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Editor DAYA KRISHNA

Indian Council of Philosophical Research
Rajendra Bhavan (Fourth Floor), Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Marg, New Delhi 110 002

Anekānta: both yes and no?*

BIMAL KRISHNA MATILAL

I

A metaphysical thesis, in the context of classical Indian philosophy at least, usually (more often than not) takes the form of such a proposition as 'Everything is *F*' or 'Nothing is *F*'. Philosophical rivalry springs from the varieties of such proposed positions, that is, varieties of such *F*s. For example, the Advaita Vedānta says, 'Everything is Brahman', the Mādhyamika, 'Everything is empty of its own-being or own-nature', and the Yogācāra, 'Everything is a *vijñāpti* making of consciousness'. We may add to the list even such positions as 'Everything is non-soul, impermanent and suffering' (the Buddhist in general), and 'Everything is knowable and namable' (the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika). If we have to add the Jainas to the list, then we can say that their position is: Everything is 'non-one-sided' *anekānta*. However, I shall argue that at least on one standard interpretation, the Jaina thesis is held at a slightly different level; if the others are called metaphysical, this one may be called meta-metaphysical. The sense of it will be clear later on. I do not wish to claim this to be the 'one-upmanship' of the Jainas. The claim here is a modest one; it harks back to the historical origin of the position.

It is rather hard to see how such metaphysical theses as illustrated above, in the form of 'Everything is *F*', can be proven in a straightforward manner. They are often presuppositions, sometimes accepted as an axiom of a system. The argument, if there is any, must be indirect or *reductio-ad-absurdum*, it is persuasive and suggestive. It may be pointed out at this stage that according to the later Nyāya school any argument that has a conclusion (a thesis) of the form 'Everything is *F*', is fallacious, because it would be inconclusive. To use their technical vocabulary, the inferred conclusion of the form 'Everything is *F*' (where 'Everything' is the subject term, playing the role of a *pakṣa*), is faulty because it suffers from the defect called *anupasaṃhārin*. Such a defect occurs when and only when the *pakṣa* (the subject locus) is *kevalānvayin* which corresponds to a universal class. Strictly speaking, we should say that the property that qualifies the subject locus here, that makes it what it is, a subject-locus, is a universal (or everpresent) property. Such being the case, we cannot *compare* or *contrast* it with anything else. The

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Indian theory of inference, on the other hand, depends essentially upon the possibility of such comparison (by the citation of a *sapakṣa*) and contrast (by the citation of a *vipakṣa*). This does not make the Indian or the Nyāya theory a theory of inference based upon analogy. It only certifies its empirical, that is its non-*a priori*, character. Proving something to be the case here means to make it intelligible and acceptable by showing how, (1) it is similar to other known cases and (2) what it differs from and in what way. This demand on the proof is much stricter than usual. Otherwise, the Indians will say that something may actually be the case but it cannot be claimed or established as such. Hence the inconclusiveness (*anaikāntika*) of the said type of inferences was regarded as a defect, a *hetvābhāsa*.

A metaphysical thesis was usually expressed in the canonical literature of Buddhism and Jainism in the form of a question 'Is *A B*?' 'Is everything *F*?', to which an answer was demanded: either yes or no. If yes, the thesis was put forward as an assertion, that is, the proposed position '*A* is *B*' or 'Everything is *F*' was claimed to be true. If no, it was denied, that is, it was claimed as false. Therefore, 'yes' and 'no' were substitutes for the truth-values, true and false. The Buddhist canons describe such questions as *ekāṃśa-vyākaraṇtya*, those that can be answered by a direct yes or no. However, both the Buddha and the Mahāvīra said that they were followers of a different method or style in answering questions. They were, to be sure, *vibhajya-vādin*, for they had to analyse the significance or the implications of the questions in order to reach a satisfactory answer. For, it may be that not everything is *F*, although it may not be true that nothing is *F*.

The followers of the Mahāvīra developed their doctrine of *anekānta* from this clue found in the canonical literature. This is the clue of *vibhajya-vāda*, which originally meant, in both the Buddhist and Jain canons, a sort of openness—lack of dogmatic adherence to any viewpoint exclusively. The philosophy of Jainism has been called 'Non-dogmatism' or 'Non-absolutism'. I prefer the literal rendering 'non-onesidedness', for it seems to retain the freedom of the interpreter as well as its open-endedness.

A metaphysical puzzle seems to have started in the early period in India (as it did in Greece too) with a dichotomy of basic predicates or concepts such as, being and non-being, permanence and change, is and is-not, substance and modes, identity and difference. Although the five pairs just cited are not strictly synonymous, they are nevertheless comparable and often interchangeable depending, of course, upon the context. The first of these pairs used to be captured by a common denominator, *à la* the Buddhist canons, called Eternalism or *śāśvatavāda*, while the second pair constituted the opposite side, Annihilationism or *uccheda-vāda* (sometimes, even Nihilism). In the same vein, i.e. the vein of rough generalization, we put the spirituality of reality on one side and the materiality of reality on the other. Looking a little further we can even bring the proverbial opposition between

Idealism and Realism, in their most general senses, in line with the above pairs of opposites.

Avoidance of the two extremes (*anta* = one-sided view) was the hallmark of Buddhism. In his dialogue with Kātyāyana, the Buddha is said to have identified 'it is' as one *anta* (= extreme) and 'it is not' as the other extreme, and then he said that the Tathāgata must avoid both and resort to the middle. Hence Buddhism is described as the Middle Way. The Mahāvīra's *anekānta* way consisted also in not clinging to either of them exclusively. Roughly, the difference between Buddhism and Jainism in this respect lies in the fact that the former avoids by *rejecting* the extremes altogether while the latter does it by *accepting* both with qualifications and also by reconciling between them. The hallmark of Jainism is, therefore, the attempted reconciliation between the opposites.

II

It would be better to start with some traditional descriptions of the concept of *anekānta*. An alternative name is *syādvāda*. Samantabhadra describes it as a position 'that gives up by all means any categorically asserted view' (*sarvathaikāntatyāgāt*) and is dependent (for its establishment) upon the method of 'sevenfold predication' (*Āptamīmāṃsā*, 104). Mallişeṇa says that it is a doctrine that recognizes that each element of reality is characterized by many (mutually opposite) predicates, such as permanence and impermanence, or being and non-being. It is sometimes called *vastu-śabala* theory (SdM, p. 13), that underlines the manifold nature of reality. Manifoldness in this context is understood to include mutually contradictory properties. Hence, on the face of it, it seems to be a direct challenge to the law of contradiction. However, this seeming challenge should not be construed as an invitation to jump into the ocean of irrationality and unintelligibility. Attempts have been made by an array of powerful Jaina philosophers over the ages to make it rationally acceptable. We will see how.

Guṇaratna Sūri, in his commentary on Haribhadra's *Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha*, says that the Jaina doctrine is to show that the mutually opposite characterization of reality by the rival philosophers should be reconciled; for, depending upon different points of view, reality can be discovered to have both natures, being and non-being, permanent and impermanent, general and particular, expressible and inexpressible. The Jainas argue that there are actually seriously held philosophical positions, which are mutually opposed. For example, we can place the Advaita Vedānta at one end of the spectrum, as they hold Brahman, the ultimate reality, to be non-dual, permanent, substantial, and an all-inclusive being. This is where the 'being' doctrine culminates. The Buddhists, on the other hand, are at the other end of the spectrum. Their doctrine of momentariness (as well as emptiness)

is also the culmination of the 'non-being' doctrine, which can also be called the *paryāya* doctrine. Traditionally, in Jainism, *dravya* 'substance' ('permanence', 'being') is contrasted with *paryāya* 'modification', 'change' or even 'non-being'. One should be warned that, by equating Buddhism with 'non-being', I am not making it nihilistic. For 'non-being' equals 'becoming'. *Paryāya* is what is called a process, the becoming, the fleeting or the ever-changing phases of the reality, while *dravya* is the thing or the being, the reality which is in the process of fleeting. And the two, the Jainas argue, are inextricably mixed together, such that it does not make any sense to describe something as exclusively 'permanent', a *dravya*, without necessarily implying the presence of the opposite, the process, the fleetingness, the impermanence, the *paryāya*. Being and becoming mutually imply each other, and to exclude one or the other from the domain of reality is to take a partial (*ekānta*) view.

The idea is not that we can identify some elements of reality as 'substance' and others as 'process' or *paryāya*. Rather, the claim is that the same element has both characteristics alternatively and *even simultaneously*. It is the last part, 'even simultaneously', that would be the focus of our attention when we discuss the sevenfold predication. The challenge to the law of contradiction that we have talked about earlier can be located, in fact, pinpointed, in this part of the doctrine. The *anekānta* has also been called the *ākulavāda*, a 'precarious' doctrine. The idea is, however, that it challenges any categorically asserted proposition, ordinary or philosophical. Its philosophical goal is to ascribe a 'precarious' *value* to all such propositions. It condones changeability of values (i.e. truth-values). However, it does not amount to scepticism, for the manifoldness of reality (in the sense discussed above) is non-sceptically asserted. It is also not dogmatism, although it can be said that they were dogmatic about non-dogmatism.

III

How do the Jainas argue in favour of their position and answer the charge of irrationality and unintelligibility? Traditionally, their method of *saptabhaṅgī* or 'sevenfold predication' as well as their doctrine of 'standpoints' (*nayavāda*) supplies the material for the constructive part of the argument. To answer criticism, however, they try to show how contradictory pairs of predicates can be applied to the same subject with impunity and without sacrificing rationality or intelligibility. This may be called the third part of their argument. I shall comment on the last by following an outstanding Jaina philosopher of ninth century A.D. Haribhadra. In another section, I shall discuss the first part, the sevenfold predication, before concluding with some general comments.

In his *Anekāntajayapatākā* ('The Banner of Victory for Anekānta'), Haribhadra formulates the opponents' criticism as follows (we will be concerned with only a few pages of the first chapter). He first selects the pair: *sattva*,

'existence' or 'being', and *asattva*, 'non-existence' or 'non-being'. The opponent says G.O.S. 1940 edn., p. 11):

> Existence is invariably located by excluding non-existence, and non-existence by excluding existence. Otherwise, they would be non-distinct from each other. Therefore, if something is existent, how can it be non-existent? For, occurrence of existence and non-existence in one place is incompatible . . .
>
> Moreover, if we admit things to be either existent or non-existent, existence and non-existence are admitted to be properties of things. One may ask: are the property and its locus, the thing, different from each other? Or are they identical? Or, both identical and different? If different, then, since the two are incompatible, how the same thing can be both? If identical, then the two properties, existence and non-existence, would be identical . . . . And if so, how can you say that the same thing has (two different) natures? (pp. 11-12)

The main point of the argument here depends upon reducing the Jaina position to two absurd and unacceptable consequences. If the properties (or the predicates) are incompatible (and different), they cannot characterize the same entity. And if they are somehow shown to be not incompatible, the Jainas lose their argument to show that the same entity is or can be characterized by two incompatible properties. Haribhadra continues:

> If they are both, identical and different, we have also two possibilities. If they are different in one form or one way and identical in another way, then also the same cannot be said to have two different natures. However, if they are different in the same way as they are identical with each other, this is also not tenable. For there will be contradiction. How can two things be different in one way, and then be identical in the same way? If they are identical, how can they be different?" (pp. 12-13)

This is the opponent's argument. The formulation is vintage Haribhadra. Now the answer of Haribhadra may be briefly given as follows:

> You have said 'How can the same thing, such as a pot, be both existent and non-existent?' This is not to be doubted. For it (such dual nature of things) is well-known even to the (unsophisticated) cowherds and village women. For if something is existent in so far as its own substantiality, or its own location, or its own time or its own feature is concerned, it is also non-existent in so far as a different substantiality, a different location, a different time or a different feature is concerned. This is how something becomes both existent and non-existent. Otherwise, even such entities as a pot would not exist. (p. 36)

The existence of an entity such as a pot depends upon its being a particular

substance (an earth-substance), upon its being located in a particular space, upon its being in a particular time and also upon its having some particular (say, dark) feature. In respect of a water-substance, it would be non-existent, and the same with respect to another spatial location, another time (when and where it was non-existent), and another (say, red) feature. It seems to me that the indexicality, or the determinants of existence, is being emphasized here.

To make this rather important point clear, let us consider the sentence:

It is raining.

This would be true or false depending upon various considerations or criteria. It would be true if and only if it is raining, but false if it happens to be snowing. This may correspond to the 'substantiality' (*dravyataḥ*) criterion mentioned by Haribhadra. Next, the same would be true if and only if it is raining at the particular spot where the utterance has been made, otherwise false (at another spot, for instance). It would be likewise true if and only if it is raining now when it has been uttered, but false when the rain stops. Similarly, it would be again true if and only if it is raining actually from rain-clouds, for instance, not so when it is a shower of water from artificial sprinklers. It is easy to see the correspondence of these criteria with the other three mentioned by Haribhadra.

Haribhadra, in fact, goes a little further to conclude that a statement like 'It is raining' or even 'The pot exists' has both truth-values, it is both true and false, in view of the above considerations. In fact, it is better to talk in terms of truth-values (as will be clear below), rather than in terms of the contradictory pairs of predicates. For the law of contradiction, as it is usually stated in ordinary textbooks of logic, requires that the denial of a predicate, F, of a subject, a, be the same as the affirmation of the contradictory predicate of the same subject and vice versa. Besides, saying yes and no to such questions as 'Is *a F*?' is equivalent to assign truth and falsity respectively to the statement 'a is F'.

One may argue that discovery of the indexical elements on which the determinants of a truth-value depends, that is, of the indexical determinants for successfully applying a predicate, may not be enough to draw such a radical conclusion as the Jainas want, namely, co-presence of contradictory properties in the same locus or assigning of both truth and falsity to the same proposition. Faced with such questions where indexical elements play an important and significant role, we may legitimately answer, 'yes and no. It depends'. However, to generalize from such evidence that the truth and falsity of all propositions suffer from this indeterminacy due to the presence of the indexical or variable elements, and further, that all propositions are therefore necessarily and omnitemporally (*sarvathā* and *sarvadā*) both true and false, may be an illicit jump. The successful application of any predicate to a thing, on this view, depends necessarily upon a variable element such

that it can or cannot be applied accordingly as we can substitute one or another thing for these variable elements. These elements, which may remain hidden in a categorically asserted proposition, is sometimes called a point of view or a standpoint. It also amounts to a view which announces that all predicates are *relative* to a point of view; no predicate can be *absolutely* true of a thing or an object in the sense that it can be applied unconditionally at all times under any circumstances. Jainism in this way becomes identified with a sort of facile relativism.

If the points in the above argument are valid, then it would be a sound criticism of Jaina philosophy. However, let us focus upon two related points. First, relativism. The reflexes of relativism are unmistakable in Jainism, as they are in many modern writers. The familiar resonance of Jainism is to be found in Nelson Goodman (*The Ways of World-Making*). A typical argument is to show how the earth or the sun can be said to be both in motion and at rest depending upon the point of view. An obvious criticism of facile relativism (though not that of Goodman) is that it can be shown to be self-inconsistent, for in trying to argue that all truths are relative to some point of view or other, it makes use of an absolute notion of truth. Will this charge hold against Jainism? I do not think so. For Jainism openly admits an absolute notion of truth, which lies in the total integration of all partial or conditionally arrived at truths, and is revealed to the vision of an omniscient being such as the Mahāvīra. The emphasis here is on the conditionality and limitedness of the human power and human vision and therefore it applies to all humanly constructible positions. The concern is somewhat ethical. Rejection of a seriously held view is discouraged, lest we fail to comprehend its significance and underlying presuppositions and assumptions. The Jainas encourage openness.

Are the Jainas guilty of illicit generalization? This is another point of the above critique. All predicates for which there is a contradictory one, are indeterminate as regards the truth and falsity of their application. In fact, by claiming that the contradictory pairs are applicable they take the *positive* way out as opposed to the Buddhists, the Mādhyamikas, who take the *negative* way. Of the familiar four Buddhist alternatives, yes, no, both, and neither, the Jainas may prefer the third, both yes and no, while the Mādhyamikas reject all four. If unconditionality and categorically of any predication, except perhaps the ultimate one, *anekānta* in this case, is denied, then this is a generalized position. The only way to counter it would be to find a counter-example, that is, an absolute, unconditionally applicable, totally unambiguous and categorically assertible predicate, or a set of such predicates, without giving in to some dogma or having some unsuspected and unrecognized presupposition. The Jainas believe that this cannot be found. Hence *anekānta*.

Haribhadra and other Jaina philosophers have argued that we do not often realize, although we implicitly believe, that application of any predi-

cate is guided by the consideration of some particular *sense* or criterion (excessive familiarity with the criterion or sense makes it almost invisible, so to say). This is not exactly the Fregean *Sinn*. In the Indian context, there is a well-entrenched tradition of talking about the 'basis' or the 'criterion' for the application of a predicate or a term. This can be called the *nimitta* theory (the 'basis' or 'criterion' theory). A predicate can be truly applied to something x in virtue of a particular or a specific basis. The philosopher, when he emphasizes the particularity or specificity of such a basis, indirectly and implicitly commits himself to the possibility of denying that predicate (i.e. of applying the contradictory predicate) to the same thing, x, in virtue of a different basis or criterion. Haribhadra says (p. 44):

> (The Opponent says:) The lack of existence in virtue of being a watery substance, etc., belongs to a particular earth-substance, a pot; however, this is because the locus of non-existence of something cannot be a fiction. We admit therefore that it is the particularity of the earth-substance, the pot, that excludes the possibility of its being existent as a water-substance (this does not amount to admitting the co-presence of existence and non-existence in one locus).
>
> (The Jaina answer:) Oh, how great is the confusion! By your own words, you have stated the *anekānta*, but you do not even recognize it yourself! Existence in virtue of being an earth-substance itself specifies its non-existence in virtue of being a water-substance (you admit this). But you cannot admit that the thing has both natures, existence and non-existence. This is a strange illusion! No object (or thing) can be specified without recourse to the double nature belonging there, presence of its own existence in it, and absence from it, the existence of the other.

The general point of the Jainas seems to be this. Any predicate acts as a qualifier of the subject and also a distinguisher. That is, its application not only refers to or, in the old Millian sense, connotes, a property that is present in the subject, but also indicates another set of properties that are *not* present in it at all. In fact, insistence, that is, absolute insistence, on the presence of a property (an essential property) in a subject, lands us invariably into making a negative claim at the same time, absence of a contradictory property, or a set of contrary properties from the same subject-locus.

At this stage, the opponent might say, with some justification, that the conclusion reached after such a great deal of arguing tends to be trivial and banal. All that we have been persuaded to admit is this. Existence can be affirmed of a thing, x, in virtue of our fixing certain determinants in a certain way, and if the contrary or contradictory determinants are considered, existence may be denied of that very thing. This is parallel to assigning the truth-value to a proposition when all the indexical elements in it are made explicit or fixed, and being ready to accept the opposite evaluation if some

of their indexicals are differently fixed or stated. Realists or believers in bi-valence (as Michael Dummett has put it) would rather have the proposition free from any ambiguities due to the indexical elements—an eternal sentence (of the kind W.V. Quine talked about) or a thought or *Gedanke* (of the Fregean kind)—such that it would have a value, truth or falsity—eternally fixed. However, the Jainas can reply the charge of banality, by putting forward the point that it is exactly such possibilities which are in doubt. In other words, they deny that we can, without impunity, talk about the possibility of clearly and intelligibly stating such propositions, such eternal sentences, or expressing such thoughts. We may assume that a proposition has an eternally fixed truth-value, but it is not absolutely clear to us what kind of a proposition would that be. For it remains open to us to discover some hidden, unsuspected determinants that would force us to withdraw our assent to it.

V

A more serious criticism of Jainism is that if the senses are changed, and if the indexicals are differently interpreted, we get a new and different proposition entirely, and hence the result would not be affirmation and denial jointly of the same proposition. If this is conceded then the main doctrine of Jainism is lost. It is not truly an *anekānta*, which requires the *mixing* of the opposite values. This critique, serious as it is, can also be answered. This will lead us to a discussion of *saptabhaṅgī*.

The philosophical motivation of the Jainas is to emphasize not only the different facets of reality, not only the different *senses* in which a proposition can be true or false, not only the different determinants which make a proposition true or false, but also the contradictory and opposite sides of the *same* reality, the dual (contradictory) evaluation of the same proposition, and the challenge that it offers to the doctrine of bi-valence realism.

Let us talk in terms of truth predicates. The standard theory is bi-valence, i.e. two possible valuations of a given proposition, true or false. The first step taken by the Jainas in this context is to argue that there may be cases where joint application of these two predicates, true and false, would be possible. That is, given certain conditions, a proposition may be either (1) true or (2) false or (3) both true and false. If there are conditions under which it is true and there are other conditions under which it is false, then we can take both sets of these conditions together and say that given these, it is both. This does not mean, however, the rejection of the law of contradiction. If anything, this requires only non-compliance with another law of the bi-valence logic, that of the excluded middle (the excluded third). It requires that between the values true and false, there is no third alternative. The law of non-contradiction requires that a proposition and its contradictory be not true together. This keeps the possibility of their being false

together open. Only the law of excluded middle can eliminate such a possibility. This is at least one of the standard interpretations of the so-called two laws of bi-valence logic. In a non-bi-valence logic, in a multiple-valued logic, the law of contradiction is not flouted, although it disregards the excluded third. The Jainas however disregard the mutual exclusion of yes and no, and argue, in addition, in favour of their combinability in answer to a given question. We have shown above how such opposite evaluations of the same proposition can be made compatible and hence combinable.

It is the sameness of the proposition or the propositional identity that is open to question here. If the change of determinants of point of view, of the indexical element, introduces a different proposition, the change of truth-values from 'true' to 'false' would not be significant enough. However, we may claim that the proposition, whatever that is, remains the same and that it has both values, 'true' and 'false', depending upon other considerations. This would still be a non-significant critique of the classical standard logic of bi-valence. The Jainas therefore go further, in order to be true to their doctrine of 'precarious' evaluation (*ākulavāda*), and posit a separate and non-composite value called '*avaktavya*' ('inexpressible'), side by side with 'true' and 'false'. I shall presently comment on the nature of this particular evaluation. First, let us note how the Jainas get their *seven* types (ways) of propositional evaluation. If we allow combinability of values, and if we have three basic evaluative predicates (truth-values?), 'true', 'false' and 'inexpressible' (corresponding to 'yes', 'no' and 'not expressible by such yes or no'), then we have seven and only seven alternatives. Writing '+', '−' and '0' for the three values respectively:

$$+,\ -,\ +-,\ 0,\ 0^{+},\ 0^{-},\ 0^{+-}.$$

For proper mathematical symmetry, we may also write:

$$+,\ -,\ 0,\ +-,\ {}^{+}0,\ {}^{-}0,\ 0^{+-}$$

This is following the principle of combination of three basic elements, taking one at a time, two at a time and all three. The earlier arrangement reflects the historical development of the ideas. Hence, in most texts, we find the earlier order.

The 'Inexpressible' as a truth-like predicate of a proposition has been explained as follows: It is definitely distinct from the predicate 'both true and false'. For the latter is only a combination of the first two predicates. It is yielded by the idea of the combinability of values or even predicates that are mutually contradictory. Under certain interpretations, such a combined evaluation of the proposition may be allowed without constraining our intuitive and standard understanding of a contradiction and consistency. 'It is raining' can be said to be both true and false under varying circumstances. However, the direct and unequivocal challenge to the notion of contradiction in standard logic comes when it is claimed that the same proposition

is both true and false at the same time in the same sense. This is exactly accomplished by the introduction of the third value—'Inexpressible', which can be rendered also as paradoxical. The support of such an interpretation of the 'Inexpressible' is well founded in the Jaina texts. Samantabhadra and Vidyānanda both explain the difference between the 'true and false' and the 'Inexpressible' as follows. The former consists in the *gradual* (*kramārpaṇa*) assigning of the truth-values, true and false, while the latter is joint and simultaneous ('in the same breath') assigning of such contradictory values (cf. *sahārpaṇa*). One pat suggestion is that the predicate is called 'Inexpressible' because in this case we are constrained to say both 'true' and 'false' in the same breath. Something like 'true-false' or 'yes-no' would have been better, but since these are only artificial words, and there are no natural-language-words to convey the concept that directly and unambiguously flouts non-contradiction, the Jainas have devised this new term 'Inexpressible' to do the job—a new evaluative predicate, non-composite in character, like 'true' and 'false'.

This metalinguistic predicate, 'Inexpressible', has been acknowledged as a viable semantic concept in the discussion of logical and semantical paradoxes in modern times. Nowadays, some logicians even talk about 'para-consistent' logics, where a value like 'both true and false simultaneously' is acknowledged as being applicable to paradoxical propositions such as 'This sentence is false' or 'I am lying'. The third value is alternatively called 'paradoxical' or 'indeterminate' (this is to be distinguished from 'neither true nor false', which is also called 'indeterminate'; see Priest, 1979). With a little ingenuity, one can construct the matrices for Negation, Conjunction, Alternation, etc. for the system. The Jainas however do not do it.

I shall now emphasize the significant difference between the philosophical motivations of the Jainas and those modern logicians who develop multiple-valued logics or para-consistent logics. First, the logicians assign truth to the members of a certain set of propositions, falsity to another set and the third value, paradoxicality, to the problem set, i.e. the set of propositions that reveal the various versions of the liar paradox and other paradoxes. The Jainas, on the other hand, believe that each proposition, at least each metaphysical proposition, has the value 'Inexpressible' (in addition to having other values, true, false etc.). That is, there is some interpretation or some point of view, under which the given proposition would be undecidable so far as its truth or falsity is concerned, and hence could be evaluated as 'Inexpressible'. Likewise, the same proposition, under another interpretation, could be evaluated 'true', and under still another interpretation, 'false'.

Second, my reference to the non-bi-valence logic or para-consistent logic, in connection with Jainism, should not be over-emphasized. I have already noted that Jaina logicians did not develop, unlike the modern logicians, truth matrices for Negation, Conjunction, etc. It would be difficult, if not totally impossible, to find intuitive interpretations of such matrices, if one

were to develop them in any case. The only point which I wanted to emphasize here, is to show that the Jaina notion of the 'Inexpressible', or notion of *anekānta* in the broader perspective, is not an unintelligible or irrational concept. Although the usual law of non-contradiction, which is by itself a very nebulous and vague concept, is flouted, the Jainas do not land us in the realm of illogic or irrationality.

Last, but not the least, the Jainas in fact set the limit to our usual understanding of the law of non-contradiction. There are so many determinants and indexicals for the successful application of any predicate that the proper and strict formulation of the ways by which this can be contradicted (or the contradictory predicate can be applied to the same subject) will always outrun the linguistic devices at our disposal. The point may be stated in another way. The notion of human rationality is not fully exhausted by our comprehension of, and the insistence upon, the law of non-contradiction. Rational understanding is possible of the Jaina position in metaphysics. In fact, one can say that the Jaina *anekānta* is a meta-metaphysical position, since it considers all metaphysical positions to be spoiled by the inherent paradoxicality of our intellect. Thus, it is a position about the metaphysical positions of other schools. It is, therefore, not surprising that they were concerned with the evaluation of propositions, with the general principle of such evaluation. In this way, their view rightly impinged upon the notions of semantics and problems with semantical paradoxes. And above all, the Jainas were non-dogmatic, although they were dogmatic about non-dogmatism. Their main argument was intended to show the multi-faceted nature of reality as well as its ever elusive character such that whatever is revealed to any observer at any given point of time and at any given place, would be only partially and conditionally right, ready to be falsified by a different revealation to a different observer at a different place and time. The Jainas think that in our theoretical search for understanding reality, this point can hardly be overstated.

The concept of law and its relation to dharma

SARLA KALLA
University of Rajasthan, Jaipur

In this paper I wish to bring into focus some of the distinguishing features of the concept of law as I find them in the classical Indian tradition. I feel that the subject has not yet received the attention it deserves. To begin with, I have set before myself the preliminary task to systematizing the ideas that are scattered in a vast literature, so as to articulate an intelligible concept of law. A fully developed theory of law involves much more than what I am attempting. It might include presenting legal order as a part of social order, exploring its philosophical foundations, working out features which it shares with other social phenomena as well as identifying its differentiating criteria and finally, analysing its own distinctive concepts. Since I would be dealing with only one aspect of the whole enterprise i.e., what is characteristic of law that distinguishes it from all other social phenomena, this paper does not offer any theory of law, though it might *lead* to a particular theory of law. As our discussion proceeds we will see that an unconventional approach towards the concept of law emerges. Our traditional social thought has the notion of *dharma* at its axis, hence understanding this foundational notion would be of utmost importance in any enquiry into the nature of law. Here, a fundamental question arises: Does the notion of *dharma* carry the same sense and retain its value when it operates in any domain whatsoever? Our posing the problem this way assumes that the idea of *dharma* did not have a standard meaning but remained flexible according to the requirements of the domain or the context in which it got its expression. This assumption is not unwarranted, as I shall argue.

Anyone acquainted with the Indian intellectual tradition is aware of the complex nature of the concept *dharma*. The term has not only undergone considerable change in meaning at various stages in the history of thought, but has also been used in different senses at a particular time even in a particular domain. It conveys a more or less specific meaning at least in the Vedic literature where *dharma* means the sacrificial act which helps maintain the cosmic order. It is in this sense that the *Mīmāṃsā* school uses the term. *Dharma* is an 'ought' which helps one to be in tune with the universe. This sense is carried further when *dharma* is seen as that which sustains something or which prevents something from falling apart. Further, when man is seen not only as a part of nature but also as a social being, *dharma* signifies man's duty in society which will guarantee him well-being in this life and also in the other world. Here we see *dharma* carrying a sense of

'moral ought' and so we speak of the *dharma* of a man according to his status in social life. It is in this sense *primarily* that the *Dharmaśāstras* speak of *dharma*. Interestingly enough, although seldom noted, we find *dharma* being treated as a dynamic concept when applied to law, which has to be evolved with the help of commonsense and reasonableness in the light of social experiences. But then the transcendental character of *dharma* is also not lost sight of and this shift in meaning makes it difficult to provide a definite characterization of the relationship of *dharma* to law. We will return to this problem after having seen the characterization of the concept of law in the *Smṛti* texts.

I. The term '*vyavahāra*', which comes nearer to what we now a days understand by the term 'law', has been used in several senses in the *Dharmasūtras* and *Smṛtis*. It means 'dealing'[1], 'law-suit'[2], legal capacity to enter into transactions,[3] and finally, a means of settling a dispute.[4] Yājñavalkya makes a distinction between '*vivāda*' (law-suit) and '*vyavahāra*' (legal procedure).[5] Kātyāyana, giving its etymological meaning, says that '*vyavahāra*' is so-called because it removes various doubts[6]—doubts as to whose claim is valid according to the laws of the *Smṛtis*. It is necessary to keep in mind all these meanings attached to the word law. K.J. Shah in his famous article, 'Of Artha and the Arthaśāstra' has picked up one meaning of the word law. He then goes on to present the matter as if *vyavahāra* presents a legally relevant factual situation and *dharma*, a relevant legal norm. He says,

> (T)he terms vyavahāra, caritra and rājaśāsana do not need explanation, but one may point out how the four factors operate in the implementation of dharma. It is a matter of commonsense. In the settlement of a dispute, the appropriate rule or law is provided by dharma. No law can exhaustively describe all the possible situations. In order to implement the law, therefore, the facts of transaction (vyavahāra) must be known.[7]

For my part, I disagree with what has been said in this passage. Firstly, law does not exhaustively *describe* all the possible situations, but is a norm that attempts at covering *all the possible situations wherein it can be applied justly*. But since all the possible situations cannot be foreseen by the human mind, when a new situation arises which cannot be rationally decided in accordance with pre-existing laws, then, either the existing law has to be interpreted in a different way or a new rule has to be evoked and the decision be given accordingly. Laws are always incomplete—using Hart's phrase one can say, open-textured—but that incompleteness cannot be removed by adding a fact to it. Shah presents the whole matter as if when *dharma*, which is a norm, is incomplete, then *vyavahāra*, which is a fact, helps one to implement the law. It is clear that he has picked up just one meaning of the word *vyavahāra* that is, dealing or transaction. Here too it is necessary to see that dealing means factual occurrence, which is in accordance with some legal norm. We have already seen that *vyavahāra* itself is considered as a

means of or a norm for settling a dispute. If *vyavahāra* is understood in a limited sense as Shah does, the relationship of law to *dharma* too would be understood accordingly. In fact, the passage quoted above starts by explaining how *dharma* is implemented through *vyavahāra*. In the same passage Shah goes on to state how law is implemented, perhaps assuming that implementation of law is ultimately only implementation of *dharma*. This all too comprehensive notion of *dharma* does not help us much. We shall return to this problem later on, but here I would like to add that the term *vyavahāra* does need some explanation.

Since most of the *smṛtikāras* have treated law as a device for settling disputes, they have provided a thematic classification of those disputes that are entertainable in a court of law. Manu mentions eighteen titles of law or *vyavahārapadas*. They are as follows: (1) non-payment of debts, (2) deposits, (3) sale without ownership, (4) partnership, (5) resumption of gift, (6) non-payment of wages, (7) transgression of *compact*, (8) recession of purchase and sale, (9) disputes between the master and the herdsmen, (10) boundary disputes, (11) assault, (12) abuse, (13) theft, (14) heinous offence, (15) adultery, (16) duties of husband and wife, (17) partition, and (18) gambling and prize-fighting.[8] This enumeration is accepted by almost all the *smṛtikāras* with certain differences in nomenclature. The contents of the *vyavahārapadas* reveal that law is concerned with, what is called, person and property. Assuming that these *vyavahārapadas* cover almost all the disputes that can arise between persons in their private capacity, those that arise between persons (in their private capacity) and officials are further classified as *prakīrṇaka*.[9] The real difference between *vyavahārapada* and *prakīrṇaka* is that, in the former, the disputes can be brought before the court only at the instance of the party concerned, whereas in the latter, it is initiated by the state or the king himself.[10] But in all the cases the king remains the final judical and executive authority.

Once the issues of litigation are framed certain criteria that are necessary for the entertainability of disputes in a law court are laid down. Taken together they constitute a well-demarcated domain of law. A plaint is not entertainable if it (1) does not specify the time, place and statement of the situation or event, (2) lacks meaningfulness, (3) contains an unknown grievance, (4) is opposed to the usages of the country or the command of the king, (5) is incapable of proof, (6) is contradictory, (7) is about an injury that is very small, (8) mixes up several *vyavahārapadas*.[11] We can see that these criteria cover linguistic and substantive conditions, conditions regarding empirical and logical consistency and those having pragmatic considerations. In the decision-making process, the very first step is to decide whether a plaint fulfils the criteria of entertainability or not, and that helps us to clearly ascertain whether a dispute falls within the domain of law. It should be noted that among all the modes of social ordering only law has a fairly well-outlined boundary which also specifies the main area of jurisdic-

tion of state power, the king being the final judicial and executive authority in all matters relating to law. In deciding a particular legal case it has been considered essential, by almost all the *smṛtikāras*, that a dispute should be of a nature that can be settled with the help of proof; it should relate to something that is empirically and logically possible. Hārīta says, '...that is declared to be *vyavahāra* where the attainment of one's wealth (taken away by another) and the avoidance of the *dharmas* of the other (such as those of heretics) are secured with the help of means of proof.'[12] Accordingly, law's task is to see not only that everyone performs his duty but that everyone gets his rightful claim as well. Nibandhakāra says that 'in some *vyavahārapadas* (as in *ṛṇādān* and *dāyabhāga*), the relief claimed is something to be given or rendered (*deya*) by one party to the other, while in others (in *sāhasa* and *steya*) the principal relief is in the form of punishment (*daṇḍa*)'.[13] Bṛhaspati says that law-suits are of two kinds according to the way they originate, in demands about wealth and in injuries.[14]

This account shows an awareness of the distinction between civil and criminal law; more importantly, it brings into focus the concept of right in the concept of a legal order. This fact should be taken into account, for it runs counter to the generally accepted view that ours is a tradition preoccupied with the concept of duty. Incidentally, it may be pointed out that, in spite of being a logical correlative of 'duty', the concept of 'right' does not figure as an important concept in the Western classical tradition. Classical Greek did not have an equivalent of the word 'right' as used in the sense of 'claim'. It is only with modern natural law theory that the concept of 'right' became central to Western political and legal thought. Interestingly, in the Indian tradition the dispensation of justice is considered to be the prime duty of the king and conversely, the individual's right to get justice. In this context, Manu says that taxation and protection go together.[15] In fact, it is a characteristic feature of legal norms that they prescribe duties that correlatively give rise to the claims of *other specific* persons. Unlike moral duties prescribed by *ācāra* which I think, one owes more to himself than to any other person, legal duties *necessarily* arise in relation to some other specific member or members of the society. Of course, it is often the case that a particular legal norm simultaneously has moral value and, accordingly, any deviation from the norm is considered as having results at two different levels—social and individual. *Vyavahāra* takes care of the harm done by a person to another member of the society, while '*prāyaścitta*' takes care of the wrong-doer himself. In the domain of *vyavahāra* the final judicial authority is the king or the state power, while determining the punishment in the form of *prāyaścitta* is the prerogative of the Brāhmaṇas alone. It is to be noted that a king can be subject to punishment in the form of *prāyaścitta*, but is immune to legal punishment. It has been argued that the king, being the protector of the society and the final judicial authority, cannot be subject to any legal punishment.

Another important feature to be noted is that the domain of *vyavahāra* is perhaps the only realm where custom plays a very important role. As for procedural rules concerning the hearing of cases, Nīlakaṇṭha compares them with the rules of grammar in that they are regulations founded on usage.[16] Even the *substantive* legal rules are seen as based on custom. For example, regarding the laws of succession, Vijñāneśwar remarks that the *śāstras* hardly do anything more than reproduce rules prevailing in the world,[17] to which Mitramiśra adds that all authors of digests agree in viewing the part of *Dharmaśāstra* devoted to *vyavahāra* as reproducing rules habitually followed by the people.[18] Custom, apart from being incorporated into the *Dharmaśāstra* which finally takes the form of rule of law, is also considered by Kātyāyana as an independent source of law that can even overrule *śastric* rules of *vyavahāra*.[19] Yājñavalkya says that '(O)ne should not practise that which is ordained by *smṛtis* but is condemned by people.'[20] Again, it is true only in the domain of law that *śāstric* law can be overruled by custom. The Mīmāṃsākāras clearly say that custom cannot be recognized in respect of religious matters if they go against the *Vedas* and the *Smṛtis*.

II. We can now characterize the Indian concept of law or *vyavahāra* as a mode of social control exercised by the state to resolve conflicting claims or disputes between individuals with the help of empirical evidence or proof. The procedural rules of *vyavahāra* are nothing more than conventional methods developed by the society to resolve disputes, while the substantive rules of *vyavahāra* are either ordained by the *śāstras* or are based on customary practices. In the later *smṛtis* we also find the idea of law emanating from a definite secular authority. It is not clear at what stage in the development of law the command of the king became an important source of law. Yājñavalkya mentions it, while Nārada clearly states that king-made law overrides sacred law and custom. On what subjects precisely the king could exercise his legislative power which could override the *śāstric* law is not made clear by the *śāstrakāra*. We can assume that perhaps it was more in the areas of the economy and external affairs that the king could exercise his power of legislation, because the hierarchy of the social structure, broadly speaking, remained unaltered. This conjecture of ours gets support from the fact that in the later *smṛtis*, commentaries and digests we find social prestige, political power and economic interests so distributed as if to seek an equilibrium of the various kinds of power and privileges that are granted to the three upper *varṇas*. Hence one *varṇa* may rank higher in the hierarchy from the point of view of social prestige but another *varṇa* may rank higher when economic or political power is considered. Hence when we speak of hierarchy, it has to be qualified. However, this readjustment of the power system leads us to the conclusion that legislation by the king must have played a role in reshaping the legal order and up to that extent, the social order also.

Apart from custom, the king's ordinance and rules of *vyavahāra*, the

śāstrakāras also speak of *dharma* as an independent source of law. This takes us back to the problem of understanding the relationship of law to *dharma*. Treating *dharma* as an independent source of law can perhaps be explained by saying that when other sources of law are insufficient to lead to a particular judicial decision, *dharma* would provide the guideline in a particular matter. But then, it is not all that clear. In fact, it is difficult to ascertain the hierarchy in which the four sources of law, that is, *dharma, vyavahāra,* custom and king's ordinance were placed, for we find contradictory assertions in the *śāstras*. We have seen above Kātyāyana making the assertion that custom can override *śāstric* law, Nārada making the king's ordinance the supreme source of law, and we also find the usual tendency to place *dharma* above everything. In favour of the supremacy of *dharma* a few examples are provided, say, rules regarding marriage have two-fold conditions: the one relating to the prohibition of marriage between persons having *sapiṇḍa* relationship and the other prohibiting marriage to a person who is suffering from a serious disease. The first condition, it is said, does not have a visible motive and, therefore, is a rule of *dharma* and cannot be violated, else it will render the marriage void. The latter condition, on the other hand, has a purely visible motive and its violation does not render a marriage void.[21]

A few such examples have been considered enough in support of the assertion that *dharma,* which is transcendental in nature, having unquestionable authority, reigns supreme in the domain of law as in all other domains of social life. But if we carefully look at the example chosen by the *smṛtikāras,* where *dharma* is said to claim its superiority, we will find that the situation is rather different. The example relates to those rules which do not deal with purely legal relations but which simultaneously, and more strongly, reveal some religious aspect of life. The relationship between husband and wife or between father and son is more of a non-legal kind. For Hindus, marriage is more a sacrament than a contract. Hence, establishing the superiority of *dharma* becomes much easier if the example chosen relates to the rules regarding marriage or succession. Among rules that settle boundary disputes or disputes arising out of breach of contract or those about sale without ownership, it would be difficult to find any element of *dharma* in the sense of having invisible motives and results, not to speak of its getting the edge over other elements. Most of the examples chosen by the *smṛtikāras* in this context relate only to two *vyavahārapadas* out of eighteen and hence are not evidence enough in support of making the broad assertion that *dharma,* in the specific sense of having a transcendental nature, permeates the entire legal domain.

If one argues that at least wherever an element or principle of *dharma* is involved, it is always the supreme criterion of the validity of a particular legal act or legal relation or legal procedure, we can counter it by saying that this too is not always the case. *Divya* is considered a *pramāṇa* by

dharma but it always has to give way to empirical proof, or *pramāṇa,* when a person is being convicted in a law court. It is only when empirical proof is not available, that *divya* can be considered as proof of the guilt. Later *smṛtis* even try to repudiate it (*divya*) completely.

Notwithstanding the situation some *smṛtikāras* have not only uncritically asserted the superiority of *dharma,* but have also considered the *śāstra* which is supposed to deal with *dharma* as superior to those which deal with other *puruṣārthas*. Yājñavalkya, who considers the *Arthaśāstra* along with the *Dharmaśāstra* as providing the foundation for a judicial decision, maintains that the rules of the former are subordinate to those of the latter.[22] I do not know of any valid reason that has been provided by commentators or writers of digest in support of their so-called preference to rely more on the *Arthaśāstra* than on the *Dharmaśāstra* in the construction of what may be called the juridical science. It seems that the prestige attached to the *Dharmaśāstra* has served as a non-theoretical pressure, for we see no theoretically substantial reason for preferring the rules of the *Dharmaśāstra* to those of the *Arthaśāstra* when the point of enquiry relates to a domain that concerns worldly relations or actions having visible motives and consequences.

So far we have been looking at one important aspect of law, namely, how does law get its content? We have found that, first, law has four sources, *dharma* being only one of them. Second, all other sources of law are not derived from *dharma* and therefore may be considered independent sources of law. Third, other sources may be directly in conflict with *dharma* and the latter does not necessarily override them. Fourth, it is only in some areas of substantive law that *dharma* permeates the content of law and as far as procedural law is concerned, its rules are neutral to *dharma*. Further, when we look at another aspect of law, i.e. its functioning, the idea of *dharma* clearly emerges as a dynamic and relative concept. Bṛhaspati makes a very important remark in this connection. He says, '(A) legal decision should not be given by merely relying upon the text of the *śāstras*. When consideration of a matter is divorced from reasoned commonsense, loss of *dharma* results.'[23] Meaning thereby, that *dharma* is not something static or given or finished in form but has to be evolved.

