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Cresswell, Frege and Russell on propositional attitudes

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INTRODUCTION AND THESIS

The best description of Cresswell's book *Structured Meanings* (henceforth referred to as *SM*) is given in an article.[1] In this article the authors refer to *SM* as '... "post modernistic" solution to the problem of propositional attitudes—a solution that combines some old ideas with some new technology'. By propositional attitude (henceforth PA) I mean such sentences as 'x ϕ that p' where x is an individual and ϕ is a proposition. In this particular presentation my main aim is to explore those portions of *SM* which contain the 'old ideas', and to explore the new technologies that Cresswell has introduced. By 'old ideas' I mean those ideas which link Cresswell with Frege. By the phrase 'new technologies' I mean those ideas where Cresswell goes beyond Frege in his analysis of statements containing propositional attitudes. I shall also briefly state Cresswell's similarity with Russell. This presentation will be divided into two parts. In Part I, I shall concentrate on a comparative estimate of Cresswell and Frege and of Cresswell and Russell. In Part II, I shall consider Van Heijnoort's article[2] which seeks to deny important distinctions between Frege and Cresswell by means of reinterpreting Frege.

PART I

Frege and Cresswell

The following are the most important similarities between Frege and Cresswell:

(*a*) Both view meaning as compositional.

(*b*) Both regard the that clause is not a genuine constituent of the propositional attitude sentence.

(*c*) For both the reference of the that clause is the sense of the complement clause.[3]

The central theme of Cresswell's book *Structured Meanings* is the problem of meaning of sentences containing propositional attitudes. The following is an example of the sentence whose meaning Cresswell is interested in:

(1) x ϕ that p.

In discussing the problem of the question of meaning of sentences containing propositional attitudes Cresswell has the following contentions:

(*d*) To know the meaning of any sentence *p*, is to know the conditions under which *p* is true and the conditions under which *p* is false.

(*e*) The problem of meaning of PA sentences is really the problem of reference of PA sentences.[4]

(*f*) Meaning in the case of sentence like (1) is always *functionally compositional*. Cresswell says, 'Meanings will turn out to be complex senses made up, ... from simple parts. The simple parts will be functions that are combined in such a way that by applying them one to another a reference as well as a sense may be obtained'.[5]

(*g*) The only solution to the above problem lies within a possible world semantics (PW-semantics).

Let us see what Cresswell means by (*d*). Suppose I say that a child knows the meaning of the statement:

(2) The cat is on the mat.[6]

This means that the child knows that (2) is true *when and only when it is so*, that is the cat is on the mat. In other words when in the world the fact is that the cat is on the mat. (*f*) is a very important point in Cresswell, and forms the central core of his solution to the problem of propositional attitudes in *SM*. In order to understand the notion of functional compositionality we have to understand the notion of 'compositionality' first and 'functionality' next. Regarding compositionality let us see what Cresswell says:

> Very roughly, to say that meaning is compositional is to say that the meaning of a complex expression is determined by the meaning of the words in the expression and the way they are combined. By contrast, the meaning of the words themselves are not compositional; that is they are independently learned.[7]

Further, Cresswell also says,

> ...the meaning of any complex expression should be determined by the meanings of its simple expressions together with the structure of the expression. Usually the expression will be built up in several stages, with successively more complex expressions being embedded in even more complex ones until the level of sentence itself is reached.[8]

Next let us consider the notion of 'function'. A function is a mathematical concept. In general it means something which takes something as an argument and each time returns *the same thing*. Take the example of a black box. There is an input and an output of the black box. Now suppose I enter the input (argument) *x*, the output will always come out as *y* (value); in other words the value is always *invariant* in the case of a function. The numbers

that form the argument of the function are called its *domain* and numbers that form its value is its *range*. Consider the function 'successor of'. Let *f* represent the function 'successor of', then we shall have:

$f(0) = 1$
$f(1) = 2$
$f(n) = n+1$

In this case the domain of *f* is all natural numbers and its range is all the numbers except 0. Now take another function *e*: here *e* is the function 'even numbers', such that, $e(n) = n \times 2$. Here the domain is still all numbers but the range is just the even numbers. A function is often said to be *defined* for those things that are in its domain and *undefined* for those that are not. Similarly take the case of $+$. It is a two-place function. It can be defined as a list of four columns such that if the first two are fixed the third is fixed. It can be shown as an ordered triple. For example the sum of $5+7=12$ can be shown as: $<5, 7, 12>$. Here when the first two numbers of the order are fixed the third is fixed.

One important thing emerges from the above discussion: one of the pillars on which Cresswell's solution of problem of propositional attitudes rest is the principle of *Categorial Semantics*, which means that the meaning of a whole is obtained from the meaning of its parts through application of function to arguments. The other pillar of Cresswell's solution lies in proposing a solution of the PA within a possible world semantics (henceforth PW semantics). Suppose ω is a function, then ω will represent the function of P in the following way: In the proposition '*a* is *p*' *a* will have the property P, in world *w* iff *w* is in the sets of world where $\omega(a)=P$, that is, the value of the function ω operating on *a*. This set of world can be considered as the proposition '*a* is P'.

Now having considered the basic assumptions of Cresswell, let us regard the points of similarity between him and Frege regarding the problem of the solution of meaning of PA-sentences. Cresswell's similarity with Frege is very clearly stated by Cresswell himself: 'In fact the *de re* solution has much in common to the Fregean solution...'[9] Let us try to understand what Cresswell means by a *de re* solution. Take the case:

(3) Jane believes that $5+7=12$.

Here, according to a *de re*-belief analysis the above expression is about the numbers $5+7$, to the effect that they have a certain property, namely adding up to 12. In contrast to this there is the propositional account of belief, according to which the meaning of the expression '$5+7=12$' is a belief in the proposition that $5+7=12$. In other words (3), above is true, in the latter sense, iff Jane stands in a belief relation to the proposition $5+7=12$. Since the proposition that $5+7=12$ is the same as the proposition that $12=12$, so Jane, on this account, believes $5+7=12$ iff she believes $12=12$. Whereas

according to the *de re* solution Jane stands in the relation to the ordered pair 5 and 7, believing them to be the sum 12. In the *de re* solution we do not get any proposition that $5+7=12$. So, as Cresswell points out, '. . . the question whether it is the same proposition as the proposition that $12=12$ just does not arise'.[10]

Accordingly, the *de re* solution consists in having the propositional attitude relate not to the meaning of '$5+7=12$' taken as a whole, but to the meaning of its parts taken separately. On the other hand the propositional solution constitutes the meaning of the expression $5+7=12$ taken as a whole. Cresswell clearly points out that the sense of $5+7$,[11] is the *structure* $<5, 7, +>$. Now what is the status of 12 here? Cresswell has two solutions:
(*g*) '=' not as having identity as its meaning but rather as being the predicate that relates structures $s_1 = s_2$. Suppose the result of evaluating s_1 according to functional structure is the same as the result of evaluating s_2 according to *its* functional structure, then the sentence '$s_2 = s_2$' is true.
(*h*) $<5, 7, +>$ can also be taken as the *sense* of the expression $5+7$ while 12 is its reference. These are Fregean notions, that Cresswell uses, and has to be understood within the context of Frege.

The first similarity between Cresswell and Frege is that both believe in the compositionality principle. According to this principle, the meaning of the whole is determined by the meaning of its parts. With this in mind, let us see what Frege has to say about sense and reference. In his classical paper 'On Sense and Reference'[12] Frege expounds his notion of sense and reference. These may be said to be 'primitives' in Frege's philosophy so nowhere a direct definition is found. We can explain this distinction in the following way. The relation of reference holds between an object and its name. Take the expression "*a*"; it is a *name*, or a *sign* that stands for the object *a*. To take a concrete example, the referent of the expression 'the morning star' is the star Venus, of the signs 'that little boy' is the little boy in the real world. Just as the whole expressions has a reference, so each of the terms making up the expression have references. For example, take the expression 'that little boy': here this whole of the expression has a reference, this reference for Frege is determined by the reference of each of the expression 'little', 'that' and 'boy'.

Regarding sense Frege has given no clear definition of *Sinn* or sense; however, Frege has given a notion of what *Sinn* means in his system:

> The names, whether simple or themselves composite, of which the name of a truth value consists, contribute to the expression of the thought, and the contribution of the individual [component] is its *Sinn*. If a name is part of the name of a truth value, then the *Sinn* of the former name is part of the thought expressed by the latter name.[13]

Consider the above expressions again: 'that little boy' and 'the morning star'. Both have senses. Now each of the two expressions have names in

them which individually contain senses, and the sense of the whole expressions is determined by the sense of each of the expression. The notion of sense and reference will be clear if we consider their differences in the context of an expression. Take the example that Frege gives. Suppose *a*, *b* and *c* are the midpoints of the triangle ABC. Now let us consider the lines drawn from *a* to *b*, from *a* to *c* and from *b* to *c*. Take the following three sentences:

(4) $ab = bc$
(5) $bc = ac$
(6) $ab = ac$

Now (4), (5), and (6) have the same reference, that is, they have the same object, but they do not have the same senses. Further, take Frege's classical example, 'the morning star' and 'the evening star'. They both have the same reference, that is the star Venus, but they have different senses. Further, take the sentence

(7) Pegasus is a winged horse.

Here the sentence has a sense, as it expresses a thought, but it has no reference as there is no object in the world corresponding to the sign 'Pegasus'.

So from what we have seen above we can see that sense and reference are two distinct things in Frege's system. Further, according to Frege a sentence has a truth value, and the truth value of the sentence is its reference. Regarding the truth value of a sentence Frege says,

> By the truth value of a sentence I understand the circumstances that it is true or false. There are no further truth values. For brevity I call the one True, the other the False. Every declarative sentence concerned with the reference of its words is therefore to be regarded as a proper name, and its reference, if it has one, is either the true or the false.[14]

The fact that reference is the truth value can be seen from the test of substitutivity of identicals. According to Frege, in all cases where two terms can be substituted identically without loss of meaning can be seen as having the same truth value. However, the rule of intersubstitutivity of identity does not hold everywhere. Let us see what they are. Let us consider the cases of 'indirect reference'. The reference of all expressions are not objects as in the case of 'the morning star'. There are cases where the references of a sentences are thought senses. Where the reference of a sign is an object it is called a direct or customary reference, where it is not so it is called an indirect reference. This can be understood particularly in the case of what Frege calls quotational context. There are two types of quotational contexts: direct and indirect. In direct quotation reference is another person's words, and in indirect a thought. Take, 'the morning star': here the expression has a direct reference, to use a Fregean terminology, here expressions have their

ordinary reference. In contrast to this, words are often used not to denote objects but to refer to other words as in quotational context. Here words are used to denote the words of another person, i.e. in quotational marks. In other words, reference of the words are the senses of another's words. Take the case of reported speech:

(8) Helen said that John will come.

Here the reference of the that clause is the sense of the complement sentence or its thought and not any object. Frege further gives several examples of the noun clause, followed by that, 'it seems that', 'it seemed to me that', 'I think that', and also command verbs like 'ask', 'forbid', 'doubt', 'where', 'how', 'who' where words do not have their customary reference but their indirect reference to their customary sense. Regarding the subordinate clause Frege says:

> . . . the subordinate clause has for its reference a thought, not a truth value; as sense not a thought, but the sense of the words 'the thought that. . .', which is only a part of the thought of the entire complex sentence.[15]

This happens also after 'say', 'hear', 'of the opinion', 'be convinced', 'conclude' and similar words. Frege also says that it is indifferent to the truth value of the whole whether the subordinate clause is true or false. Take the following two examples from Frege, 'Copernicus believed that the planetary orbits are circles' and 'Copernicus believed that the apparent motion of the sun is produced by the real motion of the earth', Frege says,

> In such cases it is not permissible to replace one expression in the subordinate clause by another having the same customary reference, only by having the same indirect reference, i.e., the same customary sense.[16]

Further examples of indirect reference are when the subordinate clause are within the scope of 'It seems that . . .', 'It seems to me that', 'I think that . . .', 'to be pleased. . .', 'to approve. . .', 'to hope. . .', "to fear. . .', Frege gives the following example.

> If, toward the end of the battle of Waterloo, Wellington was glad that the Prussians were coming, the basis of his joy was a conviction. Had he been deceived, he would have been no less pleased so long as his illusion lasted; and therefore he became so convinced he could not have been pleased that the Prussians were coming—even though they might have been already approaching.[17]

One further example of indirect reference of words is brought about by Frege through the following example. Take the following sentence: 'Columbus inferred from the roundness of the Earth that he could reach India by travelling towards the west', consists of two parts:

(9) the earth is round.
(10) Columbus by travelling west could reach India.

What is relevant here is that Columbus was convinced of (9) and (10), and the one conviction was ground for another. That here there is indirect use of words can be seen from the fact that it is immaterial to the truth of the above sentence whether the earth was really round and that Columbus really reached India by travelling west. But it is not immaterial whether we replace 'the earth' by 'the planet which is accompanied by a moon whose diameter is greater than the fourth part of its own'.

Further, a sentence containing command, or request does not express a truth value but has only a sense. Further examples are dependent clauses like 'where', 'how', 'why', have indirect reference. As Van Heijnoort puts it, in Frege all sentences containing propositional attitudes the *Sinn* or sense are the objects. Here the expression does not denote any ordinary reference (by which we mean objects) but its sense.[18]

Now, let us go back to Cresswell. What does he say about sense? Cresswell says,

> The sense of an expression consists, roughly, of the meanings of the parts of that expression combined in a structure that reflects the structure of the sentence. The reference is the result of letting the parts operate on one another in a function and argument way.[19]

According to the example given above the reference of the expression $5+7$, is 12, whereas the sense of $5+7$ is the structure $<5, 7, +>$. Now in determining the problem of the meaning of propositional attitudes Cresswell suggests a *de re* solution which consists in '. . . converting the sense of the complement sentence into the reference of the complement taken as a whole.'[20] This reminds us of Frege's idea that the indirect reference in the case of propositional attitude sentences consists of their customary sense. Gupta and Savion say,

> Now, propositional attitudes, on Cresswell's theory, expresses a relation between a person and the *sense* of the complement sentence. not its *reference*. Viewed this way Cresswell's approach appears as a combination of the Carnap-Lewis account of sense in terms of intentional isomorphism and the Fregean idea that propositional contexts are oblique: the reference of a sentence in such context is its usual sense.[21] (italics mine)

Next let us consider, briefly, how close Cresswell's sense/reference distinction really is to that of Frege. In order to show this we must make clear Cresswell's distinction between intension and extension. Let us consider first functions (see functions as above). Instead of mathematical examples, let us consider the empirical proposition 'potato sizzles'. Here if we give the potato a name like 'Dido' then the predicate 'of sizzling' acts on

Dido to give us the meaning of the above proposition. Let us follow the convention of giving ω[22] to the predicate 'of sizzling' and a to Dido, then, the meaning of the above proposition is $\omega(a)$. According to the rule that the meaning of a proposition is a set of worlds its value will be those set of worlds where $\omega(a)$ is true. In other words, $\omega(a) = w$, where w is a subset of the set of W(worlds) in which Dido sizzles. Now, the intention of the above proposition is $\omega(a) = w$, where its extension is just the truth value. This whole distinction between intension/extension for Cresswell occurs *within the reference of a PA-sentence*. Senses for Cresswell, are unevaluated structures made up of basic intentions. So the sense/reference distinction for Cresswell is the difference between an unevaluated structure and the result of that evaluation. However, as Cresswell points out, Montague has used sense/reference in the same way as Cresswell uses the intension/extension distinction. To say that one is more Fregean than the other is problematic, because we are not entirely convinced as to which distinction is *really Fregean*. Cresswell says, 'In terms of Frege's original intent there are, I believe, reasons for going either way; so there is no question of which terminology is more correct'.[23]

There is one further point of similarity between Frege and Cresswell, in order to understand which we have to understand what a 'that clause' and a 'complement clause' is in a PA-sentence. A 'that clause' is the sentence preceding 'that' in a PA-sentence, and a 'complement clause' is the sentence *following* it. For example, in the sentence, 'Helen believes that John does not sing', 'Helen believes' is the 'that clause' while 'John does not sing' is the 'complement clause'. Both Frege and Cresswell regard the 'that clause' as not being a genuine constituent of the PA-sentence.

Having considered the similarities between Cresswell and Frege, let us now consider the differences. As far as I understand Frege and Cresswell in their view of PA, I can point out three important differences.[24] These are as follows.

(*i*) For Cresswell, as for Frege, the references of the sentence in 'oblique' context are indirect, i.e. not their usual reference, but what their customary sense is, and we have considered this point above. But the major difference between them is that for Cresswell 'sense' is a structure, whereas for Frege *Sinn* is not.[25]

(*j*) The complementary sentence is a genuine constituent of the PA-sentence in Cresswell but not so in Frege.

(*k*) For Cresswell sentences containing PA are structurally ambiguous, but not so for Frege.

Let us consider each of these differences. First, Cresswell is different from Frege in so far as Frege takes the sense of the subordinate clause as being completely determined by the sense of each individual part. But for Cresswell the structure of the sense is important too. Why so? Because, as Cresswell puts it, the attitude verb is sensitive to the internal *structure* of the complement

verb. This has to be taken into account in determining the meaning of PA-sentences. Contrary to this, Frege holds that the individual sense of the complement clause will make up the whole sense of the clause. This fine structure distinction is missing in Frege. Cresswell himself is aware of this difference between Frege and himself, for he says: '. . . we have a rather Fregean account in which the reference of the that-clause is the sense of the sentence that follows it. Of course, Frege's own theory did not identify sense with structure as has been done here. . .'.[26]

Second, Cresswell does not consider the notion of complement sentences as a genuine constituent of propositional attitude sentences, but Frege does. According to Cresswell, though p and q are the same in meaning, 'x believes that p', is not the same as 'x believes that q'. Here the complement sentence p is not a genuine semantic constituent of the sentence 'x believes that p'. However, Frege does believe that the complement sentence is a genuine constituent of PA-sentences. But what is more important for us is to see that Cresswell, unlike Frege, considers all propositional attitude sentences to be structurally ambiguous. Cresswell says, 'We have to decide where the ambiguity should be located. Given the principle that we should not postulate an ambiguity in the attitude verb. . .the ambiguity must therefore be in the that clause'.[27]

The notion of structural ambiguity in natural language is brought out by Cresswell very appropriately in Chapter 4 in his example of the map. Cresswell asks us to consider the following situation. He and his wife are supposed to travel along a route from A to C through B and the section from A to B is 5 km, while that from B to C is 7 km. To the question 'How far is it from A to C?', there are three answers:

(11) The map indicates that it is 12 km from A to C.
(12) The map indicates that it is 5+7 km from A to C.
(13) The map indicates that it is 7+5 km from A to C.

Now, suppose we contrast this with the situation, as Cresswell says: 'Contrast this with a situation in which I am putting the map to a different kind of use. My wife wants to know whether the long stretch or the short stretch comes first, so she asks me to tell her what the map indicates about distances in the order in which we are driving.[28] Here (12) is a correct response, and not (13). So for Cresswell (13) is ambiguous. For in (13) the relative order of 7 and 5 is important. Cresswell solidifies his argument noting the interpretation of sentences like (13) in which the relative order of 7 and 5 is important is clinched by adding 'in order that' as follows:

(13) Well, the map indicates that it is 7+5 km from A to C in that order.

According to Cresswell, in case of PA-sentences, there is no ambiguity at the level of reference. The problem of ambiguity does not arise in PA-sen-

tences such as those containing the attitude verb 'belief' if the intention of 'belief' operates in a function and argument way to give a set of worlds. The problem arises if, for example, we want the belief operator to operate on the level of sense. If the 'that' in 'that' 5+7=12 is true' is taken as 'that$_0$' then its meaning is just the identity function operating on the reference of '5+7'. Now, if we take 'that' as 'that $_s$', meaning 'that 5+7=12' which is the sense of '5+7=12', then the meaning cannot be an identity function, because the sense of 5+7=12, as we saw before is the *structure* <5, 7,+>, 12=>, and not any proposition.

Next let us consider the notion of ambiguity within PW-semantics. Take the following sentence:

(14) Jane does not paint.

The semantic analysis of the above sentence will be:

not (paint Jane).

Let us analyse this in accordance with the principle of categorial semantics. According to this principle there are categories:

(*l*) Sentences represented by 0

(*m*) Names represented by 1

(*n*) Truth functor like 'not' makes a sentence, an expression in category 0, out of another sentence. Its syntactic category is (0/0).

(*o*) Truth functor like 'and' makes a sentence out of two sentences and its syntactic category is (0/00).

(*p*) 'That' is treated by Cresswell as a name-forming operator in Chapter 3 of *SM* so its category is (1/0). In PA-sentence, 'that' can have different values by operating in various ways on the complement, 'that' can be a complex name whose meaning is just the intention of <Mary, sings>, in the sentence 'that Mary sings'. Again, 'that' can be sensitive to the intension of its parts separately. In the first case 'that' will be in category (1/0), in the second in category (1/(0/1)1). Thus we have the following representation of 'that':

(15) that $_{((0/0),(0/1),1)}$ (not, paint, Jane)
(16) that $_{((0/0),}$ (not, (paint Mary))
(17) that$_0$ (not(paint Mary))

Here these three different clauses generate three different meanings for the above sentence.[29] In (15) 'that' operates on 'not', 'Mary' 'paint' to give the sentence. In (16) 'not' operates on 'paint' and 'Mary' and 'that' operates on the meaning thus yielded. In (17) the that-clause names the proposition expressed by the sentence following 'that'. The above can be represented in three tree forms as follows:

(15)



(16)



(17)



Certain criticism has been pointed out against the notion of ambiguity of sentences having PA sentences in natural language. Gupta and Savion[30] for example, have criticized the map example chosen by Cresswell, in so far as it '. . . illustrates at best only the familiar fact that a propositional attitude sentence is ambiguous when the complement is. . .'. Take the above example of (13). Gupta and Savion think that if (13) is ambiguous then (13′) will also be ambiguous:

(13′) It is 7+5 km from A to C.

For (13′) can be put to the same kind of use as (13) described by Cresswell. Hence Gupta and Savion conclude that,

> . . .its source is the ambiguity of the complement, not the sensitivity of 'indicates' to different levels of analyses of the complement. What is wanted, however, is a case of ambiguity in which the context of the attitudes are different even though the propositions expressed by the complements are the same.[31]

It is outside the scope of this paper to go into the pros and cons of this argument and our aim here is to show that this notion of ambiguity is a completely novel notion that cannot be found in Frege.

Russell and Cresswell

Russell's theory of multiple relation in judgement can be interpreted to be similar to what Cresswell calls the *de re* solution to the problem of propositional attitudes. However, unlike Cresswell, Russell does not treat the 'that clause' as a genuine constituent of the propositional attitude sentence. Both, however, regard that the complement sentence is not a genuine constituent of the PA-attitude sentence.

Regarding multiple relation Russell says that,

> The theory of judgement which I am advocating is, that judgement is not a dual relation of the mind to a single objective, but a multiple relation of the mind to various other terms with which the judgement is concerned.[32]

Why does Russell have to accept this theory? Let us begin by analysing Russell's notion of the multiple relation in belief or judgement.[33] According to Russell it is not *things* but *judgements* that can be ascribed as true or false. Russell advocates the theory that in all cases of judgement (true or false) there is actually the relation between the mind and several other terms. In order to advocate this view, Russell refutes another view commonly hold—that judgement is actually a relation of mind to an objective. Let us see first what this view is and why Russell rejects this view. Any judgement consists of the judging mind and the fact about which it judges. So there is always the objective ground according to which a judgement 'Charles I died in bed' is false, while the judgement 'Charles I died in the scaffold' is true. Here when I judge the relation of the former statement I can hold three views:

(18) Relation between me and the single fact, that is, Charles I having died in bed.
(19) Relation between me and 'that Charles I died in bed'.
(20) Relation between me and Charles I, dying and in bed.

Russell in his analysis accepts this. Why so? Let us see. Suppose there are single objects of which we judge that they are true or false. Russell, following Meinong, calls these objectives. Now if we shift our analysis to the above sentences then accepting such an objective is not difficult in the case of Charles I having died in scaffold, as a matter of historical truth; so is the case with other objectives which are true. But the difficulty arises in case of false judgement as in the case of 'Charles I died in bed'. In this case the question that naturally arises is this: what is the objective of the judgement that 'Charles I died in bed'? There is no such event as 'Charles I having died in bed'. We can of course say that false judgements have objectives too. But the problem then will be, as Russell sees it, as follows: 'there will be in the world entities, not dependent upon the existence of judgements, which can be described as objective falsehood. This in itself is almost incredible. . .'.[34]

Because of this problem, says Russell, we have to take the object of the above judgement as 'that Charles I died in bed'. If so, then we have to take the true judgement also in the same way. But here another difficulty arises. Let us see what this is.

Russell says that the acceptance of 'the so and so. . .' leads to a paradox. Russell says that it is difficult to believe that there is such object as 'that so and so', as it has no complete meaning in itself. This means that it is unable for 'that so and so' to denote a definite object as 'Galileo'. The above phrase has meaning only when we add 'I believe that so and so', 'I deny that so and so'.

To further illustrate Russell's theory of multiple relation of belief take the relation of loving, as in 'Othello loves Desdemona'. Here according to the multiple relation analysis, it is not as if there is a relation between X (who is judging) to 'Othello's love for Desdemona'. For though in this case it is possible, as Othello does love Desdemona, yet in such a case as 'Casio loves Desdemona' if analysed as above then the judgement would be impossible unless Casio really loves Desdemona. However, when the judgement is taken as a relation between X (one who judges), Casio, Desdemona and love, the mere fact that the judgement occurs does not mean that it involves any relation between the object, Casio, Desdemona and love. So in this analysis the possibility of a false judgement is fully allowed. We may therefore state the difference between truth and falsehood as follows. In every judgement there obtains a relation between the judging mind and several objects, which is actually a relation, where the objects may be related to other objects (in case of true judgement) or not (false judgement). This reminds us of Cresswell's analysis of the sentence 'Helen believes that Mary does not sing'. This means that a relationship has to hold between Helen and the meanings of 'not', 'Mary' and 'sings'. Although this relationship holds, it is no guarantee for the truth of the relationship like 'Helen believes that Mary does not sing iff there is a barber who shave all those who do not shave themselves'.[35] This is similar to Russell's theory of multiple relations in belief. However, for Russell there are numerous relations and not just one. This is because Russell does not hold that the complement sentence in a PA-sentence 'that p' is denoting, while Cresswell holds that it is. In fact Russell was led to his theory because he thought that 'that p' cannot denote anything if 'that p' is false. However, Cresswell views belief as a two-place relation, and makes room for false judgements. He holds that the relation holds between the person, say Helen, in the above case, and structured meanings like:

$$<{}^{w}not\ {}^{w}sing\ {}^{w}Mary>.^{36}$$

Further, we have seen that for Cresswell 'that' is ambiguous whereas for Russell the verb 'believe' is ambiguous. However, Cresswell agrees with

Russell in not viewing the complement sentence as a genuine constituent of the PA-sentence.

PART II

We have said that one of the most important differences between Frege and Cresswell is that, for Cresswell, the sense of the complement clause has a structure but for Frege it does not. Now in this section we are going to consider one view which tries to work out Frege's notion of *Sinn*, as given in his *Grungesetze der Arithmetic*, as having structure. Let us restate Frege's definition of *Sinn*:

> The names, whether simple or themselves composite, of which the name of a truth value consists, contribute to the expression of the thought, and the contribution of the individual [component] is its *Sinn*. If a name is part of the name of a truth value, then the *Sinn* of the former name is part of the thought expressed by the latter name.

For the rest of the discussion, the significance of the two words 'contribution' and 'part' that occur in the above phrase are very important. These are three things to be noted in this connection

(*a*) The explicit statement of Frege's system as a function of names

(*b*) The use of function to typed combinatorial logic. In the case of a function any function

f taking input ϕ and output ψ the relation between the two can be expressed as $\phi \rightarrow \psi$: with three types like:

(1) type 1: $(i \rightarrow i)$
(2) type 2: $(i \rightarrow (\rightarrow i))$, and
(3) type 3: $((i \rightarrow i) \rightarrow i))$

This, together with the fact that each function takes on two arguments we have six types as Frege's variable:

(4) $(i \rightarrow i)$
(5) $((i \rightarrow (i \rightarrow i))$
(6) $((i \rightarrow i) \rightarrow i)$
(7) $((i \rightarrow (i \rightarrow i)) \rightarrow i)$
(8) $(((i \rightarrow i) \rightarrow i) \rightarrow i)$
(9) $(((i \rightarrow (i \rightarrow i)) \rightarrow) \rightarrow i)$

The addition of certain set theoretic function to his basic eight functions, each having a symbol, a value, and a type:

Name	*Function*	*Type*
Assertion (a)	$a(t) = t$, $a(x) = f$, for $x \neq t$	$(i \rightarrow i)$
Negation (n)	$n(t) = f$, $n(x) = t$, $x \neq t$	$(i \rightarrow i)$

Name	*Function*	*Type*
Conditional (c)	$c(t) = f$, $t \neq t$	$(i \rightarrow (i \rightarrow i))$.
Universalization (u)	$f(i \rightarrow i) = t$, if $f = t$, $u(x) = f$, $x \neq (i \rightarrow i)$	$((i \rightarrow i) \rightarrow i)$
Identity (I)	$I(x, y) =$ if $x = y$ then T else F	$(i \rightarrow (i \rightarrow i)$
Extention (E)	(f)f associates x, for some x	$((i \rightarrow i) \supset i)$.
Description (d)	$d(u) = a$ if $U = E$ (Ia) for some a, else $d(u) = u$	$(i \rightarrow i)$
Second-order universalization (V)	$V(g) = t$ iff $g(f) = t$ for all f	$(((i \rightarrow i) \rightarrow i) \rightarrow i)$

(*d*) Plus two functions of combinatorial logic: K^{α} and S^{α}

(*e*) the use of combinatory logic.

(*f*) the forming of a syntactic and a semantic tree.

(*g*) The elimination of bound variable, and the only notation is the linear notation, from left to right parenthesis. For example the Fregean object $\forall x\,(x = x)$, in variable-free notation becomes

(10) U (WI).

Now take the Fregean object $\forall F \forall x\,(Fx \rightarrow Fx)$ (True); in our combinatorial logic it will become $V(B^{b}U(B^{a}(WC)))$, which can be represented in the tree form as:



Van Heijnoort says:

Given a formula tree T, we map it into an isomorphic tree T', in chaus way that, if at a terminal node n of T we have the symbols, at the corres-

ponding node n' of T' we have the denotation of s, and with each terminal node of T' we associate the operation of applying a function to its argument. We take T' to be the *Sinn* of T.[37]

According to this definition, as Van Heijnoort says, we can say that a thought is a special *Sinn* or sense, namely, the sense of a sentence. Van Heijnoort wants to represent sense by an ordered tree. Suppose *a* is subformula of the formula of *b*, then the sense of *a* is a subtree of the sense of *b*, which fits exactly what Frege's notion of 'part' and 'contribution'. Here each formula branches into a subformula and that again into a subformula and each is an ordered pair such that it will never be the case that WC but always W and C, and that would be the case in all the other branches too. So here the sense of the formula *a* is not completely determined by the sense of the individual words but by the structure of the words. However, the question whether Frege's definition can be interpreted to mean that sense has a structure is a controversial one. For my part I hold from my reading of the above 'definition' of *Sinn* that, though Cresswell's notion of turning the reference of the that clause of PA-sentences into the sense of the complement clause taken as a whole is Fregean, yet the notion of sense as a structure is entirely his original. Take the function 'successor of' (f):

$f(0) = 1$

Here, 0 is the *argument*, 1 is the *value*. The numbers that form the argument of a function are called its domain Now D_0 refers to sets of possible worlds and D_1 to sets of things. $D_{(\tau/\sigma_1,\ldots,\sigma_n)}$ is a class of n-place function whose domains are taken from $D\sigma_1, \ldots, D\sigma_1$ the σ in $D\sigma$ is its semantic category. ω is the function from D_1 to D_0. Proposition is a semantic category repesented by 0. The proposition 'a is P' means:

$\omega(a) = w$

where w is the set of worlds in which proposition 'a is p' is true.

V = value assignment

Now, take the following sentence:

(11) $that_0$ Mary sings

Here Mary is in category 1 (being a name), sing is a one place predicate in category (0/1), the function ω takes a name to an object, its type is $D\sigma \rightarrow D_1$, it is in domain $D_{(1/0)}$ such that if $a \in D_0$, then $\omega(a) = a$. The V of $that_0$ is the function ω. Where 'that' takes two inputs, one, one-place predicate, one name and returns a name then that is a function ω from the domain of one place predicate to the domain of names: $D_{(0/1)} XD_1$. When $a \in D_{0/1}$ and $b \in D_1$ then $\omega(a, b) = <a, b>$.

Now take that $_{((0/1)1)}$. 'That' in this case operates separately on expressions that by themselves can combine to form sentences. By operating on them that makes out of them a name of the sequence consisting of the meaning of the separate parts.[38] The V of that $_{((0/1)1)}$ would be the function ω from $D_{(0/1)} X D_1$, such that if $a \in D_{(0/1)}$ and $b \in D_1$, then $\omega(a, b) = <a,b>$. From this we can abstract the following general rule: where $that_{(0/\sigma_1\ldots\sigma_n)}$ is in category $(1/(0/\sigma_1,\ldots,\sigma_n)1)$, and where, $a_1, \ldots, a_n$ are in categories $D\sigma_1, \ldots, D\sigma_n$ respectively, and ω is in $D_{(0/\sigma_1\ldots\sigma_n)}$ the $V = _{(that\ \sigma_0,\ldots,\sigma_n)}$ $(\omega, a_1,\ldots,a_n) = <\omega,a_1,\ldots,a_n>$. My contention is that however we interpret the *Sinn* in Frege this sort of structure sensitivity of the sense of complement clause in PA-sentences is not found in Frege.

Notes and References

1. A. Gupta and L. Savion, 'Semantics of Propositional Attitudes: A Critical Study of Cresswell's *Structured Meanings*', in *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 16,1987.
2. J. Van Heijnoort, 'Sense in Frege', in *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 6, 1977; henceforth referred to as *HE*.
3. It is doubtful whether Cresswell is using the sense/reference distinction in the Fregean sense. I say this because Cresswell has an intension/extension distinction which, according to some, may be the Fregean sense/reference distinction, and the sense/reference distinction that Cresswell is using is independent of Frege. We shall discuss this in the following pages. But first we have to see that for both Frege and Cresswell the reference of the that clause is the sense of the complement sentence ein PA-sentences.
4. M.J. Cresswell, *Structured Meanings*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachuesetts, 1985, p. 28.
5. This will be explained in detail later. See *SM*, p. 61.
6. I have taken this example from Cresswell's *Semantical Essays: Possible Worlds and their Rivals*, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1988.
7. *SM*, p. 10.
8. Ibid., p. 26.
9. Ibid., p. 30.
10. Ibid., p. 19.
11. We shall discuss in detail the sense/reference distinction in the following pages.
12. 'On Sense and Reference', in *Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, translated by P. Geach and M. Black, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1977; henceforth referred to as S/R.
13. Frege, *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*, Vol. 1, 1893, reprinted in 1962, partial English translation in Frege, 1964.
14. *S/R*, p. 63,
15. Ibid., p. 73.
16. Ibid., p. 67.
17. Same as Frege, 1893.
18. *HE*, p. 100.
19. *SM*, p. 77.
20. Ibid., p. 29.
21. A. Gupta and L. Savion, 'Semantics of Propositional Attitudes', p. 398.
22. According to categorial semantics of which we shall talk more later.
23. *SM*, p. 70.

24. There may be others, but I am more or less certain that these are the important ones.
25. For some authors Frege's *Sinn* has structure, which we shall see in Part II of this essay.
26. *SM*, p. 30. More about structure in Part II.
27. Ibid., p. 35.
28. Ibid.
29. To avoid such vital ambiguities as strong where that means w_{that0} in both cases as 'Helen believes that Jane does not paint' and 'Helen believes that Jane paints iff there is a barber who shaves all and only those barbers who do not shave themselves' (I owe this particular example to Gupta and Savion, with slight changes) say the same thing, what has been introduced by Cresswell is Macrostructure constraints although he himself says that he has left this vague (see *SM*, p. 80). However, Cresswell says later (see *SM*, p. 91), that the Macrostructure Constraint is important in case of iterated modalities like 'Helen believes that $_{((0/1,1)1,1)}$ Jane believes that the earth is flat', in determining how much of the complement clause is to be taken into account into determining the intention of the 'that-clause'.
30. A. Gupta and L. Savion, 'Semantics of Propositional Attitudes', p. 401.
31. Ibid.
32. B. Russell, *Philosophical Essays*, Longmans, Green, and Co., London, 1910, p. 180.
33. I shall use the two terms as same. See, *Philosophical Essays*.
34. Ibid.
35. In some analysis of 'that'.
36. Where W is the world.
37. *HE*, pp. 99-100.
38. Refer to *SM*, p. 103.

Wittgenstein and the context principle

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The discovery of the so-called context principle—it is only in the context of a sentence that a word has meaning—is usually attributed to Gottlob Frege. And it seems that this attribution is right. Even if Kant's idea that the unit of thought is a judgement is an anticipation of Frege's discovery, what Kant was advocating is not quite the same as the context principle itself. There is at least one respect in which they differ. What Kant was advocating is not, at least not primarily, a linguistic thesis; but Frege's context principle *is* a linguistic thesis. And even if it is true that the context principle is embedded in the Kantian thesis of the primacy of judgement, Frege has to be credited with the first clear formulation of the principle.

In *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (3.3) Ludwig Wittgenstein writes the following: 'Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning'. There is no doubt that what Wittgenstein is propounding here is, on any possible interpretation, something very closely similar to Frege's context principle. In fact, it is quite natural to suppose that what Wittgenstein is propounding in 3.3 is the same as the Fregean principle, and that it has simply been taken over as it is from Frege. But it is very difficult to accept that it is in fact so. There are many reasons why we have to conclude that the matter is not so simple as that. First, it is not quite clear what principle Frege himself was advocating; second, it is doubtful that Wittgenstein accepted the Fregean principle in any of its possible readings in an unamended form. In fact, as I shall try to explain, the Fregean principle is grounded in some features of Frege's philosophy of language which Wittgenstein abhorred.

I

Let us first consider the context principle as we find it in Frege. In *The Foundations of Arithmetic*—and, interestingly, in this work alone—Frege speaks of the context principle in four places: in the Introduction, and in Sections 60, 62 and 106. Each time the principle is given a different formulation. Some of the differences are immaterial, it being clear that what we have are equivalent formulations of the same principle. But in some cases the differences are not so immaterial and it seems doubtful whether Frege had the same principle in mind all the time. Unless we decide to brush aside all the differences as immaterial, we shall have to say either that Frege

was not clear in his mind about what he wanted to maintain or that only one of the different interpretations that are suggested by the various formulations of the principle is the correct one, and, contrary to appearance, Frege always had just one principle in mind, the principle under the correct interpretation.

My own view is that Frege did have just one principle in mind, and it is also possible to be more or less certain about what that principle is. Consider first the various formulations of the context principle in the *Foundations*. In the Introduction, where the principle is spoken of as one of the three fundamental principles to which he has adhered in his inquiry into the foundations of mathematics, it is stated as follows: 'never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition.' It does sound as though Frege is recommending the context principle here only as a methodological policy. The idea seems to be that Frege is telling us something about how, i.e. by following which procedure, we can best try to find out the meaning of a word: the best way is to try to find out the meaning of a word not in isolation, but in the context of a sentence (presumably by a consideration of how the word contributes to our saying what we want to say by use of the whole sentence in which it occurs as a constituent).

The subsequent formulations of the context principle in the *Foundations* are much stronger. In Section 60, Frege says, 'Only in a proposition have the words really a meaning.' This seems to say something not so much about how to *find* out the meaning of a word as about how a word comes to *have* meaning at all: a word has meaning not by itself, but only as a part of a sentence. Frege makes the principle appear to be even stronger by proceeding further to add: 'It is enough if the proposition taken as a whole has a sense; it is this that confers on its parts also their content.' If we take this formulation of the principle seriously, we shall have to take it to mean that meaning belongs primarily to the sentence, and that if a word has any meaning at all it is what is conferred by the sentence on it. In Section 62, Frege repeats more or less the same thing: '. . .it is only in the context of a proposition that words have any meaning.' But when he refers to the context principle again in the Conclusion, he seems to revert once more to a merely methodological view of the principle: '. . . we must never try to define the meaning of a word in isolation, but only as it is used in the context of a proposition.' It should be added, however, that this particular statement of the principle is rather ambiguous. While the words 'we must never *try*' suggest a methodological reading, the rest of the statement can, it seems to me, encourage an extremely strong interpretation of the context principle. It may encourage the interpretation according to which the principle tells us that every word has to be defined contextually, and there is no other way in which a word can be defined. What makes this particular interpretation extremely strong is that the contextual definition,

of which Russell's definition of the definite description is a paradigm, is in fact designed to show that the word (or phrase) that can be so defined does not have any meaning in isolation, being eliminable altogether from our language.

Thus, as I have discussed elsewhere at length (in collaboration with B.K. Matilal in 'The Context Principle and Some Indian Controversies over Meaning', *Mind*, January 1988, especially pp. 75-81), the so-called context principle in Frege admits of three different interpretations: a strong, a weak and an intermediate. According to the strong interpretation, which associates the principle with the contextual definition, the individual word does not have any meaning of its own, whatever may be the role it plays in the sentence that alone can be said to have meaning. In the weak interpretation, the context principle is nothing but a methodological advice, an advice about how to proceed to find out the meaning of a word. The intermediate interpretation takes the principle neither as a merely methodological advice nor as a kind of denial of meaning to the individual word. It takes the principle to say that, although the individual word within a sentence does have meaning, the meaning which it has is nothing but the contribution it makes to the meaning of the sentence.

Now, if we do not want to conclude that Frege was totally confused about what principle he was advocating, we shall have to find out which of these three possible readings of the principle is correct. It seems to me, and this is what we tried to argue in the study mentioned above, that it is the intermediate interpretation offered by Michael Dummett (in his *Frege: Philosophy of Language* as well as in his *The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy*) which is the correct one. The weak interpretation is too weak to capture any significant philosophical idea; the strong interpretation is too strong to be compatible with some of the other tenets of Frege's thought, especially the so-called composition principle which says that the meaning of a complex expression, including that of a sentence, is determined by the meanings of the constituent words—if meaning is taken to be the same as *sense*, the meaning of a complex is actually *made of* the meanings of the constituent words. (How can the meaning of a complex expression be determined by the meanings of its constituents if the constituents do not have any meaning of their own?)

Frege's problems with the context principle do not, however, come to an end with the acceptance of the intermediate interpretation, One main source of his problems lies in the distinction between sense and reference. When the principle was propounded by Frege in *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, he had not yet drawn the distinction between sense and reference, and used the word 'Bedeutung' in his statement of the principle, a word which, in German, stands for meaning generally, leaving it uncertain whether what is intended by the use of the word is sense or reference. (In fact, the distinction was drawn, and two separate terms were used by Frege, just to

remedy this deficiency of the German vernacular.) It is really worth inquiring whether the context principle can survive the sense/reference distinction made by Frege in his later writings. To give just one example of the kind of problem Frege has to face with the context principle vis-à-vis the sense/reference distinction, if the meaning of a word (or some other sub-sentential expression) is nothing but what it contributes to the meaning of the sentence in which it occurs as a constituent, if the meaning of a sentence is the *sense* it has, and if the sense of a sentence is nothing but its truth conditions, then we get the curious result that the meaning which a sub-sentential expression has, the meaning which is nothing but its contribution to the determination of the meaning (that is, the sense) of the sentence, is only its *reference*. This result follows because what a sub-sentential expression, typically a name or a predicate, contributes to the determination of the truth conditions of the sentences in which it occurs is always its reference. There is nothing in Frege's theory which can cope with this problem for he was committed to the simple thesis that what determines sense is itself sense, and what determines the reference (of a complex) is itself reference (the reference of its constituents); as much as he was committed to the view that the sense of a sentence is the same as its truth conditions. (At least he does appear to have been committed to this last view.) There is not enough time to enter into the details here, but it does seem that unless some of the components of Frege's thought are dropped altogether, it would not be possible for Frege to maintain the context principle once the sense/reference distinction is made. Wittgenstein, I think, has a better way of putting together the sense/reference distinction with the context principle in one single theory.

