shows with perspicacity by the use of appropriate case-endings the relationship that should figure in the understanding of the meaning of the compound. But one might say that in treating a compound word as essentially of the nature of its corresponding explicating sentence we would be going against the law of parsimony by advocating that appropriate non-verbal suffixes representing the necessary case-endings be at least mentally introduced (*vibhakti-smṛti*). Our humble reply is that, since we cannot aptly formulate the principle of identity interpretation for covering compound words by ensuring its applicability to cases where it should be applied and also by ensuring its non-applicability to cases where it should not be applied, the compound words taken by themselves and completely independently of the corresponding explicating sentences are only dumb unmeaning marks and not any meaningful symbols. Therefore, for treating the compound words as meaningful we are to treat them only as abbreviated sentences. If our point of view is accepted, the compound words under reference should be understood in the following way:

(1) *Rājapuruṣa* = *Rājño* (King's) *puruṣa* (men)
(2) *Citragu* = *Citra* (Brindled) *gau* (cow)
yasya (one whose), i.e.
'The one whose cow is brindled'
(3) *Nīlotpalam* = *Nīlam* (Blue) *utpalam* (lotus)

It should be noticed that the explicating sentence in (1) does not contain two name expressions in the same case-endings and thus has no scope for identity interpretation; that in (2) it contains as parts two name expressions in the same-case-ending, while in (3) it contains only two such expressions in the same case-ending. Thus both of them in (2) and (3) merit an appropriate

application of the principle of identity interpretation. Understood this way there is no scope or need, as Gaṅgeśa would admit, for invoking the hypothesis of transfer of meaning in determining the meanings of compound words. Nor is there any necessity of a twisted formulation of the principle of identity interpretation for its application to compound words. The upshot of our argument in criticism of Gaṅgeśa's plan of extension of transferred of meaning to verbal inflections and compound words is that the hypothesis of transfer of meaning is not to be necessarily tagged to the problem of construing of meaning of the linguistic entities under reference. The argument aims to show that the hypothesis will not command greater acceptability or lose all of its intrinsic merit with the success or failure of Gaṅgeśa's said plan of extension. Gaṅgeśa has also utilized the hypothesis of transfer of meaning in his account of cases of auto-reference, and we propose to discuss his views in the concluding section.

V

AUTO-REFERENCE AND TRANSFER OF MEANING

There is a philosophical view alluded to Vātsyāyana in his commentry on *Nyāya-sūtra* (1.1.4) and also held by Bhartṛhari at a later time, according to which knowledge involves use of words. When I express my knowledge about a thing as having a property or as being related to some other thing, I surely use separate words for the varied contents of my knowledge. The supporters of the view argue that it is not only for expressing my knowledge but also for my having that knowledge it is necessary to have intercourse with words. Supposing that I have knowledge about *x* as having *P*, I must use the word that stands for *x* and another that indicates *P*. I, therefore, know *x*, being designated by a specific word, as having *P* which also is being indicated by a different word. by Knowledge about things is thus knowledge about words also, and without the latter the former is not possible. Though the scope of such a view extends to every kind of knowledge, its plausibility is very much apparent in the case of the hearer's knowledge which he arrives at on the testimony of speech by others. The supporters of this view further hold that sound is the ultimate principle of being, since nothing that cannot be referred to by some word or other can be said to exist. Thus, if a word is taken to be of the nature of sound, anything of this universe, the argument continues, partakes of sound to some extent. But, even if speechless knowledge is not possible, it would be too much to claim that when we are in an objectual attitude our knowledge of objects is also knowledge of words. Because of this fact and also because of the strong metaphysical bias the view involves, it did not attract acceptance by others, though philosophers of other schools including Gaṅgeśa found intrinsic interest in some of the philosophically challenging and metaphysically neutral problems of auto-reference the supporters of the view under reference have discussed.

If for everything in this universe we have some word or other at our

disposal to refer to, then for sound and its varieties also we have words. Thus, consider the words 'sound', 'word', 'sentence', etc. Words and sentences when spoken are sounds. Therefore, the mentioned words are all words for sound, and the last two for words and sentences. Letters also behave like words when they stand for themselves. If anyone is to develop a science of origin of words and of ways of forming sentences with words (as Pāṇini and Patañjali did regarding the Sanskrit language), he would perhaps have to use many specific words for different purposes of the science in addition to the kind of generic words we have mentioned. If it is, thus, possible to conceive a system of words and their use all for the realm of letters, words and sentences, the problem of auto-reference is bound to attract attention of philosophers. We shall, however, begin with words that stand for things and may on occasions stand for themselves. Let us consider first, such examples as offered by Gaṅgeśa:

AR-1

Gām uccāraya (say)

Say *go* (= the root corresponding to *Gām*)

The first constituent of *AR*-1 is the object to the verb '*uccāraya*' meaning 'pronounce/utter/say'. According to the rules for use of words as objects to transitive verbs, *Gām* has been rightly used in the second case-ending. The root corresponding to *Gām* is *go* which is known to stand for cows. On listening to the sentence, the hearer will first try to take the first constituent as meaning a cow. But taking it that way he fails to arrive at an acceptable interpretation of the sentence, for a cow is not what can be pronounced or uttered. Hence the hearer travels back to the word that stands for a cow for arriving at an acceptable interpretation. The route to this interpretation is then a trial with the standard or normal meaning and then shifting to something that is related to this normal meaning, and in this case this relation is nothing other than the relation of being designated by. The procedure thus suits the situation for what has been described as transfer of meaning, and Gaṅgeśa holds that this is actually involved here in respect of the constituent *Gām* in *AR*-1.

Gaṅgeśa anticipates here an objection to his view. A hearer can arrive at the meaning of any given sentence and form a corresponding belief, if the meanings of the words contained in the sentence are already known to him before-hand. The objects the words stand for are not present in his surroundings. Since he already knows the meanings of words, he recalls the ideas of the objects on hearing the words and then arrives at the sentential meaning; and this process of recalling the ideas is involved in cases of use of words with normal meaning and also in cases of use of words with a shift in or transfer of meaning. According to the objector, since the word *Gām* in *AR*-1 means itself and has been presented to the hearer through his hearing, there is no

scope or need for recalling the word here and also no scope for postulating the relation of either normal meaning or of transfer of meaning in this context. The intention or purport of the speaker is palpably clear here, and, if necessary, we can take this as the as route to the construing of the sentential meaning. But it is natural to have some apprehension here about the objector's proposal to treat the speaker's intention as the route to what his word stands for. It is, indeed, true that, if the speaker's intention can be rightly guessed, it will help us opt for the right sense of a word in case the word used is a homonym or select the appropriate shift in meaning in case a word has not been used in its standard or normal meaning. Knowledge of the speaker's intention may thus sometimes be useful to arrive at the right sort of sentential meaning. But speaking generally, to assign to the speaker's intention the status or role of a sort of meaning relation would involve undue dependence on subjective factors and make the process of linguistic understanding a matter of chance or coincidence which certainly it is not.

The objector might here observe that, even if intention is not taken as a substitute for meaning-relation, we can rightly hold that the meaning-relation in case of use of a word in its normal meaning which is called *śakti* in Sanskrit or the same in case of use of a word with a shift in or transfer of meaning which is called *lakṣaṇā* in Sanskrit is such that the word and what it stands for are distinct from each other. But in case a word refers to itself this fact of distinctness is missing. This justifies us in reaching the negative conclusion that no meaning-relation can be said to obtain here, and the objector also would not thus press for the position that speaker's intention is the substitute for meaning relation in such a case. In reply to the objector's stand, Gaṅgeśa appeals to certain linguistic phenomena to show that there is no escape from meaning-relation even when a word stands for itself. He thus refers to Pāṇini, according to whom only a *prātipadika* can take upon itself non-verbal suffixes of the variety needed for declension and called *subantavibhakti* as well as non-verbal suffixes, which, when added to nouns or noun-equivalents, yield words similar in nature to the root, for example, the suffix *cha* which yields '*acchāvākīya* when added to *acchāvāk* (etymologically meaning one with clear speech and conventionally meaning a *Ṛg-Vedic* priest, a reference to whom has been made in *Khilasūkta* [7.5.10] ... *somasya pivatvācchāvāk yaja*). Pāṇini defines a *prātipadika* as one which is meaningful (*arthavat*) but distinct from a verb (*adhatu*) and also from a suffix (*apratyaya*). Gaṅgeśa emphasizes the element of positive characterization in Pāṇini's definition and holds that, since *Gām*' in *AR*-1 is the product of a *prātipadika* and a *subanta* suffix and *acchāvākīya* in

AR-2

Acchāvākīyaṁ Sāma
A *Sāma* hymn containing the word '*acchāvāk*'

is the product of '*acchāvāk*' and the non-verbal suffix *cha*, the concerned words (i.e. the *prātipadikas* *go* in *AR*-1 and *acchāvāk* in *AR*-2) must be meaningful, even though they stand for themselves in both the cases. And, if the speaker's intention is not to be regarded as a kind of meaning-relation, the meaning-relation obtaining in respect of the concerned cases in *AR*-1 and *AR*-2 must then be the meaning-relation of the sort involved in cases of use of words with normal meaning or with a shift in or transfer of meaning. Gaṅgeśa points out that, as *go* does not mean a cow in *AR*-1 or as *acchāvāk* does not mean a priest in *AR*-2 which two constitute the normal meaning here, the words have been used then with a shift in meaning.

Gaṅgeśa now turns his attention to the objector's claim that the words in question in situations like *AR*-1 and *AR*-2 are sensibly present to the hearer. All words barring single-lettered ones, if there be any, are combinations of sounds corresponding to letters constituting the words. Viewed thus, a word represents a sequence of succeeding sounds, and when utterance of a word comes to an end what is sensibly present to the hearer is only the sound corresponding to the last letter and not the whole sequence. The objector might suppose here that, though a word is a combination of letters and the sequence of sound corresponding to a word is analysable into different sounds represented by the constituent letters, we can nevertheless treat the sound corresponding to a word as a single perceptible datum composed of percepts and percept-like images. But, even if this point is conceded, this so-called perceptible datum does not remain so with the hearer when he arrives at the sentential understanding; for this can emerge only if other requisite processes, considered necessary, such as knowledge of mutual expectancy (*akāṁkṣa*) and that of other necessary factors, intervene between this datum and the sentential understanding to emerge. Furthermore, the auditory datum *Gām* in *AR*-1 is not what is being advised to be uttered by *AR*-1, for it does not mean

'Say *gām*'. It rather means 'Say *go*'

If thus what is here taken by the hearer as the sound to be uttered is not the transformation *gām* but the root *go* which is not a datum here, the objector's argument loses its edge. Gaṅgeśa further points out that, if the objector wants to capitalize this claim about the givenness of the sound the word in question stands for, there will be an awkward situation like the following one. He wants us to consider

AR-3

Gaur asti
asti (exists)

To the hearer the sound corresponding to the first word of *AR*-3 is a sensible datum, and thus there is no difficulty in taking this datum as a thing that

exists. But the first word may be used to designate a cow, and if it is used that way the sentence means

(The) cow exists.

and not

Gaur/*Go* (the root of *Gaur*) exists.

But if the mere fact of givenness is considered sufficient for taking the auditory datum corresponding to the first word as an element in the interpretation of the meaning of the sentence and if this datum seems to agree with the meaning of the other constituent, interpretation of the meaning of the sentence will always be in the form '*Gaur* exists' and never in the form '(The) cow exists'. The reason for this is that the auditory datum which is to lead to the idea of the cow will not do so, because this being self-referring and because of its givenness being already instrumental to a construing of sentential meaning will be inoperative in giving rise to the idea of the cow which is necessary for the construing of the other meaning of the sentence. Thus, if *AR*-3 asserts that the cow exists, the hearer will not be able arrive at it. If, however, we accept Gaṅgeśa's point of view that when a word is self-referring it must be through transfer from the normal meaning to the shift in meaning, there will be no such difficulty.

Gaṅgeśa anticipates here an objection to his view, and the objector wants us to consider:

AR-4 :

Ja-va-ga-ḍa-daśam āha

The first word of *AR*-4 represents an arrangement of letters utilized in Pāṇinian grammar in various ways. There are two approaches towards the ordering of letters of the Sanskrit alphabet. According to one of them, the established and familiar ordering of letters are unsuitable for a compact and economical system of explanation of origins of words. Thus, Pāṇini himself prefers a different pattern of arrangement of the letters to the familiar phonetic ordering. He follows a system of such an arrangement which is believed to have descended from the lips of Lord Śiva, and the aphorisms relating to this are known after Him as *Śiva-Sūtra* or as *Māheśvara-Sūtra* ('Maheśvara' being another name of Śiva). These aphorisms first give a few clusters of vowels and then those for consonants. The tenth *Śiva-Sūtra* enumerates the following consonants in one such cluster:

J, v, g, ḍ, d, ś

Every student of Pāṇinian grammar has to master these aphorisms by repeated readings. But, as the consonants when unaided by vowels cannot be

pronounced, the concerned aphorism enumerates, for facilities of pronunciation, the mentioned consonants by adding the vowel *a* to each of the consonants except the last one, and the aphorism reads:

Ja-va-ga-ḍa-da-ś (*Śiva-Sūtra* 10)

In grammatical literature this cluster is usually referred to by the abbreviation *Jaś* which contains only the first and last components of the above aphorism. The fuller unabridged aphorism is treated as a word composed of these letters, and Pāṇini and others permit well-formedness of sentences containing such a word with appropriate non-verbal (*subanta*) suffixes.

AR-4 is such an well-formed sentence, and Gaṅgeśa's commentators have come up with two more such sentences containing the word under reference. Thus:

AR-5

Ja-va-ga-ḍa-da-śāḥ prameyāḥ (are objects of knowledge)

AR-6

Ja-va-ga-ḍa-da-śāḥ ṣaḍ (are six in number)

Though *AR*-5 and *AR*-6 raise special problems of interpretation, these two and *AR*-4 contain the same compound word *Ja-va-ga-ḍa-da-ś* which takes up appropriate *subanta* suffixes, and by Gaṅgeśa's own admission it is thus a *prātipadika* having meaning. So far as *AR*-4 is concerned, it asserts that someone said *Ja-va-ga-ḍa-da-ś*. Let us imagine that a teacher in Pāṇinian grammar recited to his pupils the concerned *Śiva-Sūtra*, and someone of them was perhaps unmindful and missed it. When he asked the pupil sitting beside him about it, the latter stated that the teacher said (*āha*):

Ja-va-ga-ḍa-da-śa(m) [*āha* (said)]

Assuming that we have been able to give an idea about the contexts in which the word under reference has been and may be used, we can now explain the contention of the objector which challenges Gaṅgeśa's claim that when a word means itself it does so via transfer from normal meaning to a shift in meaning. But in *AR*-4 (and also in *AR*-5 and *AR*-6) the word under reference is a meaningless (*nirarthaka*) expression in the sense that the compound does not mean anything in the outer world. Hence there is no scope of transfer of meaning, for it involves a trial with normal meaning which is lacking here. In reply to the objection, Gaṅgeśa points out that the word should not be taken in its face value as a cluster of consonants succeeded by vowels, because the intention of the concerned aphorism as well as of the teacher and his informed pupil is to refer to the consonants only, and we should not forget that the convention of adding the vowels has been followed

to facilitate pronunciation of the intended cluster of the concerned consonants. Gaṅgeśa here holds that the consonants figuring in that pronounced clusters stand for themselves, and that the concerned letters can be said to constitute the primary meaning of the consonants. This being the case, the word as actually uttered, i.e. each of the consonants followed by the concerned vowel, is constituted by the consonants also, and when the word as so uttered means itself the route to this meaning is first the primary meaning of the consonants and then a transfer to a combination containing them. Gaṅgeśa thus shows that his thesis that auto-reference involves transfer of meaning does not fail in *AR*-4 also. And, if it does not fail in *AR*-4, it should not fail also in *AR*-5 and *AR*-6, if we remember that the predication involved in *AR*-5 is a case of distributive predication inasmuch as each of the consonants is an object of knowledge and that involved in *AR*-6 is a case of collective predication inasmuch as the consonants taken together are six in number, though taken singly they are not.

We would like to consider a few more cases of auto-reference noted and made use of in the Pāṇinian tradition and to make an assessment of Gaṅgeśa's views in the light of those cases. It has been noted in the fourth section of the paper that a root verb can act as a finite verb in a sentence when it takes up suffixes of a special variety (called *tinganta-vibhakti*). A root verb can also find its place differently in the role of a verb but only after taking up other appropriate verbal suffixes (e.g. *tumun*, *kta*, *ktavatu*, etc.) But it is never allowed that a root verb can take up non-verbal suffixes (say, of the variety called *subanta-vibhakti* which a noun or its equivalent, i.e. a *prātipadika* alone can take up), if the root verb after taking up such a suffix is to function in the role of a verb-constituent of a sentence. Though this is the case in the normal sentences containing root verbs along with appropriate verbal suffixes, this restriction has to be given up if root verbs themselves are to be used in the role of nominatives, accusatives or in similar other capacities that are natural to nouns or noun-equivalents. Such a use of root verbs becomes necessary for various purposes when one desires to speak about the verbs themselves, say, about their types or about their meaning or about their appropriateness for taking up suffixes of special kinds. There is thus provision in Pāṇinian grammar for mentioning the verb (*dhātunirdeśa*) in non-verbal roles by adding appropriate suffixes of a very special variety for deriving a name expression from a root verb to refer to the verb itself as is evident from the following rule:

Ikstipau dhātunirdeśe

The suffix '*ik*' or the suffix '*tip*' may be added to a root verb to obtain a name expression to refer to the verb itself (*dhātunirdeśe*).

We give below a few such examples illustrating the application of the suffix *ik*:

(1) The root verb *gām* (to go) and the suffix *ik* yield *gami* and this is used in

AR-7

Gamerḍoh

Gamer = *Gameḥ* which is *gami* in the possessive case-ending

(2) The root verb *pac* (to cook) and suffix *ik* yield *paci* and this is used in

AR-8

...tatsarvaṁ pacerarthaḥ

pacer = *paceḥ* which is *paci* in the possessive case-ending

We thus find that *AR*-7 and *AR*-8 contain name-expressions coined from root verbs, and the suffix *ik* and the products do not mean what the root verbs mean. The derivatives stand for the root verbs themselves. If these derivatives are thus names for root verbs, they must stand related through some form of meaning-relation. Since these newly coined names do not stand for what the verbs stand for, there is no scope for treating the meaning-relation involved as a case of transfer of meaning. By exclusion then, the root verbs themselves constitute the primary meaning of the derivatives. Let us at this point take note of a few cases of auto-reference of a different sort.

Even before Pāṇini, the greatest of the grammarians, and his predecessors were born and propounded the system of Sanskrit grammar, the elitist people of Vedic India found it necessary to refer to different hymns of the *Ṛg-Veda* which are called *sūkta* and also to different Sāmavedic hymns called *sāma*. The practice they followed to refer to the different hymns was to pick up words of respective hymns, preferably two words, in the beginning, and coin a new name with them after adding a suffix to their combinations. We have earlier come accross such a coinage, viz. '*acchāvākīya*' in *AR*-2. A few other familiar words of a similar nature are '*nāsadīya*' (= *na* + *asat* + *cha*), *Mitrāvaruṇiya* (= *Mitrāvaruṇa* +*cha*), '*yajñāyajñīya*' (*yajñāyajña* + *cha*), *kayāśubhīya* (= *kayā* + *aśubha* + *cha*') and *asyavāmīya*.

We shall, however, concentrate only on the last word and note here some of the important points made by Pāṇini, Patañjali and their followers. People used to refer to the Vedic hymn (*Ṛg-Veda* i, 164) which begins with the words *Asya vāmasya* as *asyavāmīya* hymn. The word '*asyavāmīya*' is the product of '*asyavāma*' (which is taken to be a *prātipadika* or noun) and the suffix '*cha*'. The rule that regulates such a formation has been stated by Pāṇini as *Matau chaḥ sūktasāmnoḥ* (*Pāṇini-Sūtra* 5.2.59).

The product understood in the light of this Pāṇinian *sūtra* means a Ṛg-Vedic hymn that contains (begins with) *asya vāma...* (the second word here is the *prātipadika* which assumes the form *vāmasya* in the possessive case-ending). As the suffix *cha* is a non-verbal suffix, it can be added only to a noun or its equivalent, and this implies that *asyavāma* is so. But, in order to be such a noun word capable of taking up such a suffix, it must be a single

word. As *asya-vāma* consists of two words, they can be treated to constitute a single word only, if they are capable of being compounded according to some rule regarding formation of compound words. Barring a few exceptions (and the word under reference does not fall within that group), it is not permissible to retain the non-verbal suffix of the *subanta* order determining the case-endings in the body of the compound word. If we would have followed the rule rigidly, the first word *asya* would have been shorn of the possessive case suffix and it would have been reduced to *'etad'* and the compound would have been *etadvāma*. But this would have defeated the purpose for which the compound has been formed, for the Vedic hymn under reference begins with *asya-vāma* and not with *etadvāma*. The restrictive rule regarding formation of compounds has its validity, only if the compound does not represent and refers to the constituents of the compound, and when it does, the compound that is to be formed falls outside the scope of the rule. The explanation seems to be that when a word refers to itself the referring word is the imitation (*anukaraṇa*) of what is being referred to (*anukārya*), and thus, if the compound is to be such an imitation of its constituents, they must preserve the mode of their original appearance.

