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Wittgenstein's private language argument and Quine's indeterminacy thesis: two contrasting models of semantics

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The Private Language Argument (PLA) can be seen from different viewpoints and the conclusions to the effect would be as follows:

(1) Meaning cannot be *determined* privately (seen from a semantical point of view);
(2) Meaning cannot be *identified* with a private entity (seen from an ontological point of view);
(3) Meaning cannot be *justified* privately (seen from an epistemological point of view).

A parallel distinction of the three viewpoints can be drawn for the Indeterminacy Thesis (IT) as (4), (5) and (6) respectively.

(4) Meaning cannot be *determinated*;
(5) Meaning cannot be *objectivated* with any reference-point;
(6) Meaning cannot be *founded* on any justification.

The contrast between (1), (2), (3) and (4), (5), (6), respectively, can be put forth in a precise way.

The PLA model accepts meaning-determination, even though it argues against private determination. The IT model advocates 'meaning-scepticism' in the sense that it argues against any absolute determination of meaning. The PLA model approximates a semantical determination of ontology in the sense that it objectivates meaning by means of certain constitutive rules of language-games. However, no private or concrete object is identified with meaning. It asserts those constitutive rules to objectivate meaning with reference to particular frameworks. On the other hand, the IT is against any such objectivated meaning. It argues against the semantical absolute determination of ontology. It advocates 'ontological relativity'. The PLA model denies the private justification of knowledge though it tries to put forward certain 'indubitable' justifications, whereas the IT denies any such justification to avoid any form of foundationalism.

To point out the contrast still more precisely I would say that the PLA advocates a foundationalistic approach whereas the IT advocates a naturalistic approach. By 'foundational' I do not mean a Cartesian or Kantian

type of foundationalism but a linguistic foundationalism that turns to what George D. Romanas calls, 'Linguistic Absolutism' when it is stretched to ontological discussions. The foundationalism I mentioned is conceivable, in the context of analytic philosophy, *à la* Richard Rorty, to be 'one more variant of Kantian Philosophy'.[1] Thus an underlying theme of this paper that runs between the explanations of the two contrasting models is the answer to the question: How can we conceive of going beyond 'Analytic Philosophy'?

I confine my discussion here to looking at the PLA and IT from the semantical point of view. I believe that parallel discussions can be worked out for the other two angles of viewing as well.

The Private Language Argument (*PLA*)

Wittgenstein's PLA is an attempt to deny the possibility of any private language. It is not only that there is no private language but also that, in principle, there can be no private language. Language cannot be without rules and rules are meaningless unless they are publicly testable. The naive claim of privacy of language on the basis of examples such as of code-languages, introspective talk, dreams or hallucinations is completely ruled out. In commonsensical language, we may refer to these as private but in reality they are equally public. However, not being a simple 'no' to a privacy beyond this commonsensical use, the PLA can be advanced with certain steps (premises) as follows:

(a) Meaning is in use.
(b) Use makes no sense unless certain rules are embodied in it.
(c) Hence meaning makes no sense unless there are certain constitutive rules.
(d) Rules are always public in character because there is no sense in following a rule privately.
(e) Hence meaning cannot be determined privately.
(f) Language is coextensive with meaning in the sense that it is all that by which you can mean something and something can be meant to you.
(g) Hence there is no private language, nor can be any possibility of such a language.

The first premise of the argument does not define meaning. It does not assert meaning to be definitionally equivalent to use. It is an explication. Explication is what really matters when philosophizing under the Wittgensteinian norm. To say that meaning is in use means to explicate meaning, to make explicit the ways in which language is used for communication. Aversion to any definition of meaning has the import of averting any attempt at a behaviouristic theory of meaning in face of the fact that language is to be studied in relation to the concrete circumstances of communication, yet without the attachment of meaning to an entity independent of language. Meaning is immanent in language.

But how does 'use' explicate meaning? The negative approaches it extends are as follows. (a) That meaning is not to be identified with an object—we need not bother to identify an object corresponding to the word; for example, 'five' when we seek the meaning of 'five red apples'.[2] (b) That the sense of a sentence is determined by its depth grammar and not by its surface grammar—for example, the elliptical use of 'Slab!' in place of 'Bring me a slab' does not make any difference. Both may be used as an order or a request.[3] (c) That the sign 'N' can have meaning even if its bearer ceases to exist. (d) That ostensive definition does not explain meaning,[4] for to define so, one has already to know (or be able to do) something in order to be capable of asking a thing's name. This ability to know is to have a mastery over the language, it presupposes use. Hence, explanation by ostensive definition has the least significance. (e) That the search for an absolute 'simple' ought to be rejected because the question of 'simplicity' and 'composite' is completely ruled out unless it is considered in relation to a framework or language-game. Whether an expression is simple or composite is to be decided in relation to its particular use out of the number of ways it can be used. It explains that meaning is not a thing outside language.[5] It is not that here is the word and there is the meaning—'The money and the cow you can buy with it (but contrast: money and its use)'.[6] It also explains that meaning is not a picture of the word and what a word/an expression/a sentence means is the way it is used.[7] It explains that interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning. That is, an alleged *flash* of grasping an expression is not the meaning because this grasping is just an interpreted use.[8]

The account given so far in connection to the question 'How does use explicate meaning?' is quite negative in the sense that it says what meaning is not. The positive approach to relate meaning and use is quite dependent on the concepts of 'rules' and 'rule-following'. We find an explicit assertion in the second premise of the PLA mentioned above. Use makes no sense unless certain rules are embodied in it. Thus, that meaning is in use can be well established when the second premise of the PLA is proved to be true, that is, when the positive explicatory aspect of 'use' is proved to be adequate.

The importance of rules is a *prima facie* requirement for the explanation of non-arbitrariness in meaning-determination. It is needed to save a 'use' from utter flexibility that may lead to a chaotic situation in linguistic communication. Rules cannot be conceded to be purely artificially imposed on a human being as it is imposed on a computer with particular programmes. The fact that man is free to choose a rule to follow, such a concession is not permitted. That is, we are not under compulsion to follow a rule and, at the

same time, we cannot follow a rule arbitrarily or whimsically. Thus the constraint, the rule, can be said to be natural in the sense that it is 'revealed' in the very way of a linguistic practice, in its use: it is embodied and revealed, not that it is imposed and carried out. This very sense of rule-embodiment supports the notion of 'constitutive rules' without which a language-game ceases to be a language-game just as a game of chess ceases to be so if the rules of chess are violated. Thus meaning being in use and use is meaningful when certain constraints are there, meaning is what constrains use. Its antimentalistic import is that a cat-image does not constrain the term 'cat' to be used and this term can be used with reference to non-cats—snakes, undetached cat-parts. Cat-image is not the meaning of the term 'cat'. A term is meaningful due to its specific role in a language-game, the way it is constrained to be used. Without any constraint it is useless because it ceases to have any specific role in a language-game.[9]

The problem of explaining 'meaning' does not end with the acceptance of the constraints or rules, it adds nothing significant to 'use' itself unless the explanation of 'following a rule' or using language with certain constraints is extended. The explanation wanted is to answer the question: How can we say that somebody has followed a rule correctly or not? For to be ignorant of that and, at the same time, to claim that meaning is what constrains the use, is just to beg the question: How do we 'use'?

Step (d) of the PLA explicitly asserts that we follow a rule publicly, there is no sense in following a rule privately. To obey a rule is a 'custom',[10] a 'practice',[11] it is 'not an interpretation'.[12] 'To think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule "privately".'[13] This character of publicity being infused in notions like 'custom' or 'practice' explains the public-testability of a rule. But, even if it explains the nature of a rule, it does not explain the nature of a correct/false rule or following a rule rightly/wrongly. It provides no criterion for any such assessment.

This is what really leaves us at a controversial point between realism and anti-realism. A conventional view certifies that the customs or practices of rule-following are purely based on social conventions. This explains the agreement among the members of a group or community. In a situation, the social conventions may point to the correctness of rule-following. But rules themselves become anti-realistic. We leave nothing to language as such and the best we do is *arbitrariness followed collectively* instead of individually. On the other hand, if we accept a realistic interpretation and propound the 'autonomy' of languages we have to insist on an 'ineffable grammar' of language. The constitutive rules of a language-game are somehow beyond the hold of the community. The grammar really exists but is instantiated in our practice. We are, in this case, granting a reality to language over and above the social conventions and social consensus. To pursue the controversy is not my interest here. What I want to bring to notice is

that both the interpretations, realistic as well as anti-realistic, are in search of some objective conditions to determine the truth of following a rule.

Search for Objectivity

Searching for objectivity—whether in social consensus or in language as such—is scientific when investigations are made *par* with psychology or linguistics. But to claim that objectivity *consists* in social agreement or in an ineffable grammar is just to make a philosophical (in its traditional sense) claim that we are really pondering over social 'conventions' or 'grammar' without doing anything fruitful to either and only to nourish the age-old 'objectivity'. That is where an anti-foundationalistic interpretation of the PLA model breaks down. A foundation in the name of language-game is retained. Whether one takes sides with a realist or with an anti-realist, unless one's search is a scientific one, what one really does is to commit oneself philosophically to Wittgenstein's language-game. The said 'objectivity' is left open. It is the 'language-game' in relation to what meaning is determined and the role of a grammar and conventions cannot be nullified at all, it is left to oneself to choose the primacy. If one pursues the 'objectivity' philosophically one is no more anti-foundationalistic, nor does one add anything fruitful to language or epistemology.

This foundationalistic objectivity is the objectivity that, being established once for all, can become foundational to our entire search for language, meaning and understanding. It gets its sense because we get an alleged sense of determining meaning in a determinate way. A sense of determinate meaning gives rise to the sense of philosophical objectivity very much there in the PLA model in the name of 'language-game'. It is left open for many to analyse the 'language-game' in search of that objectivity, taking sides with either the realist or the anti-realist. If 'language-game' is just a negative explication of meaning to the effect that an aholistic standpoint is to be advocated against any essentialistic point of view, then it functions marvellously. But to stretch it further to put forward a positive explanation, is to resume the pursuit of essentialism of a linguistic kind. Thus, to be very sympathetic to the PLA model, one may restrain it from being stretched further, and thereby one can save its anti-foundationalistic approach. But thereby it does not amount to being naturalistic.

The Indeterminacy Thesis (IT)

It is important to note that IT does not refute the possibility of a manual of translation, only the possibility of *the* manual of translation, called *the* correct one. For different alternative manuals can exist compatible with the data or environment, relying solely on what manuals are framed, yet conflicting or contrasting in nature to themselves.

The IT is the natural conclusion of Peircean pragmatism and Duhemian holism but without the exclusive rigidity of either. 'If we recognize with Peirce that meaning of a sentence turns purely on what would count as evidence for the truth, and if we recognize with Duhem that theoretical sentences have their evidence not as single sentences but only as larger blocks of theory, then indeterminacy of theoretical sentences is the natural conclusion.'[14]

To recognize Peirce means to recognize an investigation with a 'laboratory mind'[15] that upholds no *a priori* foundational doctrines but some revisable, hypothetical, statements made on the basis of 'sensible' effects of observation. Unlike the Jamesian conception of subjective psychological satisfaction in relation to pragmatic truth, the 'meaning' of a sentence depends upon the evidence of its truth parallel to a hypothesis made in the natural sciences, whose truth depends upon the evidence called out of experiments. A hypothesis cannot be afforded to be uniquely true because many possible alternative hypotheses may come true on an experimental basis. So also, our observation or experience cannot provide us any sentence with a uniquely determined meaning because on the basis of the same observational data many possible alternative meanings can be put forth.

However, the objectivity of truth is retained on the basis of general agreement in experiments acceptable in a Quinean framework only with some constraints. 'Scientific method is the way to truth, but it affords even in principle no unique definition of truth.'[16] No truth can be incorrigible and, thereby, no meaning can be uniquely determinated although it is acceptable that truth must have some evidence and, thereby, meaning depends upon evidence for truth. That objectivity consists of a general agreement in experiment is denied and this is supported by Duhemian holism. Duhemian holism basically argues against the so-called 'crucial experiment' which is supposed to provide conclusive evidence against one hypothesis as well as supporting evidence for another. Duhem argues that the two conditions presupposed for the tenability of 'crucial experiment' that simultaneously falsify one hypothesis and verify another cannot be fulfilled. The two conditions are (i) that an unambiguous falsification procedure exists, and (ii) that *reductio ad absurdum* methods are applicable to scientific inference.

If an unambiguous falsification procedure exists, that is, if a hypothesis, H, is refuted by an observation, —O, then it is presupposed that scientific reasoning follows the simple schema, $H \rightarrow O$, and falsification is represented by $(((H \rightarrow O).\ -O) \rightarrow H)$. But scientific reasoning does not follow such a simple procedure. For, every scientific prediction is based on several hyoptheses, not on a single hypothesis; scientific reasoning follows the complex schema $(H_1, H_2, H_3 \ldots H_n) \rightarrow O)$, and not the simple schema, $H \rightarrow O$. Thus, by confronting a recalcitrant experience, —O, we cannot falsify a single hypothesis, H, but the conjunction of several hypotheses

(i.e. $H_1, H_2, H_3 \ldots H_n$). Isolated hypotheses are immune from refutation and there exists no unambiguous falsification procedure.

Reductio ad absurdum methods being applicable to scientific inference means that one hypothesis can be said to be verified on the basis of a contradiction inferred from the acceptance of another hypothesis. It is supposed here that falsification of one particular hypothesis implies the acceptance of any alternative one. Duhem argues that, even if we grant the falsifiability of a particular hypothesis (which is not possible at all), there is no such implication, nor can one enumerate the possible alternative hypotheses which can explain an event. The falsification of a particular hypothesis, H, does not imply the acceptance of another particular hypothesis, —H, but the acceptance of several assumptions, hypotheses, even theories, on which —H is based. Furthermore, the alternative assumptions, hypotheses and theories on which —H can be based to explain an event are not fixed, nor can they be fixed so. Since there can be no such fixed alternatives, falsification of a hypothesis, —H, means verification of no particular hypothesis but an infinite number of hypotheses; the *reductio ad absurdum* method cannot be applicable to scientific inference.

However, Quine does not claim that the Duhemian arguments against 'Crucial experiment' are correct, nor is he interested in showing the nontriviality of such arguments. On the contrary, in a letter[17] to Grünbaum, he admits that he has 'probably' used the Duhemian thesis in a trivial way although, arguments apart, the thematic conclusion abstracted from the Duhemian thesis is very much indispensable to Quinean holism, with some reservation. The required restraint is made in view of the fact that 'observation sentences' are immune from revision even though it is said in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' that 'no statement is immune to revision'. 'Duhemian thesis would be wrong if understood as imposing an equal status on all the statements in a scientific theory as thus denying the strong presumption in favour of the observation statement.' The strong presumption is that the observation sentence is the cornerstone of semantics. It fundamentally acts as the repository evidence for scientific hypothesis and as the only entry to language.

The thematic conclusion of the Duhemian thesis is that an isolated statement cannot be verified or falsified by single evidence. Since the Peircean thesis says that 'meaning' depends on 'evidence of truth', we can conclude that an isolated statement cannot possess any meaning and a statement is meaningful only in relation to other statements of that language-system or theory. The meaningfulness of a sentence being theory-dependent, meaning cannot be determined absolutely or in isolation because no theory can be incorrigible and an infinite number of alternative theories can be compatible to the same data, though those theories may be conflicting in nature. One may put 'meaningfulness' to a sentence only in relation to a system of

language but as the system of language is revisable, the meaning of that sentence cannot be said to be absolutely determined in any way.

So far I have discussed the anti-foundationalistic semantics that the IT advocates—the untenability of an absolutely determinate meaning and, hence, the untenability of any statement's being true analytically such that it can, at all, be foundational. The foundation is denied to a language-game itself because a language-game is not immune to revision. Now I would like to extend the exposition of the IT with a behaviouristic explanation which in turn highlights the naturalistic semantics advocated by Quine.

Stimulus meaning plays a major role in IT's behaviouristic explanation. It is 'meaning' explained in terms of sensory stimulations and verbal reactions. The affirmative stimulus meaning of a sentence for a speaker *a* at a time *t* is defined as the class of all the stimulations, Σ, 'that would prompt' *a*'s 'assent' at *t*. And, the negative stimulus meaning of S is the class of all the stimulations, Σ′, 'that would prompt' *a*'s 'dissent' at *t*. And, stimulus meaning is defined as the ordered pair of affirmative stimulus meaning and negative stimulus meaning ⟨Σ, Σ′⟩.

The dispositional character of stimulus meaning signified by the phrase 'that would prompt' is a correlation between assent and the presence of stimulations of the object and between dissent and the absence of stimulations of the object. In experimentally equating the uses of 'gavagai' and 'rabbit' it is stimulations that must be made to match, not animals.[18]

Since the particular occasion of querying that really amounts to extending the verdict on the sentence in question, standing sentences cannot get any such verdict directly from the occasion of querying. Thus understanding as well as equivalence of meaning of a standing sentence cannot be identified with a particular occasion of assent/dissent disposition. Hence, 'a proper semantical analysis of standing sentences, in terms of behavioural disposition, will be primarily occupied with the interrelations of sentences rather than standing sentences one by one.'[19] In view of the fact that different systems of such interrelations are possible and there exists no objective reference to claim a particular system to be the correct one IT becomes inevitable.

The Contrast

Before pointing out the contrast between the PLA and IT, I would say something about the *prima facie* similarities.

The principle of publicity is observed by both Wittgenstein and Quine. Both applaud the social character of language and the observable means for its learning and understanding though there remains disagreement about the determination of *the* correct meaning of an expression. In the beginning of the preface of *Word and Object*, Quine says that 'language is a social art' and further, he stresses that identification of expressions having meaning is justified only 'in terms of man's disposition to respond overtly to

socially observable stimulations'.[20] So also, Wittgenstein emphasizes 'forms of life' and thereby, the social character of language, when he says that 'to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life'[21] and 'speaking of language is part of an activity or of a form of life'.[22] The *overtness* of language as a social activity is explicitly stated by Wittgenstein too when he says, 'commanding, recounting, chatting are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing'.[23]

However, the scope of the principle of publicity is constrained by the PLA in connection to 'rules'. The autonomy of language by means of the 'constitutive rules' which are merely exhibited as instances of our interpretations curtails the public hold over language—no longer can we be proud that we can penetrate and revise each and every dimension of language. There seems to be some intangible, invincible, ineffable 'grammar' of its own. On the other hand, nothing seems to be unrevisable when it is established in a behaviouristic explanation of meaning in terms of stimulus response where 'dispositions' play a great role. For, whatever publicly observable rules of language are in practice could have been made in different, indefinite number of alternative ways. There remains no *fact of the matter* to determine which alternative is the *correct* one.

It is not that Wittgenstein ignores 'disposition', but he puts it on the back seat for meaning-determination. For him, 'obeying a rule' has the hold over 'disposition'. Disposition is a kind of 'interpretation'. It is meaningless if it goes beyond 'interpretation'. An interpretation is always constrained by the constitutive rules.[24] Since interpretations may not be determined as true or false by themselves because they are merely exhibitions of the 'constitutive rules', so also dispositions cannot be determined by themselves. In relation to dispositions the PLA and IT are on a different footing. 'Dispositions' are said to be the ability that can be exhibited publicly but the contrast relates to a vital point—the PLA model keeps 'constitutive rules' as the foundation, the determining force over meaning, whereas the IT model keeps no such foundation, and it is natural that there can be no determinacy of meaning when meaning is accounted for in relation to 'disposition' and 'stimulation'.

The 'rules' of the PLA model are very controversial in the sense that if a transcendental status is conceded to the reality of these rules then language can no more be claimed to be a social practice because a social practice, custom or institution is never transcendental but empirically observable. On the other hand, if there are rules which are conventional, then the IT is well supported, but these rules are meant to be determining meaning, yet being conventional. Quine cannot accept a transcendental status for these rules and can at best accept conventionalism for the sake of the social character of language. But the social consensus of these rules cannot be, as the conventionalists may argue, stretched to the extent of determining meaning absolutely. For conventionalism cannot be digested at the cost of

empirical observation; empirical observation is the basic ground of scientific study and in terms of our sensory reception of the external world, in terms of the stimulus-response mechanism, Quine explores language and comes to the conclusion of IT.

What remains as a threat to the PLA model is the scepticism—in defence of what this model searches a *foundation* against which the sceptic cannot raise his voice. So that, the model can be established once for all. For this reason, there is the pondering over some 'objectivity' in meaning, the objectivity after what the realists as well as the anti-realists run by exploring 'language-games'. Had it been the case that the PLA model was explicit in keeping no foundation even in the name of 'language-games' then there would have been no controversy over any objectivity of meaning.

The threat from the sceptic is not there in the IT model. What it really makes indispensable is a scientific sceptic. That is, the IT model, being very far from searching for any foundation, embraces any sceptical voice that really helps in a scientific investigation. It pays no heed to an epistemological sceptic who challenges any foundation because there is no foundation in the model itself; rather, the model is directly against any foundationalism, classical as well as linguistic.

In the end, to emphasize the *contrast* between the two models I may sketch the arguments discussed and developed in this paper as follows:



Notes and References

1. See Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Basil Blackwell, Publisher, Oxford, 1980, p. 8. However, even if one understands 'Analytic' Philosophy as a 'variant of Kantian Philosophy', this understanding need not be so nihilistic that one cannot uphold a 'successor' subject to epistemology. This issue cannot be taken up here but, roughly, it can be hinted that an understanding of 'accuracy' (in place of 'representation') as to be the constant mistaken methodological point on what just the style or medium undertaken varies can be helpful in this regard. A more or less similar discussion on ontology can be found in George D. Romanos' *Quine and Analytic Philosophy*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 1983, see pp. 31-40, where he distinguishes 'Linguistic Absolutism' from early Wittgenstein's 'Picture Theory'.
2. See L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, 2nd edn; Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1958, (1976 reprint), Section 1. (Hereafter, reference to this book is abbreviated as *P.I.* and the number following *P.I.* is the section number).
3. That is, the meaning of a sentence is neither the feeling(s) nor the thought(s) that can be mistakenly conceived of being attached to the component words or the sentence itself. See *P.I.*, 20.
4. On the other hand, instead of 'meaning', naming is explained by ostensive definition Cf. *P.I.*, 45.
5. See *P.I.*, 45-48, 97. However, even if the simples or essences are criticised, it is with the warning that the 'sense' must not be vague and arbitrary. "... the sentence must have a definite sense". (*P.I.*, 99).
6. *P.I.*, 120.
7. And, thus, when we understand a sentence we are not forced to do that by any preceding picture that comes before our mind. Cf. *P.I.*, 138-39.
8. See *P.I.*, 198 and 201.
9. Cf. *P.I.*, 197 and 205.
10. And, thereby, it cannot be obeyed by one person just on one occasion. See *P.I.*, 199.
11. Hence, just a 'thinking of obeying a rule' does not amount to 'obeying a rule'. See *P.I.*, 202.
12. For, roughly speaking, interpretation is 'the substitution of one expression of the rule for another'. See *P.I.*, 201.
13. *P.I.*, 202.
14. W.V.O. Quine, *Ontological Relativity and Other Essays*, Columbia University Press, New York and London, 1969, pp. 80-81.
15. P.P. Wiener (ed.), *Charles S. Peirce; Selected Writings (Values in a Universe of Chance)*, Dover Publications, Inc., New York, 1958. See p. xiv.
16. W.V.O. Quine, *Word and Object*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960, p. 23.
17. See Sandra G. Harding (ed.), *Can Theories be Refuted? Essays on the Duhem—Quine Thesis*, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Holland, 1970, p. 132. In his "On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World", *Erkenntnis, vol.* 9, 1975, pp. 313-28, Quine is more explicitly against an unrestricted Duhemian Thesis. See pp. 314-15, where he says "Duhemian thesis would be wrong. . .".
18. *Word and Object*, p. 31.
19. W.V.O. Quine, "Mind and Verbal Dispositions" in S. Guttenplan (ed.) *Mind and Language*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975, p. 89.
20. *Word and Object*, p. ix.
21. *P.I.*, 19.

22. *P.I.*, 23.
23. *P.I.*, 25.
24. This relation between interpretation, disposition and constitutive rules is more or less explicit in *P.I.*, pp. 191-97.

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The concept of time

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The Context

Time, like the concept of space, matter and the nature of the self, has been a subject of deep reflection since eternity. The presumption that one may begin unfolding or explaining some new dimension of this concept now may certainly seem dubious. Yet, when one is confronted with the fact that even now when serious issues about time arise in practical life, especially with regard to law and morality, the physicist's or the metaphysician's analyses are of little help, one wonders whether they have been dealing with a different notion of time that has little to do with ordinary life, or whether they have provided an incomplete explanation of the notion. Epistemological economy would suggest that it is unlikely that there are different conceptions of time. The explanation, such as that scientific and philosophical analysis of time have been of little help to the lawyer's concern, lies more probably in the fact that the analytical enterprise is incomplete. Philosophers and scientists have just not given sufficient consideration to the problem from the point of view of the social arena, specifically the legal arena. This is not to say that the legal arena is the only significant arena of the social realm, but only that this realm focuses on and crystallizes the issues that are inherent in the whole social realm in a way in which decisions not only have to be necessarily taken but they also become part of an objective public consciousness open to review by everyone. The legal arena thus stands in total contrast to the individual psychological arena, and legal consciousness, therefore, becomes a very significant aspect of what one may call social consciousness. Any analysis of the concept in the social realm, hence, cannot afford to ignore that aspect of the realm where the concept plays the most significant role.

One cannot, of course, expect scientists, especially physicists, to deal with the social notion of time, and moreover, of being informed of the problems as they arise in law and morality. The charge here is not of being unaware or unreflective, but that when they deal with the notion of time, such as in the theory of relativity, quantum mechanics or cosmology, the assumption seems to be that they are dealing with *the* notion of time, and that the analysis exhausts the totality of this notion, whatever that may be. The grounds on which the natural scientists' restricted interest can be explained away, do not, evidently, apply to the philosophers since they are supposed to perceive issues in their totality. However, philosophers who have reflect-

ed on the notion of time seem to have, by and large, confined their attention to the issues as they arise in physics, mathematics, logic or cosmology. Some have gone beyond these to psychology, but that is where the limit is usually drawn. The legal and the moral realm, which are the crux of the social realm, have been of little interest. We shall, subsequently, look at the various scientific and philosophical accounts of the notion of time, in some detail, and also the possible reasons for why the area of interest has been limited in the manner it has. But having said this much, it is first necessary to show that there is in fact a genuine area of legal and moral concern about time where problems arise in ways which are different from those involved in the natural sciences, mathematics or logic. Without this the basic assertion that the concept of time has not been dealt with exhaustively remains vacuous.

The Questions

Typical questions about time with which physicists and philosophers have been concerned are of the type: Is time real? Is it absolute or relative? Is it a duration, a point or a flow? Is the flow a myth? Does it progress linearly or is it cyclical? What does irreversibility of time mean? Is time-travel possible? Why are there no traces of the future? And so on. Notice the totally different type of questions that arise in law and morality, and for all of us in ordinary social life, since we are moral agents: Is this the proper time to do X? Was X done in the right time? Can this much time be said to be sufficient for X? Is it too early? Too late? Too much? What amount of time can be said to be enough to establish the truth of X, or the claim for X, and why? In how much time must the claim to X begin or cease, and why? By what criteria must the sufficiency of time be determined? Notice that the notion of sufficiency here is not the same as that of duration. This notion of sufficiency (*paryāpti* in Sanskrit) is the notion of a duration which is internally complete. The question, therefore, what makes duration complete or incomplete, and what sort of notion of time is involved here, is a very important one for social life—one which does not seem to have been addressed by scientists or philosophers. Lawyers talk of the notion of sufficiency or inadequacy of time in terms of 'reasonable time'. The jurisprudential question, hence, can be framed as: what makes a particular duration of time reasonable or unreasonable, is it a matter of mere social convenience or is there something in the nature of time itself which qualifies it thus? To explicate the issues further, let us turn to the significance of some of the above questions in the context of some actual social occurrence.

The Normative Conception

There is a wider normative conception of time which is involved in various social structures and institutions. For example, in communication certain formal greetings or statements are appropriate at only certain times, and

they may also be indicative of the time: 'Good Morning', for instance. At a more restrictive level, and with a lesser contingency people may structure acts in time which are not merely statements but a whole series of acts: Indian classical music is a good example of this. Particular *ragas* are to be sung only at specific times of the day. These examples would suggest that the relationship of time to the acts is only a contingent and external one, the structure itself does not demand a necessary relationship. A greeting would still be a greeting even if not said at the appropriate time, and the *Bhairava raga* would still be *Bhairava raga* even if not sung early in the morning. Let us turn, therefore, to other types of social structures where the relationship is not external and not so contingent. The best examples of such structures are games.

In games what will count as an event or an occurrence is limited by time. The act of shooting a goal, for example, will not count as a goal if it occurs even a second after the closing whistle has been blown. The act of throwing or pitching a ball will not count as an act of bowling unless it is done within the duration the umpire has indicated. Such temporal constitution of acts—where the act is a particular act only if done within a certain time—may once again be thought to be a matter of social convenience, for one may argue that although the acts are temporally so construed it is not necessary to perform those acts. The temporal necessity is conditional, that is, if one wants to play the game, but one may choose not to. Nonetheless, one will still have to accept the conditional necessity as a part of the internal logic of games—where a set of acts cannot be constituted as a game if it is not constitutively delimited in time. Are there acts in social life whose characterization as a particular act is such that their constitutive temporal structures are not matters of social convenience, and where the necessity to constitute it in particular temporal limits are unconditional? In other words, are there acts which must not only be construed in particular time, like games, but where there is also a necessity or obligation to do the acts, such that one does not have the choice not to do them, unlike games? Indeed there are, and such acts are precisely those which fall within the domain of law and morality.

But before we take up a review of this domain, it is important to briefly remark on one aspect of the game situation, the one in which the logic of games is stretched to real life. This can be done in both positive and negative ways to enrich life. The point here is not to evaluate or analyse this extension, but only to point out one specific peculiarity. One may stretch the conditional necessities of games to ordinary life, and define particular acts as specific acts only when constituted within a certain time—as we do in astrology (*Jyotiṣa*), for example. A set of acts could be defined as constituting 'marriage' only if done within a certain *lagan* (celestial arrangement of stars and the Zodiac at a particular time). Or we may define 'auspicious' or 'inauspicious' times for construing other acts. Astrology, in this sense,

shares the logic of temporal constitutive conditionalities of games in application to real life, and thus makes life resemble a game. (A goal is a goal only if done within this time period; a marriage is a marriage only if done within this time period!) All life, of course, is not a series of games. The reaction against astrology, in a deeper sense, is a reaction against attempting to treat life as a matter of conditional contingencies. Often, the question in real life is not: if you want to play the game of life then do X. At certain times one is just compelled or obliged to do X, these are the times which law and morality are usually concerned with.

The Moral Conception

A simple way to comprehend the unconditional temporal constitutions of acts, with which law and morality are concerned, is to review some specific illustrations. Consider, for instance, the following cases: An undertrial has languished in prison for ten years; when the trial finally takes place it is found that he deserved imprisonment only for two years (such a situation is not far-fetched in law, and specially in Indian law). A child is unable to get the affection of one parent and is kept bereft of the benefits of the wealth of the other because the courts take fifteen years to decide the divorce case and determine the rights of the child and those of the parents (such cases too are not uncommon in Indian law). A man cannot claim his father's property because the will was contested by the trustee with whom the father had left the property; the man lives as a pauper and dies of poverty, and only after many years of forensic research do the police and the courts decide that the property actually belonged to the man and not to the trustee who enjoyed it. All these cases are instances of the well-known juridical maxim, 'justice delayed is justice denied'. The maxim is not merely an imperative telling one to do justice in time, it is a descriptive definition of what constitutes justice, namely that only those acts which are done within a certain time framework can be described as just acts, and not merely if the eventual judgement or acts are right. The obligation to constitute one's acts necessarily within a time framework is an unconditional one, if it is to count as just; and the obligation to do justice is also unconditional, certainly within the legal framework. The notion of justice, we see therefore, involves or entails the notion of time; and the notion of time, conversely, is evidently as much a moral and juridical notion as a physical one. Time, as a moral notion, limits and constitutes what can and what cannot be called a just or a moral action. Just acts are constituted in such a way that time enters into the very essence of the act, and like games it can be called that act only if done within that time frame, but very much unlike games the time framework is unconditional, not a matter of social convenience, and the doing of the act is also unconditional. This moral aspect of the nature of time seems to have completely eluded the scientists' and philosophers' examinations of the nature of time. We shall subsequently see why this has been so. Here let us proceed to a more detailed review of the legal framework, since in law time does not appear only as a moral concept—there is another very important aspect of it which will become apparent only after consideration of the details.

The Legal Conception

Besides the factor of time at the very basis of the notion of justice, which determines what can be called just, there are at least three other ways in which considerations of time play a very important role in law; in legal terminology, these concern prescriptions, limitations and evidence. The laws of prescription determine the duration of time which must elapse before a right or an entitlement can be recognized in law; the law of limitations prescribes the limit of time after which a suit or a proceeding cannot be maintained in the court of justice; and the temporal aspects of the law of evidence determine the time limit within which something can or cannot count as evidence in the court.

Prescription is the most ancient temporal aspect of law. We find the principle recognized in the ancient laws of the Athenians, Romans and the Hindus.[1] The notion of prescription is a counterpart to the notion of property. How long must one till a piece of land to claim property rights over it? How long must one have lived and used a house (even if rented) to claim property rights? How long must one have used a common water source (such as a pond, river or a stream) to claim rights to water? As regards common resources, such as natural water, air and space, in India the Easement Act, 1894, defines the rights. The time limits are defined by the Limitation Act (now of 1963, as amended; the earlier ones were of 1872, 1908, etc.). The prescriptive period of use, as regards common resources, was between 60 to 20 years earlier. The 1963 Act makes it 20 years. Prescription periods for private property is determined by various laws concerning private property, such as the Rent Control Acts, the land laws, and so on. Limitation is a much later notion in law. It is mentioned by jurists such as Bracton and Plowden in the thirteenth century, but the earliest statute of limitation is that of Henry VIII. The more exact ones, however, are those of the nineteenth century, such as the Real Property Limitation Acts (1833-74) in England. In India the Limitation Act was passed in 1859, and it came into force in 1862.[2] The rules of limitation evolved mainly from cases of tort which the ordinary contract laws could not handle. The Court of Equity in England, for example, developed the doctrine of *laches* (delays) to sort out equitable claims which involved time. Rules of limitation determine important questions of time without which justice cannot be done. For example, suppose that someone turns up tomorrow with a genuine deed paper that your great grandfather sold the house you have been living in for generations to the deed holder, and you have therefore to vacate. Should such a deed be complied with? Or suppose that you contracted with some-

one to build you a house, but he takes twenty years over it, because the time within which the house is to be built was not specified in the contract. Can you sue the man? Yes, you can, and in accordance with the laws of limitation the courts will determine what would be a reasonable time to fulfil the contract. Or take a third example. A woman's husband absconds, his whereabouts are unknown despite the best of efforts. For how long should the woman wait before she can marry again? Most family laws now specify a period of seven years. There are also various cases of insurance claims of all types which require determination of time within which claims can be made. The Limitation Act, for example, specifies 90 days within which insurance claims can be made after accident.

The third way in which the time factor enters legal concerns, as mentioned, is in relation to evidence. In some cases of cognizable offence, such as murder, facts discovered after any amount of time are still relevant as evidence, but in others, such as rape, the facts must be established within three hours, any proof after that is not evidence. The Evidence Act, the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code lay down strict rules about what will and what will not count as evidence after specific periods of time in different cases, and also the time period within which cases must be reported if the state is to take action or the act to be registered as a crime. In civil law, we have already seen how elapsed time counts as proof of ownership or rights, such as to land, house or common resources. This elapsed time of use is itself the evidence for the establishment of a truth—the fact about who owns what and who has what sort of rights.

The Basis of Legal Conception

Having familiarized ourselves with some of the basic ways in which the time factor enters into the very fabric of law, and hence into all structures of social life, let us pose the fundamental philosophical questions with which the jurist is faced. To begin with, why should there be prescriptions and limitations on time at all? This is different from the technical legal question, how much of time is reasonable or sufficient time? The question is, what is the reason for there being reasonable time in any case? The traditional Islamic and Jewish laws have neither advocated nor recognized laws of prescription and limitation.[3] What is it in the Common law and Hindu law traditions which has demanded such determination of time? One simple answer is that this type of limitation facilitates social order; it is a matter of public utility or social convenience. In fact, this is precisely the theory advocated by many modern texts of jurisprudence, such as of Salmond and Austin. Salmond advances the belief that the laws of prescription and limitation are founded on a 'presumption of the coincidence of possession and ownership' of fact and right.[4] From the fact that you are long in possession of property the court 'presumes' that you are the owner of it. Austin, similarly, refers to the 'presumption of a grant' of easement.[5] Such assertions can hardly be a *theory* for prescription or limitation, it begs the question, for the basic question for this part of law is not whether the courts must so presume (they must of course do so for operational reasons), but why must they make such presumptions in the first place. A theory must answer the why question, not merely reiterate the fact that presumption is made in the laws of limitation and prescription. Such texts, therefore, fail to provide a theory, leave alone a satisfactory one. It is true that a major part of the laws of prescription, limitation and evidence are for the sake of public convenience and order. Limiting insurance claims to 90 days, prescribing 20 years of use for easement and riparian rights to common resources or even setting the voting age at 18, are certainly matters of social convenience. As regards evidence, there can also be factual considerations, which are not a matter of convenience but necessity, such as the fact that the evidence will most likely not remain after three hours in the rape case. But as we have seen, not all cases of time consideration are a matter of mere convenience or utility. Gross injustice will result if too much, too little or indefinite time is permitted. Take the case of the woman whose husband is absconding, and who is presumed to be permanently missing or dead only after seven years. In a sense even this seven years of necessarily waiting seems unjust, but consider if she had to wait indefinitely and could never remarry. That would surely be injustice to her. The law determining the time in this case is not merely a matter of convenience but mainly one of doing justice to her and also giving the missing man a just opportunity. Authors of legal texts, such as Salmond, Paton and Austin, whose books are now used as standard texts of jurisprudence in law, seem to have totally forgotten the basic reasons for which the laws of prescription and limitation arose in the first place. They were evolved to deal with unfair claims, avoid injustice to individuals due to unfair delays, to determine reasonableness of contracts in terms of fair or just time required to fulfil the contracts. The doctrine of *laches*, it must be remembered, was evolved by the Court of Equity and not by the ordinary civil or criminal courts. Nineteenth century Common law jurists, such as Blackburn, would in fact give an outright moral justification for the laws of limitation by citing a basic maxim (a moral principle) of Roman law, namely: *Vigilantibus et non dormeintibus lex succurrit* (justice is done by protecting the diligent and not the indolent). A man who has negligently slept over his rights for an undue length of time will not be allowed to litigate in respect for them; and a person who (without any fraud or breach of trust) has been in the enjoyment of property, or of a right, or of immunity from a demand by another, for a period of time, will be allowed to enjoy them for ever in peace. These principles laid down in cases such as *Marquis Cholomondley* v. *Lord Clinton*[6] (1820), around the very beginning of the codification of the laws of limitation, are evidently in consideration of what constitutes justice

and not convenience. Even *Smith* v. *Clay*,[7] in which Lord Camden of the Court of Equity gave birtth to the doctrine of *laches*, speaks in terms of human conscience, and does not put forward a utilitarian theory.

Time and Normative Truth

Let us summarize the main features of the concept of time that we gather from the discussion so far. First, we notice that time can be related to social actions, events or facts both externally and internally. When it is related externally time limits do not bind the very possibility of doing justice. Law merely recognizes a certain time period as a matter of social or economic convenience. Such is the case in determining the age for voting or in recognizing easement rights. However, when time is related internally to the doing of justice, the very possibility of doing justice demands that it must be done within a reasonable time period, as is the case in criminal trials, determination of reasonable time for the fulfilment of certain types of contracts, and realization of rights or remedies for the suffering, the underprivileged or victims. This internal relation of time to justice makes time a juridical, and hence, an essential part of social morality. This moral aspect of the concept of time is, as we have noted, what has been missed in the physical or psychological analysis.

The second equally important aspect of the concept of time, which such analysis miss out, and which would be evident in the foregoing discussion, is the relationship of time to truth or evidence. In the social structure time itself is a proof, and hence a criterion, for the recognition of a truth. If you have lived in a house for more than 12 years and paid your rent, it is true that you have an occupancy right; if you have used a natural water resource for more than 20 years the time period elapsed becomes a proof for the truth of the statement that you have a right to continue to use it. This notion of temporal proof, it must be noted, is very different from the way in which time enters into scientific or mathematical proof. In science something is true if it can be repeated in time, in exactly the same way. The predictability criterion assumes the non-interference of time as a factor of change. Mathematical proof, on the other hand, is supposed to be totally independent of time, not only in the sense that it is supposed to be true at all times (*kālanirapekṣa*), but also in the sense that how much time it takes to prove a mathematical fact should not affect the truth of that fact. Imagine the absurdity of the statement, if it were to be made, that the Pythagoras theorem is true only if it can be proved within a hour-and-a-half, or if it has continuously been proved so for 20 years. But this is precisely the situation we face in the normative realm; an act claimed to be a goal is a goal only if made within the hour-and-a-half of the game time; a possession claimed to be owned is owned only if 3, 12 or 20 years have elapsed; an accident is recognized as an accident only if reported within a certain time; a forced intercourse is a rape only if registered within the limited time; and so on.

