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Editor's Note

It gives me great pleasure to announce that Professor Daya Krishna has kindly agreed to undertake the responsibility of editing the *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research* (JICPR). The present academic position and popularity of the *Journal* are mainly due to the unstinted cooperation that I have been receiving over the years from the friends like Professor Daya Krishna, Professor Sibajiban Bhattacharyya and Professor Pranab Kumar Sen. Other members of the Editorial Advisory Board have extended their full support to me. I do hope that under the editorship of Professor Daya Krishna this *Journal* will add to its existing academic prestige. I further hope that the sort of cooperation that I have been receiving from all concerned, especially the contributors and the readers, will be extended also to Professor Daya Krishna.

D. P. CHATTOPADHYAYA

Jaipur
9 August 1990

Philosophy, religion, morality, spirituality: some issues*

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Can Indian philosophy be called philosophy? Or is it religion? Or is it both? Is Hinduism religion? These and such other questions have raised considerable controversy and much greater confusion, and it is in this area that I propose to do something in this paper. I shall try to do this by considering the nature of the Sāṅkhya system, and shall start with presenting an outline of my understanding of it.

It is already known that, according to Sāṅkhya, Prakṛti-Puruṣa *viveka* (discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa) is the goal of man. I want to suggest that it has three aspects: *anubhava* (experience or knowledge), *vicāra* (thought or reasoning) and *ācara* (conduct or morality). All these together constitute the human goal. Anyone of the aspects, apart from the other two, is an abstraction, though in the attainment of the goal one or the other aspect may be central and the other two subsidiary (consider the case of the examplars).

But is this understanding of the Sāṅkhya a legitimate understanding or only an understanding which I read into the text? In this paper I shall try to show that it is a legitimate understanding by considering its relation to the text, and also by relating it to an understanding of the *prasthānatrayī* (the Upaniṣads, the *Brahma-Sūtras* and the *Bhagavad-Gītā*), some examplars, and the theory of *puruṣārthas*.

The Sāṅkhya System

According to the Sāṅkhya system of thought, the goal of human life is to discriminate between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. But what is there to discriminate between Puruṣa and Prakṛti? The answer to this question is not a simple one; one could distinguish three answers which are interrelated, or one could say that there is one answer with three aspects. What are the three interrelated answers or aspects?

First, one might say that the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti is ordinarily understood as a matter of understanding the elements of the Sāṅkhya system and their interrelationship—Prakṛti with its various elements and Puruṣa. Secondly, the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti is a

*This paper was presented at a seminar on *Puruṣārthas* held at Rajasthan University, Jaipur in January 1988.

matter of experience/knowledge. (*anubhava* is usually translated as experience, and is thought of as a mystic experience. However, *anubhava* is not merely a flash of experience, but involves knowledge of one's self.) In the Sāṅkhya thought, there is no clear account of this experience. However, the sort of account given in, say, *Kārikā* 64, 'I do not exist, naught is mine, I am not', may be taken as a description of this experience/knowledge. Thirdly, it is a matter of an aggregate of dispositions which brings about or consists in the three attainments of *pramoda, mudita* and *modamāna*. These attainments together or the last one (*modamāna*) refers to the suppression of three kinds of misery.

Of these three answers, the first two are very often spoken of, but not so often the third. I should, therefore, like to explain my inclusion of this third answer.

Sāṅkhya distinguishes eight intellectual dispositions: four of the *sāttvika* variety—virtue, wisdom, non-attachment and the possession of lordly powers; and four of the *tāmasika* variety which are the opposite of the four of *sāttvika* variety, viz. vice, ignorance, attachment and the absence of lordly powers. Besides the eight dispositions, there are the effects of these dispositions.

> Through virtue (comes about) departure upwards and through vice departure down below; through wisdom is release (acquired), and bondage through ignorance. From non-attachment (results) merger in Primal Nature, migration from passionate attachment, from power (comes about) non-obstruction and the opposite thereof, from the contrary (*The Sāṅkhya-kārikā of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, Kārikā* 45).

The dispositions and the resulting consequences form an aggregate. Accordingly, as the elements are combined in different quantities, there are different aggregates. These are classified under four main heads: (*a*) ignorance (*viparyaya*); (*b*) infirmity (*aśakti*); (*c*) complacency (*tuṣṭi*) and (*d*) attainment (*siddhi*). The further subdivision of these gives us five types of ignorance, twenty-eight types of infirmity, nine types of complacency and eight types of attainments, thus giving us altogether fifty types of aggregates (*Kārikās* 47-48). Of these, the three attainments—*pramoda, mudita* and *modamāna*—are the suppression of the three kinds of misery. I could not get quite clear about the meanings of the three terms. Is each of these concerned with a particular type of misery? Or is each of them concerned with all the three types of misery representing a stage in the suppression of all the three kinds of misery? However, what is important is that the highest attainment is also an aggregate of the dispositions and their consequences. It is an aggregate which brings about or which is the suppression of the three kinds of misery. It is an aggregate in which the consequences of the dispositions like virtue, vice, non-attachment, attachment, attainment of powers and absence of powers are transcended as is described in *Kārikā* 67.

> Virtue and the rest having ceased to function as causes, because of the attainment of perfect wisdom, (the Spirit) remains invested with the body, because of the force of past impressions, like the whirl of the (potter's) wheel (which persists for a while by virtue of the momentum imparted by a prior impulse).

It is true that even at this stage Puruṣa's association with Prakṛti has not ended. However, it has ended all but in name: only the previous *saṁskāras* are working out, and there is no question of turning back. It is possible to call this stage the concrete expression of the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti.

In order to consider whether we have three answers here which are interrelated or one answer which has three aspects, we must take into account the interrelationship between these three answers. I shall consider this by asking whether anyone of these three by itself could justify the claim that one has attained discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. For example, could one attain such discrimination in experience/knowledge without attaining it in thought and conduct?

Suppose, discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa could be merely a matter of experience/knowledge. In that case, one can have such discrimination even when the aggregate of dispositions one has attained is not of *pramoda, mudita* or *modamāna*. Nor would it be necessary that one should have an intellectual grasp, more or less sophisticated, of the discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. If this were to be so, would not the experience of such discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa be a matter merely of a sensation? Surely, to attain such sensation cannot be the ultimate human goal. Only when it is accomplished by the appropriate conduct and a theoretical understanding (it is important to emphasize that the theoretical understanding could be more or less sophisticated), the experience/knowledge becomes not merely a sensation but knowledge of such discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa, and, therefore, a matter of the knowledge of the self.

Now we shall consider the view that the discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa is a matter of mere intellectual understanding of the relationship between the *vyakta*, the *avyakta* and the knower, between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. But how can such intellectual understanding be anything other than a verbal or a formal game unless it is related to the understanding of reality enabling one to distinguish between one who has such discrimination and one who does not have it? However, this would only enable one to understand others in terms of discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Only in so far as one has oneself attained the aggregates of *pramoda, mudita* or *modamāna* would one be able to say that it is a matter of experience/knowledge or thought for oneself.

Nor is it possible for one to say that discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa is a matter merely of conduct. The conduct is not understood as merely physical activity; it is to be understood in the context of an intellectual frame-

work, and it will be necessary to distinguish between conduct which shows discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa and that which does not show such discrimination. And when one has attained conduct which shows that discrimination, one would have experience or knowledge of such discrimination, and, therefore, knowledge of self.

If one is right in the foregoing account, then anyone of the three answers by itself cannot justify a claim to discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. The three answers are not independent answers but three aspects of one answer. However, in actuality, the answers have a certain independence: in any actual case, one or the other aspect may be central and the other two aspects subsidiary. But then it may be asked: am I not reading too much into the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, reading into it what I want to? Though all these aspects are present in the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā*, they are not distinguished, and there is no mention or consideration of their mutual relationship.

Let me now consider the doubt expressed at the end of the last paragraph: one reason why the different answers and their mutual relationship are not mentioned may be that they are taken for granted and there is no need to mention them. The need to mention them arises, because there has been a tendency to overemphasize one or the other answer and devalue, if not ignore, the other two aspects. Under the influence of modern Western philosophy, the theoretical or the intellectual part only is overemphasized; the other two aspects are ignored; they are an embarrassment (to philosophy).

Further, we can see that there is no reading into the text of what is not there, if we consider a wider context—the wider context is provided by the concept of the *prasthantrayī*—the Upaniṣads, the *Brahma-Sūtras*, and the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. These give a further support to the view that here we have an answer with three interrelated aspects. We might say that the Upaniṣads are *anubhavapradhāna*, and in them experience or knowledge is at the centre, and thought or conduct do not occupy that central a place; they are understood in the framework of knowledge. The *Brahma-Sūtras* are *vicārapradhāna*, have intellectual considerations or thought at the centre, and knowledge and conduct do not occupy that central a place; they are understood in the framework of thought. The Bhagavad-Gītā is *ācārapradhāna* and in it considerations of conduct are at the centre, and knowledge and thought are understood in the framework of conduct.

It will help us to understood this kind of difference, if we consider particular examples of each kind. Could we possibly say that, even in this century, Ramakrishna Paramahamsa and Ramana Maharshi are examples of *anubhavapradhāna* individuals? Sri Aurobindo an example of a *vicārapradhāna* individual? And Gandhi an example of an *ācārapradhāna* individual? A consideration of these examples will show that a particular factor in them is only central, while the other two factors are not absent. In the Sāṅkhya system, the aspect of thought is central, but knowledge and conduct are not absent from consideration.

Some Further Considerations

To examine the nature of the foregoing thought, it will be helpful if we put forward some further considerations. We have presented the Sāṅkhya system in terms of *anùbhava*, *vicāra* and *ācāra*. Other systems of Indian thought can also be presented in a similar manner. However, the description or account of *anubhava*, *vicāra* and *ācāra* will vary with each system. Though these differences are there, all the systems accept an account of the goal which is the same for all the systems, and this account is in terms of the *puruṣārthas*—the four human goals—*dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*. This raises many questions: how is it that in spite of differences in the description of *anubhava*, etc. different systems accept a common account in terms of *puruṣārthas*? What is the relationship of the account to the systems? And how can the one goal of the system and the four goals of *puruṣārthas* be reconciled?

Let us start with considering the last question. Some people say that there are not four goals; there are only three goals, *mokṣa* being a later addition. On the other hand, some others say that the three goals are not really goals, they are means to the ultimate goal of *mokṣa*—freedom from the pursuit of the other goals. I do not want to go into the historical considerations (though my 'memory' of discussions at Tirupathi tells me that there is good evidence in favour of the four *puruṣārthas* including *mokṣa*, though the word mokṣa may not have been used at some time in the distant past). I should like to mention that four *puruṣārthas* are mentioned in *Manusmṛti*, Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*, *Mahābhārata*, *Rāmāyaṇa*, etc. But are these not later interpolations?

However, interpolations may be only explications, if we realize that *dharma* and *mokṣa* are not independent of each other, rather they are closely and necessarily interrelated and complement each other. One can say that *dharma*, the code of conduct, disciplines our relationship with others in the pursuit of *artha* and *kāma*, and at the same time it disciplines our emotions. It is this disciplining of our emotions that is related to *mokṣa*. When that discipline is complete, one attains *mokṣa*, and becomes a *sthitaprajña* in the terminology of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. On the other hand, any direct training of the emotions through meditation, *tapas*, etc. not only helps us to perfect internal discipline but also to discipline our relationship to others in the pursuit of *artha* and *kāma*. If this is so, the theory of four *puruṣārthas* need not be replaced by any of these two views. Not only that. The four *puruṣārthas* together constitute one goal—*mokṣā* which perfects and is perfected by *dharma*, and *dharma* which disciplines our pursuit of *artha* and *kāma*.

Now we see how the four goals of *puruṣārtha* are reconciled with one goal of the system. The four goals together give us self-realization, a single goal; and the goal of the system is also self-realization, e.g. described as Prakṛti-Puruṣa *viveka*.

This is true not only in the case of the Sāṅkhya system but also in the case

of the other systems—Vedānta, Vaiśeṣika, etc. Even though the description of the goal is different, it involves self-realization—*ātmabrahma-aikya*, or *kaivalya* and so on. That is why all the systems accept the theory of *puruṣārthas*.

But, then, why do we have the different systems? Why should we not have only the theory of *puruṣārthas*? The theory of the *puruṣārthas* emphasizes the unity of the individual, and of the individual and the society. The systems emphasize the unity of all reality and the place of the self in it. The systems do it differently, because it can be done differently; because different persons are troubled by different problems, different doubts.

It is interesting to note that the *Arthaśāstra* mentions three systems expressing this unity: Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata. Very often I have felt that here we have three different bases of unity: Sāṅkhya accepts transcendence but not God, Yoga accepts both transcendence and God, Lokāyata accepts neither transcendence, nor God. Thus, the theoretical metaphysical structures may be very varied, and yet the goal can remain the same: the realization of the self. This is not good-natured tolerance but a hard theoretical understanding of the Hindus. It is at least as sound as the rigidity of the theoretical-metaphysical beliefs of the Semitic thought.

Before I close this section, I shall give some references which support the foregoing understanding of the Sāṅkhya system and of Indian thought. First, let me quote from Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* (I, ii, 2-B):

> The followers of Manu say that the Sciences are only Trayī, Vartta and Dandanīti, and Anvikṣiki is only a special aspect of the Trayī.
>
> The followers of Bṛhaspati say that Vartta and Daṇḍanīti are the only sciences; Trayī is only a summary of the principles to one who knows the affairs of the World.
>
> The followers of Ushanas say that the only science is Daṇḍanīti, it is the beginning and the end of all sciences.

This account of the relation between sciences shows also the close relationship between *artha* and *kāma*, *dharma* and *mokṣa*. It is further brought out by the following (*Arthaśāstra*, I, vii, 3-5):

> ...that he [the king] should not be without pleasures, but he should enjoy pleasures which are not against Dharma and Artha (consistently with the pursuit of Dharma and Artha). Or he should pursue the three equally which are bound up with one another. If any one is pursued in excess, it harms itself and the other two.

Here what is said about the king holds true of everyone.

Now a quotation from Manu (*Manusmṛti*, II, 224):

> Some declare that the chief good consists in Dharma and Artha, others place it in Kāma and Artha, others in Dharma alone or Artha alone, but the decision is that it consists in the aggregate of all the three.

The foregoing references do not support a simple hierarchical understanding of the *puruṣārthas*, rather they represent a matrix of interacting goals.*

Discussion Regarding the Nature of this Thought

What is the nature of this thought? Is it moral? Is it spiritual? Is it religious? Is it philosophical? As we shall see in the following, there is no clear-cut answer to these questions. One could say that it is none of these (if one kept to the understanding of these in terms of Western thought); or that it is all of these (if one took into account not the technical definitions of these but the functions performed by them).

One might say that in part it is moral thought, but it is so only in part. It does not concern itself only with what one ought to do (*dharma*?) but also with what one ought to be (*mokṣa*). (See the explanation of the Sāṅkhya system). What one ought to do and what one ought to be are not independent of each other; in fact, each is a necessary condition, though not a sufficient condition, for the complete attainment of the other.

Is this thought spiritual thought? As one saw in the last paragraph, it is spiritual—it is concerned with what one ought to be; but it is not merely a matter of a state of being, it is related to what one ought to do. But is it religious? In so far as spirituality is an element of religion, it is also religious. But in so far as religion is a matter of belief in God or a book or prophet or even a definite metaphysical point of view, it is not; because the spiritual element is related not only to the metaphysics of the Sāṅkhya system but also to the metaphysics of other systems such as Nyāya, Advaita, etc.

Is the thought philosophical? Once again, the thought, though not merely that, is philosophical. The Sāṅkhya account articulates the intellectual structure of matter, life, mind, intellect/discrimination, morality and spirituality. This account establishes the existence and nature of the self, the realization of which in experience/knowledge and conduct is the goal. The intellectual structure and the practical life *mutually* support one another. May I suggest that this could be looked upon as giving the necessary conditions of the possibility of discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti (involving matter, life, mind, intellect or discrimination, morality and spirituality and their interrelations). Could I possibly say that Kant was in search of such a comprehensive account, but he could get only a fragmented account of the necessary conditions of the possibility of science and mathematics, of morality, of beauty and of religion within the bounds of reason but not of all three put together?

*See my 'Artha and Arthaśāstra' in T. N. Madan (ed.), *The Way of Life*.

If I am right, then it will be misleading to characterize Sāṅkhya as anyone or the other of morality, spirituality, etc. It is all of these put together. Perhaps it will better to call it an anvikṣiki or an 'enquiry' or a *darśana*. But to say, on this account, that there is neither philosophy, nor spirituality, nor religion, nor moral theory in Indian thought is too legalistic an attitude, especially when such two different traditions are under consideration. As I said earlier, all the functions of these various disciplines are performed by Indian thought.

Consideration of Further Difficulties

As I said at the beginning, I have given here one understanding of Indian thought. But it is no more personal or subjective than any other. It is one kind of understanding supported by text and examples. This understanding, by being different, meets a number of questions raised by Professor Daya Krishna. I shall, however, consider here a few of them discussed in detail and at length by him.

Is *mokṣa* that which belongs to practical philosophy or that which forms a part of cognitive philosophy? Obviously, the question arises from considering the various disciplines as independent of one another. But in the light of the account I have presented of the Sāṅkhya system and its relationship to the theory of *puruṣārthas* hinted at, mokṣa is closely related to *dharma* and is, therefore, a matter of practical philosophy. But it has a cognitive aspect that finds expression in *anubhava* (experience/knowledge) by which one knows the self through the discrimination of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Again, this aspect is expressed in its being a part of the metaphysical understanding of reality as a whole.

But is not the self *nityasiddha*? I must say that this is a controversial issue, but it does not rule out the possibility of the kind of understanding that is presented in the last paragraph.

If our understanding of the relationship between *dharma* and *mokṣa* is correct, then *mokṣa* does clearly belong to practical philosophy. But it also belongs to cognitive philosophy in so far as both *dharma* and *mokṣa* lead to the knowledge of the self. But is not the self *nityasiddha*? Yes, but its knowledge is not *nityasiddha*. In knowledge, there is confusion, because of Prakṛti, *avidyā*, *māyā*. And it is the removal of this confusion or misunderstanding that leads to the knowledge of the self. But then how can it be *nityasiddha*? Does it mean that entanglement does not injure it in its essential aspect?

But what is it to come to know the self? Does it mean that its connection with the body ceases forthwith? Or would it not be enough if its connection with the body changes its nature? Is this not what is supposed to be the case in the account of a *sthitaprajña* that is given in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*? I think the understanding of *mokṣa* in terms of a *sthitaprajña* and a *jīvanmukta* is as much a part of Indian thought as anything else, and perhaps it may be a truer understanding if one looks at the examplars.

However, it seems that sometimes Professor Daya Krishna wants to insist that there should be and could be only one understanding of *mokṣa*, and, therefore, it alone could be or should be the goal of all Indian (philosophical) thought. I think it would be all right, if one strand of philosophical thought could be understood in that way.

But there is another way. I have tried to argue how *mokṣa*, though described in various ways, is in substance the attainment of the highest spiritual discipline, and, however differently described, it leads to the knowledge of the self even in Lokāyata (consider the meaning of *anvikṣiki*).

However, Professor Daya Krishna wants also to say that there are systems of thought which do not have *mokṣa* as a goal, and he argues that this is so in the case of Nyāya. Professor Daya Krishna argues that the very first and second *sūtras* of Nyāya could be interpreted to show that *mokṣa* is not the goal of Nyāya; and that the interest of Nyāya lies in argument and reasoning.

But one can also argue the other way (and, therefore, the evidence in favour of the interpretation of the second *sūtra* is not strong at all; in any case, it is not as strong as it is claimed to be). Because why is the interest in reasoning? To this question, even if one answer is that it is reasoning itself, there can be another answer that it is not only reasoning itself, but also the realization of the highest human goal—*mokṣa*, *kaivalya* (here the understanding of Bhartṛhari regarding the relation of intuition and reason is important). But, surely, one does not attain mokṣa by intellectual argument. I should like to present the following considerations. I think that it is not merely as a matter of lip-service that in the Indian tradition the various disciplines claim to help, if not bring about, the attainment of mokṣa. The point is that any activity which is a part of the total activity of living —language, ritual, *artha*, *kāma*, reasoning—if performed properly, would lead to mokṣa, because only in the context of such a life could the performance of any of these activities be said to be proper. Therefore, it is said that even if one could use one word properly (not only mean in the syntax of a sentence but in the syntax of life), then one could attain mokṣa. (It must be remembered also that in Indian thinking logic is not merely a theory of validity but a theory of truth.)

Another issue which is emphasized in the discussion of Professor Daya Krishna is that of the significance of God in modern Western philosophy. He says that, in spite of such significance, we do not call the modern Western philosophy spiritual, because to be spiritual all reality must be understood in terms of spirit. But what is the significance of God? In the case of most modern philosophers also, the reality and truth of every thing is derived from the reality and truth of God. The philosophical system presents a theoretical foundation for this view. But what is its relation to spirituality which is a characteristic of human life? Is it life according to God's Will that makes it spiritual? But if spiritual life is made a ground of God's existence, then the argument will be circular. Not only that. The argument which is part of a philosophical system and the argument from spiritual life are held to be in-

dependent of each other. This also is one important reason why the Western philosophy is not called spiritual.

Another issue that Professor Daya Krishna discusses in detail is that of *puruṣārthas*. It is right that he does so in view of the importance of *puruṣārthas* in the context of Indian philosophical thought. Professor Daya Krishna rightly thinks that, if his understanding of Indian philosophy is to be upheld, the theory of *puruṣārthas* should be rejected.

One of the first questions raised is about the meaning of the terms that designate the human goals—*dharma, artha, kāma* and *mokṣa*. I shall discuss the terms with reference to the treatises which treat them.

Arthaśāstra—the *śāstra* of *artha*—concerns itself with the acquisition and maintenance of land. Though *Arthaśāstra* talks of these in relation to the king, the acquisition and maintenance of land by the king is also the condition of such acquisition and maintenance by citizens. And, though only land is mentioned, it includes all kinds of material wealth.

> Kāma is the enjoyment of appropriate objects by the five senses of hearing, feeling, seeing, tasting and smelling assisted by the mind together with the soul. The ingredient in this is a peculiar contact between the organ of sense and its object, and the consciousness of pleasure that arises from that contact is called Kāma. (Burton's translation of *Kāma-Sūtra*.)

This is what one might call the aesthetic pleasures in the mildest sense of the term.

Dharma has many senses, but in this context it refers to the code of conduct derived from Śruti and Smṛti, *sadācāra* and *ātmatuṣṭi*. The code of conduct is described in terms of *sādhāraṇa dharma, viśeṣa dharma* (*varṇa* and *āśrama dharma* in their *nitya, naimittika* and *kāmya* form). (This will also include the rituals.) *Dharma* regulates one's behaviour in relation to others in the pursuit of *artha* and *kāma*.

Mokṣa, as we have seen, is theoretically described in many ways, but in concrete terms it means self-realization, a complete internal self-discipline which is helped by external discipline as also by internal discipline such as meditation, *tapas*, etc.

Thus, these four goals are distinguishable, but they are closely and necessarily related. And this creates confusion about their very nature.

(*i*) It might be said that *artha* is a means, whereas *kāma* is an end. But one might say that the pursuit of *artha* may itself be an enjoyment, according to the manner in which the activity is performed. So the same activity may be pursuit of both *artha* and *kāma*.

(*ii*) It may be said that *dharma* is a means and *mokṣa* is an end. But this is to pose a sharp distinction between the two which, as we have seen, does not exist.

(*iii*) Sometimes a sharp distinction is made between *artha* and *kāma* on the one hand and *dharma* and *mokṣa* on the other, so that *artha* and *kāma* become secular ends whereas *dharma* and *mokṣa* become the spiritual end. But, even in the case of this distinction, if *artha* and *kāma* are pursued not according to *dharma* and, therefore, also not according to *mokṣa*, then they cease to be *puruṣārthas* or the goals of human beings. They become greed and lust.

And equally, if *dharma* and *mokṣa* are not related to *artha* and *kāma*, they become ritualism and escapism. Thus, any activity is associated with all the *puruṣārthas*. Any activity is not specific to a *puruṣārtha*, except apparently. The *puruṣārtha* followed by the activity is a matter of the character of the individual as a whole.

But could not all the *puruṣārthas* be reduced to *kāma*? If this is done, there will be no hierarchy of desires. But the hierarchy of desires is posited when there is a conflict. Though no goal is to be sacrificed totally in such a conflict, the goals of *artha* and *kāma* may have to be sacrificed totally in case the possibility of self-realization is for ever jeopardized.*

But is not self-realization a matter of freely developing oneself without reference to others and other aspects of oneself? Here, too, there is not one way of understanding freedom and development. The traditional Indian thought considers freedom and development with reference to others and other aspects of oneself; the modern thought does so only in so far as it helps one's own idea of freedom and development.

Concluding Remarks

In presenting this understanding, have I done any injustice to the meanings of the term philosophy or to that of the term religion? I do not think so. But I think that this way of looking at the two traditions gives us a better understanding of them than by drawing the sharp distinctions between the two.

It might be said that I want to say this, because I want Indian thought to have the credit of being grounded on philosophy and religion, and also because I want to argue for the tradition. If I wanted to argue for the tradition, I would have said that the Indian thought is not less of philosophy or less of religion because of its structuring; that it is rather more of both philosophy and religion; that and it is the Western thought which is less of philosophy and less of religion because of their structuring and sharp separation. But I do not want to do any such thing. What I want to bring out are the possibilities and limitations of both the traditions.

I am sure that Professor Daya Krishna and many others would disapprove of my approach as a whole. They would call it illegitimate and an attempt to

*See Charles Malmond, in T.N. Madan (ed.), *The Way of Life*.

confuse issues. I think I have done sufficiently in terms of explanation and results to ward off such a charge. If it is said that I have not done my work well enough or that I have not done it in sufficient detail, I must agree but plead both lack of ability and lack of serious response, except from Professor Daya Krishna. I would state that I have done enough to make a meaningful debate possible. And if a certain historical perspective is to be added to the theoretical one, mine may be treated as preliminary work in that direction.

The text of the Nyāya-Sūtras: some problems*

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The Indian intellectual and literary traditions are not known for any special concern for finding the authentic originals of their texts. In fact, normally the question itself does not arise and hence the problem of additions, modifications, deletions, interpolations, etc. is not even seen as a problem which needs to be tackled. The recent search for the so-called *Ur-texts* and their reconstruction on the basis of diverse criteria is distinctly due to the demands which Western scholarship has imposed in the field of all classical studies, including those relating to India. It is surprising, therefore, to find that even in classical times there were attempts to fix the authoritative text of the *Nyāya-sūtras*, the foundational work for *Nyāya* in the Indian tradition. Up till now little thought has been given to these attempts or to ascertain their reason or assess their significance, if any.

The exercise in fixing the text of the *Nyāya-sūtras* becomes even more intriguing if we remember that *Nyāya* has had a more continuous and sustained tradition of thought and discussion than any other philosophical school not only in India but, perhaps, elsewhere also. From Gautama to Gadādhara or Baccā Jhā[1] or Badrīnāth Śukla[2] is certainly a long period of sustained intellectual inquiry to be found anywhere else in the world. The text of the *Nyāya-sūtras* was first attempted to be settled by no less a person than Vācaspati Miśra I who, in his *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, not only fixed the text of the *Nyāya-sūtras* but also divided them in proper order. This fact is well known to scholars, yet no one seems to have asked himself the simple question why Vācaspati Miśra I felt the necessity of fixing the text of the *Nyāya-sūtras*, specially when sensitivity to textual purity does not seem to have been a distinctive characteristic of traditional Indian scholarship, either then or now. Vācaspati Miśra

*This paper owes a great deal to Pt. R. Thangaswami Sarma without whose sustained help in sorting out problems by replying to my incessant queries and sending me xeroxed material bearing on the issues, it could never have been written. I have also been helped by Dr. Tripathi, Director, Ganganatha Jha Research Institute, who generously supplied photocopies of some articles which otherwise I would never have seen. Prof. R.C. Dwivedi and Dr. Mukund Lath have, as always, been continuously associated with the discussions regarding the problems this paper deals with. It was the former, in fact, who drew my attention to the text of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* in the *Nyāya-mañjarī* edited by Pt. Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla. And, it was Dr. Mukund Lath who brought to my attention the works of Keśava Miśra and Bhaṭṭa Vāgīśvara edited by Dr. Kishore Nath Jha discussed later in the paper. While every care has been taken to see that the details given are as accurate as possible, some mistakes in computing might still be there. But they would not affect the main contention developed in the course of the paper.

himself does not seem to have undertaken the exercise with respect to the text of any other philosophical school on which he has also written his commentaries. Also, he was not the first commentator on the *sūtras* as both Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara had already written their *Bhāṣya* and *Vārtika* on it. As Vācaspati Miśra's own work on *Nyāya* is supposed to be a ṭīkā on Uddyotakara's *Vārtika*, it may be assumed that he was basing himself on Uddyotakara's text as it was available to him. The relation between Uddyotakara's *Vārtika* and Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* is not quite clear. Is the first an independent work on the *Nyāya-sūtras* or is it a work primarily on Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* and, thus, only indirectly on the *sūtras* themselves? As a *Vārtika* is not supposed to be a full commentary like the *Bhāṣya*, it would be interesting to know what were the special issues *chosen* by Uddyotakara to write his *Vārtika* upon. The same thing applies to the work of Vācaspati Miśra I as well as the subsequent writers on *Nyāya*. Unfortunately, neither the traditional Pandits nor the modern scholars interested in Indian philosophy have been interested in undertaking this task.

It has, of course, been said that Vātsyāyana had no *sūtrapāṭha* before him to write his *Bhāṣya* upon or that there is even a 'hidden *vārtika*' in the *Bhāṣya* itself.[3] The suggestion seems to be that there was a 'floating body of sūtras' out of which he picked some and treated them as authoritative. In other words, he first did what Vācaspati Miśra I was to do later, though more explicitly and clearly than Vātsyāyana ever did. But, then, why not reconstruct the *sūtras* out of Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*? There are supposed to be technical difficulties in this as the way in which the *sūtras* are referred to is not such as to clearly demarcate them from those that are not the original *sūtras*. In fact, there seems to be a lot of confusion even about such a simple fact as the manuscripts of the *Nyāya-sūtras* themselves. H.P. Sastri, in his article entitled 'An Examination of the Nyāya-sūtras' published as early as 1905, has stated : 'Ninety-nine per cent of the manuscripts of this work are accompanied with some commentary or other. Manuscripts giving the *sūtra* only are extremely rare.'[4] However, Gaṅgānātha Jhā has referred to at least three manuscripts containing the *sūtras* only which he had consulted for his own translation of the text along with the *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana and the *Vārtika* of Uddyotakara. He refers to 'a palm-leaf Manuscript of the Sūtra only', 'Paper manuscript of the sūtra only belonging to Jagadish Mishra', and 'Paper Manuscript of Sūtra only belonging to Babu Govindadasa'.[5] He does not mention any discrepancies in the manuscripts. Rather, according to him, 'every one of these manuscripts was found to be quite correct'.[6] Gopīnātha Kavirāja, in his 'Introduction' to this monumental work of translation of Pt. Gaṅgānātha Jhā, seems to be unaware of any problem regarding the paucity of manuscripts containing the text of the *Nyāya-sūtras* only. Rather, he writes:

> ...a critical edition of the Sūtra-pāṭha of Nyāya, based upon a collection of all available manuscripts of different recensions and of the sūtras as accepted by the various glosses and commentaries still existing, is the greatest desideratum of the day, and until this is done it is vain to endeavour to determine the sūtratva of a particular aphorism.[7]

This obviously implies that it is not the absence of manuscripts of the *Nyāya-sūtras* which has made their collation impossible, but only the fact that nobody has tried to undertake it. In fact, Karl Potter in his bibliographical entries under Gautama refers to a host of editions of the *Nyāya-sūtras* published between 1821 and 1977, and it may be assumed that at least some of them would have consulted the original manuscripts of the work.[8] The references in the *New Catalogus Catalogorum* X, p. 276 at the beginning of the bibliography on the *Nyāya-sūtras* may be treated as additional evidence for this assumption.

Yet, though the *Nyāya-sūtras* seem to have been edited and translated so many times, no one appears to have made an exhaustive list of the discrepant readings of the text or of their significance. Even H.P. Sastri who writes of discrepant readings in the article referred to above does not give any concrete examples of the discrepancies he is referring to. What is, perhaps, even more surprising is the fact that nobody accepts the text of the *Nyāya-sūtras* as given in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* of Vācaspati Miśra I as finally authoritative, though no one has given reasons for doubting either their authenticity or his authority. Pt. Gopīnātha Kavirāja, for example, has said in his 'Introduction' to Gaṅgānātha Jhā's work:

> ...in the translation efforts have been made to determine this, as far as possible. From the very nature of the present work, the translation has had to rely upon the verdict, direct or implied, of the *Bhāṣya*, the *Vārtika*, the *Tātparya* and also upon Vācaspati Miśra's *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*: but help was also derived from two old manuscripts, obtained from two different sources.[9]

The statement of Pt. Gopīnātha Kavirāja is surprising in more ways than one. Firstly, it does not indicate in what ways the sources he has cited differ between themselves with reference to the text of the *Nyāya-sūtras*. Normally, one would have expected either Gopīnātha Kavirāja or Gaṅgānātha Jhā to have pointed out the issue, discussed the discrepancies, given reasons for their choice or reconstruction of what they considered to be the correct rendering of the *sūtras*. Gaṅgānātha Jhā has not given even the Sanskrit version of the *sūtras* so that one could do the required exercise oneself. Not only this, Gopīnātha Kavirāja finds no problem in referring both to the *Tātparya* and the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* as independent sources for the determination of the text of the *Nyāya-sūtras*. By the *Tātparya*, he presumably means the *Nyāya-vārtika tātparyaṭīkā*. But if this is so, then, as everybody knows, both the *Tātparya* and the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* are works of one and the same person, that is, Vācaspati Miśra I, and it would be strange to think that there are discrepancies

between the two. The *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, it should be remembered, was itself written to establish the authentic *sūtras* and must have been based not only on Uddyotakara's *Vārtika* on which the *Tātparyaṭīkā* is ostensibly written but also on Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* to which the *Vārtika* is related and which must have been available to him independently at that time. The only reason for postulating a divergence between the text as given in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and those found in the works of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara would lie in the assumption that the texts of these works which were available to Vācaspati Miśra I were different from those that are available to us today. But, then, it should have been the task of Gaṅgānātha Jhā, if not Pt. Gopīnātha Kavirāja, to have pointed out the discrepancies between the text of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and those found in the texts of the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārtika* as they are found today.

What is, however, even more surprising is the total lack of any reference to the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* either by Gaṅgānātha Jhā or Gopīnātha Kavirāja in their works mentioned above when this work also tries to fix the text of the *Nyāya-sūtras* like the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* to which they refer to. It is inconceivable that either of these scholars, justifiably renowned in their times, did not know of the work. Gopīnātha Kavirāja explicitly refers to H.P. Sastri's article published in 1905[10] which specifically refers to the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*. The translation of the *Nyāya-sūtras* by Gaṅgānātha Jhā was originally published in *Indian Thought* (Vols. IV-XI) from 1912 to 1919. Thus, a careful scholar like him may also be assumed to have known of H.P. Sastri's article. But even if he did not, he should have known independently of the work as it had already been published in the Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series in 1896 as their publication No. 9 along with the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* of Vatsyāyana. Pt. Gopīnātha Kavirāja does write about it later in his work entitled *Gleanings from the History and Bibliography of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature*, but even there he neither mentions where it has been published nor discusses its discrepancies with the text of the *sūtras* as given in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*. He treats it only as a Maithila recension of the *sūtras*. In his own words:

> This booklet was intended to determine the number and true readings of the genuine *sūtras* as distinguished from those which have been interpolated into the text from time to time. This work is therefore in its object, of a similar nature with its predecessor, the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* of Vācaspati Miśra I. Its principal interest however consists in the fact that it represents the Maithila recension of the *Sūtrapāṭha*.[11]

It is unbelievable that a scholar of Pt. Gopīnātha Kavirāja's eminence should have failed to see the problems raised by the statement. He did not ask himself the simple question as to why Vācaspati Miśra II felt even the necessity of settling the text of the *Nyāya-sūtras* when Vācaspati Miśra I had already done so earlier, or what were the interpolations that he thought needed

to be rectified, or what were the discrepancies between the text as established by Vācaspati Miśra I and the text as established by Vācaspati Miśra II,* and why? His conclusion seems even stranger, for if his intention was 'to determine those which have been interpolated into the text from time to time', then how can it be treated as a mere Mithila recension of the text? And, what is the evidence of its being such a recension? Has the whole Mithila school accepted it? And, is not Vācaspati Miśra I himself supposed to belong to Mithila?

Not only Pandit Gopīnātha Kavirāja fails to raise these questions, he does not even give any indication of the text of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*, whether in published or manuscript form, so that one could try to find the truth of what he is saying.

H.P. Sastri, of course, is himself mistaken in his reference to the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*. First, though writing in 1905, he is under the mistaken impression that the work had not been published at all till it was given by him to Dr. Venis who published it in Benaras. He writes: 'I got one from Midnapore, and gave a copy of it to my friend Dr. Venis, and it was published at Benaras.'[12] Secondly, he seems to be under the impression that both the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* are the works of the same person. He writes:

> The difficulty which I feel in regard to the *Nyāya-sūtras* was also felt about a thousand years ago, when Vācaspati Miśra, who flourished about the end of the tenth century, twice attempted to fix the number of *Sūtras* and their readings, namely, the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* and in *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, both of which go by his name. If both are the works of one man, as they profess to be, it is apparent that the author did not feel sure of his ground.[13]

*Recently, Dr. Kishore Nath Jha has disputed the ascription of the authorship of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* to Vācaspati Miśra II on the grounds that many of the *Sūtras* accepted in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* have neither been mentioned nor commented upon in the *Nyāyatattvāloka* which is also ascribed to Vācaspati Miśra II. In his own words: '*yato hi nyāyasūtroddhāraparigṛhītāni bahūni sūtrāṇi nyāyatattvāloke na vyākhyātāni na ullikhitāni. tasmād-ekatra tadanupasthitiraparatra tadupasthiteḥ pramādikatāmeva sādhayati. ekasyaiva viduṣaḥ dvayoḥ kṛtyoḥ parasparavīruddhalekhana katham nāma sambhavet.*' (*Dr. V.R. Sharma Felicitation Volume*, Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth, Tirupati, 81, pp. 71-72). Dr. Jha has forgotten that one's 'not mentioning' a *sūtra* or 'not commenting upon' it may just be a sign that one does not think it sufficiently important to mention or comment upon. On the other hand, one may also do it because one may not have anything important to say upon it. Further, if this criterion were to be accepted, then one would have to deny the ascription of the authorship of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* to Vācaspati Miśra I, as there are *sūtras* in it which have not been commented upon in the *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā*. But even if one were to accept the contention of Dr. Kishore Nath Jha, it will only raise another issue, viz. who is the author of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* and why did he feel the necessity of establishing the text of the *Nyāyā-sūtras* once again after it had already been established by Vācaspati Miśra I in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* assuming, of course, that whoever was the author of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* came after him. For the present, we will assume that it is the work of Vācaspati Miśra II as even if it were not to be so, it would not affect the substance of our argument in this paper.

It is obvious that the writer is not aware of the existence of Vācaspati Miśra II, who flourished centuries after Vācaspati Miśra I, the author of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*.

The neglect of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* by such outstanding scholars even after its publication as early as 1896 in one of the most prestigious Sanskrit Series defies all explanation. In fact, the facts about this work seem to have been wrongly given even in prestigious bibliographical reference works. Potter's classic reference work on Indian philosophies published as late as 1983 does not seem to be aware of the fact that the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* had already been published, and that, too, as early as 1896. The entry under *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* only states '(Partly in ms., acc. to DB, 147; cf. also UM, 292)'.[14] Similarly, in the volume on *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, the only reference to Vācaspati Miśra II occurs not with reference to his work entitled *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*, but in connection with the name of the author of the *Ratnakośa* mentioned by him.[15] There is the reference to the publication No. 9 of the Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series, but without any mention of the fact that, as far as we know, it published the text of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* for the first time.[16]

Dineshchandra Bhattacharya has tried to deny the authenticity of the text as being the text of *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* of Vācaspati Miśra II. He writes:

> The so-called *Gautamasūtras* printed along with the *Nyāyabhāṣya* in p. 28 with the introductory verse, *Śrī Vācaspatimiśreṇa mithaleśvarasūriṇā likhyate munimūrdhanya śrīgautamamataṁ mahat*, is not an edition of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*, as is sometimes supposed but only a text of the *Nyāyasūtras* prepared by the editor of the *Bhāṣya* after consulting various books including a copy of the *Sūtroddhāra*.[17]

However, this is a mere statement unsubstantiated by any evidence whatsoever. Not only this, he does not even care to state as to what is the authentic text of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* in manuscript or published form and how this text departs from it. Further, as he has not here given exact reference to the edition of the *Bhāṣya* he is referring to, it is not easy to check what he is referring to. Later, of course, in his article entitled 'Nyāya Works of Vācaspati Miśra II of Mithilā', he does give the reference in the footnote as viz. ed. 1896[18] which obviously refers to Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī's edition of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* published in that series. But if it refers to that, then it has to be explained as to why the *Sūtrapāṭha* given therein has been preceded by the verse he has quoted, for it ascribes it to Vācaspati Miśra and not to the editor Pt. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailaṅga. Second, in case he is the compiler of the *Sūtrapāṭha*, as alleged by Dineshchandra Bhattacharya, why should he have given such extensive footnotes to the *sūtras* claiming in the case of many of them that the *pramāṇa* of their *sūtratva* does not seem to be available, a point we will discuss in detail later on. Also, though the editorial statement in the beginning (*pṛthak sūtrapāṭhaśca Vācaspatimiśrakṛtasūtroddhāranāmakaṁ baṅgākṣaralikhitam nātiprācīnaṁ pustakamālocya saṁyojitāḥ*) is capable of being interpreted the way Dineshchandra Bhattacarya has interpreted it, generally it has not been so interpreted. And there is no reason to do so, unless someone produces a more authentic text of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* based on manuscripts which someone has critically edited. However, even if there were to be such a text, it will only prove our main point that not only the text of the *Nyāya-sūtras* has been repeatedly sought to be fixed by eminent Naiyāyikas in the past without giving sufficient grounds for their choice, but that the practice continues in the present with the added anomaly that the present scholars do not seem to be aware of each other's works or even of the implication of their statements.

The scholar who takes the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* seriously for the first time is, perhaps, Pt. Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla who, in his Edition of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī*, has not only printed the text of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* at the end of the work, but also compared it with other renderings of the *sūtras* or their existence or non-existence in other standard texts on the subject. It is perhaps the most comprehensive comparative statement of the *Nyāya-sūtras* as rendered by different texts.[19] However, as the appendix is neither listed in the table of contents of the book nor discussed by the author in his 'Preface' to the work, it seems to have escaped the attention of most scholars of the subject. This could also be the reason why Potter, though mentioning it in the bibliographical section on Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, fails to include it under the bibliographical references on Gautama's *Nyāya-sūtras*.

In fact, even earlier, Rāma Bhavana Upādhyāya had published the variant readings along with the deletions and additions of the *sūtras* in an article in the Pandit New Series.[20] However, it had confined itself only to the text of Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti* on the *Nyāya-sūtras* as found in the Sarasvati Bhavan Library MS. on a *tāḍapatra*, referred to in his article as आ. वृ., the edition of the same as edited by Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara and published in Varanasi, referred to as मु. वृ. and as given in Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* published in the Pandit Series itself referred to as मु. भा. along with the *sūtras* as given in the published text of the Nyāya *Vārtika* edited by Pt. Vindhyeshwari Prasad Shastrī in A.D. 1888 referred to as मु. वा. Thus, the article compares the *sūtras* as given in the ms. of Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti* found in the Saraswati Bhavan Library with the published version of the text edited by Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara, along with the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārtika* published earlier.