Thus, in their commentary *Kāśikāvṛtti* on Pāṇini's *sūtra* under reference, Vamana and Jayaditya write: *'Anukaraṇaśabdāśca svarūpamātrapradhānāḥ pratyayam utpadayanti, tena-anekapadādapi siddham ...'* But, though this relation of phonetic idempotency obtains between such an imitation and what is being imitated, the latter is no single word but is only a group of words while the former behaves like a single word as it takes up a suffix. But more important than this phonetic affinity and the difference between them in respect of form and function is the fact that *asyavāma* in *'asyavāmīya'* is only an imitation and not a perfect reproduction of the imitated, for the latter is a part of a Vedic song sung strictly according to the prescribed rules, while its imitation is only a prosaic representation of the concerned sounds. Because of such basic difference Patañjali maintains that the imitation is distinct from the imitated. Therefore, like *gami* which refers to *gam* and *paci* which refers to *pac*, *asyavāma* as occurring in *asyavāmīya* is something distinct from that occurring in the hymn. Since it is distinct from what it refers to, there is no difficulty in treating it as a name for the original sound—the relation obtaining between them being one of primary meaning. It should, however, be noted in this connection that the word *asyavāmīya* refers to the hymn beginning with the words *Asya vāma(sya)* and not to these words themselves. But, as the hymn consists of these words and a few more and as *asyavāmīya* refers to the sequence of these words, it can be said that it refers to these words also. Understood this way, the derivative *asyavāmīya* and (not its component *asyavāma*) refers to the first two words in the beginning the Vedic hymn. On this interpretation, this word looks similar to the verbal derivatives like *gami, paci*, etc. inasmuch as like them *asyavāmīya* also is distinct in appearance and spelling and pronunciation from what it

refers to. But we should also note that such a distinctness is missing in respect of the concerned words involved in cases like *Gām uccāraya* and *Gaur asti*. Moreover, if letters are taken to refer to themselves, we would not be able to postulate such a distinctness in this area of auto-reference. What then is the way out? Treating

Gām uccāraya as *Go iti uccāraya*,
Gaur asti as *Go iti asti*

and also

Gami as *gam iti* or *Paci* as *pac iti*
and similarly, *asyavamiya* as *asyavāma iti*

we can achieve consistency in the view that when a word refers to itself the referring word and the word being referred to are distinct from each other, though the word 'itself' in 'when a word refers to itself' is to be taken as implying that the referring word, in spite of being distinct, is an imitation of what is being referred to. Alternatively, however, both the referring word which is only an imitation and the word being referred to are to be taken as differently pronounced sounds, thereby dispensing with quotation marks and similar other devices like adding *iti*. But on each of the two alternatives the words are taken as distinct from one another. Philosophically, more interesting position is, however, that according to which the concerned words may also be taken as identical. Some of the later philosophers even of the grammarians' school (for example, Kauṇḍa Bhatta), maintain that the relation between the concerned words may be either identity or distinctness.

What type of relationship, according to Gaṅgeśa, may be said to obtain between the concerned words in cases of auto-reference? By his explicit admission the letters mean themselves, and, therefore, the relationship involved is one of identity. In other cases of auto-reference we have discussed from Gaṅgeśa, it should also be the case that the involved terms are related by way of identity, for, according to him, a word means itself through transfer of meaning, and the route to this is first a trial with the standard or normal meaning and then travelling back to the word itself as its designator. For difficulties cited earlier and for absence of any clinching argument in favour of the Gaṅgeśite hypothesis, I would personally favour the sort of explanation Patañjali has offered by postulating that the words involved in cases of auto-reference are distinct from each other in respect of certain fundamental features. But, for the sake of argument, we would not object to Gaṅgeśa's plan of treating them as identical. The position that they are identical does not, however, necessarily imply that a word means itself through transfer of meaning. It may refer to itself as its standard or normal meaning, though, in other instances of its use, it may refer to something different from itself as its standard meaning. Thus, a word is necessarily a homonym, because in some uses it means itself when we make (and we

certainly can make) assertions about it while in others it stands for some object outside. If words are thus treated as homonyms, there is no scope for treating the words as meaning themselves through transfer of meaning, for they may be taken to constitute the primary meaning, and this does not preclude the possibility that the objects also may constitute another primary meaning. We would hereby avoid the roundabout meaning of words in cases of auto-reference.

It may be recalled that we have argued in the earlier section that the hypothesis of transfer of meaning is not indispensable for solving the problem of meaning of the verbal inflections of *tinganta* type called *ākhyāta* in philosophical literature, or for solving the problem of meaning of tricky compound words. We have ended up with a similar negative conclusion in respect of problems of auto-reference. But in all these three realms our alternative in place of transfer of meaning is that what is sought to be covered by 'deviant denomination' may very well be taken as constitutive of standard meaning, the implication being that the concerned words are cases of homonyms. Since we have thus been able to raise doubts regarding the extension of the thesis of transfer of meaning, the issue has to be settled by reference to the staple cases for which this has been primarily postulated, and some of these are those enlisted in the second section. But it should be noticed that they are mostly cases of metaphors and other allied types of figures of speech. In the West also philosophers have utilized the theory of transfer of meaning for solving the problem of metaphor. But recently attempts have been made by Donald Davidson and his followers to distinguish between metaphorical turth and truth of the metaphorical sentence. It has thus been argued that the inventor of a metaphor may hint at some metaphorical truth, and the interpreter of the metaphor may be successful in arriving at it through some route but not through his sentential understanding ensuing upon his listening to the metaphorical sentence. The supporters of this view are of the opinion that the inventor of the metaphor does not take his metaphorical sentence to be true. Nor does he intend it to be taken as true, and likewise the interpreter also does not take it to be true. If what is thus argued for is justifiable, there is no scope to push forward the thesis of 'deviant denomination' or of 'deviant predication', to borrow the expressions from Paul Ricoeur, for an understanding of the meaning of the metaphorical sentence, since there would then be no necessity of suspension or *epoche*, or, in our jargon, of *tātparyānupapatti* which is taken to be a condition for postulating transfer of meaning. So far as Nyāya literature is concerned, there is not much of detailed discussion of the points of view of the rhetorecians, though we find statements of the general strategy for tackling metaphorical sentences. We look forward to Indologists and experts in comparative literature to familiarize us with the views of the rhetorecians of our land, so that we can take a stand and defend the official Nyāya theory or come up with alternatives of our own.

Scientific rationality—a rethinking*

MAHASWETA CHAUDHURY
University of Calcutta, Calcutta

INTRODUCTION

In recent times it has become a philosophical fashion to undertake sociological/relativistic standpoint for evaluating science and its activities. The stance itself is not objectionable, but different varieties of it have one point in common: their axe upon the view of science as rational enterprise. The tradition is initiated mainly by Kuhn's *Scientific Revolution* and encouraged and elaborated by Feyerabend and instrumentalists/relativists of various colours.

In this paper, I shall try to re-establish the traditional view of science as pre-eminently a rational activity by examining and eventually rejecting some alternative views which are very popular. Now, rationality of science involves various complex concepts such as the aim of science, scientific method, growth of science etc. To bring all these areas into the purview of the present discussion would be a stupendous task. Moreover, a survey of all the different approaches that undermine the thesis again is a difficult task, not because their arguments are formidable but because the recent literature is very much overladen with such work.

So, I shall first state the traditional view in brief, then pick out some alternative views of science from recent literature. Feyerabend's anti-method view is the first one I shall take up (Kuhn will be discussed later), and, after a short exposition, argue that, despite his tall claim about 'anarchism', Feyerabend could not completely dispense with the notion of rationality.

Hempel's recent thesis of instrumentalist view of scientific rationality will be analysed next and eventually rejected as inadequate for a satisfactory account of theory choice.

David Bloor and Larry Laudan's debate about the nature of scientific belief will give us a typical model of relativistic/sociological account, on the one hand, and the rationalistic (although Laudan is a kind of instrumentalist) concept of science as a progressive problem-solving pursuit, on the other. Laudan's refutation of Kuhn's epistemological relativism is discussed next to pave the path for a positive account of scientific rationality.

Finally, I shall argue for defending a position that recognizes science as pre-eminently an epistemic activity, and, for its epistemic objective, the notion of rationality is built into it. Furthermore, rational enterprise/knowledge also

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requires the notion of truth or at least truth-likeness. The cliche 'science aims at truth' is not totally empty. It can be satisfactorily supplemented with the notion of science as truth-using and truth-preserving activity. The recent thesis of I. Niniluoto about truth-likeness is one such possible move.

I

'It is not *what* the man of science believes that distinguishes him, but *how* and *why* be believes it. His beliefs are based on evidence, not on *authority* or *intuition*'.

—BERTRAND RUSSEL

When anyone is initiated into the tradition of science or philosophy, he is advised not to accept anything for true without reasons. The difference between a pedestrian and a (rational or) scientific/philosophical perspective consists in that the former believes something without good reasons or with extra-logical reasons while the latter seeks good reasons. The first lesson a philosophy undergraduate learns in epistemology is that knowledge is true belief, but *all* true beliefs are not knowledge. To be considered as knowledge, beliefs need to be supported also by good *reasons*. Now, there can be quarrel about what constitutes a good reason, but not about the issue whether we need them or not. From Aristotle's time science is regarded as an inquiry, an inquiry into physical nature, man and animal kingdom, celestial sphere and so on. For what? Surely, for information, knowledge about the intricate relationship among different aspects of nature and man. Science is basically an organized, systematic body of knowledge, possessor of a special method, because it is committed only to evidences and reasons. This special method demarcates science from metaphysics, fairy-tales and other enterprises; for science declares its findings as testable, whereas other enterprises do not. Therefore, science is considered as the epitome of rationality. This is, in a nutshell, the traditional view of science as a *rational* activity.

In recent times, K. Popper is a champion of such a view.[1] His euphoric exclamations about the picture of science as objective, growing and progressive with the aim of finding out truth (although we do not know what truth is), provoked criticisms from various philosophers who do not necessarily have much in common among themselves. The use of terms like 'progress', 'growth', 'objective' were criticized as using 'success words'.[2] Popper's over-zealous idealization of science notwithstanding, the principal tenet of his account of science can be vindicated, although one may reject or modify some of his supporting arguments and minor theses. To him the true concern for epistemology is to account for scientific knowledge, and the principal aim of philosophy is not so much to distinguish science from non-science as rational from irrational. The method of science is the method of conjecture and refutation. Theories are attempts to approximate truth on the face of *severe* tests, devised by the scientist to refute them. The method of science is rational,

because it is a *critical* method making its thesis always open to criticism and falsification. Testability of theories makes scientific method rational and science an epitome of rationality for its constant vulnerability to tests and refutations.

Popper's falsificationist method faces many problems (which, for the sake of brevity, I cannot discuss here), and we do not find any other clear arguments for holding science as rational than referring it to the falsifiable character (one may also doubt that) of scientific theories which belong to the domain of objective knowledge.

The modified 'methodological research programme' of Lakatos[3] is an attempt to improve upon Popper's falsificationist programme through an appeal to history. The main points of departure lies in citing from history that :

(*i*) Theories are not so easily and quickly refuted as Popper's method (Lakatos calls the requirement 'instant rationality') needs;
(*ii*) A research programme is not so simplistic as a single theory, but a 'series of theories'.
(*iii*) A falsified theory can stay on with the scientific corpus long after it has been refuted, for example, it took fifty years after its falsification for Newton's theory to go; and
(*iv*) A falsified theory can stage a 'comeback', so falsification is in conclusive test for a theory.

Despite the minor differences, Lakatos' methodological research programme also regards science as a rational programme and a progressive pursuit towards a certain goal—the goal of more informative content, falsifiability and hence more rationality.

It is generally said[4] that most Popperians are epistemological moralists, and that they have a normative orientation to science rather than a naturalistic one. Unlike them Kuhn does not make a distinction between reason and unreason, because his methodology does not require it like the Popperian's goal-oriented model. If there are revolutions, Lakatos points out, 'then the growth of knowledge is insufficiently determined by "rules of reason"; it is thus open to "religious maniacs" to justify their irrationalism by pointing to its existence in science itself'.[5] Lakatos thinks: '*Belief* may be a regrettably unavoidable biological weakness to be kept under the control of criticism but commitment is for Popper an outright crime.'[6] For Popper commitment is a form of irrationality, and *criticism* is rational. But Kuhn thinks otherwise. Although Lakatos concedes more to Kuhn than Popper does, the empirical emptiness of their criticism, some people think, is similar. It is apparent from Lakatos' admission: 'my concept of a research programme' may be construed as an objective 'third world' reconstruction of Kuhn's socio-psychological concept of paradigm.[7] But the growth of science in the third world is not the growth of actual science but the growth of a 'rationally recons-

tructed' history of science. As it is rationally reconstructed history, it remains immune to the findings of actual history. Be that as it may. Popperian account of science does not take into the account of rationality the question often raised by the sociologists of science: is actual science rational? Popper's blatant indifference to the issue annoys his critics. I shall come back to this question in the last section of the present discussion and now turn towards the view that opposes the thesis: science is rational.

II

'The only principle that does not inhibit progress is anything goes'

—P. FEYERABEND

P. Feyerabend is branded as an epistemological atheist, a methodological anarchist. In *Against Method*, his emotional outbursts leave a picture of science and scientific community guided by irrationalist norms. He violently denies that there is or ever has been *an* objective scientific method. Not only that. He claims that, if any progress is discernible in science, it is the results of scientists having broken every conceivable rule of rationality. He himself uses propagandist methods (with which he characterizes successful scientists) in order to erode our confidence in 'objectivity'. Originally a follower of Popper, Feyerabend later turns against all his well-known tenets: objectivity and rationality of knowledge, truth as an aim of science, critical attitude of scientists rather than commitments; everything in a word, that Popper stands for. Of course, Feyerabend's onslaught has some therapeutic force as to look again at the philosopher's idealized vision of science from the practitioner's experience of it.

Feyerabend starts from the reasonable premise that 'proliferation of theories is beneficial to science while uniformity "impairs" its critical power'. The apparent uniformity found in scientific research is the product of an ideological conspiracy which is enshrined in the institutionalization of science. The present-day science functions, in his view, in the same manner as the church did in former times, the men in white coats being the modern spokesmen for an absolute incontestable authority. History reveals that 'anything goes' is the only methodology for science. No episode in real science is sufficiently simple to fit anyone of the conventional methodologies; thus, it has always been a normal practice to cope with inconvenient facts by ignoring them, by explaining them away in blatantly *ad hoc* fashion or even by concealing them behind a smokescreen of rhetoric. As an example, Feyerabend discusses Galileo's defence of Copernican astronomy. Galileo showed through the telescope that the moon had mountains and that the height of them could be estimated by the length of their shadows. By so doing he hoped to refute the Aristotelian idea that the heavenly bodies were all perfect crystalline spheres, yet at the time telescopes were of extremely mediocre quality and the wild inaccuracies of Galileo's own drawings could be easily seen. Galileo offered no theoretical reasons, Feyerabend says, why the telescopic observations should be accepted as superior when viewing the heavens, and Feyerabend asserts that his only reason for preferring them was that they tended to confirm Copernicus. In short, according to Feyerabend's reading, Galileo prevailed over his critics by virtue of his astute propaganda.

Feyerabend's liking for Lakatos' account springs from his claim that it is merely anarchism in disguise. In his failure to define the time limit after which a degenerating research programme must be abandoned, Lakatos seems to admit that there is no rational means by which a scientist may direct his allegiance to one programme or another. Lakatos' methodology, in Feyerabend's view, seems to be very sophisticated (possibly because he espouses proliferation of theories which Feyerabend likes); yet, when stripped to its core, it is revealed as no methodology at all. However, Feyerabend welcomes it, because, in his opinion, science should also be assessed on its own merit, and it is surely not the 'best' ideology for an individual to follow. Furthermore, the aim of science is also not 'truth' or any cognitive ideal, it should be human happiness.

The above exposition is more or less a summary of Feyerabend's anarchistic model of scientific tradition. I shall now proceed to argue briefly that, despite all his sound and fury, Feyerabend's non-method is not entirely irrationalist. In other words, his thesis would be trivially false, if my interpretations do not hold.[8]

First, about the issue of rational theory-choice as found in Lakatos and Kuhn. Reconstructed somewhat, Feyerabend's argument is that no satisfactory account of rational theory-choice can be found within the framework of either Lakatos or Kuhn. Kuhn's approach fails, because, whatever class of values we specify, we can find scientists who do not subscribe to the view and non-scientists who do. For instance, Oxford philosophers and gangsters, according to Kuhn, appear to share the values, that characterize the relevant community—at least to the extent that scientists do.[9] And Lakatos' approach fails, because it yields acceptance of rules which are either vacuous or arbitrary. They are vacuous, if they allow scientist to wait as long as they like in the hope that a degenerating programme will stage a comeback; and they are arbitrary if combined with a time limit. As Feyerabend remarks: '... if you are permitted to wait, why not wait a little longer?'[10]

In a similar vein, he has denied the distinction between the context of discovery and that of justification. This distinction entails a distinction between scientific and non-scientific reasons. But the converse is not true; one may hold the latter distinction without accepting the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. Popper and Lakatos hold both distinctions; Kuhn distinguishes only the distinction between scientific and non-scientific reason; and to Feyerabend none of the distinctions have any decisive role to play in our understanding of science.

Notice that whatever is said about rationality so far does not entail that theory-acceptance is not an essentially rational affair. All we are prevented from holding is that science is guided by a distinctive kind of rationality. It

is not said that science is governed by *no reasons* at all. Although Feyerabend never says it explicitly, it seems that he thinks that science is also run by ordinary reason. That he is arguing only against the idea of a distinctive nature of rationality is indicated by his treatment of Galileo. His praise for Galileo seems to spring from the only fact that Galileo had the good sense (ordinary reason) to violate important rules of scientific method[11] and the originality to support it with subtle and far-reaching arguments.[12] Moreover, we have to remember that *Against Method* is basically a treatise on method. 'The debate', he says, 'is about methodological rules only and that "freedom"... means freedom vis-à-vis such rules.'[13] A third indication about my contention occurs in connection with Lakatos' response to his allegation that Lakatos' rules are arbitrary. In response to his line of defence, Feyerabend does not simply point out that in appealing to common sense we 'leave the domain of rationality as defined by (Lakatos's) standards;'[14] he also remarks in a more positive vein that support for a degenerating programme may be 'eminently rational *according to other standards*, for example, according to the standards of common sense'.[15]

Finally, note that Feyerabend's discussion of incommensurability also suggests a commitment to 'ordinary reason'. For Feyerabend, incommensurable theories are theories so radically different that none of the usual logical relations (inclusion, exclusion, overlap) can be said to hold between them.[16] They cannot be compared by comparing 'content classes',[17] and are as a result beyond 'the more familiar standards of comparison'. This means that incommensurable theories cannot be compared by appeal to methodological standards which apply in *all* circumstances; it does not mean that they cannot be compared at all. 'Aesthetic judgements, of taste ... factors not completely beyond the reach of argument'[18] may all have a role to play. I think it is sufficiently clear now from the arguments and textual references so far that Feyerabend is merely replacing scientific reason with ordinary reason.

I suggest that Feyerabend's position is best viewed by Kuhn who sees it 'as an attempt to show that existing theories of rationality are not quite right and that we must readjust or change them to explain why science works as it does'.[19] Indeed, Feyerabend's hammer is more on the sacrosanct nature of scientific rationality (and the scientists) than on a general concept of rationality. One small point before we close the discussion on Feyerabend. Even if Galileo's theory had truly been supported by propaganda, that itself does not entail that it is not rational (or true); and if Feyerabend is granted that the aim of science is human happiness, that alone cannot disallow one to hold a cognitive aim as well for science. In fact, knowledge can dispel human suffering more effectively than what ignorance or common sense can.

Hempel's Instrumentalist Account of Scientific Rationality

One may wonder at this stage why I am not choosing the usual Kuhnian

position for ascribing arationality to scientific enterprise. In the next section, in connection with the controversy between Bloor and Laudan, Kuhnian position plays an important role and has been subjected to formidable objection if not totally rejected. Hence my address to Hempel comes first. To Hempel: 'A mode of procedure or rule calling for that procedure surely can be rational or irrational only relative to the goal the procedure is meant to attain.'[20] The rationality of science, according to this view, depends solely on the instrumental efficacy of the activities of science in attaining the goals of science.

> [If] a proposed methodological theory of science is to afford an account of scientific inquiry as a rational pursuit, it will have to specify certain goals of scientific inquiry as well as some methodological principles observed in their pursuit, finally it will have to exhibit the instrumental rationality of the principles in relation to the goals. Only to the extent that this can be done, does the conception of science as the exemplar of rationality appear to be viable.[21]

On this view, the rationality of science is a 'means-end' instrumental rationality: given the goals of science, it is rational to the extent that its methodology helps to secure the goals.[22] In a recent debate, Kuhn and W. Salmon also agree with Hempel that the rationality of science must be a function of the ability of science's methodological principles to achieve its goals.[23]

This kind of view seems to rely heavily on determination of the goals of scientific inquiry. Hempel offers two kinds of goals:

> (*i*) Science is widely conceived as seeking to formulate an increasingly comprehensive, systematically organised world view that is *explanatory* and *predictive*.[24]
>
> (*ii*) ... science aims at establishing a sequence of increasingly comprehensive and accurate systems of empirical knowledge.[25]

Notice that the kinds of goal depicted are different: (*i*) emphasizes on efficiency, not verisimilitude (truthlikeness), while (*ii*) speaks of truth as the goal of science.

Other philosophers have suggested very different accounts of the goals of scientific inquiry: the solving of problem, the achievement of understanding, the furthering of human control of nature, etc. Since different goals will yield different judgements regarding the rationality of scientific procedures and norms, it is necessary, in order to establish rationality of science, to establish science's goals at first. If these goals have to be 'rational to make scientific inquiry rational—in addition to its rule and methods to be efficacious—the instrumentalist notion of rationality as proposed by Hempel falls short of that ideal. Being efficacious may be instrumentally necessary (one may even

doubt that) for a goal to be rational, but it is not sufficient to make it so, for it needs not only the means but also the *end* to be rational. Take any example of an ordinary notion. Suppose, I have the (irrational) belief that the goal of a teacher's life is to be popular among the students. With that goal in mind, my actions, say, supplying of all kinds of suggestions and questions to the students before the exams, teaching them only those topics which are easy and sure to be asked on the exams, and all kinds of hobnobbing with them which surely will soon help me achieve the goal. The means are efficacious in bringing about the goal, but the action surely is not rational as the goal is not.

The necessity of taking the rationality of ends into account is, however, problematic as it seems to fly in the face of decision-theory which requires rationality of action to be questions *only* about means and not ends. Contrary to the tradition of decision-theory, the notion of rationality of means being partly dependent on the rationality of ends can coherently apply to question of end as well as to questions concerning the means to those ends. This general point of rationality applies to science as well.

Thus, Hempel's analysis of the rationality of science is not adequate. I say not adequate mainly for three difficulties:

(1) His construal of rationality as efficacy is not right.
(2) Rationality of science is not, as Hempel presumes, the rationality of scientific inquiry but also the results of such inquiry, such as claims, theories and hypotheses. An account of the rationality of science should address the rationality of scientific belief as well as the latter.
(3) Hempel rejects (*contra* Carnap and many others) that the methodological principles for appraising the rational credibility of hypothesis would have to hold a priori. He says that 'the conception of timelessness for all standards for rational theory-choice be abandoned'.[26]

The standard of rationality is contingent upon the kind of world-view 'prevailing at the time'. Of course, 'some' standards are time-relative, but revolutions in science would not have been possible if great scientists would adhere only to the world-view 'prevailing at the time'. I shall come back to these questions later, but now address the issue as presented by David Bloor as contrasted with Laudan's model of scientific rationality—the issue more well-known to philosophical circles as the 'Bloor-Laudan debate'.