Evidently, the fact that time itself can become a criterion for a truth reveals an additional feature of the concept of time, which is not available when one looks merely at the physical, mathematical or psychological realm. It is important to distinguish what is being said about the notion of time here from a common understanding of it, which is reflected in sayings such as: 'Only time can tell the truth.' Here time and truth are not independent, time is the truth, it does not tell it, it is the basis or the criterion for what can be called truth. In statements like 'only time can tell the truth', what is being referred to is the physical durability or continuity of a process or a fact which already exists; the very existence of the fact is not being defined in terms of a duration of time.

The two additional aspects of the concept of time that we have noted so far—that it is a concept of morality, and that in a theory of evidence or proof (as well as in practice) it works as a criterion for truth and hence knowledge, in the social realm—does not of course take away from it any property that is discovered in an analysis of the role of the concept in the physical realm, namely that it is a duration, it flows, it is irreversible, it is cyclic, it is relative, and so on. Why then have the scientific and philosophical analyses missed out on these aspects of the concept of time? One obvious reason, as suggested earlier, is that they have neglected the social, moral and legal realms where these other aspects would have been discovered. But then, the question still remains, why have they neglected them? So let us now turn to take a closer look at the manner in which the concept of time has been hitherto analysed.

The Ideal of Theory Construction

Let us begin by understanding why the scientists 'and philosophers' analyses of time has failed to illuminate the lawyers' problem with time. The lawyer is primarily concerned with making truth-value statements about *particulars*, with establishing that on some particular occasion some particular occurrence preceded the other and led to it. This type of concern is not only true of law but also of history, political science, economics and even ordinary social life. In the case of law, however, such statements are of utmost significance because in most cases someone's life or property, or even punishment, may depend upon the truth of the statement. The lawyer's characteristic concern with the temporal or causal connections between events is not to discover the general patterns amongst the events or occurrences, but is often to apply generalizations, which are already known or accepted in the statutes or legal principles, or which may even be platitudinous. In this regard the statements made by lawyers, and in social life in general, are singular statements identifying in a complex situation certain particular events or causes connected to other events or causes in specific temporal relations.[8] In contrast, in the natural sciences, by which so much of the philosophical discussion of temporality has been influenced, the focus of

attention is the discovery of generalizations and construction of theories. Since Hume European philosophy has been dominated by the doctrine that the generalization of laws, which is the prime business of the experimental sciences to discover, constitutes the very essence of theory construction.[9] Theory construction, under this dogma, consists of finding out and demonstrating how from a given set of particular facts one can construe a theory which will explain all such possible occurrences. It is not as if theory construction is not involved in law, history or economics. The point of theory consruction in the social disciplines is, however, precisely the opposite. Starting from a set of general laws, principles or hypothetical rules, which apply to all possible occurrences under the laws, theory construction demands that one must demonstratively construe a theory which will explain the existence of the particular. For example, if one knows the general principle of tort law: everyone is strictly liable for a dangerous entity kept on his premise, demonstration would demand showing how something for which there is liability in all such possible cases, also existed in a specific case, such as in the case of the Bhopal gas leakage. A theory of tort law should be able to explain how one moves from the general to the particular. The basic thing one needs to understand is that there are two types of theory construction—one which shows how what actually happens is possible, this is what the natural sciences deal with; and the other which shows how what is possible becomes actual, this is what the social sciences and especially the legal science deals with. In possible worlds language, the natural sciences deal with the relationship of all possible worlds with this actual world, whereas legal science (certainly amongst the other social sciences) deals with the actualization of this existing world amongst all possible worlds.[10] Just as discovering and explaining generalizations is a difficult task for theory construction, discovering and explaining the process or reasons for actualization or individualization of general principles is an equally difficult task.

There is another major issue which needs to be taken into consideration when one takes into account the two different types of theory construction. This concerns exceptions to the general rule or law (*apavad* in Sanskrit). In the natural sciences the basic epistemic assumption in theory construction is that once one has arrived at a general law there must be no exception to the law, in principle. If there are exceptions then the theory (which employs the general laws) is either wrong or incomplete. In the social sciences, on the contrary, and especially in legal science, the basic epistemic assumption is that there *will be* exceptions to the general rule or law, when one moves from a generalization to its individuation. The existence of exceptions to the rules does not invalidate the general rule. For example, even though there may be a general law that everyone has a constitutional right to freedom of expression, there may be cases when a particular person does not have this right; one's right can be suspended or one may lose the right. The exception to the rule does not invalidate the legal theory that in a legal

system one of the basic general laws is that right to freedom of expression is guaranteed. Such a theory construction which begins with the assumption that there will be exceptions to the rule must naturally employ other heuristic principles, such as closure rules, to allow for the implementation of the theory.

Closure rules are those rules within a theory which tell which way the system must proceed when it comes up against an exception. For example, one of the closure rules in legal theory is: the courts are forbidden to leave any case undecided (that is, no judge is allowed to declare his ignorance of the law or facts, or state that the law and facts on the matter cannot be found, and hence refuse to pronounce a judgement on the matter). Now the truth of the matter is that there will be exceptions to the laws (that is, issues on which there is no decided law), but given the closure rule the judge is obliged to generate a law on the issue from within the system. This is not the occasion to go into the details of legal logic. The point of this illustration is only to bring out the major difference in the two types of theory construction in relation to exceptions to the rule.

The reason why theory construction in the Greek tradition has been misunderstood, as being only about the discovery of universals or generalizations, seems to be partly Platonic and partly Cartesian. Plato made all search for true knowledge to be a search for the universal forms. In fact he even made the understanding of morality and justice depend upon understanding the form of 'Good' and the form of 'Justice'.[11] Descartes enterprise made mathematics the ideal model for all sciences—the queen of sciences, in which the establishment of universal principles which applied in all possible worlds at all times became the sole purpose of the scientific enterprise.[12] The impact of Platonic philosophy was that all particulars became *mere* 'instances' of the universals, which in epistemological terms meant that they were inferior in value and hence less deserving of attention. The impact such an epistemic attitude would have for theory construction in the social sciences should be evident. Aristotle, the founder of the natural sciences, carried through Plato's epistemic bias by making the discovery of genus and species (universals) the major criterion for scientific enterprise and theory construction. The impact of Cartesian philosophy has been that the hallmark of theory construction has become the discovery of general principles which apply at all times, like the principles of mathematics and logic, and are therefore in a sense timeless (*kālanirapekṣa*), whereas we have seen that not only legal science and the social sciences but the very concept of justice is time-bound (*kālasāpekṣa*). The principles of justice demand that in reality justice can be said to have been done only if it is done within a specified time period. Any theory of justice must, hence, account for this temporal aspect of the concept of justice. In most theories of justice, including the contemporary ones, time does not figure at all as an aspect of the concept of justice.

The Consequences

The devastating impact that the Platonic, Aristotelian and Cartesian beliefs about theory construction has had on Western philosophy is evident in the fact that even now, about two thousand years later, the recent best-seller about time and the universe, Stephen W. Hawking's *A Brief History of Time*,[13] exhibits absolutely no understanding of the fact that time is a moral concept or that it has something to do with the establishment of truth concerning rights, claims and evidence. Hawking's worlds, whether they be symmetrical or asymmetrical, irreversible or linear, are all morally neutral, morality of time does not figure in the worlds at all. He perhaps needs God only for explaining the Big Bang, the initial moments of the universe, not for explaining why justice needs to be done to all creatures in appropriate or requisite time. Hawking's history of time is clearly not the history of the universe as we know it in law, morality or ordinary social life, where the value of time is not merely a matter of objective measurement or relative frames of reference, or even one of subjective feeling or intuition of duration, but where time itself is an objective social value.

Hawking's assumption that all that needs to be said about the nature of time is only what the natural sciences and mathematics are dealing with, is evidently a more recent expression of the dogma that has continued in the West since the Greeks. Zeno, puzzled by the continuity of time, rejected the view that an extended time interval could be composed of timeless instants.[14] St Augustine, being impressed by the lack of analogy between spatial and temporal measurements (you can measure the length of stationary object in relation to another, but you cannot measure a running time in relation to another because there is no common stationary point to relate), accepted the reality of only the present (stationary) moment, and thereby rejected any idea of the flow of time.[15] This so-called myth about the flow of time, was later accepted and explored by many other philosophers. Even later, Locke attempted to rehabilitate the notion of the passage of time by making duration and not moment the fundamental character of time. Duration, according to Locke, is a fleeting extension.[16] But such extensions, of course, cannot be objectively observed. Bergson, who accepted only the notion of duration (*durée*) to be fundamental and real, had, therefore, to assert that this duration is a subjective matter which can be grasped only intuitively; what we measure outside is a matter of intellectual construct.[17] Some later philosophers, such as McTaggart and Bradley, simply rejected the reality of time, both its duration and moments.[18] What is common to all these explorations is the Cartesian and Platonic background of theory construction, which made the physical world and the sciences about it, and mathematics, the ideal models and the context for questions relating to time. If law or legal science had been the paradigm or the ideal type for theory construction, the questions about time and their answers would have been very different.

The fact that a social science, such as legal science, could never become the ideal type or paradigm in the Greco-European heritage, has created a cleavage between theory construction and generalizations in science and theory construction and the application of general rules to social life, since the ancient Greco-Roman times. The development of Roman law and jurisprudence occurred almost independently of the Greek and Roman philosophies. In fact, Plato himself failed to notice that his own atemporal theory of justice, developed in the *Republic*, proved to be of little use to him when it came to drawing up the Athenian Constitution and writing the *Laws*. It is the same hiatus—on account of the erroneous assumptions about theory construction and ideal types—that most subsequent philosophies about time, in the Greco-European systems, have continued to be of little use to the lawyer's concerns, or to any concern in the pursuit of justice.

Theory Construction in India

This is not the occasion to discuss the history or philosophy of theory construction in India. But a few important remarks may not be out of place to bring into relief the sharp contrast between the Greco-European and the Indian traditions. In the Indian tradition of jurisprudence the temporal nature of *dharma vidhāna* (the doing of justice) has always been accepted as a basic principle. No theory of justice, morality or the teleology of human life has, therefore, sought general atemporal principles which are independent of time or could be applied at all times. All theories of *dharma*, whether at the individual or the social level, have attempted to define moral or legal rules or concepts as applicable at different temporal stages of life (*varṇāśrama-dharma*), different social times (*āpada-dharma*), during wars, for example, and even *sāmānya dharma* (rules applicable to all) are bound by *yuga dharma* (*dharma* for a particular age or eon).[19] It is also important to note that in India mathematics (*gaṇita*) was not taken to be the ideal type for theory construction. In fact no discipline has had an epistemologically superior status. If one were to be selective one may suggest that theory construction in linguistics (*vyākaraṇa*) has had a somewhat favoured position.[20] As a consequence, unlike in the West, in India there has been no cleavage between theoretical sciences and practical sciences. *Dharmaśāstra* (jurisprudence), therefore, continued to be closely influenced by *nyāya* (logic), *mimāṁsā* (hermeneutics), *vyākaraṇa* (linguistics) and other sciences. In fact, some of the important problems in jurisprudence, such as the nature of legal propositions (*vidhi-vākya*), have been dealt by logicians (Gaṅgeśa, for example, in his *Tatvacintāmaṇi*), or linguists (Bhartṛhari, for instance, in his *Vākyapadīya*), in *Mīmāṁsā* by Jamini, for example.

Besides the interdisciplinary flexibility, the constructivist approach to theory construction also provided sufficient logical space for the problems concerning exception to the rules of the theory. Pāṇini's theory of grammar, for example, classifies various types of *apavada* (exceptions), including

sāmānya apavāda (general exceptions). (See Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*.) The linguistic theory itself provides rules which will demonstrate or accommodate the exceptions. The logic of *apavāda* was also well known to *dharmaśāstra, nyāya* and other disciplines, which evolved their own unique ways of dealing with the matter.

What has been said so far concerns the traditional Indian law and social sciences. The modern context of theorization, being either a product of the recent colonial past or being still greatly influenced by the intellectual enterprises of the West, suffers from similar malaise as those of the West. The view expressed in this work, however, attempts to re-establish the Indian view as the appropriate one from within the perspective of law morality and social structures. This implies that this would also be the view implicit in western law, although not in western philosophies or social sciences. In the West the cleavage will remain so long as theory construction is differently understood.

The Temporality of Justice

Before this discussion is concluded there remains one crucial question that needs to be considered. Although one may understand and accept that time is a moral and epistemic concept concerning the validation of truth, one may still want to know why in the social realm time has these specific properties. More specifically, why, for instance, is the concept of justice internally constituted and bound by the concept of time? The answer to this question will take us into metaphysics, and is not essential to the purposes of this essay, since its major intent has been to merely describe the concept of time, and to explain why hitherto it has not been so described. However, since a rational answer to this why question may help in deepening the conviction in the concept of time described here, a brief solution may be ventured. This part of the argument is, however, independent of the characterization of the notion of time. There may be other answers as to why time manifests these properties in the social realm, than the one provided here. They may be separately sought, but that would not alter the description of the notion of time presented here.

Kant's epistemology may be usefully employed to outline the answer. A detailed argument must, of course, also show that Kant's epistemology is indeed useful for dealing with this issue. But for the sake of the limited purpose here this will be presupposed.

To counteract Hume's scepticism about our knowledge of the world Kant had argued in his *Critique of Pure Reason* that our knowledge of the world does not occur by external information merely impinging upon our mind.[21] The mind has an active role to play. It constructs the incoming input into meaningful data so that they become information for us to make sense of. Since our understanding of the world is partly our own construct there is no

ground for scepticism. The reason why the mind is able to perform this task, Kant argued, is because it operates with its own categories and rules of understanding which it is able to employ on the incoming sense datum. Amongst such categories (which Kant called categories of pure reason) are the concepts of space and time. Amongst rules whose employment make possible our knowledge of the external world, there are those such as: every event has a cause. Kant called such rules as synthetic *a priori*; 'synthetic' because they synthesize data, and '*a priori*' because their truth or correctness cannot be proved by reference to the external world, they must be presupposed first to make sense of the external world. On this view then, we do not see space or time, the mind must necessarily see things *in* space and time. The mind orders and locates things or events in time, it does not perceive time as an external something. Similarly, the mind does not deduce by inference that every event has a cause, it must necessarily employ the principle to relate the events in the world.

This is a simplified version of Kant's complex philosophy, but it will suffice to make the essential points here. Now think of the question: what would be the mind's role when it comes to the social world as distinguished from the physical world? The social world, which consists of institutions like the parliament, schools, jails, posts such as that of the prime minister, professors, doctors, human acts such as voting, bowling, litigating, and so on, is something which is certainly not just pre-existing there by itself like the physical world, which we merely need to understand and use; it is something that we have ourselves created and constructed *ab initio*, however old the history may be. This construction of the social world is clearly a different type of act as compared to the mere construction of the understanding of the physical world. In the latter case the mind merely processes the data to construct an understanding of the physical world. But in the case of the social world the mind must not only understand it but actually construct it. What role do then the categories and the synthetic *a priori* principles of reason play in the construction of such a world?

Kant clearly understood the implication of his epistemology, in so far as the mind's different role in practical life is concerned. He designated this role as that of pure practical reason and went on to write his second *Critique of Practical Reason*, in which he sought the *a priori* synthesizing principles of morality.[22] However, Kant never really worked out the details of the epistemology and metaphysics of the social world, in the manner he had done for the physical world. He confined his attention to some issues of morality and law. He did not, for instance, pose the question: what role do the categories of reason, such as of space and time, play in the working of practical reason, or how are the synthetic *a priori* principles of pure practical reason operationalized in the construction of the social world (in the noumenal realm, as he called it, in contrast with the phenomenal world).[23]

He may have perhaps assumed that having worked out his epistemology in the first *Critique* there was no further need to worry about the realm of practical reason and its operation in the social world.[24]

In fact, Kant had worked out his basic ideas about time and space much before writing the first *Critique*, in his *Inaugural Dissertation*:[25] *Disputato de mundi sensibilis atque inteligibilis forma et principis*, in which he had taken a Newtonian view of time. The *Critique of Pure Reason* is more concerned with how the mind can both generate and reconcile to the opposing views about time, namely that the world has both a beginning in time and that it does not; what he called the thesis and the anti-thesis about time. The first *Critique*, in a sense, does not add anything more to the notion of time than what was stated in the *Inaugural Dissertation*. Here Kant's view on time suffers from the same problem as those of other western philosophers —of making physics (Newtonian physics in this case) the ideal type for the context of discovery about the nature of time.

For the purposes of our present work, however, it is not Kant's concept of time that is required, but the framework of his epistemology. The epistemology too, as noted, needs to be further developed for its application to the social world. Its brief extension can, however, suffice for the immediate purpose.

If there be categories of reason and synthetic *a priori* propositions, their role in practical reason would be to actually *in-form* the social world, that is, give it a form, and not merely inform our understanding of the world.[26] This is so because the social world, in its totality, is a creation of our actions. It is to be noted that the difference that we are talking about in relation to the social and the physical world concerns the difference in the nature of human action apropos these worlds, the argument is not about the ontologies of these worlds (which may or may not be different; one would require a separate argument to show that they are different). All that is being said here is that the nature of the cognitive and creative actions in relation to the physical and social worlds are different. This being so, to construct the social world we would need some basic heuristic and ordering principles as well as categories of practical reason which would play a *constitutive* role in the very formation of the social structures. (That is, they would be the basis on which the social structures and functions would be constituted.) We see, therefore, that the categories and basic rules of our mind play a very different role in the social realm than they do with reference to the physical realm. To mark the differences between the categories and *a priori* rules of pure and practical reason, as applicable to the physical and social worlds respectively, they would have to be designated differently. The synthetic *a priori* principles of the social realm could, for example, be designated as 'normatively synthetic *a priori*', and those applicable to the physical world as 'factually synthetic *a priori*' principles.[27] Some examples of such basic

principles would be: for every action there is an actor; every agent is a moral agent (that is bearer of rights and duties).

Now, if time is a category of pure and practical reason then the role it would play with reference to the social and physical world would evidently be different. We would perceive the physical world *in* time, but we would have to constitute the social world, and all its aspects, *within* time, if it is to at all make a meaningful or purposeful aspect of the social world. Here constituting it in time does not mean merely letting it be in a running chronological order, over that we hardly have any choice; it means constructing that social aspect or structure in a manner such that it can exist as what it is intended to be only within the time-frame intended or required for it. The concept of justice too, hence, would have to be constituted within some time-frame, and outside that it would either be meaningless or cease to be justice (that is, what it is intended or required to be). Time, thus, necessarily becomes an aspect of the notion of justice, and many other social concepts and structures. This is the basic reason why in our social lifetime is a juridical and a moral concept.

Before concluding there is one implicit outcome of the above arguments that needs to be made obvious, although it does not add anything more to the points about the moral aspect of time. A basic thematic conclusion of the discussions here has been that time reveals different characteristics when considered in the context of a different ontology—namely, the ontology of the social and moral realm as compared to its characteristics in the physical realm. There is little reason to assume that the universe is ontologically or existentially poor, on the contrary we find that there are various types and levels of existence in the world. There are entities and events in the dream world, fiction, theatre, films, mythology, imagination. All these entities and events are also ingredients of the same universe. Consequently, it is very likely that time will reveal a different nature and characteristics in these various ontological realms. It would be a dogma to assume that the properties of time are the same in a dream world or film as in the physical realm. The arguments here limit themselves to the distinctions in the properties of time in the physical and social realms. The nature and characteristics of time for different existential realms would have to be worked out separately. This evidently is not the occasion to do that, but one thing should be clear—questions such as 'is time linear or cyclical?', 'momentary or a flow?', do not exhaust the list of important questions that can be asked about time, they are in fact *simplistic* entry points. The concept of time is far richer and more complex than what physicists may have us believe.

Notes and References

1. See Sandars, *Institutes of Justanian*, 7th edn., p. 146, which describes the principles of *usucapio* and *praescriptio*.
   For the position in Hindu law see, *Laws of Manu* (Buhler's translation), ch. 8, Arts. 145-49; and Mitra, *Laws of Limitation and Prescription*, Tagore Law Lecture, 1882) 6th edn., pp. 19-24.
2. For the historical details of the Laws of Limitation in India see K.J. Khambata, *Limitation and Prescription*, N.M. Tripathi and Co., Bombay, 1941.
3. Ibid., p. 6.
4. Salmond, *On Jurisprudence*, 9th edn., pp. 613-17.
5. J. Austin, *The Province of Jurisprudence Determined* (1832), 4th edn., p. 509.
6. *Marquis Cholmondely* v. *Lord Clinton* (1820), 2. Jac. and W. 1 at pp. 140-41.
7. *Smith* v. *Clay* (1767), 3 Bro. C.C., 639 n.
8. For a detailed account of the differences between the lawyer's problem with the notion of causation and those of the philosopher, see H.L.A. Hart and T. Honore, *Causation in the Law*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1959.
9. David Hume, *Inquiries Concerning Human Understanding*, Selby-Bigge (ed.), Oxford, 1946. For a detailed account of the type of understanding that has mainly influenced theory construction in the Greco-Roman tradition, up to the modern times, see R.B. Braithwaite, *The Nature of Scientific Explanation*, Cambridge, 1953.
10. For a more detailed argument of the issues about physically possible and normatively possible state of affairs (worlds), that is involved here, see Chhatrapati Singh, *Law from Anarchy to Utopia*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, pp. 121-49.
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14. For a good discussion of the paradoxes of Zeno, see Adolf Grünbaum, 'Modern Science and the Refutation of the Paradoxes of Zeno', in *Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 81, 1955, along with his 'A Consistent Conception of the Linear Continuum as an Aggregate of Unextended Elements', in *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 19, 1952, pp. 288-308.
15. Augustine, *Confessions*, book XI, chs. 14-28, trans. A.O. Outler, vol. VII of the *Library of Christian Classics*, Philadelphia, 1955.
16. John Locke, *Essays*, book II, ch. 14, Sec. 1.
17. Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, New York, 1910.
18. F.H. Bradley's arguments for the unreality of time are given in his *Appearance and Reality*, 2nd edn., Oxford, 1930. J.M.E. McTaggart's arguments for the unreality of time is to be found in his *Philosophical Studies*, London, 1934.
19. P.V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1930-52, 6 vols. Kane's discussion on the concept of *dharma* is to be found in vol. I.
20. For an account of theory construction in India which presents a similar view in more detail see Navjyoti Singh, *Foundation of Mathematics in India, a Comparative Study*, NISTADS Papers, New Delhi, 1988.
21. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, Macmillan, New York, 1929.
22. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. Lewis W. Beck, Bobbs-Merill, Indianapolis, 1965.

23. Kant identifies the noumenal realm with the social (legal and moral) realm in his *Rechtslehre*, (Pt. 1 of *Metaphysik der Sitten*), trans. John Ladd, *The Metaphysical Elements of Justice*, Bobbs-Merill, Indianapolis, 1964.
24. For a detailed critique of Kant's position and the manner in which the synthetic *a priori* propositions of pure practical reason work as constitutive principles in law and morality, see Chhatrapati Singh, *Law from Anarchy to Utopia*, pp. 91-95, 171-78, 238-44.
25. See Kant's *Inaugural Dissertation*, trans. John Handyside, Open Court, Chicago, 1929.
26. For detailed arguments about the role of synthetic *a priori* principles in constituting the social (especially the legal) realm, see Chhatrapati Singh, *Law From Anarchy to Utopia*, pp. 59-95.
27. Ibid., p. 92.

Aurobindo on reality as value

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Philosophy, according to Aurobindo, is 'the intellectual search for the fundamental truth of things', and religion 'the attempt to make truth dynamic in the soul of man'. They 'are essential to each other, a religion that is not the expression of philosophic truth, degenerates into superstition and obscurantism, and a philosophy which does not dynamise itself with the religious spirit is barren light, for it cannot get itself practised'.[1]

To one who attends only or primarily to the first part of the above characterization of philosophy, it may give the impression that it does not cause any diminution of the large area philosophy has, in its long history, been allowed to occupy as its legitimate owner. This is so because anything which has been called a philosophic truth can be called a fundamental truth about something and any search which can be called a philosophic search an intellectual search for some fundamental truth about something. For example, the philosophic truth (if it is one) that all *a priori* propositions are analytic is a fundamental truth about *a priori* propositions and a search for it an intellectual search of the above type. But the impression is immediately dispelled when one turns one's attention to the second part of the characterization in which Aurobindo adds that philosophy has to dynamise itself with the religious spirit. It is obvious that everything which has been called philosophic cannot, in point of logic, be required to be dynamised with the religious spirit. It makes no sense, for instance, to require the philosophic thesis of, or the search about, the analyticity of *a priori* propositions, to be so dynamised. This means that such truths or searches have to be called non-philosophic if Aurobindo's characterization of philosophy is accepted.

The objection might be raised that I am unfair to Aurobindo because I have tried to apply his characterization to a philosophic doctrine (or search) belonging to Western philosophy, when it was intended to represent only the spirit of classical Indian philosophizing. This would be a very lame objection for more than one reason. Firstly, Aurobindo is not characterizing classical Indian philosophy but philosophy *per se*. He would very strongly resent being called a mere interpreter of classical Indian philosophy. Secondly, there are several theses, admitted to be philosophic truths by classical Indian philosophy which, on Aurobindo's characterization, would require us to call them non-philosophic. For example, all the classical schools[2] admit that *anumāna* (valid inference) is a *pramāṇa* (a source of knowledge) only if it contains a *vyāpti* of a certain type (an incontrovertibly

true and contextually relevant universal proposition). This doctrine, thesis, or truth, as one may choose to call it, is not categorially very different from the Wittgensteinian doctrine of the analyticity of *a priori* propositions. It makes no sense, again in point of logic, to require it to be dynamised with the religious spirit. Aurobindo, therefore, seems to draw the boundaries of philosophy in such a manner that a large part of philosophy, Indian as well as Western, is left out. As this part contains some extremely important doctrines, which are needed even by some of the doctrines belonging to the part or parts he would like to retain within the boundaries, leaving it out would make philosophy poorer than it so far has been, as evidenced by its long and rich history.

He wants philosophy to be dynamised with religion because, if it is not, it 'cannot get itself practised'. The obvious implication is that he wants it to be 'practisable' in a very specific way, which may be called the religious way; otherwise there is no reason for requiring it to be dynamised with religion and not by anything non-religious. It is not that philosophy, for him, has to be practisable in a broad, general way; rather, it has to be in one specific way which is the religious way. A non-religious, secular, advocate of practisable philosophy could have required it to be dynamised with, for example, the spirit of social justice, or of moral upliftment, or of material well-being. When a Marxist wants to make philosophy a powerful instrument of economic or social change, he wants it to be practisable, and therefore dynamised. But his dynamising agent is not the spirit of religion, it is some economic/social theory or a set of some economic/social theories, some social science or a set of some social sciences, or a concern for social/economic well-being conceived in a certain manner, etc.

Aurobindo's conception of philosophy is, therefore, much narrower than the ordinary, general one, i.e. the conception current in the circle of professional philosophers through the ages. It is narrower than the latter because it leaves out many things which the latter includes within the net of philosophy. It leaves them out by requiring philosophy to be practisable by being dynamised with religion. It is narrower than the ordinary, general conception of practisable philosophy, current among those who think that philosophy is, or ought to be, practisable, because it considers only its dynamisation by religion to have the power to make it practisable in the right way.

Aurobindo is not the only Indian thinker of this century who maintains that an essential feature of any worthwhile philosophy is its inviolable link with religion. S. Radhakrishnan, G.R. Malkani, J.N. Chubb and many others hold this view.[3] They also hold that classical Indian philosophy satisfies this criterion. Rather, many times they seem to locate its distinctiveness or individuality in its being imbued with, or as Aurobindo puts it, dynamised with, religion. They seem to treat this feature of it as the chief ground of its superiority over Western philosophy. According to Aurobindo,

'it is at least a fundamental principle of the ancient wisdom', the wisdom of the East—and by the East he definitely means ancient or classical India—that 'philosophy ought not to be merely a lofty intellectual pastime or a play of dialectical subtlety or even a pursuit of metaphysical truth for its own sake, but a discovery, by all right means, of the basic truths of all existence which ought, then, to become the guiding principles of our own existence.'[4] It is this sort of wisdom on which he claims to have founded his own thinking or philosophizing.

The above is not a fair characterization of the classical Indian conception of philosophy, but I shall not discuss this matter here, firstly, because I have discussed it elsewhere,[5] and secondly, because it is not very relevant to the theme of this essay. What is important here is Aurobindo's conception of philosophy as such, and not his interpretation of the classical Indian conception of philosophy. I would, however, like to underline the fact that neither Aurobindo's conception of philosophy, nor his interpretation of the classical Indian conception of philosophy, is strikingly different from the relevant views of some of his Indian contemporaries.

Philosophy, for Aurobindo, as the lines quoted above show, is a discovery of the basic truths of all existence and these truths are not merely intellectual truths. Rather, they are truths which ought to become, i.e. which we ought to make, the guiding principles of our own existence. It is here, in getting them become, or in enabling us to make them such guiding principles that philosophy's dynamisation by religion would be, I think, according to Aurobindo, helpful or effective, and dynamisation by no other, secular agent, would be. Aurobindo does not discuss why only religion and no other agent would accomplish this feat. This is not a very serious lacuna because from the context of his thinking we can very reasonably guess, as I shall show a little later, his reason for holding this view. At this point there is something else which bothers me and to it I now turn.

Let us grant that philosophy discovers by the use of all right means the basic truths of all existence, and that P is such a truth. Since P is a basic truth of all existence, by definition, it is a basic truth of our existence because our existence is not outside all existence: if it is outside, then all existence is not all existence. Because P is a basic truth of all existence, and therefore of our existence, no existence, including our own, can violate it, flout it, or go against it, in very much the same way as no segment of nature can flout a law of nature basic to all nature. But when P is inviolable by any and therefore by our existence, there is no point in saying that it ought to be, or we ought to make it, a guiding principle of our own existence. It makes no sense to admonish anyone for making any principle a guiding principle when he cannot violate or break it. If, on the other hand, he can break P, P would not remain a basic truth of his existence and therefore of all existence.

Aurobindo seems to think that if something is a basic truth of all exist-

ence, then it is obvious that it ought to be made a guiding principle of our existence. But the logical consequence of calling any P a basic truth of all existence is that we cannot speak of *making* it a guiding principle of our existence. It is in the very logic of 'ought', of normativity or prescriptivity, that we can meaningfully say that one *ought to make* a principle a guiding principle only if it is possible that one *may not* be guided by it, or may violate it. Therefore, if philosophic truths are basic truths of all existence and consequently inviolable, philosophy cannot be said to be practisable in the sense that it gives principles or truths we ought to make our guiding principles. Aurobindo's attempt to establish the practisability of philosophy, and therefore the need or utility of its dynamisation by religion, by calling it a discovery of basic truths of all existence, thus becomes self-frustrating. This is not a surprising terminus for a thinker who considers intellectual or dialectical subtlety a polluter of philosophy's purity.

Perhaps these basic truths are practisable in the sense that they *in fact* guide and regulate our existence. But then they would be of the same type as those of the natural sciences like physics, chemistry or biology. The laws of physics, for example, in fact govern physical nature, including the physical aspects of our existence. There is no point in calling them, or asking us to make them, the guiding principles of our existence. And, there is no point in requiring physics to be dynamised with religion. Moreover, Aurobindo would not be willing to put his basic principles on par with those of any science whatsoever, natural, social or formal.

Basic truths, one may say, according to Aurobindo, are not merely ontological truths; they also contain an element of normativity or evaluativeness. But in that case they would become extremely confusing or puzzling entities. Because they contain an element of normativity it may not look pointless to prescribe that they ought to be made the guiding principles of our existence. But because they are already the basic truths of all-existence, it would be pointless to issue this prescription. On this interpretation they are in fact true of all-existence and at the same prescribable, i.e. unbreakable, unexceptionable, ontological truths as well as normative principles we ought to be guided by. This seems to be an incomprehensible position but, maybe, this is what Aurobindo intends to hold. Let us see where in his system of thought we can find its roots.

It seems to me that behind Aurobindo's insistence that philosophy should be dynamised by religion is a view or assumption to the effect that the religious or spiritual life is the highest kind of life, i.e. some religious or spiritual goal is the highest goal one ought to aim at. This he takes to be the same as realizing what is also the highest, most basic, or ultimate, reality. Generally religious thinkers consider the ultimate religious goal as also ontologically ultimate, and Aurobindo is not an exception. It is here, in his identification of ultimate reality with ultimate value (or vice versa), i.e. in conceiving ultimate reality *as* ultimate value (or vice versa), that we can

reasonably hope to locate the roots of the idea of dynamising philosophy with religion. Some philosophers, namely those who are pure ontologists or metaphysicians, conceive ultimate reality as pure existence, but religious philosophers, by and large, conceive it as value as well. This step, they seem to think, makes ultimate reality more attractive or appealing, and provides an unshakable base for what they consider to be the highest value anyone ought to seek.

The highest reality, which is the object of Yogic knowledge, the highest kind of knowledge, is called by Aurobindo 'the Self, the Divine, the Supreme Reality, the All, the Transcendent', or 'the One in all these aspects'.[6] He also calls it the Infinite, the Absolute, God, etc. It is the 'summit of existence', i.e. it occupies the highest place among things which are real. 'To reach the spiritual consciousness and the Divine' is 'the ultimate goal and aim of our being and therefore of the whole development of the individual and collectivity in all its parts and activities. . .'.[7] This is a scalar conception of reality according to which one real thing can be more or less real than another, and the Divine is the highest reality.

When a concept C is considered to be scalar, one can legitimately ask of any X and Y, when X is claimed to be more C than Y, what is it that makes X more C than Y, or why is X given a higher place on the C ladder than Y. For example, if both X and Y are pen-knives, we can ask what is it that makes X a better pen-knife than Y, if someone says that X is better than Y. The concept of a good pen-knife is scalar and therefore our question is in order. If 'real' is also used as a scalar concept, then, if both X and Y are real, and not toy, pen-knives, we should be able to say meaningfully that X is a more real pen-knife than Y and also be able to ask meaningfully why this is so. But we are not and the reason is that 'real', as ordinarily understood, is not a scalar concept. It is therefore that 'real pen-knife' is also not a scalar concept. 'Good', on the other hand, like any other value-term, is scalar and it is therefore that 'good pen-knife' is. Value-predicates are scalar. Therefore, one way to eliminate the ring of oddity surrounding the use of 'real' or 'reality' in the scalar sense is to treat them as value-terms. Whether or not doing so is logically or conceptually fair is another matter, and many modern philosophers would say it is not. Aurobindo does treat 'real' or 'reality' as a value-predicate, otherwise he would not have asserted that the Divine, the ultimate reality or 'summit of existence', is 'the ultimate goal and aim of our being'. His theory of ultimate reality is thus, as already pointed out, a theory of reality *as* value.

If 'real' is an ontological as well as an axiological predicate, then to call the Divine the summit of existence would also amount to calling it the summit of value, or the highest value. To call its realization the ultimate aim or goal of life would then need no further justification. But by making 'real' axiological, though we can rule out the question why the Divine, which is the ultimate reality, is also the ultimate value, we cannot rule out the

question why is the Divine to be called the ultimate reality. This question is not very much different from asking why is the Divine to be called the ultimate value, because calling it by one name is also to call it by the other name in Aurobindo's scheme of things.

Identifying ultimate reality with ultimate value cannot make it illegitimate to ask for the justification of calling the Divine either ultimate reality, or ultimate value. The question why is the Divine *considered to be* the ultimate value may be (mis)taken to be identical with the question how is it *known* that the Divine is the ultimate value, but they are *two different* questions. The first can be answered by mentioning the reason or reasons, if there be any, for calling it ultimate value, and the second by mentioning the method or methods of knowing the reason or reasons. It is possible that there *exists* some reason but we do not know it or only inadequately know it, though if we *know* what it is, then it certainly exists. But though conceptually the two questions are different, one may try to answer both of them by answering the latter, by explaining how he knows that the Divine is the ultimate value, provided his claim to its knowledge is valid.

It seems to me that Aurobindo *cannot say* that the Divine is the ultimate value *because* it is the ultimate reality, since anything's being real is neither a sufficient nor a necessary reason for its being or having a value. Perhaps he would say that *in being* the ultimate reality it is also the ultimate value, which would be tantamount to saying that 'being the ultimate reality' and 'being the ultimate value' mean the same thing. But the two do not normally mean the same thing. Using them to mean the same thing, therefore, would neither prove that the Divine is the ultimate reality, nor that it is the ultimate value.

Aurobindo quite often says that the Divine, God, or the Self, is pure bliss or *Ānanda*. '. . . the idea of a joyless God is an absurdity, which only the ignorance of the mind could engender.' 'When the *Ānanda* comes into you, it is the Divine who comes into you, just as when the Peace flows into you, it is the Divine who is invading you, or when you are flooded with Light, it is the flood of the Divine himself that is around you.'[8] 'The Divine whether it manifests itself in All-Quality or in No-Quality, in Personality or Impersonality, in the One absorbing the Many or in the One manifesting its essential multiplicity, is always in possession of self-bliss and all-bliss because it is always Sachchidānanda. For us also to know and possess our true Self in the essential and the universal is to discover the essential and the universal delight of existence, self-bliss and all-bliss.'[9]

But though the Divine is bliss or *Ānanda*, Aurobindo does not seem to consider its *Ānanda a reason* for its being the ultimate value. Rather, 'being the Ananda' and 'being the ultimate value', as is the case with 'being the ultimate reality' and 'being the ultimate value', seem to be used by him synonymously. Therefore, the Divine's being the *Ānanda* cannot be used as a reason for its being the ultimate value, and if it is, then Aurobindo would

have to prove that *Ānanda* or bliss is at least a necessary determinant of all (positive) values, which also he does not. Since, in effect, to say that the Divine is the ultimate reality, ultimate value, or Bliss, mean the same thing, if a reason can be asked for its being the one, it can also be asked for its being any other, and if no reason has been given by Aurobindo for its being the one, no reason has been given for its being any other.

But it would be *unfair* to conclude that Aurobindo *has no reason* to call the Divine the ultimate reality or value. His reason is his Yogic, spiritual, experience. 'Spiritual experience tells us that there is a Reality which supports and pervades all things as the Cosmic Self and Spirit, can be discovered by the individual even here in the terrestrial embodiment as his own self and spirit, and is, at its summit and in its essence, an infinite and eternal Being, Consciousness and Bliss of Existence.'[10] That there is the Divine and that it is the ultimate reality as well as ultimate value, both are, for Aurobindo, revelations made by spiritual experience. Similar positions or positions differing from it in some not very significant details, have been taken by many other mystics and theistic thinkers of classical India.

The advaitin Śaṅkara too appeals to spiritual experience, but he also makes use of highly sophisticated logical analyses to provide an intellectual support to his revealed truths, so much so that he sometimes seems to be claiming our credence for them on sheer rational, logical, grounds. Aurobindo, on the other hand, not only does not indulge in logical sophistication, but seems to hold that logic is of no use in this regard. This is clear from his critique of reason. Reason, according to him, is destined to end in agnosticism. It is because of its dependence on reason or intellect that he accuses European thought of inevitably ending in agnosticism. 'European metaphysical thought', he says, 'does not in its method and result go beyond the intellect. But the intellect is incapable of knowing the supreme truth. . . . At the end of European thought, therefore, there must always be Agnosticism, declared or implicit. Intellect, if it goes sincerely to its own end, has to return and give this report: "I cannot know, there is, or at least it seems to me that there may be or even must be something beyond, some ultimate Reality, but about its truth I can only speculate; it is either unknowable or cannot be known by me".'[11] Aurobindo's wholesale condemnation of European thought as merely intellectualist and therefore agnostic may be condoned as an expression of his attachment to some philosophical or religious traditions of ancient India, or of his national pride and patriotism. But certainly it cannot be justified on factual grounds. Neither is the whole of European thought intellectualist or agnostic, nor is the whole of (ancient) Indian thought spiritualist.

When Aurobindo claims that something is the case on the ground of its being revealed in his mystic or spiritual experience, his pattern of thinking can be presented as follows: Since in my experience D seems to be the ultimate value (Reality, Bliss, etc.), D is the ultimate value (Reality, Bliss, etc.).

He does not seem to notice the logical possibility of a gap between D's *seeming to be* and *being* the ultimate value. He seems to compensate for this apparent, logical, oversight by attributing to mystic or spiritual experience some sort of infallibility, by claiming that it can never go wrong. It thus becomes definitional to hold that *what seems to be* real in mystic experience *is* real. But there is another logical insensitivity in not noticing that by defining mystic experience in a certain way, nobody even if he is a mystic, can make the gap between 'seems to be' and 'is' non-existent.