This account leaves no doubt about the fact that many *smṛtikāras* and most of the commentators and writers of digest maintained that *dharma,* when operative in the realm of *vyavahāra,* cannot be considered sacrosanct or transcendental in character. The very acceptance of custom and the king's ordinance as independent sources of law and the possibility of giving new meaning to the already existing norms through judicial interpretation, makes the concept of law, and accordingly, the concept of dharma, dynamic. Hence, if rules of *vyavahāra* are still to be called rules of *dharma* then *dharma* certainly means something different, its characterization is changed and so is its value. This change is not accidental. It necessarily occurs because of the requirements of the domain itself in which *dharma* gets its expression.

The problems which emerge within the system have a bearing on the foundational notion itself. The generally accepted presumptuous notion that the nature of *dharma* remains intact, irrespective of the context, will have to be abandoned before one proceeds to develop a meaningful theory of law.

Notes and References

I have relied upon Kane's *History of Dharmaśāstra* (1946 edition, hereinafter referred to as 'Kane') for the translation of Sanskrit *ślokas* as well as for the references of some commentaries and digests quoted in this paper.

1. Āpastamba *Dharmusūtra*, II, 7.16.17.
2. *Manusmṛti*, VIII, 1.
3. *Gautamadharmasūtra*, X. 48; *Vaśiṣṭhadharmasūtra* 16, 8.
4. *Gautamadharmasūtra*, XI, 19.
5. *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*, II, 8, 305.
6. Kātyāyana, quoted in Kulluka on *Manusmṛti*, VIII. 1; see Kane, p. 246.
7. K.J. Shah, 'Of Artha and Arthaśāstra', in T.N. Madan (ed.), *Way of Life: King, Householder, Renouncer: Essays in Honour of Louis Dumont*, Vikas Publishing House, New, Delhi, 1982, p. 62.
8. *Manusmṛti*, VIII, 4-7.
9. Nārada, 1-4, quoted by *Mitākṣarā*.
10. *Kātyāyanasmṛti*, Sl. 27.
11. *Mitākṣarā* on Yājñavalkya, II.6.
12. Hārita, quoted in *Smṛticandrikā*, II p. 1; see Kane, p. 247.
13. Nibandhakāra, quoted in *Saraswatīvilāsa*, p. 51; see Kane, p. 258.
14. Bṛhaspati quoted in *Smṛticandrikā*, II, p. 9; see Kane, p. 258.
15. *Manusmṛti*, VII. 128.
16. *Vyavahāramayūkha*, IV: 9:3; quoted by Robert Lingat in *The Classical Law of India*, 1973 edition, p. 182.
17. *Mitākṣarā* on Yājñavalkya, II, 135, 136.
18. Viramitrodaya, quoted by R. Lingat in *The Classical Law of India*, 1973 edition, p. 182.
19. *Kātyāyanasmṛti*, Sl. 37.
20. *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*, I. 156.
21. *Mitākṣarā* on Yājñavalkya, I, 52-53.
22. *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*, II. 21.
23. Bṛahaspati; see Kane. p. 259.

Philosophy of History: 2*
Historical facts and fiction and their explanations

S.S. BARLINGAY
University of Poona, Pune

I

When one talks of history, following the Humean distinction, one is talking about matters of fact and not relations of ideas. The matter of fact in regard to the past is something that has already happened, although it is possible that this happening might not have been properly recorded and could even have been distorted. But if it has really happened and been properly recorded, its existence cannot be doubted. It is a part of reality. It is more so in the case of the present. But what is the status of the future? If we take it for granted that the future also exists it means that something is already present, already existent, already happening in some 'future' time, i.e. even the future time is somehow or the other present just now. In this case time is conceived not as a succession of moments but as a co-existence of moments. The present and the future are conceived as being contemporaneous, i.e. as present only. This is contrary to our commonsense concept of time and history. Nevertheless sometimes we do conceive time in some such oblique way, when our reason is on holiday and we regard future events as somehow or the other existing. Perhaps we go on using the concept of existence ambiguously in this way even in the context of the future. And this is how we apply the concept of causation to future and history. When we say the future will resemble the past it is this ambiguous use of the words 'resemble' and 'exist'. As a matter of fact, when we say the future will resemble the past, what we really mean is that we *will* that the future resembles the past. It is our will that the future should resemble the past and the will statement is somehow given the status of existential statement. In every causal statement some element of will seems to operate. But parallel to our will there is also some actual happening and we try to relate the will to the happening. The will is not caused by the happening nor is the happening caused by the will in a straightforward way. The will only 'explores' the possibility that if *A* is happening it is going to be succeeded by some, till-then-unknown, *B, C, D, E,* etc. These *B, C, D, E* have not happened. They may or may not happen. Only one of them might happen at a particular moment. The will,

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so to say, explores this happening, the would-be-happening. In such a situation the willed is identified with actuality. Sometimes the will creates the possibility of the actualization of the object of the will. What is true of will is also true of hope. Hope and will belong to the same family. We also *imagine* the nature of happening. Our imagination also belongs to the family of will and hope. Our futuristic statements, then, are based on hypostatizations of our will, hope, imagination or desire. How is this possible? Every temporal or matter-of-fact statement has three aspects: (1) The aspect of time which manifests in the bare form of moments. (2) But these moments are never empty. Whether time is cosmocentric or anthropocentric, moments do not remain empty. That with which the moments are filled is likely to be of two kinds: (i) they may be filled with something that is objective and impersonal; (ii) they may also be filled with happenings due to the efforts or actions of human beings. It is strange, but still a fact, that human action can be 'accumulated' when it is mixed with the cosmic material and it also takes the form of things or conceptual systems. For example, the electric bulb is a product of human action. This is an action on something which already exists in a different form. But the human action gives it a new form, and this new form continues to remain unchanged at least for some time. Some of the elements in the newly formed structure or form are human knowledge, human will, human desire, human hope, human action. When a new happening becomes a reality superimposed on the earlier reality, a part of this new happening is due to human action. But the earlier layers of happenings also must involve some human hand, some human intervention; and so, in a way, it is a manifestation of human will. The world that we know is, therefore, so to say, a pyramid of the matter which at each step has undergone a change due to some human action. Suppose there are five layers, A, B, C, D, E; although each layer, except the first, is due to human action, the complexity of action at each layer is not the same. Suppose the basic layer is A, then when it becomes B, B will have to be analysed as A+human action. When B is transformed into C, C again is B+human action. When C is transformed into D, it is again C+human action, and so on. When one talks of human action it is personal, individual. But the individual or personal human action has a tendency to become social and discard the personal elements. The individual aspect of an action is either ignored or forgotten and thus an action which is otherwise individual tends to become objective, or impersonal, or social. This is something like the second objective world imposed on the first objective world. In this way layers of objective worlds are created and although they belong to different orders they are treated as if they belong only to one order, and finally, the distinction between the first order and the other orders is forgotten. It is some kind of human amnesia which works. These different orders other than the first caused on account of human and non-human interventions can be called environment. It is possible that even moments may be of this kind. Thus, for the succeeding order

or human creation the previous order or human creation works as a background (substratum) or the objective world. All such preceding objective worlds, except the first, we regard as environment. Such environments do not have a personal element. They may be social or otherwise. And so, some scientific, semi-scientific, or pseudo-scientific explanation can be given of this objective world also. But, when human action takes place, its author is always an individual, and therefore in the beginning any action is only individual. Such action takes place because of will, hope, etc. and is therefore characterized by freedom. When such action merges into environment, this freedom is lost. Now in every happening which is human, all the three factors are basically present. I call them T (World, Time), E (Environment) and F (Freedom). When human will is realized and becomes a fact, the F factor is erased and so also the E factor is ignored; only the T factor is regarded as significant and of the nature of the world or reality. My proposition can be verified even by an example from economics. Labour is present at the stage when raw goods are turned into first finished products. At the next stage these finished goods are regarded as a raw material and are further subjected to human labour to make the second order of finished goods. At each stage the personal part of the labour is forgotten and at every next stage the earlier labour is also forgotten. But the personal part, if properly understood, is always constituted by freedom. I, therefore, propose to regard every action, every bringing about, as of the form T, E, F.

When we talk of future happenings these three factors are to be carefully understood. The first factor is more certain than the second, and the uncertainty is due to the third factor. It is because of the third factor that it is hard to make a prediction. It is to the second factor that we sometimes apply the law of causation and therefore think of the future as determined by some causal or other natural laws. The third factor, i.e. freedom, is really nothing but our will and it is only our will that something should come into existence. But our will and the events may not go hand-in-hand. This creates uncertainty. So the third factor, in a way, combines the uncertainty of matters of fact and man's freedom. Hence, that which is conceived conceptually does not happen actually and so our predictions go wrong sometimes. The ratio of our predictions going wrong may be partly due to our personal actions not becoming a part of environment. In history this is still more obvious because history is a record of events initiated by human beings, and individuals are not eliminated in history. A war is not merely a collision of weapons at a certain time and in a certain space; the will of different individuals is also a factor. Although we have a tendency to regard human history as objective it is never so in the way physics or mathematics is objective. The concept of human will or freedom is never separated from history and a historical record is never stored in a store-room in the way physical things are stored. History is merely a store of will and desire objectified in a

peculiar way. When one talks of the interpretation of future events, one will have to consider all these elements in the process.

II

Historical explanation is an explanation of man's behaviour, and since man's behaviour is concerned with time, a philosopher of history has to be concerned with all the three modes of time: past, present and future. But these three modes pose three kinds of problems when they are concerned with man's behaviour. First, the present is continuously becoming the past and so the present exists only for an instant. Thus, the explanation of the present is really the explanation of the past although it may be either an immediate past or a more and more distant past. But even as we can say that the present becomes the past, we cannot similarly say that the future becomes the present. It is certainly true that something is continuously present. But I am not sure whether we can strictly use the phrase 'becoming the present'. For, when we talk of the future, it is always of the nature of will or desire and not of the nature of existence. In a way, when one connects the future with the present, one is connecting will or desire with existence. Becoming the present is realization of desire. It is the transforming of desire itself into existence. This is not so in regard to the relation between the present and the past. It relates that which is existent with that which was existent. In a way it is existence becoming non-existence. It is reducing something that is real to the status of memory. The past is no more a part of the physical reality. Therefore, it exists only in the world of consciousness, perhaps in the self-conscious world and is also gradually eliminated or distorted when it is reduced to memory. Explanations in history in relation to the past are, therefore, merely explanations of the correlations of the contents of time as represented in memory. The events as deposited in memory also have an order in succession. They are always on the time-scale $-t1$, $-t2$, $-t3, \ldots -tn$. But the events, when they are put on this time-scale, do not remain as 'vivid', to use Hume's words, as the impressions in the present are. Gradually the vividness fades and even the order in the time-scale is lost. Thus the events which are at $-t9$ and $-t10$ may be interposed. This affects the concept of history. For example, we have thought of a certain causal relation between $E-t10$ and $E-t9$, such that $E-t10$ is the effect and $E-t9$ the cause. But with the rupture in our memory, things would look different. When we talk of events, we have still not talked of them as abstractions. Man is not the same as humanity. When we talk of man, we talk of his spatial dimensions, his weight, etc. Now suppose we change his spatial dimensions, suppose, instead of saying he is six feet tall, we say he is six-hundred feet tall; if he has a certain strength, we now say he has strength equal to the strength of ten thousand elephants; and if he has lived, say for seventy years, we now say he has lived for seventy thousand years. We

would not get a different picture of the man. He would still be historical man, an individual, but his relationship with us will be of a very different kind. He might be depicted as a demon in *kṛtayuga*. But all this is possible in imagination and the conceptual world. Thus, the contents of their relationship can be changed and history can be distorted. We can, for instance, make a man fly like an imp in the *Arabian Nights*. Such distorted or mutilated contents of history assume the status of myths. The more distant the history the more likely it is to become a part of mythology. In every myth, if we carefully investigate, there is bound to be some history, but the spatio-temporal relationships and their order is distorted. Sometimes we carry the temporal happening of the myth to a distant past, sometimes we bring it nearer the present. The myth of Santa Claus, for example, is such a myth. It is now associated with Christmas and the Christian religion. But I am told that this myth came into existence long before Christianity came into existence. And, in fact, such myths exist in almost every part of the world. The roots of such myths are manifest when, for example, a mother tries to put her child to bed. A mother in Maharashtra would say, 'Go to bed, otherwise Bongyabau will come'. The same is the case with the Santa Claus myth. One need not say that the Santa Claus myth exemplifies goodness. The chimney in that myth only shows that the myth, as it comes to us, comes from colder areas where houses have chimneys. A historical event, thus, can be transformed into a mythological event and may be uprooted from history proper. But if this is so, one truth follows: some genuine historical event must underly a myth (or even a legend). In the hands of man almost everything that happens, as also all that he creates, becomes a combination of truth and untruth and history is not an exception to it. When does a historical event become a mythical event? Nobody really knows. But a historical event is continuously marching in that direction. It is, of course, done unconsciously. Human imagination is continuously playing its role. But if one understands the logic of historical events becoming myths one would also know that historical explanations stand on the escalator which moves from history to mythology. One must realize that in our construction or the reconstruction of reality we are continuously under the burden of imagination. Our historical explanations are those which suit us, suit a particular class, a particular nation, a particular society and therefore they are always a mixture of reality and imagination, truth and falsehood.

III

When events are deposited in memory another kind of distortion is also possible. Man always does this distortion in the name of universality and logic. When events take place they are particular: man universalizes them, generalizes them, by distorting them. He can again re-arrange these generalizations or universalizations by disrorting space and time relations. He also

imposes some kind of particularities over these entities and events. He creates another world parallel to the world in which he lives. This leads to poetry, literature and art. This would give us the feeling that we are actually talking of some real experience in the world of history. But, as a matter of fact, the world that is presented to us now is a world of fiction. It is the creation of a new world over the background of space and time and characteristics imposed on some imagined individuals. But when history is thought of not as history of individuals but as history of society it also becomes a history of characteristics. It is no more a history of individuals who have actually lived. It is the history of characteristics and tendencies with a particular society; it is a history of a segment of time as it is manifested. How are we to distinguish between a picture of a certain segment of history and a picture of such a fiction? I feel it is impossible to distinguish between the two. A historical picture, of course, has a truth-claim, whereas a picture of fiction has not. But how do we verify the truth-claim? It does not seem possible to verify such a truth-claim. For, as soon as events are deposited in memory we have already lost our power of verification for any claim whatsoever. Moreover, when we start interpreting history we are not talking of a truth-claim concerning particularities. A truth-claim concerning universality is equally present whether it is a piece or history of a piece of fiction. History says that Shivaji was born in 1627 and died in 1683. During his life he established a kingdom and had relations with the Mughals, the Bijapur king, the Portuguese and the British. From the point of view of the history of man, whether this particular great king was Shivaji or not would be strictly irrelevant. What is important and relevant is the relationship that existed between certain elements, say *A*, *B*, *C*, *D*. What is important is the rise of a certain social structure which is again due to the presence of certain characteristics emerging out of the manifold. So, barring the emotional satisfaction that there lived a king called Shivaji, one does not gain anything more. Shivaji, for example, is said to have constructed a big sea-fort at Sindudurg. Now what would be relevant is the presence of the fort and not whether Shivaji constructed it or whether Kanhoji Angre or someone else manoeuvred certain strategies from the fort against the British, the Protuguese or the Siddis. Again, in the fort of Sindhdurg there are supposed to be a foot-print and a palm-print of Shivaji. But whether the footprint or the palm-print is of Shivaji or of somebody else's can neither be verified, nor, if verified, be useful for maintaining any relevant historical truth. We may, for example, say that there was Shivaji. But when we go to more distant past are we certain about the particularities? Allauddin Khilji, we take it for granted, was a sultan of Delhi and we also assume that Rana Bheem was a king of Chittaud and that Allaudin Khilji invaded Chittaud. But are we also certain that Allaudin invaded Chittaud in order to abduct Padmini? Or, is it also a fact that he agreed to see Padmini's face in a mirror? Perhaps all this is a creation of human imagination and utterly false. Perhaps such myths are created because kings in those times might have developed a lust for the wives of conquered kings. But this would only be a picture of a tendency, a picture of a characteristic, and that also may become relevant if it acted or reacted in a certain way, in a certain social explosion. Historians, for example, talk of the great fight which Rana Pratap gave, almost single-handed, to the Mughal emperors af Delhi. Bards have sung ballads of the battle of Haldighati. They say that on one occasion the king did not have anything to eat. Somebody gave him seeds of a certain wild grass. He managed to cook some bread out of that. But those too were taken away by a wild cat. The story effectively deepens the emotional effect. But whether this is a fact of history. nobody would know. One could as well construct a fictitious story of a fictitious king and sing the story of a fictitious fight. The only difference between the format of fiction and history is this: while describing a historical event we may say, 'There was (a king . . .)', etc., and in fiction we might say, 'Once upon a time there was a king . . .'. But one thing must be granted. If history is a study of man in time it could never remain a study of particular men at a particular time. Finally it would be difficult to distinguish between history and fiction, as it would be difficult to distinguish between history and myth. In fact, a lot of history is inherited by us through social and cultural practices, through literature, art, folk-lore and myths. At the same time, particularities can never be eliminated from history. Any history, which is after all a story, must be a story of concrete being, concrete individual. Thus, in a way, history presents a paradox. This paradox is due to the inseparability and blending of the *T*, *E* and *F* factors mentioned above. But it presents another unique feature of history.

IV

I may be permitted to repeat some of my observations made so far. I have said that historical facts develop in two ways: (1) they tend to eliminate individuality and manifest a tendency to generalize and conceptualize, and (2) they tend to distort spatio-temporal relationships. One gives rise to fiction and legends, the other gives rise to myths. But in history, individuality cannot be completely eliminated. This throws light on another aspect of history. History does not appear to be the history of man in general. It is the history of concrete individuals and therefore concrete individual characteristics, including man's idiosyncracies, play an important role in the development of historical actions and historical explanations. It is here that history ceases to be a natural science or cosmology. It does not remain merely a record of man's achievements, it becomes man's creation also (*E* and *F* factors act together). And although we give explanations of history in language, history becomes a system of selected memories coupled with desires and purpose and tries to formulate the future course of man's development. The agents of this development are individuals and it is their role

that matters. It is not sufficient to say that Shivaji and Gandhi and Lenin were products of their times and their nations. They have also been the founding fathers of new times, the makers of history. This they were able to do because of the awareness, insight and foresight through which they were able to grasp not only the present but also the future. The future is certainly concerned with desires. But it is man's efforts that actualize those desires, make them a part of the present. He wills it that way and since all willing leads to action through the instrument of causation, he is able to see how the actions are brought about and with an addition of which variables he would be able to achieve the willed results. This residual factor is supplied not by environment but by man's freedom, man's ability to construct and reconstruct the world. In a way, then, history is a construction of social reality which, of course, takes place through individual efforts. What we call social is always a function of moment-series and individual efforts, including individual conflicts. Whether the intended result is achieved depends on man's capacity and favourable opportunities (environment). This is not only true of political history but also of social and scientific histories. Edison invented the electric bulb. In a way, the invention was due to the progress of science and society. But it required an Edison to invent it. Man requires a proper or suitable environment to produce the intended result. Jagdishchandra Bose, we are told, had conceived the idea of radio-set earlier than Marconi. But he did not get the necessary opportunity to realize his idea and publish his results, due to the absence of the favourable environmental factor. The growth of capitalism in England was marked by several such factors. The spirit of renaissance, the vision of science, the courage for adventures, were all in the background. But these were not sufficient conditions for the growth of capitalism. The common man, with his will to oppose the barons and lords, and the spirit of cooperation and entrepreneurship, was necessary for the development of capitalism in England. When Shivaji founded Swaraj, the background, in a way, was prepared, but it did require Shivaji to fulfil the task. The leadership factor is also the individual factor, the factor which comes in the purview of will. It is this factor which makes room for decision, it is this factor which freedom supplies. Causation in history is therefore a combination of causal (environment) factors and freedom factors. The causal factors may give us mathematical precision in the process while the freedom factors may topsy-turvy the whole situation. Uncertainty in history, like achievement in history, is due to this freedom factor. Causation is therefore only partly applicable in determining the historical process. Objectively, one can only say that in a moment-series there would be an event series and at some time or the other, the events would change or differ from earlier ones. Causation is based only on this concept of difference. One can, of course, make a general prediction because the social reality constructed earlier continuously tends to become a part of the environment and can be subjected to causation. One can, therefore, make such predictions as, with a change in the means of production there is bound to be a social change. But when we talk of a change in the means of production, it does presuppose a great social history which has become a social reality and has supplied the background for the social or historical change. The social background also, in its turn, is a product of the natural background. For example, a certain geographical situation may cause a certain change which otherwise would not be possible. The Greeks could fight the Persians because of Thermopile. And the Marathas could succeed, unlike the Rajputs, against the Mughals, because of the hills, caves and forests of Sahyadri. All this would come under the geographical situation responsible for certain changes or events.

V

The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā theory of Indian philosophy tries to give a causal account of man's actions. Actions are bound to have causes and effects and the process must be continuous. If there are more men than one, their interactions also must modify further actions. In principle, therefore the *Karma* theory, at least in one of the forms, does not appear to be absurd. All our actions have two factors—*Sancita*, which are stored results of earlier actions and *Kriyāmāna*, actions which spring from them. The Purva Mīmāṃsā talks of a third factor also, viz. *Prārabdha*. All our actions start on the background of cosmic movements. Our actions cannot be considered without them. Cosmic movements act like the geographical factor just as *Sancita* acts like the environmental factor and therefore the *Karma* theory, in a way, gives us a very important perspective of the philosophy of history. The *Karma* theory, according to me, gives us one more important truth. It also takes into account the freedom factor. The responsibility of historical creation ultimately lies with individual men. For, this development is due to the freedom factor. Mere geography or cosmic dynamism would not achieve it nor would it be achieved by the tribal or social factor developed earlier. Thus, the *Karma* theory brings home to us the limitation of the causal theory. In a way it gives us the logic of historical process. The only difficulty with the *Karma* theory is that it carries this explanation to an absurd limit and therefore, though paved with good intentions, leads to hell. Every individual history begins with the individual's birth and ends with the individual's death. But once you regard an individual as immortal (through, of course, his soul) we begin to carry the explanation of *Karma* to states earlier than birth and later than death. Here the rational *Karma* theory meets its doom. It is indeed true that society does not have birth or death in the manner an individual has. It is also true that the concept of society is more fluid than that of an individual. Nevertheless, a society is also conceived in the fashion of an individual. It may be a collective concept, but it tends to become a singular one. So if we take any cross-section of society. it does follow the

pattern of individual history, and is governed by some dialectics very similar to the one supplied by *Karma* theory and its factors like *Sancita*, *Prārabdha* and *Kriyāmāna*. But if one inserts into this theory the mystic concept of immortality and rebirth, the social dialectics leads to absurdity.

VI

Although history, mythology and fiction get intermingled with one another it must be admitted that conceptually they are different. History, although it is an interpretation, aims at remaining objective and does not want to cut its umbilical cord which links it not only with the world but with its chronologically succeeding objectivity. Moreover, it does not want to substitute one situation for the other, or one individual for the other. At least conceptually it is concerned with *Svabhāva* and not with *Vibhāva*. Thus, it does not want to get alienated from objective reality. Most of the predictions we make in history, although they are of the nature of our desires which we want to be realized, are possible because of this regulated and ever succeeding order of time-moments. If this is disturbed not only would there be anachronism but the very objectivity of history would be affected. Historical memory is not arranging our experience as we like it. The order of this arrangement is given to us by the very nature of time or Kant's objective succession. Thus, if the order 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, is reordered as 1, 6, 4, 2, 5, 3 nobody would know anything about the individual or social history or social development. When we are concerned with ancient history particularly, this is bound to happen. The history of India before Harsha is so hazy that any conjecture about it with mathematical precision is bound to give us a very wrong picture of the development of the people of that time. Is Kautilya the same as Arya Chanakya Vishnugupta? And is the *Arthaśāstra* that has come to us written by Vishnugupta? If they are different, then by identifying the author of the *Arthaśāstra* with Vishnugupta, we would get a very wrong picture of Mauryan times. Historical research is always of the nature of joining broken memories together to make one whole. But some similarities may thwart the progress of our historical research. For example, in India the beginning of historical identification starts with the identification of Palibothra with Pataliputra. This identification may be correct. But one must also know that it is a matter of guess. It is not a matter of inference, or deduction. Although historians and archaeologists take this as a definite point of history and regard Chandragupta Maurya and Sandrakottas of Megasthenes as identical, one must know that it is a very weak link. And if every other part of history between the Mauryas and the Vardhanas is based on this weak link, our historical research is likely to be unobjective. When Sir William Jones identified Palibothra with Pataliputra the records of history found later were not available. For example, Sir William Jones says that Prayag was never a metropolis. But later records

show that Prayag was in all probability a metropolis as is seen from the line अनुगांगं प्रयागं च भोक्षन्ते गुप्तवंशजाः ।*

We should, therefore, have challenged this interpretation of history, and it would have either ramified the previous conclusion or given us a new hypothesis. If we had come to the same conclusion as Sir William Jones drew we would definitely have stood on firmer ground. An interpreter of history, like a philosopher, should start with the method of doubt. He has to be sceptical. He must not accept anything that is given to him with religious gusto.

*anugāṅgaṃ Prayāgañca bhokṣante Guptavaṃśajaḥ/

The problem of the world in Husserl's phenomenology

PARITOSH KUMAR DAS
University of Burdwan, Burdwan

Initially Husserl wanted phenomenology develop as a descriptive science of the essences. It was not to be a philosophical system in its traditional sense. Moreover, it was to avoid any ontological commitment as to the reality-status of the phenomena to be studied in this science. But gradually it was stretched so far as to satisfy the Cartesian idea of philosophy as the all-inclusive unity of the sciences, within the unity of an absolutely rational grounding on the basis of absolute insights behind which one cannot go any further.[1] With the incorporation of the Cartesian ideal of philosophy as the universal science, phenomenology could no longer be wholly non-systematic and, further, it hardly could avoid ontological considerations. The kind of system that phenomenology ultimately gives rise to is, as Husserl himself explains, 'a system of *Phenomenological* disciplines,'[2] which is, of course, other than an 'all-embracing system of deductive theory' projected by Descartes and others. Again, transcendental phenomenology as the systematic unfolding of the *universal logos of all conceivable being* be *ipso facto* the true and *genuine universal ontology* that comprises in itself all regional existential possibilities.[3] The universal ontology is *the all-embracing a priori* innate in the essence of a transcendental subjectivity, and correspondingly in that of a transcendental inter-subjectivity.[4]

In all this, transcendental phenomenology explains a curious architectonic, which is as follows:

Name of the science	*The field of study for the corresponding science*
Egology	Transcendental ego-consciousness
Inter-subjective phenomenology	Transcendental ego-community
Universal ontology	The all-embracing a priori
Science of matters of fact	The different regions of the world

The architectonic explains that the world as we know it, or the one with which we are concerned in our daily practical living, is the fact world, and this fact world is founded on the all-embracing a priori (essences), which is, again, 'innate in the essence of a transcendental subjectivity (and consequently in that of a transcendental intersubjectivity).'[5] Thus, our knowledge due to the sciences of the world of facts presupposes our implicit belief in the existence of the essences which do not fall within the scope of those sciences of facts. For an understanding of those essences we are referred to an all-

embracing a priori phenomenology itself, i.e., the sciences of the all-embracing a priori. 'This total science of the a priori would then be *the foundation for genuine sciences of matters of fact*.'[6] 'All the rationality of the fact lies, after all, in the a priori. A priori science is the science of radical universalities and necessities, to which the science of matter of fact must have recourse, precisely in order that it may ultimately become grounded on such radical principles.'[7] But the a priori science must not be naive; on the contrary, it must have originated from ultimate transcendental-phenomenological sources. Thus, for a *radical clarification of the sense and origin of the concepts*: *world, nature, space, time, psycho-physical being, man, psyche, animate organism, social community, culture*, and so forth, we are referred to intersubjective phenomenology, which is, in turn, founded on the Egology of the primordially reduced Ego.[8]

The course of reason as originating in pure, absolute, or transcendental consciousness, runs down the world which is, for a conscious being like man, the basis of living. All forms of human activity follow from his living presence or participation in this world. What we call science is a cultural product based throughout on criticism of daily practical living or practical experience. But its criticism is not ultimate criticism of knowledge. It shares the naivete of daily living, and further, it introduces naiveties of a higher level. 'Consequently we have—and precisely at the high level attained by modern positive sciences—problems of fundamentals, paradoxes, unintelligibilities.'[9] What is demanded of phenomenology is a radical clarification of the genuine concepts that are fundamental to all sciences. With this clarification, the sciences cease to be naive or unintelligible and their paradoxes are finally removed.

Now, sciences are basically of two different types—sciences of matters of fact and sciences of the a priori. The former have been developed by following the methods of deduction, induction, etc., and the latter can be developed by following the method proper to eidetic phenomenology, i.e., eidetic reduction. Corresponding to every science of fact we may have a science of the a priori, and both may be regarded as 'sciences of the world'. The fundamentals of every science of the world are ultimately clarified in transcendental phenomenology.

II

The architectonic, as Husserl's phenomenology exhibits, explains a two-tier foundation of knowledge and experience, of culture and science, etc. First of all, every worldly experience, by articulating which we have science and other forms of culture, is grounded in the natural world, the corresponding object of the natural attitude of mind (the essence of which is our natural belief in the real existence of the world). We may here use such an expression as 'first foundation', and the natural world is that first foundation. But

really the world does not exist in itself. Its existence is presumptive. It exists in and for the activities of pure or absolute consciousness. Therefore, pure, transcendental or absolute consciousness, is the ultimate foundation of every knowledge, every experience and every science.

But if transcendental phenomenology proceeds through *epoché*, i.e., through a suspension of our natural belief in the real existence of the world, then, can it in any way be relevant to the sciences of the world, let alone work out their foundation? Phenomenological *epoché*, unlike Cartesian doubt, is not a temporary affair. It remains operative throughout the whole course of transcendental phenomenology. Then, is transcendental phenomenology in any way competent to talk about the World and the sciences of the world which have already been left out of consideration?

In order to remove any misgiving about the competence of phenomenology working out the foundation of the sciences of the world and man's life in the world, Husserl reasserts, 'I must lose the world by epoché, in order to regain it by a universal self-examination.'[10] The world that is rediscovered by a universal self-examination is the clarified meaning of the naively accepted world. But by so clarifying the meaning of the world, 'We subtract just as little from the plenitude of the world's Being, from the totality of all realities, as we do from the plenary geometrical Being of a square when we deny (what in this case indeed can plainly be taken for granted) that it is round. It is not that the real sensory world is "recast" or denied, but that an absurd interpretation of the same, which indeed contradicts its *own* mentally clarified meaning, is set aside.'[11] The same idea is expressed by Husserl in his *Formal and Transcendental Logic*:

> The transcendent world; human being; their intercourse with one another, and with me, as human beings; their experiencing, thinking, doing, and making, with one another: these are not annulled by my phenomenological reflection, not devalued, not altered, but only understood. And, in the same manner, positive science, as achieved by labours in common, becomes understood.[12]

Yet, serious doubts have been cast as to the identity of the natural world and the phenomenological world, the 'world lost by *epoché*' and the 'world regained by a universal self-examination'. Thus, Roman Ingarden[13] thinks that Husserl indeed identified the phenomenological world with the real natural world, but this identity is not in any way phenomenologically demonstrated. There is a wide gulf between the phenomenological world and the real world. The phenomenological world is the world-as-meaning or the meant world. It is the world that consciousness intends. The real world, on the other hand, is given in flesh and blood; it is concretely given and is the one in which one lives and takes active interest. The real world shows a special sufficiency, an autonomous being, which the meant world is lacking in.

Ingarden's objection, if it holds good, is very serious, for it undermines the claim of transcendental phenomenology to have concretely realized the 'idea of philosophy' which aims at complete rationalization of reality. In order to consider this objection with all its implications we may first explain the different conceptions of the world that we have in Husserl's phenomenology.

III

Husserl explains three different conceptions of the world—the natural world, the phenomenological world, and the life-world. We begin with his conception of the natural world, as found in § 27 to § 30 of *Ideas I*.

The natural world is the world of 'the natural standpoint', i.e., the standpoint form which natural human beings imagine, judge, feel, will and act. For a natural human being the world is there. It is spread out in space endlessly, and in time becoming and become, without end. The presence of the world is discovered immediately, intuitively, in the different ways of sensory perception, through sight, touch, hearing, etc. The world includes corporeal things, animal beings, and fellow human beings like me, each of which is individual. I may attend to them, I may not, though they are immediately there for me. But it is not necessary that they should be present precisely in *my field of perception*. Some of them are distinctly perceived, some others are in a distinct or indistinct *co-present margin*, forming a continuous ring around the actual field of perception, and a vast number of other objects reach farther in a fixed order of beings into the *limitless beyond*. This 'limitless beyond' cannot be completely outlined, yet it has the 'form' of the world as 'world'. Likewise is it with the world in respect to its *ordered being in the succession of time*. Thus, in sense perception I discover individual objects as 'objects of the world', or as objects having the form 'world'.

The natural world contains things and beings of infinite variety and infinite quantity. They are not static either. Change is a permanent feature of the world. But though the objects of the world pass through constant change, the world remains one and ever the same. It is continually 'present' for me, and I myself am a member of it. 'Therefore this world is not there for me as a mere *world of facts and affairs*, but, with the same immediacy, as a *world of values, a world of goods*, a practical world'.[14] I find the things before me with value-character such as beautiful or ugly, agreeable or disagreeable, pleasant or unpleasant, and so forth. They also stand there as objects to be used, the 'table' with its 'books', the 'glass to drink from', the 'vase', the 'piano', and so forth. The same considerations apply of course just as well to the men and beasts in my surroundings as to 'mere things'. They are my 'friends' or my 'foes', my 'servants' or 'superiors', 'strangers' or 'relatives', and so forth.

As a physical or bodied being I am included in the natural world as an object among other objects in it. But at the same time, this fact-world in which I find myself is also my world-about-me. It is to this world that the complex forms of my consciousness stand related. Related to it are the different theorizing activities of consciousness (such as observing, describing, comparing, collecting, inferring, etc.), the diverse acts and states of sentiment and will (such as approval and disapproval, joy and sorrow, desire and aversion, hope and fear, decision and action), and so on. Or to say it simply, I am present to myself continually as someone who perceives, represents, thinks, feels, desires, and so forth; and for the most part herein I find myself related in present experience to the fact-world which is constantly about me.

The natural world is not only the world-about-me, it is also the world-about-us. Whatever holds good for me personally, also holds good, as I know, for all other men whom I find present in my world-about-me. I experience them as men, I understand and take them as Ego-subjects, units like myself, and related to their natural surroundings. I understand that each has his place, his own field of perception, memory, imagination, etc., which may considerably differ from my own. 'Despite all this, we come to understandings with our neighbours, and set up in common an objective spatio-temporal fact-world as *the world-about-us that is there for us all, and to which we ourselves none the less belong*.'[15]

So far Husserl gives a pure description of the general features of the natural world of natural standpoint, which may be summed up as follows:

(i) The world is one unbroken world.
(ii) The world is a fact-world.
(iii) The world is ready-to-hand.
(iv) The world is enduring. It endures persistently during the whole course of our life of natural endeavour.[16]
(v) The world is given in perception and not in any act of judgment, though it can be expressed in the form of such a judgment.[17]
(vi) The world includes me and others.

The above-mentioned general features of the natural world and the corresponding natural standpoint, are further generalized into the most universal feature of the natural world, and thereby of the natural standpoint, and this is what Husserl regards as the 'thesis'. The thesis is 'the world that I find to *be out there*, and also *take it just as it gives itself to me as something that exists out there*.'[18] In other words, the thesis is the certainty of the world that exists outside as an independent reality. For further clarification of the meaning of the thesis we may bring out the salient features of the thesis, as follows:

First, the thesis is certain. It is immune from doubt.[19] We may consider, for example, the following passage from *Ideas I*:

> All doubting and rejecting of the data of the natural world leaves standing the *general thesis of the natural standpoint*. 'The' world is as fact-world always there; at the most it is at odd points 'other' than I supposed, this or that under such names as 'illusion', 'hallucination', and the like, must be struck *out of it*, so to speak; but the 'it' remains ever, in the sense of the general thesis, a world that has its being out there.[20]

Second, the thesis of the natural standpoint is more fundamental than the thesis of such other standpoints as, say, the arithmetical standpoint. When I adopt an arithmetical standpoint the arithmetical world is there for me. But, '*the arithmetical world is there for me only when and so long as I occupy the arithmetical standpoint*.'[21] The natural standpoint and its corresponding world, on the other hand, remain before and after we have adopted the arithmetical standpoint. When I am busied with the arithmetical world the natural world does not vanish, it remains in the background. It is now only unattended, unconsidered. The natural world and the arithmetical world are present together, though disconnected; their connection lies in their common relation to the Ego who can freely direct the glance to the one or the other.

Third, the thesis is a living conviction that goes on living despite phenomenological bracketing.[22]

Fourth, the thesis is self-evident.[23]

Fifth, the thesis posits the world universally, but the thesis is not posited consciously in any act of judgment. It is already given to the man, who from the very beginning of his life, lives in it. Every conscious act posits the object in some form or other, and to posit the object is to posit it as existent. The world being universal existence every act of position takes place on the basis of the world. Therefore, the thesis is the universal basis of all worldly experience, but in itself it is not a worldly experience. It is an inborn attitude of the mind of which we are not normally conscious.

IV

Husserl regards his phenomenology as transcendental, i.e., a science that transcends the scope of the natural attitude of mind. It is a science based not on worldly experience but on phenomenological seeing made possible by the execuation of *epoché*. The main subject of study for the science in pure and absolute consciousness that transcends the scope of the natural world. And yet, transcendental phenomenology is concerned with the world in a very important way. It seeks to work out the foundation of knowledge and experience, of science and culture, etc., as are directly or indirectly grounded in our belief in the real existence of the world. By demonstrating the truth that the world exists not in and for itself, but through a dispensation of sense by the activities of pure consciousness, it hopes to work out the foundation of knowledge and experience, science and culture, etc., en

bloc. However, though transcendental phenomenology is concerned with the world, it cannot deal with the world as it naturally gives itself to us as something that exists out there, for this science proceeds on the basis of *epoché*, and *epoché* de-naturalizes consciousness along with the world. The world with which transcendental phenomenology is concerned is the de-naturalized world. This world is the world-as-phenomenon, i.e., phenomenological world. The phenomenological world is the world-as-meaning or the world-as-sense, and pure consciousness is the giver of every sense.

Then, what is the link between the phenomenological world and the natural world? Husserl points out that actually the phenomenological world and the natural world are not two different worlds. They are the same world looked at from different points of view. Viewed naturally, the world is the fact-world, the existent world, but viewed under the attitude of the *epoché* (which is, really speaking, not an attitude, but a direct view uncoloured by any prejudices, natural or otherwise), the world is the world-as-meaning, and phenomenology claims that '*the whole being of the world* consists in a certain "meaning" which presupposes absolute consciousness as the field from which the meaning is derived' (emphasis ours).[24] Husserl's theory that meaning or sense is neutral to existence, that consciousness is meaning-giving consciousness, that consciousness generates meaning by virtue of those acts which are essentially intentional, that intentionality essentially has its two-sidedness in the form of *noesis* and *noema*, that the intending object is the noematic unity of sense, all these give a systematic exposition of the general position that the world-as-meaning derives its being from pure or transcendental consciousness.

Nonetheless, Husserl's claim that 'the whole being of the world consists in a certain "meaning"' that '*all real unities are "unities of meaning"*',[25] seems to have diluted or dissolved the essential distinction between 'sense' and 'existence'. Whereas the thesis of the natural standpoint posits universal existence which is 'the' world, the *epoché* '*completely bars me from using any judgment that concerns spatio-temporal existence*.'[26] Then, how does the phenomenological world recapture 'the whole being of the world'?

That the distinction between sense and existence is fundamental is clear from Husserl's analysis of 'noesis', 'noema' and 'meaning'.[27] Every intentional experience is analysable into its *proper components*, and their *intentional correlates*, or the components of them. The former are noetic contents and the latter are noematic contents. The noetic contents and the noematic contents are correlative, though the former are real (*reelle*) components and the latter are not real (*reelle*) components. What is called 'meaning' lies at the base of the noematic correlates of an intentional experience. The intentional experience intends the object by virtue of its gift of that 'meaning' which lies 'immanent' in the experience. Thus, meaning is neither a real component of experience nor a real object outside; it is the noematic correlate precisely as it lies immanent in the experience. Perception, for instance,

has its noema, and at the base of this its perceptual meaning, that is, the *perceived as such*. Under normal circumstances we do not distinguish between the 'perceived as such' which lies immanent in experience and the real object perceived outside. But, if the perceived object is a mere hallucination, let us suppose, then there is nothing real outside to which the perceived as such relates, and yet the 'perceived as such' stands. The real perceived object is meaning, 'perceived as such', and existence fused to a unity. But the perceived as such is only meaning. So, when phenomenological reduction takes place, real existence of the world outside is left out of consideration, and what remains for consideration is the world-as-meaning.

Husserl makes this point clear with the help of an example, as follows: Let us suppose that we are looking with pleasure at a blossoming apple tree in a garden, at the fresh young green of the lawn, and so forth. From the natural standpoint the apple tree is something that exists in the transcendent reality of space, and the perception as well as the pleasure a psychical state which we enjoy as real human beings. Let us now pass over to the phenomenological standpoint. The transcendent world enters its 'bracket', in respect of its real being we use the disconnecting *epoché*. We now ask what there is to discover, on essential lines.

> 'In' the reduced perception (in the phenomenologically, pure experience) we find, as belonging to its essence indissolubly, the perceived as such, and under such titles as 'material thing', 'plant', 'tree', 'blossoming', and so forth. The *inverted commas* are clearly significant; they express that change of signature, the corresponding radical modification of the meaning of the words. The *tree plain and simple*, the thing in nature, is as different as it can be from this *perceived tree as such*, which as perceptual meaning belongs to the perception, and that inseparably. The tree plain and simple can burn away, resolve itself into its chemical elements, and so forth. But the meaning—the meaning of *this* perception, something that belongs necessarily to its essence—cannot burn away; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties.[28]

V

Clearly, then, the real world differs from the phenomenological world in substance. The real world is a massive world but the phenomenological world is lacking in massivity. The sciences of the world, such as physics and chemistry, are concerned with those physical and chemical properties of the objects as can be found only in the real world, but not in the phenomenological world. It is certainly true that the sciences of the world exist not simply because the world is there; the existence of the world is a necessary condition for their existence, though not sufficient. They handle the real world which has its physical and chemical properties, and so on,

through and with the help of certain concepts which owe their origin to conscious processes. A phenomenological consideration of the world may be useful, even necessary, for clarifying the philosophical issues pertaining to those concepts. But to say that the real world is reducible to the phenomenological world, that phenomenology explains both the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the world, (i.e., the ultimate foundation of the world) and thereby, of the sciences of the world, is too gross a claim to be entertained.

Also, in *Ideas I* we discover some conflicting tendencies in Husserl's mind. He explains the meaning of *epoché* in such a way as to suggest that the *epoché* removes our natural blindness as to the being of consciousness. It does so by suspending the action of the natural-world-thesis. But when it deals with the intentional structure of conscionsness, the noetic-noematic correlation, noematic meaning and its relation to the object, as a prelude to the phenomenology of constitution, later taken up in *Ideas II*, his suggestion is that meaning is independent of existence, and that meaning analysis is carried out by leaving the question of existence out of consideration. This might suggest that phenomenological reduction is a bracketing of existence, that phenomenology is a philosophy of sense and not an ontology of being or even metaphysics. But as we come to *Cartesian Meditations* and *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, we have no doubt that Husserl's phenomenology really dissolves the questions of real existence rather than *putting* them into abeyance. In *Formal and Transcendental Logic* Husserl writes:

> These are the results of systematic sense-investigations concerning the world, which, as a 'phenomenon', lies within me myself and gets its being-sense from me...[29]

This passage appears to leave the issue about the relation between the world-as-phenomenon or the phenomenological world and the real world yet unsettled. But immediately thereafter Husserl declares:

> Accordingly the *radicalness of this philosophic self-examination*, the radicalness that sees in everything given beforehand as existing an index for a system of uncoverable constitutive performances, is indeed the most extreme *radicalness in striving to uproot all prejudices*. Every existent given beforehand, with the straightforward evidence thereof, is taken by it to be a 'prejudice'. An already given world, an already given province of ideal being, like the realm of cardinal numbers—these are 'prejudices' originating from natural evidence, though not 'prejudices' in the disparaging sense.[30]

VI

The question of real existence is an ultimate metaphysical question. Hume

observed that such a metaphysical question cannot be answered except by committing speculative excess. If philosophy is to be a scientific study, it must give up speculation and, hence, the question of real existence. The world indeed exists but we do not know its real nature. On the other hand, the world as we understand it, the world with which our sciences and other forms of culture are concerned, is the world of meaning created by human understanding and attributed to the existent world. Thus, in a sense, for us human beings, the world or nature is human nature. If we reduce the given world to world-as-perception, we get the contents of human nature. The primary elements out of which this nature is constituted are impressions, which are later copied as ideas. These impressions may be derived from either real existence or from any other source. In his less cautious philosophical moments Hume might admit that real existence is the cause of those impressions, but in his more cautious philosophical moments he prefers to keep silent on this issue: impressions arise in the soul originally without further introduction.[31]

That Hume developed his philosophy as a philosophy of sense rather than a metaphysics of being or existence is nowhere more evident than in his discussions on the body. 'We may well ask, *what causes induce us to believe in the existence of body*?' but it is in vain to ask, *whether there be body or not*? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.'[32] Seen in this way, Hume's celebrated discussion on cause runs on this line: what makes *A* the cause of *B*? The answer is: if the question is a metaphysical one then it does not admit of any answer. For, we do not really know what *A* is or what *B* is or what their internal connection is. But if it is asked, what enables me to say that *A* (as I experience it) is the cause of *B* (also given within the scope of my experience), then my answer is: if in my experience I find that the *A*-likes are follwed by the *B*-likes without exception then I believe that *A* and *B* are causally connected, that is, necessarily connected. In other words, within the world of my meaning there is nothing more than that *A*-likes are being followed by *B*-likes, and the belief that in future there will be a similar following.

Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, too, may be regarded as a philosophy of sense. In it real existence has been put within brackets as the unknown and unknowable thing-in-itself. In his *Practical Reason*, however, Kant fully utilizes the services of the thing-in-itself to lend support to his ethical theories, and there it functions not merely as a limiting concept, but as a storehouse of inexplicables.

Husserl, unlike both Hume and Kant, is opposed to the idea of setting a limit to reason's capability of enlightening the heart of reality, the real existence. In this regard, Husserl is a Cartesian rather than a Humean or a Kantian. He despises the idea of the unknown thing-in-itself, the rationally incomprehensible reality, as absurd. On the contrary, he has absolute faith in reason's supremacy and capability and takes the Cartesian idea of

a supreme science of philosophy with all its seriousness. As he writes in *Cartesian Meditations*:

> Finally, lest any misunderstanding arise, I would point out that, as already stated, phenomenology indeed *excludes every naive metaphysics* that operates with absurd things in themselves, but *does not exclude metaphysics as such*. It does no violence to the problem-motives that inwardly drive the old tradition into the wrong line of inquiry and the wrong method; and it by no means professes to stop short of the 'supreme and ultimate' questions.[33]

VII

But if phenomenology is finally a philosophy of being rather than a philosophy of meaning, then Roman Ingarden's objection to Husserl's phenomenology remains essentially valid. Ingarden's objection to Husserl is summarized by Tymieniecke[34] as follows.

Husserl reduced all objects of cognition or of constitution, to intentional objects; the real object is represented by Husserl in constitution as transcendent, yet this transcendence is supposed to be an existential mode constituted in a special set-up of conscious acts. Thus, this table with all its transcendent features is existentially reduced by Husserl to the status of Hamlet, that is, of a purely intentional object. If this were true, that the real object could be completely assimilated to the intentional object, constitution of reality would be like the creation of a work of art. It is precisely Ingarden's objection to Husserl that this is not true. The structure of the real object shows that it cannot be reduced to the status of the purely intentional object of constitution and that it demands to be taken in its own right.

Ingarden's stricture against Husserl is based on the argument that the real world and the meant world exhibit very different essences. Husserl appears to hold that by virtue of the *epoché* the real world is transformed into the world as a system of phenomena. The meant world is the universe of phenomena that is retained through the operation of reduction. But the real world is incapable of being transformed into the world-as-phenomena. The two worlds are given differently, are known differently and are affected differently. Thus the one cannot be assimilated to the other. Husserl rightly points out that between the real world and consciousness there yawns an abyss of sense. But, again, there stretches an abyss of sense between the real world and the meant world. What is truly founded in consciousness is the meant world, that means, the world comprehended by me, but not the real world.

Apparently, the relation between absolute consciousness and the real sensory world gives rise to a paradox. Almost all Husserl-scholars are con-

vinced that the problem of the transcendence of the world is a real problem in Husserl's phenomenology. But most of them are not prepared to believe that Husserl in his long phenomenological career did not find any solution to the problem. Thus, they have variously interpreted Husserl's phenomenology as a certain form of realism or idealism or existentialism.[35] Some even think that the problem of idealism-realism does not concern Husserl ultimately. For Husserl, the problem of transcendence is one of genesis of signification. The real problem for Husserl is, 'what is the genesis of the significant world for me now?'[36] But, everyone who advocates a realistic, or an idealistic, or an existentialistic, or even a neutralistic interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology has to concede that there are many texts in Husserl's works which resist one's own interpretation.

Among other Husserl-scholars Paul Ricoeur[37] thinks that, in view of the ever-widening gulf between the immanent phenomenological world and the transcendental real world, Husserl, towards the end of his philosophical career, went in search of yet another final ground, and he struck this ground in his fresh conception of the *lebenswelt* or the life-world. Husserl's conception of the *lebenswelt*, Ricoeur thinks, brought him to the doorstep of French existentialism, which is, of course, several steps away from transcendental philosophy. This is, however, not an agreed opinion, and yet forceful enough to reckon with. Then, what is *lebenswelt*?

VIII

In *Ideas I* the world is characterized by Husserl as the 'natural world'. It is the 'thesis', the fundamental doxic basis, on which is grounded the total attitude of a man as a natural human being. In *Crisis* Husserl replaces the concept 'natural world' by the new concept 'life-world'. He introduces the concept 'life-world' to better express his concern for the crisis of the European sciences, which, according to him, is in fact the crisis of modern man, the crisis of his culture. Today, man's understanding of himself and his world is completely guided by the ideal of scientific knowledge. Meanwhile, science has lost its connection with the original ground from which it has taken its start. The original ground is the life-world. The life-world is the world in which a man discovers himself as a living, conscious being. It is the world in which he lives and in which he takes active interest. Here man is a prominent figure. But in the world of science, strictly speaking, there is neither man, nor his society, nor his ideas, nor his body, nor his senses, etc. The world has undergone objectivistic dissolution to such an extent that the last vestige of subjectivity has disappeared from it. Man is only a composition of atoms which are completely determinable by exact mathematical principles. But the sciences have originated in human experience, by way of articulating those experiences theoretically. If science (natural or objective science) is only too willing to destroy the ground of those experiences then

ultimately it will face an internal crisis, and in Husserl's opinion, the crisis has already become evident in the form of the crisis of European culture. However, strictly speaking, it is not science which is responsible for the present crisis; rather, it is Western man's failure to live up to his philosophical destiny that has brought him to the crisis before which he now stands. If he is to meet the crisis which faces him, he must be reborn in the spirit of scientific philosophy that regards man as essentially a spiritual subject, where infinite goals and infinite possibilities reside. Phenomenology answers this description of scientific philosophy. The proper task of phenomenology as a philosophy would be, in the first place, to restore man's life-world, and then, his reason. Phenomenology is the science of man all through. On the mundane level it is the science of the life-world—man in his actual station of life—and on the transcendental level, it is the science of universal self-consciousness or universal reason.

At this point one may well wonder why Husserl now speaks of the 'life-world' instead of the 'natural world'. In what way is the life-world different from the natural world? The concept of 'life' seems to be a significant addition to the concept of 'world'. However, as we see, Husserl prescribes the use of transcendental *epoché* with regard to the life-world in order to achieve an ultimate clarification of its meaning from the point of view of transcendental or constituting consciousness. Thus the life-world should not be fundamentally different from the natural world, which is the only world given before reduction. Husserl strongly emphasizes this point in *Ideas I*. There is no more than one real world.[38] The real world is the fundamental basis of all human enterprises (including the cognitive activities of natural man). It is the original ground on which all sciences, all forms of culture, etc. are based. The meaning of this world needed to be clarified phenomenologically. Husserl's idea in this respect does not seem to have altered basically.

At the stage of *Crisis*, however, Husserl is more particularly careful to discover and to explicate the structures that make up the essence of the world, as the world that we experience, as the world that is not yet subject to constructive or destructive interpretations. But the problem is that we have too many conflicting world-pictures. There is the world of science, the world of historical communities, the world of professional groups, and in a sense, each and everyone has a world of his own. But, then, which world is the primary world? Modern man is apt to consider the world of science as the primary world. Today, science speaks of a world that is not immediately perceptible, but is exactly determinable in terms of mathematical physics. Nonetheless, the claim that the world of science is the primary world appears to be naive to a historical way of thinking. There were, and even today there are, people whose understanding of the world is in no way affected by modern science. The scientific world-picture is only one among many, and like all others, it has been produced by a certain society under certain definite conditions. The world of science is a world of construction.

> The construction of the universe of science involves, as a mental accomplishment, certain specific operations, especially that of idealization. Obviously, idealization presupposes materials to be idealized. By virtue of its intrinsic sense as a superstructure, the universe of science requires a foundation upon which it rests and upon which it is constructed. The foundation is no other than the *lebenswelt* and the evidence of common experience . . . .[39]

Thus, in order to determine the structures belonging to the world as such we must not consider the world of science but must go back to the world as is originally given in immediate experience prior to every theoretical consideration. In this connection Husserl prescribes 'first *epoché*', that is, *epoché* with regard to science from our consideration of the world.

Our problem, however, is to understand thoroughly the meaning of the concept 'life-world'. Husserl offers various descriptions of the life-world which are not without equivocations. In an appendix to *Ideas II* he identifies the life-world with the natural world. This is one of the earliest passages, written in the twenties, in which the term 'life-world' occurs.[40] It is however *Crisis* which securedly establishes the concept of the life-world. In *Crisis* the life-world is regarded as the field, the horizon, which is constantly and necessarily pre-given.[41] It is the perceived world,[42] the original ground of all theoretical and practical activity,[43] the source of self-evidence and the source of verification.[44] The life-world is the world of all known and unknown realities[45] in which everything has a bodily character.[46] It is the world in which we live according to our bodily, personal ways of being.[47]

IX

We see, therefore, that the new concept 'life-world' retains almost all the important traits of the 'natural world'. The life-world is now regarded by Husserl as something 'pre-given'. In *Ideas I* it has already been pointed out that the natural standpoint is the original standpoint and is given prior to all other standpoints. The presence of the world is original and is the permanent basis of all acts of cognition. All sciences develop in it and never go beyond it. Thus it is not unnatural that Husserl regards the life-world as something 'pre-given'. If the pre-givenness of the life-world is taken to mean the original presence of the world, then the life-world is the same as the natural world.[48] Even the addition of the concept 'life' to the concept 'world' is not something unusual. It is a fact that mankind lives in the world. The realm of being uncovered by *epoché* is not the realm in which we live or act or have any practical interest. All the interests of life centre round the natural world in which we live.[49] Because of this fact of living the world is never mere nature. The world contains objects that have human significance. The world is therefore more appropriately regarded by Husserl as the *lebenswelt*

or the 'life-world'.[50] Again, the fact that mankind comes to live in the world makes the world 'subjective-relative'. It is not that the world is given first and then mankind comes to live in it. The world is inconceivable apart from human living and human existence. As Dr. Landgrebe puts it: 'We cannot even conjecture what a "world" would be that was never experienced or is never experienceable. It would be an empty word without meaning.'[51] On the other hand, however primitive we start, we do not find men living in a pre-worldly state. Wherever conscious life is said to begin, it begins on the basis of the world. This mutual reference of man and the world prompts Husserl to characterize the world as 'life-world'.

But if Husserl's conception of the life-world does not materially differ from his conception of the natural world, then, as our discussions have amply clarified, the wide gulf between the real world and the phenomenologically clarified meaning of the world still stands. The world as the ontological being, its existence, which Hume's theory of understanding left out of consideration and which Kant incorporated within his critical philosophy as the unknown and unknowable thing-in-itself (or considered as a problematic concept, a noumenon), could not be enlightened by Husserl's transcendental phenomenology either.

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Phenomenology as the foundation for psychology: a critique

SANTOSH KUMAR PAL
Burdwan University, Burdwan

Before going into the problem of foundation let us take a look at how psychology as a discipline was cultivated by the traditional thinkers. It was from the seventeenth century that an attempt was made to tear psychology away from the apron-strings of philosophy. With the progress of the mathematico-physical sciences, the psychologist, too, wanted to develop psychology as an exact science. They adopted the methodology of the natural-physiological sciences. The application of a scientific methodology gave the other sciences immense progress, but nothing significant took place in the field of psychology between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, although the researchers in this field were not inferior to those in the other sciences. The fact was that psychologists, in the name of making their discipline an exact science, were simply imitating the models of the natural-physiological sciences, forgetting the truth that there is a qualitative difference between facts of physical nature and those of the human psyche, and ignoring the significational-valuational aspect of psychical experiences. As a result, in spite of serious attempts by physiologists and physicists like J.V. Müller, F.H. Weber, Volkmann, Helmholtz, Fechner, Wundt, etc., there was no real progress in the field of psychology. Husserl, the initiator of phenomenological reflection, first noticed this problem which, according to him, is the problem of foundation. He opined that for psychology to be a genuine science it must incorporate the valuational and teleological aspects of mental life. He reiterated that psychology has to be established on the basis of an exploration of how meanings are constituted in consciousness. This inquiry into meaning and the essence of psychological facts would give psychology a methodological foundation. The present paper is an attempt to explicate Husserl's reflections on this problem of foundation, after which a critical assessment of Husserl's radical views will be taken up.

THE GENESIS OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

It was in Leipzig, in 1876, that Husserl was initiated into the world of psychology. This was the psychology under the influence of Brentano, Stumpf, Dilthey, etc. In his first systematic work, *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (1891), Husserl defended a kind of psychologism by advancing the thesis that the

epistemological foundation of mathematics is to be provided by empirical psychology.

In this book he extensively discussed the mathematical notions of numbers, plurality and unity, and he claimed that many of the conceptual difficulties involved herein are based on the psychological constitution of these concepts.[1] That is, the psychological investigation of actual human thought is a necessary, and sometimes sufficient, condition for mathematical and logical investigations. We find Husserl referring to Mill who attributed the validity of the logical law of contradiction to the psychological constitution of man.

Although the text of *Philosophy of Arithmetic* is meant primarily to present a foundation of mathematics by taking recourse to psychologism, it contains several indications of phenomenological investigation,[2] e.g., the notion of phenomenological description, eidetic intuition, etc. And as such the notion of eidetic psychology is discernible in it. This notion was developed under the influence of Frege.

Influenced by Frege's criticism of this book, Husserl very soon came to realize that psychologism is inadmissible. In his two volumes of *Logical Investigations* (1900-01) he corrected his mistake and affirmed that the ideal object of mathematics has a being of its own which can never be interpreted as psychical generalization. In *The Idea of Phenomenology* (1907) he formulated his basic ideas of phenomenology as a radical way of investigation.

From 1907 onwards we find psychology as a constant pole of comparison in Husserl's explanations of the meaning of his phenomenology. Gradually it became clear to him that it is possible, even necessary, to bridge the gap between empirical psychology and phenomenological philosophy with the help of a completely new science which is called 'eidetic psychology' first and 'phenomenological psychology' afterwards. This view is expressed for the first time in *Ideas-I* (1913), although traces of these insights are also found in his *Logos* article (1910-11).

Between 1913 and 1923 Husserl was especially concerned with constitutional problems. As a result of these investigations he realized that the conception of phenomenological psychology so far developed was not sufficient, and that the relation between phenomenological psychology and transcendental philosophy had not been founded in a radical way. For this reason, he dealt with the topic in different lecture-courses, which were later published systematically in his *Phenomenological Psychology* (1925). In the Introduction to this book he characterizes the new psychology as *a prioric*, eidetic, intuitive, or a pure descriptive and intentional study of psychical facts.[3] The epithet '*a prioric*' implies that 'this psychology aims first of all at all those essential universalities and necessities, without which psychological being and living are simply inconceivable.'[4] The title 'intuitive' stands for the source of this *a priori*. The term 'intentional' implies the most universal

characteristic of psychic being and living: psychic life is the life of consciousness, and this consciousness is consciousness of something.

The same ideas are to be found in Husserl's *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article (1927) where he says,

> Together with this philosophical phenomenology, but not yet separated from it, however, there also came into being a new psychological discipline parallel to it in method and content: the *a priori* pure or 'phenomenological' psychology, which raises the reformational claim to being the basic methodological foundation on which alone a scientifically rigorous empirical psychology can be established.[5]

In *Cartesian Mediations* (1931) Husserl mentioned for the first time that a special reduction is needed for phenomenological psychology. In his last work, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1936), Husserl returned to this point and tried to determine the specific nature of this reduction.

ORIGINAL VIEWS ON PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

According to Husserl, we would be able to correct fundamental mistakes of traditional psychology by means of a phenomenological psychology. In his *Amsterdam Lectures* (1925) Husserl opines that present-day psychology is the science of real psychological events which occur in the concrete domain of the spatio-temporal world. The 'psychical' manifests itself in the world where there is also the 'physical'. That is why psychology is sometimes considered as a branch of more concrete anthropology which also deals with the psycho-physical aspect of living beings.

Now the question is, how far is a pure psychology possible in addition to empirical psychology? It is clear that psychology as an empirical science of facts can never be pure in its investigations. For, no matter how far the pure psychological experience and the theory founded on it can reach, it is certain that the merely psychical about which each intends to speak possesses its spatio-temporal determinations in the real world. And thus within the domain of empirical psychology as an objective science of facts, it is absolutely impossible to constitute a pure science of psychology. But a pure psychology is indispensible for a scientific orientation.

In a certain sense we could say that in every psychic experience something appears to the subject in so far as this subject is conscious of it. From this perspective, then, the phenomenality manifests itself as the fundamental characteristic of the psychic as such, so that from this perspective 'pure psychology' can be called phenomenology.

Phenomenologic-Psychological Reduction

But how can a pure phenomenological experience be brought to light? 'Pure'

has a double sense[6] here. In the first sense, this experience must be pure in being free from all the physical and psycho-physical with which it is connected. Second, this experience must be free from all prejudices which spring from other scientific spheres and which can blind us to that which phenomenological reduction immediately offers us. Obviously, such a pure analysis of psychic experience had not been made up to Husserl's time. Even Dilthey and Brentano did not succeed in this task, although they gave intentionality a central place in psychology and tried to found psychology as a systematic and descriptive inquiry of consciousness.[7]

If a phenomenologist aims at pure psychic experience, he has to eliminate the non-psychic element associated with it. As phenomenologists we must, as it were, be 'disinterested spectators'[8] of our own conscious life. Instead of living in our own consciousness and being interested in the world given in it, we have to look upon it just as the consciousness of something. In order to get into such a realm of pure psychic being, we do require, according to Husserl, a phenomenologic-psychological reduction.[9] Within the sphere of such epoché consciousness always remains consciousness of something, and this something is taken here to be only that toward which consciousness' intention is directed, while as reality in the spatio-temporal world this object is put in brackets. Just as physical nature is reduced to a noematic unity of phenomena, so also the real human ego is reduced to pure psychic unity. My being a man in the objective spatio-temporal world and my mundane life is maintained only as 'meant', i.e. as that toward which the intentional conscious acts of intentional life, reduced to the pure psychical, are and continue to be oriented.

The consistent disclosure of the noema can shift toward a consideration and analysis of the correlative noeses. But in addition to these conscious intentional acts the ego-centre as such manifests itself as something on and in itself, as the ego of every *cogito*, as an ego which in all these acts is and continues to be identical. Thus the unity of the psychic is maintained. According to the natural-empirical interpretation, on the other hand, different sense data are organized in a unity mechanically, in which subjectivity has hardly any active role.

It is, however, in these analyses concerning the pure life of the ego that the fundamental and essential distinction between the mode of being of consciousness in its phenomenological purity and nature as it is given in our natural attitude clearly manifest itself; this distinction is clearest in the ideality according to which the noematic contents are included in every conscious act. Therefore, one can also say that this difference consists in the typical synthesis which makes each consciousness-of into a unity of *one* consciousness. All forms of synthesis ultimately go back to identity synthesis. Let us try to explain this with an example.

In every conscious act we are directed toward an object, we 'intend' it; and reflection reveals this to be an immanent process characteristic of all

experiences. To be conscious of something is not an empty having of such a something in consciousness. Each phenomenon has its own intentional structure, which analysis shows to be an ever-widening system of intentionally-related, individual components. The perception of a house, for example, reveals multiple and synthesized intention: a continuous variety in the appearance of the house, according to differences in the points of view from which it is seen and corresponding differences in perspective, and all the differences between the front actually seen at the moment and the back which is not seen and which remains, therefore, relatively indeterminate, and yet is supposed to be equally existent. Observation of the stream of these noemata and of the manner of their synthesis shows that every phase is already in itself a consciousness-of-something, yet in such a way that the constant entry of new phases in the total consciousness, at any moment, is consciousness of one and the same house. Thus in the noema of a certain individual act there are already implied references to other aspects of the same house. The same holds true for every conscious intentional act. Here the real essence of an intentional relation becomes manifest: that of which I am conscious in every intentional experience is a noematic pole which refers to an open infinity of always new intentional experiences in which this house would appear as identically the same. This means that the noematic pole is not really but ideally contained in the different possible experiences.

Thus, we may say that a systematic construction of a phenomenological psychology requires: (1) the description of all the characteristics belonging to the essence of an intentional lived experience and of the most general law of synthesis in particular; (2) the explanation of the characteristic features and forms of the different types of lived experiences which necessarily are found in every consciousness in all their typical syntheses; (3) the explanation and essential description of every essence of the universal stream of consciousness, (4) an inquiry into the ego as the centre of the lived experiences and as a pole of actualities and potentialities of consciousness.

The notion of phenomenological psychology, however, may further be elaborated referring it to the celebrated two levels of phenomenological investigation, i.e. the descriptive psychological and transcendental constitutive. Phenomenological psychology is the investigation of unities of meanings of psychical states and processes, and this is possible by describing all the characteristics belonging to the essence of an experience, thereby aiming at the invariant pure essence of the same. But this cannot be fully understood unless we also take note of the transcendental constitution of the pure Ego-subject. To the concrete psychical Ego there corresponds the transcendental Ego, which is the ultimate ground of all meanings. Thus we find that there is a transcendental dimension of phenomenological psychology. But this is not to be taken as meaning complete merging of phenomenological-psychology into transcendental philosophy. This point is elaborated in the next section.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY

The analyses of phenomenological psychology may give the impression that phenomenological psychology is identical with transcendental philosophy in essence. But this is not so: phenomenological psychology is not interested in transcendental philosophical problems. Its purpose is limited to exploring the foundation of empirical psychology;[10] the objective ways of human behaviour studied in empirical psychology are shown to be unities of meaning as given by and in subjectivity. In doing phenomenological psychology we do not want to be philosophers any more than a mathematician or a physicist would like to be. To say the truth, phenomenological psychology is powerless in the face of transcendental problems, for the purpose of the phenomenologic-psychological reduction is not to bring transcendental subjectivity to light. It is, however, true that phenomenological psychology will never be able to expose the foundation it intends, if in its forward development it is interested only in the intramundane beings which manifest themselves in our lived experience. Phenomenological psychology is possible and meaningful only if one is able to perform a determinate reflection in which the lived experience comes to the fore as intentional. This reflection is made possible, as we have noted, by the execution of phenomenologic-psychological reduction through which 'objective', human ways of behaviour are reduced to unities of sense as given in subjectivity as a real psychological entity in the real world. That is why psychology remains within the realm of the natural attitude. In this sense, transcendental reduction is different in essence from phenomenologic-psychological reduction. We may here quote Husserl from his *Phenomenological Psychology*, where he says, 'All psychology in the historical sense and in the reformed sense which can naturally join it refers to the already given world and belongs to the sciences of the world'.[11] This however, is not to be taken as meaning complete and ultimate separation from transcendental phenomenology. Husserl also writes,

> One step further is the all-inclusive consideration of the world by carrying out the transcendental phenomenological reduction and we make the world as such our theme together with which leads us into transcendental mentality. The fundamental science then becomes transcendental phenomenology, a psychology of the highest sense, a new sense which includes all critique of reason and genuine philosophical problems.[12]

To determine the very essence of phenomenological psychology, especially in so far as it is related to transcendental phenomenology, Husserl's thinking seems to reach its final phase in the *Crisis*; there he qualifies his description of the meaning of phenomenological psychological reduction by stating that even though phenomenological psychology and transcendental philosophy are essentially distinct from each other because of their different attitudes,

phenomenological psychology necessarily fades into transcendental philosophy, where it has its ultimate foundation. Husserl writes in the *Crisis*,

> Basically there is no psychology that could remain psychology. Once the method of disclosing *intentionality* has been found, then, 'consistent with the matter itself', the analytic way from the pregiven unities to the truly constituting depths of intentional life and thus to the transcendental dimension will be further pursued. Psychology must flow into transcendental philosophy.[13]

TOWARDS AN APPRAISAL

It is clear from the above discussion that Husserl, while instituting a phenomenological psychology, wants to lay a methodological foundation for empirical psochology, by freeing psychology from empiricism (which is based on a faulty conception of the essence of the psychic), objectivism (which flows from a misconception concerning partners playing a role in psychical phenomena), and scientism (which results from a metaphysical over-valuation of empirical insights).

Although Husserl's intention is clear, there have been objections against his position. We now consider some of them.

There is an objection to the effect that phenomenological psychology is merely a return to introspection, i.e. it is an introspective psychology engaged solely in dealing with subjective experiences. Merleau-Ponty, in an article,[14] refutes this objection by arguing that it results from misunderstanding Husserl. Husserl here speaks of 'reflection', not of introspection. Introspection is said to consist in the presence of some internal data to the subject consciousness, the noting of an event with which I coincide. But reflection in the Husserlian sense is neither the noting of a fact, nor a passive attitude of the subject who watches himself live, but rather the active effort of the subject who grasps the meaning of his experience. As Merleau-Ponty explains, 'Reflection on the meaning or the essence of what we live through is neutral to the distinction between internal and external reflection'.[15] Rather, phenomenological reflection has, in addition, a bearing on another person, since I can 'apperceive' him through his modes of behaviour. It has, thus, an inter-subjective stratum.[16]

Again, Merleau-Ponty institutes a comparison between phenomenological intuiting of essence (*Wesensschau*) and induction.[17] We can see that Husserl is basically opposed to the theory of induction. Like Hume, Husserl, too, seems to think that the tendency to induction is some type of instinctive imagination. And so he cannot but oppose this tendency of the nineteenth-century philosophers. According to Mill, induction is a process by which, in considering a group of facts, we discover a common character and set it

apart by abstraction, regarding it as essential to the group of facts with which we have started. But Merleau-Ponty opines that scientists do not always proceed in this way. How does Galileo proceed? Does he consider all the different examples of falling bodies and then, by using Mill's method of agreement, abstract what is common to these examples? Obviously not. He proceeds in a totally different way. The conception of the fall of bodies which guides his experiment is not found in the facts. Rather, he forms it actively, he constructs it actively. He freely conceives the pure case of a freely falling body, of which there is no given example in our human experience.

What Merleau-Ponty wants to say is that *Wesensschau* is not the exclusive possession of the phenomenologists. In discovering pure fact scientists proceed in the same way. The only difference is that while phenomenological *Wesensschau* is based on the 'imaginary free variation' of certain facts, the investigation of scientists is based on 'effective free variation'. We are thus led to the following conclusion: If eidetic psychology is a reading of the invariable structure of our experience based on examples, empirical psychology which uses induction is also a reading of the essential structure of a multiplicity of cases.

Thus, Merleau-Ponty points to the fact that it is not plausible to subordinate psychology to phenomenoloy. Such an attitude is also developed by Koffka in his *Principles of Gestalt Psychology*. Koffka observes that Husserl's argument here rests on the explicit or implicit assumption that every psychological theory reduces psychological relations to external relations of pure facts. But, he opines, Husserl's contention does not apply so far as Gestalt psychology is concerned, since, according to their own principles, psychological processes are organized by relations that are wholly intrinsic. Koffka contends that the notion of Gestalt helps us in understanding psychical facts. That is why he proposes to integrate psychology with phenomenology without subordinating it to the latter.[18]

Further, there is an objection that abstraction of facts by phenomenologic-psychological reduction might rob themselves of their real content. Sartre, for example, although subscribing to phenomenological methodology, holds that in dealing with psychical facts we have also to take note of the 'situation' under which they manifest themselves. Otherwise psychology would surely fail to be 'human'.[19]

In order to tackle the above contentions we may still recall Husserl, the later Husserl, who speaks of 'life-world' (*Lebenswelt*). Indeed, in the *Crisis*, along with some other manuscripts, Husserl supplies a different theory of science—the science of 'life-world'. By introducing this theme of 'life-world' Husserl finds a way out of the dualism of the psychic and the bodily. Husserl here describes life-world as a world at the pre-reflective, immediate level and opines that in and through this primordial experience the distinction of the psyche and the bodily is overcome. And thus we find Husserl to

be 'more and more existential';[20] the Husserlian Egology claims thereby to be *in* the world, not *of* the world.

But still then it will not be very wise to conclude that Husserl has said the last word for instituting a genuine science of the psyche. Long before the beginning of psychology as a science Heraclitus proclaimed: 'You would not find out the boundaries of the soul, even by travelling along every path: so deep a *logos* does it have.'[21] Following Heraclitus we may also say, 'There is no end to psychology no matter what method it uses; for its essence, the depth of the psychic, is unfathomable.' Perhaps the ultimate relevance of phenomenological philosophy for psychology is its clear sense for this dimension in the phenomenon of the psychic.

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Bimal Krishna Matilal—a personal memoir

JITENDRANATH MOHANTY
Temple University, Philadelphia, U.S.A.

Bimal Matilal, a friend, colleague, co-researcher and philosopher, above all a fine person—gentle, courteous, unassuming, and discerning—is no more. David Hume had advised 'amidst all your philosophy, be a man'. Bimal was both a good philosopher and a good man—no mean, certainly a rare, combination. Of him as a person and as a friend, many of us will mourn within, perhaps publicly, on other occasions. On this occasion, I wish to remember him as a philosopher. He would have, I am sure, liked this most.

Belonging as he did almost to the same generation as I (and as many other philosophers present here today), there is, or rather was, a common intellectual situation which all of us, and he, encountered when we started doing Indian philosophy. It would be appropriate to recall elements or rather features of that situation briefly. That situation may be described as a set of problems and concerns as to how to do Indian philosophy. On the one hand, we all realized that it was imperative to do Indian philosophy by returning to the Sanskrit sources. But how to interpret the texts? The way our past generation of Indian philosophers did that had proved unsatisfactory to us. We were searching for a new way. While some of us started out by studying primarily western philosophy and *then* went over to the Sanskrit College to study the Sanskrit sources of Indian thought, Bimal started out as a Sanskritist, then became a Tarkatīrtha, and gradually acquired, first here in Calcutta by his own efforts, but then at Harvard, the tools of western logic and philosophy. We met somewhere in the middle—moving in opposite directions.

There were, perhaps are, those ways of doing Indian philosophy—those traditions between which we, including Bimal, found ourselves. In saying this, I know how both he and I characterized it during our numerous conversations in the last six years. First, there was long, continuous, tradition of scholarship of the Pandits. At the other extreme, there is and was a two hundred fifty years old tradition of European—German, French and Dutch in the first place but also American today—Sanskrit and indological scholarship. There was also the way the English-educated university professors of philosophy did Indian philosophy. This last group was the most unsatisfactory for us, excepting some very special cases.

The Pandit tradition preserved the study of the Sanskrit texts in a rigorous manner. Here you study the texts under a master; and transmit it to the next generation. A certain way of reading—perhaps separately characteriz-

ing each lineage—was being preserved and transmitted in each case, a certain rhetoric was being preserved and used. Creativity had come to an end again with rare exceptions. But we were grateful for the masterly way in which a rich and complicated tradition has been preserved and transmitted. Bimal studied, amongst others, with Ananta Kumar Tarkatīrtha and Madhusūdana Nyāyācārya, both great scholars and inspiring teachers. The Pandits are indispensable, and he regretted, as did I, that they were a vanishing species.

There were two subtle changes taking place, seemingly insignificant but not quite. For one thing, a certain mode of living had been dissociated from mode of thinking. For another, the Indian philosophers were writing in English. There was a break on both counts. One could be grateful to the Pandits, but one could not do what they were doing.

For a Harvard-educated Indologist, one alternative was to be an indologist. Indology has been a curious discipline. Born in 18th century Germany at the wake of the discovery of the Indo-European language group as such, and fostered under the aegis of the European romanticism's search for its 'other', the indologist perpetuated these two in exemplary manner. On the one hand, there grew up a great tradition of philosophical work, of minute philological research, especially Vedic, into the Indian tradition. There is no gainsaying that this tradition has established itself as a solid research tradition, and I know how Bimal admired it. But what was clearly deficient in it was a lack of concern for ideas as such, for the philosophical content of the text, and in this regard the philological was influenced by the romantic. For the European, Orient was the 'other'. At worst, India was the dreamt land of childlike naivete in relation to the world; at its highest, Indian culture was enthused by a mystic union with the one. But, as Hegel put it bluntly, the Indians did not *think*, it did not raise their intuitions to concepts, how could they have *philosophy*? Philosophy, as two great European minds since Hegel—Husserl and Heidegger, both—held was a Greek invention, an European destiny. The indologist there studied Śaṅkara, not to focus his theories and his arguments or evidences in support, but to locate his beliefs in the context of Indian culture, especially religious history. The Indian philosopher of today could learn from the methodical philological researches in order to correct some of his a-historical preconceptions, but he cannot use their results for *doing* Indian philosophy. Bimal parted company.

The Indologist had another deficiency: he regarded the traditional Pandit interpretation as biased and without adequate philological basis. In reading the Vedic texts, e.g. he wanted to return to the 'texts themselves' without the *via media* of the commentarial tradition. Here the new hermeneutics of Gadamer *et al.* goes against him. You cannot return to the 'original intention'. We had to go through the density of the 'interpretive history' of the text. We have to read Śaṅkara through the *Bhāmatī* and the *Vivaraṇa*, and their successors.

Now to come to the third strand. The Indian philosophers, educated in

western thought, developed a myopic vision of Indian thought. They characterized it in such global terms as 'spiritual', 'transcendental' and 'metaphysical'. In all this, their perception was certainly determined by the way the romantic West looked at India, by the patronizing and pleasing characterization of Schopenhauers and Max Müllers. The clichés, characterizing Indian thinking as spiritual, intuitive and synthetic (and western thinking as materialistic, intellectual and analytical), poured in from pulpits and platforms. In this, curiously enough, the Indian agreed with the Indologist. The difference was only how one *evaluated* this contrast. Hegel regarded western thinking to be superior, while exactly with the same reading of the contrast many Indians regarded the intuitive, mystical thinking of the Indians to be superior.

It became Matilal's life's mission to demonstrate that both are mistakes. He spent his life pressing the point and demonstrating that Indian thought, even in its most metaphysical and soteriological concerns, was rigorously analytical, logical and discursive, no less than western thought. I say, 'even in its most metaphysical and soteriological concerns', for Bimal never wanted to say that all Indian thinking was logical analysis. He was fully aware and cognizant of the mystical and metaphysical dimension; but, as he maintained in his inaugural lecture at Oxford, even the mystical illumination had a logico-linguistic aspect and basis. He strongly argues for 'the seriousness and professionalism of Indian mystical philosophers'. Using Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī* and Śrīharṣa's *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, he brings out the logic behind the so-called mystical positions. Note that he never held those positions himself. But with characteristic generosity he writes:

> 'My personal philosophical view does not, I must admit, coincide with that of either Mahāyāna Buddhism or Advaita Vedānta. But I must emphasize at the same time that these two philosophical systems of the East were not the work of fools.'

In emphasizing the analytical content (and form) of the Sanskrit philosophical texts, then, he was not saying that this is all that is in them, but wanted to bring to the forefront an aspect which had been neglected by most Indian (and western) writers and even denied by many.

He often confessed his preference for the British and American analytical philosophy. His writings on Indian philosophy are strewn with references to Quine (with whom he studied at Harvard), Strawson and Dummett (whom he befriended at Oxford). This was partly because he wanted (and in a large measure succeeded in it) to engage Indian philosophy—or rather the philosophers of the past to engage in conversation with the contemporary philosophers of the West. Thus in the book on *Perception* Uddyotakara, Vācaspati, Udayana, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, to name only a few, converse with philosophers at Oxford and the Ivy League. We are confronted with

what truly may be called a 'conversation of mankind', aiming eventually at a global philosophy.

This is a delicate path to traverse. One may fall into the trap of 'interpreting' Indian philosophy from the perspective of one's favoured western schools. Bimal never did that. His attempt was to engage both sides in an authentic conversation. He knew Sanskrit well enough to see that you cannot just impose one discourse upon another. That would be doing violence, the result would lack authenticity. He learnt Indian texts at first hand, and the western ideas at their source with their best practitioners. As a result he knew both authentically, and having been able to engage in conversation with philosophers at Oxford he succeeded in forging a language which is true to both. (Recall, e.g. his translation of 'bhāsate' as 'floats', very literal!)

The point was never, how to present Indian writings to the West to make the illimitable content and form of the texts intelligible to them. That is a spurious motive. Why should we? The point was to let them converse. Conversation, to be genuine, requires from both partners humility, willingness to listen and understand, to step into the other's point of view. The conversation was facilitated because the mediator, Matilal himself, was a genuinely humble person, not arrogant to preach, but always willing to listen. Even he had moments of frustration when western parochialism stubbornly confronted him, as also when orientalists here and there, more particularly at Oxford, opposed his 'philosophization' of Sanskrit texts. The indologist's prejudice that philosophy is western in conception, origin and execution was, even for him, a hard nut to crack. If you are a Sanskritist, do philology, grammar, religion; study mythology, rituals, witchcraft, magics and the like. Why philosophy?

They did not realize Matilal's mission was to destroy that prejudice by revealing (not constructing) the genuinely philosophical content of the material. In doing this, he was not seeking at the core of Sanskrit texts, something western. But he believed that 'philosophy' had a global *sense.* In this sense, Indian and Western philosophies were philosophies *in the same sense.* What he wanted to achieve was to actualize this *global sense* in actual practice, i.e. by generating a dialogue.

Single-handedly, and within a brief span of two and a half decades, he achieved much—not merely careerwise but in making this goal nearer realization. The *Journal,* he founded, presented a new picture, focused on fresh problems and avoided the old clichés

The imminent threat, even certainty of death, did not stop his philosophizing. Three weeks ago, he still talked about projects yet to be done, and he continued to think (and dictate) like Socrates ignoring that final end's coming by the sheer determination to *think.* What overtook, and does overtake that determination is not death's knock at the door, but sheer pain—almost absolute pain. And, that is what happened.

Origin and structure of puruṣārtha theory: an attempt at critical appraisal

V. SHEKHAWAT
University of Rajasthan, Jaipur

I

Puruṣārtha theory may be said to form the core of classical Indian social philosophy as it has presumably been influential in giving rise to a tripartite classification of the humanistic sciences into Dharma Śāstra, Artha Śāstra and Kāma Śāstra. Perhaps, for this reason, it has been the object of attention of many contemporary thinkers.[1] However, considerable confusion regarding the concepts of *dharma, artha,* and *kāma* persists primarily because these concepts have a long history and have been employed in diverse senses in differing context.[2] We are interested in investigating here how these concepts are employed in *puruṣārtha* theory and how the theory itself arises. It is not our endeavour here to trace the origin and history of these concepts but rather to find out how the concept of *puruṣārtha* itself arises and how *dharma* etc. may be said to be the *puruṣārthas.*

The concept of *puruṣārtha* as a set, of which the subsets are generally to be *dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa,* is a complex one, and one could study it from different perspectives. One could study it in the context of its historical evolution; in the context of a single text in which it figures centrally; in the context of an author, so as to achieve a measure of clarity. Another context in which concepts such as these may be studied fruitfully is that of a *theory,* since a theory generally consists of a rational structure of arguments in which concepts have definite, well-defined, precise meanings. The concept of *puruṣārtha* figures pre-eminently in the Sāṁkhya theory of reality which is the earliest khown natural philosophy having a systematic structure of arguments. Moreover, Sāṁkhya theory has been an influential world-view for a long time in India, providing a *paradigm* for various science and arts such as Ayurveda,[3] Yoga,[4] Artha Śāstra[5], Dharma Śāstra[6], etc., and concepts formulated within it could have been even more influential and actually operative so that one could even say that those meanings were *the* dominant meanings. In so far as the concept of *puruṣārtha* is concerned, it figures not only in the Sāṁkhya theory of Kapila but also in the Yoga theory of Patañjali and Dharma theory of Manu—the latter two being 'first order' theories of psychoanalytic therapy and general human conduct respectively, based as they are on the 'ground' theory of Sāṁkhya. We shall, therefore, refer to all these theories in our search for an adequate understanding of the *puruṣārtha* concept.

Sāṁkhya theory, as a rational, demonstrative structure of arguments, tries to uphold nothing without supporting reasons. As a general theory of reality, it aims at providing a *causal explanation* of the phenomenon of suffering, change and variety as also a *teleological explanation* for establishing some conclusions to be given shortly. Our claim here is not that all the arguments of the theory are *valid*, nor that its demonstrative structure is faultless—we are accepting this demonstrative structure of arguments as such and seeking only to locate how the above concepts arise in it and what logical status they might have within the structure of the theory. Briefly, the structure of the theory is as follows: It begins by demonstration of two epistemological or metatheoretical principles, namely, *tripramāṇavāda*[7] and *kāraṇatāvāda*.[8] The former principle provides a method of *proof* and criteria of truth and falsity, while the latter principle provides a method of *discovery* by which underlying causes of the given data of experience may be sought. According to the first principle, three means or *pramāṇas*, namely perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*) and evidence of works (*śabda*), are necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing all that is real; according to the second principle, every effect (*kārya*) must have a cause (*kāraṇa*). * We shall not present here a demonstration of these principles.

The above principles being true, inference and causation are employed for proving the real, independent existence of imperceptible *prakṛti* as *cause* of all existence, change and variety. Since, however, *prakṛti* is nonconscious (*jaḍa*), it cannot by itself be purposive. Yet the *fact* of purposive conduct of all creatures for suffering and enjoying the experience of practice (*bhogārtha pravṛtti*), as also for emancipation (*kaivalyārthaprakṛti*), leads to the inference of a real, incorruptible, unchanging, conscious-element (*puruṣa*) existing independently of *prakṛti* as the seat of enjoyment and suffering. Thus, the entire commerce of *prakṛti* is *for* the *puruṣa*, otherwise the commerce would be meaningless This commerce, from contact (*saṁyoga*) till release (*vimokṣa*), is divided into two cosmic phases: *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti*. Bhoga occurs during the former phase, the latter phase marks the *beginning* of release or *mokṣa*. Since *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* essentially subsist on *prakṛti*, the fact of purposive conduct in the form of *bhoga* and *vimokṣa* is a *kāraka hetu*, or telic reason, for the existence of *puruṣa*. Thus, purposive conduct as a datum is the *reason* for *puruṣa's* reality and nature. Both *bhoga* and *vimokṣa* are not *values* that *ought* to be sought, but purposes, as they *are naturally* sought *necessarily* by all creatures without exception. Clearly, then, *bhoga* as *natural*, goal-directed activity is treated as a *fact* in the theory; *bhoga* as experience seeking practice is a necessary condition of *vimokṣa*; and *bhoga* and *vimokṣa* themeselves are necessary conditions for the existence of *puruṣa*.

*This principle is further extended to *satkāryavāda* according to which the effect is always there in the cause as energy (*śakti*) manifesting from *within* it whenever the conditions are fulfilled.

Given the above analysis, the concept of *puruṣārtha* has the following senses in the theory: when referring to *prakṛti*, we say it is active *for* the *puruṣa* (*puruṣārtha*); and when referring to *saṁyukta puruṣa*, we say *its* purposes (*puruṣārtha*) are *bhoga* and *vimokṣa*. There is no third sense in which the concept of *puruṣārtha* occurs in the theory. In fact, this is a general practice followed in both Sāṁkhya as well as Yoga—they define all their central concepts both from the standpoint of *prakṛti* as well as from the standpoint of *puruṣa*. The same is true of the concept of *puruṣārtha*. Thus, for purposes of clarification, we shall use the term *puruṣārtha* only with reference to *puruṣa*, using a synonymous term *parārtha* while speaking with reference to *prakṛti*.