Bloor's 'Strong Programme' and Its Weaknesses:

The so-called 'strong programme' is the programme proposed by D. Bloor[27] which disallows the appeals to norms of rationality in the explanation of belief. Bloor's first tenet is: belief-states are to be given causal explanations; the second: sociology of knowledge should be 'impartial with respect to truth and falsity, rationality and irrationality, success or failure'; his third tenet is: the symmetry principle which stipulates that the sociologist must invoke 'the same types of cause' in explaining why someone holds a particular belief, regardless of the status of this belief with respect of these dichotomies (of truth, falsity, etc.).

Laudan finds the last tenet to be most controversial aspect of Bloor's programme, and complains that the latter fails to specify any criteria for regarding causes to be of the same type.[28] One can also find the causality principle, i.e. the first tenet to be problematic which Laudan finds 'innocuous'. Laudan seems to include reasons as cause, but Bloor does not.[29] Laudan argues that Bloor should provide us with a taxonomy of causal types, without which it will be impossible to distinguish between an agent's reasons for his or her belief and his or her socio-economic status as being of the same kind of cause. This would make Bloor's 'symmetry' thesis 'uncontroversial'. Bloor distinguishes 'rational' from 'irrational' causes in response to Laudan, but he (Bloor) intends his symmetry principle to be understood as ruling out appeals not to any 'rational causes' but only to rational of a particular type. He draws a further distinction between a 'descriptive' concept of natural rationality and an 'evaluative' concept of 'normative rationality'.

> Natural rationality refers to typical human reasoning propensities; normative rationality refers to patterns of inference that are esteemed or sanctioned. The first one has reference to matters of psychological facts, the other to shared standards or norms.[30]

However, Bloor does not think that it leads to denial of the symmetry postulate,[31] which requires identical causal stories for different behaviours. Bloor seems, then, to remove rationality from the causal nexus. An individual's reasons for his or her beliefs cannot be the causes of that belief, because the norms of rationality that connect the reasons to the belief in question are not causal principles.

It is difficult to see, then, how such a programme would work. If norms are removed from the world, what is left for a sociologist to explain?

Bloor tries to avoid this problem by replacing sociology of knowledge with sociology of belief. It seems easier to ascribe a belief to an individual than knowledge, for belief does not apparently require a norm; because beliefs can be defined in terms of behaviour criteria for determining when an agent has some particular belief. However, attribution of scientific beliefs (theories) including beliefs about the contents of scientific theories, beliefs in logical or mathematical truths, would not be possible in the same way. In these cases, the behavioural (or operational) criteria for ascertaining when an agent holds some theoretical belief must include linguistic behaviour, which surely is governed by shared norms or standards. If one were to remove such values/ standards from one's descriptive ontology, it would become impossible to

characterize the linguistic behaviour of agents. Bloor makes such a distinction, but he thinks attributing irrational beliefs to cause and rational beliefs to reasons violates the symmetry thesis, because values, norms and reasons have a different ontological status from that of nature.

Laudan's objection to the symmetry thesis can be endorsed by actual practice in science. He argues that one may bring in, say, both chemical and physical principles to explain the breakdown of a calculating machine due to rust, but only the physical ones to account for its normal rational operation. Thus, Bloor's symmetry principle is not descriptive of actual practice even in the physical sciences.[32] Everybody will agree that, when Bloor explains scientists' beliefs with causal explanations, devoid of any account of rationality, he should give some criterion for the causal explanation. Otherwise, it will be trivial. Of course, progress in science is far from 'natural', but, is indebted to traditions of critical discourse.[33] Nobody denies that, when we examine a scientist's decision to pursue some specific programme of research, we are but offering a partial explanation; a fuller explanation must, indeed, include social, political-economic and even psychological condition in which the scientist is found to make his or her rational choice. It should also include some general principle that, whenever scientists are able to make rational choices, they will choose to follow a progressive research programme.[34] The adequacy of a research programme is measured not only in terms of the number and importance of its applications but also in terms of its ability to avoid inconsistencies, ambiguities, anomalies and question-begging, all of these latter being given negative weight. Laudan's view implies that principles of rationality are normative, whereas causal laws are descriptive. Now, the sociologist might reply that for his purpose *principle of rationality* may be treated as descriptive, that is, they may be regarded as describing the norms which are actually operative in society. Laudan modifies his view that a historian of science is on a par with the sociologist to take the 'prevailing norm or standard' operative in a particular time or place, while judging beliefs of other societies or of different periods of time. This concession can undercut Bloor's objection that 'endorsing a set of standards has no role to play in its explanation'.[35] But a hard-core sociologist of knowledge may find this account as unconvincing, for his universe is normatively empty. Bloor maintains that a number of disciplines such as biology and psychology would have to be combined with sociology for a comprehensive understanding of all the aspects of an activity such as science. Again, the argument is short-sighted; it misses the point that these may be necessary (one can also doubt that) but not sufficient to understand the progressive character of scientific beliefs as a free rational choice. In other words, the rationality of the decision is a cause of that decision in the sense of having been necessary in the circumstances. To follow the dictum of the 'strong programme' against allowing any standards of rationality to play a role in explaining the actions of others would be counter-intuitive to our understanding of others' behaviour. A

hard-core sociologist of knowledge may further say that rationality itself is a social fact which differs from society to society. But this seems to be a gratuitous assumption. If biological and psychological facts can be similar in different societies, why cannot rationality as a social fact be the same?

Now, the sociologists may feel threatened (if they have to give up the symmetry principle) by the suggestion that they should confine themselves in explaining mistakes, and the 'sociology of knowledge is the sociology of error' and 'logic, rationality and truth appear to be their own explanation'. This fear would be baseless, if, as Laudan suggests, the sociologist considers reason and rationality to be possible causes of belief. The greatest stumbling blocks which Bloor's programme finds itself to be confronted with are logical and mathematical (belief) thinking. Of course, the appeal to alternative mathematics can be made to vindicate Lakatos' rival research programmes. But, even if we grant Bloor that paradigm-change is a social phenomenon, the problem still remains to find a social cause for it. Nobody denies that a community of mathematicians and scientists is a social institution, but the rationality of a choice among competing research programmes can be understood in terms of its problem-solving efficacy (as Laudan says) with less ambiguity and more testability (as Popper says). The greater those values, the greater the rationality-value of a programme which fulfills them. Only one move can save Bloor's strong programme from a total collapse, namely, if he includes reason in value-free universe and makes it a part of social explanation with the principle of rationality.

In concluding this part, I must concede the relevance of Bloor's anxiety about a causal explanation. It is true that, even if we see scientific activities as free rational choice (not 'caused'), there are certain other kinds of restraint that determine the scientists' beliefs and questions. In science one responds to an intellectual situation that is given; in short, science has an inner logic which stamps certain hypotheses as relevant and dismisses others. As Koyre says,[36] the Copernican Revolution was *raison d'être* of the 'century of the genius'. These scientists were constrained in the sense of having a single outstanding problem: the dire need for supplementing the heliocentric theory with an adequate physics. Among two attempts offered, namely, Descartes' vortex theory (of push) and Newton's theory (of pull) of universal gravitation, the latter theory won because of solving more problems and for being consistent with the Copernican theory. Although questions can be answered in various ways in science, there are only a handful of ways to answer them.[37] The inner logic of science is such that scientists are constrained in a more fundamental sense; not only are they bequeathed a problem-situation, its structure imposes severe restrictions upon the responses of scientists to it. But these restrictions are not extra-logical as the sociologists of science claim.

This discussion will not be complete without a reference to the Kuhnian model of paradigm-based research which attributes arationality (if not irrationality) to scientific theory-choice. I shall not go into any exposition of

Kuhn's view (it is so well-known now) but only point out its limitations in connection with Laudan's reticulated model of rationality.

Kuhn's Epistemological Relativism versus Laudan's Reticulated Model of Scientific Rationality

The kind of epistemological relativism Kuhn's view seems to espouse contains the claim that, while there are typically some good reasons for theory-change in science, there are often equally good reasons for adhering to the other theory. The thesis of such 'moderate relativism'[38] is that scientific change is typically underdetermined by good reasons. It paves the path for a 'sociological relativism which claims that the explanation of scientific development or agreement requires an ineliminable sociological component to explain why scientists agree to make theory-changes which are underdetermined by the good reasons in their favour'. Laudan calls such situations cases of 'local determinations', and rejects the relevance of 'moderate relativism' to an adequate conception of scientific rationality. He does that by the way of[39] dissecting the Holistic Picutre of scientific change'—and dissection is what he has done.

Laudan classifies four kinds of argument in Kuhn for defending the thesis of local determination, none of which are acceptable. The arguments are as follows:

(1) The 'ambiguity' of shared standards arguments;
(2) The internal inconsistency argument;
(3) The shifting standards argument; and
(4) The problem-weighting argument.

I shall briefly discuss these arguments and their inadequacies partly by following Laudan's line and partly by my own. Of course, they often overlap.

(1) It seems to imply that scientists often can interpret methodological rules, so as to 'rationalize' their own paradigmatic preferences. They can do so, because such rules are often ambiguous and 'imprecise'. So, it appears that Kuhn wants to curtail the importance of methodological rules and the standards in scientific choice. He also likes to inject some psychological factors into the choice. 'I continue to hold', Kuhn says, 'that the algorithms of individuals are all ultimately different by virtue of the *subjective* considerations with which each (scientist) must complete the objective criteria before any computations can be done'.[40] For lack of space, it is not possible to refute this point more elaborately. But this much can be said that, although some rules are not sufficiently decisive, there are many which can clearly indicate what conditions a theory has to satisfy. I can recall Popper's dictum 'more content and precise a theory is, more its rationality (falsifiability) value as a scientific theory'.

(2) By 'collective inconsistency of rules', Kuhn means that scientists sharing the same standards may often end up in choosing two rival (and, therefore, incompatible) theories, because many methodological standards do pull in different directions and scientists may go whichever way they like. Kuhn makes (from a handful of *actual* cases) a stronger claim that such is the nature of any set of rules or standards which any group of reasonable scientists might accept. This is a very serious charge and very weak, because even from actual scientific tradition we can cite examples of false theories which are self-consistent. Take the example of Descartes' vortex theory of motion. It is an extreme example of not only false but almost impossible picture of reality, but there is no internal inconsistency in it. Space is extended in Cartesian universe; therefore, a constant 'push' mechanism is conjectured to explain motion in a universe without an empty space.

(3) This argument claims that with a paradigm-change there occur 'changes in the standards governing permissible problems, concepts and explanations'.[41] This again leads to serious consequences. If Kuhn is right, then scientists belonging to rival paradigms can never reach consensus, because they use different standards of appraisal. Laudan's merit lies in refuting this irresolvability of scientific issues by introducing 'piecemeal change' mechanism which does not assume that factual disagreements can only be resolved by the methodological rules, and any dispute at the latter level can only be resolved at the higher axiological level. Change in his model* can happen at any stage, thus resolving a problem. Justification can flow downward as well as upward. I shall come back to this model later.

(4) Kuhn phrases this problem as follows: 'Scientific controversies between the advocates of rival paradigms involve the question: which *problem* is it more significant to have solved?'[42] He thinks that partisans of different paradigms often disagree about which problem it is more important to solve. As Laudan says 'we need to dissect' it (meaning this point) at a more basic level.[43]

Now, Kuhn appears to be right that there are different ways in which a problem may be important to a scientist—economic, social, personal curiosity. Many other reasons may motivate a scientist to a particular problem. But these senses of importance have no particular 'epistemic or probative significance'. Popper cries his voice hoarse in protestation that these considerations are of no relevance for a theory-choice. He calls this analysis 'psychological'. Kuhn's thesis presumably would be that there is no rational way of deciding the assigning of epistemic weight. So we cannot say which scientist's epistemic claim is greater by their choice of particular problems: but this is wrong. The primary function of scientific epistemology is to inquire and assess relative importance of different scientific problems. It is true that sometimes a problem remains obscure due to the lack of a theory to assess it. But the 'whole point of the theory of evidence is to desubjectify the assignment of evidential significance' by indicating the kinds of reasons that can legiti-

*See the diagram on p. 112.



mately be given for attaching a particular degree of epistemic importance to a confirming or refuting instance.[44] As I have already suggested in the first section, the claim to (knowledge) solve a problem by a theory can only be established when it can furnish sufficient evidence (or reasons) for it. Reasons for epistemic preference are completely independent of any socio-psychological factors.

Assignment of importance to a certain problem can only be called rational when it can show that 'there are viable methodological and epistemological grounds for assigning that degree of importance rather than another'.[45]

Kuhn and Doppelt[46] share another thesis: during any paradigm-change, there is always found to be cases of 'epistemic loss'. Therefore, we cannot say that a new theory is 'better' or science is progressive. Their pet example is Daltonian theory. It is true that pre-Daltonian chemistry of the phlogiston-theory and the theory of elective affinity answered many questions and solved many problems which nineteenth-century Daltonian chemists could not explain.

On the other hand, Daltonian chemistry can explain many others which the previous theory could not. Kuhn concludes that advocates of new and old paradigms will necessarily be unable to make proper assessment of each other's paradigms. This argument is false. Kuhn's conclusion does not follow from the premise of epistemic 'loss' or 'gain'. Laudan thinks that Kuhn-Doppelt thesis follows from a wrong assumption. The assumption is that 'the centrality of a problem on one's explanatory agenda necessarily entails one's assigning a high degree of epistemic or probative weight to that problem...'.[47] The most probative of epistemic weights are attached to those observations of a scientist which constitute 'severe' tests for a theory. A test devised by the scientist achieves importance not by solving problems but when it involves what is called 'startling' predictions of the theory. Contrary to Kuhn, most theories demand that credit should not be assigned on the basis of solving problems the theories are designed to solve, but by corroborating new predictions. Popper calls it 'extracorroborative value' of a theory. Both Kuhn and Doppelt are short-sighted to miss this important epistemic aspect of theory-appraisal and fall short of giving an adequate account of theory-choice in extra-sociological terms.

Although Laudan rejects the relativistic account of scientific (change and) rationality, he does not fully accept what he calls 'the hierarchical model of rationality' either. The key concepts he uses for showing the difference of his model are 'consensus' and 'dissensus', which is roughly similar to Kuhn's 'normal science' and the 'crisis period'.

Laudan argues that both the heirarchical model (Popper, Hempel) and the relativistic model give implausible accounts of scientific aims. The heirarchical model makes the possibility of rational consensus dependent upon the gratuitous assumption of fixed, universal, unchanging scientific aims. Relativism, on the other hand, recognizes that scientific disagreement (and change)

affects the very aims of science, but it implausibly argues from the fact of 'value dissensus' concerning aims to the impossibility of rational consensus on aims in science. From Laudan's standpoint both positions obscure the nature of scientific reasoning concerning scientific aims and standards in which one or more of these elements is rationally revised in order to better accommodate or increase the epistemic credibility of every thing else accepted by the science of the day—its theories, methods, techniques, standards, etc.[48] This is, in a nutshell, the model of Laudan's Reticulation Model.

Laudan's central insight in this context is that epistemic credibility in science does not *only* flow downward from aims to methodological rules and from these rules to empirical beliefs as the hierarchical models insist.[49] On the contrary, well-entrenched theories of beliefs can also provide good reasons for the acceptance (or rejection) of methodological standards and the highest order scientific aims as well. This occurs, for example, when the aims or methodological standards accepted by scientists either (*a*) repeatedly fail to generate theories which satisfy them or (*b*) turn out to be inconsistent with the theories actually developed and accepted by scientists. In such cases, the substantive scientific beliefs accepted by scientists provide good reasons for rejecting or modifying their aims or methodological rules, new aims or standards or priorities among them become rational to accept on the basis of the theories enjoying the greatest credibility and promise among scientists at the same time.

In the present context, it is not possible or necessary to give a critical account of Laudan's model (that needs a complete paper). But it seems that, as he does not either accept that scientific aims or ideals are fixed (in the cases when he thinks hierarchical model is adequate) or that certain aim is built into the acceptance of a paradigm (as Kuhn presumes), he requires some independent account of the rationality of certain scientific aims. He seems to assume the rationality of agreed—upon scientific aims. This is indicated when he claims that scientific epistemology, properly understood, is an 'empirical discipline' which requires a 'naturalistic theory' of scientific knowledge. But scientific epistemology cannot be conceived as an empirical discipline as Laudan himself recognizes that scientific aims undergo change, conflict, disagreements. In fact, he faces the Kuhnian challenge to show how a change in fundamental scientific aims and values could be rational. The key question is what must any conception of rational scientific change show about that change in order to establish its rationality. Laudan's naturalistic account of (gradualist) scientific rationality is inadequate, unless he entrenches it with a theory of rationality. This may lead him to make a major concession to Kuhnian type of 'moderate relativism'.

III

In the words of Karl Popper: 'It is the method of science, the method of critical discussion, which makes it possible for us to transcend not only our culturally acquired, but even our inborn frameworks.'[50]

The above statement of Popper has come under severe challenges from various standpoints that can be put under the general umbrella of historicism. Contemporary philosophy of science is plagued with innumerable controversies regarding the issue of rationality of science. The amount of literature on the subject is indicative of the crisis. Part of the problem lies, I think, in a sort of confusion about certain questions regarding the issue (as I have already indicated in Section I). Before I try to disentangle the skein, let me put the questions first. The main question is: what constitutes the rationality of science? And the other is: is science, in fact, rational.[51]

The question of the first type is a normative question, calling forth for standards, norms and methodological rules, while the second question is clearly an empirical one to be answered by historical, sociological and other extra-logical factors. Now, once we disambiguate these two questions, it appears that all scientific debates and disputes are debates about the kinds of evidence, reason and standards. A Daltonian and a pre-Daltonian, disputing the importance of a surprising measurement of weight during combustion, challenge only the reasons or evidence of the other but not rationality of science itself. Scientific debate implies debate about sufficient and appropriate reasons for holding one theory or other. The philosophical storm that has been started by Kuhn and fanned by Feyerabend and many others seems to blur our vision about this basic issue. They are right in their basic intuition that proliferation of theories is more desirable than unanimity. But proliferation itself does not entail that all of them are equally rational. Most of the participants in a debate between rival theories claim that their views are based on better grounds, because their belief-acquisition is scientific, i.e. their beliefs are acquired through a better method. Scientific method is the method of commitment only to evidence/reason—such as testability, objectivity, etc.—which is guranteed by the methodological rules. Evidence is conceptually related to hypothesis *h* in such a way that it justifies our believing, accepting, pursuing *h*. Thus, evidence and reason are conceptually related as rationality is related to science. Therefore, scientific method *only* secures rationality of science, but does not specify the constituents of rationality *per se*. That remains to be part of an epistemological enterprise.

The second question raises an empirical issue, and it may also involve debate depending on the standard one chooses. But the confusion between these two questions results from a tradition of overrated emphasis on historical account stated by Kuhn (Polanyi is an often-forgotten name in this context, but he also suggests this kind of explanation). Their principal witness is history. Insufficiency of the account of scientific growth is argued by showing negative analysis of, say, the method of enumerative induction, gradual accretion, etc. The main pillar of the historicist's powerblock is threefold:

—theories are incommensurable
—theories are underdetermined by evidences in their favour
—there is epistemic loss in theory-change

As Kuhn says, we do not find 'an algorithm able to dictate rational unanimous choice'.[52] Indeed, we do not, because we do not need a precision of that degree; a rational agreement is possible on an assessment of various appraisal-criteria. Even if Kuhn and his followers are granted that so far all attempts (rather a big concession!) have failed to give an adequate epistemological account of science, that kind of negative analysis can accrue only the non-rationality of scientific beliefs (theories), not that of scientific inquiry. It is perhaps in this sense that Carnap espouses timelessness of standards of theory-choice (which Hempel rejects). The commitment to evidential support is time-independent, while particular principles of evidences/reasons are time-relative.

Now, even after we distinguish between the two issues—science as a method being rational and the question what makes an evidence or reason rational—the more difficult task still remains to be undertaken, namely, what is a good reason for a scientific belief? I have already indicated, as it is an epistemological issue, that science, rather philosophy of science, is basically an epistemological inquiry. Popper is right about this fundamental point. It is the primary concern of a philosopher of science to develop a general account of the warrant of scientific reasons that would enable us to determine whether or not, in any given case, the reasons offered for a hypothesis actually afford warrant to that hypothesis. Moreover, acceptance of our first question does not necessarily contain acceptance of the second. One can be either indifferent to the issue, or else make a stronger claim by accepting a positive answer to the second question. The latter is a realist's position. But that position also requires a theory of truth or at least an account of progress in science.

Kuhn also recognizes that more often than not 'later scientific theories are better than earlier ones'. So, he concedes to the realist that 'this is not a relativist's position, and it displays the sense in which I am a convinced believer in *Scientific Progress*'.[53] A realist is required to give an account of progress, but it is not necessarily the only possible stance. In arguing against the approach-to-truth view, Laudan gives an account of science as 'problem-solving rather than a truth-seeking' enterprise.[54] By 'problem-solving effectiveness' he means 'the number and importance of the empirical problems which the theory solves and deducing therefrom the number and importance of the anomalies and conceptual problems which the theory generates'.[55] This is an instrumentalist view of progress without any commitment to truth. It faces many of the general difficulties of an instrumentalist view in addition to the internal difficulties of Laudan's own formulation.[56]

One of the important difficulties is that it might make a theory trivial. Since everything follows from an inconsistent theory, it is possible to generate some 'problem-solving' consequence also. But that formal difficulty can be solved by blocking the possibility by pointing out that inconsistent theories involve many other difficulties. A far more serious difficulty is that, if a theory gets credit (for being rational or progressive) only *after* its effectiveness is

observed by empirical success, then Laudan cannot avoid the implication that the aim of science is to make not *only* rational but also true predictions. As Niniluoto observes: 'If we disregard issues about the truth-values of predictions, then non-scientific predictive devices (horoscopes, crystal balls, cards, etc.) could have a very high problem-solving ability.'[57]

To define scientific progress in terms of a cognitive enterprise, then, requires a notion of truth or at least verisimilitude. Both these notions, again, involve many conceptual problems. Niniluoto's recent thesis of 'truth-likeness' or 'highly truth-like information' about reality seems to me a good move. The notion is based on but an improved version of Popper's notion of verisimilitude. The latter includes falsity content also as a part of *vs* of a theory T in a way such that *vs* of a theory $T = Ct_t\, T - Ct_f\, T$ and

$$vs \text{ of } T^1 > vs\ T^2$$
$$\textit{iff}\quad Ct_t\, T^1 > Ct_t\, T^2 \text{ but}$$
$$Ct_f\, T^1 < Ct_f\, T^2$$

this notion of *vs*, in terms of both truth and falsity content, generates many problems.[58] The version of truth-likeness, however, remains less problematic. As Niniluoto says: 'My distinction between real and estimated truthlikeness and the corresponding distinction between real and estimated progress' gives a sufficient cognitive criterion for a decision to prefer theories *h* which have a higher value of estimated verisimilitude than their rivals given evidence *e*. This account is quite agreeable to our traditional intuition of rationality in science. Without going into the formalized definition of truth-likeness Niniluoto offers,[59] we can understand real truth-likeness as the absolute or logical truth-likeness and estimated truth-likeness as the epistemic truth-likeness contingent upon the evidence *e*. This distinction also blocks the kind of objection Laudan raises, namely, it follows from this theory that an empirically successful (i.e. having high estimated truth-likeness) theory has to be referential. But there are many empirically successful theories such as the ether theory of the nineteenth-century atomism whose central terms are not referential. Laudan's criticism applies only to absolute truth-likeness; and the epistemic type truth-likeness does not require the epistemic criterion to be infallible, for all our knowledge about matters of fact is fallible. Thus, 'it is possible that ver(h/e) is high but ver(h/e&e′) where *e′* is a new evidence, is not high', which means that it is not rational any more on evidence *e* & *e′*, while it is rational to hold it only on *e*.