II

When Wittgenstein took over the context principle from Frege he was already aware of the sense/reference distinction drawn by Frege, and there is every reason to conclude that he formulated the context principle *in terms of* it. Consider, to begin with, the actual wording of the principle in *Tractatus*. He writes, 'Only propositions have *sense*'—the German word actually used by him is 'Sinn'—'only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have *meaning*'—the German word used now is 'Bedeutung'. It is difficult to believe that Wittgenstein had no particular reason for using two different terms. It seems, on the contrary, that he deliberately chose two different terms because he thought that once the distinction between sense and reference was drawn, the context principle could be defended only by adhering to the distinction in the way he does in his statement of the principle.

Now, how does Wittgenstein use the two different terms, 'Sinn' and 'Bedeutung' in his statement of the principle? He uses the first in connection with the *sentence* (a proposition, according to Wittgenstein, is nothing but a sentence in its projective relation to reality), but the term 'Bedeutung' is

used in connection with the *name*. If we take this feature of his use of the two terms seriously, and take them to mean 'sense' and 'reference' respectively, we are led to the view that Wittgenstein maintained the following theses when he put forward the principle in 3.3.

1. A sentence has sense.
2. Nothing but a sentence has sense. A name, in particular, does not have any sense.
3. A name has reference.
4. A name does not have any reference apart from the context of a sentence. Whatever reference a name may have it has in the context of the sentence.

It is quite natural to suppose that Wittgenstein wanted also to maintain that just as a name does not have any sense, the sentence does not have any reference. If this supposition is correct then Wittgenstein was committed to a fifth thesis as well:

5. A sentence does not have any reference.

We are able to note the crucial differences between Wittgenstein and Frege now. Of the five theses just enunciated, Frege would *not* accept theses 2 and 5. He was, as we know, of the view that both a name and a sentence have sense as well as reference. These differences between the two philosophers result from what seems to me to be a deeper difference between them. Frege, especially in his later philosophy, did not take the difference between a name and a sentence seriously at all; in fact, he maintained that a sentence was a name of a sort—a complex term standing for a peculiar kind of object, the True or the False. Once the difference between the name and the sentence is obliterated it follows that they would have the same features: the features we certainly associate with a sentence must also be taken to belong to the name, and, again, the features we certainly associate with a name must also belong to a sentence. Thus, since a sentence certainly has sense, a name must also have sense; and, since a name certainly has reference, a sentence must also have reference, Wittgenstein, on the other hand, never assimilated sentences into the class of names. He kept the two classes separate throughout, thinking that the difference between a name and a sentence is quite fundamental. The difference is fundamental because what a name is supposed to do is fundamentally different from what a sentence is supposed to do. If, thus, their respective functions are realized as being different by a philosopher, he would not be tempted to ascribe all features equally to items having these differing functions, for, certainly, it is not difficult to see that the (semantical) features of an expression are inextricably connected with the functions that expression has in our language. To be more specific, if the function of a name is that of picking out an object we want to speak about, and if it is not necessary for a name to have sense in order to pick

out the object, there is no reason to suppose that a name has sense. Likewise, if the function of a sentence is that of saying something, true or false, and if it is not necessary for a sentence to have any reference to do this, there is no reason to suppose that the sentence has a reference. Wittgenstein's own view of the function of a sentence was that a sentence, at the basic level of elementary sentences, and, consequently, at all levels in the ultimate analysis, represents reality by forming a picture of state of affairs. A name occurring in a sentence, on the other hand, deputises, i.e. stands in for, an object that is a constituent of the state of affairs the sentence pictures. So, for Wittgenstein, the question of whether a name has sense reduces itself to the question of whether it is necessary for the name to have sense so that it could deputise an object; and the question of whether a sentence has reference reduces itself to the question of whether it is necessary for the sentence to have reference so that it could be a picture of some state of affairs.

It is easier for Wittgenstein to answer the second of the two questions—the question regarding the reference of the sentence: It is not necessary for the sentence as a whole to refer to anything at all so that the sentence could picture the state of affairs; it is sufficient that the names in the sentence refer to, by deputising, the objects that are the constituents of the state of affairs. One can say that the sentence as a whole *stands for* the state of affairs it pictures, but we have to realize that the relation between the sentence and the corresponding state of affairs is so different from that between a name and the object which it is a name of that we cannot mean the same thing by the phrase 'stands for' in the two cases. A sentence, after all, is a picture, and a picture is not a name. We should recall at this point Wittgenstein's profound insight that a picture of a fact is itself a *fact*. A fact is not a name, just as a name is not a fact. Actually, a name as a constituent of a picture which is a fact is an *object*. We shall never realize the true nature of a sentence as a picture unless we realize that a sentence is *not* an object, but a fact. Of course, a sentence can be treated as an object; but in so far as it is so treated it is not treated as a picture.

I think Wittgenstein was right, as against Frege, to maintain that a sentence is not a name. I think also that he would be right in maintaining that a sentence does not have reference. I think further that he also actually wanted to maintain that the sentence does not have any reference at all. The reason why Frege at all wanted to maintain that the sentence too has reference is, as I have tried to explain, because he took the view that the sentence itself is a name of a sort. I also think that although Wittgenstein's own reasons for concluding that a sentence is not a name were strong enough within the frame-work of his picture theory—certainly a picture has to be a fact rather than an object—it is not necessary to commit oneself to the picture theory in order to arrive at the conclusion that a sentence is not a name. It is possible to offer independent arguments. A sentence, we may say, is primarily used for the purpose of making *assertions* which are true or false,

but, certainly, a name cannot be used to make any assertion at all, whether true or false. For sure, Frege maintained that the sentence was a *name* of the True or the False, but we have to see the difference between being a name of the True or the False and being true or false. (Perhaps this was dimly realized by Frege himself, and that is why he maintained that it was only a *thought* which could be said to *be* true or false, in addition to maintaining that the sentence named the True or the Flase.)

One should, however, consider whether the word 'Bedeutung' used in *Tractatus* 3.3 can really be translated as 'reference' as has been done in the now standard translation of Frege's philosophical writings. Could it not be the case that Wittgenstein used the term in a sense much wider than the Fregean, to express both the relation of referring, typically exemplified by a name and its bearer, and the relation of picturing that obtains between a sentence and the corresponding state of affairs? In fact, there are reasons for concluding that Wittgenstein did often use the term 'Bedeutung' in *Tractatus* in a sense wider than the one which covers only the name-bearer relation. (This has been pointed out by Peter Carruthers in his excellent recent study, *Tractarian Semantics*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1989.) Sentential connectives or numerical terms do not, according to Wittgenstein, stand for any object, and, consequently, they cannot have any reference in the Fregean sense in Wittgenstein's theory; but he does suggest that they too have Bedeutung. In fact, as Carruthers points out (pp. 26-27), there are passages in *Tractatus*, e.g. 5.02, which suggest that Wittgenstein is prepared even to speak of the Bedeutung of a sentence. But whatever may be our answer to the question regarding in what sense Wittgenstein used the word 'Bedeutung' in *Tractatus*, that is, as far as I can see, not going to affect what we have noted earlier, namely, that *if* we take 'Bedeutung' in the Fregean sense to mean reference, *then* a sentence does not have any Bedeutung in Wittgenstein's theory. Having settled that question we can now ask what that sense is, in which even a sentence can be said to have Bedeutung. That must be the sense in which all linguistic expressions that can be said to be *significant* at all can be said to have Bedeutung. But, certainly, the only thing which *all* significant expressions, without exception, can be said to have in common is *significance*. Thus, it would seem that Bedeutung is nothing but significance, or, for that matter, *meaning*, in the most general, and, consequently, vague sense of these terms. It is in fact noteworthy that both the English translations of *Tractatus*, thanks to the wisdom of the translators, use the word 'meaning' to translate 'Bedeutung'. Perhaps we can do a little better. We can take 'Bedeutung' to stand for *whatever is communicated* by the use of the expression, whether it is a sentence or a sub-sentential expression. I think that Peter Carruthers has shown how to improve upon this idea of what is communicated. We can take 'Bedeutung' to refer to what he calls the 'semantic content', 'that of which mutual knowledge is required for linguistic communication (or what comes to the same thing: to refer to

that which an expression contributes to what is communicated by the literal assertion of sentences containing it).' If we interpret the term in this way, a name would have as its Bedeutung the object of which it is a name, and a sentence, the state of affairs it describes (or pictures). But then the most interesting thing that happens in Wittgenstein's theory is that the Bedeutung of a sentence is no different from its Sinn. It can be shown that the Sinn of a sentence, according to Wittgenstein, is the state of affairs (the existence of which would make the sentence true).

I shall come back to the question of what the Sinn of a sentence is, of how it is related to its Bedeutung, supposing it does have a Bedeutung, and our original question regarding how the context principle in *Tractatus* is to be understood. But before that I want to consider very briefly one question we had posed to Wittgenstein but have not addressed yet. It is the question of whether it is necessary for a name to have a sense in order to deputise an object, the question to which is reduced the question of whether the name has a sense. The greatest strength of the sense theory of names is just this: it alone can explain in any satisfactory manner how a name can pick out one particular object rather than another. The theory becomes really attractive when sense is again understood in terms of some condition which an object does, or does not, satisfy. We can say, by way of explaining how a name manages to pick out just that object which it does, that associated with the name there is a condition which is both necessary and sufficient for an object to satisfy for it to be capable of being picked out by the name.

Being a Russellian in this respect, Wittgenstein did not believe in the sense theory of names. But it must be granted that it is not clear, as it is not in most critiques of the sense theory, how, in the absence of such a (descriptive) condition, a name can manage to pick out the particular object it does. In Russell, as we know, the answer to the question is that a name picks out that object of acquaintance with which the name is currently associated. Something like this, I think, would be maintained by Wittgenstein, but without the epistemological bit about acquaintance. A name would pick out that object which it is made to deputise, and a name is made to deputise a particular object by establishing some connection between the object and the name *directly*, by stipulation, or fiat, or convention, but not via any (descriptive) condition. And so, if sense is understood in terms of the descriptive conditions supposed to be associated with names, then a name does not have any sense according to Wittgenstein. We can certainly argue, as Dummett and many others have done in recent years, that the sense should not be taken to be a descriptive condition, as the critique of the sense theory takes it to be. Sense is only, in the language of Frege himself, the mode of presentation of the object. It is not, however, necessary to enter into the merits of this argument. Maybe, Frege never had in mind anything like a condition the object has to satisfy for it to be picked out by a name when he spoke of the sense of a name. But then he has not addressed the semantical question which Russell, Wittgenstein and many others had in mind. The mode of presentation of an object does not explain why this particular object rather than that would be picked out by a name.

III

Let us now go back to the question regarding what the sense of a sentence is, how it is related to its Bedeutung, and what interpretation of the context principle would suit Wittgenstein given the view of Sinn and Bedeutung he had.

The following propositions are crucial for being clear about how the Sinn of a sentence was understood by Wittgenstein.

4.022 A proposition *shows* its sense.
A proposition *shows* how things stand *if* it is true.
And it *says that* they do so stand.
4.023 ...A proposition is a description of a state of affairs.
4.024 To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true.

Taken together, these propositions say that the Sinn of a sentence—let us remind ourselves once more that a proposition is nothing but a sentence in its projective relation to reality—is the truth condition of the sentence; alternatively, the *state of affairs* that it describes, the state of affairs the obtaining of which would make the sentence true.

If what we have said so far about the Sinn and Bedeutung of a sentence in *Tractatus* is correct, then there is no difference between the two as far as Wittgenstein is concerned. The Sinn coincides with the Bedeutung in the case of a sentence, for both of them are the state of affairs which the sentence describes.

Keeping this in mind, let us once again ask the question of how the context principle is to be understood in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*.

First recall the exact formulation of the principle:

> Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have Bedeutung.

The principle can now be understood to say that a name does not have any function in our language excepting that of deputising (standing for, picking out) an object which is a constituent of a state of affairs the sentence as a whole describes. Understood in this way, the principle sounds eminently sensible. We can certainly say, it seems to me, that even if a name has some other function in our language, say, that of figuring in a list, this function must be parasitic upon its basic function of occurring in a sentence to pick out what the topic of the sentence is. (The name 'Jones', for example, could

not possibly occur in a list of men unless it had already occurred in such a sentence as 'Jones is a man'.)

I shall conclude by saying just one thing about a problem I mentioned quite early, a problem which Frege's version of the context principle faces, because of the peculiarities of his theory of sense and reference. The problem is as follows: How can it be that an object, which is the reference of a name, be a constituent of the sense of a sentence? (It seems that it has to be because the sense of the sentence, according to Frege, was nothing but its truth conditions.) Wittgenstein does not face this difficulty. The sense (Sinn) of a sentence *is* the state of affairs corresponding to it, and that is also its Bedeutung, the only kind of reference, if we at all want to call it 'reference', a sentence can possibly have.

Philosophy of history: 3 history and futurity

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1. While discussing the concept of history, we must keep in mind the ambiguity which goes with the use of the term. The term 'history' refers to the subject-matter, i.e. the sequence of various actions in time, as well as to the model of conceptualizing that subject-matter. *Prima facie*, this is an ambiguity. But this duality may have certain more profound implications. Perhaps the structure of history as subject-matter patterns the form of conceptualizing history. The epistemology of historical awareness and the key concepts and principles involved in such awareness may have a bearing on the form of historical existence or historical being. The structure of historical being determines the pattern or the mode of historical awareness, and the underlying epistemology, in turn, influences the historiographical perspective. All these three modes (SHB, HA and HP) may be said to be operative at all levels, existential, epistemic and methodological. The concept of historical being is the basic category in this scheme, it opens up before us the philosophic-anthropological relation of the structures of human nature and accordingly attempts a mode of structural analysis of man as a historical being. Three principles, in particular, regulate this analysis: the structure of temporal existence, man's dialectical relationship with the cosmocentric world and his relationship with others involved in the form of life. Time, dialectics and inter-subjectivity shape the conception of man's historicality. In terms of this understanding of man as a historical being, the analysis turns to the modes of historical awareness and to the form of history as a form of life. Here I should mention a few key concepts relevant for the understanding of history—change, progress, action, power and value system. These elements form a gestalt of cognition, and finally lead to the notion of man as a historical being. Man's historicality is realized in action. Hence it is necessary to understand the epistemic structure of the historical being and the type of the concepts and conceptual connections involved in the idea of historical being. This would provide what may be called a conceptual map of history as a mode of knowledge.

2. I think when we talk of history we have in fact three different conceptions of history. History is generally supposed to be a study of man in time. The question arises: study of which man? If it is a study of man as concept, bereft of concreteness and individuality, time becomes a carrier of events and man is reduced merely to some kind of relations amongst

events. In such a case it will be merely a game of some kind of temporal logic or dialectics. Some Marxists and Hegelians seem to be playing this game when they eliminate individuality and particularity and talk of merely succeeding events or developing ideas using the law of triad-thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis. Of course I am aware that all Marxists or Hegelians do not give such an explanation of history. If we say that history is a study of man in general (as we use the common noun man), then, although it is not the study of particular men, it does become the study of living man—man who had or has lived on this earth and who is likely to live. This allows for a pluralistic universe of men. But in this conception of history too, man is bereft of individuality and becomes merely a carrier of certain trends or characteristics. In this conception of history the problems would be as to how we should distinguish history from anthropology and even myth. When history turns itself into myth, the acquaintance of historical characters is forgotten, their facial resemblance is erased and their physical proportions and temporal relations get changed. Still they are human-like characters moving in space and time and the basic essence of history is not forgotten when such myths are spread. Myths come into existence when events become a part of our blood system or breath system. In such cases history does not remain history. When we talk of anthropology, although we talk of men we are concerned with man's class characteristics and we leave aside the individual characteristics which make each individual a concrete living individual. Such anthropology is certainly not history.

According to the third conception of history one could accept many concrete individuals who have actually lived in space and time and who are likely to live in space and time. Here we are preserving the particularity and identity of individuals. But how are we going to write the biographies of these different individuals? The valour of these 'concrete living' individuals may inspire us, but we cannot give a full biography of all these men. We have to follow a process of selection and elimination. We have to eliminate several characters in history when the history gradually recedes into the social memory and the characters in history become merely inhabitants of past time. However, all these three conceptions of history do not take into account the future which is projected through wish, desire or will. The third conception of history is likely to give us colourfulness. But it would not give us rules that might help us understand the future possibilities which are likely to take place.

3. Let me elaborate this point. The colourfulness of history is due to the fact that we take for granted a pluralistic universe which persists through changes in different times and which has concrete individuals as pawns in the games of history. In these games it is only the ground which is non-plural. But strictly speaking, this is also not true. Even the plurality of the background emerges both on account of different geographical locations

and the temporal gaps by which the same or different backgrounds are recognized as different. The presence of different concrete human situations also make the picture unique. If these pictures are different and unique what kind of explanation can be given? Perhaps the only explanation that we can offer is that they are different. But in this uniqueness there could be traces of similarities. Causal explanation can be given when we trace such similarities, ignoring the differences. But it is the complex of similarity and difference which make each situation unique and in such a case strict causal explanations would become inoperative. Causal explanation requires that we take a picture of the situation stretched in time, but also taken out of the entire time-stream. If this picture is composed of units of events which could be characterized as universal and uniform then alone could the different parts of the situation, earlier and later, be explained in terms of causation. But historical units are unique, real and concrete and therefore causal and statistical explanations in such cases are impossible. If we consider these historical units as having universal characteristics, without the concreteness or special characteristics which human beings as individuals have, then, as stated earlier, it would be difficult to find out the difference between history and a piece of fiction: and the fiction may be of various types, a lyrical poetry, an epic, a short story or a bunch of connected short stories, a novel, a drama. They are all related to human beings and when we read such literature we feel as if we have met these characters. In fact we meet such characters several times and in several segments of space and perhaps on this account we begin to think that history repeats itself. But in such abstractions, have we still retained the concrete reality with which the uniqueness of history is concerned? I feel that in such experiences, we are only concerned with general psychological characteristics which we usually name as reason, emotion, desire, etc. We require some human beings to hold or own these (abstract) notions and so we conceive of human characters having these psychological characteristics. Human beings act here only as 'stands' or 'holders' of these psychological characteristics. But just as it is true that we seem to feel that we meet these characters in our life, it is also true that we never come across these concrete characters in our life. The explanation which fiction suggests would never give us history. For we are already deprived of the concreteness and particularity with which history is concerned.

The explanations in fiction as also in history are coloured on account of our personal attitudes, to which we give the sober name, interpretation. Take, for example, the frescoes of Ajanta. The only thing we can definitely say is that if there are frescoes there must have been makers of the frescoes. Everything else in our explanation or historical interpretation in regard to style, etc., is a product of our imagination. Although people try to study the history of art, a large part of this study is likely to end in frustration. But in this study, even when we try to give explanations, the picture of the

world, or a fragment of the world, or an aspect of the world is pluralistic. Again, we may enjoy an album of the frescoes but a mere album of frescoes would not give us any history. We are also interested in knowing the individuals, although even if we 'know' the names of individuals it will be merely a make-believe. Suppose we start with a unitary or holistic concept of the universe and its history. If it is just unitary, any explanation is really forbidden to us; individuals would not remain individuals. But history is, in fact, concerned with individuals and their actions. Without the context of individuals actions will be reduced to mere movements, and if we take away the pluralistic elements and the concreteness the movements will tend to become moments. If we talk of the somnambulistic form of such movements, the mobility of the movements will also come to a stop. What kind of explanation can then be given? Instead of the unitary picture of history, if we think of history in its holistic form, then also the explanation as conceived by most philosophers of history would become meaningless. The spatio-temporal world would have mere parts and the dynamism to which we give the name 'history' would be inseparable from these parts. The whole could be conceived as merely the whole of parts. The part-whole mechanism does not allow any causal or statistical explanation. We only know, if there is mobility, that one part will recede to the past giving place to some other part, and we will remember the past because of our memory. But if we have memory alone and not wishes and desires our conception of history will be such that there will neither be any reference to future nor prediction of the future. The future which is not strictly a part of history is, as already stated, concerned with our wishes and desires and it is on account of our imagination that we connect the future with the concept of history. The so-called dialectical explanation of history is of this kind. The concept of history as also the explanation in this sense are bereft of individuals and concreteness. In this conception of history only the flow of history is retained. We only know that there is change. But we would not be able to know whether there is any progress also. But we do talk of progress and regress. This is because progress and regress are attributed only to the world of human beings.

4. Although literally history means the story of the past, it must be remembered that, that which is momentary cannot be regarded as history. When one talks of history one has to talk of a certain continuum. Suppose we symbolize this continuum as $E1$, $E2$, $E3$ and suppose this continuum is contemporaneous with a time-continuum called $M1$, $M2$, $M3$ (such that $E1$ corresponds to $M1$, $E2$ corresponds to $M2$ and $E3$ corresponds to $M3$). In such a case, if someone is observing $E1$, then $E1$ will be present, $E2$ will be immediate future and $E3$ will be a little distant future. This would mean that the terms past, present and future are only relative. They are relative to a certain observer, they pre-suppose a certain time and even if no events take place the time will continue to flow. But it could also mean that the continuous flowing of the time would be neither past nor future nor present. The event

series which is contemporaneous with the moment series alone would make room for concepts like past, present, future and would make history possible. However, when one talks of events, they not only would take place in time, they would not merely have length without breadth, but they would also take place in space. And as soon as one conceives of space there need not be only one series of events, there could be a parallel and intersecting series of events. History in such a case will have to be considered as a game not comparable to the game of patience played only by one person or a game of tennis as played by two people (two sides). It will be a game played by many people belonging to many sides, played at different points of space and time. The different parts of the game will also have to be depicted not by event points but by an event continuum. Had history been only one event series depicted by $E1$, $E2$, $E3$ it would be like a flow in time and it would be governed by Newton's law of inertia, it would be moving continuously and evenly. But if there are several event series simultaneously criss-crossing one another, one event series is likely to be a hurdle or obstruction to the flow of other series and the prediction which could be possible in the case of one event series alone would not be possible. It must be further remembered that even in one event series the events do not flow continuously with the same velocity. Since the forces which govern such flows of events are infinite, it would be difficult to arrive at a definite prediction in regard to the future.

Nevertheless, a prediction about the future is always attempted by historians and scientists. The scientists' formula that the future will resemble the past or that nature is uniform is based on two considerations, viz.: (1) they consider one phenomenon only at a time, and (2) they further consider that, whatever the time be, it behaves exactly like space. If there were space alone and no time, all events would be simultaneous and one would get a complete, though momentary, picture of all events (which would not have any temporal length). The laws of science, astrology, yoga and history are based on this fact, that they regard the successive as simultaneous, that the successives also follow the same law as is followed by the simultaneous. This means that the movement which goes with succession is forgotten and we think that there is no difference between the successives and the stills. On account of this erroneous presumption we are likely to get a distorted image of history so far as the future is concerned.

Nevertheless, philosophers of history try to predict the future and success or failure of the philosopher of history is measured by the success one attains in predicting the future. Is predicting the future altogether irrelevant to history or to human life? I feel, it is not. For, everything that we do points to the future and has already penetrated into the future. Man's life and in fact everything which has consciousness is heading towards the future and if one has self-consciousness one is bound to think of the future and base one's

expectations on the basis of something which may be called the past experience. There seems to be something common between past experience and future expectation. Man, and for that matter any living being, has a certain form of life. This means that his expectations, like his achievements, are finite in number and are made of the same elements. He does not expect something which is totally different in nature from what he has earlier experienced or achieved and if the parts which make his achievements can take place in previous experience, they can also take place in future experience. Expectations are not so normative that they have nothing to do with the form of life. It is only through the selection of certain past experience that man is either expecting something or universalizing something in order to transform it into expectation or norm.

After all, it must be remembered that some expectations come true just as some expectations do not. Why do our expectations or predictions come true? Can this be the case unless there is some relation between those expectations and their 'existence'? If there is a human being, there are bound to be his actions and the actions, whether they belong to the past, present or future, are bound to be similar; it cannot be that in the context of the human world there is vacant time without it being filled with certain actions, events, etc. This makes for similarity between the past events and the so-called future events. As stated earlier, when we expect something we treat time as non-existing or we treat it more or less as space, and on the basis of this we predict. And our predictions come true in so far as time becomes irrelevant for prediction.

5. Instead of asking the question, do predictions come true, we should rather note the fact that some predictions come true. The education department announces that the S.S.C. results would be declared, say on 20 May, and usually the results are declared on that day. But sometimes, despite the announcement that the results would be declared on a particular date, the results are not declared. Some may say that it is not a prediction, because the results are already tabulated. They are ready but not declared. But is there not a gap between being ready and not being declared? Many things could happen in this gap. Someone may steal the result sheet, it may catch fire, the building may collapse and so on. But this does not usually happen and we are able to anticipate a few things for the simple reason that there are no obstructions. Where the time element can be ignored tentative laws of prediction can be established. Where the time element becomes significant this is not the case. For example, when an aeroplane is manufactured, unless something very serious goes wrong with it, it is supposed to fly for a certain number of hours. Those number of hours are taken as a co-ordinate like other co-ordinates. Futurity becomes irrelevant for such calculations. The metal of which the plane is made has a certain strength. We measure it in terms of its efficiency for a certain period of time. Ordinarily this works,

which means that the time element can be ignored and we can work as we do in regard to non-temporal elements. But sometimes there is 'metal fatigue'. Nobody knows what this is, but it causes a break-up. It means that the element that we thought should be ignored cannot be ignored and in such cases the prediction goes wrong. If I give a lecture on Wednesday and if I regularly take a class on Wednesdays, students can predict that next Wednesday I would take that class. This prediction takes place by ignoring the temporal obstruction which could intersect my plan. But it is possible that I fall ill or there may be holiday or students may not attend, etc. In such a case I would not take the class. However, what is more important to note is that being a human being, I might die and in such a case I would never take a class after that point. Here time becomes a relevant factor because all kinds of intersections are possible. Let us take two instances: (1) water can be analysed into two portions of hydrogen and one portion of oxygen. We take it that in the future also this would be true. This is so because there is the least possibility of any obstruction intersecting that which we have discovered. As against this, (2) if we say the sun will rise tomorrow it would be mostly true but it is possible that some other heavenly body collides with the earth or with the sun with the result that the sun's rising tomorrow would not be true because it would be irrelevant. In history there are several co-ordinates which are to be considered. One of them is man, nay, men. The other is nature. The third is time. The fourth is events—happenings and actions. All these co-ordinates may not act harmoniously. The impersonal laws of history can be predicted to a certain extent. Personal laws cannot be predicted because they are beset (endowed) with many an obstruction. And even in the case of impersonal laws, obstructions may thwart the laws, make it impossible to predict. History is the study of the matter of fact and though we may talk of harmony and consistency, it will only be approximate. History is not governed by the law of contradiction. For, in social affairs the law of contradiction does not operate. When a prediction goes wrong, then also it is consistent with history, in the same way as when it comes true. History is a kind of symbiosis where whatever happens becomes a part of it. One can then predict only with the understanding that even when one's predictions do not come true, it is consistent with the nature of history.

6. Man has curiosity about his ancestry. And this curiosity often leads men towards pointing out how their forefathers were more civilized and cultured than those of others. If we can point out that such inquiry leads us towards the more remote past and unfolds the signs of civilization, we experience some kind of fulfilment and happiness. The hidden objective of establishing the superiority of our forefathers is to establish our own prestige. In this endeavour to discover their heritage the Europeans discovered Greek culture. The United States of America is perhaps the most powerful nation on the earth today, but its history is

hardly 225 years old. Yet Americans want to establish something which is 'their own' and which is prior to the statue of Liberty. In this endeavour they want to buy, with thousands of dollars, the London bridge, break it into parts and reconstruct the same in America. They also want to rebuild some of the ancient cathedrals in Europe, like the one at Casa Blanca, by purchasing it, demolishing it and rebuilding it with the same old material. The reasons for doing all this is that man has an urge to create a record of his achievements and to provide a historical context to his present status. But unfortunately the world of man is divided into several fragments and instead of creating one record of human achievements, he creates a record of one fraction with a partial point of view. History therefore becomes a record of the dialogue and struggle between different fractions of human society and deviates from the much vaunted concept that history is a study of (universal) man (in time). If human beings enter into a dialogue, as well as fight with one another, the study of man will have to take cognizance of this aspect also.

What then is the nature or purpose of history? I think it is to establish our identity. Although history is supposed to be 'his' 'story', history aims at making this story 'my' story. While reading history we unconsciously take sides, we identify ourselves unconsciously with one side or the other. This is because in history we see our heritage. Historians, while presenting history, do not merely stick to events or the chronologies of events, they are forced to give interpretations. This is because through history we are searching for the sublimity of our heritage. We enjoy history on this account. We want to establish that we have a great heritage, that our so-called forefathers were great men. If we are defeated, we think it is the fault of those who defeated us, it is unrighteousness on their part, it is our duty to avenge the defeat and establish our greatness which has come down to us by tradition. Any history, therefore, is going to be the history of something with which we identify ourselves. It is the history of an individual, it is the history of an individual family, it is the history of an individual nation. All these make history inspiring.

History tells us that we transform moments into movements, movements into events and events into actions. This cannot be done without man. This has two sides, perhaps more. It is a recognition of the fact that there are many beings like us, a plurality of individuals. History is concerned with a dialogue amongst them, it is concerned with the conflict of one individual with another, whether this individual is just a person or a family or a village or a nation. Whether it is a conflict or a dialogue, it is unquestionably a record of communication. It seeks our identity by taking sides. As Dhṛtarāṣṭra puts it in the *Bhagavadgīta*, either they are *mine* or they are Pandu's...and history is concerned with: 'किम् अकुर्वत' (what did they do?). As soon as we use the word मामक (mine) the purpose of history is clear. It is our identifying with some group, our partiality to some group,

it is building the story of the actions of that particular group. Of course, the idea is to depict the story of the whole human world. But in a pluralistic and self-based universe this would not happen. Nevertheless the human world and the natural world are the background on which the game of history is played. Both these worlds are suggested by qualifying the words, क्षेत्र by धर्म and कुरु in धर्मक्षेत्र and कुरुक्षेत्र (in the first verse of the *Bhagavadgītā*).

Facing truths: ethics and the spiritual life

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In this paper I continue an enterprise begun in earlier work (McGhee, 1988, 1989) in which I attempt to naturalise into a western philosophical context concepts that derive from the practice of Buddhist meditation. In particular I shall try to make use of the notion of *samādhi* (sometimes translated as 'concentration') and *vipassana* or insight. I should stress that I make no attempt at a scholarly explication of these terms as they appear in the literature but try to establish a use for them as result of reflection upon my own limited experience. In particular I try to use them as an aesthetician concerned with the expression and intentionality of the emotions and as a moral philosopher with a particular interest in retrieving the Greek virtues of continence and temperance. I have tried to relate these virtues to stages in the emergence of what I call an 'ethical sensibility', so that temperance, for instance, becomes the natural state of someone in whom such a sensibility is flourishing. But I see the development of that sensibility as a matter of the *concentration* or gathering of a person's energies into its structure, into the sustaining of the thought or perception upon which action or non-action depends, as well as into the sustaining of action itself. In talking of 'energy' here I am trying to develop an idea of Simone Weil's in which she refers to 'the energy available for action'. It seems to me that these are large issues and I fear that I have made little more than a start on them.

Not everyone is comfortable with the phrase 'spiritual life', perhaps for good reason. But I am using it for want of a better, and hope that I can draw attention to a set of traditional associations that will temper the discomfort. The point is to *track* its application rather than to assume what it must be. In what follows I shall sketch a naturalistic conception of ethics in which I claim that moral dispositions are expressions of determinate stages of our spiritual life, including a stage, for instance, in which a person comes to feel a spirit which delights to do no evil.

So I do not rely on a well-understood notion of the spiritual life in order to build up a picture of ethics, nor again on a well-understood conception of ethics to illumine the idea of the spiritual life. They are both thrown into contest and I try to construct the content of each out of the other. Even so I hardly approach what might be called the metaphysics of the

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spiritual life, the questions about what insights might be yielded about the nature of reality, even though I rely to some considerable extent on the notions of 'concentration' and the regulative idea of 'seeing things as they really are'. Despite the absence of metaphysics I do not want to *reduce* the spiritual life to ethics. On the other hand, in more than one tradition a connection is made between the two, so that spiritual progress is manifested in a person's demeanour, or in the forms of relation established in a community. By the same token, there has been a traditional tension between the idea of spiritual progress and conventional morality.

To make a beginning, I shall present the spiritual life as a series of transformations of the persons of a community, from one set of dispositions and forms of connection (or disconnection), to another, in which there is no disconnection. It would be proper at this point to include the idea of a political transition from a social life governed by violence and domination towards one governed by freedom and justice, but though such issues provide a more or less unspoken background, I want to concentrate on moral psychology and its relation to ethical foundations, so that I can establish an epistemological approach that makes sense of the importance attached to such political values. The transformations I have in mind need to be shown to depend upon some notion of *discernment* or understanding, upon some recognition or acknowledgement of *reality*. Neither change nor discernment seem to me to depend directly on the will: in fact they seem to come to us as a kind of grace of nature. To capture the connections between change, understanding and reality I am inclined to talk of *transformations of sensibility*, if the term 'sensibility' may be thought not to recede too much from the idea of action and forms of contact. It is not so much that inner processes stand in need of outer criteria as that the single process by which the concentration of life and conduct occurs has inner and outer moments, and it is, finally, by our fruits that we shall know one another. But at least a rich enough conception of sensibility gathers together the ideas of responsiveness and knowledge, motivation and cognition, the idea of 'reading' and acting in its light, as well as the idea of false readings, misrepresentation, delusion and ignorance. So I shall retain the notion of sensibility, despite the suspicion of 'feeling' to be found among philosophers, because it carries with it the idea of being *moved* by what one has come to know, see, or believe, an idea without which action, even with knowledge, is inexplicable, and because feeling, as Sartre recognised, is revealed in action. The key idea is that of the transforming power of knowledge or understanding, itself dependent upon a sufficient degree of alertness or concentration. Touched by reality, we are affected, and act.

I shall borrow a phrase of Schiller's to express the epistemological *leitmotif*: 'impressions move the soul'. The status of claims about what kinds of impression move to what kinds of response is really the central topic. I think there are truths to be established about such matters, and that

our knowledge or ignorance of how impressions move the soul provides the grounds of mutual expectation, the grounds of our sense of how a person ought to behave, of what attitudes they ought or ought not to have. But when I talk here of what attitudes a person ought or ought not to have, I do so not in the sense of some fugitive moral 'ought' or unexplained form of normativity or obligation, but in the sense of *what we have reason to believe or expect*. The epistemic expectation that I have in mind sits well with the expressivist position that underlies my claim that our ethical dispositions are natural expressions of determinate states of consciousness, or stages of 'concentration', which I understand as the suspension within which a form of perception and conduct are capable of being sustained. Our mutual expectations are grounded, in other words, in implicit beliefs about the intentionality of sensibility or motivation, about *what* impressions move the soul, and in *what* way. Any community's expectations will be limited by the range of responses that are so far available to it, by its known sensibility, possibilities which can be lost and found in the tradition, again and again. Known motivation provides the ground of expectation in a way that matters to us, sometimes urgently, hence the illusion of normativity associated with expectation, the anger, for instance, at its disappointment, when in reality the expectation is merely empirical. Relative differences in our knowledge or ignorance of how impressions move the soul is also the source of mutual incomprehension, though the incomprehension is not always mutual. As Kierkegaard observed, two people can agree with one another, word for word, and yet be guilty of the grossest possible kind of misunderstanding. We cannot neglect this notion of incomprehension, since it seems to be an unavoidable feature of the notion of *progress* or, more neutrally, states of concentration, which define an available horizon, bring into focus particular forms of motivation, sustaining the associated thoughts and perception which move to action. Implicit in this latter thought is a theory *about* ethics, that conduct, and forms of community, depend upon degrees of concentration of energy.

I have been reminded by recent work of Nicholas Lash (1987) of the pull of a tendency to which I have already to some extent succumbed by my readiness to talk of impressions moving the soul. It would be natural to proceed at this point somewhat as follows. The impressions that we perceive are perceived under descriptions, and it is in the light of our discernment of particular realities and their causal connections, represented thus and so, that we are moved to action or restraint, though to what action, and by what impressions, depends on the state of the subject, an aspect usually neglected in discussions of emotion. To say this is to make a quite proper gesture towards the intentionality thesis as it operates in relation to the emotions or sensibility, and it marks the cognitive aspect of feeling: we respond to realities as we take them to be. But though this may suffice as a very general indication of that aspect of sensibility, we need some strong qualification if

we are to characterise the nature of our ethical responses. The tendency, of course, is to swerve away from the personal. If we say that impressions move the soul, it is easy to refer that to facts, to states of affairs, to situations, to the objects of the emotions. There is nothing wrong with this, in fact it is something to emphasize, but there is an essential rubric under which such talk should fall. We are not just affected by what happens in the world, though we are: we are affected, under certain conditions, which I intend to discuss, by how persons, and, more generally, fellow-creatures, are affected by what happens in the world. Such natural patterns of response conflict with egocentric or communal patterns of thinking in which events are related exclusively to oneself or one's own community. But even in our own case we respond to states of affairs *as they affect us*, (and they affect us according to how we are then constituted), either in immediate reaction, or through some conception of ourselves as persons among others, which may or may not be adequate to how we are then constituted. Thus we act for our own sake, perhaps to remedy a situation by which we are adversely affected, or see ourselves as adversely affected.

The ethical life, though, opens up at the point where we respond to situations as they affect persons *qua* persons, and then, more generally, as they affect other sentient beings, and where, in consequence, we act for their sake, in accordance with our understanding of the nature of their being. So impressions move the soul, but it is our sense of what is happening as it affects one another for good or ill that moves us to *ethical* action. And we cannot avoid the issue that our *sense* of what is harmful or beneficial is dependent on what we take ourselves to be, upon our sense of the nature of our own reality. To put it another way, with an obvious Kantian resonance, in the ethical life we become for each other *ends of action*. What I mean by this is that we come to want to sustain each other in our own being, a being which I take to be essentially ethical. But our conception of what we are may or may not coincide with the *realities* of personhood. For instance, our view of what it is to be a person may fail to acknowledge the truth of the claim, if it is a truth, that unless a grain of wheat fall into the earth and die, it shall not bear fruit. I say 'if it is a truth' because I take it that individuals stand in different relations to this remark, and others like it, from the point of view of their experience. That they do so makes the issue of moral realism difficult in unexpected ways.

The background motivation is not an intellectual or so-called 'ethical' commitment to the flourishing of persons. On the contrary, in the spirit of my attempt to offer a naturalistic reading, I should say that the background motivation emerges from the *finding*, and the finding satisfaction in, possibilities of mutual response, solidarity, and other notions constructing the arrival of an 'existence for one another'. All these notions could be summarised under that of the *appreciation of persons*. But the arrival of these possibilities determines the self that comes to be constructed out of them, and which

did not previously exist. To put it another way, the terms in which we become for one another 'ends of action' depends crucially upon the realities associated with 'appreciation'. Under certain conditions, of *meeting* and *union*, which bring about this 'existence for one another', we come to appreciate the *beauty of persons*, and are thereby regenerated in a way which should, rationally, be reflected in our conception of personhood. This appreciation provides a background sense of what persons are that can become the ground not only of delight but also of compassion. It can become such a ground for an important reason. Our *sense* of what is harmful or beneficial, of what we can rejoice in or feel compassion for, is dependent on what we take ourselves to be. But if we are constituted by the trajectory I am attempting to describe, then what diminishes its possibility we shall treat as 'harm' and what enhances it as 'benefit'. I refer to a trajectory, and that allows us to say that there is a time before and a time after we come to appreciate the beauty of persons and to treat them as ends, a time before and a time after, that is to say, the emergence of *ethics*. And since, as Diotima insists, we desire to procreate in beauty, it is out of the reciprocal appreciation of the beauty of personhood, and hence of its possibility within one another, that forms of life are constructed in which persons are let be and enabled to become.

Since I am making central to my account this Platonic notion of appreciation of beauty of soul and the associated desire to procreate in beauty, I had better rehearse how I think such beauty can be the object of desire, or rather, how certain states of persons can be considered 'beautiful'. Someone who *exemplifies* such beauty embodies or mediates a certain concentration of energy, that by which a certain perspective and demeanour is sustained, a perspective and demeanour that become the *form* of that mode of energy. By 'perspective' here I simply mean the being moved in a determinate direction by particular kinds of reason, i.e. states of affairs that are the intentional objects of particular motivations. Coming to treat persons as ends is a matter of coming to be established in the corresponding ethical sensibility focused on well-being. As I have just said, the sustaining of such a perspective, such a sensibility, depends upon a concentration of energy around the relevant forms of attention. But such energy *radiates* and attracts, is an object of *Eros*, a form of beauty. I have suggested elsewhere (McGhee, 1990) that one reason such forms attract, are the object of *Eros*, is that they represent the direction of our own *Bildung*, our own future. I had better add, since there are false teachers and false prophets, that the energy radiates in demeanour and disposition, which provide the criteria of identity for forms of energy. However, the *conjunction* of such energies, between persons, produces new forms, a new spirit, hence my reference just now to the experience of meeting and union, and these discoveries of contact produce transformations that rationally determine changes in our conception of personhood and hence of what we take to be harmful or beneficial.

Many philosophers, including Thomas Nagel and Simone Weil, have tried to make the notion of 'recognizing the reality of persons' work for them in this context. But such phrases are not really helpful unless we tie them to something more fundamental which determines the *form* of that recognition. What I suggest is that this recognition is manifested in the discovery of the forms of relation and construction that constitute the ethical life and determine our sense of what that reality is. Simone Weil writes that 'belief in the existence of other human beings is *love*'. But I would rather say that love is a *form* of belief in the existence of other human beings, one moreover which helps to construct the nature of that existence.

It is crucial for my later argument that it should be a common experience that when someone finds this perspective and form of contact and loses it again they experience the loss as a darkening and oppression of the spirit, in a way analgous perhaps to the expense of spirit that occurs in sexual excess. We should associate this darkening of the spirit, not merely with the sense of energies scattered and concentration and focus lost, but with its corollary, what I would call a loss of *world*, a closing in of the horizons, depletion, isolation, envy, hatred, which again is imaged in the sexual life by the experience of lust as 'a drug against imagination of all but carnal forms' (Morgan, 1936, p. 267); and we may contrast this with the sense of energies returned and gathering, increase in intensity answered in extensity of scope, enlargement of sympathy, responsive to a touch, a glance. The ebb and flow of spirit is the epistemological ground of rational expectation in regard to conduct. The ebb and flow is between what Blake calls the two contrary states of the human soul, between what Rousseau calls the state of nature and the just society. The claim is that recognisably moral dispositions reflect some state of the soul, or better, some state of a society. But I want to offer an epistemological account of what I have just called moral dispositions, a moral epistemology. The experience of the ebb and flow between hatred and love, that is to say, the common experience, attested to in our traditions, provides the rational grounds of expectation, in the sense that even in the palpable absence of ethical response there are grounds for the judgement that the response ought to be there. But this ought is to be given an epistemic construction in terms of rational expectation.