However, though the article was written around 1922, the author who himself edited and published Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti* on the *Nyāya-sūtras*, did not refer either to the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* or the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*, the two known texts which earlier had tried authoritatively to fix the text of the *sūtras*. In fact, there seems to be an extreme arbitrariness amongst the scholars regarding what shall be accepted as the source of *pramāṇa* for the *sūtratva* of a *sūtra* in the *Nyāya* tradition. If we take, for example, the text of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* as first published by Pt. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailaṅga in 1896 as a text of the

Nyāya-sūtras with Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* in the Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series, Vol. IX, we find that, according to him, no *pramāṇa* is available for as many as 184 *sūtras* out of a total of 531 *sūtras* given in the text. That this is a surprisingly large number need hardly be emphasized. Yet, what is perhaps even stranger is the fact that the learned editor of the text is hardly bothered about it or, for that matter, anyone else who has written about it. The situation will become even more intriguing if one remembers that there is not a single *sūtra* out of the first chapter whose *pramāṇatva* has been questioned by him. And, as the whole of the second part of the fifth chapter is problematic in a special sense, the real proportion of the non-*pramāṇic sūtras* is found amongst chapters 2 to 5.1, that is, the first *Āhnika* of chapter V. Even amongst these the distribution of the *non-pramāṇic sūtras* varies as will be evident from the following list:

Chapter	*Total no. of sūtras*	*The Number of non-pramāṇic sūtras*
2.1	68	17
2.2	66	19
3.1	73	20
3.2	77	32
4.1	68	38
4.2	51	30
5.1	43	27

It is obvious from the above that in chapters 4.1, 4.2 and 5.1 the proportion of the non-*pramāṇic sūtras* is above 50 per cent, while in chapter 3.2, it is not very far from it. How could any text have been taken seriously in such a situation, and why did Pt. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailaṅga waste so much time over it and publish it in the beginning of his scholarly edition of the *Nyāya-sūtras* in 1896? What is, however, even more surprising is the fact that in spite of his considering so many of the *sūtras* as un-*pramāṇic*, he treats them as the *Nyāya-sūtras* in the main body of the text edited by him. All the 183 *sūtras* about each of which he writes '*nopalabhyate asya pramāṇam*' are reproduced in the main body of the published text without giving any reason as to why if there is no authentic foundation for treating them as genuine *sūtras* as he has explicitly stated they should be treated as the *sūtras* on which *Vātsyāyana* had written his *Bhāṣya*. And in case the latter is treated as a *Bhāṣya* on those *sūtras*, then is it not a sufficient ground for treating them as genuine? The lack of any discussion on the part of the learned Pandit makes it difficult to answer these questions. In fact, even when he departs from the reading of the *sūtra* as given in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* text published by him in the main body of the work, as he does in the case of *sūtras* 5.1.17 and 5.1.34, he does not give any reasons for the change or why he prefers the variant version, and on what basis.[21]

The problem is even more complicated by the fact that when Pt. Sūrya Nārayaṇa Śukla tries to find the prāmāṇas for those *sūtras*, he finds them either in *Nyāyataṭtvāloka* or *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* or *Anvīkṣānayatattvabodhaḥ*. Now, while one may accept the possibility of Pt. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailaṅga not knowing about *Nyāyatattvāloka* as the only known copy of it is in the India Office Library in London and that, too, in an incomplete form,[22] it is inconceivable that he did not know of *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* which is the most well-known compilation of the *Nyāya-sūtras* done by Vācaspati Miśra I who had himself written the famous *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā*, or of *Anvīkṣānayatattvabodaḥ* about which, according to the entry in *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, mention had been made in the Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavan Studies, III, pp. 133-34.[23] Even if it be assumed that the latter work was not known to Pt. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailaṅga, the neglect of *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* remains a problem which can only be solved by assuming that he did not accept its *pramāṇic* character. But as he does accept Vācaspati Miśra's *Tātparyaṭīkā* as *pramāṇic*, it is surprising why he should not have accepted the *pramāṇic* character of his *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* also, particularly when it was ostensibly written to fix the text of the *Nyāya-sūtras* and classify them according to the topics dealt with. The only way this anomaly could perhaps be dealt with would be to assume that, in his opinion, these two texts were not written by the same person or, in other words, that the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the *Tātparyaṭīkā* were written by two different persons. This, however, will be even a more radical position to take and one would have to explicitly justify it on cogent grounds rather than just assume it, as seems to have been done by Pt. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailaṅga.

But if one does accept the identity of the authors of the two texts, as most authorities do, then it becomes incomprehensible as to how one can cite them as *independent pramāṇa* for the *sūtratva* of a *sūtra*. But that is just what Pt. Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla does in his attempt to find *pramāṇa* for the *sūtras* given in the text of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*. He give both *Tātparyaṭīkā* and *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* as *pramāṇa* for the *sūtratva* of a *sūtra* forgetting that as they are written by the same person they cannot be independent *pramāṇas* in the situation. In fact, it is not clear why if one of these texts provides a basis for the authenticity of a *sūtra*, the other would not do the same unless one were to assume that there was variation in what are counted as *sūtras* in the two texts. However, if one were to assume this, one would have the problem of explaining how the two could, then, have been written by the same person.

In fact, Pt. Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla not only cites both *Tātparyaṭīkā* and *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* as sources for the authenticity of the *sūtras* as given in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*, but also *Tattvāloka* which is supposed to be a work written by the author of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* itself. But this he could have done

only if he did not know the identity of the authorship of the two texts. But to have known the text and not to have known the author would be strange indeed, particularly as it is not considered to be an annonymous work. There is, of course, the further problem as to how Pt. Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla could have seen the work in such detail as the only manuscript of the work, according to the *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, is in the India Office Library.[24] He, of course, could have got a photocopy of the manuscript, but considering the facilities prevailing in the early thirties, it is extremely unlikely that it was so. Perhaps, there was a manuscript of the *Tattvāloka* in the Saraswati Bhavan Library at Benaras, not known to the compilers of the *New Catalogus Catalogorum*.

In any case, it is baffling why Pt. Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla had to go to such unpublished sources for establishing the *pramāṇatva* of the *sūtras* when most of them could easily be found in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*. To give but one example, the *pramāṇa* for *sūtras* 2.1.47 and 2.1.48 is given as *Tattvāloka* on p. 7 of the Appendix to his edition of the *Nyāyamañjarī*. But both 2.1.47 and 2.1.48 can be found in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, the former with a little modification and the latter with none. The *sūtrapāṭha* in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* is '*nāpratyakṣe gavaye pramāṇārthamupamānasya paśyāmaḥ*' (2.1.47) and '*tathetyupasaṁhārādupamānasiddhernāviśeṣaḥ*' (2.1.48). In the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* they are given as '*nāpratyakṣe gavaye pramāṇārthamupamānasya paśyāma iti*' and '*tathetyupasaṁhārādupamānasiddhernāviśeṣaḥ*' (pp. 12-13). Of course, the numbering of the *sūtras* in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* is not 2.1.47 and 2.1.48, but 2.1.48 and 2.1.49 respectively. But that hardly matters, and is easily explained by the fact that, while there are only 68 *sūtras* in the first *Āhnika* of the second *Adhyāyā* in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*, the corresponding number of *sūtras* is 69 in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*. In fact, the situation is the same even with the remaining ones where *Tattvāloka* alone is given as a *pramāṇa*. Why has this been done and what purpose does it serve passes all comprehension. The situation is even more baffling if one remembers that the author has given in the case of many *sūtras* more than one source of authentication. *Sūtras* 2.1.59 to 2.1.64, for instance, provide one such example where both *Tattvāloka* and *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* are cited as *pramāṇa* for the *sūtratva* of these *sūtras*.

In fact, as only 10 *sūtras*[25] of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* are missing from the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, all the rest may be authenticated from the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, if its *pramāṇic* character is accepted by a thinker. In case variant readings are also taken into account about 11 *sūtras*[26] in the *Nyāyasūttroddhāra* have a variant reading (including additions, deletions, etc.) from the one found in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*. Hence all in all we would have only a problem of about 21 *sūtras* if we confine our attention to these two texts only. On the other hand, if we take the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* as our base, we find 8 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* missing in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*.[27] Thus,

there is a discrepancy of 18 *sūtras* between the two texts. In case we include the variant readings also, it would all come to 29 *sūtras*.

However, the story does not close with these two texts alone. If we forget the pre-*Nyāyasūcīnibandha* attempts to fix the text of the *Nyāyasūtras*,[28] there are a number of post-*Nyāyasūtroddhāra* attempts which cannot be ignored. The most prestigious of these is, of course, the *Vṛtti* of Viśvanātha Bhaṭṭācārya originally published in 1922 in Pandit New Series 2.2, edited by Rama Bhavana Upadhyaya and reprinted in 1985 in the Anandashram Sanskrit Series No. 91. If we take the *sūtra-pāṭha* as given in the Appendix to the work as the base, we find that 11 *sūtras* of the *Vṛtti* are missing in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and 6 *sūtras* in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*.[29] Conversely, we find 3 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* missing in the *Vṛtti* (2.1.20, 2.2.43 and 3.1.73). As for the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*, it appears that none of its *sūtras* is missing in the *Vṛtti*. If we take the *sūtras* with the variant readings from the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* (with additions, etc.), their number comes to about 16.[30] If we take them from the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*, the variant readings in the *Vṛtti* are also around 16, though this time they relate to different *sūtras*.[31] Thus, in all, Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti* has a difference in about 30 *sūtras* (missing or variant reading with additions, etc.) from the *Nyāyasūcīnibanadha*, and of about 22 *sūtras* from the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*.

Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti* is a well-known work and the discrepancies in the *sūtra-pāṭha* from both the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* may be deemed to be important. The same can hardly be said about the *Nyāyasūtra* text given by Rādhāmohana Gosvāmī Bhaṭṭācārya published in the Pandit New Series, 23, 24, and 25 in the years 1901, 1902 and 1903 along with his commentary on them entitled *Vivaraṇa* by S.T.G. Bhattacharya.[32] Though the work was brought to the notice of the scholarly world at the very beginning of this century, it has hardly been discussed or paid attention to in any significant way by the scholarly community. In this respect, it seems to have had the same fate as the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* which was published only slightly earlier, that is, in 1896. However, if the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* had the good fortune of having engaged the attention of Pt. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailaṅga and Pt. Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla whose work we have discussed earlier, the text of Rādhāmohana Gosvāmī has had the good fortune of finding an advocate in T.K. Gopalaswamy Aiyangar who has written a couple of articles trying to draw attention to its importance in the context of the question as to what exactly is the text of the *Nyāya-sūtras*. In his article entitled 'A Critique of the Nyāyasūtra Text as interpreted in the Nyāyasūtra Vivaraṇam',[33] he has given in the Appendix to the article detailed comparison between the readings of the *sūtras* between the *Vivaraṇa* and the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* where the two differ. According to him, seven *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* are missing in the *Vivaraṇa*, and six *sūtras* of the *Vivaraṇa* are missing in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*.[34] The variant readings between the two texts, on the other hand, seem to be unbelievably large. If we take *Vivaraṇa* as the base of comparison,

then the *sūtras* that have a variant reading come to about 85, while, if we make the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* as the base, they come to about 87. These are rather large discrepancies and should have been the subject of intensive discussion and investigation by scholars interested in *Nyāya* philosophy in the country. But, as far as I know, nothing of the kind seems to have taken place even after the publication of Gopalaswamy Aiyangar's article in a reputed research journal.

However, Gopalswamy Aiyangar compared the *Vivaraṇa* text only with the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and not with the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* or with Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*, though he does mention both in the list of editions of the *Nyāya-sūtras* which were available up till then. One reason for this seems to be his belief that both the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* were written by the same Vācaspati Miśra, an opinion he gets from H.P. Sastri whom he quotes to this effect. But, while there might have been some justification for H.P. Sastri to have made the mistake in 1905, there could have been none in his case in the year 1947. Surprisingly, the author does not even know of the *Nyāyatattvāloka* and thinks that the references to it by the editor of *Vivaraṇa* are perhaps the result of some confusion. He writes:

> I wish to draw the attention of the readers to the fact that the editor of the Nyāyasūtra Vivarṇam refers to a *Nyāyasūtra* text known as *Nyāyatattvāloka* as being ascribed to Vācaspati Miśra ... and very frequently refers to the book to point out the variations in the reading with reference to *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*. He does not refer to *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* at all. So it is doubtful whether the editor identifies *Nyāyatattvāloka* with *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* or refers to a separate work of Vācaspati Miśra. Perhaps, *Nyāyatattvāloka* is an outcome of a third attempt of Vācaspati Miśra in collecting the *Nyāyasūtras*. *Anywhow no such work is available.*[35]

It is obvious that the author has not seen the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* text published by Pt. Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla in the text of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, which he edited and published in 1936. For, otherwise, it would have been obvious to him that *Tattvāloka* was not only a different work from the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*, but also that it was well-known to scholars in Kāśī. However, the fact that the editor of the *Nyāyasūtravivaraṇa* made a reference to it in 1901 suggests that the information given about *Tattvāloka* in both the *New Catalogus Catalogorum* and the *Darśanamañjarī* is incomplete as some other manuscript of it, besides the one in the India Office Library at London, must have been available at Banaras. As for the information in Potter's *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. I, it is doubly wrong as it not only identifies *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* with *Tattvāloka*, but thinks that it is available only in manuscript form, and that, too, only partly.[36] In a sense, it appears that Gopalaswamy Aiyangar has not even carefully seen Dr. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī's text in the Vizianagar Sanskrit Series, No. 9 to which he refers in the article mentioned above. For, had he done so, it is unbelievable that he would not have been struck by the fact that, according to the learned editor, no *pramāṇa* was available for so many *sūtras* in the text of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* which he had published therein. His reference to *Nyāya-Koṣa* seems even more otiose as there is no discussion about the text of the *Nyāya-sūtras* in it except for stating that there are in all five *adhyāyas* in the *Nyāya-sūtras* each consisting of two *Āhnikas*, and the total number of *sūtras* being 537.[37] Surprisingly, in his article on the same subject published 23 years later, he does not show any awareness of the gross confusions and downright mistakes of which he is guilty in this article.[38]

The two subsequent works that surprisingly show self-conscious awareness of the problem are *Gautamīya Sūtra Prakāśaḥ* of Keśava Miśra and the *Nyāya Tātparya Dīpikā* of Bhaṭṭa Vāgīśvara, both edited by Dr. Kishore Nath Jha and published by Gaṅgānātha Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth, Prayaga, in 1978 and 1979 respectively. In his 'Introduction' to the first volume, Dr. Kishore Nath Jha quite clearly states that in any discussion about the text of the *Nyāya-sūtras*, one would have to take into consideration besides the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* of the elder and the younger Vācaspati Miśra, the *Vivaraṇa Pañjikā* of Aniruddha, the *Pariśuddhi* of Udayana, the *Prakāśa* of Keśava Miśra, the *Vṛtti* of Viśvanātha Pañcānana, the *Khadyota* of Gaṅgānātha Jhā, the corrected *Bhāṣya* of Phaṇibhūṣana Tarkavāgīśa, the *Nyāya Bhūsaṇa* of Bhāsarvajña, the *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and other relevant works where the *Nyāya-sūtras* have been explicitly stated and counted. It is not quite clear why he has not included Rādhāmohana Gosvāmī Bhaṭṭācārya's *Vivaraṇa* in it, as it is unlikely that he is not aware of it or of *Tattvāloka*, specially when so much had already been written about them. In any case, Dr. Kishore Nath Jha has shown a considerable awareness of the complexity of the problem, and he is perhaps the first person who has taken into account a work written in a language other than Sanskrit, that is, the outstanding work of Pt. Phaṇibhuṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa in Bengali.

But though he has indicated the enormity of the task, he has confined himself to noting the problems raised for the *sūtrapāṭha* only by the text he is editing, that is, the *Gautamīya Sūtra Prakāśaḥ* of Keśava Miśra Tarkācārya.[39] Pt. Ananta Lal Thakur, on the other hand, says in his 'Introduction' to the *Nyāya Tātparya Dīpikā* that for determining the text of the *Nyāya-sūtras* it would be best to take the *Nyāya-tattvāloka* of the younger Vācaspati, the *Nyāyasūtravṛtti* of Vaṁśadhara, the *Gautamīyasūtraprakāśa* of Keśava Miśra and the *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā* of Bhaṭṭa Vāgīśvara.[40] It is not quite clear if the learned Pandit is once again confusing *Tattvāloka* with the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* of Vācaspati Miśra II, for if he is talking of the *Tattvāloka* whose manuscript is supposed to be in the India Office Library, London, then it can hardly serve as the basis of establishing the text of the *Nyāya-sūtras* as it is supposed to be incomplete. And, pray, why not the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* of Vācaspati Miśra I

which, as far as we know, is the earliest known attempt at fixing the text of the *Nyāya-sūtras*? In any case, the self-consciousness of these two scholars about the problem as displayed in their 'Introduction' to these two recently edited works is a welcome change and needs to be pursued more systematically by others.

If we compare the *sūtrapāṭha* given in these two recently edited texts, we find that 13 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* are missing in the *Gautamīya-sūtraprakāśaḥ* and 39 *sūtras* in the *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā* of Keśava Miśra and Bhaṭṭa Vāgīśvara respectively. Conversely, 5 *sūtras* of *Prakāśa* and 29 *sūtras* of *Dīpikā* are missing from the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*. The variant readings between the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* and the *Prākāśa* are roughly about 14, while those between the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* and the *Dīpikā* are about 53. Thus the total *sūtras* missing between the *Dīpikā* and the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* comes to 60, while that between the *Prakāśa* and the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* comes to 18. The comparison of these two texts with the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* reveals that 40 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* are missing in the *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā* and 8 *sūtras* in the *Gautamīyasūtraprakāsaḥ* of Keśava Miśra. On the other hand, 25 *sūtras* from the *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā* are missing in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, while only 3 *sūtras* from the *Gautamīyasūtraprakāśaḥ* are not found therein. The variant readings between the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the two texts is about 31 and 12 respectively. (For details see Appendices, I, II, III and IV.)

The comparative situation between the six texts that we have examined up till now may be summarized thus:

(1) 8 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* are not found in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra.*

(2) 10 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* are not found in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha.* (Total 18)

(3) The variant readings in the existing *sūtras* between the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* occurs in the case of about 11 *sūtras* only.

(4) 3 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūcīnbandha* are not found in the *Vṛtti* of Viśvanātha.

(5) 11 *sūtras* of the *Vṛtti* are not found in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha.* (Total 14)

(6) No *sūtra* of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* seems missing in the *Vṛtti.*

(7) 6 *sūtras* of the *Vṛtti* are missing in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra.* (Total 6)

(8) The *Vṛtti* has about 16 *sūtras* which have a variant reading from that of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha.*

(9) The *Vṛtti* has variant readings from the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* in about 16 *sūtras* also, though they are not the same as have the variant reading when compared with the *sūtras* in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha.*

(10) 7 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* are missing in the *Vivaraṇa.*

(11) 6 *sūtras* of the *Vivaraṇa* are missing in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha.* (Total 13)

(12) The variant readings between the *Vivaraṇa* and the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* seem to range between 85 and 87.

(13) 13 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* are not to be found in the *Gautamīyasūtraprakāśaḥ.*

(14) 5 *sūtras* of the *Gautamīyasūtraprakāśaḥ* are not found in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra.* (Total 18)

(15) The variant readings between the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* and the *Gautamīyasūtraprakāśaḥ* are roughly about 14.

(16) 8 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* are missing in the *Gautamīyasūtraprakāśaḥ.*

(17) 3 *sūtras* of the *Gautamīyasūtraprakāśaḥ* are missing in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha.* (Total 11)

(18) The number of variant readings between the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the *Gautamīyasūtraprakāśaḥ* comes to about 12.

(19) 31 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* are not to be found in the *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā.*

(20) 29 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā* are not to be found in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra.* (Total 60)

(21) The variant readings between the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* and the *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā* come to about 53.

(22) 40 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* are missing in the *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā.*

(23) 25 *sūtras* of the *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā* are missing in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha.* (Total 65)

(24) The variant readings of the *sūtras* in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā* occur in about 32 *sūtras* of the two texts.

If we treat the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* as the reference point, we find the following situation obtaining in respect of the texts we have examined in the article:[b]

	NS	*Vṛtti*	*Vivaraṇa*	*Prakāśa*	*Dīpikā*
Missing total	18	14	13	11	65
Variant readings	11	16	85 to 87	12	32

On the other hand, if we take the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* as our base, we find the following situation:

	Nsṭ	*Vṛtti*	*Vivaraṇa*[c]	*Prakāśa*	*Dīpikā*
Missing total	18	6	?	18	60
Variant readings	11	16	?	15	53

b The abbreviations stand for the following texts: (*i*) *Ns* = *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*, (*ii*) *Nst* = *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*, (*iii*) *Vṛtti* = Viśvanātha Bhaṭṭācārya's *Vṛtti* on Vatsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*, (*iv*) *Vivaraṇa* = *Nyāyasūtra Vivaraṇa* of Rādhāmohana Gosvāmī Bhaṭṭācārya, (*v*) *Prakāśa* = *Gautamīyasūtraprakaśaḥ* of Keśava Miśra and (*vi*) *Dīpikā* = *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā* of Bhaṭṭvāgīśvara.

c The comparison of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* with the *Vivaraṇa* has not been done as we have not been able to procure a copy of the latter.

The two tables reveal that the most radical situation obtains in the case of the *Dīpikā* and the *Vivaraṇa* which seem to be very unorthodox in their approach to the text of the *sūtras*. The *Dīpikā* has a differences of as many as 65 *sūtras* from the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and of 60 from the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*. Even if we take into account the editor's contention that many of these additional *sūtras* are statements taken from the *Bhāṣya* and elevated to the status of the *sūtras*, the difference still remains substantial as the total number of what may be called the *Bhāṣya-sūtras* is only 13. So, even if we ignore them, the total difference will still amount to 52 and 47 respectively. The variant readings in the case of the *Dīpikā* are also unusually high: they run to around 32 when compared with the text of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and to about 53 when compared with the text of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*. The only comparable situation is found in the case of the *Vivaraṇa* where the variant readings come to about 85 or 87. This is almost the combined variant readings of the *Dīpikā* with respect to both the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*. Surprisingly, the total number of missing *sūtras* in the *Vivaraṇa* is only 13, though we should remember that it is perhaps only a one-way comparison between the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the *Vivaraṇa*, and does not include the reverse comparison which is necessary to get a complete picutre of the situation.

The author of the *Dīpikā*, according to Pt. Ananta Lal Thakur, seems to belong to a period before Udayana and is in the tradition of older *Nyāya*.[41] As for the author of the *Vivaraṇa*, he is supposed to belong to seventeenth century and is well versed in Navya-Nyāya, according to T.K. Gopalaswamy Aiyangar.[42] From tenth century (if we accept Udayana's date as eleventh century)[43] to seventeenth century is a long period and yet the freedom with respect to what to accept as a *sūtra* and what not, or which reading of the *sūtra* to adopt, seems to remain the same. It is not as if the older author is more concerned with accepting the so-called authority of the venerable elders than the younger—a situation one would have normally expected the way the Indian Intellectual tradition is usually presented to us in the textbooks on the subject. Rather, it is the elder who seems more independent, as he does not hide what he accepts or rejects or modifies under the guise of finding a new manuscript of the text.

Keśava Miśra Tarkācārya's *Prakāśa* comes in between the two as, according to Potter's *Bibliography*, he flourished around 1525.[44] *Prakāśa's* variant readings or the missing *sūtras* are not very different in number from those in the other texts, though it seems closer to the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* than to the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* at least in numerical terms. Viśvanātha Pañcānana's *Vṛtti* belongs to a slightly later period than Keśava Miśra as the former is supposed to have flourished around 1540, according to the same source.[45] If we accept the date of Vācaspati Miśra II, the author of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*, as A.D. 1450[46] and of Vācaspati Miśra I as A.D. 960[47], then the chronological order of the six texts we have considered would be the following:

(1) *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*
(2) *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā*
(3) *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*
(4) *Gautamīyasūtraprakāśaḥ*
(5) Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*
(6) Rādhāmohana Gosvāmī Bhaṭṭācārya's *Vivaraṇa.*

It should, however, be remembered that the *Dīpikā* is a text only recently discovered/edited and that its author's date is only conjecturally suggested by Pt. Ananta Lal Thakur in his 'Introduction' to the text on the basis of internal evidence. In fact, the text is not listed either in the *New Catalogus Catalogorum* or Potter's *Bibliography* or Thangaswami Sarma's *Darśanamañjarī*. The only work referred to by that name both in the *New Catalogus Catalogorum* and the *Darśanamañjarī* is one by Jayasiṁhasūrī, being a commentary on Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāyasāra*.[48] As for *Vivaraṇa*, it is primarily a commentary on a *Nyāyasūtra* text supposed to have been found by Rādhāmohana Gosvāmī Bhaṭṭācārya, and as no one else seems to have seen the original text, neither its dating nor its author is known. In fact, if the authenticity of that text is believed, then one would have to believe that in some essential respects the *Nyāya* tradition from Vātsyāyana onwards has been essentially mistaken. In T.K. Gopalaswamy Aiyangar's words:

> So in the light of a clear deviation of the readings of many *sūtras*, and of the disclosure of some new *Nyāyasūtras* unknown as yet to the world of the Nyāya scholars, and of the unflinching fidelity on the part of the commentator to a different text, it can be admitted that the *Nyāyasūtra* text as found edited in the *Nyāyasūtra Vivaraṇam* belongs to a different recension of the *Nyāyasūtras* unknown either to the Bhāṣyakāra, Vārtikakāra, or Vācaspati Miśra or Udayana.[49]

He is, of course, aware that 'most of the critics may contend that Rādhāmohana Gosvāmī Bhaṭṭācārya, who flourished somewhere in the seventeenth century A.D. even perhaps subsequent to Viśvanātha Pañcānana might have interpolated some into the body of the text to suit his line of Nyāya conception.'[50] He rejects this possibility, but does not explore or even show any awareness of the problems raised by such a situation. If Rādhāmohana Goswāmī has not interpolated the *sūtras* and the variant readings, then either the writer of the manuscript did or we would have to hold Vātsyāyana guilty of deleting, modifying, interpolating the *sūtras*, and the *sutra*-variations in his text. The other alternative of two recensions with such divergent readings would only push the problem still further back, and also raise the question why there is no prior evidence of the other recension till Rādhāmohana Goswāmī Bhaṭṭācārya in the seventeenth century. Further, the whole notion of 'recension' is so loosely applied in scholarly writings relating to classical Indian studies that one usually does not see how many problems it hides under the carpet by using the term.[51]

However, the question of the missing *sūtras* or the variant readings is, as we have already seen and as T.K. Gopalaswamy Aiyangar should have known, not confined to Rādhāmohana Goswāmī Bhaṭṭācārya's *Vivaraṇa* alone. Perhaps, the only unique thing about his additions, omissions and variations is their supposedly radical difference from the accepted *Nyāya* position, but even that would have to be established by a comparative study of the other additions, omissions and variations found in different texts, only some of which we have noted in the course of this article. Why, for example, the omissions, additions and variations in the *Dīpikā*, which are far greater in number than in the *Vivaraṇa*, be considered of less significance, is not clear. Unfortunately, the editor of the *Dipikā* has not even referred to the work of Rādhāmohana, let alone compare it with the *Dipikā*.

In fact, the lackadaisical manner in which classical scholarship in this field has worked is truly unbelievable. How would one possibly account for the fact that Pt. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailaṅga, who perhaps was the first person to edit and publish the text of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*, has nothing to say about how he found the manuscript, where it was located, what problems it raised for the text of the *Nyāya-sūtras*, what variations it has and what are their philosophical importance, etc. The only thing he says is that he has separately given the *sūtra-pāṭha* of a text named *Sūtroddhāra* written by Vācaspati Miśra found in a not-very-ancient book written in Bengali script after having critically edited it.[52] This is perhaps the same text about which H.P. Sastri had written in 1905: 'Manuscripts giving the *Sūtra* only are extremely rare. I got one from Midnapore and gave a copy of it to my friend Dr. Venis, and it was published at Benaras. It is known as the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*.'[53] If the two works are the same, as is most likely to be the case, then it is surprising that even after nine years of its publication, the learned Pandit does not know that this is not the work of the author of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* with whom he confuses him in this article. Not only this, he does not even care to compare the two texts and discuss the differences therein. And, though he refers to Rādhāmohana Gosvāmī in the article, he not only places him in the nineteenth century but also shows no awareness of those supposed radical variations in the readings of the *sūtras* or of those new *sūtras*, which are alleged by T.K. Gopalaswamy Aiyangar to lead to the postulation of a totally different recension of the *Nyāya-sūtras*, even though the *Vivaraṇa* commentary had been published in the Pandit New Series 23 (1901), 24 (1902) and 25 (1903).[54] Further, surprisingly, if the *New Catalogus Catalogorum* entry under *Nyāya-sūtroddhāra*[55] is to be believed, he has entered it as a commentary, and that, too, incomplete, assuming, of course, that he is the author of the *Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts*, Second Series, published in 4 volumes by the Government of Bengal, Calcutta in 1900, 1904, 1907 and 1911. The anomaly becomes still more incomprehensible if we remember that, while the article was published in 1905, the relevant notice of the manuscript of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* is supposed to be in Vol. II of the *Notices* which was published in 1904. Perhaps,

this is a different manuscript from the one claimed to be given by Pt. H.P. Sastri to Dr. Venis.[d] In any case, what is surprising is that no one has tried to check the veracity of the statements of Pt. H.P. Sastri made in his article in 1905 or the correctness of the entry in the *Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts*, Vol. II published in 1904 or that of the entry in the *New Catalogus Catalogorum* published in 1978.

The problems relating to the works of Pt. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailaṅga, Pt. Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla and Shri T.K. Gopalaswamy Aiyangar in this connection have already been referred to earlier. So also have been those arising from the 'Introduction' by Pt. Gopīnātha Kavirāja.[56] One may say that the traditional Indian Pandit had not much interest in textual or historical matters. Rather, he was primarily concerned with the philosophical issues and only secondarily with historical questions relating to the authenticity of the text. In fact, it may be urged that it was the intrusion of the Western way of looking at the texts and their tradition that, in a sense, forced the Indian scholars in this century to work in this field; and that, as their heart was not in it, they produced the kind of inexcusably shoddy work we have discovered them doing. But, then, what about the moderns? They do not seem to show any awareness of the problem either. Rather, they seem to show a blindness to things before their eyes which perhaps is even more inexcusable than that of the Pandits. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, for example, seems completely unaware of the falsity of the statements made by H.P. Sastri in his article 'An Examination of the *Nyāya-sūtra*' which he has included not only in the second volume of *Studies in the History of Indian Philosophy* edited by him and published in 1978, but also referred to approvingly in his long 'Introduction' to Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyaya's translation of the *Nyāya-sūtras* with Vātsyāyana's commentary published from Calcutta in 1982. Similarly, Matilal[e] in his discussion of the *sūtras* in his recent work on *Perception* hardly shows any awareness of the problem. Not only this, though he refers to Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* edited by Pt. Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla and published by Chowkhamba from Banaras in 1936,[57e] he does not seem to have seen the text of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* published therein or noted the problems we have referred to in our discussion of it earlier.

Thus, the traditional and the modern both seem to be either uninterested or unaware of the problems that we have tried to highlight in this paper. And the situation with respect to one of the most ratiocinative, argument-oriented schools of Indian philosophy in the year 1990 is that there is no standard, authoritative edition of its basic work, that is, the *Nyāya-sūtras* giving all the additions, deletions and variant readings with an assessment of their philosophical significance, if any. Even such a prestigious publisher of classical works

[d] I say 'claimed' as Pt. Gaṇgādhara Śāstrī Tailaṅga has made no mention of this fact in his 'Introduction' to the VSS publication of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*.

[e] Bimal Krishna Matilal, *Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 429.

of Indian philosophy as Motilal Banarsidass has not taken the opportunity to ask an outstanding scholar in the field to survey the problems relating to the text when reprinting recently Gaṅgānātha Jhā's well-known work, *The Nyāya-sūtras of Gotama*. Perhaps, the Indian Council of Philosophical Research and the Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan could undertake this work jointly with the help and collaboration of the well-known Nyāya scholars in the country.

Any such work, however, will first have to come to terms with the following:

(1) What is the manuscript on the basis of which Pt. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailaṅga published his version of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* in VSS. volume IX?

(2) What is the exact nature of the entry under *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* in the second volume of *Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts* by H.P. Sastri and published by the Government of Bengal in 1904?

(3) Where is the manuscript of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* referred to under this entry?

(4) Is this the same as has been published in VSS volume IX, or is it a commentary as mentioned in the *New Catalogus Catalogorum*?

(5) What are the grounds of the assertion that the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* is the work of Vācaspati Miśra II, and not of Vācaspati Miśra I?

(6) What is the manuscript of the *Nyāyatattvāloka* said to be in the India Office Library, London, about? Is it the same as the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*, as is asserted by Potter in his *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. I? In case it is different, what are the grounds of believing it to be the work of Vācaspati Miśra II?

(7) What could be the possible grounds for Pt. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailaṅga's denying the *pramāṇatva* of so many *sūtras* in the footnotes to the *Nyāya-sūtroddhāra* as given in VSS volume IX?

(8) What could be the possible reasons for his accepting almost all the *sūtras* whose *pramāṇatva* he could not discover, as genuine *sūtras* in the main body of the text?

(9) What could be the possible reasons for Pt. Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla to give *Tattvāloka* as a *pramāṇa* for *sūtras* in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* in his 1936 edition of *Nyāyamañjarī*, when the two are usually supposed to be works by the same author?

(10) Where is the manuscript on the basis of which Shri S.T.G. Bhattacharya edited and published Rādhāmohana Gosvāmī Bhaṭṭācārya's *Vivaraṇa* on the *Nyāya-sūtras* in Pandit New Series 23, 24, and 25 in 1901, 1902 and 1903 (according to Potter in the Vol. I of his *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*)?

(11) Did Shri S.T.G. Bhattacarya write any editorial note giving information about the manuscript he had found and the radical character of the additions, omissions and variant readings as pointed out latter by T.K. Gopalaswamy Aiyangar in his articles discussed above?

(12) Why are *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā* mentioned separately as authoritative sources when they are supposed to be the works of the same person, that is, Vācaspati Miśra I?

(13) If Vācaspati Miśra I's *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā* is supposed to be a *ṭīkā* on Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārtika*, then how can it reject the *sūtratva* of those *sūtras* which have been accepted as such in the *Vārtika*?

(14) The problem of something occurring in Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* being taken as a *sūtra* should be distinguished from someone accepting as a *sūtra* something which does not so occur in the *Bhāṣya*.

(15) The variant readings should be divided into those which are philosophically significant from those that are only linguistic in character or where *sūtra-pāṭha* has been separated or combined to make one *sūtra* read as two *sūtras* or two *sūtras* as one. Special attention should be paid to *sūtras* where the variant readings include or exclude the negative prefix which makes the sense totally different.

Notes and References

1. Baccā Jhā, 1860.
2. Perhaps, the most outstanding *Naiyāyika* in twentieth century India. He recently passed away. Sometimes back he had propounded the theory of *Dehātmavāda* within the *Nyāya* framework at a gathering of more than hundred *Nyāya* scholars at Sarnath, Banaras. The text of the lecture along with his reply to the objections raised is proposed to be published by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi. An English translation by Dr. Mukund Lath has been published in *JICPR*, Vol. V, No. 3, 1988.
3. Karl H. Potter (ed.) *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgeśa*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977. p. 234.
4. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (ed.), *Studies in the History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi & Co., 1978. p. 88.
5. Gaṅgānātha Jhā, 'Preface', *The Nyāya-sūtras of Gautama*, Vol. I, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, Repr. 1984. p. ix. Originally published in *Indian Thought* from 1912-19.
6. *Ibid.* p. ix.
7. *Ibid.* p. xvi.
8. Karl H. Potter, 'Bibliography', *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. I, 2nd rev. ed., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983. pp. 43-47.
9. Gaṅgānātha Jhā, p. xvi.
10. *Ibid.*, p. xii, xv.
11. Gopīnātha Kavīrāja, *Gleanings from the History and Bibliography of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature*, Calcutta: Indian Studies: Past and Present, 1962, p. 46. Originally published in 'Princess of Wales, Saraswati Bhawan Studies', Banaras from 1924 to 1927 in vol. x. 3, 4, 5 & 7.
12. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, p. 88.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
14. Potter, Vol. I. p. 234. Potter's reference to *History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithila* by Dineshchandra Bhattacharya does not exactly corroborate what he had written as nowhere on p. 147 it is said that the text is partly in ms. It only says: 'It appears that the late Mahamahopadhyaya V.B. Dwivedi had access to a MS. of this work copied in Caitra 1418.' Reference under DB on p. x also needs correction for the year of publication; it is 1958 and not 1959 as given in Potter's *Encyclopedia*.

15. Potter, Vol. II on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, p. 684.
16. Potter, Vol. I, entry 788, p. 43.
17. Dineshchandra Bhattacharya, *History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithila*, Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, Darbhanga, 1958, p. 147.
18. *Journal of the Gaṅgānātha Jhā Research Institute*, Vol. IV, 1947, 47, p. 300.
19. Pt. Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śuklā (ed.), *The Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Kashi Sanskrit Series, No. 106, Banaras: Chowkhamba, 1936, pp. 1-28 (at the end of the work).
20. Rāma Bhavan Upādhyāya, Pan-NS. 2-1, 1922. I owe this reference to Pt. Thaṅgaswami Sarma, the outstanding scholar who has compiled perhaps the most exhaustive reference bibliography on *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* published under the title *Darśanamañjarī*, Pt. I, from the University of Madras in 1985.
21. 5.1.17 reads in the main body of the text as: *pratipakṣātprakaraṇasiddheḥ pratiṣedhānupapattiḥ pratipakṣopapatteḥ* (p. 240), while in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* it reads as: *pratipakṣātprakaraṇasiddheḥ pratiṣedhānupapattiḥ* (p. 25). Similarly, 5.1.34 reads in the main body of the text as: *dṛṣṭānte ca sādhyasādhanabhāvena prajñātasya dharmasya hetuttvattasya cobhayathabhavānnaviśeṣaḥ* (p. 253) while in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* it reads as: *dṛṣṭante ca sādhyasādhanabhāvena dharmasya hetuttvattasya cobhayathābhāvānnaviśeṣaḥ* (p. 26).
22. R. Thaṅgaswami Sarma, *Darśanamañjarī*, Pt. I, p. 34.
23. V. Raghavan, *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, University of Madras, 1968, Vol. I, p. 242.
24. See *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, Vol. x. p. 247. The entry mentions 'in 2 chs. by Vācaspati Miśra. IO 1868'. First, it may be pointed out that according to the detailed indication regarding the abbreviation IO on p. ix of the first volume there is no such catalogue published in 1868. It specifically says: 'A catalogue of Sanskrit and Prakrit manuscripts in the India Office Library. By Julius Eggeling. 2. parts (London, 1887, 1896) and Vol. II in 2 parts by A.B. Keith, with a supplement—Buddhist Manuscripts—By F.W. Thomas, London, 1935.' This may be regarded as a printing mistake, but it is inexcusable on the part of the editor not to have indicated whether it was Vācaspati Miśra I or Vācaspati Miśra II who is supposed to be the author of the work. By the year 1978, when the tenth volume was published, it was generally accepted that there were two different Vācaspati Miśras and that the *Tattvāloka* is the work of the later one. It is not that the *New Catalogus Catalogorum* does not know of the fact as it refers to the author of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* as 'Vācaspati Miśra (Junior) of Mithila (15 cent.)' on p. 280. But even here the entry is wrong in two respects. First, it classifies the text as a commentary, which it certainly is not. Secondly, it mentions it as incomplete which also is mistaken. The editor relies on what is written by H.P. Sastri in his *Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts*, Second Series, published in 4 volumes in Calcutta by the Government of Bengal, in 1900, 1904, 1907 and 1911 which is cited as the authority for the statement. But the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*, as we know, had already been published by Pt. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailaṅga is 1896, a fact which does not seem to be known either to H.P. Sastri in 1904 or to Prof. Kunjunni Raja, the editor of Vol. X of the *New Catalogus Catalogorum* in 1970. If we remember that the text of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* had once again been published in between by Pt. Śūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla in 1936 with new footnotes, the situation is unbelievable indeed. Or, is there another *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* which is a commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtras* to which H.P. Sastri refers to in his *Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts* published in 1904. Strangely, even Pt. Thaṅgaswami Sarma who in his *Darśanamañjarī*, Pt. I, published in 1985, mentions the 1896 publication of *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* in VSS 9, does not question the correctness of its classification as a commentary in the *New Catalogus Catalogorum*.
25. The missing *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* are 3.1.15, 3.1.38, 3.1.63, 3.1.69, 3.1.70, 3.2.34, 3.2.38, 3.2.47, 3.2.69 and 3.2.70.
26. The following *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* have variant readings (with additions, etc.) in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*: 2.1.47, 2.2.17, 2.2.52, 3.2.14, 3.2.26, 3.2.48, 5.1.17, 5.1.18, 5.1.19, 5.1.20 and 5.1.24.

27. The missing *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* are 2.1.20, 2.2.28, 2.2.43, 2.2.49, 3.1.29, 3.1.30, 3.1.31 and 3.1.73.
28. Prof. Thaṅgaswami Sarma informs me in a personal communication that even Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārtika* tries to do this to some extent.
29. The *sūtras* in the *Vṛtti* missing in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* are 3.1.15, 3.1.38, 3.1.53, 3.1.63, 3.1.69, 3.1.70, 3.2.10, 3.2.44, 3.2.47, 3.2.69 and 3.2.70. The *sūtras* missing in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* are: 3.1.29, 3.1.30, 3.1.31, 3.1.53, 3.2.10 and 3.2.44.
30. The list of the *sūtras* in the *Vṛtti* which have a variant reading (with additions etc.) from the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* are: 2.1.25, 2.1.53, 2.2.13, 2.2.17, 2.2.48, 2.2.49, 2.2.52, 2.2.61, 3.1.62, 3.2.10, 3.2.14, 3.2.25, 4,1.49, 4.1.61, 4.2.10 and 5.2.15.
31. The variant readings in the *Vṛtti* and the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* relate to the following *sūtras*: 2.1.25, 2.1.44, 2.1.53, 2.2.13, 2.2.48, 2.2.61, 3.1.62, 3.2.10, 3.2.14, 4.1.49, 4.1.61, 4.2.10, 5.1.18, 5.1.19, 5.1.20, 5.1.24 and 5.2.15.
32. Potter, *Encyclopedia*, Vol. I, entry 790, p. 43.
33. T.K. Gopalaswamy Aiyangar, *Journal of the Shri Venkatesvara Oriental Research Institute*, Tirupati, Vol. VIII, 1947, pp. 34-47.
34. The *sūtras* of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* missing in the *Vivaraṇa* are: 2.1.20, 2.2.37, 2.2.43, 3.1.38, 3.1.55, 4.2.7, and 4.2.8. The *sūtras* of the *Vivaraṇa* which are not to be found in the *Nyāyasūcinibandha* are: 3.1.15, 3.2.10, 4.1.45, 4.1.49, 4.2.50, and 5.2.20.
35. T.K. Gopalaswamy Aiynagar, fn., p. 35. Italics mine.
36. Potter, p. 334.
37. Bhīmācārya, *Nyāya-Kośaḥ*, Poona, Bhandarkara Oriental Research Institute, 1978, p. 2.
38. T.K. Gopalaswamy Aiyangar, 'Lost Nyāya-sūtra as restored by Rādhāmohana Gosvāmī Bhattacharya' in *The Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute*, Vol. XXVI, No. 4 (October 1970), pp. 41-44.
39. Though the editor has not added '*Tarkācārya*' to his name it is necessary to do so to distinguish him from Keśava Miśra, the author of the *Tarkabhāṣā*.
40. Kishore Nath Jha, (ed.), *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā* by Vāgīśvara Bhaṭṭa, Allahabad, Ganganath Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth, 1979, p. tha,da.
41. Kishore Nath Jha, *op.cit.*, p. 2.
42. T.K. Gopalaswamy Aiyangar, 'Lost *Nyāya-sūtras* as restored by Radhamohana Gosvami Bhattacarya', *Journal of the Ganaganatha Jha Research Institute*, Allahabad, Vol. XXVI. No. 4 (Oct. 1970). p. 41.
43. On Udayana's date, see Potter, *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. II. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977, p. 523.
44. Potter, *op.cit.*, p. 345.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 411.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 334.
47. Potter, p. 205.
48. *New Catalogus Catalogorum*, Vol. X. p. 248. Also *Darśanamañjarī*, p. 74.
49. T.K. Gopalaswamy Aiyangar, 'A Critique of the *Nyāya-sūtra* Text', p. 41.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
51. See for a further illustration and discussion of this point my article 'The Vedic Corpus—Some Questions' in *JICPR*, Vol. III, No. 1, Autumn 1985.
52. The only thing he says about it is '*pṛthak sūtra-pāṭhaśca vācaspatimiśrakṛtasūtroddhāranāmakaṁ bangākṣaralikhitamekam nātiprācīnaṁ pustakamālocya saṁyojitāḥ*'.
53. H.P. Sastri, *op.cit.*, p. 88.
54. There does not seem to be any mention of these in the *New Catalogus Catalogorum*.
55. Vol. X, p. 280.
56. Interestingly, Gaṅgānātha Jhā refers to three different manuscripts consisting of the *sūtra-pāṭha* only. These are: (*i*) A palm-leaf Manuscript of the *sūtra* only; (*ii*) Paper manuscript of the *sūtra* only belonging to Jagadish Mishra; and (*iii*) Paper manuscript of *sūtra* only belonging to Babu Govindadasa. See p. ix of the 'Preface'. This is in

contrast to the statement by H.P. Sastri in the 1905 article already referred to. The *New Catalogus Catalogorum* seems to refer to a number of manuscripts without commentaries (Vol. x. p. 276) but none seems to have collated or checked the standard reading of the *sūtras* with them.