The upshot of this truncated debate about the notion of rationality and its relevance to truth and scientific method as pre-eminently a cognitive activity is that we can dispense with a certain kind of principle or/and evidence as not rational but cannot do so with the very notion of it; it is built into the concept of science as a cognitive enterprise. Apart from its theoretical concepts (i.e. domain of objects), science also involves some operational predicates basic for each theoretical domain. It is also possible to hold that scientific progress is not unilinear.[60]

Proliferation of theories does not only eliminate errors of earlier theories but may add up to it, at least conceptually. The possibility of Non-Euclidean Geometry not only paved the way for understanding celestial geometry (of spheres) but also expanded the horizon of geometrical concepts. An adequate philosophy of science must show, as D. Shapere thinks:'...how is it possible that we *might* know, without guaranteeing that we *must* know'.[61] Historicist approach, in its war against structuralism, ignores the possibility of a rational but non-justificationist model of scientific knowledge.

The only way to keep the sceptic away is not by hitting him on the head; we may simply close the door on his face for the time being.

Notes and References

1. See K. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, 1959; *Conjectures and Refutations*, 1963; *Objective Knowledge*, 1972.
2. See Chap. I in D.C. Stove, *Popper and After*, 1982, for a vituperative criticism for using words in such a way.
3. I. Lakatos, 'Methodological Research Programme' in Lakatos and Musgrave (eds.), *The Criticism and Growth of Knowledge*, London, 1970.
4. For such criticism, see sec. 3-4 in B. Bernstein, *T. S. Kuhn and Social Science*, 1982.
5. I. Lakatos, *op. cit*, p. 59.
6. I. Lakatos, *op. cit*, p. 92.
7. I. Lakatos, *op. cit*, p. 179.
8. P. Heirgreaves in a review of *Against Method* in *Telos* (Spring 1976, p. 224) says that Feyerabend 'openly welcomes the charge of irrationalism'.
9. P. Feyerabend, 'Consolations for the Specialist' in Lakatos and Musgrave (eds.), *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, London, 1970, p. 200.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 215.
11. P. Feyerabend, *Against Method*, 1970, p. 112.
12. *Ibid.*, Appendix 2.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 87.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 199.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 199.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 223.
17. P. Feyerabend, 'Consolation for the Specialist' in Lakatos and Musgrave (eds.), *Criticism and Growth of Knowledge*, London, 1970, p. 227.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 219.
19. T.S. Kuhn, 'Reflection on My Critics', *Ibid.*, p. 264.
20. C.G. Hempel, 'Scientific Rationality: Analytic vs Pragmatic Perspectives' in T.G. Gereats (ed)., *Rationality Today*, 1979, p. 51.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
22. L. Laudan endorses this conception of instrumental rationality, though he differs from Hempel regarding the goal of science.
23. See W.C. Salmon, 'Carl G. Hempel on "The Rationality of Science"' in *Journal of Philosophy*, 80, 1983, pp. 555-62. T.S. Kuhn, 'Rationality and Theory-Choice' in *Journal of Philosophy*, 80, 1983, pp. 563-71; and also Hempel's paper in the 'symposium', 'The Philosophy of C.G. Hempel' in *Journal of Philosophy*, 80, 1983.
24. C.G. Hempel, 'Valuation and Objectivity' in Cohen and Laudan (eds), *Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis*, 1983, p. 91 (italics are mine).
25. C.G. Hempel, *op. cit.*, 1979, p. 51 (italics are mine).

26. *Ibid.*
27. D. Bloor, in *Knowledge and Social Imagery*, London, 1976 and 'The Strengths of the Strong Programme' in *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 11, 1981. D. Bloor has developed such a programme.
28. L. Laudan, 'The Pseudo-Science of Science?' in *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 11, 1981 and 'More on Bloor' in *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 12, 1982.
29. D. Bloor, 'The Strengths of the Strong Programme', *op. cit.*, 1981.
30. D. Bloor, *op. cit.*, 1981, p. 207 (italics mine).
31. D. Bloor, *op. cit.*, 1981, p. 208.
32. L. Laudan, 'More on Bloor', *op. cit.*, p. 73.
33. L. Boon, Review of *Knowledge and Imagery* in *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 30, 1979.
34. Laudan subscribes to such a view. See his *Progress and Its Problems*, 1977, p. 187.
35. D. Bloor, *op. cit.*, 1981, p. 210.
36. A. Koyre, *Newtonian Studies*, 1965.
37. See J.N. Hattiangadi, 'A Methodology without Methodological Rules' in *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 1982.
38. The term is due to G. Doppelt, 'Kuhn's Epistemological Relativism' in Meiland and M. Krausz (eds.), *Relativism, Cognitive and Moral.*
39. L. Laudan, *Science and Values*, Berkeley, 1984. Chapter four of this book has this title.
40. T.S. Kuhn, *The Essential Tensions*, 1977, p. 329.
41. *Ibid.*, 1977, p. 325.
42. T.S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolution*, 1962, p. 110.
43. L. Laudan, *Science and Values*, Berkeley, 1984, p. 97.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 98.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
46. Doppelt is an ardent follower of Kuhn; he analyses and supplements many Kuhnian theses with good arguments and examples.
47. L. Laudan, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
48. See L. Laudan, Chap. 5 of *Science and Values*, Berkeley, 1984.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.
50. K. Popper, 'The Myth of the Framework' in Eugene Freeman (ed.), *The Abdication of Philosophy and the Public Good*, 1976.
51. I owe the formulation of these two questions to Herbert Seigel; the interpretation, addition and alteration, however, is mine.
52. T.S. Kuhn, *The Essential Tensions*, Chicago, 1978.
53. T.S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* (2nd edn.), 1970, p. 206.
54. L. Laudan, *op. cit.*, pp. 7, 70.
55. L. Laudan, *op. cit.*, 1977, p. 68.
56. For such criticisms see: A. Lugg, 'Laudan and the Problem-solving Approach to Scientific Progress and Rationality', in *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 9 (1979), 466-74; H. Sarkar, 'Truth, Problem-solving and Methodology' in *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, 12, 1981, 61-74; I. Niniluoto, *Is Science Progressive?*, 1984, Chap. 7; A. Musgrave, 'Problems with Progress' in *Synthese*, 42, 1979, p. 443-64.
57. I. Niniluoto, *Is Science Progressive?*, 1984, p. 165.
58. Popper himself discovers the difficulties. See J. Agassi, 'To Save Verisimilitude' in *Mind*, 1981, for an attempt to save it. See also the paper by Hattiangadi in *Mind*, 1982, for a further criticism.
59. I. Niniluoto, *op. cit.*, 1984.
60. For such a view, see E. Agazzi, 'Commensurability, Incommensurability, and Cumulativity in Scientific Knowledge', in *Erkenntnis*, 22, 1985.
61. Dudley Shapere, *Reason and the Search for Knowledge*, Dordrecht, 1984.

Knowledge, reason and human autonomy: A review article*

DAYA KRISHNA
Rajasthan University, Jaipur

I

Prof. N.V. Banerjee was one of those rare persons on the Indian philosophical scene who devoted himself single-mindedly to philosophical reflection without caring much for illusory attractions of power which most academicians seek in India by rising (or falling?) to positions of administrative authority in the official educational establishment of the country. Whenever one dropped in at his residence near the Delhi University area where he lived after his retirement, one would find him working on some latest book of his, out of which he would read a few pages which would always reveal the freshness of his approach and the seriousness of his concern for philosophical issues that was so conspicuously missing in many of his contemporaries. Most people lose interest in intellectual matters as they grow older; many actually 'retire' from intellectual life after retirement; many other just go on repeating what they had said earlier. Not so, Prof. N.V. Banerjee. He continued to think and grow and write till almost the end of his life. His was the life of an active mind and the last work of his, posthumously published, shows him at the height of his powers as a philosophical thinker who had to say something of his own.

Published in 1985—a year after his death in 1984 at the age of eighty-seven—this book brings many of the themes of his earlier work into a new focus and a new unity which not only stands apart but is also, in many ways, independent of his earlier work. The diverse strands found in the earlier work are not only brought together and unified in a new way, but many new ideas are brought to enrich the whole which is the result of deep and sustained thought spread over a life-time.

Prof. Banerjee's thought is 'anthropocentric' in the best sense of the term. Whether we like it or not, we *are* there and we are aware that *we* are there. The very starting point of Banerjee's philosophical reflection is, thus, not the isolated Cartesian *cogito*, or the Husserlian 'transcendental ego' which has 'bracketed' the world, or the pure *puruṣa* of *Sāṁkhya* who is the eternal subject which can never be an object to itself or know that there are other *puruṣas* in the world besides itself, or the Advaitic Ātman which has no other or the non-Advaitic Ātmans which have an essential relationship only with

*N.V. Banerjee, *Knowledge, Reason and Human Autonomy*, Bombay, Somaiya Publications Pvt. Ltd. 1985.

the Lord and which either have no knowledge of other selves or know them only as fellow-devotees who are totally immersed in some form or other of the *bhakti* of the divine. Rather, it is man in the plural—man not as 'I' but as 'we', the 'we's'—who alone may communicate and have a dialogue or rather a 'multi-logue' amongst themselves. There is, of course, the whole inanimate world of nature and the living world of animals and plants with which he is in some sort of relationship also. Banerjee's distinction between the relationship at these different levels is in terms of the possibility of communication as well as its degree and mutuality. Inanimate nature, thus, is a 'bare other' to us as any manner of intercommunication between man and nature seems impossible. There may, of course, be 'empathy', 'whether purely natural as in the case of primitive man or predominantly aesthetic as in the case of the poet or the artist'.[1] Strangely, Banerjee also thinks that the 'otherness' of nature may also be construed as 'hostility' on the part of nature, particularly in the context of 'the rigour of the biological law of survival to which he is unavoidably subject'.[2]

The problem of communication between man and animate nature, specially with that part of it which has been brought into human orbit by domestication and keeping of pets, is considered by our philosopher, though only marginally. The plant world is, of course, totally ignored. The animal world is all lumped together, and not much attention is paid to the difference in communication that man is able to establish with some of the so-called higher species as against all others. However, a significant point is made when it is suggested that, even though linguistic intercommunication is not possible between man and animals, interbehavioural communication is possible. And, instead of the relation of 'empathy' which man develops towards inanimate nature in order to overcome its essential 'otherness', the relation with animate nature is characterized by 'sympathy'. And just as there can be a feeling that nature is 'hostile' to man, so also there may be such feeling with respect to the animal world. Only, in their case, the relationship of 'hostility' may be mutual, as it normally cannot obtain between man and nature. The relation with the animal world is, thus, characterized either by sympathy or hostility or even indifference—the last being existentially different from what he has called 'non-hostility' to nature.

The possible relationships between the human and the animal world are, in a sense, reproduced in the relationships within the human world, but only, so to say, at the animal level. The strictly human relationship is essentially beyond these; it lies in what he has called their '*essentiality to one another*'.[3] The so-called 'we' of the human situation with which we all start is not 'I and others', but rather 'I *with* others' where the word 'with' is supposed to undo the alienation implied by the word 'other'.[4] Man's relationship with man operates, thus, at a dual level, the animal, that is, the vital-biological, and the strictly human. The former is the inevitable result of his 'unavoidable biological birth' and makes him treat others as he treats the other non-human

species, that is, the animals. The latter, on the other hand, is a 'demand' on him of which he is vaguely aware and in whose realization his essential being may be actually said to consist in.

The varieties of 'otherness' and the diversities in modes of relationship with respect to it and the ways of its annulment is, then, the focus of Banerjee's inquiry. Everything is anthropocentric from the beginning, and, in fact, cannot but be so. Man is at the centre of philosophical enquiry, but not the isolated, lonely, monadic man of most philosophical thinking, or even the socio-political man of Aristotle or Confucius or Marx or Manu; but rather a being who has a relation of 'essentiality' with all other human beings; and who is somehow allergic to 'otherness' and tries to overcome it in one way or another. 'Basic otherness', is what characterizes inanimate nature in relation to man as he cannot communicate with it in human terms at all. Man relates to it in terms of knowledge, according to Banerjee, and the 'otherness' of the 'other' is sought to be removed by *empathy* 'which enables man to project his personality into what is an "other" to him and thereby make him feel his community with the latter'.[5] If empathy is the way in which the 'otherness' of the inorganic world is sought to be overcome, then 'sympathy' is the way through which the 'otherness' is attempted to be overcome in respect of living beings with whom one can enter 'into linguistic intercommunication or at least inter-behavioural relation'.[6] It is the latter, that is, the inter-behavioural relationship which brings the animal world within the scope of human sympathy and excludes the plant world from it, even though the latter is as much a part of the living world as the former. However, 'sympathy', even when it is confined to human beings, is essentially a one-sided affair and does not involve mutuality. Also, as 'the object of sympathy, whether an animal or a human being, is, after all, an *object*', it 'can by no stretch of imagination be regarded as strictly human'.[7]

If neither empathy nor sympathy can overcome the 'otherness' of the other, then can anything else do so? Communication is one way of overcoming the otherness. But communication may consist in the impartation of information about things or oneself, or in some cases about the feelings of persons. 'Sharing of feeling' is one way of overcoming 'otherness' and bridges the alienation between man and man. But, while sharing of feeling may help in overcoming of 'otherness', it may also, so to say, unite a particular group, whether it be a tribe, community, race or nation *against* other groups; and thus 'contribute to the aggravation of *otherness*' proving 'ruinous to the cause of the establishment of human relations'.[8] Also, feelings and emotions are both evanescent and contingent, that is, dependent upon some situation, and hence can hardly be relied upon as means for 'the establishment of fellowship among individuals'.[9]

Treating knowledge as totally irrelevant to the situation as it essentially presupposes the 'otherness' of the object in order to exercise its function, and disappointed with feelings and emotions for the reasons mentioned above,

Banerjee turns to Will in the hope that he might find in it the clue to the solution of the problem he has set for himself. But Will, for Banerjee, is not just something concerned with action in the restricted sense of the term, as it has usually been understood in philosophical literature. Rather, it is seen as taking diverse forms such as the *Will to create*, the *Will to believe*, and the *Will to adjust* which lie, according to him, at the foundations of art, religion and morality—the three great adventures of the human mind 'which, in the last analysis, are but man's *immediate* attempts to establish communion between himself and his fellows'.[10]

But do these three enterprises of the human spirit succeed in offering 'any solution to the most human of all human problems—the problem of the conquest of otherness'?[11] The whole of the Part II of the book is devoted to an exploration of the answer to this question. As for art, Banerjee's conclusion is that, though 'artistic appreciation brings about an extraordinary and indeed a unique relation between the appreciator and the artist as represented by his work of art', the two, placed in this relation, remain basically 'external to each other, with the result that the problem of the conquest of *otherness* is left unresolved'.[12] As for the work of art itself, it essentially consists, for Banerjee, in 'the attempt to translate, in one manner or another, the ethereal vision of perfect adjustment or harmony into some *perceptible form* or other'.[13] Now, this 'vision of perfect harmony which is essential to artisitic creativity implies *transcendence*... from the world of change of which he himself is a part' and hence 'in art man finds a way of escape from the tyranny of time in the sense of the temporal series'. 'His refuge', here, 'however, is not the timeless or the eternal, but the *specious present* which is but the syncopation of the temporal series through the absorption of the *before* and the *after* in the *now*.'[14] Thus, neither the person who creates nor the person who appreciates is able to overcome the 'otherness'—the task which was sought to be attempted through the pursuit of art by man.

Does religion as the 'Will to believe' or morality as the 'Will to adjust', then, fare any better than art in the fundamental task which has been set for humanity or which humanity has set for itself, and without whose fulfilment the central problem of all human life will remain unresolved? Religion, for Banerjee, is basically rooted in the primal fear of annihilation, on the one hand, and the sense of the mysterious, on the other. The solution that religion builds out of these two is to posit a realm of the supernatural, and thus provide a transcendental solution to the foundational problem which hardly touches the essentially human dimension of the problem. The basic issue in this context for Banerjee is how religion, in whatever way it may be imagined, conceives of the relation between man and man and not between man and God or between man and himself which seem to have been the central concerns of most religions up till now. Seen in this perspective, the religious quest of man seems to be wanting in essential respects. First, it seems to be concerned too much with personal immortality and/or personal liberation or salvation. Secondly, its relation to other human beings is basically minimal, indirect and instrumental. Also, the relation between a religious person, whether he be God-centric or Self-centric (the self with a capital S), and the other is basically that of a *Guru* and *Śiṣya* or master and disciple, that is, essentially asymmetrical. The religious solution to the problem of the conquest of 'otherness' thus is primarily transcendental, that is, tangential in character.

But, while both art and religion may be treated as tangential solutions to the essential problem of man as seen by Banerjee, how can the same be said about morality which, at least *prima facie*, seems to be concerned directly with the problem itself. The basic problem with both art and religion was that they were 'attempts to solve the problem in question through the intermediary of a system of symbols regarded as an extraordinary dimension of reality, *instead of in and through the ordinary sphere of human behaviour*.'[15] But that is exactly what morality seeks to do, that is, concern itself with the ordinary, day-to-day, world of interpersonal behaviour of man. But, for Banerjee, this is only an apparent or seeming superiority, for 'owing to a certain peculiarity of its nature, the solution in its case, as in the case of aesthetic and religious experience, cannot but be indirect.'[16] And, if something is not direct and immediate, it cannot count as a real solution for Banerjee.

There is, however, a basic distinction between moral experience and religious experience for Banerjee, as the former is essentially non-judgemental for him unlike the latter which consists in judgements of belief. In this respect, moral experience is closer to aesthetic experience as both are non-judgemental in nature according to his analysis, and he treats them as such. The difference between the two, according to him, is that, while aesthetic experience is still *epistemic* as it is 'nothing apart from the contemplation of beauty in some perceptible form or other',[17] moral experience is activistic in character. Moral experience, then, is not only non-judgemental, non-epistemic and activist but activist in a sense which is primarily intentional in character rather than as indicating the actual behaviour in which it embodies itself. As he writes, commending Kant: '... moral experience, despite the fact that it is *activistic*, primarily refers to a disposition of the human mind and not to overt acts and their consequences..'[18] The overt behaviour is basically secondary to the actor and becomes *primary* only to the onlooker or to those who are affected by the action, thus becoming the subject of moral judgements from their point of view. Perhaps, this is the reason why Banerjee thinks that the solution offered by morality to the essential problem of man is also not satisfactory, for it results in 'the anomaly which consists in that man is a person and yet appears not to be a person but a *mere* individual to others'.[19]

Such a situation requires one to distinguish between 'the demands that arise in, and are confined within the limitations of man as *mere* individual and the demand for the mere individual's being the person that man essentially is'[20] and the conflicts within and between the two realms. Banerjee further distinguishes between the demands 'confined within the limitations of the

mere individual' which are bound to be many and various and 'the demand for this very individual's being the person'[21] which cannot but be just one and only one by its very nature. Further, while the former have power, but no authority; the latter has authority, but no power. Thus, 'it is evident that the conflict ... is, in the final analysis, between *power* and *authority*'.[22] And it is this conflict which lies at the heart of that feeling of constraint which is essential to moral experience distinguishing it from those which are non-moral in character. The conflict and the constraint engendered thereby are sought to be resolved by formulation of 'certain standards or patterns of human behaviour in terms of certain *rules* of conduct' which 'play the same role of an *intermediary* in the field of morality as is done by relevant symbolic systems in the fields of art and religion'.[23] But while 'an intermediary in the shape of some symbolic system or other is an essential need of both aesthetic and religious experience, *the admission of such things as standards or patterns of human behaviour is ruinous to moral experience in the manner of the denial of its essential directness*'.[24] And this abrogation of 'directness' is the only reason given by Banerjee for the inability of moral experience to solve the fundamental problem of overcoming 'otherness', and thereby becoming a 'person' in the genuine sense of the term.

At this point, one may wonder that, if knowledge is irrelevant to the solution of the human problem and if art, religion and morality are only escapes from attempting to solve the problem, what else would fill the bill? Or, in other words, what surprise Banerjee has up his sleeve or what miraculous solution has he to offer to a problem which seems to have been formulated in terms that appear to render its solution impossible in principle? But, like a good story-teller, he keeps the reader in suspense, and takes a detour to discuss whether the human situation has been radically altered by the new phase in which science and technology dominate the scene and art, religion and morality seem to have taken a back seat.

The radical change in the human situation in the context of which the basic human task of becoming a person through the conquest of 'otherness' in respect of his fellow human beings is articulated by Banerjee in terms of what he calls 'the advancement of the "understanding of what is known."'[25] Knowledge, for Banerjee, is essentially 'perceptual knowledge', which is rooted in 'basic otherness' and 'mere otherness', and which man shares with animals, barring some minor differences which derive from the type of perceptual structures that he possesses as a matter of biological heritage. Such knowledge 'in the case of man as well as in the case of animals is invariably an *occasion* for the occurrence of overt actions or else the arousal of the tendency to act'.[26] However, the distinction between man and animal in this respect, according to Banerjee, is that in man there is the additional 'demand for the *understanding* of whatever is known'. And it is this demand which leads to science, mathematics and logic. But, 'understanding', for Banerjee, is not purely cognitive in nature as both rationalists and empiricists have

tended to conceive it. Rather, it 'is a bi-dimensional faculty, being cognitive-performatory'. Not only this, it is also essentially social in character, and thus leads to what he calls 'technology-science'. In his own words: '... the possibility of technology-science is dependent upon understanding regarded as both *cognitive* and *performatory* on the one hand, and charactistically *social* on the other.'[27] But this 'sociality is no conquest over egoity, but, on the contrary, amounts to the enlargement or expansion of egoity'.[28] And, in a sense, this expansion of egoity tends to overcome some of the intrinsic limitations involved in the egoity of man as a mere individual. Understanding, thus, as technology-science, is to be seen as the attempt on the part of the expanded egoity of man to exploit nature, and, in the process, also to learn to exploit other societies, other men.