Kant talked of treating humanity as an end, whether in one's own person or in that of any other. I think he was mistaken to think in terms of an imperative in this context, as I shall explain later. But I want to retain the reference to 'ends', without subscribing to the conception of 'humanity' under which it was supposed to happen, and I want to relate it to a characteristic sensibility and form of life, as I said. These come about under certain conditions, and their emergence or growth occurs against the radio interference of forms of life that are already in place: hence the two contrary states of the human soul. But for Kant the failure to treat humanity as an end is represented as a matter of treating it merely as a means. No doubt

there is such a contrast, but it seems to me that a fuller account of what we could call the 'anti-ethical' must include the active hatred of humanity, the contrary of appreciation, and hence an attitude specifically directed towards beauty of soul, the attitude of Claggart towards Billy Budd, for instance. Nevertheless if we think in terms of the two contrary states of the human soul we can represent the polar possibilities as the active or passive hatred of humanity, on the one hand, and the treatment of humanity as an end, on the other. But as I have already said, it is a particular development of *Eros*, our coming to appreciate the beauty of persons, which determines the formation of what I am calling the ethical life, and, consequently, our coming to treat one another as ends of action, as beings we desire to sustain in a being we mutually create. The discovery of this general form of relation marks the transition between *the* two contrary states of the human soul. Blake does not refer to two among a number. These poles represent the *natural possibilities*, a claim important for any moral epistemology, and they correspond to polar forms of *sensibility*, the passage from the one to the other of which is arduous, a matter of struggle and hazard, away from the reactions of violence, towards the feeling of a spirit that delights to do no evil. Responding to one another as ends, in the terms I have described, refers directly to a distinctive sensibility and form of life, *must* do so, if it is not to be depraved into the mentality of the *Collector*. For instance, coming to appreciate each other's beauty as persons, we are *solicitous* for one another about the good or harm that can befall us. But Diotima connects that reciprocal appreciation to procreating in beauty, as we have already seen. What are begotten or constructed out of such meetings are beneficent forms, the co-operative building of forms that aid each other's free development.

Now once we recognize the passage from one pole of sensibility and structure to another, we need to put content into the movement from the anti-ethical to the ethical by putting in place a multiplicity of concepts which structure the realities of this movement. In other words, if we are to talk plausibly about the realities of personhood, then we need to show their structure. I have in mind, for instance, such concepts as consent, the conditions under which it is given, trust, reconciliation, forgiveness, and so forth. The point I want to make is that these represent *realities* whose nature we have to learn, whose nature we may not immediately grasp, because they have to be learnt from experience. The processes of forgiveness, for instance, have their own reality independently of what any individual may happen to think, so that here there are truths we know or fail to know. Whether we are interior to these realities or not determines the extent of mutual understanding, but, more importantly, our knowledge or ignorance determines our sense of what enhances or diminishes our personhood, since it determines our sense of what *constitutes* our personhood, so that the direction of our solicitousness for someone's welfare may *collide* with realities that we do not understand, in such a way that the well-meaning becomes enemies of the good.

II

What I have presented so far is the barest sketch of a transition towards the ethical life, which I have represented in terms of discovery, construction and education, one in which we are concerned for each other's welfare, *qua* persons, under a particular conception of personhood, one that needs rationally to keep pace with the transformations of sensibility by which we are constantly reconstructed. The forms of that relation to one another, their realities, already provides us with some sense of what constitutes our personhood, since they serve, or help, to construct it, and our knowledge or ignorance of the relevant truths determines our understanding of what enhances our being or diminishes it, though attachment to particular constructions may blind us to the further reality that in order to find our life we must be prepared to lose it.

However, in this section, I want to enter into a more detailed discussion of what constitutes moral truth, or how we are to understand the way questions of truth enter into ethical discourse. I have already promised that I would carry out an epistemic reinterpretation of 'ought', and I turn to that now. What I offer is intended as a general account that is neutral between different conceptions of the good or rival moralities.

One of the issues in contemporary moral philosophy is whether moral utterances that have the form of statements have a substantive factual content. If they are genuine statements then they should have a truth value. But before we can decide whether or not they do, we need to be clear about what we are to count as moral statements in the first place. Thus, for instance, the presence of key terms like 'good', 'bad', 'ought' and 'should', 'right' and 'wrong', too readily identified as 'ethical symbols', do not by themselves establish that a purported statement is a moral one. (The current use of 'wicked' as a term of commendation should make this clear.) For example, the claim that you shouldn't beat your children does not yet give us the information we need to identify it as a moral claim. This becomes obvious when we turn to the speaker's *grounds*. If the coupling of the claim with its grounds yields the statement that you shouldn't beat your children because you are likely to get prosecuted, then it becomes clear that what we have is a prudential judgement.

Let us stay with this prudential judgement for a moment and draw out the way it might function as a hypothetical imperative. In addition to the reason for the judgement, you are likely to get prosecuted, there is an implicit parenthesis that says, 'and you don't want that, do you?', that is to say, an assumption about the wants or desires of the hearer.

But there are two ways in which the judgement is defeasible. It may be false that you are likely to get prosecuted, so on *that* account it is not true that you should stop beating them, though there may be other facts which would render it true. There is, of course, a second hurdle. If the assumptions about the hearer's wants are wrong, if they want to get caught or are indifferent to that outcome, then again, on *that* account, it is false that they should stop beating their children, though again there may be other desires that make it true.

But now, if the reason offered for the judgement that you ought not to beat your children is something like, 'it will traumatise them' or 'do them harm', then this grounding reference to their welfare points towards the utterances being a moral statement. The moral statement is not, 'you should not beat your children', but rather, 'you should not beat your children because it will do them harm'.

The familiar crux, though, is whether we need to add the same implicit parenthesis that we applied in the prudential case. Do we need to add to the reason that it will do them harm the assumption that the hearer has some relevant moral end, without which the judgement has to be withdrawn because a necessary condition of its application is missing? The question that is familiar to moral philosophers since Philippa Foot's influential article is whether so-called 'moral oughts' are similarly hypothetical upon the ends of the agent. Does the *truth* of the claim that you should not beat your children depend not only on the truth or otherwise of the grounding judgement that it will harm them ('it never did me any harm'), but also on the truth of the hypothesis that you don't want them harmed? In other words, does the fact that you want to harm them, or are indifferent to their being harmed, undermine the truth of the claim that you should stop beating them? Does the judgement apply to you only if you have the relevant moral end of causing none harm?

If you want to harm them, or are indifferent to their being harmed, then it looks as though we should say that it is *false*, at least on that account, that you should not beat them. On the other hand, I shall introduce an epistemic construction of 'ought' at just this point, indicating an *expectation* that derives from beliefs about what impressions move the soul: the causing of harm being one such. What I want to consider is whether it might be *true* that you should stop beating your children if it is true that by beating them you cause them harm *and* if it is true that you *ought* to want not to harm them. The thought here is that the reference to their well-being or harm draws attention to the intentional object of a form of motivation that the speaker expects to be present in the hearer. If the thought is correct, then the practical ought reduces to a *deployment* of the epistemic ought. It is in the expectation that they are thus motivated that the attention of the hearer is drawn to the relevant fact in the first place. What I am suggesting is that in the case where the hearer *denies* that they are thus motivated and the speaker declares that they ought to be, the speaker is claiming that there was reason to believe that they would be on the grounds that people are.

Now clearly there are going to be difficulties with this claim. In particular it is important that it should not be the means of smuggling into the account an unacknowledged normativity. In a moment I shall make some important

qualifications. Before coming to that, it is worth pointing out that someone who makes such a remark will be aware that the claimed indifference represents a state of affairs that may be dangerous from the point of view of well-being, and drawing attention to a disappointed expectation is a possible means of eliciting or awakening the expected motivation.

So what is the force of the claim that you ought not to want to harm people? The first thing to say is that 'ought' does not here govern an action but a want or desire. It makes reference to the idea of a desire that someone ought to have, in the sense, I shall maintain, that there is reason to believe that people do have that desire, or would have it under certain conditions.

Clearly there is an important difference between the belief that people do have a certain desire, and the belief that they would have it under certain conditions. In order to clarify the difference, and explain its significance for the position I am trying to develop, I shall invoke a context of innocence and a context of experience.

The naive version of the epistemic construction treats the moral derelict as anomalous or weird. In fact this is the form of a very common reaction to disappointed expectation in moral contexts. After appealing to certain considerations that the derelict claims to be indifferent to, many people may think or say, 'but you *shouldn't* be indifferent', and I suggest that their meaning is something like, 'but people *aren't* indifferent to such things: you're weird'. I think it is plausible to claim that this is the structure of a common response in such circumstances, it is an expression of incredulity in the face of recalcitrant experience. The (sheltered) background belief is that people as a matter of fact respond in particular, predictable ways, and here is someone who doesn't, someone anomalous or weird. The utterance may, of course, carry all the weight of fear and loathing the context may elicit. Disappointed expectations cause dismay because they make a difference.

But though I think it is plausible to claim that many people do in fact respond in this way, it is clear that the response itself is inadequate. The background belief is manifestly false. The more brutal the environment the innocent find themselves in the less likely are they to retain that belief. On the contrary, it is all too likely that brutality becomes precisely what they expect, and they may come to look askance at its absence rather than at its presence.

Let me now with some caution invoke a context of 'experience'. I have already alluded to the idea in an earlier part of this paper. My proposal is that experience perhaps may lead someone to a more sophisticated background belief, viz., people *are* moved by 'ethical' considerations, *unless they are prevented*, if I may so formulate it, at least provisionally. So when such a person addresses the derelict, saying 'you *should* be moved', knowing full well that they won't be, we should understand them to be saying, 'you *would* be moved by such things if you were not prevented'. In other words, they *expect* the relevant attitude to be missing, and they have an explanation.

I said earlier that I thought Kant was mistaken to think in terms of a categorical *imperative*, and my thinking so is connected with the possibility of treating 'ought' epistemically. Kant writes plausibly enough about the need of imperfectly rational beings to address imperatives to themselves, but it seems to me that he becomes confused when he associates prescription with 'ought'. He claims that 'all imperatives are expressed by an "ought" ' and this because they are addressed to a will which is determined by other considerations than the good, and so has to be necessitated (hence the imperative). In the case of the holy will on the other hand,

> there are no imperatives: '*I ought*' is here out of place, because '*I will*' is already itself necessarily in harmony with the law. Imperatives are in consequence only formulae for expressing the relation of objective laws of willing to the subjective imperfections of this or that rational being—for example, of the human will. (Paton, p. 78)

But there is only a contingent relationship between the presence of 'ought' and the need for self-addressed imperatives. 'Ought' as a logical indicator of a practical judgement applies as much to the holy will as to the imperfectly rational will, and simply indicates the presence of a reason for acting. Once a reason has been established or become apparent, the holy will is no doubt determined appropriately, says 'I will' and acts. This is not the case with the rest of us, but this fact simply reveals the imperfect human context in which ought-judgements are uttered, as it were, through clenched teeth. In any case it seems plausible to offer an epistemic reading of the so-called imperative. To claim that as rational beings we ought to act in such a way that we always treat humanity, in our own person, or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end, is in effect to claim that there is evidence that this is what rational beings *would* do, if they were not prevented by the sway of contrary inclinations. We *are* moved to treat each other as ends—unless we are in some way prevented—and to that extent, of course, our actions are in conformity with universal law, in conformity, that is to say, with a conception of what any human being is.

I shall turn aside from this discussion of the epistemic ought for a while because it needs to be connected with another issue, that of the meaning of terms like 'right' and 'wrong', which I shall treat as expressive, in certain contexts, of particular forms of motivation in relation to their intentional objects.

But in order to consider how to construe these terms I shall discuss another aspect of moral judgement that is also connected with the issue of truth and falsity.

What may tempt a philosopher to think that moral statements possess some sort of 'mind-independence' is the fact that there is sometimes a determinate answer to the question, about some proposed action, 'what *makes* it wrong?' Furthermore, a child seeking reassurance, who exclaims, 'it's *true*

that it's wrong, isn't it?' may reasonably be given the same determinate answer.

But this reference to some action judged to be wrong is hopelessly underdetermined. So let us look at an example. Simon Blackburn offers an apparently promising one: it is wrong to kick the dog, and he says,

> it is not because of the way we form sentiments that kicking dogs is wrong. It would be wrong whatever we thought about it. Fluctuations in our sentiments only make us better or worse able to appreciate how wrong it is. (Blackburn, 1984 p. 217)

So far as fluctuations in our sentiments go, the intentionality thesis allows space for the *rooting* of them in specific states of affairs, their objective correlative, which is also a criterion of their identity. If our emotions are unstable, the criteria of identity are not, for they represent the cognitive element which a person may hang on to despite the ebb and flow of affect. Though the thought that such and such an action would be *wrong* may be fairly drained of affect, it is nevertheless the channel along which feeling flows, and even the heroic, willed refusal to commit the act draws strength from the motivating description, and represents a modification of feeling, feeling as it is under certain conditions. The idea that our sentiments are subject to *fluctuation* reflects, of course, a particular, contingent experience of them. However unstable what we call our feelings are, their counterparts in the language, the evaluative *foregrounding* or *isolating* of specific phenomena, by which we give them expression, is itself relatively stable. The relationship between evaluation and description reflects the intentionality of motivation.

But Blackburn's comment seemed to provide some grounds for a 'quasi-realist' position on moral statements: it seems to be true that the action is wrong whatever we think—or feel—about it. It also helpfully provided a *caveat* against a too simple view of the implications of asserting a 'subjective source' for ethics. He goes on to give the obvious answer to the question, 'what makes it wrong?' and it is the answer one might well give to the child who wants to be reassured that it is *true* that it is wrong to kick the dog:

> What makes it wrong to kick the dog is the cruelty or pain to the animal.

If we wanted to reassure the child we may well say that it is true that it is wrong to kick the dog because doing so causes pain to the animal.

But is this really such a satisfactory example of a moral statement whose candidature for truth or falsity we can now go on to discuss? The example seems to imply that there is something in virtue of which an action is wrong, something, moreover, that makes it wrong whatever any particular individual may think or feel. In fact it is unilluminating. It does no more than to

show the relation between one description of an action and another, one that presents it precisely as the focus, the intentional object, of a particular sentiment. Kicking dogs is wrong because it causes them pain, and the causing an animal pain is something there is some reason to expect that anyone will recoil from, though as we know very well the expectation may be disappointed.

Presumably, though, we should want to say, not only that it is wrong to kick the dog, but that it is wrong to cause animals pain, or needless pain, which is, after all, what is wrong with kicking the dog. But if it is wrong to cause unnecessary suffering, or, to use an example of Timothy Sprigge's, wrong to cause pain to others for one's own enjoyment, then *what makes it wrong*? I present that as a rhetorical question, since I do not think the case is parallel with asking what makes it wrong to kick the dog. That question, I suggest, demands to know what the relevantly motivating description is, a motivation whose general direction is *expressed* in the use of 'wrong' in connection with causing unnecessary pain.

But if what I presented was merely a rhetorical question, can we not ask, nevertheless, whether it is *true* that causing unnecessary suffering is wrong? Some philosophers would simply treat it as an emotive utterance, not to be taken as a genuine statement at all. Others may see it as a truth to be discerned by rational insight. Others again may see it as the expression of a principle we simply have to choose or commit ourselves to. My own position is closest to emotivism, in so far as I agree that the statement draws a kind of exclamatory attention to the intentional object of an emotion. But it is to an emotion, as it were, that we expect to find. And here we must return to the discussion of the epistemic ought, so that I can offer at the same time a naturalistic reduction of so-called ethical statements *and* an emotivist reading of such terms as 'wrong'.

What qualifies my genuflection to emotivism is that while I think that 'wrong' gives expression to a response, it is to a response that *anyone ought to have*. What I mean by this is, a response that there is reason to believe that anyone *will* have. Let us leave on one side for the moment the necessary qualification 'unless they are prevented'. We are initiated into these expectations, learning profiles of personhood in the acquisition of language.

It might help to make this plausible if I point out that when a speaker says something like 'you shouldn't kick the dog' and offers the reason, 'because it will cause it pain', they do so to remind, or bring to the attention of the hearer, a *fact* which they expect to move them, a fact, that is to say, that they think *will* move them, and this thought is grounded in the background belief that people *are* moved by such considerations, a belief which gives point to the attempt to draw attention to the relevant fact, an attempt premised on the assumption that anyone will be moved, or, with experience, may be moved, or may just possibly be moved. To exclaim that it is *wrong*

expresses, as do tones of voice, etc., the nature of that motivation, but it is essentially a motivation that anyone ought to have in the sense I have indicated.

I think the implication of this is that to claim that some form of conduct is wrong, in the context under discussion, implies that it is a form of conduct that anyone ought to avoid, and this is to be construed as: a form of conduct there is reason to believe anyone *will* be moved to avoid. The advantage of this analysis, incidentally, is that it allows for non-expressive uses of 'wrong', including its use in non-asserted contexts. Thus when I say x is wrong I may or may not express the attitude I thereby imply that anyone ought to have. In unasserted contexts, where I say, 'if x is wrong, then . . .' I am saying 'if x is such that anyone ought to avoid it, then . . .', which is to say, 'if x is such that there is reason to believe that anyone will avoid it, then . . .'.

If what I say is more or less right then we need to part company with the simple emotivist analysis of 'it is wrong to cause unnecessary pain'. What I offer instead is 'causing unnecessary pain is something anyone ought to be moved to avoid', which is to say, 'causing unnecessary pain is something there is reason to believe anyone will be moved to avoid, unless they are prevented'.

Part of the interest of a quasi-realist view of moral statements was to yield statements which, though subjectively derived, nevertheless made a claim to truth independent of what any individual happened to think. In the previous section of this paper I have already drawn attention to possible truths which are stronger candidates for realism. Thus I claimed, for instance, that there is a truth about the conditions under which forgiveness is possible, which holds firm quite independently of what anyone happens to think of the matter, as is the case, say, with 'fire burns'. If we ignore either we are likely to get our fingers burnt. The sort of truth I have in mind enters into one's conception of good and harm, and is significant for the development of a rather different moral realism from that to which we have become accustomed. But in the present context we are discussing another candidate for truth, the claim, e.g., that people are moved to avoid doing what causes harm, unless they are prevented.

In the first part I said that I wanted to sketch a conception of ethics which showed our moral dispositions to be expressions of determinate states of our spiritual life. The proposition that there is a determinate state in which we would naturally recoil from cruelty, for instance, is certainly truth-claiming, and obviously underpins the evaluations which give expression to it. To the extent that it is an expression of our being, we are harmed if the emergence of that state is suppressed. Such states of the spiritual life are a matter of the *sustaining* or holding together of the relevant sensibility, the holding in focus of the objects of awareness upon which action depends, and the maintaining of the possibility of action itself. The transformation

of personhood is thus a matter of the concentration of energy within the relevant forms, forms that construct the person out of an ethical sensibility. The ethical sensibility becomes the form of the person, and the travails of its emergence are the travails of personhood.

However, the immediate claim is that anyone *would* recoil from cruelty, say, unless they are prevented. And the immediate problem is, how can it be defended? How might one begin to establish, or, more modestly, find evidence for, the proposition that someone who was indifferent to humane considerations was in some way prevented from being otherwise, someone who presumably wouldn't think of *themselves* as prevented?

I have given the gist of how one might go about this in my earlier remarks about the darkening and oppression of spirit which I said characterised the periodic loss of an ethical sensibility. What is crucial is the experience of an *oscillation* between two poles, between the two contrary states of the human soul, between the conditions upon which depend Cruelty, Jealousy, Secrecy, Terror, on the one hand, and Mercy, Pity, Peace and Love, as Blake represented it, on the other.

Whether there is such a trajectory from one state to the other is something that has to be personally appropriated from experience, the culture and the tradition. What has to be a matter of personal appropriation, a truth that can only be established subjectively, as Kierkegaard would put it, is the experience of an oscillation away from and in the direction of *a determinate orientation*, a tendency away from one form of life and towards another, so that our estimation of the poles is already stacked in favour of the *terminus ad quem*.

It is significant that the negative phases of this movement may be felt as a diminishing of the power of action, and a loss of world, because it entails the loss of the concentration of energy upon which such action depends, and the dismemberment of a formation of the self. Indeed one of the extreme points of oscillation involves the total eclipse of the perspective by which the contrary pole is constituted. Perhaps the eclipse is usually only partial, manifested in the experience of *incontinence*, which is an important clue. It represents an inability to act in the light of ethical considerations, even though one is moved in that direction. Incontinence represents a kind of partial eclipse, a moment between total eclipse and unimpeded vision. It is a state of mind which *prevents* someone from *acting* in the light of acknowledged good. I suggest that there are analogous states of mind which can prevent a person, not only from acting but also from being moved by the relevant impressions in the first place.

So the claim is that the derelict *would* respond if their vision were not obscured. It is the obscuration of vision that prevents the possibility of ethical action, that is to say the *finding* of those forms of contact that determine our coming to treat persons as ends. I make that qualification because the image of obscured vision could be misleading: it might suggest that a

sort of ethical vision is there all the time, if only the clouds were not in the way. In reality the obscurations prevent the *formation* of that vision.

So the claim that the moral derelict *would* respond ethically if they were not prevented amounts to saying that a certain formation of the person *would* develop if they were not entrenched in the states of mind that prevent it, not an arbitrarily privileged formation, but the one we have found. They are entrenched, we should have to say, in the known states of mind that prevent the insisting tendency that belongs to them as persons, a development by which they are constituted.

It is appropriate, I think, to draw attention to the precariousness of this claim. I have already said that whether we are constituted by this trajectory is a matter to be subjectively established, a truth to be ascertained between persons, and within oneself. It is hardly *well* established, there are too many instances where, if it is not disconfirmed, it is certainly not confirmed. On the other hand, people do change, and the presence of goodness has had observed effects.

So we rely on a view, to be subjectively established, about how we are constituted, a view about how anyone is constituted, to the effect that we are progressively structured around the trajectory I have described, around the emergence of an ethical awareness, and around the travails of its emergence.

If someone's *conception* of what a person is derived from the experience of that transformation, a transformation that represents their *Bildung*, then their judgement that the delinquent *ought* to be moved by ethical considerations can reasonably be thought of as epistemic, even if it is compounded by consequential evaluations. The delinquent ought to be thus and so because that is how people are, and how people are is a matter of the embodiment of the natural history of an ethical sensibility. In addressing the derelict in these terms, you should not be like that, the speaker attempts to recall them to themselves.

The corollary is that our sense of what is harmful or beneficial is dependent on what we take ourselves to be. If we are constituted by the trajectory towards the ethical life that I have described, then what prevents its possibility is felt as harm, and what furthers it is felt as benefit.

We thus have a rational conception of the good that undercuts much moral relativism while being compatible with wide cultural divergences in the expression of determinate spiritual states. This is a point worth highlighting because it is a common enough problem in moral philosophy that while morality is focused on the avoidance of harm or the furtherance of well-being, we have radical disagreements about what is to count as good, or count as harm. While there are wide cultural differences in the matter of what will bring about harm, or what will *be* harm, it seems to me that a rational limit is set on such conceptions by the fact, if it is a fact, that we are formed out of a sensibility associated with treating persons as ends, seeking

to sustain them in their being. But such a state of *Eros is* their being, and if it is undermined they are harmed. Treating persons as ends becomes a matter of sustaining them as beings who have precisely that aim, and the sensibility it entails.

I am tempted to talk here in terms of our real constitution, but I think it is a temptation to be avoided. The implication would be that we are thereby fully formed and that there is some independent standard by which we could confirm as much. But maybe we are still forming. The experience of a progressive concentration around the formation of an ethical sensibility must already to some extent undermine the idea of a fixed self we need to hold on to, and perhaps a doctrine of *anatta* could be developed from the idea that the flourishing of that sensibility is dependent upon conditions. Among those conditions is the steady retrieval of energy from forms of conduct and patterns of reaction and thought that are already *unsatisfactory* (or *dukkha*) from the point of view of the emergent sensibility which already announces itself in pre-reflective unease and *postmortem* remorse. What I have attempted to describe is a particular form of concentration, one which sustains the possibility of active thinking and the dawning of understanding. What a more sustained concentration may reveal about the nature of reality, and our relation to it, remains, perhaps to be seen, for I speak, alas, as a philosopher, and not the exponent of a tradition.

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Religious pluralism and relativism: The possibility of inter-religious communication

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The present academic mood for an analytical and critical inquiry concerning the issue of the 'otherness' of the other is to be welcomed for stimulating a reappraisal of the question of religious pluralism. To acknowledge religious pluralism as an empirical phenomenon is not necessarily to assume the stance of a relativist; for that one requires additional arguments. Relativism, however, is one amongst the various possible theories which try to make sense of pluralism, just as its very opposite, i.e. essentialism, also claims to be able to account for this phenomenon. What essentially prompts this discourse on pluralism in the religious context is need that the members of various religious communities have to achieve a higher level of critical self-understanding by placing themselves in a larger context which inevitably involves an encounter with the presence of the other. One may also turn it around and simply say that perhaps some of the most powerful and primordial formulations of the 'otherness' of the other originate from the religious traditions themselves. Implicitly, when not overtly—it may be urged—there is always a message embedded in these traditions regarding how to view the 'difference', the 'otherness' of those who do not abide by the same doctrine of salvation, or a share a system of values, beliefs and dogmas (or whatever may be deemed to be pertinent for the identity of a given religion). Hence, a deeper acquaintance with what exactly constitutes the 'otherness' of the other in the religious context is indispensable for achieving inter-religious communication. If there were no possibility whatsoever of grasping the conceptual content of this 'otherness', we could simply say with Kipling,

> All nice people like Us are We
> And everybody else is They.[1]

The urgency for an academic involvement with the question of religious pluralism seems to be intimately tied with any attempt to understand the contemporary world—a network of complex and complicated issues which amongst others also has its theological dimension. Evidently, it is no adequate description of the present global situation to say that the nuclear age is a post-religious era. Religions are major sources of ideas which provide meaning and a sense of direction for human existence. They play an important role in how a people constitute a sense of selfhood and a sense of 'otherness' of the other, a sense so charged that religions can indeed be considered

powerful determinants of collective behaviour. They are important factors in the continuing power of group identities. They not only unify, they also divide. The purely theoretical aspects of the issue of religious pluralism and the possibility of inter-religious communication need to be examined in the light of this awareness. It is evident that whatever strategies have been tried out so far, to the extent that they were designed to underplay or eliminate religious pluralism, have not worked. On the other hand, to assert pluralism and yet emphasize the incommensurability amongst them to a point where inter-religious communication seemed impossible is equally obsolete. Whatever factors were earlier at work in generating specific sorts of interests and attitudes for promoting or thwarting a deeper acquaintance with traditions other than one's own, the present concern for the issues of religious pluralism and inter-religious communication as an academic task itself requires a careful re-examination. What is at stake is no more a simple scholarly search for similarities and differences amongst the various traditions, not merely seizing upon an effective tool for doing what is called 'comparative religion' but how to lay bare the distinct experiential phenomenon, the profound insights embodied in various traditional cores of thinking which is called religious. The challenge remains, how to expose to the reflective gaze the various strata of the complexities of a tradition, how to help ensue a new creative discourse which is not a repetition of stereotypes and cliches which have jeopardized inter-religious communication. At this point, it is too hasty to predict the sort of influence that a full and a critical exposure to distinct traditional messages would have on future religious thinking. The responses would depend on the quality of the conversation which may emerge.

I

Let me briefly refer to some positions that have been taken regarding these issues.

Respecting the sense of group identity of various communities by virtue of which the blurring of differences is successfully resisted, there are several possibilities within the Indian traditions.

The Indian experience of religious pluralism is a subject that requires detailed and careful treatment which is not possible within the scope of this paper. Openness to religious diversity has ever been a distinctive feature of Indian culture; and it is in itself an interesting task to trace within Hinduism—a system of beliefs and ideas which very largely is supportive of diversity and which has left an unmistakable stamp on Indian philosophy, art and society. The traditional Indian responses and reactions to religious exclusivism will no doubt make an invaluable study not only because of the way the various views seek to preserve pluralism, but also because of differences in how they look at this plurality.

Regarding their implications for an encounter of religions, a review of the

positions taken in Advaita Vedānta (a Brahmanical School), Śūnyavāda of Mādhyamika (a Buddhist School) and Anekāntavāda, the Jaina view, seem specially relevant. To explain the presence of diversity, recourse has been taken to various moves which unfold the many forms that the dialectic of the self and the other can assume.

There is a move to preserve pluralism while retaining a belief in a universal truth. Sometimes this truth is described as inexpressible, or ineffable (an idea which admits of several versions) whose articulation, unavoidably imperfect, by any given community will depend on the historical experience and the conceptual resource of that community.[2]

Another move is to employ dialectics in order to abolish all conceptual constructions, and to bring to consciousness the inner conflict in any dogmatic weaving of theories. It is not only criticism directed only toward the 'other', but is self-criticism as well. The purpose is to reject all *dṛṣṭis* (views).

Still another move may be read as follows. Every religion presents a unique point of view and reflects an aspect of the universal truth, which cannot be negated, sublated. What needs to be rejected is the absolute claim to it (the universal truth) by any religion. A full treatment of these positions cannot be undertaken here.

Again, the suggestion[3] of using phenomenological epoché may also be examined as a move which relegates questions about truth or falsity to the background, and so makes room for an open understanding of the other religion.

It may also be urged that what is required is something more radical, say the rejection of the very conception of absolute truth. Does this amount to relativism? In order to argue that on a certain construal it does *not*, and eventually to introduce the idea of interpretation in the context of inter-religious communication, a useful step is to consider the implications of essentialism.

Essentialism holds that not only every specific religion, such as Hinduism, has its own essence, but that all the different religions have a common essence; and, what is more, that the essence is the very ground of the possibility of differences. The differences are what they *are* only within the framework provided by the essence. In this paper, I cannot examine such an essentialism at great length. However, why such a stance is found unsatisfactory can be briefly indicated.

One cannot, it may be said, determine the essence without considering the differences. When one does determine an essence, there is no *a priori* guarantee, however, that new differences would not upset our claim of having determined the essence definitely. In the long run, it depends upon the decision of the investigator where to stop, and this decision is determined by one's own prior understanding of the meaning of religion. Thus, the concept of essence may be shown to be an ontological hypostatization of the concept

of meaning. Once one reaches this point, the path to relativism is clearly seen. All that one needs is to emphasize that meaning is relative to an interpretive act. But before turning to relativism let me consider another form of essentialism. This entails locating the essence not at the beginning, but at the end, or as the goal of a teleological process. The classic form of such essentialism is to be found in Hegel. But many other thinkers make use of it in their own ways. It is a common move to portray different religions as stepping-stones in a developmental process which may be taken to culminate in a religion which is closer to one's heart. The weakness of such approaches may be brought out by pointing out that there is no unique way of ordering the series, and that, therefore the original pluralism can reappear in quite different series devised by different thinkers.

Through the glasses of relativism, however, a different picture emerges. Emphasis on the worth of many ways provides a challenge to all claims to exclusive possession of the whole truth, and to the view that the way to salvation is only one. Relativism has many facets and forms. It can be moderate or extreme. It has a definite bearing on the issue of religious pluralism. It does not seek to negate the presence of distinct traditions. It is important to note that the view of tolerance that thus emerges is no trivial compromise; it not only is tolerant towards others but demands tolerance from others. There comes a shift in the understanding of 'difference' and 'otherness'; one begins to look at the facile ordering of religions as 'higher' and 'lower', an attitude which has prevailed too long.[4] However, as one seeks to appraise the consequences of such a position, in its moderate and extreme forms, a wide range of arguments for or against it is seen to be possible.[5] It may, however, be said that relativism has brought a fresh challenge questioning the presuppositions of comparative study of all sorts, including that of religions. It stimulates the need for thinking anew on such issues as whether religious pluralism implies a pluralism of incompatible truths, values, etc., since the dogmas and standards of a particular religious community cannot apply to another. It has been supportive of pluralism by giving a jolt to those theological stances which claimed to have absolute truth.

To say that religious pluralism entails a moderate relativism is to understand the issue in terms of a theory which relativizes the truth or falsity of beliefs to a system, so that what is true in one system may be false in another and vice versa. It is the extreme form of relativism which alone may be said to be pernicious. According to extreme relativism, the meaning of the concepts or terms used in a system change when one considers another system in which the same word also functions. Thus, for example, it may be claimed that the concepts of god, salvation, etc. as they function in one religion are radically different from the way they function in another.

This does not merely mean that propositions which hold good of 'god', etc. in one religion are simply not true in another (that would be moderate relativism), but that the very meaning of the word 'god', or its supposedly

translational equivalent in another language, will be different; and that even the meaning of 'true' and 'false' would suffer the same fate. In that case members of one religious community would not even *understand* what members of another religious community say. One may wonder if this radical relativism and this theory of meaning-change are tenable. Could it not be said that in spite of difference of meaning, in such cases there remains a central core which is the same and which makes communication between religions possible?

To take an example, the extreme relativist might hold that Sanskrit words like *Deva* and *Īśvara* do not translate as 'god'. There may be some justification for this claim, but one may also insist that in spite of differences both sets of expressions mean a higher form of being, a divinity in the sense of one who is the source of illumination. What may be lacking in the Vedic term '*deva*', one may urge, is the idea of being the creator. Even if it is argued that the Vedic god creates, the relativist might reply that the idea of creation itself is not exactly the same in the Judaeo-Christian and Indian traditions.

In the face of such relativistic argument I would maintain that none of this proves that one cannot understand the other's tradition, and that all that it may be said to suggest is that one may not agree about the truth value of the other's beliefs. Extreme relativism seems to be more a purely theoretical attitude rather than a description of the actual process of inter-religious dialogue. What seems to be particularly relevant and a useful conceptual tool is, rather, the idea of interpretation.[6]

II

To introduce the idea of interpretation in the context of inter-religious communication is to adopt a view where both *A* and *B* are interpreters, and interpret their own individual as well as each other's utterances. The position is to be distinguished from the classical and standard understanding according to which *A* communicates a thought to *B* when *B* grasps the same thought or proposition which is expressed by the sentence *A* utters.

According to this same picture, to translate one sentence into another requires that the two sentences express the same thought. This picture (whose classical exposition is given by Frege) has serious difficulties. First of all this account postulates a non-linguistic abstract entity called thought (which by itself is not implausible). Secondly, this theory has to explain how *B* who hears *A*'s utterances can enter into *A*'s mind and grasp the very thought which she wanted to express. Thirdly, such explanation, if at all possible, will have no place for the idea of interpretation, as distinguished from the mere reception of a readymade ideal context. Upon this account, neither *A* nor *B* is an interpreter.

If one introduces the idea of interpretation in order to understand the

process of communication, one may begin by taking an intermediate position according to which when *A* utters the sentence *S*, *A* (merely) knows what thought she is expressing, but *B* who hears the utterance, interprets it and assigns to it a meaning. His interpretation is correct if the meaning which he assigns to *S* is identical with the thought that *A* expressed.

The problem of inter-religious communication and understanding, it seems to me, requires a still more radical view, a view *which* regards both *A* and *B* as interpreters. The speaker and the auditor are both involved in the process of interpretation. Whatever may be the limitation of such a picture, it has the great advantage that it overcomes the problem associated with mentalism (private mind) and avoids positing such abstract, ethereal entities as thought. The prospect of success of this model over the two others, described above, is that it helps us to focus on the idea that religious meaning is not a set of unchanging thoughts attaching to the texts, rituals and practices of a religious community. The truth indeed is that the members of a religious community are continually engaged in interpreting, making sense of symbols, and that their act of interpreting is an ongoing, developing historical process. It is also to be noticed that even if we confine ourselves to a selected time-period, a single homogeneous interpretation, one unique mode of self-understanding is rarely, if ever, to be found in any traditional frame. Some religions have undoubtedly achieved more uniformity of interpretation than others (here the inquiry is not directed to *how* this has been attained), but it is perhaps no exaggeration to say that there always is a great deal of heterogeneity within what may be broadly called one religious tradition. In fact, if one is to gain a rich, broad and adequate description of any complex religious tradition, it must not be at the cost of playing down the tensions and oppositions that are inevitably present in, and which form an important part of the conceptual experience of a tradition.

There is nothing to gain by overlooking the various interpretations and re-interpretations of texts, etc. that are part and parcel of any given tradition. It is worth recalling the words of Gadamer that 'in a tradition this process of fusion is continually going on, for there old and new continually grow together to make something of living value, without either being explicitly distinguished from the other.'[7]

It may now be said that the problem of communication amongst religions really amounts to how the interpretations of an outsider, the 'other', relate to the historical process of interpretation by the members of the community themselves (the insiders).

Before I proceed further, let me put a question. What exactly is gained by this new picture? I think that one important gain is that we need no longer speak of *the* religious meaning of a text, ritual or practice. Hence the problem of understanding is not how to identify a specific, readymade meaning, but how to interpret (a second level of interpretation, of course) the historical process of interpretation by the communities themselves.

At this point, a pertinent question that arises is regarding what would be the criterion of distinguishing an authentic interpretation by an outsider from inauthentic ones. One could, of course, also ask whether an insider's interpretation is always authentic. It is evident that the issue of the (factual) distinction between the outsider's and the insider's interpretations is not equivalent to the (evaluative) difference between authentic and inauthentic interpretations. It seems to me that one has to take recourse to a purely pragmatic criterion. That interpretation is authentic, be it made by an outsider or by an insider, which is truly grounded in the historic consciousness of a tradition. When it comes to the question of the authenticity of an outsider's interpretation in particular, what would play a crucial role is perhaps the consideration if the community of insider interpreters accepts it, considers it seriously and appropriates it into its own self-understanding. An outsider's interpretation regarding any text or issue, theologically deemed vital, is bound to be considered inauthentic if it becomes evident that it is in clear conflict with the community's own understanding of the same, as it is reflected in the historical process of interpretation of texts, etc. by its members. A concrete example, rather than a purely speculative conjecture, might be useful to show exactly how and why inter-religious communication gets thwarted.

III

Consider, for example, the question of time as an issue in the context of the encounter of world religions. A global history of ideas bears witness to the philosophical and theological concern with this question, at a very early date. Time may, therefore, very well be considered pertinent subject-matter for initiating a conversation amongst the participants of different philosophico-religious traditions.

There have been some attempts to situate the time-experience of major traditions in a global setting. It is in this context of cross-cultural and inter-religious discourse that clichés concerning the time-experience of various traditions abound. It is commonplace, for example, to maintain that the Indo-Hellenic view of time is cyclic as opposed to the Judaeo-Christian understanding of linear time. In order that a productive discourse may ensue in the area of inter-religious and cross-cultural studies, it seems to me to be specially important to examine carefully these general and broad distinctions that are made, repeated endlessly and hardly ever questioned.

While dealing with time at the crossroads of cultures, the insightful observation of Paul Tillich may be recapitulated:

> In every religious interpretation of history, philosophical elements are implied, first of all, a philosophy of time, and in every philosophical interpretation of history religious elements are implied—first of all, an

> interpretation of the meaning (or meaninglessness) of existence. Whenever existence itselfs is to be interpreted, the difference between philosophy and theology decreases, and both meet in the realm of myth and symbol.[8]

Perhaps some of the stereotypes about Indian thought in an inter-cultural context such as the cliché that the Indian view of time is cyclic is precisely due to not seeing the larger interconnections between philosophical concepts, religious ideas, myths and symbols. In brief, it is due to a lack of deeper acquaintance with the historic consciousness of Indian thought. As I have shown elsewhere[9], the Indian conceptual experience of time knows of great diversity. It is not possible here to give more than an outline of some of the ideas that emerge from the complex world of Indian thought.

One can trace ideas about time from very early sources of the Indian tradition, such as the *Atharva Veda*, the *Mahābhārata*, the Purāṇas, at the level of myths and allegories. Some of these are impregnated with suggestions anticipating later theories. The theories of time developed at that stage of philosophical growth which saw the rise of distinct schools of Indian philosophy. The contrast of views is awe-inspiring. If at the one end of the scale there is a unitary view, there is a pluralistic view at the other end; if some maintain the objective, independent reality of time, others question it. Some hold time to be discrete[10] and regard continuity as nothing but a mental construction, again a position which others do not accept. Some even emphasize that the distinction between being and time is due to an arbitrary linguistic convention, insisting that they coalesce ontologically.

It may be emphasized that, apart from the last position, which is a Buddhist view, all the views mentioned above, regarding time, were held by some of the major schools of Brahmanical philosophy, despite their common allegiance to the exegetical texts of the Upanisads and their steadfast adherence to the idea of *Atman*. The soteriological implications of these views are to be appraised in the specific form of each school. Vaisnava and Saiva literature abound in their variegated theological treatment of time. The Brahmanical polemics with the Buddhist and Jaina schools also bear witness to their deep understanding about the wide-ranging implications of specific views of time.

This great diversity of views must be taken into consideration in any appraisal of the Indian conceptual experience of time. To ignore this or to reduce these varied notions under the single caption of cyclic time is to distort the image of a major and complex philosophical tradition.

Surprisingly, at this point it may be observed that, while the appellation of 'cyclic time' features so often in the Western encounter with the Indian tradition, the idea can hardly be identified as the view of any particular school or even as an issue for debate in the polemical literature.

Indian philosophers debated and discussed at length about such issues as whether time is discrete or continuous, real or appearance, perceived or inferred, an independent category or not, but there is no record, to my knowledge, of any dispute about whether time is cyclic or not. The necessity for probing the meaning and significance of this appellation arises only in the inter-cultural context and has little relevance within the frame of Indian thought. In other words, the reading seems to be in conflict with the self-understanding of the Indian tradition.

Polemizing against a Greek view of 'circular time', from which we can gather what cyclic time is or implies, St. Augustine thus describes the view in his *City of God*:

> . . . as those others think, the same measures of time and the same events in time are repeated in circular fashion. On the basis of this cyclic theory, it is argued, for example, that just as in a certain age the philosopher Plato taught his students in the city of Athens and in the school the Academy, so during countless past ages, at very prolonged yet definite intervals, the same Plato, the same city and the same school with the same students had existed again and again . . .

An analysis of these oft-quoted lines shows clearly that the appellation 'circular time' carries the implication of exact mechanical recurrence not only of cosmological processes but also of individual destinies. There cannot possibly be any salvation in this conceptual frame, a matter of grave theological consequence. Augustine, by repudiating this view, puts in relief the Christian contribution to the religious interpretation of time.

Before I cite an example of the import of cyclic time which is ascribed to Indian thought, let me first turn to the Purāṇas, a body of mythological literature which draws on philosophical sources as well. Here we find a grandiose cosmological model where the universe is conceived as undergoing repeated creation and dissolution. Vast time-scales are used for measuring each world cycle (*Kalpa*) in terms of billions of human years. The divisions and sub-divisions of this time-period are called *Manvantara*, *Mahāyuga*, etc. This idea is present not only in the *Mahābhārata* and *Bhagavad Gītā*, but is very largely accepted by the major Brahmanical schools which, it needs to be emphasized, put forward different views of time.

In other words, the idea of cosmological cycles should not be confused with that of cyclic time. The Indian mind, it is important to note, uses the idea in a soteriological frame-work.

However, in an inter-cultural context the philosophical and religious significance of this idea does not seem to be properly understood. Even so perceptive a culture-historian, as Arnold Toynbee, so sympathetic to the Indian civilization, misconstrues the idea. He writes in his *The Study of History*, . . . This philosophy of sheer recurrence, which intrigued, without ever quite captivating, the Hellenic genius, came to dominate contemporary

Indic minds.' Referring to the Puranic idea of '*Kalpa*', etc. Toynbee comments,

> Are these vain repetitions . . . really the law of the Universe, and, therefore, incidentally the law of the histories of civilizations? If we find that the answer is in the affirmative, we can hardly escape the conclusion that we are the perpetual victims of an everlasting cosmic practical joke, which condemns us to endure our sufferings and to overcome our difficulties and to purify ourselves of our sins—only to know in advance that the automatic inevitable lapse of a certain meaningless measure of time cannot fail to stultify all our human exertions by reproducing the same situation again and again *ad infinitum* just as if we had never exerted ourselves at all.