As regards the concept of *bhoga*, one may ask, what is the nature of *bhoga* and how does it sustain itself life after life? Further, how does the turn towards *vimokṣa* or *apavarga* occur? The answers to these questions are provided in the action-fruition theory (*karma-phala-niṣpatti*). The *karma-phala* theory is evident in the Sāṁkhya theory itself,[9] but it is more systematically developed in the Yoga theory of Patañjali in the context of *kleśa*-theory. There it is pointed out by *causal* analysis, that *kleśas* (specifically *avidyā*) are the causes of desire for action (*karmāśaya*) which causes perceptible and imperceptible births (*dṛṣṭa adṛṣṭa janma*) which, being causes of merit and demerit (*puṇya apuṇya hetu*), give rise to forms of life (*jāti*), span of life (*āyu*), and undergoing of active experience (*bhoga*).[10] That is to say, what will be one's form of life (human, animal, etc.), what will be one's span of life and what kind of active experience one will undergo, will be determined by one's merit and demerit rooted ultimately in the desire for action, which is in turn rooted in *avidyā*. *Jāti*, *āyu* and *bhoga* are, thus, called 'coctions of action' or *karma vipāka*. As regards the desire for *nivṛtti* or *vimokṣa*, it arises by the realization that every action eventually results in some kind of suffering, and a causal analysis thereby of suffering or *tattva jñāna*.[11]

Subsequent analysis of *jāti-āyu-bhoga* is affected neither in Sāṁkhya theory nor in Yoga theory but we shall have to turn to the *Manusmṛti* for that which, again, as a theory of human conduct, is founded on Sāṁkhya theory itself. According to this theory, all our actions are *triguṇātmaka* so that their fruition also has a threefold division.[12] Thus, the essence of *karma vidyā* consists in making this threefold movement (*gatiḥ*) of life explicit.[13] Conduct such as study of Veda, penance (*tapa*), knowledge (*jñāna*), purity (*śauca*), controlling the senses (*indriya nigraha*), contemplating on the self (*ātma cintā*) and good conduct (*dharma kriyā*) are the characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of *sattva guṇa*.[14] Conduct such as propensity for initiative (*ārambha ruci*), impatience (*adharya*), continual search for objects (*viṣayopasevā*) and accumulation of good deeds are the characteristics of *rajas guṇa*.[15] And the conduct of greed (*lobha*), cruelty (*kraurya*), dreaming (*svapna*), sickness of mind (*pramāda*), non-acceptance of self (*nāstikya*), haste (*adhṛti*) and begging (*yāciṣnutā*) are the characteristics of *tamas guṇa*.[16] There are also

the good (*uttama*), medium (*madhyama*) and bad (*jaghanya*) fruitions respectively (*phalodaya*) of the actions divided according to the *guṇas*.[17] Finally, *kāma* is the *lakṣaṇa* of *tamas*, *artha* is the *lakṣaṇa* of *rajas*, and *dharma* is the *lakṣaṇa* of *sattva*, the latter being superior to the former (*śreṣṭhāmeṣām yathottaram*).[18] Since all *bhoga* is nothing but pleasant or painful experience of the fruits of one's conduct including this conduct, and since conduct as well as its fruition is *triguṇātmaka*, it is clear that *bhoga* as experienced conduct is *triguṇātmaka*. Thus, it is the *bhoga* itself which is analysed as of the form of *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma* which are *lakṣaṇas* of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* respectively. It is not necessary for present purposes to go into a more detailed explication of *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*. Following this *guṇa* analysis, *jati* itself is analysed in godliness (*devatva*), humanness (*manuṣyatva*), and sub-humanness (*tiryaktva*).[19] Humans are further analysed into threefold *varṇas* as *brāhmaṇa*, *kṣatriya* and *vaiśya*, again on the basis of *guṇas*.[20] No rationale is provided for the division of human *āyu* into *āśramas* and one may think it was done purely on the basis of practical considerations.

The following conclusions may be drawn on the basis of the above considerations: the activity of *prakṛti* being *parārtha*, it consists primarily in the fruition of actions as *karma vipāka*. The *karma vipākas* are *jāti*, *āyu*, and *bhoga*, each of them being *triguṇātmaka*. Of the threefold *jatis*, the *jati* of humans is further threefold. The *bhoga* is of the form of *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*. This *parārtha* activity eventually takes the form of *karma nivṛtti* (as opposed to *karma vipāka*) and culminates in *vimokṣa*. These conclusions are reached on purely *rational* grounds without any empirical generalization whatsoever—strictly speaking, these are reached by a *causal* analysis of the activity of *prakṛti*.

If seen from the standpoint of *puruṣa*, the *puruṣārthas* have to be spoken of as purposive conduct of *saṁyukta puruṣa*. Thus, the activity as *puruṣārtha* results in *karma vipāka* so that *jāti*, *āyu* and *bhoga* are themselves *puruṣārtha*. *Puruṣārtha* itself being *triguṇātmaka*, so are *jāti*, *āyu* and *bhoga*.



The *puruṣārtha* eventually takes the form of *vimokṣārtha pravṛtti*, culminating in the ultimate purpose of *vimokṣa*.

The above analysis may be presented in the form of a tree.

II

Since our concern here is *puruṣārtha* theory, we shall speak from the standpoint of *puruṣa* in the subsequent discussion. The above analysis of *puruṣārtha* as carried out primarily in the context of Sāṁkhya theory is purely *descriptive*, seeing events as well as purposes of parts as a *natural* process. One may ask if there is any scope of *value* or choice of goals within the theory. It is clear that the only goal advised by the theory is *vimokṣa*, since all other 'goals', whether natural, purposive or 'chosen', lead eventually to suffering. It is, however, the *karma vidyā* which provides a higher principle of choice, such as mentioned above in the threefold analysis of human conduct. The principle holds that since *sattva*, therefore *dharma*, is superior to *rajas* and *tamas* (therefore *artha* and *kāma*), that *ought to* become the ruling principle of all our conduct. This is often interpreted as the principle that only that *artha* and *kāma* is proper which does not conflict (*aviruddha*) with *dharma*. Thus, although *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma* as forms of *bhoga*-as-*puruṣārtha* are not values or goals in themselves, one can choose or value only that *artha* and *kāma* which is not in conflict with *dharma*.* This, however, does not make *dharma* itself an evaluative principle; the evaluative principle being the *rule* that '*dharma* is superior to *artha* and *artha* is superior to *kāma*', what is the justification for this higher rule? The rule is derived neither by inductive generalization nor by demonstration, but is *intuitively* posited and intuited posits in classical Indian thought are generally considered absolutely true, their justification lying in their validity by subsequent experience. What we mean to say is that the rule may be validated only by conducting one's life according to the rule and noticing if it leads to increased content of merit in one's life. On the other hand, the principle has not been accepted as true by many, some holding that *artha* and not *dharma* is primary (*pradhāna*) while others hold that *kāma* and not *dharma* and *artha* is primary. If, however, we accept *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma* as *lakṣaṇas* of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* respectively and if *sattva* does represent *knowledge*, *purity*, etc., then strong grounds for the primacy of *dharma* do exist.

But *dharma*, though perhaps primary due to its being defined as *lakṣaṇa* of *sattva*, is yet essentially a kind of *bhoga* of which the essential characteristic is *pravṛtti* or propensity for activity and where contact with objects remains. As a *bhoga-puruṣārtha*, therefore, *dharma* is on the same footing as *artha* and *kāma*. Only when combined with the intuited principle of primacy

*Strictly speaking, that *kāma* which is not in conflict with *artha* and *dharma*, and that *artha* which is not in conflict with *dharma*.

does *dharma* represent the *possibility* of turning away from *pravṛtti* to *nivṛtti*, from praxis seeking experience (of joy and suffering) to praxis negating all experience. That is to say, only when one seeks to maximize *dharma* in one's conduct, making at the same time the conduct pertaining to *artha* and *kāma* in harmony with the former, can one possibly make a transition from *bhoga-puruṣārtha to vimokṣa-puruṣārtha*.

What sort of conduct characterizes *vimokṣa puruṣārtha*? Although no specific analysis of conduct of *vimokṣa* has been made in the classical literature, by their stress on certain types of conduct one may analyse it into the company of wise and emancipated persons (or *samprayoga*),[21] practice of *yoga* and practice of *nyāya*. The practice of *yoga* essentially consists in the arresting of fundamental mental activities (*critta vṛtti nirodha*) by the eightfold techniques of disciplining the body, the senses and the mind.[22] The practice of *nyāya* consists essentially in dialogue (*saṁvāda*) and criticism (*vigraha*), following the techniques of dialectic (*vāda*) and argument (*tarka*).[23] Both *yoga* theory and *nyāya* theory themselves stress the indispensability of their techniques for *tattva jñāna* and subsequent *vimokṣa*.

We may now present the above analysis in the form of following tree:



The above tree is only another way of suggesting that *puruṣartha* as purposive conduct of *puruṣa* following its *saṁyoga* with *prakṛti* is firstly of the form of *bhoga* as *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*; and then of the form of *vimokṣa* as *samprayoga*, *yoga* and *nyāya*, resulting in its *apavarga* or *kaivalya*. In the case of *vimokṣa-puruṣārtha*, there is generally no principle of primacy of any one over the others and they are normally accepted as simultaneous forms of praxis.*

We may then say, on the basis of the analysis carried out above, that the concept of *puruṣārtha* may be understood in three different ways. Under a demonstrative or *logical* interpretation, the *puruṣārthas* may be understood as structural components of Sāṁkhya theory. There, they are seen as telic reasons or *kāraka hetus* —being *facts* of natural purposive conduct, for *puruṣa* (as pure consciousness) being the seat of experience of all forms of active life since unless such a seat exists, such conduct would become meaningless and inexplicable. Under a *practical* interpretation, the *puruṣārthas* may be understood as rational, not *a priori* or intuited, forms of praxis (human praxis specifically), *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma* being the forms of object-oriented praxis, and *samprayoga*, *yoga* and *nyāya* being the forms of object-withdrawn praxis. We call them *rational* forms of human praxis because they are arrived at by ratiocination, not by inductive generalization or on practical grounds.[24] Finally, under a *valuational* interpretation, the *puruṣārthas* may be understood as *values*, provided that in the case of *dharma-artha-kāma*, an intuited principle of primacy of *dharma* is added, there being no need for such a principle in the case of *vimokṣa*, which is by definition the *ultimate value*. Whether *puruṣārthas* are seen as necessary and sufficient conditions of one's being a *puruṣa* at the root, or as rational forms of all human praxis, or as values becoming so only when governed by a rule, their import can be appreciated only in the context of the *kleśa-karma*-theory in particular and a ground theory of reality in general.

*Though *vimokṣa-puruṣārtha* is also *triguṇātmaka*, it is the *sattva guṇa* which dominates culminating in the *'pratiprasava'* of *guṇas* when *kaivalya* is reached which is also called *'puruṣārthaśūnyatā'*.

III

Attempts have been made to interpret *puruṣārthas* as values alone[25] or as some sort of attitudes[26] or as social functional concepts,[27] but the attempts are faulty at the roots since these attempts lack a systematic method of studying these complex concepts and often lapse into speculative exercises. Most such thinkers are concerned with the social implications of these concepts since the concepts, though they pertain to analysis of the human individual, do certainly have a social import—particularly the *bhoga-puruṣārthas* would be meaningless without a social context. Since the entire human conduct is of the form of *bhoga* and *vimokṣa*, in a given society at a given time, there will be only four sets of persons: those whose conduct is of the form of *bhoga* alone or *vimokṣa* alone; and those whose conduct is both of the form of *bhoga* and *vimokṣa* with *bhoga* dominating or *vimokṣa* dominating. It is clear that both *bhoga* and *vimokṣa* are *social* in character—only, the community of *bhoga*-dominated persons will be different from the community of *vimokṣa*-dominated persons.

If society is conceived as a community of *bhoga*-dominated persons by and large, what protective mechanisms does the theory offer for justice, non-exploitation, equality of opportunity, etc.? For an answer to these questions, we shall have to turn to the Dharma Śāstras and Artha Śāstras where slightly differing conceptions of the State have been advanced. It is not our purpose here to make detailed investigations in this direction; it may briefly be pointed out that in the former the State is essentially a system for enforcement of *dharma motivating* its subjects for *vimokṣa*, while in the latter the State is a system for organized increment of *artha* motivating its subjects to the path of *dharma*. Whatever the distinctions, *dharma* is essentially of the form of justice, non-exploitation and equality of opportunity (though limit-

ed by the *varṇa* division) and any failures in that direction are essentially failures of *dharma*—or, to say the same, the failures mark a general moral decay in both the State and the subjects. Though the Artha Śāstra, by stress on organization and enforcement of the *artha* form of conduct as the primary business of the State, marked a radical breakthrough in the direction of 'secularization', yet the fact that it acquired meaning only if the subjects could be motivated towards the *dharma* form of conduct and the officials and rulers themselves were so motivated, indicates that a conception of the State apparatus is impossible without the intuited principle of primacy of *dharma*. Not only does conduct of the form of *artha* and *kāma*, without the principle of primacy, yield to increasing conflict but it also becomes a synonym of corruption. Imagine a situation where both the rulers and the state officials as well as the majority of subjects were engaged in conduct predominantly of the form of *artha* and *kāma* (though with lip service to *dharma*): if the above theoretical analysis is correct, this will inevitably lead to increasing demerit, therefore widespread suffering, in the whole of society.

The role of the principle of the primacy of *dharma* is indeed to ensure a minimization of suffering during *bhoga*. Since *dharma-artha-kāma* are intermingled and interrelated being, as they are, the *lakṣaṇas* of *guṇas*, a given conduct is only predominantly of the form of *dharma* or *artha* or *kāma*. How about *adharma*, *anartha*, and *apakāma*, and how are they understood in the theory? It should be clear from the theory that since all *bhoga* occurs with *kleśas* in the background, all our *bhoga* remains infected by *avidyā*, therefore demerit or error. Even when governed by the principle of the primacy of *dharma*, all human conduct of the forms of *dharma-artha-kāma* also has lesser or greater content of *adharma-anartha-apakāma*. Error in the phase of *bhoga-puruṣārtha* is inescapable; therefore, so is suffering. Only, if the above principle is adhered to, it can minimize such error and suffering. Thus, although *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma* are interrelated and error in the forms of these conducts is inevitable, this interrelation and inevitability is not for reasons advanced elsewhere.[28]

One of the goals of the Dharma Śāstras is to provide 'therapeutic measures' for error in *bhoga*. The legitimacy of the Dharma Śāstras also derives primarily from the principle of the primacy of *dharma*. Following the Ayurveda model, they divide all human conduct into *ācāra* (which corresponds to preventive measures) on the one hand, and *vyavahāra* and *prāyaścita* (which correspond to curative measures) on the other hand.[29] The role of *ācāra vidhāna* is to prevent the occurrence of error in conduct—as far as possible; and the role of *vyavahāra-prāyaścitta-vidhāna* is to cure the consequences (or possible consequences) of such error. The State as an apparatus of legal enforcements, thus, is also a curer, through punishment, which at the same time deters subjects against errors in conduct.

IV

Since the intuited principle of the primacy of *dharma* is not only the basis of social philosophy but also the basis of the State, one may ask if there can be any rational grounds in its favour. It is generally agreed that although *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma* are necessary forms of *natural* conduct for all life—human and nonhuman—it is only humans who can *choose* to make *dharma* the primary form of conduct, this being not possible for animals and birds, say, whose conduct is largely instinctive.* Ability to adopt the principle as a source of values in one's life is thus considered a criterion that distinguishes humans from animals. Though most humans have great propensity for *artha* and *kāma* forms of conduct, it is also true that no one likes to be an animal. One may say that the greater the sincerity with which a man commits himself to this principle, the greater is the degree to which he is human and therefore an asset to society.

One may ask if the tripartite division of *bhoga* into *dharma-artha-kāma* forms of conduct is adequate to encompass *all* forms of human conduct. It seems it is, since at least I have not so far been able to think of a conduct which cannot be understood in terms of one or a combination thereof of the above *puruṣārthas*. Though both *jāti* and *bhoga* have been analysed in accordance with the principle of three *guṇas*, one may wonder if *āyu* can also be so divided. *Āyu* is generally divided in three *āśramas* (the fourth being for those seeking *vimokṣa*) which do not fit into the *triguṇa* analysis. If one holds that each day of the *āyu* may be divided in terms of the dominance of *sattva* in the morning, *rajas* in the day, and *tamas* in the night, so that the morning is for the *dharma* form of conduct, the day for the *artha* form of conduct and the night for the *kāma* form of conduct,[30] then the problem arises regarding the *kāma* form of conduct in early age as well as in old age. If we divide the whole *āyu* in terms of *dharma* in the beginning, *artha* in the middle and *kāma* towards the end, then the *kāma* form of conduct will be as good as no-*kāma*. The fact is that *āyu* does not yield to the *triguṇa* form of analysis and therefore we have to remain satisfied with arbitrary, not ratiocinative division.

In effecting the analysis of *jāti*, it is held that *deva* is predominantly *sāttvika*, *manuṣya* is predominantly *rājasika*, and *tiryak* is predominantly *tāmasika*. However, in subsequent analysis, *manuṣya jāti* is again analysed into *sāttvika*, *rājasika* and *tāmasika*. The problem is: how can that which is predominantly of the *rajas* type only, give rise to a *varṇa* of a predominantly *sattva* type? Clearly, that which has been analysed as *rajas* cannot further be analysed into *sattva* or *tamas* and such analysis involves a *fallacy* of *complexity* if we go beyond one step. Therefore, while *jāti* analysis may be accepted as valid, *varṇa* analysis in a next step is clearly fallacious, therefore invalid. Moreover, it is generally stressed in the Sāṁkhya theory that the

*The *dharma-artha-kāma* of sub-human forms is said to be fixed or *niyata*.

guṇas are dynamic and a continuous transformation of one into another is taking place. If we extend the same principle to their *lakṣaṇas*, that is, *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*, one may wonder how, for instance, *artha* may transform into *kāma* and *kāma* into *dharma*. This continual conflict and transformation of the *puruṣārthas*, one into another, has generally been ignored in classical literature and may help a great deal in their deeper understanding. Not only the idea of transformation but also the idea of conflict (*virodha*) of *guṇas* may be extended to *bhoga-puruṣārthas*. Thus, *dharma* is naturally in conflict with *artha* and *kāma*, and so is *artha* naturally in conflict with *dharma* and *kāma*, and so on. It is perhaps for this reason that another principle of equal stress (*sāmya*) on these *puruṣārthas* is generally added. The principle of primacy of *dharma* is only a necessary condition for the possibility of *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma* as values but in combination with the principle of equal stress, they constitute necessary as well as sufficient conditions of *bhoga* with minimum suffering. The former principle is actually an *ethical* principle of good, whereas the latter one is a *policy* principle for optimum efficiency of *bhoga*. Thus, for example, one's *dharma* form of conduct may conflict with one's *artha* form of conduct or the same may happen at an interpersonal level. Or, for that matter, one's *artha* form of conduct may conflict with another's *artha* form of conduct. In each case, a detailed study of the actual situation and application of the above principles will resolve the conflict and help one arrive at a correct decision. Since ethics and policy are basic presuppositions of classical Indian law (*vyavahāra*), these principles are therefore indispensable to law as well.

Notes and References

1. M. Hiriyanna, *The Quest After Perfection*; Karl Potter, *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies*; R.N. Sharma, 'Hindu Way of Life', review article; C. Malamoud, 'On the Rhetoric and Semantics of *Puruṣārtha*'; R. Prasad, 'The Theory of Puruṣārthas; Revaluation and Reconstruction,' *Jr. Ind. Phil.*, 9 (1981), pp. 49-76; R. Sundara Rajan, 'The Puruṣārthas in the Light of Critical Theory'; K.J. Shah, 'Of *artha* and the Artha Śāstra'; Daya Krishna, 'The Myth of Puruṣārthas.'
2. Daya Krishna, *op. cit.*, points out many central concepts such as '*svargakāmo yajeta*', '*niṣkāma karma*', '*mokṣārati*', etc. used in diverse contexts.
3. Caraka Saṁhitā largely employs basic concepts of Sāṁkhya and Vaiśeṣika theory for its causal analysis of disease and *dhātu-rasa* theory. See V. Shekhawat, 'The Art of Theory Construction in Caraka Saṁhitā', *Ind. Jr. Hist. Sc.*, 21, (1986) pp. 99-111.
4. Patañjali's Yoga theory, as a psychoanalytic analysis of human psyche and as therapy, is largely based on Sāṁkhya theory.
5. Significant Sāṁkhyan influences are noticeable in the Artha Śāstra.
6. *The Manu Smṛti*, presumably the earliest *dharma śāstra*, is largely Sāṁkhyan and similar influences may be traced in the Yājñavalkya Smṛti.
7. *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, kārikas 4-6; also Sāṁkhya Sūtra, sūtras 1-87 to 1-103,
8. *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, kārikas 8-11; also Sāṁkhya Sūtra, sūtras 108-138.
9. *Sāṁkhya Kārikā*, kārikas 52 to 55, also sūtras 3-1 to 3-13.

10. *Yoga Sūtra*, sūtras 2-12 to 2-15.
11. *Yoga-Sūtra*, sūtras 2-15 to 2-27.
12. *Manu Smṛti*, chapter 12, sloka 30.
13. Ibid., 12-47.
14. Ibid., 12-31.
15. Ibid., 12-32.
16. Ibid., 12-33.
17. Ibid., 12-30.
18. Ibid., 12-38.
19. Ibid., 12-40. Also Sāṁkhyakārikā, kārikās 54, 55.
20. Ibid., 1-85.
21. *Sāṁkhya Sūtra*, 4-24.
22. *Yoga Sūtra*, chapter 2, sūtras 21-29.
23. Nyāya Sūtra, chapter 4, sūtras 44-51.
24. Rajendra Prasad, op. cit., p. 53.
25. Hiriyanna, op. cit.
26. Potter, op. cit.
27. Rajendra Prasad, op. cit., pp. 49-51.
28. K.J. Shah, op. cit., p. 59.
29. Yājñavalkya Smṛti divides its texts in these three parts.
30. Gautama *Dharma Sūtra* as quoted in Yājñavalkya Smṛti.

Indo-European encounter: an Indian perspective

RAM SWARUP
G-3 Maharani Bagh, New Delhi 110065

*India and Europe** originally came out in German in 1981. The English translation which was originally published by the State University of New York in 1988 has now been brought out in an Indian edition and made available to readers in India by Motilal Banarsidass. The English translation is a much enlarged version of the original German edition and the Indian edition carries a special Preface by the author. The book contains 604 pages divided into three sections sub-divided into twenty-four chapters. The first section divided into ten chapters deals with "India in the History of European Self-Understanding." It is probably the best portion of the book and very useful to an Indian reader. It presents valuable historical material well digested and analysed. It deals with important sub-topics like India as seen by the Greeks of the Classical period, India as approached by the missionaries as Europe entered its modern period, India as seen by the Europe of Deism and the Enlightenment, and shows how its own internal controversies were given an edge or even shaped by Indian presence. It gives us the history of Indology, it tells us what some of the greatest European thinkers like Voltaire, Herder, Hegel, Schelling and Schopenhauer thought of India. In this sense, the book is also Europe's own self-portraiture.

The second section, again divided into ten chapters, deals with "The Indian Tradition and the Presence of Europe". It discusses mainly Neo-Hinduism, or Hinduism as modified by the influence of European concepts and categories, a Hinduism unable to speak for itself but which used European categories of thought for its self-presentation and self-assertion. This section maintains the erudition of the first but lacks its sweep.

The third section called "Appendices" contains additional material added to the English edition. This section deals with certain key concepts such as "Experience" and "Tolerance". If one was inclined to regard them as Indian contributions to the East-West Dialogue, one must be ready for disappointment for the author finds the two concepts "ambiguous" and questionable. Following the inclination of the book, the author at the end (Chapter 24) adds an important discussion on the "Europeanization of the Earth", a subject on which the author also spoke on January 4, 1989 at the India International Centre, New Delhi.

*Wilhelm Halbfass, *India and Europe: An Essay in Philosophical Understanding*, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Limited, Delhi, 1990. pp. xvii+ 604, Rs. 225.

After this brief summary, let me deal with some important points of discussion more fully. I keep close to the language of the author even in places where I do not directly quote him. I take full advantage of his erudition and freely draw from his researched material but I offer my own conclusions and a different *schema.*

II

India and Europe opens with the "Philosophical View of India in Classical Antiquity", or India in the old Greek tradition. It assumes that classical Greece provides Europe's antiquity and that the two are related in some special way. It is a debatable point but it has been assumed here as axiomatic. The fact is that at the time when Greece represented a living culture, it did not know Europe, nor Europe of that time knew Greece.

The Greeks knew themselves as Hellenists, not Europeans. And whenever they sought the origins of, or influences upon, their own philosophy and religion, they thought of Egypt, Chaldea and India, not of Europe. They received little from Europe and they bequeathed not much to it, at least at the time when they represented a living culture. In fact, Christian Europe as it was taking shape first grew in opposition to and later in forgetfulness of Greek culture. Christian Europe in its early period used Greek language and Greek philosophy to establish itself; then it attacked ferociously Greek religion and culture; it destroyed Greek literature, its schools and libraries. The work of destruction was so complete that even the memory of Plato and Socrates was obliterated and for a thousand years Christian Europe grew in complete ignorance of what it calls its classical antiquity. When Greek learning revived again, it was too late for it to exert a living influence on anyone. It had died as a living tradition and it was now a thing belonging to museums and libraries and was a topic only for learned dissertations. But even in this form, it began to invite fierce opposition. The Reformation was a revolt against the classical Renaissance, a "reaction of backward minds", or a "protest of antiquated spirits", as Nietzsche saw it. The call to go back to the Bible and to Jehovah was in a very deep sense a repudiation of the Greek tradition, whether spiritual or intellectual. Today what Europe calls the Greek learning is not the learning as it was seen by the Greeks, but as it is understood by the Europeans through their own categories of thought. To the Greeks, Homer and its Gods were great realities, part and parcel of their lives; to Europeans of the Renaissance period, they were legends and interesting tales.

Even earlier, during the first centuries of Christianity, it was clear that the Greek and Christian approaches to the life of the spirit were incompatible and Christianity waged a relentless war against the Greco-Roman approach; and when the Greek learning revived again, the old incompatibility was still there undiminished. But if the Greek learning still found a certain receptivity

the reason was that by this time, it was totally misunderstood and misconceived. But for any truly classical revival, Christian soil was very inhospitable indeed.

This however does not mean that modern Europe had no link with old Greece. An unknown link connected the two intimately and the link was established when Sanskrit was discovered. When this discovery was made, it became obvious that India, Greece, Rome and Europe had great linguistic, spiritual and ethnic affinity and even a common ancestry derived probably from India and Sanskrit. But this suggestion was soon resisted by rising European colonialism. To counter such a suggestion, it postulated on the other hand a third, conjectural source still more remote in time and also far removed from India. But according to all the testimony available at present, the old affinity between these regions and peoples, particularly in its spiritual dimension, is still best represented by India. The Christian interlude in Europe and the Muslim interlude in Iran are merely distorters or aberrations of this old affinity.

But while one need not subscribe to Professor Halbfass's unproved assumption that old Greece represents modern Christian Europe's classical antiquity, there should be no difficulty in readily agreeing that the author's treatment of the subject of "India in Greek Tradition" is able and competent. It brings together many traditions on the subject within the confine of one chapter and it is useful for interested readers. One could of course still point out some obvious omissions. For example, Apollonius of Tyna, the great sage of the Greek world who is reputed to have come to India to meet its sages, is mentioned just to be told that his biography by Philostratus is "legendry". There is nothing improbable in a saint of the Greek world visiting India, but even if the biography is legendry, it is known to have been written by 220 A.D., and even as a legend it is a good witness and tells us where India stood in the estimation of Greek sages and philosophers of an early date. It tells us that the Pythagoreans of Greece and the Naked Philosophers of Egypt had derived their doctrines from the "Wise men of India".

Professor Halbfass follows a scholar's methodology in determining the extent of Indo-Greek contact. He is determined to find a document, some written mention, some journey relating to this contact before he would admit it, but by their very nature such evidences can only be very rare considering the time that has lapsed and the changes that have been wrought. But if Professor Halbfass had followed a more inward method or criterion of looking at Greek literature, he would have easily found plentiful evidence of a living Indo-Greek contact, particularly at the deeper level of the spirit. Both shared a common spiritual approach; both intuited man and his world in the same way; both expressed their spiritual intuition in the language of *Gods*; both taught *Ātma-vāda*, and the theory of Two Selves and Two Ways; both taught the theory of *Karma*, rebirth and *Mokṣa*. In fact, the Greece of

Pythagoras, Plato and Plotinus have more in common with Hindu India than with Christian Europe.

III

Then a long period of more than a thousand years intervened—a period of triumph and consolidation of Christianity in Europe. Already Christianity had successfully fought Greek as well as several Eastern spiritual influences in the shape of Mithraism, Gnosticism, etc. An ideological iron-curtain fell on Europe and its spirit underwent a process of systematic Semiticization. Thanks to this sustained conditioning, the European spirit became incapable of appreciating and understanding Indian spirituality. This spiritual impediment was reinforced by a physical one when Islam triumphed in the Middle East and swayed over the sea and land routes connecting the Mediterranean with India.

During these long years of lost contact, India became a legend. But contact was resumed when a new route to India was discovered and Vasco da Gama landed in 1498 at Calicut with soldiers, missionaries and traders. Thus the first modern contact was military-cum-missionary-cum-commercial, and any subsequent academic intellectual interest grew out of this and it contained the qualities of the first encounter.

India and Europe includes a very interesting chapter on the "Missionary Approach to Indian Thought". Most missionaries had a very dim view of Hinduism which they regarded as unmitigated evil. St. Xavier thought that Brahmins, a highly revered class, stood between Christianity and the heathens and that this class should be destroyed. He requested the king of Portugal to use the secular arm for the conversion of the Hindus.

But there were certain missionaries who had a livelier idea of the difficulties and their situation. They proposed the strategy of using Hinduism against Hinduism, a strategy which has its Biblical precedent in the practice of St. Paul. Robert Nobili, representing this school, made a distinction between the social customs of the heathens and their religious ceremonies. He preached that while the former could be accepted, only the latter should be opposed. He also pointed out that the Brahmins were mainly teachers and priests and their function was social and educational and not religious; and therefore they need not be opposed but only neutralized and, in fact, the respect accorded to them could be used to promote Christianity. He himself pretended that he was a Romanic Brahmin and the teacher or Guru of a lost Veda, *Jesurvedam*, which he offered to teach to his fellow-Brahmins in India.

While most missionaries saw Hinduism as a handiwork of the devil, some also saw in it the remnants of an old monotheism, probably borrowed from Christian and Judaic sources, but now distorted and defaced beyond recognition. B. Ziegenbalg (1682-1719), a Lutheran missionary, wrote back to his patrons in Europe about this original monotheism which had been subsequently lost because Hindus "allowed themselves to be seduced by the devil and their ancient poets into believing in a multitude of gods."

IV

These reports reaching Europe had an unintended effect; they were used to support a very different line of reasoning—a line of reasoning which was even anti-Christian. In order to understand this, we shall have to understand the Europe of those days.

After the crusades came to nothing, Europe was in an intellectual ferment and was learning to question some of its cherished ideas and dogmas. A pamphlet "On the Three Impostors" (Moses, Jesus and Muhammad) came out in 1598 and had a wide clandestine circulation When the Greek learning was revived, stoicism, the old Greek religion, was also rediscovered. Many advanced thinkers saw that it was deeply religious and highly ethical, and yet it had no revelation and no mediator; it also spoke in the language of reason and conscience and it had a universality of approach quite unknown to Christianity.

Under these new influences, a school grew in Europe which spoke of a "natural religion" and "natural theology". It said that man's "reason" and "conscience" were enough to account for God and morality and they needed no revelation and no mediators. Thomas More (1478-1535), an English statesman and author, expressed this idea of a "rational religion" and "natural theology" in his famous *Utopia.*

This view also agreed with man's enlightened commonsense. Therefore, when reports reached Europe from the Far East of a religion—Confucianism —which had no heaven-mongering and yet was highly ethical and humane, it had a warm reception in certain highly intellectual circles. Leibnitz (1646-1716), the German philosopher and mathematician, thought that Chinese missionaries should visit Europe in order to instruct the westerners about the questions of "natural theology" and commonsense.

It was at this time and in this climate that India entered Europe. India was already known for its natural theology. Quite early even Shahrastani (1086-1153), in his *Kitāb al-Milal wa'n-nihal* had noticed that prophets were unknown to the Brahmins and that they tended towards a kind of rationalism which does not depend on revelation.

India not only taught high morals like the Chinese, but unlike them it also did not neglect the metaphysical dimension. Some, like Schopenhauer, were in search of a "philosophy which should be at once ethics and metaphysics." India did not disappoint them. Schopenhauer (1788-1860) found it in the Upanishadic *tat twam asi*, "that thou art". Earlier J.C. Herder (1744-1803) had found that Indians' morals were "pure and noble", and their concept of God "great and beautiful". Indian thought satisfied those who sought spiritual transcendence without an anthropomorphic God who is always thunder-

ing, threatening and promising, and also an ethics embodying man's innate moral nature and not arbitrary commandments from an external agency. This thought, in one of its lower expressions and movements known as Deism, made a wide appeal in Europe. It even affected many European administrators and residents abroad. William Carey, a Baptist missionary, complained that "India swarms with Deists".

V

Original Home of All Religions

It did not take long for the question to acquire another dimension, the dimension of time. India gave a religion which was not only *rational* but was also *prior* to all other religions. In 1760, Voltaire acquired a copy of *Ezourvedam*, a forgery of the Jesuits (most probably of de Nobili). But even this served an unintended purpose. Voltaire with his acumen saw even in this document the voice of an ancient religion. While he praised Brahmins for having "established religion on the basis of universal religion", he also found that India was the home of religion in its oldest and purest form He described India as a country "on which all other countries had to rely, but which did not rely on anyone else". He also believed that Christianity derived from Hinduism. He wrote to and assured Frederich the Great of Prussia that "our holy Christian religion is solely based upon the ancient religion of Brahma".

This view was held by many European thinkers and writers. F. Majer (1771-1818) said: "It will no longer remain to be doubted that the priests of Egypt and the sages of Greece have drawn directly from the original well of India." And again: "Towards the Orient, to the banks of the Ganges and the Indus, it is there that our hearts feel drawn by some hidden urge—it is there that all the dark presentiments point which lie in the depths of our hearts. . .In the Orient, the heavens poured forth into the earth."

J.G. Herder also saw in India the "lost paradise of all religions and philosophies," the "cradle of humanity", the "eternal home", the "eternal Orient . . . waiting to be rediscovered within ourselves". This is high praise, indeed, but it does not mean that he ever thought that India supplanted the West. Any such thought was far from his mind. What he meant was that India represented humanity's childhood, its innocence, as Hellenism represented its "adolescence" and Rome its "adulthood". Similarly, while Indians were "the gentlest branch of humanity", Christianity was the religion of "purest humanity".

The thesis of Indian origins of Christianity found a warm reception in many quarters and it continued to be propagated by Rosicrucians, Theosophists and individual scholars and philosophers like Schopenhauer, L-Jacolliot, A. Lillie and F. Nork.

But the traditional Christianity did not yield easily and it argued furiously for the primacy of the Mosaic-Christian Revelation. A. Dacier, J. Bouchet and Th. La Grue argued for the priority of Biblical Chronology. Even Newton was involved in the controversy and argued for the primacy of the Biblical Chronology. But the growing knowledge of history and older civilizations was against them.

Orthodox Christians took recourse to another line of argument. While yielding a certain chronological priority to India they upheld Christianity's moral and spiritual primacy. They said that even if India had known some kind of religion at an early date, its essential truths were badly corrupted and it needed the living waters of Christianity to revive them. To them, India offered a classic example of a tradition that had been unable to safeguard its original purity against its pagan superstition and priestly fraud, and disgusting barbarism—a warning and reminder to others. An article on "Bramines" in *Encyclopedie* says that a Christian could not fail to see the "effect of divine wrath" in such decay and deprivation. Professor Halbfass informs us that India's example was often cited to illustrate the theme of the eclipse and suppression of "natural light" through superstition and ritualism, and that this theme enjoyed a great popularity among thinkers of the Enlightenment.

VI

A New Phase

Soon the Indo-European encounter entered a new phase. Indian texts began to be translated into European languages. Works of Roger, Dow, Holwell, Wilkin's translations of the *Bhagavad Gita* and the *Hitopdesha* and W. Jones' *Shakuntala* created a taste for Indian thought. Western scholars read in translations such things as: "Vishnu is in you, in me, in all beings"; or "See all men in your own soul"; or "Banish the delusion of being different". Though later on, the missionary writers tried to dismiss such teachings under the label of "pantheism", many Western thinkers heard such sublime thoughts and ethics for the first time and were deeply stirred. The stir was Europe-wide, but it was most conspicuous in Germany. F. Schlegel, one of the pioneers of the Oriental Renaissance, wrote about India: "Here is the actual source of all languages, all the thoughts and poems of the human spirit; everything, everything without exception comes from India." Later on of course, he changed his views when he became Roman Catholic and not to India but to Biblical Mesopotamia gave the palm of being the "cradle of mankind", but his contribution to the Oriental Renaissance remained outstanding.

Another great name belonging to this movement was that of Schopenhauer. His interest in Indian religion was first aroused by reading Anquetil Dup-

peron's Latin translation of Oupnek'hat (1801-1802), itself a translation from a Persian version. He was deeply moved and he found its reading "the most rewarding and edifying," and its philosophy "the solace of my life and will be the solace of my death." After this he continued to take a deep interest in India. In Indians, he found the "most noble and ancient people", and their wisdom was the "original wisdom of the human race". He spoke of India as the "fatherland of mankind", which gave the "original religion of our race" and the "oldest of all world view". He thought of the Upanishads as the "fruit of the most sublime human knowledge and wisdom", documents of "almost superhuman conception" whose authors could "hardly be thought of as mere mortals". He expressed the hope that European peoples "who *stemmed from Asia* . . . would also *reattain the holy religions of their home*" (Italics added).

Sanskrit

Europe's discovery of Sanskrit also worked in the same direction. F. Sassetti had observed as early as the second half of the sixteenth century that Sanskrit and Europe's classical languages were related in some way. Jones also saw the basic similarities between these languages and soon some basic concepts of linguistics and history were revolutionised. The discovery of Sanskrit proved a great event in Europe's intellectual history. It upset Europe's self-image; it showed that its semitic association and identification were brief and accidental and that its linguistic and, therefore, its philosophic, religious and cultural roots lay elsewhere. Europe's close affinity with India could no longer be a matter of speculation; it was written all over in the languages of Europe, classical or modern. J.G. Herder asked himself: "All the peoples of Europe, where are they from?" And he answered: "From Asia."

Sanskrit was found to be the oldest of all Aryan languages and therefore also their ancestor. Hegel, no admirer of India, admitted: "It is a great discovery in history—as of a new world—which has been made within rather more than the last twenty years, respecting the Sanskrit and the connection of the European languages with it. In particular, the connection of the German and Indian peoples has been demonstrated." German Oriental Renaissance was erected on Bopp's linguistic foundation.

The enthusiasm for Indian culture was wide-spread. Amaury de Riencourt in his *The Soul of India* tells us that philosophers like Schelling, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Schleiermacher, poets such as Goethe, Schillar, Novalis, Tieck and Brentano, historians like Herder and Schlegel, all acclaimed the discovery of Indian culture with cries of ecstasy: "India, the home of universal religion, the cradle of the noblest human race, of all literature, of all philosophies and metaphysics." And he adds that "this enthusiasm was not confined to Germany. The entire Romantic movement

in the West put Indian culture on a lofty pedestal which the preceding Classical Movement had reserved for Greece and Rome."

Tolstoy, a late-comer, was also deeply influenced by Indian religious thought. Like Wagner, his introduction to it was through Burnouf and Schopenhauer. Beginning with his *Confessions*, there is no work of his "which is not inspired, in part by Hindu thought", to put it in the words of Markovitch quoted by Raymond Schwab in *The Oriental Renaissance*. He further adds that Tolstoy also "remains the most striking example, among a great many, of those who sought a cure for the western spirit in India."

Thus we see that India's influence was widespread throughout Europe, but it was the greatest in Germany. In fact, Germany was called "the India of the Occident". Hugo said that "Germany is to the West what India is to the East, a sort of great forbear. Let us venerate her." These words (Sept., 1870) might have been said though in order to flatter Germany in the hope that she would spare Paris which her armies had besieged.

Importance of Indian Influence

While the Oriental Movement expanded the West's intellectual horizon and influenced it at a deeper level, it was also used in the current controversies and polemics of the day. Some used it in support of the forces of Enlightenment and rationalism to give themselves an example of high-minded religion and ethics which did not depend on revelation and dogmas; others used it against the naive rationalism of the eighteenth century.

Some found that the Bible's Hebraic tradition with its narrow-mindedness, intolerant monotheism, its coarse materialism and lack of mysticism had a corrupting influence on European culture, and they found their answer in Indian religious culture which was both rational and mystical.

Oriental Renaissance was also used against classical Renaissance, particularly in Germany. For long, Germans had been accused, particularly by Latin people, of being Teutonic barbarians who destroyed the great Mediterranean culture. In return, the Germans by identifying themselves with the more ancient Indian culture rejected the cultural superiority of the Latin races and especially of French Classicism. Thus by identifying themselves with ancient India and by claiming a new lineage, the Germans restored their self-respect and equality with their accusers.

VII

Opposition

Thus the Oriental Renaissance came to tread over too many toes and its results were disturbing even to many Orientalists who had intended their labour to yield a different kind of harvest. For example, H.H. Wilson, a

celebrated Indologist, Boden Professor, translator of the *Ṛg Veda* and the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, speaking at the University of Oxford in 1840, said that the objects of Indian studies were "to contribute to the religious enlightenment of a benighted, but intelligent and interesting and amiable people"; another object was "to confute the falsities of Hinduism." Earlier William Carey had said that the purpose of translating Sanskrit texts was to show they were "filled with nothing but pebbles and trash". But the results were just the opposite. Many of the best minds of Europe thought that these texts were sublime, and the possessors of those texts could not be benighted and needed no foreign aid in religious enlightenment. Some also used these texts to show the inadequacy of Christianity.

Oriental Renaissance began to invite opposition. Missionaries were one obvious source of it. Another source was imperialism. European powers were becoming self-conscious imperialists and they could not rule with a clean conscience over peoples who were proud possessors of great cultures. Therefore they opposed views which exalted the ideological status of their colonies. Another source, a natural result of imperialism, was growing Eurocentricity. Europe became less and less inclined to believe that anything worthwhile could be found anywhere outside of Europe. Therefore, the Oriental Movement began to be downgraded. It was called "romantic", and even "fanatic", its fascination for India was a form of "Indo-mania". Others dealt with it in a more intellectual, but equally hostile way. They admitted a certain antiquity and even priority for Indian people and their culture, facts which could no longer be denied but they saw in it no reason for departing from their low estimate of India. Hegel, for example, admitted that India "was the centre of emigration for all the western world", but he said that it was merely a "physical diffusion". "The people of India have achieved no foreign conquests, but have been on every occasion vanquished themselves."

Similarly, though he admitted the fact of India's cultural spread arguing that Sanskrit lies at the foundation of all those further developments which form the languages of Europe, the Greek, Latin, German, but he also found in this cultural diffusion only "a dumb, deedless expansion," which "presented no political action". No wars, no forcible conversions, no cultural impositions; therefore, worth nothing much, nothing creditable!

Others dealt with the problem in other ways. They retained old facts but gave them a new rendering; or they retained some facts and changed others and offered a new combination. For example, Indians were allowed to possess the Vedas, the oldest literature of the Aryans, but the Aryans themselves were made to migrate, this time from Europe to India as conquerors. Thus the tables were turned. Migration remained but its direction changed. India which was hitherto regarded as the home of European languages and people now became the happy hunting ground of the same people who came and conquered and imposed their will and culture on India. The theory of

Aryan invasion was born. History was written in support of the new hegemony and power relations.