Understanding, then, like the vital drives at the individual level, is allied to power which has both a positive and a negative aspect: positive in that it is necessary for survival and progress; and negative in that it leads to exploitation and dehumanization. But, in order that the strictly human task of the overcoming of egoity and the realization of essentiality be accomplished, it is essential that there be a faculty in man other than understanding whose authority it may accept, at least to some extent. And this Banerjee finds in imagination, but imagination in his own peculiar sense of the word. Rejecting the usual classification of imagination in terms of 'productive' and 'reproductive', Banerjee raises the question as to what is the specific form and content uniquely belonging to this faculty of the human mind, and contrasts it with perception, on the one hand, and memory, on the other. Both perception and memory have a content, a variable content, and a form which, though needing to be discovered, is yet invariant in character. In the case of imagination, however, both its form and content have to be discovered and have to be the same for all persons. 'Thus Imagination', according to Banerjee, 'is that faculty of the human mind in whose case the content as well as the form are each universal without being subject to variation'.[29]

Imagination, then, is what really provides universality and unites men in an essential manner as both its form and content are one, and, thus, shared by all human individuals, however different otherwise they may be. What, then, is the form and content of imagination is one of the central questions of Banerjee's inquiry. His answer regarding the real universal form of imagination—which is not just general as concepts are, or just abstract as the entities with which logic and mathematics deal with, nor some *a priori* intuition, for all intuitions are particular—is that it is time, time understood in a particular way. Normally, time is supposed to consist of the triad before-now-after where each enjoys an equal status and the three collectively constitute its reality. But, for Banerjee, this is not so. The so-called 'now' is 'mainly concerned with perceptual knowledge', and hence may be regarded 'as the formal aspect of this kind of knowledge'.[30] 'And this means that the "now" is *essentially spatial* and, in a sense, indistinguishable from "here" which may well be regarded

as the paradigm of the spatial references involved in knowledge derivable from perception.'[31] As for 'before', it obviously seems to be related to memory, and may be regarded as its form in a certain sense, conveying basically a sense of 'absence' characterized by something 'not being here'.

Interestingly, Banerjee has some extermely perceptive and novel remarks to make with respect to space as it may be conceived in itself and space as it is seen under the influence of time. He writes:

> But, while space itself is characterised by simulaneity and is *infinitly* divisible, space as determined by the influence of time presents itself *successively* and not *simultaneously* nor as infinitely divided, but as embracing the distinctions of 'now' and 'before'.[32]

Thus, both 'before' and 'now' of the temporal triad are not purely temporal in nature, but rather 'temporalized spatial determinations', or rather space as it is apprehended under the influence of time.

What remains of the temporal triad is only 'after', and this, according to Banerjee, constitutes the real essence of time as unlike the 'before' and the 'now' it is completely non-spatial. It should, however, be understood that to think that there is, or can be, an 'after' to the 'after' itself, would be to conceive it in spatial terms, as it would make the 'after' turn into the 'now' or the 'before' once more. The 'after', thus, is ceaseless and endless, and 'its ceaselessness and endlessness imply that the "after" is one without division or break within itself or, in other words, is an undivided or unbroken whole; for division or break implies cessation or end'.[33] Yet, though time is endless in the sense of 'after', it need not be beginningless or rather 'the question whether it has a beginning or not is irrelevant in its case'.[34]

Time as 'after', thus, is the form of imagination. But, then, what is its content? The content obviously would have to be intimately connected with the form, and, as the form consists essentially of time as the endless 'after', it is bound to be something that is to be endlessly realized *by* man of something which is essentially *for* man also. And this Banerjee calls the universal plan of action which is concerned with the realization by man of his essentiality with others and rising from being a mere individual sufficient unto himself to becoming a person essentially related to everyone else.

Now, imagination with time as its form and the one universal plan of action as its content exercises an influence on understanding which is bi-dimensional in that it is both cognitive and performatory at the same time giving rise to technology-science, on the one hand, and the human enterprises of what may be called the theoretical and practical reason on the other. Understanding in the form of technology-science usually allies itself with the power of the vital drives with their assertion of strident individuality against the gentle voice and authority of imagination.

> [But] the impact of imagination upon Understanding succeeds in bringing about the disturbance of the equilibrium of the complex of performance-knowledge which characterizes Understanding and, in particular, is essential to its productivity of power. In consequence, Understanding is rendered indifferent to *power* which it is eminently fitted to beget; and it launches upon an altogether new career under the title of Reason with freedom to emphasize the importance of performance and knowledge *disjunctively* so as to function as Practical Reason on the one hand and Theoretical Reason on the other.[35]

Reason, then, whether theoretical or practical, is related both to understanding and imagination, and derives some peculiar characteristics from both.

> In virtue of its relation to Understanding Reason is left a stranger to time in its strict sense—time as 'after' which is the form of imagination. On the other hand, its relation to imagination holds it apart from the temporal triad before-now-after which constitutes the foundation of technology-science.[36]

But, then, does reason have nothing to do with time at all? Banerjee's answer is that it does have something to do with time, but only in the peculiar form of the *specious present* 'which embodies the nullification of the division of time into the "before", the "now" and the "after" and so is in a sense non-spatial as well as non-temporal'.[37] And hence reason deals with both human performance and human knowledge in the context of the *specious present* which is neither spatial nor temporal in the usual sense of the terms. As concerned with performance, it obviously cannot deal either with the universal plan of action which is the content of imagination and whose form is time as 'after'; nor particular plans of action which vary from time to time and from individual to individual as they involve the temporal triad in the form of 'before-now-after', and hence can consist of nothing but types or patterns of action. And, as actions emanate either from the Will to adjust or the Will to create or the Will to believe, 'patterns of action as well as actions themselves are of three different kinds respectively characterisable as aesthetic, religious and moral'.[38] But, as already seen, these ideal patterns of action, whether belonging to the field of morality or religion or art, may only help one in 'adjusting oneself to a life of bondage as well as possible', but not in a release from it in any essential sense of the term. But, if practical reason has failed in the task, can theoretical reason do any better?

There can be little hope from theoretical reason as it is neither concerned with 'time as after' or even with the 'temporal triad', and hence is 'unavoidably indifferent to, if not absolutely unconcerned with, the one universal plan of action as well as particular plans for action'.[39] Thus, 'Theoretical Reason, while being *of* man, is alienated *from him.*?[40] The definition of man as a

'rational animal' is, thus, doubly wrong, for reason in its theoretical aspect ignores the notion of 'agency' along with the 'universal plan of action' which is distinctive for the understanding of man. But theoretical reason seeks to render the world intelligible, and in this enterprise develops into what has come to be called 'science' these days. But, as the enterprise of rendering the world 'intelligible' presupposes 'knowledge' which Banerjee confines strictly to the realms of sense-perception and memory, it is also thereby limited to those domains where these are applicable in a pre-eminent sense. It is, therefore, in the realm of inanimate nature where man encounters 'basic otherness' and which is known primarily through sense-perception alone that science is most successful, as it is suited just for that. Thus, even 'the animal world to which man is held in the relation of mere otherness, does not admit of so rigorous a scientific investigation as does the physical world to which he is held in the relation of basic otherness'.[41] And, as for the human world, 'the realm of human beings falls outside the scope of scientific investigations, while the possibility of its being investigated in some other manner is left open'.[42]

The problem of the intelligibility of the universe, thus, is not a unitary problem for Banerjee. Rather, it is seen as divided into three radically disparate parts: the one relating to the inanimate universe, and the other two relating to the living world of animals and the human world respectively. Science is pre-eminently fitted to deal only with the first, though it claims to encompass the other two in its domain also. But, even with respect to the intelligibility of the inanimate world as a whole, the problem remains as to how to construe this whole as a 'whole' and how to relate the so-called 'intelligibility' of its parts to the 'intelligibility' of the 'whole'. Banerjee touches on the problem, but does not pursue it systematically. The only conclusion he draws from the obvious difference between the 'intelligibility' of the whole and the 'intelligibility' of the parts is that the former, therefore, must be 'non-sensuous' in character. In his own words: '... whereas the intelligibility of the parts constituting the world is *sensuous*, the intelligibility of the world as a whole must be non-sensuous, though not opposed to the sensuous.'[43] Banerjee, though an ardent student of Kant, has forgotten that 'intelligibility', whether it be that of parts or of whole, cannot in principle be sensuous in character.

The whole, for Banerjee, is primarily formal in character. And, though forms may sometimes be perceptible, it is not necessary that this should always be so. Also, perhaps, a form that is perceptible may not be said to render the whole 'intelligible' in any intelligible sense of the word. Not only this. It is the non-perceptible forms that open our minds to the realization:

> ... that which is not perceivable need not necessarily be fictitious or unreal, but may on the contrary be real, but real, not in the ordinary sense in which things such as tables, chairs, etc. are real, but in a more comprehensive sense which makes room for the admission of certain extraordinary dimensions of reality.[44]

Reality, then, is not identical with the existent, that is, that which is known through sense-perception and memory. Besides this which can be known and spoken of, it comprises also that which can only be spoken of but not known; or rather which is unknowable by its very nature and the merely symbolic which cannot even be said to be spoken of in any relevant sense of the word. The distinction between the knowable and the unknowable, on the one hand, and the speakable and the unspeakable, on the other, is important in Banerjee's thought. However, it should be remembered that he is using these terms in a peculiar sense in the context of his own thought. The term 'knowledge', as already explained, refers only to that which is apprehended through sense-perception or memory. And this is both speakable and knowable. The term 'speakable' has not exactly been defined, but one may construe by the context that he considers only that as 'speakable' which refers to the world known through sense-perception and memory. This seems supported by the fact that he characterizes myths and literary creations as being 'merely speakable' and not 'knowable'. On the other hand, that which is 'merely symbolic', he treats as 'unspeakable'. Perhaps, this may derive from the fact that most of the non-literary arts use a symbolic language which is strictly non-verbal and hence 'unspeakable' in principle. Religion also uses symbols which at least sometimes are said to convey that which is 'unspeakable'. Thus, the notion of a 'purely symbolic' language which is not literally 'speakable' is not as otiose as it may seem at first sight.

But Banerjee's interest here is not to draw attention to the purely symbolic and hence 'unspeakable' aspects of art or religion; but rather to point out the purely symbolic character of much of the language of science which it has perforce to employ to render the world 'intelligible' through 'interpreting' what is 'known' at the level of perception and memory. The only difference between the symbols employed by science and those used by the arts is that they 'are *invariably abstract* and *non-sensuous*' in character.[45]

Practical reason, then, whether it be as Will to create or as Will to believe or as Will to adjust, is bound up with the world of perception. 'And', according to Banerjee, 'this must be so for the simple reason that Practical Reason is primarily, though not exclusively concerned with human actions, and that the field of human actions, after all, falls within and not outside the field of perception'.[46] Theoretical reason, on the other hand, is interested in interpreting the world as a whole and understand it, and hence has inevitably to create symbols which are not only abstract and non-sensuous but also impersonal, and thus not tied to the speaker in any essential sense which all verbal, or even gestural, language necessarily tends to be. It is thus only in the language of logic and mathematics that the enterprise of interpreting the universe

finds its foundational support and without which it cannot make much headway either.

In its theoretical aspect, then, 'reason is the source of three predominantly theoretical enquiries respectively called pure science, mathematics and logic'.[47] Pure science, at least, may 'yield the *laws* which serve to interpret, or bring out the *intelligibility* of, the world of nature'.[48] 'Mathematics and logic, on the other hand, are ultimately concerned with the invention of well-ordered symbolic systems, which are of fundamental importance in the *regulation* of our thought and, incidentally, in the scientific interpretation of the universe.'[49] On the other hand, practical reason also elaborates it own characteristic symbolic systems in the field of art, religion and morality whose final achievement 'consists in the admission of man to a way of life lived in allegiance to the symbolic systems concerned'.[50] But, whether in its theoretical or practical aspects, reason only succeeds 'in encouraging indifferentism in preference to the spiritual struggle against human bondage and in helping the non-human attitude of complascence prevail over the human demand for the fulfilment of man's title to liberation'.[51]

What, then, can 'overcome the indifferentism of Reason, conquer the shortcomings of Imagination by rendering its authority effective and, above all, make the power of the vital drives as well as of technology-science obey the demand of the liberation of mankind'[52] is the question that Banerjee poses at the end of his critique of the three faculties—reason, understanding and imagination—with which his work has been concerned up to this point. And his answer refers to a new activity of the human mind which he calls *autonomy*.

Human autonomy, for Banerjee, ultimately means man's determination by what is distinctive to himself; and that, at once, excludes not only everything in nature, including all other living beings, but also all that is supposed to be *above* man, that is, God or gods, the Absolute or, in short, the world of the superhuman and the supernatural. In his peculiar phrase, it should be not merely *for man* but also be *of man*. But, in order that it be both *of* man and *for* man, we will have to understand what man is. And the first thing in this connection to understand is that man 'while being embodied and, as such, being an object of perception, is not a mere object of perception, but something more, on which account he is a class apart from the world of material objects'.[53] And 'hence it is evident that neither the concept of the temporal triad nor that of the *specious present* is of relevance to the understanding of the nature of human existence and the determination of the destiny of man'.[54] Thus, man 'while being embodied, is, unlike material objects, ultimately non-objective so that he falls apart from the world of *becoming* governed by the triadic temporal series before before-now-after'.[55] But, though non-objective and not governed by the temporal triad, he still thinks himself to be so, and this is the fundamental structural ignorance determined for him by the fact of his biological birth, and thus the achievement of non-objectivity and non-triadic temporality is a task in terms of which human existence has to be essentially conceived. And the task is that man is to overcome this illusion forced on him by the natural conditions of his being and become a person, that is, to become a human being in the strict sense of the term. In Banerjee's words: 'The task in question then is to terminate the illusory supposal with which he is seized—the supposal that he is a *mere* individual, that is, an ego held at best in the relation of mutual otherness with his fellows.'[56] But this does not mean, as it has been taken many times to mean, that 'man as a strictly human being' is separate 'from biological man and, consequently, that it is incumbent upon him to desist from whatever action biological man is apt to perform'.[57]

But, then, this humanizing task which is set for every man 'does not admit of formulation in terms of precepts like "do this", "do that", "do not do this", "do not do that" '[58]. Rather, 'Do *thus* whatever you do is preferable to "do this" or "do that"; for the former unlike the latter suggests a standard or a principle to which whatever is done is in need of conformity.'[59] And it is in the formulation of these principles which take into account the human situation and are both 'of man' and 'for man' and which, if followed, would transform all action in such a way as to lead from 'socialization' which is an accomplished fact to personalization which 'points to a *problem* to be solved and a *task* to be accomplished'[60] that philosophy fulfils its function. The fundamental illusion being the result of man's biologically centered situation, the principles of human conduct cannot but be 'the embodiments of the negation of biological man's illusory ego-centricity and other illusions of a more or less basic character consequent upon it'.[61]

The first and foundational principle of all action which may lead man away from the separateness of human beings, then, may be derived from this very fact itself. And Banerjee formulates it thus: 'So behave in any given circumstance that your behaviour is not circumscribed by ego-consciousness but is such as to present itself to be, as it were, *anyone's* behaviour in that circumstance.'[62] This may be called the principle of universalizability. But as it is too general and too abstract, it is necessary to discover

> ... certain *derivative* principles of human conduct, that is, principles of human conduct which would be *directly* and *immediately* concerned with the elimination of the basic and yet palpable manifestations of biological man's illusory ego-centricity, and whose concern with the elimination of such ego-centricity would be *indirect*.[63]

The two manifestations of ego-centricity which may provide a clue to these derivative principles are: (*a*) 'excessive, if *not exclusive*, interest in one's own self conjoined with poignant concern about one's own future'; and (*b*) 'one's usual lack of interest in or indifference to, one's fellows'.[64] These are 'complementary to each other or, in other words, are the two sides of one

and the same thing, namely, ego-centricity'.[65] The deepest manifestation of the former is in the universal dread of death and the desire for personal immortality, while that of the latter may be said to be the 'aversion to suffer *with* or *for* others or, to put it otherwise, aversion to bear the cross'.[66]

The two principles for the guidance of human conduct which may be derived from these two manifestations of ego-centricity would, then, be:

(1) 'So behave that your behaviour is in no circumstance governed either directly or remotely by the dread of death and the desire for personal immortality'; and
(2) 'So behave that your behaviour is on no occasion governed either directly or remotely by aversion to bear the Cross.'[67]

The radical novelty of Banerjee's formulation lies in these two principles as they go counter to some of the deepest aspirations of man in all religions and cultures. The first articulates only the demand for universalizability which all ethical thinkers have accepted as a generalized requirement of any morality, at least at the abstract theoretical level. And, though Banerjee thinks that it is 'the embodiment of the practical significance of the doctrine of "no-self" (anātma) taught by Gautama',[68] it is nothing of the kind as Buddha did not deny rebirth nor discuss the problem of the 'other' in the state of 'nirvāṇa'. Similarly, his attempt to link his second and third principles with Socrates and Jesus and treat them as symbolizing 'the culminations of the ways of life lived'[69] by them is also misleading as the belief in the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost is an integral part of what Christ believed and lived and died for. And so is his belief in the life hereafter, the heaven and the hell which provide the *raison d'etre* of whatever is commanded or recommended by Christ. The example of Socrates seems more apt, though it is not clear why Socrates treats himself primarily as an Athenian and not as a world citizen. In any case, the references to Socrates, Buddha and Jesus, in my opinion, only tend to hide the far-reaching novelty and implications of Banerjee's principles. His is perhaps the first clear formulation of a conception of a community of human beings cut off from any idea of transcendence, not even of that of after-life or survival in some form which few thinkers have been able to give up.

These principles, then, are 'regulative principles' of human conduct; and, hence 'in order to live as a strictly human being, man should act as if these principles were *objectively valid*', since it is only 'by acting in this way that he can bring about the elimination of his alienation from himself and from his fellows and thus be restored to the joy of living (ānanda) in fulfilment of his ultimate destiny'.[70]

The end of the long investigation closes with the formulation of these three principles which, if followed, would provide a solution to the problem set for man by his biological situation which leads him to conceive of himself as essentially apart from others and lends his consciousness, and all the actions

following from it, an essentially ego-centric character. The philosophic depth displayed throughout the investigation is truly remarkable, and there can be little doubt that Banerjee's three principles articulate the moral situation and the moral insight far better than the far more well-known principles formulated by Kant. Also, he is perhaps one of those very, very rare thinkers who has been able to avoid the temptation of succumbing to the charms of the transcendent without doing flagrant injustice to the values embodied in the religious quest of man.

II

We have tried to delineate the main line of Banerjee's thought developed in his book *Knowledge, Reason and Human Autonomy* and hope that those who have up till now been either indifferent or hostile* to him will be convinced that here is a thinker whose thought deserves to be paid serious critical attention by those who are genuinely interested in the creative philosophical thinking done recently in this country.

A critical evaluation, however, presupposes first a genuine understanding of what a philosopher has said. The exercise is doubly difficult in the case of any thinker who belongs to this country and tries to say something which is radically different from the past philosophical traditions of this country. Even the thought of K.C. Bhattacharyya or of Kalidas Bhattacharyya, two of the most original thinkers of this century in the field of philosophy in India, has had hardly a comprehensive presentation, not to talk of critical evaluation, up till now. The thought of N.V. Banerjee which displays an even more radical departure from the tradition would require perhaps an even more presistent effort at understanding before its full-fledged critical appraisal could be undertaken. Still, a few points may be raised which, in my opinion, require further elucidation. First, it is not quite clear what is exactly meant by 'essentiality to one another'. Surely, biological preconditions of living are far more 'essential' than other human beings, at least in one and perhaps the most basic sense of 'essential'. But even if one accepts that other human beings are 'essential' to one's being a 'human being', it is not clear how each and all of them are equally 'essential'. And what about people about whom I do not know anything at all, with whom I never come into contact? To put the same point differently, from 'some human beings are essential to some one human being' it does not follow that 'all human beings are essential to every human being'.

And what is this fuss about 'ego-centricity'? Is one human being different

*The phrase may seem too strong, but it is difficult otherwise to account for the fact that these days, when there are *Festschrifts* galore and *Essays in Honour of* or *in Memory of* every Tom, Dick and Harry (or Chaitra and Maitra, as they say in the Indian tradition), none has been brought out in his honour. Nor has the university which he served all his life (the University of Delhi) instituted any awards, lectureship, etc. in his honour. And he was the only eminent living Indian philosopher who was so conspicuously absent at the Fiftieth Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress held at the University of Delhi.

from another human being, or not? Banerjee eschews metaphysics, and, in fact, is totally against it. Being out-and-out anthropocentric, he cannot have recourse to some transcendent, non-empirical, non-vyavāhāric identity as many Advaitins do. But at the empirical, vyavāhāric level differences are what provide individuation, and thus provide that richness and variety which is the spice of life. Not only this. At the empirical level, we are not just human beings but belong to some sex, caste, race, religion, nation, language group, civilization, etc. All these define and restrict the field of those with whom I can meaningfully communicate. It is strange that, while Banerjee has said so many interesting things about language and communication, he has not talked about the empirical fact of there being a plurality of languages along with the fact that most human beings are born into a particular special community which restricts their communication-field primarily to those who can speak that language.

Similarly, Banerjee seems to believe that all action is primarily individual, that is, done by individuals in their individual capacity and oriented to other individuals *qua* individuals. But this just is not true. Many actions are done in a *representative* capacity and are oriented to others who also *represent* groups, institutions, public bodies, etc. What norms or principles should govern such actions of competitiveness which are as much a fact of life as those of co-operativeness and hence should also have been the subject of philosophic attention? One may try to minimize the former and increase the latter in one's personal life. But is it also possible at the level of public institutions, and to the same extent?