This is an incorrect appraisal of the Indian understanding of time and its implications for history. A deeper acquaintance with Indian thought would show to anyone that there is no idea of mechanical recurrence of the particular or repetition of individual destinies which does not take into account human action. The pan-Indian concept of *Karma*, a concept however difficult and subtle in its implications, has a final and an irrevocable place in Indian thought. What recurs, in nature and culture, is the generic pattern.

It is in this connection that I would like to draw attention to the metaphor of the wheel which pervades Indian literature. The Indian culture as a whole makes profound and profuse use of this symbol in a variety of ways. It is tied up inextricably with the life and culture of the Hindu-Buddhist world. To the participants of this culture the wheel captures the pole of experience which allows one to arrive at a notion of law, that which makes prediction possible. The Buddhist tradition makes the symbol a vehicle of Buddhist thought. The message that the symbol of the 'wheel of becoming' (*Bhāva-Cakra*) has been transmitting for the past 2500 years is not any idea of mechanical repetition of individual destiny, externally imposed. On closer examination it can be seen that the emphasis is on the inexorability of the moral law, *Karma*, involving and implying ideas about rebirth and salvation.

Again, to cite an authentic example from the Brahmanical tradition to show the function of the wheel as a symbol, let me refer to the commentary of Vyāsa on the *Yoga-Sūtra*. 'From virtue arises happiness, from impiety pain, from happiness attachment, from pain aversion, attachment and aversion lead to efforts, which result in action. This in turn gives rise to virtue or impiety, happiness or pain, attachment or aversion, and so on and on.' Thus revolves the 'six-spoked wheel of existence'.

The emphasis, it is evident, is on the generic pattern and not on a recurrence of particular phenomena or mechanical repetition of individual destinies. Cycles and arrows/lines are major metaphors which appear and reappear in various contexts conveying distinct messages touching upon the poles of experience of recurrence and irreversibility.

The metaphor of the arrow carrying the sense of irreversibility often appears in the Indian context in discussions pertaining to the idea of *Karma*. The imagery of the arrow that is shot and can thus be not called back is used to convey the idea that actions once performed are sure in their irreversible course to bear fruits (*Karmaphala*). The ethical concern is obvious. The warning that is implicit in the imagery of the arrow is tied up with the idea of the efficacy of human actions and the notion of irreversibility.

It is interesting to note that while recognizing the arrow as the major metaphor of Western culture, Stephen Jay Gould reclaims the place of time-cycles in his book, entitled *Time's Arrow Time's Cycle* (Cambridge, 1987). Cycles and arrows, he says, are 'so central to intellectual (and practical) life that Western people who hope to understand history must wrestle intimately with both' (p. 16). He quotes from the Book of Ecclesiastes to confirm that time-cycles is an idea which has a religious foundation.

All these indicate that time is a multi-dimensional issue and that the early formulations of various traditions are of particular interest for the self-understanding of cultures. This in turn has an impact on the meeting of cultures and encounter of world-religions. In other words, the importance of academic concern with these aspects of the question of time is not confined within the limits of the academic world. Its influence is of much larger significance.

There is no doubt that a keen awareness of the conceptual distinctions present in various thought traditions is a stimulating intellectual adventure. But caution must be exercised to see that the zeal for finding differences in the area of cross-cultural studies does not get out of proportion as this can eventually lead to a distorted image of the 'otherness' of the other culture.

The 'bias towards overthematization' is undeniably glaring when one observes how the expressions of linear and cyclic time have come to designate distinct cultural experiences of time. The question should be raised whether the experiences of irreversibility and recurrence are emphasized in any such absolute and exclusive manner in any culture that such schematizations of cultural representation of time can be justified, even if one insists, as does Geertz[11], that 'the question isn't really whether everybody has everything . . . but rather the degree to which things are elaborated and their power and force.'

Thus, the implications of time-metaphors become a pressing issue for anyone involved in cross-cultural and inter-religious studies, as one cannot but take note of how cycles and arrows gradually cease to be simple time-metaphors and come to be associated with such concepts as history, progress, salvation. It also becomes apparent, slowly, how the schematizations of time-representations of various cultures express, what Fabian in his book *Time and the Other* described as 'denial of coevalness' to the other culture. As one peruses the relevant literature, one sees that it is not at all unusual to underplay the concept of time in one tradition as contrasted with another.

Arnoado Momigliano, in an essay entitled 'Time in Ancient Historiography' (*Quarto Contributo*, Rome, 1969), observes, 'In some cases they oppose Indo-European to Semitic, in other cases Greek to Hebrew, in others still Greek to Jewish-Christian or Christian alone.' In other words, to set up one tradition against another is not uncommon in an inter-cultural and inter-religious frame-work. But the presuppositions of such schemes often go unexamined and therefore their untenability is not detected. Truly, these clichés block our perceptions by giving a simplistic picture of a tradition or a culture. The sharp concluding remarks of Momigliano are an important warning. He writes:

> Many students of historiography and especially the theologically minded among them, appear to assume that there are neat and mutually exclusive views about time, the Jews had one, the Greeks another. To judge from experience, this is not so; and one would suspect that philosophers would have an easier task if it were so.

This shows that in order to explore fruitfully the cross-cultural dimension of varied human perceptions in the treatment of the issues of time and history, fresh effort in terms of scholarly research, collaboration and exchanges needs to be made.

A most pertinent example of how prevalent these clichés are and how even the best minds, keenly aware of the theological importance of bringing together the major views concerning time and history in a global frame-work, fall prey to these misconceptions can be seen in the writings of Paul Tillich. In his work entitled *The Protestant Era*, Tillich attempts to classify the major views under two headings which involve, as he puts it, a sharp distinction between 'The historical and the non-historical types of interpreting history'. In his summary of the characteristics of the 'non-historical type, which comprises Indian thought amongst other similar world-views, one comes across the view, again, that one main feature of such a position is that 'time is considered to be circular or repeating itself infinitely . . .'

This clearly shows that a built-in theoretical bias as one's starting point, which often is simply due to a lack of information, does not facilitate understanding in this sensitive and complex area of investigation. One of the tasks before the theologians engaged in the encounter-situation is precisely to identify and dismantle some of the stereotyped devices and strategies that have prevailed too long and blocked inter-religious communication.

IV

To sum up, the encounter of world religions—in this construal—entails a situation where the phenomenon of religious pluralism is not seen merely as a provisional state, ultimately to be overcome. A move designed to have eventually no room for the 'otherness' of the other cannot be accepted. The

participants in such an encounter are of course aware of their predicament. They know that as interpreters they are so rooted in given traditions that they can make sense of the 'otherness' *only* by placing themselves in the ongoing process of transmission of religious ideas, etc. in their traditional frames. They know that a creative appropriation of the other's theological perceptions requires an *authentic* interpretation, a genuine participation in the process of critical self-understanding of a tradition. They are also aware that the 'other' too is in the same predicament.

What the consequences of such an exchange and collaboration will ultimately be remains to be seen. The immediate task is preparation for a dialogue where encounter is not understood, as it has often been, merely as talking *to* the other or *about* the other, but *with* each other. The starting point of a successful conversation is not to assume to know before one has heard carefully what the understanding of the partner in the dialogue actually is regarding an issue.

Moreover, it calls for the critical awareness that no tradition is so completely and rigidly fixed that it leaves absolutely no room for further self-examination or emergence of new insights. To say that would be to proclaim that the tradition in question is incapable of further growth, that, virtually, it is no more alive.

On the contrary, if a continuous self-scrutiny leading to a fusion of old and new ideas admittedly can be said to happen within a tradition, perhaps the demand for self-examination becomes even more acute when members of a tradition consciously engage in a dialogue with those of another. This involves a preparedness to listen to the other while interpreting the story that is told. This is a situation where apprehending one's distinct identity itself demands that the 'otherness' of the other is authentically grasped. The encounter-situation thus is perceived as a possibility for greater self-enrichment in an unexpected manner, just as it involves also facing the tension between the self and the other, risking even the possibility of conversion.

In the history of the meeting of minds perhaps it is inevitable that participation in the ongoing historical process of religious traditions would have various phases of understanding of the 'otherness' of the other. Comparing, contrasting, arranging in hierarchical orders are all part of it, but now perhaps efforts may be made to transcend it.

This is exactly where, I think, more academic involvement can considerably improve the present state of crisis in the inter-religious dialogue. It can help focusing on the subtle conceptual distinctions that are present in any tradition regarding any issue considered important for religious thinking. It can, in other words, introduce complexity where an oversimplified picture amounts to nothing but the projection of a distorted image of the 'otherness' of the other tradition. It can, as it must, make us aware that more caution need to be exercised so that the zeal for finding differences amongst various religious traditions does not, in the long run, block our understand-

ing of the 'other', which in turn is bound to reflect on the self-understanding of a tradition. It can make us sensitive to the specific messages of the various religious traditions, by preparing us to receive, to listen while engaging in a second level of interpretation. It would hopefully witness creative moments which happen from the 'fusion of horizons', to borrow an expression from Gadamer. This fusion is possible when the participants are so immersed in the process of interpretation that they will not find it sufficient to relate to the other as an indifferent outsider or assume the posture of an uninvolved spectator; but would attempt to seize the 'otherness' in a genuinely creative manner. If understanding the other involves interpretation, it also calls for an openness which leads to the realization that it is not necessary to close one's eyes to the possibilities of interpretation beyond one's own tradition's already achieved self-understanding. It is a situation which is impregnated with various possibilities of intensifying the awareness of the profundity of the insights as well as of the blindness and oversights of one's own tradition, just as of the other.

At the end, it may be emphasized that the crisis of the situation which is religiously plural is not the phenomenon itself, nor the apprehension of the tensions and oppositions which are present within a tradition or amongst the various traditions. It lies in the inability to open up a creative discourse which seeks to attain a higher stage of reflection that a growing spirit of critical understanding alone can foster through successful inter-religious communication. The progress of such an endeavour will be witnessed in the increasing awareness that shunning an encounter with the other tradition is paving the way for stagnancy in religious thinking. It will then become evident that a diffusion of information from authentic sources can remove barriers in this major domain of human reflection which in turn will have a larger impact on other areas of activity as well. Polemics and debates will ensue and are to be accepted and encouraged as part of an open inquiry. Evidently, there cannot be any prior demand for an eventual agreement/conversion between the partners in the dialogue. A successful conversation among insiders or between the latter and the outsiders can proceed, however, only on the basis ot the authenticity of their interpretations. The situation calls for a readiness to perceive the effective and important role that world religions could play in today's world through a greater participation of members across boundaries. The crisis lies in not noticing that successful inter-religious communication is *the* antidote for all forms of religious egoity since, as S. Radhakrishnan puts it so poignantly, who would deny that 'no one is so vain of his religion as he who knows no other'?

Notes and References

1. Quoted in P.I. Rose, *They and We*, Random House, New York, 1964, p. 74.
2. Cf. my paper, presented at the Radhakrishnan Centennial Meeting, University of Miami, 1988, 'S. Radhakrishnan and the Advaitic approach to the question of encounter of world-religions'.
3. J.N. Mohanty, 'Phenomenological Rationality and the Overcoming of Relativism' in *Relativism*, edited by M. Krausz, University of Notre Dame Press, 1989.
4. Elvin Hatch, *Culture and Morality*.
5. For papers on Relativism, against Relativism and Anti-Relativism, cf. *Relativism* edited by M. Krausz, University of Notre Dame Press, 1989.
6. Richard Rorty, 'Solidarity or Objectivity?', in *Relativism*, op. cit.
7. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, New York, 1985.
8. Paul Tillich, *The Prostant Era*, Chicago, 1948.
9. Cf. my *A Study of Time in Indian Philosophy*, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1983, 'Reflection on Time in Indian thought with comments on the so-called Cyclic time', in *The Study of Time V*, edited by Fraser etc., University of Massachusettes Press, 1986.
10. Distinctly different views on discrete time can be found in Yoga, Jaina and Buddhist literature. Cf. *The Study of Time*, op. cit.
11. In *The Preview of Culture Theory*, edited by R. Shweder and R. Levine, Cambridge University Press, 1984.

The logical structure of *syādvāda**

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The Jaina doctrine of *syāt* is a doctrine central to Jaina philosophy. In the Jaina theory of *pramāṇas* it is the doctrine which corresponds to *śabdapramāṇa* or *śrutapramāṇa* as understood by Jainas. The doctrine is closely connected with Jaina ontology which highlights the infinite-fold character of reality. It is also closely connected with the Jaina theory of values because it provides us with a methodological tool for exercising non-injury in the intellectual field.

In this paper I wish to concentrate upon the nature of the Jaina doctrine of *syāt*, popularly known as *syādvāda*, with special reference to the logical structure of the doctrine.

I have remarked above that *syādvāda* corresponds to the Jaina account of *śabdapramāṇa*. Naturally *syādvāda* is concerned with statements or propositions. In the articulations of *syādvāda* we are generally given a list of seven statements or statement forms (*bhaṅgas*) which are apparently inconsistent with one other. Every statement from the list contains the word *syāt* as a prefix. This inclusion of the word *syāt* in each statement implies, amongst other things, that the statements made as a part of the seven-fold scheme (*saptabhaṅgī*) are not contradictory at all, but they throw light upon the different aspects of reality. This raises a question regarding the logical structure of the *syāt*-statements (that is, statements containing *syāt* as a prefix) as understood by the Jaina thinkers. In order to solve this question and understand clearly the import of *syādvāda* some modern scholars of Jainology and logic have suggested some logical models. In this paper I shall discuss three such models which I call the model of many-valued logic, the model of modal logic and the model of conditionality respectively. After discussing these models one by one, I shall suggest a fourth model which, I feel, is the most adequate one.

The Model of Many-valued Logic

Professor S.L. Pandey in his article 'Naya-vâda and Many-valued logic'[1] has conceived *nayavāda* and *syādvāda* as the two formulations of many-valued logic. In fact, he claims that the logic of *nayas* is the three-valued

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logic of Lukasiewicz. He further claims that *syādvāda* being an instance of *nayavāda*, *syādvāda* too refers to many-valued logic. Here we are not concerned with the question whether his claim that *nayavāda* is Lukasiewiczian three-valued logic is correct, but we are concerned with his argument with regard to *syādvāda*. Whether *nayavāda* is many-valued logic or not, it seems incorrect to hold that *syādvāda* is nothing but an instance of *nayavāda*. Because *nayavāda*, as has generally been held, gives us a class of 'partial truths', whereas *syādvāda* gives us a class of whole truths (or the whole truth). And the whole truth cannot be an instance of a partial truth. *Pramāṇa* cannot be an instance of *pramāṇāṁśa*.

Pandey also presents some independent considerations in favour of his interpretation of *syādvāda* as many-valued logic. His main considerations may be briefly stated as follows:

(1) Jainas accept that even contradictory statements like p and $\sim p$ could be true together. This implies that they challenge the law of contradiction. They give some truth-value (other than falsehood) to contradictory statements.[2]

(2) *Avaktavya* or 'indescribable' could be best understood as 'indeterminate', the third truth-value of Lukasiewicz's three-valued logic. But Pandey also claims: Jainas observe that the indeterminate compound statement is a conjunction of a positive statement and its negative form and that it challenges the law of contradiction.[3]

Both these considerations have one point in common, viz. it is by challenging the law of contradiction that we arrive at the third truth-value. But do Jainas really challenge the law of contradiction? Do they hold that two contradictory propositions like p and $\sim p$ could be true together? In that case there was no point in prefixing *syāt* to each statement in the seven-fold scheme. The import of the term *syāt* is that any given statement can be held to be true, but only in a certain respect or from a certain standpoint (*kathañcit*). Both p and not-p are true in some respect. But of course the respect in which p is true is different from the one in which not-p is true. In this way the role of the term *syāt* in *syāt*-statements is to dissolve the apparent contradiction between statements by pointing out that the truth of apparently contradictory statements is relative to the respective standpoints. The interpretation of *syādvāda* in terms of many-valued logic, especially Pandey's version of it, does not take due notice of this role of the term *syāt*.

Of course this criticism of Pandey does not answer the problem of the meaning of *avaktavya* which, according to him, is the third truth-value. One can try to respond to this problem in two ways.

First, the question regarding the essence of *syādvāda* needs to be distinguished from the question regarding the nature of the seven-fold scheme. It would not perhaps be correct to suppose that *saptabhaṅgī* itself is the essence

of *syādvāda*. One could accept *syādvāda* in its essence, but may not accept its articulation in terms of *saptabhaṅgī*. Like Professor Mohanlal Mehta[4] one could say, *syādasti* and *syāt-nāsti* suffice as the two basic forms. So it is perhaps incorrect to suppose that the category of *avaktavya* is essential to the Jaina theory of *syāt*.[5]

Second, even if the category of *avaktavya* is thought to be essential to *syādvāda*, the question remains whether it indicates 'indescribability' or 'indeterminateness' arising out of contradiction. For, the category of *avaktavya* does not seem to emerge simply because two contradictory statements happen to be made simultaneously (*yugapat*), but rather because the two standpoints from which the two apparently contradictory statements are asserted are considered at once and not sequentially. It is, for instance, odd to consider whether 'pot' exists as 'pot' and at the same time as a 'cloth'. But the oddity involved is more of an epistemological kind than logical. The middle value designated by the term *avaktavya* is therefore better understood as the epistemic middle rather than as the logical middle. It is closer to the middle truth-value called 'undeterminable' of Kleene's three-valued system[6] rather than to the Lukasiewiczian third truth-value called 'indeterminate'.

As a result we can say that *avaktavya* is not the third truth-value in the logical sense of the term, because it does not arise out of the violation of the laws of logic such as non-contradiction and excluded middle.

The above discussion suggests that Pandey's attempt to interpret *syādvāda* as a kind of many-valued logic is not satisfactory. Now let us turn to the second model.

The Model of Modal Logic

We have seen that the interpretation of *syādvāda* as a kind of many-valued logic does not give an adequate account of the significance of the term *syāt* in *syādvāda*. In this second interpretation however there is an attempt to attach some special significance to it.[7] According to this interpretation the term *syāt* means 'maybe', 'perhaps', 'possibly' or 'probably'. One can now formalize a *syāt*-statement by using some modal operator (say, M). But two points have to be noted at the outset before we try to formalize the seven-fold scheme in terms of the modal operator.

(1) Although Jainas use the same term *syāt* throughout the seven-fold scheme of *syādvāda*, the different occurrences of *syāt* point at different standpoints in different cases. *Syāt* in *syāt asti* does not point at the same standpoint as *syāt* in *syāt nāsti* does. Now, although the third *bhaṅga*: '*syat asti nāsti ca*' contains only one occurrence of *syāt* we will have to analyse it as *Syāt asti syāt nāsti ca* and also keep in mind that the two occurrences of *syāt* in this analysis do not point at the same standpoint. The same thing has to apply to our use of the modal operator M.

(2) We will have to use some special operator for indicating *avaktavya*. Just as we signify 'It is not the case that p' by '$\sim p$' similarly we could signify, 'It is undeterminable whether p' by '∞p'.

Now we are in a position to formalize the seven-fold scheme of *syādvāda* in the following way:

(1) Mp
(2) $M\sim p$
(3) $Mp.\ M\sim p$
(4) $M\infty p$
(5) $Mp.\ M\infty p$
(6) $M\sim p.\ M\infty p$
(7) $Mp.\ M\sim p.\ M\infty p$

It is, *prima facie*, possible to justify this interpretation by relating it to the Jaina concept of *naya* and also with the notion of third truth-value as may be applied to *nayas*. Pandey, for instance, in his article mentioned above, tries to show that all *nayas* being partial truths can be assigned the third truth-value I of Lukasiewicz's three valued system. Now Lukasiewicz himself relates the idea of the middle truth-value with some modal logical considerations.[8] His attempt to combine the two considerations may be used for our purpose in the following way: 'Possibly p' is true when p is indeterminate. 'Possibly $\sim p$' is true when $\sim p$ is indeterminate. But if p is indeterminate so is $\sim p$. (Jainas would add: if p is indeterminate, so is ∞p.) So, given any proposition p which expresses a *naya* (which is indeterminate), Mp, $M\sim p$, $Mp.\ M\sim p$, $M\infty p$, all are true.

One could also add: if p is indeterminate, Mp is true, but $\Box p$ (i.e. necessarily p) is false. And this is in tune with the basic insight of the Jaina logicians when they claim that *Ekāntavāda* (i.e. insisting upon partial truth as if it were the whole truth; insisting upon an indeterminate view as if it were necessarily true) amounts to a fallacy of *naya* (*nayābhāsa* or *durnaya*).

This justification seems to be *prima facie* intelligible, but it is doubtful whether it gives a true picture of what Jainas mean by the term *syāt* in *syādvāda*.

It seems incorrect to identify 'incomplete truth' or 'partial truth' with indeterminateness. That a *naya* is 'partially true' implies that it is true in a certain respect and certainly true in that respect. *Naya* is also partially false because it is false in some other respect and certainly false in that other respect. Truth or falsehood of *naya* does not imply any kind of uncertainty,[9] whereas indeterminateness does involve a kind of uncertainty. This partialness of truth in the case of *nayas* is made explicit in *syādvāda* by applying the prefix *syāt* to *naya*-statements. *Syāt* therefore does not mean 'maybe', 'perhaps', 'possibly', or 'probably'; rather it means 'in a certain way', 'in some respect', etc. This is the meaning of the term *kathañcit* which is generally used as the synonym for the term *syāt* in *syādvāda*. Modern

scholars like Muni Nathmal and B.K. Matilal bring this out and also repudiate in a way the claim that *syādvāda* could be rendered as a case for modal logic.

But while interpreting *syāt* as 'in some respect', instead of 'possibly', some modern scholars also give a different explanation of *syādvāda* by rendering *syāt*-statements as conditional statements of a kind. This leads us to the third model, which I call the model of conditionality.

The Model of Conditionality

Professor Sagarmal Jain[10] and Professor B.K. Matilal[11] in their papers have independently interpreted *syādvāda* in terms of conditional propositions. Jain has even formulated a complete version of *saptabhaṅgī* in terms of conditional statements; but we need not go into the full details of it here. The essence of the view of both Matilal and Jain is that the proposition of the form *syāt ghaṭaḥ asti* could be expressed as a conditional statement in which the statement 'the pot exists' is the consequent and the standpoint from which the consequent is asserted is expressed by the antecedent.

The first two forms in the seven-fold scheme could be instantiated with the help of another instance as follows:

1. If 'self' means the present act of consciousness then the self is impermanent.
2. If 'self' means the substance to which different acts of consciousness are attributed, then the self is permanent.

The forms of the two statements are:
$C_1 \supset (S \text{ is } p)$
$C_2 \supset (S \text{ is not-}p)$

This interpretation is better than the earlier two interpretations in an important respect. It takes the word *syāt* to mean 'under such and such condition', which is very close to 'in some respect', the meaning of *kathañcit*.

However, the interpretation seems to have at least two major drawbacks:

(1) *Syāt*-statements under this interpretation are supposed to appear as conditional or hypothetical statements. But actually the *syāt*-statement does not have an if-then form. A conditional statement does not exclude the possibility that its antecedent be false and yet the consequent be true. But a *syāt*-statement seems to presuppose the truth or at least the admissibility of the standpoint from which the statement is claimed to be true. The logical difference between a conditional statement and a *syāt*-statement seems to be like the one between the following two forms:

(a) If the standpoint C_1 is true, then p.
(b) There is the standpoint C_1 from which p.

(2) A *syāt*-statement indirectly refers to *some* standpoint but does not specify any standpoint. Rendering a *syāt*-statement as a conditional statement, however, demands on our part that we specify the standpoint in the *syāt*-statement itself. Jain thinks it essential to specify the condition or the respect in which a proposition is true, in order to avoid certain confusions and misconceptions.[12] Indeed Jain is right if he means that when it comes to the justification of a *syāt*-statement, one will have to specify the standpoint from which the given statement is true. But if he means that the specification of the standpoint should be incorporated in the formulation of the *syāt*-statement itself, then his suggestion amounts to distortion of the original logical form of *syāt* in *syādvāda*. The peculiarity and the beauty of *syādvāda* lies in indicating the existence of *some* standpoint, *some* condition or *some* respect which makes the given statement true, without specifying the exact standpoint or condition or respect which does so. The model of conditionality does not seem to preserve this peculiar logical form of *syādvāda*. Hence it fails to be fully satisfactory.

An Alternative Model: The Model of Existential Quantifier

It would not, therefore, be pointless to make an effort in search of an alternative formalization, a more adequate formalization of *syāt*-statements. The effort could be made on the following lines.

We have seen that Jaina logicians usually translate the prefix *syāt* as *kathañcit* and that *kathañcit* could be translated in English as 'from a standpoint', 'in a way', 'in some respect', etc. *Syāt* in this sense does not appear as an antecedent of a conditional but more like an existential quantifier of the following sort:

There is a standpoint such that...
There is a way in which...
There is a respect in which...

Now let us try to analyse the *syāt*-statement:

syāt jīvaḥ nityaḥ

in terms of the above interpretation of *syāt*. The statement would rather mean:

(a) There is a standpoint such that 'that Self is permanent' is the case.

Now if we introduce x as a variable ranging over different standpoints and p as a constant which stands for the statement 'Self is permanent', then the same *syāt*-statement could be formalized as:

(b) There exists some x such that x makes p true.

Here I have presupposed that a relation can hold between a standpoint and proposition which could be described as 'the standpoint makes the proposition true' or that 'the proposition is true from the standpoint'. We can symbolically represent 'x makes y true' as xTy in which case the *syāt*-statement could be formalised as follows:

(c) $(\exists x)\,(xTp)$

If we want to specify that x ranges over standpoints and not anything else, within the formalization itself, then our formalization will take a little complicated form, because we will have to introduce a propositional function Sx to mean 'x is a standpoint'. Now the *syāt*-statement would be formalized as follows:

(d) $(\exists x)\,(Sx.\ xTp)$

This (d) would be our standard version of the first *bhaṅga* in *saptabhaṅgī*. By representing 'It is not the case that p' by '$\sim p$' and 'It is undeterminable whether p' by '∞p' we get the complete version of the seven-fold scheme of *syādvāda* as follows:

(1) $(\exists x)\,(Sx.\ xTp)$
(2) $(\exists x)\,(Sx.\ xT\sim p)$
(3) $(\exists x)\,(Sx.\ xTp).\ (\exists y)\,(Sy.\ yT\sim p)$
(4) $(\exists x)\,(Sx.\ xT\infty p)$
(5) $(\exists x)\,(Sx.\ xTp).\ (\exists y)\,(Sy.\ yT\infty p)$
(6) $(\exists x)\,(Sx.\ xT\sim p).\ (\exists y)\,(Sy.\ yT\infty p)$
(7) $(\exists x)\,(Sx.\ xTp).\ (\exists y)\,(Sy.\ yT\sim p).\ (\exists z)\,(Sz.\ zT\infty p)$

Although this formulation is more adequate than the earlier formulations it does not seem to be perfectly adequate. One of the differences between the original seven-fold scheme of *syādvāda* and the above formulation is that all the statements in the above formulation are metalinguistic in character. They are statements about the statement p, whereas the original *syāt*-statements are at least seemingly object-linguistic in character. One will have perhaps to search for an object-linguistic counterpart of the above metalinguistic formulation. The first *bhaṅga* could be restated now in the following way:

(a) There is a standpoint such that 'that Self is permanent' is the case. This could be restated as
(b') There is a standpoint from which Self is permanent.

This looks like the original *syāt*-statement. Here we will have to introduce a three-term relation of the following sort:

$Fxyz$: y is z from x

Now (b') could be formalized as

(c') $(\exists x)\,(Sx.\ Fxsp)$ where s stands for self and p for permanent.

It appears that we have succeeded in giving an object-linguistic formalization of the first *bhaṅga* of the *saptabhaṅgī*. But have we really succeeded? In order to pursue this question we may have to analyse the notion of 'standpoint' which is frequently used by Jainas. We can address ourselves to the question: What is there in a standpoint on account of which we can say that one and the same statement could be true from one standpoint and false from another?

In an answer to this question, I think the distinction between sentence and statement that logicians generally make is of crucial importance. According to this distinction, a statement is the cognitive content of an indicative sentence. It is the sense of an indicative sentence. The same sentence can be used for making different statements, some true, some false. In terms of this distinction we could say that standpoint is something like a sense of an indicative sentence or at least that it has something to do with the sense of a sentence. It is because of this that the change in standpoint results in change in the sense of the sentence and this could result in change in the truth-value.

We could now say, in response to the question we addressed to ourselves, that it is not the same *statement* which is true from one standpoint and false from another. It is rather the same *sentence* which expresses a true statement under one interpretation and a false statement under another. A standpoint in this sense is an interpretation of a given sentence or at least something that goes into the interpretation of a given sentence.

The above discussion supports an insight of Matilal which he exhibits when he translates *syāt* as 'in a sense'.[13] But if there is a truth in this insight, then another consequence follows. A *syāt*-statement, in so far as it is a statement *about* a sense of a sentence, is a metalinguistic statement and not an object-linguistic one. The *syāt*-statement like *syāt jīvaḥ nityaḥ* seems to be directly about Self, but it is in fact directly about a sentence like 'Self is permanent' and about the sense in which the sentence could be construed as true. It is a metalinguistic statement in disguise.

This fact about the logical structure of *syādvāda* may have some important implications in the field of Jaina ontology and also in the Jaina theory of values. But it is a matter for separate discussion.

Notes and References

1. Included in M.P. Marathe, Meena Kelkar, P.P. Gokhale (eds.), *Studies in Jainism*, Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publication, Pune, 1984, pp. 156-66.
2. '. . . Hence only that logic is indicated by *syādvāda* which challenges the law of contradiction and gives some truth value to contradictory statements.' Ibid., p. 163.
3. Ibid., p. 161.
4. See Mohanlal Mehta, *Jaina Dharma-Darśana*, (Hindi), Pārśvanātha Vidyāśrama Śodha Saṁsthāna, Benares, 1973, pp. 373-74. Mohanlal Mehta points out that the seven-fold scheme of *syādvāda* is not a later addition. It is very much there in the Jaina canons. But he concludes the discussion by saying that out of the seven forms four are main: is, is-not, both and neither. And even of these four, two are main: is and is-not. The point is that one can present the essence of *syādvāda* even in terms of the two basic forms.

5. S.L. Pandey, however, contends that it is essential. He says, 'The fourth *bhaṅga*, i.e. the conjunction of a positive statement and its negative form needs a little more consideration as it is basic to Jaina logic. It is also called as *avaktavya* or indescribable'. *Studies in Jainism*, op. cit., p. 161.
6. Nicholas Rescher remarks in the case of the three-valued system of Kleene: 'In Kleene's system a proposition is to bear the third truth-value I not for fact-related, ontological reasons, but for knowledge-related, epistemological ones: it is not to be excluded that the proposition may *in fact* be true or false, but it is merely unknown or undeterminable what its specific truth-status may be'. Nicholas Rescher, *Many-Valued Logic*. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1963, p. 34.
7. This interpretation was first suggested by S.S. Barlingay in his *A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic*, National Publishing House, New Delhi, First Edition 1965, p. 6, 65. His suggestion was further developed in terms of kinds of possibilities by M.P. Marathe in his paper 'An Analysis of *Syāt* in *Syādvāda*' (*Studies in Jainism*, op. cit., pp. 141-55). The formalization of the seven-fold scheme in terms of a modal operator was suggested and examined by me in a Marathi article '*Syādvāda, Svarūpa āni maryādā*' in *Parāmarśa*, Vol. I, No. 3, Deptt. of Philosophy, University of Poona, 1979.
8. Nicholas Rescher states this in the following way: 'With a view to the future contingency interpretation of the third truth-value I, Lukasiewicz introduced a modal operator of possibility and necessity (symbolically △ and □) into his three-valued logic. These are to be subject to the truth-table:

P	△P	□P
T	T	T
I	T	F
F	F	F

See *Many Valued Logic*, op. cit., p. 25. For typographical convenience I have used M and L as the respective symbols for modal operators.
9. Muni Nathmal emphasizes this point by distinguishing between *syādvāda* and *aniścayavāda*. See *Jaina Darśana, Manana aura Mīmāṁsā* (Hindi), Ādarśa Sāhitya Saṅgha Prakāśana, Churu, Rajasthan, Revised Edition, 1973. B.K. Matilal too is insistent on this point. See his article '*Saptabhaṅgī*' included in J.N. Mohanty and S.P. Banerjee (ed.), *Self, Knowledge and Freedom*, The World Press, Calcutta, 1978, pp. 162-64.
10. '*Syādvāda: Eka Cintana*' (Hindi), included in *Studies in Jainism*, op. cit., pp. 167-92.
11. '*Saptabhaṅgī*, included in *Self, Knowledge and Freedom*, op. cit., pp. 159-72.
12. '*Syādvāda: Eka Cintana*', op. cit., p. 181.
3. 'Thus *syat* means in the Jaina use a conditional Yes. It is like saying "in a certain sense, yes".' B.K. Matilal, op. cit., p. 163.

Concept of the *pramāṇas* in *Mānameyaprakāśikā* according to *Viśiṣṭādvaita* philosophy

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Harijīvandās Śāstrī was a philosopher of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Vedānta in nineteenth-century Gujarat. He was born in A.D. 1883 in a village named Dharmaja in Khera district, Gujarat. He was a follower of the Auddhava Tradition of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Vedānta, and has authored many books on Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta. Among his books, originally written in Sanskrit, *Mānameyaprakāśikā* is an important contribution to Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy.[1] The other works with Sanskrit and Gujarātī commentaries are *Śikṣāpatriṭīkābhāṣya*, *Satsangijīvanavivaraṇa*, *Vāsudevamāhātmyavivaraṇa*, *Śrīviṣṇusahastranāmavivaraṇa* and *Śikṣāpatrīpañcaratnam-nityabidhiḥ*.

The work *Mānameyaprakāśikā* is a philosophical elaboration of thoughts which were previously dealt with by Venkaṭnātha in *Nyāyapariśuddhiḥ* and *Nyāyasiddhāñjanam* respectively. But the author of *Mānameyaprakāśikā* describes both the *pramāṇa* and the *prameya* sections of the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita in a more sophisticated fashion than the other authors. In this paper, I shall highlight only on the concept of the *pramāṇas*.

In the Auddhava Tradition, it is admitted that worldly miseries can be solved only by worshipping Lord Kṛṣṇa; devotion to Him is the ultimate solution for emancipation. Swāmīnārāyaṇa is known as the establisher of this tradition, hence it is also called Swāmīnārāyaṇa Sampradāya.[2] In *Mānameyaprakāśikā*, the three *tatvās* of Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy, i.e. *cit*, *acit* and *Īshwara* are discussed in three chapters; *Jaḍapariccheda*, *Jīvapariccheda* and *Īshwarapariccheda* respectively.

Without knowing the *pramāṇas*, we cannot conceive the reality of this world, as the *pramāṇas* are the only source to knowing the *prameyas*. In this tradition, the three *pramāṇas* are advocated as a source of valid knowledge —perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*) and scriptural testimony or verbal knowledge (*śabda*).[3]

There are two classes of propositions, valid and invalid. The *pramāṇas* are dealt with as valid knowledge. In *Mānameyaprakāśikā*, Harijīvandās defines *pramāṇa* as the right knowledge known by its use.[4] In this definition the word *pramāṇa* is used in the sense of *Bhāve Lyut*, and not *Karaṇe Lyut*. Thus *pramāṇa* is the righteousness of any knowledge known by its use. *Pramāṇa* means *pramā* here.[5] This definition is made to avoid false knowledge like the knowledge of silver in shell or of snake in a rope. The use of the *pramāṇa* is to get the rightness of any object.

Viśiṣṭādvaitin admit that every knowledge is valid, '*Sarvam Jñānam Yathārtham*'. But in the instance of *Sukti-rajat*, the rightness of the knowledge is due to adoption of *satkyātivāda*.[6] In this instance the major part of the *rajat* is known but due to its uselessness it becomes invalid. Further, the author of *Mānameyaprakāśikā* writes that the *pramāṇas* are also a source to know about prameyas. But the word *pramāṇa* is defined only in *Bhāve Lyut*. So it is not very clear whether he admits *pramāṇa* as an instrument of knowledge like Naiyāyikas or whether he uses the term in the sense of knowledge only.[7] Thus, the word *pramāṇa* denotes the rightness and utility of any knowledge, since it discriminates valid knowledge from invalid knowledge. To conclude the definition of *parmāṇa*, it is right knowledge and its rightness is known by its use in any time.

Harijīvandās includes all the *pramāṇas* in the three *pramāṇas* admitted in the systems of Indian philosophy. Recollection (*pratyabhijñā*) depends upon a previous perception. For instance, in 'This is that Devadatta', this Devadatta is perceived in the past and he is the same person in the present, so this involves perception. We cannot treat this knowledge as merely remembrance, because the knowledge produced here is qualified by thisness with perception and remembrance of thatness. So recollection is merged in perception.[8]

Negation (*abhāva*) is merged in a positive entity. A person looking a cow knows her as a cow and not as a horse.[9] Harijīvandās identifies prior negation with its previous state, posterior negation with its subsequent state and mutual negation, as in 'a cow is never a horse', with the nature of another subject. We can know negation through perception. There are two forms of a substance; negative and positive. So we perceive non-apprehension of any object through positive entity.[10]

Presumption (*arthāpatti*) is merged in inference. 'Although Devadatta does not eat in the day, yet he looks strong'. In this instance, Devadatta's eating at night is inferred from the perception of his strength without eating in the daytime. Thus the presumption of Devadatta's strength which is inferred by the universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) of a person not eating in the daytime but looking strong, proves his eating at night.[11]

Comparison (*upamāna*) is merged in verbal knowledge, perception and inference.[12] It is merged in verbal knowledge because a man hearing 'a cow is similar to a wild cow' knows that this similarity produced by a directive sentence. It can be included in inference because it depends upon the knowledge of the universal concomitance, 'whatever is similar to a cow is a wild cow'. In the same manner, 'whatever is dissimilar to a wild cow is not a cow' is also an aspect of universal concomitance. It can be included in perception because comparison is the perception of a wild cow endowed with similarity to a cow.

Sambhava and *aitihya* are also included in inference and verbal testimony respectively.[13] 'Five rupees are possible in fifty rupees'. In this instance, five rupees are inferred in fifty rupees. 'The devil lives in this tree'—in this instance, through a reliable person's statement, *aitihya* is merged in verbal testimony.

Thus, there are only three *pramāṇas*: perception, inference and verbal testimony or verbal knowledge.

Perception

Harijīvandās defines perception as that knowledge which occurs directly and immediately.[14] Like Naiyāyika, he also admits that perception is that knowledge which is not mediated by other knowledge.[15] Inference is produced by the knowledge of a sign (*liṅga*) and verbal testimony is produced through the relation of a word to its object, but perception is not produced by the knowledge of any instrument of knowledge.

Harijīvandās divides perception into two parts, as indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) and determinate (*savikalpaka*).[16] Indeterminate perception is qualified knowledge of the first object and determinate perception is qualified knowledge of the second object. 'This is a cow' is an instance of indeterminate knowledge and 'This is also a cow' is an instance of determinate knowledge. Venkaṭanātha also rejects unqualified knowledge of the dumb person and the perception of an animal, because both cognize qualified objects. We look at their nature of accepting and avoiding those things which are useful and useless for them accordingly.[17]

Unqualified knowledge is seen as being indeterminate by the Naiyāyikās.[18] They admit that qualified knowledge is produced by the knowledge of a qualification. For instance, in 'fragrant sandal', qualified knowledge is produced by the knowledge of a qualification of fragrance. But in the instance 'This is a cow' qualified knowledge is not preceded by knowledge of qualification of cowness. Harijīvandās rejects this view of the Naiyāyikās because there is no fixed rule that all qualified knowledge must be preceded by the knowledge of a qualification. Knowledge of a qualification is only needed where there is qualified object and a qualification is not perceivable by the same sense-organ.[19]

In 'fragrant sandal', fragrance is perceived by the nose, sandal is perceived by the eye and the memory of fragrance is perceived by the nose; hence, knowledge of fragrance is used as a qualification of a piece of a sandal. So this is the rule: qualification is used only when the qualified object and qualification are not perceived by the same sense-organ.[20]

It is necessary to aviod the Nyāya principle of both kinds of perception in Viśiṣṭādvaita because their conception of 'Nirvikalpaka' perception cannot be applied in Viśiṣṭādvaita. Viśiṣṭādvaitin advocate every object as *viśeṣaṇa* of the qualified Brahman. Brahman is called *viśeṣya*. In Viśiṣṭādvaita every object is a qualification of Iśvara. Thus, cognition of every object may be qualified. When *cit* and *acit* are the qualification of the Brahman, it becomes necessary that every object is qualified in cognition. So in the

'Nirvikalpaka' kind of perception the *niṣprakārakajñāna* cannot be admitted in the light of the Viśiṣṭādvaitin view. In the same manner as *cit* and *acit* are the *prakāras* of the qualified Brahman, so every perception may be of the nature of *saprakāraka*. Similarly, in the Auddhava Tradition, it is rightly felt that the cognition of *niṣprakāraka* is of qualified objects only.

Harijīvandās admits other kinds of perception, viz. *arvācīna* and *anarvācīna*.[21] He divides *arvācīna* into two parts, i.e., that with the help of sense-organs and that without any help of sense-organs. The second part is further divided as *yogaja* and *divya*. There yogic perception is due to the excellent merits of yogis; when their *manas* is united with God, they perceive all objects without any help of the sense-organs. *Divya* perception is that of devotees. Perception created without any help of the sense-organs is included in *divya* perception.

Sensual perception is of five kinds—*cākśuṣ, rāsana, gharāṇaja, tvāca* and *śrāvaṇa*. This perception is created without any defect of the sense-organs.

Harijīvandās admits *sannikarṣa* of two kinds—*samyoga* and *samyuktāśraya*. In *samyoga* sense-contact with the object and in *samyuktāśraya* sense-contact with the qualities of the object is admitted.[22]

Inference

Harijīvandās admits inference as a separate *pramāṇa*. Due to its dependence on perception and its nature of representing verbal testimony, it is rightly discussed in second number. Cārvāka opposes inference. He only admits perception and ignores the other pramāṇas. Here, inference is defined as valid knowledge of a probandum (*vyāpaka*) from the knowledge of a probans (*vyāpya*) in any subject of inference with invariable concomitance.[23]

Viśiṣṭādvaitin admit the word *anusandhāna* in place of *parāmarśa*, admitted by the Naiyāyikas. Where *parāmarśa* denotes the sense of invariable concomitance only, the word *anusandhāna* also denotes the possibility of inference caused by perception. So the word *anusandhāna* rightly deals with *anumāna* owing to perception.

Inference becomes a process by which we get knowledge of a particular case through the knowledge of a universal case, i.e. a particular fire in a hill is known through the universal concomitance of a smoke and a fire in many times and places. Accepting inference, Harijīvandās defines inference like the Naiyāyikas. The only difference, between Viśiṣṭādvaitin and the Naiyāyikas is in accepting the *kevalavyatirekī* form of *anumāna*. Viśiṣṭādvaitin do not accept the *kevalavyatirekī* form of *anumāna*. This difference is to be discussed later on.

Inference is made through the knowledge of a universal concomitance between a probans and a probandum. A probans exists in less sphere of time and place,[24] e.g. smoke exists where there is a fire, but does not exist in a heater. So its range is less than that of fire. A probandum exists in a greater sphere of time and space than a probans, e.g. fire exists in a red hot iron or a heater, where there is no smoke at all. So smoke may be called a probans and fire may be called a probandum due to their existence in the range of time and space. Thus, inference is merely a process setting the valid knowledge of a probandum from the knowledge of a probans.

The relation between a probans and a probandum is inseparable in time and space or both.[25] The relation between smoke and fire is an instance of both time and space. Inferring the special position of the sun in the sky through the shadow of a person is an instance of time only. Heating and a quality produced by its existence is an instance of space only.