Other scholars made other kinds of attempts. Considering that Europe's religious and philosophical tradition was a late comer, some European thinkers had derived it from India, a common enough practice in the academic field in such matters. But William Jones now offered the hypothesis of a *third unknown source*. He said that India was not the original home of the religious and philosophic tradition of the West, but itself represented an old offshoot of an original source common to both East and West. "Pythagoras and Plato derive their sublime theories from the same fountain with the sages of India", he said. As the attitude in Europe changed, the *hypothesis* was lapped up and it was accepted as *fact*.

The hypothesis of a third lost source began to be applied to many fields but more particularly to linguistics. Some scholars even began to reconstruct this common source and invented "Indo-European roots". These roots were a logical construct and the already existing Sanskrit roots could have done as well, but possibly a psychological motive was at work. Though Sanskrit had the oldest literature, the idea that it could have some sort of a primacy in the Aryan family of languages was not acceptable. Therefore they accepted the next best hypothesis that both Sanskrit and European languages had a common source still more ancient but now lost. To own a filial relationship with India was no matter of pride for Europe; so the next best thing under the circumstances was to make this relationship collateral and push it as far back in the past as possible. Things may change and India's social status may improve after its political and economic status improves.

HEGEL

Europe, at the head of a far-flung empire, had to assert its superiority at all levels: military, commercial, religious and philosophical. It could not countenance a view which exalted the peoples of the Orient in any way. Missionaries were always on the war-path but on the level of philosophy, Hegel led the attack and his attack was as unsparing and ungenerous as that of the former. But while the missionaries used the language of theology, Hegel used the high-winded language of intellectuality, or just sheer "confused, empty verbiage", according to Schopenhauer.

Herder had thought that India represented man's living past, his *innocence*, but Hegel believed that the World-Spirit (Weltgeist) moved from East to West, and in the Oriental tradition, Europe faces, in a sense, its own petrified past. He believed that the Occident had already superseded the Orient and the Orient has to be "excluded from the history of philosophy". In fact, Hegel himself gave us a "philosophy of history", a scheme which brought non-European cultures and thought in historical subordination to Europe.

After Hegel, many European scholars have engaged in this labour and in Marx it touched new heights and achieved much concrete, political results.

According to Professor Halbfass, Hegel and others "reflected Europe's historical position at the beginning of the 19th century. It claims intellectual, moral and religious superiority over the rest of the world." The author tells us that Hegel "even tries to justify the historical necessity of Europe's colonial activities". In his *The Philosophy of History*, Hegel praises the British for undertaking "the weighty responsibility of being the missionaries of civilization to the world".

Following Hegel's lead, though the lead was hardly necessary, Indian philosophy began to be berated. Professor Halbfass writes a whole chapter entitled "On the Exclusion of India from the History of Philosophy". But there is nothing surprising about it. In the same spirit and with the same level of understanding, Indian religion, art, sciences and technology, social and political thought were also either omitted or berated. But what is really incomprehensible is that India's own elites under the spell of Europe have shown no appreciation and commitment to their country's intellectual and creative contribution.

In a sense, this omission is no deprivation but in fact a blessing. Exclusion does no harm and inclusion brings no honour. In fact, inclusion is far worse than exclusion. The fact is that Europe is not spiritually prepared to take Indian higher thought into its purview and, therefore, it is better that it is left out altogether. But on occasions when Europe does speak about it, it speaks vaguely about something it does not comprehend. For example, take Hegel himself. Speaking about Yoga, he says that the "ascent to Brahman is brought about by utter stupefaction and insensibility". The comment is simply laughable. Similarly, he often speaks, probably more than any other European philosopher, of *consciousness*; but he does not seem to be aware, even conceptually, of a state of consciousness which is liberated from its own images, thoughts, stored impressions, its opacity, duality and ego, a state of consciousness about which Indian Yogas speak. In this state, the consciousness is joyful (*višoka*), and luminous (*jyotishmati*), truth-bearing or truth-filled (*rtam-bharā*), and those who attain it live on truth (*rta-bhuj*), and dwell in truth (*rta-sad*).

VIII

India entered Europe as a widening and deepening force and it was looked upon with respect and admiration by some of its greatest thinkers like Voltaire, Schelling and Schopenhouer. But the vested interests and forces of narrowness and obscurantism were powerful and they banded together and made a determined stand. Eventually the Euro-Colonial-Missionary forces triumphed, represented by soldier-scholars like J.S. Mill, Hegel, Macaulay, Marx and many others. They were thoroughly Eurocentric and

they looked at India and other countries of the East with contempt and condescension. But they became popular not only in the West but in India and Asia as well. They taught several generations of Indians how and what to think of themselves and of Europe. The Indian elites began to look at their country and people through European eyes and European categories. They even borrowed the West's contempt for their own people. Traditional India, during its recovery and reaffirmation, finds itself most fiercely opposed by these elitist forces at home. These forces have intimate, intellectual, organizational and financial links with the West.

Neo-Hinduism

This *anti-Hinduism* of the Hindus, their Missionary-Macaulayite-Marxist view of themselves, their culture, religion and history, is the most powerful legacy the European contact has left behind. But Professor Halbfass does not discuss this at all. On the other hand, he discusses, in the second section of his book, what he calls Neo-Hinduism, a Hinduism shaped by and during the presence of Europe but which is not anti-Hindu and which, in fact, defends Hinduism though not in its native idiom but in the borrowed idiom of Europe. According to Professor Halbfass, Neo-Hinduism took shape "in a historical setting created by Europe", and it "has difficulties speaking for itself"; it "speaks to a large extent in a European medium".

To some extent, this is true; but the limitation is not all on the side of Neo-Hinduism. If it is to engage in a dialogue with the West, it must speak in the idiom best understood by the listener. Though the West is an acute linguist and it has mastered many languages but it is not so nimble-witted in understanding the peoples who spoke them.

Moreover, Neo-Hinduism does more than justify Hinduism; it also justifies Christianity, Islam and many other non-Indian cults. As it uses western categories to defend Hinduism, in the same spirit it uses traditional Indian categories to promote Semitic religions. In its insatiable desire for "synthesis" and similarities, it seeks and finds Vedānta in the Bible and the Quran and in *Das Kapital* too; it says that Jesus and Muhammad and Marx all are incarnations and Rishis, and that they all say the same thing. The net result is that Semitic prophets are as popular among the Hindus as their own. Western Rationalism had rejected Christianity not only for its miracles but even more so for its exclusive claims which offend rationality, but it is now coming back under Hindu auspices and promotion.

IX

Hindu Passivity

At more than one place, Professor Halbfass gives us what he regards as

a basic characteristic of the Indo-European dialogue or encounter. In this encounter, he tells us that while Europe's role was active, that of India was passive; that while she never went out to study or preach or proselytize, the West has been, on the other hand, in search of India in a variety of ways. It has looked there for analogies and origins; it has even used India for its own self-definition; it has tried to define its identity "by demarcating it against, and reflecting it in, the otherness of India". India, on the other hand, has never tried to find Europe, but discovered it when she was herself discovered, and "started responding to it while being discovered, subdued and objectified by it".*

What Professor Halbfass has said so graciously has been said less civilly by many others. H.U. Weithrecht, for example, makes no such intellectual ado and states quite brutally that India's contact with the outer world "has been mainly through immigration of foreign invaders".

We thank Professor Halbfass for his civility and we also think that there should be no difficulty in agreeing with his observation in a broad way. But what he says has many unstated implications and it also raises some deeper questions which should not go unmentioned.

The author presents the East-West encounter as an intellectual enterprise in which the west played, on the whole, the part of a disinterested pursuer of knowledge and truth. It wanted to know others and it went out in search of this knowledge. Perhaps, sometimes it was too eager and, therefore, indiscreet and even aggressive, but all this was in the pursuit of knowledge. History however does not support this rosy view and reveals a different story. It tells us that the East-West encounter was a very cruel affair and the intellectual component was the least important part of it. Its main expressions were piracy, gun-boat diplomacy, political domination, religious arrogance, economic enslavement and cultural genocide. These things have not even been mentioned by the author.

And looking at "knowledge" the encounter generated, we find that though its quantum is impressive its moral worth is very little. It abounds in censuses, surveys, reports, maps, charts, atlases, tables, chronicles, archives, transactions and other such data useful for ruling over a country; it contains laborious studies of castes and creeds and other social divisions so that these could be used for "divide and rule", and even studies of history and religions so that these could be used for subversion. All this is "knowledge" of a sort but it is worthy of administrators and generals, and not of scholars and philosophers of cultures and civilizations. Data-collection is not knowledge and knowledge is not wisdom.

*Is it really true? Has Europe, particularly Christian Europe, been really so alert and curious as Professor Halbfass claims? According to E.R. Bevan, far into the Medieval ages Christian Europe drew its conception of India mainly from books written before the middle of the third century B.C. and the additions of this period "never equalled in substance or interest the older books" (*The Cambridge History of India*, p. 383).

But even those works pretending to study other peoples' cultures are most of the time worthless. Take, for example, the *Encyclopaedia of Religions and Ethics*, in twelve volumes; it is written by more than 450 scholars, Europe's best minds, great linguists and top-notch theologians. The volumes study world cultures, past and present. But with all their scholarship, they constitute a hate-book, a declaration of war against all non-Christian cultures and peoples. They prove that European intellects is profoundly inadequate for dealing with other peoples' cultures. It has neither the necessary sympathy nor the insight for this kind of task.

While on the subject, we may also make a comment or two on the intellect of the West. In contrast to its eastern counterpart, it is supposed to be objective but facts show that it can be quite credulous and careless about facts. For example, we know how for centuries, it believed in a legendary Prester John, the ruler of "the three Indies", the "illustrious and magnificent king...and a beloved son of Christ", the centre of many legends whose support the Christian world hoped to gain against Islam. Similarly, we now know the story of Barlaam and Josaphat, two fictional characters in a story of Siddhartha Buddha taken over and after suitable adaptations converted into two real saints of Christiandom whose feast day falls on 27th November. We also know how strong is its belief in Apostle Thomas visiting India which though found to be a myth continues to be promoted for extraneous reasons. All these facts do not speak for an alert, objective and disinterested European intellect.

Now let us also give some thought to the author's perspicacious observation that India's role in the intellectual encounter has been passive. This is true, at least apparently. India's behaviour conforms to its basic attitude in the matter. India believes that there is such a thing as higher learning; and in this kind of learning, one learns best about others by learning about oneself. This kind of learning about others does not analyse, compare and judge all the time, but it *accepts* them as they are. This method gives a benign, a compassionate knowledge of others. In fact, in this kind of knowledge, there are no others. India has known mankind in this benign sense from the beginning. In this sense, India can also have no true xenology of European fancy though the author discusses it at length in a whole chapter, Traditional Indian Xenology (Chapter II), where one can also see Indology at work in all its intellectual irresponsibility.* Hindus have their own pride but they

*Here the author follows the lead of Indology quite uncritically. The discussion is set in the framework of the theory of Aryan invasion as already a proven fact. We are told of the Aryans as "a closly knit group of conquerors and immigrants who gradually took possession of the Indian sub-continent," and of aboriginals who were "vanquished and subdued by Agni," an Aryan God. We are told that the conquerors had already "a clearly recognizable, though somewhat mythical awareness of the surrounding world of foreign or hostile powers or groups or people." How this awareness was both clear and mythical at the same time is not explained but treating it so makes it easier to regard myths and parables as history. We are also told that according to the testimony of the

have no concept of an *ummah*, and a divinely ordained mission, and therefore no true xenology though they could have words indicating praise and censure and even hostility. In point of fact, Hinduism has concerned itself with

Vedas themselves, the subdued people were "excluded from the Aryan community and its ritual performances" (and blamably not "compelled to come in"), and were described as *dasyu* or *dāsa*, and as *aśraddha, ayajña, avrata, anyavrata* and *akarman*.

In this scheme, the pre-Vedic conquest proves the Vedic epithets and the Vedic epithets in turn prove a pre-Vedic conquest. But, really, have the epithets to be applied to a conquered people? They could as well be applied by moralists to the members of their own society who in their eyes were not worshipful and observant enough. Manu does it often enough and advises that even kings and Brahmins who do not perform sacrifices (ayajña) are not to be honoured (3.120). But in all probability and in most cases they were applied by Rishis to all mankind, to man at large, to his inner life, his seeking and struggle, to his soul which seeks kinship with Gods but which is also subject to the opposite pull of impiety, lack of faith, worship and spiritual effort.

Taking a leaf from the Orientalists' book, could we argue that the words like gentiles, heathens, infidels, pagans, servants, slaves and serfs which abound in European religious and social literature assume a conquered people? Could we also hold that the Biblical words like *sklero-trachelos* and *qesheh oreph* (stiff-necked) are physical descriptions of those people *a la* "noseless" (*anāsa*) *dasyu* of Orientalists ? Could we further say that the Bible's words like ignorant (*agnoeo*), unbelieving (*apeitheo*), heedless (*aphron*), unrighteous (*adikos*), lawless (*anomia*) and accursed (*anathema*) are not moral judgements but epithets applied to conquered peoples of various grades?

But even if we take the Vedas to be history, we must apply a chosen criterion consistently and not pick and choose according to our convenience. In a Rg verse (7.6.3) which speaks of the foolish, the faithless, the rudely-speaking, the nigggardly, of men without belief, sacrifice and worship (*nyakṛitu, grathina, mṛidhra-vāc, paṇi, aśraddha, avṛidha, ayajña*), we are also told that "Far, far away has Agni chased those dasyus, and, in the east, has turned the godless westward," a direction which is just the opposite of what the Orientalists have been telling us—not eastward and southward but westward. Why neglect this testimony?

Let me take another example of this intellectual irresponsibility. Beginning from the beginning and tracing the tradition of Indian xenology, Professor Halbfass quotes P. Thieme to show that "while in Greece the word for foreigner (*xenos*) becomes the words for 'guest' or 'host', the corresponding word in India [*ari*] becomes a term for the enemy." (p. 175). Well, we do not know whether the word *ari* in the Vedic lore ever meant a stranger which in time began to mean an enemy. But such things are possible and words do change their meanings in response to many factors (for fuller discussion, see our *The Word As Revelation: Names Of Gods*, Impex India, New Delhi-2). A word of a living language responds, among other things, to the collective experience of its speakers. A stranger is not always a friend and sometimes he comes as a guest but stays back as the master as the experience of native American-Indians proves and the word has to to incorporate and convey such new meanings too.

But turning away from these larger speculations, let us turn to the concrete case in hand. We are not sure whether such a change of meaning as suggested by Thieme took place in India but it did take place in Europe. If Professor Halbfass had carried his etymological investigation a little further, he would have found that the Greek word *xenos*, a stranger, is akin to Latin *hostis*, a stranger and and also an enemy, giving us the word 'hostile' in English; it is also the parent of the word 'hostage', a person kept in pledge. The Latin *hostis* also acquired the sense of an 'army' (from the plural *hostes*, enemies). Akin to this was also the Latin *hostia*, an expiatory victim offered to a deity, a

humanity, with man, nay with all beings, animate and inanimate, past and present and future, on all planes , visible and invisible.*

There is also another, an inferior kind of knowledge; it tries to know others without knowing oneself. This kind of knowledge too has its usefulness but it very often has an aggressive intent. It treats others as *means*, as *objects*. This kind of knowledge is good for political and economic domination and spiritual aggrandizement, but it serves no higher end.

Also, though Professor Halbfass claims for the west a special intellectual curiosity and desire to learn, he does not say whether it followed the code proper to a learner. In Indian thinking, for higher learning, a pupil goes to a teacher with "fuel in hand", with a desire to know and the readiness to serve and in a spirit of humility and openness. But the west came with pride and attacked and enslaved. How could it, in this way, learn the deeper things of the spirit? True, it picked up odds and ends and "translated" texts, but as the sages say the knowledge of a "Veda-stealer" does not bear fruit and remains barren.

What has been said of learning could be said of teaching too. India believes that like higher learning, there is also a higher teaching which requires no army of missionaries and preachers. Here one teaches by *being*, not by *preaching*; and the medium of communication is often *silence*. In *Tao Te Ching*, it is known as "teaching without words and accomplishing without doing".

Traditional India has conformed to this concept of teaching, and its apparent silence has not prevented such Europeans as were ready from learning from it. In fact, in spite of its silence, and in spite of the absence of any missionary activity, traditional India has not failed to exercise a great influence over the West. The author devotes a whole section to "The Indian Tradition and the Presence of Europe" in which he discusses Neo-Hinduism or Neo-India, or Hinduism and India as modified by the presence of Europe. But a book named *India and Europe* could as well contain a section named

sacrifice. The sense is still actively retained in the Church's most important rite, the *eucharist*, in which they eat (*substantially*, they say) the flesh of the sacrificed victim, Jesus Christ, the Son of God. Perhaps the word retains the memory of the days when they sacrificed their first-born to their God, perhaps later replaced by a stranger, then by a living animal and then by a consecrated bread or wafer, the host. The word reveals the steps in European Xenology and its etymology helps in constructing European history. Or, this would if India had its Occidentalists and they were as bright as Europe's Orientalists.

*But increasingly faced with a world of strong nation-states and religious ecclesias organised on *ummah* principle, Hindus like other pagan peoples found themselves at a great disadvantage (for example, while not successful in converting the Muslims, St. Xavier said: Give me out and out pagans). Therefore they tried to develop a measure of political nationalism and religious solidarity (*sangathan*) of their own under the leadership of people like Swami Dayananda, Swami Vivekananda, Tilak, Sri Aurobindo and Mahatma Gandhi, but these sentiments still retain the full imprint of universality.

"The European Tradition and the Presence of India", which could discuss Neo-Christianity and Neo-Europe, modifying their idiom under the influence of Indian thought. There is no dearth of data, but there is a reluctance to acknowledge that kind of data under the inertia of an old habit of thinking. For this reason, even Gandhi appears most briefly and perfunctorily in the book though he earned a wide audience in Europe and America, and not as an Indian political leader but as a Hindu thinker and saint; he is also treated as a representative of Neo-Hinduism, and not one who contributed to the shaping of a Neo-Christianity.

The fact is that India has been exerting a great influence though it often remains unacknowledged and unnamed. For example, India's *Panchatantra* began to be translated from an early date and it saw more than fifty translations and its stories are found in two hundred adaptations though without any knowledge of their Indian origin. The Indian influence has been silent but sure. For example at present, the *Hare Krishna* movement and the *Śaiva Siddhānta* are visible but partial forms of a great invisible but abiding influence. Under this influence, many are taking to vegetarianism, hundreds of thousands of western brothers believe in the Law of Karma, and in rebirth, and millions have participated in some kind of meditation sessions. Traditional Christianity has hitherto spoken the language of dogma, authority and superiority, but under this new influence, even it is forced to speak the language of "experience" and reluctant "plurality". The Bible does not even know the word "consciousness," but under the influence of Indian thought, even the televangelists are embracing the word though without realizing that the word properly belongs to a different spiritual ethos and has little meaning in the Christian tradition.

X

Experience

Such overwhelming evidence of the influence of Indian spirituality has made it difficult to avoid its discussion altogether. So the author turns to it at the end of his book and in two separate chapters discusses two key concepts, Experience and Tolerance, concepts quite new to Christian-western vocabulary. Dean W.R. Inge says that the "centre of gravity in religion has shifted from authority to experience". Professor Halbfass also finds the word "most significant" and "most conspicuous in works on Indian religion and philosophy, and in the so-called dialogue between India and the West." But apparently he does not think much of it. He quotes H. Cox who speaks slightly of a "gluttony of experience". He also regards the term "most ambiguous and evasive" and seems to agree with H.G. Gadamer who says that the word is the "most obscure of all philosophical concepts" and also "among the least clarified concepts".

For that matter what concept is not ambiguous in philosophy? Is "experience" more ambiguous than the concepts of "East and West", or "encounter", "tradition", "Europe" and "understanding", concepts which are so much used by the author and some of which even decorate the title of his book? Most scholars do not seem to share this view and they have found the word good enough and clear enough for ordinary use. William James, the celebrated American philosopher and psychologist, wrote his famous *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902). Similarly, only recently, about a decade ago, Sir Alister Hardy, a zoologist, established a "Religious Experience Research Unit" (RERU) at the University of Oxford, England.

Tolerance

Professor Halbfass's discussion on "tolerance" is also out of focus. He uses his erudition to confuse the straight meaning of the word. In this discussion, he introduces one Paul Hacker (1913-1979) and gives him a place quite disproportionate to the importance of his ideas. Paul Hacker says that "Hinduism had inclusivism instead of tolerance", and that "what seems to be tolerance to the Europeans, is almost always inclusivism". According to him the terms "tolerance" and "intolerance" are "inappropriate for the description of Hinduism". H. Von Glasenapp, who missed tolerance in Hinduism paraphrased Hacker's "inclusivism" as "non-violent fanaticism".

Professor Halbfass discusses "tolerance as a modern European idea", and finds it inapplicable to traditional Hinduism because it "does not recognize the idea of man, and of human freedom and equality, which constitute the background of the modern concept of tolerance". Here, it is obvious that he neglects to take advantage of a larger perspective that is needed in discussing such inter-civilizational issues. Particularly, a deep culture like Hinduism based on a profounder definition of man and a wiser understanding of what makes for true human freedom and equality needs more than this kind of cavalier judgement.

The author discusses the modern context of Europe's idea of tolerance without mentioning a word about its practice of intolerance in dealing with Asian and African countries. Tolerance, as a "modern European idea and ideology", acquired "special significance in connection with the tensions between different Christian denominations since the period of Reformation", he says. Thus the question is treated as an intra-Christian question, a question of relationship between different denominations of Christianity. The larger question of how Christianity views other religions is simply glossed over. There is not a word about the vast missionary apparatus, a living monument of intolerance, doctrinal and practical. Perhaps, this apparatus and its work are included in the modern "European idea of tolerance." It seems that Professor Halbfass's view, in this matter again, has failed to rise above the western-Christian horizon.

The argument that treats tolerance as a "modern European idea or ideology" is of one piece with the arguments of missionaries. For example, Seale Bate in his *Religious Liberty: An Inquiry*, a missionary-sponsored work, argues that since Hindus did not practise persecution, they did not know tolerance! For the very lack of persecution itself "did not raise clear issues of compulsion or liberty." And he further adds that "it is only in the political development of recent years [that is when the British were leaving], in the missionary introduction of fresh Christian undertakings, that the issue of religious liberty had become apparent". According to this view, if Hindu India questions some of these "Christian undertakings", it will prove that it lacks and denies religious liberty. But when India was under the British and no such questions were raised, that was true religious liberty of "modern European idea or ideology."

XI

Europeanization of the Earth

In the last chapter, Professor Halbfass discusses the concept of the "Europeanization of the Earth", a conviction and predilection which philosophical Europe too has shared with religious and political Europe. Christian Europe has always believed that it has the divinely ordained mission of bringing all heathendom under the domain of the Church; similarly at the dawn of modern period, Imperial Europe felt heavily the "white-man's burden of civilizing the world"; philosophical Europe too felt that it had an equally "onerous task of understanding others" under its "idea of truth which requires and authorizes it to understand other cultures", to put it in the language of M. Merleau-Ponty.

The thought found its first most powerful expression in Hegel and lately in E. Husserl. Professor Halbfass tells us that Hegel believed that the European horizon transcends the Asian horizon, that Asian thought is comprehensible and interpretable within European thought, but not vice versa, and that European thought has to provide the context and categories for the exploration of all traditions of thought. Europe has an "innate entelechy" which urges it on towards an "absolute idea", a universality beyond the reach of other cultures.

Husserl believes that Europe has acquired the spirit of "true philosophy" and "pure science", "autonomous thinking" and an "attitude of pure theory" and "freedom from prejudice"; and, therefore, is especially equipped to understand other cultures while other cultures lacking in these qualities cannot understand Europe. "European mankind" has a "universal human mission". Its culture "comprehends and cancels other cultures".

Not that other cultures lack reason altogether, but it is of a merely human, pre-philosophical kind. "As animal reason is to human reason, pre-philosophical reason is to philosophical reason." This philosophical reason provides

to the West a kind of "self-transparent omniscience". This gives the West a great advantage over others. Others will have to Europeanize themselves, "whereas we, if we understand ourselves properly, will never, for example, Indianize ourselves", Husserl says. Naturally, the "Europeanization of all foreign parts of the world" is the destiny of the earth. God made Europe in His image, and now the rest of mankind will be made in the image of Europe. M. Heidegger also refers to the "complete Europeanization of the earth and of mankind", but he is less proud about it. Recently, Dr. Francis Fukuyama, a scholar and official of the United States, wrote an essay, *The End of History*, which was widely discussed. It celebrated the "triumph of the West, the Western idea".

But what does "Europeanization of mankind" exactly mean? Does it mean that European rationalism will triumph over Asian intuition? And European sciences, forms of knowledge and technology and even social and economic forms replace sciences, forms of knowledge, technology and social and economic forms developed elsewhere? Let us remember that developed cultures like India, China and Egypt were masters of many sciences.

A measure of Europeanization in the sense of some dominant European influences is quite on the cards. The last several centuries belonged to Europe and the rest of mankind was on the retreat. In these days, economic and political colonialism went hand in hand with intellectual colonialism. Many western ideas and ideals were successfully planted. Even highly developed cultures like those of India and China were under a tremendous psychological pressure to accept the world-view, the value-system, intellectual fashions and preferences and political and social forms of the West. Many Afro-Asian countries tried to go western in the hope of acquiring the West's power or even approval, but without success. They were de-indigenized without being Europeanized. Some of these countries like Brazil and Mexico failed even in the more external forms. They tried to adopt western patterns of industrialization but their harvest has been colossal debts, inflation, economic bankruptcy and great social upheaval. It is clear that whatever the adjustments it is necessary for the non-European countries to make, the path of imitation is hardly the path of their salvation.

Then there is also the question of desirability. Thanks to the West's glamour and its technological achievements in many fields, it is not widely and fully realized that Europeanization has also meant the externalization of the spirit and its impoverishment. The Europeanization of the earth started long ago. It started with the Europeanization of Europe itself; let us remember that there was a time when Europe was not Europeanized in the modern sense; its Europeanization started with the semiticization of its religious feeling and thinking; it then invaded other departments and expressions of its life; Europe began to lose its roots; and while it underwent inner contraction, it started on the path of outer expansion, recognizing on the way no one else but itself. It began to seek Europeanization of the earth.

But will it do any good to anybody? What will happen if the Afro-Asian countries also became consumers and polluters on the European scale? What the earth, including Europe, needs is not Europeanization, but a new philosophy, a new life-style which is in harmony with man's spiritual nature and ecological system.

Europeanization of the earth may satisfy the West's ego, but the satisfaction will be short-lived. The west does not realize how deep is man's, including its own, present spiritual crisis. In the depth of this crisis, it is not above learning from developed Hindu-Buddhist culture of Asia. This culture could teach us innerness, respect for plurality, ways of frugal, harmonious and compassionate living.

Socialism reviewed

AMLAN DATTA
CB 110 Salt Lake, Calcutta 700 064

In the debate on the relationship between the individual and society, we risk running into error whichever side we take. On the one hand, the individual is the focal point of all significant thought and experience. Truth cannot be lived at second hand. The individual must articulate and act upon the truth as he himself perceives it and suffer the consequences and learn from them. To act otherwise would not be to follow the truth, but to follow fixed habits. Yet, on the other hand, the individual cannot effectively serve the truth in a vacuum outside society. "It is astonishing", J.M. Keynes once wrote, "what foolish things one can temporarily believe if one thinks too long alone". The search for truth is a social and co-operative enterprise. When we elevate the role of society or of the individual in that enterprise to the status of an ideology, calling it by the name of socialism or individualism, we possibly import an one-sided emphasis and do less than justice to the full dialectical relationship between society and the individual. Yet the debate must continue as an aid to clarification of ideas under changing social conditions. For words have a chameleonic character, and as conditions change so do words and their shades of meaning.

The dichotomy between capitalism and socialism also is beset with somewhat similar problems. How does one explicate the meaning of capitalism? For some, the heart of the matter lies in the overwhelming importance attached to "accumulation of capital", the extraction of "surplus" and its investment and reinvestment. This led some to call the Soviet economy under Stalin by the name of "state capitalism" in view of the overriding importance attached to just that process for the sake of rapid industrialisation. For others capitalism is concerned, above all, with the question of ownership of property, more particularly, the means of production, and, by that token, the U.S. economy and the Soviet economy are supposed to stand at opposite poles. Still others make the meaning of capitalism turn on the idea of the "free" market economy. Socialism, too, displays a similar diversity of meanings. Socialism, said Arthur Lewis, economist and Nobel laureate, is about equality, which reflects a widely shared notion on that subject. In fact, one of the principal Indian words for socialism (or communism) is connected with *sāmya* or equality. Others take the question of ownership as the central question and, at least until recently, this was quite common, particularly among Marxists, and so was the idea of central planning of leading

Michael Luntley, *The Meaning of Socialism, Open Court.*

economic activities. Still others have more loosely thought of socialism as a system under which social welfare and social preferences are allowed precedence over private profit and individual preferences.

Some recent events have been interpreted to signify a historic defeat for socialism and an impressive vindication of the case for capitalism. The tested models of socialism have failed to deliver the goods. Capitalism, by contrast, with its market economy and the profit motive, has established itself as a more dependable engine of economic growth. To the usual objection that growth does not guarantee welfare there is the equally oft-repeated rejoinder that without growth there is no stable basis for increased provision of welfare. But this still leaves the debate quite inconclusive. The proposition that without growth there can be no welfare does not provide sufficient ground for the inference that the presence of growth necessarily produces welfare.

In fact, there are two contrasted sets of errors which need to be avoided in this connection. Let us note them briefly one by one. On the one hand, economic growth propelled by the profit motive, unless supplemented by other well-designed measures, does not provide the surest way to welfare, particularly in a culturally heterogeneous and traditionally hierarchical society. Moreover, there are certain consequences of economic growth, beyond what is intended by individual consumers and producers, both in material and moral terms, which may be of questionable value or even definitely undesirable. These, therefore, deserve special attention. But, on the other hand, there are errors of an opposite kind which require equally to be guarded against. While it is true that the profit motive is careless of social welfare, it is an egregious error to believe that discarding the principle of profit implies accepting "the authority of the good". What might result is not simply inefficiency and waste, which is bad enough, but the authority of war-lords or a feudal bureaucratic spirit which is something worse. When in the concluding notes of the celebrated General Theory, Keynes wrote that "it is better that a man should tyrannise over his bank balance than over his fellow-citizens; and whilst the former is sometimes denounced as being but a means to the latter, sometimes at least it is an alternative", he was not just giving expression to a passing thought, but stating with due deliberation an idea that had formed in his mind over the earlier two decades.

Meditating on the German war-economy during World War I, it occurred to the English economist that industrial economies which were not organised for profit might still be organised and centrally planned for power. Keynes was so struck by certain ideas propounded by Professor Jaffé at that time that he summed them up in an article in The Economic Journal, September, 1915, in the following significant words: "The old order of industry, which is dying today is based on Profit; in the new Germany of the twentieth century Power without consideration of Profit is to make an end of that system of capitalism." It is hardly necessary to add that a system of "etatistic planning" for Power, under which dictators and bureaucrats tyrannise over fellow-citizens, may very well adopt also a whole range of welfare measures without any substantial change in its basic character. Moreover, many capitalist economies have already assimilated certain features of rival etatistic economies which have appropriated the name of socialism.

An ideology of any worth and durability is born of a cross-fertilisation of some relatively permanent values embedded in long tradition and certain conditions, conflict of interests, hopes and frustrations, which are more time-bound and constitute special characteristics of the epoch in which that ideology presents itself. Although academic discussion of an ideology should be conducted with a certain amount of detachment, this does not offer sufficient reason for abstracting the debate from the contemporary context. However, even as we pay attention to the temporal context, we should be careful not to allow ourselves to be excessively influenced by such temporary factors as the political success or failure of the ideology in question. To take an outstanding example from this century, the victory of the Russian Bolsheviks in 1917 and the political-military gains made by the Communist movement after World War II produced unbounded enthusiasm among many adherents of Marxism and led them to believe that the verdict of history had been finally given in favour of their creed and that it was only the bad faith and perversity of their opponents which kept the argument going. Judged by the same standards, the year 1989 can again be treated as a terminal year, though in an opposite sense, and it may be thought that it is time to bring the debate on socialism to a close. But, of course, it is going to continue and there are some good reasons why it should. It is still useful to assess the socialist tradition, to judge and decide how much of it should be modified or rejected and how much retained, and in what language what is still valuable in it should be clothed.

To the on-going debate on socialism, Michael Luntley, who teaches philosohpy at the London School of Economics, and belongs to the younger generation of socialists, has recently made a notable contribution. His book, which appears under the title of *The Meaning of Socialism*, was published by Open Court, La Salle, Illinois, in 1990. In the next few lines an attempt will be made to give very brief indications of some of the ideas expounded in that book.

Michael Luntley's central concern is with what he calls "the good life". His is a search for ways and means of establishing in society "the Authority of the Good", or, at least, moving resolutely in that direction. There are lots of people all over the world, including many believers (with faith in God) and quite a few atheists (believing in the authority of Reason), who would sympathise with his central concern but might not choose to call themselves "socialist". Now, there are some definite reasons why Luntley makes that ideological choice. He is deeply distrustful of "the rampant individua-

lism of liberalism." He wants to give the notion of the community, as "the repository of the good life", an essential place in his system of ideas. He finds in the socialist tradition powerful support for that notion.

Why does Professor Luntley assign such an important place to that notion in his model of socialism? The idea of the good has a social dimension. Moral values are rooted in the positive concern, the good will, that a person feels for other persons. This feeling of concern comes when we see others "as like ourselves". But this comes naturally within a "face-to-face" community, a "reference group" with which one has so identified oneself that within it one's own good and the good of others tend to coalesce into a common good. It is within such reference groups that the search for the good comes most unforced, as a manifestation of man's innate moral nature.

As a socialist, Luntley is a bitter critic of capitalism. "Under capitalism", he says, "life is lived not under the Authority of the Good, but under the aristocracy of capital". With the rise and spread of capitalism old community ties have been disrupted. A capitalist economy must have the freedom to rearrange resources, both human and material, in such a way that profit on investment is maximised. Capitalism, therefore, cannot be friendly to stable community bonds. The destructive role of capitalism is most evident in that it leads inexorably to "the fragmentation of the reference groups grounding our moral traditions". Capitalism is the enemy of the good life. By contrast, socialism offers the principles of moral reconstruction.

For Professor Luntley, the Good, like the Truth, has an objective existence. This does not mean that we, or anybody else, has already discovered it. It only means a certain faith in the possibility of continually approximating it. Within the traditional community there is a continuing dialogue on norms of the good life and it is a common enough experience that most of the time people move towards a consensus. Within the reference group there is a convergence on the idea of the good, which in a way is what holds the group together. But when we make reference groups the grounds of our moral traditions, we are faced with a problem: the moral traditions of different reference groups are not identical, they may even be conflicting. But the large society, finally the world community, must find space for all the local reference groups to coexist and, even if in a limited way, to cooperate. Conflicts in local ideas of the good life may then appear as rents in the moral fabric of the larger global association. The requirement of the idea that there is such a thing as *the* good life, says Luntley, demands that we find some way to repair such rents. How is that to be done? Perhaps the best way to do that is through a process, a reflective practice, of criticism from within. Conflicting ideas of the good life arise on account of erroneous or distorted moral intuitions. Such distortions, Luntley believes, are caused by economic interests. The best way of confronting a biased intuition of the good is to challenge it to defend itself on grounds other than those of economic interests.

By such a process of critical reexamination and reconstruction of local and proximate traditions, it should be possible to approach higher levels of apprehension of the idea of the good life and its practical requirements. This is not some work to be entrusted to and performed by a philosopher king. Rather what is required is an unending dialogue in which as many people as possible actively participate. It is in the basic reference groups and local communities, workers' committees and village councils, that direct participation of all or most members can materialise. A special characteristic of the dialogue at those levels is that the ethos of the community encourages decisions to be reached by consensus. It is this model of direct democracy along with the striving for consensus rather than division which assorts best with the spirit of Luntley's contemplated socialist society. To be sure, it cannot be made to work in assemblies representing larger territories and constituencies. But it still remains important as an ideal. It provides a standard by which the deficiencies and limitations of other democratic institutions can be judged and it hopefully sets a direction in which the practice and ethos of democracy can be developed and improved in future.

It is tempting to stop at this point and draw attention to the striking affinity, though not identity, between the ideas presented in *The Meaning of Socialism* and an important line of thought developed in India by people like M.K. Gandhi, Vinoba Bhave and Jayaprakash Narayan. Jayaprakash, a Marxist in his younger days, was a kind of "left-wing" Gandhian in his maturer years. A socialist who preferred to swear by Sarvodaya in his Gandhian phase, the idea of the face-to-face community occupied such an important place in his political philosophy that, to stress the point, he occasionally called himself communitarian. The affiliation of Narayan's line of thought with Gandhi's is beyond question. I can best indicate its affinity with Professor Luntley's ideas with the help of a short extract from one of my earlier writings. "Gandhi had a step-by-step method of thinking, the steps leading from bottom upwards. . . . One must begin with one's immediate neighbourhood, which is a face-to-face community, a village, let us say. It is here that human problems, whether of poverty or sickness or lack of education, appear not as an abstraction but as something immediately felt and seen, and it is here that love of one's neighbour and the good life begin." (*The Gandhian Way*, North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong, 1986, pp. 12-13.) I shall not proceed to describe the political structure, complete with direct democracy at the base and the principle of consensus, recommended by Gandhians, but it has obvious similarities with Luntley's model. This is a notable example of that convergence of ideas, however incomplete, which I am sure Professor Luntley will find welcome.

Gandhi had a special place for woman in his social philosophy. He once wrote: "It is sad to think that the Smritis contain texts which can command no respect from men who cherish the liberty of woman as their own." And he went on to add, "the future is with women". It is interesting to note that Luntley's book has a special place for woman; the word "her" is consistently used where other writers would habitually write "his". Note, for instance, the following: "The ideal socialist has a fire in her belly and a moral hymn in her heart".

But there are differences too in style and substance. In the Gandhian philosophy the emphasis on society is carefully balanced by an explicit recognition of the pivotal importance of the individual. "If the individual ceases to count", wrote Gandhi, (*Harijan*, 1 February, 1942), "what is left of society? Individual freedom alone can make a man voluntarily surrender himself completely to the service of society. If it is wrested from him, he becomes an automaton and society is ruined." It is not apparent from Luntley's book that he is convinced of the need for such an emphatic recognition of the value of individual freedom.

Socialism, Gandhi once said, is a beautiful word. But he did not make a creed out of it. He painted an appealing picture of an ideal village community, but he was honest enough to call it a village of his "dream". The tradition of a community may be at least in part unjust, oppressive, unenlightened, inhuman. Distortion of moral intuition may not be caused simply by economic interests; it may be derived from hardened superstitions or accumulated deposits of fear and jealousy. The methods of direct democracy and open debate proposed by Luntley are, indeed, commendable; but a narrow-minded, even cruel, tradition may yet continue for long despite such methods. The social consensus is so often against the creative and deviant individual. The presumption about the moral superiority of the authority of the community or the nation is not always friendly to the idea of the good. What, under the circumstances, is the conscientious objector to do? It will not do clearly to endorse his rights in a capitalist society and be half-hearted about them under a socialist dispensation.

The glorification of such collective entities as the nation and the class has been one of the more disturbing features of the century which is now drawing to a close. Individual freedom has been sacrificed at the altar of such glorified collectivities. The brands of socialism we have seen in this century, the brands that have proved influential, are national socialism and the Marxian variety which in practice gives primacy to the collectivity of the class.

Socialism is a beautiful word; but can the tendencies just noted be effectively countered under the banner of socialism? The disintegration of community life and the atomisation of the individual are surely things to be worried about. Amidst the wreckage of possessive and power-hungry

societies and empty restless selves, the task is to promote a culture hospitable to creativity.

It is important to emphasise, as Luntley does, the value of the place of society in the life of the individual. In fact, man is not man without society. But it is dangerously one-sided to end on that note. As F.H. Bradley carefully remarked: "Man is not man at all unless social; but he is not much above beasts unless more than social". To be creatively social, one has to be more than social.

There is in man a cosmic energy, a "soul-force", that impels him to seek communion not only with society but with nature and the universe. Love expresses itself through our relationship with other men whom we then see as ourselves, but it also goes beyond and lights up whatever in the universe it touches. There is in man what Ocampo, trying to explain Tagore's religion, called "the hunger of unity". Less demonstrative than its twin and rival, the hunger for power, it is yet no less tenacious. The individual derives his idea of good and evil not only from that social consensus that exists outside of him even when he participates in it, but also from that insistent spiritual urge within. It is from there again that he gets an intimation of a third meaning of freedom, besides the two discussed by Luntley. In our moments of communion with the universe, passing beyond the bournes of fear, we feel free. Although we bring that feeling from a larger universe, we struggle through the stresses and strains of our too material existence and the seductions of misconceived ideals, to find a place in society, as wide and secure as possible, for that spirit of inner freedom, and we make it part of our idea of the good. In any philosophy of the good life, whatever the name by which it goes, this more-than-social dimension of the true human ideal should not be lost.

Discussions

SOCIALISM WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE RAWLS-NOZICK PROBLEMATIC ALONE

There is much to admire in Kai Nielsen's *Equality and Liberty*.[1] The book is an intricate, sustained defence and clarification of the socialist ideal of an egalitarian, democratic, classless society. I am particularly struck by Nielsen's methodological care and self-consciousness, his salutary emphasis on the importance of social classes, his excellent idea of taking Daniel Bell-style meritocracy seriously, and his impressive synopsis of a critical literature in twenty-three contra-Nozick theses.

Nonetheless, I feel a vague dissatisfaction, a sense that essential elements may be missing. We English speaking philosophers, doing social and political philosophy in the 1980s, work either within or in reaction to a distinctive approach to social and political thought which I shall call the Rawls-Nozick problematic. For all their differences, Rawls and Nozick (as well as Dworkin, Feinberg and most other mainstream social and political philosophers) forcefully project an understanding of what constitute 'significant problems', 'good arguments', and 'relevant considerations'. I shall argue that one is rightly uneasy with Nielsen's near adherence to the Rawls-Nozick problematic. I believe that work within the Rawls-Nozick paradigm both avoids certain crucial issues and contains unfortunate biases in its treatment of the topics it does address.

An alternative way of posing the questions in which I am interested is: Why couldn't there be a philosophical statement of socialism analogous to the statements of welfare-state liberalism and free-market libertarianism found respectively in Rawls' *Theory of Justice*[2] and Nozick's *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*?[3] Nielsen's work is certainly a candidate for such a position. But I will attempt to illustrate ways in which Rawls and Nozick restrict their discourse that pose special problems for a socialist similarly constrained.

The Rawls-Nozick Problematic

Characteristic of the Rawls-Nozick problematic are:

A lack of concern for the 'practical' question of how to get from current reality to a more just society.

A view of human nature according to which persons are rationally seeking to pursue their interests and are not prone to be dominated by non-rational, emotive cores. The passions and prejudices surrounding religion, race, and gender are treated as relatively insignificant.

An avoidance of ordinary politics with its uses of power, cults of personality, personal loyalties, parties, etc.

A preference for abstract, mathematical or quasi-mathematical methods and formulations.

An emphasis on intuitions concerning thinly described, unrealistic, hypothetical situations.

English speaking philosophers as recently as John Dewey and Bertrand Russell practised a much broader notion of social and political philosophy. No doubt the rise of the Rawls-Nozick problematic goes hand in hand with increasing academic specialization, positivist critiques of speculation, and the rise of economics as purportedly the most scientific and worthy of emulation of the social sciences. But, I have neither the space nor the expertise to trace adequately the origins and development of the distinctive approach of which Rawls and Nozick are currently the two best known practitioners.

Nielsen is by no means uncritical of the constraints imposed by working within the Rawls-Nozick problematic. In the Preface he writes that in contrast to Rawls and Dworkin, he will:

> . . . try to articulate a more sociologically based egalitarianism that is both more egalitarian than liberal egalitarianism and takes greater cognizance of and is more responsible to thicker sociological descriptions of the world, has a firmer grasp of our social realities (including the way power relations work in our societies), and has a better understanding of what our social alternatives are.[4]

While Nielsen's movement away from the Rawls-Nozick paradigm should not be minimized, I doubt that he has gone far enough in his *Equality and Liberty*.

History and Politics

Within the Rawls-Nozick problematic one does not find historically-informed discussions concerning the tendencies of individuals, groups, institutions, or nations. Page after page of what concerned Plato in *The Republic*, Aristotle in *The Politics*, Hegel in *The Philosophy of Right*, Mill in *On Representative Government*, and of course Marx, is said to be psychology, sociology, economics, or political science, if worthy of consideration at all.