Had these issues been raised during the lifetime of Prof. Banerjee, he might have replied to them or reformulated his position in their light. Unfortunately, this is a posthumous work, published after his death, and hence even the possibility of the arising of such a situation does not exist. But he had written many other works prior to this in which some of the key ideas developed in this book had been sketched and which were published during his lifetime. However, the tradition of taking our thinkers seriously has hardly flourished in contemporary India. And, when belatedly, the Department of Philosophy at the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, under the leadership of Dr. K.L. Sharma, organized a seminar on his philosophy in its series devoted to the critical evalutation of the work of living Indian philosophers,* he was too ill to attend it. Let us hope that the same fate will not befall the work of other thinkers in contemporary India, and that the philosophical community in this country would revive the past tradition of *pakṣa* and *pratipakṣa*, argument and counter-argument, in an ongoing debate which sometimes lasted many centuries, if not millenia.

*The first seminar in this series was organized on the philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya. The volume containing the papers and his replies thereto has been published in the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly Series* (No. 9) from Pune under the title *The Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya* (1985).

NOTES

1. N.V. Banerjee, *Knowledge, Reason and Human Autonomy*, p. 6.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 27 (italics author's).
6. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 82 (italics mine).
16. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 100-01. The use of the word 'disposition' here is unfortunate, as it is difficult to understand how a disposition can be an experience.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 105. It is strange that Banerjee forgets that the same objections can be raised against what he offers as his final solution to the problem at the end of the book.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 109.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 109; italics mine.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 114.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 117.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 133.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 133-34.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 134.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 145.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 155.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 155.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 156.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 162.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 164.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 197.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 222.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 222.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 222.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 222.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 222.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 222-23.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 234.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 234.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 237.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 241.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 242. The quotation has been slightly changed to suit linguistic convenience. But it means the same as in the original.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 242.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 242.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 247.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 252.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 256.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 257.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 258.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 258.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 260.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 260.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 261.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 261.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 265.

Sri Aurobindo, the sage of Pondicherry and his śakti, The Mother

*A review article**

S.R. BHATT
University of Delhi, Delhi

In profundity of thought and width of its spectrum, in prolificity of writings and felicity of expression among the contemporary Indian thinkers Sri Aurobindo can legitimately claim to have a distinction, parallel only to that of Mahatma Gandhi. Imbued with a spirit of nationalism both set out with a mission to emancipate the motherland from foreign yoke and emerged victorious to a large extent. They, however, widened their horizon to liberate the whole humanity in their own way. But, in contrast to Mahatma Gandhi, Sri Aurobindo had the unique privilege of having the Mother as his collaborator in his major spiritual experimentation and in his victorious achievements. Whereas Mahatma Gandhi's task was carried forward by his followers rather half-heartedly, the Mother continued the task left by Sri Aurobindo with ardent devotion and personal involvement. Sri Aurobindo and the Mother had identity of purpose and singularity of the method, and that is why they could partake in a joint venture. They came into existence, so to say, to supplement and complement each other, to reinforce each other, to support each other. Before they met physically they were at it independently, but when they met they joined hands together, helped each other, collaborated and perfected it.

The book under review presents a lucid and comprehensive account of some of the salient 'experiments, experiences and realisations' of Sri Aurobindo and the Mother from the pen of an erudite Aurobindian scholar and an ardent devotee of the Mother who had the good fortune of being an 'antevāsin' (intimate disciple) of the Mother, who partook in 'numerous educational experiments under the direct guidance of the Mother' and who lived and taught at the Sri Aurobindo International Centre of Education for two decades.

This work gives a complete picture of the thought and practice of the Integral Yoga by Sri Aurobindo and the Mother, and the whole presentation is profusedly interspersed with lengthy citations from the original works of Sri Aurobindo and the Mother providing an aura of authenticity to it. The choice and selection of the passages from their voluminous writings is very apt and judicious, and only one who is deeply steeped in this discipline and

*Kireet Joshi: *Sri Aurobindo and the Mother*, The Mother's Institute of Research and Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1989, Rs. 150.

its literature could have made such a remarkable presentation of the sum and substance of the 'width, depth and the height' of this vast literature is a short span of 280 pages. It is not, therefore, without justification that the blurb of the book carries the opinion:

> There is hardly any book, like the present one, that provides a study covering the entire thread of the work of both Sri Aurobindo and the Mother, and the reader will find in this book a scholarly and scrupulous handling of an overwhelming mass of material contained in the books that are listed in the bibliography.

The chapterization and arrangement of topics is also of superb order, exhibiting an organic unity and continuity. To those given to occultism and mysticism and religiosity this book will prove to be a rare treat. Some of the appendices, particularly II, III and IV, are highly enlightening and worth reading even by a philosophical mind of logical acumen.

Sri Aurobindo appeared on the Indian horizon like a meteor and by the use of his powerful pen 'electrified the nation and surcharged the people with a new energy' to struggle for freedom. Even when he retired from active political life and took to *sannayās* in Pondicherry, he continued to work as a remote controller for the freedom of the motherland. It is not, therefore, without significance that India achieved freedom on the birthday of Sri Aurobindo.

The ultimate aim of Sri Aurobindo was not just to help liberating the motherland; that was, in fact, 'a part of his larger work' to transform the whole universe and to usher in a new world order. The author very aptly writes: "Warrior and hero of Indian independence, Sri Aurobindo had now scaled vast heights of knowledge and power and had launched upon an unprecedented revolution of the entire mankind.' Sri Aurobindo was born with a larger mission 'to bring down the supramental consciousness and power on the earth', and he departed from this mortal world with the satisfaction of having fulfilled his purpose.

Sri Aurobindo began his worldly career as a sceptic and an agnostic, but soon came under the spell of absolutistic spiritualism which enabled him to realize Brahmic silence, i.e. *nirvāṇa* and the universal dynamic presence of the divine. This movement from doubt and disbelief to magic and miracles and then to *yoga* and occultism was smoothened by his encounter with Shri Lele, a *yogi*, who excercised upon him a decisive influence and provided a turning point. The seeds of a *yogi* were already germane in him, and he was *yogi*-in-the-making. Sri Lele was only a *nimitta*.

Through *yoga* Sri Aurobindo attained *nirvāṇa*, and this was the beginning of his spiritual flights. For him *nirvāṇa* was not a nihilistic or negativistic extinction of all existence but a positive and perfectionist march through light to *ānanda*. It was a beginning of a life of a *jivana-mukta*, a *bodhi-sattva*, so to say. Equipped with the plank of *nirvāṇa*, he set out to liberate the whole humanity, nay, the entire universe.

It was a happy coincidence, perhaps divinely ordained, that in 1914 the Mother (Mirra Alfassa) met Sri Aurobindo. But she could partake in his venture only in 1920 with the firm conviction that the realization will be accomplished. Now we have not Sri Aurobindo alone or Mirra Alfassa alone but Sri Aurobindo and the Mother, like Lord Śiva and His Śakti as embodiments of *prakāśa* and *vimarśa*, knowledge and volition, theory and praxis.

The chief aim of Sri Aurobindo, as stated earlier, was to bring down the supramental consciousness and power on the earth. He did so by theorizing about the nature of the supermind, the necessity and process of its descent, and also its dynamic consequences for the solutions of the problems of the mankind. The main endeavour of the Mother was to supplement this task by bringing about a supramental transformation of the physical consciousness at the cellular level. From the worldly point of view, the latter was of greater significance and utility. In fact, Mother's explorations into the body-consciousness and her discovery of the 'cellular mind' (comparable to the Queen Monad of Leibnitz), capable of restructuring the nature of the body, needs to be attended to by the present-day scientists, particularly the biologists and the neurologists, in order to investigate into its scientific veracity.

Lest the above account may give rise to the impression that Sri Aurobindo and the Mother had separate missions, it is desirable that their thoughts and practices are treated in close affinity. To put the whole thing succinctly, the joint venture of Sri Aurobindo and the Mother in effecting total and integral transformation had a three-pronged strategy, viz.:

(*i*) To bring about the supramental manifestation on the earth;
(*ii*) To transform human body as divine body; and
(*iii*) To facilitate rise of new species of humanity, the gnostic beings, the supermen.

In their yogic realizations they experienced that all the present ills and evils of mankind are due to the 'evolutionary crisis' and, therefore, they endeavoured to direct the entire evolutionary process along the three-fold lines stated above. The evolutionary process for them is to be tackled at once both at the individual and at the cosmic levels, as the two are interlinked and there can be no advancement of one without the other. Like *Ātman* and *Brahman* of the Upaniṣads, they are two sides of the same coin.

In order to realize their objectives, Sri Aurobindo and the Mother evolved a method known as 'Synthesis of Yoga' or 'Integral Yoga' or 'Supramental Yoga'. In accordance with this, they also outlined a philosophy of education, the ultimate aim of which was to enable the individual to discover the divine reality within him and to work for its manifestation in the physical life. They found that there have been in the past many varieties of *yoga*—all useful, beneficial and good but having narrow and limited aims and applications.

They felt that all these could be synthesized into one and that their total integration was a logical necessity. In fact, such an attempt was made in the *Gītā*, but it was not total. So now it was given to Sri Aurobindo and the Mother to put it into effect. In this Integral Yoga the whole life with all its dimensions—the physical, the vital, the mental, the intellectual and the spiritual (cf. the *pañca koṣa* theory of the Upaniṣads)—is to be transformed in a conscious planned way, so that the individual consciousness comes in direct communion with the universal consciousness resulting in the realization of unitive consciousness, a consciousness of the unity of the self, the nature and the total reality.

On the basis of their intense experiences in the state of yogic trance, Sri Aurobindo and the Mother described the details of the twin processes of ascent and descent. These are, in fact, not two different processes but two ways of looking at and naming the same phenomenon. From the point of view of the supramental, it is descent; and from the point of view of the Mother, it is ascent. The descending journey of the supramental terminates when it reaches right up to the lowest level of matter, the insenscient, in order to bring about transformation of matter. This is also known as the manifestation of the supramental in the material life. The two words, 'descent' and 'manifestation', apparently have different connotations, one referring to an individual movement in an individual and the other to the transformation of the total matter into 'new matter', so that it could be a fit receptacle of the 'Advent of New Consciousness'. Yet at bottom these two processes are one and the same. Here it must be pointed out that this idea of 'new matter' having 'new perception' has striking similarity with the idea of evolved monad of Leibnitz. Sometimes the Mother talks of it as 'true matter', a luminous matter, an idea which resembles the notion of *śuddha śattva* of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta.

The various accounts of ascent and descent, narrated in the works of Sri Aurobindo and the Mother, are quite picturesque and fascinating, and they look like Pauranic tales and miracles. Of course, Sri Aurobindo and the Mother will not be willing to call them so, as for them they are real experiences amenable only to realized souls. The author writes about them with full conviction. In his words:

> Mother's body had become a living and conscious laboratory of the new species ... Three simultaneous and interrelated processes were going on in Mother's body. Firstly, there was a progressive dissolution of the inconscience at its utmost bottom. Secondly, there was the infiltration, permeation and invasion of the supermind in the cellular consciousness and in the physical consciousness so as to counteract the Falsehood in Matter, Life and Mind. Thirdly, there was the gradual transformation of the body by means of the collaboration and change of the physical mind and by means of radical changes in various functionings of organs and faculties.

In the writings of Sri Aurobindo and the Mother we meet with another interesting idea of transformation or emancipation of matter which consists in the purification of the three *guṇas* of *sattva, rajas* and *tamas* into *jyoti, tapas* and *sama* respectively. Sometimes the Mother talks of a state of equilibrium and expresses it with the help of a fascinating formula as follows:

> Stability and change;
> Inertia and transformation;
> Eternity and progress.

The Sāṅkhya thinkers also theorized about it when they talked of *sāmyāvasthā* of Prakṛti wherein there is only *svarūpa pariṇāma* (homogeneous change). Describing Mother's formula the author very aptly remarks: 'If stability and the process of transformation could be continuously maintained in a state of equilibrium, death cannot occur. ... ' This is immortality, this is eternity, this is freedom and this is *mokṣa.*

Apart from the emancipation of matter, there is another dimension of Integral Yoga which consists in radical and total transformation of man, so as to pave the way for the emergence of a new species of supermen. But this is not an individual *sādhanā*, a transformation of an individual, by an individual and for an individual. It is not a flight from this world of matter, not a liberation of spirit from the shackles of matter, not an escape into a 'cosmic static reality of featureless nirvāṇa', or into 'supra-terrestrial planes of heavenly existence'. It is, on the contrary, establishment of the kingdom of Spirit on this earth or the descent of the supramental. It is a collective enterprise, rather a cosmic one. That is why a need was felt to have an *Āśrama* as a laboratory of yogic research where experimentation and verification through experience was a part of its methodology. To start with, the *Āśrama* could have been organized as a research laboratory by chosing a few on the basis of representative selection of specimen of different varieties of human consciousness and development. But the *Āśrama* came rather to be established spontaneously and naturally without any deliberate process of formation. The *Āśrama* was established not for renunciation of action but for dynamic *sādhanā* which would accelerate the evolution of the supermind in the life on the earth. It was an open experiment, an experiment into a corporate divine life, a life of Integral yoga, of dynamic *sādhanā*, of spiritual realization through *karma.*

In the *Āśrama* every thing was under the close supervision of Sri Aurobindo who was the *prakāśa* and the Mother who was the *vimarṣa*, a unique but needful combination of knowledge and action. There was regular contact with the inmates by letters in case of Sri Aurobindo and by personal meetings in case of the Mother. About the desired development in the *Āśrama* life, the author writes:

> At the collective level too, some radical changes were appearing in the functioning of the Ashram. Mother was placing individuals more and

more into conditions where synthesis, unity and harmony would become increasingly imperative. A greater and greater stress was laid on the creation of collective consciousness. There were deeper imperatives, too. Already we find in the Agenda of 1961, certain indications of the idea of an ideal city which could be a habitation of a collective life and which could serve as the embryo or seed of the future supramental world.

While concluding, a question need be raised, which, in fact, the author himself has very pertinently voiced in his work, as to what exactly was the work of Sri Aurobindo and how the Mother continued and completed it. He has sought answer to this question from the writings of Sri Aurobindo and the Mother, and has devoted half of the work to this. As a matter of fact, a similar question was raised during the lifetime of Sri Aurobindo himself not only by the outsiders but by the inmates of the *Āśrama* as well. Sri Aurobindo was painfully aware of it, but had the optimism of its successful outcome. There was not all harmony in the *Āśrama* life, and both Sri Aurobindo and the Mother confessed it. The Mother even attributed Sri Aurobindo's decision to depart from this world largely to the behaviour of the inmates. The present state of Auroville constantly reminds us as to what went wrong and where, whether in the end or in the means or in the modalities. The million dollar questions that raise their heads are: what has happened to all these realizations? What has been the progress thereafter? Is the work complete? Obviously not. But, then, who is carrying it on and how? When Sri Aurobindo left this earth, he had by then trained the Mother who could continue his mission ably. Why did the Mother not train a suitable receptor and successor? The accumulated result of Sri Aurobindo's *sādhanā* was transmitted to the Mother. Why did she not do so in turn? The Mother herself confessed that it would take centuries to work it out. So, who is doing it now? After Mother who? Has the work stopped? Sri Aurobindo had promised: 'I shall manifest again in the first supramental body built in the supramental way.' Let us await that day and that manifestation. For resumption and consummation of the work we may only hope and pray.

Notes and discussions

THE OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT

In this paper an attempt is made to show that Moore's Open Question Argument, though a useful device for testing definition of good, does not logically establish his thesis that good is simple and indefinable within his framework of ethics.

G.E. Moore in his book *Principia Ethica* argues that, if the term 'good' does not denote something simple and indefinable, there are only two alternatives possible: either it denotes something complex or it has no meaning at all.

> ...if it is not the case that 'good' denotes something simple and indefinable only two alternatives are possible: either it is complex, a given whole, about the correct analysis of which there may be disagreement; or else it means nothing at all, and there is no such subject as Ethics.... There are, in fact, only two serious alternatives to be considered, in order to establish the conclusion that 'good' does not denote a simple and indefinable notion. It might possibly denote a complex as 'horse' does, or it might have no meaning at all (p. 15).

Moore examines both the alternatives and arrives at the conclusion that none of the alternatives can be true. The first alternative, he says, cannot be true, because whatever complex thing we may or might choose to define the term 'good' it is always possible to ask, with significance of the complex so defined, whether it is itself good; and it is good enough to say that 'good' cannot denote something complex. If the term 'good' could have denoted something complex, there would have been no possibility of asking the question, with significance of the complex so defined, whether it is itself good; because all definitions are analytic if they are true, and analytic statements rule out this possibility. But since the very possibility of 'good' denoting something complex is ruled out by the fact that we can always ask, with significance of the complex so defined, whether it is itself good shows that no definition of good could ever be found. For to define is to analyse and analysis is possible only when the thing in question is complex. If no analysis and definition of good could ever be found, it follows that good is simple and indefinable.

The same argument, Moore says, also establishes that the second alternative cannot be true as well. Had 'good' been a meaningless term, it would have never been possible to ask, with significance of the complex so defined, whether it is itself good, because the question contains the term 'good' which would make the question always meaningless. But since the very fact that we can always ask meaningfully of the complex so defined whether it is itself good

shows that 'good' is not devoid of meaning. It is a meaningful term. This, of course, would have been impossible, had the definition of good been correct.

Thus, when Moore finds upon his Open Question Argument device that no complex thing could ever be found to define 'good' and yet the term has meaning, he concludes that good is simple and indefinable. The question now is: does Moore's Open Question Argument device really establish that good is simple and indefinable? Definitely not. Because Moore's Open Question Argument rests on his notion of meaning and his notion of meaning is logically independent of simplicity and complexity. And, as a result, it fails to establish that good is simple and indefinable. To substantiate this point, let me begin with Moore's notion of definition. Moore writes:

> The most important sense of 'definition' is that in which a definition states what are the parts which invariably compose a certain whole; and in this sense 'good' has no definition because it is simple and has no parts. It is one of those innumerable objects of thought which are themselves incapable of definition, because they are the ultimate terms by reference to which whatever is capable of definition must be defined. That there must be an indefinite number of such terms is obvious on reflection, since we cannot define anything except by analysis (pp. 9-10).

It is quite evident from this passage that Moore's notion of definition involves the notion of analysis in it. No definition of a term, on his account, is possible unless the term denotes something complex; for to define a term means to analyse the object denoted by it, and analysis of the object is possible only when it is complex. Complex things are the only things that are capable of analysis. Simple things are not capable of analysis since they have no parts. In this sense, Moore says, 'good' has no definition, because it is simple and has no parts. This shows that indefinability, on Moore's account, is not the ground of simplicity. Simplicity is the ground of indefinability. Simplicity is logically prior to indefinability. If simplicity is the ground of indefinability and is logically prior to it, the simplicity of good cannot be established on the basis its indefinability. In other words, Moore cannot use indefinability of good as a weapon to establish its simplicity. For him the only way to establish the simplicity of good would be to show that it is unanalysable and has no parts, that is, good is not complex. Moore cannot say that indefinability of good establishes that good is not complex, because to say so would amount to admitting that indefinability of good establishes the simplicity of good which is a mistake on Moore's account, for simplicity of good always comes logically prior to its indefinability.

It might be said that indefinability of good, on Moore's account, does establish the simplicity of good, because he identifies definition with analysis. For him definition means nothing but analysis. But this view is mistaken. Moore never identifies definition with analysis. He maintains the distinction

between them. When he says 'we cannot define anything except by analysis', he simply means that no definition of a thing is possible without analysis. Definition is necessarily connected with analysis. And to say this is not to say that definition, for him, is nothing but analysis. Had it been so, Moore would not have said that definitions tell us what the word is used to mean. He should have only said that definitions describe the real nature of the object denoted by a word. But since he says, as a matter of fact, that definitions do not merely tell us what the word is used to mean and that they also describe the real nature of the object denoted by a word, it would be incorrect to say that definition for him is nothing but analysis. This view of Moore is quite obvious from his following passage.

> Definition of this kind I am asking for, definitions which describe the real nature of the object or notion denoted by a word, and which do not merely tell us what the word is used to mean, are possible when the object or notion in question is something complex. (p. 7).

It is evident from the passage quoted above that definition, according to Moore, serves two kinds of functions:

(*a*) It describes the real nature of the object or notion denoted by a word;
(*b*) It explains or explicates meaning of a word.

When Moore says that definition describes the real nature of the object or notion, he means that definition states different parts of the object or notion which invariably compose it. In other words, it means that Moore treats description as analysis. For him to describe an object means to analyse it, and to analyse it means to state the different parts of the object of which it is composed. This shows that no description of an object, on his account, is possible unless the object in question is complex, because complex objects are the only objects that are capable of analysis. If no description of an object is possible unless it is complex, it implies that no definition of a word is possible unless the word in question denotes something complex, because to define is to describe and to describe is to analyse. And analysis is possible only when the object denoted by a word is complex. This shows that Moore's account of definition is logically connected with analysis and complexity. But that does not mean that definition, for him, is nothing but analysis. Analysis is not everything that forms his notion of definition, although it is necessary in the sense that without it no definition is possible. Definition explicates meaning of a word besides stating the real nature of the object or notion denoted by it, and meaning of a word is different from the analysis of the object which it denotes. Analysis operates at the level of reality, but meaning is attached to a word and word is different from the object which it denotes. Had meaning of a word, according to Moore, been indentical with

analysis, he would not have said that 'good' is a meaningful word, because saying so would have amounted to admitting that good is a complex which he denies. Therefore, it would be self-contradictory to identify Moore's account of definition either with meaning or analysis.

Definitions do explicate meaning of a word, but they do not explicate meaning of all words. Definitions explicate, according to Moore, meaning of only those words whose denoted objects are complex. That is to say, definitions explicate meaning of complex words, because complex words denote complex things and complex things are the only things which are analysable. This implies that simple words are devoid of definition, because they do not denote complex things. They denote simple things, and simple things are beyond analysis. But it does not follow thereby that simple words are meaningless. Simple words are not meaningless. According to Moore, they do have meaning, because they denote simple objects, and meaning of a word embraces its denotation on regardless of whether the object denoted by it is simple or complex. But the meaning of simple words, on his account, cannot be explicated through definition, because they have no definition. This implies that Moore's account of meaning is not related to definition in the sense in which definition is related to meaning. The relation of definition to meaning is analytic, since the notion of definition includes the notion of meaning in it. The latter is a part of the meaning of the former. Therefore, if a word is definable, it implies that it is meaningful. But the relation of meaning to definition is non-analytic and contingent, since the notion of meaning does not include the notion of definability in it. The latter is not a part of the meaning of the former. As a result, a word could be meaningful on Moore's account even if it is not definable. If a word could be meaningful without being definable on Moore's account, then it is evident that his account of meaning is logically independent of definability.