Let us assume, however, for the sake of argument, that the Divine is the highest value and that Aurobindo knows that it is, and let us then try to understand the nature of this knowledge. To emphasize the uniqueness of this knowledge he calls it Yoga. It is 'not merely an intellectual conception or clear discrimination of the truth, nor is it an enlightened psychological experience of the modes of our being. It is a "realization", in the full sense of the word, it is the making real to ourselves and in ourselves of the Self, the transcendent and universal Divine, and it is the subsequent impossibility of viewing the modes of being except in the light of that Self and in their true aspect as its flux or becoming under the psychological and physical conditions of our world-existence.'[12] For anyone to have this knowledge, then, is to *realize* the Self or Divine in himself. Consequently, it becomes impossible for him to consider any other thing except in the light of this reality. It culminates in a kind of identity or becoming. 'We must not only see God and embrace Him, but become that Reality.'[13] It is 'the knowledge by which we become what we know.'[14]

To know the Divine is to know what it is and to know what it is, is to become the Divine. But what sort of claim is it? Is it a logical or an empirical claim? It cannot be an empirical claim because then the possibility of its being sometimes false cannot be ruled out of court. But Aurobindo will not allow that it can ever be false. For him it is impossible that one knows the Divine but does not find that it is the ultimate reality or value, or does not become it. Can we then call it a logical or definitional claim? Does Aurobindo make it definitional that only he can be said to know the Divine who agrees to call it ultimate reality and value and who becomes the Divine? This would amount to redefining the word 'know'. It cannot be said to be used in its standard, normal, sense because what is meant by knowledge here is not what it ordinarily means. Redefining a concept is not always objectionable. But a really serious objection can be raised to the effect that by defining, or redefining, knowledge Aurobindo cannot solve any problem of knowledge, not to speak of solving the problem of explaining the nature of the knowledge of ultimate reality or value.

There are several possible ways in which one can react to Aurobindo's account of the nature of ultimate reality and value. His reactions would very much depend on the kind of person he is. If he is a tender-minded, devotional, person, he may take it as a sacred truth, as a not-to-be-questioned

revelation, and try to mould his life-style according to it. If he is himself a mystic, a yogi, he may try to relive the relevant experience to test it. But what if he finds his experience not supporting Aurobindo's claim? This is not an impossibility since mystics do sometimes disagree among themselves about the verdicts of their mystic experiences. There is no way to decide which mystic is right, or more right than some other one. But if he is a mere philosopher, he can only try to *understand* what Aurobindo reports on the basis of his mystic experience.

Since any experience is private, to the philosopher would be available only the set of statements or utterances made by Aurobindo and not his experiences. Therefore, he can make only the former the raw materials of his philosophizing. But he cannot test their truth-claim because he is not a mystic and therefore lacks the ability to have the needed mystic experience. He can only try to ascertain how cogent, how sensible, how logically or pragmatically defensible, they are. In doing all this, he has to use his normal, professional, logical tools. If it is held that they can be properly understood only by another mystic, or by one who is devotionally oriented towards mysticism, or that the philosopher's logical, conceptional tools are inapplicable to them, there is no alternative for the philosopher but to keep off the scene. On the other hand, if it is said that a genuine philosopher need not care for logic, or be guided by any logical consideration, in his study of the mystic discourse, or that the mystic alone is a genuine philosopher and not he who subjects the mystic's utterances to logical scrutiny, then the issue becomes a verbal one as to how should the word 'philosopher', or 'philosophy', be used.

Aurobindo offers his statements about the Divine as reports of his spiritual experience, and since they are claimed to be reports, he does not have to, one may like to say, give any argument or reason for them. Even a sense-empirical report, an observation-report, does not need to be supported by any reason. Therefore, when a mystic-empirical report of Aurobindo is not accompanied with a reason or ground for accepting it, it need not be taken as an indication of any intrinsic deficiency in it. When I taste sugar and find it sweet, it would be absurd to say 'Sugar tastes sweet because. . .'. Similarly, when he finds in his spiritual experience that the Divine is the highest value, it would be absurd to expect him to say 'The Divine is the highest value because. . . '. All this is sayable, but there is a basic difference between an ordinary observation-report and a mystic report.

The logical possibility of sugar sometimes not tasting sweet is not rejected *ab initio* by the sense-empiricist, but Aurobindo seems to rule out the logical possibility of any of his mystic-empirical reports ever being untrue. If his mystical utterances are like ordinary empirical reports, the logical possibility of their being untrue must be granted, and if they are unlike the latter, they cannot be exempted from the requirement that they must be accom-

panied with supporting reasons on the ground that they are like empirical reports or observation-statements.

To know the Divine is, for Aurobindo, as has been mentioned earlier, to become the Divine. This kind of knowledge is, in the mystical, religious, tradition, rated as a higher kind of knowledge than the ordinary, common, garden variety of knowledge, the acquisition of which does not consist in the knower's becoming the known. One consequence of the former conception of knowledge is to efface the conceptual distinction between *knowing* what is the ultimate value and *attaining* or acquiring it. Since the Divine is the ultimate value and knowing it is to become it, only he really knows what the ultimate value is who has become the Divine, i.e. who has attained the ultimate value. Ordinarily we think that *knowing* what one ought to be is a necessary condition of being, or trying to be, what he ought to be. But Aurobindo's conception of knowledge makes it impossible for anyone to fulfil it before actually being what he ought to be. In fact, for him *knowing* what one ought to be is isomorphic with *being* what he ought to be, and therefore it cannot be called a condition, necessary or sufficient, for the latter.

Perhaps one would like to say, in support of Aurobindo, that he who has not yet known the Divine by becoming it can have a second-hand knowledge of it from the utterances of Aurobindo (or of any other mystic), which he has to take on trust, and proceed, as required or directed, to attain the first-hand knowledge which would be a kind of becoming. But then one comes back to the starting point of the orthodox, Vedic, systems of classical Indian philosophy: one has to start by accepting on trust the statements or utterances of some authority, some Vedic sage, or an Aurobindo. It is a relevant question to ask which mystical authority one should accept since all authorities do not say the same or similar things. He cannot be advised to approach a third authority to seek guidance about choosing between two conflicting or differing ones unless he is given a standard to judge authorities. In case he is, the authorities will cease to be absolute authorities because then their credibility will be determined by their satisfying the standard given. Aurobindo cannot advise an aspirant to accept an authority, even his own, on the ground of its rationality because he has already declared that reason is incompetent to provide any decisive guidance in spiritual matters. Moreover, to make the rationality of an authority the criterion of its acceptability would amount to letting reason supersede authority. But exaltation of reason to this level will not be acceptable to Aurobindo.

Aurobindo has said more than once that the higher activities of man express his seeking for God. 'In all the higher powers of his life man may be said to be seeking, blindly enough, for God. To get the Divine and Eternal in himself and the world and to harmonize them, to put his being and his life in tune with the Infinite reveals itself in these parts of his nature as his concealed aim and his destiny. He sets out to arrive at his highest and largest and most perfect self, and the moment he at all touches upon it, this self in him appears to be one with some great Soul and Self of Truth and Good and Beauty in the world to which we give the name of God.'[15]

One may read in the above words an argument for the claim that the Divine or God is the ultimate value: Since we always seek to realize God, God is our ultimate value or destiny. Such a mode of reasoning may be subjected to a criticism similar to the one Mill's alleged inference of the 'desirable' from 'the desired' has been subjected to. I do not want to do that. It is true that if Aurobindo shows that man always, as a matter of fact, seeks God, God can be said to be, in the factual sense, his ultimate value. But then, it would be an empirical claim and would need empirical support. But, as is expected of him, he does not give any empirical support for the claim that man always seeks God. He seems to accept it on the authority of ancient sages. 'The truth that all active being is a seeking for God' is 'a truth on which the sages have always agreed, though by the intellectual thinker it may be constantly disputed.'[16]

Thus, Aurobindo's basic claim, or at least one of his basic claims, that the Divine is the ultimate value, remains an unargued principle, a principle which can at best be treated as 'a gift of the sages', or of Aurobindo's own, spiritual experiences. Treating it in the one way is not different from treating it in the other way since in principle it could be a gift of both. But in both the cases it remains a gift, to be accepted out of respect or reverence, and not on account of its being supported by a convincing reasoning.

Any attempt to treat Aurobindo's theory of reality as value as philosophical theory, i.e. to ascertain and assess what could be called its supporting reasons or considerations is, therefore, very likely to cause an incurable tension to a philosopher. It is a part of his professional ethics to do the latter sort of exercise before giving or withholding credence to any philosophical theory. That is why it is not unnatural if his philosophical or logical conscience gives him an uncomfortable pricking when he ventures to form either a positive or a negative opinion about Aurobindo's theory, or about a similar theory given by any mystic. Perhaps there is no escape from suffering all this if he chooses to study philosophically any mystical theory or language without watering down his regard for reason and reasoning.

Notes and References

1. Sri Aurobindo, *The Supramental Manifestation and Other Writings*, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, 1971, p. 314.
2. Many interpreters of classical Indian philosophy would object to this statement by saying that the Cārvākas reject *anumāna* or inference as a source of knowledge. This is a standard charge against the Cārvākas. But to me it seems to be based on the non-recognition of a very important distinction, namely, that between inference and a

theory of inference. The Cārvākas reject the then prevalent theory of inference and not inference, just as Hume rejects a certain theory of causality and not causality. The theory of inference they reject is that according to which every inference which is valid, or which can deservedly be called *anumāna*, must have, as a constituent of it, a *vyāpti* in the sense of an incontrovertibly or necessarily true universal proposition. They need not reject *anumāna* if *vyāpti* is allowed to mean a universal proposition with only a high, or very high, degree of probability.

Both the orthodox Indian logicians and the Cārvākas, have in their mind empirical inference when they talk or theorize about inference. Both, in spirit, mean by *vyāpti* an universal, empirical, non-analystic, proposition. The former think that it is possible that a proposition is both empirical and universally or necessarily true, while the latter think it is not. According to the latter, at the most it can have a very high degree of probability. The universalistic and probabilistic interpretations of *vyāpti* would, of course, affect the estimation of the certitude of the conclusion. Assuming that an inference is otherwise faultless, if its *vyāpti* is incontrovertibly true, its conclusion would also be incontrovertibly true; on the other hand, if the *vyāp* has only a very high degree of probability, the conclusion cannot claim to be inco trovertibly true. Speaking commonsensically, a probabilistic inference is as much an inference as is an apodictic one. The Cārvākas, being commonsense philosophers, would not object to admiting inference as a source of knowledge if it is said to yield only probable and not incontrovertible knowledge. The controversy between the Cārvākas and others is thus not about the availability of inference as an epistemic agent, but about its acceptable structure and competence.

If one looks at the Cārvāka position in the light of modern logical theory and epistemology, one would feel justified neither to treat the Cārvāka criticism of the orthodox theory of *anumāna* too casually, nor to characterize it as a total rejection of *anumāna*. The latter can be done only if the concept of *anumāna* is taken as epitomizing the orthodox theory. This would only confirm the proposition that the Cārvākas reject a theory of inference, and not inference, since then *anumāna* would mean inference as understood or conceived in the orthodox theory. It seems to me that this in fact is the case. '*Anumāna*' does not, in classical Indian logic, according to its prevalent interpretation, mean inference as such, but only inference as defined or conceived by the orthodox thinkers. To reject a certain definition of anything is not necessarily to reject the reality or utility of that thing.

3. Rajendra Prasad, *Regularity, Normativity and Rules of Language*, University of Poona, Pune, 1989, chaps. 18 and 19.
4. Sri Aurobindo, *The Synthesis of Yoga*, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, 1970, p. 367; cited hereafter as *SY*.
5. Rajendra Prasad, ibid., chap. 19.
6. *SY*, p. 286.
7. Sri Aurobindo, *The Human Cycle*, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, 1970, p. 162; cited hereafter as *HC*.
8. Sri Aurobindo, *Letters on Yoga*, Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, 1970, p. 173; cited hereafter as *LY*.
9. *SY*, p. 363.
10. *HC*, p. 158.
11. *LY*, p. 157.
12. *SY*, p. 290.
13. *SY*, p. 292.
14. *LY*, p. 160.
15. *HC*, p. 145.
16. *HC*, p. 136.

Nothingness and freedom: Sartre and Krishnamurti

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Amongst the recent philosophers of 'human Freedom', Sartre and Krishnamurti appear as the most challenging figures in the Western and Eastern approaches to the subject respectively. They are challenging not only intellectually but also ethically, since they offer philosophies which they claim can be 'lived'. Both derive their conceptions of freedom from considerations about the nature of consciousness whose relevant features they hold in common. Yet they arrive at two radically different views concerning the way freedom finds a foothold in actual life. That is, they differ sharply in their accounts of how freedom manifests in the human reality and how the individual can *live* it. In this paper I examine their accounts of the realization of freedom and offer arguments to support Krishnamurti's contention that freedom is not the power to choose but rather the state of not-having-to-choose. First, however, I must provide a brief exposition of the relevant background.

Consciousness as Nothingness

According to Sartre the human mode of existence is primarily a 'being-for-itself', though at times it slips into the mode of a 'being-in-itself'. The latter has no awareness of itself, and its existence is independent of anyone's consciousness of it. In the former mode man exists *qua* a conscious subject, requiring for its existence an 'object' of consciousness. However, nothing in the universe can exist in both modes at once. The for-itself is not only conscious of the things in the world, it is also by its very nature, though non-cognitively, aware of itself. It cannot exist without such awareness. Thus a for-itself has at once both an awareness, as in ordinary sense-perception, of an object outside of itself or 'transcendent' of itself, and simultaneously a 'pre-reflective' non-cognitive awareness of itself. It can, of course, in self-reflection 'take a point of view' upon itself and 'know' itself as an object. But this 'reflective' consciousness of itself does not give true *knowledge* of itself, since consciousness *per se* is never an object; it is always only a subject.

It is Sartre's claim that freedom is the very *being* of a for-itself as a conscious subject. Thus his notion of freedom is closely linked to his explanation of what it means to be a conscious subject. To understand 'freedom' there-

fore, we must understand the central features of Sartre's view of consciousness itself.

First, let us underline the fact just mentioned that consciousness *per se* is never an *object* of experience. Empirically speaking, therefore, we experience only conscious *capacities,* such as those realized in thinking, feeling, perceiving, remembering, judging, valuing, choosing, etc., as well as in various kinds of physical actions. Next, Sartre maintains that the ego does not appear to the unreflected consciousness—consciousness *per se* is non-egological or impersonal. The ego is discovered by the reflective consciousness; it 'is not the owner of consciousness; it is the object of consciousness'.[1] And, to account for the unity, continuity and identity of consciousness we need not make any reference to the ego as such. These claims taken together produce the initial picture of consciousness as 'nothingness'. As Glynn puts it, '. . . human consciousness as subject is the very antithesis of objects or things, that it is indeed *No-thing*.'[2] This picture is further sharpened when we consider the inner dynamics of acts of consciousness. First, since consciousness is always directed towards its object, is always 'of something', it 'has no "content" ' of its own.[3] Next, in its actual operation, Sartre says, 'consciousness is a pure and simple negation of the given'.[4] For example, in perception one sees a *figure* standing out against a *background* which *the figure is not*. Similarly in an act of evaluation, to grade a person as 'good' is, in the same act, to consider him as 'not evil'. In general terms, 'the capacity to evaluate any situation, etc., presupposes the capacity to imagine it as other than it is; to posit an alternative, which is to say conceptually to negate the actual, in the name of the possible which it is not.'[5] In each act, Sartre explains, '. . . everything happens as if the For-itself by its very nihilation constitutes itself as "consciousness of".'[6] There is, however, another surpassing—that of *itself* considered as a being, i.e. a consciousness of *such and such sort*. As soon as consciousness becomes aware of its own identity as *consciousness-of,* it surpasses itself. Thus Sartre says that consciousness is 'a double nihilation of the *being which it is* and of the being in the midst of which it is.'[7]

Nothingness and Freedom

In the above account we see how consciousness becomes aware of its own nothingness—which is derived from both its awareness of an object in the world and its awareness of itself as a reflected-upon thing in the world. In both cases consciousness puts itself at a distance from the object it is aware of, nihilating *what is* in favour of what is not. But in what sense does this nothingness signify human freedom? The answer is to be found in Sartre's conception of the dual nature of the conscious subject. On the one hand, the for-itself is 'its own nothingness'; on the other hand, he is that action by which he chooses to inhabit his nothingness. In the former aspect, consciousness, having no fixed nature or essence, escapes the constraints of

determinism. 'If this being were not its own negation it would be what it is —i.e. a pure and simple given.'[8] In that case it would have been governed by the deterministic laws of nature. But that is not the case. Consciousness (though we often tend to represent it as a 'given') is essentially a subject, i.e. its own nothingness. In the latter aspect, consciousness stands for the power by which the for-itself can affect 'a rupture with its own past . . . so as to be able to consider it in the light of a non-being and so as to be able to confer on it the meaning which *it has* in terms of the project of a meaning which it does *not have*.'[9] Thus the for-itself in one leap of consciousness dissociates itself from the 'in-itselfness' of its past, and also finds its being in its own nothingness. The nothingness of 'one's own being' is what frees one from the bondage of the past, and also provides the possibility of redefining oneself by choosing or affirming a new end. Consciousness is 'perpetually disturbed'. It cannot stay put with its own nothingness. It must find a way of *being its own nothingness*. This it does by making choices embodied in every decision it makes and every end or value it affirms. Thus a conscious subject is of necessity (ontologically) a free being. The nothingness of his being is the ground of his freedom. He is free to make himself by choosing as he shall be. He can indeed ignore his freedom by concealing his nothingness from himself and pretending that he was simply an in-itself; thus allowing his 'past' and the environment to determine what happens to him. But that would be an exercise in 'bad faith'. We can sum up Sartre's account of this relationship between freedom and nothingness in his own words as follows: 'Human reality is free because it *is not enough*. It is free because it is perpetually wrenched away from itself and because it has been separated by a nothingness from what it is and from what it will be. It is free, finally, because its present being is itself a nothingness in the form of the "reflection-reflecting". Man is free because he is not himself but presence to himself. The being which is what it is cannot be free. Freedom is precisely the nothingness which *is made-to-be* at the heart of man and which forces human-reality *to make itself* instead of *to be*. As we have seen, for human-reality, to be is to *choose oneself*; . . . Thus freedom is not *a* being; it is *the being* of man—i.e., his nothingness of being.'[10]

In the above account there is a sense of duality in the way in which freedom becomes available to man. On the one hand, ontologically, man is conceived to be necessarily free in his nothingness, on the other hand, he has to realize his freedom by *choosing himself,* vigilantly avoiding the 'comforts' of self-deception and essentialism.

Krishnamurti would agree with much of this. For him too, consciousness is always *of* something: 'The content of his consciousness *is* this consciousness.'[11] The human-reality is essentially characterized by nothingness or emptiness, and aims to redefine itself through the affirmation of ends and values in the choices it makes: 'Being nothing, being a desert in oneself, one hopes through another to find water.'[12] 'In himself he is insufficient, empty,

lost. So out of this emptiness, of which he is afraid, he depends on property, on people and beliefs.'[13] You seek out of emptiness, reach out either to fill that emptiness or to escape from it. Next, he also suggests that for freedom to be there must be a rupture from the past: 'All life is in the present, not in the shadow of yesterday or in the brightness of tomorrow's hope. To live in the present one has to be free of the past, and of tomorrow.'[14] 'All will is desire based on this past . . . and when something new is to be found there must be the absence of the past . . .'[15] Further, he also regards one's nothingness or emptiness as the foundation of freedom, and exhorts us to confront it and live it rather than allow the 'past' to direct the course of our lives. Yet Krishnamurti arrives at a totally different conception of what is involved in the *realization* of freedom. In particular he rejects the way of 'choice' as the way of continuing realization of freedom. For him choice does not embody the spontaneity of freedom. Rather, 'choice' is seen as a 'reaction', which presupposes a background of conflicts of desires. What one chooses finally must in some degree depend upon the strength of the felicitous desire. Choice, thus, has a cause which itself is not chosen implying an element of determination rather than spontaneity. Ideally, choice also presupposes a chooser independent of the act of choice, which neither Sartre nor Krishnamurti admits. However, before we can see the full force of Krishnamurti's rejection of 'choice' as freedom-realization, we must understand the Sartrean details of what is involved in choosing.

The Necessity of Choice

Now, considering the 'mechanism' of choice by which the conscious subject comes to define its being, Sartre tells us that it involves a double willing—'it is necessary to will to will.'[16] In a given situation, when one performs a willed act, as for example, when one chooses to flee to safety in face of danger to one's life, Sartre says that one is 'announcing' a prior choice of placing 'a value upon life'. In *affirming* the value of life one has willed to will the fleeing away to safety. This is of course one expression of the 'passional' way of realizing the willed will. There are others. One could have affirmed the same value by, for example, willing to encounter the danger by working out a strategy of defence. Sartre believes that such individual choices by which I define myself, hail from other preceding choices, and so on, which finally depend upon an 'original choice of Being' which I am supposed to have made, but for which there is no reason. In fact, since it is an *original* choice there *can be no reason* for it. Such is the 'absurdity' of human existence. The individual choices, hierarchically fitting into myriad of projects, are all expressions of my original choice of a Fundamental Project in order to redefine myself, 'which I am'.[17]

Here it is clear that the notion of 'original choice' is conceived to have explanatory force. That is, if one asks why it is that one flees from danger, the answer will be 'because one values life'. But if we ask why it is that one

affirms the value of life in the first place, there is no further explanation available. It is simply that 'freedom can arise only as being which makes itself a desire of being; that is, as the project-for-itself of being in-itself-for-itself.'[18] And, 'the upsurge of freedom is immediate and concrete and is not to be distinguished from its choice; that is, from the person himself.'[19] Thus the placing of the value upon life is simply the spontaneity of consciousness which constitutes its freedom and which, as we have seen, manifests in the way one chooses to be one's own nothingness. Since the aim of consciousness is always to *be* 'to make itself be and thereby to pass beyond itself',[20] 'choice' turns out to be a *continuing necessity* for being a for-itself.

However, there seems to be something deeply unsatisfactory in the above account. Firstly, an individual choice is explained by reference to a preceding choice, which in turn is explained by reference to a former choice of a project and so on, until we reach the original choice. But the trouble is that the original choice is so general, devoid of specific contents, that it loses all its explanatory value. Thus one wonders how the fact that one places a value upon life can serve as the sole explanation of the fact that one flees rather than fights. Surely, one feels, there has to be something in the personal psycho-physiological background of the 'chooser' to serve as the explanation of *that* particular choice. The placing of value upon life does not seem to be sufficient to determine the contents which express it. Another person in similar circumstances may have chosen a different embodiment of the same value. In other words, the original choice gives no indication of how it would be or ought to be expressed.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that the original choice is not a distinct act from the act which embodies it. At one stroke the human reality affirms the end which is embodied in the choice of the *way of being*. In our example above, the fleeing from the scene of danger is at the same time an affirmation of the value of life. If the original choice is not made independently of the choice of the means by which it is expressed, then the choice of the means as well as of the end, both must owe their being to *some* background in the individual human reality. Can mere nothingness be the sole identity of this background? Sartre seems to think so. For he maintains that, 'This fundamental project must not of course refer to any other and should be conceived by itself . . . The project of being or desire of being or drive toward being does not originate in a physiological differentiation or in an empirical contingency; in fact it is not distinguished from the being of the for-itself.'[21] This means that the entire sequence of individual choices are churned out of nothingness and appear out of the blue. But surely, *choices* are not made *ex nihilo*, since, by definition, they are made *by* an agent who must already exist and possess some attributes to which the choices refer. Nothingness by itself cannot supply any determinate ends. Indeed for Sartre himself choices are based in desires. But desires are parts of a hierarchical structure rooted, as we have seen, in a 'Fundamental Project'. And the

human-reality itself is 'a being which is originally a project.'[22] Thus desires do not *explain* choices. Rather, a choice is a way of being one's desire, signifying a project of Being. This vitiates the explanatory 'mechanism' of choice. In the end we are simply left with the brute fact of a Nothingness driving towards Being by 'choosing' the ends it does. Next, Sartre's account of 'choice' considered above fails to accommodate the important, empirically available, fact that choice is delivered to consciousness as 'owned' by an 'I' or 'ego' or 'self'. In this case, as in all deliberate acts, the 'I' appears as an *aspect* of the very act under which the act is considered *owned*. Choice necessarily refers to a chooser. It is true that, ontologically, the 'I' is not a separate entity, and 'owning' is not a separate act from the act of choice. It is present nevertheless in the very act of choosing. Then, the necessity of choice has introduced the necessity of perpetual 'I'-consciousness, which goes counter to Sartre's claim that consciousness is essentially non-egological. Finally, since the original choice, apart from constituting individual choices, is also a choice of Being, in making it the chooser chooses *himself*. *Prima facie* this is quite puzzling. How can one *choose* oneself in one's very Being? One can indeed often choose several details of one's being, but that is possible only when one already has Being, while Sartre is saying that the original choice *constitutes* oneself in the first place. However, before we spell out how these puzzling features in the notion of choice bear upon the realization of freedom, we must look at the process of self-construction carefully.

Choice and Self-construction

Sartre, as we have seen, moves towards his notion of freedom from considerations about the nature of consciousness, in particular about the nihilating power of consciousness. Consciousness is the human capacity of 'wrenching itself away from its past'. In this 'nihilating withdrawal' from the past, consciousness experiences its own nothingness, or (what amounts to the same thing for Sartre) its freedom. In the rupture from the past one sees what one is *not*, and that amounts to the recognition that one was free. Thus freedom is built into the very mode of being a subject. The conscious subject is not a fixed or determined object, an in-itself, but simply a self-recognition. It is indeed, as we have seen, 'a double nihilation of the *being which it is* and of the being in the midst of which it is'. But in the same act of nihilation, consciousness finds its Being. This it does in choosing a Fundamental Project, executed through a myriad of choices one makes by which one constructs oneself. Thus, for example, my present desire to finish writing this part of the paper, through various individual desires and projects, hierarchically related to an 'original choice', is nothing short of the choice of myself. Since, as Sartre observes, 'Fundamentally man is *the desire to be* . . . . Moreover the desire to be by no means exists *first* in order to cause itself to be expressed subsequently by desires *a posteriori* . . . (it) exists and manifests itself only . . . through jealousy, greed, love of art, cowardice, courage, and a thousand contingent, empirical expressions which always cause human reality to appear to us only *as manifested* by *a particular man*, by a specific person.'[23]

But, surely, the human reality conjoins both, the in-itself and the for-itself. As Sartre himself affirms, consciousness is not 'the totality of the human being' but only its 'instantaneous nucleus'.[24] In making particular choices, then, when the human reality affirms its being in its nothingness, the thrust for the affirmation must come from the background which constitutes the individual human being minus its 'nucleus'. For it is clearly unintelligible that a subject who is wholly established in his nothingness may nevertheless manifest an *urge to choose* and redefine his being. In actual fact the background in question is always present, since at no point of his life does the human being exist without a 'past'. (As Heidegger has said, as soon as one is born one is 'already too old to die'.) The very fact that to encounter one's own nothingness one has to 'effect a rupture from one's own past' shows that prior to the rupture one is identified with that 'past'. Indeed the 'I' appears as the 'owner' of its past. Thus the individual choices must refer to an owned past. Only then can they take the form of 'jealousy', 'greed', etc. as mentioned above. Yet the very fact that one is identified with one's *past* points to one's nothingness in the reality of the 'now'. Thus there is a tension in Sartre's account of self-construction through choice, which is doubly paradoxical. First, to *be* one's own nothingness one must choose oneself. To choose oneself one must shed the past. Yet to be able to make the choice one requires the very background of the past which one is supposed to have shed. This is so since choice, as we have seen, is an act which must be referred to an 'owner', a 'me', which, in turn, is available only by reference to the past. Next, for self-construction one needs to convert one's nothingness into Being. Yet the *being* is construed as nothing but a nihilating of Being. Since 'the nature of consciousness simultaneously is to be what it is not and not to be what it is.'[25] Choosing to *be* must always be simultaneously an attempt at escaping from Being. This dual nature of choice, therefore, indicates self-construction to be a positive twin-action—an attempt to *be* and an attempt to escape from Being. If this is the nature of choice, can either or both of these positive acts be equated with 'being one's own nothingness'? We shall try to answer this question in the next section. For the moment, let us bear in mind the upshot of the discussion in this section; which is, that for a coherent account of freedom based in one's own nothingness, we must resolve the above paradoxes. It is here that Krishnamurti's insights come to our rescue. In particular, Krishnamurti differs sharply in his account of 'what it is to *be* one's own nothingness'. This is the crux of the matter: if human freedom is grounded in the nothingness of

one's being, can we specify *a way of being* one's own nothingness without either positively *escaping* one's being or turning one's nothingness into *a* being through choice?

Being One's Own Nothingness

Now, for Krishnamurti too freedom consists in being nothing (No-thing). But his conception of what is involved in being nothing is much richer than that of Sartre. True, Krishnamurti also invokes the idea of a wrench from the past. But again this idea is taken much more seriously and fully explored by him. In the present section we shall try to come to grips with these two connected themes.

First, however, to understand the full-fledged notion of 'being nothing' we must be clear about the meaning of 'one's own nothingness' itself. In Sartre's theory, since consciousness is No-thing, the human reality *qua* consciousness must be basically considered as a state of 'No-thingness'. What it means is that there is no fixed 'essence' of an individual conscious subject. He *is* his moment to moment choices, and nothing enduring throughout his choosing career—though ordinarily we believe in an enduring self and hold it to be the *source* of our choices, etc. That is, in reality the self is nothing over and above the flow of 'personalized' choices, and the self we believe in is nothing but, as Howells puts it, 'an imaginary construct, outside consciousness, object not subject of consciousness, a continuous creation held in being by belief'.[26] We can say then that the term 'one's own nothingness' is simply meant to underline the essential nothingness of the individual self. With this meaning in mind we can proceed to explain what is involved in *being* one's own nothingness.

For Sartre, as we have already implied in the preceding section, being one's own nothingness involves a continuing exercise in self-construction which consists of choices, though self-nihilating, made in order to find one's being, i.e. to *be*. In contrast to this, Krishnamurti points out that being nothing strictly requires that the conscious subject remains *wholly established* in the nothingness of his individual self. To remain thus established, in turn, requires an end of *the desire to continue*, psychologically, as an individual enduring 'me' or self, which one imagines oneself to be, with the consequence that one *actually* abandons the exercise of self-construction altogether. For Sartre, as we have seen, one must keep redefining the nothingness of one's being by hierarchically related choices. But an act of choice is either an act of procuring fresh identity or modifying the existing identity of a being who is essentially nothing. So any attempt to define oneself through choice would be considered to be a negation of 'what is', i.e. of one's own nothingness, and not necessarily a negation of one's existing identity as Sartre thinks. Moreover, 'choice', as noted earlier, presupposes a 'chooser' independent and prior to the act of choice. But both Sartre and Krishnamurti agree that the chooser *is* the choice. This

follows from their theses that in reality the self or ego, which is believed to be the source of one's thoughts and actions, is nothing but an imaginary construct. Prior to the affirmation of being in choice, the 'chooser' as such is non-existent. Thus if a *choice* is made at all, Krishnamurti suggests, the conscious subject could not have been wholly established in his nothingness—he must have identified himself with the background which accounts for the choice. That is, the rupture from his own past could not have been real. Rather, the subject must have carried his past over in the form of the 'me' as the chooser, and the choice must have proceeded from that background. It is for this reason that Krishnamurti refers to choice as 'reaction' (in contrast to pure action). In choosing it is the 'conditioned past' that is reacting. This is implied, though not recognized, in Sartre's own account of the hierarchical structure of desires in a chosen project. When we consider the original choice we find that it 'is absurd, not because it is without reason but because there has never been any possibility of not choosing oneself'.[27] But surely this is paradoxical. On the one hand, for any act to be my choice it must refer to my 'me' which makes the choice; on the other hand, there is no identity available for the 'original' 'me' before the original choice has actually been made. How then can I call the original choice a choice *made by me*? It is the original choice itself that *constitutes* the 'me' in the first place. Since no one can choose himself before he has been 'chosen' to be, the original choice cannot be called a *choice* made *by* me; it can only be seen as a choice made *in* the universe constituting the original background from which I react in my subsequent choices.

Krishnamurti also offers an instructively original explanation of the very presence of the *urge* to choose, i.e. of how it comes about that one chooses at all. Sartre says that 'the for-itself chooses because it is lack. . . .'[28] But choice, as we have said, presupposes a relevant desire and appropriate beliefs about oneself and the circumstances in which one exercises the choice. These, however, can be supplied from Sartre's views which we have already mentioned, namely, that the human reality is 'fundamentally, the desire to be' and that through nihilating consciousness man has the power to 'make himself'. But now, the fact that the for-itself *is* a lack cannot explain such desire and belief, since the latter *constitute* the for-itself in the first place. That is, the 'lack' cannot explain the rise of the original choice and therefore cannot explain the subsequent choices either which follow upon it.

In Krishnamurti there is no talk of an original choice. There is no such thing as an *original* chooser. In self-consciousness man discovers himself already loaded with a 'past'. However far back on seeks out oneself one always encounters a 'me', a self-identity. Indeed one *is* one's past. As Krishnamurti affirms: 'The "me" is the very essence of the past, the "me" is time, the "me" is sorrow—the "me" endeavours to free itself from itself, the "me" makes efforts, struggles to achieve, to deny, to become . . . the

"me" seeks security . . . identifies itself with something greater in which it hopes to lose itself—whether that be the nation, the ideal or some god—is the factor of conditioning.'[29] Given this, Krishnamurti explains that it is not just the fact, considered objectively as it were, that the for-itself *is* lack which explains why it chooses, but the *sense of lack* or the consciousness of emptiness that drives one to choose. And it is the 'mind of the "me" in all its self-centred activity (that) has created this emptiness, this isolation.'[30] The consciousness of lack is the shadow of the consciousness of the 'me'—the 'me' which is believed to be an independent enduring entity but which is never encountered as such. (A search for the 'me' always ends up with a *nothing*.) Consciousness *per se*, Krishnamurti agrees, is non-egological but the particular form of choice which 'the desire to be' makes presupposes 'the mind of the me'. And the non-availability of the 'me' as a reified object is responsible for the sense of lack. Sartre, implicitly, seems to recognize this fact when he says: 'Yet this quality of "my-ness" in the world is a fugitive structure, always present, a structure which I live.'[31] But Sartre does not attach the same significance to this insight as Krishnamurti does. For Krishnamurti 'the mind of the me' with its desire to 'become' is what explains the urge to choose. As long as the 'me' exists, man will remain 'condemned to choose'. And the constant striving to *be* through choice will remain a perpetual postponement of the *being* of one's own nothingness, and therefore a denial of freedom. For Krishnamurti, thus, it remains irrelevant to consider *what* or *how* one chooses to be; it is the very fact of *having to choose* your being that is the element of bondage. Freedom is not the power to choose but a state of 'not-having-to-choose'.

Krishnamurti's positive characterization of 'being one's own nothingness' requires taking the idea of 'rupture from the past' in an altogether different light. First, it has to be noted that the rupture in question is not *eo ipso* realized in each and every act of consciousness. It is true that consciousness being an act 'can be conceived only as being at its core a rupture with the given',[32] but this does not necessarily imply that the 'past' is *dissolved* or purged out of one's being for good; it could equally be the case that the past serves as a sort of springboard for consciousness to jump off into the 'not'. But in that case, though consciousness has taken a leap into the future, the causal efficacy of the past has already been upheld. The course and the reach of the jump of consciousness (to continue with the analogy) must, up to a certain extent, be determined by the nature of the 'springboard'. And thus, in a sense, the past has been carried over into the future. In Krishnamurti's view a total wrench from the past requires the conscious subject to exist, literally, in a state of (psychically) 'owning' no past at all. To appreciate this point we must apply the distinction Krishnamurti draws between objective time and what he calls 'psychological' time. The former is chronological, measurable and quantifies processes involving change in the physical world. The latter exists only as personal memories of experiences in relation

to one and the same enduring (imaginary) self, namely oneself. That is, psychological time is the remembered 'me'—memory of having experienced certain pleasures, hurts, 'achievements', sorrows, etc. with their accompanying hopes and fears, together with the belief in a personal future. As Krishnamurti explains: 'The past is all our accumulated memories. These memories act in the present and create our hopes and fears of the future. These hopes and fears *are* the psychological future: without them there is no future. So the present is the action of the past, and the mind is this movement of the past. The past acting in the present creates what we call the future. This response of the past is involuntary, it is not summoned or invited, it is upon us before we know it.'[33] Thus psychological time signifies the sense of 'owning' a personal past and its projection into the future. In this sense psychological time identifies the very structure of 'me'. Any movement of consciousness in psychological time, therefore, cannot amount to being one's own nothingness.

For Krishnamurti, then, being one's own nothingness signifies a real state of awareness in which psychological time has altogether ended. In this state consciousness has not only made a rupture from the past, *it has also ceased to 'own' a past and to accumulate* it any more. While consciousness as an *act* continues nihilating what is, in favour of what is not, as a subjective nucleus it remains established in its own nothingness.

In all actions of the *will* the past comfortably lurks in the background. When consciousness is wholly established in the nothingness of the self, the action of the will is completely suspended. This idea of a total suspension of the will, without turning oneself into an in-itself, is hard to understand by those who are brought up in the Cartesian tradition of thinking that willing is the only thing one can *do* by way of immediate action of the soul. And the 'necessity of choice' implies that one is always engaged in willing any way. Even in mere judging one is willing, since one is saying 'yes' or 'no' to what is 'given'. But for Krishnamurti no action of the will can ever affect a rupture from the past. Since 'all will is desire based on the past . . .'[34] the action of the will inevitably carries over the past into the future. But, Krishnamurti maintains, one can suspend the action of the will altogether. It is possible to do so in an effortless surrender to 'what is'. In such act of 'tremendous simplicity' even the minimal exercise of the will (in accepting or rejecting the false) stands negated. He calls this surrender an *act* of 'choiceless awareness' which he explains as follows: 'Awareness is an observation, both outer and inner, in which direction has stopped. You are aware, but the thing of which you are aware is not being encouraged or nourished. Awareness is not concentration on something. It is not an action of the will choosing what it will be aware of, and analysing it to bring about a certain result.'[35]

The possibility of choiceless awareness is a fact in the human reality. This insight of Krishnamurti is an important contribution to our understanding

of the nucleus of human existence. Since the negation of the 'past', of the 'me', in choiceless awareness is not itself an act of the will, it represents the spontaneity of consciousness. In this state consciousness is no longer enmeshed in the exercise of 'self-construction'. 'Such negation is the most positive action, therefore it is freedom.'[36] In sum, while Sartre recommends that we cash our freedom in affirming of ends or fulfilling the *desire to be*, and remain condemned to choose, Krishnamurti shows us the way of being truly nothing and therefore free in choiceless awareness.

The Character of Freedom

We are now in a position to see that the way of choice, far from being the way of being one's own nothingness (and therefore freedom), is really the way of being one's own 'past'. In choosing, the Sartrean subject is caught up in the illusion of 'freely' procuring new identities by redefining himself. In actual fact he is simply reacting from the background of the 'past', succeeding only in strengthening the 'me'—the self which is an imaginary construct.

For Krishnamurti, 'being one's own nothingness' signifies 'dying to the past'. In choosing the past is alive; 'our action is based on knowledge and therefore time, so man is always a slave to the past.'[37] In freedom the 'past' has ended and therefore the whole structure of the 'me' vanished into nothingness. Choice obviously presupposes a whole set of activities of thought (belief, desire, evaluation, choice, etc.). For Krishnamurti this network of self-centred activities can be described as an attempt at 'becoming'—understood in its psychological accretions. That is, the human reality, apart from aiming at material results in the objective world, is constantly trying to *become* something—through various forms of 'gains', such as power, fame, wealth and other mundane pleasures. This constant striving at 'becoming' is a total denial of the freedom of being one's own nothingness. Thus 'becoming' is the way of being one's bondage to the 'past', and freedom must be free of 'becoming'. In suggesting 'dying to the past' Krishnamurti is obviously not suggesting committing suicide. The dying in question is 'the ending of one's attachments'. '. . . Everyday you are abandoning everything you are attached to.'[38] Since, as Sartre says, 'human reality is action' and action naturally produces an ever accumulating past, 'dying to the past' is a continuing process—a continuing nihilating of what otherwise would have been accumulating as the 'me'. Dying, thus, is a process representing a *mode of being* involving an awareness of Being without the centre of the 'I' or 'me'—the centre which, as we have seen, is 'held in being by belief'. Dying is living in a state of choiceless awareness in which one is no longer choosing to redefine oneself. In freedom personal motives, i.e. motives of self-advancement are no longer operative. The very desire to *become* is absent. This is truly *being absolutely nothing*, which means having 'no ambition—which does not mean that you vegitate—no aggression, no resistance, no

barriers built by hurt'.[39] This non-egological awareness of *being* without 'becoming' is the true character of freedom. It is the death of the psychological temporality of man. In this ending 'there is freedom from the fear of not being able to continue'.[40]

When Sartre says that man is condemned to be free, it suggests that the character of freedom is of the nature of 'burden'. Indeed, according to Sartre one feels 'anguished' at the availability of the unbounded freedom. One is unable to cope with it and seeks to hide one's freedom from oneself. All this is quite extraordinary and contrary to our natural intuition in this matter. If freedom were really manifest in the human reality, man would have felt the 'effortlessness' of spontaneity and the bliss of creativity—features which Sartre rightly associates with freedom. Further, man would have loved his being rather than sought to escape from it. He would have felt absolutely secure and blissfully fulfilled. But Sartre's philosophy implies a completely opposite conception of the character of freedom. By identifying freedom with the necessity of choice Sartre, it seems, has unwittingly priced it out of the market.