What happens when socialists try to write within this constraint? I am afraid that they appear to be dodging crucial issues. As reflected in the title of his book, Nielsen is deeply concerned with the relation between equality and liberty, maintaining that 'liberty requires equality'.[5] But the case for maintaining that liberty requires equality requires facing a trenchant historical and political objection. Conservatives are fond of simple remarks such as:

> In theory socialism enhances genuine freedom; in practice it denies all freedom.
>
> Socialism would only work in heaven, where it wouldn't be needed.
>
> . . . democracy [meaning democratic capitalism] is the worst form of government except all other forms that have been tried from time to time.[6]

Underlying these glib remarks is a serious objection, namely, that this century's experiments with socialism have been on the whole disastrous and that the source of the difficulties can be traced to the nature of socialist ideals. In other words, equality and liberty have *proven in practice* to be incompatible.

Socialists energetically respond to this charge of incompatibility, but their responses inevitably involve discussion of specific nations, political situations, and historical periods, which places them outside of the Rawls-Nozick problematic. Consider the variety of replies that are made. Some argue that the historical record has been misinterpreted. Others, that what has been tried was not socialism. Still others, that in so far as socialist experiments have failed, they have failed because of adverse circumstances. Still others, that a new approach will avoid past difficulties. One has to talk about the Soviet Union, China, Yugoslavia, Cuba, etc. One has to argue that oppression and imperialism are part and parcel of capitalism. One has to treat democratic capitalism in both its conservative and liberal incarnations as more than an abstract theory of rights and distribution.

While most in the socialist tradition have felt the centrality of political and historical considerations, there are noteworthy exceptions, namely, technological and economic determinists. Deterministic socialism shares many methodological features with the Rawls-Nozick problematic: a lack of concern for the 'practical' question (since the answer is inevitable) of how to get from current reality to a more just society; a preference for abstract, quasi-mathematical formulations; and an avoidance of ordinary politics. Given this affinity, it is not surprising to find Nielsen treating G.A. Cohen, whose *Karl Marx's Theory of History*[7] is a model of clarity and careful formulation, as more generally a model of philosophical exposition.[8] My concern is that, as many critics have said, Cohen leans toward technological determinism and the view that non-capitalist, industrial modes of production will require much greater material wealth than we (let alone the Third World) currently enjoy. Richard Miller in *Analyzing Marx* rightly criticizes Cohen for not paying adequate attention to politics and genuine historical studies.[9] The issues matter. If a better, non-capitalist society is only possible *after* capitalists create societies of immense wealth, then currently we are

best advised to encourage capitalist accumulation while attempting to control its most dangerous aspects. In short, the Rawls-Nozick problematic carries strong biases even in the context of socialism.

Means, Ends and Character

Reading books of political philosophy that do not address how to get from here to there is inherently frustrating. Of course no book can address everything; the 'transition problem' has filled volumes. But failure to discuss the transition problem gives a work a distinctly utopian tone. Perhaps, Rawls and Nozick can avoid discussing the transition problems raised by their books because their works are easily interpreted as endorsements of mainstream political options and because a mainstream moralist, like a preacher, is expected to present an ideal just beyond reach.

Nielsen might defend focusing only on ends by saying that one must first establish the desirability of an ideal before one worries about how to attain it. But such a theoretical separation ignores the practical inseparability of means and ends. Ends without means are frivolous; means without ends are blind.

A related gap inherent in working within the Rawls-Nozick problematic is any discussion of either political movements or the personal virtues and character desirable in those who would promote change.[10] An observation of Alasdair MacIntyre's will help make my point: a 'transition problem' is inherent in most traditional understandings of morality, namely, How do I, miserable wrongdoer that I am, best go about becoming a better person?[11] Certainly the process of *getting* to the desired state is every bit as important a consideration in the Bible as is the nature of the ideal. The answer will inevitably involve a discussion of practices, situations to seek and to avoid, habits, attitudes, virtues to cultivate, etc.

Their concern with creating socialist societies has led socialists to prolonged discussion of desirable political strategy and personal attributes. Such discussions have no place or legitimacy in the Rawls-Nozick problematic.

Misrepresenting One's Critics

Nielsen uses Nietzsche as an example of an advocate of thoroughly aristocratic principles that contrast sharply with the principles of egalitarians and advocates of human rights.[12] Nielsen's list of fifteen Nietzchean claims is carefully constructed and useful. But I am struck that such thoroughness did not find room for principles concerning gender and race. On my reading of Nietzsche, gender and race are essential elements in his social philosophy. While Nielsen's statement of Nietzschean principles includes references to 'sympathy and pity', and 'selflessness and humility',[13] an essential element in Nietzche's thought is missing if one doesn't note that Nietzche castigated these traits as 'womanly'.[14] Furthermore, Nietzsche was obsessed with genetic origin and clearly thought that race and origin could be valuable indicators of 'slavish mentalities'.

In Nielsen's *Equality and Liberty*, Nozick receives relatively deferential treatment. Of course Nielsen does not endorse anything like Nozick's conclusions, but he is unduly respectful of Nozick's approach. Nielsen appears to feel that Thomas Nagel and other critics do not take Nozick seriously enough, that Nozick is 'rigorous', 'penetrating', and 'theoretical' in a way that his 'sociological' critics do not appreciate.[15] My own feeling is that Nozick is quite close to the other-worldly liberations, Ayn Rand and Murray Rothbard, in working with intuitions concerning thinly described, unrealistic, hypothetical situations, and that Friederich Hayek and Milton Friedman represent much more thorough, challenging, and theoretically interesting libertarian critiques of the welfare state.

What does Nielsen find in Nozick that makes his work appear distinctly philosophical and methodologically meritorious? While Nielsen in the end charges Nozick with 'one-valued moral absolutism', he appreciates the relentless consistency and rigor with which Nozick pursues his one absolute: property.[16] But, what makes Nozick's pristine worship an example of Philosophy, while the works of most of his critics are mere sociology? If Nozick does Philosophy, and most his critics are sociologists, then Philosophy might not be worth pursuing.

Nielsen might respond by noting the need to mark the distinction between critiques of Nozick which centre on Nozick's ideals and critiques which centre on the evil consequences of attempting to approximate those ideals in practice. I have no quarrel with making this distinction; my quarrel is with seeing the distinction from within the Rawls-Nozick problematic as one between Philosophy and Sociology. Challenging the distinction between theory and practice is central to most socialist visions.

I have before me a recent copy of our campus right-wing newspaper. The content centres on race and sex; Blacks, feminists, and homosexuals are the targets. I believe that this sexual and racial politics is many times more important in understanding contemporary conservatism than are libertarian utopias. Nietzsche himself might agree: 'The degree and kind of a person's sexuality reach up into the ultimate pinnacle of his spirit'.[17]

Conclusion

I have noted several ways in which socialism and the Rawls-Nozick problematic are an unhappy pair. If Nielsen does not give a full enough defence of socialist ideals it is because socialism cannot be fit within the bounds of the Rawls-Nozick problematic alone. Too much of what is essential to socialism—a concern with movement solidarity and strategy, a detailed appreciation of class analysis, power politics and ideology, a growing appreciation

of nationalism, sexism, and racism—do not fit. Furthermore, several of the most significant challenges to socialist ideals cannot be answered. Finally, some of what can be done within the frame-work—critiques of alternatives—are limited by avoiding political, sexual, racial, and class analysis.

My remarks have stressed the tensions inherent in defending socialism within the confines of the Rawls-Nozick problematic. But there are benefits as well. Nielsen has admirably stretched the paradigm to its limits. *Equality and Liberty* is a very good book, one that needed to be written, and I hope it receives the audience it deserves. But if one is convinced by and attracted to the ideal Nielsen carefully delineates, one should realize that working towards that ideal will involve, among other things, moving sharply away from the Rawls-Nozick paradigm. I believe that Nielsen has indicated as much himself in his most recent articles.[18]

Notes and References

1. Nielsen, *Equality and Liberty: A Defense of Radical Egalitarianism*, Rowman and Allanheld, Totowa, N.J., 1985.
2. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971.
3. Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, Basic Books, New York, 1974.
4. Nielsen, *Equality and Liberty*, op. cit., p. vii.
5. Ibid., Part V, 'On Liberty Requiring Equality: a Final Word for Egalitarianism', pp. 283-314.
6. Winston Churchill, Speech in the House of Commons, 11 November 1947.
7. Cohen, *Marx's Theory of History*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1979.
8. Nielsen, 'On Finding One's Feet in Philosophy: From Wittgenstein to Marx', *Metaphilosophy*, 16, 1985, pp. 9-10.
9. Miller, *Analyzing Marx*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1984, Chapter 5, pp. 171-220.
10. Ibid., 'A Model of Character', pp. 63-76.
11. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Ind., 1981, Chapter 5, pp. 49-59.
12. Nielsen, *Equality and Liberty*, Part I, pp. 4-41.
13. Ibid., p. 31.
14. The equation of masculinity with the good and feminity with the weak, superficial and distracting occurs throughout Nietzsche's writings; see, for example, *Thus Spake Zarathustra* in Kaufmann (ed.), *The Portable Nietzsche*, The Viking Press, New York, 1982, pp. 159, 169, 177-179.
15. Nielsen, *Equality and Liberty*, op. cit., p. 196.
16. Ibid., p. 213.
17. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* in Kaufmann (ed.), *Nietzsche*, p. 444.
18. Nielsen, 'On Finding One's Feet', and 'Historical Materialism, Ideology and Ethics', *Studies in Soviet Thought*, 29 (29), pp. 47-63.

Philosophy Department, Durham DREW CHRISTIE

RANKING, CHOICES, AND POWER: A COMMENT ON KAI NIELSEN, *EQUALITY AND LIBERTY*

In *Equality and Liberty*, Kai Nielsen devotes three chapters to a discussion of issues of desert and merit in a conception of social justice. Most of this discussion criticizes the meritocratic position that basic social inequalities are justified because some people contribute more to society than others. On the contrary, for Nielsen, justice requires that all persons live under conditions in which their needs are met and in which they achieve self-respect, regardless of any comparative measures of desert or contribution. Such conditions require that we aim for a classless, statusless society with rough equality of basic life situation.

At the same time, Nielsen holds that radical egalitarians should not altogether reject criteria of desert and merit in the distribution of goods and positions. Wishing to give due to what he regards as compelling intuitions that those who work harder deserve more, he appears to assert something like the following principle: When basic needs have been met, public services taken care of, reinvestment allowed for, equal opportunity assured, and no other principle of justice would be violated, social surplus should be distributed and positions allocated according to who deserves them the most, where desert means ability plus effort.[1] Nielsen has two reasons for this position. First, unless we give place to desert as a criterion of distribution, we will not recognize that people have some control over their actions. Second, a rational society wishes to discourage freeloading and encourage hard work.

I think Nielsen has been bewitched by his own compromising spirit, and I want to explore in this comment why we should be sceptical of these intuitions. I take up three considerations: (1) the fact that no system of ranking is without bias; (2) an ideological move which attributes moral significance to scoring high on scales; (3) the issues of decision-making in the formulation of criteria for evaluating merit.

I

When scarce benefits are distributed according to criteria of desert or merit, this necessitates introducing some system of ranking. I think that in our society we have a deep ideology about ranking, namely, that it is possible and desirable to develop impartial, unbiased and objective measures of ranking attributes, performances and behaviours. When we do develop such measures, we have identified the 'natural' order, if you will, of persons with respect to those attributes or behaviours.

But any system of ranking is biased, in the sense that it privileges certain attributes according to certain standards, and devalues or excludes other

attributes. Ranking systems entail choices, often implicit and reflecting the context of institutions and interests in which they are made. These choices include how to classify, quantify and weigh certain attributes according to the primary values of the ranking system, and how to determine the 'fit' between particular cases and the measures. My claim here is not that ranking systems cannot be applied in a fair way. Rather, the point is that any ranking system has specific and exclusive values built into it.[2]

Nielsen claims that when there are not enough graduate fellowships for everybody, for example, they should be given to the most qualified (p. 128). What makes one student 'more qualified' than another? John and Jane are both making satisfactory progress toward their degrees, and the only difference in their performance is that during the fall semester Jane got an 'A' in Prof. F's philosophy of language seminar, and John got a 'B'. So it is Prof. F's judgement which establishes that one student is more qualified than the other. John claims Prof. F's judgement is biased, because he wrote his paper on Lacan and Jane wrote hers on Quine. If the department decides to introduce a more objective and scientific system of ranking graduate students by a standardized and quantified test, this does not eliminate bias. If anything, it introduces more steps at which bias can enter. It might allow more considered, and inter-personal judgements in the making of value and weight choices, but nothing more.

At several points in his text Nielsen recommends distributions according to desert or merit as though there were some natural and unproblematic modes of determining desert. In Chapter 6 he suggests that different levels of reward for different kinds of work, in proportion to the social contribution of the work, might be a requirement of justice. There are difficulties associated with measuring and ranking the contributions of different occupations, he suggests, but they are not major.

> We can make some not unreasonable intuitive estimates about the comparative contributions conscientious members in various occupations makes to society. Surely dentists, welfare workers and members of the Salvation Army score higher than advertising agents, circus barkers, and script writers of TV commercials. (p. 107)

Who are 'we' here, and where do our 'intuitions' come from? Welfare workers score higher on the contribution scale than advertising agents only according to some specific values (which also happen not to be the ones that define the intuitions of mainstream society in the US). We have no natural and unambiguous measures of contributions, but only those determined by some specific value choices which exclude some attributes and relatively devalue others.

In his argument for a limited use of merit criteria in awarding positions, Nielsen adopts a principle he finds commonly used to distribute jobs, a principle of productivity: 'job assignments should be made by selecting the most productive array of job assignments' (p. 179). Now, if all Nielsen means by this is that jobs should be assigned according to who will do them the best, this may be fairly uncontroversial. (Though a radical egalitarian might require giving high priority to people's interests and preferences, and justice might also require job rotation, so that no one becomes a specialist.) This formulation of his principle, however, can play into an ideology of productivity. The term connotes a system of ranking by which workers can be compared in the total units of output their efforts produce during a given time. Capitalist rationality does, of course, seek often to structure work processes so that such comparisons can be made, but such structures usually define the nature of the work itself and exclude many possibilities of creativity and cooperation. Posing as an objective and neutral measure of worker achievement, productivity usually carries the biases and priorities of the bosses.

Nielsen himself is quite aware of the biases and choices involved in ranking. In his argument against the meritocrats who claim that inequalities in life outcomes are justified on grounds of different levels of intelligence, Nielsen pointedly appeals to the biases and exclusions of IQ ranking. If IQ is to be used as a mechanism for distributing desirable positions, then we need a non-arbitrary measure of intelligence that can reduce it to scaler qualities. But intelligence is too complex and plural a set of phenomena to be reduced to a single scale, Nielsen asserts. Many testing experts recognize this, he says, and decline from claiming to measure anything like native intelligence. Rather, they claim only to measure probable performance in school and in the workplace. This move boldly reveals the arbitrariness of such ranking of intelligence.

> The measure for merit or human worth becomes, on the above reading, what people have the capacity to succeed in a society organized along capitalist lines to maxmize profitability. Those who are good at doing that are the ones said to be intelligent and meritorious. Those who are not get scaled down in intelligence and desert to the degree they depart from that norm. (p. 176)

I am arguing that this same analysis of bias can be made for any system of ranking of any attributes. There is no non-arbitrary measure of any performance or attribute among different individuals; any measure will be according to specific values and will favour some ways of manifesting the performance or attribute over others. As we shall see, the conclusion to draw from this is not that using ranking to determining merit and distributing according to merit is always wrong, but it is suspect in a way stronger than Nielsen acknowledges.

II

By asserting a principle of desert and merit as criteria of distribution of

rewards and positions, Nielsen tends to play into an ideological move common in meritocratic discussions of desert, which I will call moralizing the conventional. There are at least two meanings of 'desert' that often get collapsed in discussions of desert as a criterion of just distributions. When a person does something we regard of particular moral value, we say the person deserves credit, recognition or praise. Here attribution of desert is a statement about a person's moral character. On the other hand, there is a sense of desert which means entitlement earned by virtue of some action or effort in accordance with explicitly or implicitly stated rules or conventions. So, to use one of Nielsen's examples, a student who works hard and passes her exams deserves a diploma. Usually when we use the term deserve or desert in the awarding of some benefit, we are referring simply to the right to such benefits that the rules, contract or agreements found on condition of certain actions or attributions. The contracts or agreements may or may not be just. Either of these senses of desert does presuppose, as Nielsen argues, that we regard people as responsible for their actions. Nothing follows, however, about the justice of using merit criteria for distributions.[3]

Practices of distributing rewards according to a competitive system of ranking are always only desert-based in convention. Current distributional conventions promise people that if they rank high they will be awarded more. Within the given institutional context, people feel entitled to rewards, positions, etc., in proportion to their ranking on scales of aptitude, productivity, achievement, and the like. But the entitlement here is entirely conventional, not grounded in any moral rights or principle. I have been arguing that every ranking system is conventional, moreover, in the sense that it reflects choices and judgements guided by specific interests and values, and that there can be no unbiased, neutral and objective ranking system that identifies the 'natural' order of attributes or performances.

The moralization of convention tends to collapse these two meanings of desert, however. When a person deserves, in the sense of is entitled to according to a certain benefit, we often hear that as a judgement about the person's moral character, as when we say a person deserves recognition for saving five children from a flaming building. This is a classically ideological process: where contingent institutions are made to appear natural and ultimate.

III

I have argued that there is no unbiased ranking system, that any ranking system entails choices and judgements about the values, priorities and weights of the system, as well as its method of application. So the most important issue in considering desert or merit as an issue of justice is: *Who decides*, and *how*? Who decides when distribution according to merit criteria is appropriate, what the values determining the ranking are, the value priorities, quantification methods, weightings, and modes of applying the ranking system to cases? In our society, for the most part, these things are decided by bosses, government officials, managers and administrators, together with social scientific 'experts'. An implication of the ideology that unbiased and objective ranking systems are possible is that some people can master these scientific ranking methods, and therefore should make the ranking decisions. If there are objective and scientific methods for assigning ranks, then it does not matter who decides, as long as they do it correctly. This ideology of scientific ranking methods legitimates a system of injustice.

Nielsen does not raise this most fundamental issue of who ought to decide whether to apply criteria of merit and what the criteria should be. Like most theorists of justice, in this text Nielsen focuses on questions of distribution, failing to give explicit attention to questions of decision-making power and procedures. Contemporary philosophical theory of justice tends to formulate all questions of justice in terms of the distribution of some benefit or burden among individuals, even where the benefit is not some material good. Such a distributive orientation tends to obscure issues of justice involving the conditions and processes of assigning distributions.[4] While Nielsen is certainly not unaware of these issues, his own formulation of issues and principles of justice tends to be distributively oriented, thus de-emphasizing issues of institutional relations and decision-making.

In his argument against meritocracy, for example, Nielsen is specifically concerned that political power not be concentrated in the hands of an elite (who might, among other things, make decisions about ranking systems). But the concept of democracy he appeals to seems itself to have a distributive meaning, as equality in distribution of resources and rough equality of status. I find little in this radical egalitarian justice that explicitly conceptualizes democracy as institutions and procedures of decision-making.

When we add a conception of democratic decision-making to radical egalitarian justice, I think we find the following principle regarding distribution according to merit criteria: After needs are met and conditions for self-respect exist apart from questions of desert, justice permits distribution according to a competitive ranking system if and only if a democratically operating body decides to so distribute, and collectively decides the values and methods of ranking. 'Democratically' means with discussion in which all interested parties have a genuine voice under circumstances without domination. Here I am taking issue with Nielsen's assertion of a general principle that requires or allows distribution according to desert or merit within certain limits. Units of democratic decision-making might find that the utilitarian reasons Nielsen offers for merit distributions in their particular situation outweigh other considerations, but there are no general principles of justice which imply that they must.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Nielsen's position is in fact not clear, in at least two respects. First, it is not clear whether he is claiming that distribution according to criteria of desert or merit is a requirement of justice or simply compatible with justice. On p. 128 Nielsen asserts that it would be unjust to deny certain rewards to the most qualified, but on p. 129 he asserts that it is not unfair to use criteria of desert. Nielsen does not call attention to the difference between these two assertions, and argue for one in particular. A reading of the whole chapter leads me to think that it is more of an argument for the former than the latter claim.
   Second, it is not clear whether Nielsen thinks that both jobs and rewards should be distributed according to criteria of desert or merit, or only jobs. In Chapter 6 he seems clearly to hold that those who do more in some sense deserve more reward. In Chapter 8 he seems to restrict use of criteria of merit only to the allocations of jobs, and not to the rewards for doing the jobs. 'We should look for egalitarian reward schedules while generally accepting meritocratic job placement' (p. 182). I find these two chapters simply inconsistent in their argument. So for this comment I am going to assume that Nielsen's position is that both rewards and positions should be distributed according to desert or merit.
2. On the issue of the arbitrariness of merit criteria, see Philip Green, *The Pursuit of Inequality*, Pantheon Books, 1981, pp. 169-76.
3. Rawls makes a distinction similar to this distinction between desert as a moral attribution and desert as an entitlement earned by fulfilling the conditions of institutionalized rules. See *A Theory of Justice*, Harvard University Press, 1971, pp. 310-15.
4. I develop this analysis of distribution orientation in my paper, 'Toward a Critical Theory of Justice', *Social Theory and Practice*, Vol. 7, No. 3, Fall 1981, pp. 279-302. See also R.P. Wolff, *Understandings Rawls*, Princeton University Press, 1977 and Evan Simpson, 'The Subject of Justice', *Ethics*, 1980. Nielsen himself criticizes some writers about justice for focusing too much on issues of the distribution of material goods and not enough on issues of power. See 'Global Justice, Power and the Logic of Capitalism', APA symposium on international justice, Eastern Division meetings, 1983. In that paper, however, he poses the issue of power itself in distributive terms.

IRIS MARION YOUNG

AGAINST THE GRAIN: A REPLY TO CHRISTIE AND YOUNG

I am grateful to Professors Drew Christie and Iris Young for their probing examination of my *Equality and Liberty*.[1] My response shall have three parts: first, some disclaimers; second, some metaphilosophical remarks directed principally to Christie's largely metaphilosophical commentary; and third, a discussion of desert in response to Young's interesting critique of that part of my book.

DISCLAIMERS

Both Christie and Young raise questions concerning democracy. Speaking of desert in the context of social justice involves talking of a ranking system. In doing this the question naturally arises: *who* decides on criteria here and how is that decision made? In our societies that determination is generally neither very rational nor democratic. Saddled with that situation and with the distorted perspective on values it affords us, the careful reflection and investigation that comes to placing our considered judgements concerning desert and related matters into wide reflective equilibrium, seems to me particularly important. This coherentist procedure which, in contrast with intuitionism, makes our considered judgements mesh with everything we know, yields whatever rational basis we can gain for our judgements concerning desert and for ranking criteria.[2] Yet, *vis-à- vis* democracy, this does not give to understand that some élite (including an élite of moral philosophers) has the right to impose, if it can, ranking criteria on others. There should be, what is not at all the case in our society, democratic acceptance here if there is to be any acceptance at all. Where this cannot be attained there should be no philosopher-kings to impose a ranking scheme. The judgements should be our considered judgements in wide reflective equilibrium. The stress on 'our' and on consensus here reflects a democratic commitment.

Young says of my conception of democracy that it 'has a kind of welfare ring to it . . .' That, however, is a groundless claim in the face of my repeated arguments that no such society—no genuine democracy—is possible short of a socialism of a sufficiently robust sort that it is clearly incompatible with capitalism. Genuine welfare statists, by contrast, such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, argue for a social minimum in a society that, they believe, inevitably will remain a class society. That is genuine welfarism. I stress, by contrast, the need for socialism and the importance of industrial democracy with public control of the means of production which is also workers' control of the means of production. This entails the firm proscribing of private productive property and as such it is hardly a welfarist conception of democracy. I do not say, as both Christie and Young note, how an industrial democracy—a workplace democracy—is to be attained and sustained. That very difficult and vital task was not mine in *Liberty and Equality*, though I do make it plain there that my radical egalitarian principles could only be exemplified in a society which was an industrial society that was also a socialist society. This, whatever else we may want to say about it, is very distant from welfarism.

Young perceptively probes what I say about desert and merit and states in her end-notes where I say conflicting things, but toward the end of her commentary she makes a remark that simply amazes me. She remarks that focusing on questions of distribution, I fail to 'give explicit attention to

questions of power . . .' In fact, I repeatedly point out in *Liberty and Equality*, in criticizing both Rawls and Dworkin and neo-conservatives such as Frankel, Nozick and Bell, that, to the detriment of their theories, they ignore questions of power, particularly institutional power and control through capitalist class formation. Moreover, particularly in my critique of Rawls, but in my final chapter as well, I argue that it is a mistake to consider questions of distribution independently of production.

METAPHILOSOPHY

Christie explicitly, and Young to a lesser extent and implicitly, raise a cluster of metaphilosophical questions which should be addressed.

Reflecting on what he takes to be my overly analytical approach, Christie rightly raises a series of fundamental questions about what we philosophers who are on the left should be about. I agree with much of the spirit of what he says and sometimes with the substance as well, though with respect to the substance, I also demur in places. I shall sort this out a bit and I shall do this in what is perhaps a blockbustering way through saying something grandly programmatic.

The epistemologically-oriented foundationalist and ontologically serious ways of doing philosophy, that in various ways are part of the Anglo-American and Scandinavian traditions, and in somewhat different ways are part of the continental tradition as well, are in shambles and ought to be replaced by, what I like to call, *philosophy as critical theory*, though with the disclaimer that philosophy as critical theory should not be identified with the critical theory of the Frankfurt School or with Habermas.[3] (It seems to me that, as I take critical theory, it was just this sort of thing that Marx powerfully practised, though it should never be forgotten that he was revolutionary as well, something a critical theorist may or may not be.) Critical theory would, as I conceive it, involve an integrated non-eclectic amalgam of descriptive-explanatory work, interpretive analysis and critique, including, to be redundant, normative critique. Such a programme, if taken at all seriously, is no doubt daunting and it is not unreasonable to be sceptical about whether anyone in our time can, with the knowledge explosion and with the greater complexity of our social world, pull it off in the way Marx, Weber and Gramsci once did in earlier, simpler times. Certainly we philosophers, trained as we have been trained, cannot. But in somewhat different ways this is true of people in other disciplines as well. What we need is to come to have people, as we do not have them now, trained in a new way with an integrated curriculum of philosophy and the human sciences (including history and political economy), though the philosophy component would reconceive its core so that there would be less emphasis than there is presently on the philosophy of language, logic, metaphysics and epistemology. Whether we continue to call this 'philosophy' or think of it as the successor

subject to philosophy is a matter of indifference, but what is important to recognize is that what I have called 'philosophy as critical theory' would have the integrated descriptive-explanatory, interpretive, normatively critical structure I have just described.

Whether we can do something like that, something similar to what Marx, Weber and Gramsci once did, is perfectly open to test. When we can institutionalize such a regime of study, we can see, after a couple of decades, whether we can pull it off. If we can, we will have given something of a theoretical underpinning to the answer to Christie's perfectly legitimate concerns. The rest is a matter of resolute *praxis* including an unswerving but undogmatic taking the point of view of labour.

However, what should we do now as left intellectuals, philosophically deformed as we are? Firstly, and rather platitudinously, we can and should take part, in the various ways intellectuals best can, in the class struggles of our time. (Chomsky is an exemplary model here). Secondly, and more theoretically, we can, using whatever philosophical talents we possess, put them to use in the critique of ideology. Part of the task of philosophy as critical theory will be analytical in any event, though this is not to suggest that it is the whole of it or even the most important part. But, for those of us with anything like a typical philosophical training, it is our major talent. Rather than bemoaning its limitations, we should put it to good use while (i) remaining acutely self-conscious of its limitations, and (ii) trying to develop new talents in domains that will enable us to do critical theory instead of just talking about it in a programmatic way. It is this conception of things—a vision if you will, of how to proceed—that explains my starting from (i) what Christie calls the Rawls-Nozick problematic and (ii) my loyalty to Analytical Marxism of which G.A. Cohen is a major representative.[4]

Let me start with Analytical Marxism. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels and the classical Marxists following in their footsteps, while being first and foremost revolutionaries, also constructed, as an intellectual tool for their revolutionary activity, what I have called a critical theory of society. This theory in the time intervening has been subjected to criticism and has undergone development. Like any other theory with any scope it has been shown to have various inadequacies. For this not to have been the case Marx would have had to have God-like powers. He would have had to be able to do what no other thinker has been able to do, namely, to have constructed a flawless theory that would have no lacunae and would withstand all criticism. But theories are not like that. Flawed though his theory is, he did leave us a systematic, elaborate and powerful, but not altogether lucid, critical theory of society. In trying to build on Marx, clarifying him and correcting him where necessary, analytical Marxists in an underlabourer's capacity give a rational reconstruction of part of Marx or classical Marxist theory, trying to provide a tidier version of the canonical parts of Marx

than did Marx, who, in creatively forging the theory, did not have the time or the inclination to do so himself. The varied and (partially) conflicting work of G.A Cohen, Richard Miller and Andrew Levine on historical materialism exemplifies this, as does the work of Robert Paul Wolff and John Roemer on the labour theory of value and on exploitation.[5] Such rational reconstructions are by no means mere scholastic exercises, for when they are done with a good understanding of contemporary social reality, a knowledge of the state of the art in the relevant scientific areas (e.g., theories of epochal social change and the state of political economy) and a good knowledge of the classical Marxist canon, they will be vital elements in our extending and developing critical theory. Marxist accounts of social reality are arguably the most elaborate and nuanced accounts we have. A rational reconstruction of Marx will be a tidier, more precise version than the original, a version that is more criticizable but also more clearly developed and defended as well as defendable. Given such a rational reconstruction, a good knowledge of social reality and a good knowledge of the scientific alternatives to such a Marxian picture, we will be in a far better position to see how far an adequate critical theory would have to depart from Marx and we would have a better sense of what we would have to develop to achieve an adequate critical theory and thus a better tool in our struggle for emancipation from class society.

Beyond that analytical Marxism can and should develop areas not developed by Marx, such as arguments about moral ideology, efficiency, justice, autonomy, liberty, equality, authority and legitimation. Here the work of Cohen and Levine has again been vital as well as the work of Gary Young and Jon Elster.[6] And some of my own work, subsequent to *Equality and Liberty*, has addressed itself to those concerns.[7]

Equality and Liberty, by contrast, was not an exercise in analytical Marxism, though I hope what I have argued there is compatible with Marxism. There I tried to argue to socialist and Marxist conclusions using reasonably standard analytical philosophical techniques, assuming a cluster of central values captured in our considered judgements which are values not at a distance from central values in the dominant tradition and utilizing a more realistic political sociology and thicker social descriptions than Rawls, Nozick or Dworkin would employ. (I do not, *pace* Christie, think that there is anything wrong with sociological critiques or that they are inferior to philosophical critiques.) In doing this, I utilized the analytical skills we philosophers, in varying degrees, are good at, if we are good at anything. In work like this, where analytical techniques are deployed with skill and persistence, they are not negligible elements in our struggle for liberation and emancipation; though I would not claim, like Hans Reichenbach, that we have any high-powered analytical techniques, we do have some humdrum useful analytical skills.[8]

Why proceed, Christie asks, from the central values of the dominant tradition? Why reason from the confines of such a bourgeois tradition? Why so fetter yourself, why develop such a compromising spirit (as Young puts it)? Why not instead make a deeper transvaluation of values? Firstly, I think liberty, equality and fraternity would be, and would continue to be, and indeed should continue to be, valued by socialist persons in a future communist society. The very idea of our being comrades connotes it. Secondly, tactically speaking, that is the place to start. Unless we wish to 'ghettoize' ourselves in the debates in social philosophy, we must start from where the debate is and transform it. I wanted to show (and Cohen, Landesman, Levine, Schweichart, Daniels, Reiman and Exdell have done similar things) that if we are serious about the gestalt of values like justice, equality, liberty and autonomy, we had better opt for socialism. Using a methodology widely accepted in Anglo-American and Scandinavian philosophical circles, starting with central values of the dominant tradition, we seek to hoist the bourgeoisie by their own petard and strike another blow in the long, intractable and bitter ideological battle for socialism.

This underlabourer work is surely only an element in the construction of a critical theory of society, but not, for all of that, a useless element. Going beyond it—as indeed we must—will take a much larger and a much more varied repertoire—a repertoire that is not so distinctively 'philosophical' and a repertoire that we (or at least most of us) do not have yet and that we will not be able to gain overnight (indeed it will probably be for another generation of philosophers, though in some recent work there are helpful signs) and which we better set about attaining if we can. But in the interim, if we have the political and moral will—the guts—in our dark times, in the very barbaric bastions of capitalist hegemony, we can, welding our experience of society and our moral reflection with our analytic skills, do emancipatory work which will make its contribution to the struggle.

Perhaps it is something of this that Christie had in mind when he spoke right at the end of his commentary of something being gained as well as something being lost in my account. There is, of course, a lot lost without a full-blown critical theory. There are only a limited number of tricks that analytical Marxism can turn. But, at least until we have a new kind of intellectual who can do critical theory and who has the integral relation to the masses of which Gramsci spoke, a division of intellectual labour, though with a good awareness of what others in other disciplines are doing, is in order. Christie remarks that the issues of race, gender, religion and, I would add, issues turning on the ways in which the consciousness industry works, the way the capitalist order with its capitalist state gains hegemonic control and the role of ideology in education may be more important in struggles for emancipation than the issues I have dealt with or with which Cohen has dealt. That may indeed be true, but, except in the characterization of what an ideology comes to, these seem to me matters better dealt with by political economists, sociologists, social psychologists and historians. We philoso-

phers should use their work in our own work and try to integrate it into our work. But it would be a mistake for us to try to duplicate their labour and do worse what they can do better, rather than to focus our energies on the things we can do best.

However, none of this has yet faced Christie's crucial point that, though we may have a conception of what a just and truly human society would look like, approaches like my own say precious little about how we get from current reality to such a society. That is to say, how do we get from capitalism to socialism? Reading books on political philosophy, he remarks, that do not address how to get from here to there are inherently frustrating.

For those of us who are socialists this is indeed a question to which we attach a very high priority indeed and one of our deepest frustrations is that we do not have any very satisfactory answers to it. The lack of an answer here does indeed haunt us. The old 'certainties' of classical Marxism are gone and we live with pessimism of the intellect and optimism of the will. But, while all of this is true, this is often not the first question for people who are not socialists or for people who are thinking about whether they should be socialists. And in discussions between socialists and non-socialists the question centrally at issue is not the question that haunts the socialist. The central—or at least a central—issue between socialists and non-socialists could be put this way: there are actually existing socialisms and actually existing capitalisms neither of which are, to put it minimally, very attractive models for a just and a truly human society. We also have a number of differing *conceptions* of what capitalism and socialism could be. Do we have a historically feasible conception of a socialist and eventually a communist society of the future that is clearly humanly preferable to any historically feasible capitalist alternative? This is something to which not a few reflective and informed people—even people who are mindful of Marx's remarks about not writing cookbooks for the cookshops of the future—would like very much to have something of a reasonable answer. Before we worry overly, many will think, about how we get from here to there, we need to know if we can gain such an answer, whether getting there is something which really would, everything considered, be better. It was the underlying intent of my book to make a contribution to showing that we have a conception of a historically feasible communist society of the future that is humanly preferable to any historically feasible conception of a capitalist society. Part of the showing of this was to show that no capitalist society could be a just society or at least a thoroughly just society. I do not—at least not now—have any original ideas about how the transition is to be effected, but, more in line with my training, I do have some ideas about what a just and truly human society would look like and about how we could plausibly argue for that conception. It was to this that I directed my attention in *Equality and Liberty*.

However, Christie's question about how we get from here to there, returns

like the repressed. For it will—and not unreasonably—be wondered if my account is not too utopian: something that does not square with what we know about human nature and about how societies work. I talked about historically feasible options and not a few will think that my option is not historically feasible. We must face, for example, the careful arguments of Stanley Moore that on the basis of Marx's own theory of historical materialism we have no good reason to believe we can get beyond social democracy.[9] Here, for starters, we not only need a perspicuous reading of historical materialism, but also an articulation that we have good grounds for believing to be an approximately true account of epochal social change and indeed an account which will allow us to make at least some crude predictions about the future direction of change.[10] To have these things we need more than a good historiographical knowledge of the history of ideas, moral sensitivity, knowledge of moral philosophy and conceptual sophistication. We need a very deep knowledge of history, an understanding of political economy, of sociology and the other human sciences. We need something of the breathtaking scope and depth of a Max Weber or a Karl Marx and that is something of which we philosophers are likely to be in short supply. It seems to me that we should, in trying to get something like this, develop a broadly cooperative approach to research across disciplines and that for now—though I do not say this of the critical theorists of the future—philosophers, doing what they are best at, should deploy their analytical skills to set out perspicuous models of historical materialism and other conceptions of epochal social change which more empirically informed scholars can test against the historical record, against actual movements with in society and sociologically and psychologically plausible assumptions about trends that are discernible within society. We can see here activities that ask, as things now stand, for a division of intellectual labour and even some division like that, though not so sharp, would happen with people trained to do critical theory. There will, that is, among such critical theorists also be a certain amount of specialization but that need not turn them into deformed, alienated specialists suffering from the tunnel vision of the *fachidiot*.

Desert

Iris Young concentrates her criticism on the three chapters in *Equality and Liberty* devoted to discussing desert and merit. I want to say at the outset that even if Young's criticisms were perfectly sound the central argument of my book would, as she acknowledges, not be affected. There might have to be some minor technical fiddling with my second principle of justice, but nothing that is central would be affected. Indeed I think in that eventuality my overall position would be strengthened. It certainly would be simplified.

The chapters on desert and merit are essentially defensive chapters com-

posed late in my writing of *Equality and Liberty*, after the basic structure of my account had been formulated. As, in the process of writing *Equality and Liberty*, I argued, in various places, for its central egalitarian conception of justice, and as I discussed my views and Rawls' views in classes, I gradually became convinced, reflecting on the way that students and colleagues in various universities stubbornly clung to justice as getting what you deserve, that these considered judgements answered to something which was not simply ideological and that all talk of desert could not simply be set aside, as Stuart Hampshire, building here on Rawls, set out to do.[11]

However, I still remain more ambivalent about those chapters than any of the others. If we were justified in setting aside questions of desert, I should be happy to do so and my account would, as I just mentioned, be much simplified. But I do not think we can entirely set aside considerations of desert, though they should play a much smaller part in a theory of justice then they typically do in many traditional and often right-wing treatments of justice. In working with a coherentist model and getting our considered judgements into wide reflective equilibrium, the considered judgements that express certain judgements of desert will not be extinguished.

Young fails to appreciate how thoroughly pragmatic my appeal to desert is. I make it clear that we cannot make assessments of people's moral worth and that, when we consider the facts of social and genetic roulette, we will be disinclined to talk about what people really deserve. Some people, as a result of having good luck in the game of social and genetic roulette, will have the abilities and drive to do certain things that are not infrequently useful to themselves and society. Others will lack either the ability or the drive or both. We, treating these things as a social asset, want to encourage those traits and in job allocations they should be kept firmly in mind. However, we should not use benefits accruing to people with such abilities to undermine egalitarian patterns making the already disadvantaged still more disadvantaged, but, *ceterus paribus*, e.g., where it is not an affirmative action situation and the like, in situations like that of having only one job to give out or one fellowship to award, we should give it to the most deserving where that can be, as *sometimes* it can be, reliably ascertained. (Remember we are not trying to speak of 'intrinsic moral worth' or anything like that.)

To so proceed makes good pragmatic sense, treating those abilities as social assets and beyond that, it is, in relations between people, at least not unfair, and indeed sometimes as fair a thing as can be done in such a situation. In such situations it is not unfair to assert that those who work harder and contribute more, where they are in comparable situations, should get more where there are scarcities such that in these contexts (say job allocation) everyone cannot get the same.[12]

Young says that we should be sceptical about our intuitions concerning desert and meritocratic ranking in our societies. Extant capitalist and bureaucratic state socialist societies both fit this mould and both should be

regarded as suspect. But I do not see how this is a criticism of my account, for my chapters on meritocracy were designed to establish such points. To put it crudely and baldly, I think many of the merit rankings in our societies are *not* rationally and morally sustainable. They are, rather, self-serving for the élites of capitalist society and their counterparts in state socialist societies. But Young appears to believe that any ranking system in any society will be arbitrary and unjustified, a moralizing of the conventional, as she nicely puts it. 'Practices of the distribution of rewards according to a competitive system of ranking are always *only* desert based in convention' (*italics mine*). The entitlements here are 'entirely conventional, not grounded in any moral rights or principle'. There can, she claims, be 'no unbiased, neutral and objective ranking system'.

I agree that there can be no *neutral ranking* system. Indeed, the very idea of 'a neutral ranking system' strikes me as a contradiction in terms, but I am not convinced that, even in optimal circumstances, there can be no unbiased and objective ranking. That there can be such a ranking system is not. I shall argue, a *conceptual* impossibility but just something that is not going to happen in the public domain in our class-divided and ideologically bamboozled societies. (We will not there even get something remotely like an ideal speech situation.)

We do not need, and indeed should not want, neutrality—C. Wright Mills, was right about that—but we should want impartiality, lack of bias, an absence of ideological distortion and the kind of objectivity possible for normative claims, i.e. the getting of considered judgements into wide reflective equilibrium. Objectivity here would come to the kind of rational intersubjective consensus defended by such socialist moral philosophers as Jane English, Norman Daniels and myself.[13]

Young thinks that ranking systems cannot be impartial and fair because they require choices that reflect specific interests and values, indeed interests and values that are either class-oriented or are in some other way ethnocentric. Indeed Young rightly claims that any ranking system will select out and privilege certain attributes according to certain standards and select out and devalue certain other attributes. But it does not follow that such selecting and privileging must be biased and subjective. Morality is ideology-prone but it does not follow that our very moral understanding must be ideologically distorted.[14] Karl Marx is not Karl Mannheim. That our ranking systems tend to be class-biased and unjustified does not establish that they must be: that the very idea of an impartial, morally justified ranking is incoherent or otherwise impossible. No doubt there are no 'natural and unproblematic modes of determining desert' but it does not follow that with a careful and resolute application of the method of wide reflective equilibrium, *starting* with firm and widely shared 'intuitions' about what is fair and the like, we could not achieve a rational consensus about what counts as a just ranking system, though in turn, it does not follow that it is a perfectly

determinate system in all respects for all situations. That would be an utterly unrealistic expectation. But similar things should be said for firmly scientific contexts as well. And remember we do not just add up intuitions and take a vote. Rather, using a standard coherentist model, we can only appeal to such of our considered judgements as would not be extinguised when we get them into the coherentist patterns of wide reflective equilibrium. There is plenty of room here for correcting intuitions.

I do not believe that when considered judgements have such constraints on them, it would be the case that advertising agents would be seen as making as high a contribution to society as do nurses. If we must make differential rewards, we have, *ceterus paribus*, good reasons for giving more to nurses and less to advertising agents. That judgement could, as far as logical possibilities are concerned, turn out to be false, but what would falsify that claim is what would turn out to be people's considered judgements in wide reflective equilibrium, not just the counting up of people's judgements (intuitions) when they are not in such an equilibrium.

Let us try a thought experiment to see if we can get anywhere with the very idea of a justified ranking system that does not, by an ideological trick, moralize the merely conventional. Let us imagine that we are living in a democratic socialist society far enough along in the transition such that bourgeois consciousness is a thing of the past, that people are now by and large genuinely socialist persons, that the productive forces are sufficiently developed so that there is by now considerable social wealth in the society but not so far that there do not remain some significant scarcities. Some of these remaining scarcities in the society are such that we still must make job allocations and fellowship allocations on what we hope to be objective criteria of merit.