The relation between meaning and analysis is also non-analytic and contingent. Meaning is neither identical with analysis nor is analysis a part of meaning. Meaning is not identical with analysis, because it does not terminate when analysis does. Analysis is not a part of meaning, because a word could be meaningful, even if its denoted object is incapable of analysis. This shows that analysis is not co-extensive with meaning. Meaning is logically independent of and unconnected with it. Had meaning been logically connected with analysis, simple words would have had no meaning on Moore's account. But since simple words, according to him, do have meaning, his account of meaning cannot be said to be logically connected with analysis. To say this is not to say that meaning is inconsistent with analysis. Rather, meaning is quite consistent with analysis. This follows from Moore's notion of definition itself. Complex words are not only meaningful but also the objects denoted by them are capable of analysis.

If a word, on Moore's account, could be meaningful, regardless of whether it denotes simple or complex objects, then it is evident that his account of meaning is logically independent of simplicity and complexity. Moore's account of meaning is logically independent of simplicity, because complex words, according to him, could be meaningful even if their denoted objects are analysable. Meaning is not opposed to analysis. Analysis is opposed to simplicity. Meaning is independent of complexity, because simple words, according to him, could be meaningful even if their denoted objects are unanalysable. Meaning is not opposed to unanalysability. Unanalysability is opposed to complexity. If simple and complex words, on Moore's account, could be meaningful regardless of what they denote, his account of meaning cannot be said to be opposed to either simplicity or complexity. They are quite consistent. Had it not been the case, neither simple nor complex words would have had any meaning, because simplicity is opposed to complexity. But since, according to Moore, both simple and complex words do have meaning, it follows that his notion of meaning is not only quite consistent with simplicity and complexity but also is logically independent of them. If meaning is logically independent of simplicity and complexity, simplicity or complexity of a thing cannot be established by reference to it. This means that Moore cannot logically establish that good is simple and indefinable on the basis of the meaning of the word 'good', as he does in his 'Open Question Argument'.

Moore's position is also untenable from another point of view. Moore maintains that whatever notion we may or might choose to define the idea of good, whether simple notion like the notion of pleasure or complex notion like that of desire, we can always ask meaningfully: 'Is the thing so defined after all good?' From this it follows that the difference of simplicity and complexity does not logically affect the intelligibility of the open question. The intelligibility of the open question is logically independent of simplicity and complexity. This would have been impossible, had intelligibility been logically connected with simplicity or complexity as they are opposed to each other. If the open question could be intelligible or meaningful without being connected with simplicity or complexity, the simplicity of good cannot be established by appealing to it, nor can it establish that 'good' denotes something complex. As a result, Moore's Open Question Argument fails to establish his contention that no definition of good could ever be found, because indefinability of good is based on simplicity; and that simplicity of good cannot be established on the basis of the intelligibility of the Open Question, since they are logically unconnected. The intelligibility of the Open Question can establish simplicity and indefinability of good only when Moore presupposes that 'good' has no meaning if it has no unique meaning. But to presuppose this would amount to begging the question. But if he does not presuppose it, he cannot claim, as he does on the basis of the intelligibility of the Open Question, that no definition of good could ever be found. If Moore fails to hold the view that no definition of good could ever be found, he cannot maintain the thesis that, whatever definition be offered, we can always ask, with significance, whether the thing so defined is itself good. Because to main-

tain this view would amount to admitting that no definition of good could ever be possible. And this Moore cannot hold unless he presupposes that 'good' has no meaning if it has no unique meaning. This follows from the use of the term 'always' itself. But to accept this again would amount to begging the question. Moore cannot escape from this dilemma. His position is untenable in either case. This does not mean that the Open Question Argument device has no value; it does have a value as it is a useful method for testing definition of a word. But it cannot establish simplicity or complexity of an object or a notion. Nor can it establish definability or indefinability of a word even if we admit that denotational theory of meaning is valid, because denotational theory of meaning asserts only that meaning of a word consists in its denotation, no matter what it denotes.

North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong JAGAT PAL

THE 'BODY': A HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

In the *Ideas I*, Husserl introduced the notion of body to explain how consciousness, which in its essence is pure immanence and 'transcendental Absolute', can yet take on the character of transcendence, and become mundane. In the natural sphere consciousness is real in a human or animal sense. Human beings are worldly beings, and every worldly being is a bodied being. Thus, consciousness can be real in the world only by being embodied in it, and as a part of it. The body which receives consciousness is distinguished from other bodies in nature, a special dimension of the world, as an 'animate organism'. What is a real body or an 'animate organism' in the natural sphere is seen to be a body-phenomenon in the attitude of the *epoché*. In the *Ideas II*, Husserl employed his methodological resources to provide a constitutive analysis of the phenomenon of body and to elaborate his theory about it. Side by side, he elucidated the link of body-constitution with the constitution of such other phenomena as psyche or spirit, the other Ego, and the 'full intersubjective world'. In the *Phenomenological Psychology*, he even went forward and spoke of 'bodily intentionality'. In the *Crisis*, Husserl elaborated the concept of the 'life-world', and there the importance of the body was once more emphasized. In the life-world everything has a bodily character (*Crisis*, p. 106).[1] In it we ourselves live 'in accord with our bodily (*leiblich*) personal ways of being' (*Ibid.*, p. 50).

> The original givenness of the world—our 'life-world'—depends on the fact that, as men living in the world, having our experience and carrying on our practical activities in it, we are unities of body and mind, such that all our experience of the world is ultimately mediated by our senses and the functioning of our sense-organs.[2]

THE BODY AS A CONSTITUTED PHENOMENON AND THE BODY AS THE LIVED-BODY

According to Husserl's phenomenology, there are two ways of viewing the world, or for that matter any object in it. Thus, the body as a worldly object can be viewed as either a real natural object or a phenomenologically conceived phenomenon. As a real natural object the body is a lived-body; in it consciousness lives according to its bodily personal ways of being. The natural body is an incarnate body; here consciousness and thinghood form a connected whole, connected with the particular psychological unities which we call animalia (*Ideas* I, p. 126).[3] The animalia in its fullness is not merely physical but psychological.

> The 'pure' experience 'lies' in a certian sense in what is psychologically appercieved, in the experience as subjective human condition; with its own essence it takes on the form of psychical subjectivity, and therewith the intentional relation to man's Ego and man's body (*Ibid.*, § 53, p. 166).

However, phenomenologically viewed (seen through *epoché*), the body is a constituted phenomenon, a body-object among other objects of the world; it is constituted in the acts of pure consciousness as presided over by the pure ego. Pure consciousness is not a part of the world. The world, too, is not a really inherent element or a part of consciousness (*C.M.*, p. 26).[4] Consciousness is again absolute, into which nothing can penetrate and from which nothing can escape. Causality, conceived as a relation of dependence between realities, does not apply to consciousness. The world is intended by consciousness and not caused by consciousness. Then, how can consciousness lie in a region of the world? How can that which is absolute in itself and purely immanent abandon its immanence and put on the character of transcendence? Or, to put the question in a different way: how comes that consciousness is incarnate in the body?

Husserl faces the question about participation of pure consciousness in the factual world, for the first time, in § 39 of the *Ideas I*. In that subsection he explains that there are two ways for consciousness to be inserted in the real world: (*i*) through bodily incarnation and (*ii*) through perception. True to the mentalistic cast of his thought, he thinks that the first is derived from the second. The natural wakeful life or our Ego is a continuous perceiving, actual or potential; and every perceiving consciousness has the peculiarity that it is the consciousness of *the embodied* (*leibhaftigen*) *self-presence of an individual object*. So, if consciousness has to find a place at all in the world, it must ascribe to itself a body. Consciousness is thus finally incerted in the world by

ascribing to itself a body. Through bodily incarnation consciousness becomes mundanized, becomes worldly. As Husserl writes:

> Let us make clear to ourselves how consciousness, so to speak, enters into the real world, how that which is absolute in itself can abandon its immanence and put on the character of transcendence. We see at once that it can do this only in virtue of a certain participation in transcendence in its first and primordial sense, and that obviously is the transcendence of material Nature. Only through the empirical relation to the body does consciousness become real in a human and animal sense, and only thereby does it win a place in Nature's space and time—the time which is physically measured (*Ideas I*, § 53, p. 164).

Husserl's discussion on the subject of incarnation is sketchy. But, we believe, the significance of certain important notions of Husserl's phenomenology, especially the notion of phenomenological reduction or *epoché*, can be better understood from this perspective. Absolute consciousness is involved in the real world by virtue of its incarnation in the body. Through incarnation it is manifested as the state of consciousness of a real human being or an animal. The body is a part of material nature. It is limited by nature's space and time, and is causally bound by the objects in nature. The various forms of conscious experience, being tied to the body, have the meaning of natural events as are determined by the laws of nature. In this way, consciousness is completely determined by the world, and the world 'acts' on it. Consciousness, too, by making 'use' of the body makes 'use' of the world. For embodied consciousness, its body is the organ of perception, of will, and of action. The world has its 'value' for consciousness. It is in this world that consciousness, in the form of a real human being or an animal, can live. The *epoché* suspends the incarnation of consciousness, and thereby puts the *thesis* of the world 'out of action'. Consciousness is freed from its attachment to the body, and the world ceases to act on consciousness. Consciousness becomes non-worldly, pure experience. For absolute and pure consciousness, the world is not the world of a living concern; it is merely a constituted phenomenon which exists secondarily 'in' and 'for' consciousness.

However, if we regard *epoché* as the suspension of incarnation through which the action of the *thesis* on consciousness is neutralized, we must make a strict distinction between 'incarnation' and 'constitution'. Through incarnation consciousness is identified with the body, and thereby it is 'lost' and forgotten in the world. The constitution of the world including man may be a precondition of incarnation, but consciousness is involved in the world not through constitution, since the execution of *epoché* leaves standing the world including man. The *epoché* brings about a personal transformation of man. The absolute subjectivity, which was so long concealed in the natural man through an attachment to the body, returns to itself. It now realizes that it

is absolute subjectivity and not the natural man. The natural existence of man is not unreal but a mere constituted phenomenon.

Though incarnation, according to Husserl, explains how absolute consciousness is integrated into the real world, one does not fail to notice the paradox involved in it. Consciousness is said to be incarnate in the body, but consciousness and the body are fundamentally opposed types of being. The body is one among other transcendent objects, constituted 'in' and 'for' consciousness. The being of consciousness is absolute, whereas the body is a contingent being. According to Husserl, the pact of consciousness with the flesh brings about 'a natural unity' of body and consciousness that can be empirically intuited. Nevertheless, incarnation is not a transcendental structure of consciousness. It is, according to Husserl, a so-called 'linking on' (*Ideas I*, § 53, p. 165), a peculiar type of 'apperception' (*Ibid*), an 'appearance' (*Ibid.*) that rests on bodily foundation. Through incarnation consciousness forfeits nothing of its essential nature and assimilates nothing that is foreign to its essence (*Ibid*). And yet, through incarnation, consciousness becomes something other than what it was: a very part of nature. Consciousness is no longer grasped as pure or absolute consciousness, but as a state of consciousness which is the condition of a self-identical real ego-subject. Certainly, the notion of incarnation involves a paradox, but phenomenological reflections cannot either solve or dissolve the paradox. All that phenomenological reflections can do is to bring out the meaning of a certain phenomenon, however paradoxical it may appear. Husserl's greatness is that he is prepared to recognize the riddle as a riddle wherever there is any. In any case, a philosophy cannot be rediculed on the ground that it accepts many paradoxes, for the exposure of the paradoxical character of a phenomenon may well be the part of a philosophical explanation.

The Constitution of the Body

From the point of view of transcendental phenomenology, the body is a constituted phenomenon, and like any other constituted phenomenon it has its being for consciousness. However, the phenomenon of body is rather unusual. The body is a part of corporeal nature, and yet it is not intended to be merely a corporeal object. It is my animate organism. As an animate organism it 'embodies' and thereby 'expresses' the consciousness of whose organism it is. Hence all of my bodily movements are experienced by me as at once corporeal, determined and determinable by means of physiological laws, and as a subjectively lived *Ich bewege* which itself embodies this corporeal movements. The body is experienced by consciousness as its own 'animate organism', and in that experiencing it is intended as being reflexively related to itself sense-perceptively, and in practice and action. Thus, I 'can' perceive one hand by means of the other, an eye by means of a hand, and so forth. In this experiencing procedure, the functioning organ must become an object

and the object a functioning organ (*C.M.* p. 97). In Husserl's constitutive analysis this peculiar character of the phenomenon of body—as at once an object and an organism—has been investigated.

Husserl's constitutive analysis follows a pattern. It takes up a particular object as given 'straightforwardly' at a particular time as the 'transcendental guide', and then reflexively goes back to those actual and potential modes of consciousness in which the given sense (of the object) has been accomplished. Husserl distinguished four moments of the noemetic-objective sense, 'animate organism' (*C.M.* p. 97), as is experienced originaliter:

(1) My animate organism is the centre of orientation, the zero-point of origin, with respect to which all other objects are organized in the spatio-temporal world;
(2) It is as well as a certain organ of perception;
(3) It is the field of localized sensation; and
(4) It is that which most immediately actualizes my willings.

Husserl points out that the four different moments of the sense, 'animate organism', belongs to the primary level of sense, i.e. to the solipsistic level. The solipsistic level of sense is reached by dropping all references to what is alien to me from the 'universe of phenomena' that is retained through *epoché* and reduction.

> Accordingly this peculiar abstractive sense-exclusion of what is alien leaves us a *kind of 'world'* still, a Nature reduced to what is included in our ownness and, as having its place in this Nature thanks to the bodily organism, the psychophysical Ego, with 'body and soul' and personal Ego (*Ibid.*, p. 98).

The sense, 'animate organism', is at first analysed as an utterly unique member to be found within the 'ownness sphere'. The analysis is completed on the intersubjective level. On the intersubjective level my animate body becomes fully objective. It is my animate body for everyone.

The four moments of the sense, 'animate organism', may be explained as under:

(*a*) The body that is uniquely singled out within the 'ownness sphere' is the 'owned body' (*Corpse Propre* or *Leib*), and the nature to which it belongs is the 'owned Nature'. The owned body is the reference pole for all physical bodies comprising the owned nature. Under the solipsistic prespective my animate body is not located somewhere in an objective space. It is the original 'here' corresponding to every 'there', the here which remains, and in relation to which everything changes its place. Accordingly, for my immediate experience my animate body is immobile. It is impossible for me to vary the angle, side or aspect under which my body appears to me, or to step away from it and have it turn in relation to me.[5]

(*b*) The sense that the animate body is the bearer of the orientational point, the centre, the absolute 'zero-point', is constituted for consciousness in the course of its harmonious sense experience. Consciousness intends its animate organism as that 'by means of which' the surrounding world can be sensuously perceived and physically manipulated. In order that the objects of the world are viewed as objects of perception and the body as its centre of reference, the body must be constituted as a system of organs, particularly the organs of perception. Each organ has its own organization and its own zero-point with regard to its specific object. But they are relative to the body, with regard to which all other objects are determined with respect to their loci. The body is the fundamental ground, and with reference to it I move about the earth and act on it. This is possible, because the body is intended as an organ of perception.

(*c*) The body, Husserl points out, is originally constituted as an organ of perception in sensation. The body is intended as the sole object in the world to which I ascribe fields of sensations. I experience my body as the 'bearer of localized sensation'. The body is an object, but it is such an object as I can locate in it the various sensations that I experience. Sensations are multiple. They are variously localizable in various parts of the body and have their respective zero-points. In the midst of the multiplicity of data and the multiplicity of zero-points, the 'animate organism' is experienced as a sort of 'synergetic system'.[6] The experience of the 'animate organism' as a 'synergetic system', according to Husserl, has its direct bearing on the constitution of the identity of the 'things' which are given through profiles and in succession.

The sensations in which my 'animate organism' is constituted are not what the traditional philosophy understood by 'sense-data'. They are, as Husserl points out, 'live-bodily events', and not physical events. The localized sensations are not properties of the 'animate organism' as physical things, but are the properties of the things 'animate organism'.[7] The animate body is not the 'body-subject', rather it is the body thing. Thus, Husserl's analysis of the body is not existential. The 'owned body' is not the *Le Corpse Propre* of Merleau Ponty.[8] It is a thing in which sensations appear under circumstances, if the body is touched, burned, and so forth. In other words, the 'animate organism is not an incarnate consciousness, but a thing to which sensations are ascribed through a relation of dependence. The body is a constituted thing, a material thing, which 'has' sensations. In virtue of sensations the body is the animate body which 'embodies' and thereby 'expresses' consciousness of whose organism it is.

In the course of the constitutive analysis of the phenomenon of body, Husserl draws our attention to the distinction between sensations of objects and sensations of the body or kinaesthetic sensations. The latter sensations immediately reveal my corporeal existence to me, that I stand somewhere in space and that I am freely mobile. Kinaesthetic sensations are not representational, but are determined by 'if-then' conditionality. A thing that appears to

me in a particular way may appear to me differently, if I move my eyes, my hands, my stands, etc.

The body as the field of kinaesthetic sensations not only reveals my corporeal existence to me; it also supplies the orientation index which motivates the coalescence of a series of sensible appearances and possible appearances into one object. The constitution of material objects involves reference to my kinaesthetic perceptions of my body in another way. They enable us to discriminate between what appears to us as material things and what really is a material thing; otherwise we are not able to distinguish changes in the things from changes in our perception of them. Whether a given change is a change in the object or is a change in my perception of it depends on the constancy or change of my position in relation to the object perceived. I am informed of these circumstances by my kinaesthetic sensations. Accordingly, the constitution of a material object in perception involves kinaesthetic sensations.

(*d*) The body is not only experienced as the centre of reference, as a system of organs of perceptions, as the bearer of localized sensations; it is also experienced by me as the 'organ of will' (*Willensorgan*). The animate body is the sole object immediately obedient to my motor spontaneity. Because the body is an organ of will, I can move about the world, can determine it in some way according to my choice, can also account for my success, for my failure, and so on.

Thus, we see that the body, according to Husserl, is a part of corporeal nature. It is a constituted thing or an intended object in which sensations are localized. On the basis of the initial localization of the sensations the body acquires the complex sense of 'animate organism', which presupposes the sense of being the 'absolute zero-point', a *Sinnesorgean* and a *Willensorgan*. And thereby a thing, a corporeal nature, is uniquely singled out for me as my *animate organism* in which I live and grow, in which I sense, and through which I act, and so on.

> This occurs in such a way that I at once perceive not only the thing, animate organism and its corporeal conduct, but also at the same time my psychic life; and finally, both of these at once: the self-embodying of the latter (the psychie life) in the former (my organism), and the self-expressing of the one in the other.[9]

Husserl, through a constitutive analysis of the phenomenon of body, wants to establish the thesis that the embodiment of consciousness is not a transcendental structure of consciousness. The body, like the rest of the world, is constituted in experience. The body as my 'animate organism' is constituted for consciousness by virtue of certain conscious participation in the transcendence of material nature. The body, in itself a part of corporeal nature, receives the sense, 'animate organism', for me in such a way that it is me (the animated soul or the psyche) and that it expresses me. However, as the constitutional analysis of the body shows, it will be a mistake to think that the constitution of nature precedes the constitution of my 'animate organism'. While the constitution of nature involves references to the 'animate organism', the constitution of the 'animate organism' as a thing implies that nature is already constituted; nature without my 'animate organism' is inconceiveable, and so also is my 'animate organism' without nature. This mutual reference of 'animate organism' and 'material nature' for a constituting consciousness tends to suggest that original or constituting consciousness is not possibly as pure as Husserl would like to suggest. Possibly, constituting consciousness is already embodied, and it is not a series of disembodied acts.

Notes and References

1. In the body of the paper *Crisis* stands for Edmund Husserl's *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. D. Carr, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.
2. L. Landgrebe, 'The World as a Phenomenological Problem' in *PPR*, Vol. I, 1940-41, p. 45.
3. *Ideas-I* stands for Edmund Husserl's *Ideas : General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson, New York: Macmillan Co. 1958.
4. *C.M.* stands for Edmund Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*, trans. Dorion Cairns, The Hauge: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977.
5. Paul Ricoeur, *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology*, trans. E.G. Ballard and L.E. Embree, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967, p. 64.
6. *Ideas II*, pp. 145-46, cited by R.M. Zaner, *The Problem of Embodyment*, The Hague, 1964, pp. 255-56.
7. *Ideas II*, p. 146, cited by R.M. Zaner, *Ibid.*, p. 256.
8. Paul Ricoeur, *op. cit.*, p. 48.
9. *Erste Philosophie*, Husserliana Band VIII, The Hague, 1959, pp. 60-61, cited by R.M. Zaner, *op. cit.*, pp. 259-60.

Burdwan University, Burdwan PARITOSH KUMAR DAS

Book review

SUSHIL KUMAR SAXENA: *Ever Unto God—Essays on Gandhi and Religion*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research and Ṛddhi-India, Calcutta, 1988, 228 pages, Rs. 110.

The book under review is a significant contribution to both Gandhian thought and religious philosophy; to the former for filling the long-standing lacuna in Gandhian literature of an essentially analytic and comprehensive work on Gandhi's religious beliefs garnered from the totality of his *own* writings on, and practice of religion; to the latter for revisiting some of its perennial problems from the believing and spiritually functional viewpoint of a *sādhaka* —one who tries to observe some ethico-religious discipline—in sharp contrast to the intellectual's dispassionate and merely theoretical grasp of the matter, and for challenging, in the process, some set ways of approaching these problems so as to forcefully bring home the point that 'the seeing eye of faith' is here a necessary prerequisite.

The book is a product of the author's lifelong academic involvement with Gandhian philosophy (Preface); however, the insightful treatment of the subject, the vitality of the argumentation and the depth of analysis here bespeak of a concern, overreaching the purely academic. Indeed, the essays portray all along a rare analytical skill and philosophical aplomb coupled with wide scholarship and penetrative—often mystical—insights.

The thoughtfully picked title indicates the author's sensitivity to Gandhi's penchant—or passion!—for practice, as does his choice of subject: Gandhi's total commitment to God as evinced in his godward living which, to be sure, is 'no mere feat of the intellect ... but a whole vast discipline of doing and suffering' (p. vii). This is why Gandhi struggles 'to always *behave* in accordance with his insight into present truth ... is in fact ever anxious to see that his actions square with his principles, and that his handling of political matters does not give the lie to the faiths he professes to cherish in his personal life ...' This being the case, 'we can hardly deny', argues the author, 'that Gandhi pursues the bigger accord of act, understanding and attitude' which warrants that 'a kind of consistency must be at once granted to him' (p. 2). Thus, those who glibly accuse Gandhi of being inconsistent should bear in mind that it is ontological—and not conceptual—consistency that is of vital import to him; and so, as he *grows in truth* or ontologically, he truthfully—if not consistently—makes a corresponding change in his former writings, asking the reader to select his later opinion as the authentic one. This point is substantiated at great length by the author in the later chapters of the book. For instance, he clarifies how 'the genuineness of faith is much more important to Gandhi than the adequacy of his *view* of God' (p. 27, italicis mine),

his main concern being 'the active *exercise* of faith' (p. 11, italics mine); how 'Gandhi's own active *involvement with* suffering is much more instructive than his views *on* it' (pp. 145-46, first italics mine).