On the other hand, Krishnamurti has shown that freedom involves a perpetual surpassing of the continually changing inner self-identity and abandoning the self-image altogether. Then, in living without attachment to the 'past', the conditioned self no longer censors and distorts the spontaneity of life.[41] Krishnamurti calls this, living in the right relationship of 'love'. Sartre recognizes that man is afraid of the spontaneity of the non-egological consciousness. But he fails to appreciate that a consciousness which is *afraid* of its own spontaneity, in fact cannot be spontaneous and therefore cannot be called free. In 'love' there is no fear of one's own nothingness, rather one apprehends nothingness as the ground of a moment-to-moment-creativity. Freedom, then, is the way of 'selflessness'. By being *nothing* one has to fear nothing. Thus freedom is not *for* the self, it is freedom *from* the self, from the 'me', i.e. from having to *be* a being 'condemned to choose'.

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Towards a creative synthesis of cultures: an Indian view

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Introduction

Culture is indeed a complex concept and stands for a world of ideas ranging from the sum total of ways of living built up by a group of people and handed over to posterity through successive generations to the quality of excellence in the individual and collective life of a people brought about through an assimilation of value-systems and ideal-configurations. While the two ends of the spectrum may be regarded as standing for 'early beginnings' and the culminating points in the *Weltanschauung*[1] of a people, it would be unrealistic to draw a rigid dichotomy between them and assign to the former a secondary place and accord prime importance to the latter. For, notwithstanding the complexity of the latter and despite the seeming simplicity of the former, on analysis it is found that ideas characterizing the one *are* found to be present in the other either in a recognizable form or in an imperceptible manner. The main reason for this phenomenon is that the reflective temper of man brings with it thought-constructs which transform the quality of life of a people at every stage of development of man and society. The interaction between thought-systems and patterns of living thus account both for the complex texture of culture and for the varying possibilities of articulation of the ideas transmitted and ideals visualized by a people. This indeed suggests that the idea of creativity expresses itself through the processes of interpretation and reinterpretation.

From a philosophical perspective, an analysis of culture points to both a *view of life* and a *way of life* and more importantly to an interaction between them. One of the dominant expressions of the former is seen in the philosophical systems that emerge and of the latter, in the religious traditions that evolve. Even at the outset it is necessary to note that the philosophical systems incorporate within themselves both *a scheme of values* and *a theory of reality*. It is also essential to point out that *religious traditions stand not merely for certain belief-systems* but also, at a deeper level, *for certain ideals considered worthwhile to achieve by man*. The processes of interpretation and reinterpretation referred to above can well be expected to have, as their subject-matter, both philosophical ideas and religious ideals found in a particular geographical area, current during a historical era or prevalent in the world at large. This is perhaps what is meant by the oft-quoted statement that the

cream of a culture is to be found in its philosophy and religion. The full implication of this statement for the idea of a creative synthesis of culture will become evident in the sequel but it needs to be explicated here that this task is undertaken in the present paper by analysing aspects of an Indian philosophico-religious classic, the *Tirukkuṛaḷ*. As the Tamil classic itself is reflective of the Indian philosophical and religious ideas on the cultural side, it is necessary to consider the backdrop provided by Indian classics in general.

The Backdrop Provided by Indian Philosophical Classics

Confining our attention to philosophical classics, it is good to start with the commonly accepted idea that the Sanskrit language has been one of the most powerful media of transmission of the Indian cultural tradition. The Sanskritic philosophical literature may, for our purposes, be classified into two types, viz. those which are spiritually oriented and those dealing with secular concerns, respectively referred to as *mokṣa-śāstra literature* and *dharma-śāstra* literature. As the secular concerns of man include those of the economic and psychological (feeling-emotional) aspects of life, the classics specifically dealing with these aspects, such as the *Artha-Śāstra* and the *Kāma-Sūtra*, may also be brought under the second type of literature. But since a number of works akin to these have been produced by the Indian ethos and since they bring to the fore a dominant strand of thought concerning the secular aspects of human living, the terms *artha-śāstra* literature and *kāma-sūtra literature* are also made use of to refer to them specifically.

The dominant motif in the *mokṣa-śāstra literature* has been the portrayal of the ideal of spiritual perfection referred to as *mokṣa*, *mukti*, *apavarga* and *kaivalya*.[2] The conceptualization of the ideal (also referred to as the ultimate ideal to be aspired for in human life) in these systems has been through a process of metaphysical system-building, through a sustained inquiry into the nature of reality and the place of man in it and the role he has to play by adopting a scheme of life which enables him to attain the ideal.

Secular concerns occupy the attention of the second type of literature which includes the *dharma-śāstra*, *artha-śāstra* and *kāma-śāstra* writings. Human life is analysed in terms of its personalistic and institutional dimensions in these discussions. Idealization of both aspects of life takes the form of visualizing the individual-institution relationship as geared towards transforming the quality of man's secular life. The creative contributions made by philosophers in this context have indeed been instrumental in enriching the meaning of culture.[3]

The striking feature of Indian philosophical literature in Sanskrit has been that a core idea is clearly discernible in it, viz. that the secular and the spiritual spheres of life are neither discontinuous with one another nor do they play discordant tunes though they may *appear* to be so. The Sanskritic literature as a whole suggests a four-fold scheme of values (termed the *puruṣārthas*[4]), representing the secular and spiritual aspects of life. In fact, it will not be an exaggeration to suggest that the contents and contours of Hindu culture have been influenced a good deal by accepting the philosophy of values as providing a guiding principle for *personal as well as institutional life*.

Thus, the ideas centring around *secularism* and *spiritualism* (if the two terms are employed to indicate respectively secular and spiritual values) are suggestive of: (i) the multi-faceted characteristic of human nature which needs to be 'catered for', and (ii) the development of a harmonious relationship between the secular and the spiritual realms of human life. In regard to (i) it needs to be noted that human nature expresses itself both in terms of the ordinary 'desires' felt and in terms of the attractiveness offered by a realm beyond the ordinary, by a sphere not confined to the purely secular. In regard to (ii) the development of harmony between the two spheres, viz. the secular and the spiritual, is to be visualized as a potentiality which is trying to become actualized in life by a deliberate and creative act of the human will. In this sense *the idea of creativity of culture signifies, from the Hindu point of view, the consistent attempts of man to visualize and actualize a scheme of life which coheres well with his innate nature and dignity both in the personal and at the institutional spheres*.[5]

The continuity envisaged between the secular and the spiritual realms is provided by a regulative value (known as *dharma*) at the secular level and attempting to achieve a transformed outlook in individual and social life. The affirmative action-plan such an outlook on life engenders is itself indicative of attitudinal changes considered desirable in man; the changes may be described as pointing to an idealistic-normative approach to life. The effect of such a transformed outlook may also be described as *spiritual* in so far as life is not viewed purely in terms of corporeal elements but also in terms of incorporeal elements, imperceptible though they may be. In a slightly different and extended sense of the term, the *spiritual* outlook may also be understood as *not* considering secular life as an end-in-itself but as a means of transforming the quality of the individual's personal as well as institutional life and also helping others in society to achieve a similar transformation of the quality of their lives.

The references above to the ideas of the secular and the spiritual and more especially to the continuity between them are helpful in appreciating the fact that the Indian tradition as a whole (notwithstanding the differences in the modes of articulation of the ideas) has been deeply concerned with the ideal of a *good life. A significant and unique area of agreement* between them *has been*, as was hinted at at the commencement of the paper, *regarding the core idea of what constitutes the ultimate good*. Furthermore, they all visualize the overarching influence that the aspiration for attaining the ultimate good has on human life, viz. that it transforms the outlook on life and also

the approach to society and the world at large of those who are intent on reaching the ultimate goal.[6]

The concept of *the good life* may thus be considered highly suggestive of the need for reordering human life by 'reconsidering priorities'. The crisis of values experienced by humanity that some thinkers complain of today means precisely that certain values which ought to be pursued by man *are not actually being followed*. The implicit suggestion is that while the good life may, in the ultimate sense, be visualized as achieving the epitome of spiritual perfection, aiming at a high standard of ethics both at the individual and at the institutional levels in the *immediate present* and at the level of secular living, is no less important.

The subtle distinction between the good life conceived of as an *ideal life as an end* to be achieved by man and the *ideals in life to be adopted as means* drawn above is highly suggestive of the divergent expressions of an idealistic view of life found in the Indian cultural tradition. It seems to me that the characteristic of 'unity in diversity' so often pointed to by students of Indian culture means precisely that the same ideal has been conceived and reconceived in manifold ways within the Indian context itself. Furthermore, the reciprocal relationship between the *ideal of a good life* (achieving the epitome of spiritual perfection) and the *ideals in life* (incorporating a life of value in individual and collective life) has been highlighted in divergent ways in the various Indian languages and geographical locations within the Indian subcontinent itself and offer us an insight into the 'Indian viewpoint'.[7]

The Tamil Classic Tirukkuṛaḷ as Reflecting the Indian View

The Tamil work *Tirukkuṛaḷ* is a case in point. The distinct standpoint it takes on the issue of the nature of the relationship between the immediate ideals and the ultimate ideal is evident from the author of the classic conceiving of this relationship in a very unique way. Even while endorsing the Sanskritic view of the intimate and reciprocal relationship between the secular and spiritual realms of human existence, and even as he accepts the idea of the multiple ideals which concern man in the immediate context of life in answer to the different aspects of man's personality make-up,[8] he does not consider the ultimate ideal as occupying a totally distinct sphere from the non-ultimate ones. The structure of the text itself evidences this fact in two important respects: (i) no separate section is allotted for a consideration of the ultimate ideal, and (ii) even when the immediate ideals are referred to, it is unambiguously suggested that, pursued in an ethical way, they themselves 'constitute' the realization of the ultimate ideal.[9]

In this context it is worth noting that of late, due recognition has been given to the fact that classical languages of India like Tamil, reflect and project, through ethico-social treatises, the Indian viewpoint, just as much as Sanskrit. A.K. Ramanujan, a contemporary writer who interprets Tamil

literature to the West, has significantly pointed to the necessity of studying classics written in other languages like Tamil to get a good insight into Indian tradition. His observations on this point are apposite:

> For a long time, Indian civilization was thought of only as the civilization of classical India expressed mainly in Sanskrit. For over a hundred years in Europe and America they have had Sanskrit studies. Now people are beginning to realize that there are many Indias. It is not one India and India is not just in the past. India has a live, longstanding, continuous tradition and it is a multiple tradition. In the study of this multiple tradition we need the living languages. We need all the different linguistic traditions to be represented, not only Sanskrit but also Dravidian traditions . . . Until we have some idea of, and some acquiantance with all of these, . . . the picture of India will not be complete. It will be partial and it will be unbalanced. The recognition of such imbalance is one reason why Dravidian studies and particularly Tamil studies are increasingly receiving attention . . . For a total picture of Indian civilization and Indian linguistics we need both these classical but contrasted languages.[10]

The *Tirukkuṛaḷ* is regarded as the greatest ethical treatise produced by the Tamil genius and is also considered a world classic. The work reflects the characteristic feature of Tamil literature, viz. its confidence in human powers expressing itself in a positive affirmation of life on earth. This point needs to be reiterated since *the concept of culture does not connote merely visualizing an ideal* far above the average secular concerns of man, but rather, dwelling at length on the concerns of the common man and the everyday life of the man-in-the-street and exhorting the achievement of deeper meaning and significance by leading a life which is ethically good, morally pure, religiously 'other-regarding' and philosophically reflective of all aspects of human personality—those that are immediately apparent to the senses, those that attract the attention of the sensitive mind and also those which do not escape the sensibilities of the human intellect and the deeper, ever-present self. The point also helps us to appreciate how the idea of *cultural synthesis has its roots deeply entrenched in such a view of the importance accorded to 'this-worldly' concerns* and rises far above the ground level to reach out to higher regions where the pure air of clear thinking and the warm sunshine of wisdom coalesce and pave the way for a philosophy of life which is transgeographical in nature and a style of life in which concern for human kind shorn of divergent religious affiliations[11] and cultural diversities[12] is the only meaningful one.

The chief concern of the work is with the fundamentals of the good life as paving the way for a cultural transformation[13] of man understood in the sense indicated above. In contrast to the Sanskritic division of human values into four, viz. *dharma* (virtue), *artha* (material wealth), *kāma* (desire) and

mokṣa (spiritual perfection), we find in it a detailed discussion of only the first three. The distinctive feature of the work is its claim that the good life consists in living up to the ideals of the first three values and in the process, realizing the fourth. The deliberate 'omission' of the fourth value, however, has *not* resulted in a qualitatively inferior type of approach to the concept of good life, but has impressed upon its readers the importance of living out the first three not mechanically but meaningfully, by fathoming the valuable and venerable depths of the human psyche.[14]

I am thus suggesting that the Tamil work seeks to convey the general Indian view through the emphasis it lays on the first three values alone. An attempt is made in the rest of the paper to indicate further that the philosophy of good life portrayed in the Tamil classic has implications for world thought inasmuch as it suggests the need for cultural synthesis.

Towards a Creative Synthesis of Cultures: The Kuṟaḷ View

The dominant idea we find in the *Kuṟaḷ* in this regard is rooted, no doubt, in the philosophy of a good life but the latter gets its grist and form from the idea of moral and ethical principles permeating individual and institutional life *everywhere*. The close-knit relationship between the principle of morality and the good life would indeed indicate that if the former is considered distinctive of *man*, irrespective of distinctions of class,[15] sex, time, clime, culture or religion,[16] then it may be said that any ethico-social treatise which is considered a classic, can well be expected to contain within it, root ideas of cultural synthesis. And, it is hence not surprising that the *Kuṟaḷ*, as a world classic, does offer guidelines for humanity as a whole on the subject of *synthesis of cultures*. The prime factor which makes the synthesis possible is *morality* in so far as it touches the deepest layer in the *human psyche* and paves the way for an idealistic and open-minded world view.

It is interesting in this context to note that while writing a pre-publication review of an English translation of the *Kuṟaḷ* by the Rev. G.U. Pope, R.C. Temple observed as follows:

> The *Kuṟaḷ* is not only the first work of its own language, but as 'one of the highest and purest expression of human thought' has also interest far beyond the ten million speakers of Tamil . . . .The *Kuṟaḷ* is divided into three books, embracing really in a series of short stanzas the whole ethics of the daily life, not of any particular race or people but of mankind generally . . . In its own land the *Kuṟaḷ* owes its popularity as much to the beauty of its versification as to its morality, but it is the breadth of view and its speaking to the heart of man that must make it a favourite with the world at large.[17]

The idea of *morality* which is emphasized in the *Kuṟaḷ* signifies precisely that as a core-value, it runs through the whole of life. This is tantamount

to considering man as the individual 'bearer of values' who has the responsible function of 'sustaining' the various institutions of which he is an integral part. Individual values are thus seen to provide the foundational elements to the social institutions he visualizes, 'creates' and participates in.

The core-value of *morality* is referred to by the Tamil classic as *aṟam*[18] and all secular concerns are brought under two values, *poruḷ*[19] and *inbam*.[20] Of these *poruḷ* refers to economic and political aspirations and is considered to provide the foundation for the institutions of property and the state; and *inbam* stands for the psychological aspect of desire and is visualized as foundational to the institutions of marriage and family. The core-value status accorded to *morality* signifies that it should pervade the pursuit of the other two values and permeate the institutions they express themselves in. The *Kuṟaḷ's* significant contribution, even while subscribing to the essentials of the Indian philosophy of values suggested in the Sanskritic tradition, lies in its envisaging one key concept, viz. *aṟam* in such a way that the other two values, viz. *poruḷ* and *inbam* become but extensions of *aṟam*.

Looked at from this point of view, the concept of *aṟam* holds the key which unlocks the philosophy of good life in the *Kuṟaḷ*. The subtlety in the presentation and analysis of *aṟam* that is found in the *Kuṟaḷ* matches indeed the subtlety with which *aṟam* pervades the entire life of man—both the personal and the institutional aspects—and makes him truly human. The imperceptible, though not ineffective, presence of *aṟam* in the workaday concerns of man paradoxically is responsible for the warmth of feelings and depth of emotions in man and for the idealistic motivations that are seen in human action, suggests the classic. The result is that the very idealizations of man[21] are seen presented not as exhortations to man to become seriously and strenuously ethical and spiritual, but as gentle suggestions (though characterized by firm conviction) that extending principles at work at the personal level to inter-personal life-situations constitutes the very essence of the ethical and spiritual life of man.

The idea of extension of the principle of *aṟam* is thus to be understood as introducing the idealizing element into secular life itself which is analysed in terms of the various social institutions. It is interesting indeed to observe that in recent discussions of social institutions, five of them are listed as important and significant, viz. property, state, family, religion and education. The first three are referred to as secular institutions *par excellence* and philosophically, the exhortations made in regard to participation in each of these institutions by man are by way of idealizations of man to observe certain ethical principles. Education and religion are both considered useful in infusing such principles and are in effect deemed to make possible an idealistic orientation towards the institutions themselves.

In the idealistic scheme of Tiruvaḷḷuvar, the secular institutions referred to as the objectifications of the principle of *aṟam* are property and state, connoted by *poruḷ*, and marriage and family, connoted by *inbam*. It needs to

be reiterated that these institutions are looked upon as objectifications of the moral principle of *aṟam* in so far as they represent the panoramic projections of an abstract principle trying to find expressions in concrete, interpersonal situations of human life.

The idea that living an idealistic secular life (understood as participating-meaningfully and ethically in the various secular institutions) is nothing but a result of applying the internal moral principle to the external, concrete realm of human existence[22] can be better understood by asking ourselves what the resulting difference would be for a philosophy of good life, if *poruḷ* or *inbam* is considered the central or core concern in human life. Considering *poruḷ* as the chief concern not only at the individual but also at the institutional level would certainly result in considering *aṟam* not as an extension of *poruḷ* but as an inevitable and indispensable *accessory*, and would be a true representation of a predominantly materialistic approach to life (if *poruḷ* is considered to be economic pursuit), or as a typical treatment of man as a political animal (if *poruḷ* is understood in its extended meaning of state as an institution). Likewise, if *inbam* is looked at as the core-value, it can be described in no terms other than the ancient Indian hedonistic philosophy of the Cārvākas. The accommodation of *aṟam* in such a scheme of life can at best make room for ethical hedonism as it happened in the later history of the Cārvāka system.[23]

On the other hand, considering *aṟam* as the nucleus of the good life does not amount to relegating either *poruḷ* or *inbam* to a secondary place. Whether we consider *poruḷ* and *inbam* as indispensable for the pursuit of *aṟam* or look at them as outward manifestations of a pinciple inherent in human nature, *aṟam* does not suffer devaluation nor does its significance get diminished. In either case, each of them will be looked upon as attempts at institutionalizing the value of *aṟam*,[24] though in the one case the institutionalization is in the larger area of the economy and polity and in the other case, the process (of institutionalization) relates to the comparatively small area of family.

The idealistic and open-minded world view referred to above as indicating 'culture-synthesis' is now clear. For a person whose life has been so transformed, the area of concern is not simply his own immediate family, nor even the country to which he belongs, but the whole of humanity. Accordingly, the inspiration for such a person is not simply from his own scriptures or religion but from all scriptures and religions of the world.

The basis of such a philosophy of culture enshrined in the Tamil classic is that an idealistic conception of man and society is not the exclusive prerogative of any one culture but is found in the various cultural traditions of the world. Hence the classic emphasizes that *all the cultural traditions are valuable* and are hence worthwhile considering. This is not in the spirit of quenching the intellectual thirst of *understanding* 'other cultures', but with a view to getting newer insights and gaining true *wisdom*.

The subtle but significant distinction drawn between *understanding* and *wisdom* is to be understood *not* as underestimating the importance of an intellectual comprehension of cultures but as pointing to the need for 'going beyond' and attempting to transform *understanding* into *wisdom* by assimilating the best from the diverse cultures of the world. To quote from the *Tirukkuṟaḷ* itself: 'Though we learn diverse things from different sages' lips, wisdom consists in getting at the truth through each of them!'[25]

Conclusion

It is, then, the submission of this paper that the complex texture of *culture* in terms of the intricate and interwoven nature of the relationship between philosophy and religion on the one hand, and in terms of the creative contributions of the human mind to the way the deeper implications of human life need to be comprehended, on the other, has in it the potentiality for a synthesis of cultures.

Since potentialities need not necessarily become actualized and may remain 'unexploited' unless it be through deliberate efforts of man, it may be reiterated in conclusion that *mere theoretical constructs* will not help the situation. Cognitive constructions of a good life and a laudable system of values no doubt provide the strong foundations for an idealistic approach to life which, far from excluding with impunity, attitudes of man-in-society towards the others in (his) society and other societies, envelops in an inclusive way, a positive outlook on secular life itself, but in a deeper way. Since the foundations by themselves *do not* constitute the structure to be erected, even though their strength ultimately ensures the enduring character of the superstructure, it is necessary to 'go beyond' mere comprehension, understanding and intellectual appreciation.

The idea of transformation of the quality of life thus hinges on the need to observe in practice the values cherished. This may be referred to either as bringing down values to the level of living or as living out the ideals envisaged and aspired for. The very effort at infusing values into patterns of living guarantees the transformed outlook, the *sine qua non* for culture-synthesis. While this idea has found expression in different ways in the various cultural traditions of the world, in India it has been through visualizing the relationship between philosophy and religion as between theory and practice. The intimate and reciprocal relationship between philosophy and religion, a characteristic feature of the Indian tradition, has in turn been articulated in diverse ways and the main submission of the present paper has been that the *Tirukkuṟaḷ* incorporates one such reflection of the Indian view.

Notes and References

1. The German term does not admit of an accurate English equivalent. Though the word 'world view' is generally accepted as the equivalent, it is not expressive enough to bring out the philosophical import that the German term possesses. It should be conceded, however, that 'world view' suggests the metaphysical orientation of life that idealistic philosophers visualize by refusing to be concerned merely with what is presented to them through the sense-organs.
2. These four terms relate to the concept of spiritual perfection visualized in the six systems of Hindu philosophy known as the 'orthodox systems' or *āstikadarśanas*. The two terms more commonly used are *mokṣa* and *mukti*. The Nyāya system makes use of the third, and the fourth is employed by the Yoga system. In general, these four terms may be considered as 'equivalents' to the term *nirvāṇa* used by the two 'heterodox systems' or *nāstikadarśanas*, Jainism and Buddhism.
3. If ethical and moral discussions found in the Indian tradition are considered 'parallel' to metaphysical discussions, one running theme down the ages has been the transformation of the quality of human life. Importance is accorded to this idea as much as to the ideal of spiritual perfection. In fact, reference to the former is made in the context of a discussion of the latter and *vice versa*. Considered in this light, *culture*, understood in the sense indicated at the commencement of the paper, has been subjected to continued reflection through succeeding generations of philosophizing in the various regions of India and has lent itself to creative contributions from various quarters within the Indian tradition.
4. It may be helpful to state briefly the general philosophy of the *puruṣārtha scheme*. The scheme is based on the principle that the ultimate spiritual aim of human life (*mokṣa*) can be achieved progressively and not at one stretch. It is based on the sound psychological principle that the spiritual ideal can be attained through regulating secular life. Secular values which are generally sought after by man need not be abandoned altogether. A definite place is accorded to them since they represent natural human inclinations. Though over-indulgence in them is not permitted, regulated expression is encouraged. The Tamil tradition too accepts this approach to the philosophy of values.
5. The capacity for transcendence seems to be indicative of the transcendental dimension of human personality. Human nature unambiguously reveals its amphibiousness. Man lives on the 'good earth' and his aspirations are towards a 'brave new world'! No doubt, his living on 'mother earth' is responsible for his reflecting about how happiness, 'here, on earth' can be realized, but his thoughts about 'father heaven' *do* make him visualize a transcendental plane of existence and *does* leave its stamp on his philosophizing about the empirical realm in which he actually lives. It then occurs to him that the ethically good is not necessarily opposed to but is in fact compatible with his metaphysical quest, nay that it is but an aspect of it. When we add to this the fact that ethical as well as metaphysical analyses of human life are themselves products of human thinking, it becomes apparent still that a meaningful consideration of the one entails an analysis of the other as well. Culture thus signifies transformation of human life by aiming at and realizing enduring values.
6. In the *Kuṛaḷ* the idea gets more clearly and less ambiguously articulated. Suffice it to mention here that the Tamil classic, without actually mentioning a spiritual value by name (comparable to *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa*) but accepting it in substance and spirit, presents an idealistic philosophy of action. Though the activistic philosophy is unmistakably presented, the need for adopting an *attitude of renunciation* which lends deeper significance to action itself, is insisted upon (see *Tirukkuṛaḷ*, 35.6). In categorical terms it condemns the habit of taking to renunciation *formally*, i.e. without imbibing the renunciatory spirit (ibid., 28.10).
7. A renowned Tamil scholar explains the pan-Indian framework of the philosophy of values as follows, 'It is itself a product of the common efforts of the intellectual world of India spreading from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin and, therefore there is . . . a common heritage and a common harvest.' (T.P. Meenakshisundaram, 'Philosophy of Tiruvaḷḷuvar', in M. Venugopaula Pillai, ed. *Thirumathi Sornammal Endowment Lectures on Tirukkuṛaḷ*, University of Madras, Madras, 1971, p. 234.)
8. Such an understanding of human nature subscribed to by the *Tirukkuṛaḷ* is reflected in a number of couplets. However, one particular couplet in which the author uses a significant phrase, *vaiyatthuḷ vāḻvāṅku vāḻpavan*, is worth referring to here. For in this couplet the author clearly takes note of the interwovenness of the two natures when he describes human life on earth as 'participating in heaven' when it is led in the light of the ultimate ideal (Couplet 5.10).

   The idea is, in fact, quite clear from the methodology adopted by Tiruvaḷḷuvar while introducing us to the concept and content of the good life. He indicates the intertwining of the metaphysical and empirical aspects of good life and also outlines his philosophy of good life even at the commencement of his treatise (though suggestively) in the first four chapters.
9. Chapters 1-38 constitute Section I entitled *Aṛattuppāl*. In this section the importance of the principle of morality is explicated. Chapters 39-108 form Section II with the heading *Poruṭpāl*. This group of chapters deal with the institutions of state and property. Chapters 109-133 grouped under Section III with the title, *Kāmattuppāl*, concern themselves with sex and love in human life as providing the foundational principles of the institution of marriage. No separate section is devoted to *Veeḍu*, the ultimate spiritual value. All the same, the classic is emphatic on the point that when secular life is led with *aṛam* as the guiding principle, that itself constitutes the attainment of spiritualization in life.
10. *Span*, New Delhi, August 1970.
11. It is a truism, it may be pointed out here, for it is widely understood that the *Kuṛaḷ* contains strands of thought which may be identified with Brahmanical Hinduism, or with Jainism or with early Buddhism, but it seems to us that a specific mention of this fact is called for at this stage in view of the 'claims' on the *Kuṛaḷ* made by scholars belonging to or in sympathy with the different religious traditions of India. Furthermore, the claimants also give us the impression that they mean to deny the presence of other strands of thought as well in the Tamil classic. (Of course, such an extreme claim is not made from the side of Buddhism.) It is hence important to underline the fact that the *Kuṛaḷ* need not be reduced to be a book of one particular tradition in the narrow sense of the term.
12. It is also interesting to note that a devout and pious Christian as he was, Pope unfailingly spotted the sayings of Lord Jesus Christ in the *Kuṛaḷ*. The ten couplets constituting the fourth chapter entitled 'Commendation of Virtue' fascinated him most and he wrote: 'I translate the ten couplets of which it is to be noted that they are perhaps on the whole the most polished in the book; . . . since the writer: (1) was an avowed eclectic; (2) was unfettered by caste; (3) was an inhabitant of San Thome and so in the midst of Christians, it seems to me a natural supposition that he had heard the Sermon on the Mount. To such a man the lives and words of our blessed Lord and of his holy Apostles, especially St. Paul, would have a peculiar charm.' (Cited in K.C. Kamaliah, *Preface in the Kural*, M. Seshachalam and Co., Madras, 1973, pp. 3-4.) Kamaliah also refers (p. 6) to Pope's seeing in the *Kuṛaḷ* Mohamme-

dan influences as well and remarks: 'It is patent that toe *Kuṟaḷ* is acceptable to all strata of people in the community of mankind, irrespective of their religious persuasions, social status and even political affiliations. But verily can it be said that the *Kuṟaḷ* is forthright in its appeal, never compromises on, fundamentals, with its affirmation of truth and negation of evil.'

13. The transformation is aimed at converting the raw, unregenerate aspects of man's social living, into an acceptable 'cultured' life. This is apparent from the language of exhortation as well as designation that the *Kuṟaḷ* adopts. (See for instance Couplets 4.3-6, 6.10 and 7.4-6.)
14. This would also explain the general thrust of the *Kuṟaḷ's* philosophy, viz. its insistence on man's doing virtuous deeds *in this world*. In a significant couplet the author of the classic says: 'If men acquire ample glory *in this world* by doing virtuous deeds, the world of, the gods will cease to laud the sage who has attained *that world*.' (Couplet 24.4)
15. This is especially evident from Tiruvaḷḷuvar's statements contained in two important couplets: 'All men that live are one in circumstances of birth and diversities of works give each his special worth.' (Couplet 98.2) 'A brahmin, even if he forgets the Vedas can recover it by reading, but if he fails in propriety or good conduct, even his high birth is destroyed.' (Couplet 14.4).
16. *Vide*, note 12 above.
17. *Indian Antiquary*, 1886.
18. This core-value may be deemed to refer to *the Good*, and the concretization attempts made by man may be referred to as indicating aspects of the good life. *Aṟam* as referring to the Ideal of the Good is a transcendental category, notwithstanding the fact that it is also definable concretely with reference to man in terms of what is conducive to the enrichment of his life. Both the aspects of *aṟam* are derivable from the etymology of the term itself. Etymologically, *aṟam* is derived from *aṟu*, which in Tamil means 'to cut', 'to define' and 'to delimit'. *Aṟam* thus signifies *what is definitive of what ought to be done*.
19. This Tamil term literally means 'material wealth'. It is considered to stand also for the institution of the state in so far as the latter is important for making the acquisition preservation and augmentation of wealth. The value named *poruḷ* can thus be considered to stand for the secular institutions of property and the state.
20. This Tamil term refers to happiness as a psychological state of the human mind. The wide spectrum of meaning the term stands for, by derivation, ranges from the idea of desire for sex to the love of companionship, not to mention the idea of art-appreciation, and aspiration for spiritual realization. In terms of secular institutions, the value named *inbam* is considered to be foundational to marriage and family.
21. The idealization of the economic and political aspects of human life (what I would refer to as extension *aṟam* in the economic and political spheres) are specifically found in the second section of the *Tirukkuṟaḷ*, 'Porutpal', as was noted above.
22. See *Tirukkuṟaḷ*, 4.4; 8.9.
23. If the earlier and later phases of Indian materialism, *Cārvāka*, were to be referred to as representing *psychological hedonism* and *ethical hedonism*, the idea that even in the more philosophically advanced stage, Cārvāka materialism provided *dharma* only a secondary place would become evident. This is on the count that whereas in its earlier phase the Cārvāka system did not provide *dharma* any place in its scheme of values, in its later phase, it 'accommodated' the ethical value of *dharma* as a means of augmenting the sum total of pleasures attainable and enjoyable by man.

24. The idea that the secular institutions are extensions of *aṟam* is gathered both from the *Kuṟaḷ's* according all-importance to *aṟam* in human life (*vide* Couplets 4.2, 6, 8, 9 and 10) and from its insistence that the principle should be observed in all the institutional situations in life referred to in general as the 'householder's stage' (*Illaṟam*). (See Couplets 5, 2, 5, 6 and 9.) The need for considering the acquisition of wealth as an occasion for observing the altruistic attitude in life found in Couplets 17.3, 22.2 and 23.5 reinforces the idea further.
25. 43.3.

Evidence in testimony and tradition

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PREAMBLE

In any pursuit of incontrovertible knowledge, we are told, we need a theory that provides generalized answers to questions such as: When is a cognitive claim valid? What sorts of evidences are acceptable in adjudicating the validity of a cognitive claim? What sorts of beliefs are acceptable? What criteria are admissible in the critical appraisal of rival claims? In cases where there are conflicting criteria, what are the relative strengths and weaknesses? In India these questions are generally addressed in the *Pramāṇa* theory, which is what in the West is called epistemology.

In this paper I shall endeavour to show the ramifications of the conception of knowledge and its justification developed specifically in the context of the thesis of *Śabdapramāṇa*, i.e. the class of knowledge claims based on the evidence of testimony or tradition. While the basic problematic and framework is derived from Indian philosophy, the critical examination of the thesis frays into recent discussions of testimony in Western philosophy.

I

The Problem of Knowledge

Questions have been asked as to why it is plausible to take evidence and justification as definitive of knowledge (Nozick, p. 248). Gettier made the thesis of justified true belief (JTB) most vulnerable through his famous example that pointed to a paradox in JTB. We need not rehearse that here in detail, save to note that S may have the belief that p, and justifiably hold to this, or claim to know that p is true, when in fact p is not true, or p is true by chance, or through some other contingent circumstances; or that p is neither true nor false (as in non-cognitive states). If we can say (trivially) that knowledge that p does not entail belief that p, then we can say that knowledge p does not entail belief that p. This is not so trivial after all, for the Indian philosophers do want to be able to speak of knowledge *qua* cognitive claim in as direct a connection with p as possible, albeit an epistemic rather than a psychological connection.

While admitting the informal and contextually contingent nature of the relation of knowledge to belief, some philosophers have pressed the argument that it may still be legitimate to ask what would be sufficient to vali-

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date *S*'s belief that *p*. While this renders the role of belief and justified (true) belief subsidiary in the central concerns regarding knowledge, philosophers are insistent that it nevertheless provides an adequate means for deciding issues which sceptics are only too happy to throw out altogether.

Such an approach rules out a causal theory of knowledge, that is, causal connections *of a certain sort* constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions on which one's (true) belief may be rightly taken as knowledge (Margolis, pp. 31-32). This is so because the causal sequence linking the circumstantial conditions that might generate knowledge, thus *p*, and the belief that *p*, remains problematical, and it is not clear what the proper relationship between them is (Margolis, pp. 31-32). So, what then would be the sufficient grounds, or how is this discourse to be framed?

It appears that we have to turn to evidence (*q*) for confirmation of the case that *p* if that is what the belief is about. Again, there are difficulties and problems here. For one, not all knowledge depends on evidence (as of pain or simple colours) and other self-intimating states or immediate awareness (Margolis, p. 34). 'For another, *any* belief not incompatible with what is putatively known and not strong enough to entail what is known may, by some circuitous route, be construed as evidence. Again, if knowledge that *p* need not entail belief that *p*, then there can be no formally adequate connection between belief that *q* and knowledge that *p* (suitably had by *S*) if, on the hypothesis, *S* has no belief about *p*. Again, if *S* must know that for some belief of his, *q* is evidence for *p*, in order to qualify as having knowledge that *p*, then we should be caught in a vicious regress in order to establish that *S* knows that *p*.' (Margolis, p. 34).

Nozick, using a tracking strategy, asks us to consider the simple model, 'Evidence for a [statement or] hypothesis is something that would hold if the hypothesis were true. If *e* is evidence for *h*, then (a) *h*→*e*; if *h* were the case *e* would be the case. Realizing that the subjunctive connection is not sufficient, for *e* could hold anyway even if *h* were not true, Nozick modifies the conditional, adding (b) if *h* weren't true, *e* wouldn't hold; not-*h*→not-*e*. This makes *e* a strong evidence for *h*, which would not hold if *e* were not the case. Combining (a) and (b), given that *e*, Nozick says we can deduce the hypothesis *h*. A severe test will look for not-*e*: if not-*e* is discovered to hold true, *h* fails the test and is false; if *e* is discovered to be true, it passes the test, but is a weak evidence for *h*.' (Nozick, pp. 248-50). The issue is whether or not the subjunctive (rather than one or the other tracking conditions) holds. I believe there is some merit in this formulation and I think a position I will elucidate later is not too far from this model, although I will substitute *jñāna* for hypothesis, and press for non-deductive inference.

Now it is one contention of Indian philosophers that in many respects the *Pramāṇa* theory embeds a conception both of knowledge and its validating grounds in response to the sorts of issues just raised, but in a rather fundamentally different way. Firstly, the starting point is not knowledge as such, much less statement or proposition, but awareness, *jñāna*, which may be compared to a claim to knowing *p*; secondly, it is *pramāṇa* or the means of true knowledge and the appropriate one that fulfils the condition of both the causes and justifications for *jñāna*. (The causal conditions are rather more complex than simple physical sense-data type of contact.) Thirdly, the *pramāṇa* yielded in this way is irreducible, for knowledge must be true to the nature of that and that type of object being cognized. Hence, a theory of justification is built into or is integral to the *Pramāṇa* theory, so that, *ceteris paribus*, if one wants to know about a matter which is not accessible to the senses, such as a generalized tradition of virtues and rightness or wrongness of actions in a community, one resorts to the *pramāṇa* of *śabda* or testimony. This rather more special theory of *śabdapramāṇa*, I will come to in a moment.

Before that, I want to state, without arguing for it, an Indian formulation of truth (or legitimation), which comes from Kumārila's definition of *prāmāṇya*, as follows:

> The truth of an awareness is given by virtue of its being of the nature of knowledge; but it is set aside as 'the object is not so' if the knowledge is differential or if there is apprehension of vitiating factor in the source. (ŚV, 2.53).

In the syncretic theory of truth that I have proposed elsewhere (Bilimoria, 1988), I take the self-evidential thesis implicated here as a rather weak or 'soft' theory of truth, which however can be strengthened by incorporating the Nyāya (logicians') requirement of actively seeking the 'mark of excellence or evidence' (*guṇatva*). And this is to be ascertained externally through appropriate tests, precisely in terms of disconfirming evidence or falsification (akin to Nozick's search for not-*e*) which will heed to the negative inference (*vyatireka*): if the *J* proves its tenacity against all attempts to refute it, then it can legitimately be held to be true (again, truth here is construed as a provisional rather than an absolute mark), and in this sense it is also said to be a justified claim.

Any knowledge-claim *p*, then, that is not self-evident would require for its validation another *q* and yet another knowledge *b*, or circumstantial evidence *e*, and a rule *r* that will relate *e* to *s* to *q* to *p*, and so on. But *e* and *s* may need further corroboration if doubts continue to arise and persist as to their grounds or their relevance in the particular context. However, there is no reason to assume that each successive confirmation requires either to be self-evident or to be as strong as the preceding instance, given that their function is to *confirm* and not to replace the judgment. Some confirmatory evidence may not be cognitive at all, they may be performative and self-intimating, such as for example, quenching of thirst (*C*) by drinking what

one perceives as being water. The so-ascertained judgment (*A*) may then become a familiar (second-order) evidence for a similar, fresh, judgment (*B*) about which there is some doubt. Or, driving the negative syllogism a stage further, one can assume momentarily that *B* has no truth value, on the grounds that what does not have *T* does not yield *C*. But since *A* and *B* converge in their conditions, *B* like *A* possesses the *guṇa* (distinctive quality) of *C*; therefore it must have *T*. This form of argumentative 'proof' is used quite frequently by Naiyāyikas (logicians) to settle disputes of philosophical kinds, such as whether or not the universe has a maker/creator, and the familiarity principle (from the conviction that all manufactured things, such as pots, cloths, etc. have makers) is turned into a sophisticated form of analogical evidence.

Alternatively, one can assume that the core judgment is simply false, and a false judgment is one that does not conform to the property of the object it is an awareness of (*ayathārtha tu arthavyabhicāri apramāṇajaḥ*). A hypothesis may be set up, formalized thus:

If $a \rightarrow b$
for a judgment $j = aF$ because G is b
Assume j is false, hence $j = -aF$ because G is $-b$
$-b$ iff $-(q+t)$
q has s but not f, etc.

But suppose the subsequent test fails to show *f*, but shows *s*, and its locus is *q*. There is further independent evidence that *q*, together with *t*, does occur. But this is opposed to $-(q+t)$, which in turn negates $-b$. Thus a confirmation of $-b$ has not arisen; and if *b* is not negated then *a* is also not negated (from $a \rightarrow b$): it follows that *j* has not been shown to be false. Further corroboration may be sought by appeal to successful activity (*sāmarthya*), or to its coherence with relevant knowledge; or finally, by an appeal to traditional wisdom, i.e. to *śabdapramāṇa*.

II

Now what can possibly justify appeal to *śabda*? How is *śabda* as words or linguistic utterances to function as both a mean of claim to knowledge and an instrument for settling disputes over rival claims?

There are two ways of looking at *śabdapramāṇa* (word as knowledge): (i) as an individualistic claim based on some authorial testimony (such as the statements of a re-identifiable subject *x* with an indentifiable intentionality); or, (ii) as a non-individualistic claim, i.e. in the holistic frame of a culture's accumulated knowledge, self-understanding, wisdom, insights and experiences over a significant historical period, which we may call *tradition*, and refer to its testimony as *Tt*. The latter is a more amorphous kind of claim

and unlike the former often resists or slides past attempts at analysis, although it leaves itself open to interpretation. But I suspect that the analytical preoccupation with *śabdapramāṇa* comes about much later as an attempt to give firm grounds and indeed justify the acceptance of *śabda* in the more holistic or communitarian sense, i.e. *śabda* as the text of the tradition. For some, the two approaches stand at arm's length to each other, and neither one can be used to support in any way the other, because the assumptions (in regard to discovery, confirmation, transmission, etc.) each makes are so radically different, even incommensurable. (I shall come to it later: e.g. imperatives versus declaratives).

Let us, however, take the standard individual approach in consonance with the kind of analysis I began the paper with. The question here usually comes down to: How can one know anything and be sure of its truth merely from hearing another's utterance? In more current terms: How can one be justified in accepting that *P* simply because someone says so? Among the criteria suggested for adjudging, apart from the ones mentioned earlier for the general truth theory, there are two, it seems to me, that are distinctive to *śabda*. These are *yogyatā* and *āptabhāva*. What do they mean?