57. Bimal Krishna Matilal, *Perception: An Easay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 429.

Appendix I

A

Sūtras in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* missing in the *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā* of Bhaṭṭavāgīśvara.

1. 2.1.61
2. 3.1.15
3. 3.1.18
4. 3.1.54
5. 3.1.71
6. 3.2.14
7. 3.2.16
8. 3.2.21
9. 3.2.34
10. 3.2.37
11. 3.2.38
12. 3.2.39
13. 3.2.46
14. 3.2.47
15. 4.1.15
16. 4.1.16
17. 4.1.33
18. 4.1.49
19. 4.1.60
20. 4.2.6
21. 4.2.11
22. 4.2.12
23. 4.2.14
24. 4.2.17
25. 4.2.20
26. 4.2.21
27. 4.2.22
28. 4.2.25
29. 4.2.27
30. 4.2.28
31. 4.2.29
32. 4.2.30
33. 4.2.32
34. 4.2.33
35. 4.2.34
36. 4.2.37
37. 4.2.42
38. 5.1.20
39. 5.1.34

Total 39

B

Sūtras in the *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā* of Bhaṭṭavāgīśvara missing in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*.

1. 2.1.20
2. 2.1.21
3. 2.1.27
4. 2.1.34
5. 2.1.56
6. 2.1.60
7. 2.1.64
8. 2.2.7
9. 2.2.10
10. 2.2.11
11. 2.2.50
12. 2.2.51
13. 2.2.52
14. 3.1.1
15. 3.1.18
16. 3.1.28
17. 3.1.30
18. 3.1.31
19. 3.1.32
20. 3.1.41
21. 3.2.16
22. 3.2.19
23. 3.2.20
24. 3.2.22
25. 3.2.37
26. 3.2.42
27. 3.2.60
28. 4.2.22
29. 4.2.30

Total 29

C

Variant Readings of the *sūtras* in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* and the *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā* of Bhaṭṭavāgīśvara.

1. 1.1.28
2. 1.1.40
3. 1.2.17
4. 2.1.1
5. 2.1.24
6. 2.1.25
7. 2.1.43
8. 2.1.44
9. 2.1.46
10. 2.1.55 (variant reading with न)
11. 2.2.7
12. 2.2.8
13. 2.2.9
14. 2.2.11
15. 2.2.15
16. 2.2.17
17. 2.2.31 (Variant reading with अ 2.2.34)
18. 2.2.56
19. 3.1.16 (Variant reading with न)
20. 3.1.13 (Variant reading without न)
21. 3.1.28
22. 3.1.34
23. 3.1.38
24. 3.1.46
25. 3.1.53
26. 3.1.65
27. 3.2.12 (Variant reading with अनुपलब्धि)
28. 3.2.24
29. 3.2.29
30. 3.2.45
31. 3.2.48 (Variant reading with न)
32. 3.2.54 (Variant reading with न)
33. 3.2.65 (Variant reading without न)
34. 3.2.74
35. 3.2.76
36. 4.1.4
37. 4.1.7
38. 4.1.10
39. 4.1.36
40. 4.1.39
41. 4.1.40
42. 4.1.47
43. 4.1.62
44. 4.2.10
45. 4.2.15
46. 4.2.23
47. 4.2.35 (4.2.19)
48. 4.2.47
49. 4.2.49
50. 5.1.17
51. 5.1.38
52. 5.2.3
53. 5.2.15

Total 53

Appendix II

A

Sūtras of the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* missing in the *Gautamīyasūtraprakāśaḥ* of Keśava Miśra.

1. 1.1.8
2. 2.1.25
3. 3.1.15
4. 3.1.54
5. 3.1.60
6. 3.1.65
7. 3.1.71
8. 3.2.38
9. 3.2.47
10. 3.2.71
11. 3.2.73
12. 4.2.7
13. 4.2.8

Total 13

B

Sūtras of the *Gautamīyasūtraprakāśaḥ* missing in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra*.

1. 2.1.20
2. 3.1.28

3. 3.1.29
4. 3.1.30
5. 3.2.10

Total 5

C

Variant Readings of the *sūtras* in the *Nyāyasūtroddhāra* and the *Gautamīyasūtraprakāśaḥ*.

1. 2.1.55 (Variant reading with न)
2. 3.1.6 (Variant reading with न)
3. 3.1.30
4. 3.1.36
5. 3.1.38
6. 3.1.50
7. 3.1.53
8. 3.2.54 (Variant reading with न)
9. 4.1.7
10. 4.1.24
11. 4.2.44
12. 4.2.45
13. 5.1.17
14. 5.1.20

Total 14

Appendix III

A

Sūtras in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* missing in the *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā* of Bhaṭṭavāgīśvara.

1. 2.1.25
2. 2.1.46
3. 2.1.61
4. 2.2.28
5. 2.2.43
6. 2.2.51
7. 2.2.52
8. 3.1.17
9. 3.1.38
10. 3.1.55
11. 3.1.71
12. 3.2.14
13. 3.2.16
14. 3.2.35
15. 3.2.44
16. 4.1.15
17. 4.1.16
18. 4.1.33
19. 4.1.48
20. 4.1.59
21. 4.2.6
22. 4.2.11
23. 4.2.12
24. 4.2.14
25. 4.2.17
26. 4.2.20
27. 4.2.21
28. 4.2.22
29. 4.2.25
30. 4.2.27
31. 4.2.28
32. 4.2.29
33. 4.2.30
34. 4.2.32
35. 4.2.33
36. 4.2.34
37. 4.2.37
38. 4.2.42
39. 5.1.20
40. 5.1.34

Total 40

B

Sūtras in the *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā* of Bhaṭṭavāgśīvara missing in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha.*

1. 2.1.21
2. 2.1.27
3. 2.1.34
4. 2.1.35
5. 2.1.49
6. 2.1.56
7. 2.1.60
8. 2.1.64
9. 2.2.7
10. 2.2.15
11. 3.1.1
12. 3.1.18
13. 3.1.28
14. 3.1.41
15. 3.1.42
16. 3.1.68
17. 3.2.16
18. 3.2.19
19. 3.2.20
20. 3.2.42
21. 3.2.60
22. 3.2.69
23. 4.1.42
24. 4.2.22
25. 4.2.30

Total 25

C

Sūtras with variant readings in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā* of Bhaṭṭavāgīśvara.

1. 1.2.8
2. 1.2.17
3. 2.1.26 (A mixture of 2.1.25 and 2.1.26)
4. 2.1.46
5. 2.1.58
6. 2.2.8
7. 2.2.10 & 11 (combined into 2.2.9)
8. 2.2.18
9. 2.2.34 (Variant reading without अ)
10. 2.2.55
11. 2.2.57
12. 3.1.14 (Variant reading with न)
13. 3.1.29
14. 3.1.38
15. 3.1.50
16. 3.1.63
17. 3.2.22
18. 3.2.30
19. 3.2.47
20. 3.2.63 (Variant reading with न)
21. 3.2.71
22. 4.1.4
23. 4.1.7
24. 4.1.36
25. 4.1.37
26. 4.1.38
27. 4.1.44
28. 4.2.9
29. 4.2.17
30. 4.2.34
31. 5.1.18

Total 31

Appendix IV

A

Sūtras in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* which are missing in the *Gautamīyasūtraprakāśaḥ* of Keśava Miśra.

1. 1.1.8
2. 2.1.26
3. 3.1.38
4. 3.1.55
5. 3.1.61
6. 3.1.71
7. 4.2.7
8. 4.2.8

Total 8

B

Sūtras in the *Gautamīyasūtraprakāśaḥ* of Keśava Miśra missing in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha*.

1. 2.1.32
2. 3.2.10
3. 4.1.45

Total 3

C

Variant readings of the *Sūtras* in the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* and the *Gautamīyasūtraprakāśaḥ* of Keśava Miśra.

1. 1.1.27
2. 3.1.32
3. 3.2.46 (Variant reading with न)
4. 3.2.48
5. 4.1.17
6. 4.1.24 (Variant reading with ण)
7. 4.1.36
8. 4.2.42
9. 4.2.43
10. 5.1.33
11. 5.2.11
12. 5.2.15

Total 12

Three accounts of paradigm shift

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1. Introduction

In this paper an attempt has been made to exhibit the growth-pattern of scientific theories, the problems embedded therein and the manner in which the scientist seeks to solve the problems. Incidentally, we have also brought under examination the relation of scientific theories to other modes of thought by tracing their historical character. There is obviously some justification in adopting this line of thought, for we have noticed that knowledge in each field is marked by a historical development. Its aim in general is greater cohesion and comprehension, an aim towards which it is marching through successive stages, each of which is an advance on what had been done before. Consequently, in each stage of its development it builds some model which is liable to be corrected by further knowledge. In this way knowledge advances by building models over the ages.

This model-building activity can be best illustrated with reference to science which is a paradigm of knowledge, and histority is an essential condition of understanding of it. In this paper different accounts of the histority of science and their philosophical (-cum-ideological?) presuppositions have been offered. These presuppositions, either injected from the above or from the below, act as the external source of changing scientific paradigm. Sudden switch-over to some philosophical presuppositions may result in change in scientific presuppositions which in turn leads to the development of a new paradigm. Besides external source, there is internal source representing an adjustment of facts and theories; and this causes change in the paradigm, both in the normal and abnormal periods of science.

The paper finally opens a controversy relating to the nature of change of paradigm between Collingwood, Kuhn and Popper, and poses question whether these views are antithetical or complementary. A reconciliation of these views has been sought as a proposed answer to this question.

2. Schemata of the Paradigm

The advance of science suggests that scientific knowledge is a model-building activity. The models built add to the growth of knowledge, but like all human activities these models are fallible, and, therefore, open to correction and even replacement by a new and a more successful one. A paradigm supplies a model of scientific theories, and so it has an important implication for scientific activities. It is developed in accordance with the current and more or less specific metaphysical ideas about the nature of the world or the nature

of the phenomena under investigation. These metaphysical ideas have been described as absolute presuppositions of a scientific theory. Moreover, the paradigm comprises a methodology of discovery of laws supposed to be governing the phenomena. The methodology also attempts to put forward a procedure by which new theories can be constructed and accepted in the place of old theories proved incompatible with the new discovery or ineffective in yielding desired results.

The evolution of science, from the classical to the modern period, may be represented in three paradigms, viz. the Greek, the Newtonian and the Einstenian. The schemata of the development of science as depicted by these paradigms are given below. However, the schemata do not represent what science, in fact, is or has been; they only show how the philosophers of science work in their analysis of logical structure of scientific theories constructed by the scientists in comprehending the nature—the subject-matter of science. It follows that there exists, first of all, science which does not depend for its existence on whether it is being conceived by Kuhnian or Popperian or Collingwoodian way. It is also obvious from the following schemata of the empirical science that more than one such schemata is conceivable. Consequently, there cannot be any question as to which of them is true. They are, in fact, theoretical idealization of scientific experience.

1. *Popper's Scheme*

   Problem (1) ⟶ Tentative Theory (1) ⟶
   Error Elimination
   New Problem (2) ⟶ New Theory ⟶

2. *Kuhn's Scheme*

   Normal Science ⟶ Revolutionary Science
   ↘ ↖
   Normal Science

3. *Collingwood's Scheme*

   Question (1) ⟶ Answers (1) ⟶ Question (2) ⟶
   Answers (2)...
   History goes on and on

3. Three Accounts of the Paradigm Shift

As historians of science, Popper, Kuhn and Collingwood, have provided a rational account of scientific progress. It is evident from the above schemata that these three accounts, in spite of their different roots, have one thing in common, viz. that all have emphasized the progressive character of scientific knowledge which seeks conceptual mastery over a wide range of natural phenomena, and generally this causes paradigm to change. Growth of knowledge does not allow any system to stand static. It is progresses by discovering inconsistency in the prevailing system. It is questioned from various standpoints, particularly in the light of new experience acquired in course of time. As a result, new problems emerge which prove difficult to solve satisfactorily

within the existing system. This causes modification and even replacement, slow or fast, of the existing system by a new one. Thus, new science blossoms out in the place of the old one and dominates the field for centuries. Incidentally, we would briefly discuss the views of Popper, Kuhn and Collingwood who have successfully highlighted, of course, in different ways, the developing character of scientific knowledge.

Popper's model suggests how scientific knowledge progresses by detecting problems emerging from a theory already developed, and how it is again reconstructed and corroborated by 'testing evidence'. To quote him: [Growth of knowledge implies a] 'repeated overthrow of scientific theories and their replacement by a better or more satisfactory one'.[1] The scientist initially starts with a *problem*, he then suggests *solution* to it. On the basis of the solution a *tentative* theory is constructed. This tentative theory is again put to test which gives rise to some new and deeper problems evoking another theory for their solution. This new theory, in its turn, poses new problems to be solved by the scientist again by developing a more promising theory and this process goes on. Thus, in Popper's scheme growth of knowledge proceeds from old problems to new problems by means of *conjectures* and *refutations*, i.e. by inventing tentative hypotheses as answers to the problems under study and then subjecting them to empirical test.

The same principle applies to Kuhn's model which implies that the scientist starts from a 'normal science' and proceeds by detecting certain *anomalies* and *puzzles* leading to 'crisis' which ultimately causes its replacement. According to Kuhn, the scientist begins his observation from a 'normal science' which includes, among other things, past scientific achievements given recognition provisionally by a section of scientists. It is provisional, because its acceptance is not final. It stands ever open before our eyes, and, therefore, always keeps open the door of advancement. Initially, this 'normal science', in a very loose sense, is a first-received paradigm, an expected model containing theories, laws and methodology acquired through experience for solving problems. Or, rather, it is preparadigmatic stage of any scientific enquiry expected to account successfully for most of the puzzling experiences. On the basis of this expectation the scientist is able to recognize that something has gone wrong within the existing paradigm, and in consequence new paradigm emerges which becomes more precise and far-reaching than its commonsense prototype. To quote him:

> Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly, i.e. with the recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science. It then continues with a more or less extended explanation of the area of anomaly. And it closes only when the paradigm theory has been adjusted so that the anomalous has become the unexpected.[2]

Collingwood is not a scientist, but the conception he has developed in *The Idea of Nature* about the process of natural science is one which we actually find in the activities of the scientists. These activities are at once destructive and constructive, and, through this process of destruction-construction, scientific knowledge proceeds towards ever-deepening understanding of the structure of the world of nature adding bit by bit the results of researches left by the scholars working in this field. Naturally, his question-answer model resembles both Kuhn's and Popper's. We question a theory and find out its possible answer which we try to confirm by correlating it with evidence available; this confirmed theory is again questioned in the context of a new situation. Consequently, it gets modified or even replaced by a new one, and so goes on the process in a chain reaction as it were. Collingwood has made this observation in the context of change of the absolute presuppositions which seeks to explain the growth of scientific knowledge. He insists strongly on the necessity of rejecting or modifying presuppositions as demanded by the new context and the problems arising out of it. A fuller knowledge of this new context may occasion a change in the presuppositions previously accepted. The new set of presuppositions seems to be promising if it explains not only the cases in which the rejected set succeeded but also those cases where it failed; and the new set will be accepted as long as it is not refuted, but it may be refuted, in similar ways, which is pressed by the demand of the new context, and the process repeats itself, though not identically. This historical character of absolute presuppositions as developed by Collingwood comes close to Popper's observation that all interpretations of natural phenomena are subject to revision in the light of further evidence and are accepted only for the time being. And this resembles Kuhn's observation that no paradigm can solve all problems, for each problem solved gives rise to a new one. And here is a typical statement of Kuhn: 'If the paradigm represents work that has been done once for all, what further problems does it leave to solve'.[3]

Thus, all these three theories are based on the commonly shared conviction that scientific knowledge is conjectural in character. Popper's theory implies that the reconstruction of the problem from which the scientist starts has the character of a conjecture. He proceeds from old problems to new problems by means of conjectures and refutations, revised conjectures and fresh refutations, and the process repeats with the ever-widening horizon of knowledge. Likewise, Kuhn observes that challenge and adjustments are the standard part of normal research in the field of empirical science. Collingwood's paradigm implies that all historical understanding of the past involves hypothetical reconstruction of a historical problem situation.

In spite of these striking parallels between these views, Popper, in order to show the distinctive character of his view, is anxious to draw a line of difference between his view and that of others. Popper argues that he has viewed the structure of revolution causing change of paradigm from the standpoint of *logic and methodology*, whereas Kuhn has laid emphasis on the *psychological drives* of the scientist. Kuhn replies that the way through which a scientific theory is being developed depends much on society rather than on logic, and for this it is necessary to trace the ideology—a value-system together with the institutions through which that system is transmitted and introduced. For 'what scientists value, we may hope to understand what problems they will undertake and what choice they will make in particular circumstances of conflict'.[4] But perhaps this does not amount to psychologism. In fact, philosophers of science are not scientists. They are historians of science; hence the method they adopt must be descriptive and not prescriptive, i.e. they can only say what a scientist normally does while dealing with problems and not prescribe what he should do with them.

To this point Kuhn's analysis resembles Collingwood's rational reconstruction of the historical past. Collingwood makes it clear, in the context of history, that the essential thing in understanding a past historical fact is not the analysis of its situation, but the historian's thought of its re-enactment, the sympathetic repetition of the original experience. The analysis of the situation serves merely as a help, an indispensable help, for the re-enactment. But to Popper this process is psychological and inessential too, though it may sometimes serve as an aid for the historian, a kind of intuitive check of the success of his situational analysis. What is regarded as essential is not the re-enactment, but the situational analysis, i.e. analysis of the 'problem-situation' as it appears to the agent. This is similar to Collingwood's method, but it eliminates from the method of historical understanding of the situation the sociological and psychological aspects which for Collingwood or for Kuhn are its crux.

Popper might reply that both Kuhn and Collingwood are tracing the ideology or psychology of normal science in the name of historical approach. The words like 'incommensurability' and 'unexpectedness' which Kuhn ascribes to a new paradigm may appear to be psychological and not logical in character. To quote him: 'The question how it happens that a new idea occurs to a man may be of great interest to empirical psychology; but it is irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge.'[5] On the contrary, what he claims to be doing is the sociology of science. True, terms like 'bold conjectures', 'sincere hypotheses' and 'conscious effort' used in describing scientific activities have psychological touch, yet, Popper thinks, they may be applied as parts of the objective or inter-subjective method of science. To say that a man is bold and that a method is bold are different matters. A method employed is bold when it can survive test and meet criticism. While developing his view, Popper maintains, like Kuhn, that the new theory must be as unexpected as possible, though the sense of unexpectedness which Popper might use is quite different from that which Kuhn ascribes to a theory. The new theory, according to Popper, is 'unexpected' in the sense of including 'as much new empirical content as possible'. It is 'bold' as it frames hypotheses that might contradict even well-established laws. It is

'improbable' as it is 'falsifiable to the greatest possible degree'. In connection with the revolutionary process of overthrowing a theory or paradigm, Popper suggests that unless the scientist makes conscious effort to frame bold and new theories having rich informative content revolution will not occur. But all these suggestions are not to be confused with psychologism or prescription. It only signifies a romantic intellectual excursion in the field of science.

But to Kuhn this procedure outlined is nothing but procedural prescription in the name of scientific revolution. We read: 'Rather than a logic, Sir Karl has provided an ideology; rather than methodological rules, he has supplied procedural maxims'.[6]

This criticism, even if well taken, seems one sided. Popper claims that he is not prescribing but simply describing what a scientist does when he brings revolutionary change in the existing scientific paradigm. Thus, the difference between Kuhn and Popper lies mainly in their emphasis on different aspects of the scientific activity. Kuhn has stressed on both the process of conceiving new problems and the method of testing them, but Popper spells out the former and brings the latter into focus. Secondly, Kuhn lays emphasis on both normal and abnormal or extraordinary periods of science, whereas Popper concentrates his attention only on the revolutionary periods, which, according to Kuhn, can only be allowed in the rare moments of crisis.

Popper has somewhat underestimated the role of 'normal science' in making revolutionary science possible, because he considers it to be a real threat to science as it has a tendency towards intellectual laziness, if not irrationalism. Scientists working within the frame-work of 'normal science' are, like prisoners, lodged in a prison of theories, following almost routine-bound behaviour peculiar to animals adjusting themselves rather instinctively to their environment. His scheme, on the contrary, is a routine-free picture as it breaks the routine deliberately through the method of trial and error, enabling the scientist to escape from it into freedom.

It would not be proper to think that Popper has ignored 'normal science' totally. Although he does not explicitly make any distinction between normal periods and extraordinary ones in the history of science, we find him maintaining, implicitly at least, two phases of science, viz. less revolutionary and more revolutionary phases, which resemble Kuhn's distinction between 'normal science' and 'extraordinary science' respectively. The two views differ mainly on one point which seems to me of importance. Popper does not think that in a less revolutionary period scientists follow a routine which in a more revolutionary period is overthrown by following a new routine. Rather, from the very beginning of their works they are revolutionary in spirit, boldly facing problems, the potential falsifiers of the system, a product of 'creative intuition' in the Bergsonian sense and searching for their solutions. Though they may be less revolutionary at the initial stage of their work, still they are not following any routine.

It is clear that Popper's criticism of Kuhn has inspired some other critics,

notably Watkins and Lakatos, to interpret Kuhn's description of the process in which an old paradigm gets replaced by a new one as an 'irrational leap of faith'. Watkins is of opinion that the process which Kuhn describes normal is 'non-rational'. Similarly, Lakatos, whose position is already foreshadowed in Popper's, observes that Kuhn's suggestion for uncritical commitment to paradigm implies irrationality, and the overthrow of one paradigm by another as described by Kuhn falls within the realm of psychological discovery.

Interestingly enough, Dr. T.K. Sarkar in an unpublished paper, 'Some Meta-scientific Queries about the Models of Growth of Scientific Knowledge', expresses his unhappiness over the Kuhnian lines of scientific historiography, and comes very close to the ideas of Watkins and Lakatos, both of whom distinguish Kuhn's position from that of Popper on the ground that scientific process as described by Kuhn is not at all rational. To support my analysis, I would like to offer an extract from his paper: 'The revolutionary changes which follows periods of extraordinary research are described by Kuhn in such a way that here again we can hardly avoid the impression that they involve complete irrational process.'

At least some of the criticisms of Kuhn do not appear to be sufficiently justified. The critics have picked out some points of Kuhn's thought to the exclusion of some other, very important and related ones, and their criticism does not reflect a proper assessment of his work as a whole. What Kuhn actually says is: a scientist usually starts his work within the context of a normal science, he should not frame hypotheses which contradict the established laws, but he might break away from this framework at any time. Admittedly, in that case he would find himself again in a frame-work, but it would be a 'roomier' one; and he could at any moment break it again. Hence Kuhn never thinks that transition from one paradigm to another is made according to a definite routine.

Nor the process he describes is irrational. He does not ignore the role of criticism in the advancement of science, rather he admits it as the heart of scientific enterprise. To quote Kuhn: 'I have never, in fact, accepted the description of my views as a defence of irrationality in science'.[7] The term 'uncritical commitment' which Popper describes as 'Myth of Frame-work', only suggests that the choice between paradigms or theories is not determined by *logic* alone. He keeps on reminding us that there is no unique method, or '*the method*' of science and its mainstay is inspired guesswork which is testable.

The point is that commitment to a paradigm or a theory and suspension of criticism are not a prerequisite to the advancement of science. This does not imply that science is a series of 'conjectures and refutations'. The scientists do not think right at the start or at each and every step that their cherished theories are false and are to be rejected. Even if facts contradict theories, they try to protect them by inventing some subsidiary hypotheses as long as these counter-instances are not felt as necessary falsifiers. Otherwise, science cannot normally begin. So detection of anomalies and adjustment of theories, as

Kuhn has pointed out, are the usual process of science. His 'normal science', an accepted research programme, is just the starting point which initiates the research works, and for this suspension of criticism may be felt necessary at its initial stage. The same facts applies to Lakatos' 'hard core research programme', the part of which, Lakatos claims, must be accepted, rather uncritically inventing auxiliary hypotheses as a 'protective belt around this core'.[8] in order to carry on research programme, and it can be attacked only after accepting another programme. As already mentioned, Newton's four laws constitute the basic commitment of the Newtonian programme, and they have been protected from refutation by a wide 'protective belt'.[9] Popper also favours solving problems from a 'background knowledge' which, he thinks, is an implicit body of intertwined theoretical and methodological beliefs about the natural phenomena serving as the starting point of the scientists. This 'background knowledge' resembles Kuhn's 'normal science' from which the scientists should start. In fact, this is the character which Collingwood has attributed to a set of absolute presuppositions comprising the whole system of our preceding assumptions, theories, metaphysical as well as scientific. Thus, these views, when correctly interpreted, turn out to be complementary, excepting in certain peripheral areas where minor disagreements can be noticed. In fact, this is what Kuhn says himself about the similarity of their views. To quote him: 'On almost all the occasions when we turn explicitly to the same problems, Sir Karl's view of science and my own very nearly identical.'[10]

In spite of this general agreement, Collingwood's view represents a radical departure from the other two. Kuhn and Popper have viewed science as the best form of knowledge. On this point Collingwood disagrees mainly on metaphysical ground, and insists that science is not the highest form of knowledge; it presupposes metaphysics for its intelligibility. The phenomenal world with which science is concerned is not intelligible unless it is brought under some transcendental principles or, in Kant's words, categories. Here he is more Kantian than Kuhnian or Popperian. But, though pro-Kantian, he retains his uniqueness by tracing, unlike Kant and more like Kuhn and Popper, the histority of all forms of knowledge. The supremacy of philosophic knowledge over scientific knowledge is also highlighted by Croce and Bradley. Corce regards science and scientific activities as forms of practical activities and not genuinely cognitive, because they are based on pseudo-concepts, or, in Bradley's words, concepts riddled with contradictions. Collingwood does not entertain such an extreme view. Nevertheless, he does not accept science as the highest form of knowledge, the knowledge which philosophy tries to offer, that is to say, an all-comprehensive knowledge of Reality. Science as a form of knowledge is not false; it is only partial, an approximation to Reality. Collingwood realizes this deeper significance of scientific knowledge and expresses this truth by exhibiting its historical character.

4. Sources of Paradigm Shift

The historical character of science as represented through these schemata leads to an important question: why scientific paradigm changes and what are the sources of its change? The sources of change of paradigm may be traced either externally or internally. In this section we have highlighted how the external source which describes a clash between a theory and its presuppositions, on the one hand, and the internal source representing an adjustment of facts and theories, on the other, necessitate a change in the paradigm. However, what is internal or external is to be determined by one's methodology. Absolute presuppositions, usually regarded as external factor serving intellectual influence upon a paradigm, become the internal 'hardcore' of Lakatos' research programme. His 'hardcore' consists of assumptions about the basic kind of entities of the world and methodology of constructing and testing theories. In this essay absolute presuppositions may be treated as external source furnishing reasons for paradigm shift.

The External Source

The external source of the change relates to the changing metaphysical, religious and cultural traditions of the age in which the scientific activities are carried on. In science a theory is formulated on the basis of certain problems. The conception of a problem and its solution depends largely on the outlook of the scientist regarding the physical world, of which the practising scientist is not generally aware. This is expressed in Arthur Pap's observation that the scientists themselves are metaphysicians, only they are not aware of their own metaphysical presuppositions. He means thereby that no scientist is indifferent to his age; his outlook is influenced by the social situation and the scientific age in which he belongs, and he formulates his problems and solves them accordingly.

It is generally agreed that metaphysical ideas play an important role in the advancement of science. We have traced elsewhere how the Greek cosmology was coloured by the metaphysical views of that time. The natural philosophy of Pythagoras was influenced by his theological presuppositions that soul can transmigrate from body. This anthropological dualism of soul and body is extended to the cosmic dualism of form and matter. The soul which is regarded as the principle of activity is identified with the form in the cosmic plane. This 'form' is further identified with number on the ground that 'form' can be described in terms of mathematics. Due to the Pythagorean influence, Plato is led to seek a deeper truth which is to be grasped by uncovering the pattern which lies hidden within the phenomenal world, a pattern upon which the universe is supposed to be based. This is presumably the reason why Aristotle lays emphasis on final and efficient causes in his treatment of nature. In brief, underlying the Greek cosmology, with minor

exceptions, is the metaphysical presuppositions that nature is teleological. Its process is not a mere physical activity determined by the past, but is tending towards a goal—the realization of a purpose.

This implies that metaphysics is within science. Almost every scientific theory incorporates metaphysical ideas within it, and a theory is distinguished from other theories with reference to its metaphysical content. The metaphysical idea that nature is purposive distinguishes Greek thought from those of the Renaissance period which are based on different metaphysical presuppositions. It is true that metaphysical ideas acting as absolute presuppositions of a scientific theory are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the truth of the theory. Yet, they influence the scientists in conceiving the problems and developing theories in a definite manner. The radical change in scientific theories during sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was made possible by turning down the metaphysical presuppositions of the Greek cosmology, viz. the teleological view of the universe, and this was replaced by the mechanical view of the same.

The mechanical view of nature which characterizes the Newtonian paradigm is reflected in the thoughts of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo and Newton. While developing the mechanical view of nature, these scientists have profoundly been influenced, through Descartes, by the atomism of Democritus which insists that only atoms and the bodies having determinate atomic structure are real.

Again there is a feed-back relation between theories and their metaphysical presuppositions. A theory may collide with another theory, and in that case we have to suppose that some areas of a set of presuppositions or a set as a whole of a theory are not in agreement with its counterpart in another theory as it happens in the case of Euclidean and Riemannian systems. The two systems differ as they are based on two different sets of presuppositions.

In deductive systems two sets based on different presuppositions may exist simultaneously, but this does not usually happen in the case of empirical systems. If a metaphysical idea of a theory collides with its counterpart in another theory, then either of the presuppositions or of the theories requires change or modification. This explains why Gallileo, in spite of his acquaintance with the works of Kepler, rejected the already established idea of lunar influence upon the tides, and maintained dogmatically that tides were due to accelerations resulting from the complex movement of the earth. The reason for his rejection seems to be that he was an opponent of astrology which identified planets with Gods.

Sometimes the conflict of metaphysical ideas may lead to the replacement of an accepted scientific theory by another. This is due to the modification of subsidiary metaphysical assumptions or the inclusion of some new metaphysical components within the new theory. It happens in the case of Kepler's theory which was viewed as the best theory at a certain phase of scientific development, but was subsequently replaced by Newton's.

It goes without saying that a departure in any field of human enquiries tends to be accompanied by an outbreak of some kind of new metaphysical ideas. Sudden switch-over to some metaphysical presuppositions may result in change in scientific presuppositions which in turn may lead to the development of a new paradigm. In the twentieth century, Newtonian paradigm has been overthrown by the Einstenian one, resulting in the breakdown of the atomic philosophy on which Newtonian Mechanics is supposed to be based. The new paradigm draws our attention to some form of 'idealism' which tends to present a coherent picture of the world. The physical world is conceived as a single continuous whole of interconnected parts, a dynamic totality of flux of energetic activity. We may add here the names of Aristotle, Leibnitz and Bergson, all of whom, in some form or other, support the idea of a developmental process which is in agreement with the spirit of the contemporary science. Thus, it may be concluded that new experience and metaphysical pressure may lead to the change of sceintific knowledge and consequently to the scientific paradigm.

The role of metaphysical ideas in the advancement of science and the development of a new paradigm has often been ignored by a section of the pro-empiricist philosophers. This is not without reason. A metaphysical presupposition is a socio-cultural product. A society based on a particular culture might produce or welcome a particular ideology stimulated by the economic and political ideas and ideals current in that society. The ideology, through the established authority, might even support *degenerating programme*, scientific or social, and resist the intrusion of a better one, and, in consequence the former achieves a socio-psychological victory over the latter. In the Soviet Union, the Lysenko affair is a case in point. The country gives whole-hearted support to the scientific research effort like Lysenko's which tends to find scientific evidence for the Marxist philosophy of man; naturally, it pays little attention to the evolutionary biology of Darwin and Mendel, since their theories contradict the Marxist view that man's very nature can be changed by his environment.

I cannot tell that this is the reason why Neurath looks askance towards metaphysical presuppositions; nevertheless he concedes that metaphysical ideas may act as stimulus like some narcotic. He has defended the view that scientific laws and theories are translatable directly or indirectly into empirical language. True that many important scientific concepts like 'soluble' cannot be translated directly into empirical language but, it is argued, they can be made intelligible by giving conditional definitions. In the case of 'soluble' the conditional definition might be 'If X is immersed in liquid and if it dissolves, then X is soluble'. Carnap has put forward an operational definition of scientific terms. Such definition indicates, in the case of non-quantitative concept, a definite testing operation by which the meaning of that term may be specified. The term 'acid', for example, may be operationally defined as follows: the term 'acid' applies to a given liquid, if a litmus paper immersed

in it turns red. In the case of quantitative concepts such as 'length', 'velocity', and the like, such definition assumes the form of rules of measurement. He even claims that the concept which admits of no operational definition leads to meaningless statements and questions as it happens in the case of metaphysics. Ramsey also fails to assess the proper role of metaphysical ideas in the advancement of science. Like Carnap he has made an attempt to eliminate the metaphysical content from scientific theories replacing the former by an empirical equivalent. The concept of 'force', for example, in Newtonian physics may be replaced by empirical content like 'mass-times acceleration'. Such reduction is made possible by treating the two as equivalent on the ground that both belong to a system in which all the primitive terms are taken to be empirical, 'protocols', in his words.

It is difficult to imagine how all the non-empirical contents of a scientific theory can be replaced by the empirical ones. Carnap's *operational* definition ascribes only partial meaning to non-empirical concepts, since they are left undefined for cases in which the operation is not performed. Secondly, the operational definition of the concept of force in terms of mass-times acceleration seems to be circular. For mass-times acceleration, i.e. the measurement of force, is introduced by the second law which states that the rate of change of momentum is in proportion to the impressed force, and this change takes place in the direction in which the force acts; and the concept of force is introduced by the first law, the principle of inertia, which states that every event has an antecedent from which it follows in accordance with a rule, Thirdly, there are many important scientific concepts which cannot be introduced either by explicit or by operational definition. Among these are theoretical terms like 'psi-function' in quantum mechanics, which are introduced by the axioms of the system representing somehow the motion of the electron in atom. Even Einstein admits the necessity of introducing *artificial* substances like electric and magnetic fields for the understanding of the phenomena of nature which, it may be presumed, cannot be replaced by empirical equivalent for the obvious reason that these are primary concepts and, therefore, cannot be reduced to simpler ones. However, Carnap, as understood by Losee, admits the narrowness of his proposed criterion. Ramsey's programme of replacing non-empirical contents by empirical ones, on similar ground, seems defective. Besides, such procedure even obscures the theoretical aspects of scientific concepts. It is rather impossible to specify operational criteria for each and every scientific concept.

The difference between empirical contents and metaphysical ideas, i.e. non-empirical contents, will be evident, if we consider how a scientific theory is constructed.

A scientific theory consists of certain elements standing in certain relations. In solar system these elements are sun, moon, earth and other planets which stand in a determinate relation. This relation can be expressed in a set of

related propositions like 'Earth moves round the Sun' and so on. It has commonly been supposed that such system is capable of demonstrating complex empirical propositions from simple axioms with the help of certain empirical laws. These axioms are supposed to be true without being proved, and, therefore, their validity or invalidity remains unquestioned within the system over a time. These axioms may be described as presuppositions or metaphysical content of a scientific theory. Any principle may be regarded as metaphysical content of a theory T, if it is a consequence of T, that is, neither a consequence of T_1 nor empirically testable. The first requirement suggests that the said metaphysical idea can only be implied by the theory T with which it is supposed to stand in a feed-back relation; this enables us to reason back from T to that idea. The second idea suggests that the said idea which is presupposed by T does nevertheless belong to the body of T, and, therefore, being *a priori* in this sense, it is not empirically testable. If it were, there would be no distinction between metaphysical idea and other empirical consequences of the theory T including empirically testable laws. These ideas are metaphysical in the sense that they are not falsifiable in the way an empirical statement of a scientific theory is falsified, i.e. by test-statements. This is because the underlying conceptual frame-work of metaphysical and empirical contents of a theory is utterly different. Had it not been so, there would be no difference between metaphysical and empirical contents of a scientific theory or between theories themselves; and in consequence the two theories will converge or they will be treated as equivalent. It may be the case that two theories are logically equivalent as they possess similar formal structure and yield similar empirical law-statements, though they have conflicting metaphysical contents. Or it might happen that there are two theories having overlapping area which may be made meaningful by both the sets of presuppositions, but that does not imply, due to the conflicting sets of presuppositions, that one is a substitute of the other. This may be represented in the following diagram:



Let T represent Newtonian theory and T_1 Einstenian; x and z represent independent areas of the respective theories and y the overlapping area of the two. Y suggests that no theory can be propounded with the complete break with the past. And z suggests that it is the only new aspect of T_1, which is expected to explain, as much as possible, new phenomena by proposing new theories and laws and by minimizing the trivialities, i.e. y, which seems to be intellectually uninteresting; y is not what the scientists are after. For no scientist propounds a theory to support another. Certainly, in that case, his theory will loose its efficacy; it gains significant weight only when it brings considerable change to the previous one incorporating radically new metaphysical ideas which give the theory power of additional predictions. The history of science offers ample evidence of changing worldviews caused by the changing metaphysical postulates. It is evident that, whenever there is a considerable advance beyond an existing scientific theory, there is always a break with the old metaphysical ideas incorporating new ones having rich informative content which enables the theory to claim that it is the most satisfactory account of the phenomenal world at a given period. It is told that both Leibniz and Huygens were about to reject Newtonian physics, because its ontology was incompatible with the accepted metaphysics of the day.

Some neo-empiricists, though they regard metaphysics as unscientific, do not ignore the influence of metaphysics on the advancement of science. The advancement of science shows that its problems are reformulated and even replaced over the time, and this is not always due to the falsity of the theory but due to the changing metaphysical presuppositions. Popper realizes that the main external stimulus of scientific theories comes from 'unscientific theories', i.e. theories which are metaphysical in character. Lakatos calls it the 'hard core' of a research programme which, from a methodological point of view, may be treated as metaphysical, and, therefore, within the programme it is not exposed to criticism or subjected to empirical refutation. Watkins describes this 'hard core' as 'external influential metaphysics'. It lies explicitly in the back of the mind of the scientist, and controls or influences his thought and scientific activities.

Collingwood describes these metaphysical ideas as absolute presuppositions of the scientific theory. He anticipated Kuhn's theory. Lakatos' *research programme* or Kuhn's *normal science* is based on the absolute presuppositions of the day. They are, in Lakatos' words, basic value judgements of a community of scientific elite. It has often been stressed how this external source has influenced Kepler, Galileo and Newton in developing their scientific theories. The sun-centred system of Copernicus appeals to Kepler on theological ground. Newton also suggests that Absolute Space is an 'immanent effect' of the creator. He maintains on theological ground that, since the universe is created *ex nihilo*, there must exist a container within which created matter is distributed. To quote Kuhn: 'On Newton's view Absolute Space and

Absolute Time are ontologically prior to individual substances and their interaction.[11]

Popper has also discovered an implicit connection between Heinsberg's principle of indeterminancy and the metaphysical view of thing-in-itself, the unknowable reality. This idea can also be stressed in Bohr who prefers to restrict physical studies to appearances and their interrelations.[12] This is presumably the reason why Popper himself has renunciated the idea of complete verification or falsification of a scientific theory. Thus, metaphysical ideas are proved to be influential as they lead to a *critical* examination and revision of an accepted paradigm. Apart from metaphysical and religious ideas, other subcultures of the concerned society may act as the external source of the change of paradigm. Each scientist, due to his cultural affiliation, thinks within the context of a definite historico-cultural situation and conceives his problem accordingly. There are ample evidences which point in that direction.

Side by side with the metaphysical presuppositions the methodology of scientific theory often poses problems which necessitate modification or replacement of a theory. The methodology defines problems, helps detecting anomalies, frames auxiliary hypotheses to protect the theory from its potential falsifiers. When a methodology fails to serve this purpose adjustment is needed, but when it poses a major problem better technique and methodologies are to be invented. In the section to follow the merits of alternative methodologies are assessed. These methodologies may be viewed as internal source of causing change of paradigm.

The Internal Source

The internal source of the change of paradigm may be traced in the activities of the members of a particular scientific community at a given period. Kuhn and Popper, though differ on many a point, have shown with sufficient clarity how the activities of the scientists have played an important role in changing scientific paradigm.

No scientist, Kuhn observes, is able to see the whole mystery of the universe, and, in so far as he tries to conceive it, he does it from a particular historical perspective. Therefore, the paradigm a scientist designs aims at solving a few problems with which he is confronted and not all the problems. Naturally, these unsolved problems may turn into counter-instances, and thus become a source of 'crisis' causing change in scientific theory. The crisis is then a prerequisite to the emergence of a scientific theory. This does not mean that the scientist should take note of each and every crisis; if he takes note of it, he tries to solve it first by correcting or replacing some laws or theories, Ptolemaic by Copernican, for example, within the existing Newtonian paradigm.

Ptolemy's theory of epicycles, with respect to heavenly bodies, often fails

to cope with many astronomical researches and in particular with those 'wandering stars' which were found to be moving sometimes towards the east, sometimes towards the west and at times to be stationary, and this contradicts the Ptolemaic theory which assumed all celestial motions to be real and circular. Consequently, they turn into counter-evidence creating tremendous pressure or posing crisis too severe to withstand by the Ptolemaic theory and, as a result, it collapses. This ultimately causes new theory to emerge, viz. the Copernican set, closely on the basis of anomalies between theory and observations, between expectation and unexpected new findings detected in Ptolemaic set. It explains the apparent irregular motions of those planets by assuming that the planets like the earth are moving round the sun, each in separate eccentric circle, called the orbit, because of the variable distance of the planets from the sun.

The Copernican set, though unchallenged for the time being, may perhaps be false, as it is liable to further test and criticism. And the process repeats itself. But there certain unsolved problems or anomalies, so far accumulated, may pose grave crisis to the theory or theories. The crisis may further be deepened by some new findings posing problems to the scientists. This situation may further be aggravated by technological advance or by social and economic changes at the given period. All these accumulated problems ultimately lead to grave crisis generating a sense of distrust among the scientists engaged in this field regarding the adequacy of the existing paradigm which has ceased to function properly in solving those accumulated problems; so it is dropped, and this causes ultimately new paradigm to emerge as it happens during a revolutionary period. Consider the crisis that prepares the way for the emergence of the Einstenian paradigm. One root of this crisis perhaps may be traced in Leibniz's criticism of Newtonian concept of absolute space or Reemannian concept of space having infinite dimensions. This creates further crisis for Newtonian paradigm. For Newtonian paradigm presupposes, following Euclidean geometry, space having three dimensions, and, therefore, a 'world event' in this paradigm, is determined by three co-ordinates assuming earth to be fixed. This may be represented in the following diagram:



N is the foot of the perpendicular drawn from E over xz plane. Therefore, the co-ordinates of N will be (xz). NB is the perpendicular on ox, NA is the perpendicular on oz axis: Therefore, $OA = z$ and $OB = x$.

As the time of occurrence is also involved in the determination of a 'world event', it is assumed that not three but four co-ordinates are necessary to determine such event. The three co-ordinates are related to space and fourth to time. It is against this background that Einstein's theory of relativity emerged in 1905.

Collingwood's account of the way in which one set of absolute presuppositions of metaphysics or science of a given period gets replaced by a new one at different ages resembles Kuhn's account of the way in which one paradigm gets replaced by another. The absolute presuppositions change due to 'strains' or inconsistence of the present system detected in the light of fresh knowledge gained.