A wide experience of concomitance is needed to affirm inference. Thus, a single instance is not sufficient to prove concomitance like the Advaitins do occasionally.[26] This is the only way to get an undoubted and unconditional invariable concomitance that we must observe various instances.

In Cārvāka's opinion, invariable concomitance cannot be established, because one is not able to observe all the instances of a probans to be accompanied by all the instances of a probandum. This observation is not always free from the existence of conditions (*upādhi*). Harijīvandās rejects this view of Cārvāka and says that when Cārvāka presents a reason to prove the invalidity of inference, he also accepts a reason and it can only be known by concomitance or inference.[27]

The Buddhists accept identity as a relation between a person and a probandum. This view cannot be admitted. While from the rise of Kṛtikā, the rise of Rohiṇī is inferred, they are neither identical in essence or effect nor the cause of each other. If essential identity is accepted to prove the relation then all trees would be mango trees. If the former is accepted as the cause of the latter, then the reasoning involves self-dependence (*ātmāśraya*).[28]

The invariable concomitance in inference is admitted as unconditional. Condition is co-extensive with a probandum, but does not accompany a probans and a property distinct from the property of a probans.[29] Wet fuel is a condition that is an invariable concomitance of fireness. Invariable concomitance is of two kinds—positive concomitance (*anvayavyāpti*) and negative concomitance (*vyatirekavyāpti*). Both kinds of invariable concomitance are vitiated by the presence of a condition (*upādhi*).

There are only two kinds of inference—*kevalānvayī* and *anvayavyatirekī*. The *kevalavyatirekī* form accepted by the Naiyāyikas cannot be admitted, because it lacks invariable concomitance and is similar to the nature of *asādhāraṇa* fallacy. In *asādhāraṇa* fallacy the *hetu* exists only in *pakṣa* and does not exists in *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. In the *kevalavyatirekī* form of inference *hetu* exists in *pakṣa* only. 'The earth is eternal due to *gandha*'. In this instance, *gandha* is only found in the earth and there is no other instance of *sapakṣa* or *vipakṣa* to prove concomitance. This view of the Viśiṣṭādvaitin is mostly true. Similarly, inference cannot be divided into *svārth a* (for one-

self) and *parārtha* (for others) as adopted by the Naiyāyikas. Inference may be treated one's own mental act and knowledge of any object which is beyond perception. Thus, the division into *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* is unnecessary.[30]

The Naiyāyikas admit five kinds of inference—a proposition, a reason, an example, an application and a conclusion. But the Viśiṣṭādvaitin think there is required use of any three, four or five members, according to the intellect of the user.[31]

Lack of invariable concomitance in inference violates its nature and it becomes a fallacy (*hetvābhāṣa*). The concept of fallacy in *Mānameyaprakāśikā* is similar to that found in Nyāya philosophy. Fallacy is defined as that knowledge or *hetu* which is not correct.[32] It is of five kinds—*asiddha, vyabhicārt, viruddha, bādhita* and *satpratipakṣa*. The author has also discussed *kathā* and *nigrahasthāna* like the Naiyāyikas. As Kathā is defined as the use of the sentence between two opponents, it is of two kinds. *Nigrahasthāna* is the use of those sentences by which one establishes one's reason to deny the speaker's reason.[33] It is of twenty-one kinds.

Verbal Knowledge or Testimony

Harijīvandās defines the verbal testimony as that knowledge of an object produced by a sentence, which is not uttered by an unreliable person.[34] This definition is very important, because it proves the validity of both personal and impersonal sentences. Knowledge produced by an unreliable person's sentence is not valid knowledge. Verbal knowledge is directly produced by words, so it is a separate *pramāṇa*. It is very necessary to admit it as a separate *pramāṇa*, because our activities and behaviour are mostly influenced by it. There is another cause also. Those objects which are beyond the approach of perception and inference can only be treated by verbal knowledge. In Vedānta, whether it be Advaita or Viśiṣṭādvaita, it is very essential to accept impersonal sentences (*śrutis*) as a *pramāṇa*, because these are the only source to establish the whole of Vedāntic thought. The Vedās and the Upaniṣads are the important source to recognize the validity of Vedānta philosophy. In the Auddhava Tradition, it becomes necessary to follow the Viśiṣṭādvaitin concept of *śabda pramāṇa* so that it may prove the validity of the Purāṇas and sayings uttered by Svāmīnārāyaṇa.

Sentences are of two kinds—personal and impersonal. Personal sentences are uttered by persons, and they may be true or false. But impersonal sentences are never false. The Vedās are full of impersonal sentences because they are not uttered by a particular person, like the sentences of the *Mahābhārata*, etc.[35] So there is no need to find out the utterances of a reliable person in the Vedās.

Impersonal sentences are never senseless, because of their nature of expectancy, proximity and compatibility. The Vedās are eternal, their impersonality is known by *śrutis*. These sentences are related at the beginning of each creation of this universe. God is not the creator of these sentences, but merely a manifestor of these sentences. These sentences are eternal truth manifested by the great sages. Nyāya describes vedic sentences as the creation of an agent, owing to their nature of a sentence, but it is not proved due to the beginningless nature of these sentences.

In Auddhava Sampradāya, the eternity of the Vedās is established. Their *prāmāṇya* is by themselves. Like impersonal sentences those personal sentences are also *pramāṇas*, which are uttered without any doubt of instrumental defects. In the instance 'The greatest Himalayas are in the north', the utterance is without any doubt, so it is also *pramāṇa*.

Words contain the power of meaning, which is of two kinds—primary meaning (*abhidhā*) and secondary meaning (*lakṣaṇā*). The hotness of fire is denoted by its primary meaning. Word power is known by many sources. There are two kinds of proximity to a quality of a subject. In the sentence 'There is a hut in the Gaṅgā', the word 'Gaṅgā' does not denote a stream of water, but the bank of the Gaṅgā. In 'Devadatta is a lion', the word 'lion' denotes the heroism of Devadatta. These are secondary meaning of the words. So a word has the natural power of denoting its meaning. The Vedās are always in the same order in which they were manifested. So they are not the creation of a person. This also proves their eternity.

In the Naiyāyikā and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka view, the doctrine of *abhihitānvayavāda* is advocated—that words of a sentence convey their isolated meanings. It accepts three powers of words—denoting their objects, meaning with conveying power and the meaning of a sentence. But Viśiṣṭādvaitin are of the opinion that in a sentence the connected meaning of words is the meaning of a sentence. This is called *anvitābhidhānavāda*, which is also accepted in the Prabhākar school of *Mīmāṃsā* and in *Mānameyaprakāśikā*.[36]

Harijīvandās defines a sentence as having expectancy, proximity and compatibility of words.[37] Thus, both personal and impersonal sentences are sentences comprising these three necessary qualities of a sentence.

In the Auddhava Tradition the *prāmāṇaya* of the *smṛtis*, Pañcatantra and Sacchāstraṣṭaka, is also admitted. The Vedās, the Bhāgavata, the Purāṇas, the Viṣṇunāmasahastram, the Bhagavadagītā, the Viduranītiḥ, the Vāsudevamāhātmyam and the Yājñavalkyasmṛtiḥ are called *sacchāstraṣṭaka*, i.e. the existing eight Śāstrās.[38]

In this research paper I have attempted to give proper information about the philosophy of the Auddhava Tradition. As *pramāṇas* are the very source of knowledge, so in the light of Viśiṣṭādvaita it also becomes necessary to admit the *pramāṇas* to prove the *prameyas*. Harijīvandās is very fair to introduce the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita in the Auddhava Tradition. He makes an effort to contradict the Cārvāka and Buddhist views, and adopts the Nyāya view, whenever it becomes necessary and reasonable.

The first and foremost difference from Nyāya philosophy is due to adopt-

ing the definition of the *pramāṇas*. The other difference is of the *nirvikalpaka* concept of perception, denying the *kevalavyatireki* form of inference and a new apporach regarding *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna*. The impersonality and eternality of the Vedās is established. This paper is informative and highlights the various aspects of the concept of the *pramāṇas* in *Mānameyaprakāśikā*.

Notes and References

1. *Bibliography of Indian Philosophies* compiled by Karl H. Potter, 2nd edition, Motilal Banarsidass, New Delhi, 1974, p. 111.
2. Harijīvanadās, *Mānameyaprakāśikā, Sampradāyaparicayaḥ*, Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, Mumbay, 1949.
3. Tatkaraṇānica Prameyasiddhyarthāni Pramāṇāni pratyakṣamanumānam Śabdaśceti triṇyeva *Mānameyaprakāśikā*, p. 10.
4. Yathāvasthitavyavahārānuguṇam Jñānam Pramāṇam. Ibid., p. 2.
5. Pramāṇamiti bhāve lyuṭ Prameti Yāvat. Phalamiṣṭādhigamādi. Ibid., p. 2.
6. Viṣayavyavahārabādhābādhābhyam bhramatvapramātve, Āśritaścāsmābhirbhramasthale satkhyātivādah. Ibid., p. 3.
7. Tatkaraṇāni ca prameyasiddhyarthāni pramāṇāni. Ibid., p. 10.
8. Ibid., p. 10.
9. Gām paśyato gaurayamiti bhavati dhīh, tathā nāyamaśvaiti ca. Ibid., p. 11.
10. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
11. Ibid., p. 13.
12. Yattu Kaścidāha-Kīdṛggavaya iti pṛṣṭaḥ Kaścidāha gosdṛśo gavaya iti, tadidamupamānamiti. Asya caśabda eva antarbhāvah tenaiva Vākyena gosadṛśo gavaya iti gavayatvāvadhāraṇāt. Ibid., p. 16.
    'Āraṇyakavākyaśravaṇasamayāvadhṛtasya gosādṛśyasya Samskāratah Smaryamāṇasya sannikṛṣṭasya gavayasya veśeṣaṇatayā bhānam. Tadidam pratyakṣa evāntarbha—vatīti nopamānam pramāṇantaram'. Ibid., p. 16.
    'Yo Yatsādṛśah sa tadgatasādṛśyapratiyogī, yathā mithah svahastau, iti vyāptisiddham, gauretatsadṛśī, etadgatsādṛśyapratiyogitvāt, ityanumānāt smryamāṇagata sādṛśyasiddhih'. Ibid., p. 18.
13. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
14. 'Sākṣātkāripramā pratyakṣam, tatkaraṇam pratyakṣapramāṇam.' Ibid., p. 19.
15. 'Athavā Jñānākaraṇakajñānam pratykṣam.' *Nyāya siddhānta Muktāvali*.
16. 'Tacca pratyakṣam dvividham-nirvikalpam savikalpam ceti'. *Mānameyaprakāśikā*, p. 146.
17. 'Bālamūkātiryagādivijñānamapi hi samjñādivikalparahitamapi Viśiṣṭavastuviṣayameva, anyathā teṣām heyopādeyavibhāgapūrvakaprvṛtiviśeṣānupapatteh.' *Nyāyapariśuddhih*, Nath Munivethi, Madras, 1978, p. 75.
18. 'Tato' rthasannikṛṣṭendriyeṇa nirvikalpakam nāmajātyā diyojanāhīnam vastumātrāvagāhi kincadidamiti jñānam janyate'. Keshave Mishra, *Tarkabhāṣā*, p. 70; commentary of Badri Nath Shukla.
19. 'Sarvenaive Viśiṣṭajñānena Viśeṣaṇajñānapūrvakenaiva Bhāvyamiti hi na niyamah, Yayorviśeṣaṇaviśeṣyayo rnekendriyagrāhyatā tatra Viśeṣaṇagraheṇa Pūrvameve bhāvyam'. *Mānameyaprakāśikā*, p. 21.
20. Ibid., p.21.
21. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

22. 'Sannikarṣaśca samyogārheṣvartheṣu samyogah, atadarheṣu rupādiṣu samyuktāpṛthaksiddhih.' Ibid., p. 23.
23. 'Vyāpyasya vyāpyatvānusandhānāt vyāpakaviśeṣapramitiranumitih. Tatkaraṇamanumānam'. Ibid., p. 27.
24. 'Tratra vyāpyamanadhikavṛtti, vyāpakamanyūnavṛthi'. Ibid., p. 27.
25. Ibid., p. 28.
26. 'Tacca Sahacāradarśanam bhūyodarśanam sakṛtdarśanam veti veśeṣo nādaraṇīyah. Sahacāradarśanatvasyaiva prayojakatvāt.' *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, p. 126.
27. 'Sarvasya vyabhicāritve byabhicāro na siddhyati, Ekasyavyabhicāritve na sarvavyabhicāritā'. Ibid., p. 26.
28. *Mānameyaprakāśikā*, p. 30.
29. 'Yo hi bhavati sāddhyavyāpakah sādhanāvyāpakaśca so'yamupādhih'. Ibid., p. 31.
30. 'Na hi parasyānumānena parasyānumitih. Tasmādbhūyodarśanam nyāyaprayogaśceti anumānasāmagrīdvaividhyameva tu yuktam'. Ibid., p. 35.
31. 'Sthūlamadhyamasūkṣamamatitāratrmyānurodhena pañcānām trayāṇām dvayorvā prayoktavyatayā'niyamavādinah siddhāntinah.' Ibid., p. 36.
32. 'Hetubhinnatve sati hetuvyavahāraviṣayo hetvābhāṣah.' Ibid, p. 37.
33. 'Tatvavicāraviṣayagocara vādipratīvādinorvākya santativiśeṣah kathā'. Ibid., p. 41.
    'Tatvapratipattisūcakam vakturapajayaprayojakamnigrahsthānam'. Ibid., p. 51.
34. 'Anāptānuktavākyam śabdapramāṇam. Tajjanitatadarthavijñānam Śabdapramā'. Ibid., p. 56.
35. 'Nahi vedo Bhāratādivatpauruṣeyah, Yenāptoccaritatvena tasya prāmāṇyam ghaṭeta. sa hi' pauruṣeyah.' Ibid., p. 56.
36. 'Evam padārthasamsargarūpāpūrvarthanirṇayāt, 'Śabdasyāpi pramāṇatvam jñāyamānasya sambhaveta.' Ibid., p. 88.
37. 'Yogyāsannasākānkṣapadasamudāyaśca vākyam'. Ibid., p. 68.
38. 'Tathā ca Śikṣāpatryām svayamevoktam-vedāśca Vyāsasūtrāṇi Śrimadbhāgavatābhidham, Purāṇam Bhārateṣu Śrivisṇunāmasahastrakam. Tathā Śribhagavatagītā nītiśca viduroditā, Śrivāsudevamāhātmyam skandavaiṣṇavakhaṇdagam. Etānyaṣta mameṣṭāni sacchāstrāṇi bhavantihi.' Ibid., p. 78.

Prārabdha karmas, ripening accumulated *karmas*

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According to the doctrine of *Karma*, *karmas* do not fructify immediately; they fructify after a considerable lapse of time but fructify they must.[1] It is believed that the *karmas* done in a particular life get accumulated in the first instance and they gradually but subsequently bear fruit. This led to the concepts of *sañcita* (accumulated) *karmas* and *karma vipāka*, ripening of actions. In course of time this led to the classification of *karmas* into two categories: *sañcita* (accumulated in the past) and *sañciyamāna*, works being done at present which are being accumulated.

There was a controversy among Indian religious teachers and philosophers whether, on the attainment of enlightenment, *jñāna*, and dispelling of ignorance, *avidyā*, by a person, all his residual *karmas* (*sañcita karmas* remaining unexhausted) are liquidated or whether he has to experience them and has, therefore, to be reborn for that purpose. It was, however, agreed that there was no fresh accumulation of *karmas*—no *sañciyamāna karmas* are formed only after a person has attained enlightenment, but before he dies—*deha tyāga*, gives up his mortal coils. To resolve this controversy, it appears that a new category of *sañcita karma* was evolved, called *prārabdha karma*—accumulated *karma* which has begun to bear fruit. *Prārabdha karma* are those *karmas* which have started bearing fruit; these are a species of *sañcita* or accumulated *karmas* which have become operative, their latent potential matures, or actualizes, and manifests itself.

However, the term *prārabdha* comes into vogue rather late. Originally the term used for works which have commenced giving their fruit was *ārabdha*. The past accumulated *karmas* which lie unripened and would mature at some future time were known as *anārabdha karmas*. Hence the term *prārabdha* is a synonym for *ārabdha*[1] *karmas*.

The *sañcita karmas* were thus sub-divided into *prārabdha karmas*, those accumulated *karmas* which have started to bear fruit, which have become operative, the accumulated *karmas* of an individual which ripen and bear fruit in the duration of a particular life, as distinct from those accumulated *karmas* which will bear fruit in the subsequent life or lives or incarnations of soul. Śaṅkara in his *Aparokṣānubhūti* 92 defines *prārabdha* thus: *Karma janmāntarīyam yat prārabdhamiti kīrtitam*: *karma* done in previous life is called *prārabdha*: In other words, *prārabdha* is a sub-set of *sañcita karmas*.

Since *prārabdha* is that part of the accumulated *karma* which is the causative factor of the present life and its quality, this assumes the utmost importance.

The idea of accumulated *karma* can be traced to the *Upaniṣads.*[2] *Chāndogya Upaniṣad.* VI. 14.2 says, *'tasya tavādeva ciram yavānna vimokṣye atha sampatsya iti'*: 'I shall remain here [in the world] so long as I shall not be released [from ignorance]. Then I shall reach perfection.' Again, the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* II.ii.8 speaks of the annihilation of the *karmas* of a person—*kṣīyante cāsya Karmāṇi*—who has attained the knowledge of the supreme. *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* III.ii.7 says that when a person attains the Brahman, his *karmas* (and his *ātmā* or soul) become unified with the supreme. *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* III.ii.9 stresses that such an enlightened soul rises above sin or aberration, *taratipāpamānam.* The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* II.iii.4 stresses that a person who attains knowledge or realization before death is not reborn, but he who fails to do so, is embodied in the world of creatures. The *Bhagavadgītā* IV.37 also avers that fire or *jñāna* or knowledge reduces all *karmas* to ashes: *jñānagniḥ sarvakarmāṇi bhasmsāt kurute.*

The Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas go to the other extreme and hold that all accumulated *karmas* must be exhausted before a being can achieve *mokṣa* or liberation from rebirth. According to the *Nyāyabhāṣya* III. 2 60 the body is the result of the persistence of the effect of previous acts: *pūrvakṛta phalānubandhāt.* Again, only after merit and demerit are completely exhausted, the soul attains freedom from *saṃsāra* and rebirth. According to Vātsyāyana, "the fruition of all one's acts comes about in the last birth preceding the release". The Vaiśeṣika Praśaṣtapāda[3] in his *bhāṣya* says that when a person becomes free from attachment, *dharma* (*puṇya*, merit) and *adharma* (*pāpa*, demerit) cease to be produced and he attains liberation on exhaustion of previously accumulated *karmas.* In other words, there is no destruction of *sañcita karmas* when one is on the threshold of liberation.

Kumārilabhaṭṭa in *Ślokavārtikā* 19.108-09 explains that liberation (*mokṣa*) is achieved with the exhaustion of past actions (*pūrva kriyā*) through experiencing (*bhoga*) and when there is no subsequent accumulation (*uttara pracaya*) or residue of *karmas*, that in the absence (*abhāva*) of *karmas*, the body ceases to be produced, that is, there is no rebirth. Thus the Pūrva Mīmāṁsakas also believed that the destruction of all *Karmas* must precede *mokṣa.*[4]

The Sānkhya, on the other hand, accepted the concept of *prārabdha*: emancipation is achieved only after the *prārabdha karmas* are ripened and experienced. Even though *avidyā* has been destroyed, the realization of emancipation has only to wait till the *prārabdhas* exhaust themselves.[5]

The *Sānkhya Kārikā*[6] LXVII says: "By attainment of perfect knowledge, virtue and the rest become causeless; yet soul remains a while invested with body as the potter's wheel continues whirling from the effect of the impulse previously given it." Gauḍapāda in his commentary observes that on attain ment of perfect knowledge, (new) virtuous acts cease to be productive and the "body continues from the effects of previous impulse"; the "knowledge destroys all future acts, as well as those which a man does in his present

body". So there is no fresh accumulation of *karmas.* According to the *Sāṅkhyapravacanasūtra*[7] the body of the enlightened person continues to subsist due to the force of *prārabdha*; though the *jīvanamukta* or the liberated person has no *aviveka* (ignorance), his past *saṃskāras* compel him to possess a body (III, 82-83).

The followers of the Yoga school, who are closely allied to the Sāṅkhyas, however, postulated that a *yogī* could obviate experiencing *prārabdha karmas* through objectless *samādhi*[8] (*asamprajñāta yoga*) and also exhaust *karmas* through *tapas* or self-mortification (*Yoga Sūtra* II. 1) as in the case of Jainas. Vâcaspati Miśra in his explanation of *Yoga Sūtra* III.22 states that a *yogin* can create many bodies for himself and experience immediately the fruit of *karma* and thereafter die when he wills; this enables him to liquidate *prārabdha karmas* prematurely.

Though the Buddhists did not specifically formulate the concept of *prārabdha*, they appear to subscribe to the idea embodied in this concept.

In the *Aṅguttaranikāya* 1.141 and in the *Milindapañha*[9] 67 and 68 the Buddha specifically declares that 'he does not die until that evil *karma* is exhausted'. This is, however, contradicted in *Milinda* 34 wherein it is stressed that *'sabbam...akusalam jhāpetvā bhagavā sabbaññutam patto'*: 'The Buddha had burnt out all evils. There was none left.'

The Buddhists called the *sañcita karmas upacaya.* These have to be exhausted before a person can attain *mahāparinirvāṇa* or *anupadhiśeṣa nirvāṇa.* After his enlightenment, the Buddha lived for forty-five years before he attained *mahāparinirvāṇa.* So the Buddhists distinguish between *sopadhiśeṣa nirvāṇa*, Gautama's life as a Buddha, an enlightened being, and *anupadhiśeṣa nirvāṇa.* In the *sopadhiśeṣa nirvāṇa*, his corporeal frame continued to exist, whereas in the *anupadhiśeṣa nirvāṇa* he met physical death besides becoming extinct, that is without rebirth. In the state of *sopadhiśeṣa nirvāṇa*, he is subject to bodily ailments and old age infirmities, and suffered from backache or dysentery after taking his last meal with Cuṇḍa.

In the *Milindapañha* 44-5, the king asks Nagasena whether a person who is not liable to be reborn feels any unpleasant feelings. Nagasena replies that such a person feels physical but not mental pain and he does not escape into final *nirvāṇa* by dying quickly because 'An *arhat* has no more likes or dislikes. *Arhats* do not shake down the unripe fruit, the wise wait for it to mature' (*Milinda* 44). As Sariputra said: 'It is not death, it is not life I cherish. I bide my time, a servant waiting for his wage.'[10] (*Milinda* 45)

Thuse the *Milindapañha* claims, on the one hand, that after becoming a Buddha, Gautama burnt out all evils, on the other, that he does not die till evil *karma* is exhausted.

The explanation in *Milinda* 134-36 that diseases like dysentery, bile (disturbance of bodily humours) and wind from which the Buddha suffered and the injury caused to the Buddha by the splinter of a rock thrown at him by Devadatta, were caused by various external factors such as heat, cold, over-

eating, improper food, excessive exertion, hostile external agency, etc., and not by *karma*, is not convincing. The doctrine of *prārabdha* can satisfactorily explain the Buddha's physical suffering after his having attained enlightenment, the statement in the *Milinda* that an *arhat* does not shake down unripe fruit (unripened *sañcita karmas*), and also avoids a non *karmic* source of suffering.

The Jainas did not subscribe to the concept of *prārabdha karmas* because they believed uncompromisingly that all *sañcita karmas* must necessarily be exhausted before one can attain enlightenment, *kevala jñāna*. In fact, in the twelfth and thirteenth *guṇasthānas* (stages of spiritual progress), a Jaina monk sheds *sañcita karma* through *nirjarā*, mortificatory practices, which ripen prematurely the accumulated *karmas*. That is why Vidyānandi[11] (seventh to eighth century) in the *Tattvārthaślokavārttika* states that when a person attains *tattva jñāna*, he does not have to be reborn for the exhaustion of the residual *karmas*. He has the capacity to mature these *karmas* before their due time, *prakṣyaḥ*, and exhaust them prematurely in that very life.

It is true that the Jainas call the accumulated *karmas*, which have begun to bear fruit, *udaya karman*. But it would not be correct to equate *udaya karmas* with *prārabdha karmas*, except that both have begun to ripen.

It was the *Brahmasūtras* which put forward the thesis that *ārabdha* (or *prārabdha*) *karma* must find fulfilment. In the *Brahmasūtra* IV.1.13 it is stated that knowledge of the Brahman frees one from the effects of later and earlier sins (*uttara pūrva-aghayoḥ*). It is further explained in *Brahmasūtra* IV.1.15 that only *anārabdha karmas* which have not begun to yield results, are destroyed. It is reemphasized in *Brahmasūtra* IV.1.19 that only by experiencing (*bhogena*) the two types (good and evil of *ārabdha karma*) that one becomes one (with Brahman).

Śaṅkara accepted and developed that concept of *ārabdha* or *prārabdha karmas*. In his commentary on the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.14.2, he states: *ārabdha kārye puṇya pāpe upabhogena kṣapayitvā brahma sampadyate*: only after experiencing of good and evil *karmas*, which have begun to bear fruit, does one attain Brahman. In his commentary on *Brahmasūtra* IV. 1.15 Śaṅkara emphasizes that only *anārabdha karmas*, good or evil, are destroyed by *jñāna* or *vidyā* (knowledge), that *ārabdha karmas* should be distinguished from *anārabdha karmas* and that *ārabdha karmas* are not destroyed on achieving enlightenment: *na tāvadanāśrityārabdhakāryam karmāśayam jñānotpattirupapadyate*.

Śaṅkara further explains why the *ārabdha* or *prārabdha karmas* must bear fruit. In his commentary on *Brahmasūtra* IV.1.15 he compares them with the movement of a potter's wheel. *Kulāla cakravatpravṛta vegasyāntarāle pratibandhā sambhavādbhavati vegakṣaya pratipālanam*: like a potter's wheel which is rotating and which stops only after the momentum of its motion comes to an end, the *prārabdha karmas* continue to fructify even after a person has attained enlightenment. In his commentary on the

Bhagavadgītā XIII.2.3, Śaṅkara compares the momentum of *ārabdha karmas* to the release of an arrow (*iṣu*) which continues to move even after piercing the target, and falls down only after its force of motion is exhausted. The body creating *karmas* (*śarīrārambhakam karma-prārabdha karma*) continues as before till the exhaustion of their inherent energy or momentum (*vegakṣayātpūrvadvartata*). He describes *prārabdha karmas* as *vartmāna janmaārambhakāni*: *karmas* which have brought about the present birth of a being. He also repeats the analogy of the arrow in *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* 415[12] wherein he avers that the *ārabdha karmas* preceding enlightenment are destroyed by *jñāna*.

Śaṅkara finds support for his views in the *śruti*: *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.14.2 says that an enlightened being's merger in the Supreme Being (final liberation) is delayed, so he is not freed from his body and this delay is due to his having to exhaust *prārabdha karmas*. Padmapāda,[13] a pupil of Śaṅkarācārya, in his *Vijñānadīpikā* invokes an analogy to describe the nature of *prārabdha*. He compares *sañcīyamāna karma* to grain standing in the field, *sañcita karma* to grain stored in one's house and *prārabdha karma* to food put in one's stomach. Food which has been taken is exhausted by its being digested, which takes some time. Therefore, *sañcita* and *sañcīyamāna karmas* are annihilated by knowledge and *prārabdha karma* by experiencing its results.

Vijñāneśvara in the *Mitākṣarā*, the commentary on the *Yājñavalkya Smṛti* III. 216 explains that *prāyaścitta* (expiation) is for the purpose of destruction of sin (*pāpakṣyārtham prāyaścittam*). However, *prāyaścitta* serves no purpose in destroying the transcendental potential of sin which as *prārabdha* has begun to fructify: *naca prāyaścittena prārabdha phala pāpāpūrva vināśe kiñcana prayojanamasti*. In other words there is no *prāyaścitta* for *prārabdha karma*.

Vidyāraṇya[14] (fourteenth century A.D.) in *Pañcadaśī* subscribes to the same view. In *Pañcadaśī* 131 he states that a person who has attained knowledge 'allows his *prārabdha* to wear out.' Further, 'In the experience of their fructifying *karma* the enlightened and the unenlightened alike have no choice' (131), a wise man may be forced by his *prārabdha* to live a family life and maintain many relatives (144). He maintains that *prārabdha* is inexorable.

Apathyasevinaścorā rājadāraratā api
Jānanta eva svānarthamicchntyārabdha karmataḥ. (*Pañcadaśī* VII. 153).

The sick attached to harmful food, the thieves and those who have illicit relationships with the wives of a king know well the consequences likely to follow their action, but in spite of this they are driven to do them by their fructifying *karma*.

Again:

Avašyam bhāvi bhāvanam pratikāro bhavedyadi tadā
tadāduḥkhairna lipyerannalorāma yudhiṣṭhiraḥ (*Pañcadaśī* VII.156)

If it were possible to avert the consequences of fructifying *karma*, Nala, Rāma and Yudhiṣṭhira would not have suffered the miseries to which they were subjected.

Again:

na ca īśvara tvamīśasya hīyate tāvatā yataḥ (*Pañcadaśī* VII.157.1)

God himself ordains that these (fructifying *karma*) should be inexorable.

Again:

Anicchā pūrvakam cāsti prārabdhamiti tacchṛṇu (*Pañcadaśī* VII.158.2)

A man has to experience his fructifying *karma* though he may have no desire to experience it.

Again Vidyāraṇya says:

Bhogena caritārtha tvāt prārabdham karma hīyate (*Pañcadaśī* VII.166.1

The *prārabdha* fructifying *karma* spends its force when its effects are experienced.

The *Vivaraṇa Prameya Samgraha*[15] of Vidyāraṇya (p. 263) says that though the knowledge of truth destroys *avidyā* which is the material cause of all *karmas*, yet it does not remove *prārabdha karma* since it is itself the fruit of *karma*. In brief, the position of *prārabdha* is summed up in the *smṛti* saying: *Prārabdha karmaṇām bhogādeva kāyaḥ*: the previously done work which has become *prārabdha* (operative), is destroyed through experiencing the result of that *karma*.

The *Devībhāgavatpurāṇa* 3.12.56 says that when a person becomes a *brahmajñānī*, enlightened, all his worldly fetters (*māyādikam*) are burnt out (*dagdham*) and only the *prārabdha karma* survives till the life span of that being (*prārabdham karmamātram tu yāvaddeham ca tiṣṭhati*).

In his *Śrībhāṣya* IV.I.15 and 19, Rāmānuja also subscribed to the concept of *prārabdha karma*. Rāmānuja says that, on attainment of knowledge, only those previous works perish, the effects of which have not yet begun to operate. He goes on to add:

> If those good and evil works are such that their fruit may be fully enjoyed within the term of one bodily existence they come to an end together with the current bodily existence; if they require several bodily existences for the full experience of their results, they come to an end after several existences only. All those works, on the other hand, good and evil, which were performed before the rise of knowledge and the results of which have not yet begun to operate—works which have gradually accumulated in the course of infinite time so as to constitute an infinite quantity—are at once destroyed by the might of the rising knowledge of Brahman.

However, the followers of the *bhakti mārga*, as a rule maintained that even *prārabdha* can be annihilated through the *grace* of God. In Chapter 45 of the *Ahirbudhnaya Saṁhitā*[16] of the *Pañcarātra*, it is narrated that King Kuśadhvaja suffered from loss of memory and other ills due to his having murdered a righteous king in a former life. He obtained the grace of Sudarśana by building a temple, as a result of which he was cured. Vedāntadeśika says in *Rahasyatrayasāra*[17] (Chapter 18): '*Bhakti* adopted as an *upāya* can destroy all sins except those sins that have begun to operate in this life. On the other hand, *prapatti* (or *sādhya bhakti*) is superior to *bhakti* and can destroy even those sins of the past that have begun to produce their consequences in this life.'

To sum up, the schools of thought which held that all *karmas* were annihilated on a person attaining *jñāna*, enlightenment, were faced with a conundrum: *karmas* determine the length of life and happiness and suffering a being experiences. So a *jīvanamukta*, a person who has attained *jñāna*, continues to live and suffer before attaining *videhamukti*—freedom from embodiment, rebirth. The post-enlightenment existence and suffering of an enlightened being were sought to be explained by the concept of *prārabdha karma*: a kind of *sañcita karma* which alone is not annihilated on enlightenment and which must exhaust itself in the interregnum between *jīvanamukti* and *videhamukti*. *Prārabdha karma* is thus a sub-set of *sañcita karma* and was a product of the conflict between enlightenment (*jñāna, mokṣa*) and the post-enlightenment existence of a being.

Notes and References

1. S. Radhakrishnan, The *Principal Upaniṣads*, London, 1953.
2. Śaṅkarācārya speaks of *ārabdha* and *anārabdha karmas* in his *bhāṣya* on *Brhama-Sūtras* IV.1.15 and 19 and in the *Upadeśa Sāhasrī* IV.4. He uses the term *prārabdha* in *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* 445, 446, 453, 454 and *Aparokṣānubhūti* 92.
   Sureśvarācārya in *Saṁbandhavārtika* 17 uses the term *prārabdha* in a different context at the commencement of the *Vārtika*. He uses the term *anārabdha* in verse 95 to mean fruits of work which have not begun to take effect or mature.
3. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, edited by Durgadhara Jha, Varanasi, 1985, pp. 678-80. He observes: *rāgadveṣādyabhāvāt tajjayordharmādharmayoranutpatto pūrvasañcitayoścopabhogānnirodhe . . . nivṛtti . . .*
4. Kumārilabhaṭṭa: *Ślokavārtika* with commentaries *Kāśikā* and *Nyāyaratnākara* Tr. by G.N. Jha, Delhi (2nd ed.) 1983. G.N. Jha: *Pūrva Mīmāṁsā in its Sources*. Benares 1942, pp. 36-37.
5. S.N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. III, Delhi, 1975, pp. 487-88 and 445-46.

6. *Sāṅkhyakārikā* of *Iśwara Kṛṣṇa* (tr.) by H.T. Colebrook with commentary of Gauḍapāda, (tr.) by H.H. Wilson, Calcutta, 1887.
7. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, London, 1948, p. 313.
8. Dasgupta, op. cit.
9. V. Trenckner, *Milindapañha* P.T.S., London, 1880 and T.W. Rhys Davids, *The Questions of King Milinda, Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XXXV, Pt. II, New Delhi, 1956.
10. E. Conze, *Buddhist Scriptures*, Middlesex, U.K., 1959, pp. 159-60.
11. N. Tatia, *Studies in Jaina Philosophy*, Benaras, 1951, p. 152.
12. In *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* 451 Śaṅkara states: *Jñānodayāt purārabdham karma jñānānna naśyati . . . adatvā svaphalam*: The work which has fashioned the body prior to the dawning of knowledge is not destroyed by that knowledge without yielding its fruit . . . Again, *Prārabdham balavattaram khalu vidām bhogena tasya kṣayaḥ jñānahutāśanena vilayaḥ prāksañcita āgāmināṁ* (*Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* 453): *Prārabdha* work is certainly very strong for the men of realization, and is spent only by the actual experience of its fruit while the actions previously accumulated and those yet to come are destroyed by the fire of perfect knowledge.

    In *Aprokṣānubhūti* 91, Śaṅkara states: After the origination of the knowledge of Reality, *prārabdha* verily ceases to exist inasmuch as the body and the like become non-existent, just as a dream does not exist on waking. Further, he reiterates that in the absence of rebirth (*janmāntara abhāvāt* and *janma abhāva*), *prārabdha* cannot subsist. It would appear that the term *prārabdha* here means post mortem residual *karmas* or *sañcita karmas* generally. In fact *prārabdha*, also means 'fate, destiny'. See V.S. Apte, *Sanskrit English Dictionary*.
13. Umesh Mishra (ed. and commented), Allahabad, 1940. Cited by P.V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. V, Pt. II, Poona, 1977, p. 1599.
14. The *Pañcadaśī* classified *prārabdha* into three categories: *Icchā anicchā parecchā ca prārabdham trividham smṛtam*, (*Pañcadaśī* VIII. 152): Fructifying *Karma* are of three kinds—'producing enjoyment or result with desire', 'in the absence of desire' and 'through the desire of another'.
15. Cited by T.M.P. Mahadevan, *The Philosophy of Advaita*, (4th edn), New Delhi, 1976, pp. 282-83. *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṃgraha I*: *tattta sākṣātkāre jāte apya prārabdha kṣhyam avidyā leśa anukṛtyā jīvanamukti*, Cited by Rama Murti Sharma. 'Liberation' (*mukti*). K.V. Sarma Felicitation Volume, Hoshiarpur, 1980, p. 355, fn. 6.
16. F. Otto Schrader; *Introduction to Pañcarātra* and the *Ahirbudhnava Saṁhitā*, Madras, 1916, p. 135.
17. M.R. Rajagopala Ayyangar (tr.), Kumbhakonam, 1956, p. 183.

A note on the concept of prārabdha karma

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The doctrine of *karma* has two dimensions, viz. theological and ethical. Performance of rituals and sacrifices leading to certain results is the theological concept of *karma*, and performance of good or evil deeds leading to happiness or suffering is the ethical concept of *karma*. Which of these came into vogue earlier is difficult to ascertain. However, as things stand now the two cannot be totally separated.

The *karma* theory guided the lives of Indians for a long time. Then arose the concept of *jñāna*, i.e., enlightenment. This was considered to be the means for freedom from suffering and bondage of matter. Enlightenment could arise any time if the necessary effort is undertaken. As and when enlightenment takes place freedom from suffering follows. When this position of enlightenment leading to freedom crystallized, there arose a conflict between the result of *karma* and the result of *jñāna*, particularly in respect of *karma* in the ethical sense.

Whatever good or bad deeds one performs one must reap their results. A man performs innumerable good and bad deeds. His experiencing the results of these during the present life only is not observed in many cases. Therefore, it is envisaged that the scope of *karmaphalānubhava* extends to his rebirth also. During rebirth he again performs the good and bad deeds. Thus he gets involved in an endless chain of *karma* and rebirth. The concept of *jñāna*, i.e. enlightenment, is utilized to cut this chain and lead to freedom.

Now, this freedom arising from enlightenment is expected to arise when one is still alive. Freedom involves freedom from matter, i.e. the physical body. The physical body does not suddenly collapse when one attains enlightenment. Therefore, some explanation is necessary to account for the continuation of the physical body after enlightenment. It is for this purpose that the concept of *prārabdha karma*, i.e. deeds whose result is presently being experienced is introduced.

Further, before the advent of the concept of *jñāna*, or enlightenment, *karma* and its result theory was very strong. Some hold the view that even freedom can be achieved by *karma* supported by *jñāna*. The extreme view that the chain of *karma* could never be broken and one can improve one's lot only by better *karma* was also prevalent. Therefore, those who argued that *jñāna* destroys *karma* had to make some compromise. Hence, *karma* was classified into three groups, viz. (1) *sañcita*, i.e. accumulated; (2)

prārabdha, i.e. commenced to yield results; (3) *āgami*, i.e. to be performed in the future. *Āgami karma* was treated as ineffective or devoid of moral value in view of enlightenment. It is *prārabdha karma*, the results of which have commenced to be experienced, that is admitted to persist during the remaining part of the life in which enlightenment is achieved. This compromise formula seems to have satisfied both the protagonists of *karma* and *jñāna*. This compromise formula seems to have been arrived at only in the Upaniṣadic times. However, the Vedānta *sūtras* have clearly stated it.

Almost all Schools of Indian philosophy and religion have accepted this concept of *prārabdha karma*. To exhaust *prārabdha karma*, whether the remaining part of the life during which one is enlightened is sufficient or a few more births are necessary, whether the enlightened person can assume more than one body during that very life, etc. are details worked out differently by different schools. The Bhakti schools have utilized the grace of God to destroy *prārabdha karma*.

It is difficult to envisage whether it is the concept of rebirth that helped to extend the scope of *karma* beyond the present life or whether it is the need to exhaust *karma* that gave birth to the concept of rebirth. Similarly, it is difficult to envisage whether it is the concept of a permanent self that gave a basis for the concept of rebirth or whether it is the concept of rebirth that led to the concept of a permanent self. Whatever the sequence these have an interdependency and form a complex that has influenced Indian ethics considerably.

Values in science education: an Indian dilemma

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Introduction

Contemporary Indians express a series of ambivalent attitudes toward modern science and technology ranging from outright denial in the name of religious spirituality to an expectation that these fields can solve virtually all of the problems of India today. India's commitment to modern science and technology can be seen in its vast system of technical education resulting in the production of the world's third largest numbers of scientists and engineers, surpassed only by the United States and the Soviet Union. And the Government of India has established an institutional structure and a planning apparatus to further the development of science and technology as a national goal. In 1939, Jawaharlal Nehru served as Chairman of a National Planning Committee appointed by the Indian National Congress. Nehru invited leading scientists to participate in the work of this Committee and as India's first Prime Minister continued to give science and technology an extremely high priority in the national agenda. A. Rahman describes the phases of evolution for research and development in India as follows:

(*i*) Creation of infrastructure for research;
(*ii*) Promotion of research aimed at import substitution and export promotion, to solve the economic problems of the country;
(*iii*) Attainment of self-reliance;
(*iv*) Science for the people; and
(*v*) Promotion of basic research and international impact.[1]

Science and technology emerge from, and operate and thrive in a cultural context. Greek science, ancient Indian science, Arabic science, Chinese science, and modern Western science all emerged from the cultures in which they existed. Science in modern India, however, did not develop from an indigenous culture, but was imported from the West through British colonialism. Cut off from the great tradition of Indian science, some Indians have resisted modern science as an illegitimate imposition of Western imperialism. Others have accepted the same Western science as an instrument of material progress unrelated to the great Indian cultural tradition of religion and the arts. Many Indians simultaneously live today in two different worlds: (1) the cultural and spiritual world of traditional religion; and (2) the world of modern science and technology.

The dilemma of science education in India today is: *The values of Indian culture taught to the youth are not reconciled with the values of science and technology*. Since the national government's policy stresses the use of science and technology as instruments of progress, large numbers of students seek advancement through a technical education usually drawn from Western technical education without a cultural context. Science and engineering are taught as 'objective' subjects cut off from their proper cultural origins. The results of such an education are not just the possible development of inhumane science and technology, but also often second-rate technical achievements lacking adequate motivational intuitions. New theorems and new scientific discoveries result from new insights motivated by intuitions that are fed by culture rather than by technical education alone. In an extremely perspicacious analysis of Indian education, Richard Lannoy observed the following in his *The Speaking Tree: A Study of Indian Culture and Society*:

> The low status of the teacher in India, and more particularly the widely held view that formal education is merely a *quantitative* accumulation of superficial facts and therefore inferior to the nobler and more enduring acquisition of *values*, are due to a largely unexpressed conviction that they violate the basic Indian goal of all learning. Whereas, in the traditional scheme, knowledge is a means to acquire 'direct apprehension of reality' and this 'reality' is 'transcendent', the modern idea of learning is firmly based on knowledge of empirical reality. The former is the domain of the *guru*, and the latter of the *schoolmaster*, and one gets the impression that when an Indian has to make a choice he will not rate the latter higher than the former. The two domains have been designated superior and inferior because one is 'spiritual', and the other 'material'. But the very latest of modern teaching methods are gradually reducing this outmoded distinction.[2]

I shall shortly argue, however, that the presumption that values must be taught only in the spiritual realm because science is value-free is a distinction that cannot be sustained. Science as taught in India seems to be devoid of values because the science that is presented in the classroom is Western science that is necessarily divorced from the Indian tradition. I shall argue that: (1) science is necessarily value-laden; (2) the clash of values between modern science and the Indian tradition need not take place; and (3) a creative movement in science and technology based upon a synthesis of traditional values with the values of modern science can arise in contemporary India. Such a synthesis will not only bring emotional stability to today's Indian scientists and engineers, but will also result in dramatic creative advances in understanding the nature of the world.