The first criterion, *yogyatā*, is about semantical competency of an utterance or speech act, i.e. it looks for logical and empirical congruency or compatibility between the sense of the utterance and that about which it is an utterance. Thus, if someone says (to use a stock example): 'The fireless hill has fire', while there may arise a successful *śābdabodha* or linguistic understanding of this (although a hard Naiyāyika will deny even this possibility), there is no likelihood of a (*śabda*) *pramā* arising here, for the utterance lacks *yogyatā*. In other words, the probability of a *true* understanding (which I use here for true knowledge), is already in some ways prefigured in the structure of the utterance itself: it gives no guarantee of the truth of *P*, but at least circumscribes, as it were, a ring of truth about P. Thus, for instance, upon hearing the utterance, 'the green hill smokes cheddar cheese' we have an intuitive sense of there being something rather odd about this expression.

The second criterion is *āptabhāva*, i.e. reliability—and this is most controversial. Now such an approach might be acceptable in *sādhanā* where one guru conveys what he knows to the pupil; the Upaniṣads are full of sentences meant to transmit ideas to the novice, etc. But what kind of evidential force does reliability have? It is clear that some sort of inductive process is involved here, for one is to judge the truth or probable truth of *P* by an inference in respect of the reliability or trustworthiness of the author (*A*) of *P*. This, however, constitutes a move away from evidential notions, and seeks justification on some other basis. It is intriguing that the Indians had thought it fit to make such a move, of the sort that prevailed in the late medieval and renaissance period in the west and which we have seen revived in some ways by Leslie Stevenson and Alvin Goodman. (However, for Goodman, relia-

bility has little or nothing to do with the characteristics of the author; rather it is reliability of the cognitive process by which *S* comes to believe that *p*, and some processes are *a priori* justification-conferring, e.g. introspection ['What is Justified Belief?' in Pappas, *Justification and Knowledge*, *Reidel*, 1979, pp. 1-23; *Epistemology and Cognition*, Harvard University Press, 1986]).

Of course, Hume had simply relegated the notion of reliability to sheer credulity with no justification; this tirade was continued in this century by Russell, Ayer and the OLP school; it was Reid and later Wittgenstein, though, who made us rethink the reductionist approach (*On Certainty*). Leslie Stevenson, in an interesting paper, tries out a number of formulations defending the thesis of the transmissibility of knowledge. One formulation embeds a principle that requires more than the mere absence of evidence against the reliability of the author: it requires that one have inductive evidence in favour. Thus:

> (*Tr*) If *B* hears and understands *A* say that *p* with all appearance of sincerely speaking from knowledge, and if *B* has no other evidence for or against *p*, then *B* is justified in believing that *p* if *and only if B* has evidence for *A*'s reliability (at least in matters such as *p*).

Indeed, this is not so different from the Naiyāyika's requirement for *śabda*.

Stevenson brings in some decisive considerations in restricting the grounds of reliability, which it would be important for us to note so as to strengthen a position that has worn its surface rather thin through the admixture of sectarian and non-philosophical biases. Stevenson grants that there is an *a priori*, though defeasible, way in which testimony could be relied upon but only on claims about *observable matters*; the following is his final restricted principle: *If* p *concerns perceptible matter, and if* B *hears and understands* A *say that* p *with all appearances of sincerity in a situation in which* A *can perceive the relevant state of affairs, and if* B *has no evidence against* p *or against A's reliability, then* B *is justified in believing that* p. (P)

I would like to add two considerations to this; (a) that of *yogyatā* (which I have mentioned earlier), and (b) the presence of *sāmarthya*, i.e. pragmatic viability. This is not meant to reduce reliability to pragmatism, but to relate the claim (*p*) to some real events in the world (though not necessarily in all possible worlds, but only in all such worlds with caveat), and which leads to some satisfactory result (*sāmarthya*), hence strengthening the claim; conversely the absence of *sāmarthya* may furnish good grounds for doubt (not necessarily a basis for the falsity of *p*). Hence here we combine reliability with fallibility and workability, as the triune marks or *guṇas* of testimony, giving evidence to, but not for, the truth of *Tr* (*p*).

This more epistemic basis of testimony however gets into further difficulty in regard to ontic claims (i.e. without reference to the belief of this or that

person) and non-observable claims (or large cosmological theories, history, religious and theological tenets). For how do we establish the reliability of such entities as tradition? How do we even locate discrete judgments in isolation from a whole cluster of background and interlinking presuppositions undergirding the particular worldview, etc. that informs such judgments? If, for example, Śaṅkara says that the self is the foundation of knowledge, do I introspectively look at my own self to see if there is any evidential force in this statement? No. For reference to the self here has to be understood in the context of the broader thesis of cosmic non-dualism (i.e. absolute identity of self and Brahman) which Śaṅkara reads into the Upaniṣads, the veritable authority for Vedāntins. Besides, the same apodictic intuition with Descartes leads to a radically different conclusion; and for Kant the 'I' is as much a basis for error as for truth.

Still, Śaṅkara will protest that there are no presuppositions or preconceptions of a larger metaphysical kind involved here. 'For how', he would insist, 'can one man contest the fact of another possessing the knowledge of Brahman—vouched for by his heart's conviction?' (BSB, IV 1 15). But what really is this a conviction of? Of a self-evident intuition, or of the preferred interpretation of a *mahāvākya* (great revelatory sentence) in the context of the Upaniṣads? Clearly, it is of the latter; which is why every Vedāntin of a non-advaita persuasion brought a different nuance to the very near-analytical sentences, such as 'You are that'. (Also, why the *mahāvākyas* are preferred over the *mantras* and *vidhis* insisted upon by Mīmāṃsā as the primary text of scripture; this indeed weakens the case of self-evidentiality.) The question, then, is not whether scripture is reliable (as *S* is or is not), but rather whether scripture has any basis for its presupposition on all that it pronounces.

This leads us inevitably into issues of interpretation of the purport of scripture, for which the Vedāntins rely on the hermeneutics worked out by the Mīmāṃsakas, who, though, derived a wholly ritualistic sense from scripture. Moreover, we are drawn into a rather complicated metaphysical disquisition which has, in the last resort, to be settled through argument. But Śaṅkara would not allow us this route with any finality, which is why he dismisses the Sāṃkhya doctrine of two natures which, however intuitively persuasive it might be, appears not to lead to a coherent picture of the world in terms of the pronouncements of scripture.

Rāmānuja, likewise, has the same starting point and shares many of the assumptions that Śaṅkara does (about the inviolable authority of scripture and so on), but he comes to a somewhat different conclusion and is decisively critical of Śaṅkara's conclusion. How do we resolve this impasse? Either we settle it from an internalist position or we go outside the scriptures altogether; the former will, again, entail reliance on *ṣaḍliṅgas* or scriptural hermeneutics and some coherentist approach; the latter will entail seeking evidence of an entirely different kind (it may stray into

scientific, historical, anthropological, even sociological analyses of just what is being said, by whom, in what context and for what ultimate purposes). I submit that tradition, to which the Vedāntins are wedded, would reject this contingent approach, even if by some queer accident their conclusions are confirmed. This is clear from Śaṅkara's insistence that on such matters the *pramāṇas* of perception, memory and induction or reason are inapplicable for such is not their domain of enquiry: this is Śaṅkara's critique or way of setting limits to human knowledge processes. Śaṅkara wants us to accept scriptural testimony (*St*) but not to question it; Rāmānuja would have us accept it, but allow for possible alternative interpretations, but that too only in the context of the Upaniṣads and so forth.

Suppose a more liberal Vedāntin in the twentieth century, such as Sri Aurobindo, were persuaded that there should be room for attempted falsification of scriptural testimony (*St*), and that empirical evidence of a quasi-scientific sort should be positively sought and admitted. How far can we go with this approach? There are two issues that immediately arise. The first is of a methodological kind, where we need to ask, will one or two contrary or negative evidential instances be sufficient to warrant a refutation of a whole movement of cumulative knowledge (or what Kuhn would call 'normal science')? No scientist, unless he is naive, believes that a single instantiation of a hypothesis through some empirical or experimental verification has really necessarily anything to do with reality. Rather it reflects some finer tuning achieved within the theory in the background of an accepted worldview which the scientist projects onto reality, likewise with disconfirming instances, although a bit stronger (cf. Nozick).

Second, there is an analytical principle according to which questions which cannot be posed and solved through technical prescriptions or tasks, but which instead also require a self-understanding within their concrete situation, cannot be expected to receive a cogent theoretical answer (Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, 1973, p. 264). Although this positivistic dogma has waned somewhat with the radicalization of cognitive theories and the human sciences, still, as Śaṅkara would be the first to accede, the kinds of philosophical claims he is interested in can never in any significant and epistemically decisive sense lend themselves to technical testing; rather there is something of an incommensurability between the two kinds of claims we are talking about. It is obvious then, as Ninian Smart rightly notes, that reliance on scripture must depend on the thesis that in regard to transcendent matters—that is, matters which belong to a transcosmic sphere—knowledge must derive from some source other than ordinary perception or inference ('Knowledge in the Indian Tradition', in Perrett (ed.), *Indian Philosophy of Religion*, Reidel, 1989, p. 116).

Why, however, should we accept scriptural testimony as the ultimate authority, irreducibly and indefeasibly so? Does this also mean that Śaṅkara's interest in scriptural testimony (*St*) is circumscribed purely by

the value orientation of the brahmanical class, i.e. expressive of imperative or performative (even perlocutionary) force of interest to the brahmins—with no descriptive or explanatory force at all? Professor Mohanty has tended to aver to the view that not just *śruti*, i.e. scriptural testimony (*St*) but possibly all of *śabda* (*pramāṇa*) captures irreducibly the domain of what ought and what ought not to be done, and *śabda* is defeasibly so. Śaṅkara would be concerned about this reduction of scriptural testimony (*St*) to non-cognitive speech acts, as he is hardly himself interested in the *karmakāṇḍa* as the Mīmāṃsakas are; Śaṅkara would argue that scriptural testimony (*St*) embeds what we might call (*pace* Strawson) descriptive metaphysics precisely in respect of the philosophy of language that is operative in its making. (The thinking here is that it is because we have not understood the nature of the 'word' that we have not understood the 'knowledge' it is intimately related to; and this relation is a metaphysical one, not simply an epistemological one as the *pramāṇa* theories have presupposed.)

As an example, Śaṅkara would cite scriptural testimony (*St*) or declaration that 'Brahman is *vastu*' (of the nature of the objective or 'fact'), that 'Brahman is the origin of the world', that in one respect (albeit in a non-modal sense) 'Brahman is also the Lord'. Nothing of the nature of 'ought' follows from all this; no action is entailed, and no action is likely to take one any closer to the truth embodied in these declarations. But I share and agree with the spirit of the criticism directed against Śaṅkara, not for his glossing over the fact-value distinction (for this distinction itself, like psychologism, is something of a modern bogey), but that Śaṅkara simply returns us to the authority of the canon whose terms of interpretation remain foreclosed; that is to say, from a modern (indeed post-modern) perspective, scriptural testimony (*St*) runs the two-pronged danger of an over-commitment to an absolutist metaphysics or *logos* whose horizons face total self-closure, and a determination of a context that allows for little or no external evidence to shake or alter its self-complacency, or self-justification

But this is the kind of consequence the self-evidential theory, when it is stretched to the case of scriptural testimony, leads the tradition to. True, in the literature we see appeal being made to various criteria, such as: internal consistency or coherence; the good fruits of heeding virtues and spiritual practices commended; the consistency of scripture with other knowledge, of history and science, and the relative inconsistency of other scriptures; and so on. But again, none can be taken to be a clinching evidence; singly or together they may serve to confirm one's certitude ('faith') but they do not make for public certainty. There is also the question, as indicated earlier, of the background worldview which looms large in all such claims, and which can neither be easily proved nor disproved, or notoriously passed off as the 'ineffable' or even *anirvacanīya*.

Before concluding, however, I wish to give two examples to illustrate how

Indian philosophers have been able to combine appeal to *śabda/śruti* (*Śt*) with appeal to reason and well-founded arguments. I draw on the debate Mīmāṃsā has with Nyāya and Buddhists. Two issues are contested: one on the creation of the world; the other, an interesting one, on the question of the authorship of the Vedas. Mīmāṃsā bases its authority on its authorlessness, Nyāya on its divine authorship and Buddhism rejects it by rejecting the authorless claim. It is a very involved debate as there are some circularities involved: Nyāya makes appeal to the scripture's apparent impeccability and infallibility as pointing to an omniscient source or author. Next, the authority of the scripture is established or confirmed on the grounds of the omniscience of God.

There is an obvious circularity here (though not a vicious one), which Kumārila points out, in asking what evidence is there for the actual authorship of the scripture in question. But turning the table against the Mīmāṃsakas, Nyāya asks, what grounds have the Mīmāṃsakas to argue for the absence of the author: does mere non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) of the author suffice one to conclude that there is no author? That indeed is not the Mīmāṃsā position, for such an author still has *yogyānupalabdhi*, i.e. it is capable of being perceived but is not perceived (*dṛṣya-adṛṣṇanābadhitam*, such as the Buddha). However, with respect to the scriptures in question Mīmāṃsā wants to say that it is *ayogyānupalabdhi*, i.e. the author is not perceived because there is no possibility of an author being perceived (in any possible world). This position cannot be disproved, but it cannot be proved either; its justification rests very much in the worldview which it embeds; and to prove or disprove worldviews is indeed not a mean task.

On the question of the creation of the world, the Nyāya writers bring a number of considerations in support for their view, which draw heavily on a theory of causality and such empirical evidence as could be brought to defend their account of causal relation. Since an agency is seen to be involved in all modes of production, whether a piece of art, a pot from clay, and so on, one can say that every finite effect has a cause, whether formal, material, final or efficient. The argument is in respect of the *kāryatva* or being-an-effect, which is causally linked to an agent. Likewise, things in nature (*physis*), must also have an agent as with manufactured products (*technè*). The cause of the natural effects cannot but be a universal cause. God, in this theory, is postulated as the universal and formal cause, and so on. Kumārila expresses deep scepticism about such an argument, and what his objections show at least is that he is sensitive to the question of evidence and justification of such large claims. In his rebuttal he continually asks for evidence and grounds of this and that (particular) hypothesis or assumption that goes towards supporting the Nyāya thesis.

First, he asks, what is the evidence that the law of causality holds for everything? Like Hume, he begs, we can wonder about the creator of the clock, but can we ask the same question categorically of the whole

universe as well? At best we can make inferences on the basis of an analogy with what we know now; but it is questionable whether we can infer from such 'evidence' anything about the state of the whole universe in some remote past? He next raises issues about the corporeality or material causation of the world. Did God create the universe out of his own body (like the spider emitting its web)? Or was there a pre-existent substance from which the world was created? And what of time or temporality? Did that begin with the universe or was it always there? And so? Kumārila, then, looks out for gaps in both conceptual or logical and empirical or 'scientific' bases for the thesis the Nyāya wants to champion. In fact, Kumārila is so astute in his observations that elsewhere I have been moved to compare his rebuttals with those of Hume's centuries later; indeed, Kumārila turns out to be very much a sceptic or an agnostic, not unlike the major character in Hume's dialogue (concerning natural religion). It is a great pity that Kumārila does not ask these fundamental questions of evidence and justification in regard to his own position on the inviolability and inerrancy of the Vedas, for if he did, his position, if at all defensible on these grounds, would have been greatly strengthened and would not have suffered the scurrilous blows it received at the hands of the Buddhists and later Naiyāyikas.

Still, we may ask, where would this really take the Mīmāṃsakas? Does making the scripture authorless render it inviolable, or trivial, or nonsensical? Suppose we were to show that all authorless texts are either meaningless or false (not the notion of authorlessness itself, which is another matter and of much interest to Derrida and post-modernists), then the whole foundation of the edifice they want to build their philosophy on collapses. On the other hand, even if it has some basis, the contents conflict with evidence and judgment of other kinds: even though Śaṅkara says no amount of scriptural evidence can deny that fire is hot, such statements and suggestions abound in *śruti* or scripture; historically and contextually what might have been right for Kumārila's days seem all but parenthetical and baseless in the flight of modernity towards science and technology.

Suppose, again, scripture says, given some understanding of gravitation and the Archimedean principle, that a house cannot fly unless a tornado or hurricane lifts it up; but today a model house can be fitted with jet engines and propellers and flown (cf. space shuttles, satellites, Star Wars). The scriptural testimony would seem to be preposterous. Let us say, finally, scripture perhaps served just the function science does, in the Kuhnian sense, as a collective (communitarian) body of knowledge, some proven, some unproven, some sanctioned by background metaphysical and worldview assumptions—without which there would be no science—serving largely realist interests and a utilitarian ethos, and not antithetical to, but perhaps abetting liberal Enlightenment-style individualism. Latour shows that what goes to make a theory acceptable involves vastly more than a set of precise

experiments and empirical evidence laced with detailed self-critical reasoning; rather a corporate style process is at work, etc.

Likewise, a tradition is perhaps an even more complex affair, as Gadamer has ably shown, and that is why it holds power over people, but through it people find their self-identity and self-understanding as well. And if we dispense with tradition, then much of past history, folk wisdom about things may appear trivial to us (e.g., infant-birth, the controversy surrounding old folk practices and scientific wisdom); but then we are also supposed to accept, if we accept scriptural testimony (*St*), that Brahman is all, and Brahman is absolute, non-personal, etc., and this is difficult to swallow. However, what scripture says and intends is not without dispute: variables and variations in interpretation abound. Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita quarrel over the same text; Mīmāṃsā developed principles of interpretation, a complex hermeneutics, whose appeal is also coherentist, but it uses a different argumentative process and calls on more empirically and phenomenologically grounded evidence in refuting Nyāya, which attempts to use reason and logic in defence of its variant reading of and position on scripture. Authority, then, whether of perception, reason or inference, or of testimony and text has not gone without question and criticism within Indian philosophy, although a systematic critical theory of testimony is far from having been developed.

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Mokṣa, the parama puruṣārtha*

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In this article I have dwelt upon the concept of *mokṣa* as the *parama puruṣārtha*, or the supreme human value. In different philosophical systems it appears in different names, such as *apavarga, nihśreyasa, nirvāṇa, kaivalya, mukti*, etc. These concepts differ from one other in detail, but there is a basic conceptual similarity which cuts across the ontological commitments of these systems. I have turned my attention to that basic concept.

'*Mokṣa*' literally means freedom, and the assurance of freedom is indeed very alluring. Herein lies the popular appeal of *mokṣa*. In philosophical literature *mokṣa* has been classified as a *puruṣārtha* and *puruṣārtha* literally means the end which the *puruṣa* desires. To borrow a description from Hiriyanna, it is 'human value consciously pursued'.[1] It involves a number of features. These have been admirably summed up by Rajendra Prasad, who says, 'Mokṣa also denotes so many things, e.g. freedom from the chain of birth and death, freedom from suffering, freedom from karma (action), freedom from attachment to the objects of desires, discriminative knowledge that self is completely different from not-self, eternal bliss, propiniquity with god, identity with god, etc.'.[2] It is to be noted that the last three are entertained only by some schools and are not shared by all. Of all the listed characteristics the basic one is freedom from suffering. In classical Indian thought *mokṣa* has been defined as complete, total and final annihilation of sorrow. Avoidance of sorrow being a normal human urge, *mokṣa* is said to be the most coveted end.[3]

For the *mokṣa-vādins* or the adherents of *mokṣa*, the basic premise is that life is full of sorrow. According to these thinkers the root cause of this sorrow is a misconception that the self is an embodied person and an individual. *Mokṣa* is achieved when this misconception is destroyed. This leads to the dissolution of individuality and with that to the destruction of all sorrow. It is the person who is subject to the law of karma, and the inviolable chain of birth and rebirth.[4] Thus, *mokṣa* implies escape from these. I have deliberately avoided these issues in this paper as these do not constitute the core of the concept and unnecessarily arouse controversial presuppositions which I do not want to examine here. According to traditional analysis all the constituents of personality, such as the ego-sense (*ahaṃkāra*, which

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literally means the I-maker), and the cognitive, conative, emotive states of awareness belong to the realm of not-self. *Mokṣa* is said to be founded on *ātma-jñāna* which is this knowledge of the self. I have not examined the metaphysics behind this stance, but I have asked whether a person who suffers sorrow can at all accept this ontology and the corresponding theory of value which incorporates *mokṣa* as the *summum bonum*, or not.

My dissatisfaction with the classical concept of *mokṣa* is mainly two-fold. First, I hold that the concept of the highest end as freedom from sorrow and that only, is unsatisfactory and partial; it is based upon a one-sided analysis of human nature. Secondly, such a concept is in a sense suicidal for the individual, and so, it is neither desirable nor consistently possible for a person to desire *mokṣa*.

Keeping this in mind, I have broken up the discussion into four broad sections. In the first, I have discussed the three other recognized *puruṣārthas—dharma, artha* and *kāma*, in order to establish how in their context '*puruṣa*' means the individualized self. In the second, I have presented the various difficulties that I see in the concept of *mokṣa* as developed in traditional thought. Here I have tried to show that the excessive emphasis on sorrow and the suggestion that our erring sense of identity with the personalized self has to be eliminated in *mkoṣa* is not tenable. In the third, I have suggested that it is impossible to formulate the concept of *mokṣa* as a value, without accepting its necessary connection with desire and individuality. In the last section, I have delineated a concept of *mokṣa*, which I find comparatively more satisfying.

I

The concept of *mokṣa* forms an integral part of our traditional culture. In common parlance we often talk of *caturvarga*, or the four-fold scheme of values.

In philosophical literature these have been described as *prayojana*; the latter is defined as the end which motivates individuals to activity. Uddyotakara, who presents this definition, says that the basic urges which prompt human activity are the urges for attainment of happiness and avoidance of sorrow. He adds that some thinkers accept *dharma, artha, kāma* and *mokṣa* as *prayojana*.[5] Vedanta Paribhāṣā gives a slightly different definition of *prayojana*, describing it as that which when known is desired as one's own. It also speaks of happiness and absence of sorrow as primary *prayojana*. Vedanta Paribhāṣā also accepts the four recognized ends and places *mokṣa* highest in the hierarchy.[6]

The fourfold scheme is accepted as a convenient classification of values. These are accepted as values because of their relevant connection with happiness and sorrow. *Mokṣa*, as we have already noted, is a value as it puts an end to all sorrow, for all time to come. The term '*kāma*' refers as

much to desire as to objects of desire. In the oft-quoted saying, '*na jatu kāmah kāmānāṃ upabhogena śāmyati*', which means that desires are not satisfied by the enjoyment of the objects of desire, the first '*kāma*' stands for desire, whereas the second '*kāma*' stands for the objects of desire. *Kāma* in the restricted sense stands for the objects of sensual desire, but in the extended sense it refers to all objects of physical desire. Such objects, as also the associated feeling of pleasantness, are covered by the term '*kāma*' in the theory of *puruṣārtha*. *Kāma* is a primary value as it directly produces happiness or is naturally pleasant, whereas *artha* or wealth is accepted as a secondary value as it helps satisfaction of *kāma*. *Dharma* is also a secondary value and is furthest removed from these, as it is expected to produce happiness in some distant future.

So all these four ends are accepted as values, because they somehow satisfy the basic human urges for attainment of happiness and/or avoidance of sorrow. But this similarity is superficial. The person who desires *kāma* and *artha*, the physical and the economic values, is the socially situated natural man, an embodied person who interacts with many such agents. These two are essentially connected with *dharma*, the moral value. The general trend is *dharmādarthaścakāmaśca*,[7] which literally means that from *dharma* comes *artha* and *kāma*. It actually implies that wealth and objects of physical desire become value only when these are sanctioned by *dharma*. That these two have no similarity with *mokṣa* is quite apparent. These two only temporarily satisfy human desires; but *mokṣa* annihilates these desires themselves through dissolution of personality. *Mokṣa* does not stand for a life of unalloyed joy (as it is commonly supposed to be) where all our desires are satisfied. Such a life is promised in heaven, and heaven, even if it exists, is far from *mokṣa*. There are a handful of *ānandamokṣavādins* who hold that *mokṣa* is a state of bliss; but to most thinkers *mokṣa* is as much a negation of all sorrow as of all happiness. According to all thinkers, in *mokṣa* there is no pain of thwarted desires, because it is a state of desirelessness. The *ānandamokṣavādins* also do not define *ānanda* as an emotion arising out of satisfaction of desires, but they look at desirelessness as a positive state. And they have all looked at *mokṣa* as involving virtual dissolution of personality. Thus there is an unbridgeable gulf between *mokṣa* and these two values, and if *mokṣa* is a *puruṣārtha* it is so in a very different sense. It remains for us to find out the position of *mokṣa* as a value *vis-à-vis dharma*.

Here I have made two statements which require clarification and justification. I have said that *mokṣa* is qualitatively distinct from other *puruṣārthas* as first, it involves desirelessness, and secondly, it recommends dissolution of personality. Both these points would be discussed in the next two sections. However, it is to be noted that this directly clashes with the opinion of Rajendra Prasad.[8] In his excellent analysis of the *puruṣārthas*, he lays down the main features of *dharma, artha* and *kāma*, the *trivarga* (the three-fold values). With great expertise and insight, he discusses their inter-relationship, and

shows that these are social and functional in nature. He shows how *artha* is a means to *kāma*, and *kāma* is to be regulated by *dharma*, and *dharma* being totally a social value these two are also so. He argues that *dharma* is social because the *dharmic* obligations are socially allotted, and observance of *dharma* is a necessary condition of social stability and harmony. I agree fully with this analysis, though I have some reservations about the totally social interpretation of *dharma*. I shall come back to this later. According to Rajendra Prasad, the basic difference between the *trivarga* and *mokṣa* is that the former are social in nature, while the latter is personalistic. But, Rajendra Prasad has also said that *mokṣa* is similar to the *trivarga* because although some interpreters hold that *mokṣa* involves dissolution of personality, actually it does not. On this point I would definitely disagree with him. In my next section I shall try to establish my position. He has suggested that the theory of the *puruṣārthas* should be restructured 'so as to include the concept of *mokṣa* in that of *kāma*'.[9] This, I also think, is impossible. *Kāma* stands for satisfaction of all physical desires, or as he himself says, 'it is a categorial representation or hypostatization of a man's appetitive life'.[10] But *mokṣa* looks at desire as bondage, it has prescribed desirelessness as the highest value, so the restructuring has to be concretely worked out before this inclusion.

Before turning to these issues let me give a brief exposition of *dharma*. It has been defined in various allied senses in different systems of thought. In some it means the objective value produced by performance of duty.[11] In another system *dharma* stands for some property produced in the self by performance of duty.[12] In still another simply the practice of the injunctions has been called *dharma*.[13] The source of obligatoriness of the duties might be the scriptures; thus *dharma* has been technically defined as '*codanā lakṣaṇa arthaḥ*' or ends sanctioned by the injunctions and prohibitions of the *śruti*. Similarly, the moral rules tabulated in the *smṛti* of Manu, etc., as also the socio-ethical rules present there, have been accepted as *dharma*. Again, the traditionally preserved moral codes as expressed in the behaviour of the *śiṣṭa*, the knowledgeable good person, are said to be ideal and trend-setting. Manu says that in matters of conflict a person may appeal to his conscience as a last resort.

Dharma as much stands for rituals as for a large body of ethical virtues. Some of the moral duties were called *sāmānya-dharma* and these were obligatory for one 'in virtue of his being simply a member of the human species'.[14] Some of these are truth, non-violence, non-appropriation of the riches of others, protection of the distressed, etc. These are definitely social morality. It may be rejoined that these are not directed towards improvement of the society and that these are actually personal excellences. But it is clear that even if these are personal excellences, they are so of a social man. The bulk of these virtues emerge in situations involving the interaction of individuals. In the epics these have been presented through different

parables and have been portrayed as relativistic and situation-bound. The virtue which is introduced in a story is emphasized as the highest virtue. Thus in one non-violence, in another truth, in still another charity has been focused upon as the highest virtue. In contrast, *viśeṣa-dharma* refers to rituals and moral rules obligatory for different social groups. These are *varṇa-dharma*, or duties assigned to people belonging to different castes; *āśrama-dharma* or duties tied to different stages of life; or *kula-dharma* or duties obligatory to people belonging to different families, etc. They have enumerated the various obligations of a man as indebtedness to gods (*devaṛṇa*), to his forefathers (*pitṛ ṛṇa*), to his fellow individuals (*nṛ ṛṇa*), to the learned men of the past (*ṛṣi ṛṇa*) and even to the animal world (*paśu ṛṇa*). An individual is seen here not only as a part of the society but also as a part of nature. Thus it is his duty to work for the well-being and sustenance of all. So a person who practises *dharma* is a socially situated, natural man.

Through the following three alternatives we may formulate the exact relation between *dharma* and *mokṣa*:

(i) *Dharma* is practised for the attainment of various extraneous ends;
(ii) *Dharma* is self-rewarding as a value;
(iii) *Dharma* is a necessary pre-requisite for the realization of *mokṣa*.

(i) Because we have presented *dharma* as a social virtue, it must not be thought that it was consciously directed towards the sustenance and well-balanced development of the society. To individuals *dharmas* were prescriptive personal rules, but they were so framed that they automatically led to a smooth and proper working of the society. But some thinkers, especially those preoccupied with the *smṛtis*, held that observance of *dharma* ensured a journey to heaven after death, or achievement of certain excellences in the next life.

Let me explain the position more clearly. *Dharma* as a value sanctioned by various scriptural injunctions and prohibitions is linked with various duties such as *nityakarma* (daily necessary duties), *naimittika karma* (occasional duties), *kāmyakarma* (conditional duties), etc. These duties are desire-bound, for, by their performance, a person either goes to heaven or gets some other rewards. Manu, for example, says that by performance of *dharma* codified in the *śruti* or *smṛti*, a person acquires fame in this life, and goes to heaven hereafter. Gautama asserts that performance of *dharma* would determine a man's family, appearance, intelligence, wealth, learning, etc. in his next birth.[15] Some have claimed that the daily necessary duties should be likened to unconditional moral laws as by their performance a person does not earn any reward. But then it has been amply made clear that these actions are negatively connected with results, as their non-performance would be met with punishment.

Under this interpretation *dharma* being directed towards some achievable end and being necessarily connected with socially situated persons is absolutely different from *mokṣa*. If after entertaining this view *dharma* is described as a necessary condition of *mokṣa*, then that would be an artificial imposition from outside.

(ii) This view was held by the early Prābhākaras. Injunctions were considered self-validating. But injunctions become *dharma* only when they are supposed not to produce unhappiness in excess of happiness. So *dharma* is in a sense tied to happiness and the reference to an end is in-built in the very concept of *dharma*. Even then they held that the accomplishment of the dictates of injunction is in itself *dharma* and there is no ulterior end. As expected, such a view of *dharma* is complete in itself and does not point to any further *puruṣārtha* or *mokṣa*. For them *niyogasiddhi*, or realization of the imperative, is the highest end. As Rajendra Prasad comments, 'dharmic life is an end in itself'.[16]

On rare occasions the idea of *dharma* as intrinsically valuable emerged in the epics. In the Yudhiṣṭhira-Draupadi *Saṃvāda* in the *Vanaparva* in the *Mahābhārata*, the former derides people who perform *dharma* seeking the results, i.e. the future well-being of the performer as '*dharma-vaṇijyaka*' or 'trader of morality'. He speaks of himself as one who performs sacrifices or practises charity because those are his duties.[17] Unfortunately, in these texts the connection of such *dharma* with *mokṣa* has not been systematically worked out. It is interesting to note that the epics often speak of *trivarga*, or the first three values. Thus, in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, Lava and Kuśa propose to sing the story of the epic which would lead to the enhancement of *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*. In the *Mahābhārata* the Pāṇḍavas have often been addressed as people well versed in these three values. This absence of reference to the concept of *mokṣa* might be the result of a historical accident, that the concept originated much later. But in view of the fact that they have mentioned *mokṣa* elsewhere, this might mean that *mokṣa* as a value is fundamentally different from the other three values.

This is my response to Rajendra Prasad's suggestion. When he asserts that *artha*, *kāma* and *dharma* constitute a well-knit trio I agree with him. When he declares that the *trivarga* scheme seems to be quite self-complete and *mokṣa* does not fill up a gap, I accept him.[18] But it is to be remembered that the traditionalists presented *mokṣa* as a transcendent value, qualitatively different from the mundane values and (as I hold) as an alternative to these. So we must examine the concept of *mokṣa* more thoroughly before totally rejecting it, or incorporating it in the three-membered set.

In any case, under this interpretation, there is no logical connection between *dharma* and *mokṣa*.

(iii) *Dharma* is accepted as a necessary pre-requisite of *mokṣa* in many systems of thought, specially in Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Vedānta. It is held that purification of the mind is necessary for the realization of *mokṣa*, which is achieved

through practice of *dharma*. There are eight steps of Yoga of which the final one is *mokṣa*. The first two steps are *Yama* and *Niyama* which cover some of the moral precepts which come under *dharma*. Now this *dharma* which is a means to *mokṣa* and the concept of *dharma* which we have been developing as an independent value which regulates and perfects *kāma* and *artha* are two distinct disciplines, because the attitudes behind them are different. The second one is necessary for the proper development of a well-balanced social individual. The first is a discipline which prepares the aspirant for *mokṣa*, for self-realization encouraging dissociation from natural and socio-ethical life. I shall come back to this later.

II

In Indian philosophical literature we come across a peculiar preoccupation with sorrow. There are comments on the sorrowfulness of life, classification of various types of sorrow, ingenious arguments presented to focus on the supremacy of sorrow in life. The whole of Buddhist philosophy is developed in the background of four noble truths, the first of which is the essential sorrowfulness of life. From Buddha through various thinkers up to the recent past, this trend has been alive. Here I would like to speak of an argument given by Schopenhauer, mentioned by Tilak in his commentary on the *Gītā*. Schopenhauer states that when our desires are satisfied we are happy; but desire itself is unpleasant in nature and some of our desires are certain to remain unfulfilled. So if we present the situation in the form of a fraction, i.e. satisfied desire/desire as such, the denominator would necessarily be greater than the numerator. This expression is supposed to represent the overall sorrowfulness of life. I do not think that this is a persuasive argument and perhaps only by comparing satisfied desires with thwarted desires we can get a correct picture. But here I do not want to establish the sorrowfulness of life; I only want to show how our traditional thinkers harped upon the predominance of sorrow in life.

In the background of such an analysis of life, *mokṣa* is presented as the supreme end. All our classical thinkers agree in defining *mokṣa* as permanent, complete and necessary annihilation of sorrow. They assert that whereas our ordinary attempts to destroy sorrow sometimes fail, in *mokṣa* there is necessary removal of sorrow or *aikāntika duḥkhaniṣedha*, and whereas in our mundane life, we destroy one sorrow to face some other sorrow from some other quarter, in *mokṣa* the eradication of sorrow is total or *ātyantikaduḥkhaniṣedha*. So *mokṣa* is basically a negative state. (I shall discuss the exceptions later.) The Naiyāyikas have discussed the nature of this absence threadbare. *Mokṣa* roots out all future sorrow, thus it can claim to be prior absence or *prāgabhāva*. Prior absence is also antecedent absence, and it is supposed to precede the future emergence of the negatum. But *mokṣa* totally rules out the possibility of any future sorrow. The Mīmāṃ-

sakas have tried to retain the description by calling it *paṇḍa prāgabhāva,* or futile prior absence. The Naiyāyikas have preferred to describe it as destructional absence or *dhvaṃsābhāva*. They hold that the removal of every particular sorrow is destructional, but this absence is very special inasmuch as it is non-contemporaneous with any other sorrow.[19] Thus *mokṣa* is destruction of all sorrow and destruction of the very possibility of sorrow.

This totally negative character of *mokṣa* deserves special consideration. When Rajendra Prasad comments on the similarity of *mokṣa* and *kāma,* he asserts, '. . . the essential characteristic of *mokṣa* is satisfyingness or absence of disagreeableness which is also the result of the fulfilment of any normal desire.'[20] But this 'absence of disagreeableness' present in *mokṣa* is qualitatively different from such states emerging out of satisfaction of desires. It is not just removal of a want or destruction of a sorrow but destruction of the very *possibility* of sorrow. Hence it is fundamentally different from *trivarga.*

Here naturally we ask, how is the very possibility of sorrow destroyed? The answer is that in spite of the mutually opposed analyses of self, all the schools have agreed in rejecting the reality of the individuated self. They all agree that our sense of identity with the natural social person is erroneous and the root cause of all our sorrow. Human desires traceable to the ego-sense are said to be the chains which constitute bondage.[21] And all these schools recommend not expansion and transcendence but rejection and nullification of individuality. Rajendra Prasad differentiates between personalistic value and egoistic value.[22] He states that *mokṣa* is a state of egolessness, but in *mokṣa* the personality is retained 'since it is the person, the individual, the self, which is said to be liberated'.[23] According to him, '. . . to say that the (*mukta*) liberated is egoless is to say that his apparent, crude, or undesirable ego is effaced or sublimated for the liberation of the genuine, refined or desirable ego.'[24] My point is that while this type of *mokṣa* is desirable, the way in which our classical thinkers have treated the concept amounts to virtual dissolution of personality. They often say that the *ātmā,* or self, is free, but I do not think that this *ātmā* is the individual.[25] So, if my position is accepted, then *puruṣa* has to pay too dear a price to achieve the *parama puruṣārtha*. But let me discuss this in more detail.

In our traditional thought sorrow has been treated in at least three different ways. First, different types of sorrow have been enlisted and classified, as we find in Sāṃkhya. Secondly, suffering and happiness have been accepted as opposites, but happiness has been shown to be invariably associated with sorrow, and the overall sorrowfulness of life has been projected, as we find in Nyāya. Thirdly, everything in life has been called transitory and momentary and therefore painful, as we find in Buddhism. In this section I propose to explore these three alternatives.

Let me consider the second alternative first. The main trend of the Naiyāyikas is to endorse a purely negative view of mokṣa. (Bhāsarvajña, the Naiyāyika influenced by the Śaiva school, is an important exception.) The

Nyāya Sūtras dwell on the predominance of sorrow in life, and then define *mokṣa* as final deliverance from suffering. The Naiyāyikas have looked at sorrow from three different angles. First, they have said that there is both joy and sorrow in life. Life is compared to poisoned rice sweetened with honey. In life joy and woe are woven fine but as *vivekahāna* is not possible, or as it is not possible to separate happiness from sorrow and enjoy it, therefore to uproot sorrow men agree to forego happiness.[26] Secondly, they have emphasized the predominance of sorrow in life. The Naiyāyika tells us that if we weigh sorrow and happiness on a scale we find that sorrow is heavier, as happiness has sorrow as its invariable associate. The Naiyāyika goes on to say that sorrow pervades our life. To seek happiness is an unpleasant experience; if we fail to achieve our desired goal we feel sorrow, if we realize it partially we are dissatisfied; to attain our goals we have to encounter many hurdles and even when we get the much striven-for object, we are always apprehensive that we shall have to part with it in future. Thus sorrow is said to be ingrained in happiness.[27] Nyāya does not deny the reality of happiness in life. It is said to be *sarvajantupratyakṣa,* or directly experienced by all. But Nyāya holds that it partakes of the nature of suffering being invariably present with it. Nyāyabhāṣya says that life is sorrowful not because there is absence of happiness, but because there is presence and association of sorrow.[28] Curiously enough, at least in one important passage the Naiyāyika (precisely speaking, Vācaspati Miśra) asserts that sorrow and happiness are invariably related and vice versa.[29] This means that both happiness and sorrow are present in the same locus, or they are experienced by the same person, or both are caused by the same factors.

Keeping this third position in mind the critic might say that this does not prove the predominance of sorrow over happiness in life. The optimist can well emphasize the brighter side of life. The Naiyāyika himself has said that love of happiness and aversion for pain are the twin basic urges which activate men; now, the onus lies with him to explain why the *mumukṣu,* i.e. the person who desires *mokṣa,* foregoes this natural love of happiness and develops an aversion for it. Once the Naiyāyika admits that happiness is invariably related with sorrow and vice versa, it is arbitrary for him to say that the highest value is geared to one part of the assertion, viz. happiness is necessarily connected with sorrow. Similarly, it can be argued against the first and the second argument that once the reality of happiness is admitted, it is unjustified to say that the urge for happiness should be given up, just because pure happiness cannot be extracted or just because happiness is necessarily associated with sorrow. In spite of all their sophistications, can they give a satisfactory answer to the question put forward by the Cārvākas, viz. who gives up rice being afraid of husk, or who gives up fish being afraid of bones?

According to Nyāya the root cause of our sorrow is our erroneous identification of ourselves with the psycho-physical complex, the personality cons-

tituted of our body, our sense organs, our *manas*, etc. Nyāya holds that through the knowledge of reality our *ahaṃkāra*, or the ego-sense, or the sense of individuality, conditioned by defects, is removed.[30] The Vaiśeṣikas say that in *mokṣa* the connection of self with all its special properties such as awareness, happiness, suffering, desire, aversion, etc. is severed. It is continuation of bare self which would never die, never grow old.[31] The Naiyāyikas describe this final end as destruction of all sorrow and destruction of all awareness of sorrow.[32] The supposed opponent describes this state as end of all activity, of all happiness, of all awareness. I feel like supporting them in exclaiming that such *mokṣa* is terrible. Identifying life with sorrow, the Naiyāyika describes *mokṣa* as the end of this life and the end of the possibility of any future life.[33] The Naiyāyikas have defended their position by saying that when life becomes unbearable because of suffering, even death is welcome to a person. But can suicide be the supreme value in life? Can such *mokṣa* help us to regulate and reorient life positively? Does such *mokṣa* add a new dimension to life? To my mind it looks like pure escapism.