Besides Kuhn and Collingwood, it is Popper who has offered reasons for the change of paradigm. A theory is proposed and accepted on the basis of solution of some of the problems which the scientist feels to be acute. This proposed theory is again put to trial. If it survives test or criticism, it is accepted and accepted as long as it explains problems. For it is noticed that no theory is a permanent solution to all problems; naturally, in the light of fresh experience and the discovery of new discrepant facts, this conjectured theory is subjected to modification and ultimately liable to breakdown under tremendous pressure arising out of acuteness and complexity of problems, i.e. when all the attempts of the theory to solve problems fail. And a new theory emerges.

Thus, all of them consider 'strains' or 'anomaly' leading to 'crisis' or 'falsity detection' as the cause of the revolution leading to the change of paradigm. Collingwood remarks that a set of absolute presuppositions undergoes change when certain strains become too severe. This resembles Kuhn's remark that revolution takes place when accumulated 'puzzles' create tremendous pressure on the existing paradigm; when, as Popper thinks, all problem-solving activities within the existing paradigm get exhausted.

5. Parallel between Revolution in Science and Politics

In much the same way a political revolution is accompanied by a growing sense of frustration—the frustration that the existing institution has ceased adequately to meet the problems, either material or mental, that have been partly created or initiated either directly or indirectly by the institution itself and partly by the social situation that emerges out of technological advance or by the changing economic and intellectual conditions of the given community. All these conditions, though playing decisive part towards achieving a desired result, do not receive equal weightage because of the different social

and economic problems faced by a particular country. For example, in states like China and Russia, mainly economic conditions were responsible for the outbreak of revolution, whereas in the West in similar or, at any rate, comparable circumstances emphasis was laid on political and socio-cultural spheres. A deeper reason for this revolution perhaps lies in the absolute presupposition which influenced the social structures of these countries.

It is Marxism which prepared the way for revolution in communist countries, but in the West, where revolution took place, it was expedited by liberal philosophy based on the ideals of freedom and equality in every sphere of life. In all these cases, in spite of their different roots, there were problems leading to the total failure to promote material and mental well-being, and the people confronting this crisis began to give up faith in the existing paradigm or set-up. Revolution took place and a new set-up emerged as a substitute which, it was hoped, would meet boldly and rather unexpectedly all the problems that baffled the old system.

At the point of political crisis the society is divided into competitive groups, one seeking to defend the old institution and the other seeking to install new one. Polarization starts playing its role, and the authority introduces certain minor changes in the infrastructure in a hectic bid to solve certain local problems in order to pacify citizens. In the course of time polarization becomes complete, and all political recourse to befool or pacify the people fails. This results in a total change in the existing set-up.

Revolution in science exhibits the same manifestation. Herein also some problems have given rise to acute crisis leading to the emergence of an alternative candidate for paradigm and the consequential recognition given to it by a section of scientific community. Sometimes this emergent paradigm may remain in embryo before the crisis has become developed. Newtonian paradigm, for example, has been criticized by the scientists having Einstenian paradigm at the back of their mind. In politics too, when people rise in revolt they have an idea of a better set-up which inspires them to overthrow the existing system.

Thus, in both the cases change is historical, that is, it is not abrupt, but is effected by a gradual process. The main difference is that the social sphere change is not so logical or rigid as it is evident in the case of science. The relation between infrastructure and superstructure within a social situation is less rigid and less rational, and, therefore, change in infrastructure may cause gradual change in the superstructure, whereas in the case of scientific paradigm the relation between infrastructure and superstructure, i.e. between theories and paradigm, is more rigid and consistent and, therefore, any change in the paradigm may necessitate the arrangement of the theories in a new way.

Tracing thoughts of others is a thankless job; nevertheless it is interesting to note what like-minded persons say on a particular question and how they differ from one another. We would like to dwell on this point by critically assessing the views of Popper, Kuhn and Collingwood. These three philo-

sophers have agreed to this point that change of paradigm implies a process somewhat revolutionary which follows periods of extraordinary research. To quote Kuhn: 'We are both concerned with the dynamic process by which scientific knowledge is acquired...both emphasise instead the revolutionary process by which an older theory is rejected and replaced by an incompatible new one'.[13]

The process is revolutionary as it is a conscious effort on the part of the scientists engaged in this field to overthrow the existing paradigm or set-up on the ground of its failure to solve new problems that have emerged. The new paradigm emerges with enriched concepts and vocabularies, improved technique and methodology hitherto not envisaged. Einstenian paradigm represents global characteristics which are markedly different from those of the Newtonian paradigm, for the scientists working under it feel as if they are working in a different world. This does not mean what Wisdom has suggested that Kuhn gives the impression 'that scientists who develop a new theory cannot be on speaking terms with the scientists of the...[old] Theory'.[14] Similar observation has been put forward by Watkins who thinks that Kuhn's new paradigm cannot have any real history. Kuhn himself favours to regard it a 'Gestalt-Switch'. This is how Watkins sums up his view: 'Kuhn has to maintain the unmanageable thesis that the switch to the new paradigm must be regarded as the very same thing as the invention of the new paradigm'.[15]

He supports his view by extracting some lines from Kuhn's book: 'The new paradigm...emerges all at once, sometimes in the middle of the night, in the mind of a man deeply emmersed in crisis'.[16] Similarly, Novakovic is of opinion that the change that takes place in science or in society is not so profound as Kuhn thinks it to be. In the new paradigm many problems can be found that resembles the old one.

It is doubtful how far these criticisms are tenable. True that Kuhn uses the term like 'Gestalt-Switch' or 'sudden character', but these terms do not suggest that revolution is abrupt or it has no continuity with the past. Here 'sudden character' stands for the unexpectedness of theory. The new theory is unexpected in the sense that it is 'incompatible' or 'incommensurable' with the old one. On this point Kuhn's view is in agreement with that of Popper who suggests that revolution causing change in paradigm does not mean abrupt change, not a sudden switch-over from an old to a new theory, though there must be considerable difference between the old and the new; the new theory is developed on the basis of the failure of the old theory.

However, this similarity of views does not in all cases obliterate or minimize their difference. In fact, this is the observation of Popper himself. Popper tends to retain his uniqueness by raising doubt as to the effectiveness of Kuhnian approach which implies that revolution normally follows from change, for he suggests that transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new paradigm from which a new tradition of 'normal science' emerges is a matter of normal process. But the point is that starting from 'normal science' and

detecting its anomalies will not lead to revolution unless the scientists deliberately strike out at the very root of the 'normal science' and the scientific activities that follow therefrom by framing 'bold and sincere hypotheses' which might invite the theory for further test. Such a change will only lead to evolution, as it happens in the normal period of science or of society.

Sometimes Kuhn also speaks of revolution. He says that 'successive transition from one paradigm to another via revolution is the usual developmental pattern of natural science'.[17] But the process he prescribes and the nature of such process he describes are very much like evolution. This is evident from the following passage: 'A revolution for me [is] a special sort of change involving a certain sort of reconstruction of group commitments. But it need not be a large change nor need it seem revolutionary to those outside a single community'.[18]

But in another passage Kuhn suggests that crisis leads to revolution, the consequence of which is a total change. He read: 'The transition from a paradigm in crisis to the new paradigm is of sudden character....It happens in the form of conversion, so that it has to be sudden and all at once, like the Gestalt-Switch'.[19] This is Kuhn's view about the sudden or unpredictable character of the change of paradigm. Thus, the difference between Kuhn and Popper, at least on this point, seems to be negligible, for none thinks of revolution as normal process, whatever their official views might be.

6. Problem in Kuhnian Approach

Sometimes it might happen that a problem, scientific or social, being public, may be solved by different explanatory theories or paradigms. This fact poses a problem to be monophasic character of the Kuhnian model which forbids simultaneous development of theories or paradigms of equal importance. The 'normal science' developed on the basis of observation is usually supposed to answer all questions raised at a given period.

Alternative theories of equal importance can be found both in the social and scientific spheres. In physics, both models, 'corpuscular' and 'wave', explaining the phenomena of light seems to have come to stay. Both these models have a long struggle for supremacy. The experimental fact which confirms corpuscular model is the propagation of light through vacuum. It is thought that any wave phenomenon requires a material medium for the propagation of wave. Although corpuscular model explains the propagation of light through free space and predicts the correct forms of laws of reflection and refractions, it fails to explain the phenomena of interference, diffraction, etc. Further, the 'Newton's ring' once explained by the corpuscular model is later on proved to be unsatisfactory by Boyle and Hooke who discovered it to be a beautiful manifestation of the wave-nature of light rays which was

proposed for the first time by Huyghens and developed further by Fresnel and Young in the nineteenth century. The advantage of wave model in explaining light rays becomes more and more apparent. Fresnel said that action of radiation can be best pictured as ocean of wave running up on the beach.[20] The intensity of the wave will increase more and more, the greater its amplitude. This is presumably the reason followed by Einstein when he explained photo-electric effect originally proposed by Hertz in 1887. Hertz discovered that a metal surface irradiated by a light beam would emit electrons if the frequency of radiation were beyond certain limit. The wave nature of light has been proved so reliably that any further experiment in this matter seemed unnecessary.

Yet, in the beginning of the twentieth century, it has been discovered that light sometimes behaves like a particle, and in many respects it behaves like a wave. Heisenberg, following Bohr, was sure that electron was a particle; Schrodinger, on the other hand, believed in the wave character of electron. In the times of Planck and Einstein it is believed that these two properties of light do not exclude each other, for no experimental test can strictly refute one of the two rival hypotheses and, therefore, duality remains.[21] Thus, it has been shown that when light travels through space it is distinctly wave-like, and that when it interacts matter-in-energy-exchange process it assumes corpuscular character. In geometry the 'same' concept of space helps developing alternative geometrical systems. In politics one sees that within one and same state some province may remain loyal to Marxism and some to the Western-type democracy. History allows simultaneous rational reconstructions of past historical facts. Collingwood has shown this possibility in *The Idea of History*. Often it might happen that two alternative explanations, independent of each other, can explain a particular fact of history. This can be shown in the following diagram:



Let C be some fact which may be explained equally by two independent theories, E_1 and E_2. This may be made clear by a concrete example, the fall of the Congress Government of India in 1977. This fact may be explained by reconstructing alternative explanatory situations:

E_1a. The majority of the people of India disliked the policy adopted by the then government.

b. For the policy adopted could not redress the sorrows and sufferings of the masses; on the contrary, it increased social imbalance.

c. To suppress criticism, leaders of the opposition parties were thrown into jail and the freedom of the press was taken away.

d. The people feared that the rulers might turn despots, if they were returned to power, and, therefore, they had cast their votes against the ruling Congress Party.

E_2a. or, it may be said that the conspiracy of a big power is the cause of the downfall of the Congress.

b. The big powers conspire when their economic interest is adversely affected.

c. The conspirators through their agents tried to control the economic policy of the then government, but the government firmly opposed it.

d. The big powers had taken a serious note of it. They had successfully infiltrated into the government and the administrative machinery like C.B.I. and R.A.W. This enabled them to bring about the downfall of the Congress Government.

Whether any such affair actually happened is, of course, another question. But both the explanations, E_1 and E_2, offer good reasons for the downfall of the Congress and in this sense both are historically 'true'. Historical truth, unlike its logical counterpart, does not mean really provable, but what is highly plausible, accords with known facts and becomes acceptable. An explanation is acceptable, if it is reasonable, i.e. compatible with the evidence at our disposal. The reason is: historical facts, because of their pastness and complexity, cannot be known in their strict uniqueness. Therefore, no explanation can be claimed to be exhaustive or absolutely true.

Sometimes it may happen that some new evidence discovered or new information gathered may necessitate addition and alternation to the propositions describing the situation. Besides, the historian's choice of the relevant factors supposed to be involved in explanatory situation partly depends on the historian's interest, biases and prejudices, his way of thinking and sense of value. On account of these subjective factors no historian can reconstruct the situation as others do. This does not imply that reconstruction of the past is an arbitrary affair. Rather, it may be maintained, with certain reservations, that objectivity in this field is attainable. Historians are rational beings; in their account of the past they always try to transcend their own subjectivity and to give objective account as far as possible. Moreover, there is something in the nature of the fact which demands uniform interpretation,

though we admit that complete objectivity or uniformity can hardly be achieved in this field. This allows simultaneous development of incompatible but reasonable, and in this sense historically true, explanatory theories. On this point Collingwood comes close to Popper who offers almost similar reasons for the proliferation of scientific theories. All these facts pose a problem to Kuhn's thesis that major fields of scientific enquiry must be dominated by a single supreme paradigm.

Kuhn might overcome this problem if he says that there may be rival theories, Kepler's and Galileo's, for example, within the Newtonian paradigm, but there must not be rival *supreme* paradigms, Newtonian and Einstenian, for example, simultaneously present within the same period and equally influencing the research programmes. Only our supreme paradigm over the period will stimulate scientific activities, until it is replaced, through evolution or revolution, by a new one. This is not to ignore the overlapping areas in the transitory period that may be explained by both paradigms.

It seems that Popper does not care to maintain the difference between evolution and revolution through which scientific knowledge proceeds, and, therefore, when he speaks of science he has only the extraordinary science in mind in which major revolutions may break out. To quote him: '...growth occurs...by revolutionary overthrow of an accepted theory and its replacement by a better one'.[22] Consequently, he has characterized the entire scientific activity, including the everyday research, in terms of process that apply only to its occasional revolutionary periods. But the development of knowledge is likely to be misunderstood, if it is viewed *exclusively* from the point of revolution it occasionally produces. In everyday enterprise certain types of mistake or failure may be detected, and usually they may be corrected without replacing the entire system or the paradigm.

This point has been highlighted by Stanisa Novakovic, a critic of Popper. She argues that, although Popper speaks of scientific revolution, he suggests no way of distinguishing global scientific revolution from minor change of scientific theories. This fact creates confusion among philosophers interested in Popper. Both Watkins and Lakatos are under the impression that Popper seems to claim that the new theory emerges through revolution in permanence. However, Novakovic is sympathetic to Popper. She says that, although Popper speaks of scientific discovery as revolution in permanence, he does not mean thereby that there is no distinction in science between the period of stagnation and progressive period which may be characterized as revolutionary and on which Popper has laid much emphasis. But he never says that all periods are permanently revolutionary in the sense in which Newtonian or Einstenian revolution is spoken of. Popper is not prepared to be known as methodologically a Trotskyte.

On this point Kuhn's view is explicit; he is concerned with the 'macro-revolution', but he is insistent on the possibility of extending the concept of revolution to the so-called 'micro-revolution'. And, secondly, revolution,

either micro or macro, does not in all cases imply total or abrupt change, rather it often maintains its continuity with the past. Had it been so, there would have been a communication gap, both in conceptual level and in practical level, between the past and the present. Hence, normally, a paradigm allows simultaneous growth of rival or incompatible theories under its umbrella; but it does not allow the workings of other parallel paradigm. In fact, the very concept of 'parallel paradigms' is alien to Kuhn's frame of thought. Only under special circumstances, particularly in transitory period, coexistence of two paradigms can be noticed. Kuhn is fully aware of this possibility, though he thinks of such circumstances as rare. To quote him: 'Relativistic dynamics cannot have shown Newtonian dynamics to be wrong, for Newtonian Dynamics is still used with great success by most engineers and, in selected applications, by many physicists'.[23]

Often in the case of rival explanatory theories we have to make our choice. This fact might disturb both Kuhn and Collingwood, for their theories apparently do not suggest any guideline. According to Collingwood, explanatory theories, rationally reconstructed about historical facts, seem to be acceptable, for each has been developed from a particular socio-historical point of view, and in this sense each is partially true, offering good grounds for the acceptance of the explicandum. Collingwood thus suggests that proliferation of scientific explanations are essential to the understanding of the growth of science. Often different explanations converge or supplement, rather than contradict, one another; consequently, they become parts of a single explanation. It follows from Kuhn's thesis that in physics rival explanatory theories may be acceptable. Herein also, like history, we can at best say, following Einstein, that the choice of a theory becomes 'more a matter of taste than of scientific conviction'.

7. Quest for a Good Theory

Since the concept of absolute truth is given up in explaining facts of human life or of natural events, the question 'what is a good theory?' is an important one. We have to make our choice, specially in natural sciences, for a good theory among the competing ones. By good theory in science is meant the 'best tested theory'. The question is, therefore, how a theory is to be tested. A theory may be tested either by the method of justification, by supporting evidence or by the method of falsification, by rigorously testing evidence. These two methods differ from each other in so far as the former lays stress on positive instances, the latter on the negative instances, on the basis of which they hope to guarantee the reliability of their theories.

Both these methods have their good advocates. Those who defend the former are pro-inductivists and those who stick to the latter are anti-inductivists, and in this sense pro-deductivists. Copernicus tries to support his theory by explaining those facts which Ptolemey's system fails to cope with. Galileo also supports his theory by supporting evidence even ignoring counter-instances of his theory of tides. He believes that the tides are due to the periodic reinforcement and opposition of two motions of earth—its annual revolution around the sun and its diurnal rotation on its axis. His hypothesis is that, for a given coast, these two motions of the earth accelerate each other at mid-night and oppose each other at noon. As a result, the water of the coast is left behind at mid-night, and it is accumulated along the coast at noon. The consequences of this hypothesis that there should be just one high tide at a given coast at noon fail to square with the fact that there are two tidal bulges per day at a given coast. Moreover, the times at which they occur vary from day to day. But Galileo attaches no importance to these negative instances and dogmatically assumes that there are due to some unimportant factors, such as irregular depth of the sea and shape of the coastal line. Newton also reaffirms this inductive method as followed by Galileo claiming that physics be restricted to inductive generalization reached through experience, even though his theory is not restricted solely within this method. His method of analysis lays stress on generalization from the results of observation of experiment. The axiomatic method, by contrast, places greater stress on creative imagination for the discovery of laws. Up to this point he comes close to Aristotle who suggests that induction of general principles exemplified in experience involves a matter of direct intuition or insight which should be taken as the basis of generalization from experience.

Those who belong to the other tradition—Kuhn and Popper, for example—are anti-inductivists in temper. They have denied any role of induction in scientific reasoning on the ground that there is no rule for deducing correct theory from facts experienced. Instead, they have viewed theories as 'imaginative posits'. Popper regards them as the product of guessing. To quote him: 'Scientific theories are not the agent of observation, but they are invention-conjectures boldly put forward for trial, to be eliminated if they clashed with observations'.[24] Similarly, Kuhn describes the process of revolution by which a new paradigm emerges as 'non-cumulative developmental episodes in which older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one'.[25] The term 'non-cumulative' suggests that the process is non-enumerative or non-aggregative.

This urges them to hold that the justification of paradigm, theory or law, whatever the case might be, by counting heap of positive instances is not a proper scientific approach, for this process involves infinite regress. Any theory or law or statement which is put forward as justifying another will have to be justified in its turn and so on *ad infinitum*. Hence a sceintific theory cannot be shown applying successfully to all its possible instances, but it can be shown to be unsuccessful in particular cases. Popper gives this method the name *falsification* coined from logic where it stands as antinomy of proof; it determines under what conditions a theory is to be regarded as falsified.

The method of falsification suggests a criterion of testing theories. We

attempt at first to guess a solution to our problem: this conjectured solution is deliberately put to test. We find crucial falsifying instances in which it is liable to break down. If it breaks down, we guess another and put it to test again. And eventually we reject all except the one which survives test or criticism. But this conjectured theory which comes successfully out of the test is falsifiable in a similar way as no theory is expected to solve all problems, but only a part of it. Yet, it can be regarded as best theory for sometime, i.e. as long as it is not refuted. To quote Popper: 'A reasoned hypothesis based on careful consideration of evidence which has been tested critically and systematically might be considered to have a claim to be called scientific'.[26]

Thus, putting theories to serve test this method of falsification singles out the good theory by eliminating all its competitors. Here the approach is negative, a Cartesian systematic doubt, so to say, though it is not claimed *a la* Descartes that truth thus achieved by this method is indubitable, for it is impossible to achieve conclusive disproof of any theory. Popper's claim is rather humble, that the theory established by this method, though not absolutely true, is a better approximation to truth, because it stands to test or criticism. Similarly, Ayer observes that finding a counter-example proves the statement false, but failing to find one does not prove it true; it might break down, for we can never be sure that we have considered all possible anti-instances. Nevertheless, it is a sufficient and necessary condition for the selection of a good theory.

The role of falsification in detecting good theory is not equally appreciated by all. Lakatos argues that 'falsification' in the Popperian sense does not imply rejection, for Popper himself has admitted that it is impossible to achieve conclusive disproof of any theory. Further, a theory is rejected on the basis of crucial experiment, i.e. by showing its inconsistency with an accepted basic statement, a statement which needs no justification. But to Lakatos no accepted basic statement is sufficient to reject a theory. 'Such a clash may present problem; major or minor, but in no circumstances a victory'.[27] One may expect that new basic statements unexpected before might emerge, and that they might lead to the revision of the old one. He insists that a theory can be eliminated by a better one which is 'excess empirical content' over the old, and for this the old theory may not have to be rejected or falsified.

Lakatos' criticism of Popper does not seem to be very basic, for his view may be reconciled with that of Popper. In the case of rival theories explaining a problem, Popper suggests, we may reject all theories by considering their weak point except the one which has a favourable strong point, or we may refute all these theories and come out with such a new one in which the best elements of the rejected ones are preserved. Here the words, 'favourable strong points' by virtue of which a theory is being accepted and others rejected, resemble 'excess content' which Lakatos has taken as a criterion of the acceptance of a theory.

The condition for the acceptability of a theory as laid down by Popper

is not appreciated by Duhem, though he admits, to some extent, Popper's thesis that a scientific theory cannot be proved to be true, but can be shown to be false, of course, not by falsifying some of its auxiliary or background hypotheses, a method prescribed and strictly observed by Popper, but by falsifying the theory as a whole, i.e. globally.

However, we are not as sceptical as Duhem in regarding the efficacy of Popper's method of falsification, for it is possible, at least in a few cases, that refutation of hypotheses leads to the refutation of a theory. But Duhem has made an important contribution in this field claiming that no scientific theory can be refuted by falsifying some of its isolated auxiliary hypotheses, and, therefore, our views that there are overlapping areas between two scientific paradigms or two historical explanations are quite justified. And on this point neither Popper nor Kuhn nor Collingwood has any prejudice. Popper has also adopted this methodological decision that by force of verified consequence no theory can be established as true in an absolute sense, though it is of significance for the selection of good theory.

The role attributed to falsification by Popper is much like the role assigned to 'anomalous experience' by Kuhn, since both prepare the way for a new theory. Nevertheless, Kuhn claims that 'anomalous experience' should not be indentified with the falsifying one. He is very critical of Popper on this point. He argues that the study of development of scientific theories does not disclose any process that might resemble 'the methodological stereo-type of falsification by direct comparison with nature'. Many theories, Ptolemaic theory, for example, were replaced before they had in fact been tested. Copernicus felt that the difficulties the model faced might lie in Ptolemaic approach itself rather than in the particular version of Ptolemaic theory so far developed. So he thought, normal adjustment of the model would set the situation aright.

This does not imply that Kuhn has underestimated the utility of the method of falsification. Rather he admits it as part and parcel of scientific activities. He only suggests that scientists do not try, at each step, to falsify their theories; instead they normally accept those theories already provided by the paradigm.

The method of falsification, if accepted for controversy, will lead to a quandary, because no theory can solve all problems at a given time, nor are the solutions so far achieved often perfect. This is also evident from Popper's contention that 'no theory can be shown to be absolutely true'.

Thus, if failure to survive test is accepted as the ground for theory rejection, all theories should be rejected on the ground of their incompleteness. If, on the other hand, serious failure to fit in be admitted as the ground for the rejection of theory, a criterion of the degree of falsification is to be admitted. In either case, the method of falsification will lead to an undesirable consequence. It seems that Popper has not attached due importance to the dilemma in which his theory is involved. He rules out conclusive disproof of

theories, but has provided no substitute for it. To this point Kuhn's stand is univocal. He has accepted both the criteria, viz. falsification and puzzle-solving, though he admits no fundamental difference between the two. He says that severity of test criteria is simply 'one side of coin' whose other face is puzzle-solving tradition. But, of these two criteria, the latter, Kuhn claims, is more fundamental and efficacious, for on some occasions it is found that test is not a prerequisite to the revolution in science, but this does not apply to the case of 'puzzle', which is competent enough to go in for the replacement of a theory.

It may be suggested, in this connection, that method of falsification and problem-solving are complementary to each other in the search of a better theory. That is, the acceptability of a theory is determined both by the falsification *and* the puzzle-solving process, for both do count the cases where the theory is liable to break down. This is not to underestimate the role of the method of justification by supporting evidence, for, though the method does not establish a theory conclusively, it provides more or less strong support for it, corroboration of it. Our search for a good theory is an ideal one. Relativism, in this sphere, is unavoidable, but this does not adversely affect scientific practice. Rather, it seems to be a true description of how scientists think and act.

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Metaphysics, religion and Yoruba traditional thought

AN ESSAY ON THE STATUS OF THE BELIEF IN NON-HUMAN AGENCIES AND POWERS IN AN AFRICAN BELIEF SYSTEM

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I

In this paper, I examine the issue of the extent to which it is tenable to assert, as many experts on African traditional thought have done,[1] that Africans are religious in all things. I do this by considering the status of the belief in some non-human agencies and powers, for example, divinities, spirits, magic, witchcraft, etc. in the belief-system of an African people, the Yoruba who constitute an ethnic group in south-western Nigeria. I argue that this assertion is mistaken: first, because it is based on inadequate definition of religion which does not allow for a proper delimitation between the realm of the religious and the realm of the metaphysical; and, second, because it does not take proper cognizance of the fact that, although certain institutions or beliefs may have the same social usage in two societies, they may function differently in the explanatory schemes of these societies. Thus, in the second part of this paper, I attempt an analysis of 'metaphysics' and 'religion'. This is done with a view to providing a basis for the arguments in the third part in which I examine, in a critical manner, the status of the non-human powers and agencies beliefs which, in the opinion of many writers on African belief systems, make Africans a profoundly religious people.

II

In his book entitled *The Nature of Things*,[2] Prof. Anthony Qinton defines 'metaphysics' as 'the attempt to arrive by rational means at a general picture of the world'.[3] The word 'rational' in this definition, according to him, rules out of metaphysics two things that are ordinarily taken to be part of its meaning. The first of these is any 'picture of the world that has been acquired by mere absorption from the surrounding intellectual atmosphere,[4] the second being beliefs which 'rest simply on tradition and authority'.[5] Thus, for Prof. Qinton, although some general picture of the world which most people have can consist of metaphysical beliefs, such general pictures cannot be said to be part of metaphysics, because 'it has come into existence in a

passive non-rational way'.[6] For him, therefore, most people are what he calls clients of metaphysics, not metaphysicians.

Prof. Qinton's view on the nature of metaphysics brings to the fore an important distinction that should be made between two senses of 'metaphysics', if that word is to have any determinate meaning. There is, first, the sense in which it connotes a general picture or conception of the world passively arrived at or acquired 'through mere absorption from the surrounding intellectual atmosphere'[7]—the broad, ordinary, first-order, sense of the term—and, second, the sense in which it connotes a rational reflection on the nature of existence or reality. This is the technical, strict, second-order sense of the term. In this second sense, although it is intelligible to talk of 'Aristotle's metaphysics', 'Russell's metaphysics', etc. it is not intelligible to talk of 'Greek metaphysics', 'Akan metaphysics', 'British metaphysics', etc. The distinction between the two senses of 'metaphysics' just isolated can be put in these terms: that whereas, in the first sense, metaphysics can be seen as a spontaneous conception and interpretation of the experience engendered by the continuous encounter between man and other elements of the world-process, it is, in the second sense—the technical sense—a systematic attempt at reflecting on the raw data presented by that experience in terms of comprehensible concepts, theories, and categories.

But why, it may be asked, do I bother myself with this distinction between two senses of the term 'metaphysics'? I do this, first, in order to make an important clarification. This is that this paper is not a work in 'Yoruba metaphysics' concerned with an enumeration of the non-human agencies and powers that feature prominently in Yoruba traditional thought and the nature of the belief in them. Rather, it is a systematic attempt, which relies on the tools of philosophical analysis, at examining the ontological status of these agencies and powers with a view to determining the extent to which belief in them can be said to make the Yoruba a profoundly religious people.

However, this distinction between two senses of 'metaphysics' is important in another respect. In the first sense of the term—the sense in which it connotes a general picture of the world and the place of man in it—every individual, indeed every society, can be said to have certain metaphysical beliefs. These are usually embodied in myths, folk-tales, proverbs, etc. The question, therefore, arises as to how metaphysical beliefs of this kind can be distinguished from religious ones. This question is important, since both systems of belief—the metaphysical and the religious—rely on entities which appear to be of the same kind in their explanation of the nature of the world-process and the place of man in it, a situation that may encourage the kind of confusion I indicated at the beginning of this paper. What, then, is 'religion'? And how is it to be distinguished from 'metaphysics' in its broad sense?

Now, it is a well-known fact that the term 'religion' is surrounded by a lot of definitional controversies. Whatever may be the nature of these controversies, one thing, however, is clear. It is that, for any definition of religion

to be considered adequate, it has to be one that enables us to distinguish between what is religious and what is not. Yet, this is a requirement many definitions of religion fail to meet.

In attempting the analysis of 'religion', I begin with an assertion which, I think, most people are likely to accept, perhaps as a truism. It is that the characteristically religious interpretation of experience is a product of man's efforts to determine his place in the world-process. This is a task which inescapably forces itself on man's consciousness as he tries to relate himself to other elements of the world-process. In an attempt to answer this riddle, he discovers that he is dependent on some other elements of the process for his existence and this places limitations on his knowledge, his values, his identity, etc. Feuerbach is, therefore, right when he says that religion is identical with the distinctive characteristic of man, which is self-consciousness—the consciousness which he has of his nature.[8]

But the recognition of one's limit within the world-process is not unique to the religious interpretation of experience. For everybody, even the atheist, seems to recognize these limits. It is precisely in recognition of these limits that some metaphysical interpretations of experience rely on certain non-human agencies and powers in explaining some experience. Thus, religion cannot be explained simply in terms of 'experience' as writers, such as H.D. Lewis, have done. For Lewis, what is to be emphasized in dealing with religion is religious experience. 'The core of religion', he writes, 'is religious experience.'[9]

The emphasis on experience does not seem to provide an adequate characterization of religion. This is because it does not allow for a clear conception of the source of religious experience and the nature of the human response to it. Yet, these two things seem to be the most significant aspects of religion. Experience, we do know, is undifferentiated until it is interpreted. Usually, however, these interpretations differ from one individual to the other. It, therefore, appears that what differentiates 'religious experience' from other kinds of experience is not 'experience' as such, but the way it is interpreted. Now, the interpretation of experience embodies a set of beliefs which determines what the attitude of each individual to that which is thought to be the source and ground of experience as such will be. This suggests that the core of religion is to be found in the nature of the attitude which every individual develops towards that consciousness of limitations in his power, in his knowledge, in his values, in his identity, etc. This, of course, is dictated by the nature of the interpretation which he gives to this consciousness in terms of its source and ground. The keynote to the interpretation of religion, then, is the religious attitude.

To say this, however, is not to say that any attitude toward any object or anything can be termed 'religious'. John Dewey, for instance, seems to take this position when he contends that the adjective 'religious' denotes 'attitudes that may be taken toward every object and every proposed ideal'[10] and,

consequently, that 'any activity pursued in behalf of an ideal and against obstacles and in spite of threats of personal loss because of conviction of its general and enduring values is religious in character'.[11] The implication of this definition of the adjective 'religious' is that systems of belief as varied as capitalism, communism, even apartheid can be put in the same category as Islam, Buddhism, Christianity, etc. Yet, we do know that the two sets belong to different conceptual categories. What is more, on this definition of the adjective 'religious', commitment to, and love of, things as varied as golf, motor cars, dogs, etc. can be termed religious, depending on the extent of one's commitment to them.

This characterization of the religious attitude is inadequate, and should, therefore, be rejected on the following grounds. First, it blurs the distinction which we normally make between the religious and the non-religious, thereby running counter to our intuitive understanding of the nature of religion. The second ground, which is a corollary of the first, is that it is too broad to be of any use in the discussion of religion and its relation to other activities in human societies.

These criticisms against the definition of religion as attitude toward any object or anything applies to its characterization as 'that total conception of the universe and man's place in it without which a man or a body of men are like people wondering in the wilderness'.[12] For, apart from conflating religion with metaphysics and thus getting us entangled in an avoidable conceptual muddle, this generalized notion also runs counter to our intuitive understanding of religion by interpreting it simply as a system of coherent beliefs.

Yet, this is the notion of 'religion' that seems to inform many researches on African world-views;—researches which purport to be works on 'African religion', but which, strictly speaking, are no more than descriptive accounts of different accounts of the universe as they are held in various African societies. Part I of George Parrinder's *Religion in Africa*,[13] for example, is devoted to a discussion of issues as diverse (though not totally unrelated) as 'Literature and Art', 'Philosophy and Cosmology', 'Plurality, Powers of the Universe', 'Society and Morals'—in short, just anything that the author felt was relevant to the 'African world-view'. The same observation goes for Asare Opoku's *West African Traditional Religion*,[14] John Mbiti's *Introduction to African Religion*[15] and some other works of similar content. The implications of this inadequate conception of religion for the claim that Africans are in all things religious will be considered later.

For now we can only note that the keynote to the understanding of religion is the 'religious attitude'. But, at the same time, it has been pointed out that it is not every attitude to an object that can be regarded as a religious attitude. The question that arises then is this: how do we differentiate the typically religious attitude from any other attitude?

I want to say, without much hesitation, that what differentiates one attitude from the other is the 'object' to which it is directed as an attitude. For, although an attitude is primarily a reaction to an experience, what sustains it is not that experience which, in any case, is fleeting but that which is conceived to be the source of the experience. I am, therefore, in agreement with William James when he writes:

> All our attitudes, moral, practical or emotional are due to objects of our consciousness, the things we believe to exist, whether really or ideally, along with ourselves. Such objects may be present to our senses, or they may be present only in thought. In either case they elicit from us a *reaction*....[16]

Another issue we need to examine has to do with the nature of the 'object(s)' to which a typically religious attitude as a reaction. To do this, let us quickly recapitulate what was said on the nature of the experience that is produced by man's encounter with other elements of the world-process. This encounter, it was noted, makes man realize, as a conscious being, his limits within the process. With this realization comes, quite often, a feeling of dependence on something greater or more powerful than man himself. This he regards as the root of his being in, and to, which he has interest and commitment. A typically religious attitude can, therefore, be defined as that which is characterized by an interest in, and commitment to, that which is perceived to have the ontological significance of being the ground and source of sustenance of human existence. And, since this interest in, and commitment to, that being cannot but be manifested in certain practices in honour and acknowledgement of that being and his powers, we can refine our definition of the religious attitude to become: a devotional attitude to that which is perceived to have the ontological significance of being the ground and *source* of human existence and its sustenance. The typically religious attitude, thus, becomes a response to that 'thing' which is considered to be the ultimate reality and which, for that reason, is indestructible.

The objection could be raised that the idea of the transcendent or what Durkheim calls 'the idea of mystery' is not essential to the definition of religion, the argument being that there have been, and probably there still are, some societies (the so-called primitive societies) which we shall be prepared to call religious, but which do not make any distinction between the natural and supernatural. So the definition of religion in terms of an ultimate reality can be seen as 'excluding... the greater part of the fact to be defined'.[17]

This argument misses the essential points of the definition of religion given in this paper. For, in this definition, what is essential to religion is the ontological significance of, and attitude to, that which is thought to be the ground of human existence and its source of sustenance. This ultimate reality does not have to be transcendent or mysterious in nature. If this is the case, then the absence of 'the idea of mystery' or the conception of a transcendent

being from a people's conception of the universe does not make them a people without a religion.

It is for the same reason that we cannot even say that the definition of religion proposed in this paper does not square up with experience, because there are some religions—Buddhism, for example—which contains no idea of ultimate reality. Quite often, we make the mistaken assumption of thinking that such reality has to be transcendent before it can be so described. It need not be. The definition of religion given in this paper can, therefore, still be seen as taking care of a religion like Buddhism. In Buddhism, as we know it today, a divinity is seen in Buddha (the Enlightened One) and adherents of the religion surrender themselves to him.

But it could still be argued that the definition offered here is inadequate, because there are no common or peculiar characteristics which all religions possess. This objection fails. This is because it does not take sufficient cognizance of the role of concepts in the systematization or organization of experience. Fundamental concepts—and religion is one of them—demarcate ranges of meaning. They help to relate together ideas or things of the same kind, thereby enabling us to distinguish between ideas or categories of things in the universe.[18] That being the case, there seems to be no reason why it should not be possible to isolate the phenomena for which religion stands in terms of what they have in common, however concealed this may be. In any case, even if there are no common and peculiar characteristics which all religions possess, they can still be brought under one concept by virtue of the fact that they share some family resemblances.

It should now be clear that religion, unlike metaphysics, is not simply a way of looking at the universe; it is also a kind of attitude to something in terms of which human experience is explained. Thus, before the claim can be established that a particular group of people are religious in all things, we have to be able to show that those entities in terms of which they explain phenomena and their attitude to them are of a typically religious nature. The question that arises at this point, then, is the question of whether the entities which feature prominently in the explanatory schemes of the Yoruba are typically religious in nature, whether the people's attitude to them is also a religious attitude.

III

The major elements of the Yoruba conception of reality can be put under the following headings:

(1) Belief in *Olódùmarè* (supreme being);
(2) Belief in divinities and spirits;
(3) Belief in ancestors; and
(4) Belief in other mystical powers, incantations, magic, and witchcraft.

Olódùmarè is regarded as 'the origin and ground of all that is'.[19] This conception of him is reflected in the different qualities that are attributed to him. He is, for example, regarded as the creator (*Elédã̀*) and the maker (*Asèdá*) who is the origin and giver of life (*Elémí*). Furthermore, he is regarded as the undying king (*Oba àikú*) whose habitation is the heaven above (*Oba Órun*) and who is over and above all divinities and men; a being whose work is done in perfection (*A-sè-kan-má-kù*); a supreme judge who judges in silence (*Adákédájó*); and the controller of man's destiny.[20]

Next to Olódùmarè are the divinities (*Òrìsà*). These divinities fall into three different groups. In the first group are those that can be regarded as the primordial divinities, that is, those that are believed by the Yoruba to derive directly from Olódùmarè. Among these are Òrìsà-ńlá (Obàtálá), Oruńmìlà, Ésù, Ògún and Odúdùwà. The second group consists of deified ancestors such as Sàngó and Òrìsà-Oko. And the third group consists of personified natural phenomena—the earth, rivers, lagoons, mountains, etc.

As for the spirits (*Ebora* or *Imolè*), they are believed to be:

> ...dreadful divinities whose habitations were the thick, dark groves and unusual places; those who walk the world of men at night and prawl the place at noonday; the very thought of whom was hair-raising; to pass by whose groves was blood-curdling; with whom man feels compelled to make terms for his own safety; more propitiated out of fear than worshipped in reverence.[21]

Of course, we also have other mystical powers—particularly magic and witchcraft—which, as Asare Opoku puts it, 'are recognised and reckoned with for their ability to aid or harm man'.[22]

The analysis of the nature of the entities mentioned above has to await another occasion. Suffice it to say, however, that it is the fact of belief in these entities that has made some writers on African belief-systems to contend that the Yoruba are an 'incurably religious' people. Prof. Bolaji Idowu, for instance, asserts:

> The real keynote of the life of the Yoruba is neither in their noble ancestry nor in the past deeds of their heroes. The keynote of their life is their religion. In all things they are religious. Religion forms the foundation and the all-governing principle of life for them. As far as they are concerned, the full responsibility of all the affairs of life belongs to the Deity; their own part in the matter is to do as they are ordered through the priests and the diviners whom they believe to be the interpreters of the will of the Deity...[23]

However, I ask: to what extent can we regard these non-human agencies and powers which feature prominently in the explanatory schemes of the Yoruba

as religious entities? Even if they are religious, can the attitude of the Yoruba to them be regarded as typically religious attitude?

To answer these questions, I recapitulate very briefly, the salient features of a religious object, and the nature of that attitude to it which can be regarded as a typically religious attitude, which emerges from the analysis of religion in Section II of this paper. There, it is noted that a typically religious object is that which has the ontological significance of being the ground of human existence and its source of sustenance, and, which, for this reason alone, is indestructible. A typically religious attitude is then defined as a devotional attitude to this kind of 'object'.

Now, if we examine the entities which feature prominently in Yoruba traditional worldview—Olódùmarè, divinities, spirits, etc.—it should not be difficult to see that Olódùmarè can be regarded as a typically religious object. For, as I have pointed out, he is regarded by the Yoruba as the supreme being who is the ground of human existence and its source of sustenance. Although there may be no clear-cut practices that can be taken as symbolizing the expression of a devotional attitude to him, the mere fact that the people mention him in prayers and also regard him as the ultimate reality suggests that he is a religious object to which the people have a religious attitude. Indeed, it can be said that Olódùmarè is the ultimate point of reference of whatever may be called 'Yoruba traditional religion'.

As for the divinities, only the primordial ones, particularly Òrìsà-ńlá, Òguń and Òruńmìlà, can be regarded as religious objects. This is because they are believed to assist Olódùmarè in various ways in his activities. But, when we consider the deified ancestors and personified forces, the story takes a different turn. These divinities—deified ancestors and personified forces—cannot be regarded as objects which have a typically religious nature. I do not think either that the attitude of the Yoruba to them can be regarded as being typically religious. There are many reasons for saying this.

First, many of these divinities are believed to be dependent on human beings: the strength and extent of their acceptance are determined by the number of devotees they have and the extent of their commitment to them. This situation is aptly revealed in this Yoruba saying: *Ibití enià kòsí kò sí imalè* (where there is no man, there is no divinity).[24] Thus, the significance of each divinity in a community depends on the number of devotees it has. This, it seems to me, is the reason why the primordial divinities still enjoy some prestige in many Yoruba communities. Another manifestation of the dependence of these divinities on the people is the fact that it is their devotees that maintain their secrets, such that any betrayal of a divinity by its devotees simply reduces it 'to an empty word, an object of ridicule'.[25] The story of the deification of Sańgó (god of thunder) is very revealing in this respect. Sańgó was a king of a town in Yorubaland called Òyó. He was a renowned warrior. However, Sańgó was expelled from Òyó, because his rule was patently tyrannical. Having been deserted by his friends and his favourite wife (Oya), while he was going into exile, he hanged himself at a place called Koso. Those who saw his dead body began to spread the news of this sordid deed 'much to the embarrassment of his friends who resolved to put an end to the circulation of the scandal'.[26] And the way they went about doing this was by setting fire to the houses of their enemies. These people, on seeking help from Sańgó's friends, were told that it was Sańgó who caused the fire in reaction to the indiscretion of the people in spreading the news of Sańgó's ignominous end. As a result, the people decided to retract the story by claiming that Sańgó had not hanged himself.[27] This, according to the story, was how Sańgó became a deified ancestor. 'The raising of fire during thunderstorm' can, therefore, be seen as 'the principal device of the priests of this *Òrìsà* for keeping up the interest of the people in Sańgó and their respect and awe for him'.[28]

Now, if these divinities or, at any rate, most of them can be seen to be highly limited in their powers and if they owe their 'existence' to the grace of their worshippers, then they cannot, in any way, be regarded as having the ontological significance of being the ground of human existence and its source of sustenance. For then they can be seen to be no more than mere instruments that can be used and discarded, depending on the circumstances and dispositions of their devotees. This, perhaps, explains the reason why many of them could not survive the influx of alien religious and cultural practices—an influx which, to say the least, marked a turning point in the historical evolution of many African societies.