Is it so clear that in such a circumstance we must be in such a hopelessly subjective and biased situation as Young contends? Let us imagine that in a particular university in that society we have three students, all analytical Marxists, who have taken the same courses and studied for the same length of time and who are in the same situations of comfort and security and that none of them have been studying under conditions of psychological duress. Suppose, in addition, that most of their professors are also analytical Marxists and this is the more typical philosophical position in that society while the Althusserians and Gramscian historicist Marxists are among the less frequently held positions. Suppose they all write, as part of their competition, papers on historical materialism. It is something comparable in our society to the three competing students in a standard philosophy department writing on Quine and Putnam on indeterminacy of reference. It is, that is, a circumstance, comparable to the Quine-Putnam circumstance, and not the Quine-Lacan situation described by Young. Here, where they are being graded by professors with a broadly analytical Marxist

orientation, it is quite plausible to believe that the professors, at least in some circumstances, could reasonably rank order the pasers and, extrapolating from that circumstance, that they could sometimes objectively rank order the general performance of these three students for the purpose of awarding the fellowship. Even a professor who is a technological determinist might very well put the paper of a student who is more Millerian about historical materialism above that of a student with a more Cohen-like technological determinist paper, even though that orientation is more like the professor's own orientation. We do this all the time in grading and some of us often do it successfully. There is no reason to believe that a conscientious *non-partis pris*, non-uptight professor, who is also knowledgeable and experienced, could not do this. It would get more difficult if the three competing students were an analytical Marxist, an Althusserian and a Gramscian. There subjectivities are more likely to enter and they are harder to counter, but that it can be done in the simpler case shows both that it can be done and that there is no in principle blocking of impartial ranking in the more complicated case. We would have to work harder at it but it is no longer the case that we should believe it cannot be done, particularly when we also keep in mind that objectivity, like being neurotic, admits of degrees and that our example comes from philosophy, a very contentious subject indeed. For choosing brain surgeons, electrical engineers, garage mechanics and airline pilots, it need not be so difficult to attain objectivity. In trying to rank in all these type cases there will be hard cases but hard cases will be the exception and not the rule. And even if there are more hard cases than we expected, all the cases are not hard cases. There are some evident paradigms in which we could make determinate and impartial rankings. It is not at all evident—to use illustrations—that *A* would make a better brain surgeon or dog trainer than *B* is always, or usually only, or even primarily, just a matter of convention.

In a socialist society we might very well want to play down such ranking. Indeed, it seems to me clearly what we would do particularly when we have proceeded well along in the transition. We certainly would not be so obsessive about it as people are in bourgeois societies. But to the extent, in further building up the productive forces, we need to use it to enhance productivity or, in a situation of limited but still genuine scarcities where we needed to rank for considerations of fairness, there is no good reason for believing that in such a socialist society we could not develop a ranking system that would be reasonably fair with some genuine, though no doubt imperfect, impartiality and objectivity.[15]

Notes and References

1. Drew Christie, 'Socialism within the Limits of the Rawls-Nozick Problematic Alone' and Iris Young, 'Ranking, Choices and Power' both delivered as part of a symposium on Kai Nielsen's *Equality and Liberty: A Defense of Radical Egalitarianism* (Rowman and Allenheld, Totowa, NJ, 1985), Annual Meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in Washington, DC, December 18,1985.
2. I defended such a conception in Chapter 2 of my *Equality and Liberty* and in my 'Considered Judgements Again', *Human Studies*, Vol. 5, 1982, pp. 109-18. See, as well, Norman Daniels, 'Vide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics', *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 76, 1979 and his 'Reflective Equilibrium and Archimedean Points', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 10, No. 1, March 1980; and Jane English, 'Ethics and Science', *Proceedings of the XVII World Congress of Philosophy*, 1979.
3. I have explicated and developed this conception rather extensively in my 'Can There be Progress in Philosophy?', *Metaphilosophy*, January 1987.
4. G.A. Cohen, *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1978.
5. G.A. Cohen *op. cit.*, Richard Miller, *Analyzing Marx*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1984; Andrew Levine, *Arguing for Socialism*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1985; Robert Paul Wolff, *Understanding Marx: A Reconstruction and Critique of Capital*, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1984; and John Roemer, *A General Theory of Exploitation and Class*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1982.
6. Gary Young, 'Justice and Capitalist Production: Marx and Bourgeois Ideology', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. VII, No. 3, September 1979; Jon Elster, *Making Sense of Marx*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1985, pp. 166-239, 521-31.
7. Kai Nielsen, 'If Historical Materialism is True Does Morality Totter?', *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 1986, and Kai Nielsen, 'Marxism, Morality and Moral Philosophy' in Richard M. Fox and Joseph P. DeMarco (eds.), *New Directions in Ethics*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1986, pp. 92-112.
8. Hans Reichenbach, *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy*, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1951. For a critique of such confidence about powerful analytical tools see Richard Rorty, *Consequence of Pragmatism*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN, 1982, pp. 211-30.
9. Stanley Moore, *Marx on the Choice Between Socialism and Communism*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1980.
10. William H. Shaw, *Marx's Theory of History*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1978, pp. 162-68; Kai Nielsen, 'On Taking Historical Materialism Seriously', *Dialogue*, Vol. XXII, 1983, pp. 319-38; Richard Hudelson, 'Popper's Critique of Marx', *Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 37, 1980, and his 'Marx's Empiricism', *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 32, 1982, pp. 241-53.
11. Stuart Hampshire, 'A New Philosophy of the Just Society', *New York Review of Books*, Vol. 24, February 1972, pp. 36-39.
12. See here Norman Daniels, 'Meritocracy' in *Justice and Economic Distribution*, edited, by John Arthur and William H. Shaw, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1978 pp. 164-78.
13. See footnote 2.

14. See the references in footnote 7 and see Joe McCarney's important *The Real World of Ideology*, Harvester Press, Sussex, 1980.
15. Perhaps even a briefer reply to Iris Young could be put as follows: She believes, and believes she has objective grounds for that belief, that *Equality and Liberty* would be a better book if it deleted what I had to say about desert. Such a simplified account would, she believes, be a more adequate account, a better defence of egalitarianism. But *if* she is right in this claim *then* she is wrong in denying that I mistakenly appeal to desert because no objective and impartial ranking is possible. I owe this example, or at least something like it, to Frank Cunningham.

Department of Philosophy, University of Calgary KAI NIELSEN

Obituary

BIMAL KRISHNA MATILAL

1935-1991

Professor Bimal Krishna Matilal, a doyen among India's contemporary philosophers and a leading authority on classical Indian logic and epistemology, passed away at the John Radcliffe Hospital in Oxford on 8 June 1991, after a protracted illness. Known for his profound erudition and critical approach, Matilal brought to bear on his philosophical writings an unmistakable intellectual openness that represented the best in both the Indian and the Western traditions. He was the second Indian, after Radhakrishnan, to have earned the prestigious chair of Spalding Professor of Eastern Religion and Ethics at the University of Oxford way back in 1976. Among his notable works the following come to the mind readily: *Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge*, *Logic, Language and Reality*, and *The World and the Word: India's Contribution to the Study of Language.* Besides, he was the author of about a hundred learned articles in reputed journals and a score of books. He was also a profound scholar of Buddhist philosophy. In 1990, the Government of India conferred on him the title of *Padmabhusan*. Matilal wore his own greatness with ease and modesty.

Born in 1935 at Joynagar, a village in West Bengal, in a family of modest means Matilal showed the makings of a scholar even at a very early age. He studied at the Sanskrit College and Calcutta University for his B.A. and M.A. degrees. After a brilliant academic career, he took up an appointment as Lecturer at the Sanskrit College, Calcutta, in 1957 where he taught till 1962. During this period he was deeply involved in the study of philosophical classics in Sanskrit in the style of a traditional pandit and earned the title of *Tarkatirtha* in 1962. Soon after, he went to Harvard as a Fulbright Scholar to work on his doctoral research project under Professor Daniel Ingalls. After obtaining his Harvard Ph. D. in 1965 on the topic 'Navya-Nyâya Doctrine of Negation' he accepted a position at the University of Toronto. Matilal was a widely travelled person and held visiting positions at several universities including the University of Pennsylvania and School of Oriental and African Studies, London, before joining All Souls College, Oxford. He was editor of *Journal of Indian Philosophy* which he founded in 1971.

During the last few years of his life, Matilal went through intense suffering due to his prolonged illness. Cancer was diagnosed in 1988. But Matilal struggled valiantly during these years to live the only life he knew. Even

until a few days before his death he was still working at a feverish pitch on the ambitious project, *The Development of Logic in India*, which however remained unfinished.

RANJAN K. GHOSH

Book reviews

BIMAL KRISHNA MATILAL (ed.), *Moral Dilemmas in the Mahābhārata*, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, 1989, xiv+158 pages, Rs. 95.

The book is a collection of thirteen essays by scholars drawn from different disciplines like Sanskrit, Comparative Literature, History, Philosophy and Religious Studies. Besides his own paper, one of the most discerning, Prof. Matilal writes an Introduction. The Preface by Prof. Margaret Chatterjee, then Director, IIAS also serves as an Introduction.

The notion of 'moral dilemma' itself deserves a closer examination. A 'dilemma' cannot be used as a facile synonym for 'paradox', 'conflict', 'predicament', 'puzzle' or 'riddle', as some authors have chosen to in their papers. A 'dilemma' refers to an argument presenting two alternatives, equally conclusive, against an opponent. A 'moral dilemma', therefore, refers to such an argument in the sphere of moral choice.

But does 'morality' have an autonomy? And in what sense? There are conflicting views in that according to some thinkers there are no moral 'oughts' and 'ought nots' over and above those which are called legal or theological. According to others, moral 'oughts' and 'ought nots' cannot, strictly speaking, be swallowed by those belonging to the spheres of law and theology. On our part, we assume that the sphere of morality, at least in some of its significant aspects, is beyond the ambit of theology and law; vice (vitium) cannot be reduced either to sin (peccatum) or crime (delictum). It is altogether a different matter that in certain contexts and traditions, sin, crime and vice have been used co-extensively. The fact that they have been so used does not offer a rationale for this usage. It is not true that in the Indian tradition the notions of sin (*pāpa*), crime (*aparādha*) and vice (*adharma*) were not clearly distinguished. The fact is that these notions were usually viewed as facets of a larger whole called '*dharma*', a word which has traditionally been used in a variety of senses. Among others, '*dharma*' meant religious, legal propriety and moral uprightness, and in the narrow sense it referred to 'moral' virtues, strictly speaking; '*adharma*' meant vice. I have a feeling that the ancient thinkers were not unaware of the polysemic use of '*dharma*'; if they chose to use the word, there were reasons. I will refer to some of the reasons in the sequal. Perhaps the search for what Santina calls 'fundamental principles of rational morality capable of universal application' (p. 114) was seen as a futile exercise by the ancient thinkers.

For the large majority of men and women the commandments of the scriptures or the sanctions of the laws of the land are there to be obeyed, perhaps, in a slavish manner. The common man seldom analyses or examines

the commandments or the sanctions. Moreover, his acquiesence is governed more by expediency than by the felt need of participation. But if the same person encounters an authentic moral situation, his obedience becomes 'active', informed with feeling. Imagine a citizen coming across a blind person waiting to go to the other side of a crowded street. If the citizen stops to help the blind man to go over to the other side of the road, his choice could be said to be 'active' as well as 'moral', in the best sense, in that it is neither servile nor habitual as, for example, was his conventional obedience to the scriptural commandments and legal sanctions. If, again, the same person found himself obeying the commandments and sanctions in the same 'active' manner, we would call him a 'good man' and not simply a 'good citizen', a distinction with which Aristotle has made us familiar. His active participation could stem only from a fairly careful examination of the commandments, the sanctions and, above all, his own life. He might also begin to see that there are situations where the theological, legal and moral 'oughts' and 'ought nots' do not stand aligned. He, in that case, faces these moral dilemmas. There are, to my mind, two kinds of moral dilemmas: weak and strong. A weak moral dilemma refers to a situation where the moral agent faces two conflicting 'oughts', one moral and the other either theological or legal. A strong moral dilemma, on the contrary, refers to a situation where the two 'oughts' faced by the agent are both moral.

Moral dilemmas, weak and strong, arise in diverse situations. The agent, for example, knows what he should do but is not able to act on account of the weakness of his will. It may arise, secondly, when the agent really does not know what he should do; there may be 'informational constraints'. Thirdly, the agent knows what he should do, but fears that his action might have unwanted consequences. Fourthly, the agent is perplexed because the action will have different effects on himself, on his family and on the state or the community; the agent is at a loss regarding their priority. Finally, and closely related to the fourth, the agent may have a schism in his will, he is tormented by two conflicting wills equally powerful. An examination of the various moral dilemmas found in the *Mahābhārata*, in the light of the scheme suggested above, an ambitious task in itself, is worth undertaking.

Matilal (p. 2), Dubey (p. 38) and Kunjunni Raja (p. 51), all hold that Kṛṣṇa never faced dilemmas. It is said that he resolved Arjuna's dilemma. The manner in which Kṛṣṇa is said to have dissolved Arjuna's dilemma needs a more detailed examination. Thinkers and commentators of all hues—I am not referring to the papers in the volume only—have gone back, from time to time, to dissect the famous dialogue. If Kṛṣṇa wanted to impress upon Arjuna that it was his '*svadharma*' to take up arms, then the long-drawn discussions on *karma* and *bhakti* or on the nature of *atman* appear to be redundant. Matilal's observations regarding Kṛṣṇa's resolution are perspicacious, even if tantalizingly brief. Did Kṛṣṇa really resolve Arjuna's '*viṣāda*'? Or, did he not succeed, in a manner of speaking, only in inducing Arjuna to take

up arms? Did Kṛṣṇa not, at one stage, terrorize Arjuna? All these questions and many others assume that the *Gītā*, even though it is a part of the *Mahābhārata*, is to be read as more than an epopee. In the Indian tradition the *Gītā* has been treated, even though it records the Lord's words, as a *smṛti*. How, then, do we explain Kṛṣṇa's suggestion that in certain cases one should remain silent or, if necessary, tell a lie to mislead the miscreant? Matilal approaches the problem with remarkable candour. But one wishes he had dwelt on the issues at greater length. Is *dharma* alone dictated by a contingency of the situation (p. 10)? Or, is it '*adharma*'? One is reminded of what Plato said about the 'use of falsehood and deception' (*Republic*, 414b, 459c and *Laws*, 663d) or what Gorgias, the Sophist, said about the 'art of justifiable deception'.

Draupadi's question, 'an unresolved dilemma', according to Kulkarni, is perhaps another instance of dilemma in the weak sense. Kulkarni admits that 'very few members attempted an answer to her question' (p. 150). Dubey's choice of translating '*dharmapāśa*' as 'moral dilemma' (pp. 35 and 42) does not seem very good. Draupadi uses the word, which means '*dharma's* noose', to explain the inactivity of the Pāṇḍavas when she is insulted in Virāta's court. Dubey's observation that the *Mahābhārata* is not a '*dharmaśāstra*' (p. 36) sounds strange when the Mahābhārata describes itself as a *dharmaśāstra*, a fact acknowledged by Principal Rukamani (p. 20), Jani (p. 69), and Kantawala (p. 89).

Sukhthankar once observed that Bhīṣma is the 'central character of the *Mahābhārata*', it is a pity that he never spelt out this cryptic statement. Bhīṣma's character remains enigmatic. His supporting the Kauravas and his refusal to marry Ambā are not, strictly speaking, dilemmas, as Principal Rukmani (pp. 28 and 30) and Dubey (p. 41) hold. In fact, Dubey himself observes that Bhīṣma was obliged to support Duryodhana because of 'economic dependance' (pp. 38 and 41). Bhīṣma's decisions are indeed inexplicable unless, of course, one accepts '*daiva*' (destiny) as a factor which governs human action. Even the *Gītā* holds that *daiva* is a factor. Did Bhīṣma obtain salvation? But how could he? He was a celibate and yet did not renounce the world; he died without an offspring. Can we, finally justify Arjuna's killing of Bhīṣma and Droṇa?

Kṛṣṇa's treatment of the meaning of the '*puruṣārtha*' is not very illuminating. That '*mokṣa*' is entirely different from the three other *puruṣārthas* is not acknowledged by Kṛṣṇa; I doubt if he has encountered the arguments of Dandekar. Rajendra Prasad and Daya Krishna, the authors he himself has referred to. That *mokṣa* is attainable only after one has 'given up' all *dharmas* is averred by the *Gītā* (18. 66). Santina's observations on '*svadharma*' are interesting. But he should have explained at length the statement that the 'Śrāmanical sentiments expressed in Arjuna's speech are largely ill-defined'. Kashap's paper on the concept of action is highly readable even though it is not quite fresh. Agarwal's concluding observations do

hold our attention as do the two concluding paragraphs of Sree Krishna Sarma's paper. Kulkarni's paper is incisive.

We must not forget that the *Mahābhārata* is an epic of encyclopaedic dimensions and tradition expects it to be treated in that manner. In antiquity a '*kavi*' (poet) was also viewed as a wise man, *manīṣī*. Don't we expect the language of an epic or, for that matter, any great literary work, to be characteristically different from the language of a scientific treatise? Perhaps such a difference is inherent in the nature of these two kinds of writings. The author of a scientific treatise expects a body of readers possessing what I would like to call a 'socialized intellect', an intellect shared, in a significant way, by a group of investigators, inquisitive, critical and communicative. A poetical work—this is particularly true of the *Mahābhārata*, 'a compilation' as Sukhthankar points out—even when it is meant to reach a very wide circle of readers, does not expect a community of critical and communicative investigators. The individual reader is expected to approach the text in the manner in which an artist (*rasajna*) enjoys, for example, a sunset or a piece of art, or a discerning listener enjoys a musical composition. The spectator or the listener remains an individual, i.e. a person endowed with an 'individual mind'. Imagine two spectators enjoying a sunset. It would, indeed, be strange if one of them were to walk up to the other seeking the latter's corroboration of his enjoyment in the manner in which a scientific investigator seeks the corroboration of other investigators. The perception of the ethical 'ought', not unlike the enjoyment of a discerning spectator, or listener, depends on the sensitivity and refinement of the individual seeker. There is, in other words, an irreducible 'subjectivism' made up of the '*dhī*' (intellect) '*medhā*' (retentiveness) and the maturity (*manīṣā*) of the seeker. The text of a great literary work is read (mentally interpreted) by one who possesses a refined heart; it is to be made a part of the heart, the seat of *vidyā* (see Br. up 4.5.13 and 2.4.11). Morality is not basically a matter of cerebration but of action, as Aristotle would say. Knowledge is concerned with the universal while 'actions' are in the class of particulars (See *Nicomachean Ethics*, $1095^{a}5$; $1103^{b}26$; 1179^{b} 3-4; $1110^{b}6$; 1146^{a} 9 and 1180^{b} 20-21).

After all, the *Mahābhārata* (like the *Rāmāyaṇa*) has deliberately woven 'moral dilemmas' in the main body of the work to be read and comprehended at several levels by the large mass of the readers in their own ways. The *Mahābhārata* is a *dharmaśāstra*, an *itihāsa* and a *kāvya*, all rolled into one; it would indeed be wrong to approach this description as a figure of speech or a poetic overstatement. *Dharma* is said to be traditional customs (*Manu Smṛti*, 1.108; 2.6 and 12). The same authority elsewhere says that *dharma* is *daṇḍa* or the staff, a symbol of authority (7.18). Perhaps these are the ways to make '*dharma*' intelligible to the common man, one who obeys dos and donts as a matter of sheer habit. But *dharma* in the *Mahābhārata* is said to be 'subtle'; it is 'hidden in a dark cave'. The whole idea is that *dharma* is not

out there, staring at the face of one who is really tormented or perplexed (*ārta, arthārthī* and *jijñāsu*). The sincere seeker is required to explore the dimensions of *dharma* deep within his own heart. The metaphors of 'heart' (*hṛdaya*) and cave (*guhā*), where righteousness and truth lie hidden, are found at several places in the *Vedas* and the *Upaniṣads* (See *RV*, 10.46.2; *Kaṭha*, Up. 1.14; 2.20; *Swet*, Up. 3.20; *Br.* Up. 4.5.13). Dharma, as is well known, is a word with many meanings and the meanings are to be unpacked or decoded by enquiring minds. *Dharma* is 'rightness' as Aristotle said (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1096^{a} 25-29; 1109^{a} 26-29; 1120^{a} 25f). To say that '*dharma*' is a 'mode of life or a code of conduct', as Kane says, is not enough. Where do I expect the 'code'? Manu's answer, to my mind is extremely pertinent. Manu says that it is found in the *Vedas*, the *Smṛtis*, the customs of virtuous men *and* the agent's profound satisfaction. The agent's profound satisfaction is, in fact, the highest court of appeal in that the agent must himself be able to see what the *Vedas*, the *Smṛtis* and the customs reveal or express. An authentic moral agent is one who 'chooses' or one who obeys the 'oughts' and 'ought nots', neither for prosperity or reward in this or any other life, nor for fear of punishment, neither for recognition or praise, nor for blame, for fear of hell, etc. In fact, moral autonomy, in the real sense, is a reality only for an authentic moral agent. Obviously, the number of such moral agents, at any time, is always very small. Mostly we find men who trade in virtue (*dharma vānijyaka*) (*Mahābhārata*, 3.32.1 and 111).

Santina says (p. 114) that the 'ancient Brahmanical texts. . . provide no clear formulation in presentation of fundamental principles of rational morality capable of universal application'. He is mistaken. For one thing, the notions of '*sādhāraṇa*' and '*sāmānya*' *dharmas*, found in several texts, clearly refer to such principles. The *Mahābhārata* itself contains lists of vices and social crimes 'capable of universal application'.

At a deeper level, the search for principles 'capable of universal application' may itself be fruitless. The big assumption is that all men are equal. The ancients did not think that all men are equal; they believed in hierarchy, hierarchy based not only on *varṇa* and *āśrama* but also on the refinements and largeness of mind men and women come to acquire in the course of their intellectual growth and moral struggle (see *Mahābhārata*, 15.17.21). This is what Kunti said to Yudhiṣṭhira: '*dharme te dhīyatām buddhir manas tu mahad astu ca*', 'may your reason be fixed on *dharma*; may your mind be large'. Perhaps the ancients were sceptical about principles 'capable of universal application'; such principles would, at best, satisfy the hunger of those who seek to build theoretical edifices, but are of no consequence for the morally perplexed individual. As I have observed above, moral autonomy exists, if at all, only for the wise, courageous and sensitive individual; for others, there are only the commandments and sanctions to be obeyed.

Here is a book on a great theme. These essays will encourage a large

number of our young readers to read the epic in a more perceptive manner and examine the issues this immortal epic has raised or suggested.

48B Devi Path, Kanota Garden, Jaipur A.M. GHOSE

BHUDEB CHAUDHURI and K.G. SUBRAMANYAN (eds.), *Rabindranath Tagore and the Challenges of Today*, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, 1988, Rs. 180.

The Indian Institute of Advanced Study at Shimla organized a week-long seminar in 1986 on the occasion of the one hundred and twenty-fifth anniversary of Tagore's birth. Distinguished scholars from different parts of the world attended the seminar and the papers presented have been edited by two eminent scholars for this volume.

In all there are twenty-two papers besides Prof. Margaret Chatterjee's Welcome Address, Dr Mulk Raj Anand's Inaugural Address and Prof. Sisir Kumar Das's Keynote Address. We also have the excellent Report of a symposium on Tagore's paintings; the participants were Sankho Chaudhuri, Anand, Subramanyan and Dinkar Kowshik. The last section contains the Report of Discussions and Prof. Chatterjee's Closing Remarks.

The participants belong to different disciplines: literary critics, artists and sculptors, art critics, professors of Philosophy, History, Sociology, Chinese, Bengali, English, Economics, Comparative Literature and Japanese. Then there is a renowned jurist and a scholar of Hindi. The harvest is impressive.

Tagore's versatility is indeed astounding; it is difficult to think of another Indian who turned so easily from one subject to another with the ease and facility one finds in the writings, life and thoughts of Tagore. Above all else he was a poet. But he was also a journalist, a novelist, a literary critic, an essayist. He wrote and composed about two thousand songs in Bengali; he introduced the teaching of dancing; he not only wrote a number of dramas but acted in them and directed them; he gave shape to the Bengali language and introduced new verse-forms. He was an essayist who wrote religious sermons and discourses, a thinker who wrote on the history of his country and on the basic issues of pedagogy and education, rural reconstruction and co-operative movement; he wrote three short but profound biographical essays on Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar, Ram Mohun Roy and Maharshi Debendranath Tagore, his father. He was an indefatigable writer of letters—hundreds of them were written to his friends and relations as he travelled far and wide, he was an artist who left behind thousands of paintings; an activist who took keen interest in rural reconstruction and established an educational institution which attracted eminent scholars from different parts of the world. Early in life he looked after his father's estate in remote areas of Bengal. He also wrote text-books for children.

Obviously, Tagore is a difficult subject for anyone to study today. His

major works are available in Bengali; in Bengal he is mainly studied, and naturally so, as a Bengali! Among his predecessors, scholars would count, besides the great Sanskrit poets, the medieval Vaishnav poets like Vidyāpati, Chandidās and the Bāüls and later poets like Bhāratchandra and Ishwar Gupta; among the novelists one of his distinguished predecessors was Bankim and among poets, Madhusudan Dutt. Tagore had equally distinguished successors. In the realm of poetry there were Sudhindranath Datta, Bishnu Dey and Jibanananda Das; among novelists there were Sarat Chandra, Tarasankar, Satinath Bhaduri. The Bengali-knowing scholar would have easy access to the manner in which he wielded the language, the way in which he introduced innovations in the verse-forms and dealt with the hopes and aspirations of his contemporaries, belonging to the urban, upper class Bengali society. A scholar whose knowledge of Bengal and the Bengali language is limited will naturally be unaware of these aspects of Tagore's writings.

But Tagore was an Indian besides being a Bengali. As an Indian his distinguished predecessors were the great Sanskrit poets, Vālmiki and Kālidās and the well-known medieval saint-poets like Kabir, Dadu, Rajjab, Ravidas and many others. His acquaintance with the ideas of the Sufi poets was fairly wide (see Anand's observations on p. 330). Finally, there were the poetical writings found in the Vedic literature. Among his illustrious contemporaries were Iqbal and Prem Chand.

Further still, Tagore is said to belong to the world. Outside the country he is mostly read in English translations. As a poet he was influenced by the great Romantic poets who wrote in English; recent researches have shown the influence of German poets like Heine and Holderlin. Some of the greatest literary figures of England and France of his times were his personal friends. Tagore's acquintance with the thinkers of ancient China and Persia was more than casual. His well-known lectures delivered in different parts of the world were, of course, written in English. He himself translated some of his own poems into English; today, however, they are not considered 'admirable' by modern-day critics and scholars. Those who read Tagore in English will have to remain satisfied with the lectures he delivered and some translations of his novels and poetry. His literary works drew the attention of several eminent poets and thinkers, mostly British, in the wake of his getting the Nobel Prize in 1913. These admirers saw in Tagore a mystic, a point emphasized, among others, by Jha, and many in Europe saw in Tagore a 'wise man from the East'. This perception was shared by many even in this country. Western commentators, barring a few who saw Tagore at Santiniketan, did not have a close knowledge of the milieu in which Tagore grew up and spent his life. Indians who got to know Tagore in the twenties and the thirties—by then he was already known as 'Gurudev' saw in Tagore a *ṛṣi*. That Tagore was more a romantic than a *ṛṣi* is stated by Sisir Kumar Ghose (pp. 312 and 313). Someone should have thrown more light on the distinction between a romantic and a *ṛṣi*!

There are, as a matter of fact, several ways in which Tagore could be studied and read. These approaches would depend on how one chooses to study Tagore's works and life. He could be studied as one who carried on the traditions initiated by the ancient Upanishadic thinkers and medieval Saint-poets, a point emphasized by Sengupta (p. 40) and Anand (p. 83); he could be studied in the context of what Majumdar calls, 'the East-West colloquy'; he could be studied 'historically' and 'sociologically', in the context of what is known as the Bengal Renaissance: a typical product of the upper class Bengali society shaped by a host of factors which include the findings of the Orientalists and Indologists, the impact of the British administration, manned by officials, enlightened and not-so enlightened, and an eclectic world-view drawn from the thoughts of Green, Mill, Sidgwick, Bentham even Comte and, finally, the literary traditions of Europe and England, in particular. Whether or not those approaches provide a distorted picture of Tagore, it is difficult to say. It is difficult because I am not quite sure about what would constitute a distortion-free picture of Tagore. Prof. Das has talked of 'a garland of many Rabindranaths' (pp. 16 and 18) and Biswas too has spoken of "many Tagores" (p. 314). One is tempted to ask: Does this plurality obtain in the minds and thoughts of the scholars and commentators, or is it out there in reality? How do we, in any case, discover a link between the 'many Tagores'? Of Course, Tagore could simply be read and enjoyed and not 'studied' academically, which involves analysis, dissection and comparison. But an 'intuitive enjoyment' may not be so reassuring. At some stage the reader comes to ask: is my enjoyment proper and wholesome? What would enrich my enjoyment? This would invariably involve some kind of 'cerebration' which he initially sought to abjure. With a certain amount of plausibility, it may be averred that artistic enjoyment *per se*, i.e., an activity distinct from scientific understanding and explanation, must allow a degree of distortion; in other words, a scientific approach (such an approach will surely involve dissection, analysis and comparison) needs to be distinguished from the 'disinterested' and 'pleasurable' activity associated with enjoyment. These issues arise in the context of certain observations made by Biswas (cf. 'Aesthetic Intentionality', pp. 65, 69 and 70), Ayyub ('Two Cultures', pp. 227-237) and Morimoto (p. 329). But these issues need not be discussed here.

The Inaugural Address by Anand and his essay on Tagore's humanism refer to a few interesting incidents regarding his personal contact with the poet. Rightly, Anand calls him 'the first modernist in our country'. But the poet's profound acquaintance with ancient Sanskrit poetry (the essays are included in *Prāchīn Sāhitya*) gives a new dimension to his modernism. Tagore's 'humanism' is a topic which many authors have touched upon (Banerjee, p. 37; Anand, pp. 8 and 82 f; Bhudeb Chaudhury, p. 205 f). The poet's 'humanism', to my mind, was shaped by three inter-related factors. First, there was the poet's perception of the 'poverty' and 'backwardness' of

the masses in the rural areas and the sub-human life they led. In the second place, he saw the baneful effects of increasing industrialization and the invasion of the machine (Masud, p. 81, Nandini Joshi, p. 199 and Majumdar, p. 301). This led to dehumanization, a fact of life he must have seen in and around Calcutta. Finally, characteristically humanistic thinkers like Tagore felt that 'humanism' needed to be saved from the disdainful attitude of the 'spiritually advanced' seekers of the Absolute: *mokṣākānkṣin*. There is, however, a fourth sense in which 'humanism' has been used although Tagore was perhaps not seriously concerned with this sense. In this sense 'humanism' is said to be antithetical to 'scientism', another fuzzy notion. Tagore's 'humanism' sought to meet these challenges and he found an eminent predecessor in the medievel Bengali poet, Chandidās. One expected a critique of this 'humanism' in these essays.

In these essays dealing with Tagore it is not at all surprising to find references to 'romantic' and 'romanticism'. We know how eminent historians of ideas, literary critics and art critics have sought to define and explain this notion ever since it became popular first in Germany and then in England. The questions that suggest themselves are: Is not romanticism a part and parcel of 'utopian' thought and aspirations? Hasn't 'romanticism' got something to do with 'hope' as well as 'nostalgia'? Has it not something to do with 'quest', particularly when it turns out to be relentless? Are not genuine 'quests' essentially relentless? Would it be proper to treat all 'romanticism' as 'disease'? Balance and detachment, harmony and proportion are commendable values. But can a poet (like a statesman for that matter) aspiring for 'excellence', remain untouched by 'madness' as the term was understood by Plato and Aristotle?

Tagore, more or less, remained aloof from the 'political life' of the country. This aloofness has been interpreted and commented upon in different ways. Tagore, it may be said, never saw 'politics' as the 'master activity' of human affairs; he may have believed that the search for a 'master activity' is itself futile. In fact, Tagore's views on the nature and character of civilization and 'history', in particular, deserved serious treatment in this seminar. Two of Tagore's essays on Indian history, written early in his life, were translated by no less a scholar than Jadunath Sarkar. The translated version of his essay on the Sikhs was published in *Modern Review* in 1911 and the more famous essay, 'My Interpretation of Indian History', was published in the same journal in 1913. These essays were widely discussed over a long period. Perhaps Tagore agreed with the view: 'Where there is no vision the people perish'. Incidentally, this translation of Proverb 29.18, with which we have been familiar for centuries, is different from what is found in the Revised English Bible, 1989, p. 572 which runs as follows: 'With no one in authority, the people throw off all restraint'! And yet a few questions suggest themselves when one reads Tagore's essays on the 'irrelevance' of politics. At one place Tagore observes, 'Civilization is a kind of mould that each

nation is busy making for itself to shape its men and women according to its best ideal. . .' (*Sādhanā*, Macmillan, 1946, p. 13; italics added). This observation, in one form or another, is found at several places in his writings; the Herderian belief was widely shared by many Indians at one time. A nation, *inter alia*, is a political notion; to acquire identity the people who constitute a nation, must provide themselves with an ideological umbrella. This could be achieved by bringing about greater cohesion among the people if they remain divided by narrow loyalties. Secondly, they must protect themselves, physically and morally, from alien invasions and aggression. Given the meaning, 'politics' is an inalienable feature in the life of a nation. Gandhi once observed that 'politics encircle us today like the coil of a snake from which one cannot get out, no matter how much one tries' (*Young India*, 12.5.20). Perhaps the Tagore-Gandhi controversy deserved detailed treatment in a seminar concerned with 'the challenges of today'. Broadly speaking, what disturbed Gandhi was the poverty and hunger of the Indian people and the indignity they suffered. What disturbed Tagore was the coarseness of taste, insensitivity, vulgarity and ostentation all around. While Gandhi thought that politics is unavoidable, Tagore thought the refinement of the needs of the mind can be obtained without 'politics'. Gandhi, I am inclined to believe, would accept the Aristotelian definition of of man as a 'political animal', maybe in a modified sense, but Tagore would hold that 'the surplus in man' (a point discussed by many participants like Banerji on p. 30, Sen Gupta on pp. 39-53, Bhudeb Choudhury, p. 210) takes man beyond 'politics' which in Tagore's view has an odiousness about it. There is, however, one important point where Tagore and Gandhi agreed. Both of them viewed the individual and his moral life to be more important than anything else.

One of the most readable essays is by Justice Masud, 'Tagore on Human Values'. Two other extremely readable essays are by A.K. Jha, entitled 'Tagore's Development as a Poet up to 1912' and Indra Nath Chaudhari, 'Tagore's Drama and Its Symbolism'. They do not beat about the bush; and are free from jargon. But Jha's observation (p. 125) that 'A Vedantic interpretation of reality as being manifested in the life of the common man will lead one to the realization of freedom in bondage' is unintelligible. Santidev Ghose's article contains interesting information regarding the history of the teaching of music at Santiniketan. Prof. Tan Chung's article on 'A Sino-Indian Perspective of Tagore' gives a balanced view of the Chinese response to Tagore; one would have liked Prof. Chung to tell us more about the Chinese response to Tagore after 1956 where he stops. Maybe Tagore is not so well-known to the present generation.

Peter Cox's article contains fond reminiscences of his visit to Santiniketan.

Mrs. Ayyub's article on 'Two Cultures', I am afraid, does not discuss the basic issues which arose in the wake of the debate initiated by Snow.

Science refers to a method of inquiry and inquiry presupposes what we, in India, call '*prayojana*', purpose, a concept found not only in the Nyāya system but also in an ancient scientific work like the *Caraka Saṃhitā*. Science, secondarily, refers to a study of 'established' facts and laws belonging to any field of knowledge. The questions that have been raised are: (1) Can 'knowledge' be divided into 'scientific' and 'non-scientific' or 'pseudo-scientific'? Is 'knowledge' at all divisible? We have, no doubt, 'faculties' and 'departments' in our educational institutions. They are unavoidable for reasons of administration and the allocation of funds. But do these reasons confer any legitimacy to the division? (2) Must we not believe in the ultimate unity of culture?

Pabitra Kumar Roy's essay on 'Tagore's Concept of Language' appears to have overlooked a significant fact: Tagore's empirical approach to the study of language. In an essay of eleven pages Ray has sought to discuss the views of Heidegger, Austin, Adorno, Chomsky, Croce, Kuntaka, Leibniz, Kant, Polanyi and Hoijer—the last two names have been spelt wrongly in print; naturally the paper is a little ponderous.

Boudhayan Chattopadhyay observes (p. 318) that 'all discussions about education could take place in the perspective of the kind of society *we* wanted to *build*' (italics mine). What does he mean by 'we'? Does it not smack of conceit? Who in any case has empowered the 'we'? Can a society be 'built'? And what kind of society will come into existence when it is 'built'? In this connection I would like to draw the attention of Gitasree Bandyopadhyay's observations (p. 167) where she talks of 'developing a system of educational system for the common man'. In fact she is referring to Tagore's views expressed in a speech delivered about a century ago at Rajshahi. Why is the common man a common man? Is it because he has been deprived of education alone? Do we need another 'system of education' for the élite? Finally, what has a system of education got to do with 'medium'?

Sen Gupta's observation (p. 45) that 'man is essentially a personal being' is a little too cryptic. Biswas's observations (p. 57) that the concept of art is 'an *open concept* as distinguished from the *closed concepts* of logic, mathematics and geometry . . . New forms of art may emerge', needs amplification. After all, the emergence of new forms of logic, mathematics or geometry is not an unknown fact!

For all his love of 'the lowliest human beings, the humble folk, the helpless ones' (pp. 92 and 125) Tagore is really at his best when he deals with the thoughts and feelings, anxieties and hopes of men and women belonging to the upper middle class, the class to which belonged. Anand's views on Tagore as an artist (pp. 90 and 143) may appear to many as his own. Only two of the eight reproductions of Tagore's paintings and drawings (three of them being coloured) carry their dates. I am afraid the drawings and paintings have been selected rather casually and arbitrarily.

There are some jargons which I think could have been avoided. Bhatta-

charya talks of the 'foundations for a transcendent rural life . . . .' (p. 189). The same author refers to 'the western concept of development' (p. 189) without spelling out the alternative models of development. The use of 'subjunctive' at four places (pp. 252, 256 and 260) does not throw much light on what P.K. Roy (spelt differently on page 340) means to say. Tagore, according to Sisirkumar Ghose was a "puzzling ecumenical figure. . . a mystery and a challenge." (p. 331). What precisely does that mean? It is difficult to agree with Anand when he says that Tagore was a pioneer in Indian novel writing (p. 331). Tek Chand Thakur (Pyare Charan Mitra) and Bankim Chandra Chatterji wrote novels in Bengali before Tagore.

The list of contributors does not mention anything about the participants in the Discussions even though their contribution was at times substantial. Unfortunately the book does not have an Index. A. M. GHOSE

NIRBHAI SINGH, *Philosophy of Sikhism*, Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, New Delhi, 308 pages, Rs. 230.

It is with some degree of trepidation and a great amount of thrill that I attempt a review of this book—trepidation because it is a work of high scholastic achievement and I do not find myself fully equipped for the job, and thrill because of an equally high personal involvement on my part in the subject. This latter element, I believe, would need some explaining. Normally, a book review should be attempted by someone who can be objective and I must confess that I suffer from three subjective limitations, viz., I am *too rabid* a Punjabi; I am *too rabid* a Sikh, of course in the strict cultural sense of the generation and milieu to which I belong; and I have a grounding in the kind of Hinduism that has always considered Sikhism as an integral part of Hinduism, at least in the realm of thought. In that case, should I not have refused the assignment in the very first instance? I could not do so, because I have always been very interested in knowing everything about my Gurus and their thought-pattern. To me they were unique in that they effected change in a moribund society, creating heroes out of men who changed the very direction of history. They were men of destiny—a new destiny—whether as men of God or as men of action.

The review is divided into two parts: the positive aspects; and negative aspects of the book.

POSITIVE ASPECTS

The most positive aspect of this book is that it constitutes a fairly complete and significant statement. The author has done full justice to the difficult job he had at hand. To build a system of metaphysics out of a religious lore that grew, from stage to stage, for more than two hundred years,

is a formidable task. The task becomes doubly difficult in a country like India where every second person has his own rootedness in spiritual thought and that too of a very complex kind. The author needs to be complimented for his boldness and self-assurance. Even a superficial feel of the book is enough to convince the reader that he is in for a rich feast. And if he is serious enough to go through the book, he is bound to be doubly rewarded.

The obvious inference, therefore, is that the author has worked very hard to equip himself for the arduous task. He has marshalled his arguments with a clarity, discipline and epistemological finesse that would do credit to any book of philosophy. But what makes his work outstanding in its genre is the amount of research that seems to have gone into it. He seems to have diligently mastered the sources as for example the Mandukya Upanishad, the Shamkara classic on the Brahma Sutras, the Buddhist philosophy of *Shunyavad*, the Semetic religious tradition, both the Indian and Persian schools of mysticism, Greek thought that forms the bedrock of modern dialectical thinking and even such obtuse Western philosophers as Spinoza and Kant. The work is throughout marked by an erudition that compels spontaneous admiration.

While all this provides the necessary philosophical backdrop, the author's knowledge of the Sikh religion, thought and tradition is almost all-inclusive. In fact, he is the first even among Sikh thinkers and scholars to study the *Adi Granth* and the *Dasam Granth* as forming an indivisible whole on which the mighty edifice of Sikh religion, its code of life, high ethical values, personal God and monoistic thought stands. The *Dasam Granth* has so far generally been considered to contradict the *Adi Granth* in major respects. Countering this, the author presents a holistic approach to affirm Sikhism as a new, dynamic system of spiritual and social living, built on the ruins of the classical Hindu and Islamic thought pattern.

Another significant aspect of the book is that it answers a great felt need of the Sikh Church itself, to be able to stand on its own with a complete and independent identity, no longer bound to the apron-strings of Hinduism. For over one hundred years now Sikhism has been groping to find its way, to emerge from the umbrella that Hinduism is or has been, as an independent social, cultural, spiritual and religious movement or even a way of life. When this movement started, its first obvious thrust was that Sikhism was at best a synthesis of Hinduism and Islam, made ecstatic by its *Bhakti* content. Then the emphasis began to change and it was increasingly stressed that Sikhism was closer to Islam than to Hinduism, at least in some very fundamental respects. Some common areas between Sikhism and Islam were found to be: a personal God who at the same time was impersonal and non-dual; the equality of all men; the concept of God being Mercy incarnate; the inherent imperative of *hukam* (operating through His will and grace); the primacy of the Book and the prophet (in the case of Sikhism, the Guru); the congregation as an embodiment of the chosen ones; and proselytization

into the community of the chosen ones. There were also weighty arguments in favour of Hinduism being the mother of Sikhism in that Sikhism believed in the dialectics of *Dharma* and *Adharma* and the revival of *Dharma*, a typically Hindu thought, taken directly from the *Bhagwadgita*. Not a few Sikhs themselves strongly held the view that the Khalsa was a militant expression of *Dharma* and that it came into being in response to a special need of Hinduism. At the higher philosophical level, Sikhism was regarded as a blend of Vedantism and Vaishnavism from which asceticism had been eschewed. However, it was the social reality that made Sikhism the vanguard of the Hindu *Dharma*, intent on chopping off its dead wood. The elevation of social reality to such an extent was hithertofore unknown to the Hindus. And that explains its sustained emphasis on high moral values in social living.

In effect, there was no perception of any cleavage between Hinduism and Sikhism or even of Sikhism as a schism of Hinduism, until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Their shared living was expressed in the *Dharamsal* (A mandir-cum-gurudwara) and the commonness of *Roti* and *Beti* (interdining and intermarriage). The word Hindu was seldom used in common parlance. Instead, it was a common brotherhood or commonwealth of the *Monas* (those who did not wear long hair) and the *Sikhs* (those who were distinguished by long hair). Anyone could wear long hair without entertaining the slightest idea that he had changed his religion. The traffic in the reverse direction was as easy as it was free and pronounced. Many a foreigner and British historian have attested to this situation. This kind of intimate inter-relationship continued to be practised until the modern reform movements took roots both among the Hindus and Muslims.

The book under review strikes an altogether new note. It rejects both these views, and cuts itself independent of both Islamic and Hindu influences. In fact, it claims equi-distance from both these sources. Further, it finds both the parent creeds philosophically inadequate. The result is the emphasis that Sikhism is a new thought-structure with its own independent metaphysical development, emerging into a new philosophy. It is this profound philosophical identity which this work seeks to establish. It forcefully propounds the reality of a unique *IK*, which though impersonal, is not static like the attributeless *Brahm* of Shamkara. It is uniquely personal at the same time, operating through the powerful and dynamic principle of *Hukam*. Thus, the author does not look at Sikhism as the end-product of two potent counter-influences, interacting with each other first in an ambivalent, alienated situation and then emerging as a healthy synthesis of the two. Instead, he posits Sikhism as a new independent school of thought, beliefs and values which can stand any epistemological test known to philosophy. Hence, this work is extremely daring and creative adventure on the part of Dr Singh. His effort appears, *prima facie*, to be successful.