It is to be noted that as a matter of fact Nyāya does not speak of the end of self in *mokṣa*. The self substance retains certain properties such as number, infinite magnitude, etc.; but being devoid of specific properties such as awareness, desire, happiness, etc., which I consider to be the essential constituents of self, it is virtually dead to me. It is also interesting to note that Nyāya sees in *mokṣa* rectification of an error. It is erroneous to maintain the ego-sense, and this is corrected in *mokṣa*. But *mokṣa* is not identical with this knowledge. The knowledge has only instrumental value, as through a number of steps (i.e. destruction of defects, of all actions, of the birth cycle) it ultimately leads to annihilation of sorrow. But, as I have already suggested, the Nyāya theory of *mokṣa* as the highest value does not do justice to the richness of human experience.

Now let us turn to the first alternative exemplified in Sāṃkhya. The ontological commitments of Sāṃkhya are diametrically opposed to those of Nyāya, yet there is the same emphasis on suffering. There is the same rejection of the empirical ego-sense of persons as erroneous and the same concept of *mokṣa* as transcendence of activity and agency. The very first Sāṃkhya Sūtra defines *puruṣārtha* as complete annihilation of sorrow. Sāṃkhya classifies suffering under three heads. First, it speaks of sorrow pertaining to the self, where the self means the individual, or the psycho-physical complex. These are the sorrows associated with fever, anger, jealousy, etc. Secondly, there are sorrows rooted in natural factors, such as those caused by fire, snake-bite, etc. Lastly, they have spoken of sorrows traceable to demons, earthquakes, floods, etc., which they have described as sorrows caused by extra-natural factors. According to Sāṃkhya, we suffer all these sorrows because we confuse the *puruṣa* or the self, which is contentless consciousness, with the individual persons who are evolutes of *prakṛti*. Sorrows actually belong to the psycho-physical complex, but they are projected as belonging to the self. The self is nothing but pure subject. All activity belongs to the realm of the object, and to the objective world belong all actions and all sorrows associated with it. *Mokṣa* is *vivekakhyāti* or the cognition of the subject and the object in their proper perspective. Sāṃkhya considers it erroneous to hold that the self is an agent and in *mokṣa* this sense of agency is dispelled. *Mokṣa* is also called *kaivalya* where the self which is as a matter of fact unrelated is realized as unrelated.

We have seen that the sorrows which they have listed affect the mind-body complex which we call the individual. The more intense is our attachment to and our sense of identity with this individuated self, the more intensely we would feel this sorrow. But a person who feels identified with the embodied natural self would welcome the well-being of that self; why would he seek de-individuation, which is the essence of *mokṣa*? The natural man as affected by sorrow would like complete destruction of sorrow, but he would like to remain a natural man. He would either try to get rid of his particular problems (which he is constantly trying to), or he would seek unmixed pleasure, but why would he try to transcend this level? There is a qualitative difference between our particular attempts to remove particular sorrow and the attempt to remove all sorrows through *mokṣa*. In one the sense of agency is retained, in the other it is rejected. It is difficult to see why the agent, because of the sorrows associated with his individuality, should be ready to forego his sense of individuality itself. All the constituents that make up our personality, such as *buddhi* or intellect, *ahaṃkāra* or the ego-sense/the I-maker, the *manas*, the five sense organs, the five organs of action or the whole psycho-physical complex called a person, is a superimposition on the unrelated pure self, and the pure self is only a witness. I hold that solely the desire to get rid of sorrow cannot motivate a person to realize that pure self.

The following diagram would clarify my position:



P is the person affected by the various sorrows. Sāṃkhya maintains that the actual self is *S*, the pure unrelated principle of consciousness, and asks us to realize that the sorrows belong to *P*, the not-self, and not to self. This realization is said to be *mokṣa*. But my point is that if the sorrows are the pro-

blem of *P*, why would he accept the dissolution of *P*-hood as the solution of this problem? Sorrowfulness of life is presented in a particular framework of which personhood is a necessary feature, and the eradication of sorrow should be within the same framework. Here, instead of explaining the problem, Sāṃkhya explains it away.

If I am permitted to introduce a classification of evil from a totally different system of thought, then I would like to recall Leibnitz's. He speaks of three types of evil—physical evil or suffering, moral evil or sin, and metaphysical evil or imperfection. Here the Sāṃkhya thinkers give a list of suffering analogous to physical evil, but they seek to root out such evil through metaphysical perfection. But, I feel, that only if sorrow is felt at the metaphysical level would it lead to yearning for *mokṣa*.

To sum up, my dissatisfaction with Sāṃkhya is two-fold. First, the way in which they present *mokṣa* as freedom from sorrow is not persuasive. Secondly, their analysis of self as consciousness only is virtually equivalent to dissolution of personality. They have tried to retain individuality of selves by accepting *bahupuruṣavāda*, or the theory of plurality of selves. But in the absence of any principle of discernibility it has remained an inexplicable inconsistency in Sāṃkhya. This free self as pure consciousness is as much anti-egoistic as anti-individualistic.

Let us now turn to the last view, where sorrow has been linked to the transitoriness of life. The Buddha's first noble truth asserts the sorrowfulness of life. He speaks of sorrow which is traceable to disease, old age, death, presence of hated objects, parting with desired ones, unpleasantness arising out of thwarted desires, etc. His point is that everything which we experience has been produced by something, hence it is transitory and liable to destruction. His *anityavāda*, or the theory of transitoriness, leads to *kṣaṇikavāda*, or the theory of momentariness, and the resultant *nairātmyavāda*, or the no-self theory. Buddhism asserts that as there is no persistent self or stable object, so all our desires, cravings and attachments to permanent life is baseless. To realize this is to attain *nirvāṇa* or *mokṣa*. Whether *nirvāṇa* stands for total annihilation without any residue or just for complete cessation of all desires commensurate with a peaceful, changeless continuity is controversial in Buddhist literature. But it is beyond all controversy that in *nirvāṇa*, there is complete destruction of all sorrow. Unlike Nyāya and Sāṃkhya, Buddhism does not accept the existence of a permanent self; but like them it holds that our idea that there is an individuated abiding self is erroneous. It is the root cause of all our sorrow, and dissociation from such a self is *mokṣa*.

Different schools of Buddhism with most diverse ontologies have all agreed to deny the reality of the personal self. The Buddha himself denied the existence of the self-substance and replaced it by five *skandhas* or *nāmarūpa*, which is the psycho-physical complex. Then, under *samyag-smṛti*, he

preached *kāyānusmṛti*, where he urges that the seeker of freedom should remember that the body is reducible to thirty-two constituent elements without any residue, so that the ego-sense and the senses of 'I' and 'mine' are unfounded. This thought is foundational for later Buddhist schools and it has been emphasized by them in various ways. Theravāda, for example, speaks of chains of *saṃyojana*, and so freedom is freedom from these chains. The first of these chains is *satkāyadṛṣṭi*, or personality belief—the belief that there are persons, whereas there are only *skandhas* or constituent conditions. The Vijñānavādins speak of *kleśāvaraṇa*, which are impediments to freedom. The main point is that there is no self but an ever-continuing stream of conscious states. Different defects which breed the belief that there are persons are *ātmadṛṣṭi*, which is *satkāyadṛṣṭi*, as explained above. Then there is *ātmamoha*, or the unfounded belief that there is a self; *ātmamāna*, or self-conceit; *ātmaprema*, or love of personal self, etc. But the *arhat* has rectified all these errors so that there is end of all sorrow with the end of belief in personality.[34] Vasubandhu would say that there is non-dual de-individualized continuity for ever. It is comparable to the Nyāya theory of *ahaṃkāra-nivṛtti* or the Sāṃkhya projection of *mokṣa* as the realization of the pure unrelated self.

Thus far I have criticized the traditional schools because they have spoken of *mokṣa* as dissolution of personality. This means that I have taken for granted that our basic awareness of ourselves is as persons. When our classical thinkers assert that the empirical personality is not tenable in the last analysis, their theory of value is parasitical on their ontology. But then *mokṣa* should not be presented primarily as a value involving destruction of sorrow; it is to be considered as an unpalatable but necessary corollary of their respective metaphysics. I have shown that the other three *puruṣārthas* are based on the concept of *puruṣa* as a person. If the personality is nullified, *mokṣa* does not remain a human value. This would become clearer in what follows.

III

Mokṣa has been categorized as a *puruṣārtha*, and *puruṣārtha* has been defined as an end which is desired. In this context my discomfort is two-fold. First, I hold that it is impossible to chalk out the concept of *mokṣa* as a value, without a reference to a person who desires it. Secondly, *mokṣa* is defined as a state of desirelessness, but this clashes with the idea of *mokṣa* as an end which is desired. It is to be noted that our classical thinkers were aware of both these difficulties. Let me dwell upon these at some length.

Mokṣa has been presented as an end to be realized or achieved. It is true that the Advaita Vedāntins do not accept this end-like nature of *mokṣa*. But then, in a sense they admitted it by introducing the twin concepts of *prāptaprāpti*, or attainment of that which has already been attained, and *parihṛta-*

parihāra, or rejection of that which has already been rejected.[35] By describing *mokṣa* as the realization of an end which is eternally realized, they make room for some sort of attainment. The concept of an end is closely connected with that of a voluntary action. A quick survey of their analysis of voluntary action, even in very broad outlines, might prove rewarding.

There might be two different types of analysis of voluntary action, the Nyāya type and the Mīmāṃsā type. The most simple definition of voluntary action is that it is preceded by *svecchā*, or desire of the agent. Nyāya has spoken of a number of necessary conditions of voluntary action. One of them is *kṛtisādhyatājñāna*, or the awareness that the action can be performed. But the really important factor is *iṣṭasādhanatājñāna*, or the awareness that the action would be conducive to good. But this good is relative, and it has been explained as the good of the agent. Thus here a reference to the agent is unavoidable. The Prābhākaras also accept *kṛtisādhyatājñāna*, but instead of turning to the results of the action or projection of the goodness to be produced, they hold that the sense of duty is more important here. Thus they speak of *kāryatājñāna*, or the awareness that a certain action is one's duty, as a necessary condition of voluntary action. But this awareness moves an agent only after it refers to the agent. This stage is called *svaviśeṣaṇatayā pratisandhānam*, or projection of the proposed action as qualifying the self. Action proper must be preceded by ideal appropriation of the action by the agent. Gāgābhaṭṭa, belonging to the Bhāṭṭa tradition, distinguishes between the two senses of *kāryatājñāna*.[36] There may be just the rational awareness that a certain action is one's duty. But when it is accepted as my duty, i.e. when it is morally accepted, then only does it become morally obligatory. Thus the role of the agent here is decisive. Such an agent has to be a person and an individual and it is inconsistent for him to desire dissolution of personality.

Now, let us turn to the concept of *mokṣa* as a state of desirelessness. Being apprehensive that a purely negative view of *mokṣa* would fail to motivate people, a group of thinkers have presented a positive concept. The proponents of such a view have been a section of the Buddhists, one or two Naiyāyikas and the different schools of Vedānta. The bulk of the Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas have been their opponents. Without entering into their maze of arguments and counter-arguments, we can say that the main point raised by the critics of the positive view is that if *mokṣa* be a pleasant state it would be desired, but desire itself is a bondage, and desire for eternal happiness is no exception. Thinkers belonging to the negative schools argue that *mokṣa* does not cease to be a *puruṣārtha*, even if there is absence of bliss and desire for bliss; they hold that through destruction of sorrow, it becomes *puruṣārtha*.

The traditional tirade against desire deserves certain considerations. Desire has been criticized on various grounds, of which the most widely prevalent is the pragmatic. The oft-repeated couplet that desire cannot be satiated by fulfilment of desire, just as fire cannot be extinguished if it is fed with ghee, expresses this stance. Another such couplet asserts that when a person's desire for an object is satisfied, he would be troubled instantly by some other desire. But it is to be remembered that thinkers outside our own tradition have not looked at desire as so pernicious. In fact, some thinkers hold that through our desires we expand our personality. However, the Indian attitude is that our desires are necessarily ego-centric, and clinging to such ego is typical of the man in bondage. The liberated man is expected to have snapped the fetters of desire. Thus the free man has been described as *akāma*, or desireless; as *āptakāma*, or one whose desires have been satisfied; as *niṣkāma*, or one who has given up all desires; as *ātmakāma*, or one who is satisfied with the highest metaphysical self, etc.[37] In this background my comment to both the opponent and exponent of the negative view of *mokṣa* is that their position *vis-à-vis* desire is the same, ar the desire to get rid of all sorrow is as much a desire as the desire to realize pure bliss. So if desire is bondage then both the views are equally deplorable.

The traditional thinkers have tried to save the situation in different ways. The supporters of the positive view say that the seeker of *mokṣa* does not desire bliss, but necessarily gets it in the form of peace and contentment associated with the sense of perfection. Further, they all hold that the desire for the total annihilation of sorrow is not ordinary desire, it is not aversion or *dveṣa*, but *vairāgya*, or the sense of renunciation. *Vairāgya* is said to be qualitatively different from desire. But most of these philosophers trace *vairāgya* to the sense of sorrow and thus fail to work out this qualitative difference. The Naiyāyika, for example, has spoken of '*nirveda*', which literally means lack of interest in pleasure and the acknowledged means of pleasure. This leads to *vairāgya* which is defined as distaste for the objects of enjoyment,[38] even when those are presented. But then, these do not significantly improve the situation, as these states are traced to the awareness that life is full of sorrow. Ultimately, the sense of sorrow is considered to be the most overwhelming emotion of life, and I think that this evaluation is one-sided and partial.

Śaṅkara in his commentary on the Brahma-Sūtras has given a slightly different meaning of '*vairāgya*'. The prerequisites to be fulfilled by the seeker of freedom are four-fold. The first of them is *nityānityavastuviveka*, which literally means an awareness of the distinction between things eternal and things non-eternal. The second is *vairāgya*, which has been expanded as detachment from the results of the work done here and hereafter. These have not been traced to the unbearability of suffering. They together highlight the awareness of the emptiness and hollowness of mundane life coupled with the belief in life eternal. The second condition stands for a distaste for the results of all actions and thus it covers both happiness and sorrow. In other words, it means a devaluation of all mundane values.

The third condition stands for a number of physical and mental disciplines which include *titikṣā*, or forbearance of suffering, without any regret or attempt to overcome it.[39] This leads to *mumukṣatva*, or intense urge for freedom. I am not claiming that the Advaitists have not looked at *mokṣa* as annihilation of all sorrow. Vedānta Paribhāṣā describes *mokṣa* as *niratiśaya sukha*, or maximum happiness, and as *śokanivṛtti*, or the end of all suffering. But it has to be acknowledged that with Śaṅkara it is more a transcendence of empirical life and realization of the super-personal self than destruction of sorrow.

But then it is well known that Advaita Vedānta looks at de-individualized continuation as the *summum bonum* of life. It speaks of total dissolution of personality. Śaṅkara's position has been described as involving 'the expansion of the I-consciousness to the extent of infinity' where there is 'ruthless ignoring of the individuality of man'.[40] So, though Śaṅkara has given a new explanation about the urge for freedom, his concept of *mokṣa* fails to satisfy us.

In the traditional concept of *mokṣa*, i.e. in the definition of *mokṣa* as destruction of all sorrow and desire and in the rejection of individuality as erroneous, I see a denial of all naturality. As a creature of nature a person has various conscious experiences and *mokṣa* is transcendence of all these. Śaṅkara has said that the *pramāṇa-prameya vyavahāra* is *naisargika*, or the cognitive relation with the objective world is natural, which the individuals share with lower animals, in *mokṣa* this is transcended. The Mīmāṃsakas have said that the experienced world chains up a person through three factors: through the body which is the seat of experience, through the sense organs which are the instruments of experience, and through colour, sound, taste, etc., which are the objects of experience.[41] In *mokṣa* these chains are snapped, i.e. all natural experiences are expunged. As a creature of nature a person has various conscious experiences such as cognition, emotion, conation,etc. These are all said to be founded in our erring sense of identity with the natural person. *Mokṣa* is transcendence of all these.

Mokṣa as a *puruṣārtha* is qualitatively different from the other *puruṣārthas*. The others serve as incentive to the natural, socially situated, ego-bound agent, whereas *mokṣa* demands virtual dissolution of that ego. (The Advaitins have admitted the diametrically opposite nature of the two types of value in their differentiation of the *pravṛtti mārga*, which is the life of action and the *nivṛtti mārga*, which is the life of renunciation.) According to the traditional thinkers the natural man is not the self. For some schools, the rectification of this error that the individual is the self is *mokṣa*. According to the others there is a super-personal self, and to realize such a self as true self is *mokṣa*. They all have presented *mokṣa* as transcendence of the limits of nature. My suggestion is that instead of looking at this transcendence as nullification of personality and radical de-individuation, it is possible to look at it as a continuous process of expansion. Such a concept is present

in the writings of Kalidas Bhattacharyya. In my last section I would like to turn to him.

IV

Kalidas Bhattacharyya has added a new dimension to our traditional concept of *mokṣa*.[42] In many of his later works he has been occupied with the concept of freedom. While retaining the old structure, he has injected new meaning into the concept of *mokṣa*. He looks at man as at once natural and trans-natural, as one who is an integral part of nature but at the same time as one who has transcended the barriers of naturality. Here he differs from the thinkers who look at man as merely a part of nature, i.e. as an efficient animal. Bhattacharyya means by nature the domain strictly determined by space, time and causality. Because of such determination our physical, organic and even psychical behaviour is often predictable and calculable. Man rises above nature by his conscious refusal to submit to these determinations. The reflective consciousness is an essential ingredient of freedom. So not through mere indeterminacy, but through self-conscious refusal, man rises above nature. Man is thus born free; but this 'freedom is to be developed and expanded. This withdrawal from nature or dissociation from nature has been described as negative freedom. It is to be supplemented by the infinitely rich concept of positive freedom. He presents his theory of freedom through the twin concepts of 'freedom from' and 'freedom to'.

The self-awareness of consciousness is one face of positive freedom, but still it is 'freedom from'. In some places he means by 'freedom from' 'the conscious non-submission to the natural determinants'. All the philosophers who have spoken of freedom as dissociation, such as the Advaita Vedāntins, who have spoken of dissociated consciousness in itself as the highest ideal, or the Mahāyāna Buddhists who have emphasized dissociation in itself, have endorsed the different versions of 'freedom from'. But Bhattacharyya holds that 'freedom to', which means 'free dealing with nature and its items', is superior to this freedom.[43] Instead of cancelling and nullifying nature, he prescribes a return to nature with a changed attitude.

Bhattacharyya has described in detail the various alternative forms of this freedom. Such dealing with nature may be cognitive, conative or emotive. Free cognition is not merely blind interaction with nature in terms of causation, or mere recording of presentations after mechanical submission to nature. Through universalization and theory construction and speculative metaphysics, which are the gradual unfolding of reason, free cognition expresses itself. On the emotional side, human experience is no more limited to the personal experience of anger, attraction, hatred, etc., which are the instinctive calculable responses. Free emotion expresses itself through the various experiences of art and religion. Free conation finds expression in organization of social norms and various rationalistic ethics. To me, this

concept of freedom is very valuable, as it does not involve any rejection of life and nature. The free life is seen as continuous with the life of nature, so that the reorientation of life in the light of freedom is possible. This is neither dissolution and nullification of natural life, nor again acceptance of such life as final.

I would like to turn to the traditional concept of *mokṣa*, in the light of these observations. Bhattacharyya often comes very near the traditional thinkers, as for example when he speaks of 'every man's authentic awareness of himself as free'.[44] Here he is talking the language of Advaita Vedānta. But when he speaks of freedom as that which is opposed to strict causal determination, he has drifted away. Bhattacharyya classifies philosophers into two groups: the naturalists and the transcendentalists. He places Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā under the first group. According to him the naturalists look at human life as an integral part of nature, such that everything is controlled by the compulsive forces of nature and all human activity is predictable. For him conscious transcendence of naturalism is freedom. In traditional thought the acceptance of the personality woven around the finite I-consciousness as real and final is bondage. None of the schools accept the natural, relational, individuated self as ultimately real. Thus I would say that as far as *mokṣa* is concerned, none of the traditional schools, not even Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā, is naturalist; they all deny the reality of natural persons. According to them this realization is *mokṣa*.

The traditionalists have recommended contentless expansion which is like a circle, which has neither any centre nor any circumference. But following the footsteps of Bhattacharyya, we can think of *mokṣa* as finite-centric extension of life beyond the limits of naturality. Such life would be a continuous process of expansion, not without the 'I', but *without the animal-like clinging to the 'I'*. The I-maker is to be retained, for the core is necessary for the continuation of life. Freedom is freedom from blind attachment to it. Such a concept of freedom is valuable, as it does not involve a rejection of life, individuality or nature. The free self is seen as continuous with the ego, so reorientation of life and free dealing with nature is possible. Here transcendence of naturality is the awareness of the futility of the totally ego-bound life. It finds expression in 'better understanding, appreciation or reorganization of Nature' and personality.[45]

The most pertinent question here is, in what sense is this concept preferable to the traditional one? I have argued that the concept of *mokṣa* as entertained in traditional thought falls short of our expectations on three grounds. First, it looks upon *mokṣa* as freedom from sorrow merely, which approach is one-sided and partial. Here the urge for *mokṣa* is conditioned by awareness of the hollowness of the totally naturalistic life and a desire for expansion and free expression in different facets of life. This transcendence of naturalism is present in man, and it calls for further development

and refinement. Secondly, traditional thought demands dissolution of individuality, whereas this concept recommends retention of individuality, and transformation and further development of personality through cultivation of the higher values of life. This concept does not demand total rejection of the I-consciousness or the ego-sense, but it speaks for the destruction of blind attachment to the 'I', so that the 'I' does not remain the only propelling factor in human activity. Animal-like clinging to the 'I' is to be rejected as pernicious, ego-bound values are to be given up. As Bhattacharyya has shown, it is possible to inculcate the higher values of life only after transcending these attachments. The development of the higher values requires some amount of dissociation from too great an attachment to the ego.

I have said that two different types of analysis of voluntary action is possible, and both of them necessarily refer to the ego. The one says that the awareness of the goodness that the act is to produce is the determinant of the act, while the other asserts that the very acceptance of the act as duty is the most important necessary condition. Under both analyses reference to the person or the moral agent is unavoidable. But if personal attachments are erased, then it would be possible for the agent to take an objective view of the situation and take the correct moral decision. Bhattacharyya has said that in the realm of science also, for proper development, the personal factor should be wiped away.

My last point was that the traditionalists held that in *mokṣa* either the very personality of the *puruṣa* is dissolved, or the individual self continues, but all his connections with experience are severed. They looked upon desire as bondage. But the revised view is opposed to totally ego-bound desires and not to any and every desire. Desire for happiness and aversion towards sorrow might be the two basic urges which control our activity. But freedom is connected with a third urge, which is at once awareness of our finitude and the urge to transcend the limits of a life controlled completely by these two natural urges, and an intense desire for self-expression through various finer values. Thus, under this view, there is no inconsistency in the desire for the highest value. Here *mokṣa* is neither *nirvāṇa* or end of life, nor is it *kaivalya* or a state of unrelatedness, but it is *niḥśreyasa* or the highest good.

Another pertinent question is, is this concept practicable? Or, is it not true that the ego-bound life is the only possible kind of life? Is it possible to live a dissociated life, where the centre of all experience is the ego, yet where there is no attachment to it? Here, my suggestion would be that even if it is impossible to actualize such a life, it should at least be accepted as the regulative ideal. That some amount of dissociation is practised by man is our common experience.

I would like to add that the idea of this type of freedom is not foreign to our tradition. The life of the *jīvanmukta* is something like this. But *jīvanmukti* is accepted in traditional thought as an intermediate stage where life

is continued, before death ushers in *mahāparinirvāṇa* or *videhamukti* which we have discussed as *mokṣa* above. But I feel that the dissociated life of the *jivanmukta* should be accepted as the highest ideal and there should be emphasis on the positive aspect of life. Such positive freedom might find expression in various ways. Bhattacharyya himself has mentioned *niṣkāma karma*. Only if a person has transcended his attachment to the ego is it possible for him to perform *niṣkāma karma*. The duties of a person might be determined by the concrete social situation, yet only if he is properly *niṣkāma*, only if his actions are not determined by ego-centric desires, are his actions totally free. The *Bhagavadgītā* repeatedly says that a person should be *nirmama* and *nirahaṃkāra*, or he should do away with the sense of 'mine' and 'me'. But this does not mean end of life. Kṛṣṇa instructs Arjuna to return to life in its full glory, after being dissociated from the narrow ego. Or, let us take the case of a real devotee. By complete surrender to the divine will, one does not any more cling to the natural ego, yet one can lead a full life. Or again, personal emotions bound up with the individual agents become *rasa* when the personal elements are expunged and the emotion is universalized. Even in our cognitive life, such free relation with objects of awareness is possible. Our senses are naturally directed towards the external world and through them we become an integral part of nature which exercises its sway over us. But the *Gītā* says that after complete withdrawal or inwardization and discipline of the senses it is possible to dwell freely on the objects of awareness, i.e. without blind involvement and objective compulsion, and by so dwelling a person achieves a life of contentment.[46]

Here *mokṣa* is the return of the self to natural life after overcoming its animal entanglement with nature. This is positive freedom. In this sense *mokṣa* can claim to be the *parama puruṣārtha*.

Now, what would be the connection of *mokṣa* with the other three values of life? *Dharma* would definitely be the expression of this *mokṣa*, for by overcoming our natural propensities, it is best possible to do our duties. But such *dharma* is not to be interpreted merely 'as an important factor in the maintenance of social stability and harmony'.[47] Practised in the correct attitude it is the expression of the sense of goodness present in man. *Artha* and *kāma*, however, would be reduced to secondary means necessary for the sustenance of the agent. Being totally social and natural in character, they do not have any direct connection with the development of the free life of a person.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. M. Hiriyanna, *The Quest after Perfection*, Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore, 1952, p. 22.
2. Rajendra Prasad, 'Theory of Puruṣārtha' in *Karma, Causation and Retributive Morality*, ICPR, New Delhi, 1989, p. 279 (henceforth *TP*).
3. I have deliberately characterized *mokṣa* as a *'coveted end'*, without entering into the controversy as to whether this end is the normally desired one or whether it is normatively desirable. To ask this question is to introduce the distinction between description and evaluation, which is present in Indian tradition only in a subdued form in the shape of the distinction between the *preya* and the *śreya*, or the pleasant one and the better one. The *puruṣārthas* have been presented as the ends which motivate men to activity, and in that sense they are the desired goals. But they have also discussed why and under what restrictions these ends become desirable. The general attitude towards *mokṣa* is that the wise desire it and it is the highest desirable goal.
4. To explain the continuity of personality after death, in the absence of the physical body, they hold that a subtle body remains, which is not destroyed in death.
5. Uddyotakara, *Nyāyavārttika*, edited by P. V. P. Dvivedin, Delhi, 1986 (henceforth *NV*), p. 14. *Kiṃ punaḥ prayojanamiti. Yena prayuktaḥ puruṣaḥ pravartate, tat prayojanamiti laukiko'yamarthaḥ. Kena prayujyate. Dharmārthakāmamoksaiḥ iti kecit. Bayaṃtu paśyāmaḥ sukhaduḥkhāptahānibhyam.*
6. Dharmarajadhvarindra, *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*, edited by Pancanana Bhattacharya, Calcutta (year of publication not mentioned). *Yadavagatam sat svavrittitayeṣyate tat prayojanam. . . . Tatra sukhaduḥkhābhāvau mukhye prayojane.* (p. 319). *iha khalu dharmārthakāmamokṣākhyeṣu caturvidha puruṣārtheṣu mokṣa eva parama puruṣārtha* (p. 4).
7. It is very interesting to note that for Yudhiṣṭhira, the king, the knowledgeable one, the epitome of virtue, all the three values are equally important. Thus Nārada, while instructing Yudhiṣṭhira, asserts that he hopes that the latter with expertise would divide his time and aspire after all three values—*dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*. He continues that he hopes that Yudhiṣṭhira would not neglect *dharma* by running after *artha*, or *artha* by running after *dharma*, or both by running after *kāma*. The attitude is that if one is assured that *dharma* would not be transgressed, then all are equally important.
   Mahābhārata, Sabhāparva, V:
   Kvacidarthañca dharmañca kāmañca jayatām vara.
   Vibhajya kāle kālajña samam varada sevase. (20)
   Kvacidarthena vā dharmaṃ dharmenārthamathāpi vā.
   Ubhau vā pritisārena na kāmena prabādhase. (19)
8. *TP*, pp. 279, 283-84.
9. Ibid., p. 302.
10. Ibid., p. 278.
11. S.K. Maitra, *The Ethics of the Hindus*, University of Calcutta, (henceforth *EH*), 1956, p. 84. '. . . dharma or moral good is not the act itself but the Apūrva or the supersensuous veriety which it generates or involves.' This is the opinion of the Prābhākaras.
12. Ibid., pp. 85-86. '. . .according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system *dharma* is essentially righteousness or virtue, and thus a subjective trait or disposition of the mind or the self.'
13. Ibid., p. 91. According to the Bhāṭṭas the acts themselves constitute *dharma*.
14. *TP*, p. 278.

15. Madhusūdana Sarasvati, *Commentary on Śrīmadbhagavadgītā*, edited by Nalinikanta Brahma, Navabharat Publishers, Calcutta, 1986. Quotations from Manu and Gautama in the commentary on 18/45 (henceforth *MS*).
16. *TP*, p. 299. *EH*, p. 153.
17. *Mahābhārata*, Vanaparva, XXVII:

    Dharmavaṇijyaka hino jaghanyo dharmavādinām. (5)

    Dharmam carami suśroṇi na dharmaphalakāraṇāt. (4)

    Nāham dharmaphalāṇveṣi rājaputri carāmyuta.
    Dadāmi deyamityeva yaje yaṣṭavyamityuta. (2)
18. *TP*, pp. 283, 298.
19. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa, *Nyāya Darśana*, Pascim Banga Rajya Pustaka Parsad, Calcutta, 1988 (henceforth *ND*). Discussion in Bengali on 4/1/67, p. 427.
20. *TP*, p. 302.
21. *NV*, on 1/1/22: *ragādveṣau hi bandhanamiti.*
22. *TP*, p. 295.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Some schools of Vedānta, especially the Viśiṣṭādvaita school, speak for retention of personality in *mokṣa*. But they usually introduce the concept of God in heaven, so that the discussion tends to be more theological than philosophical. Because of my limited knowledge, I dare not discuss these.
26. Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya, edited by Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa, Vol. I, Calcutta, 1939 (henceforth *VB*), 1/1/22. . . . *aniṣṭahānāya ghaṭamānanam iṣṭamapi jahāti. Vivekahānasyāśakyatvāditi.*
27. *ND*, 4/1/56.
28. Ibid., 4/1/57. *duh khānuṣaṇgāt duhkham janmeti, na sukhasyabhāvāt.*
29. Tātparyaṭīkā on *Nyāyasūtra*, 1/1/2: *Anuṣango'vināhāvaḥ. Tatsvarupamāha-yatraikam sukham vā duhkham vā tatretarat duhkham vā sukham vā.*
30. Discussions in Bengali attached to *VB*. Quotation from *Nyāyasutra*, 4/2: *Doṣanimittānām tattvajñānādahaṃkāra nivṛtti.*
31. *VB*, 1/1/2: *Tadabhayamajaramamṛtyupadamiti.*
32. Ibid.: *Sarvaduḥkhocchedam sarvaduhkhāsaṃvidam.*
33. Ibid. 1/1/22: *Upāttasya janmano hānam anyasya cānupadānam.*
34. Discussion attached to *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, edited by Sukomol Chaudhuri, Sanskrit College, Calcutta, 1975, pp. 106, 119, 121, etc.
35. *VP*, p. 323: *loke'pi prāptaprāpti parihṛtaparihārayo prayojanatvam dṛṣtameva. Evam prāptasyānandasya prāptiḥ parihṛtasyānarthasya nivṛttir mokṣaḥ prayojanam.*
36. The two forms are: (i) *Mayā idam kartum sakyate*, (ii) *Mayā idam avaśyam kartyavyam.*
37. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4/46: *Yo'kāmo niṣkāma āptakāma ātmakāma na tasya prāṇa utkrāmati.*
38. *VB*, 1/1/21: *So'yam sarvam duḥkhenanuviddhamitit paśyan duḥkham jihāsur janmani duhkhadarśi nirvidyate, nirviṇṇo virajyate, virakto vimucyate.*
39. *Bhāratīya Darśanakoṣa* (Vedānta), Sanskrit College, Calcutta, 1981; on Titikṣā, p. 64, on Sādhanacatuṣtaya, pp. 145-46.
40. N.V. Banerji, *The Concept of Philosophy*, University of Calcutta, 1968, p. 50.

41. Pārthasārathi Miśra, *Śāstradīpikā*, edited by Lakṣman Śāstri Drāviḍa, Chowkhamba, 1913. . . . *Tredha hi prapañcaṃ puruṣaṃ badhnāti . . . bhogāyatanam śarīram, bhogasādhanānīndriyādini, bhogyaḥ śabdādayo viṣayaḥ . . . tadasya tribidhasyāpi bandhasyātyantika vilayo moksaḥ.*
42. Kalidas Bhattacharyya dwells upon the concept of *mokṣa* in the following articles (among others): 'Bharatiya Sanskriti O Anekanta Vedanta', Burdwan University Press, Burdwan, 1982; 'Notions of Freedom Compared and Evaluated', in *Communication, Identity and Self-Expression: Essays in Memory of S. N. Ganguly*, eds. S.P. Banerjee and Shefali Moitra, Oxford University Press, Delhi; 'My Reactions', in *Philosophy of Kalidas Bhattacharyya*, ed. Daya Krishna, I.P.Q. Publication No. 9, University of Poona, Pune, 1985, etc.
43. 'Notions of Freedom Compared and Evaluated', op. cit., p. 106.
44. Ibid., p. 114.
45. Ibid.
46. *MS*, 2/64.
47. *TP*, p. 283.

Basanta Kumar Mallik's theory of knowledge

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I

In Mallik's first book of metaphysics, *The Real and the Negative*,[1] he begins his discussion of knowledge by referring to the Cartesian theory of the mind that knows and the matter which is known, an assumption which underlies mainstream European thought of the last three centuries. Before discussing knowledge as such he says we must first ask the question: Is there such a thing as mind? And if so, should it be contrasted with matter or some other entity?[2]

Various efforts have been made in the history of thought to devise a procedure by which mind can be distinguished from matter. Mallik lists three procedures: classification, deduction and evolution. The difficulty he sees about classification is that while class, anomality for instance, and species, dog or cat, may be intelligible notions, no satisfactory account has been recorded of the relationship between class and species. It has never been decided whether instances are parts of a whole, or approximations to the essence, or core of a perfect ideal entity. Mallik suggests a new approach based on his account of the metaphysical structure which he had already outlined. In this account the Relative Universe, or Discontinuous Universe as he came to call it, is constituted by multiple individual centres existing in relationship. Could certain individuals in this scheme be called mind and be distinguished from others which must be called by other names?

A Mallikean account of an individual, John, illustrates how unlike this approach is from any of the previous accounts.

From his first appearance as a baby to his last as a man on the point of retirement, who leaves this life suddenly after a heart attack, John remains the same individual. On that point he and those who know him throughout his life will have no doubt. It is equally indisputable that throughout his life he has shown a capacity to change—in appearance, achievement, and as John himself would see it, in experience. He has never existed as a completely detached individual, but always as an instance of a group or a class—as a schoolboy, engineer, soldier, citizen. In other words, he is a unique series of related instances, each moment of experience related to other individuals and implying simultaneous experiences in others of a similar class or engaged in the same event. John has school friends, he handles stones or metals; he finds himself in conflict with other soldiers; he contributes to the planning of highways for the benefit of the community. John is part of

the world in which he lives because he exists simultaneously with and related to the rest of his fellowmen and his environment. As long as he is alive we can see how he changes, not at random, but with a recognizable objective or series of objectives influencing those changes.

Not only John, but any particular, if it is identifiable (as all existent entities must be), has to be a unique series of changes, existing as related and yet distinct from other entities which are also moving through their unique series of changes. John does not remain in static membership of a single group or class. He may be a surveyor and share surveyers' knowledge and problems. But if by mischance the dam he was building collapsed he might suddenly become flotsam, like any other obstacle, tree or rock which lay in the path of the resulting flood. His identity must be recognized as dual in its character: always one of a group and always at one instant of his unique history.

Theories of deduction or evolution are not adequate to explain John or his career. He cannot be regarded as the predicate of one neutral substance or the effect of a single cause. There is no logical ground for claiming that because we recognize the profession of engineering, John must represent only or mainly that profession; or that he changed from being a baby to being an engineer by some strange developmental process on which theories of evolution appear to be based. While John is an engineer he will share the advantages and disadvantages of that profession. He, like other engineers, will 'stand or fall' together as they tackle technical challenges of stress, durability and the rest. John, again, develops so many varied interests and skills in the course of his life that no theory of evolution could account for them. They are evidence that he is capable of change while continuing to exist as any other individual does, in a chain of series of experiences.

Mallik freely admits that the distinction between mind and matter is one which has puzzled thinkers for generations, and still continues to do so. 'The whole of our philosophic history is much too full of references and controversies with regard to mind and matter to justify an exclusion or denial of the distinction between mind and matter.'[3] All the controversy about the two has not led to either being discarded. The net result has been the survival of both, with the distinction between them still seen as a problem.

The distinctions generally associated with mind and matter are consciousness and non-consciousness, or sub-consciousness; or activity and passivity. Matter has been defined as non-conscious, passive or mechanical.

Can any distinction be made between mind and matter, and if so should it be in terms of conscious and non-conscious? If John believes in or has direct experience of, sees or feels a stone or another human, that experience is John's and John's alone. He can never get outside his own experience, share or penetrate the experience of the stones in the quarry or even that of his human friend. He cannot do more than refer to these other particulars or

individuals. There seems, therefore, no reason to distinguish John's two experiences—of the stones, and of his awareness of the feel of the stones—as being non-conscious and conscious. Mallik distinguishes them as percept, the immediate self-absorbed experience which does not refer but is referred to, and image which refers to the percept, a past or future experience.

He suggests that consciousness, like any other experience may be taken to mean 'the whole of anything that ever did or could form the subject matter for belief, opinion or thought'.[4] 'Belief', he says, 'is not a dual fact constituted by a process of knowing on the one hand and an object known or believed on the other.'[5] It is a strictly unique fact as applicable to the belief or experience a stone might have as it is to John's experience. Having quietly made this astonishing claim he goes on to modify it by giving a new definition of consciousness as the individual's experience of the multiple or of distinction, in the context of conflict and harmony. He admits that this theory of knowledge or belief may not be easy to follow or be widely accepted, but he suggests that part of the difficulty in doing so may arise from the fact that men were supremely anxious to preserve what they regarded as the chief feature and pride of the human mind—the function of knowing.[6] He may have sensed an echo of this attitude in the theory which he saw as underlying many psychological statements suggesting a sub-conscious state as a degree of the conscious which might develop into a conscious experience. He found two flaws in this position: first, it limited the sense in which the word 'conscious' was used to a scientific hypothesis to be treated as a matter for experiment. He took consciousness be a logical or metaphysical concept, a feature of all individual centres, organic, inorganic, human or psychical. Second, the theory of conscious and sub-conscious was too closely linked with whole and part, or degrees. He was prepared to agree that consciousness had different instances, of which sub-conscious might be one; but it should not be regarded as a degree of consciousness. So, though the conscious and the non-conscious can be regarded as different types of knowledge, they do not correspond to the distinction between mind and matter, because matter is clearly as distinguishable and varied as what is known as mind. 'There is no phase or stage of our historical experience which is not saturated with consciousness, because it is the region where differences and distinctions appear.'[8]

It is also recognized that there are experiences in which the terms discrimination and distinguishability are not relevant. For example, 'Those profound experiences which lie to the credit of our spiritual men and women. The term that is often used is "serene joy" and if anything peculiar is sought to be conveyed by it, it is the note of placidity or profound stillness that is furthest removed from our discriminating consciousness.'[9]

Might it not be more appropriate, he asks, to call such esoteric or mystical moments 'non-conscious'? He adds the logical argument in support of this that the individual centres have to exist alternately in a state of distinc-

tion and a state of unity or identicalness. At this stage of his work he calls them states of multiplicity and simplicity; these basic features are examined at length in his later work.

This leaves the alternative pair of terms: active and passive. Mallik accepted that mind might be regarded as the active partner in an event and matter as the passive one. This would imply that mind and matter could not appear in the same centre simultaneously, but must appear in succession. This does not mean that activity is to be associated with causality, as the idealists incline to think. It is a state or phase of existence, and not creative or generative. For example, if *A* contradicts or complements *B* both have their own distinct experiences quite independent, both connected with an objective. There is no interaction or interpenetration; there is only interdependence in the sense that they both change simultaneously and spontaneously.