Another reason why I do not think that these divinities are typically religious objects is the fact that they are considered as objects of veneration or fear simply on the basis of the people's perception of their utilitarian value, determined by the extent to which they are believed to have the power to aid or hinder human activities. Òrìsà Oko, for example, is a patron divinity of Yoruba farmers who, according to a Yoruba legend, once lived in a town called Irawo. He was sent away from his town, because he suddenly became leprous. But, while in exile, the wife discovered that some fruits eaten and thrown away in the past grew and produced nourishing fruits of their kind. She, therefore, started cultivating crops and getting food to provide for herself and her husband. When the husband and his wife returned to Irawo (after the man had got himself cured), they taught the people their newly acquired knowledge, an act for which the people never forgot them after their death.[29]

It is, therefore, clear that many of the divinities that feature prominently in Yoruba explanatory schemes were man-made. This discussion has also shown one important feature of Yoruba traditional thought. It is that belief in the existence of these divinities is fundamentally pragmatic in nature. Many of these non-human agencies and powers are venerated or feared because they are believed to have certain powers for either doing good or harm to human beings. Once any of them is perceived to be unable to demonstrate these powers, it becomes not an object of veneration or fear but an object of

ridicule. I find it difficult to arrive at any other interpretation of the Yoruba cosmological world-view. For, in the words of Prof. Oyekan Owomoyela:

> What other reason could explain the actual worship of a disease like *Sòpònná* (small pox) or such a destructive phenomenon as thunderbolt in the person of Sango. Obviously the Yoruba came to the realization that it is wise and expedient to ingratiate themselves into the good graces of these terrible forces by worship or flattery.[30]

Senghor's observation that 'neither fear nor material cares dominate African religion. . .it is dominated by love and charity, which is love in action[31] is, therefore, mistaken. For, as this analysis has shown, the principal, if not the only, determinant of the attitude of the Yoruba to many of their divinities is their perception of the power of these divinities in enhancing or disrupting human activities. This kind of attitude can hardly be regarded as a typically religious attitude, unless, of course, we want to contend that religion is simply a matter of hard-nosed pragmatism anchored on expediency, which it is not.

Thus far the attempt has been to deny many of the divinities, particularly the deified ancestors, a religious status. It should be noted, however, that each of these divinities, if taken separately, could be religious objects. This would be the case if, for instance, their devotees see them (the divinities) as having the power of life and death over them. But it should be noted that a divinity is not religious, simply because it is being worshipped by a group of people. (If we adopt this criterion that anything that is being worshipped by a group of people is a religious object, then almost anything can be a religious object and this will be conceptually unsatisfactory.) Its status as a religious object can only be determined in terms of its relationship to other objects of its kind in the belief-system of the people concerned. In other words, the determination of the religious status of a divinity should have a point of reference. In the case of the Yoruba, this point of reference is Olódùmarè. Thus, any divinity that can be shown not to have a direct connection with him—and many of the deified ancestors do not appear to have this connection—whose existence or non-existence depends almost entirely on the whims and caprices of its believers, and whose qualities do not harmonize with his qualities, cannot, within this frame of reference, be a religious object. So the seeming contradiction involved in denying a divinity the status of a religious object is resolved by making a distinction between the mere fact that a divinity is worshipped by a group of people and the significance of this divinity within the religious frame of reference of the people.

Thus, it seems to me that, although the Yoruba may be described as being religious on the basis of the fact that they acknowledge the existence of a supreme being who is the ultimate reality and on whom human beings are believed to be dependent for their existence and also recognize some divinities as his ministers, there is obviously no ground for contending that religion pervades all their activities.

The tendency to regard the Yoruba and, indeed, Africans in traditional societies as being profoundly religious can be attributed to a number of factors. There is, first, the perception that in these societies nature is deified and conceived as 'a living, divine organism, producing all things, all gods, men and animals, by generation'.[32] It is for this reason that many other forces and powers, apart from whatever entity they may regard as the supreme being, are recognized as being capable of influencing human activities. Another reason why many writers on African traditional belief-systems hold the view that the Yoruba cosmological world-view is an incurably religious one has to do with the tendency of the Yoruba to see the work of Olódùmarè and the divinities in many occurrences. However, these reasons alone do not make the Yoruba a profoundly religious people. For, even if we grant that all the divinities are religious in character, the admission of this fact does not make the Yoruba religious in all things. There are certain aspects of their life—their conception of health and illness, for example—in which they are profoundly secular.[33]

Before concluding this paper, I should like to point out that the tendency to give a purely religious colouring to the metaphysical belief in non-human agencies and powers by the Yoruba is also not unconnected with the nationalistic promptings of some African writers. These writers—Prof. Bolaji Idowu, for example—in reaction to certain ethno-centric distortions of African belief-systems by early European travellers, missionaries and anthropologists, would want to see the supreme being, the divinities and other non-human powers as having the same ontological status and significance which their supposed equivalents have in Western societies. This nationalistic approach to the interpretation of African world-views has, however, led to a failure on the part of these writers to take proper cognizance of the fact that 'what appears to be the same social usage in two societies, may have different functions in the two'.[34] They, therefore, assume that the belief in the existence of certain non-human agencies and powers (particularly the belief in a supreme being) in African societies is open to the same kind of interpretation as belief in such agencies and powers in other societies, presumably Western societies. Yet, the way the Yoruba conceive of them—Olódùmarè and the divinities—and the functions they perform in their explanatory schemes are sufficiently different from the way they are conceived in, and their function in, the explanatory schemes of other societies with which many writers on African belief-systems are to compare African traditional societies.

IV

I should, therefore, like to conclude this paper by saying that the assertion that the Yoruba are in all things religious is based on:

(*i*) A conceptual error, resulting from an inadequate, if any, analysis of what religion is; and

(*ii*) Failure to note the important point that, although certain institutions or beliefs may appear to have the same social usage in two societies, they may function differently within the explanatory schemes of these societies.

It is, therefore, my belief that Africans may never have an adequate interpretation of African traditional belief-systems until they embark on a rigorous analysis of the key concepts on which these interpretations are to be anchored. And, since I do not believe that sociologists are better equipped for this task than philosophers, I venture to say that the analysis of these key concepts—and religion is one of them—should be one of the major preoccupations of philosophers in Africa today.[35]

Notes and References

1. See, for instance, E. Bolaji Idowu, *Olodumare: God in Yoruba Belief*, London, Longman Group Ltd., 1962, p. 5; J.S. Mbiti, *African Religions and Philosophy*, 1st ed., London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., 1969, p. 2; and Asare Opoku, *West African Traditional Religion*, Accra: FEP International Private Limited, 1978, p. 1.
2. Anthony Qinton, *The Nature of Things*, London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 235.
4. *Ibid.*
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6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*
8. cf. Ludgwing Feuerbach, 'The Essence of Christianity' in Joseph D. Bettis (ed.), *Phenomenology of Religion*, London: SCM Press Ltd., 1969, p. 16.
9. H.D. Lewis, 'Worship and Idolatry' in H.D. Lewis (ed.), *Contemporary British Philosophy*, 2nd ed., London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961, p. 266.
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11. *Ibid.*, p. 40,
12. C.L.R. James, *The Future in the Present*, 1st ed., London: Allison and Bursby, 1977; reprint 1980, p. 186.
13. George Parrinder, *Religion in Africa*, London: Penguin Books, 1969.
14. Asare Opoku, *op.cit.*
15. John Mbiti, *Introduction to African Religion*, London, Ibadan and Nairobi: Heinemann Educational Books, 1975.
16. William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1961, p. 59.
17. Emile Durkheim, 'Concerning the Definition of the Religious Phenomena' in W.S.F. Pickering (ed.), *Durkheim On Religion*, London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975, p. 9.
18. Cf. John Wilson, *What Philosophy Can Do*, Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes and Noble Books, 1986, p. 44.
19. E. Bolaji Idowu, *op.cit.*, p. 18.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 39-42.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 62.
22. Asare Opoku, *op.cit.*, p. 10.
23. E. Bolaji Idowu, *op.cit.*, p. 5.
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25. Karin Barber, 'How Man Makes God in West Africa: Yoruba Attitudes Towards Orisa', in *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 51, No. 3, 1981, p. 738.
26. N.A. Fadipe, *The Sociology of the Yoruba*, ed., Francis Olu Okediji and Oladejo O. Okediji, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 1960, p. 263.
27. Cf. Samuel Johnson, *The History of the Yorubas*, Lagos: C.S.S. Bookshops, 1921, p. 34.
28. N.A. Fadipe, *op. cit.*, p. 263.
29. This is taken from J.O. Awolalu, *Yoruba Beliefs and Sacrificial Rites*, London: Longman Group Limited, 1979, p. 38.
30. Oyekan Owomoyela, 'The Pragmatic Humanism of Yoruba Culture', in *Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 3, Fall 1981, p. 27.
31. Leopold Sedar Senghor, *Prose and Poetry*, ed. and tr., John Reed and Clive Wake, London, Nairobi, Ibadan and Lusaka: Heinemann African Writers' Series, 1976, pp. 38-39.
32. R. Hooykaas, *Religion and the Rise of Modern Science*, Edinburgh and London: Scottish Academic Press, 1972, p. 9.
33. The Yoruba do not report to these divinities at first blush in explaining events. Indeed, the type of diagnosis of, and therapy for, an illness in the Yoruba traditional medical system is determined by the nature of that illness.
34. Radcliffe-Brown, *Structure and Function in Primitive Society*, London: Cohen and West, 1952, p. 184.
35. This paper was first presented at the Department of Philosophy Seminar, University of Ibadan, in December, 1985. It has since then been revised in the light of suggestions by Prof. P.O. Bodunrin, Dr. G.S. Sogolo, Dr. A.G.A. Bello and Dr. Segun Gbadegesin. I am grateful to them all.

Problems of understanding

J. L. MEHTA

JARAVA LAL MEHTA, retired Professor of Philosophy at Banaras Hindu University, died in Cambridge, Massachusetts on July 11, 1988, after a heart attack. Dr. Mehta was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Hawaii from 1971 to 1973 and Visiting Professor at the Center for the Study of World Religions, Harvard University, during the years 1968-69, 1970-71, and from September 1973 to January 1979, after which he and Mrs. Mehta returned to India and made their home in Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh. The Mehtas had come back to the Center for the Study of World Religions in May 1988 for three months, where, as Visiting Scholar, Dr. Mehta planned to continue his research on the *Ṛg-Veda* and the *Mahābhārata*.

Dr. Mehta was born in Calcutta in 1912 and brought up in Banaras, where he earned his B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees at Banaras Hindu University. Schooled in Sanskrit and Indian philosophy, Dr. Mehta developed an early interest in the psychoanalytic theory of Sigmund Freud and the philosophies of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger. He was to become one of the few Indian philosophers conversant with modern German philosophy and an internationally recognized Heidegger scholar.

Dr. Mehta's teaching spanned the fields of psychology, philosophical hermeneutics, and the various schools of Indian philosophy, both classical and modern. He wrote widely in both Indian and Western philosophy journals. His books include *The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger* (1967, 1971), revised as *Martin Heidegger: The Way and the Vision* (1976), his English translation of Walter Biemel's *Martin Heidegger* (1976), and a collection of essays entitled *India and the West: The Problem of Understanding* (1985), and *Philosophy and Religion*: *Essays in Interpretation* (1990).

The following lecture on 'Problems of Understanding' was given less than a month before his death on 13 June 1988 at Harvard University before the 1988 Summer Institute on Teaching Comparative Courses: Exploring Thematic Approaches to the Study of Religion, sponsored by the National Endowment for the Humanities. JOHN CARMAN, Harvard University.

The subject given to me for this occasion is a pleasant reminder of the course given here jointly by Prof. John Carman and myself, first in 1969 and then repeated several times in subsequent years. As a student of philosophy I had long been under the spell of Martin Heidegger's thought and then of Hans Gadamer's writings on philosophical hermeneutics and the debate generated by the publication of his *Wahrheit und Methode* in 1960. What I

found exciting in all this was the concern, not with the art and method of interpretation, that is, hermeneutics in the traditional sense, but with the philosophical implications of the process of understanding; what does it mean to understand something or someone; what happens, from the point of view of truth, when understanding occurs; the forms and sources of understanding; how tradition is built up and sustained by continuous reinterpretation of the past in the perspective of our present. In that course we sought to apply these insights to a concrete inquiry and to test how far they illumined the historical process of the encounter between India and the Western world of ideas, the process which began with Hegel in Europe, following the rise of Western Oriental scholarship, and with Rammohun Roy in India. Questions of the following sort engaged us: how and under what presuppositions did Hegel appropriate within his system the pioneering Indological knowledge communicated to the Western world by scholars like Williams Jones and Thomas Colebrooke? What were the intellectual forces that shaped the religious thinking and modernizing ventures of Rammohun Roy, sometimes called the father of modern India? What was the contribution of the Serampore missionaries in the modernizing process, and how far did their own religious prejudgements affect their understanding of Indian religious life? What, generally, were the enabling as well as the limiting conditions under which Western scholars, poets, and culture critics—fired by the vision of an Oriental Renaissance, Christian missionaries, and agents of the Imperial power—functioned in their understanding of the Indian cultural and religious situation? What, similarly, were the preconditions under which Indian intellectuals, reformers, men of letters, and politicians appropriated modern Western ideas in their social, political, legal, and religious thinking? To what degree has the mind of the modern intellectual in India been shaped by currents of religious and secular thought flowing from the West? To what extent and in what manner does the Indian intellectual, who has learnt the inescapability of participating in the dominant Western civilization of today, feel obligated not only to participate in the heritage of his own tradition but to feel at home in it? There is, above all, the question of language: how far must the thinking Indian allow himself to be dominated by the English language, the very embodiment of what was until recently an alien culture? What happens when he lets the 'speculative instruments' embodied in one of his own languages, of his native tongue, with its own special metaphors, images and symbolism, take over?

For me personally, these questions were not just abstract problems pertaining to the academic pursuit called comparative religion—though I confess to a personal fascination with Western letters for their own sake—but part of a continuing effort at self-understanding which, in my view, constitutes the basic religious process. A certain degree of alienation, opacity, and bafflement, a sense of resistant otherness, prompts the effort to understand, and this has, therefore, always an other for its object, be it the otherness into which parts or

elements of my own tradition have lapsed, be it the ways of living and thinking belonging to alien religious and cultural traditions. Now, that in me which enables me to get a hold on this 'other' is not so much my explicitly formulated beliefs as it is the total horizon which determines my thinking and of which my implicitly held judgements, my prejudgements or prejudices, my preunderstanding in short, are a crucial part. The attempt to understand the other thus brings me up against another total cultural horizon which I seek to enter on the basis of my own historically constituted horizon. Whether it is the forgotten past of my own traditional heritage or the otherness of a different religious tradition, in each case I am thrown back upon myself, to a re-examination of my own preconceptions, to an awareness of my own prejudices and their restrictive influence on my thinking. This to-and-fro movement between myself and the other, between my present and the heritage of my past, is also part of what is known as 'the circle of understanding', which leads to a deepening and widening of my own self-awareness through this corrective circularity of understanding. Thus, a certain interfusion of different horizons takes place and otherness is overcome, to some degree, between myself and the other, between the past and the present.

In the context of interreligious relations, it seems to me, the intellectual activity of understanding must itself be understood as part of, and subordinate to, a wider whole encompassing the human person as a thinking, feeling, and acting being, in ways governed in some measure by the sight provided to him by his religious tradition. And it must itself be viewed and practised as a *religious* activity, not for the sake of mastery but as a form of mutuality and self-subordination. So regarded, and only so, will it shed the arrogance which often marks the enterprise of understanding the other, when togetherness slides into an objectification of the other, and the other is 'comprehended', held in one's grasp, from a vantage point of superiority, and eventually mastered. We adopt such an attitude when we view the heritage of our own past ironically and cynically, as a reminder of outgrown childhood, and when we look upon others and their cumulative traditions as objects serving the high ends of scholarly research and the accumulation of a methodologically secure body of knowledge *about* them.

A question often discussed in philosophical hermeneutics is whether it is possible to understand an author better than he understood himself: that is, precisely what, in fact, understanding him means. With a sovereign confidence characteristic of the Enlightenment, Kant took it for granted that in the realm of thought this happens quite frequently. For Schleiermacher it is the main purpose and meaning of understanding: the critic and interpreter makes explicit much that the creative writer spontaneously achieved, much that escaped and overflowed his conscious intention. In the name of science and reason, a mode of understanding thus arises in which the other is reduced and devalued through the practice of such a 'hermeneutics of suspicion', as Ricoeur calls it. Instead of saying that we understand an author, as a person,

better than he understood himself, we should perhaps say that the *matter* he wrote about, the *Sache*, may be understood, if not better, at most in a newer light than it was earlier, by subsequent thinkers. In the case of sacred texts, however, we cannot disregard the fact that these texts are the products of a way of life adopted by an entire prople and in turn have inspired and nourished their faith, that the texts here play a crucial role within the context of a whole way of being, living, and thinking. Understanding what is said in a text, thus, cannot be dissociated from the life that is lived under the inspiration that the text has provided, and continues to provide, in the life of a people. When the scholarly work on a text is done we must annul the objectification and put the text back within the personal context where it belongs. From this perspective a sacred text ceases to be just a verbal icon, an object to be brought within our conceptual grasp, for it has been effective in the destiny of people without awaiting the results of scholarly labour, and will presumably continue to be so irrespective of what the scholar discovers. The unknown and the unspoken speaks through it, the unspeakable announces itself through it. It nourishes, stimulates, and provokes the attempt to understand without ever fully yielding its secret to such attempts. An element of mystery remains, as it does when we seek to understand a person *as* a person, not seeking control over him but *being with* him, who is as ineluctably a mystery as anyone we love can be.

Our understanding of our own religious past and that of others depends largely on how we view our situatedness in the present, politically, culturally, and religiously, on our perception of our movement into the future. Following the law of circularity, we in turn comprehend and judge the world of our present in terms of our understanding of our religious and cultural tradition. One may be so firmly in the grip of the present secularized, scientized, and technified world as to reject one's religious tradition altogether and identify oneself with modernity. One may judge it as the only and inevitable way to go and welcome it as an advance into a bright future, yet also experience the need to bring the resources of one's religious tradition to bear on this time of crisis, even to go so far as to insist that only the resources of one's particular religious tradition can satisfy that need. One may reject the ideology of a secularized life in favour of a new medievalism, or seek to go further back in the past and regain the lost innocence of a more pristine way of life. In each case we have a different framework of prejudgements and anticipations, within which our understanding of ourselves and of others will operate. The 'hermeneutic situation' in which we all find ourselves at the present time is a strange amalgam of a sense of greater riches at our disposal than ever before in history, an unheard-of freedom born of the opening up of new possibilities, and yet a gnawing experience of vacuity and absence, of something irretrievably lost, a whole dimension of living missing from our disenchanted world. From its position of dominance and affluence, the West reaches back to its own religious past and out to more tradition-bound cultures in order to enrich, supplement, and appropriate from them, within its own cultural context, whatever suits its own religious needs. A developing country like India does the same, in its own way and according to its needs, though the modes of understanding and the regions of its operation in each case vary according to the difference in the two perspectives. In my own experience, for example, I have found this double movement of understanding, out to the other and back to oneself, operative most of the time. I seek to understand the West by attending to its philosophical tradition, including the more subversive, self-critical moments in it, and to its literary, scientific, and religious-humanistic currents of thought and sensibility, in that order. For self-understanding I reach back again to the religious texts of my own tradition, seeking to break out of the immediacy of just living out of it, in its language, reflectively appropriating it from the perspective of my participation in the 'world civilization' of the present. I must also admit that in this task of reinterpreting and reappropriation I find Western scholarly work on ancient Indian texts of fascinating interest, both because it sometimes scratches and irritates and so forces me to give shape to my reflection, and also because it enables me to achieve a certain distance from what is mine, by virtue of the difference in language, idiom, and scholarly protocol. I am thus enabled to gain a freshness of understanding which would not otherwise be available to me. Also, I am convinced that we in the Orient—the 'Orient' of the West's imagination and coinage, against which it has defined its own identity—can come back to ourselves at this moment in history only by passing through the West, as a pilgrimage to our own selfhood, and being mediated by this passage through the West.

It is important, I am suggesting, to become self-conscious of the presuppositions and motivations operative in our attempt to understand the other and to see and spell out, for oneself and the other, that these are constitutive elements of the understanding we achieve at any moment. No method, no suprahistorical or transcendental point of view is available that can lift us out of this circle of understanding and of our finitude. Most of what goes on in our academic work, and in the discipline which goes into the making of a scholar, is a form of *Herrschaftswissen*, of understanding as an instrument of the will-to-power. It is a noble expression of such will, so long as it does not give rise to a whole system of discourse, to use Michel Foucault's terminology, which is meant to entrap and dominate other human groups, whether they belong to other traditions or to the excluded other in one's own. Scholarship, individual or institutionalized, like other forms of mastery, is inseparable from civilized living, and it is better to work out our repressions in acquiring mastery over a 'field of knowledge' than over fellow human beings. It remains, however, a mode of sublimation, resting on repression and resistance to the universal religious command to look within oneself. It is the highest form of sublimation, perhaps, but it is all the more insidious when abused as an instrument of mastery over other people. As a form of sublimation, the dedication to

scholarship points to the still remaining task of self-knowledge. It invites us, *should* we do so, to ask why and in the name of what I am engaged in this scholarly enterprise—as an individual, or as representative of an institution or a community, a culture, or a civilization—to ask what it is in me that generates this motion and this passion. The question of motivation cannot be evaded at any of the levels just mentioned. The wisdom literature of the world, the so-called *philosophia perennis* and scripture everywhere, the community of saints the world over, are all at one in insisting upon the return to awareness of self as the culmination of all knowledge, involving the leap from one way of knowing to another.

The novel feature of the world in which we live today, whatever may be the religious tradition to which we belong, is that we are all inextricably caught up in what Heidegger has called 'world civilization', a process which has spread out from its origin in the West, of which the roots go back to the Greek-Christian foundations of Western civilization, and of which the fruits are manifest in modern science and technology. This last is not merely a neutral instrument at our disposal but represents a mode of knowing, having its foundations in the philosophy of the West, which gives mastery over everything that is by objectifying it. In this sense, at least, Hegel's famous dictum has proved true, the assertion that 'The history of the world travels from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end of history, Asia the beginning', though one may wonder whether it is really 'the Sun of self-consciousness, which diffuses a nobler brilliance [than the physical sun]' that has finally arisen in the land of the setting sun. We are living and participating in a 'world civilization' in which we seek to fill the emptiness within us by doing something 'meaningful', but in which thinking men and women all over the world are for once united in their perception of some indefinable peril confronting us, a peril that threatens not only our existence but, what is more important, because beyond all measures of control, our human substance itself. This global phenomenon has made it all the more evident that we must recall afresh, understand in a new fashion, the resources that our different religious traditions hold in reserve for us, beyond all motivations of self-insistence, mastery over others, or the concern for saving 'others'. There are indications that the enterprise of understanding is taking a form appropriate to the new crisis that envelops humankind, especially in that part of the cultural world from where the threat has arisen in the first place. The nature of this new form requires, first, that if we at all make it our business to study the texts which have shaped other religious traditions, we must do it with reference to how, to what degree and extent, they matter now to the people concerned, to how far such study shapes our relations, not to other 'religions' but to people belonging to these other traditions. No amount of scholarship of 'other religions' is going to help, if it does not in the end enable us to live with these others, to live together with them like children at play. In the second place, I will just mention a moral principle beautifully formulated by the philosopher Kant, that our duty towards others is to give them happiness, and towards ourselves it is self-perfection—not the other way round. Religiously this would mean, I suppose, that understanding others should not be only the satisfaction of curiosity inspired by a sense of wonder, or a means of extending our power over them, or the detached contemplation of an odd phenomenon, or even the spell exercised and the love inspired by the other and the different. Understanding others must culminate in self-understanding, as an acting on oneself but letting the other be, and in *that* sense of compassion be an understanding of the other, not in the sense of an intellectual operation performed on him. Understanding then would be a pilgrimage toward oneself, others being the *tīrthas*, the sacred places one passes through on one's way to the final destination.

The wayfaring of an individual through the limited span of his life, of a people through history, or of humankind itself into the unforeseeable future—these, too, are pilgrimages. And I suggest that, from a certain perspective, they are pilgrimages toward scripture. At the beginning of each of the great religious traditions stands a body of writings, or orally transmitted mass of words, which sends off the tradition on its voyage in time. It is authoritative for participants in that tradition in the sense of providing them with a light which illumines and gives meaning to their lives; with a medium through which they experience and understand life, reality, and truth; with a measure in terms of which they judge between good and bad, right and wrong, true and false; with the very terms in which they understand themselves and others. In the second place, traditions are constituted by a continuous process of interpretation and reinterpretation of scripture and by the accumulation of a body of sacred literature which defines or redefines, enlarges or narrows, the scope and authority of scripture. The encounter with other traditions plays a significant role in this process, introducing, as at the present time in history, a kind of self-examination and self-criticism in each of the major traditions, which is somewhat new to each of them. None of these traditions is a monolith; each has conflicting elements within its structure, giving to it its own unique dynamism; each has gone through, and responded to, the crises and contingencies of the factitious turns and events of history; each moves into the uncertainties of the future; and for none of them is their present completely transparent to them.

The community of faith to which scripture, or rather the scriptural process, gives rise is a 'community of speech', a *Sprachgemeinschaft*. Such a community may seek to enlarge the area of its own manner of speaking in a variety of ways, such as mastering the alien mode of speaking and subsuming it under one's own. This might be called the Hegelian method of *Aufhebung*, understanding for purposes of mastery, religious and linguistic absolutism. This approach has generated in the West, during the past two centuries, much of what Edward Said calls 'the discourse of Orientalism'. During recent years, however, there has been talk of 'religious pluralism' as a fact not to be

wished away, and some kind of acceptance of it, even if it be with unspoken reservations. At its best, understanding here is often for the sake of learning from the other, enriching in this way the resources of one's own speech, but also sometimes out of sheer love for the other, and for the sake of a world of mystery and delight to which the new linguistic magic casements give access. This is pure reaching out to the other, which does not seek either to enslave him, or to change him, or to save him, but which finds joy in the beauty of his otherness; it is like learning a new language and gaining access to the new world it opens up. But a language, though one may *use* it as an instrument to serve one purpose or another, is something more, a house, a home to be lived in as one's own, to be claimed by it in turn, however temporarily.

One 'speech community' understands another, I make bold to say, to the extent to which it learns to live in the same 'house of words' as the other. This is not just a question of scholarship nor, to use an expression much in favour these days, of 'dialogue'. This has mostly been an ill-disguised monologue in which one partner is bilingual and the other (the initiator of the dialogue) knows or is at home in only one language, his own mother tongue. The conversation, therefore, takes place in the latter's mother tongue, and the poor bilingual traveller between two worlds, but not he alone, has already lost the dialogical battle before the exchange actually takes place. It is worth pondering on the kind of understanding that happens here. My mother tongue is, say, Hindi and my second linguistic home is English. While having a dialogue with *X*, whose mother tongue is English, *I* can understand *him* but *he* understands *me* only in so far as I am a guest in *his* house and answer back in his own terms. It does not make a big difference in this state of affairs if *X* has taken a few courses in Hindi in his home country or spent a couple of years in North India. What he sees in my speech is his own mirror image, reflected back to him in my words, an image enframed in a suitably exotic and 'native' context. For those who have not become immune to this kind of dialogical situation, either because they have made 'dialogue' into a profession, or because they have some other axe to grind than mutual understanding, religious encounters of this type are apt to leave us ruffled; they activate my sensitivity to the partner's talk as a kind of attack rather than a reaching out; they aggravate my sense of my religious identity, and leave us further apart than before the dialogue took place. The affirmation, or flaunting, of his identity in terms of his religious tradition by my partner in such a dialogue, to the exclusion of what binds us as human beings, provokes a similar response in me, often to my shock and sorrow in retrospect. My religious identity is a secret transaction between me and my God; I win it by wrestling with my angel, by submitting to the voice of my tradition, by eventually losing this identity in favour of what my heart is set on, of what claims my faith, as something that transcends and annuls my little 'I', that gives me selfhood and wholeness. A dialogue can succeed only to the extent that the partners forget all about their specific religious identities for the moment and converse

with each other like two wayfarers who are thrown together for a while as companions on the same pilgrimage. What sort of dialogue takes place among them; who speaks here, in what language?

Although I am not so sure now about the direct applicability of philosophical hermeneutics to the question of interreligious understanding, let me mention one or two of the insights which still appear to me as valuable. Understanding a text, a person, or oneself involves in its fullness, Hans Gadamer said, three moments: initial comprehension, explication or interpretation, and application. To understand a text I must go beyond the general sense I make of it on a first reading by explicating or interpreting it for myself so that it means something to me now, says something *to* me, and this involves its application to my present situation, its translation into my present language, as I speak it now:

> We do not really understand and explicate a text, whether philosophical or literary, legal or scriptural, so long as we take it only as a historical document and do not translate it so that it speaks to us in our present concrete situation, so long, in other words, as it is not applied to the historical point where we stand, here and now.

In the matter of interreligious understanding, the crucial problem of translating what *he* says into how *I* would say it is bound to arise. To the extent that each rises to the occasion, a back and forth movement is generated, which movement then itself begins to be in control of the conversation. In every dialogue, we can, therefore, say that 'each speaker plays a language game of his own to begin with, and the authenticity of the dialogue depends upon the extent to which they gradually surrender themselves to the sway of a language game that encompasses them both'. Understanding, in this sense of a game in which we ourselves are at some point played, takes on the character of a historical happening, the creative moment in the continuity of a tradition.

The principal value of philosophical hermeneutics seems to me to lie in clarifying the nature of self-understanding rather than in the understanding of others. Along with the philosophical debate it has generated and with the new developments in semiotics, poetics, and text-theory, it is now an essential supplement to the classical conception of philological scholarship and the reading of texts. Here also I will remark only that I am often instructed but sometimes shocked by the difference between the way a Western scholar reads texts which have shaped my tradition and the way I read them. But that is another, and long, story. Setting aside for the moment learned and bookish models for religious understanding, I would like to suggest the model of a pilgrimage as more appropriate and helpful. Imagine a group of people, rich and poor, of various classes, coming from different cultural regions of the country, speaking different languages, not necessarily belonging to an iden-

tical religious sect, coming together at the starting point of the pilgrimage and venturing forth together on a perilous journey on foot to a common destination, to a major *tīrtha* in India up in the Himalayas. They come together and walk and live together for a while, a week or a month, and will go their separate ways again when the pilgrimage is over. They are not learned men and women, though a man of learning and pious living may be among them, going his own lonely way, sometimes giving them the benefit of a religious discourse. But of one thing we may be sure. There is no one there to say 'halt' to them, because the 'gegenwärtige Stand der Forschung' in regard to the origin of this sacred place and its significance does not permit 'us, Indological scholars in the Western world, to arrive at any certain conclusion' or to say: 'We are uncertain even about this custom of pilgrimage in India, on which matter several universities—Paris, Heidelberg, Oxford and Harvard among them—are at this very moment engaged in a long-term project of research'. Unaware of such profundities, the pilgrims walk merrily on, listening sometimes to the tales told by passing holy men, sometimes relating to each other the story of their lives, and sometimes praying, much of the time in playful exchanges and fun among themselves. The difference in the languages they speak, as in other things, hardly prevents them from making themselves understood. Recognizing and respecting these differences, they yet arrive at an understanding which goes deeper than words. Many of them are there, because they wished to undertake the pilgrimage once before they die, to understand and experience the meaning of their lives and of what remains to give completion to their pilgrimage through life, to be able to give the very name of a pilgrimage to their lives. However great their achievements may have been down below—or however little—this last act fills up a lack, for without it, dying would be a breaking off rather than a fulfilment. What is understanding among people worth if it does not take place in full awareness of our common mortality, common yet beckoning to each of us to meet it alone, in the privacy of our solitary pilgrimages?

The ordinary pilgrim, with little to boast of by way of letters, has yet a few words that inspire him and give him the strength and the courage to venture forth on his arduous wayfaring, and carry him on to its conclusion: a hymn, a divine name, a promise he once made to the bearer of that name. One mutters, 'Siva!' and the other says, 'Govinda!' and, caring little about the difference, they understand each other and are *with* each other. It is their scripture from which these words come, words of faith which have not only set them off on this particular pilgrimage, but transformed their lives into a pilgrimage. To begin with, as they set out, they hardly understand what these words 'mean'. It is the wayfaring, the toil of the steps taken along their way, that gives meaning both to these words and to their lives, to scripture itself. Their scripture gives meaning to the pilgrimage, and the latter in turn transforms a shadowy mass of words into a source of meaning in life, of which now the whole purpose may be seen to lie in discovering at last what that scripture

means in relation to the life to which it has given such fullness of meaning. Not until living itself is transformed into a pilgrimage, which is nothing if not living in the face of death—one's own—does scripture disclose its sovereign majesty, become truly scripture. We scholars play around with words, study them, manoeuvre them, and torture them, do things to them. But our pilgrimage through words is no pilgrimage until words begin to do things to us and become the word by which we live. *Then* scripture begins to disclose *its* meaning, the meaning of *our* life and, with luck, the unity of these sorts of meaning as the end of our quest.

Scriptures of different religious traditions differ, yes, but if regarded from the perspective of the remark I threw out in passing earlier, that life is a pilgrimage towards scripture, that difference may yet be seen to shrink into a mere inconvenience. For, like all pilgrimages, like life itself, all scriptures transcend itself, cancel and empty itself into the disclosure of a dimension in which there is neither the toil of understanding, nor words, nor wayfaring.

Some self-centric tendencies in Śaṅkara Advaita

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Prof. N.K. Devaraja makes the following remarks on Indian philosophical systems:

> Release in these systems consists not in the establishment of relationship with a being external to the self, but in the realisation of the essential nature of one's own self...
>
> Our conclusion is that the classical systems of Indian philosophy conceived the ultimate goal of man's existence as being intrinsic to him; it consists, according to them, in the reaffirmation or attainment of a perfection which is inherent in our own being.[1]

Most ancient Indian thinkers have generally given an extreme version of this basic faith, thus laying themselves open to the charge of self-centricity. In fact, the charge is more or less true in the case of four orthodox systems of philosophy: Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya and Yoga. But when writers like R.C. Zaehner[2] group Vedānta and Sāṅkhya together under the category of self-centric mysticism, they betray a complete lack of understanding of the basic distinction between the ontologies and valuational approaches of the two greatest systems of Indian philosophy.

The present paper starts with two premisses:

(*i*) That the Vedānta of the Upaniṣads expresses a basically theocentric religio-philosophical viewpoint; and
(*ii*) That the post-Śaṅkara Advaita Vedānta represents a relatively more self-centric philosophy and valuational approach.

The two contentions, especially the first one, are well recognized by modern Indian thinkers and need not be argued here in detail. Still, they would have to be stated in brief, as I intend to derive from them a third one: that Śaṅkara's Advaita contains in it both the Brahman-centricity of early Vedānta and the self-centricity of later Advaita philosophy, and hence marks a transition from the former to the latter.

In describing Upaniṣadic Vedānta as theocentric we are not advocating an understanding of it as theistic, especially when theism is understood in terms of Semitic religions. Rather, the term theocentric is intended to emphasize the truth that it is the Ātman-Brahman, and not the individual self, which

is the pivot round which the entire early Vedānta is developed. With a few exceptions, the Upaniṣadic seers have always affirmed that it is not the individual empirical self but the Witness-consciousness within it that is identical with or the same as Brahman.[3] Stated in this way it becomes a tautology, as the Ātman is but another name for the self-same Absolute perceived from the point of view of the subject self.

At the same time, the individual self is essentially the same as Brahman, and its individual being is just a transient product of the association of Pure-Consciousness with individuating factors, such as intelligence, mind, vital breath, etc.[4] If so, the individual existence becomes rather illusory or at best an undesirable state of imperfection, and the ultimate goal of human life becomes the realization of one's identity with the supreme Self. This realization is best understood in terms of self-transcendence. Liberation (*mokṣa*) is mostly explained in the Upaniṣads as the merger of the individual self into Brahman[5] and the resulting loss of all individual consciousness in that state. This understanding of unitive experience in terms of self-transcendence is in the best traditions of mysticism and is comparable to the Sufi concept of *fanā* or self-naughting. It is, therefore, as far removed as possible from any self-centric interpretation of either the ontological reality or the state of liberation.

Post-Śaṅkara Advaita Vedānta presents a distinct departure from the above Brahman-centric philosophy, and expresses a marked self-centricism in both its ontological beliefs and the concept of liberation (*mokṣa*)[6] The followers of Śaṅkara carry the idea of the transcendence of Brahman to its logical conclusion, and almost exclude Brahman from their cosmological speculations. The scholastic discussions in post-Śaṅkara Advaita regarding the nature and locus of *avidyā* (cosmic nescience) led to the extreme view of *dṛṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda*, according to which the creation persists only so long as the perception of the individual subject lasts. It is mostly the Self (Ātman) and not Brahman which is the central theme of philosophic inquiry in later Vedānta. Of course, this Self is still conceived ontologically as a universal or ultimate reality; but the context of all discussions of the self is consistently the subjective experience. For example, Vidyāraṇya gives a significantly subjective explanation of the famous Upaniṣadic text regarding the Self being the true object of all human affections.[7] According to his interpretation, our love for others is solely motivated by our desire for personal happiness.[8] In the same context he further says: 'A son is dearer than wealth, the body dearer than son, the sense organs dearer than the body and the self is supremely dear than life and mind.'[9]

The context of body and senses leaves no doubt as to which self is being spoken of here. How and why this unfortunate transformation in the meaning of the term self took place is difficult to say, but that it did take place is beyond doubt. There was a concomitant change in the Advaitic concept of liberation. Whereas it was earlier conceived as the absorption of the individual consciousness into the ultimate universal Consciousness, now it came to be

understood primarily as the realization of the purity and transcendence of one's own self. Later philosophical and semi-philosophical works boldly declare the world as the creation of the mind, and conceive liberation in frank self-centric terms: 'It is through your ignorance alone that the universe exists. In reality you are one. There is no individual self, or supreme self other than you.'[10]

Such passages can be multiplied indefinitely from the works of such post-Śaṅkara Advaitins as Śrīharṣa, Citsukha, Prakāśātman and Madhusūdan Sarasvatī. The true unitive experience denies the individual self in order to assert the sole reality of the 'Divine'. Here the process seems to be reversed, and the man of realization repeatedly seems to sing the glory of his inner self.[11] Such a self-centric approach can have no philosophical justification in the absolutist monism of Vedānta, while it is both natural and central to Sāṅkhya. The ontological pluralism of selves affirmed by Sāṅkhya naturally leads to the concept of liberation in terms of *kaivalya* (realization of the transcendent glory of the individual self). If the later Vedāntins seem to understand both the ultimate reality and liberation in self-centric terms, it may only mean that the Sāṅkhyan ideas were gradually imbided by them to an extent that it affected a qualitative transformation both in their world-view and concept of religious goal.

II

Though Śaṅkara's philosophy is the sublimest expression of the Vedāntic monism, it contains, at the same time, certain self-centric tendencies which can well be traced to the influence of Sāṅkhya. They have definitely provided a rational justification for the much more self-centric stance adopted by post-Śaṅkara Advaitins. Of course, the chief thrust of Śaṅkara's philosophy is always towards the assertion of the sole reality of Ātman-Brahman. The self which is to be realized in the state of liberation is the same as the transcendent Absolute, so much so that the two terms, Ātman and Brahman, are interchangeable in Śaṅkara just as in the Upaniṣads. Like the Upaniṣadic seers, Śaṅkara affirms that the ultimate Reality in Vedānta is a universal and transcendent one and not one's individual self. In his own words:

> Indeed, distinct from the agent who is the content of 'I', the real self is the Witness of the idea of 'I' which exists in all creatures ... which is one, unchanging, eternal and all-pervading universal Consciousness. It is the Self of all; it is beyond all rejection and acceptance, for all mutable and impermanent things culminate in *Puruṣa* as their ultimate limit.[12]

If the essence of the individual self (jīva) is the universal Self (Ātman-Brahman), then the former's bondage consists only in its apparent existence,

and its liberation would mean transcendence of its limited individuality which is the same as being merged into the supreme Self. Śaṅkara, therefore, often explains liberation in the familiar Vedāntic terminology of the loss of the individual consciousness, resulting from its absolute, unconditional identification with or merger into the transcendent Pure-Consciousness.[13] Śaṅkara also categorically rejects the Sāṅkhyan doctrine of the plurality of selves. He argues in a convincing manner that, since all selves are ultimately identical with the Pure-Consciousness, the separate identity of individual selves and their distinction from the supreme self as well as from each other are illusory or at best empirical.[14] The truth lies in the fact that the essence of all individual selves is the transcendent self which is beyond all distinctions and hence can logically be universal and non-dual only.

Śaṅkara, inasmuch as he asserted the ultimate identity of individual selves with the non-dual Absolute and denied the ontological plurality of selves, could not subscribe to any self-centric concept of liberation. And, yet, he mostly understands liberation in terms of self-realization. To quote Śaṅkara:

> The non-attainment of the Self is but the ignorance of It. Hence the knowledge of the Self is its attainment. The attainment of the Self cannot be, as in the case of things other than It, the obtaining of something not obtained before, for here there is no difference between the person attaining and the object attained.[15]

The reason for this somewhat self-centric approach lies in Śaṅkara's understanding of the Absolute (Ātman-Brahman) exclusively in terms of the Self (Ātman). According to him, no man can deny his own self;[16] and if it is asserted that the reality behind the universe (Brahman) is the same as the Self within (Ātman),[17] then the being of the Absolute also does not require any proof. Perhaps because of this very certitude of the being of one's inner self that Śaṅkara always prefers the term Ātman for describing the ultimate Reality. That is how, even when the context is definitely cosmic, he still chooses to call the Absolute the Self.[18]

Śaṅkara further seeks to understand the Self in a subjective context as the transcendent presupposition of all our experiences and knowledge. The self is the pure-consciousness implied in every perception, the entity which uses and for whose sake all the senses and mind exist.[19] It is indubitable, for 'it is the Self of even one who would deny it'.[20] In another context, Śaṅkara even cites the functions of memory, recognition, etc. as proofs for the being of a permanent subject of experience or self.[21]

Many of these passages should be understood in the context of the text which he is commenting upon. Śaṅkara personally prefers the concept of the Self as the transcendent Witness-consciousness (*sākṣin*) which is devoid of the contact with the body and mind, and hence is neither an agent nor a knower.[22] The attribution of subjectivity to the Self is due to the superimposition of the qualities of the intellect and mind, a part of the not-Self, on it. In a definite departure from the absolutist monism of the Upaniṣads and in a language reminiscent of the Sāṅkhyan dualism, Śaṅkara declares in his introduction to his commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras* (*Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*):

> It being an established fact that the object (not-Self) and the subject (Self), that are fit to be the contents of 'you' and 'I' respectively, and are by nature as contradictory as light and darkness, cannot logically have any identity. . . Nevertheless, owing to a lack of discrimination between these attributes, as also between substances which are absolutely disparate, there continues a natural human behaviour based on self-identification....