The book has seven chapters in all, and it would be appropriate here to

give a short gist of the thoughts covered in them. In the preface Dr Singh says, 'We have tried to interpret the scriptures in the light of modern philosopical terminology.' The claim is justified. Every subject in the hands of academia is handled in the contemporary jargon of the subject. But the jargon in this book does not get the better of the argument.

In the first chapter, which is the introduction to the discussion, the author avers, 'A critical and comprehensive study of the literature (Sikh scriptures and related religious literature in this case) reviewed so far indicates that there is a cogent metaphysical system (embedded) in Sikh scriptures which we shall try to discover.' Thus, it is clear from the very beginning that the author is seized of the fact that he is attempting something profound and unique. The only problem with this sentence however is that one cannot figure out whether 'so far' should go with the preceding word or the word that follows it. Probably he has purposely left the point as vague as possible. Yet, as far as my gut-feeling goes, he has himself reviewed the literature and found the thesis embedded in it. All preceding works of this nature fight shy of making such a claim, viz., being the author of a new metaphysical system.

The next chapter discusses Reality as it is adumbrated in Hinduism and Islam. This is a focally important chapter inasmuch as Dr Singh wants to demolish once and for all the basis of the thesis that Sikhism is a synthesis of the two philosophies. Having established the nature of Reality in Sikhism in the earlier chapter, his task here is comparatively easy. For argument's sake, he is arbitrarily choosy in the sense that Shamkara and Ramanuja are taken by him as the quintessential representatives of Hindu thought. It is significant that he has not taken much note of the Bhagavadgita. And when, in the seventh chapter, he simply cannot avoid doing so, he brushes aside that great source of Hindu thought as at best mythological. Shamkara to him deals with Reality which leads to asceticism and hence is wholly static.

The next chapter, which is most crucial to his theme, deals with the utterances of the Gurus as being germane to the evolution of reality. But the evolution of Sikh philosophy from stage to stage is not his way of looking at things. He skirts the massive *Sakhi* literature which simply cannot be ignored as part of the scriptural literature of the Sikhs. As for the history of the Sikhs turning against the Mughals, he does not mention a word. Protest, which is the hallmark of the message of Guru Nanak, is conspicuous by its non-mention. He also avoids any reference to Guru Nanak's unique ability to invest old motifs with new meanings, to demolish the opponent's case by giving new meaning to the opponent's argument. Perhaps when we talk in modern terms, these very basic aspects of Guru's thought are irrelevant as points of discussion. Anyway, Dr Singh appears intent on showing that the Gurus were more of conscious philosophers than *Bhaktas*.

The next three chapters deal with Reality and Attributes of Reality, the Sikh view of Appearances and Reality and Reality *vis-à-vis* Experience. Dr

Singh's explanation of some of the portions of Japuji are very interesting. For example, let us take *Moolmantra* or the quintessential thought of Guru Nanak. He finds that Shamkara established Reality by adopting negative reasoning, viz. *Neti-Neti*. But when he comes across negative expressions in the *Moolmantra* such as *Nirbhau*, *Nirvair*, *Akal Moorat* and *Ajooni*, he simply finds them to be non-negative. His explanations of *Khands* that lead to *Sach Khand*, the region of eternal bliss are simply a brilliant exercise in intellectual sophistry which may overwhelm the reader but cannot convince him. Not referring to the *Naths* and *Siddhas* in explaining these *Khands* are like studying a tree without reference to the seed. However, these are minor blemishes in view of the great goal of making Sikhism an independent philosophy.

The last chapter, on social reality and a dynamic social reality at that, needs to be taken notice of separately. The picture that emerges is that of an ultimate utopia. But then without social applicability, there cannot be a worthwhile philosophy inasmuch as 'Philosophy is the criticism of life'.

Finally, it must be said to the credit of the author that he has an excellent command over the language. Obviously, such a perfect turn of phrase and facility of expression cannot be obtained without the mind and the pen going together. Dr Singh's use of the language is both creative and spontaneous and his years as a teacher have not taken away any of his freshness; they have only contributed to his maturity.

The review would have ended here had I not discovered that Dr Singh has worked to a design. This design becomes clearer when one attempts to read the book from the last chapter backwards. This brings me to what appear to me to be the negative aspects of this work.

Negative Aspects

Reading backwards, one is likely to conclude that this book is a conscious public relations effort. It is both an agenda and a manifesto in which information and ideas that do not suit the author seem to have been deliberately glossed over.

An important fact which is conspicuous by its omission from the very first chapter is that there is a cut-off point in the realm of Sikh studies before which all scholars, both Indian and Western, regarded Sikhism as a spiritual and militant outgrowth of Hinduism only. If outgrowth is not the proper word, let it be projection. But after that cut-off date, this belief began to be strongly rebutted, even rejected. This cut-off date coincides with the British taking interest in understanding Sikhism, in the later half of the nineteenth century. That is also roughly the period when the policy of 'Divide and Rule' took shape. Ernest Trumpp, a scholar of considerable repute from Germany, was appointed to translate the Sikh scriptures. He took nine long years to do it. When his work finally appeared in 1877, he had found nothing in Sikhism which was non-Hindu, whether in thought or inspiration. He particularly rejected the idea of Sikhism owing any debt to Islamic mysticism. This obviously did not serve the ends of imperialism. Hence it was rejected. Dr Singh also dismisses Trumpp's work in the space of half a sentence as 'hasty, subjective and derogatory' to Guru Nanak and the Sikh scriptures. These remarks themselves are no less hasty and subjective. Let me translate what Ram Swaroop, a venerable scholar of India's religious and philosophical thought has to say on the matter:

> Trumpp found that in the birth and development of Sikh Panth there was no such element which could be called new. There is neither any Semitic influence on Sikhism nor there is any inherent spirit of rebellion against the parent creed which in this case is Hinduism. He clearly said that Guru Nanak as the founder of Sikhism 'had no intention of starting a new religion. Not just that. He (Guru Nanak) followed implicitly all aspects of Hindu Philosophy prevalent in India. He particularly followed the teachings of Bhagwadgita, which were very popular among and dear to the savants of *Bhakti* movement in India.
>
> As about the Sikh emphasis on monism which the European thinkers had begun to take as born of Islamic influence, Trumpp said that it was merely another form of Hindu Vedanta which had been perfected much before Nanak and which the *Bhaktas* had made popular.
>
> (Ram Swaroop in *Panchjanya*, March 17,1991)

One does not expect Dr Singh to say all that. But what makes his account motivated is the fact that while he has alluded to almost all the developments in this regard, he makes no mention whatsoever of a scholar like W.H. Mcleod, whose main works have appeared in the decade or so in which Dr Singh completed his work. Even Sikh scholars find Mcleod incontrovertible because by common consensus he is today the most well-informed scholar of Sikh lore in the world. Perhaps Dr Singh would have drawn copiously on Mcleod's thoughts had he found them in line with the current opinion among Sikh scholars and those who control the Sikh Church. In fact, Singh's thesis would have become much more worthy of notice had he taken on Mcleod and then philosophically demolished him in propounding his own thesis. This lapse is too serious to be condoned.

Another great lapse on the part of the author is to almost equate the Nirmala tradition with the Giani tradition. In effect, Guru Gobind Singh founded two profoundly important institutions in the body of the Sikh Church. If one institution was the body of the Khalsa, the other was the Nirmala tradition. It was they who were made the traditional repositories of scriptural knowledge among Sikhs. But to accept them as such would be suicidal for the present-day Sikh scholarship. The *Nirmalas* are steeped in the knowledge of Hindu scriptures and Vedanta philosophy. Hence, they

have been victimized under a deliberate policy of non-patronage. No Sikh congregation is prepared any longer to listen to any Nirmala saint. This has created a strange rootlessness among Sikh scholars. They perform strange intellectual acrobatics to prove what is not at all there. The point of interest for the non-Sikh reader would be that the fading out of the *Nirmala* tradition and supplanting it with the Giani tradition almost coincides with the same cut-off date.

What is, however, of much greater interest is that Sikhism started taking shape about 400 years or at least more than 350 years before that cut-off date. In most other traditions what happens is that the sources closer to the times of the founder or founders—in the case of the Sikhs—are invariably considered more reliable than those coming at a later date. It is quite the contrary in the case of Sikhism. The question to be asked is: Why? Sometimes, it is the schism that is responsible for such a situation, as for example the Lutheran schism in Christianity is. But sometimes, it is a profound reinterpretation. In that case the earlier belief has to be rebutted with all the force of argument. However, curiously, the later tradition among the Sikhs claims to follow the purity of the scriptures more implicitly. This is, therefore, neither a schism nor a vigorous reinterpretation. Then what is it? Maybe, the motivation is other than religious. And if it is really so then . . .

Now we come to the second point. Dr Singh is right in surmising that the Hindu view of time as expressed in *Manavatras*, *Kalpas* and *Yugas* is circular in nature (p. 222). But far from admitting that it is something unique which makes Hinduism so different from other creeds or spiritual paths, the conclusion that Singh is tempted to draw is that it is mythical and unhistorical, in other words, unreal. This conclusion is mine though it could not have been much different had the author attempted one. As against this, Sikhism, in his opinion, accepts the historical reality of time. This is not only a philosophical error of an impermissible nature, it is also palpably unjust to Sikhism as such. It takes away the profound nature of Sikh mysticism at one stroke. It also takes away from Sikhism its belief in the theory of transmigration and the bondage of action and fruit which leads one to seek refuge in some higher divinity and makes for the psychology of religion. Even philosophically and scientifically speaking, after the discovery of the theory of relativity by Einstein, the reality of historical time, the Euclidean logic of space and causality have undergone a sea-change. What was so real to the Greek philosophers in these basic respects is no longer considered valid. In this context the testimony of Dr Fritjof Capra, the eminent physicist and author of *Tao of Physics* is worth considering. He quotes the following words of Mandel Sachs to prove his point:

> The real revolution that came with Einstein's theory . . . was the abandonment of the idea that the space-time coordinate system has objective significance as a separate physical entity. Instead of this idea, the relativity theory implies that the space-time coordinates are only the elements of a language that is used by an observer to describe his environment.

This circumscribes the universal applicability of these coordinates as describing environment and not Reality. Dr Singh talks about not only the Reality of modern physics but of the ultimate Reality which only profound mystics can experience. In fact, the implications of the historical time-frame are many. But one of the most profound implications is that it makes creation machinistic. No-one believing in God, therefore, really subscribes to the reality of historical time.

Another point that needs to be made is that historical time generates problems related to the ego and self-assertion. This is incompatible with Dr Singh's view that Sikhism aims at conquering egoity, i.e. *Hauma*, for that is not possible in the recti-linear logic of the historical world-view. All it produces is violence as expressed in aggression, terrorism and militancy. What is important, then, is the here and now. This is not what the *moksha panth* of Nanak is.

Perhaps that is the reason for Dr Singh having written the last chapter on social reality. This chapter is an agenda for why the world at large must follow Sikhism. All the shibboleths of the world, whether flowing from French Revolution, the American Revolution or the Russian Revolution, have been brought together at one place as flowing from the philosophical tenets of Sikhism. Whether it is freedom, peace and progress, or liberty, equality and fraternity, or an egalitarian society or justice and democracy, all are seen to be emanating from the exalted creed of the ten Gurus.

Further, Dr Singh finds reason to exalt tribalism. Perhaps in doing so the point at the back of his mind is the Sikh *misls*. In his view, a tribal society is more heroic, more spiritual and more given to such virtues as 'equality, universal brotherhood, altruism, social service, justice' etc. We should be thankful that he has not mentioned 'survival of the fittest' or the cut-throat competition of the capitalist market. The author should better reflect over his deductions rather than be carried away by his group dynamics, if he belongs to the Jat Sikh fraternity. Sikhs are already paying for the internecine nature of their tribalism. It is a fact of history that they can valiantly fight tyranny but when it comes to creating a civilization, they have never been able to hold together. They are Spartans and hence a leaderless lot.

I know that I should refrain from passing such severe indictment on a heroic people whose martyrology no people on earth can equal. But then I have been provoked. Dr Singh would do well in facing the mirror of his own history.

To come to the last negative point, it relates to the rejection of the fourfold caste system of the Hindus by the Gurus, as per Dr Singh. He is not alone in doing so; today, every alienated Indian does so with impunity. It is not appropriate for me to come out with an apology for the Hindu caste

system but then it is permissible to ask the author where and in what terms the Gurus condemned the caste system. *I demand the answer because inequality is not the function of the four-fold system, nor is egalitarianism an automatic outcome of its out-of-hand rejection.* For, inequality is a necessary condition of Adam Smith's capitalist economy of growth. What it means is that for an efficient system of market economy, all means of production should be at the command of the capitalists and the workers should have no property or stake in the control of means of production. It is, that which makes for a higher level of mobility, superior division of labour and hence results in greater production and ultimately profit—the main reason of being in business! It is this immoral situation that Marx revolted against. Dr Singh must ponder over this fact. For, the labour which creates surplus value boils down to work—mere work and exploitation is a necessary part of it. It becomes *Karma* capable of leading to *Sach Khand* only when it is born of one's *Dharma.* That is the position of Bhai Lalo *versus* Malik Bhago in the Guru's scheme of things.

Having said this, it is open to reason to ask where the Gurus decried the four-fold system. In fact, nowhere did they do so because they knew full well that it is *Karma* consistent with one's *Dharma* that alone confers spiritual merit and that is what the four-fold system is all about. The aphorism 'Sarva Dharma Sambhava' means only this: that equality of all men lies in their doing their respective *Karmas.* Hence there is no *Karma* which is high or low. It is this spiritual socialism that is the bed-rock of the Hindu division of society.

The couplet often quoted in favour of Sikhism having rejected the four-fold system is:

Avall Allah Noor upajya qudrat de sabh Bandey
Ek noor te sabh jag upjiah kaun bhale, kaun mandey.

This couplet is not by any of the Gurus but by Kabir. And since Kabir was born outside the caste system, one has to look for its meaning somewhere else. In effect, it means that *noor* came from God and nature created men after receiving it. Hence no-one *per se* is good and no-one *per se* is bad. In other words, the duality of Shiva and Shakti has created this world of affairs, and since it is so Rama and Ravana are equal in the existential situation. It may seem highly cynical to say so, but this is the Hindu view of life and divinity. And Nanak as a Vaishnavite Bhakta implicitly believes in the truth of this statement. In Bhakti, even a prostitute or a butcher confirmed in his *Karma* and *Dharma* can attain to a higher state of merit than a yogi. Hence, Nanak rejected asceticism.

Another weighty point in this regard is that the Gurus in their own lives never rejected caste. In fact, if the *Dasam Granth* is to be believed, Sikhism is nothing but *Raghu Vamsha.* To demonstrate that caste is such an evil, they

could have married their sons and daughters out of caste. But they never did so. Rather, when the Harmandir (Golden Temple) was built, it was given four gates, one for each *varna.* That symbolically underscores the point that though in the scheme of the world they belong to different *varnas,* in the presence of God they are all equal—the same as in classical Hinduism.

Conclusion

To review this book at length one would be required to write a book of at least this very size. The grievous error that Dr Singh has committed is that he has tried to find out the Reality by dividing the spiritual knowledge of evolved souls. If one is to arrive at valid truth then this kind of recti-linear analysis should be avoided. For example, the six schools of Hindu philosophy should be taken as one body of spiritual knowledge. From the duality of Samkhya to the unity of the impersonal Godhead in Vedanta, the whole discussion is one—the quest for higher truth. The Hindu sages nowhere contradict, they only affirm—the same as the Sikh Gurus did.

This is a digression, the relevance of which lies in the fact that Dr Singh has taken Shamkara and Ramanuja as two individual philosophers, propounding two different truths. Had he taken them as complementary to each other, he could have saved himself much effort, in his quest of the ultimate Reality as seen by the Sikh Gurus. Everything in Sikhism becomes wholly intelligible as an integral part of the great Indian tradition when Shamkara and Ramanuja are taken together.

Besides, works such as the present one should not be attempted as a mere scholastic exercise, howsoever profound it may be. Sikhism is born of a great spiritual vision of Reality. Hence, to interpret it with the help of modern tools of philosophy reduces it to mere intellectual sophistry, the anti-thesis of humility. Only love and humility hold the key to the realisation of *Truth.*

Nevertheless, Dr Singh's mind is rich, learning great, and quest genuine. Hence much can be expected of him in the time to come. All in all, it has been a pure joy reading this book. Compliments are due to a mind which can conceptualize a whole new philosophy out of something which really did not lend itself to it. It is an achievement for which I salute Dr Singh.

B-9 Sulehavana Niketan
Rohini Marg, New Delhi 110034 P.K. Nijhawan

PRANAB KUMAR SEN (ed.), *Foundations of Logic and Language: Studies in Philosophical and Non-Standard Logic*, Jadavpur University, Calcutta and Allied Publishers Ltd., New Delhi, 1990, Rs. 200.

This is a collection of papers, all but two of which have been written by members of the Philosophy faculty at Jadavpur University. The essays deal with a variety of absorbing and important philosophical debates in classical and non-standard logic and call themselves 'studies'. On the whole, however, it would be more accurate to describe them as studies of studies.

As editor of the book (and series), P.K. Sen delineates the basic issues centring on the relation between logic, ontology and semantics. In the course of doing this, Sen reveals a strong realist bias when he claims:

> In semantics we specify the truth conditions of statements ultimately by reference to the objects there are in the world, what properties they have, and in what relations they stand to one another. But if we do so we are certainly committed to the existence of the objects, properties and relations we have introduced in our semantics. (p. 5)

But of course there are alternative semantics, for example anti-realist semantics in terms of assertibility conditions, pragmatics theorist, etc. In a general introduction perhaps these also could have found mention. Sen goes on to raise the Fregean question: What is it that can be true or false? to which he provides the rather curious answer: 'It is clear that whatever it is that is true, it must exist, and be a part of the furniture of the world, *so that it could be true*'. (p. 5, italics mine)

Now if this answer is offered as some kind of paraphrase of Frege's rather complex account of the True and the False being the nominata of sentences it does less than justice to the latter. It misleadingly suggests that somehow existence is essentially tied to truth. Frege posited the False as being quite as objective a part of the furniture of the world, as scarcely needs reminding. Sen continues thus: '. . . if we believe that whether or not something is true is an objective matter then we shall have to say also that what is true is an objective entity totally independent of us and such an entity cannot fail to be abstract.' (pp. 5-6)

This sentence has the semblance of great clarity but on careful reading one can only conclude that it is a *non sequitur*. Is a 'true entity' abstract because it is wholly independent of us, because it is objective, or finally because it is true? Possibly there exist (*sic*!) answers to these questions, but Professor Sen's involved locutions do not encourage one to look for them. For example:

> Even if it [the theory of truth] addresses itself to the traditional task of defining truth, it does it in such a way that, from the definition it provides, statements, specifying the truth conditions of the various sentences in the language for which the definition has been provided would follow as logical consequences as it does from Tarski's definition of truth given in terms of satisfaction.

Sen assumes without argument the strong stand that logic 'presupposes as well as implies the truth of some ontological and metaphysical views.' To illustrate this point he paraphrases the well-known Quinean dictum thus: 'whenever we use a variable in quantification, in existential quantification in particular, we assume that the values of the variable thus used exist.' But this is a travesty of what Quine intends, which is to explicate existence in terms of the language of logic and science in general. To avoid needless debate, I quote Quine: 'To say that there is such a thing as appendicitis or that appendicitis' designates something is to say that the operation of existentially generalizing with respect to "appendicitis" is *valid*.' Remember Pegasus?

Amita Chatterji has written close to forty pages on the problem of the regimentation of natural languages, providing the reader with about fifty references on the subject. Thus the essay is a useful reference source. Chatterji describes at some length the controversy between the naturalists and the constructionists. In her words: 'the constructionist *translates* a natural language sentence into canonical notation . . . but the naturalist simply *regiments* it for logical reckoning' (p. 25, italics mine). However, as the essay progresses Chatterji appears to drop the distinction between translation and regimentation. Section V is confusing in this respect as it talks of the regimentalist aiming at canonical forms. In Section VI Chatterji drops the distinction between translation and regimentation altogether when she says: 'the regimentalist only wants to assert that the main concepts related to theory of inference are translatable in canonical notation' (p. 33). One is at a loss to know what to make of the clear distinction drawn on p. 25 (quoted above).

Arguing that Frege should not be branded constructionist, she offers the reason that the 'subject predicate distinction (of the grammarians) does not fall outside the scope of the function—argument distinction—the former is a special case of the latter' (p. 28); a strange piece of reasoning indeed. One might as well deny the fact of the Einsteinian revolution because Newtonian mechanics can today be seen as a special case of Einstein's theory. All in all, despite some valuable information in the paper it must be said that perspicuity of expression is not one of Chatterji's fortes. 'Explicating' Quine's well-known dictum, 'To be is to be the value of a variable', Chatterji informs us: 'By virtue of this dictum one is committed to the existence of only those things which in one's ideal language one is committed to say that they exist' (p. 22). One can also do without pronouncements of the kind we find on p. 28: 'We can get second order predicates by omitting one or more occurrences of a first order predicate from a sentence.'

Shefali Moitra's essay on 'Grammar, Logical Grammar and Grammatical

Theory' addresses the question whether language can be fully explained on the basis of 'observed linguistic data' or must necessarily rest on *a priori* notions, as Chomsky has argued. Having posed this question Moitra proceeds to answer it in mainly Strawsonian terms, taking us on a guided tour through his views, ending with his *Skepticism and Naturalism (1985)*. We search in vain for Moitra's own contribution to the debate though again we admire the assiduous manner in which the works of Strawson have been studied, absorbed and reproduced. As one writing on grammar, however, Moitra could have paid more attention to the many occurrences of incomplete sentences between full stops in her paper. For example:

> Because they answer our original query How is one to know . . . or an accidental one. (p. 65)
> Whereas his assertion that these are . . . had varied intent. (p. 77)
> Where he says 'the sense the world. (p. 79)
> Since the presuppositions . . . . (p. 80)

I reproduce them because they are clearly not the result of poor proof reading, though many other mistakes in the volume probably are.

'Self-justifying Rules' by Ranjan Mukhopadhyaya is an interesting excursion into the problem of the justification of deduction. Mukhopadhyaya discusses various conditions offered in the literature that rules of inference should satisfy in order to be self-justifying and comes up with the not unlikely result that Dummett's notion of harmony is equivalent to Belnap's notion of conservative extension. Material from the work of a large number of authors who have written on deduction is used, but oddly not a single set of quotation marks occurs in the forty odd pages that Mukhopadhyaya devotes to their work. Surely an excerpt from Dummett's article in which he defines his notion of harmony would have been more to the point than the information that a tape of Dummett's talk has been 'preserved' (!) at Jadavpur University.

What is new in Srilekha Datta's paper, 'A New Approach to the Problem of the Justification of Deduction', remains unclear to the end. She raises the problem of reconciling novelty with deductive validity and concludes that 'we find that Dummett's way of dealing with the problem is quite in order' (p. 120). Nevertheless, her paper along with that of Sutapa Saha on *oratio obliqua* which confines its scope to the question of the ontological status of 'sense', has the virtue of concentrating on one well delimited problem rather than romping over the entire landscape.

Tushar Sarkar's investigations on 'Some Systems of Deviant Logic. A Unifying Approach' bring relief in more respects than one. First, though it is about sixty pages long, Sarkar's essay is written in a style that is non-repetitious (unlike most other papers). In fact the paper contains a good deal of material useful for students of logic to whom it is explicitly addressed. (A bibliography is appended for ready reference.) Second, it is not

pretentious. Says Sarkar: 'This paper contains hardly any original or new results of logic or hardly anything which has more than expository value' (p. 172). That is a refreshingly honest statement in a volume that is characterized by its 'expository value'. Sarkar's essay attempts to demonstrate in a systematic way just which presuppositions of classical first order logic are violated/rejected by any given 'deviant' system. It does this competently and clearly. Towards the end of his exposition, Sarkar makes a curious observation that is also very revealing of the complexes of Indian academics by and large. He says:

> Secondly, my purpose . . . was to help my students to shake off their intellectual cramp . . . . Most of them seem to suffer from a morbid fear of people in authority. There is no better way to alleviate such fear than by showing that even the weight of Quine's authority is not unchallengeable. (p. 172)

The weight of Quine's authority! Just *who* is responsible for your students' 'intellectual cramp', Professor Sarkar?

Indrani Sanyal takes an elucidatory look at the literature on the ontological status of possible worlds. A large number of authors figure in her survey which is again useful mainly for its references. Though she castigates David Lewis for his distinction betwern existence and 'actual' existence, she ends up with two senses of 'exist' herself, first order and second order, an idea she borrows from Nicholas Reschar.

The last paper in this volume by Arther Falk examines 'New Wrinkles in Old Fatalisms'. It is by far the most readable paper in the book, partly for reasons not far to seek. It also has the merit, not shared by the other papers, of presenting a right mix of arguments already available in his literature (going all the way back to Cicero) and of fresh considerations, to analyse and represent which, the entire apparatus of modal logic and its ramifications (temporal, counterfactual, etc.) has been pressed into service. There are some inexcusable errors in the printing of symbolic formulae.

On putting the book down one asks: For whom are these essays written? 'Advanced students and experts' would surely prefer to read original accounts rather than digests offered by the philosophers of Jadavpur University. Perhaps the answer is, for students who, while ploughing their way through the fields of philosophical logic, can use these surveys of the territory to identify the landmarks.

Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur MOHINI MULLICK

IN LIEW OF REVIEW*

Suppose by a miracle all the works of art in the country disappear and we are left only with the various treatise on *Śilpaśāstra*, would it be possible on the basis of those texts to reconstruct masterpieces of sculpture or painting? I, for one, could hardly blame a person who expresses grave doubts about. Supremely unimportant appear to be the theories about art—at least as far as creation is concerned which comes first.

I had written a short review on the book. But on second thought did not post it. Honestly speaking, I found not much in the book. She attacks Ananda Coomaraswami, but does not remember that before venturing to criticize a master one has first to be on ones knees, and that while criticizing be constantly on ones toes. The approach of Coomaraswami appears to spring from an idea that art is figured metaphysics, and that metaphysics is a reflection of art, and that it is the same intuition differently applied, which makes the profound philosopher and the great artist. An idea not without truth in it. Ouspenstkny, I think, had said somewhere that the understanding of Buddhism can never be complete without seeing a statue of the Buddha. How true!!

In this much belated note, I shall try to write some of my observations about art, howsoever inadequate they may be. And I hope you would have the patience to go through them.

True: No art without organizing formal relations which consist in balance, pattern, rhythm, design, harmony and unity. And they are organized by means of line, mass, form and colour. Among these components balance, pattern and rhythm can be found in nature. For example, a balanced tree, branches in balance with the trunk and the foliage with the branches. In fact, without balance the tree would collapse. A nicely balanced shape is elegant—sensuously pleasing. Pattern too is found in nature: a beehive, a snail's shell, etc. Rhythm which includes both balance and pattern exists in movement, the gallop of a horse, etc. A balanced rhythm is also sensuously pleasing, and we call it graceful. But with design (or composition) enters a totally new element, that of mental creation. And yet it is tangible and can be analysed. Harmony and unity are through and through psychic, intangible and beyond analysis. Moreover, in some mysterious way they grow and change. That, perhaps, explains why the appeal of a masterpiece is never exhausted. In other words, harmony is not a pre-established harmony, and unity not an abstract unity.

Was it Schopenhauer who had said that all art aspires to the condition of music. Music, and perhaps music alone, can impart a direct experience of pure movement. All visual arts, indeed, aspire to capture movement, which

*Rekha Jhanji: *The Sensuous in Art—Reflections on Indian Aesthetics*, IIAS, Shimla, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1988.

is life. 'The secret of the art of drawing', said Leonardo da Vinci, 'is to discover in each object the particular way in which a certain flexous line, which is so to speak, its generating axis, is directed through its whole extant, like one main wave which spreads out in little surface waves'. Moreover, it is possible that this line is not any one of the visible lines of the figure. It may not be in one place any more than in another; but it gives the key to the whole. It may actually be where the awareness of the artist places itself in relation to his creation.

Last year while visiting the National Museum I was struck by an extraordinary piece in bronze 'Bharat carrying the sandles of Ram' (seventeenth century). The visible lines of the figure rise, in a most subtle way, towards a virtual centre located behind the figure. There, as if, packed into a single word one may find the secret this amzaing work conveys. You must see it the next time you go to Delhi.

Again, in the Gandhara 'Ascetic Buddha'—one of the greatest works of art—one can mentally visualize the serpentine line, Leonardo speaks about, running right through the middle of the body, and completing a circular movement along the halo around the head of the Buddha. This line alone gives life to the statue.

Not only the living quality but also time (in the sense of duration) is captured in a work of art. Visualize the famous 'Disc thrower'—one of the masterpieces of Greek art—the sculptor has captured one *essential moment* that appears to radiate over the whole process of disc throwing, and thus filling up the time of it. This fixing of the essential moment is entirely a mental act—sheer intuition.

But a work of art that comes closest to music, and so to pure movement, is Naṭarāja. This marvel in bronze has not only captured movement, but also the eternity of the dance. Its lines, pose and form leave the enigma unsolved whether the dance has just commenced, or with one full swing of the body it is going to end. No beginning, no end: Eternity. Only in such a work of art is achieved full harmony and complete unity.

Oriental art is said to be linear. Undoubtedly line plays the most vital role in it. Even in sculpture the role of line cannot be underestimated. Line has immense potentialities. In the hand of a master it can express both movement and mass. Movement not only in the obvious sense of depicting moving objects, but more aesthetically by acquiring an automomous movement of its own. Line by itself dancing with joy. This quality of line has been achieved to almost perfection in the Chinese and Japanese paintings; and when properly organized it results in extremely subtle rhythms. The most remarkable quality of line is its capacity to suggest solid forms—a quality it acquires in greatest masters, and is expressed in various subtle departures from continuous outline. One can see it in the paintings of Ajanta, and in recent times in some paintings of Sarada Ukil and Nandalal Bose.

Creation of 'form' seems to be inseparably linked with the inspiration of the artist. The roots of inspiration lie in a content or an idea, in itself formless yet seeking a form through the intution of the artist. Vision and skill: that makes art. Moreover, every culture has a dominant spirit that inspires creative activity in it. Thus forms are created according to the spirit of a culture. Harmony in art consists in a subtle relation between the inspiration and the form; and unity, a unity with the dominant spirit of culture. Thus Greeks created forms according to their inspiration and vision which was idealized beauty of human body. The main source of inspiration for Egyptian art was, perhaps, occult and magic. Whereas the Indian perception was immanent life-force running through all, and its rhythm was beautifully captured in creating artistic forms. And the Chinese created forms which endeavoured to express 'Harmony between Heaven and Earth'. What these concepts mean is not the question here. The fact is that they had been sources of inspiration which has created most beautiful forms conforming to their respective visions.

As with creation, so with appreciation. The appreciation of art also is intuitive. A rapport—an empathy as if, gets established between a work of art and the one who admires it. And it is sudden. One is literally struck by a work of art. Exploration into all its depths may take time, though that too happens in sudden leaps. What this empathy is, is easier to experience than explain. After all, when we see the dancing Naṭarāja, it is not the piece of bronze that is moving or dancing, but it is our consciousness that dances along the course of its lines and form.

Tradition of Western art goes back to Greece. Three factors dominated Greek aesthetics: Geometry, Symmetry and Rationality. Certain geometrical ratios formed the basis of Greek art. The proportion known as the Golden Section had for centuries dominated Western art. The element of rationality did not allow making radical departures from actually visible forms. And yet art had never been a copy of nature. A subtle transformation of nature is discernible in any masterpiece.

Of all the arts pottery, perhaps, is the most abstract. A Greek vase with almost perfect geometrical proportions, superbly balanced static in its harmony, has the beauty of a crystal. But the aim of the Chinese master is different. His trained sensibility not only creates delicate formal relations, but he also aspires to capture a quality of infinte subtlity expressing the 'Harmony of Heaven and Earth'. And it is this quality that makes 'a Chinese jar move perpetually in its stillness'.

Gurdgieff had divided art into two types: objective and subjective art. According to him the former alone is significant. Subjective art being private fantasy—mostly morbid and corrupt imagination running hay wire. But where exactly lies the difference between great art (according to Gurdgieff objective art) and pure fancy? If we reflect deeply upon what we feel as we look at a masterpiece, we shall find that, if we accept it and admire it, it is because

we had already perceived something of what it shows us. That what it expresses is real, and that we lose sight of it in our pale and colourless vision of things that is habitually ours. While looking at the Sarnath Buddha, it is not only the beauty of it but also the power of truth that strikes us with equal force—a truth which we had known howsoever vaguely or fleetingly. A masterpiece helps us to revive that vision. Perhaps, by objective art Gurdgieff means some such thing.

Great art touches reality on many levels. And harmony in art, perhaps also means the harmony between the different levels it depicts. Take the Naṭarāja again; explicitly it depicts the eternal movement—the dance of the Lord. But somehow it also depicts immobility, absolute stillness. Technically this is achieved by an imaginary line rising straight vertically from the resting foot of the figure up to its head. And on this line is the figure balanced. This stillness is like a significant pause in a melody—the silence that renders entire meaning to the music. If the Chinese jar moves perpetually in its stillness, Naṭarāja remains still in its perpetual movement. Here Being and Becoming are combined in one. No greater or fine work, whether in conception or execution, has been done by human hand.

Take the standing figure of Buddha (Mathura); does it not achieve the expression of the infinite in a finite image! or a Tirthaṅkara depicting utter isolation beyond everything—a naked and uncompromising aloneness. In such works of art one finds a greater unity than the formal unities of aesthetics, which at their best can only be sensuously pleasing.

If art can be divided into two kinds so also can its appreciation. There are those whose eyes seek meaning or significance in art, whose search is for a greater unity beyond formal relations. And then there are those whose arc of experience does not go beyond surface aesthetic relations. They are what I call professional lovers of art (a *rasika* par excellence). Revelling in mere aesthetics, they are, perhaps, incapable of finding deeper significance in art. Coomaraswami compares them with a 'magpie which also decorates its nest with whatever pleases its fancy, and is content with purely aesthetic experience'.

Pottery, I think, is the most abstract of all arts: Architecture, perhaps, is the most symbolic. Finest and greatest architecture has been built around the deepest symbols of human psyche. Home, the dwelling place, Beyond-God-Religion, Power, Death; these symbols have ever inspired architecture.

Indian architecture, especially the temple architecture, has sculptural quality. The lines enhance the beauty of the mass. What would you call our single rock-cut temples—architecture or a piece of extremely complex sculpture? This too is symbolic—typically Indian.

Universality in art: Rembrandt had painted many self-portraits. Towards his old age they were no more portraits of Rembrandt—the likeness was purely accidental—he was painting Man, with all his sorrows, joys, defects and victories, follies and wisdom.

Through entirely different forms or techniques the same theme or an idea can be depicted: recall Rodin's 'thinker'. Now, Epstein has made a bust of Einstein. The technique and the apparant subject of the two artists is different. But Epstein catches the 'thinker' in Einstein. The two works express the same idea.

Take Van Gogh's 'Sun Flowers'—they are fading and express the idea of the fading of Life. Go centuries back at another place, in a totally different culture creating absolutely different forms, and recall Ajanta's 'The dying princess'. That too expresses the fading of life. And the wonder is in both the cases the genius of the two artists had caught the process of the fading away.

I have seen a reproduction of the Chinese version of 'The Ascetic Buddha'. The Gandhāra one apparently emphasizes the 'Will' aspect of the ascetic, whereas the Chinese emphasizes 'Resignation'. But, in fact, both the aspects are expressed in each of the two works. For 'Will' without resignation is mere strong-headedness, and 'Resignation' without 'Will' is defeat.

Goral Kot, Binsar, P.O. Ayarpani,
Almora. (U.P).

VIVEK DATTA

List of books received

Śaṅkara, The Man and His Philosophy by T.S. Rukmani, IIAS, Shimla in association with Manohar Publications, New Delhi, 1991.

Philosophy and Religion: Essays in Interpretation by J.L. Mehta, ICPR and Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1990.

Explaining Human Action by Kathleen Lennon, Open Court Publishing Company, La Salle, Illinois, USA, 1990.

Myth and Philosophy—A Contest of Truths by Laurence J. Hatab, Open Court Publishing Company, La Salle, Illinois, USA. 1990.

The Meaning of Socialism by Michael Hutley, Open Court Publishing Company, La Salle, Illinois, USA.

The Primacy of the Political by Sundara Rajan, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1990.

The Structure and Growth of Scientific Knowledge by G.L. Pandit, Delhi.

Anthropology and Historiography of Science by D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Calcutta.

The Theodicy of Suffering by Albert W.J. Harper, Mellen Press, P.O. Box 450/240, Portage Road, Lewiston, NY, USA.

Love in the Life and Works of Mahatma Gandhi by Joseph F. M/s. Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd. Delhi, 1990.

The Philosophy of J.N. Mohanty, Edited by Daya Krishna and K.L. Sharma, ICPR Series in Contemporary Indian Philosophy, ICPR and Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1990.

Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts. Edited by Henry Rosemont, Jr. Open Court Publishing Co., Box 599, Peru, Illinois, 1990.

Concept of Man in Philosophy by R.A. Sinari, by IIAS, Shimla in association with B.R. Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1991.

ANNOUNCEMENT

A selection of the papers presented at the Mount Abu Colloquim (Jan. 7-10, 1991) on *Culture and Rationality* will be published jointly in the September, 1992 issue of the *Philosophy—East and West* and the April, 1992 issue of *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research.* All subscribers to the JICPR will get a *free* copy of the September, 1992 issue of the PEW carrying those papers presented at the Colloquium which are not included in the issue of the JICPR.

JICPR

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

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JICPR

Volume VIII Number 3 May-August 1991

ANNOUNCEMENT

The JICPR announces the publication of a Special Issue on 'Professional Ethics' under the Guest Editorship of Dr Rajendra Prasad. The volume shall be devoted mainly to the issues arising from the increasing professionalisation in modern life and the claim of such professional associations that the norms governing their conduct *override* the general norms which are supposed to define 'right' or 'wrong', or 'good' or 'bad' in human conduct. There is also the problem of the relationship between the diverse norms obtaining in different professions. In traditional terminology, the problems clustering around the issue may be said to relate to the relationship between '*sādhāraṇa dharma*' and '*viśiṣṭa dharma*' and the relationship between conflicting '*viśiṣṭa dharmas*' on the other.

For more details, scholars may write to Dr Rajendra Prasad, at the following address:

Dr Rajendra Prasad
Opposite Stadium, Premchand Marg
Rajendra Nagar, Patna 800016 (Bihar)

The last date for the receipt of articles for the issue is 31st December, 1992.

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Programme for 1991-1992

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Speaker — Prof. M. P. Rege
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20-12-1991
Subject — The critique of practical reason
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Scholars in the field of classical *Dharma Sāstra* and *Vyavahāra* texts on the one hand, and the modern Indian Jurisprudence, on the other, are invited to send papers latest by 31 July 1992. For more details please write at the following address:

Professor Chhatrapati Singh
Indian Law Institute
Bhagwandas Road
New Delhi–110 001

ANNOUNCING

A forthcoming issue of the
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on the philosophy of K.C. Bhattacharyya

The community of philosophers in India and abroad who have been interested in the work of Professor K.C. Bhattacharyya are invited to contribute articles on various facets of the writings of this seminal thinker from India.

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Saṃvāda: A Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions
Edited by DAYA KRISHNA et al.
Motilal Banarsidass. Rs. 200

Extracts from Reviews

Surendranath Dasgupta, *A Study of Patanjali*, Second edition (in association with the Indian Council of Philosophical Research), Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1989, xv + 181 pp., $ 18.00 (SAB)

The particular strength of *A Study of Patanjali* is its detailed unfolding of *Prakṛti* in terms of the evolution of the *Guṇas* from *Mahat* through *Buddhi, Ahaṅkāra, Manas*, the sense faculties and organs, and, in an outward direction to the *Tanmātrās* and gross matter. Dasgupta helps the modern thinker to visualize this complex process by presenting it as a kind of reverse version of Darwinian cosmic evolution. The book is also unique in its highlighting of the *Sphoṭavāda* semantic theory of the *Yoga Sūtras*, an aspect of Yoga theory other secondary sources ignores. This book is essential for college and university libraries and can be effectively used as a text for students alongside Gerald Larsen's *Classical Sāṁkhya*.

HAROLD COWARD, *South Asia Books*

G.C. Nayak, *Philosophical Reflections*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research and Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1987, viii+ 166 pp.

Les philosophies indiens d'ajuour'hui en leur majorité se situent dans la tradition de la penses classique de l'Inde, tendis qu'une minorité adopte les perspectives de l'analyse linguistique anglo-americaine. G.C. Nayak occupe une position plus originale: tout en etant profondement enracine dans la grande philosophie indienne, il a une reelle maitrise de l'analyse linguistique qu'll ne pratique d'ailleure qu'avec des reserves critiques.

MIKLOS VITO
Revue Philosophique, Paris

G.C. Nayak, *Philosophical Reflections*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1987

The eighteen chapters of this book range over a number of significant topics in Indian philosphy and religion.

It is typical of Nayak's work that he inserts illuminating comparative comments at many points and he uses his knowledge of western philosophy and religion to compare between cultures as well as within cultures.

Nayak's range is vast but he has a good touch throughout and he brings together in an interesting manner thinkers and topics from different religious traditions. He is aware of and he uses recent developments in the philosophy of science.

FRANK WHAILING, *Scottish Journal of Religious Studies*

Daya Krishna (ed.), *India's Intellectual Traditions*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 200 pp., Rs. 75

The hardcore intellectual tradition in India differentiated according to different fields of knowledge—and unfortunately alien to the prevailing intellectual ethois of the country—needs a rediscovery which is relevant, significant and strikinjgly different from the beaten track.

It is seeing and feeling the tradition from a near angle subjecting it to scrutiny that would reveal new facet of it if it is there, or lack of it if it is not.

MOHINDER PAL KOHLI, *The Tribune*
January 8, 1989

Daya Krishna (ed.), *India's Intellectual Traditions*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi., 200 pp., Rs. 75

There is a general recognition of India's traditions in the quest of the Spirit and Arts but very little is known of the original thinking that has gone into intellectual pursuits, e.g. Drama, Rasa, Dhvani, Jurisprudence, Sociology. The discussion is scholarly and takes into account the development in the West in these fields, dating from Aristotle, Plato, Aquinas and others.

The papers on Nāṭya Śāstra are stimulating. Manu's conceptions of man and society are shown to have a perennial relevance in sociological thought. One hopes more such studies will follow.

M.P. PANDIT, *Triveni*
Vol. 59, No. 16, January–March 1990

K. Satchidananda Murty, *Philosophy in India: Traditions, Teaching and Research*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi / Columbia MO: South Asia Books, 1985, xi+237 pp., $17.50

This is the best introductory textbook I know of for a one-semester survey course on Indian philosophy. Undertaken as a "country report" on the state of philosophy in India at the behest of UNESCO, it covers in a magisterial way the role of philosophy in Indian culture, the history of philosophical thinking, both technical and popular, religious and secular, up to the present, where it considers the more professional shape of the discipline in the universities and contemporary Indian philosophers grappling with the tension between tradition and modernity.

JOSEPH PRABHU
Religious Studies Review
Vol. 14. No. 2, April 1988

K. Satchidananda Murty, *Philosophy in India: Traditions, Teaching and Research*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research in association with Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 237 pp., Rs. 90

Professor Murty's book covers a vast range with enviable arudition and lucidity to match. Its documentation is admirable and adds to the effectiveness of the necessarily compressed presentation. Professor Murty's conception of philosophy is catholic and broad based, and his humanism suffuses the whole work.

G.C. PANDE, *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research*
Vol. III, No. 2

東方文化

JOURNAL OF ORIENTAL STUDIES

The Journal of Oriental Studies, founded by the University in 1954, is published twice a year. The *Journal* features articles on contemporary and traditional issues in the humanities and social sciences field. The area of coverage includes China, Japan, Korea and Southeast Asia. The *Journal* is normally published in English and Chinese, with English abstracts for Chinese articles.

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Articles in Volume XXVI (1988)

Articles in Volume XXVII (special issue, 1989, Guest Editors: E.K.Y. Chen, Jack F.Williams and Joseph Wong)