Equally, he believed that the materialists' claim that matter is the primal cause must be rejected. What then could be the difference between mind and matter? The answer, he believed, was that the range of individuals extends far beyond the scientific classifications so far laid down as inorganic, organic or psychical. It must be recognized, for example, that the vast majority of people retain a belief in the supernatural of one kind or another. These are all unique and equally valid instances of experience.

Mallik's theory of knowledge becomes much clearer when it is set in the context of his cosmology. This was not recorded in any detail in *The Real and the Negative*, although he had already suggested that Reality implied alternate monistic and relative phases.[10] He sets out his account of Reality in *Related Multiplicity*[11] as a triadic universe[12] and developed this theme, which is fundamental to his philosophy, in all his later work.

Reality is constituted by Being and Non-Being in a triadic universe. The first Continuous of Non-Being does not begin, but ends. It is succeeded by the Discontinuous Universe of Being and Non-Being co-existing in relationship. This universe begins and ends and is succeeded by the second Continuous Universe of Being, which begins but does not end. This scheme provides for the monistic and the relative; beginning and ending, non-beginning and non-ending. Reality is never absent, but provision is made within it for all conceivable forms of existence.

The Discontinuous Universe in which we find ourselves does not depend for its existence on any external cause, creator or emanation. It is complete and independent. We cannot have direct experience or knowledge of the Continuous Universes, because our experience implies relationship. We can only be certain of their existence by implication. If Reality is total and all-embracing they must be implied by the beginning and ending of the Discontinuous Universe. Existence cannot begin from nothing, or end in nothing.

The Discontinuous Universe is a universe of related multiplicity, being and non-being co-existing in multiple instances, a universe which begins and

ends. The beginning is spontaneous and its distinctive feature that it is different from what preceded it—the first Continuous Universe of non-being. Nor does the end of the Discontinuous Universe signify extinction. An end is a purpose which is fulfilled. It in turn is followed by a form of existence which is different from what went before. The end of the Discontinuous Universe is necessarily an event in which all its constituents are involved. The end is not nothing, it is the positive purpose which these instances of being and non-being are conceiving and seeking to realize. That is why Mallik frequently refers to the common purpose, which is not a cause of action, but a determining factor, a future event towards which the Discontinuous Universe is progressing—its end. The changes which the individual centres experience in the course of their careers are not random movements, but proceed in an orderly manner, making along the way provision for all possible variations open to related multiplicity. There is room for suffering as well as joy, failure as well as success; but there is no place for the absolute void or nothingness, which is inconceivable and impossible.

It may be helpful to summarize the conclusions Mallik has drawn so far in his analysis of knowledge. There are two kinds of knowledge: conscious, which is based on experience of differences, and non-conscious, which is based on experience of unity or the common purpose. These correspond to two basic states of existence for the related multiples: distinctness and identicalness. Knowledge may also be described as active or passive. Every individual experiences both kinds of knowledge alternately. When *A* has active knowledge of *B* this implies *B* having passive knowledge of *A*, of being known. There is no causal or generative principle in the active experience, and no interpenetration between the two. But they are related in the sense that if one arises so must the other, and both experiences refer to a common background, without which they would be absolute differents and unimaginable. Mallik describes the active as mind and the passive as matter at this stage, but as will be seen he expands the notions of mind and matter considerably before he has finished with them.

He goes on to set out his own account of knowledge in more detail and to compare it with traditional accounts. He uses a form of veiled dialogue as he did increasingly in his later books. He sets out first the reaction of 'the man on the Clapham Omnibus'. 'Surely you are not suggesting that the stone, tree or cell knows in the sense that I as a human being know?' All right, Mallik replies, let us keep the term knowledge strictly for the human. But we cannot enter into the distinction between the human and the non-human here. This is a distinction drawn by psychologists and scientists rather than by metaphysicians. The metaphysician is concerned with knowledge as a form or instance of the individual centre. He knows that this occurs in a conflict or harmony with other individuals. We want to analyse further the result of such 'knowing' which may be either certainty or uncertainty. If we reserve the terms thought and belief about actual

reality for human beliefs, we must consider that other individual centres (stone, cow, tree, etc.) have their own states of certainty and uncertainty as a result of their own special conflicts and harmonies; but we may keep the terms doubt and belief as specially relevant to human individuals. They are related to three distinct types of human experience—percepts, images and concepts which are all constituents of the knowing individual.

He gives an example: John is supposed to be knowing the mountains of Lapland. John goes through four stages: contradicting and being contradicted, complementing and being complemented by the Lapp mountains.

It must not be forgotten that neither John, who has the capacity to know, nor the mountain which the questioner says does not know, is anything but an individual centre, which must be striving to bring about the realization of the same end and through the same universal process—shall we call it the evolution of the planet? It has been suggested that the mountain does not know, or perhaps even live. But the fact remains that it serves the central end of the universe in the same fundamental manner as John does. The differences between them are subordinate to their main agreement about the realization of the central end. And so in the last analysis they are but peculiar instances of the same achievement. Hierarchy or gradation is ruled out, and absolute equality takes its place. They are all equally essential and equally interdependent.[13]

This argument has been set out in some detail as it is an example of the way in which Mallik developed his analysis. He began with a statement which his questioner put to him as a possible objection to his position. This statement was presented as incontrovertible, an obvious fact of life, in this case the distinction between human knowledge and the existence of non-human entities. Mallik concedes that there is an undeniable difference between a man, a stone, a tree and a cow. Then he proceeds to show that underlying that distinction there is a much more fundamental relationship, a common factor which refers to the purpose of all existence. He takes the opportunity to point out in passing the illusion of superiority which man has claimed on the evidence of the difference between himself and other forms of existence. Unique features and contributions, Mallik claims, cannot be graded. 'What even a blade of grass can achieve the most gifted of saints certainly cannot, in spite of the fact that they laid claim to miracles for centuries.'

He considers next the different instances or stages of knowledge which an individual experiences in an event. He takes as an example: 'John tries to beat Smith with a stick.' There will be two sets of experiences on the two sides—John has (or experiences) a number of percepts, Smith, beating, stick, John. These percepts will not only be different but opposed to Smith's percepts: Smith, beaten, stick, John. John's experience is active and Smith's passive, or if the term is preferred, material. Both are equally conscious. The important point is that John's knowledge of Smith is strictly distinguished from Smith's knowledge of himself. Neither will nor can know the other's

experience, or 'stand in the other's shoes'. At the same time, John has Smith in his experience, as if he became an image of Smith being beaten. Conversely, Smith has his own experience of John, which cannot occur anywhere else.

All experiences are shown to be both unique and referent. This account arises not just from an examination of knowledge as such, but from the relationship of conflict or harmony between individual centres. Each experience refers to another, but no individual ever becomes incorporated or confused with another. Individuals undergo changes in a definite manner, actively and passively, as a matter of necessity. Such series of experiences stand as contradictory or complementary events. The theory avoids the difficulties of solipsism, and the complications of interaction.

The function of knowledge is not to enable the subject to deal with or change the object. It is to realize the central end of the Discontinuous Universe. It is there not to manipulate but to elucidate.

In the light of this new account Mallik discusses in greater detail the constituents of knowledge—percepts, images and concepts (which he later called categorical knowledge). He refers to the perennial difficulty in the presentation of knowledge. How can the subject and object which are by definition unique, independent and incompatible be brought into a meaningful relationship? Taking the extreme case of Berkeley 'that nothing can exist which is not known', he demonstrates that this might imply either that only the cognitive subject existed, or because the knowing subject depended on the reality of the object all knowledge would be found in the object. He comments: 'One might truly find it difficult to decide whether he was an Idealist or a Realist or a non-descript who just wanted to state that the ultimate situation was the subject and object in relation.'[14] The sceptic's doubts arose because of what appeared to be the paradoxical nature of the evidence for reality. For example, how could it be both infinite and finite, monistic and relative, absolute and yet challenged or denied? Mallik sought answers to these problems which would satisfy the most rigorous test of logic and could also be supported by reference to historical experience. If reality is, it must consist of everything conceivable, and it cannot be self-contradictory. It occurred to him that many of the apparent paradoxes could be explained by making a clear distinction between the notions of alternation and simultaneity. For example, water cannot be hot and cold at the same time. Yet hot and cold water are equally undeniable experiences which imply succession or alternation. It is equally certain that the tester of the water's temperature must exist simultaneously with the water he is testing.

In mediate knowledge, dealing with objects that are indirectly presented, the difficulties multiply. One explanation has been to define mediate knowledge as a series of direct presentations. 'God, for instance, or the other side of the wall or the past and future or the physical world must be pre-

sented to those we know directly, and who, like this side of the wall or the present moment, are directly presented to us. . . . From such a belief faith in prophets and mediates may have developed.'[15] As an individual's range of direct experience is limited trust, confidence, testimony and moral virtues such as honesty have had to be defined and emphasized.

Such a framework depends for its stability on the certainty of presentation, whether direct or indirect. Until this is established and while the possibility of presentation remains a matter for controversy neither immediate nor mediate knowledge can claim to be unquestionable.

Pragmatism has been suggested as another possible solution. Its greatest achievement has been claimed to be 'its remarkable success in making even of falsehood a successful material.'[16] This might point to a new theory of conflict; but practically speaking the consequences of such a theory lead to probability in place of truth; and what is called propaganda or management in the practical world in the place of straight dealing and honest attempt to meet the situation as a whole.

Mallik then contrasts traditional notions of presentation with his own theory. For him the distinction between mediate and immediate knowledge is that between knowledge as such and knowledge of what it refers to. Smith feels the blow; he knows that John hit him. Presentation does not come into it. John's experiences and Smith's are quite distinct. No one would doubt that to beat is a very different experience from being beaten. Relationship implies a universe in which multiple centres change simultaneously in a definite way according to pre-established necessity.

This theory of parallel experiences constituting knowledge has a further implication. There is no limit to John's experience or knowledge. In principle whatever exists is open to him to discover. Conversely, whatever experience John has, whatever its form—God for example—is sufficient evidence that there is an entity in the universe standing at that time in a relation with John, which appears to him as God. This does not mean that one can immediately define or describe this other entity with certainty; but one must believe in the existence of all objects and beings of which we can think, whether definition of them or communication with them is immediately possible or not. This leads to a new view of past and future events associated with individuals. 'Why should there be any difficulty in thinking of individual centres that began with the discontinuous universe and will not come to an end as long as that universe survives'?[17] Death after all, to refer to a long-held conviction is only a prolonged doubt.

Mallik turns next to a discussion of the particular and universal. It has been generally held that the particular is indescribable and the concept is describable; or, in other words, the particular is unique whereas the universal is common to more than one particular, i.e. it has features. These definitions reflect a fixed notion of judgment. A distinction is implied between the description of subject matter and the subject matter itself. Something remains over as the presupposition of the judgment or statement. It is suggested that either that which exists as a matter of fact is particular, which can only be known by acquaintance or that which characterizes the reality is the concept, which can only be known by description. When some deny that the concepts or characteristics are real and others assert that the fact is nothing but a system of concepts or relations, an impasse is bound to result.[18]

Mallik points out that there can be human experience which is indescribable. It may be difficult to express and even impossible to communicate, but it must have some significance to the person involved, or be altogether beyond the pale of human experience. Some of the deepest experiences of the human mind fall into this class.

There are no doubt certain experiences which are exclusive or intimately self-centred, others which are more varied and more expansive. But both are in their ways describable. Take, for instance, the sentence, John is honest. The distinction made between the unique and the general or universal which have been seen as incompatibles lies at the root of the distinction between unique fact and the describable feature. He asks: can a subject's character have a meaning different from the meaning of the character himself? At the same time can the universal and particular be accommodated in the same individual? If we re-examine the description of the individual who is both the subject and object of knowledge it becomes clear that the individual centres are the foci of two series. 'Each individual will form a series by itself to represent its continuous career of succession; and also an instance of a series like cognition or conation, working out in each phase his career of similarity.'[19] The individual is linked up with every other individual in similarity, conflict or harmony; it also preserves its own continuity.

Individuality is to be understood in three ways:

(a) In terms of function and purpose;
(b) In terms of continuity and simultaneity;
(c) In terms of existing as a phase or form at any given moment.

Each individual, being particular is indescribable in so far as his individual series is concerned, but in so far as each phase of that career also forms an instance of a series, e.g. eating, praying, fighting or speaking, as many others are doing simultaneously, these forms are describable. These functions co-exist with other forms of other individuals in conflict or harmony with them. The description of honest John refers to the individual in a state of distinctness. But he knows also when he is in a state of identicalness, having no experience of conflict or harmony, or indeed of difference. Mallik began by linking such knowledge to the mystical state, but came later to define it as the experience of the Society of Beings, that is individuals concerned with the conception of their purpose as distinct from its realization.

An individual may alternate between the two states but cannot experience both simultaneously. There is nevertheless a relationship of reference between the two states. For example, conflict between opposing groups must imply some common background, or they would be absolute differents and incapable of relationship. Not all backgrounds are equally fundamental and farreaching. The background of a particular event may be perceived in quite immediate and limited terms. Just as a baby, snatched from sleep on the sudden arrival of invaders, concentrates on his personal physical discomfort, so the background of a conflict may be a temporary or very local issue, the need to defend or attack some personal advantage. 'If John, for instance had no experience that sometime in his career there was the kind of life he was trying to preserve there would be no point in his making an effort to continue it. His effort is a proof that he had that experience and also an evidence that life is no longer there.[20] If we say that John who is honest finds himself in conflict with Smith it means that at some time in the past he formed a group with others to whom the term honesty refers. All concepts or categories imply the same kind of life or some form of unity—perhaps only a temporary alliance. There was nothing to correspond to honesty as John stood in opposition to Smith except an experience of some past event in his life. This explains the use of the term 'indescribable' applied to unity. It is not that it could not be described, but it does not admit of description. The concept is describable but the event to which it refers is not.

Mallik's view of knowledge gave him new insight into the nature of time. As he says in *The Real and the Negative*, 'It is not our belief in time that will determine the nature of the universe, but the nature of the universe that will determine the validity of time. What is essential is the objective and fundamental fact of the universe.[21]

In talking of the 'mystical feature' as it is implied in conflict, he refers to the past. The opponents are fighting to preserve or destroy something they believe to be absolute, actual or already established. Once the past has happened it is believed to survive, as it were 'on ice', for ever unchanged. In this belief they share the mistake of the toddler who said: 'Let's do it as we did it tomorrow', when 'tomorrow' at the moment of speaking was in fact the day before yesterday. Time is not static, and events cannot take place twice, though they can be referred to by images. Besides, if a practice, belief or concept were truly established there would be no alternative to it and no need to fight for or against it. Life is to be found in the individual and every individual exists as a stream of changing experiences. There is no reason to deny that the individual is immortal, because they are constantly changing. There is a famous story of Lot's wife, fleeing from the wicked city, who looked back when forbidden to do so and was turned into a pillar of salt. It may well be that her companions believed that she suddenly disappeared and a pillar of salt appeared on the spot where she had been. But that did not prove that Lot's wife ceased at that moment to have experiences, although communication certainly ceased between her and her companions. There cannot be a moment when the individual is petrified and ceases to change. Death implies the end of one form or phase of the individual, it does not imply extinction, but new experiences continuing as long as the discontinuous universe remains, that is until the common purpose is fulfilled.

II

The first part of this article shows that Mallik had discarded the distinction between subject and object as being insufficiently basic to serve as a foundation for a theory of knowledge. After disclaiming various assumptions and methods suggested and different attempts made to establish the truth he sets out his own position on the meaning of knowledge and how it might be pursued. Knowledge for him implies certainty and assurance.

He gives three steps which he considers essential in examining an assertion or a claim to truth.[22]

1. To locate the contradictory feature in the claim. This he defines as the true function of logic.
2. To establish the origin of that contradictory feature.
3. To replace the claim by a new statement which must be shown to be necessarily true, that is no alternative to it can be admitted.

The last two steps he places within the domain of metaphysic. He describes this process as 'replacing a statement of values based on faith by a statement of evidence for reality. The new statement if true must be logically unassailable and supported by historical evidence. A comparison of an established creed and a 'Mallikean' statement may make his definition clearer.

We may take an article of faith: 'Love is good; it comes from God.' This implies that God has so ordered His creation that what He has laid down is good and must be pursued, rejecting and as far as possible eliminating that which opposes the good. Man recognizes that there is opposition to this belief, but he regards this as sinful or misguided, and discounts it as being an inevitable obstacle to be overcome, a temporary clash between the real and the unreal. He is concerned with what should be according to the code which he has accepted as absolutely true.

Mallik's original standpoint is different. He begins with a simple statement—Reality is; this statement must be accepted on both logical and historical grounds as being necessarily true, a statement to which there is no alternative. Once convinced of this it becomes necessary to find out what Reality means. We can no longer rely on established beliefs which have been shown to clash with other established beliefs, but must build a new system on evidence. If Reality is, it must be total, that is everything that is conceivable has an equal claim to existence.

What is conceivable, however, does not automatically have the power to

become actual. For example, the Negative is conceivable but actual nothingness as a historical fact stands contradicted by the very statement which asserts it. This process of analysis exposes the self-contradiction or impossibility of the absolute Negative; but it does not alter the fact that it has been possible to conceive of the Negative. This process or state of the Negative Mallik calls possibility—a claim to existence which can only be frustrated.[23] It is not to be confused with Aristotle's idea of possibility or potency.

Claims and conceptions imply reference, statement and communication—all features of experience. Turning to individual experience Mallik reminds us that 'Nothing exists in my pattern [of existence] except the multiple entities ...[therefore] it must be the life history of these entities which will embody formal and material truth. There will be nothing in the pattern which will embody truth as such; nor will the constants exist detached from or outside of the entities. Even the objective which is common and which necessarily is ideal will appear in the shape of an image which the entities themselves will embody.'[24]

Individuals appear in two distinct types of existence: actual or concrete, constituted by sensations and images, and categorical. A sensation may be 'pure', i.e. self-absorbed or referent. It must exist simultaneously with the sensation to which it refers. It may also be referred to by an image as a past or future event. For example, if I touch a stone, I must be in the same place at the same time; but I could also remember or refer to that sensation, that is, have an image of that event at a later date. A sensation cannot actively refer to an image or a category.

Images are also actual in that they refer to past or future sensations. The image referring to the future is not of the event which will arise to fulfil it, but rather an ideal which will give rise to action leading to that event.

Categorical experience does not characterize a future event. It simply creates the belief in the certainty of that event. The belief may turn out to be illusory.[25]

It is necessary at this point to return to the analysis of mind and matter which Mallik resumed in his book *Non-Absolutes*.[26] Defining the nature of reality, he begins by excluding two self-contradictory features: it cannot be void or indeterminate. As the Discontinuous Universe (described in Part I of this article) must begin and end it must presuppose existence and experience. Existence in the Discontinuous Universe implies related multiplicity; experience implies reference, statement and communication. The simple claim 'Being is' must be recognized as an experience; but it does no more than refute the sceptic's claim that 'Nothing is', by the notion of that which fills in the void—what we call matter, substance or 'stuff'. Since that which exists has identity it is necessarily determinate and distinguishable. From this feature is drawn the notion of mind, or that which conceives the objective. The two notions of mind and matter or experience and existence, are distinct but inseparable.

To give an example, history is taken as a record of facts; but it is equally a record of experiences. If the facts exist something else has to exist to refer to them.

Mind and matter are categorical presuppositions of experience, not existent entities. They constitute the proof for the existence of the concrete individual. Such proof is necessary when the concrete individual falls into a state of impasse or confusion.[27]

Categorical experience arose to negate the belief that the concrete has no claim to existence, the view formulated by the sceptic, who came to this conclusion when, having gone through frustration and impasse, he felt unable to continue his concrete experience because of uncertainty. He stumbled on the notion of possibility of the Negative or non-being. It seemed that, 'That which does not function must die; that is the law of the universe'.[28] The dogmatist's assurance that death had not occurred, supported by the fact of the sceptic's ability to make such a statement, introduced the necessity of the positive or being. So this reassurance was achieved by the use of evidence as a criterion of truth. These experiences of thought deal with categories which do not have concrete existence. They establish reality but do not define it. In meeting the argument for the possibility of the negative the dogmatist could point out that however intelligible as a possibility the negative might be, it could not be a fact since in its attempt at materialization it contradicted itself. It followed that positive, or being, was a necessity.

The sceptic did not recognize the full significance of possibility: that it was conceivable but not necessarily capable of becoming actual. Nor did the dogmatist see that being which was evidently necessary had not also an automatic right to be defined as 'absolute' or 'ultimate'. These were not categorical terms; they were values which were believed to be actual realities already established. Once being was re-established it was assumed that the values, beginning with the absolute were established also—for instance, mystical unity interpreted as *ātman*, or Parmenides' ultimate reality.

Mallik sums up this succession of events as a drama. 'The theme of this drama was to produce the final result of a clash between Mystical Unity, Individuality and Community—that of complete frustration. Each time the drama reached its fifth act of utter confusion an interval followed. It took the form of an epilogue in which a review was made with the conclusion that man had at least the choice of leaving the Universe for good. There was instantly a pilgrimage for freedom in the void, but it ended in Paradise.'[29]

Mallik admits that he could not point to a historical record of what happened immediately after the sceptic had been silenced and faith had been restored in Being or Reality. But it is significant that the negative and positive or being were the only true categories ever considered 'by the ancients'. Such terms as absolute or later definitions of reality as unity or individuality

were not true categories. They were believed to refer to something already existing and had overtones of value and inequality.[30]

The basic notions of unity and individuality were formulated in both classic Indian and Greek philosophy, but no solution was found to the problem of their apparent incompatibility which could have made it possible to use them positively. For instance, analytical necessity and immediate certainty were both recognized but they could not be sustained together. 'John cannot be an instance of humanity, i.e. a partial expression of it and at the same time a unique individual who lives related to Brown, also a unique individual. . .It was a gross negligence to confuse predicational judgment with a relational one by recognizing both of them as instances of judgment'.[31] One or other view prevailed, or compromises were devised, for example, the notion of space between the incompatibles. If space were redefined as the void the inevitable clash between incompatibles threatened destruction of both.

The two main illusions remained: the belief in the absolute, and the consequent acceptance of inequality. Until reality was redefined these stumbling blocks could not be removed. The ideas of possibility, necessity and evidence appear spasmodically in philosophical writing through the centuries, but Mallik found new significance in them after he had recognized that reality, which could never be absent, not only could, but must, exist in different states at different times. Man in a state of doubt continued to exist but could not function; man committed to his belief could exist and function, but had so far been unable to achieve a final or lasting result, to establish his claim permanently or avoid any challenge to it.

It occurred to Mallik at an early stage in his thought that these periods of doubt provided opportunities to develop new insight into the nature of reality. In his later books he develops the idea of the philosophers' increasing awareness that the positive and negative could not be explained away as the real and unreal or truth and illusion. A place must be found for both on a footing of equality within a universe of related multiplicity. He considered how categorical experience helped to bring about this new understanding.

A category is an actual experience, but it does not admit of verification by image or sensation. It is purely evidence about the nature of reality. It is not an attempt to describe or characterize individuals or events. Its main function is 'to help in clearing the mess which the empirical realm periodically runs into as a result of the conflict which marks its career' by providing assurance about reality and a new basis for defining and understanding it. Possibility is man's first experience of a category. It turns out to be the first of a series, each new instance brings a firmer and more definite assurance. It is followed by the category of necessity and it is after the discovery of necessity that the true significance of possibility is understood.

He returns again and again to the transition from the stage of conflict and

illusion to the stage of harmony and discovery of truth which involves shedding those illusions. The more he examined it the more complex and tortuous the process appeared, an odyssey of pilgrimage with all kinds of setbacks and unexpected dangers along the way.

There was, for instance, man's recurrent hesitation about embarking on such a far-reaching enquiry. Should the universe be subjected to a technique of finding out the truth about itself? Mallik puts this point vividly in *The Towering Wave*[32] when the pilgrims setting out on their search for truth have the temerity to ask: 'Why has man been allowed from immemorial times to fall victim to illusion, evil or fiction in spite of the goal set for them, described variously as peace or Ānanda, God's love or development of the Self?' In spite of apparently harsh, superior or even threatening messages which seem to reach them from supernatural sources, the pilgrims decide to stay with their resolve to find the truth for themselves, and not be sidetracked or turned back by portents, omens or ideals which in the past have proved impossible to verify or achieve.[33]

Removal of illusion calls not only for thought, but also for action. We have to abstain from illusion after we have had this assurance about reality from thought. It is not enough to appreciate the clash of opposing values and the inevitable frustration of attempts on either side to reach the ideal. This insight must be applied to events in which we find ourselves in religious, social, economic and personal contexts. This period of austerity which involves restraint and discipline cannot be avoided. Once the three conceptions of reality, mystical, humanistic and dualistic are seen to be illusory, there can be no escape from the necessity to negate the beliefs in those values, to make every effort to avoid realizing them.

As the stage of necessity or abstention begins to replace that of illusion man has the new experience of categorical assurance which replaces uncertainty or doubt. Any category is an evidence or proof which testifies to the validity of the individual's claim to existence. Such assurance must precede the direct experience of the concrete entity. 'Thought, in my scheme, happens to be the prime mover as it appears in the fourth stage of necessity or truth'.[34] It is one thing to be certain of concrete reality, another thing to be directly in touch with it. 'My ancestry did distinguish between *Jñāna* of the Mystical Reality and absorption in it'.[35] Once more he underlines the distinction between categorical and image or sensory knowledge: 'Categorical existence, or the experience of individuals in the fourth stage refers to concrete and complete reality, in the shape of knowledge and belief. This is quite different from images or sensations. If we hear a barking dog we not only have an assurance or image but an actual experience of what the dog could be. A category never reaches this point.'[36]

Mallik discusses at length the change in the individual as he spontaneously comes to think of and refer to reality in what he perceives as its true form. He begins to discover the illusory conceptions of absolute unity and indi-

viduality and abstains from trying to realize the values which these conceptions imply. These changes give him the status of a non-absolute actual individual, though not yet quite ready for direct experience of reality, because he has still to discard the remaining illusions of the stage of conflict.[37]

This sequence of stages, each with its own special kind of experience or knowledge, may require further clarification. It is worth repeating that it begins with the claim that reality in the discontinuous universe consists of nothing but the series of experiences of individual centres. Each series, or individual, is unique, but every instance in that series is related to other individuals. In this sense identity is dual. It is an instance in a series and a member of a class. Relationship does not mean merging or interpenetration of centres, but experiences are referent and imply simultaneous changes in the individuals concerned. Every experience is determinate, concerned in one way or another with the common purpose or end of the discontinuous universe. It is not caused by any external agent.

Because reality is total there must be provision within the discontinuous for all conceivable instances of experience and relationship. This is achieved by a sequence of stages in which to put it in very simple language, different plans are evolved and put into practice. This succession or alternation of attempts to realize objectives accommodates features which are incompatible, and therefore cannot co-exist. In this way the absolute values of the third stage are replaced by the fourth stage in which individuals with new assurance of categorical knowledge gradually divest themselves of illusions. The way for the new experiences of the fifth stage will be clear when this process is complete.

In his last books, *Non-Absolutes* and *Mythology and Possibility*,[38] Mallik recognizes that the changes which he believes are happening in the universe are much more radical than anything he had imagined when he began to write his metaphysic twenty years earlier. This new system was not the result of deduction, or a life of asceticism, or even of discussion with his contemporaries. It might be misleading even to call it metaphysic, which was still connected with an acceptance of the absolute. Nor could it be based on prophecy which implies a belief in divinity. The new form of experience which the individual embodies in the fourth stage is necessity, or knowledge or *jñāna*.[39] Only a new view of reality based on the triadic universe could enable a man to look at himself, his opponent and their background in a new light. This view could not be judged using traditional hypotheses or techniques.

The third stage of conflict and illusion could not be known as possessing the features of absolute belief and action based on such a belief which was bound to lead to a negative result, until the fourth stage of necessity appeared. The third stage operated, but its nature, constitution and origin remained obscure. Knowledge had not been necessary for action. When categorical knowledge in the setting of the triadic universe became available, the

absolute or negative stage was ready to disappear. It had already reached its fulfilment.

In *Mythology and Possibility* Mallik returns to his analysis of man's conception of reality and his reaction to the experience of frustration and doubt. The sceptic's faith in reality was shattered by the recurring crises brought about by incompatible claims. 'The claim that the Absolute was one simple piece of entire existence was fatally ripped open by the appearance of the opposites on the plane of existence.'[40]

The dogmatist silenced the sceptic by pointing out that his claim was self-contradictory, but he overlooked the fact that not only did relationship between the incompatibles survive, but the two opposing parties survived, and therefore the problem remained unsolved.

Mallik's account of the fifth and final stage of the discontinuous universe is necessarily brief and in categorical terms. The very good reason for this is that direct experience of what he calls 'the dual world' in which the common purpose is conceived and fulfilled by individuals having no intervention between them cannot be known until all illusion has been cleared away. 'We have to have assurance about the true or concrete reality before we can have direct experience of it.'[41]

Notes and References

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Discussion and Comments

REPRESENTATION VERSUS MIRRORING: A COGNITIVIST RESPONSE TO RORTY

The successive turns and revolutions in the history of philosophy, each seeking but failing to capture truth, has made Rorty sceptical of all such efforts.[1] The moral, according to him, is that the traditional concept of philosophy needs to be deconstructed. In *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* he states his objective as being 'to undermine the reader's confidence in "the mind" as something about which one should have a "philosophical view", in "knowledge" as something about which there ought to be a "theory" and which has "foundations" and in "philosophy" as it has been conceived since Kant.[2] This accomplished, he tells us there would be only open uninhibited conversation, its concern being not truth but the making of meaning.

In this paper we examine Rorty's assertions about the mind and its representations, knowledge and its foundations and the prospects for philosophy. In part I we will show that Rorty has misconceived these notions as they occur in traditional philosophy, by his running together the two notions of representation and mirroring. In part II we shall examine Rorty's notion of 'conversation' as the only possible alternative to the traditional concept of philosophy. In part III we shall give the cognitivist alternative as a response to Rorty. This will show up what Rorty has ignored—that representation is the key concept in all attempts at understanding human cognition. It will also reveal that foundationalism and epistemological concerns are not what Rorty construed them to be.

I

The basic error in traditional philosophy, Rorty informs us, is the conception of knowledge, not as justified true belief but as the 'knowledge of',[3] thus positing the knower against the object of knowledge. The consequent question of how the object is known is then explained using the ocular metaphor. This is the conception of the mind as the glassy essence of man, reflecting the external world in itself and thus yielding representations of it. These representations are believed to constitute knowledge, the most accurate among them being regarded as the foundations of knowledge.

This spectator theory of knowledge, Rorty tells us, has spawned myths such as that of the mind being an entity, knowledge having foundations and

philosophy being the repository of the most accurate representations and thereby the adjudicator of all knowledge-claims.

Rorty's alternative is a notion of philosophy as the conversation of mankind—the spontaneous expression of thoughts, playing off ideas one against the other. The knower-object dichotomy (knowledge as 'knowledge of') is replaced by the subject-proposition relation (knowledge as 'knowledge that') and Rorty is happy that the ocular metaphor is thus deleted. He believes that the notions of 'mind', 'representations' and 'foundations' of knowledge would go with it. The point that Rorty misses is that the ocular metaphor is not the only way to conceive of the mind. A more crucial point is that he cannot even afford to lose the mind, for that would negate the very possibility of conversation. Yet we find him despairing of the continuing preoccupation of philosophy with the mind and its representations. According to him, while Descartes resurrected the mind, Locke and Kant hoped, by a psychological understanding of it, to arrive at the very foundations of knowledge.[4]

A critical consideration of Rorty's assertions entails answers to the following questions: (1) What is Rorty's notion of representation? What are its implications for the conception of knowledge? (2) Does the ocular metaphor prevail in the systems of Descartes, Locke and Kant? If it does, has it generated the kind of representationalism that Rorty envisages? (3) Is the notion of foundations of knowledge a mere myth?

Rorty's Notion of Representation and Mind in Traditional Philosophy: Its Implications for the Notion of Knowledge

Rorty has not clearly worked out the concept of representation. He only says that 'to know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind.'[5] It seems to be a naive picture theory. He describes representations as reflections of the external world in the mind, the reflections constituting knowledge. Since all reflections were not believed to be accurate representations, philosophy, Rorty says, became preoccupied with understanding the nature of the mind. The underlying hope, he surmises, was that better insight into the nature of the mind would enable one to make it function more efficiently and thus acquire the most accurate representations.

This is a glaring misconstrual of the labours of Locke and Kant whom Rorty has named in this connection.[6] Both were interested in discovering the limits of cognitive ability. Locke makes this clear at the very beginning of the Introduction to his *Essay*.[7] In the same vein Kant too attempted a critique of pure reason by understanding the process of knowledge-acquisition and its limits.[8] Rorty however misconstrues these attempts as the confusion of psychological understanding of the process of knowledge-acquisition with the discovery of the grounds for justifying knowledge-claims. It is relevant at this juncture to turn to Locke and Kant and investigate Rorty's charge that they perpetuated the ocular meta phor, the

representational view of knowledge and the notion of foundationalism in modern thought.

Allusions to the ocular metaphor are present in Locke's definition of ideas (representations) and knowledge. He defines ideas as 'whatsoever the mind perceives in itself or is the immediate object of perception.'[9] Knowledge is for him the 'perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas'.[10] However, the metaphor does not, as Rorty imagines, spawn the notion of knowledge as accurate pictures of reality.

There is a widespread belief that Locke's ideas of sense are copies of the external world. However, an unbiased detailed reading of the *Essay* leads one to see that knowledge is the product of the interaction of the external world with our senses. Passages in which the mind is described as passive only assert that the mind cannot avoid receiving any ideas. There is nothing to imply that ideas are thereby exact copies of objects.[11] Locke is in fact unequivocal in his declaration the simple ideas of sense are not mirror images but are produced by the specific powers in the objects operating on our senses.[12] Yolton[13] is absolutely on the mark when he describes Lockean ideas as 'cognitive counterparts', 'response to' and 'translation of' physical stimuli. Simple ideas differ from complex ideas only to the extent that while the latter have their entire being within the individual, simple ideas have their genesis outside. Both are nevertheless products of the inner processes.

In the Kantian system the Copernican revolution rules out the possibility of naive picturing. Knowledge is not a pictorial depiction but a judgement projected by the operations of the cognitive apparatus on sense-data. This is what Kant means by his declaration that reason 'does not here beg but command'.[14] This conception of the mind as an information-processing device allows the ocular metaphor to be deleted while the mind is preserved. This is the active, cognitive conception of knowledge in contrast to the passive conception that would follow from Rorty's construal of representation. In the cognitive conception, knowledge is a mental state and its acquisition is a computational activity of the mind, involving attention, configuration, storage and retrieval on requirement in various combinations. The passive conception of knowledge as mirroring is in fact scarcely to be found in any philosophical system. 'Pictorial' sentences of Ryle and Russell do not qualify. Ryle construed the relation between grammatical form and the logical form of the state of affairs as determined only by convention.[15] Russell's sentence mirrors the sense-data.[16] Wittgenstein's picture theory would qualify, but he soon realized the naiveté of it and dropped it.

A related misconstrual by Rorty is that the notion of accurate knowledge is an illusion that philosophy has been chasing. The fact however is that accurate knowledge was the ideal of the science of the Newtonian period. Locke and Kant deserve praise for their insight into the illusoriness of such

claims to apodicticity. Their doctrine of the representative character of knowledge is proof of the fact that they did not lay claim to such apodictic knowledge.

Rorty, in contrast to Locke and Kant, having dismissed apodictic knowledge and representationalism, could see only one possible way of conceiving of knowledge—justified belief in 'closed circles'.[17] But Tom Sorell[18] cites two alternatives to Rorty's interpretation of representationalism. Bernard Williams recommends the building of a representation from numerous individual representations. Objectivity is here sought to be preserved apart from essentialism. Thomas Nagel, on the other hand, would have us begin with a hypothesis of what the world might be like and then seek to approximate to it by eliminating the individual viewpoints. Both share the characteristics of being constructivist and aspiring to objectivity without making the representations mirror-reflections. They are rather cognitive constructs. Of course, these models cannot rank very high in explanatory value for the cognitivists because they leave the question of the genesis of representation unexplored. Apart from this, there is the Davidsonian criticism that we do not have sky-hooks that would raise us above all individual viewpoints. Putnam's 'internal realism'[19] proves to be an ingenious attempt to integrate constructivism and contextualism.

A strikingly different approach is reflected by Konrad Lorenz's[20] biological model of knowledge and representation. Taking Darwinian evolution as his basis, he describes knowledge as a state of adaptation or compatibility between an organism and its environment. In this state the image of the environment is, so to say, imprinted in the organism, not as a picture but in the sense of a correspondence between the state of the organism and the conditions of the environment, often referred to as fitness for survival of the organism. Lorenz uses the term 'teleonomy'[21] and cites as examples the wave-like movements of the fins of the fish and the tendency of the paramecium on meeting an obstacle to recoil slightly and then swim on.

Rorty's stand in contrast to all these notions is anti-representationalist, the view that it is futile to hope to acquire representations of the world in any way. Therefore he recommends that knowledge is not to be considered a matter of getting reality right but rather one of acquiring skills for coping with it. Rorty apparently adopts this anti-representationalist stand to skirt around the problem of foundations. He would have us believe that the notions of apodicticity and foundations are myths that have outlived their usefulness. His error lies in failing to distinguish between two senses of the term 'foundations': (a) ground level (b) grounds of justification of knowledge-claims. Epistemology is regarded as the fundamental discipline only because of its concern with the ground level issues of cognition.

Future of Epistemology as a Specific Discipline

Rorty sees no use for epistemology and would have no regrets if it withered away. The question, however, is, does it deserve to be allowed to wither? Yes—if Rorty's contention that there can be no fruitful theorization about knowledge is true; no—if the growth of the new discipline called cognitive science is any indication.

Epistemology has turned a corner. The multi-disciplinary approach[22] called cognitive science is a rich possibility. 'Evolutionary epistemology' with its corollary of 'hypothetical realism'[23] is another possibility.

Rorty's difficulty arises from the fact that his conception of epistemology is built on the naive notion of pictorial representation. He is right in dismissing this as a worthless theory, but wrong in precluding alternative possibilities.

Rorty's stand is that of one who has lost his will and intellectual ambition. But theorization about knowledge is clearly not a worthless venture. Apart from the new attractiveness of the multi-disciplinary approach of cognitive science, one cannot help but agree with Malachowski[24] that, 'In societies where knowledge is intertwined with power . . . and ideology, we need to become more self-conscious, more sophisticated and more theoretical about what it is to know.'

II

Rorty would describe the post-philosophical culture as one in which 'no one owns the truth and everyone has the right to be understood.'[25] There will be only conversation, the activity of seeking rational certainty for one's belief through victory in argument. The notions of truth and foundations will have been replaced by that of meaning, and for the latter, we would be the sole determiners.

Rorty sees many advantages in such a change. The major one, he says is 'edification'[26] of man—making one more open to new perspectives and thereby more tolerant. It helps break 'the crust of convention',[27] he says; and thereby reduces rigidity and dogmatism. The mind would grow 'larger and stronger and more interesting by the addition of new options'.[28]

Rorty's recommendations follow from his scepticism and absolute discounting of truth and knowledge as realities. What is commended as true belief, explains Rorty, is only the normal discourse of the day, that is, the discourse that proceeds along conventional lines. Knowledge, he says, is 'simply a compliment paid to the beliefs which we think so well justified that, for the moment further justification is not needed.'[29] Serving as the cornerstone for his recommendations are two strong convictions: acculturation (we cannot climb out of our language-games) and ethnocentrism (we cannot get a God's eye-view of things). So truth, knowledge and objectivity are all relative to particular paradigms. This is why Rorty discounts both enquiry and discovery. He recommends that all epistemological preoccupa-

tions be abandoned as simply unsuccessful vocabularies. Epistemology, he tells us, is best regarded as merely an 'episode in the history of European culture'.[30] He would have us believe that it is even undesirable because it blocks conversation by its illusion of having attained apodictic truth. In contrast, 'edifying' philosophy, by its hermeneutic approach, preserves the freedom to seek alternatives. He cites Kant's system as an example of one bound by constraints. Such systems, Rorty says, objectivize and dehumanize man by giving the impression that his definition can be exhausted within a specific description.

Non-edifying philosophy, Rorty informs us, also creates mirages of truth. According to him this is accomplished by first seeking a locus for commensuration and when that is found, declaring it to be an entity. It is surprising that Rorty was never led to ponder over the conditions that make up the ground level of consensus. Rorty's treatment of truth and meaning thus makes the latter fundamental to the former. Now a question that arises is, how could we be a community of meaning-makers with absolutely no notion of any criterion or concept of truth?[31] This is where Rorty has departed from Gadamarian hermeneutics. The latter having prescribed hermeneutical conversation as the right social relation, posited the Die Sache,[32] though surreptitiously. But the basic point is that Gadamer had seen the impossibility of talking about meaning divorced from truth.

One wonders how Rorty would explain the ending of a conversation, how he would explain acceptance of a belief as adequate or justified. What would be the criterion of adequate justification? Rorty can hardly provide an answer. Peirce would have explained it as the sense of having approximated to the final convergence that is truth. Polany[33] would have answered it in terms of our tacit knowledge and 'satisfaction'. But Rorty has none of these aids. In conversation, says he, 'we might just be saying something.'[34] It is not an enquiry, nor is one putting forth a view. All of us would be with Tom Sorell[35] when he asks why at all we would be conversing if we had no reason to talk. The question becomes more acute in the light of Rorty's own appeal that the conversation be kept going. We ask, for what?