He further says in the same context: 'The Self is not absolutely beyond apprehension, because It is apprehended as the content of the concept—"I"....[23]

It is impossible to do justice to the philosophical distinction between the Self and the not-Self in the *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara in such a short paper as ours. But one thing is certain, and that is that this distinction marked a turning point in Vedāntic thought. True, the Upaniṣadic seers also often understood the metaphysical reality in a subjective context,[24] but their world-view was saved from the subjective bias by their emphatic equivocation between the cosmic Reality (Brahman) and the innermost Self of man (Ātman).[25] Though Śaṅkara definitely subscribes to the above metaphysical position, his distinction between the Self and the not-Self and the dualistic terminology that he employs to explain the mutual superimposition of the attributes of the two tend to give certain ontological reality to the not-Self. From the Vedāntic point of view, there cannot be any not-Self separate from or other than the Ātman-Brahman which can be distinguished or contrasted with the latter. Śaṅkara himself affirms the same truth on innumerable occasions.[26] Yet, he not only chooses to call his Absolute the Self; he also mostly understands this Self in contradistinction to the not-Self. In his independent philosophic works he freely uses Sāṅkhyan terminology of discrimination between and mutual reflection (or superimposition) of the attributes of the self and the not-Self on each other.[27] This Self is to be realized through discriminatory reasoning, again reminiscent of Sāṅkhyan *viveka-jñāna*, which recognizes and rejects various aspects of the empirical self, viz. body, mind and intellect, as not-Self in order to arrive at the knowledge of the Self.[28]

Of course, inasmuch as the Self as the witness (*sākṣin*) is distinguished from the empirical subject and agent, Śaṅkara's position cannot be regarded as a departure from original Vedānta. Nor can it be labelled as self-centric. But the subjective context, even though it is to be finally transcended, makes it clear that the ontological reality being talked about here is the Self whose conception is much nearer the *puruṣa* (individual self) of the Sāṅkhya than the Ātman-Brahman (absolute) of the Vedānta. The use of the two terms, Ātman and 'I', for the ontological reality and the subjective context of the discrimi-

native reasoning employed to arrive at the Self give a certain self-centric bias to his philosophy. Sometimes this self-centric bias is even more pronounced, as in the following: 'Without action, a non-agent and one without a second, I, the universal Self, make the world go round like a king who is only a witness, or like a magnet which moves iron by its proximity only.'[29]

Though it is not usually appreciated, Śaṅkara's entire philosophy evolves almost round his urgent need to counter the activism of Mīmāṁsā. His famous introduction to the *Brahma-Sūtras* and his commentary on the first four aphorisms are mainly aimed at proving the incompatibility of the knowledge of Brahman with the performance of (ritualistic) acts. In the rest of his works, the affirmation of the transcendence of the Self is always made the basis of the conclusion that such a self cannot be an agent of action, and hence all actions must be renounced in order to realize the self as well as after the self is realized. Śaṅkara, thus, became the first and foremost exponent of the way of turning-away-from-the world (*nivṛtti mārga*) in the Vedic-Vedāntic tradition. The creed of renunciation is so integral to his entire metaphysical system that the latter must be understood in its context. It is significant that all the arguments of his introduction and commentary on the first four aphorisms of the *Brahma-Sūtras* are directed against Mīmāṁsā and its advocacy of Vedic ritualism. We cannot go into the details of his philosophical and pseudo-philosophical arguments against the possibility and advisability of performance of actions, both for a seeker and a knower of Brahman. Our main interest here is to point out that Śaṅkara's appreciation for and advocacy of the creed of renunciation often determined his metaphysics and strengthened the latent self-centricity of Vedāntic thought. Śaṅkara, like the Upaniṣadic seers, had profound faith in the sole reality and transcendence of the Ātman-Brahman. But whereas in the Upaniṣads this assertion is made from a mystical point of view as an end-in-itself, for Śaṅkara the assertion of the Self's transcendent nature is often made a premise to arrive at the conclusion of the impossibility of action for a knower of Brahman.[30] Often one gets the impression that all Śaṅkara's metaphysical ingenuity is aimed at upholding the ideal of a transcendent sage or a liberated man-while-living.[31]

Renunciation of and detachment towards the world were accepted but not advocated in the Upaniṣads. They were unknown to the original Vedic 'religio-culture'. When later on renunciation of the world was accepted in the Vedic-Dharmaśāstric tradition, it was with a clear-cut condition that a man must not renounce the world unless and until he had fulfilled all his socio-moral obligations or paid off all his debts.[32] Now, if Śaṅkara argued for an unconditional renunciation of the world both for a seeker and a knower of Brahman, it could only be done by a rejection of the traditional emphasis on the priority of a man's socio-moral obligations to his desire for personal salvation. In its turn, this rejection could be effected only by adopting a markedly self-centric position. Śaṅkara argues that a life of action (mostly understood in terms of Vedic rituals) is not compatible with one's search for

liberation. Therefore, '[renunciation of works] is necessary, for *mokṣa* consists in the realization of the immutability of one's Self...hence the conclusion that devotion to knowledge should be practised through renunciation of action'.[33]

The conclusion regarding the necessity of renunciation of all actions for a seeker of liberation does not necessarily follow from the contention that the way of works cannot lead to liberation, unless one also believes that action should be undertaken only if it is conducive to some personal end. Sometimes Śaṅkara seems to think so: 'No one engages in any activity in matters towards which he is indifferent. Why should the one desirous of liberation act, seeing that he is indifferent to the three worlds?'[34]

Śaṅkara also argues for the undesirability, even impossibility, of action for a knower of Brahman or a liberated man-while-living (*jīvan-mukta*). In this context also, he occasionally betrays a similarly self-centric approach. In addition to his various philosophical arguments in defence of his thesis, Śaṅkara also offers an apparently psychological argument for the impossibility of a life of action for a knower of Brahman. According to him, such a man feels a profound gratification and sense of self-fulfilment, so that there are no unfulfilled desires in him. Since all action is *ex-hypothesi* performed for some personal desire or the other, a man who has transcended all his desires cannot perform any action.[35]

The last argument seems to deny the possibility of action with motives other than purely selfish ones. It is implied in all such arguments that a man must above all look after his spiritual welfare, and, as it is served best by renouncing the world and all its obligations he must do so. The above argument is not very important in Saṅkara's philosophic system, and so we cannot evaluate the nature of the latter on the basis of the former. But this much is certain that the creed of renunciation which is so basic and central to his entire metaphysical system cannot in its turn be sustained without a certain self-centric interpretation of the metaphysical reality. If the self were an ontologically separate reality, different from other selves and opposed to the world of not-self, as in the Sāṅkhya, then a man would have every justification in renouncing the world and all its demands for the sake of his personal salvation. On the other hand, if the self were an all-comprehending reality, as understood in the Upaniṣads and the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, then he would be left without any rationale for such a self-centric creed as renunciation of the world, since the Self for whose sake one seeks to renounce others is the Self within them all.[36]

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26. 'Brahman is the whole of the universe; besides Brahman there is nothing.' See *Viveka Cūdāmaṇi*, tr. Swami Madhavananda, Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1926, p. 236. 'Because everything springs from the Self, is dissolved in It and remains imbued with It during continuance, as it cannot be perceived apart from the Self, therefore everything is the Self.' See *Bhāṣya on Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* II.4.6, etc.
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Action and freedom

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In course of the development of Hume's theory of the passions culminating in the doctrine of sympathy, two points call for special notice. They are:

(i) That Hume makes a gradual shift to what may be called a dispositional analysis of the passions on the basis of his view of 'the whole bent or tendency' of the passions 'from the beginning to the end', and
(ii) That, since the passions are related to their corresponding behavioural signs, it is possible to have an inferential awareness of the other person's state of mind.

The correspondence between the passions and their manifestation in terms of behavioural signs is based upon the conative quality of the passions themselves. There is a special class of the passions, i.e. the other-directed passions such as love, hatred, malice, etc. which are 'attended' by certain specific propensities of action or on the part of the feeling agent as a matter of fact. However non-logical the necessity might appear between the passions and their behavioural expressions, it cannot be ignored, given the human condition. And through Hume does make a distinction between 'pure emotions' and those that call forth special feelings 'immediately exciting us to action', yet the passions like pride and humility, strictly speaking, cannot be 'completed within themselves'. Hume himself speaks of 'the port and gait' of swans, peacocks and the turkey, and considers it as a 'proof' of their pride. However unsatisfactory the examples chosen might be, right it is clear that even the so-called 'pure emotions' have their manifestation in behaviour. In the *Enquiry* Hume explains that he does not use the word 'pride' with its common meaning. By 'pride' he designates 'the *sentiment* of conscious worth, the self-satisfaction proceeding from a review of a man's own conduct and character'. So even in the case of our feelings about ourselves, just as they are about others, are implied the standards of worthiness prevailing in society, and can very well be conceived of as *causes* of behaviour. The causal relation between the passions and their corresponding behavioural expressions is what is assumed both by the principles of comparison and sympathy. The difference between the two principles lies in that in sympathizing with other's feelings we know his feelings by giving ourselves up to them, whereas in comparing we know them in subordination to our own. But in both the cases a special relationship between the passions felt by others and its expression in behaviour-sign is assumed. Moreover, Hume is emphatic in saying that the causes of the passions must 'be constant and inherent in his [the other person's] passions and *character*' and the pleasure or the uneasiness which produces

the passions in us 'proceed' from an 'action' of the other person, who is its 'cause and author'. The action and the agent, Hume says, are 'sufficiently' connected. Men's actions exhibit 'a particular fore-thought and design'. In so far as 'the action arises from the person' the passions are not ineffectual stirrings of emotions, they are conatively potent.

Now, given that actions and their agents are there, the question arises: are the actions free or determined? This leads us immediately on to an ancient and vexed problem of philosophy. The problem consists in encountering two of our commonsense beliefs in conflict with each other, namely, that all our actions are causes and that man is a responsible agent. The former is the thesis of determinism and the latter that of the libertarians. Determinism places actions due to human agency in a class with events in general, and seeks to explain actions in causal terms without any reference to human agency or deliberate human intervention or non-intervention in the course of nature. The libertarians, on the other hand, define the concept of action as deliberate human intervention or non-intervention in the course of nature. For them, action is necessarily not an event like eclipse or earthquake, and the term cannot be understood without reference to persons who are responsible agents. Action, for that matter, is human action. It is obvious that both the views, the deterministic and the libertarian, cannot be held together, yet each of them appears plausible when considered severally. Action is an extremely problematical idea and engenders many paradoxes in moral psychology. It would be convenient to take the term as denoting a proper subclass of behaviour, which, again, covers a rather wide range of phenomena. But 'behaviour' is a natural word to employ for categorizing a certain kind of animal movement, and I would like to leave the word unexplained, taking it as basic. A very common kind of human behaviour is called *action*, and episodes of this kind of behaviour are called *acts*. We speak of the magistrate's action, and in this sense 'action' can be taken to signify *something done*, while 'act' generally signifies *a doing*. Apart from our locutions about physical transactions involving inanimate objects, actions are spoken of as purposive. Again, 'action' directs our attention to what happens, to the movements made the results thereof. Then it is something overt. There is a sense in which we speak of mental acts, e.g. trying to remember, say, the French word for 'love'; perhaps we cannot speak of mental actions. An action is not an activity like gardening, walking or teaching, which may be engaged in or cultivated. An act is performed, begun and terminated at specific times. We can and do talk of failure or success of either acts or activities, but perhaps not of actions as such. Actions can be identified as being of certain kinds and described in certain respects. It is not the case that there are not overlapping of 'action', 'act' and 'activity'. What is important is not to get the notions smudged so as to overlook their differences. However, 'action' as purposive overt behaviour is more a sophisticated notion than its cognates. With this rough and ready account of the notion of action, I propose to turn to Hume's view on the matter.

Hume does nowhere say what he means by the term 'action', though it is clear that for him the term 'action' entails personal agency. Let us take his celebrated example of the acorn destroying the oak by outgrowing it. Now this botanical event is not an action, since the charge of parricide cannot be brought against it. 'Action', says Hume, 'may be laudable or blamable' and events cannot be so evaluated. Actions 'may cause a judgement' and are in their turn caused by the will, and are thus 'signs of motives'. A moral judgement is an evaluation of the motives of the agent *via* his actions. That our actions are in a peculiar way revelatory of our character is brought home by Hume's interchangeably using 'action or character'. An action can be an object of moral evaluation only if the agent is *morally* responsible. Sometimes it is possible to distinguish the notion of moral responsibility from that of causal responsibility. The relation between the two types of responsibility is asymmetrical. If an agent *A* is morally responsible for his action, he is causally responsible too but not vice versa. Deaths due to earthquake may be lamented, but the natural phenomenon can in no way be morally responsible for the sorrowful state of affairs. On the contrary, Brutus kills Caesar, and the Roman senator is *both* morally and causally responsible for the emperor's death. Brutus' causal responsibility lies in the series of bodily movements that he might have had to make, e.g. lifting his hand, holding the dagger, swooping it down and thrusting it into Caesar's skin, etc. but his moral responsibility consists in his motive. Without further elucidating the distinction between moral and causal responsibilities, we might now say that an event is an action, if and only if both moral and causal responsibilities for its happening are ascribable to a person. The concept of action co-implies the concept of personal agency. Actions are, for Hume, properly speaking, 'actions of the will'.

Let us now move from this brief and roughly stated account of Hume's concept of action to his views about liberty and necessity. The passions, direct and indirect, or the feelings that we have about good and evils, and those about ourselves and others, cause us to act. But what does it mean 'to act'? Or, since all actions are 'actions of the will', what is the will? The notion of the will is not elaborately discussed by Hume as one can find in Kant. But he does define the will as a faculty of exertion, and says that it is closely allied to the direct passions like desire and aversion. 'Desire arises from good consider'd simply, and aversion is deriv'd from evil. The will exerts itself, when either the good or the absence of the evil may be attain'd by any action of the mind or body.' The passage is significant owing to Hume's interchangeable use of 'mind or body'. The actor or the agent is a *person*, of whom both the predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics and predicates ascribing states of consciousness respectively are predicable. Hume is neither a physicalist nor a Cartesian, and, for him, persons are neither exclusively bodies as it was with Hobbes, nor are they minds only, as they were with Descartes. Because the concept of a person is identified by both the sorts of predicates it attracts,

action and willing are co-ordinated in the life history of the moral agent. However, the will is not a passion, though it does share some of the characteristics of indirect passions. On page 399 of the *Treatise* Hume describes the will as one of the 'immediate effects of pain and pleasure', and in that sense, we may take the will as a direct passion. Kemp Smith upholds this interpretation. But, though Kemp Smith does have the textual support in holding the will as a direct passion, Hume's statement is not enough clear. He says that 'it [the will] be not comprehended among the passions' and that, as already noted, it is one of the 'immediate effects of pain and pleasure'. How a direct passion is, by definition, one that arises in the individual immediately by original impressions. Then what does Hume mean by saying that the will is not a passion? The division of the passions into direct and indirect is in accordance with their origination, and does Hume intend to reserve the term 'passion' for the indirect ones alone? It does appear so, though he does not say anything to that effect. The indirect passions being simple impressions are indefinable, almost in the manner of Moore's dogma, since they are unanalysable. It is this indefinability what the will shares with the indirect passions. Despite their indefinability the indirect passions like pride and humility, love and hatred, etc. are describable in terms of their 'nature, origin, causes and objects', and the description could be dispensed with only because of our familiarity with the passions. About the will Hume remarks that ' 'tis impossible to define, and needless to describe any farther'. But what does he mean by the term 'will'? And Hume's answer is the following: 'By the *will*, I mean nothing but *the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body or new perception of our mind.*' It is, in fact, a definition, since we define the terms and not the objects or things designated by the terms. So Hume's notion of indefinability is, in fact, the notion of unanalysability of any simple entity whatsoever. In Hume's case, it is the indirect passions, in Moore's case it is the non-natural properties. Anyway, Hume's definition of the will, as I would call it, has two main features: one, that the will is an internal impression; and the other, that to will is to 'knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind'. If we take common examples of willing such as moving one's hand or calling up an image in one's mind, it is the second part of the definition that is more important than having a particular impression which we come to experience only in consequence of willing. Nothing can be a better chosen instance of willing than the ability of performing a voluntary act. But somehow Hume intends either to explain away the will or, owing to his commitment to an empiricist theory of knowledge, he is constrained to admit an entity only if we could have an impression of it. But the matter, as it stands, is that it is the impression, Kemp Smith very rightly remarks, and *not* the 'knowingly' giving rise affair that Hume proceeds to deal with, to the effect that 'voluntary actions are treated like other perceptions and ideas of the mind'. If the will is an impression, and 'like any other passion in the

mind' as Kemp Smith points out, in so far as its unanalysability is concerned, wherein then does the will's difference from the passions lie?

But for Hume to make the will an impression is advantageous, because then, like any other impression, the will as well could be explained in causal terms. He introduces the notion of 'necessary actions'. What he really means by the phrase is opaque, perhaps that actions as effects are determined by their causes. Actions are not *sui generis*, rather caused: 'We conclude one body or action to be the infallible cause of another.' Of course, everything depends on what Hume means by 'cause'. The word 'cause' is often employed whenever questions of explanations arise. 'Explanation for', 'cause of', etc. are near synonyms over a wide variety of cases. Hume often thinks of a cause as a happening, which explains a subsequent happening. He also often talks about 'cause' and 'causation' as if they were co-extensive with explanation. It may not be altogether unplausible to interpret his phrase 'determination of the mind' to mean 'explanation', since the sense of 'cause' is, at times, relative to forms of explanation. Even the word 'reason' is used in the sense of facts which might be explained by knowledge. In the case of explaining human behaviour, there are a number of items which one might mention to explain. Dispositions, emotions, motives, sympathy, etc. are a few of the explanatory factors. All of these are causes in the sense of occurrences or happenings that explain the subsequent occurrences or happenings. They operate by occurring or happening. As explanatory factors they are present in the phenomena to be explained, and mention of their presence might explain the actions done. It remains, of course, an open question whether explanatory items of causes are necessary or sufficient to explain an act. But what is clear is that by calling these facts, occurrences, etc. 'causes', we view ('determination of the mind') them as items of a kind, mention of which might explain actions performed by human agents.

It remains to be added that Hume's anti-theses of the 'actions of the mind' and the 'actions of matter' designate *mutatis mutandis* what we now-a-days call event and human action respectively. His set of synonymous expressions for human action consists of the following: besides 'actions of the mind', 'actions of the will' and 'voluntary action'. Voluntarity, for Hume, is built into the notion of human action. In this sense, he is echoing Locke, for whom the exercise of the power of the will was the distinguishing characteristic of voluntary action. Whether in performing a voluntary action one performs two separate actions—the act of willing to perform the action and the action itself—remains open to interpretations in view of Hume's account of the relationship between mind and body. At least, the matter cannot be very readily decided.

The phrase 'necessary action', in the present context, calls for elucidation. The term 'necessary' belongs to the causal discourse, and characterizes the type of connection that is felt by the mind in its passage from observed sequences of 'constant conjunction' to the habitually expected state of affairs:

'It is from the constant union that the necessity arises.' An action would be called necessary in the sense that its occurrence could be explained in terms of 'the constant *union* and the *inference* of the mind'. Events or what Hume calls 'actions of matter' are usually so explained, as items in causal sequences, as being indifferently either causes or effects, according as we regard them in their relation to their consequences or in connection with their antecedents. An action then is necessary, for Hume, only if it is causally explicable. The 'actions of matter', he says, 'are...regarded as instances of necessary actions'; and he asks whether the 'actions of mind' could be said to be necessary in the specified sense of the word as well.

Hume's position is somewhat unique. He does not propose a reduction of the 'actions of the mind' to the status of the 'actions of matter' as any physicalist or behaviourist would do, though he extends his criterion of determinism over the domain of the 'actions of the mind' without reservation. He holds that the 'actions of the mind' are 'necessary' in the same sense as those of the 'actions of matter', and says that 'our actions [i.e. actions due to personal agency] have a constant union with our motives, tempers, and circumstances'. This is Hume's premise for inferring the necessity of the 'actions of the mind', and he seeks to prove the truth of his premise on a 'general view of the common course of human affairs'. The 'common course of human affairs' is marked by a 'uniform and regular operation of natural principles'. What are the 'natural principles' is not easy to decide, for Hume does not mention it explicitly; but from the examples that he discusses it appears that by 'natural principle' he intends to designate statements of *a posteriori* sort about natural relation. Obviously, the paradigm of such a 'natural principle' would be the principle stating the *necessary* connection between cause and effect. The natural relation between cause and effect is characterized by two factors: uniformity and regularity; and in terms of these two factors Hume defines the concept of necessity. 'Necessity is regular and certain' or 'uniformity forms the very essence of necessity'. The proposition 'like causes... produce like effects' is a second-order instance of a necessary principle. That 'men cannot live without society' is another instance of necessary principle. In fact, Hume goes on to observe that man's social existence and behaviour exhibit a uniform and regular pattern. Uniformity is 'a general course of nature in human actions'. Despite the diversity and difference in men's stations in life and circumstance in their sexual and social positions, geographical and political state of affairs, they act in a uniform pattern. Men's acts are in a uniform and regular way conformable with their characters as human beings, as members of their age, group and sex, their vocational group, as members of their nation. 'The different stations of life influence the whole fabric, external and internal; and these different stations arise necessarily, because uniformly, from the necessary and uniform principles of human nature.' Again,

> There is a general course of nature in human actions, as well as in the operations of the sun and the climate. There are also characters peculiar to different nations and particular persons, as well as common to mankind. The knowledge of these characters is founded on the observation of an uniformity in actions, that flow from them; and this uniformity forms the very essence of necessity.

Now, from 'the general view of the common course of human affairs' Hume claims to have shown that 'actions have a constant union and connection with the situation and temper of the agent'. The uniformity of human actions is a logical condition for asserting the necessity of human actions. But what sort of a logical condition? Sufficient or necessary, or both? The structure of Hume's argument is not enough perspicacious. He says that the 'knowledge' for that matter, belief that human actions are necessary is 'founded' on the 'general view' that human actions are uniform. He uses logically provocative phrases such as 'flow from them'. In fact, he does not argue, simply puts the matter equivocally in another terminology, as if it were the case that 'necessity' *meant* 'uniformity'. Anyway, for Hume, there does not arise any question of denying the uniformity of human actions in order to escape the conclusion that human actions are necessary. If the relation between the premise of uniformity and the conclusion of necessity were that of a conditional proposition, then the premise could be denied only if the conclusion could be shown to be false. That is to say, it could have been the case, had Hume's argument been a substitution instance of *modus tollens*. It is doubtful whether it has that form. Again, if uniformity of human action implies its necessity, the consequence cannot be escaped by denying the antecedent, as Hume says; for that would involve a fallacious logical move. But Hume does say that the argument that human actions are necessary can be eluded 'by denying that uniformity of human actions, on which it is founded'. It could be so only if Hume had in mind some relation like entailment or strict implication. If uniformity of human actions *entails* the necessity of human actions, then, of course, the latter cannot be rejected without denying the former. Such a strong claim, perhaps, cannot be put forward on Hume's behalf.

Granted that human action is necessary in the sense that it uniformly exhibits a constant union with the agent's motives and circumstances, it remains to be shown that the necessity of human action is the same as the necessity of cause and effect relation. Hume says that 'in judging of the actions of men we must proceed upon the same maxim, as when we reason concerning external objects'. The constant conjunction of phenomena generates a propensity in the mind to expect similar occurrences in future when familiar conjuncts are presented. The so-called *necessary connection* is felt in the mind or 'in the imagination', and in all cases of probable reasoning the mind is guided by custom. The process of non-demonstrative inference for Hume is, in fact, a process of habitual expectation. The probability of the inferred state of

affairs may vary in degrees, but 'the mind balances the contrary' instances, and restores the feeling of necessary connection between constantly united phenomena. The constancy of union is the *formal* ground of causal inference on the basis of which 'a connection in the imagination is established'. The *idea* of necessary connection is derived from the *impression* of constant conjunction or union of two particular phenomena in experience. Now the same formal criterion of necessity is observed in the case of human actions. 'No union can be more constant and certain than that of actions with some motives and characters; and if in other cases the union is uncertain, 't's no more than what happens in the operations of body ....' Just as the union of phenomena *determines* us to infer the existence of one from that of another, similarly from the union of motives and actions inference, i.e. prediction of actions from motives, becomes possible. Here we come to have another way of saying the same things. To say that human actions are necessary is equivalent to saying that human actions are predictable. Various objections can be raised against Hume's view that human actions are predictable since they are uniform and hence necessary. Protagonists of popular version of libertarianism often appeal to the Heisenberg principle of certainty. The principle is alleged to state that it is impossible to predict the future state of affairs of the universe, because we can never determine what the past is. If the causes cannot be fully known, the effects cannot be fully predicted. F. Waismann has said that the principle renders the present even unknowable, let alone the future. The objection does not seem specially relevant. No one would deny that we are often able to predict the actions of our friends or the thoughts or emotions they will experience in certain circumstances. Having seen how they reacted on frequent occasions in the past, we build up an idea of their future behaviour. If such expectations are not fulfilled, our social life will become impossible. An uncharacteristic behaviour falsifying a prediction does not prove that it does not follow from the agent's character. Maybe that the predictor was unacquainted with a facet of the agent's character that explains his behaviour. Again, it may be argued that all actions cannot be explained on the same logical level. Compulsive behaviour can be explained in causal terms; but to explain intelligent, purposive behaviour we have to use the concepts of reason and motive. We have stated earlier that Hume's notion of cause is often coextensive with 'explanation'. Furthermore, the onus would rest with the libertarian to show that motive language is not causal language. If a motive cannot be different from any character trait as far as the determining of action is concerned, then the two languages, in Hume's sense of 'cause', become intertranslatable in the context of human action. Motives belong to a special class of reasons which apply to actions which are performed with a particular end in view. To give the motive for an action is to give the reason for that action, i.e. to explain that action. Though to give the reason is not necessarily to give the motive, this fact does not require us to hold that a motivated action is causally inexplicable. There is another point worth mentioning. To say that an

agent is reliable is, to a large extent, to admit that his behaviour is predictable. Perhaps it is not possible to assert that an agent is reliable and yet his behaviour is not predictable. To say that so-and-so is reliable is to imply a sort of unasserted prediction based on our past acquaintance with him. Or, in other words, prediction in human affairs can apply to those events about which we have been able to form expectations, because we have witnessed other similar examples in the past. Accuracy of our past observations concerning the character of the agent and his actions may be questioned, but this fact in no way goes to invalidate the predictability thesis as a principle. That we do expect agents to behave in a particular fashion is no less true than the feeling of 'freedom' that we often experience, e.g. the certainty that I feel that I can lift my arm whenever I please. More about such matters later.

Any attempt to predict the possible human actions on the basis of the motive and character of the agents themselves would be to offer what Hume calls *moral evidence* in support of the view that human actions are necessary. Moral evidence, he says 'is nothing but a conclusion concerning the actions of men, derived from the consideration of their motives, temper and situation'. By virtue of a constant union of men's actions and motives it becomes arguable that should a man with a specific character be placed in a specific situation his acts will follow by *natural* necessity in exactly the same way as the effects of any other set of causes.

We may now pause for a while to consider some of the points that arise from Hume's argument that human actions are necessary. In the first place, Hume defines 'necessity' in terms of 'uniformity', and this uniformity is observable in the operations of nature. We have the experience of similar objects in constant conjunction with the consequence that the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other. This is the genetic account of our idea of necessity. Now if the necessity that we feel in the mind and entertain the consequent belief that 'every object is determined by an absolute fate to a certain degree and direction of its notion', necessity of the causal sort or of that encountered with or resorted to in connection with causal reasoning would be paradigmatic. At least, it is so with Hume. The next move made by Hume is to extend the idea of necessity to cover the domain of human actions. The idea of necessity in the sense of a feeling consequent upon our experience of constant conjunction of similar objects could be said to hold in the case of human actions only if it were shown that man's motives and actions are also constantly conjoined. Hume says that he would 'prove' it, but, in fact, as has been rightly noticed by Ardal, he does not do any such thing. Nor does he point to any case of constant conjunction of motives and actions of human beings, granted that it could be so done. He is honest, though, to take into account the alleged irregularity and uncertainty of human conduct. What then is the status of the assertion that human actions are necessary? At this point, Hume resorts to his distinction between demonstrative and probable reasoning. In the domain of matters of fact demonstrative

certainty cannot be hoped for, all that we might aspire after a statistical average of evidential probability. On this issue, the force of natural evidence is as much non-demonstrative as that of moral evidence. In all cases of arguments from experience, any movement from restricted generalization ('All known *X*'s are *F*') to unrestricted or universal generalization ('All *X*'s are *F*') will and does involve a fallacious deductive step. We can certainly move from 'All known *X*'s are *F*' to 'All *X*'s are *F*' only if the necessity is logical, and is embodied in the structure of things. But Hume denies the existence of logical necessity in the non-linguistic world or the domain of matters of fact. In the circumstance, the status of the conclusion inferred from the observed constant conjunction of similar objects will be one of belief. It is as much a matter of belief that human action are necessary as to hold that every event has a cause. The *idea* of cause entails the *idea* of necessary connection with the effect, and since 'there is but one kind of *necessity*, as there is but one kind of cause' the common distinction between *moral* and *physical* necessity is without any foundation in nature. It has been one of Hume's intentions to 'cement together' the natural and the moral evidences on the basis of one definition of 'necessity'.

It may be worthwhile to consider the value of uniformity for viewing human actions. The main source from where Hume gets his moral evidence strengthened is history, because 'nothing more interests us than our own actions and those of others, the greatest part of our reasonings is employed in judgements concerning them'. In fact, history, says Hume, would be impossible without making inferences about the behaviour of other people. In the *Enquiry* the list of studies that depends on moral evidence is enlarged so as to include, besides history, politics, morals, and literary criticism. The chief function of history is 'to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature'. The discovery that motives are 'the regular springs of human action and behaviour' is a part of the wisdom of mankind: '... The same motives always produce the same actions. The same events follow from the same causes.' Now why is it that 'mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of necessity?' Mainly because the concept of necessity renders actions intelligible, just as it does a brute matter of fact. Events in nature are not episodic merely, they acquire intelligibility only if they could be construed as items of a causal sequence. We often explain people's behaviour by reference to emotions in the sense of motives or inclinations, or what Hume would call 'calm passions' that are, he says, 'settled principles of actions' as distinguished from mere agitations (the calm/violent dichotomy is not always intended, in the *Treatise*, to be based on the criterion of intensity of the passions). Philosophers have taken motive-explanations or reason-explanations to be non-causal. For Hume this would not be the case. The idea that human actions can be divided into those which are explicable by reference to reasons and those which are explicable by reference to causes does not stand up to scrutiny. Some explanations can be found which are not clearly classifiable one way or the other. Again, reasons do not operate in the absence or to the exclusion of causes;

they function in a context in which causes are also functioning. We shall take up this matter later. In the present context it may be allowable to say that to explain an action by reference to the agent's emotions is to subsume it under a propensity or behaviour trend. Many of the concepts in terms of which we describe human behaviour are dispositional, and, according to an influential view of this matter, such words are generic or determinable. That is to say, '*X* loves his wife' ('love' is a dispositional emotion word for Hume, and the passion has a 'bent' and 'tendency') does not have any episodic use. On the contrary, the statement can be construed as an explanation or interpretation of *X*'s episodic behaviour. As a dispositional statement the sentence is a tendency-stating assertion. The description that 'I love his wife' or '*X* is a loving husband' makes a wide range of different actions predictable. There is nothing harmful in thus putting the case, only if the argument is not tailored to advocate a non-causal view of the relation between dispositions and actions. A departure from the so-called generic view of dispositional terms would call for on a determinist's part. The dispositional verb 'love', it may be agreed, does not have a corresponding episodic use. Yet the range of different actions predictable from the description that *X* is a loving husband can be identified as forming a class inasmuch as they would be episodic explicable in terms of *X*'s love for his wife. In other words, a disposition is *regulative* of its determinable episodes, while these, in their turn, constitute the class or satisfaction-range determining, as it were, the truth of a dispositional account or explanation of human actions. The sentence 'I love his wife' would be vacuous, if there did not exist identifiable episodes that satisfy the description '*X* is a loving husband'. In fact, it is those episodes that fill the history of *X*'s marital relationship with dynamatic interest. On the other hand, if the episodes were not explicable by reference to *X*'s love for his wife, they would hardly have been intelligible. Hence intelligibility on the part of the episodes and significance on the part of dispositional accounts of human action require a causal relationship between the two.

Intelligibility of episodes lies, in other words, in their predictability. This predictability may be merely epistemic without being logical. Logical predictability could hold only if the necessary connection were real or structural to the sequence of events. But Hume does not allow this to be the case on any account. He says: 'In no single instance the ultimate connection of any objects is discoverable, either by our sense or reason...we can never penetrate so far into the essence and construction of bodies.' The necessary connection between constantly conjoined events is felt by the mind 'in the imagination'. The imagination is an epistemic constitutive factor in our probable knowledge, and hence the observed regularity of sequences, or for that matter, uniformity of nature and human actions renders it credible. The credibility of the necessity of human actions is a necessary condition of the epistemic predictability of human acts. The felt necessity may not offer us any logical assurance, yet it is a practical guide to our making judgements alike in the case of natural

phenomena and human actions. Often freedom is taken to be the unpredictability of our actions. But this tends to create an opacity of understanding of our fellow-beings in their reaction to social reality.

Now that human actions are caused, does it imply that they are not free? Does freedom or, as Hume has it, liberty belong to the will or to the agent? That *liberty* and *necessity* are consistent with each other is a view that has had a long history in the British moral thought. Hobbes, for instance, in the *Leviathan* argued in its favour. He categorically remarks:

> When the words *free,* and *liberty*, are applied to any thing but bodies, they are abused; for that which is not subject to motion, is not subject to impediment: and therefore, when it is said (for example) the way is free, no liberty of the way is signified, but of those that walk in it without stop .... So when we *speak freely,* it is not the liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law hath obliged to speak otherwise than he did. Lastly, from the use of the word *free will,* no liberty can be inferred of the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man, which consists in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do.

That *free will* is an improper terminology is a view not only held by Hobbes but also accounted for in another context in the following manner. What is it that make us call an act *voluntary*? 'Liberty' for Hobbes is to be conceived in a negative way as an absence of impediments, and only those actions can be called voluntary which are performed by an agent who 'hath time to deliberate' and 'the action follows his opinion of the goodness or harm of it' and follows 'immediately the last appetite'. To deliberate is to ask oneself whether he should do a thing or not, and deliberations consist of 'an alternate succession of contrary appetites, the last is that which we call the will'. He distinguishes the will from intentions and inclinations which 'change often', but the will being the last is one. The will, since 'nothing taketh beginning from itself', is the *necessary* cause. In brief, then, for Hobbes, the concept of voluntary actions is to be analysed in causal terms, actions are causally determined by the will, though there is no question of the will's being *free*, unless, of course, one chooses to abuse the term. It is the agent, properly speaking, who can be said to be free. The view has passed into the main stream of British philosophy, and we shall find Locke too expressing the same opinion. He says that *voluntary* is not opposed to *necessary*, and considers the question whether man's will is free as 'altogether improper'. For him to ask that question is as insignificant as to ask whether virtue is square. Volition, says Locke, 'is an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by exploying it in, or withholding it from any particular action. And what is the will, but the faculty to do this?' Now since, for Locke, both the will and freedom are powers, to ask whether the will is free, is, in

effect, to ask 'whether one power has another power'. The absurdity arises from one's overlooking the fact that a power can only belong to an agent. Hence Locke thinks that '*the question is no proper, whether the will be free, but whether a man be free*'. Again, Locke sees willing or choosing as an action, and man's freedom consists in doing or not doing that what he wills, and it is also true that man cannot forbear volition. Hence man is not free with regard to volition. He puts the point as follows: '...the act of volition ... being that which he cannot avoid, a man in respect of that action is under a necessity, and so cannot be free; unless necessity and freedom can consist together and a man can be free and bound at once.' Man's freedom, for Locke, consists in the absence of external compulsion. I choose a certain line of action, and there is nothing in the conditions in which I attempt to perform the act which restrains me in any way. In this sense I am free. But am I free to will? Why do I choose this action rather than another? Can I remain inactive? On the whole, it seems that Locke feels that we are not free to will, that we are determined as to what we do will.

We, in fact, shall leave the account of Locke's position rather half-way without deciding as to what, according to him, determines our will, the greatest good in view or some pressing uneasiness. But, for our purpose in view, the account will be sufficient in relating Hume's concept of the will to the tradition of British moral thought. Two points emerge from our consideration of Hobbes' and Locke's views about *liberty* and *necessity*. One is that they are not incompatible with each other; and the other is that every human action is causally related with man's will. There is, of course, difference of emphasis between Hume, on the one hand, and Hobbes and Locke, on the other. For Hume, the most engaging question is whether man's actions are free, rather than whether the will is free. The feeling of the inappropriateness of the expression 'freedom of the will' is not so marked in Hume as it is in Locke or in Hobbes. In respect of man's freedom Hobbes and Locke do not think in identical terms, but both agree that freedom cannot be a property of the will. We shall have occasion to note other shades of difference between these thinkers when we have completed an examination of Hume's concept of the will. Hume's concept of the will has echoes of Locke's. The verb 'to will', for Hume, is 'knowingly to give rise' to any action of mind or body. Both Locke and Hume take willing to consist in *knowingly* exerting oneself. The adverb 'knowingly' stands for voluntary or intentional character of the action given rise to. For Hume, to say that an act is voluntary is to give a causal account of the way the act comes about, or, in other words, the intentionality of an act implies a causal statement. The statement that an act a is voluntary on the part of an agent A would be analysable, from Hume's point of view, into a causal statement that the act a is *knowingly* given rise to by A, or a was initiated by an act of A's willing. It may be recalled that for Hume actions are intentional, and in this context his phrase 'actions of the mind' is significant.

A logical connection between will and action can hold only when 'action' implies intention. A man may be said necessarily to want to do things he does on purpose, since he does not necessarily want to do the things he does inadvertently, accidently, by mistake, that is, unintentionally. Now, supposing the relation between will or intention and deed is logical, can it be causal as well? There is no reason to suppose that the former excludes the latter. It might be said that an agent's intention that *p* cannot be adequately described unless it includes a description of *p*. In this case the relation between '*A* intends *p*' and *p* is logical. But does it prevent *A*'s intention that *p* cannot be recognized independently of *p*? Otherwise, discovery of error and failure would become impossible. And if it be the case that *A*'s intention that *p* can be a state of affairs distinct from and independent of *p*, there would be nothing to preclude the existence of a causal relation between these distinct and separate states of affairs. Hence the argument that, since the nature of intention cannot be specified independently of its effects, the logical relation between the two excludes any possible causal relation between them does not cut much ice. The purpose of our contention will be immediately evident. If the relation between intention and action can be both logical and causal, ascriptivism and causal analysis of actions can, then, as well go together. It seems hardly plausible to say that Hume explains away the intentional aspect of actions at the cost of their causal analysis. From the regularity of men's volitional decisions, we can speak of motives in a causal context. To judge that an agent is morally responsible for an action, he must not only have brought that action about, but he must also have done it knowingly (that sometimes it is correct to judge that the agent is wrong to bring about an action even when he does not do so knowingly is admitted). Any sudden, unexpected, unpredictable action which does not come from the agent is not something for which the individual can be held morally responsible. And there must be some connection between the individual and his action before he can be held responsible for it. All determinists, from Hume to Mill, have such a course of reasoning as an 'interpretation of universal experience'. It has been remarked that in Hume's account the causal side gets the upper hand, the intentional aspect of an act, designated by 'knowingly' is either explained away or left completely out of consideration. Kemp Smith had noticed it. In recent times P.T. Geach has made a similar observation about Hume's definition of the 'will'. (Whether Hume really *defined* the will could be and, in fact, has been questioned. H.A. Prichard, for example, holds that the character of willing is *sui generis*, and says that 'the activity of willing is indefinable'. Obviously, no act could be defined, but a term or a concept can be. We submit that Hume did *define* the concept of the will, since he was stating what was meant by the term. Again, the will could be indefinable if it were an indirect passion, which *qua* simple impression would be indefinable. But the will is not an indirect passion, though it is stated to share some of the characteristic features of the indirect passions. For Prichard's views see his essay 'Acting, Willing, Desiring' in

Moral Obligation. Geach writes about Hume's definition of will that he 'concentrates on the supposed internal impression' and deals with the causal relation between this and the 'new motion' or 'new perception' on the same lines as other causal relations between successive events. Like a conjurer, Hume diverts our attention; he makes us forget the words 'knowingly give rise to' which are indispensable if his definition is to have the least plausibility. Geach's position seems to verge on a non-committal analysis. It is not clear whether Geach wishes to abolish the notion of volition or the reduction of the voluntary into the causal. He is mainly fighting against the view called 'ascriptivism', which holds that to say that an act *a* is voluntary is not to describe how the act came about, but, on the contrary, to adopt a moral or legal attitude and thereby ascribe responsibility for the act to the agent. The ascriptive and descriptive strata of language are logically independent, i.e. the truth of falsity of the one in no way determines the truth or falsity of the other, because descriptive language is in a quite different logical realm from ascriptive language. Now Hume's view about the will may be called in Geach's own phrase 'voluntary causality', but to hold the view that Hume was not an ascriptivist is to court over simplification. There cannot be any dispute about the fact that Hume belongs to a tradition of modern thought, beginning more or less with Descartes, which attempts to reduce agency to causation. According to this tradition, to describe an event as a man's action is to assert that the event is caused in a certain way. This, of course, does not mean that Hume did not have in mind the notion of responsibility. Ascriptivism, or the methodological analysis of the notion of voluntary acts as ascribing responsibility can be traced back to Aristotle. In his *Ethics* Aristotle lays it down that praise and blame attach to voluntary action, i.e. actions done not under compulsion and with knowledge of the circumstances. In Book III Aristotle discusses the conditions of responsibility for actions. The agent can be held responsible for his acts only if his actions were voluntary, that is, if he were not compelled to act the way he did. Aristotle's definition of compulsion is strict: actions are involuntary only when the cause is in external circumstances and the agent contributes nothing. While knowledge of the circumstances and absence of compulsion are the necessary conditions of voluntary actions, choice discriminates character better than actions (voluntary ones) do. Choice, according to Aristotle, is the adoption of action decided on after deliberation about means. And, consequently, we are responsible for bad as well as for good actions. Now, ascriptivism and a causal analysis of voluntary actions are two different things, though, as we contended earlier, neither of them need exclude the other. Kurt Baier has pointed out that ascriptivist account of human actions or the social practice of bringing people to account is a result of an evaluative attitude. We bring people to account only when their actions have any relevance to obligatory social rules or directives. On the other hand, the causal analysis is primarily epistemological, it is concerned with the intelligibility of actions as events. Whether there can be any act which does not

come within the purview of social practice is not the question, nor would Hume consent to such a view, since he is so much emphatic about the social nature of man. His main interest in analysing *liberty* and *necessity* is not to demonstrate the incredibility of ascriptivism as Geach seems to suggest, rather to bring the concept of action within the perspective of a unified methodological category of cause defined as felt necessary connection. If Hume is a determinist, his determinism is methodological. He held that our actions are determined in the sense that they are the outcome of psychological influences and mechanisms, but this view was never meant to deny that praise and blame could be ascribed to human actions. A moral judgement is not rendered futile by the fact of the will being determined. And whether it can be determined independently of the agent's consciousness of right and wrong is as incredible an issue as that every human action is uncaused. Neither of these squares with the everyday convictions about moral responsibility. Neither Hobbes nor Hume had any such intention. Hobbes' definition of *free agent* is frankly Aristotlean, he defines *liberty* as 'the absence of external impediments'. He mentions also the factor of deliberation, as Aristotle does, in the process of voluntary acting. Again, the point of ascribing responsibility or, as Hobbes puts it, 'praise, dispraise, reward and punishment' does, of course, arise, but only from a socio-political point of view: 'What is it else to *praise*, but to say a thing is good? Good, I say, for me, or for somebody else, or for the state and commonwealth.' Hume, it is well known, always looked to the character of the agent as the proper object of evaluation. Ascriptivism and 'voluntary causality' are not indifferent to each other. It is not always that ascriptivism and causally descriptive language belong to two logically different language sets, though sometimes the intentions of the two kinds of analyses may be different. I do not in the least wish to suggest that simply on that ground the two can have no relationship whatsoever. For example, I may discover *why* I did a particular act, and my discovering so does not prevent me from feeling remorse or joy according to the nature of the act. Similarly, we may *know* why someone did not act, and at the same time bring him to account. Ascriptivism and reducing agency to causality are not mutually exclusive affairs, but depends on what attitude we take, evaluative or epistemic.

So far we have been trying to understand Hume's position in the light of Geach's remarks. The causal analysis of voluntary acts did have its critics. Even within the tradition of British moral thought, Cudworth held Locke's sort of determinism to be 'childish argumentation' and Reid worked out a strongly voluntaristic account of man's freedom. But before we can consider these views, we should see what Hume has to say on the concept of *liberty*.

After having shown that human actions are caused or, in other words, subsuming the concept of agency under that of causation, Hume now will have the task of explaining the concept of liberty or freedom. Like Hobbes or Locke, for Hume the adjective *free* cannot be applied to actions. Does Hume,

like Locke, treat the question 'whether man be free' in a paradoxical manner? The concept of liberty or freedom is a metaphysical concept, designating some power or ability of exertion that belongs to an agent. In a sense, *agency* and liberty is synonymous. If by *liberty* is meant some occult power, then obviously Hume would have no room for it in his system. About occult power he was allergic. Writing in connection with the metaphysical notion of cause as power, he found it 'obscure and uncertain'. Part of Hume's analysis of the idea of necessary connection is concerned with showing that the idea of power or efficacy is not derived from reason nor any single experience. He points to a synonymous family of terms, which result in absurdity when anyone of them is defined in terms of others. His argument is simple but potent. If the idea of power is one that we really have, in that case we must look the impression from which it may have been derived. 'If it be a compound idea, it must arise from compound impressions. If simple, from simple impressions.' Again, the idea of power cannot be derived from any unknown quality of matter. This is impossible because an idea cannot be derived from any thing else than from an impression, and we 'never have any impression that contains any power or efficacy. We never therefore have any idea of power.' But can it not be said that we have an idea of power 'in general'? In that sense, it must have 'some particular species of it' and, 'as power cannot subsist alone, but is always regarded as an attribute of some being or existence, we must be able to place this power in some particular being'. But these requirements of 'conceiving a particular power in a particular body' is not fulfilled in experience, nor is it demonstrable. The inevitable conclusion then is that 'we deceive ourselves in imagining we can form any such general idea'. Or, in other words, since the legitimacy of the alleged idea cannot be shown, when we talk of the idea of power, we only use words without any determinate idea. The corollary that is drawn from the polemical dialectic is that we have no idea of any being endowed with power.