The recurring controversy over Gandhi's philosophical status is also put to rest in the introductory chapter by the following arguments: admittedly, 'Gandhi is not a philosopher by present-day standards'; however, since philosophy is 'eligible to concern itself with reflection, say, on the basic values of life', then Gandhi, because of 'his singular involvement with values', is certainly philosophical, and his thought merits due attention. Further, in so far as for Gandhi 'philosophy without life corresponding is like a body without life ... and the aim of his life is *darśana* or direct experience of ultimate Reality through the observance of *yamas* and *niyams*, the regulative principles of conduct', he qualifies to be called a philosopher of the ancient Indian kind, for 'the *yamas* and *niyams* were once integral to the Indian philosophical quest' and *darśana*—the ultimate philosophical goal (pp. 1-5).

Two facts, therefore, influence the author's selection of approach to his subject: (*a*) Gandhi's own 'specific approach [which] is of a man who is ever keen to *be* and to *do* good'; and (*b*) Gandhi's philosophy 'develops as a rule under the stress of real situations and makes for the issue of what has been called "practical" or "embodied" wisdom'. The befitting method chosen, therefore, is to 'reconstruct experience ideally' on an analysis of language, so as to provide 'the missing links' implicit in thought but explicit in practice, giving due weightage in the process to three factors: coherence of meaning, the totality of Gandhi's writings on the topic in focus, and 'the chief regulative faiths of his everyday life' (p. 4). This method is unique in the sense that the analytic-conceptual approach is here applied in vital conjunction with the existential-phenomenological one.

The introductory essay is followed by systematically written chapters (ii-v) on the basic elements of the life of religion: God, prayer, humility, faith and 'the way of self-suffering: *Ahimsā*'. In these chapters the author structures the edifice of Gandhi's religious philosophy by piecing together into a coherent whole what often seems like a jigsaw puzzle of disjointed, unintelligible, contradictory and nebulous utterances of Gandhi on the emphases of the good life, when viewed from the 'outside' or from a non-existential perspective. He here builds on the following three-pronged logic which, though apparently simple, is yet infallible and compulsive.

(*a*) The opinion and experience of the experts in the field of religion, i.e. the sages, saints and persons practising this discipline with success:

> In respect of a matter which we do not ourselves know, it is no sign of unreason to go by the personal credibility of those who are experts in the field. Religion is no exception to this ... if even great scholars ... yield without demur to the counsel of an expert in a field different from theirs—say, to their doctor's advice—it would be wrong to suppose that acquiescence in what the saints say ... cannot but detract from our claim to be intellectual ... [thus] ... is it not improper to pass over the evidence of saints and sages, the only experts who really count in matters spiritual? (pp. 60-61 and 10; see also pp. 52, 91 and 138).

It may here be mentioned in passing that traditional Indian philosophy accepts 'testimony' of knowledgeable persons and its written expression—the *Śāstras*—as an authority in ethico-religious matters. For instance, the *Gītā* ch. xvi, 23-24.

(*b*) The 'relative claims of theory and practice' (p. 33). This is necessary, because Gandhi's paramount aim in life is 'prayerful living, and not ... mere intellect' (p. 3). Further, Gandhi himself claims to be 'a man of faith and prayer' (p. 8), regards life as '"an aspiration"—a whole-souled struggle for perfection' (p. 7) and is ever concerned with 'the exercise of faith' (p. 11), with ascertaining how 'Truth ... (can) in fact be related to us in everyday life' (p. 14).

Throughout the book the author painstakingly illustrates the difference between a theoretical and a practical point of view; the separate demands of theory and praxis. He states:

> [When Gandhi claims that] undue impatience is *himsā* (violence) ... this is no muddle of concepts with separate meanings, but a practitioner's way of warning his colleagues that the observance of *ahimsā* (non-violence) requires equal mindfulness in respect of the attitudes which recalcitrate it. ... The *thinker* would be content if violence is only kept apart in meaning from haste. The problem of keeping off violence in life may not worry him at all. But the man who is wedded to the *practice* of non-violence cannot wait to let violence occur and then be merely seen to differ from lack of patience. He has to beware of the very attitudes which predispose one to violence, and to keep away from them *as if they were themselves as bad as actual violence*. Impatience makes one liable to anger, and so to violence. ... So one who is committed to the practice of non-violence cannot disjoin the manifest badness of *himsā* (or violence) from the subtle wrong of being too eager. It is with an eye to this logic of practice that Gandhi equates impatience with *himsā* ... such a dealing with concepts is to be found in the *Gītā* too (pp. 3-4).

He continues: 'The truth of praying is ... sensed only by the person who does it. Nor is this quiet self-checking difficult. If a man is keen to pray as he sets out, and if the praying runs in tune, the experience cannot but satisfy; and the feeling will here be the testament' (p. 52).

For years, Gandhi follows the discipline of detachment from sense objects and of self-purification generally.

> [So] when he says—on the basis of insight born of long experience—that the direct relish of holding on to the path of righteousness is an index of

> our being rightly disposed towards God, the man who questions this merely ab extra is hardly quite competent to doubt the verdict of experience. ... The objector is probably one who has never done any praying himself (p. 44).

(*c*) 'Incomplete understanding' is no index of untruth in matters of religion. The author points out that 'even our scientific knowledge of things is nowhere quite exhaustive' (p. 28), and that 'impatience for an immediate and satisfying answer is no necessary part of serious enquiry. One may have to wait for years, and practise ever better the details of some discipline before the "answer" (say, to prayer), emerges. This is precisely the truth in the Hindu concept of *sādhanā*' (p. 44).

Incidentally, it may be noted here that Gabriel Marcel draws a distinction between a 'problem' and a 'mystery', and goes on to clarify that a 'myestery'. unlike a 'problem', does not admit of 'solution' by the 'broken world' of techniques (Gabriel Marcel, *Being and Having*, p. 227).

The author also makes use of this three-pronged logic in tackling the age-old problems of religious philosophy: of God's existence; of human freedom, and of evil and suffering—as against God's omnipotence and goodness.

Neither space nor the scope of this review article permit me fully to illustrate the author's treatment of these problems. I confine myself, therefore, to giving some hints thereof in order to kindle the readers' interest.

The author takes up the question of the 'proof' of God's existence and writes:

> ...though the sages all assure us in the light of their own experience that *anyone can* 'see' God for himself by following the path that leads to the 'seeing', [the theorists] ... remain unimpressed because [they] ... fear the rigours of the needed self-discipline, and would like instead to 'see' God, ... in the easy way of perception. [They] ... do not realize that verification is here a matter of 'knowing by becoming', and that it emerges as the fruit of [self-discipline]. ... For persons who are neither willing to tread the way to God themselves nor value the evidence of those who have done so with singular success, 'the weightiest argument in proof of the existence of ... God is of no avail'. On the other hand, those who have attained a living awareness of God find that it neither needs nor admits of any argument. (p. 10).

Thus, while the theoretical philosopher will forever be plagued by questions regarding the 'proof' of God's existence:

> '... the man who experiences God's reality finds it impossible to accept any argument against it. Nor is he able to prove it. This inability, however, we can reasonably suppose, may be no disproof of the *experience* itself. It may simply be a pointer to its uniqueness on the one hand; and betoken, on the other, that our common kinds of proof are not the only ways of getting at what *is* there' (p. 30).

In discussing *the problem of evil and suffering as against God's omnipotence and goodness*, the author observes:

> 'A relation between two terms can be properly denied only when both are within one's ken. ... [Thus] if one is to make a rightful attempt to determine the relation between God and ... evil, it seems demanded that both be first known with a measure of directness. This requirement is, however, just not met by the usual kind of philosophical concern with the problem in question. Here we only seek to *understand* how the *fact* of evil could be accommodated with the *idea* of God. ... Does the objector know God as directly as [the evil]? ... the man who insists that the fact of evil collides with the supposed reality of a good God considers the two sides ... abstractly, by and large. He only *thinks* of God as all-controlling and good; he does not seek to determine the truth of these attributed in relation to life. ... And he looks at evil and suffering, in the main, ab extra we may say. ... Fidelity to truth demands quite a different way of dealing with the matter. One has to try to overcome ... suffering that seems overwhelming; and, in this process of an actual struggle to deal with what defies one's individual capacities, to try maximally to see if reliance on God and prayer is of help. This alone is the way *to attest every inner detail of a total concern with the problem, as against the merely theoretic urge to verify just the finished proposition: "A kind and omnipotent God exists"* (pp. 44, 30, 68-69).

Thus,

> 'no one who claims to be seriously concerned with the God-evil relation should be content with the mere *concept* of God, or with a bare admission of the fact of evil. One has to realize the Power that God is, by living a prayerful life. On the other hand, to register evil *as such* is at once to detest it; and a man is here rightly set strictly in proportion to the degree of earnestness with wich he struggles to eradicate to subdue evil' (p. 29).

He notes further:

> '... instead of harping on the theoretical incompatibility of God and evil, men of faith often achieve dramatic success in mitigating suffering and evil—*with God's help*' (pp. 29, 33).

A man of faith—like Gandhi—who 'is aware of the two terms—God and evil—*with the requisite measure of directness and intensity* ... sees clearly that

God's goodness is "reconciliable" with evil in the sense that we can always invoke it in overcoming evil . . . so that His goodness is rightly related to the *conquest* of evil, even though we cannot theoretically reconcile the *occurrence* of evil and suffering with His presence and attributes' (pp. 29-30). Such a man, who is a man of practice,

> '. . . does not claim . . . to prove the reality of God's goodness by argument. We never see him intrude into the philosopher's domain. But then he may also be allowed to remind the philosopher that if, as the sages assure us, the reality of God is not provable logically but can only be realised *in terms of personal experience*, it would be wrong to expect that it could be *eradicated* by argument, be it from evil or from any other feature of our experience . . . the role of suffering in the economy of human life is clear to a man of faith' (pp. 31, 33).

About hearing the 'inner voice' or the voice of conscience, the author says:

> '. . . the truth that the Voice [God's Voice or the 'inner voice'] always guides and shelters those who follow Its dictates can be directly experienced by anyone who prepares himself suitably. When some effort is required even for acquiring "the commonest things", would it not be plainly unfair to insist that if It is real, the Voice should be audible to *everybody without any training*? (p. 91). See also 'On Prayer . . . Some Philosophical Questions' (pp. 52-70); 'On Faith . . . Some Philosophical Problems' (pp. 121-144).

The author, indeed, handles with considerable philosophical acumen the theme of the book: How Gandhi cultivates a 'living and full faith' in a 'living God' through 'prayerful living' or by, what Simone Weil terms as 'waiting on God', though Gandhi would disagree with her that 'the waiting in question ... [is] a merely episodic experience' (p. 86). Even a brief and cursory tracing of the theme underrunning the book will bear out the truth of Gandhi's assertion here:

As the chapter on God (chap. ii) unfolds, it becomes amply clear to the reader how for Gandhi religion is: '. . . the active cultivation of our unceasing 'relationship with the divine' (p. 44). The chapter on prayer (chap. iii) reinforces this fact and makes explicit the intense and intimate character of this relationship—the very title of the chapter, 'Praying and *Listening*' (my italics) being suggestive of the dialogue or 'communion as godward attention' inherent in prayer (p. 50). The author here reconstructs phenomenologically the meaning of Gandhi's definition of prayer as 'an intense longing of the heart . . . an expression (coming) from the deepest recesses of the heart' and related utterances to bring out the quintessence of prayer: longing (pp. 50-51). As such, prayer can be regarded as 'the essence of religion' (p. 44); the 'essence of prayer', in turn, being 'not petition but the quality of being properly disposed towards God' (p. 49). The chapter on humility and faith (chap. iv) draws out how the relationship with God, which was initially 'a simple childlike faith in Him' (p. 113), deepens and matures, as Gandhi, 'yearning for purity . . . and longing for full faith . . . throws himself on His Name' (pp. 71-74); tunes in ever more finely to listen to his 'inner voice—God's Voice', obeying Its divine dictates, reducing himself to a 'zero'; and, thereby moulds himself by degrees into an 'instrument of His Will' (p. 96 gives a phenomenological analysis of what it is for Gandhi to be an instrument of God's Will). The relationship thus culminates in 'a crowning awareness—the harvest of years of prayerful living—that ... faith is the only Reality', and in absolute, unconditional trust in God—to the extent that Gandhi can now steadily say: 'Though He slay me, yet will I trust Him' (p. 113).

The final chapter reveals how Gandhi approximates towards consummate humility or *amānitvam* by:

(*a*) Striving for Truth through non-violence—his practice of the latter principle being 'a very complex fabric of faith, prayer, humility and surrender' (p. 150);
(*b*) Acting upon the first *mantra* (stanza) of the *Īśo'paniṣad* which Gandhi 'eulogizes as the quintessential expression of the Hindu religious spirit', and which counsels, *inter alia*, renunciation of everything for God (pp. 158-66); and
(*c*) Fasting in response to his 'inner voice'.

The author's superb phenomenological analysis of Gandhi's intensely godward fasting highlights it as the apotheosis of his religious praxis; the reader sees vividly how a fast for Gandhi is 'an upsurge in surrender and as crystallizing practice of *ahimsā*' . . . 'a resolute essay in disciplined self-suffering' (pp. 179-86). And so for Gandhi at this stage: '. . . the awareness of being in love with God is at once the reassuring sense of being under His wing. It is also a felt impulsion to love and serve fellow creatures' (p. 153).

Gandhi's life of living faith is thus projected as 'a dialectic of surrender' (p. 184), through "the carefully incurred crucifixion of self' (p. 144) to 'see God face to face'. This perhaps explains the author's choice of the quote from Gandhi to adorn his book: 'It is an unbroken torture to me that I am still far from Him who . . . governs every breath of my life, and whose offspring I am'—a cry of one, torn in love and longing for union! The author, however, is quick to point out that this relationship of the man of faith and God is two-way: 'The life of faith . . . is not merely man's becoming godward, but expression—often easy to "see"—of God's own concern for man' (p. 123). Contrast this with Sartre's view that man is 'abandoned', because 'God does not exist, and . . . it is necessary to draw the consequences of His absence right to the end' (Jean Paul Sartre, *Existentialism and Humanism*, pp. 32-33).

This review article will be incomplete without mentioning that exquisitely framed, philosophically creative, poetic prose makes for inspring and delightful reading all along. A few examples:

(*i*) [Gandhi] 'merrily applying conflicting attributes to God in the manner of a devotee' (p. 6); '. . .language . . . an impulse to self-gathering' (p. 7); 'Genuine prayer . . . always a measure of fellowship with God' (p. 16); 'We can only see Him revealed, yet unframed in our ascent to goodness' (p. 22); 'Gandhi's own felt anchorage in God'; '. . . the inescapable incoherence of the language of love' (p. 27); '. . . the plastic power of faith' (p. 156); '. . . to "catch" religion as we catch a cold' (p. 37); '. . . the exquisite poise of . . . godward living' (p. 165); 'to be *in fact* steeped in God-consciousness' (p. 186); '. . . the blind and frantic urge somehow to shake off our limits as merely human' (p. 186).

(*ii*) 'As an instance of first-order religious talk, the utterance "God is" betokens not only the limits of speech, but an easy self-withholding, a quiet inner bowing, perhaps even self-effacement' (p. 11).

(*iii*) 'The heart . . . in its kinship *with the soul* . . . longing for God . . . and purity, with an unforced and intense impulse, or as a kind of "spontaneous upwelling" ' (p. 5).

(*iv*) [In fasting] 'the requisite implicitness of faith is secured with the ease of a vacuum drawing in air' (p. 80).

(*v*) 'In our everyday life, perhaps the nearest parallel to (becoming one with God) is the experience of incense-breathing flowerage which not merely quickens, but caresses the self, demanding at the same time a yet fuller ingress' (p. 105).

(*vi*) 'The "tyranny" of God as felt and acknowledged by Gandhi is in truth the bliss of being "consumed" in lone. . . . Love *is* a tyranny in the sense that one's own freedom is, so to say, overrun by devotion to the Other; but, far from generating rebellious feeling, such self-subjugation is for the devotee a state that he greatly cherishes' (p. 27).

(*vii*) Definition of religion. 'As a distinct form of life religion is not merely doing or saying, but is—as a *way* of ceaseless allegiance to God—dotted with quiet reminders to oneself that an attitude chosen and generally observed has not only been helpful so far, but is yet to be entered into with fuller self-giving' (p. 6).

The book is also well timed, for there is a worldwide resurgence of interest in the spiritual dimension of the human being, born of alarm at the harsh, soul-destroying consequences of materialistic lifestyles and a violent world order. (For instance, the New Age literature: Rifkin, Capra, Roszak, Mische, Hans Feddema, Jungk, etc. and the New World Order literature: Richard Falk, Galtung, Mendlowitz, Boulding, Kothari, etc.). In retrospect,

therefore, Gandhi today seems prophetic in rejecting Western civilization, or our present model of development, based on a secular, scientific, purely materialistic world-view that overrides our essence—as spirit—and ignores our spiritual moorings (*Hind Swaraj*). Indeed, Gandhi's prophecy is fast coming true, for, despite our phenomenal successes in the scientific and technological fields, we are dogged today by a mounting sense of failure and powerlessness in tackling our grave problems of violence—structural, domestic, regional, national and global—social opperession and injustice, economic imperialism, ecological imbalance, existential alienation and the likelihood of a nuclear war starting by mistake—if not by intent. The search is, therefore, on for alternatives to modern 'development', medicine, defence structures and way of life. Post-modern paradigms of development return to Gandhi's holistic approach to life and world order. It is implicit in Gandhi's thinking that the worst form of violence is spiritual, which can be defined as follows: the human being is a totality of body, mind and spirit; so when an individual, a society or a world-view attends only to the body and mind, neglecting to focus, in the main, on the spiritual aspect of the human person, spiritual violence is committed. Thus, the book under review fulfils a need of the hour by highlighting Gandhi's practice of religion which brings to a compelling focus the supreme significance of the spiritual in us.

However, after going through the book, one cannot help wishing that the author had here deemed it fit to make explicit by illustrating at some length from Gandhi's active political life how Gandhi relates his spiritual quest to empirical truth; how in marching ever unto God his life becomes a unique dialectic of social service, political praxis and ontological evolution. This addition could have vivified the following which is of great relevance to our times:

(1) The secret of Gandhi's charisma and the source of Gandhi's power, dynamism, and limitless energy to transform himself, to work miracles with others (to date—consider, for instance, the worldwide receptivity to Attenborough's film on Gandhi), to effect normative socio-political reality transformation and to gift to humankind a unique method and strategy of non-violent conflict resolution—*satyagrāha*—is his intense and all-pervasive spirituality. (Often, the researcher, the grassroots worker and the peace activist study and apply Gandhi's approach and political strategy, taking little account, or even being ignorant of the fact that these are rooted in his dynamic spirituality);
(2) The relevance of the spiritual in our fight for social justice and peace;
(3) How ethico-religious concepts can continually inform and be consistently applied to the formidable arena of political life and 'power politics';
(4) How the individual and society today are schizophrenic because they have divorced personally held ethical values from immediate socio-

> political realities. Our double standards are a result of our spiritual entropy. Says Gandhi: 'It is a sign of religious atrophy to sustain an unjust Government that supports an injustice by resorting to untruth and camouflage' (*Young India,* 4, August 1920).

The author comments (p. 76): '... worldly persons have no idea of what they can achieve as spirits.' He could have elaborated here, with effect, that it is perhaps in our roles as spiritual entities, wherein lies the 'hope' that rests at the rock-bottom of the 'pandora's box' of materialism which has released its evils of greed, corruption, self-centeredness and spiritual violence amidst our global village.

It may also be pointed out that a certain amount of repetition in the book—unavoidable because of the close knitting of religious concepts in the light of practice—may perhaps irk the atheist, but will certainly delight one who is in the process of establishing a living link with God or Truth and may perhaps even urge the atheist to experiment with God, for Gandhi's life is 'a dialectic of surrender' to God as Truth!

Further, it may be mentioned that in this era of heightened feminist consciousness, the exclusive use of the word 'man' (for instance, 'men of faith', 'man of non-violence', 'mankind') could have been avoided.

However, I hasten to add that the above in no way detracts from the chief merit of the book in being a philosophical work *par excellence* on Gandhi's religious praxis. Further, in this full-length study of Gandhi's practice of religion, the author brings out forcefully how '*ahimsā* is for Gandhi but a form, though pre-eminent, of godward living' (p. 8). While this may come as a revelation to those acquainted but peripherially with Gandhian thought, it is often overlooked or obscured by Gandhian scholars. This is, however, an important projection for two reasons: first, a religion that demands consideration of fellow human beings as an essential precondition for God-realization—Gandhi insists 'on the oneness of "seeing God face to face" with *ahimsā* as self-indentification with others (through acts of service)' (p. 153)—can never lead to the abuse of religion; and, secondly, it highlights the truth that a persevering practice of non-violence is intimately connected with one's spiritual resources. The author also contributes to religious philosophy by substantiating his thesis that philosophy must aim 'not at clarity alone, but at wholeness of vision ... it [must] mark and pursue the directions suggested by the filaments of experience severed from being pent in words' (p. 37).

The book contains a rich bibliography and a detailed index—a boon to the researcher. Further, the focus throughout on Gandhi's own writings and speeches on, and application of, religious emphasis is a delight, if not a relief, to the serious student of Gandhi's philosophy, so used to the sad inattention to the text of Gandhi's *own* writings in most scholarly works on the subject.

In a touching token of thoughtfulness and gratitude, the book is dedicated to Norman Vincent Peale 'for his service to humanity'. Thus, it is perhaps

in the fitness of things that this review article conclude with quoting from the closing pages of his world-famous book, *The Power of Positive Thinking:*

> This Higher Power—God—is one of the most amazing facts in human experience. I am awe-struck, no matter how many times I have seen the phenomenon, by the thoroughgoing, tremendous, overwhelming changes for good that it accomplishes in the lives of people....Why not draw upon that Higher Power?"

University of Delhi, Delhi SUMAN KHANNA

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