My presentation of these three points of my thesis will intentionally be indirect. I will begin with examinations of the widely held view in India of science as an instrument and the assumed clash between the values of the spirituality of the religious tradition and valueless modern science. Critiques of these positions will establish that science necessarily expresses values and that an historical accident rather than a logical necessity produced the clash between Indian spirituality and modern science. I will conclude with a sketch of how a synthesis could produce motivation and intuitions for science.

Science and Technology as Instruments of Progress

From Independence, the Government of India has believed that the development of science and technology would lead to improvements in agricultural and industrial production. And they have been correct in their assumption as India has emerged as an industrial giant among the nations of the world. In spite of a continuing increase in population, India has become self-sufficient in food production, exports goods and services to other nations with a favourable balance of trade, and has targeted areas like space, nuclear energy and the Antarctic for advanced scientific investigation and development. Many of the questions about science and technology have centred on how to use these instruments. Should they be directed to the development of an advanced science competitive with scientists and engineers everywhere in the world, or should they be devoted to helping the rural poor? Science policy debates in India continue to express this tension of who should benefit most from research and development. The following statement by K.I. Vasu typifies the thrust of those who would make science and technology instruments of progress for the least well-off.

> As a first step, our new strategy on science and technology should embody a direct attack on mass poverty and under-employment, a far greater degree of self-reliance and self-sufficiency, and a sincere practice of moderation. In the new approach, national production targets and development efforts should first aim at meeting the basic needs of the rural poor, especially with respect to a progressive reduction and eventual elimination of malnutrition and disease, illiteracy and unemployment. This reflects a shift of emphasis on the use of science and technology more for social than for economic development.[3]

Adopting the metaphor of an 'instrument' condemns science and technology to a valueless existence. Considered as 'instruments', they can only serve as vehicles to achieve purposes established by policy-makers. The metaphor of 'instrument' follows from the mythical assumption that science and technology are absolutely 'objective'. Elsewhere, I have described in more detail the 'myth of the absolute objectivity of science'.[4] Here, I shall only sketch my argument.

The rise of modern Western science in the seventeenth century can be

characterized by the application of mathematics to explanations of nature followed by experiments which test predictions generated by theories. Contrary to Francis Bacon who suggested inductive enumeration and comparison, modern science depends upon highly speculative mathematical speculations which find confirmation or disconfirmation in nature. Newton has usually been considered to serve as the epitome of this method. Newton formulated his three laws of physical motion and his inverse square law for planetary motion in his famous *Principia Mathematica* published in 1687. Followers of Newton like Laplace and Lagrange popularized the notion that Newton had produced absolutely objective laws which could be universalized to describe all physical phenomena. Until the overthrow of Newtonian mechanics by Einstein with his special theory of relativity in the early twentieth century, Newtonian mechanics reigned secure as universal, absolute and objective. Relativity convinced the world that Newtonian mechanics did not apply to velocities close to the speed of light, thus robbing it of its universality and absoluteness. But for relatively slow speeds, Newtonian mechanics still played a useful and objective role. The movement of space ships still depends upon Newtonian inertial laws. Historical scholarship rather than revolutionary science has brought into question the absolute objectivity of Newtonian mechanics. Until the past two decades, textbooks portrayed Newton as one of the foremost scientists in terms of his precision in the use of mathematics and his objectivity in applying laws of motion expressed in algorithms to the physical world through empirical confirmation. But as the non-mathematical papers of Newton have been published, a very different scientist has been revealed. Instead of a pure scientist restricting himself to a scientific method composed of mathematical theory and empirical experiment, we find an investigator speculating in apocalyptic theology and hermetic alchemy.[5] Preservers of the mythical Newton insist that his theological speculations and experiments in alchemy did not influence his mathematical physics. But scholars like Dobbs treating Newton's alchemy and McMullin treating Newton's notions of matter and activity have shown in detail that his concepts of mathematical physics borrowed heavily from theology and alchemy.[6]

The absence of the history of science and the tendency to treat science as a collection of facts in Indian science education have been duly noted by H.R. Adhikari.

> The hitch lies in our method of teaching science. The entire efforts of our pattern of education are directed towards teaching only the facts in science. This is not to say that facts are not important. But science certainly is not merely a collection of facts. Science is a dynamic process, being developed continuously and scientific truths are always tenative, liable to be changed in the face of new evidence...
>
> More than these, however, the major and the most significant deficiency in our science education is that it hardly brings out the social importance of science and its close interaction with society. The developmental history of science as a subject, or, as part of our science curriculum is not given the due importance it deserves.[7]

A careful examination of the history of science will explode the myth of the absolute objectivity of science. But even though subjective values do enter decisions by scientists, science does retain a relativized objectivity confirmed in intersubjectively testable empirical experiments.

Like science, technology also arises in a cultural context. Engineers design artefacts to achieve human goals: roads, bridges, automobiles and aeroplanes for transportation; sewers, water supplies, hospitals and scanning devices to maintain human health; mechanized agriculture to improve and increase food supplies; etc. Although the cultural context of technology seems obvious, this vision has been lost partially because of the modern belief in science policy that technology is applied science and necessarily always develops as the fruit of basic research. One must explore the fundamental aspects of nature before one can derive technologically based economic benefits. Vannevar Bush, a scientific advisor to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, espoused this view in a report which led to the establishment of the National Science Foundation.

> Basic research leades to new knowledge. It provides scientific capital. It creates the fund from which the practical applications of knowledge must be drawn. New products and new processes do not appear full-grown. They are founded on new principles and new conceptions, which in turn are painstakingly developed by research in the purest realms of science. Today it is truer than ever that basic research is the pacemaker of technological progress. In the nineteenth century, Yankee mechanical ingenuity building largely upon the basic discoveries of European scientists, could greatly advance the technical arts.[8]

This view does reflect the experience of the development of atomic energy which depended upon Einstein's theory of relativity and began first as a technological attempt to fabricate a nuclear weapon that would end World War II with a decisive victory. Later, the weapons programme led to the development of electric power plants. This was a clear example of technology emerging from basic research. Yet, if one looks carefully at the history of science, these examples are rare rather than common. The steam engine, automobile and aeroplane, all were developed before fundamental physical principles of thermodynamics and aerodynamics were understood. For centuries bridges and buildings had been constructed without mathematical knowledge of statics.[9] While science seeks to understand the nature of the physical universe, technology seeks to construct artefacts to modify the world. Engineers design structures and machines for human purposes, often

independent of scientific theories. These purposes include such factors as usefulness, efficiency, workability, aesthetics, economics and ethics.

Existing as parallel historical processes, science and technology do interact. One can find examples of technology preceding science, as in the case of the development of the steam engine before thermodynamics, and of scientific theory generating technology, as in the case of the relativity theory producing nuclear technology. But these two disciplines are even more intimately related as science often depends upon technology in the form of instrumentation to carry out is experiments. Without high energy accelerators, particle physicists would have difficulty in finding evidence to suggest indirect confirmations of their theories about particles like quartz. Complicated and costly technological instrumentation has removed the experimenter even further from the experiment, thereby contributing to the myth of the absolute objectivity of science.

For the past fifty years most of American science policy has been based upon the belief that technology is applied science and that to generate new products, one must investigate the science first. The success in technology of countries like Japan, West Germany and Korea has puzzled many American policy-makers. How could these countries be so successful in manufacturing high-tech goods when they had devoted so little effort to basic research in science? The all too common answer that these countries had stolen ideas discovered by basic American science has some basis in fact, but misses entirely the point that technology leads its own life and technological advances can be achieved without necessarily understanding the fundamental science underlying them.

Science by itself does not necessarily and logically undergird technology. Instead, culture provides the common foundation for both science and technology, and this insight has been blurred in the United States by an obsession with science as purely objective. The same loss of perspective has occurred in India for the same reason—the assumption that science is objective and unrelated to culture. But the historical occasion for these assumptions were very different: policies growing out of World War II influenced American science policy while colonialism contributed to the break of Indian science with its natural cultural context.

Science and Technology as Necessarily Dependent upon Cultural Values

Science and technology are clearly value-laden in their effects upon their environment—these are the external values. But in a much more profound sense, science and technology are value-laden possessing internal values. Engineers who design artefacts do so with a value-laden purpose in mind. This is the teleology of technology and the goals for design depend upon collective values derived from culture. The construction of a space vehicle

depends upon the belief that exploration of the universe is a good thing to do or that the construction and use of space vehicles to deploy communication satellites will improve communications. Engineers can construct many things and the development of a type of technology depends upon social and political decisions that this is a desirable course of action.

Some decisions to fund scientific projects also depend upon the expression of political values, like research on a particular phenomenon will somehow sometime benefit humanity. But in the case of science where research is pursued for its own sake, one does not necessarily know whether the outcome will be benign or malignant. Scientists who investigate truth for its own sake argue that knowledge itself is a virtue and that how such knowledge is used is not necessarily their responsibility. These are questions of moral values and outcomes rather than internal values.

When both a scientist and an engineer attempt to explain the most basic aspects of nature, however, they must presume a series of fundamental assumptions including: (1) that the question that they have raised is significant; (2) what the nature of a 'scientific' explanation will be; and (3) what constitutes evidence for such an explanation. A review of the history of science reveals that all three factors have changed over the centuries. A chemist in the sixteenth century looked for a different explanation with different evidence than a chemist in the nineteenth century and in the twentieth century, as theories have changed in revolutionary ways. What accounts for these changes if science is an absolutely objective enterprise? The only satisfactory answer to this question can be found in the changing collective beliefs of scientists themselves. Their Kuhnian paradigms changed not just because new empirical evidence was found. They changed because new imaginative ways of looking at both old and new evidence produced more elegant, interesting and fruitful ways of explaining the world. And the imaginations of scientists were motivated and stimulated and often formed by their subjective, cultural experiences. I have noted above that historians of science have conclusively shown that Newton's physical concepts substantially depended upon his alchemy and theology. In formulating a theory of explanation, scientists either implicitly or explicitly presume a basic metaphor about the world like 'The world is a mechanism', or 'The world is mathematical', or 'The world is an organism.' I have developed and applied this concept of scientific basic metaphors elsewhere.[10]

Stephen J. Gould in his *Time's Arrow and Time's Cycle: Myth and Metaphor in the Discovery of Geological Time* similarly exposes the subjective values of scientists expressed in their adoption of basic metaphors upon which to construct their theories.[11] Gould believes that science is a fully human and cultural activity and that to suppose otherwise wrongly presumes the myth of the complete objectivity of science based on empirical fact. He states:

> Whiggish history has a particularly tenacious hold in science for an obvious reason—its consonance with the cardinal legend of science. This myth holds that science differs fundamentally from all other intellectual activity in its primary search to discover and record the facts of nature. These facts, when gathered and refined in sufficient number, lead by a sort of brute-force inductivism to grand theories that unify and explain the natural world. Science, therefore, is the ultimate tale of progress—and the motor of advance is empirical discovery.[12]

Gould then shows how acceptance of this myth in the development of theories of geology has distorted (and still distorts) and understanding of these theories. In the history of geology, the discovery of 'deep time' has been viewed as occurring when empirical evidence suggested unconformities resulting from cycles of uplift and erosion of igneous rock. This new 'empirically' based interpretation controverted 'fictitious' accounts largely based on biblical interpretations. In this traditional story of the history of geology repeated in contemporary geology textbooks, the heroes were James Hutton, author of the *Theory of the Earth*, who established unconformities, and Charles Lyell, who firmly established the uniformity of cycles of geological change in his three-volume *Principles of Geology*. Thomas Burnet, who wrote his *Sacred Theory of the Earth* in the 1680s, has been characterized as the doctrinnaire theological villain.

Gould explodes these mythical views by examining closely these figures and finds that each of theories did *not* derive their insights from new empirical evidence; instead, they sought to express largely *a priori* arguments that espoused a cyclical view of geological history—*Time's Cycle*. Even Burnet, who has been seen as expressing the position of linear history, *Time's Arrow*, combined this biblical view with *'Time's Cycle*. Our desire to found modern science in an objective empiricism, coupled with our neglect of the cyclical view of history, has led us to misinterpret these early geologists. And Gould suggests that our ignorance of the history of science often leads us to misunderstand contemporary science. He notes: 'Most working scientists are notorious for their lack of interest in history.'[13]

Discovering theories to be constructed on the foundation of basic metaphors reveals the changing cultural values inherent in scientific explanations. How we think about the empirical world and what we accept as a legitimate scientific explanation and what constitutes evidence all arise from our collective commitments to collective beliefs about the proper parameters of 'science' itself. Today, the computational metaphor assumes that scientific explanations can best be expressed in computer generated models (often graphics). Applications of this metaphor range from explanations of non-linear dynamical systems of turbulence and laminar flow in fractals to graphical representations of neuronal activity (as the basis of thinking). Even the existence of sub-atomic particles discovered in the collisions of other sub-atomic particles in accelerators is expressed in computer generated graphics.

The myth of the absolute objectivity of science which has as its corollary the separation of science from culture cannot be sustained if one examines carefully the nature of scientific theories themselves. And the history of science proves extremely useful in making this discovery by demonstrating how the very nature of theories and the evidence confirming them change over time.

Science and Culture in the Indian Tradition

Just as the history of science has proven useful as an instrument to unlock the changing nature of theories in the West, so too an examination of the history of Indian science can illumine and motivate contemporary scientists in India. Such an investigation may uncover the basic cultural metaphors of India that can produce new and creative scientific theories. I am not suggesting that science is not universal—Indian science will be accepted as universal just as Western science has been accepted as universal. Indian thought processes are, however, different and will produce different insights and new contributions. Indian scientists live in a different cultural context from that of the West and must draw upon this environment to further their scientific work rather than setting it aside and assuming that Western science has an objectivity that eliminates cultural contexts.

Speculations have been made about how the Indian pattern of sound in language, especially Sanskrit, may have affected the development of algebra and number theory. In contrast to the development of Greek mathematics where deduction and geometry rose to the fore, in Indian mathematicians stressed algorithmic logic and number theory. Navjyoti Singh has argued that the Indian phenomenon of utterance is fundamentally a temporal additive process.[14] He also claims that making the operator more important than the being of number in Indian mathematics, parallels the centrality of the verbal root in Indian linguistics. Indian mathematicians did not distinguish between rational and irrational numbers because they stressed the becoming of numbers rather than their being.

> If numbers are regarded accomplished monadic beings the internal relation of being would give the theory of number as it did in Greece. But if the being of number is not stressed and mathematical operations are stressed instead of the number theory algebra would evolve as it did in India. The Indian mathematical attitude at thematic level is homologous to Indian linguistic attitude which regarded becoming (verb root or verbal sentence) as fundamental. Indian linguistics did not bother about accomplished beingness of words and hence did not regard word order (relation of beings) in sentence as giving fundamental grammatical relation.[15]

I had occasion to talk with a prominent Indian particle physicist and we were speculating about the possibility of an indigenous Indian science. I asked him where Indian scientists could find motivations and intuitions for the construction of creative hypotheses that might revolutionize the ways in which we think about certain problems in contemporary science. Without hesitation he answered, 'Indian scientists should study the linguistics of their own tradition, for it is here that they will find motivation for new conceptual insights.' The clusters of sound patterns unconsciously perceived in Indian languages and music may provide the intuition necessary to develop concepts centred in mosaic patterns enabling Indian scientists to develop new forms of mathematics and new scientific hypotheses. Conceptual thinking in patterns coupled with a different experience of time, the past, and the relationship between mind and matter could offer new ways of thinking about problems.

The present clash of values between traditional Indian thought and modern science and technology occurs on a level far deeper than just that of a difference between old ways and new ways. Differences about how Indian culture has traditionally thought about the world and human experience in different categories may be at the centre of the clash. But if one looks closely at the nature of these Indian attitudes, we may find that the clash need not be a clash at all. In fact the clash may take place because those who seek to examine Indian culture and compare it with modern science and technology have adopted the myth of the absolute objectivity of science. Myths, however, are not to be completely rejected; they are to be reformed by extracting from them their useful insights. The myth of the absolute objectivity of science is not completely false; science does possess an objectivity limited by the social processes by which knowledge is constructed and by the nature of the human perceptual apparatus. Similarly, the myths of the Indian tradition which express a combination of aesthetic and religious insights, convey insights into the nature of human existence and the world. Without paying close attention to the conceptual bases of this tradition, especially in the history of Indian science, Indian scientists and engineers will be condemned to living a schizophrenic life with the technical aspects confined to the alterego. Unlocking Indian myths and reforming the Western myth of the absolute objectivity of science offer the possibility of building bridges between science and culture.

The invasion of science and technology into Indian culture can be a creative movement if Indian society recognizes the intellectual challenge of constructing conceptual bridges between traditional beliefs and contemporary technical insights. Under such a scenario a renaissance of both culture and science will result. And the starting point for such an imaginative adventure must begin with major reforms in the teaching of science at all levels. The view of science as the accumulation of absolutely objective Western generated facts must be abandoned. Science must be taught as a creative,

living process of thought rooted in the rich cultural and scientific history of India.

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Discussion and comments

EDITOR'S NOTE

Prof. J.F. Staal is well-known for his work in the field of Indian philosophy. His work on the Vedic *Yajña* entitled *Agni*, along with the film that he had made on it, has made him justly famous for what he has done. Yet, in the course of what he has written on the subject, he has made highly questionable statements which have been accepted as true, on his authority, by other experts in the field. One such statement refers to the formula which is uttered along with the offering of oblations in the fire. His interpretation of the sacrificial offering has been accepted uncritically by many on his authority. Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty, for example, quotes Staal without giving any inkling to the reader that there is another side to the story and that, according to Staal himself, there is a contradiction in the situation. As she does not give the exact page number from where the quotation is taken, it is difficult for the reader to check on the original quotation and the discussion around it, even if he or she wishes to do so [see Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty (ed.), *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions* (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1983) p. 12].

Prof. Staal knows a lot of traditional scholars in the field of *Mīmāṁsā*. In fact, the volume on *Agni* itself is supposed to have been produced in collaboration with Shri C.V. Somayajipad and Shri M. Itti Ravi Nambudri. But one wonders if Prof. Staal ever talked to these persons about his theory of sacrificial offering in the Vedic *Yajña*. Or, if he did so, what their opinion about it was.

In any case, here is the opinion of some of the most outstanding *Mīmāṁsā* scholars in India about what Prof. Staal has written in his book *Agni*: *The Vedic Ritual of the Fire Altar* (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1984) on the subject. The scholars, of course, were not told whose view it was that they were being requested to comment upon. A Sanskrit translation of Prof. Staal's original piece in English was sent to them along with a covering letter, both of which are published here together with the replies received in response to our request. A copy of each of the comments has been sent to Prof. Staal for his reply, and as soon as it is received, it will be published in the pages of the JICPR.

A dialogue between current scholarship and classical learning has generally not been possible up till now, and the two have lived in worlds apart with hardly any interchange between them. The JICPR will try to break this isolation, and build a bridge which may provide a two-way traffic between them. This is the first step in that direction. Let us hope there will be many more such attempts in the pages of the JICPR in future.

LETTER FROM THE EDITOR ADDRESSED TO MĪMĀṂSĀ SCHOLARS

Dear Sir:

I am sure you must be aware that a lot of Western scholars have written a great deal regarding the Vedas and interpreted it in different ways. But, as most of it is written in a language other than Sanskrit, it does not usually come to the notice of traditional Sanskrit scholars in our country. In order to overcome this difficulty, we are planning to bring some of the important contributions of outstanding Western scholars, not merely in the field of the Vedas but also regarding other branches of knowledge, to the notice of our traditional pandits through getting them translated into Sanskrit and asking them what they think about the interpretation.

As a beginning in this direction, I am enclosing herewith an interpretation of *Dravya-Tyāga* in the Vedic *Yajña* given by a very well-known Western scholar who has worked in this field for a long time. May I request you to please consider his interpretation and send me your considered response regarding it for publication in the *Journal of theIndian Council of Philosophical Research.* We would send your response to the original writer for his reply and the same, when received, will be sent to you and also be published in our Journal.

With regards.

Yours sincerely,
(DAYA KRISHNA)

STAAL'S INTERPRETATION OF *Dravya-Tyāga*

INTRODUCTION

The Śrauta Sūtras of the late Vedic period offer several definitions of ritual. One that is often quoted characterizes it as comprising three things: *dravya*, "the substance (used in oblations)"; *devatā*, "the deity (to which oblations are offered)"; and *tyāga*, "renunciation (of the fruits of the ritual acts)." The *tyāga* is a formula pronounced by the yajamāna or patron at the culmination of each act of oblation. When the officiating priest, on behalf of the yajamāna, makes the oblation into the fire for one of the gods, for example Agni, the Yajamāna says:

> This is for Agni, not for me (*agnaye idaṁ na mama*).

At this point a contradiction begins to appear, which becomes increasingly explicit in the ritualistic philosophy of the *Mīmāṁsā*. The reason for performing a specific ritual is stated to be the desire for a particular fruit or effect. The stock example of the Mīmāṁsā is:

> He who desires heaven shall sacrifice with the Agniṣṭoma ritual (*agniṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta*).

But this fruit is renounced whenever the yajamāna utters his tyāga formula of renunciation. The effect, therefore, is not obtained.

The resulting picture is further complicated by another apparent contradiction. The rites are subdivided into two classes, "obligatory" (*nitya*) and "optional" (*kāmya*). Unlike the Agnicayana, which is kāmya, the Agniṣṭoma is a nitya rite: every brahman has the duty to perform it. So here is a ritual that appears to be optional, since it is confined to those who desire heaven (nobody's duty), but that is also not optional because it is a prescribed duty, and that does not bear any fruit because its fruits are ultimately abandoned. The texts reflect such contradictions. The Mīmāṁsā Sūtra, basic manual of the ritual philosophy of the Mīmāṁsā, lays down that the rites lead to happiness, but the subcommentary "Straight Spotless" (*Ṛjuvimalā*) observes that this does not apply to obligatory acts.

COMMENTS BY PANDIT PAṬṬĀBHIRĀMA ŚĀSTRĪ

There is a maxim which says: 'It is easy to please one who is ignorant and easier still to please one who knows the subject well, but even Brahmā (the god of knowledge) cannot please a man complacent in the little that he knows'. I feel, to begin with, a little ashamed in replying to antagonistic opinions expressed by a man who has no connection at all with any part of the Vedas nor with the performance of activities, whether *śrauta* or *smārta* (that is, enjoined directly by the Vedas or through the Smṛtis) related to the Vedas.

All *śrauta* activities (enjoined in the Vedas), whether of *yajña*, *dāna* (giving) or *homa* (offering libation), have two elements: *devatā* (a god) and *dravya* (things). Both these are known through injunctions. *Vidhi* (Vedic injunction) is expressed through *padas* with a *taddhita*-ending, such as, '*āgneyo'ṣṭākapālaḥ*', '*sauryaṁ carum*', '*vaiśvadevyāmikṣā*' and the like. These indicate both the *devatā* and the *dravya*. Sometimes a *vidhi* is expressed through the fourth case-ending (*caturthī vibhakti*); for example, '*yadagnaye ca prajāpataye ca sāyaṁ juhoti*. This indicates only the god (*devatā*). The *dravya* to be used is indicated by a separate injunction such as *payasā juhoti*' (offers a libation of milk), *dadhnā juhoti*' (offers a libation of yoghurt).

In some cases there are also examples where the *devatā* is to be known through the syllables contained in the Vedic mantra (*mantravarṇena*) and the *dravya* is indicated through a sentence expressive of use or application (*viniyogavākya*). Thus there is more than one way of expressing a *vidhi*.

Having known the *devatā* and the *dravya*, the activities [which are part of a sacrifice] are performed according to prescriptions given in the Kalpasūtra. These activities are threefold; namely, *yajña*, *dāna* and *homa*. The *yajña* to be performed is enjoined through the verb, '*yajati*', *dāna* is indicated through '*dadāti*' and homa through, '*juhoti*'. A *yajña* is defined as: giving up *dravya* for a *devatā* (*devatoddeśena dravyatyāgaḥ*). *Dāna* is the relinquishment of ownership that one has over a thing (*dravya*) in such a manner that it passes on to another who then becomes its owner. *Homa* is putting (*prakṣepa*) the thing to be offered in the enjoined place. The giving up of something in a *yajña* consists only in relinquishing one's ownership of the thing without its passing to another. In *dāna* the process is completed only when the ownership is passed on to another person. In *yajña* the process of relinquishment is an internal mental process, but in *dāna* it also has a physical counterpart, the act of giving being accompanied with the words, 'I give this to you, O *brāhmaṇa*, it is not mine'. In *yajña* the giving is accompanied with the words, 'this is for Agni, not mine' (*agnaye idaṁ na mama*), the process of relinquishment being purely mental with no physical counterpart. This is the distinction between *yajña* and *dāna*. The distinction is indicated by a difference in the use of words: [in giving to the *brāhmaṇa*], the address is, 'to you' (*tubhyam*), but in giving to Agni it is, 'for Agni' (*agnaye*). *Homa* is an act of placement and is purely physical. The act is, however, a necessary part of *yajña* which cannot be accomplished without it, since the thing (*dravya*) given up for the sake of a god has to be deposited somewhere. This is also known as *pratipatti-karma* (the consummation or completion of an action). The place where the deposit has to be made is enjoined as *agni* (fire), the *agni* known as the *āhavanīya*. The etymology of the word '*agni*' is as follows: '*etya dagdhvā nayatītyagniḥ*' (that which having received something carries that further). Agni is a god, and not merely physical fire. It is that god who after burning carries away the *dravya* given away by the *yajamāna* and placed in it by the *adhvaryu* priest. A distinction must be made here between *agni* in which something is physically deposited and the *agni* to which it is offered. The *agni* to which something is 'given' is a god, but the *agni* in which things are placed for the purpose is a physical object, a fire lit for the purpose and known by such names as *āhavanīya*, *gārhapatya*, etc. In sentences that express injunctions, *agni* as god is articulated through the use of a *pada* ending in a *taddhita*: '*āgneyaḥ*', this is the *agni* to whom an offering is made. The other physical (*laukika*) *agni* on which the offering is merely placed is articulated through the use of the seventh case-ending (*saptamī vibhakti*): '*āhavanīye*'. From the foregoing it is to be understood that the *yajamāna*, having purified the *dravya* to be offered through processes such as *avadāna*, relinquishes it for the sake of a specified god [with the words], 'it is for Agni, not mine' or 'it is for Indra, not mine' and the like. The *dravya*, thus relinquished, has to be placed in the *āhavanīya* fire. Consequently, what is placed in the fire is *dravya* which has already been given up. In this entire process the part which consists of the act of giving up or relinquishing is the *yajña*; the other part, namely, the placement of the *dravya* in the fire is *homa*. Now, where, may I ask, during this whole process is one giving up the fruit of one's action?

Let me give more details of the order in which things are done. In *yajñas*, where the *dravya* to be offered is *puroḍāśa*, the injunctions are, '*yavairyajeta*' (one should perform the *yajña* with barley); '*vrīhibhiryajeta*' (one should perform the *yajña* with paddy). Having learnt from this that paddy is to be used in the *yajña*, a sufficient quantity is poured out for the purpose; it is then threshed and cleansed. Rice is separated from winnowed grains, powdered and roasted. The roasted rice flour is formed into a ball of tortoise shape with the help of hot water kept for the purpose. The ball is then roasted in potsherds (*kapāla*); a piece of it equal to the size of half a thumb, measured from the tip is cut away from its head and placed in the sacrificial wooden ladle. This is tossed into the *āhavanīya* fire by the *adhvaryu* priest when the *hotṛ* priest intones the *vaṣatkāra*. At that very moment the *yajamāna* performs the act of giving up his ownership of the offered *dravya*. The three acts of intoning the *vaṣatkāra*, tossing the *dravya* into the fire and its giving up by the *yajamāna* occur at the same time. I do not see how another act

of giving up the fruit, which is yet to materialize of the action, can take a jump and intrude into the process? Perhaps the Western pandit will be able to tell us!

Vedic injunctions (*vidhis*) are of various kinds: *utpatti-vidhi* (which enjoins nothing more than the *yajña* to be performed), *viniyoga-vidhi* (which enjoins the acts to be performed), *prayoga-vidhi*—the manner in which these actions are to be performed (their order) and *adhikāra-vidhi* (which tells as to who is entitled to undertake the performance of the sacrifice). These are given in the Brāhmaṇa texts—Āpastamba, Āśvalāyana and other authors of the *Śrauta-sūtras*, have given their expositions as to how a *yajña* should be performed. The *sūtra*-writers do not give the *lakṣaṇa* (definition) of *yajñas*. Such a *lakṣaṇa* can be given in a single *sūtra*; it is not necessary to write a lengthy treatise for the purpose. When the Western pandit says that the Śrauta-sūtras are works which formulate a definition of *yajña* (that is, offer a *lakṣaṇa* of *yajña*), he is only parading his ignorance. Such is the true state of affairs.

Now, what the Western pandit does is to separate a sentence from the context as a whole: the sentence which accompanies the act of giving up on the part of the *yajamāna*, namely, '*agnaye idaṁ na mama*', and formulates an opposing view of his own with the intention of exhibiting an inconsistency in the Mīmāṁsā understanding of *yajña*. He is greatly deluded in this. The chief subject of the Mīmāṁsā discourse is *dharma*. As the sole source for the knowledge of godhood (*bhagavattattva*), the Veda is also the sole source for the knowledge of *dharma* (*dharmatattva*). The Mīmāṁsā is an enterprise to arrive at the truth of *dharma* (*dharmatattvanirṇaya*) through a rational interpretation (*vicāradvārā*) of the Vedic texts. It is for this reason that Mīmāṁsā is also known as Dharmaśāstra and Vākyaśāstra (a discipline concerned with the meaning of texts, literally, 'sentences'). Certain maxims or rules of interpretation (*nyāyas*) are necessary for the task Mīmāṁsā has set for itself. Consequently, every section (*adhikaraṇa*) of Mīmāṁsā has its own distinct *nyāya*. It is for this reason that the Mīmāṁsā is also described as a system of thought characterized by the use of *nyāyas* (*nyāyanibandhanātmakam*). How then can Mīmāṁsā be described as a system devoted with *yajñas* (*yajñiyadarśanam*) as the Western pandit asserts? It is a system of thought which considers categories such as substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), actions (*karma*) and universals (*sāmānya*) as *dharmas*. It is not confined to the purpose of propounding *yajña* alone as *dharma*.

Moreover, while pointing out inconsistencies in the Mīmāṁsā, the Western pandit quotes a sentence [from the Veda]: '*agniṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta*'. But no sentence with such a string of syllables is to be found there. And even supposing it does exist, it should then contain the word '*jyotiṣā*': '*agniṣṭomena jyotiṣā . . .*'. The meaning being: 'one, desiring heaven, should perform the *jyotiṣṭoma yajña* modelled on the *agniṣṭoma* (*agniṣṭomasaṁsthānena*). The *jyotiṣṭoma yajña* has seven forms (*saṁsthās*). The first of these

is indicated by the word '*agniṣṭoma*'. All this seems to have been beyond the understanding of the Western pandit.

The phrase, '*agniṣṭomena*' contains the word, '*agni*'. From this the Westerner deduced that what it means is that a *tyāga* (giving up) to *agni* has to he carried out. But what we have here is an '*adhikāra-vākya*' which speaks of who shall acquire the fruit of the action spoken of in another sentence. The fruit of an action is the purpose for which it is performed. The sentence, '*agniṣṭomena svargakāmo...*', lays down the name of the *yajña* to be performed by a person who is desirous of heaven: he will attain the desired fruit by means of the prescribed *yajña*. There is no question here of giving up the fruit of one's action. In fact, it is only someone who is desirous of a certain fruit who performs a *yajña* so that it will lead to the fulfilment of his desire. The *yajña* is not performed in order to give up the fruit. Indeed, if there is an inconsistency, it is in the position taken by the Western scholar who thinks that one needs to perform an action in order to give up its fruit and that in order to give up the fruit of an action one must perform the action.

There is another inconsistency in what the Western pandit has to say resulting from the fact that he has been unable to understand the distinction between actions which are '*nitya*' (obligatory) and those which are '*kāmya*' (optional). Actions are of three kinds: *nitya*, *naimittika* and *kāmya*. Actions with a fixed *nimitta* (occasion) are *nitya*; those for which the occasion of performance is not known in advance are *naimittika*. Non-performance of these two kinds of action can lead to harm and obstruction. *Kāmya* action is an action which, though enjoined by the Veda, is yet optional, to be performed only for the fulfilment of certain desires. Its non-performance cannot lead to any harm. If one does perform it, one has to take another birth in order to avail of its fruits. A person who wants to be free of future births should not perform *kāmya* actions. This being so, where is the inconsistency? [Govinda] Bhagavatpāda has said: Study the Vedas constantly, carefully perform the actions it enjoins in the spirit of worshipping the Lord and give up the thought of performing *kāmya yajñas*.

The Western pandit is so far advanced into the dizzy heights of delusion that he has been able to 'see' yet another inconsistency in Mīmāṁsā.

In order to get the matter clear the following should first be borne in mind. The sentence through which the *nitya jyotiṣṭoma* is enjoined is: '*vasante vasante jyotiṣā yajeta*' (one should perform the *jyotiṣṭoma* during every spring). But the sentence which enjoins the *kāmya jyotiṣṭoma* is different and reads: '*jyotiṣṭomena yajeta svargakāmaḥ*' (one desirous of heaven should perform the *jyotiṣṭoma*). The *yajña* (or, in other words, the *karma*) remains the same in both cases, the difference is one of purpose and motivation (*prayoga*). Had the *karma* been different, this would have been shown by different indicators, one being a difference in the words forming the injunction. Of the actions enjoined some are *kṛatvartha* : their goal is the proper performance of the *yajña*, while others are *puruṣārtha* enjoined towards the

attainment of specified fruits. If a *yajamāna* desires the fruits of only the *nitya karmas*, then he need not perform any actions other than those enjoined as *puruṣārtha*. Fruits are generated only by '*aṅgas*' (parts of a *karma*) and not the '*pradhāna*' (the *karma* as a whole). Take the *nitya agnihotra* where it is enjoined: '*dadhnendriyakāmasya juhuyāt*' (offer yoghurt desiring [powerful] sense organs). Here the fruit, namely, powerful sense organs are acquired by the use of yoghurt and not the *agnihotra* as a whole which functions merely as an overall context (within which the special use of yoghurt is made). Similarly, take the *nitya darśapūrṇamāsa*, where water is carried in the *camasa* vessel (*apāṁ praṇayanasādhanaṁ camasaḥ*). If the *yajamāna* is desirous of cattle, then the injunction is: '*godohanena paśukāmasya praṇayet*' (for one desirous of cattle the water should be carried in the milking vessel, instead of *camasa*). Now, if the act is done in the enjoined manner it will result in the desired fruit, the cause of which will be the milking vessel and not the *yajña* as a whole. The milking vessel is here to be taken as the fruit-producer and not the others which are obligatory. The maxim to be followed is: a *kāmya* action takes over the *nitya* (*kāmyaṁ nityasya bādhakaṁ*). The use of milking vessel is a special act in this case; it aids the fetching of the water which remains constant. It is therefore the milking vessel which produces the desired fruit. Such is the state of affairs.

Now let us look at the inconsistency that has been pointed out. The injunction says: '*ya evaṁ vidvānagniṁ cinute*'. This is the Vedic sentence that enjoins the laying of the fire-place. The sentence, '*iṣṭakābhiragniṁ cinute*', then prescribes that the act should be done with bricks. In both these sentences the *agni* meant is the secular fire and not the god. After the fire-place has been duly prepared with bricks and the fire is lit, the prescription is: then the *yajña* should be performed in the fire with *agniṣṭoma* and *ukthya*...for as many as eleven nights '*athato'gnimagniṣṭomenānuyajanti, tamukthyena, taṁ ṣoḍaśinā tamatirātreṇa, taṁ dvirātreṇa, taṁ trirātreṇa*). Here the words '*agniṣṭomena, ukthyena*'. . .which have the third case ending and denote the hymns (*stotras*) to be used. By implication, they also denote the [seven] modifications of the *agniṣṭoma* (the seven *saṁsthās*) which bear their name; these are to be performed after this particular *yajña* has been completed. Sometimes, however, the *yajña* to be performed is actually named and not just implied, as in, '*trivṛdagniṣṭutagniṣṭomaḥ*'; what is meant is the *yajña* called '*agniṣṭut*' of the *agniṣṭoma saṁsthā*. In the case we are discussing, however, the words, '*agniṣṭoma*', '*ukthya*' etc. refer to the [seven] *saṁsthās* of the *jyotiṣṭoma*. In the *jyotiṣṭoma yajña*, a bamboo-shed (*prāgvaṁśaśālā*) is put up to begin with. This is followed by rites such as the *dīkṣā* (initiation) and other performances which last for three days. On the fourth day, the platform called the *uttaravedī* is constructed where the rites of the fourth and the fifth days are consecrated. Such is the performance of the '*nitya*' (obligatory) *jyotiṣṭoma*. But the *jyotiṣṭoma* containing the *agnicayana* is different. When the *yajña* is performed in this form, then the

building of the brick-made fire-altar, a subsidiary act, is said to become the fruit-bearing part of the *yajña*, just as the milking vessel was, as discussed earlier, the producer of the desired fruit The building of the altar is not really a *yajña* but a rite for the purification of the fire (*agnisaṁskāra*). Such a purified fire is to be made use of in the *yajñas* of the seven *saṁsthās* such as the *agniṣṭoma*. Where is the inconsistency in all this is for the Western pandit to point out.

In speaking of giving up the fruit of actions (*phalatyāga*), what the teacher of the Gītā meant is that one should not perform an action with the desire for its fruit in mind and nothing more. The giving up meant here has no relevance to the performance of a *yajña*. The giving up during a *yajña* is the giving up of *dravya* (sacrificial material) and not of the fruit of the action. This is why [Govinda] Bhagavatpāda has said: 'give up the thought of performing *kāmya yajñas*'.

COMMENTS BY
PANDIT REMELLA SŪRYAPRAKĀŚA ŚĀSTRĪ

In truth there is no inconsistency. One inconsistency relates to the desire for fruit on the part of the *yajamāna* in performing the *yajña*: the *yajamāna*, it is pointed out, gives up the fruit of his action in pronouncing the *mantra*, "this is for Agni, not mine" (*agnaye idaṁ na mama*): revealing that the impetus for performing a *yajña* is *tyāga* (an attitude of giving up), rather than any desire for fruit on the part of the *yajamāna*. From this it is inferred that the *yajña* yields no fruits (it is *niṣphala*). Such an inference is mistaken. For, *yajña* is defined as the giving up of things for a god (*devatoddeśena dravyatyāgo yāga iti*). Here, in this context, the giving up of things is an inner 'mental' giving up. The *yajamāna* gives up certain things for the sake of a god. The priest known as the *adhvaryu* then offers these things to the fire. The *yajamāna* utters the *mantra*, '*agnaye idaṁ na mama*' (this is for agni, not mine), thus giving up through words what he had already given up mentally. This giving up is the giving up of things, not of the fruit resulting from the action.

However, there is something that must be stressed here. It is not true that the impetus for performing a *yajña* is in every case the desire for a fruit. *Nitya karmas* (obligatory actions) are not performed out of any desire for fruit. Such actions are quite unconnected with any desire whatsoever. The fact of being a living agent is itself the reason for undertaking such actions which have been prescribed as a duty in the Vedas. The Veda decrees that one should perform the *agnihotra* sacrifice as long as one lives (*yāvajjīvaṁ agnihotraṁ juhoti*);also, one should perform the *darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice as long as one lives (*yāvajjīvaṁ darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṁ yajeta*). One

might ask: do such actions which have been prescribed for an agent as long as he lives, have any fruit? The fruit of such actions, according to the Mīmāṁsakas is the destruction of sin and not the attainment of heaven (*svarga*) or other results (which ensue from sacrifices performed out of desire). That is why the sentences which prescribe such actions are different, being 'one should perform *agnihotra* as long as one lives' and 'one should perform the *darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices as long as one lives'. Actions (that is, sacrifices) performed out of a desire for heaven or other things are termed *kāmya* ('desired') actions. For them the prescription is (suitably worded as): 'he who desires heaven should perform the *agnihotra* sacrifice' and 'he who desires heaven should perform the *darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices' etc. We see that there is a distinction between the '*nitya*' *agnihotra* (one which is obligatory) as well as the '*nitya darśapūrṇamāsa* and the '*kāmya*' *agnihotra* and the '*kāmya*' *darśapūrṇamāsa*. The distinction lies not in the actual performance of these sacrifices which remains the same, but in the words which prescribe them towards different ends. This results in a difference in the resolve (*saṁkalpa*) with which the same action is performed. In the case of the '*nitya*' *agnihotra* the *saṁkalpa* takes the following form: 'I shall perform it in the morning.' After the *saṁkalpa* there is a sense of joy: this action of mine will please the Lord. Similar is the case with other '*nitya*' *yajñas* such as the *darśapūrṇamāsa* and the *jyotiṣṭoma*. But the *saṁkalpa* to perform a '*kāmya*' *agnihotra* or another '*kāmya*' *yajña* is accompanied by quite another feeling: namely, that 'this will result in the attainment of heaven'. In this manner it is to be understood that a difference in the prescriptive sentence and the *saṁkalpa* results in a distinction between a '*nitya*' and a '*kāmya*' action.

The point I am trying to make is that a *nitya yajña* is not performed for the sake of any fruit whatsoever; the reason for its performance is that its performer is a living agent, though such a performance leads to the destruction of sin.

This is the answer to the first inconsistency. Now about the second inconsistency:

The *agniṣṭoma* is a *nitya* sacrifice; the *cayana* is *kāmya*. Some sacrifices are *vaikalpika* (they can be one or two or more and the performer can choose to perform any one of them). Others are entirely optional. A *nitya* sacrifice is obligatory. But a '*kāmya*' sacrifice is performed only by those who might desire to attain heaven. This seems to lead to a serious objection: the same sacrifice can, as we have seen, become both obligatory and optional. But it cannot be optional, if it is enjoined. Neither can one give up the fruit of sacrifices performed for their fruit, for that would make the sacrifice fruitless, a fact which is absurd. I have, however, shown how the same *yajña* can be both optional and obligatory, depending on the words of the prescriptive sentence and the nature of the *saṁkalpa* which leads to its performance. In such cases there is no inconsistency between being optional and being obligatory.

There are many more things that can be said on this subject if an occasion is created for discourse on these matters, wherein it can be shown how all inconsistencies between different Vedic injunctions is only a seeming one. It is not difficult to establish harmony between all Vedic sentences.

COMMENTS BY PROFESSOR RĀMĀNUJA TATTĀCĀRYA

The Problem: A *yajña* is the giving up of things for the sake of a god (*devatoddeśena dravyatyāgaḥ yāgaḥ*). When a priest offers things on behalf of a *yajamāna* to the fire then the *yajamāna* proclaims: This is for Agni, it is not mine (*agnaye idaṁ na mama*). But if a *yajña* is performed for attaining a certain fruit, how then can the *yajamāna* say 'it is not mine' and thus give up the fruit of his action? How can this inconsistency be resolved? One is indeed led to a position where one can see no distinction between the doctrine of *niṣkāma karma* (acting without the desire of attaining any fruit of one's action) propounded in the Gītā and the Mīmāṁsā notion of actions performed out of a desire for fruit. Both these notions agree after all in speaking of *tyāga* (a giving up). Also, one cannot see how Mīmāṁsā can maintain a distinction between *nitya* actions (to be performed necessarily out of a sense of duty) and those which are *kāmya* (optional).