But there is a sense in which Hume uses the concept of power, demystified of course. Power is a quality of perceptions, not of objects. Mind, says Hume, 'has a great propensity to spread itself on external objects' and 'the same propensity is the reason, why we suppose necessity and power to lie in the objects we consider, not in mind, that considers them'. The 'real model' of the idea of power is a mental propensity, which, after having experienced constant conjunction of resembling things in a sufficient number of instances, is felt as 'a determination of the mind to pass from one object to its usual attendant'. In this sense, power is an impression of reflection, which is a product of custom. Power is necessity. Now, the will is thought to have a power of producing effects in the form of actions. Like every causal relation, there is no real connection between the two. The epistemic status of the will is that of a cause, and like other cause it bears no discoverable connection with its effects. Hume seems to suggest a distinction between the two ways of looking at human actions: the agent's view and the spectator's view. The latter

may be said to include one's view of one's own past actions as well. The agent can become a spectator of his own actions as he can be of the actions of others. It is from the spectator's view that actions could be said to be necessary, because the necessity is nothing but a determination of the mind of the spectator. Hume's notion of 'moral evidence' is founded on a two-fold data, one, that 'our actions have a constant union with our motives'—the testimony of any agent *qua* spectator; and the other, that our 'knowledge' of other's characters is based on an inference concerning a constant connection of their actions with their motives. In both cases the necessity arises in the mind of the spectator as a result of experiencing actions having 'a constant union and connection with the situation and temper of the agent'. Power, which is, for Hume, another name of necessity does not lie in the will of the agent, but in the spectator's mind. To say that the actions of the will arise from necessity is to have recourse to an *ipso facto* belief that actions are results of human motivation. And this belief is presupposed in making judgements about human actions. The spectator's view of necessity is very clearly stated by Hume in the following observation:

> The necessity of any action, whether of matter or of the mind, is not properly a quality in the agent, but in any thinking or intelligent being, who may consider the action, and consists in the determination of his thought to infer its existence from some preceding objects.

But what happens from the agent's point of view? 'The will' says Hume, 'seems to move easily every way, and casts a shadow or image of itself, even to that side, on which it did not settle'. These words about the will's power is repeated by Hume on page 408 of the *Treatise* while giving an account of the agent's feeling about his own abilities. The feeling is there, but it does not prove that the agent is really indetermined the way he feels. The feeling is characterized by Hume the 'false sensation of liberty' or '*illusion of the fancy*'. The justification of Hume's so calling it lies in the consideration that the passage from the *feeling* of freedom or liberty to the *fact* of it cannot be logical. The 'false sensation of liberty' writes Hume, 'makes us imagine we can perform anything', but from the feeling that we are free it does not follow that we *are* free. As agents we 'feel that our actions are subject to our will on most occasions, and imagine we feel that the will itself is subject to nothing', yet the evidence of the feeling could not be taken as, what Hume calls, 'an intuitive proof of human liberty'. Perhaps Hume was reacting against the Cartesian tradition of thought concerning the will. Descartes in his fourth *Meditation* argues that we experience our will 'as being without limits'. It is the only faculty 'which is not small and circumscribed in me'. The power of will, according to Descartes, 'consists in this, that we can either do or not do something, or rather only in this that when we affirm or deny, pursue or avoid the things that are presented to us by the understanding, we do so without

feeling that our choice is imposed upon us by any external force'. Descartes' conviction that one could experience one's will as 'without limits', i.e. 'genuine free will' was reasserted in his *The Passions of the Soul*. In Article 41 he writes that 'the will is by nature so free that it can never be constrained'. It is interesting to note that Leibniz in his *Theodicy* found the Cartesian thesis unacceptable. Referring to Descartes he remarks:

> ...the reason M. Descartes had advanced to prove the independence of our free actions, by what he terms an intense inward sensation, has no force. We cannot properly speaking be sensible of our independence, and we are not aware always of the causes, often imperceptible, whereon our resolution depends. It is as though the magnetic needle took pleasure in turning towards the north: for it would think that it was turning independently of any other cause, not being aware of the imperceptible movements of the magnetic matter.

Leibniz's example would naturally remind one of Spinoza's metaphor of stone. In a letter he wrote that, if we imagined a stone suddenly endowed with consciousness, it might think that it was falling of its own volition, since it would not perceive the cause of its movement; but it would not be free not to fall, even if it imagined that it was. The similarities in the arguments purporting to denying freedom of the will are striking, though the differences among Hume, Leibniz and Spinoza are hardly to be overlooked. Hume's determinism, if his views could be so-called, depends on his own view of necessity, defined in terms of a determination of the mind in consequence of an experience of constant conjunction of similar objects in the past. For Leibniz, the determination is logical, and nothing could be farther away from Hume's intention. By calling Leibniz's determinism 'logical' I mean that, according to him, the notion of an individual contains in itself all that the individual is to do or to become. Man, held Leibniz, is a kind of spiritual automation, and in this specific sense every action of a man issues from his own nature, and is not imposed on him from without. The soul has in itself the principle of all that it does, or in his own words, 'the soul has within it the principle of all its actions, and even of all its passions'. This is a corollary of the doctrine of the pre-established harmony. A related point may be raised in this connection. Leibniz distinguished between the truths of fact and the truths of reason. Only the latter are necessary. Actions are not necessary in that sense; they are, rather, contingent, because, taken by themselves, there is no contradiction in conceiving them otherwise. So, for Leibniz, the acts of men are all determined, though not necessary. But how far the contingent character of human acts is viable may be doubted. Let us clarify this point with the help of one of his own examples. If the monad that constitutes Julius Caesar has once and for all built into it, as it were, the attribute 'crosser of the Rubicon' (this predicate being, like all the others, contained in the subject), how can it be said of

Julius Caesar that he freely chooses to cross the Rubicon? For, under Leibniz's Schema, the decision was necessarily a 'part of him'. Leibniz might have answered that it was logically possible that Caesar should not have crossed the Rubicon; hence there was no necessity about his decision to cross the river; for 'nothing is necessary of which the opposite is possible'. The suggestion here is that 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' is a truth of fact, not a truth of reason, to say 'Caesar did not cross the Rubicon' is not to contradict oneself. But if 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' is analytic, then its negation would be self-contradictory. This is another matter, and we are not concerned with it in the present context. But this answer merely glosses over the difficulty. For if God choose the universe which was the best and most perfect of all possible universe, and Julius Caesar (together with all his attributes) is a constituent of the universe that God, in fact, selected as being the most perfect, then it is hard to see how Caesar's decision was in any meaningful sense open or 'up to him'. The mere possibility that God might have selected another universe in which there was a deutero-Caesar who did not cross the Rubicon is hardly enough to bestow any genuine freedom or avoidability on Julius Caesar's actual decision. The distinction between being determined and being necessary is hardly satisfactory. So far as Leibniz's position is concerned, to say that there is an individual *a* who chooses *P* (any decision or course of action), i.e. '$(\exists x)x=a\rightarrow Pa$' is, in fact, asserting a necessary proposition, because the mere fact in the best of all possible universes that '$(\exists x)x=a$', which Leibniz in all cases might take care to point out, is a doubtful one, how far it is viable remains an open question. It is impossible that *a* could choose anything but *P*. '$(\exists x)x=a\rightarrow Pa$' is a modally necessary proposition.

But both Leibniz and Hume share the following premises in their argument against freedom of the will: that our sense or feeling of freedom is not sufficient evidence for establishing that we are really free, and that we are often ignorant of the causes on which our choice or decision depends. Both of them seek to preserve some kind of spontaneity on the part of the human agents.

Puṇyadāna or transference of merit[1]—a fiction

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The other synonyms for the term *puṇyadāna* are *puṇya parivarta* or *puṇya pariṇāmnā* (Skt.) or *pattidāna* (Pāli).

Puṇya (Pāli/*puñña*)[2] means holy, pure, sacred, virtuous, righteous, religious merit or moral merit. The compound *puṇya karman* means meritorious or religious act or religious rite, a *karma* that produces *puṇya*. In the *Saṁhitās*, *puṇya* is *iṣṭāpūrta*, the cumulative beneficial potential of a sacrificial act or religious rite. It was in the nature of a gift bestowed by gods on the principle of reciprocity—a presentation in return for a sacrifice to gods[3]—*dehi me dadāmi te*. In the *Brāhmaṇas*, the ritual sacrifice as such was deemed to produce *puṇya*; the element of reciprocity by the gods is not discarded but is not emphasized in the *Upaniṣads*. In the *Upaniṣads* and in the post-Vedic literature, *puṇya* comes to signify the merit potential of an ethical act as distinct from a holy or religious act or rite, *yajña karma*. Thus, the word *puṇya* has two meanings: (*a*) religious merit, that is, merit arising from a religious act or rite; (*b*) moral or spiritual merit resulting from moral or ethical *karma*.

Puṇya, in short, is the prospective result of *karma*, after the *karma* done in this life becomes *pūrva karma* in subsequent life and when it becomes capable of maturing and producing *puṇya*. In the existence in which a *karma* is done, it is only potential *pūrva karma* and has the potentiality of yielding *puṇya* in a future birth only.[4] *Karma* is substantive, and *puṇya* is the derivative potential thereof.

Puṇya is also produced by *śrāddha* offerings or *piṇḍa pitṛ yajña*. As a religious rite, *śrāddha* is at par with *deva yajña*. Only the former is offered to the *pitṛs*, the deceased forefathers, and the latter to the gods. But both produce *puṇya*.

The etymology of *dāna*, the second component of the compound *puṇya-dāna*, is $\sqrt{dā}$ (*dadāti*) meaning to give, bestow, grant, yield, impart, present, offer. Hence the word *dāna* has various meanings: the act of giving, giving up, communicating, imparting, teaching, paying back, restoring, adding, a gift, donation, alms-giving, charity, liberality, gift to a *bhikṣu* or the community of monks (*saṁgha*).

We are here concerned with *dāna* as a gift, donation, alms-giving, charity, etc.

The synonyms for *dāna*[5] as gift or donation are *bali, dakṣiṇā, yajña, piṇḍa dāna* in *śrāddha*.

The word *bali* means tribute, offering, gift, oblation, an offering or propitiatory oblation, a *yajña*. The *Aṅguttaranikāya* enumerates five types of *bali:* to a relation (*ñāti*), guest, *preta* (disembodied spirit of the deceased who is

awaiting rebirth in any forms o existence, that is, who is in an intermediate state), kings and gods.

It is significant to note that *śrāddha* offerings are called *piṇḍa dāna* or *pubba petabalim* (*pūrva* or *pūrvaja-preta-bali*).

Dakṣiṇā is another term which means a gift. Generally, however, this term means the gift or fee payable or paid to a Brāhmaṇa for performing a religious rite or ceremony. In Pāli *dakhinā* is a donation given to a holy person with reference to the unhappy beings in the *preta* existence (manes). It is intended to alleviate their sufferings, 'an intercessional expiatory offering' as in the case of *śrāddha* ceremony.

Yajña means worship, devotion, act of worship or devotion, offering, oblation, sacrifice, the former meaning prevailing in the Veda and the latter in the post-Vedic literature. The Pāli equivalent *yañña*[6] stands for a Brāhmaṇic sacrifice, alms-giving, charity, a gift to the *saṁgha* or *bhikṣu*.

Thus, the term *dāna* and its synonyms include both temporal and material as well as intangible gifts. Temporal gifts embrace gifts of property: food, drink, clothes or robes, vehicles, garlands, scents or scented cream, bedding, lamps, etc.[7] It would include *piṇḍa dāna*, offering of food balls in the post-mortem *śrāddha* ceremonies. The essence of these food offerings is supposed to reach the souls of the deceased ancestors (*pitṛs*) or *pretas*.

Intangible gifts are *dharma-dāna*,[8] the gift of religious knowledge, *vidyā-dāna*, gift of education, *bheṣaja dāna*, gift of healing (by treatment), etc. These gifts are in the form of services.

Thus, *dāna* or gifts fall into two broad categories: *amiṣadāna* or *dravya dāna*, gifts of material property and services; and *dharma dāna*, spiritual gifts. For producing merit, the considerations or grounds on which *dāna* is given, the suitability of the donee, the manner of giving and the intention underlying the gifts are relevant.[9]

In understanding the concept of *dāna*, the procedure for completing the transaction of *dāna*, gift, is important.

Ordinarily, a *dāna* or gift involves delivery (*sampradāna*, *sampratti*)[10] of the property by the donor and its acceptance (*pratigraha*, *svīkāra*)[11] by the donee.

Medhātithi[12] in his commentary on *Manusmṛti* (IV, 5) explains the term *pratigraha*: merely taking a thing is not *pratigraha* (*naiva grahṇamātram pratigraha*). It is a distinctive (*viśiṣṭa*) type of acceptance: (given by the donor) with the knowledge or expectation of unseen spiritual merit (*adṛṣṭa budhayā*), it would yield and (the donee) takes possession or accepts (*grahṇāti*). What is given (*dīyamānam*) with prior recitation of a sacred text, or prayer or Vedic hymn (*mantra*). Kullūka in his commentary on (*Manu* IV. 234) also indicates that the donor is the recipient in the next birth (*janmāntra samprāpnoti*) of the fruit of *dāna* in this life.

Thus, the gift that produces *puṇya* is *dāna par* excellence;[13] other kinds of gifts also falling under the generic term *dāna* such as gifts given out of fear,

love and affection or as a *quid pro quo* are transfers[14] of property with material or non-material considerations. However, the acceptance[15] of a gift is not possible where it is given for the benefit of public in general or to an impersonal entity. Thus, the donative inscriptions of Bharhut and Sāñchi *stūpas* do not record the names or designations of the donees. In the case of *puṇya* producing gifts, the acceptance of the same by the beneficiaries may often be absent.

Piṇḍa dāna or *śrāddha* offerings are a specialized kind of *dāna* limited to the successors as donors and the deceased ancestors (*pitṛs*), agnates and cognates, as donees and also is limited to food and water (and may include clothes). These offerings are supposed to provide sustenance to the *pitṛs*; such a *dāna* also confers spiritual benefit on the souls of the deceased by securing their release from the state of *preta*. According to Buddhists,[16] such offerings can be made only to the *pretas*, whereas common gifts are gifts *inter vivos*, *śrāddha* offerings are transfers between the living and the dead.

For determining whether the gifts given to monks or the *saṁgha* produce *puṇya*, moral merit or religious merit, the test is the capacity of the donees and to whom the title or property passes. If the gifts are given to the monks in their own right as donees, they are the beneficiaries and acquire the title. But, in the case of *śrāddha* offerings, the monks are acting only as proxies for receiving the gifts and for passing on the benefit in the form of essence to the *pretas* who would be the true donees. This is borne out by the fact that *śrāddha* offerings or offerings to *preta* forefathers must be addressed to *pretas* concerned; otherwise, these would not reach them. Thus, the gift to the deceased ancestors (*śrāddha* offerings), *piṇḍa dāna* (*petabali*), must necessarily be directed to the ancestors. In other words, the ancestors must be identified as the donees, and the *bhikṣus* and the *saṁgha* are only the channel of transferring the benefit of food offerings; the *saṁgha* or the *bhikṣus* act as proxies and not donees.

The *phala* or results of *dāna* can, thus, be summed up:

(*i*) The donee of temporal gifts is enriched materially by the acquisition, *prāpti* (Skt.), *patti* (Pāli), and this makes him mentally happy.

(*ii*) The giver of the gifts (*donor*) feels happy. As the *Aṅguttaranikāya* (III.44) says: *mānapadāyi labhate manāpana*: the giving of things, which makes the mind of the receiver happy, (also) makes the giver feel pleasant. In other words, the donor also becomes happy or pleased.

(*iii*) *Piṇḍa dāna* or *śrāddha* offerings provide sustenance to the deceased forefathers, and secure their release from the state of *preta*.

(*iv*) The most important result of certain types of *dāna* is that they produce *puṇya* or moral merit. As the *Pāyāsi sutta* of the *Dīghanikāya* (11.23) says: 'We give *dāna* to gain merit in the next world, *puñña-tthikā dānass' eva phalam*.' *Puṇya* is in the nature of a beneficial potential of an ethical act which fructifies in future, as a rule in subsequent rebirths of the donor, who thus becomes the would-be beneficiary of the donation given by him. In other

words, while the immediate beneficiary of a *dāna* or gift is the donee, the donor, in accordance with the doctrine of *karma*, is the eventual beneficiary of his own *dāna*; he gets a return in the form of *puṇya*. *Puṇyadāna* is thus not the same as *piṇḍa dāna* or *śrāddha*.

(*v*) The extent of *puṇya* produced is variable, depending on the character of the donee (*pātra*), the intention of the donor and the manner in which *dāna*[18] is given.

(*vi*) In determining whether the gifts given to monks produce *puṇya* (moral or religious merit) or provide only sustenance to the *pitṛs* and the *pretas* and secure the release of the latter from the disembodied state, the relevant test is the capacity of the donees: whether the monks are given gifts in their own right and for their eventual benefit as donees *per se* or they are acting only as proxies.

With this background about the nature and significance of *puṇya* and *dāna*, we are in a position to understand the concept of *puṇyadāna*.

Puṇyadāna is the transfer, by way of gift, of the potential religious or moral merit, which will accrue when the *karma* will fructify in future. It is not a *dāna* or gift of an intangible service but merely a conceptual gift, a *saṁkalpa*, a resolve, a commitment to transfer the potential of one's good *karmas* to another. It is *dāna-puṇya dāna*: transfer as a gift (*dāna*) of the *puṇya*, moral or spiritual merit, *dharmaphala* (accruing or likely to accrue from a concrete gift of tangible property or intangible services); the time of maturation (*karma vipāka*) of the potential of an act, in particular of its merit, is wholly uncertain, and, as a rule, takes place in a future life or lives. In fact, the donor of *puṇya* himself does not know when he could possibly experience the *puṇya* of his *karmas*, much less he or the donee foresee the time when it will bear fruit after transfer. In this species of *dāna*, nothing passes; when and whether the recipient will be able to enjoy the gift is indeterminate. In this sense, *puṇya-dāna* is a gift *sui generis*, something like a transfer transaction in futures with an uncertain time of maturity. It is transfer of *adṛṣṭa*. Hence it is a fiction.

No wonder that the Buddhist canonical texts do not support the concept of *puṇyadāna*. The *Aṅguttaranikāya* (II, 182) rejects the concept of vicarious or substitutionary enjoyment of experiencing another's *karmas*. It says that no one can be a surety, or more precisely a substitute, (*pāṭibhoga*), in four things: decay, disease, death and 'the fruit of those evil deeds (*pāpa*) that defile and lead again to becoming, deeds unhappy whose fruits in future time is pain, rebirth, decay and death' (*ponobhavikāni sadarāṇi dukkhavipākāni ayatam jātijarā maraṇikāni tesām vipāko ma nibbattiti n' atthi koc pāṭibhogo*).[19] It may be pointed out that the term *pāpa karma* in the text does not refer to ethical *karmas:* all *karmas*, including ethically *puṇya* or good *karmas*, are evil inasmuch as they are the cause of rebirth and the concomitant ageing and eventual death.

Again, in the *Khuddakapāṭha* of the *Khuddakanikāya* (1.8.9) it is stated

that the treasure (*nidhi*) created through *dāna* (gifts) (and by virtuous practices and restraints) cannot be shared with anyone (*asādhāraṇam aññesam*).[20]

The *Kathāvatthu* (XVI, 3) discusses the proposition: *paro parassa sukkham, anuppadeti*: can one bestow happiness on another? After discussion, it explains that it is not the proposition (*na heva vattabba*) that one can transfer one's own happiness to another (*paro parassa attano sukham anuppadeti*) or another's happiness (*aññesam sukham anuppadeti*) or one's happiness to another (third party) (*tassa sukham anuppadeti*). In other words, it is confirmed that one cannot transfer one's own or another's happiness.[21] To remove all room for ambiguity it is denied that one can act for another (*añño annassa kārako*) or that one's good and ill are caused by another's acts (*paraṅkatam sukham dukham añño karoti*).[22] It finally explains that an enlightened being like the Buddha can remove unhappiness and confer happiness on others through his teachings. It is in this sense that the statement that one can bestow or transfer happiness on or to another is to be understood.[23]

The post-canonical literature, however, does speak of transfer of merit, *puṇyadāna* or *pattidāna*. The *Milindapañha* (295-96) emphasizes that a good deed can be shared but not an evil one (*sakka kusalam vibhajitum na sakka akusalam vibhajitum*). Though this statement was made in the context of offerings to *pretas*, yet it is so generally worded as to contain the idea of sharing or transfer of merit.

In the *Sīlanisaṁsajātaka* (190), the *bodhisattva* saves his companion, a barber, from shipwreck at sea. While the boatman had taken the *bodhisattva* on his boat, he was opposed to doing so in the case of the barber as he was 'not a man of holy life'. The *bodhisattva* overcomes the resistence of the boatman by proclaiming: *aham attanā dinnadāna rakkhitasīle bhaveta bhāvanaya et assa pattim dammiti nahāpito anumodani sāmiti*: I give him (*dammi*), the fruit (*pattim*) of the gifts I have given (*dinnadāna*)....

Likewise, Āryaśura in his *Praṇidhānasaptatināmagāthā* (*Aspirational Prayer in Seventy Stanzas*) (70) speaks of sharing the virtues the *bodhisattva* has collected with all beings.

Śāntideva in *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (X, 31) vows to use the merits he has accumulated to liberate all beings from evil forms of existence. Again, Śāntideva in *Śikṣasamuccaya* (26) speaks of renouncing one's merit for the sake of humanity.

In Buddhaghoṣa's[24] commentary on the *Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā* (*Dh.A*), there are frequent references of transfer of *puṇya*. *Aham te ito pattiṃ dammi*: I make over to you the merit obtained by this action (of obtaining food for the *Pratyekabuddha*) (*Dh.A*.2.1); *Imasmin me piṇḍa pati Sāminā patti dinna*: the reward of this alms-giving has been made over by me to my master; *Mayham mātupitunam imasmin bhaññe pattim dammi*: I transfer to my parents the merit contained in this act of preaching or intoning of the sacred word (*Dh.A*, XXIII.5), etc.

In the same commentary, there are passages which talk of the purchase of

puṇya from the doer of the meritorious act. The richman Sumana says: 'I will give him (*annabhāra*) a suitable price for his gift and make this portion of alms my own' (*Dh.A* XXVI. 10.12a). Again, Jotika gifts the sap of a sugarcane belonging to him to the *Pratyekabuddha*. As regards the sugarcane belonging to his brother, this was also gifted conditionally: 'I will give my elder brother either the price of the sugarcane or the merit thereof' (*Dh.A.* XXVI, 33).

Again, in the post-canonical literature *puṇyadāna* was believed to multiply the accumulation of merit: the donee is the beneficiary of *puṇyadāna*, the donor adds to his *puṇya* by the very act of such a donation; at the same time, he is not deprived of the merit originally acquired by him. Further by *anumodana*, rejoicing in the 'joy of rapport' on the part of the recipient, he becomes a participant in the original deed. Thus, the identification of himself with both the deed and doer can sometimes result in the beneficiary getting even greater merit than the original doer.[25]

The only rationale for the concept of *puṇyadāna* was that it was a convenient fiction which was used in two ways: (*i*) rooting out the idea of self-hood, an expression of total renunciation; (*ii*) for promoting the *dāna pāramitā*, *maitrī* and *karuṇā*. It paved the way for *nekkhamma pāramitā* (renunciation), *maitrī* and *karuṇā*. More importantly, it found means to support and maintain *bhikṣus*, *sādhus* and *brāhmaṇas*. Thus, if *karma* is an assumption, *puṇyadāna* is a fiction useful for promoting selflessness and altruism.

Now it remains to be explained how *puṇyadāna* was believed to increase, nay, multiply *puṇya*.

A synonym for *puṇya* is *dharma*. *Dharma dāna* means not only gifts made from legal or moral duty but also gift of religious knowledge.

Dharma dāna, like *vidyā dāna*, is intangible, *vidyā dāna* and *dharma dāna* are gifts of extraordinary quality: transfer or gift of knowledge or *dharma* causes no dimunition of the stock with the donor while benefiting the recipient. On the other hand, it is destroyed or lost if it remains untransferred, that is, if it is selfishly conserved and not shared.[26]

The metonymic character of the words *puṇya* and *dharma* has facilitated the compound *puṇyadāna* to claim the characteristics of *dharmadāna*, viz. that it grows with donation and distribution.

Some modern scholars[27] have put forward the view that the concept of merit transfer is essential to action (*karma*), within the frame-work of the theory of *karma* by the householders or laymen as distinct from *bhikṣus*; that the concept of merit transfer resolves the conflict between the *caryā* of laymen and of *bhikṣus*: 'How can a lay public rooted in the world adhere to a religion committed to the renunciation of the world' (quoting Tambiah)? It is explained that the *saṁgha* is the field of merit for laymen. By joining the *saṁgha* through ordination, a layman not only accumulates merit for himself but also expands the field of merit and the opportunity for earning merit. Therefore, the offerings to the *saṁgha* including sponsorship[28] of laymen

to ordination for joining the *saṁgha* constitute the supreme moral acts and hence the means of acquiring or transferring merit. It is thus held that the transference of merit strengthens specific social bonds such as between the children who transfer merit, and their parents, who are the transferees of such merit. So it is concluded that 'without the idea of merit transference there would be an irresistible conflict between the demands of the society and the demands of following the path of the Buddha according to the Vinaya'.

We must point out that there is no conflict between the goals of laymen and monks, the former aim at attaining heaven (*svarga*) which is liable to death and rebirth and from which there is retrogression, whereas the latter seek to obtain *nirvāṇa* i.e. total cessation of rebirth and death and no falling away. We have already explained that *puṇyadāna* is, truely speaking, a fiction. In any case, all *dāna* including *puṇyadāna* only augments the merit of the donor and enables him to obtain superior and happier states of existence in subsequent birth but not *nirvāṇa*.

Notes and References

1. We use the term 'merit' in the sense of spiritual credit held to be earned by the performance of righteous acts and to ensure future benefits. See *Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary*. Some scholars, however, use the term 'merit' for the spiritual energy or power acquired through *tapas* asceticism or bodily mortification, penance, religious austerity. Thus, *tapas* is also deemed to produce merit. See Minoru Hara, 'Transfer of Merit', in *Adyar Library Bulletin*, (1967-68, pp. 31-32): *Dr. V. Raghavan Felicitation Volume* (pp. 383, 388, 389, 392); see also O'Flaherty's definition of 'merit transfer' as 'the process by which one living creature willingly or accidentally gives to another a non-physical quality of his own, such as viture, credit for religious achievement, a talent, or a power, often in exchange for a negative quality given by the recipient'. W.D. O'Flaherty, 'Karma and Rebirth in the Vedas and Purāṇas' in O'Flaherty (ed.), *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions*, California, 1980, p. 3. David Miller, 'Karma, Rebirth and the Contemporary Guru' in R.W. Neufeldt (ed.), *Karma and Rebirth: Post-Classical Developments*, (New York, 1986, pp. 63, 64, 66, 72, 74) also deals with transfer of merit in the sense of transfer of *teja*. Again, G.M. Williams in 'Swami Vivekananda's Conception of Karma and Rebirth' in Neufeldt (ed.), *Karma and Rebirth: Post-Classical Developments* (p. 53) says: '...serving others implies a "merit transfer" theory; somehow what is done will help alleviate the negative effects of another's Karma...'.

   Again, the sharing of *karma* of the parents by the children has also been considered as transfer of merit. But this is an involuntary transfer more like the transfer of property by operation of law of kinship than voluntary transfer by will or donation. It would also cover both good and evil *karma* of parents. *Puṇyadāna* is transfer of merit in the nature of voluntary donation of the potential of good acts only.

   We are using the term 'merit' in the restricted sense as indicated above: it is the transfer of merit arising from good *karma*.
2. For the meanings of this and other terms, see Monier Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*; V.S. Apte, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*. T.W. Rhys Davids and W. Stede, *Pāli-English Dictionary*; R.C. Childers, *A Dictionary of Pāli Language*.
3. J. Gonda, 'Gifts and Giving in the *Ṛg Veda*' in *Selected Writings*, (Vol. IV): *History of Ancient Indian Religion*, Leiden (1972, p. 32).

4. Karl H. Potter in R.W. Neufeldt (ed.), *Karma and Rebirth: Post-Classical Developments* (p. 113-14) distinguishes between merit transfer and *karma* transfer. According to him, the Indian philosophical systems do not allow transfer of *karma*. See also 'Karma Theory in Some Indian Philosophical Systems' in O'Flaherty (ed.), *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions*, (p. 266). While the distinctions he draws are valuable, *puṇya* is a sub-set of *karma*; *puṇya dāna* is transfer of the potential result of good *karma*.
5. It is significant that *bhikṣā* is not *dāna*. It is alms or begged food. *Dāna* is a privilege which a donor gets, if the donee (*bhikṣu* or *saṅgha*) consents to receive a gift.
6. Rhys Davids and Stede observe in *Dictionary:* 'The *brāhmaṇic* ritual of the *Vedic* times has been given a changed and deeper meaning...*yañña* now consists of a worthy application of a worthy gift to a worthy applicant.'
7. *Aṅguttaranikāya* (III, 95, 45).
8. *Dharmadāna* also means gifts made from duty which is legally or morally enjoined.
9. The consideration for giving *dāna* are many: will of the donor, fear, intense love and affection (*moha*), compensation for injury or damage (*doṣa*), family tradition, earning good reputation by the donor, reciprocity or *quid pro quo* (*dānam deti immam me dānam dadāti*), attainment of heaven in the next birth. *Aṅguttaranikāya* (IV, 31-33, 35). The translation of E. Hare in the *Gradual Sayings* (P.T.S. London, 1932-36) that *moha* is 'misapprehension' is not quite appropriate.

   Similarly, Hare's translation of the word *doṣa* as 'exasperation' does not make sense. The word *doṣa* means offence, guilt, sin, injury or damage.

   The recipient of *dāna* must be suitable, a *pātra* i.e. eligible for *dāna*. *Aṅguttara* IV 34 specifies *puṇya kṣetra*, the field of meritorious activity.

   Further, *dāna* must be given properly; it should be given respectfully with one's own hands, with due thought (*cittikatam*), and it should not include what is to be discarded (*anapavidham*) by the donor. See *Pāyāsi sutta* of the *Dīghanikāya* (ii.23.32). The right manner of giving is essential to ensure that *dāna* is *puññabhisaṇḍā*, producing merit. *Manu* (IV. 49) says that *dāna* should be given (and accepted) with honour. Merit (*puṇya*) of a gift depends on the mental attitude of the giver; it should be given with *śraddhā* faith. See P.V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstras* (Poona, Vol. II Pt. II, 1974, p. 847).

   The intention underlying *dāna* also affects the yield of *puṇya* from the *dāna*. If it is given with a selfish motive to obtain some reward, then the *puṇya* will be of limited duration. The donor, after exhaustion of the *karmas*, will be reborn on earth. If, however, *dāna* is given selflessly, he will be born as non-returner after death, that is he will not be embodied. See *Aṅguttara* (IV. 49).
10. The donor also pours water into the hands of the donee.
11. *Anumodana*, (expression of) thanks by the donee to the donor, is interpreted by R. Gombrich. See 'Merit Transference in Sinhalese Buddhism' in *History of Religions* (Vol. I, 11, 1971, p. 206) as implying acceptance of a gift. He observes: 'The cognate verb *anumodi* is used in these early texts (*nikāyas* and the *Vinayapiṭaka*) with two closely related meanings: "to agree with" and "to receive with gratitude", that is, "to thank" '. In other words, *anumodana* is deemed to complete the act of gifting. Further, the word *anumodana* has been construed to mean ' "sympathetic joy", empathy, the joy of rapport'. See G.P. Malasekhara 'Transference of Merit in Ceylonese Buddhism' *Philosophy East & West* (1967, pp. 86-87) and Gombrich, *ibid.* (pp. 206-07). By this identification, the beneficiary augments his merit. According to J.M. Agasse (Le Transfert De Merite Dans Le Bouddhisme Pali Classique' in *Journal Asiatique*, 1978), *pattidāna* offers the eventual receiver the opportunity to exercise goodwill and do a virtuous act by rejoicing at another's virtuous act.

    To me this appears far-fetched. The word *anumodana* in *Skt.* means approval, assent, seconding, acceptance, thanks, especially after a meal or after receiving gifts; pleasing, causing pleasure, applauding, sympathetic joy. In Māgadhī the corresponding word *anumoyana* is defined as *ādhākarma prabhṛti kṛtapransāyām apratisedhane* (*Abhidhā-*

narājendra: A Dictionary of Prākṛta Māgadhī and Sanskrit, New Delhi, 1985); acceptance of the act of offering, endorsement of the act which is not prohibited or invalid.

Likewise in the early Buddhist literature, *anumodana* or its variants are used to convey the sense of assent, approval; *anumodi* (approved or assented): *Mahāparinibbana Sutta Dīghanikāya* (II.88); *anumodaniyena* (gave thanks): *Aṅguttara* (III.44); and *anumoditvā* (having thanked): *Aṅguttara, ibid.; anumodanam Karonti* (gives thanks) *Sasajātaka*, No. 316. In the *Macchuddānajātaka* (288), the *bodhisatta* gives the left-over food to the fishes of the Gaṅgā (*Gaṅgāya macchānam datvā*) and gives the resultant acquisition or gain (hence merit) to the river goddess (*nadīdevatāya pattim adāsi*); the goddess assents, approves the same (*devatā pattim anumoditvā*). *Anumodana* is the same as *sādhuvādo* or *sādhukāro* approval, approbation corresponding to *amen*. Prof. Heinz Bechert in 'Notes on the Formation of Buddhist Sects and the Origins of Mahāyāna' in *German Scholars on India*, Vol. 1 (ed. the Cultural Department of the Embassy of Federal Republic of Germany, New Delhi, Varanasi, 1973, p. 16) points out: 'In the texts of old Buddhism, *anumodana* is the "joyous acceptance" of a gift or of a sacrifice, in the terminology of the *Vinaya*, it is the joyous consent to important meritorious action.' In his opinion in the Mahāyāna *pariṇāmnā* is the necessary complement of *anumodana*. In other words, *anumodana* is not transfer of merit.

We also feel that the meaning of the term *pattanumodana*, as empathizing in another's merit, does not correctly translate this expression. *Patta* (Skt. *prāpta*) means acquisition or acquired. *Pattanumodana* is expression of joy or approval of at what a person has obtained. It is the Buddhist version of the Brāhmaṇical *dānastuti*—'praise of liberality, receiving with thanks'.

Again, *anumodana* (thanks) is given after receiving a gift or enjoying a meal. So *anumodana* is not essential to the completion of a gift transaction that takes place on acceptance of the gift and not on conveying thanks. Again, *anumodana* is not capable of being performed when a gift is given anonymously or silently by the donor or is given to an impersonal entity.

Even if it were accepted that *anumodana* is an expedient for earning or acquiring merit, the donee or recipient is not deemed to transfer merit from the doer of *puṇya-karma*; *anumodana* is supposed to add to the merit of the recipient and not transfer it.

It is important to note that the custom of giving thanks for alms was a later introduction. It is seen from Buddhaghoṣa's *Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā* IX.I.8 (E.W. Burlingame, *Buddhist Legends*, Pt. III, (New York, 1949, pp. 145-46) that in the first period after enlightenment the Buddhist monks, after receiving alms, did not utter words of thanks to their hosts. This appears to have offended the people especially when the heretics were offering their thanks and conveying good wishes for the donations. To win the goodwill of laymen, the Buddha then introduced the practice of thanks-giving.

12. See also P.V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstras*, Vol. II, Pt. II, (Poona, 1974, p. 842).
13. The *Bhagavad-Gitā* (17.20-22) divides *dāna* into three categories: (1) *sāttvika* (the best, spiritual): when a person gives what ought to be given keeping in view proper place, time and suitability of the donee but without expectation of a reward or return; (2) *rājasik* (middling, worldly): when a gift is given in the hope of a return or reward from the donee and is given grudgingly for a fruit or benefit; (3) *tāmasika* (inferior, producing undesirable results): when a gift is given at an improper place, time and to an unworthy person and with disrespect or contempt for the recipient.

    The *dāna* given in expectation of *puṇya* will be *sāttvik*, because *puṇya ipso facto* is the result of the act of *dāna* and not a return by the donee.
14. Thus, as already noticed, *bhikṣā*, alms *simpliciter*, is excluded from the concept of *dāna*. See fn. 5 above.
15. Thus, *Mitākṣarā* recognizes gift of religious merit. See J.R. Gharpure, *Yājñavalkya Smṛti* (with commentaries of Mitrāmiśra [*Vīrāmitrodaya*] and of Vijñāneśvara [*Mitākṣarā*], Bombay, 1937.

Agasee's observation that acceptance of merit is something essential for completion of merit transfer needs to be qualified.

16. The *Jānussoṇi Sutta*, of *Aṅguttaranikāya* (V. 177). The Buddhist position is more logical than the Brāhmaṇical. In this connection, see Y. Krishan, 'The Doctrine of *Karma* and *Śrāddhas*' in *Annals B.O.R.I.*, Vol. LXVI (Poona, 1986).

17. *Petavatthu* (I.4.1), (*PV* henceforward) directs gifts (*dāna*) being given to ancestral spirits, household deities and the *lokapālas*. In the commentary on *PV* (1, 5), Kassapa Buddha declares that to relieve the *pretas* from their sufferings 'a kinsman will give a gift to a Buddha and ascribe the credit to you'. The king invites the Buddha and says: 'I shall transfer to them (*pretas*) the virtue of the gift.' Buddhaghoṣa (*Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā* I, 8) makes it clear that when Bimbisāra first made the offerings to the Buddha and his monks, the *pretas* failed to receive the fruit thereof. But when the offerings of food and drink and cloth to the monks were specifically expressed to be for the benefit of the *pretas*, they received the same as celestial food and drink and celestial cloth. Again in *Pv* (I.7) *pretas* declare: *ito dinnena yāpenti peta kālakatā*: with their gifts, the deceased, who have become *pretas*, maintain themselves. It is said further: *ito dinnam petānam upakappati*: with these gifts the *pretas* are supported or served or maintained. In the *Pv* (II.1) the *peti* (the female *preta*) makes it clear that in the absence of compassionate relatives—father, mother and *ñātis* who could give gifts to *śramaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas* on her behalf—she remained a hideous ghost. She pleads with Sār iputta *Pv* (II.1.6) to free her from misery by 'giving something addressed to me, that is in my name': *datvā ca me ādissa ya hi kiñci*. Sāriputta gives to the monks some food, cloth and water and 'ascribed to her the donation': *tassa dakkhinam ādisi* (*Pv*. II.1.7). Immediately in consequence of the thanks (of acceptance), the gift (*dakkhinā*) matured and materialized (for her): *samanantarā anudiṭṭhe vipāko uppajjatha* (*Pv*. II.1.7-8). The *peti* repeats to Sāriputta: 'While you gave the monks food, cloth and a bowl of water, you transferred to me the virtue of the gift': *Bhikkhunam.... datvā.....mam dakkhinam ādisi* (*Pv*. II.7.14). W.S. Gehman's translation: "You transferred to me the virtue of the gift" is not precise and somewhat misleading. *Ādisa* is imperative and *ādisi* aorist form of *ādisati*, which, according to Rhys Davids and Stede (*Dictionary*) *inter alia* means: point out, refer to, to dedicate (a gift).

The *Jānussoṇi Sutta* of the *Aṅguttaranikāya* makes it clear that *yan vā panassa ito anuppavecchanti* (what is given) by friends, companions and blood relations, that gift or offering (*dānam*) to *preta* serves him, reaches him or goes to him or is transferred, *tan upakappati*, to him.

Milindapañha, ed., Trenckner, (London, 1880, p. 294) and tr., I.B. Horner, entitled *Milinda Questions*, Vol. II, (London, 1964) says: 'These givers when they bestow their offerings devote them specifically to former (relatives) now departed saying: May the gift benefit such and such: *pubbapetānam ādisanti, imam tesam pāpunātithi*.'

The *Divyāvadāna*, 8, ed., E.B. Cowell (p. 99) is absolutely clear that the benefit of *dakṣiṇā* can be received by a deceased only if it is assigned to him by name: *asmākam cāpyatītakāla gatānāmuddiśya* (addressed to the deceased) *dānāni datvā puṇyāni kṛtvā nāmnā dakṣiṇāmādiśet*: the gift for the deceased be assigned by name to him. See also *Divya*, 1, *ibid*., p. 10; 7, *ibid*., pp. 85 and 86.

Likewise in the *Avadānaśataka*, I, ed., J.S. Speyer (p. 257) observes: *buddha pramukham bhikṣu saṁgham bhojayitvā asmākam nāmnā dakṣiṇā desanām kāryitvā cāsmākam preta yonirmokṣaḥ:* by feeding the monks in the presence of the Buddha and making the offerings by name....

This conclusion is further confirmed by the fact that the ancestral *pretas* receive their offerings in the form of an essence. The *Aṅguttaranikāya* (V, p. 270) distinguishes between the food of various beings in this universe: *neriyakānam sattānam āhāro*: (the food of the dwellers of *niraya*); *tiracchāna yonikānam sattānam āhāro*: (the food suitable to birds and animals); *mānussānam āhāro*; (the food fit for human beings);

devānām āhāro; (the food of the gods), and finally *petivisayikānam sattānam āhāro*: (the food proper to the beings of the region of the *pretas*).

That is why the food of the *pretas* is called *divya anna pāna* (divine food and drink). *Dhammapada Aṭṭhakathā*, I.8. (Warren, *ibid*., Pt. I, p. 209).

We must point out that the relevance of the question of capacity will be clear from the story of Nanda's mother in the *Aṅguttaranikāya*, IV, 50. Herein there is no transfer of moral merit (*puṇya*) as believed by some scholars. L. Schmithausen in *Karma* and *Rebirth: Post-Classical Developments*; *ibid*., p. 210. Nanda's mother offers to Vessavana guest-hospitality (*ātitheyyam*) by singing a sacred song. 'Guest Hospitality' is not *dāna*. Further, Vessavana requests Nanda's mother that she should feed the *bhikṣus* as 'my gift of greeting' (*me hotu ātitheyyam*). In other words, Nanda's mother is only a proxy to give a meal to *bhikṣus*: the meal is a material conversion of the guest-hospitality received by Vesavanna and hence belonging to him. There is no moral merit earned by Nanda's mother in this transaction. The moral merit of offering of food to the *bhikṣus* rightly belongs to Vessavana.

18. It is necessary to clarify that *puṇya* is produced not only by *dāna*, or what is known as *dānamayipuññakiriyāvatthu* but also by certain activities and practices, viz. *sīla* (good conduct) and *bhāvanā* (concentration). We are, however, concerned with *puṇya* producing *dāna* only. Such *puṇya* producing actions are altruistic *karmas* involving gifts to monks, the *saṁgha* or to the community in general such as works of public welfare: construction of tanks and wells for providing drinking water, welfare of handicapped and disabled persons, construction of hospitals, *bheṣajja dāna* (gift of healing), establishment of schools and temples, etc.

19. The word *pāṭibhoga* means a surety, a guarantor. Rhys Davids and Stede in *Dictionary* explain it to mean 'one who has to be made use of in place of someone else'.

20. V. Trenckner in *A Critical Pāli Dictionary* (Copenhagen, 1924-45) explains it as 'not shared with others'. See also Childers in *Dictionary*; Nānamoli in *The Minor Readings* (London, P.T.S. 1960) which is the English translation of the *Khuddakapāṭha*, also adopts the same meaning.

21. It may be noted that Buddhaghoṣa in his commentary the *Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa Aṭṭhakathā* emphasizes that 'we are not able to hand over our happiness or other's happiness to another' and explains that producing happiness in another does not mean handing over his own happiness. The *Debates Commentary* (tr. of *Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa Aṭṭhakathā* by B.C. Law (London, P.T.S. 1940). Prof. Bechert (*ibid*., p. 16) points out that 'The Theravādins arrived at the negation of the possibility of transfer of merit.'

22. Prof. H. Bechert (*ibid*., p. 15) also takes transfer of merit in the sense of the Buddha's teaching leading to *nirvāṇa* of his followers. He states that as a result of a Buddha's teaching, numerous beings attain *nirvāṇa* without having to observe the long and arduous discipline of a *bodhisattva*, that he shows the way to salvation to beings who are not mature for salvation by means of their own *karma*. But we must point out that teaching the doctrine and the consequential benefit to the taught do not involve transfer of merit (*puṇyadāna*). *Dharma dāṇa* and *Vidyā dāna* are not channels for transfer of *Karma* but of knowledge. Teaching the way to emancipation is not transfer of religious merit of the teacher to the disciple.

23. The *Mahāvagga* of the *Vinayapiṭaka* (i, 229) and the *Mahāparinibbāna sutta* of the *Dīghanikāya* (ii, 88) contain a passage which has been interpreted as embodying the concept of *puṇyadāna*.

In the above texts, the Buddha after enjoying the meal given to him and the *bhikṣus* by the ministers of Magadha advises them: *yā tattha devatā āsu, tāsam dakkhinam ādise tā pūjito pūjayanti mānitā mānayanti na*. Rhys Davids in *The Dialogues of the Buddha* (London P.T.S. 1899-1922) translated this passage thus: 'And gave the merit of his gifts to the deities who haunt the spot. Revered, they will revere him, honoured,

they will honour him again.' Literally speaking, the first line cannot be translated to say that the donor should give the merit of his gifts. Horner give a more accurate translation of the same passage in *The Book of Discipline*, Vol. IV (P.T.S. 1952). 'If he makes an offering to those *devatās* who may be there.' This contains no idea of transfer of merit.

24. R.C. Childers says in *Dictionary* that the word *patti* is sometimes used for the merit, gain, advantage or prospective reward of a good action, and that this merit may be transferred by supererogation to another by an exercise of the will. *Patti* is the Pāli equivalent of Sanskrit *prāpti* (gain, attainment, profit), the result of the action done in a former life (Apte *ibid.*). As such it cannot be equated to *puṇya*-transfer concurrently which is really the transfer of gain or merit that will accrue in future life; it will become capable of being transferred only after it becomes *pūrva karma* or *pūrvakṛta karma*, and that can happen only in the next life. In other words, *pattidāna* cannot be equated to *puṇyadāna*.

This will find support from the fact that *puñña* is produced in three ways: (1) *dānamayampuñña kiriyāvatthu puṇya* produced by *dāna*; (2) *sīlamayampuññakiriyāvatthu, puṇya* produced by good conduct; (3) *bhāvanāmayam puññakiriyāvatthu, puṇya* produced by concentration.

The term used is *puññakiriyā* and not *patti-kiriyā*. *Patti* is not equated with *puñña* originally. It is in the post-canonical literature that *pattidāna* and *puṇyadāna* are equated.

25. G.P. Malasekhara in his 'Transference of Merit in Ceylonese Buddhism' (*Philosophy East and West*, Honolulu, 1967, p. 86) explains the rationale of the concept of merit transfer: human beings have numerous opportunities of doing good deeds and thereby earning merit, whereas such opportunities are few and far between for the denizens of the other world, viz. *devas*, animals and plants. In fact, he emphasizes that the *devas* are in need of constantly supplementing their stock of merit, so that they can continue to exist in the *deva* world. Human beings can earn considerable merit by transferring the merit of their meritorious actions to the *devas*.

This explanation is inconsistent with the concept of *karma bhūmi* and *bhoga bhūmi* which are essential features of the doctrine *karma*. According to the *Karma* doctrine, human beings alone belong to *karma bhūmi* wherein they have opportunity of doing *karma* and earning merit and demerit (*puṇya* and *pāpa*). In the *bhoga bhūmi*, a being only experiences the results of his past accumulated *karmas*, and he thereby exhausts them. There is no fresh accumulation of *karmas* for such beings. It is, perhaps, because of this concept that the *Jānussoṇi Sutta* of the *Aṅguttaranikāya* (V, 177) explains that beings other than human beings, viz. *devas*, animals, plants or those born in purgatory (*nirayam*) cannot receive the *śrāddha*, gifts, because they subsist on food proper to their states existence. But, if he is born as a *peta*, he subsists on the offerings of fellow kinsmen and beloved relations (*ñātisalohitānam*). Thus, *dāna* for the benefit of deceased beings can be effective only in the case of *pretas*. In fact, such *dāna* is considered essential for redeeming *pretas*, disembodied souls awaiting reincarnation.

It may be noted that the *śrāddha* offerings are made to the *pitaras*—deceased father, grandfather and great grandfather, and they all could not possibly be continuing as *pretas*. So *śrāddha* could not truly be beneficial in their case. This redundant and anomalous practice continued, because *piṇḍapitṛyajñā* of the *Vedic* period, when it was a 'biological necessity' of the *pitṛs* as sustenance, was adapted as *śrāddha*, a means of redemption of the *preta*, to meet the challenge from the doctrine of *karma* to this practice. See Y. Krishan: 'The Doctrine of *Karma* and *Śrāddha*' in *Annals* (BORI, 1985).

26. A popular saying expresses this beautifully:

Apūrvaḥ ko api Kośoayam vidyate tava bhārati/
Vyayato Vṛdhimāyāti Kṣayaṃnāyāti sañcayāt//
Sarvadravyeṣu vidyaiva, drvyamāhurauttamam//
Ahāryatvādanadhryatvā dakṣayatvācca sarvadā.

Is there a unique treasure which increases on being expended and is destroyed if it remains accumulated and undistributed? Among all the objects *Vidyā*, indeed, is the best of objects; by giving it is never destroyed, nay, it even increases.

27. See Charles F. Keyes 'Merit Transference in the Kamma Theory of Popular Buddhism' in C. F. Keyes and Valentine Daniel (eds.), *Karma, An Anthropological Inquiry*, California, 1983, pp. 271-78.

28. The act of sponsoring a candidate for ordination is in itself, an act of merit of the sponsor and not of transference of merit as suggested by Keyes, *ibid.*, p. 278.

Philosophical anthropology in Greek antiquity

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I

Philosophical anthropology was born when Socrates declared that 'an unexamined life is not worth living' (*Apology*, 38a). On closer examination the observation would be found a little ambiguous. The examinee may be required to examine 'Life' as a whole; it may also mean that the examinee is required to examine his own life. Perhaps Socrates meant to say that the life in need of inquiry is primarily that of the examinee's own. A life that one leads cannot, strictly speaking, be adequately examined by someone else. Moreover, it is an examination which is endless, the examiner and the examinee being one and the same person. To be sure, this examination needs a framework of assessment and evaluation which, by necessity, should be beyond mutation. This is where Socrates, Plato and Aristotle are farthest removed from Protagoras' epistemological views. In so far as Protagoras' ethical relativism is concerned the difference was perhaps not really so pronounced. We will discuss this issue in the sequel. Not only is the framework of assessment beyond mutation, the method of inquiry too has to abjure shifts: it has to have a *pou sto*. The method, in brief, consists of tireless discussions, raising questions and exchanging views with others equally engaged in such serious inquiries and, most certainly, with friends, honest and unflattering in expressing their views and clear in their speech. Such an examination, necessarily relentless, yields, if at all, a peculiar set of results. But these results never acquire any sacrosanctity; they cannot be enshrined in a code. What is really meaningful for the examinee will have to be discovered afresh in the course of one's life. One who is afraid of such sustained inquiry will have to remain 'stuffed with second-hand opinions'. (*Epis.* VII, 340b) or can only hope to be what Confucius called a robot or a tool (*The Sayings of Confucius*, 2.12). It is a life devoid of 'honour' and 'courage', unfree and passive (see Aristotle's *Politics*, bk. I, ch.5. 9).

One invariably finds oneself living along with others. If others around one are interested in examining their lives then the 'community' is enlightened; in fact, it comes into being, in the true sense; if, however, the majority are not interested in such inquiries then there is only an 'alliance' and not a real community. The quality of the life of an enlightened or 'examining' community, in fact, adds an important dimension to this task of inquiry. When I am engaged in examining my life I am perforce examining the lives of others as others are examining my life. In fact, the examinees must look beyond the present and those surround them. (Cf. Plato's *Republic*, 486a). The multiplicity of examinees—all of them are not contemporaries—give

rise to the need of discovering an immutable framework and method about which I have spoken earlier.

II

The Socratic dictum, in a significant manner, determined the course of similar investigations carried on by Plato and Aristotle. Philosophical anthropology took another important step when Plato drew the distinction between those who do reflect, examine and enquire and those who do not or cannot; (cf. *Phaedo*, 64e; *Protagoras*, 317a). Plato not only distinguished between those who do not reflect and those who do, but also between the different ways in which this reflection is done. At the moment I am not interested in the famous Platonic distinction of three classes of men. What, however, I must emphasise here is the lofty position Plato accorded to the philosopher. The philosopher enjoys the position he does not because of any extrinsic power he has managed to possess, but because he cares for truth (*Phaedo*, 91a); 'he begets intelligence and truth by consorting with Reality' (*Republic* 490b); he 'loves reality and truth' (*Rep.* 501d) and so on. Perhaps a better way of saying the same thing is that one whose lifelong desire is 'wisdom' deserves the highest respect and position (*Sophist*, 216b). Wisdom is not a particular skill and, if at all it is a skill, it deals with 'essences' like goodness, beauty, justice, harmony, etc. Plato was all the time eager to distinguish a 'lover of wisdom' from a pedlar of wisdom. An examination of the concept of 'lover of wisdom' would include an examination of the concept of 'love', a notion which figures prominently in many of Plato's dialogues.

The Platonic division of men into classes is based on the intrinsic qualities of the men who constitute the class to which they belong, as well as the qualities they acquire through education, training and *reflection*, i.e. enquiry and examination. If these qualities could be possessed (as the Indian philosophers would say, like 'the horns of an animal') then the question of 'love' would not arise. Love assumes the fear of losing what one seeks to acquire or is in the process of acquiring.

The notion of 'degeneration'—not being in love with wisdom—is characteristically Aristotelean. The Platonic notions, close to 'degeneration' are 'disease' and 'discord'; (*Sophist*, 228 ff; *Rep.* 562). On the cultivation of certain qualities of body and soul depends the fulfilment of the life of the individual *qua* individual and citizen; (see *Protagoras*, 326d). The importance of the 'community' and an individual's participation in the life of the community figures more prominently in Aristotle's thoughts. In Plato's scheme too man must grow into a person for which he is 'naturally fit'. Who, in any case, is to decide if an individual, is 'naturally fit' for a certain kind of life? This is, indeed, an extremely difficult question and I will try to answer in the concluding portion of this paper.

III

In the Aristotelean scheme the notion of 'function' (*ergon*) is singularly important for anthropological investigations. The notion of 'function' is also there in Plato (*Republic*, 352 f). But in Aristotle's scheme it occupies a more important position; it needs to be understood in a wider sense since it is integrally associated with the notion of 'final cause'. Man, in Aristotle's scheme, like anything else has a 'function'. But a study of 'function', in the context of the human situation, is complex for the simple reason that a human being is himself a highly developed animal, individually as well as socially. The one 'power' (*dunamis*) which distinguishes man from other animals is his ability to exercise 'choice' (*proairesis*). Man's power to remember, and his power to anticipate, contribute towards the complex make-up of his mind; he entertains 'hopes' and suffers from 'frustration'. The members of his family, the community to which he belongs and his fellow citizens are the other important centres of hopes and expectations. One, therefore, finds himself engaged in choosing along with several others; in exercising choice a mature individual has to reckon with others, seeking knowledge and happiness. All this makes 'choice' in the life of a mature human being such an arduous, perplexing and challenging exercise. It is not surprising, therefore, to find so many who refuse to choose, and surrender to a '*guru*' a priest, a 'tradition' or a 'path'. In the scheme suggested by Aristotle an individual, in an important sense, remains a lonely person since he has no one except himself and his own (mental) resources to rely upon. Strictly speaking an individual is one who chooses for himself.* At the same time, it is acknowledged that the individual is shaped by his family, upbringing, education and so on. Man's rationality, his thoughts and preferences, are all intimately related to his being a 'political animal', i.e. an adult living in a society making rules and governed by them; (Aristotle's *Politics*, bk. III, ch. 1; cf. Plato's *Protagoras*, 326d).

What was conceived as 'political' was not construed as an item in the constellation of other activities like the social, religious, literary, economic, etc. On the contrary, the 'political' determines the whole of tenor of life; (see Plato's *Protagoras*, 318e). For Aristotle 'politics' is the 'master skill' (*NE*, 1094 a-b). In discussing Aristotle's notion of the 'political' we have to keep in mind three things. In the first place, it should be acknowledged that man is a rational animal. Rationality, it must be added, has been used in a broad sense to include reasoned speech. In the second place, man needs to deliberate because the resources at his disposal are scarce or limited and also because there are others. Finally, it must be acknowledged that man 'produces' *and* 'acts'. 'While production has an end other than itself, action cannot, for good action itself is its end.' (*NE*, 1140 b b; Ross's translation, p. 143). The

*The Indian doctrine of *karma* also reminds the individual that he alone is responsible for his acts. Those who were enamoured of 'oceanic feeling', *bhaktas* and *jñānins*, naturally belittled the doctrine of *karma*.

notions of 'production' and 'action' have given rise to a large variety of commentaries. I must add that many of the questions raised by these commentators will remain unanswered here.

To come back to the discussion of 'choice'. Choice operates in two distinct but interrelated realms. It figures obviously in the realm of action; it also operates in the realm of 'opinions', if not in the realm of 'knowledge' (*episteme*). A detailed discussion of how choice figures in the realm of 'opinions' would need more space than I have at present. What I wish to suggest here is that certain foundational presuppositions are 'chosen' when we seek to explain or understand, i.e. we are living in the realm of 'opinion'. Aristotle, we must not forget, never looked down upon the realm of 'opinion' as Plato did, for Aristotle believed that it is not possible to banish 'opinions' from life altogether. Once, however, the choice has been exercised, the chooser is expected to marshall evidences and arguments to raise the superstructure of his 'worldview'. I will refer to a few of the famous 'givens' of Aristotle. In his *Metaphysics* he begins by observing that 'all men naturally have an impulse to get knowledge'. This 'natural' impulse to get knowledge is undying. Likewise, his *NE* begins with the famous observation: 'Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim.' (Ross's translation, p. 1). 'The *Politics* too begins with the following sentence: 'Observation tells us that every state is an association, and that every association is formed with a view to some good purpose...' (*Politics*, Penguin Classics, Rev. edn., p. 54).

One could imagine what would happen to the superstructures Aristotle raised in his *Metaphysics*, *The Nichomachean Ethics* and the *Politics* if these foundational presuppositions were not accepted *ab initio*.

I observed earlier that the notion of 'function' is integrally associated with the notion of the 'final cause'. In fact, as Hintikka has said, the concept of *telos* 'occupied a special place in the Greek conceptual system' ('Some Conceptual Presuppositions of Greek Political Theory', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Vol. 2, 1967, p. 12). The rightness, wrongness or worthwhileness of the choice depends, among other things, on the knowledge of the *telos*; a right act assumes *phronesis*, 'practical wisdom', which includes knowledge of oneself and of other human beings. The 'community' is a 'given' and in that sense 'natural'; men find themselves in it, *and yet*, a political association is always in the process of being made. Otherwise it sinks into an alliance (see Aristotle's *Politics*, bk. III, ch 9, sec. 8). The being of a 'political association depends on several factors, viz. rational nature of the citizens, their ability to communicate with each other and examine each other's *locus standi* and their ability to evolve a 'common interest' (Aristotle's *Politics*, bk. III, ch. 6, sec. 10).

IV

The notion of 'nature' plays an important role in the Greek conceptual system. 'Nature' is distinguished from 'law' or 'convention', on the one hand, and from 'skill' or 'art' on the other. A detailed discussion would take us into an examination of all these notions and so I will be very brief. All that I would like to suggest here is that there is no essential antithesis between 'nature' and 'law', 'convention' or 'skill'. The need and desirability of their cooperation has been recommended at several places by all the three philosophers we are discussing here. Knowledge, in an important sense, consists of our awareness of the designs of nature. Human action, in an equally significant sense, must follow or imitate nature. What is 'unnatural' is 'undesirable'. This, however, does not mean that all that is 'natural' is 'desirable' or all that is 'desirable' is 'natural'.

It has been said that determinism is a characteristic feature of 'nature' while freedom operates in the realm of 'spirit'. I doubt if this kind of neat dichotomy would be acceptable to the thinkers we are discussing here. If freedom were not 'natural', of course at a certain level of self-awareness or an accompaniment of maturity and seriousness, then it could not be recommended as an achievable ideal. Likewise, there is an immanent impulse in all men towards some form of 'political association'. Justice is different from legality; it is natural. (*NE*, 1134b ff).*

V

In what follows I shall try to answer the two questions I raised earlier. The first question: did Socrates, Plato and Aristotle refute Protagoras' ethical relativism? I think they did not. Protagoras' ethical relativism enunciated in the famous dictum: 'man is the measure of all things', I believe, was found irrefutable. Socrates and others accepted it in a slightly modified form. Eminent scholars have commented upon the dictum. It would, therefore, be unwise to tread over the same ground again. What, however, needs to be reiterated is that according to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, all men are not equal and they cannot be treated equally. This inequality is the reason why what is good or useful or beneficial for some would not be good for all. Not only is there a difference between men and women, but between masters and slaves, citizens and aliens, between those who are engaged in contemplation and those who are engaged in agriculture, trade and commerce and between the guardians, auxiliaries and the craftsmen. Once, that is, men are seen as unequal, the relativistic ethics of Protagoras is irrefutable.

The second and a more difficult question is: who is to judge an individual's 'natural fitness'? In fact, any social thinker would find the task of ordering

*For an excellent discussion on Aristotle's indeterminism I would recommend *Necessity, Cause and blame* by Richard Sorabji (Duckworth, 1980), a work from which I have learnt a good deal.

the classes of men (these classes are determined by several factors like physical fitness, mental abilities, wealth, parentage, etc.) hierarchically, an exteremely challenging task. The notion of 'excellence' is relative to the constitution, as Aristotle would say (*Politics,* bk. III, ch. 4, sec. 3; cf *NE*, v. 2). The scheme suggested by Plato and Aristotle recommends that a minority of the high-born, affluent and leisured section has the exclusive right to rule, while the majority of ordinary men belonging to the working classes have the duty to obey the rulers. Those, however, who rule, occupy the positions they do not by virtue of physical prowess, nor because of any 'compact' (this is where they differ from the sophists) nor again because of any 'divine right' but because 'nature', in a higher sense, ordains it. It is 'natural' that those who possess the qualities of moderation, temperance and courage, men with vision and unselfishly devoted to the state and constitution should be the rulers. But the validity of such a view may not be so obvious to all. That is why education is so important, both according to Plato and Aristotle. Plato was perhaps a little too impatient with the masses. Aristotle came closer to the sophists because he felt that the inequality among men was not wholly a natural phenomenon. A good deal of inequality, especially in the realm of opinion and taste, could, according to him, be removed by the wholesome upbringing of children, sound education and proper deliberation. Once it is admitted that things 'political' are not necessary or 'invariable', deliberation acquires a great importance, and 'persuasion' as a means of communication is accepted as a *respectable* exercise. Even Plato had to admit that there are 'good sophists' and 'bad sophists'. The rulers must always take the trouble of communicating to the ruled that they (the rulers) are intrinsically or 'naturally' superior; their superiority stems from a clearer perception of what constitutes the 'good life', the object for which the state exists and by virtue of their possessing a noble character. When, however, they fail to acquire those qualities of character, or when they do not succeed in communicating their point of view, the result is either perversion (*NE*, VIII, 10) or revolution (*Politics*, bk. V, ch. 2; also see Plato's *Republic*, 562 f) or a change in the constitution which results in political associations sinking into mere alliances (*Politics*, bk. III, ch. 9).

Two things, mutually related, are necessary to maintain a wholesome polity; a flow of able, mature and serious statesmen to rule *and* a process of education to bring up citizens, men inspired by the ideals of the constitution, 'who share in the administration of justice and in the holding of the office'. (*Politics*, bk. III, ch. 6). The notion of 'reciprocity' enunciated in *NE*, bk. V, ch. 5 is far more important than what it appears to be at first sight.

Notes and discussions

THE THEORY OF TRIPLE PERCEPTION

The Prābhākara school of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā presents a peculiar theory of perception (*pratyakṣa*) called *tripuṭīpratyakṣavāda* (the theory of triple perception). Prabhākara has propounded this theory in his *Bṛhati* which is again elaborated by Śālikanātha in his *Ṛjuvimalā* and the *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā.*

Prabhākara defines *pratyakṣa* as *sākṣātpratītiḥ* or direct apprehension which pertains to the apprehended object (*maya*), the apprehending person (mātā) and to the apprehension itself (*miti*). In each act of perception, the idea of each of these three enters as its constituent factor. In the *Amṛtakalā-prakaraṇa* of the *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā*,[1] Śālikanātha defines *pratyakṣa* as:

sākṣātpratītiḥ pratyakṣaṁ mayamātṛpramāsu sā.

Again in the *Pramāṇa-pārāyaṇa-prakaraṇa* of the same work Śālikanātha presents the theory of triple perception as:[2]

sarvavijñānahetuttvā mitau mātari ca pramā.
sākṣātkartṛtvasāmāṇyāt pratyakṣatveṇa sammatā.

According to the Prābhākaras, in a sentence like *ghaṭamahaṁ jānāmi* (I know the jar), there are three factors, viz. *jñāna* or *miti* (the apprehension), *jñātā* or *mātā* (the apprehending person) and the *jñeya* or *meya* (the apprehended object). These three are known as *tripuṭī*. In the example cited above, '*aham*' refers to the *mātā*, '*ghaṭa*' to the *meya* and '*jānāmi*' to the *miti*. These three factors are apprehended together. But, while the *meya* is apprehended as having a form, the other two (i.e. the *mātā* and *miti*) are apprehended without a form. The *meya* is always apprehended as the *karma*, *ātmā* (the soul) is apprehended as the *kartā* and the *miti* or apprehension as the *kriyā*. Direct apprehension is the proof for the existence of these three factors. Of these three factors, the first two stand in need of revealer, but the third is self-revealed.[3] The *ātmā* and the *meya* are always dependent on apprehension for the manifestation. They are not self-luminous (*svayaṁprakāśa*), because it is seen that during sleep, though they exist, still they are not manifested in consciousness. But apprehension is self-luminous (*svayaṁprakāśa*). Apprehension is its own manifester. It is formless and revealing itself by its very nature, it reveals the *ātmā* and the *meya*. Apprehension illuminates its subject and object just as the light of a lamp being self-illuminous illuminates the lamp and the objects as well. Śālikanātha very clearly explains all these factors.[4] Just as a second light is not needed to manifest a light, so a second apprehension is not necessary for manifesting an apprehension.

Prabhākara asserts that *saṁvit* which is ordinarily supposed to be equivalent to *jñāna*, both meaning apprehension, is self-revealing. At the same time he supports the theory of Śabaraswāmin that *jñāna* or *buddhi* is known by means of *anumāna* (inference). Śālikanātha says that there is no other apprehension of *saṁvit* which is nothing but the apprehension of an object; and that it does not require a second apprehension, because it is the nature of apprehension. *Saṁvit* itself is manifestation. There is no manifestation of an object in the absence of *saṁvit*, and there can be no manifestation again of this manifestation.[5] Thus, *saṁvit* is identified with manifestation of an object, and is held to be self-revealing.

According to the Bhāṭṭas, apprehension or cognition is not self-luminous, but it is inferred on the strength of a property called cognizedness (*jñātatā*) which is produced in the object through the apprehension.

Pārthasārathi Miśra, a staunch follower of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṁsā, criticizes the Prabhākara's view. He says that *ayaṁ ghaṭaḥ* (this is a jar) and *ghaṭamahaṁ jānāmi* (I know the jar) are two quite different types of judgements. In the earlier, only the object *ghaṭa* (jar) is manifested and not the self nor the apprehension. In the latter, the object *ghaṭa* (jar) is recalled, and the primary apprehension of the jar is inferred. Thus, the earlier is a case of *pratyakṣa* (perception), while the latter is a case of *anumāna* (inference), and the two never go together. So, according to Pārthasārathi, the Prābhākaras unnecessarily confound the two when they say that there is a triple consciousness in every cognition.[6]

The Prābhākaras hold that, every cognition being self-luminous (*Svayaṁprakāśa*) by nature, the collocation of causal conditions (*sāmagrī*) that produces a cognition enables us not only to apprehend the cognition itself but also to apprehend its validity (*prāmāṇya*).

According to Prabhākara, *saṁvit*, of which we are directly aware, is not a subjective process, but the result of a subjective process, and this process is called *jñāna* which results in the consciousness of an object and is inferred instead of being directly apprehended.[7] Whatever may be the criticism on the theory of triple perception advocated by the Prābhākaras, it is a common idea that in every apprehension or cognition three factors, viz., the mātā or *pramātā* or *jñāta* (the apprehending person), the *meya* or *prameya* or *jñeya* (the apprehended object), and the *miti* or *pramiti* or the *jñāna* (the apprehension) are revealed.

The *tripuṭīpratyakṣavāda* or the theory of triple perception is the peculiar theory of the Prābhākaras. Dr. G.P. Bhatt rightly remarks that Prabhākara will always be remembered as the author of a peculiar theory of knowledge known as *tripuṭīpratyakṣavāda.*

Notes

1. *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā*, p. 104.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 167.
3. *Ibid.*, fn. 2
4. *kiñcāprakāśasvabhāvāni meyāni mātā ca prakāśamapekṣantām. prakāśastu prakāśakatvāt nānyamapekṣate. jāgrato hi meyaṁ mātā ca prakāsānte. suṣuptasya tadā na tat dvayamapi prakāśate... tasmāt svayaṁprakāśasamaya eva meyamātṛprakāśaḥ.* See *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā*, pp. 172-73.
5. *saṁvideva bhāṣanam, tāṁ ca vinā bhāsamānaṁ nāstyeva. na hi saṁvido 'parā saṁvidastīti.* See *RVL* under *BR*, p. 62.
6. *yadā ca grāhyamātrameva bhāsate na kriyā kartā vā, tadā ye sarvavittiṣu tritayapratibhāsamāhuste nirastāḥ. yastu nīlamahaṁ jānāmīti pratibhāsaḥ sa nīle jñāte paścādānumānikaḥ...tasmad bhinnameva grāhyaṁ grāhakāditi. See NR on SV*, p. 219.
7. See *Indian Logic in Early Schools*, p. 104 as quoted by G.P. Bhatt in his *Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā*, p. 58.

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2. *Nyāyaratnākara*, (*NR*) of Pārthasārathi Miśra on *Slokavārttika* (*SV*) of Kumārila, Banaras: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1938.
3. *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā* of Śālikanātha Miśra, ed. Pandit A. Subrahmanya Sastri, Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University, 1961.
4. *Ṛjuvimalā* (*RVL*) of Śālikanātha Miśra; vide *Bṛhatī.*
5. *Tantrabāṣya* of Rāmānujācārya, ed. K.S. Ramaswami Sastri, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1956.

Modern Works

1. G.P. Bhatt, *Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrvamīmāṁsā.*
2. Pandit P.N. Sastri, *Introduction to Pūrvamīmāṁsā.*
3. G.N. Jha, *Pūrvamīmāṁsā in Its Sources.*
4. G.N. Jha, *Prābhākara School of Pūrvamīmāṁsā.*

Gauhati University, Guwahati Rajendra Nath Sarma

Book reviews

SARAL JHINGRAN: *Aspects of Hindu Morality*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1989, xviii+241 pages, Rs. 150.

The volume consists of seven chapters. The first contains a résumé of 'Hinduism Through the Ages'. The second deals with the Vedic Dharmaśāstric tradition in which rituals dominated, while the third deals with the morality of Dharmaśāstras and the Epics. The fourth examines the moral notions in the traditions which centred round 'liberation' (*mokṣa*) while the fifth with the moral teachings of the Bhakti Schools. The sixth is an amorphous collection of views on human perfection and the final chapter contains the concluding observation. The chapters are loosely connected.

'The present work', the author observes in the preface, 'aims at a critical evaluation of Hindu ethics in all its diversity, richeness and profundity'. I do not know if it is at all possible to achieve this task within a space of 227 pages.

The observation that 'Hinduism is an integrated whole in which religion, philosophy, morality and social culture are...intimately related' is an old hat. The author also refers to 'diversity' and 'complexity' of what she is fond of calling the Hindu 'religio-culture' at more than a dozen places. On her own admission '...we find in Hinduism the most profound philosophical speculation, existing side by side with the most primitive magical ideas; sublime ethical conceptions with gross rituals...' (p. 4). I wonder if she has been successful in sifting, in itself, an extremely difficult task, all that is coarse from that which is fine.

It is not enough to be an 'insider' to know a tradition in terms of its strength and weakness. In order to know a tradition profoundly one needs to acquire a *pou sto*, obtained after years of study and reflection. Morals have, in fact, been studied by anthoropologists, psychologists, sociologists and publicists like Lecky, Westermarck and Hobhouse, for example. Their works are monumental. In a work of the kind under review one expects the approach to philosophically perspicacious.

Morals have been qualified in different ways; qualifications like Chinese, Greek and European, for example, draw our attention to what may be called the geographical dimensions; Christian, Islamic and Buddhistic stress the religious overtones. We come across works on the Victorian morals or on the morals of the eighteenth century, for example. Morals, moreover, are qualified as hedonistic a puritan. One whose amibition it is to study the morals of Hindus undoubtedly faces a problem of amazing proportions. A work of this nature ought to begin with a prologue on methodology. There are, perhaps, two distinct methodological approaches. One begins by identifying the seminal notions, as they figure in the ancient texts, and then proceed to examine their

evolution. This approach, historical in character, takes into account the inherent tensions thrown up from time to time, within the tradition as well as the impact of alien traditions on those which are autochthonous. Such a historical treatment often coalesces with interpretative exercises. This method unfolds how the tradition absorbs words and notions received from antiquity and how, at the same time, it discards customary meanings associated with those words and, finally, how new words are coined or borrowed and introduced, sometimes, surreptitiously. In fact, a study of this kind, is fascinating in its own way though such scholarly treatments are not always germane to philosophical investigations. The other method ignores 'history'; it tends to look at the notions as though they are all contemporaneous. It treats these notions critically avoiding forays into the realms of etymology, sociology and psychology; the investigator is not obsessed with the passion to discover the genesis of notions in economics or climatology.

Dr. Jhingran's methodology, if any, is not clear or well defined. She is aware of the relevance of a historical perspective (pp. 10 and 28) but her investigations are, at best, sketchy. At times she promises to write a history, with a polemical intent, like Whewell, for example. On the other hand, there are chapters where she wants to offer a history acceptable to the readers of all persuasions in the manner of Sidgwick's monumental *Outlines*.

A survey like *Aspects* has to depend for its material, not only on ethical works, strictly speaking, but on didactic writings, fables and parables which Dr. Jhingran has ununderstandably neglected to take into account and, on works which plainly exalt customs—most of the Dharmaśāstras do nothing but praise certain customs—and, finally, on juridical works, keeping in view, all the time, their distinct features. In the Hindu tradition ethics was never salvaged from other forms of writings as was done, for example, by Aristotle and, more clearly, by Kant and Sidgwick in the European tradition. Dr. Jhingran does precious little to rescue ethics and treat it as an autonomous discipline. On p. 22 she observes that 'they (the traditional Hindu thinkers) hardly ever tried to develop the practical implications of their vision', while on p. 199 she refers to a 'definite philosophy or worldview which permeates the entire Hindu "religio-culture" '. It would have been an extremely commendable effort if she had, at least, made an attempt at gleaning 'ethical' observations embedded in a farrago of didactic statements and *ex cathedra* pronouncements of the *śāstras*.

It is not at all difficult to specify words which are not found in the Vedas and/or the Upaniṣads but used in the Gītā; similarly, there are any number of words which are used by the medieval āchāryas but not found in the Upaniṣads or the Gītā, they were commenting upon. Such lists would show the 'complex' nature of a number of very important concepts. Dr. Jhingran is adequately aware of the 'changes' and 'transformation' (pp. 4. 26, 31 and 200, etc.). In fact, one is tempted to ask: how far these changes helped in the retention or abolition of the alleged 'identity' of Hinduism' ?

'*Adhikāribheda*', '*puruṣārtha*', '*prāyaśchitta*', '*mārga*' (*mārga* associated with *jñāna, karma* and *bhakti*) are words which are not found either in the Upaniṣads or in the Gītā. '*Yoga*' and '*samādhi*' are found widely in the Gītā but scarcely in the older Upaniṣads. '*Naraka*' (not *pātāla*) is found in the Gītā but not in the Upaniṣads. '*Kula*' (Dr. Jhingran translates the word as 'family'!) is undoubtedly an ancient word but '*kulakṣaya*', '*kulaghna*' '*kuladharma*' and *kulaśtrī*) are found only in the Gītā and not in the Upaniṣads. Perhaps the *Gītā* attached greater importance to '*kula*'. '*Līlā*', found neither in the Upaniṣads nor in the Gītā, like '*prema*' was popular in the medieval texts. '*Vairāgya*' is rarely found in the older Upaniṣads. '*Pūjā*' and '*dehāntara*' are there in the Gītā but not in the Upaniṣads. '*Nimittamātra*' is a famous notion in the Gītā but is absent in the Upaniṣads. Incidentally, for Aristotle, to live as a tool, an instrument, is not really to live oneself. '*Dharma*' is acknowledged to be a 'protean' word; all attempts to find a corresponding word in the languages of Europe have failed. Dr. Jhingran's observation (p. 169) that 'the concept of *dharma* gradually became more comprehensive', I am afraid, fails to convey any sense.

The Vedānta is often referred to as though it refers to a single well-knit philosophical system. The school of thought known as the Vedānta certainly existed before Bādarāyana, the author of the *Vedānta-sūtra* in the existing form. Bādarāyana refers to more than half a dozen philosophers. Again, the views of the great commentators on several important issues are so dissimilar that to hold Vedānta as a single system is enormously misleading. The authors of text books, ancient as well as modern, are responsible for perpetuating this erroneous belief. It is a misrepresentation to say that the Vaiṣṇava Sect founded by Vallabha 'came close to the original Vedic religio-culture' (p. 159).

The central issue of the Hindu ethics, if one were to look at it sympathetically, could be traced back to the two different ways in which the nature of the individual was viewed even in remote antiquity: one by the authors of the Dharmaśāstras, who were not primarily interested in 'liberation' (*mokṣa*) and the other by those who supported '*mokṣa*'. The problem of the relativism in morals acquires a new dimension in the light of the observations, often diametrically opposed. For the authors of the Dharmaśāstras the individual, in so far as he is an individual, has to observe '*sādhāraṇa dharma*' (Manu) or '*sāmānya-dharma*' (Prasastapada). In another sense the individual, as a member of a *varṇa* and an *āśrama* has to observe certain characteristic *dharmas*. But the same individuals, as a seeker of liberation—and here he is utterly 'lonely'—must sever all his bonds (see Gītā, 18.66)—*dharmas* are treated as fetters!—which keep him fastened to *kula, varṇa, āśrama*, and *anuṣṭhānas* and *anuśāsanas* associated with them. Obviously the number of such persons at any time is small (Gītā, 6.45 and 7.3). A large number of verses in the Gītā (6.10; 2.43; 5.10-11; 11.55; 12.18; 18.6 and 23) refer to the 'lonely' character of the seeker of *mokṣa*. What these verses express is scarcely

reconcilable with what the author calls the 'socio-centric morality'. It is pertinent to refer to the doctrine of two truths; some of the finest scholars of the Advaita Vedānta and Mādhyamika Buddhism have sought to explain this doctrine; I would, therefore, avoid treading the same ground over again. In the Upaniṣads we find it at two places: Chand. Up. 7.23.1 and Br. Up. 3.4.2; the Gītā refers to this doctrine at many places: 2.16 and 2.69. The individual, either on account of profound reflection, or on account of the Lord's grace, comes to realise his utter 'lonliness'. There is a 'conversion' or metanoia, as Plato would say. Here is the beginning of an 'illumination'. Interestingly '*mokṣa*' is not found in the older Upaniṣads. But '*ajara*' and '*amara*' do figure in the older Uapniṣads. The significance of '*pāramārthika*' and '*vyavahārika*', it appears, has not been appreciated by Dr. Jhingran even though she refers to these notions. The issue has drawn the attention of all the great ethical thinkers who have seen the 'transcendent' and the 'subjective' aspects of the self.

But there is an important question: how do we (i.e. those who are not liberated) know that the 'liberated individual' is 'liberated'? Again, would the Advaita Vedānta acknowledge the 'liberation' of the follower of Madhva, for example? Or, is the Sāṁkhya notion of 'liberation' identical with the notion of liberation as Nimbārka understands it? To say, as many have said, that the ultimate goal of man's existence has been envisaged by the classical systems of India in an identical manner is not only banal but misleading.

The Aḷvar saints did not belong to Karnataka (p. 20) but to Tamil Nadu. Bhartṛhari and Caitanya have been completely neglected while Nāmadeva and Tukāram have received a niggardly treatment.

The Tāntric tradition receives only a couple of sentences with the observation: '...the Tāntric tradition has exerted an unhealthy influence of Hindu morality' (p. 55). The concluding observation are a medley of incidental remarks and some statements appear to be magisterial in tone. Here is one '...if certain basic ideas and values of Hindu dharma are presented to the Hindu Society in a rational and convincing manner, they would definitely sooner or later have a positive influence on the socio-moral values and conduct of the people.' (p. 227). The Index is incomplete and inadequate.

Jaipur A.M. GHOSE

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Contact: Phyllis Morris, 2116 Runnymede Blvd., Ann Arbor, MI 48103

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Contact: Anthony Preus, Philosophy, SUNY at Binghamton, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000

Society for the Philosophic Study of Genocide and the Holocaust (with APA)
Papers due: April 15, 1990
Contact: Alan Rosenberg, Philosophy, Queens College, CUNY, 65-30 Kissena Blvd., Flushing, NY 11367

Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts (with APA)
Theme: Philosophy and Film
Papers due: April 15, 1990
Contact: Sander Lee, Philosophy, Parker 27, Keene St. College, Keene, NH 03431

Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love (with APA)
Papers due: April 1, 1990
Contact: Alan Soble, Philosophy, U. of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA 70148

DECEMBER

Society for the Study of Ethics and Animals (with APA)
Papers due: May 20, 1990
Contact: Harlan B. Miller, Philosophy, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0126

Soren Kierkegaard Society (with APA)
Papers due: February 1, 1990
Contact: Robert L. Perkins, Philosophy, Stetson U., Deland, FL 32720

1991

JANUARY

* 10–13 **Association for Symbolic Logic**
Carnegie-Mellon University
Contact: Ward Henson, Mathematics, U. of Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801

30 **Symposium: Philosophy of Religion**
Rochester Institute of Technology
Papers due: November 15, 1990
Contact: Dane Gordon, Philosophy, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, NY 14623-0887

MARCH

1–2 **Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy**
University of California, Santa Cruz
Theme: American Philosophy and the Social Sciences
Papers due: November 1, 1990
Contact: Kenneth W. Stikkers, Philosophy, Seattle U., Seattle, WA 98122

8–10 **Society for Philosophy and Technology**
University of Puerto Rico in Mayaguez
Theme: The Discovery of Technology and Technologies of Discovery
Papers due: October 1, 1990
Contact: Joseph Pitt, Philosophy, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061

MARCH

* 27–30 **American Philosophical Association—Pacific Div. (APA)**
San Francisco
Papers due: September 1, 1990
Contact: Anita Silvers, Philosophy, San Franscisco St. U., San Francisco, CA 94132

* **American Association of Philosophy Teachers (with APA)**
Contact: Rosalind Ekman Ladd, Philosophy, Wheaton College, Norton, MA 02766

* **Association for Symbolic Logic (with APA)**
Contact: Ward Henson, Mathematics, U. of Illinois, Urban, IL 61801

* **Conference of Philosophical Societies (with APA)**
Papers due: August 15, 1990
Contact: Sander Lee, Philosophy, Parker 27, Keene St. College, Keene, NH 03431

* **North American Nietzsche Society (with APA)**
Contact: Richard Schacht, Philosophy, U. of Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801

* **North American Society for Social Philosophy (with APA)**
Contact: Kevin O'Neill, Philosophy, U. of Redlands, Redlands, CA 92374

* 27–30 **Society for the Philosophic Study of Genocide and the Holocaust (with APA)**
Papers due: August 15, 1990
Contact: Alan Rosenberg, Philosophy, Queens College, CUNY, Flushing, NY 11367

MARCH

* **Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts (with APA)**
Theme: Philosophy and Film
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* **Society for the Study of Ethics and Animals (with APA)**
Papers due: September 1, 1990
Contact: Harlan B. Miller, Philosophy, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0126

APRIL

* 3–5 **American Society for Aesthetics—Pacific Division**
Asilomar Conference Grounds, Pacific Grove, CA
Contact: Thomas Leddy, Philosophy, San Jose St. U., San Jose, CA 95192-0096

* 6 **American Catholic Philosophical Association Round Table**
Seton Hall University
Abstracts due: March 6, 1991
Contact: Florence Hetzler, Chateau Rochambeau, Apt. 6L, Scarsdale, NY 10583

* 8–9 **Metaphysical Society of America**
Pennsylvania State University
Theme: Potentiality and Presence
Papers due: September 1, 1990
Contact: Drew Hyland, Philosophy, Trinity College, Hartford, CT 06106

24 **Symposium: Philosophy of Peace**
Rochester Institute of Technology
Papers due: February 15, 1991
Contact: James Campbell, Philosophy, Rochester Inst. of Technology, Rochester, NY 14623-0887

APRIL

* 24–27 **American Philosophical Association—Central Div. (APA)**
Chicago
Papers due: September 1, 1990
Contact: Karen Hanson, Philosophy, Indiana U., Bloomington, IN 47405

* 24–27 **American Association of Philosophy Teachers (with APA)**
Contact: Rosalind Ekman Ladd, Philosophy, Wheaton College, Norton, MA 02766

* **Conference of Philosophical Societies (with APA)**
Papers due: August 15, 1990
Contact: Sander Lee, Philosophy, Parker 27, Keene St. College, Keene, NH 03431

* **North American Nietzsche Society (with APA)**
Contact: Richard Schacht, Philosophy, U. of Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801

* **North American Society for Social Philosophy (with APA)**
Contact: William McBride, Philosophy, Purdue U., West Lafayette, IN 47907

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Papers due: August 15, 1990
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Papers due: September 15, 1990
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Papers due: September 1, 1990
Contact: Harlan B. Miller, Philosophy, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0126

MAY

* 30–31 **Sixth Annual Multidisciplinary Conference: World War II—A 50 Year Perspective**
Siena College
Papers due: December 15, 1990
Contact: Thomas O. Kelly, II, History, Siena College, Loudonville, NY 12211

JULY

* 21–25 **World Conference of Philosophy**
Nairobi
Theme: Philosophy, Man, and the Environment
Papers due: September 30, 1990
Contact: Congress Secretariate, c/o Kenya Academy of Sciences, Community Bldg., P.O. Box 39450, Nairobi, Kenya

AUGUST

7–14 **Ninth International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science (LMPS)**
Uppsala, Sweden
Contact: Dag Prawitz, Philosophy, U. of Stockholm, 106 91 Stockholm, Sweden

* **Association for Symbolic Logic European Summer Meeting (with LMPS)**
Contact: LMPS, Philosophy, U. of Stockholm, S-10691 Stockholm, Sweden

AUGUST

8–11 **Seventh International Conference on Social Philosophy**
Colorado College
Theme: Celebration of the Bi-Centennial of the Bill of Rights
Contact: Iris Young, 330 New Scotland Ave., Albany, NY 12208

12–16 **Eighteenth Hume Conference**
University of Oregon
Papers due: September 15, 1990
Contact: Dorothy Coleman, Philosophy, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, ME 04011

18–23 **International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy**
Gottingen
Contact: Robert C.L. Moffat, Exec. Dir., Amintaphil, U. of Florida Law Center, Gainesville, FL 32611

SEPTEMBER

* 20–22 **Wheaton College Philosophy Conference**
Wheaton College
Theme: Contributions of Medieval Philosophy to Contemporary Philosophical Concerns
Papers due: April 15, 1991
Contact: Arthur F. Holmes, Wheaton College, Wheaton, IL 60187

DECEMBER

28–31 **Eighth International Conference on Social Philosophy**
Gujarat University, India
Theme: Freedom, Obligations (Dharma), and Rights
Abstracts due: May 1, 1990
Contact: Creighton Peden, Augusta College, Augusta, GA 30910

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