Resolution of the problem: In performing *niṣkāma karma* as propounded in the Gītā, the giving up of the fruit of action can be of three kinds. One: giving up the desire for the fruit, such as heaven, of an action. Two: giving up the sense of ownership, expressed in words such as, 'this action belongs to me', when performing an action. And three: giving up the sense of being the agent of an action, expressed in words like, 'I am doing this action'. These three kinds of giving up are characterized as (1) the giving up of fruit (*phala*), (2) of attachment (*saṅga*) and (3) of agency (*kartṛtva*).

Consequently, *niṣkāma karma* is characterized by three *tyāgas*: giving up the desire for fruit, as well as the sense of being the 'owner' of an action and the sense of agency. Resultantly, an action done with no sense of being its owner, no sense of agency and no desire for its fruit, is called *niṣkāma karma*.

The Mīmāṁsakas, however, do not believe in the notion of the giving up of the fruits of *yajñas* (*karma*). Every *yajña* whether *nitya* or *kāmya* has a fruit assigned to it and it is performed for its fruits. The giving up accompanied with the words, 'this is for Agni, it is not mine (*agnaye idaṁ na*

mama), is a giving up (not of the fruit of the *yajña*) but of the ownership of the substance that is offered as libation. The *yajamāna* gives up the ownership of what he offers as libation to a god who then becomes its owner. All three (quite unlike *niṣkāma karma*) are present in the action of a *yajamāna:* (1) the sense of being the agent of the action, for the *yajamāna* feels that he is performing it: (2) the desire for its fruit; and (3) the sense of being the owner of the action. Since the *yajamāna* feels that the action is his, all that he gives up is the ownership of the libation that he offers.

There is thus an insuperable difference between the notion of giving up as held in the Gītā and that of the Mīmāṁsakas.*

(*Translated from Sanskrit by* DR MUKUND LATH)

*The original Sanskrit versions of these three comments on Staal's interpretation of *Dravya-Tyāga* in the Vedic *yajña* are being published in the *Sarasvatī Suṣamā*, a journal of the Sampurnanand Sanskrit Viśvavidyālaya, Varanasi. Anyone desirous of getting the original Sanskrit versions may write to the Editor, JICPR in this connection.

HOW NOT TO DAMN LANGUAGE

A fair part of this essay develops by way of a response to Som Raj Gupta's article entitled "The word that became the absolute: relevance of Śaṅkara's ontology of language" carried in an earlier issue of this journal[1]—which article is, in my view, a muddled and overbearing attempt to damn language and rub it out of existence. Gupta's main aim in his essay is a pious one, that is, to enable us to see how the human soul can recover its primordial though long lost innocence in all its ethereal power, glory and purity.

The title of the essay arouses the expectation that one would here be treated to a reasoned vindication (success or unsuccess apart) of its author's main thesis—for after all Gupta cannot in fairness deny that for all his allergy to these words he means to theorize and be discursive. All that Gupta succeeds in bringing home to us, however, is the series of misconceptions he labours under. As on the first hurried look at the article in question one runs through the first page or so, one begins to feel one is in the midst of, by now familiar idiom, the existentialist/phenomenological one. The impression is confirmed a couple of pages later as one discovers the names of Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre. Gupta obviously seems eagerly looking for support and certification from respectable names in Continental philosophy for the bulk of what he has to say and what he wishes to expose and attack. (That the support does not come in so handy is another matter, however.) And if in consequence Gupta's reading of these thinkers seems on the whole lacking in that intimacy and inwardness which makes a thought give out its secret, one is left with a feeling of wearied uneasiness.

The nerve of Gupta's argument against language and its (trusted?) capacity to grasp and reveal the nature of reality—things, events, human beings—is that language is one vast system of interpretations,[2] and that as such it can never capture the human encounter—if the possibility of such an encounter be allowed—with reality in its pristine bareness. That in taking this view of language he is himself being guided by a certain 'interpretation' of that phenomenon need not at present be pressed against Gupta; it is a point however we will do well to remember. After all, the statement that all language is inescapably interpretative and *hence* false and misleading, willy-nilly, comes under the same reproach. Radical scepticism about anything including language tends to become self-inconsistent, and so rather unintelligible.

Gupta may protest that his attempted critique of language need not be taken as yet *another* interpretation of the phenomenon; that reflection (in language) on language need not suffer from the defects that afflict language in its natural form(s); that metalanguage (if that be what Gupta's critique in the end comes to) is a thing of another (perhaps higher) order. If this be one possible line of Gupta's rejoinder he can be assured that he has

already surrendered his case. Language, indeed, has a way of teaching a lesson or two to those who seek to place it under interdict while flirting with it merrily.

But how does Gupta come to his view of language as basically and incorrigibly interpretative and as therefore necessarily inadequate to the purpose it overtly sets itself? This is not so easy to tell for nowhere (in the essay) does Gupta *argue* expressly and clearly for the view, though emphatic statements of it like the following abound:

> In truth, language has nothing to do with the real existent, it is concerned with the universal abstract. It reduces an existent into an illustrative example of a category and cannot recognize it as something unique and irreplaceable (27).
>
> Men in society do not live as *I's*, they live only as *they's*, as petrified abstractions. Language as interpretation is the creator of what Heidegger calls *uneigentlich*, failure of owning oneself up, inauthenticity, and what Sartre calls *mauvaise foi*, bad faith. A being, as linguistically interpreted, disowns his own being, his own self. He is what the gaze of others has made him to be. He is an inauthentic self, an office, not a living being (29).
>
> Every phenomenon, even the most insignificant, presents a depth which no concept can catch, no amount of predication can ever exhaust—it [language] merely imposes labels on them [phenomena] convenient for a particular society. Every interpretation. . .can only be an inauthentic interpretation (29).

The above are some of the samples of Som Raj Gupta's 'troubled' pronouncements on language. Dressed in the characteristic existentialist jargon these pronouncements proclaim the tragic hopelessness which modern civilization—the characteristically *western* civilization—has come to mean and represent. This is certainly not the place—though the temptation always seems real—to dwell on by now familiar enough themes—the irrational in man, the Sisyphean kind of labour to which all human activities has been reduced, the curse of having to live and wander and die without knowing why, the stupendous upheaval of values which the late nineteenth-twentieth century in particular has wrought, the 'irrational' and the 'rational' terror that nazist and communist regimes have inflicted upon men and their progeny, and the consequent abysmal forlornness and inconsolable despair which have come to afflict man and influence his attitude towards life and existence. In point of fact one already notices a definite "convergence" of diverse, even contrary, philosophical streams. At one end are the positivists who, followed by the linguistic analysts, with Wittgenstein acting as a cult figure and permanent orientation for both, look upon philosophical paradoxes as rooted in the slatternly use of language. On the other are the heirs

of Soren Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Dostoyevski and a host of others who find in thought and reason, and therefore by implication in language, the greatest source of resistance to man's effort to recapture his singular and concept- and category-free unduplicable humanity. Pursuit of being or reality here gets anthropomorphized—it provokes interest so long as it relates to man.

Now, one need have no quarrel with Gupta's wailings (largely implicit) on the present-day civilization. What is remarkable, however, is that Gupta calls all this the doing of language, and without in the least bothering to show how. Maybe, men or the *I's* have not simply now come to be *they's* or 'petrified abstractions'; they *always* were so. Maybe, the 'failure' to own oneself up and the resultant bad faith and inauthentic existence do not characterize just the 'modern' man, and that human living and acting always bore this character, so that this plangent state of affairs turns out be a *la condition humaine* and not some particular human situation; and maybe it is only because of this that our rebellion against the present condition of the world acquires a distinctive metaphysical character. But in what way, we must ask, is this state of affairs traceable to the nature (or logic) of language?

That language itself has come to be debased and abused and denigrated and so uprooted from the soil where it truly belongs (or once belonged); that relativization of all meaning has taken away the power of words to suffer the freight and burden of our intention-suffused uses;[3] that annihilation of word (*vāk*) has been precipitated by severing language from this world and reality and opening vast spaces of verbal silence—all this may well be true. (Just consider how the words 'freedom', 'liberty', 'socialism', 'equality', 'history'—not excluding the most derided of them all, the word 'God'—have ceased to be significant, and been reduced to the status of labels loosely fastened on things and always susceptible of being torn to shreds, and betokening as signals nothing more than the presence of things.) But my concern is with that aspect of the nature of language which, on the view Gupta adheres to, operates essentially through predicates and universals. Whether these universals are *abstract* (a word which Gupta does nothing to explain in this context) is a matter on which a hasty judgement is better avoided. The respect, however, in which I find Gupta's view radically misguided and misconceived and so deserving of most resistance is that there is something basically wrong and perverse about predication *per se*. The issue here, as should by now be evident, concerns not right or wrong predication. It is that predication as such is uncannily mischievous, that it deludes and seduces and that therefore language, its pretensions to the contrary notwithstanding, ceases to be concerned with the 'real existent' in its concrete fullness and irreplaceable (existential) uniqueness. How can the individuality of a particular existent be grasped through predicates which

are (by definition) universal and which therefore can always in principle characterize more than one individual, seriously diluting in the process the privileged uniqueness of that individual?

Now I have no intention to deny *a priori* that for all one knows there might be some attributeless mode of existence—and perhaps even of knowing if that principle should admit of conception—however darkly obscure or unintelligible that may seem from the (inevitably restricted) linguistic point of view. Nor does one need to deny for the matter of that, that there are traps and whirlpools language hides and against which one needs to be continually on guard if only to facilitate one's navigation through language. What I want to insist on, however, is that such a (dogmatic) view as Gupta's is positively harmful as regards questions concerning both knowledge and metaphysics—questions which, in this writer's view, cannot be summarily dismissed as out of court. At one level (call it phenomenal if you will) it helps raise the dead horse of bare existents (metaphysics), or at least,—in case this be denied—helps sustain the bogey that the possibility of perceiving and knowing things not as such-and-such but as bare uncharacterized reals is always distinct and real. That both the views, at least the latter, have unforeseen, though avoidable hazards for any theory of reality or knowledge should be plain enough to a discerning eye. What lends to the situation a paradoxical dimension, however, is that the (so-called) attributeless manner of knowing and existing demands to be seized, and not only expressed, in the predicative speech form. The resultant situation is one of irrepressible irony—the irony of having to speak and communicate in a form which has already been condemned *a priori* and roundly, as deficient in precisely that very capacity.

Philosophers damn language, but they do so in language, necessarily and inexorably, the necessity not merely being that they are philosophers and not mystics. And if, as chance would have it, the attempted communication happens to be veridical, the case for treating language as capable of expressing something of the true nature of things (including itself) becomes stronger. The strategy of using language, not to express or communicate one's idea of things but to bring the hearer to a point where he is able to leave language behind and attain some incommunicable intuition of reality, is no doubt fascinating. The paradox, however, of having to use the ladder in the first instance remains unresolved. Resort to other symbol-systems[4] such as art and mathematics for conveying meaning turns out to be question-begging if only for the reason that these symbols themselves demand to be interpreted, and interpretation is not possible except in terms of language.

Philosophers, when they deny the role and power distinctive to language as it comes out in (the employment of) words, forget that their own *conscious* objective in writing philosophic treaties, in conveying, by summoning all the creative resources of language at their command, their ideas and conceptions of life and existence falls implicitly but stultifyingly paradoxically by their own verdict and that their implicit claim to be exempt, as if by enchantment, from the said damning turns out to be hollow and absurd. Language to them means interpretation—and of course predication—and it is of the idea of interpretation as (i.e., on their view) necessarily falsifying and distorting reality that they feel most distrustful: it plays on their sense of security. On the other hand, however, since they do not, as a matter of habit or conscious choice, always keep to silence as the fit mode of their opinions they find themselves falling victims to a self-deception—the self-deception implicit in their creative-communicative venture—to which only those men fall a prey who are not self-critical. Few things can be more absurd than to use language to denounce language categorically instead of for some specific aberration.

What it comes to, in sum, is that while one can always in principle choose to remain silent on matters concerning reality and its knowledge or whatever, as indeed Candrakīrti, the famous commentator of Nāgārjuna, prescribes (*parmārthastu āryāṇām tūṣṇīmbhāvaḥ*), the demand to say what one regards unsayable, to ascribe a predicate to what one regards unpredicable, to think about what one regards unthinkable, remains real and pertinent. The so-called surd which many think lies at the root of all experience *demands* to be freed of some at least of its anonymity and to be spoken about and acknowledged and identified, in however feeble and partial a way.

Gupta says that if language reveals it also conceals. And it is a truism without question, though it is hardly news. What he omits to ponder, however, is that this so-called dual function of language also emerges to notice only when we begin to be linguistic beings. It is through language that we come to learn more or less vividly the more or less clear limits of language, though that need not mean as Wittgenstein thought, profoundly no doubt, that those limits also define and delineate the limits of my world. The Upaniṣadic seers and the great Śaṅkara, while they never tired of underscoring the inbuilt limitations to which a system like that of language—in fact, any other analogous system for that matter—is subject, they also never faltered in acknowledging, if not always expressly, its great power which consists in its no less primordial symbolizing function. The Holy Names, like *oṃ* (or any other) become here the route *by which* to reach the symbolized so much so that they even appear (or are thought) to coalesce, to become identical.

Primarily, however, the linguistic symbol remains a vehicle of meaning. And this meaning may appear at many levels. A word may serve as a chant or an incantation, as it clearly does, say, in poetry like that of Ṛgveda. A student of philosophy may however be persuaded to guard against (to put it in Allen Tate's words) "that idolatorous dissolution of language from the grammar of a possible world, which results from the belief that language itself can be reality, or by incantation create a reality."[5]

Words surely possess a magical and incantational power as becomes evident from (e.g.) a reading of great poetry. Indeed this power needs not only to be acknowledged but (to be attempted) to be restored if we are to escape that impoverishment of language—and with that of thought—which has been the bane of much of analysis-minded Anglo-Saxon philosophy in the recent past. At the same time, however, regression to magical (or incantational) concepts has to be fought and resisted. Such a regression, needless to say, would peter out into a regress to an automatism which would divest language of its essential creativity—and this applies as much to philosophical thinking as to poetry—in which lies its power and achievement.

When we say that if language reveals it also conceals we state only a half-truth. The other half-truth is that even of the concealed or unstated we learn only through the stated, through that silence and stillness, which lies buried in the space which separates words, but which through its definite linkages with the stated—linkages which though not further spellable are not wholly amorphous either—announces itself as the stated gets under way and begins to be attended to and understood. This is easily explained by the fact—and the words 'attended to' and 'understood' in the preceding sentence deserve to be marked—that the unstated cannot succeed in breaking the barrier of incomprehensibility which goes with stillness if the unstated, and with it the stated, belongs to a speech which is alien to us. And this is true not only from the hearer's point of view; it applies equally in the case of the speaker (or the writer). Some zones of silence inevitably remain as the speaker ventures out to give utterance to the vast—though not for that reason necessarily undifferentiated or undifferentiatable at the level of bare awareness—voicelessness which is supposed to lie at the root of all experiences. (Does not experience often impel us into expression.) But a hearer possessed of the ability to understand a speech in its subtleties can see through the intricate meshes of word and sense and gather, with more or less success, what has been left unstated.

Gupta demeans not only language but also (though in a slightly different context) self-consciousness, and what is strange, goes on to equate self-consciousness with the 'remembering' of the word 'I'. He obviously omits the significant point that self-consciousness (or reflection) itself, on the Vedānta view, signifies not the deepening of the chasm—metaphysical and moral—between oneself and the other, but a sure and firm, though gradual dissociation of the not-self from the self, of the *māyic* from the *ātmic*. It is possible that by self-consciousness Gupta means just the everydayish awareness of the kind: "I am aware of my mental states, etc." The impression, however, is soon dispelled as one finds him remarking further on: "There was never a consciousness that was conscious of itself and was not constituted by otherness" (36). This conception of self-consciousness is clearly Hegelian in

its origins where consciousness of the other remains a necessary 'moment' in consciousness of oneself or self-consciousness. My point here is not to adjudicate between Vedānta and Hegel, nor for that matter to fault Gupta on his choice of words (though frankly he leaves something to be desired there). My protest is that the meanings he ascribes to such words are inconsistent with what Advaita Vedānta would like to understand by them.

The diverse world of names and forms (*nāma-rūpa*) troubles Gupta as nothing does and this seems understandable in view of his overt philosophic commitment. But to call such a world the handiwork of interpretative language is to be perverse both about language and the world. The world of distinctions etc.—Śaṅkara or no Śaṅkara—is certainly not a seduction wrought by language, even though we do as a matter of fact give names to, and so identify and place things. We not only interpret (even if we do), but also perceive and remember and forget and recognize. We not only get absorbed or drawn into things but also, if but occasionally, distance ourselves from them. All this is not *interpretation*, at least in the sense which Gupta gives to that word, though it may well turn out to be a major misapprehension. The child's regarding (if he so regards) the mother's breast as an extension of himself and his consequent resistance to being weaned away from it is not the result of some interpretative language hell-bent on doing its mischief. Nor is his realization, as he grows up, that he mistook something for something else, a wisdom achieved by turning one's back on language. These and like apprehensions take place at a level which is prior to the level where the interpretative consciousness begins, if at all, to take shape. Indeed it strikes that we are perceiving beings before we are interpreting beings. Our perceptual apprehensions constitute in many ways a *prius* to the interpretative activity. The issue therefore is much more complex than the quite simple-minded assumptions of Gupta's allow him to perceive.

One grave consequence of the view such as Gupta's—and this holds *mutatis mutandis* of some modern-day deconstructionists and their avid followers—is that we are left with language as a self-enclosed system—whether a system of interpretations or of signs—freed of all possible connection with reality, external or otherwise. Interpretations then serve as something which arises not from our primitive encounter with reality but rather have an *absolutely* autonomous life of their own. There cannot here arise the question, often thought legitimate, of preferring this or that interpretation or regarding some one interpretation as more privileged (since truer) than others—all interpretations being equally alike in the sense of bearing *no* relationship at all to reality or all interpretations being, *qua* interpretations, equally false. (Just consider Riffaterre's talk of 'referential fallacy'[6] in the context of literary criticism.) You cannot, within the framework of these views, legitimately ask whether the picture painted by Hegel—or even Śaṅkara—of the Absolute is indeed so or whether the world is indeed

absurdity-ridden, as is, for example, made out by Camus in his novels. The only question permitted as just is one of internal consistency—the argument being essentially a Snark-like one: what I tell you four times is true. No wonder then that all philosophizing is seen as an activity which only proliferates structures no one of which needs be more true than others.

Language, however,—or perhaps better, thought—interprets too. And that it interprets things in all sorts of ways is also undeniable. What is not understood, however, is that this business of interpreting should prove to some so upsetting. After all, one asks in exasperation, what is so radically wrong with the interpretative exercise *as such*. (Particular interpretations are obviously not the point at issue here.)

There is a tradition—a venerable and hallowed one—at the apex of which stands, among others, the great Nāgārjuna. He is credited with the view that all effort to understand and know reality is foredoomed to failure and vainness; that it ends up not in greater enlightenment about the true nature of things, which in any case lack in intrinsic nature (*svabhāva-śūnya*), but in graver distortions. Every view about reality is here viewed as an imaginary construction (*vikalpa*) imposed upon it, and so necessarily distorting and falsifying that reality. The ideal or 'the dialectic' is the *śūnyatā* of all *dṛṣṭis* (*sarva-dṛṣṭi-prahāṇa*), 'the negation of standpoints' (T.R.V. Murti). Indeed a case has been assiduously made out[7], in overt defence of Nāgārjuna against the likely criticisms that the opinion attributed to him, taken to its logical limit, leads to nothing but radical nihilism or at least scepticism, that while Nāgārjuna's dialectic upholds the "no-doctrine-about-reality" view, it has been "mistaken for the 'no-reality' doctrine."[8] This interpretation, leaving aside the question whether it truly reflects Nāgārjuna's basic standpoint, calls for a brief critical comment, if only for the fact that it has already become with some a principal creed. Let us suppose that a person believes that there is reality. Now, how does he come to know this 'fact'? The only plausible answer that suggests itself is that somewhere there must be some apprehension, however simple, of this reality. And if such an apprehension be denied—as indeed in consistency it should, for all apprehension amounts to knowledge and so distortion—the question arises what can be made of the assertion, *a la* Murti, that even though it cannot be denied that reality *is*, it may be impossible to maintain that it is known, for knowing it would mean having a view (*dṛṣṭi*) about it. Indeed, as it seems to this writer, to entertain such a view as the above is to commit a fundamental fallacy. You cannot legitimately in the same breath deny the *raison d'etre* of knowledge and yet maintain that a certain piece of knowledge has been found to be contradictory and is therefore false: the 'contradiction' resulting from the effort to know reality stands out as a fact and is itself a proof of the possibility of (true) knowledge, for it is *known* to be a contradiction.

It is however possible that there be reality but there be no knowledge of it. But in that case no assertion could be made about it either. For any such assertion, even when it affirms reality in its simple being-ness or is-ness, would entail its apprehension. And once this latter is admitted, as it should, the whole lot of consequences follow.

Affirmations about reality are not all of them of the same order, nor are they always a simple affair of saying yes or no to some proposition about it. Most of the time they are a much more complex affair, involving as they do, in the nature of things, perspectives, points of view, interpretations. So that, as it turns out, even the interpretative activity—having due regard to false interpretations—turns out to be a *part* of the effort to understand reality which, even when allowing for its gradations, is neither always merely atomic nor hermetically closed.

Indeed, it can even be contended that the interpretative effort already presupposes some apprehension or understanding of the thing interpreted; the initial apprehension, however vague or inchoate, already steers the attempt to interpret. As Heidegger well says: "Any interpretation which is to contribute understanding, must already have understood what is to be interpreted."[9] This consideration along with those made in the preceding pages should also take care of an influential contemporary view which maintains that "all understanding is interpretation."[10] This position seems open to objections analogous to those made above to the view ascribed to Nāgārjuna. The view in question implies that no understanding of anything is possible without interpretation. But herein precisely lies the rub. For if this were indeed so, how, one may pertinently ask, could we at all understand the interpretation itself? For in the nature of the case, it too would need another interpretation to be understood, and so would this latter interpretation, and so on *ad infinitum*. As Wittgenstein remarks: "Every interpretation together with what is being interpreted, hangs in the air."[11] Interpretation inescapably presupposes, in the end, some prior apprehension, some "way of grasping. . .which is *not* an *interpretation*."[12] There is a further count on which Gadamer's view seems misleading, namely in suggesting that understanding and interpretation do not admit of a clear and valid distinction. As we have already noted above, there are many things we do and apprehend in respect of which no interpretation can be suspected to be at work overtly or slyly. And if one still contends—as Gupta does throughout his essay or as even Gadamer or someone on his behalf might do—that *every* doing and apprehending is ineluctably mediated by interpretation, that would be to stipulate a certain usage of 'interpretation' without a warrant, and to no tangible objective. That does not mean that we can always succeed in laying our finger firmly on the point where understanding ends and interpretation begins; they may often overlap so as to seem indistinguishable and thus difficult to disentangle. The distinction, however, is clearly valid and true to fact. Interpretation may and does help in achieving a better or more adequate understanding where there has been inadequate or partial, or even superficial understanding. Often enough the under-

standing reached is itself a product of laboured interpretation and may trigger off further interpretation. Yet this subsequent more meaning-yielding interpretation sought must be guided by the prior inadequate understanding. Indeed, we feel the need for further interpretation obviated the moment the better or completer understanding provided by interpretation is felt to be satisfactory. Once again we quote Wittgenstein with advantage: "What happens is not that this symbol cannot be further interpreted, but: I do no interpreting. I do not interpret, because I feel at home in the present picture."[13]

One critical error of Gupta's comes to the fore in his bland confounding of the two quite different things, predication and interpretation. To predicate is not the same as to interpret. No reciprocal entailment seems involved between the two. 'The table is brown' is certainly a case of predication, but do we ever speak of interpreting a table? There are any number of occasions when we simply and directly apprehend or countenance something *as* something without any obvious interpretation intruding or supervening. It is also muddled thinking to suppose that if I apprehend something in its character or features I thereby fail to "recognize it as something unique and irreplaceable."

Implicit in the preceding quotation is the conviction that things do possess a definite uniqueness and irreplaceableness, an undiluted singularity. And though I myself subscribe to some such metaphysical assumption I find Gupta does little by way of clarifying its meaning, not to speak of justifying it. The commitment does require independent vindication in view of what Gupta says and observes *passim*. If things are unique and irreplaceable we are not intimated in what sense they are, and how indeed we come to divine this 'fact'. Is it by some such thing as Leibniz's principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, which would make of properties the factors which determine and enable us to know the uniqueness of things and objects? Or is there some other more plausible way of establishing this conviction. How would Advaita, we ask of Gupta, by the way, account for this 'undeniable' (phenomenal) fact?

In his utterances on man and language Gupta is so palpably one-sided and purblind that he glosses over what ought to be patent to a man on the street. Not only that. He goes on to make statements which even as figurative language seem empty of much content. Some examples are: "When, however, I come to examine the reality of the world and society, I find that they do not exist on their own but require language *for their being*" (35) (my italics); "This means that interpretative language that creates and multiplies distinctions has deserted the world" (37); "In truth, infinity constitutes every interpreted phenomenon but infinity as the other" (37); and further more: "Infinity as the *other* is the world and its interpreted horizons" (37). What is one to make of these and similar observations scattered

throughout Gupta's article? Specially of note are the last two. Gupta is here eager to get, and help us get, a perspective on infinity. And what do we get instead? A well-rehearsed jargon and an over-dose of charged platitudes. Consider, again, the following: "Linguistically interpreted, I am a man, a teacher, a fool, a wise man; a mere interpretation, living in a world which is also an interpretation" (27). Without presently joining issue with Gupta on the exact point of these remarks one may well wish to query how the language-using man called Som Raj Gupta is able to fathom the (linguistic) interpretation that he himself is and the interpretation that the world is, and of which the former is a part, and is also further able to transcend, through discursive/predicative/interpretative language, both himself and the world as linguistic interpretations? And besides, further, why should one go along with Gupta and accept *his* interpretation (for going by his logic he is also offering an interpretation) of the above interpretations? Gupta sacrcely pauses to contemplate that to interpret the existing interpretations and to denounce *all* interpretations in the same breath is to set a logical impasse, the way of which is neither simple nor easy. Gupta does not stop here, however. He goes on to call interpretative language the child of *Thanatos*, of death-instinct (39). "Daily I call myself 'a man' as if I were a stable something. In the face of the flow of life, I would believe myself an entity and repeat the concept every moment I become conscious of myself. This obstinate clinging to myself as an interpretation is the work of death instinct, of *Thanatos*" (39); and further: "At the deepest level, we are not really constituted by language, we are constituted by death-instinct" (30).

What has been said above should have a close bearing on any *over*-celebration of the way of silence. Not that silence can teach us nothing. Silence too, like language, has a more or less distinct creative function, though one should at once qualify this by saying that there are all kinds of silence. Ancient Hindus have often emphasized the need to move from *śabda* to *aśabda*, from the spoken to the speechless. Indeed, no philosophy, whether seen as a search for truth or as a systematic intellectual/conceptual elaboration of truth already seen (*darśana*), is possible without an occasional withdrawal into one's solitude and one's reality.[14] And this retreat into one's solitude is already a withdrawal from any *explicit* social-communicative encounter or interchange (which the speech act represents) and into one's silence—a withdrawal which may even in some cases spur one to make fundamental adjustments in one's mode of awareness. (This silence is certainly not of the same order as the silence which, as we noted above, resides in the void that separates spoken words.) But this silence too, in at least one of its phases or aspects, is already a dialogue which, as Plato would say, goes within oneself: it is a speech gone introvert. (For Plato this is what philosophy is at its root level). It already signals a radical confronting of one's reality in all its nakedness and radicality, and through that with the

reality of the world. While the first constitutes, to use an expression of T.H. Green's, the individual's 'cosmos of experience'[15]—'cosmos' here being distinguished from 'universe'—it need not form an island of its own for it already puts you in contact with the other cosmos of experience and thus with the universe as a primal presence (or co-presence?), each of the two bound up by a relation which in turn bespeaks of an order encompassing both. (The Kantian bifurcation of existence into phenomena and noumena is therefore fundamentally flawed.) (Even the so-called solipsistic, since windowless, souls of Leibniz remain in contact with, for they represent, the universe.) The self remains at the centre of this unity, as Advaita Vedānta understands too well. Deny the minimal unity in all existence and what you get in exchange is radical (or absolute) pluralism and logical atomism of which Russell and Ayer, for example, strive to make such a credible doctrine by adopting the logical strategem of undermining and putting in brackets precisely the self and the cosmos of experience.

The importance of *mauna* in the Hindu tradition can hardly be overemphasized. It is true, however, that silence and the truths discovered in that silence demand to be expressed, to be spoken about, and so to be communicated. And language certainly does not debase or devalue itself, in fact it edifies itself, when attempting to articulate the seemingly inarticulable truths. All those worshippers and celebrators of silence—Buddha, Christ, the Upaniṣadic seekers and Śaṅkara himself, and also no less the more problematic Nāgārjuna—felt internally impelled to talk and to communicate and thereby to celebrate and turn into a sacrament the act of speaking, and speaking not merely "*oṃ*" but the whole gamut of words. And here we notice the reversal of the process referred to above: the movement here is from *aśabda* to *śabda*.

What we call human communication need not always be viewed as a breeder and sustainer of distinctions, the distinction between *I* and *you*, I and others. It can also at a deeper level—the level of addressing[16] and of invocation—well turn out to be a remarkably powerful 'many-centred' transcending of the seemingly undislodgeable illusion that others are set over *against* me, an *I*, and a glorious finding that the point where "others" are thought to be present is precisely the point where we ourselves are, notwithstanding where we think ourselves to be placed bodily and spatially. Patient and studied reflection on the linguistic (or speaking) act helps us to discover the undeniable self-conscious intentionality (with which too Gupta finds himself impatient) that act bears within itself. A fraction of a linguistic utterance proclaims this ('self-conscious') intentionality and announces the realization, and not mere dogmatic acceptance, of self-consciousness in its freedom from the zone where causality and all that it implies reigns. Even if one were to concede that the linguistic act binds—for it is said to bind one to distinctions (though one might ask, what is wrong even with that)—it is also irrefragably true that in another of its aspects it is a redeemer too. In one act of linguistic utterance, the act for example of *giving vent* to some causally conditioned experience, one is unburdened, as if magically, of the quite massive severity of the shackles which the causally conditioned experience very often leaves in its trail. To be able to speak is already at least to partially transcend, and transcend overtly, one's boundedness, and to place oneself in autonomy and independence. It is not that one cannot suffer oneself silently. But this (so-called) silence is, I maintain, not antagonistic to linguistic activity: it is an extensional complementary of the latter. Both speech and silence embody attitudes freely adopted even if one can detect beneath them at work a certain necessity. Both have a certain irresistibility about them. In language thought and reflection gain a definiteness and a circumscription which perhaps otherwise they cannot find or find as well; in silence one confesses to the existence of the indeterminate (though not necessarily of the indeterminable), of the shadowy, though not for that reason of the unsubstantial. None of them, however, is complete by itself: they live and are sustained in mutual expectancy. Silence, as said above, is in at least one clear sense, speech gone inward. That is why a distinction is always drawn between *mauna* (silence) and *mūkatā* (mere dumbness). The former signifies an ability, a free creative ability and a choice, the other a simple incapacity born of misfortune.

One has to keep in mind the importance of *mantra-dīkṣā* (initiation into *mantra*) and *mantra-japa* in the Hindu tradition. *Mantra* and *mauna* go here together. *Mantra* here often is—as indeed even the sacred word *oṃ*—a silent (but not non-verbal) invocation cf, and *not* identification with, the reality or the deity. The word and the presence (or reality) solicited through it can be spoken of as becoming or being identical only metaphorically, unless one takes up the position of the grammarian-philosopher, the advocate of *śabdādvaita* or *śabda-brahma*. *Mauna* is always implicit speech and is, in a manner of speaking, parasitic—if one does not mind this word—upon the articulate extrovert speech.

What one has to guard against is, therefore, not the linguistic act *par excellence*, nor even the language of discourse and predication but language in its fallenness, i.e. language as eviscerated of that radicality which consists in its openness to being and in its continual striving to articulate, as best as lies within it, thought about being. (For surely to use language—in fact even any art-genre—for purposes less than it can really serve is to degrade it, to profanize it.) Reality and language (or thought) need not be seen as polar opposites out to cancel or drive each other out but as the two ends of an axis, language representing the coming into explicit (and free) self-consciousness of thought about reality, and reality representing the primordial anonymous-*looking* ground waiting to be discovered layer by layer. Philosophic thought, therefore, engaged as it remains in its perhaps inevitable business of categorizing, far from being ridiculed and jettisoned, needs to be restored back to its preeminent place among human activities.

One finds that there is a characteristic metaphysical relativism inbuilt in such attempts as Gupta's which seek to rob all human language of its undeniable value and power and creativity,—and with that human creativity itself which incidentally finds expression not only in language but also in silence whether of *mauna* or of *upāsanā* (meditation). From this it is a short step to conclude to the alleged "tyranny of language" which "man uses more to conceal than to reveal himself" (32), and which is what "creates and multiplies distinctions" (37). One recalls here a passage from Paul Ricoeur which seems to anticipate and sum up an approach towards language similar to the one adopted by those like Gupta.

> We are for ever separated from life by the very function of the sign; we no longer live life but simply designate it. We signify life and are thus definitely withdrawn from it, in the process of *interpreting* it in a multitude of ways. . . .We are no longer engaged in a practical activity, but in a theoretical inquiry . . . philosophy itself is made possible by the act of reduction, which is also the birth of language.[17]

My point in quoting the above is not to suggest that Gupta has read Ricoeur (he may or he may not have) but to enforce what I have implied all through: that the one moral that the approach towards language under consideration here suggests is that impatience with language cuts both ways, that the paradox of having to use language to impeach language and to wish it away cannot be suppressed, powerful desire to the contrary notwithstanding, so easily and so unmindfully. Relativism—including the Nāgārjunian one, if Nāgārjuna can be called a relativist in some sense—starts with the avowed objective of reducing everything—every kind of absoluteness—to a relativity while making an illicit exception for its own case. In declaring that there can be no such thing as truth, it claims itself to be true. It fails to perceive that our ability to doubt becomes a possibility in the first instance because we somewhere know the opposite, that the very idea of illusion conclusively points to our access to reality in some measure.

I am not suggesting, be it noted, that language is completely and comprehensively adequate to our purposes, even mundane purposes. But to point to language's inadequacy or to its limitations, obvious as they are, is one thing, and to deprecate it as a positive impediment of which one needs to be dispossessed at the earliest, is quite another. Indeed, in the case of language its admitted inadequacy only serves to underline and remind us of its almost inescapable necessity for us. This necessity further forces itself on our awareness when we find ourselves exploring the possibility of revising and replacing language in circumstances where it is seen to lack the resources for articulating experience in ways acceptable to thought. There is a certain definite, though not perhaps further explicitly and adequately demonstrable, organic relation between our being self-conscious beings and

our being linguistic beings. This is not to straightaway deny that there may come a stage in man's life—as indeed it did come in the lives of some great personages—when one may outgrow the need for language, the need, that is, to talk and to communicate or even *say*, but at that stage one would even outgrow the need to *talk* about language and its ontology. Gupta not only talks about ontology but also prescribes one communicatively. And as is expected, the talk of *neti, neti* comes in handy to him.

Now there is nothing extraordinarily dismal about the notion of *neti, neti*. (Whether the path of negation is one of conscious negation or something extra is a moot point here.) The way of negation may be a powerful tool in the hands of some who feel persuaded that language of its nature fails to convey their experience of reality. And it may even help us to abstract an important aspect of the deity. Read as a total explanation, however, it is a failure. The negative ways's diffidence about human capacity is obvious enough. We cannot tell what reality or Brahman is though we know quite certainly and indubitably precisely what it is not. The paramount question, however, remains: *how* do we know, with the sureness we claim, that it is neither this nor that. And so on. Nāgārjuna for all the superiority of his logic is of little help here. And Śaṅkara too fails *if* he maintains this—though I must add, Śaṅkara sounds more positive. The negative way cannot therefore hold itself against criticism for long. The logic—and the attendant, if implicit, ontology—by which it is sought to be shown that we exhaust all logically possible alternatives or answers to philosophical questions, survives waiting to be annulled. But that, alas, is the beginning of an endless process.

Be that as it may, let us now attend to some of the last pages of Gupta's paper. Here Gupta proceeds to prescribe a way or two out of the snare of distinctions and predication which language, as it is given to us, is alleged to create inevitably. This way out of language consists, according to him, in 'self-submission' to it. But what does 'self-submission' to language mean even as a metaphor? Here Gupta has many things to tell in one breath. The simple equation that emerges from his observations is language = *avidyā* (or māyā) = the world of names and forms (*nāma-rūpa*), i.e. the interpreted and *hence* unreal world. Between us, men and women, and Reality (*Brahman*) stands the almost impenetrable veil of language. Given this state of affairs as the original imprecation under which we are obliged to continue to labour, the task of human liberation which in the nature of things consists in our ability to cast off the slough of (reality-obscuring) language, may seem very much hopeless. How can we conceivably hope to outstep our own shadows? "Man, the creature of language, of *māyā*, cannot hope to reject *māyā*" (40). Mercifully, however, there is a way (or two) out of this radical impasse, Gupta wants to tell insistently. If we cannot hope to transcend language or *māyā* by active acceptance of it as the only natural and neutral-looking space within which our movement—our

desires, our thinkings, our doings—becomes possible and gains meaning and momentum, the only way open to us, once we have wakened to the truth that what we thought to be our natural habitat and a vantage point from which to 'look out' at the world was in fact nothing more than a dark cave closing in on us from all sides and inducing the vast slumber of ignorance, is to allow ourselves to 'self-submit' to that unreality *par excellence*, language or *māyā*.

So far man has been a conscious manipulator-technician of language. What is required now, however, is the suicide of precisely this activity of language- (or unreality-?) making and language-manipulating. Legitimacy for the suggested pedagogy is attempted to be achieved by reducing the whole activity of man to naming and categorizing (this latter in the constricted and derogatory sense). You are exhorted to transcend language by surrendering to it, so that a certain theory of language can be justified and preserved. Death of the act of creation in man, the act to which the linguistic act stands as one of the eloquent witnesses, is celebrated as a moment of redemption *par excellence*.

This is not to ridicule or demean Gupta's call, well-meaning as it is, to surrender oneself to some great syllable—his word is "OṂ" for he claims to take his stand on Śaṅkara—to allow it to envelop one's being such that one could disabuse oneself of needless accessories, nor to undermine the value of 'self-innocence' in itself. My aim has been different, namely to point out that the view of language which Gupta adopts to undermine language is perverse and suffers from fundamental misconceptions about human activity—creative activity—and human reality. It gets him into a bind exit from which only leads to contradictions of a very serious nature.

If language as a progenitor of (false) distinctions—I and you (*yuṣmat-asmat*) or subject and object (*viṣayin* and *viṣaya*)—is indeed what on a certain view obscures from sight the true nature of distinctionless reality, it is language alone—whether as *śruti* or otherwise, though for Vedānta mainly as *śruti*—which ironically makes us critically and reflectively aware of *this* (so-called) nature of its, and thus also produces in some of us the desire to transcend or cross over (*taraṇam*) the subsoil from which come such distinctions. Reflections on language—its achievements or limitations—refer back willy-nilly to language, to the language they *count on*, to borrow a phrase of Ortega y Gasset's used by him in a different context. Gadamer has the same point in mind when he says ". . . all thinking about language is already once again drawn back into language."[18] Any wholesale damnation of language, therefore, specially on the grounds used by Gupta, has to answer this question: If nothing finally meaningful can be said in interpretative/predicative language about reality, how can anything be truly and meaningfully *said* about language itself?

This question is analogous to the question: If nothing finally meaningful can be said in the distinction-ridden *māyic* world about the distinctionless Brahman, for any saying would in the nature of things take place in the world and assume *the* form of subject-predicate or attributive language with which the latter is absolutely *ontologically* discontinuous, how can, then, this denial make itself meaningful and intelligible? With silence then remaining as the only self-consistent procedure, a philosophy would "better pack up and go home".

In the Hindu tradition itself, specially in the Upaniṣads where different aspects of *vāk* (speech) have been unfolded in outline, speech has been thought to be the first of such faculties through which reality or Brahman manifests itself: *etad vai brahma dīpyate yad vācā vadati*.[19] (The words recall the famous Heideggerian view of language as the "house" of Being.) Language here constitutes the frame-work in which our entire knowledge of Reality, as also the self-revelation of Reality, is made possible, as becomes evident from the effort of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* to work it out (by bringing together diverse themes pursued in *Chāndogya*, *Taittirīya* and *Maitrī* Upaniṣads) by means of a grand symbolic equation in which language, consciousness (the psyche) and the universe are all co-ordinated under the supreme symbol *oṃ*.[20] It would, however, be frivolous and going too far to absolutize the equation and conclude to the identity of language and reality in the manner of the grammarian-philosopher whose doctrines with their metaphysical entailments have incidentally had among their critics even the Advaitins. It cannot be overstressed that entertaining any such literal equation would leave no room for the symbolic. No doubt Śaṅkara does seem to give the impression of so conceiving the matter in some of the passages cited by Gupta (and in some others besides). He is, however, never in doubt about the true nature of the relationship between the word—e g. *oṃ*—and reality, which (i.e. word) to him is basically symbolic, symbol meaning in turn which has the *name* and acts as the *image* of reality. It is as such a symbol that *oṃ* becomes the best means of meditating upon reality: *nāmatvena pratīkatvena ca paramātmopāsana-sādhanam śreṣṭham iti sarva-vedānteṣu avagatam*.[21] (*Oṃ* indeed not only serves as an invocation of Brahman but also affirms it.) Realism with regard to given aspects of language can be maintained only if the distinction between language and reality is kept up and the character of language as symbolic-communicative is not slurred over. But more of it some other time.

Notes and References

1. *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. VII, No. 1, Sept-Dec. 1989, pp. 27-41. All perenthetical page references in the main body of the article are to Gupta's article.
2. As a matter of fact, such a view as this is not a novel one. One version of it we come across in a philosopher like Nietzsche (*The Will to Power*): "Our oldest metaphysical ground is the one we will rid ourselves of at last—supposing we could succeed in getting rid of it—this ground that has incorporated itself in language and in the grammatical categories, and has made itself so indispensable at this point, that it seems we would have to cease thinking if we renounced this metaphysics. Philosophers are properly those who have the most difficulty in freeing themselves from the belief that the fundamental concepts and categories of reason belong by nature to the realm of metaphysical certainties. They always believe in reason as a fragment of the metaphysical world itself; this backward belief always reappears for them like an all-powerful regression." Quoted in Antonio T. de Nicolás, *Meditations through the Ṛgveda: Four-Dimensional Man* (Boulder and London: Shambhala, 1978), pp. 22-23.
3. The hero of Sartre's *Nausea* says: "I murmer: 'It's a seat,' rather like an exorcism. But the word remains on my lips, it refuses to settle on the thing . . . .Things have broken free from their names. They are there, grotesque, stubborn, gigantic, and it seems ridiculous to call them seats or say anything at all about them: I am in the midst of Things, which cannot be given names." *Nausea*, trans. Robert Baldick (1965; reprint, Penguin, 1972), p. 180.
4. In calling language a system of symbols I do not mean to treat it as a closed system devoid of creative possibilities. Our natural languages, though they may be deficient in certain respects like some closed systems, grow much as living organisms do and show a way, which can even be ingenious at times, of thinking out a better system or modifying the existing one so as to cope with the inadequacies, inevitable as these latter are.
5. Allen Tate, "The Angelic Imagination': Poe and the Power of Words" *Kenyon Review*, Summer 1952, Vol. XIV, No. 3, p. 460.
6. M. Riffaterre, "Interpretation and descriptive poetry", in *New Literary History*, Vol. IV (1973), No. 2, pp. 229-56.
7. See e.g. T.R.V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955), *passim*.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 313; see also p. 234.
9. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), p. 194.
10. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Crossroad, 1982), p. 350.
11. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), para 198.
12. *Ibid.*, para 201.
13. L. Wittgenstein, *Zettel*, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright and trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), para 234.
14. Thus Fichte remarks in a way reminiscent of the Upaniṣads: "Attend to yourself: turn your attention away from everything that surrounds you and towards your inner life—this is the first demand that philosophy makes of its disciple." J.G. Fichte, *Science of Knowledge with the First and Second Introductions*, ed. and trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982), p. 6.

15. T.H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, ed. A.C. Bradley, 5th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906), section 39, p. 45.
16. This theme has been developed at some length by Ramchandra Gandhi in his *Presuppositions of Human Communication* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1974).
17. Paul Ricoeur, "Husserl and Wittgenstein on Language", in *Phenomenology and Existentialism*, eds. E.N. Lee and M. Mandelbaum (The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 27. No wonder then that Ricoeur sees for man only "eschatological hope".
18. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Man and Language", *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, trans. David Linge (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1977), p. 62.
19. *Kauṣitaki Upaniṣad* 2.8.
20. J.G. Arapura, *Hermeneutical Essays on Vedāntic Topics*, (Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass, 1986), p. 157.
21. Śaṅkara's commentary on *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 1.1.1.

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Book reviews

P.T. GEACH (ed.): *Wittgenstein's Lectures on Philosophical Psychology: 1946-47: Notes by P.T. Geach, K.J. Shah and A.C. Jackson* (Harvester-Wheatsheaf, London, 1988), 348 pp.

The twentieth century might well go down, in the history of Western philosophical thought, as the century that belonged primarily to Ludwig Wittgenstein. While the *Tractatus* had a decisive influence on Anglo-American philosophy of the 1930s and 1940s, *Philosophical Investigations*, published posthumously dominated the same philosophical scene through the 1950s and 1960s. The remarkable thing, however, is that what has come to be known as the 'later' thought of Wittgenstein, or the 'later Wittgenstein', has not just made a crucial difference to academic philosophy in the Anglo-American world, it seems to have played a determining role in the practice of theoria, as such, in *European* thought, and, thereby, has helped bring together these two streams of thought in a living relationship. Thus, Wittgensteinean ideas are inescapably present in path-breaking theroetical thinking in the human sciences—particularly, Anthropology, Sociology and Literary Criticism—as also in the latest developments in the philosophy of the Natural Sciences. Much of this influence is, of course, subterranean, and it is impossible to articulate it with any degree of precision or adequacy, but it will not be much of an exaggeration to say that there is a subtle Wittgensteinean aura about the Western intellectual self-consciousness of the twentieth century—especially of its second half.

Only a small number of people, however, had sustained direct access to the thought of the 'later' Wittgenstein: he had published nothing after the *Tractatus*, and *Philosophical Investigations* was published posthumously. In the few years that he taught in Cambridge before he resigned his chair in Philosophy, small groups of dedicated students attended his lectures which took on the character of intimate but intense dialogue between himself and the pupils on a variety of topics. Some of the ideas developed in these lectures inevitably escaped into the wider arena of academic philosophical debate and began to circulate and be used in ways unintended and unauthorized by their author. Also, ideas similar to Wittgenstein's were being developed around the same time, perhaps fairly independently of what was going on in the lectures. It is this, perhaps, that provoked the rather remarkable statement in the Preface to *Philosophical Investigations*: 'For more than one reason what I publish here will have points of contact with what other people are writing today.—If my remarks do not bear a stamp which

marks them as mine,—I do not wish to lay any further claim to them as my property. (*Philosophical Investigations*, p. x).

In 1946-47 Wittgenstein delivered his last course of lectures before retirement. 'Each year at the beginning of his course of lectures Wittgenstein would have a great many listeners, largely female; this crowd would rapidly shrink to a hard core of regular attenders [almost all male] by the third or fourth lecture'. (Editor's Preface, p. xii) Among this 'hard core' there were three, attending the 1946-47 lectures, who kept notes of the lectures. They were: P.T. Geach, K.J. Shah and A.C. Jackson. It is these notes that have been brought together in this volume after over forty years of what the publishers have called 'somewhat of an "underground" ' existence. P.T. Geach, the editor, has 'used a very light hand as editor' and the 'three records as they stand are *bona fide* reports of what three young men could make of a great philosopher's living words'. (p. xv)

The ground covered in these lectures is now familiar to all readers of Wittgenstein: thinking, willing, intending, sensation, emotion, memory, meaning, privacy, the first-person—third-person asymmetry, the nature of philosophy and so on. What is remarkable about them is: (*i*) the insight they give into Wittgenstein's method of teaching; (*ii*) the extraordinary powers of imagination that he brings to bear upon small but significant points of detail; and (*iii*) the subtly different impressions that the lectures made on three gifted and sensitive pupils.

These lectures, like the others, are in the form of a dialogue where Wittgenstein is the supreme authoritative participant. Yet, under the powerful and resolute guidance of the great man, the others do not remain just 'actors' but become, as it were, 'the joint authors, working out in agreement or disagreement the mode of their production'.* There was, then, of course, no question of following a set syllabus. As Geach puts it in his editorial preface:

> Wittgenstein lectured without notes: but manifestly not without preparation. He expected of his audience close attention and cooperation. Since after the first lecture of a course the way the discussion went depended on what had been brought up in the previous meeting, there could have been no question of his following a prearranged syllabus. Wittgenstein was patient with people's genuine difficulties, and often brought out from a listener's remark much more than might have been expected'. (p. xii)

The topic under discussion changes frequently—from thought to meaning to intending to sensation, emotion, knowing, memory and back again—not, of course, in the same order. This is not because of any lack of organization in the lectures—quite the contrary: the nature of the subject itself demands such change and movement back and forth. Psychological

* Alasdair MacIntyre on *conversation* in *After Virtue*, London, 1981, p. 196.

concepts are interrelated in a great variety of ways; while there are similarities, there are also differences of a 'categorical' nature. And the same concept, say, thinking, invariably gathers within its net a complexity of elements which cannot be captured in a 'definition' or 'philosophical' explanation: 'If you try to apply an explanation you plunge into a mass of exceptions'. (Shah) Or take the following response to the suggestion that intending is an 'experience':

> Let us mean by experience something like imagery or perception. An experience is something that can have duration in time—like a continued note or colour. The same note again...still...still...now no longer. This is NOT a natural expression for intention—or for knowing for that matter. If a man says he sees a red disk, I might frequently ask if he still sees it, but if he says he intends to visit his grandmother tomorrow, I won't keep on asking if he still does.—An image that lasts for five minutes may obsess a man, but an intention *qua* intention, does not obsess him—though thoughts connected with it may. This distinction between thought and intention is categorical. A move in chess has no velocity, unlike the physical movement that executes it...What I mean about chess is that one might ask in mid-move which move I am making, and a reply is possible. But the temporal determination: 'I move to that square now' (in mid-move) is odd. So in 'I intend *now*' the 'now' isn't as in 'I think *now*'. One mustn't think of intention and thought as two different parts in a score. (Geach)

The temptation to look for unitary answers in philosophy is great; but this temptation must be resisted for to yield to it is to invite darkness and confusion: mind is neither inner private process nor is it behaviour. 'I am not doing behaviourism. "I have pain" doesn't mean "I cry"; it replaces crying or other expressions of pain'. (Geach) Or, 'It is misleading to say words mean behaviour. Words replace the behaviour, say, a cry'. (Shah) But then, think of 'I am trying hard'. Does it 'replace expressions of feeling? The circumstances here are completely different, e.g. having been given an order, beginning to do what I have learned to do; and the kind of interest are completely different'. (Geach) In either case, however, the important thing is *not* that a particular feeling is or is not recognized—*the* important thing—and here we come to another recurring Wittgensteinean theme—is whether or not the use of words here is firmly anchored in 'ordinary', 'normal' human life.

> We say a man has learned to use such words, only when he behaves like a normal human being. If a child looked radiant when it was hurt, and shrieked for no apparent reason, one couldn't teach him the use of the word 'pain'. Even if we taught him to use it instead of shrieking it would

> still not have consequences like taking him to the doctor; it would be a newuse. One couldn't teach him our use of psychological words. (Geach)

'If we want to teach a child a psychological word, he must behave like a normal being: even if because of courage he represses the expression of pain. But even this has to be based upon, derived from, a *suppression* of the expression of pain.' (Shah) 'There will be exceptions' (Geach) [but interestingly Shah: 'It is always, and here too, a question of "rule and exception" ']. 'But the centre of reference is ordinary human life, and further we go from ordinary human life, the less meaning we can give such expression'. (Geach)

The idea, implicit in the dualist picture of mind and body, that it is possible—even if only logically—for the mind and the body to lose, as it were, their normal points of contact, to become dissociated, seems to have haunted Wittgenstein in all his thinking about mind and mental concepts—whether in these lectures, in *Philosophical Investigations*, or in various other works published posthumously. Indeed, sometimes it looks as though by far the greater part of his enormous intellectual energy is devoted to combating this idea. 'I am in pain' is not a report, but an 'utterance' that replaces natural expressions of pain; the asymmetry between some first-person, present tense psychological sentences and corresponding third-person ones ('I am in pain' and 'He is in pain') is not one between my superior, private *knowledge* of myself and inferior public knowledge of another, but is one of the fundamental *givens* of human life. Some things I know about myself, say, the position of my limbs, *are not* based on anything (e.g., a feeling or the 'observation' of a feeling); I just know them; the question how does not arise, or, if it does, it cannot have an answer—all these and more (e.g., the parable of the 'soulless' tribe, the intriguing remarks about lying [Shah, pp. 196-97], the rejection of the idea that intentions are causes and so on) are—or can be seen as—so many fortifications against any possible infiltration by the dualist idea of the possible sundering of the normal relations between the 'mind' and the 'body'. Some time ago I read a 'true' story about a lady who, on waking up one morning discovered, with terror, that she was no longer able to tell the position of her limbs which, consequently, acquired a horrifying independence of movements. The story tells of the partial recovery that the lady made by a painful process of relearning how to correlate muscular and kinaesthetic sensations with positions of her limbs. The recovery was partial because the lady was, for ever afterwards, in *real* doubt whether the correlations she had learned would 'work' the next time round. The story, of course, may not be true; and, in any case, there are details to be filled in, which might change its entire import (the lady's affliction might, for instance, be understood in the same way as a normal person's ignorance of the position of an anaesthesized limb). But on the face of it at least, it seems to bring mind-body dualism right back to the centre, and it is possible that Wittgenstein might have found it profoundly disturbing: it seems to let

in the dualist idea of the possible dissociation of the mind and the body, through all his fortifications, and puts it in a position from where it can threaten the entire 'Wittgensteinean world'—if such a phrase is permitted—behind the fortifications.

While there is a marked correspondence between the notes taken by Geach and Shah, those of Jackson's seem to strike, as it were, a somewhat different note. They are in a way 'better organized', but, in the process, they seem to lose a little the sense of spontaneity and surprise which is powerfully present throughout the other two sets. This is, however, unsurpising, for Jackson 'used to write up his notes from memory in the evening of the day on which the lectures were given',* and 'the attribution to Dr. Wittgenstein of verbatim sentences is intended to convey one auditor's understanding of the opinion expressed'.**

There are, however, other interesting differences in the three records. Some of these differences must be put down to individual specificities of perception. But one would like to think—in respect of Shah's notes for instance—that his own civilizational background entered into them, however unselfconsciously, to give them, in part at least, the distinctive character that they have. I wish to point out here just one difference in the three records which might conceivably be seen in this light. Early on in the lectures Wittgenstein makes a remark about how philosophical problems arise. And here are the three records of it:

> Philosophical problems arise when a man has the King's English use of 'thinking' but describes it wrongly. Why should a man *misdescribe*?
>
> A description of the use of a word is given when we *define* it—when we show a sample (e.g., of colour). But a child 'picks up' psychological expressions. No explanation is ever given. Cf. the word 'perhaps'. If a child asks 'What is perhaps'? one doesn't explain; the child picks it up. If we are asked to describe the use, we are bewildered. Any explanation that comes into our head is always wrong. (Geach)
>
> Then there is a tendency to say that the trouble was verbal. But how can it be verbal? 'Thinking' and 'pain' can be confused. But in that case philosophical conflict does not arise. There is a philosophical conflict only when the person has some right idea of the use. But what is the right idea of the use? Really the person has a use and practices it. *The problem has nothing to do with conflict between different persons, it has to do with conflict within the person himself.* (emphasis added) Though the person has the right use he has a wrong idea of the use. How does this happen? It happens because the description of the use of the words is not needed

* Publishers' Preface, p. viii.
** A.C. Jackson as quoted by publishers, p. viii.

for learning the use of a word; but it is needed when we define the word . . .(Shah)

Now why does it [the idea that philosophical trouble is verbal] seem unsatisfactory? One idea comes at once. How can such an enquiry have any importance or depth? And how could it cause us any trouble? Suppose someone used 'thinking' for what we mean by 'feeling'. His mistake would have no philosophical importance; it will be like confusing Oxford blue with Cambridge blue. But he would have 'a wrong idea of the use of the word'. The philosophical problem arises *when you have the 'right idea' as opposed to that sort of wrong idea*; that is, where you have a use which you practice but cannot describe. There is a conflict between the practice and the description you can give of it. (Jackson)

What I find intriguing here is the sentence in the Shah version of the record: 'The problem here has nothing to do with conflict between different persons, it has to do with conflict within the person himself'. Although nothing corresponding to this is there in the other two versions, it has undoubtedly to do with the Wittgensteinean view—not much talked about in these lectures—that a philosophical problem arises out of a sort of self-inflicted intellectual imprisonment of the mind ('fly in the fly-bottle') and that to see one's way out of it is also to achieve liberation from such imprisonment ('to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle'). The connection between self-delusion, self-awareness and liberation is, of course, a matter of almost axiomatic variety in a powerful strand of Indian thought. In any event, the differences in the three versions will be a most interesting subject of research, apart from the fact that 'these three contemporary perspectives will surely be of immense value to all students of Wittgenstein giving us such a rare and privileged access to his didactic style, the difficulty of the philosophical problems discussed, and Wittgenstein's way of tackling them'.*

For us in this country, what is of special interest is the impact it is likely to have on contemporary Indian thought, particularly on account of Professor K.J. Shah's record of the lectures. Professor Shah's own assessment of the significance, over the years, that the lectures had for him is:

. . .in the course of time, I came to learn that in the Indian context what was important was not deciding between Shankara and Sankhya, or between Kant and Wittgenstein, but between Shankara and Kant, or between Bhartrhari and Wittgenstein. It is in a framework where classical Indian thought and modern Western thought are mutually proposition and opposition that significant philosophical discussion takes place.**

To me this statement means, among other things, that while the Western

* Publishers' Preface, p. viii.
** Publishers' Preface, p. vii.

tradition of thought is inescapably part of our intellectual self-awareness, we are also in the fortunate position of being the inheritors of another powerful and, in many ways, very different tradition of thought. The latter has doubtless remained somewhat dormant, but it is our especial responsibility and privilege to bring it into living contact with the Western tradition—it is only then that our intellectual life will acquire an authenticity and become truly creative and possibly give a surprisingly fresh turn to modern intellectual life as such. One looks forward, with great expectations, to seeing the product of Professor Shah's own continuing efforts in this direction. One knows other pupils of Wittgenstein's through their writings, that is, those among them who have published. And whatever personal contact one has had with one or two of them has been much too superficial to leave any lasting impression; but having known Professor Shah fairly intimately for the past several years, one can see now—thanks to these notes—the deep and abiding influence that this privileged proximity to Wittgenstein during his Cambridge days must have had on his intellect, and indeed, on his entire personality. K.J. Shah might have gone his own way, unlike most other pupils of Wittgenstein; but the quality of his journey surely owes much to his two years of close contact with the philosopher of the century.

The otherwise attractively produced book is marred by several printing errors. The addition of an index—difficult as the task of producing one might have been—would have been of enormous help to the reader.

North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong MRINAL MIRI

WILLIAM WARREN BARTLEY: *Unfathomed Knowledge, Unmeasured Wealth: On Universities and the Wealth of Nations* (La Salle, Illinois, Open Court, 1990), xvi+316 pp., price not mentioned.

The book under review is a collection of essays, some of which can be read independently. But before I go on to discuss the essays, I would like to mention something about the author who may not be so well-known in the country. Born in 1934, he received his doctorate in Logic and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics and Political Science under Popper, taught Philosophy, History and Philosophy of Science in several universities in America and Europe, and held many fellowships. One of his earlier works, *The Retreat to Commitment*, was published in 1962 when he was not yet thirty years old. But the work that made him well-known was *Wittgenstein*, published in 1973. It dealt with aspects of the life of the great philosopher hitherto unknown. These aspects, I may add here, are largely irrelevant to an understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophical

insights. Bartley became famous as General Editor of the *Collected Works of F.A. Hayek*. He died in 1990. Known for his historical researches and writings on the theoretical foundations of Philosophy and Economics, Bartley was named 'Outstanding Professor' in 1979 in the USA while he was teaching at California State University at Hayward.

The book contains nineteen 'chapters', only loosely connected. A few observations have been repeated over and over again, e.g. Bartley's observations on Ryle (pp. 131 and 194, n. 51); and certain passages have been taken from his earlier works. A long passage (on p. 223) is a repetition of what Bartley said in his work on Wittgenstein. (p. 167)

About half a dozen issues could be said to be salient. They are as follows: knowledge is never 'certain', knowledge is a product not fully known to its producers (i.e. knowledge is basically 'unfathomed'); knowledge is an exosomatic product; knowledge is a form of wealth and an entrenched network of ideology not only prevents the appearance of new faces in the universities for decades but thwarts the growth of genuine knowledge in the realm of philosophy. There are a few scattered observations on the philosophy of science. The whole of Part III, consisting of nine chapters, is devoted to the manner in which Sir Karl Popper's philosophy has been neglected by the existing elite in departments of philosophy, particularly in America.

Almost all that Bartley offers in these essays could be said to be a rehash of what Popper said at various places. Bartley's references to Milton's observation on truth (p. 25) or 'Schrödinger equations' (p. 61) are examples. Bartley's observations about the detractors of Popper are often disagreeably caustic. On p. 188 Bartley refers to Carnap's callous refusal in 1936 to provide an affidavit for Popper's US visa application when he wanted to leave Austria for America. But let us see what Popper himself says about Carnap and his works. 'Carnap', Popper says, 'was one of the most captivating persons I have ever met. . . .' (*Conjectures and Refutations*, p. 254). In the same work (p. 271) Popper observes, 'Carnap's *Logical Syntax* is one of the few philosophical works which can be described as of really first rate importance.' About Carnap's *Meaning and Necessity* Popper said, '. . . . the best of Carnap's books'.

Bartley's anecdotes (and there are a quite a few of them including some about his own meetings with celebrities) make an interesting reading. But they are not academically illuminating although his candour is often disarming. Writing about the 'underlying differences separating the work of Popper and Wittgenstein', (p. 213) he confesses his lack of impartiality. The view that many Wittgensteinians thought Popper to be 'superficial', I am afraid, has not been examined in an informed manner; Bartley's critical observations regarding Sir Isaiah Berlin's view that Popper was talented while Wittgenstein was deep, (p. 212) are caustic. In any case, Berlin was not a Wittgensteinean. Incidentally, Popper is not known to have written anything on aesthetics. Wittgenstein's influence on authors of philosophical aesthetics is known to be real.

Bartley writes about the depressing situation in Western universities, about the entrenchment of false philosophies in the seats of learning and about the corruption of the professoriate. To illustrate his views, he refers to several creative thinkers and innovators outside the universities. (pp. 123-29) The list of names of philosophers, scientists, mathematicians, psychologists, economists and literary figures mentioned is indeed impressive. But isn't that a strange argument from one who claims to be an inveterate critic of 'inductivism'? That the seats of learning often cease to attract innovative or creative thinkers is a fact too well-known to be reiterated. Bartley, of course, refers to the departments of philosophy in particular. Such a situation may be found in many other departments also. Perhaps the really important question is to find out why such incrustations take place and, how, moreover, this incapacity for renewal could be prevented.

Bartley's observations regarding the unfathomable character of knowledge, wholly Popperian, is an old story, like the view that knowledge is autonomous, (pp. 32, 45, 60 and 74) Bartley's exposition about how sociology of knowledge miscontrues problems, leads him to raise a few questions. One of them is as follows: 'How can our intellectual life and institutions, our traditions, and even our etiquette, sensibility, manners and customs and behaviour patterns, be arranged so as to expose our beliefs, conjectures, ideologies, policies, positions, programmes, sources of ideas, traditions and the like, to optimum criticism?' But soon he confesses that 'it is not possible to answer such questions. . .' and this brings us back to the point from where we started. Elsewhere he observes that 'the fundamental task of education is *unlearning*. . .' (p. 85) Perhaps we need to remove, from time to time, the dead wood that goes on accumulating. But Bartley's treatment, to my mind, is cursory.

Bartley claims that the theory of knowledge is a branch of economics and that knowledge is a form of *wealth*. He takes Rawls and Nozick to task because 'they neither perceive nor discuss how basic is the role of economics in encompassing epistemology'. (p. 90) The question that suggests itself is: what exactly is meant by 'wealth'? *Prima facie*, the word could be used literally as well as metaphorically, and one would have expected Bartley to work out in greater detail the meaning he expects 'wealth' to carry. His censorious observations regarding the 'plagiarism' of philosophers, 'predatory behaviour' of academics, (p. 99) the 'self-serving nature of the professors', (p. 101) supported by a plethora of 'evidence', do not throw much light on the academic life (of America, of course). These observations only express his indignation. If Machlup fails to understand and appreciate Hayek's approach to knowledge then what needs to have been undertaken is a sustained and critical examination of the two contrasting views, those of Hayek and Machlup, instead of calling

Machlup's statement 'very near to being gibberish' (p. 147 n. 56) or overwhelming the reader with a long-winded footnote. Incidentally, Popper's refusal to entertain 'what-is' questions, i.e., questions pertaining to the essence of a thing, itself needs clarification. After all the problem which remains, staring one at the face, is: what is this 'essentialism', the *bete noire* here?

It may be true, as Bartley claims, that Popper's philosophical ideas have been widely acclaimed by members of the scientific community while Wittgenstein's ideas have largely been ignored by them. But can this be acknowledged as a criterion of the philosophical worth of their ideas? 'Popper's ideas', Bartley says, 'also have an amazing scope. . .'. (p. 183) This undoubtedly shows how 'talented' was Popper. (I am quoting Berlin's remark as Bartley quotes him on p. 212.) But when Bartley goes on to add, 'As if electrically charged, he [Popper] draws an original spark from any subject he touched', (p. 183) he is only being rhetorical!

Bartley says that 'Popper is today one of the most celebrated, decorated and richly acknowledged philosophical, scientific and literary figures of the century'. (pp. 185-86) But, paradoxically, he holds that Popper's resolution of the problems of induction and demarcation have *not at all* been accepted and incorporated in the frame-work of professional philosophy. (pp. 185, 206 and 209; emphasis in the original) The reason, according to Bartley, is that 'these chaps are green with envy'. (p. 210) It is not clear from Bartley's observations whether the scholars are envious of Popper or of the Popperian approach. Disputes in the realm of philosophy, as far as I know, are never carried on in anticipation of the descent of the curtain at the end (if any) of the scene. Were it so, there would not have been Platonists and Aristotelians even today. Bartley refers to notions like 'limited rationality', (p. 232) 'pancritical rationality' (p. 236) and the 'ecology of rationality'. (p. 240) He should have known that in Popper's view 'the terms "reason" and "rationalism" are vague' (*Open Society and Its Enemies*, Vol 2. p. 224). It would have been better if Bartley had rescued the word 'rationality'!

The chapter entitled 'The Popperian Harvest' would have been far more perspicacious if Bartley had been more generous in elucidating those eight points rather than devoting a page-and-a-half to all of them.

The book makes interesting reading on account of the tattle and on account of the declamatory observations, not always in good taste, against the academic elite. But that is all. The publisher, Open Court, is known to have brought out exceptionally fine works. I am afraid here is an exception.

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Y. MASIH: *A Comparative Study of Religions*, New Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1990.

The present book has been written by one who 'has occupied himself with the subject of religion for over fifty years. (*Preface*) It is rooted in a genuine concern for developing a comparative study of religion in face of the 'fighting' between human beings in the name of religion. Professor Masih rightly indicts such fighting as 'sub-human'. (*Preface*) A dialogue or an encounter between religions is therefore just the thing needed at this juncture of human history when, as Professor Arnold Toynbee—whom Professor Masih quotes approvingly observed, 'we have to learn to live as a single family'.

Now, to bring out the necessity of a comparative study of religions in the foregoing manner appears to be some sort of adage or wise saying which is as good a thing as, if not superior, from the point of human civilization, to an academic study. But just this latter is what one would expect of Professor Masih or from his book.

And indeed Professor Masih does live up to our expectations and proves himself equal to the task. In the 'Introduction' to his book, Professor Masih cites quite a member of instances to help his readers appreciate inchoate forms of comparative religion: thus he refers to Akbar's *Din Ilahi*—admitting of course that it was 'eclectic'—John Dewey's hope of the emergence of a 'religious faith' which has always been *implicitly* the common faith of mankind' (Masih, p. 4; emphasis added), St. Paul's dream of winning the whole universe, and changing it into a 'New Jerusalem' (p. 7), etc. But then, what is more important than making references to history is reading the *meaning* of history! Professor Masih detects in human history 'the presence of a *nisus* which drives man to have his ideal self and to project this ideal self into what he considers to be his highest self'. (p. 7) But then, for Professor Masih, 'it is not enough to become one's complete self by his individual self alone'. (p. 7) 'Lest the aim of individual excellence within the defined context of particular religions should not frustrate the bigger or nobler aim of *sarvamukti*, Professor Masih *supplements* the foregoing observation of his with this observation that 'The end of a comparative study of religion is to enkindle the *nisus* within human beings so that new beings may emerge.' (p. 7; italics author's.)

It is this catholicity of spirit which permeates the entire book of Professor Masih's It begins, in fact, with a quotation from Arnold Toynbee in whom Professor Masih finds an echo: 'Catholic minded Indian Spirit is the way of salvation for human beings of all religions in an age in which we learn to live as single family. . . . (*loc. cit.*) Here is Professor Masih expressing himself in the matter: '. . . each form of theistic worship should lead to the attainment of that mental state in which all differences of caste, creed, colour, etc. are dissolved' (p. 395) also speaks of a 'common referent of all theistic forms of religion' (p. 367)—a point which shall engage us in

reviewing his work from the point of view of *Comparative Religion per se* in contrast to a *comparative study* of religion.

Masih's catholicity of spirit, combined with his comprehensive study of different religions, enables him to compare and contrast them. Of the eleven chapters in his book, Masih brings his stupendous scholarship to bear on such comparative study in as many as eight chapters. Prominent among his findings are:

1. the distinction between the prophetic religions, viz. Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and the non-prophetic religions, viz. Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism and Sikhism (p. 18);
2. the distinction between pre-exilic Judaism and post-exilic Judaism (p. 41);
3. the influence of Zoroastrian monotheism upon post-exilic Judaism (pp. 18, 19 and 42);
4. the influence of the Zoroastrian belief in the Day of Judgement upon Christianity and Islam in respect of the doctrine of Heaven and Hell (p. 39);
5. the importance of *history* for the Jewish people and their belief that God acts through history (p. 55);
6. Judaism as 'a religion of God's covenant with his chosen people, the Israel' (p. 55);
7. the Judaistic belief in the 'imitation of God' (p. 62);
8. the Judaistic-Islamic-Christian doctrine of 'amelioration' (p. 85);
9. the *very important point* that Christianity is a 'universal religion' in contrast with Judaism which regarded the Jews as 'the chosen' people of God (pp. 80-81);
10. the Islamic rejection of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity of God and the attendant Islamic conception that God is 'omnipresent' but 'not immanent' in things and in man (p. 122);
11. the doctrine of *karma-saṃsāra-jñāna-mukti* as common to Hinduism in its Brahminical form and Ajivikism, Jainism, Buddhism and Sikhism (pp. 150, 194, 211, 236 and 259).

Clearly, Professor Masih's scholarship overwhelms anybody who goes through his work.

But—and this is a big but—even after one painstakingly goes through the work which bears evidence of massive scholarship, the question remains for one: Is Professor Masih more interested in a *comparative study* of religion than he is in comparative *religion*? Is he more interested in the theological *doctrines* of the different religions than he is in religious *experience*? Can a comparative study of religions 'enkindle', to use Masih's expression, the 'nisus' within human beings 'so that new beings may emerge'? Is not such *nisus* rather woven into the *very dynamics of religious experience*? Hegel, e.g. envisaged such internal dialectic of religion. Waiving the question whether

Hegel's view, that the acme of the dialectic is reached when the different religions are *systematised* through reason, does justice to any *individual* or specific religious *experience*, we may ask Masih whether the idea of a 'nisus' in human history—culminating in the 'Cross-fertilisation' (p. 362) of religions, 'intercultural understanding'—is not a mere emotional luxury *unless however it is detected in the dynamics of religious experience*, '. . . each form of religion', says Masih, '*should* exercise toleration'. (p. 375; emphasis added) Can such *prescription* be made *ab extra* for any body of religious doctrine? Considered as a *doctrine*, a religion is a body of beliefs, practices, rituals, etc.; and interwoven with such beliefs etc. are certain ontological presuppositions. Nothing can be *prescribed* for an ontological theory; *and*, for the advocate of *a* particular religion, his religion is the only religion, his ontology is the *only* ontology. Considered as *bodies* of doctrines, religions are *definitional, ontological*, and, we may add following Wittgenstein's diction, *essentialistic*. It is according to *its* ontology that a religion determines and defines itself and thereby puts *other* religions *out of court*, i.e. out of the bounds of discourse. From the point of view of followers of the faith (in question), it is *the* Religion with the capital 'R'.

Following Professor Radhakrishnan, Professor Masih dreams of 'encounter' between different religions. It is quite all right to say that a comparative study of religions is not intended to bring about conversions, that such a study rather helps one deepens his understanding of *his own* religion (pp. 365, 366 and 368). But the aim of Comparative Religion is not merely an *intellectual* understanding from an *onlooker's* viewpoint. One makes light of Comparative Religion, it appears to the present reviewer, if one understands it as *born* of the desire to cement the divisive forces released by religious fanaticism. Laudable as the prescription of the dialogue between religions is Comparative Religion cannot be *mundanized* to the extent that its *aim* is fixed as that of promoting, fellowship of faiths and also to the extend, that it is regarded as *born* of the conflict between practitioners of religions. Religion, as a matter of *experience*, consist in getting at something deeper than the promotion of worldly interests like toleration, understanding, etc. We have to go deep into religious experience as such and get at its dynamics so that the insight into its dynamics may help us envisage the process of the emergence of the *infinite variety of religions*. It is not by stepping *outside* religious experience and comparing and contrasting religions from a *distance* that we can be 'catholic' in respect of religions. We have to adopt here an *insider's* viewpoint. Otherwise all talk of 'nisus' towards which men of different faiths are supposedly moving would be just fanciful thinking. In Professor Masih's otherwise scholarly work on the doctrinal aspects of different religions, the fundamental distinction between *religion as a body of doctrines* and *religion as a living experience* seems to have been ignored. *What, in fact, bedevils Masih's study from the beginning is his manifestly intellectual approach to religions, i.e. religious doctrines.* This approach leads Masih on to

the search fot the 'common referent of all theistic forms of religions'. (p. 367) *Inwhat way we should understand what is 'common' to all religions, what is 'universal' in religions is a basic question.* At bottom, the question is related to the *logic* of religious experience. (Of course, *one* aspect of the logic; interwoven with religious experiences are many things, viz. symbols, images, ways of life,customs, etc., *all* of which have to be understood to appreciate a religious experience.) Is the supposedly 'common referent' of religions arrived at by comparing and contrasting the different religions? How can we dissociate the (supposedly) common feature, characteristic, attribute, etc.—terms which we have no alternative but to fall back upon if we approach religions *intellectually*, if, i.e. we try to understand religions—of religions *from their ontological and theological trappings*? *The supposedly common feature derives its meaning from the whole structure of a particular religion; and since the belief-structures of the religions are different, the meanings of the (supposed) common concept are bound to be different and thus in the end the (supposed) 'common referent' comes to be diluted.* As a doctrine, a particular religion defines and determines its concepts. Its follower is *defined and determined* in terms of *it* specifically; *outside that specific context*, he is just nothing, not the 'chosen' man of God, and his doctrine is but the doctrine of a heretic. So Masih's 'common referent' is elusive. He speaks of 'sharing an experience of bliss of Godly living'. (p. 367) Well, *what counts as 'experience' to the follower of one religion is not what counts as religion to the follower of a different religion.* Masih, again, speaks of 'higher' and 'lower' forms of 'relative religions' in the context of his fanciful concept of 'common referent' of religions. (p. 375) We ask: who is to be the *arbiter* here? And what is the *yardstick*? *Which religion* is to supply the Yardstick? Masih prescribes the *refinement* of worship under the 'principle of the unity of religions'. (p. 368) But in so far as the follower of a religion defines and determines what is worship, in so far as he takes *his* religion to be the *only* religion, all talk of 'refinement' would just be treated by him as *out of place*. Then, again, there is (for him) no *other* religion to be *united* to his. He is *defined* in terms of *his* religion which is the only religion. *His* religious identity is *the* religions identity. So talk of 'encounter' with other religions makes no meaning for him. Professor Masih, again, thinks that all religions are 'pressed into the service of becoming.' (p. 283) Writes he: 'After all ideal man and God are one and same thing . . . Jesus Christ is taken to be a perfect man and Yet God. . . . According to advaitism a knower of Brahman himself becomes Brahman . . . A Christian seeks to imitate Christ . . . a Muslim seeks to imitate the prophet Muhammad so that he may become Muhammad-like. This is also the meaning of the last utterance of Lord Buddha 'appo dipobhava'. (p. 283) It appears that in his zeal for unifying religions, Professor Masih has lost sight of the differences between the religions which he has so painstakingly delineated (chapters II to IX). The Advaita, e.g. conceives of

an ontological identity of Jīva with Brahman; but talk of such identity would be blasphemous in the Semitic religions. Buddhism, again, is an individualistic religion.

Professor Masih of course tempers his Zeal for a universal religion. What he says on pp. 367-68 is well worth quoting in this context: 'It has to be accepted that men are of different types, and no one religion will suit all....' This has been taught by the Gītā. . .'Again,' Radhakrishnan recommends the worship of one universal religion of the Supreme Spirit. . .this Supreme Spirit is Brahman to which all religions refer. But this Supreme Spirit can be approached only through some form of theism. . .one does not have to give up one's theistic worship, but one has to keep on refining and purifying his theistic worship...people worship the Supreme Spirit *ignorantly* and, may also worship it meaningfully. . .' (emphasis added). But the follower of a religion, a *doctrinaire* would just dismiss this prescription for 'shedding off differences' as moonshine. How can an *outsider*, not committed to one's faith, speak of 'refining and purifying' one's faith? With what right? Again, would it not be blasphemous to suggest that one worships 'ignorantly'?

The fact of the matter is then this that no comparison and contrast of the theologies of the different religions can bring them close to each other; and the principal reason that blocks their unity is that *their ontological commitments are different and sometimes even contrary.*

Is it the case then that all Masih's observations come to naught? Cannot his programme be salvaged? Fortunately, Professor Masih himself has given an indication to that end. A religious believer may be rooted in his faith and may yet allow his faith to assume a distinct *locale*. As he says, '. . . there is no reason why Indian Christianity cannot have an Indian Christian theology. . .Indian Islam. . .is contributing much to Islam.' (p. 366) These observations are to be understood in the context of Masih's earlier observation that '. . .negligence of Bhakti and advaitic mysticism has resulted in the poverty of Indian Christian theology.' (p. 366.) But unfortunately Masih has not been able to bring out *what enables the Christian in India to extend his boundary while yet being rooted in his faith.*

Masih's entire programme can be salvaged and placed on a firm footing if his general *intellectual* approach is changed. As already indicated, one has to *bore down* to the depth of religious experience and *let religious experience deepen itself and unravel its infinite variety.* One's approach has to be *phenomenological.* Hints of the deliverences of a phenomenological approach to religious experience may be given now.

A religious experience has to be assessed in the light of the *transformation* it brings about in the individual having the experience. He *lives* his experience. It is 'real' to him—'real' in the sense of being 'realised'. It is, in other words, a *revelation.* But then the great difference between *religious*

experience as a revelation and any psychological experience is that the former is an *absolute* which the religious experiencer or believer *cannot but take as an absolute command*, whereas the latter is something *contingent* and may be, if one likes, whistled away. The individual commits himself absolutely to his experience—his experience just *dawns* on him and he *has to* open himself up to it. His individuality thus kneels, so to say, before the absolute which appears in its mystery which yet does not fully unravel itself but is felt to be as though revealing itself in *infinite* ways. *Depth* and *expansiveness* are thus intertwined in *a—and any*—religious experience. Or, in other words, it is both *profoundly vertical and infinitely horizontal.* As such, *any* religious experience, so far as it is *lived*, carries within itself *intimations of the* beyond. Each religious experience has thus an individuality and 'indefinite boundary', as Professor K. C. Bhattacharyya has pointed out.* Because of its indefinite boundary, it goes on continuously *deepening* itself and as continuously *expanding* itself. Religious unity, therefore, has to be built up, not through *ab extra* prescriptions of 'fellowship of religions', 'cross-cultural understanding', 'fertilisation of cultures' etc. Secular and humanist as these—assuredly commendable—ideals are, they do not just touch the *core* of religious experience. Masih himself, rightly pronounces indictment upon the 'confused view of secularism as respect for all religions' currently dominating the thinking of Indian politicians and makes it clear that 'secularism is not anti-religions but quite indifferent to religion'. (p. 370) Unfortuntely, however, he envisages the unity of religions in humanist terms like 'cross-fertilisation' of cultures, etc. The deep spiritual unity of religious experience far transcends any assessment in secular terms. And the Hegelian attempt to systematise the different religious revelations through 'reason' constitutes an affront to their sacredness. So the attempt to find an abstractly common feature between religious experiences is fated to failure. And the unity between revelations is not *conjunctive*, for, were it so, the distinctiveness of *a* revelation would be ignored; neither is it *disjunctive*, for, were it so, then the choice between alternative revelations would be made by *external* criterion/criteria. The unity in question may be described as a *conjunctive unity of alternatives*, such that *each* religious experience or revelation is, *alternatively*, the *truth* for one who *lives* the truth. The *identity* of a religious revelation appears, from this viewpoint, to be *non-definitional, indefinitely extensional identity*. To appreciate the unity in question in its proper spirit, the present reviewer could not do any better than seek light from Professor K.C. Bhattacharyya: 'Religious experience . . . is simple and admits no variation within itself. There is, however, an infinite plenality of unique religious experiences. Their relation is determined by themselves and not by any external reflection. . . . There is no possibility of systematising them by secular reason and so far as they systematise themselves, they present themselves in many alternative systems. . . . Extensive internally coherent systems with indefinite boundaries are actually revealed . . . The Hegelian notion of a single and exclusive gradation of religions would appear from this standpoint to be intrinsically irreligious.'*

Viśva-Bharati, Santiniketan K. BAGCHI

*In 'The Concept of Philosophy' in *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. II, Calcutta, Progressive Publishers, 1958, p. 115.

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समाज दर्शन
डा० सत्यपाल गौतम (हरियाना साहित्य एकाडमी, चंडीगढ़)।

ANNOUNCEMENT

A selection of the papers presented at the Mount Abu Colloquium (Jan. 7-10, 1991) on *Culture and Rationality* will be published jointly in the September, 1992 issue of the *Philosophy—East and West* and the April, 1992 issue of *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research.* All subscribers to the JICPR will get a *free* copy of the September, 1992 issue of the PEW carrying those papers presented at the Colloquium which are not included in the issue of the JICPR.

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Surendranath Dasgupta, *A Study of Patañjali*, Second edition (in association with the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), 1989, xv+181pp., Rs. 18.00

The particular strength of *A Study of Patañjali* is its detailed unfolding of *Prakṛti* in terms of the evolution of the *Guṇas* from *Mahat* through *Buddhi*, *Ahaṅkāra*, *Manas*, the sense faculties and organs, and, in an outward direction to the *Tanmātras* and gross matter. Dasgupta helps the modern thinker to visualize this complex process by presenting it as a kind of reverse version of Darwinian cosmic evolution. The book is also unique in its highlighting of the *Sphoṭavāda* semantic theory of the *Yoga Sūtras*, an aspect of Yoga theory other secondary sources ignore. This book is essential for college and university libraries and can be effectively used as a text for students alongside Gerald Larsen's *Classical Sāṁkhya*.

HAROLD COWARD, *South Asia Books*

G.C. Nayak, *Philosophical Reflections*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research and Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1987, viii+166pp.

Les philosophes indiens d'ajuour' hui en leur majorité se situent dans la tradition de la penses classique de l'Inde, tendis qu'une minorité adopte les perspectives de l'analyse linguistique anglo-americaine. G.C. Nayak occupe une position plus originale: tout ten etant profondement enracine dans la grande philosophie indienne, il a une reelle maitrise de l'analyse linguistique qu'll ne pratique d'ailleure qu'avec des reserves critiques.

MIKLOS VITO
Revue Philosophique, Paris

* * *

The eighteen chapter of this book range over a number of significant topics in Indian philosophy and religion.

It is typical of Nayak's work that he inserts illuminating comparative comments at many points and he uses his knowledge of western philosophy and religion to compare between cultures as well as within cultures.

Nayak's range is vast but he has a good touch throughout and he brings together in an interesting manner thinkers and topics from different religious traditions. He is aware of and he uses recent developments in the philosophy of science.

FRANK WHAILING, *Scattish Journal of Religious Studies*

Daya Krishna (ed.), *India's Intellectual Traditions*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi and Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 200 pp., Rs. 75

The hardcore intellectual tradition in India differentiated according to different fields of knowledge—and unfortunately alien to the prevailing intellectual ethos of the country—needs a rediscovery which is relevant, significant and strikingly different from the beaten track.

It is seeing and feeling the tradition from a near angle subjecting it to scrutiny that would reveal new facets of it if it is there, or lack of it if it is not.

MOHINDER PAL KOHLI, *The Tribune*
January 8, 1989

* * *

There is a general recognition of India's traditions in the quest of the Spirit and Arts but very little is known of the original thinking that has gone into intellectual pursuits, e.g. Drama, Rasa, Dhvani, Jurisprudence, Sociology. The discussion is scholarly and takes into account the development in the West in these fields, dating from Aristotle, Plato, Aquinas and others.

The papers on Nāṭya Śāstra are stimulating. Manu's conceptions of man and society are shown to have a perennial relevance in sociological thought. One hopes more such studies will follow.

M.P. PANDIT, *Triveni*
Vol. 59, No. 16, January-March 1990

K. Satchidananda Murty, *Philosophy in India: Traditions, Teaching and Research*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi/Columbia MO: South Asia Books, 1985, xi+237 pp., Rs. 90

This is the best introductory textbook I know of for a one-semester survey course on Indian philosophy. Undertaken as a "country report" on the state of philosophy in India at the behest of UNESCO, it covers in a magisterial way the role of philosophy in Indian culture, the history of philosophical thinking, both technical and popular, religious and secular, up to the present, where it considers the more professional shape of the discipline in the universities and contemporary Indian philosophers grappling with the tension between tradition and modernity.

JOSEPH PRABHU, *Religious Studies Review*
Vol. 14. No. 2, April 1988

* * *

Professor Murty's book covers a vast range with enviable erudition and lucidity to match. Its documentation is admirable and adds to the effectiveness of the necessarily compressed presentation. Professor Murty's conception of philosophy is catholic and broad based, and his humanism suffuses the whole work.

G.C. PANDE, *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*
Vol. III, No. 2