Most of Rorty's pronouncements spring from a deep-seated bias against cognitivism. What puzzles one is that he has chosen to ignore recent trends within philosophy that should have interested him. One example is evolutionary epistemology propounded by Lorenz.[36] The biological reductions should have evoked Rorty's interest. Psychology too has (most often keeping itself materialistic) offered its services to epistemology. Most exciting is cognitive science, the multi-disciplinary empirico-philosophical approach to epistemology. Perhaps it will prove to be the prolegomenon to a unified science of man. Rorty is sceptical of this possibility. But he cannot be too dogmatic. Having preferred edification to philosophy, he must be open to all possibilities. He explains his preference for the sociology of knowledge, by the fact of the absence of constraints. The irony is that Rorty himself

appears exceedingly constrained by his presumptions about what philosophy ought to be and his prejudices against what he calls traditional philosophy.

Also, the consideration of knowledge as only a social phenomenon leaves what Malachowski calls 'deep epistemology'[37] untouched. Susser[38] had the same consideration in mind when he remarked that framework [arguments, issue of paradigms, commensurability, inextricability of cognition from human interest, have no doubt made important contributions to the understanding of knowledge, but none of these provide any justification for the dismissal of the metaphysical facet of human cognition. Sociology of knowledge, as Susser rightly points out, entails its own destruction. The fact of being culture-bound and thus being evanescent applies to it as much as to any other discipline.

The cardinal failure of sociology of knowledge is its inability to distinguish between knowledge and opinion. It is alarming that Rorty does not see the necessity of making such a distinction. Susser rightly asserts that the very multiplicity that sociology of knowledge underlines, points to the existence of a permanent, satisfactory and autonomous conceptual sphere. 'Multiplicity can be explained sociologically but it can be resolved only in a philosophical unity',[39] he says.

Another cogent criticism against sociologists of knowledge is 'their patronizing superiority and implicit absolutism of their approach'.[40] One cannot agree more whole-heartedly on this, after reading *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*.

Popper's 'selectionism' is a potent attack on the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge. The test of 'catastrophe' or 'selection' enables it to sift out propositions that can be accorded privileged epistemological status. The propositions that qualify demonstrate the existence of a truth, independent of social acceptability. The fact of its being relational to a paradigm is of course not being denied. Truth, free of all paradigms, is an impossibility. What is underlined is the fact that social acceptance must not be mistaken as the sole determiner of a paradigm.

Just as Rorty's argument against what he termed the myth of the mind proved to be unconvincing, so does his presentation of 'conversation' as the only alternative to philosophy fail to carry weight. Some thinkers like Jane Heal have been unequivocal in their contention that Rorty's criticism of traditional philosophy does not logically entail acceptance of his deconstructivism as the only alternative.[41]

Having deprived himself of the possibilities of truth and knowledge, Rorty becomes vulnerable to the charge of relativism. He attempts to sidestep the issue by arguing that this seems so to his critics only because they run together the two notions of relativity and irrationality. Pragmatists are, he tells us, ethnocentrist, but not relativist. He would have us accept that in conversation every view is not regarded as good as any other, that it only stresses the fact that there is no algorithm for deciding between two views.[42]

In conclusion it would be pertinent to remark that Rorty's error lay not in his promotion of the notion of historicism of knowledge but in his refusal to acknowledge that there is more to the issue of knowledge than its historical determinism.

III

One is surprised that the cognitive turn that reinstated the mind in psychology and revolutionized epistemology has left Rorty unaffected. While he denounces the mind and its representations as well as foundations as mere myths, and epistemology as a futile pursuit, they have had a renaissance in cognitive science.

Remaining true to the etymology of the word 'cognition',[43] the new discipline underlines mediation as the character of the cognitive process. Like the men in the cave, we too can have only representations of reality. Cognitive science regards the mind as a computing device and seeks to understand its representations and computing capacities. It also seeks to know the nature of representations as they occur in the brain.[44] Today it is hypothesized that there are inner states, each characterized by a certain specificity that exerts a certain determining influence on incoming stimuli. The product of their interaction is referred to as a representation. This is in keeping with Kant's notion of representation as being not a picture but a particular mode of a functional state that stands in a isomorphic relation to the external reality. Keeping within the paradigm, representations have been conceived of in remarkably various ways.

Stephen Kosslyn, working along the lines initiated by Roger Shepard,[45] conceives of representations as quasi-pictures in the head, the latter notion having a deep and surface level meaning. As a mental picture in one's awareness it is a construction out of the interaction of external stimuli with innately occurring information patterns. Here lies the second notion of picture in the head. The innate patterns have in them archetypes of the images that we hold in our awareness. The archetypes themselves exist in a non-linguistic state but by their information-content they serve as determining factors.

A persistent critic of this image-in-the-head theory is Pylyshyn. He agrees that we do have mental pictures in our awareness and that they are the products of the interaction of external stimuli with an innate equipment. But this equipment, according to him, is the architecture of the system with its operational rules, the whole being constituted of information in propositional state (i.e. a framework for constituting conceptual relations). Pylyshyn denies the existence of any determining archetypes. Mental images, he says, have no rigid character, they are 'cognitively penetrable', i.e. they are absolutely prone to the determining influences of the beliefs and emotions

at the time in the individual. There is no matching with pre-existing tokens.

Fodor's concept is a variant of the notion of pre-existing, meaning-determining inner equipment. He refers to it as the 'language of thought', an innate system of representations that transfers its nature during the process of moulding, on incoming data.

Daniel Dennett too subscribes to representationalism, but he differs from many fellow-cognitivists by his sensitivity to the fact of rationality and purposive characteristics of human behaviour. Unlike many others who settled for a purely mechanical approach to the mind and its computational activity, Dennett proposes what he calls an intentional system of representations, seeking thereby to preserve the factors of intelligence and purposiveness of behaviour.

Ulric Neisser and Johnson-Laird are again cognitive scientists who would not settle for any exclusive or mechanical approach. The latter maintains that mentally we function at different levels in different situations. Therefore he posits three types of mental representations that resemble natural language, structural analogue of the world and construction of perceptual correlations of models of a situation or object from a particular point of view.

Neisser appeals for an ecological approach, one that would study the individual not merely as an information-processing device but a being that has a history and an ecology. His notion of representation as 'anticipatory schemata' is an illustration of conceptualization.

What is evident as common to all cognitive scientists is:

(a) the preservation of the mind independent of the ocular metaphor;
(b) a conception of the mind not as a mirror but as a computing device;
(c) cognition regarded as not the acquisition of exact pictures of an external reality but rather as the generation of an impressionistic image of it. This is accomplished by the computational activity of the mind;
(d) formal systems of symbol representation that the mind generates out of its interaction with external stimuli.

What is amply clear is that the mind is much more than merely 'the blur with which the Western intellectuals became obsessed when they finally gave up on the blur which was the theologian's concept of God.'[46]

The notion of representation as a conceptual cognition has the virtue of bringing within the gamut of science, some common experiences—one's withdrawing into a private world of one's own in which one may rehearse one's actions, re-live an experience, prepare one's thoughts and weigh the pros and cons of rival strategies of action. It also explains why the one physical world seems cheerful and melancholic alternatively with one's moods. Thus in cognition we appropriate the world on our terms. We need have no qualms about joining Rorty in his declaration that we are makers of meaning. What marks the divide between him and us is the different

depths at which we seek the ground levels of meaning. Rorty's conception drags one into the quagmire of relativity. Cognitive science underlines the strain of uncertainty in all our cognitions.

Rorty's theory of the social relativity of knowledge indicates a hesitation to let one's self be led by the cognitive abilities to the deep levels that they are capable of exploring. These are the ground levels or foundations of knowledge. Having dogmatically decided that such notions are mere myth, Rorty sees no need for epistemology. But foundationalism and epistemology have survived and the latter's existence today as the fundamental discipline of cognitive science proves that theorization about knowledge continues to be a worthy activity. In fact, to declare that the whole of cognitive science is only a footnote to epistemology, would not be philosophical chauvinism. That this is not an empty boast can be demonstrated by citing some examples of projects in cognitive science. Two interesting ones are: Computer Vision (a project to build a model of the cognitive processes involved in acquiring a three-dimensional representation from a two-dimensional image) and the Relevance Theory of Knowledge (Sperber and Wilson—a project to understand 'natural language understanding'). Both have at their basis epistemological notions of knowledge as a mental phenomenon, the mind as an active agent, knowledge as a transaction between a knower and an object. The Relevance Theory in fact was sparked off by Chomsky's notion of language as a psychological phenomenon and Fodor's representative theory of mind. Rorty has been dogmatic and even polemical in his dismissal of the notions of foundations of knowledge and the possibility of epistemology.

Rorty's problem has been succinctly described by Malachowski[47] thus: his (Rorty's) 'brush strokes are too broad, and they blot out the potential space for fresh developments.' We add that if we choose to be satisfied with less than what we can get, the world does not thereby get reduced to just that much.

Notes and References

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3. Ibid., pp. 141-42.
4. Ibid., p. 342ff.
5. Ibid., p. 3.
6. Ibid., Chapter III, Sections 2 and 3.
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8. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans., Norman Kemp Smith, Macmillan, New York, 1964, A xiv and A xvii.
9. Locke, *Essay*, II. viii.8.

10. Ibid., IV.i.2.
11. Ibid., II.i.25 and II.ix.1.
12. Ibid., II.i.3, II.i.23, II.viii.12. What is striking is the notion of external stimuli *producing* impression.
13. J. Yolton, 'Mirrors and Veils, Thoughts and Things: The Epistemological Problematic' in A.R. Malachowski (ed.), *Reading Rorty: Critical Responses to Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Basil Blackwell, Great Britain, 1990, p. 70.
14. Kant, op. cit., A 653, B 681.
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16. Bertrand Russell, *Analysis of Mind*, London, 1921, and also *The Problems of Philosophy*, London, 1912.
17. P. Munz, *Our Knowledge of the Growth of Knowledge*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1985, Chapters 4 and 5.
18. T. Sorell, 'The World from its Own Point of View', in A.R. Malachowski, *Reading Rorty*.
19. H. Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981.
20. K. Lorenz, *Behind the Mirror*, trans., Ronald Taylor, Methuen, 1977; see 'Epistemological Prolegmenon'.
21. Ibid., p. 22.
22. Cognitive science is constituted of the disciplines of philosophy, psychology, artifical intelligence, anthropology, linguistics and neuro-science.
23. Lorenz, *Behind the Mirror*.
24. A. Malachowski, 'Deep Epistemology without Foundations', in Malachowski (ed.), *Reading Rorty*, p. 151.
25. Milan Kundera, *The Art of the Novel*. Quoted by Rorty at the beginning of his book *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*.
26. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, p. 360ff.
27. Ibid., p. 379.
28. Richard Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism and Truth*, Philosophical Papers, Vol. I, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (forthcoming), p. 14.
29. Ibid., p. 24.
30. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, p. 390.
31. Rorty defines criterion as 'temporary resting places constructed for specific utilitarian ends.' See Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1982, p. xli.
32. H. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, Seabury Press, New York, 1975.
33. M. Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967. Also see his *Knowing and Being*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1969.
34. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, p. 371.
35. Sorell, 'The World from Its Own Point of View', p. 21.
36. Lorenz, *Behind the Mirror*.
37. Malachowski, 'Deep Epistemology without Foundations', p. 146.
38. B. Susser, 'The Sociology of Knowledge and its Enemies', in *Inquiry*, 32, p. 246.
39. Ibid., p. 249.
40. Ibid., p. 250.
41. J. Heal, 'Pragmatism and Choosing to Believe', in Malachowski (ed.), *Reading Rorty*.
42. Rorty's stand appears to be 'relationalism', a *via media* between absolutism and relativity. However relationalism is a self-negating doctrine, for while it states that any view is only one perspective, this proposition itself is supposed to be valid absolutely. For a detailed discussion see Ernst Grunwald, 'The Sociology of Knowledge and Epistemology', in J.E. Curtis and J.W. Petras (ed.) *The Sociology of Knowledge*.

43. The word 'cognition' is believed to have its roots in the Greek 'gnomon' which refers to the pole in the centre of the sun-dial that by its shadow helps measure the heavenly movements.
44. This is a continuation of the Lockean and Kantian endeavour to understand human cognition. It also reflects their unconcern with the unknowable (the real).
45. Shepard rejects the notion of the *lingua-franca* of the representations being propositional.
46. H. Gardner, *The Mind's New Science*, Basic Books, New York, 1985, p. 72.
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Towards an Indian sociology*

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The present O'pus is the second edition of the felicitation volume edited by Professor T.N. Madan in honour of the French social anthropologist Louis Dumont. It carries 19 articles by the 17 scholars from disciplines like Philosophy, Sociology, Anthropology and History focused on the study of Indian society to which Prof. Dumont had devoted a considerable span of his academic career during the decades of fifties and sixties.

Professor Dumont belongs to a very thin minority of the social scientists who did not succumb to the swaying vogues of raw positivism and empiricism that severed all connections between 'thought' and 'behaviour' or rather between 'facts' and 'values'. In contrast to the dominant note of pseudo-scienticism infatuating social scientists during 1960s, it was Dumont who could appreciate the unique nature of Indian social reality and believed that 'A sociology of India lies at the point of confluence of sociology and Indology' (p. 410). The pressent volume offers such a confluence to delve into. One could agree with Veena Das (p. 153) that students of Hinduism should be 'grateful to Louis Dumont for his seminal contribution to the understanding of the structural categories of Hinduism'. This epistemological methodological issue has been well presented by Prof. T.N. Madan in the 'epilogue'—'For a Sociology of India' where he has highlighted the contribution of L. Dumont as an endeavour to bring about the 'unity of fact and value' (p. 417) specially in the context of Indian social reality. In fact Professor Dumont altered the conventional categories of structural analysis from symmetrical binary oppositions to that of hierarchical ones. In the ideal-typical vein he characterized Indian *weltanschauung* as 'homo-hiararchicus' and contrasted it with the western one that he perceived as 'homo-equalis'. As the sub-title of the book reveals he endeavours to comprehend Indian social system into three categories, viz. King, Householder and the Renouncer. While on the one hand he highlights the tension between the 'householder' and the 'renouncer', on the other hand he separates 'power' from the 'ritual' status in the social hierarchy. Thus while politically a King may be superior in power, a Brahmin enjoys supreme position in the ritually organized caste hierarchy. A renouncer, i.e. a *Sannyāsin* is historically a later addition in the Vedic social order and therefore there exists a tension between the two competing religious authorities and their orders, viz. the Brahmin and his ritually based 'caste' hierarchy on the one hand and a *Sannyāsin* and his 'sect' on the other.

*T.N. MADAN (ed.): *Way of Life: King, Householder, Renouncer (Essays in honour of Louis Dumont)*, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Pvt. Ltd., Delhi, new ed., 1988, 435 pages. Rs. 190.

The present volume is concentrated to provide a thematic unity to the subject and focuses attention on the 'Brahmanical concept of the "good life" as stated in the ideology of *puruṣārtha*'. Understanding of *puruṣārthas* in-fact is pivotal to the study of Hindu society and its world-view, for while *puruṣārthas* constitute the essential goals and preferables of human life, *varṇa* and *āśramas* serve as means of attaining them. Due to the epistemic dichotomization between 'fact' and 'value' or between the 'text' and the 'context' the study of *puruṣārthas* has faced an utter neglect from the social scientists for they were attracted more towards the facts of behaviour rather than towards the desirabilities of life. It is Prof. Dumont who envisaged to look at the Indological material as an essential component for studying the structures of Hindu society. Prof. Madan in his article 'The Ideology of the Householder' (p. 224) clearly sees this epistemological chasm as a methodological pitfall that led to an overemphasis on the study of social relations and a neglect of cultural aspects. But he also cautions that the corrective does not lie 'in replacing one determinism by another but rather in adopting a dialectical approach to the interpretation of the data about everyday life. The study of ideas and beliefs must take place in the context of observable behaviour and vice versa' (p. 224). In fact merely 'structural' or 'functional' or philosophico-Indological approach does not suit and suffice to the study of the mosaic of Indian social reality; rather, as suggested by Prof. Madan, it is the dialectical approach that suits most in understanding the contradictions and variegations of Indian unity and diversity of social and cultural life.

Charles Malamoud in his opening article 'On the Rhetoric and Semantics of *Puruṣārtha*' (p. 33) dilates discursively on the nature and meaning of *puruṣārthas* and tries to decipher an implicit numerical pattern of 3+1 relationship between the fourfold existential goals of human life, viz. *dharma, artha, kāma* and *mokṣa*. He calls this 3+1 pattern of relationship as 'a fundamental stereotype in Indian discourse' (p. 34) which emphasizes an inherent gap between the three homogenous elements and the additional, not so homogenous, fourth one. In the present case, thus, according to Malamoud while the first three *puruṣārthas*, i.e. *dharma, artha* and *kāma* constitute one homogenous group the fourth one, i.e. *mokṣa*, is an addition to it which originally was not conceived as a part of the '*trivarga*' package. Similar is the case with the *āśrama* scheme where *Sannyāsa āśrama* contitutes the plus one to the first three, viz. *Brahmacarya, gārhasthya* and *vānaprastha* and in the *varṇa* order *Śūdra* as the additional fourth one originally not conceived as a part of the basic framework of the *varṇa* scheme which includes only the 'twice-born' castes in the first three *varṇas*.

Though this kind of numerary analysis sounds very impressive but in fact it does not connote anything significant in terms of its meaning and functionality. Perhaps what Malamoud has tried to see as the 'fourth' or the plus one component to the original package of the three *puruṣārthas* could

also be conceived as the third dimension, i.e. the dimension of 'Transcendence' existing beyond the pairs of opposites. This is a state of consciousness where contradictions and quandaries of perception do not exist or rather dissolved into a higher consciousness of *coincidentia oppositorum*—a state of creative passivity or what J. Krishnamurty calls the state of 'Choiceless Awareness'. But to equate the fourth or the plus one state of *mokṣa* or *Sannyāsa* to the fourth state of the *varṇa* order, i.e. Śūdra *varṇa*, appears to be ridiculous and simplistic for it offers no meaningful comparison.

Such a superficial analysis cannot be avoided unless one is inclined to look to the *puruṣārtha* scheme in a dialectical framework. In the dialectical framework *puruṣārtha* scheme offers a *sādhanā* perspective where while two of the *puruṣārthas*, viz. *artha* and *kāma* constitute the active worldly life, i.e. *pravṛitti mārga*, the fourth one, i.e. pursuit of *mokṣa* constitutes *nivṛtti marga*. The *pravṛtti mārga* constitutes the centrifugal tendency or the extrovert tendency to take to active worldly life and *nivṛtti* constitutes a centripetal tendency to prevent and withdraw from the forces of extroversion and relate to one's own inner being through contemplative religious life. While the *pravṛtti* (centrifugal tendency) constitutes the process of becoming; *nivṛtti* (centripetal tendency) leads to the realization of one's authentic 'Being'. The *puruṣārtha* of *dharma* quintessentially being the law eternal or the cosmic law (*dhārayeti iti dharma*) forms the bridge between one's 'being' and 'becoming' so as to enable a *Sādhaka* to be 'Being' in 'becoming' and 'becoming' in 'Being'—a state of zero alienation from one's own self and the perfect unity of existence. This dialectic of *puruṣārtha* scheme has found most appropriate expression in the *karma-yoga* or the *anāsakti* yoga of the *Śrīmad Bhagavad Gītā* and its wisdom—*yogaḥ karmeṣu kauśalam*.

In fact the quintessence of the *puruṣārtha* of *dharma* is not merely ritualism or repitition of the Vedic hymns but to commit to the discipline of *sādhanā* or the 'spiritual praxis' that ultimately leads one to the realization and practice of the eternal Truth. *Dharma* thus is not *karma* but the essence of it, for it manifests through the *karma* and as such no act is wholly meritorious or wicked.

No act is a full expression of '*dharma*' and none fails to express some '*dharma*'. An 'act' is correct or meritorious to the extent it is in accordance with the spirit of '*dharma*', i.e. it ultimately leads one to the realization of the Truth and emancipation. Thus in this dialectical perspective *dharma* forms the ethic of *mokṣa* or *mokṣa* in action—an encompassing reality and ideality that both prevents one from falling prey to the alienating forces of *avidyā* which happens to be the main cause of chaos and miseries in the personal and social life of man.

To G.C. Heesterman ('Householder and Wanderer' p. 251) and S.J. Tambiah ('The Renouncer's Individuality and Community' p. 299) both the *puruṣārtha* of *mokṣa* and the renouncer's position are most perplexing, for the essence of *dharma* is the discharge of the household duties (*ṛṇa*) and per-

formance of Vedic 'sacrifice' and not transcendence or *mokṣa*, i.e. release from the Karmic world. Heesterman (p. 252) inquires about the mutual accommodation of two 'conflicting traditions—the Brahman's vedic ritualism firmly based in this world and the renouncer's ultramundane discipline of final release—which somehow became aggregated' (p. 253) and finds that 'whatever additional outside stimuli there may have been, the renunciatory tendency can be seen to arise orthogenetically from within the vedic sacrificial tradition itself.'

In fact the cultural systems and traditions of India have always remained innovative and experimentation-oriented which has prevented fossilization of ideas. It is in this vein and spirit of creativity that the ultimate meaning of '*dharma*' and human existence has always remained a mystical subject, amenable only to inner discovery—*dharmasya tattvam nihitam guhāyām*—and ineffable in its final experience. It is very difficult to comprehend such phenomena with deeper subjectivity through bipolar linear models of thought; it is only a dialectical approach that can help its understanding and proper construction.

The *sādhanā* perspective and the dialectical approach finds apt expression in Madeleine Biardeau's article 'The Salvation of the King in the Mahabharata' (p. 75), Veena Das's paper (p. 153) and T.N. Madan's paper 'The Ideology of the Householder among the Kashmiri Pandits' (p. 223). While the first two papers provide a 'textual' thematic analysis, the third one gives an ethnographic account of the Kashmiri householder's world-view about 'good life'.

Biardeau tries to understand the role of Arjuna in the epic war of the *Māhābhārata*. If Arjuna is to be understood as the ideal king, 'his personal action should be analysed as mediating between *mokṣa* and *kāma*, between yogic values and sacrifice. He should be able at the same time to epitomise these opposite and complementary values in himself and ensure their harmonious working for the welfare of the three worlds.' (p. 92) Veena Das too in her paper '*Kāma* in the Scheme of *Puruṣārthas* based on the textual study of different Ramayanas, writes 'It is only when the pursuit of *kāma*, is tempered by the spirit of renunciation, that it can remain within the bounds of *dharma*', (p. 193). In her analysis of the dual nature of *kāma*, i.e. 'rejuvenative' and 'destructive', she points out that it is transcendence and synthesis of this 'dualism' that leads to human perfection seen in the characters of Rama and his consort Sītā as compared to other characters like Daśaratha and Kaikeyī, Rāvaṇa and Mandodarī, Śurpaṇakhā, etc. She writes: 'The love of both Rama and Sita is contained by their asceticism (*tapas*) and sacrifice (*tyāga*). Only to the extent that it is contained and reflects the values of asceticism can it ensure the fulfilment of *dharma*". (p. 200). She concludes 'The Pursuit of Kāma as a Puruṣārtha is the entry into an exchange fraught with great danger in which the "self" discovers the "other" in the realm of sexuality'. (p. 203).

Similarly Professor Madan too informs about Kashmiri Pandits: 'A Pandit's most precious possession, I have been repeatedly told, is his self. One's self is of course, more than one's body (*śarīra*). The physical self or the body by itself is really of little significance. It is *kṣaṇa bhaṅgura*. . .It is when the body is joined to the inner self (*antarātmā*) that it becomes the vehicle of *dharma*'. (p. 234)

The above accounts amply warant to conceive *puruṣārtha* order of human life in the dialectical framework and *sādhanā* perspective which offers a *weltanschauung* and a model of human life quite different from the chivalrous heroism, and consumeristic hedonism. To call *puruṣārtha* ideology merely as 'Brahmanical concept of the "good life"' (Preface) too appears to be somewhat narrow and xenophilic perception, for through its essential dialectic of *vita-activa* vs. *vita-contemplativa* of the *sādhanā* perspective it has incessantly served and permeated Indian social tradition right from the Vedic order to *upaniṣadic*, *śramaṇic*, medieval *bhakti* movements and the nineteenth century cultural and social renaissance and the twentieth century Gandhian movements based on the values of *satya* and *ahiṁsā*. *Sādhanā* tradition in fact forms the quintessence of Indian world-view and offers an alternative concept of man and humanism to world civilization.

The present work along with the efforts made by Professor Louis Dumont in evolving a Sociology for India deserves hearty appreciation, for it paves the way and creates a climate to build a genuine Indian sociology and anthropology both in form and content.

Foundations of Indian Culture: fact or fiction?*

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This is the second edition of Dr Pande's book. The first volume of the work has the sub-title 'Spiritual Vision and Symbolic Forms in Ancient India'. The various chapters deal with the transcendental roots of Indian culture, Vedic interpretations and tradition, various philosophical schools, such as Mahāyāna, Vedānta, Adhyātma-vidyā as philosophy, Purāṇas and Tantras, etc. In the second part of this volume, the author deals with language and myth, forms of rational knowledge, literature and art. The first part is almost a history of Indian philosophy, albeit in a condensed form.

The second volume is sub-titled 'Dimensions of Ancient Indian Social History'. It deals with patterns and standard of living from the Vedic to the post-Vedic ages, and also with the political order and ideas.

It was necessary to give some idea of the contents of the book to show what a vast field the author covers. To review the book adequately will require the reviewer to have some knowledge and understanding of all the subjects dealt with. Few would claim to possess this.

The purpose of Dr Pande's book is to show that the foundational ideas of Indian civilization were native to the soil, and the whole of this civilization developed on these ideas. Our civilization was not a layer by layer addition of ideas that came here due to migrations and invasions.

The book tries to establish that there are two main traditions which are the foundations of Indian civilization. One of them is Vedic and the other Śramaṇic. There are other minor traditions such as the Tāntric, but these did not affect much the mainstream of our civilization.

One of the most interesting chapters in the book is entitled 'Vedic Interpretation'. This describes how all through the ages attempts have been made to understand the meaning of the hymns of the *Ṛgveda* and the *Atharva Veda*. Their language, which we may call Vedic, had been forgotten long before the Christian era began. All the attempts to interpret the language of the Vedic hymns failed. The grammarian Pāṇini (fourth century B.C.) failed to analyse Vedic words; and Yāska could interpret only a few terms. So much so that 'one of Yāska's predecessors, named Kautsa actually had the audacity to assert that the science of Vedic expositions was useless,

*G. C. PANDE, *Foundations of Indian Culture*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, Vol. I, 378 pp., Vol. II, 284 pp., 2nd edition, 1990, Rs. 325 (set).

as the Vedic hymns and formulas were obscure, unmeaning or mutually contradictory'. (A.A. Macdonell, *A History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 61.)

The only attempt to comment in detail on the Vedic texts was made by Sāyana (fourteenth century A.D.), and this commentary remained the standard interpretation of the Vedas till the middle of the nineteenth century. Wilson and Max Mueller made it the basis of their translations of the *Ṛgveda*. But later European and American scholars said of Sāyana, who lived only six hundred years ago, the Vedic language was as obscure to him as it was to the ancients. They, therefore, made fresh attempts to interpret the Vedas. They took the help of the then newly discovered science of comparative philology. The German scholar Roth was the most persevering in his efforts and, as Macdonell wrote at the end of the nineteenth century, Roth brought us 'at the threshold of the world of Vedic thought'. (Macdonell, *A History of Sanskrit Literature*)

Some Indian scholars also joined the quest during the current century. They have succeeded in many respects, and as Dr Pande says in this book, 'The principal uncertainty of Vedic interpretation is not now linguistic or philological. The uncertainty arises from the fact that there is enough ambiguity in the Vedic hymns to allow a diversity of interpretation as to their exact significance.' (p. 12)

The purpose of this digression is to raise the question, why did the classical scholars invoke the Vedas as the source of their sciences if they did not understand the Vedas. In most cases the Vedas were invoked perhaps to give some authority to their works, and also to say that they were writing in the orthodox tradition. They, however, rarely quoted any actual Vedic words. Some of the scholars were honest enough to say that by Vedas they meant their recitation only and not their substance. 'The emphasis laid in Mīmāṃsā texts of the unbroken tradition of Vedic study refers apparently only to the tradition of memorizing and reciting the Vedas.' (p. 11)

A few centuries after the *Saṃhitās* or the Vedic texts were compiled, a vast amount of literature grew, ostensibly to describe how the Vedic rituals and sacrifices were to be carried out. These were called the Brāhmaṇas. They were followed by other compilations known as the Āraṇyakas and the Upaniṣads. The Dharmśāstras, the codes of conduct, perhaps came a few centuries later. The texts of the *Saṃhitas* were rarely quoted in these works, though the term *Veda* was frequently invoked in them. These texts and other literatures which followed them constitute what are known as Vedic tradition, and form, according to Dr Pande, one of the two foundations of Indian civilization. The civilization of the *saṃhitās*, which may be called Vedism, had practically no influence on them. As R.N. Dandekar puts it, 'The impact of Vedism on the mythology, ritual and philosophy of classical Hinduism has been of a superficial nature.' (*Some Aspects of the History of Hinduism*, p. 28)

Another independent foundation of Indian culture is what Dr Pande calls

the Śramaṇa tradition. It is quite obvious that this tradition, which may also be called asceticism, is all-pervading in the life and thought of all Indians. 'The Śramaṇas believed that life is basically painful and spiritually evil. The all-pervasiveness of *Duhkha* has since become a by-word in the Indian tradition and makes pessimism its hallmark' (Vol. I, p. 61). 'Life is not pleasure and pain but pain through and through' (Vol. I, p. 61).

When did this Śramaṇa tradition appear in India? Dr Pande in the present work says that it probably arose in the post-Vedic age and gained strength at the time of the Buddha and Mahāvīra. But might it not be older? Perhaps it existed from very ancient times. The joyous attitude of the Vedic seers was unable to suppress it. In fact it succumbed to it and the later Vedic tradition accepted *sannyāsa* or asceticism as desirable in the fourth or the last stage of human life. Dr Pande himself wrote in 1947, 'The anti-ritualistic tendency within the Vedic fold is itself due to an asceticism which antedated the Vedas.' (*Studies in the Origin of Buddhism*, p. 317)

Whatever its age, there is no doubt that asceticism and the striving for spiritual objectives, as against material things, is one of the main characteristics of Indian life. There is great pride in thinking that Indians are not enamoured of material ends; we aim at spiritual ends.

But is the Vedic tradition also equally a foundation of Indian culture? The *Bhagavadgītā* and the *Manusmṛti* were both compiled perhaps at the beginning of the Christian era. With these two ended the writing of original texts of the Vedic tradition. Thereafter what was written were mostly commentaries. The two texts are supposed to provide the important basis of our religious philosophy and act as a guide to the everyday life of the people. How far have they provided the foundations of the present-day Indian culture? The *Manusmṛti*, it appears, has been practically rejected by the people. The book is totally materialistic. It has little time to discuss spiritual things. It gives more space to describing what kind of meat, of the buffalo or of the rhinoceros, will please the manes more, than to the thought why the manes need be pleased at all. Manu ridicules the great idea of the *Bhagavadgītā* that one should work without worrying about the fruits of one's action. 'Not a single act here [below] appears ever to be done by a man free from desire [for rewards]; for whatever [man] does, it is the result of the impulse for desire.' (*Manusmṛti*, II, 4)

The chief religious ritual mentioned in the *Manusmṛti* is *śrāddha*, the offering of water and food to the manes. *Śrāddha* is nearly a forgotten ritual today, specially in northern India; and in the parts of our country where it is taken a bit more seriously, it is performed in a perfunctory manner.

The main foundation of Indian social life is said to be *Varṇāśrama Dharma* as expounded in the *Manusmṛti* and other Dharma-śāstras. The question is, did this *dharma* ever exist, or was it ever treated even as an ideal? In the case of the *dharma* of the four *āśramas*, there is no doubt that the first three *āśramas* did exist, at least as ideals. Doubts exist about the fourth *āśrama*,

that in the last part of one's life one should live as an ascetic. It appears that this idea was taken over from the *śramaṇa* tradition, and nobody ever actually lived like an ascetic in his old age. The *Mahābhārata* had prescribed only the third *āśrama*, the *Vānaprastha*, for Dhṛtarāṣṭra and others of his generation in their old age. In any case the position remains doubtful.

On the other hand, the idea of the four *varṇas* was always a fiction. There were actually only two *varṇas* in India: the Brāhmaṇas, who laid down the rules, and others whom we may call the Śūdras. We rarely hear of any Kṣatriya ruler of India. From the Mauryas to the Guptas to the Queen Rudrāmbā, the great administrator who ruled when Marco Polo (AD 1293) passed through south India, none was a Kṣatriya. In fact some of the Purāṇas assert that in the Kali Age, Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas were not found in the country. It was only Kamalākara Bhaṭṭa (early seventeenth century), the Maharāṣṭriyan polymath who admitted of their existence in some pockets in India. Kamalākara said that in spite of the statement in some Purāṇas that in the Kali Age only two *varṇas*, viz. the first (Brāhmaṇas) and the fourth (Śūdras) exist, Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas who have given up their proper religion and other activities do exist here and there.

The foundations of Indian religious philosophy are the Upaniṣads, the *Bhagvadgītā* and the *Brahma-sūtra*. These three together are known as *Prasthāna-trayī*. Numerous commentaries have been written on them, at least from the time of Śaṅkara. In fact, it became almost a rule that nobody could start a religious school unless he had written commentaries on these three sets of books. Of these three, the *Brahma-sūtra* is terse and cryptic. Almost any interpretation could be given to its *sūtras*. The Upaniṣads are too vague and poetic, but they brought in the idea of an abstract God. An abstract God, or Brahma, about whom nothing positive could be said, brought one very close to *Śūnya-vāda*, the all-is-empty theory, of the Mahāyānists. Śaṅkara almost fell into this trap, and was sometimes called a *pracchanna-Bauddha*, a disguised Buddhist. He saved himself by equating Brahma with self. Whether equating two unknowns makes things easier to understand is not quite clear. The idea had already appeared in the Upaniṣads as 'Thou art That'. This looks like a profound pronouncement. But does it mean anything? If 'That', i.e. Brahma, is known only negatively, '*neti*', '*neti*' ('not this', 'not this'), will not 'Thou' have the same status? All this Vedānta doctrine thus appears to be empty semantics.

In fact, this love of semantics has been a great waster of time for the intellectuals of ancient India. As Ram Mohun Roy put it in his letter to the then Governor-General of India when he protested against the establishment of a Sanskrit college, as against a modern school, '. . .no improvement can be expected from inducing young men to consume a dozen of years of the most valuable period of their lives in acquiring the niceties of Sanskrit Grammar. For instance, in learning to discuss such points as the following: *Khāda* signifying to eat, *Khādati* he or she or it eats; query: whether does *Khādati* taken as a whole convey the meaning he, she or it eats, or are separate parts of this meaning conveyed by distinction of the words. . . .' (A.D. 1823)

Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar, the Principal of Sanskrit College, Calcutta, was more outspoken. In a letter regarding the revision of the syllabus of the College to the Secretary of the Council of Education, he wrote, 'For certain reasons, which it is needless to state here, we are obliged to continue the teaching of Vedānta and Sānkhya in the Sanskrit College. That Vedānta and Śānkhya are false systems of philosophy is no more a matter of dispute.' (7.9.1853)

What has India gained by remaining parochial? It is sad to think that our philosophers never asked the perennial questions of philosophy, 'What can human beings know? How do they come to know it? And how is that knowledge deployed in thought and action?' And these questions are still as fresh as they were two thousand five hundred years ago when the Greeks started asking them. It is not that the Indians did not come into contact with the Greeks, but all that our pundits learnt from them was astrology, something which perhaps they could have done well without.

One of the greatest contributions of the Greeks in the history of human thought was the discovery of axiomatic geometry. Indians never tried to learn how from only four (and an implied fifth) postulates, the whole of the subject of plane geometry could be built up. (A postulate in mathematics is a claim to take for granted the possibility of a simple operation, e.g. of drawing a straight line between any two points.) And Indians had two chances of learning axiomatic geometry: one directly from the Greeks, and another from the medieval Arabs who re-discovered the Greek sciences, and made geometry one of the subjects of their educational curriculum.

An important mathematical contribution of the Indians is said to be the Decimal Place Value Notation. This helped them to write very large numbers conveniently and in a short space. It also could have helped them in building up a Theory of Numbers. Gauss in the eighteenth century called the Theory of Numbers, the Queen of Mathematics, but nobody in India took any interest in the application of their great discovery. The Greeks, whose manner of writing large numbers was clumsy, discovered the Prime Number Theorem, that there is no largest prime number, but Indians perhaps had not even a name for prime number.

Among the *Prasthāna-trayī*, the most popular is the *Bhagvadgītā*. This work is both a guide to human conduct, and a religious work. As a guide to human conduct, it is perhaps not very helpful. It is wholly amoral, in that it tries to justify the slaughter of one's kith and kin for a selfish end. (Some people have, jocularly, described the *Gītā* as a manual of brain washing.) As a religious work, its chief contribution is the *bhakti-mārga*, the way of salvation through devotion to God. The *Gītā* is perhaps the first exponent of *bhakti-mārga* in India. Another school which taught this *mārga*

was the Pañcarātras. It is possible that the Pañcarātras were contemporaneous with the *Bhagavadgītā*, but the Pañcarātras, according to Dr Pande, specifically denied that they belonged to the Vedic tradition. (I, 142)

Both the *Gītā* and the Pañcarātras advocate devotion to an abstract God. It is not devotion to an anthropomorphic God as we know the *bhakti-mārga* today. The *bhakti* of the *Gītā* and of the Pañcarātras has become irrelevant today: it is confined to the texts only. In fact, many educated people have not even heard of the Pañcarātras.

Bhakti to an anthropomorphic god is one of the main religions of India today. Its literary manifestation sometimes borders on the erotic. The devotee imagines himself as a female lover of God, usually Kṛṣṇa. The love scenes are enacted on the banks of the Yamunā in Uttar Pradesh. This type of devotion cannot be traced back to any Vedic or post-Vedic tradition. So far as is known, it was first expounded by the Ālvāl poets of the Tamil land between the fifth and eighth centuries AD. They wrote many devotional poems woven around the love of Kṛṣṇa and his milkmaid companions. The stories were sanskritized and incorporated in the *Bhāgavata* and the *Brahma-vaivarta Purāṇas*. As these Purāṇas travelled north, they inspired the local poets to write many love lyrics. The most famous of these collections was the *Gīta-Govinda* of Jayadeva composed in Orissa or Bengal.

By the middle of the sixteenth century there was a great resurgence of vernacular literature in Mithila and Bengal. Under the guise of *bhakti* the poets wrote numerous love lyrics. Even Tagore has not been able to surpass them as love poems. It was a period of renaissance of Bengal; and it owed nothing to the Vedic or post-Vedic traditions.

The Vedic and post-Vedic religions of northern India have their texts in the Vedic or Sanskrit languages. The rituals and philosophy which accompanied them were known only to some learned Brāhmaṇas, who in their turn never allowed the non-Brāhmaṇas to study the texts. (It was after Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar's term as its Principal that the Government Sanskrit College, Calcutta was allowed by the orthodox to admit non-Brāhmaṇas to study in the College.) Can it be said that these texts are the foundation of Indian culture when the vast majority of Indians were not even allowed to have any access to them?

The religious ritual which flourishes in India today is the worship of some god, either in a temple or in a household shrine. The name of this worship is *pūjā* (Tamil, *puca*). In the house, *pūjā* is performed by the members of the family. When it is performed in the temple, there is usually an officiating priest. He is called a *pujāri* (Tamil, *pucari*). A *pujāri* is generally a low class Brāhmaṇa; the higher class Brāhmaṇas disdaineto perform *pujā*. An important ritual in a *pūjā* is *ārati*, waving a flame before the idol. This again is from a Tamil word, *aratti*.

Ancient texts on architecture deal mainly with the construction of temples. Several types of temples such as Drāviḍa, Nāgara, and Vesara have been

mentioned in them. Two things are common to all the texts. They (the *Mānasāra*, the *Maṇamata*, relevant chapters *on the subject* in *Kāmikāgama*, etc.) are all found in south India, and the temples they describe all have spires. There is no trace of the Vedic tradition in any of the texts.

So far as is known, the construction of brick-built temples in northern India started during the Gupta period. The oldest known example is the Udaigiri temple near Bhopal (*c.* A.D. 400). It was a flat-roofed structure, rectangular in shape.

Perhaps many volumes can be written on what culture is, particularly on whether there is an all-embracing Indian culture. There are many aspects of cultural difference between one part of India and another. Language, food habits, clothes, style of music vary from place to place. This is not surprising in this vast land of over a thousand million people. But in the matter of people's or folk religion, which no doubt is an important aspect of culture there is a great uniformity. This is the reverence or worship of the *Devī*, *Mātā* or the Mother Goddess. From Kāmākhyā in Assam to Hinglāj in Baluchistan, from Kanyakumāri in the extreme south to Vaishno-devī in Jammu, there is scarcely any village in India where there is no temple or *sthāna* (place, shrine) for the *Mātā*. Sometimes she has a specific name, such as, Keola-devī in north-eastern Rajasthan, or Kālī in Calcutta. Sometimes she is known by a general name such as Shītla in the north or Mariamma in south India. Sometimes there is a temple for her, but in most cases the shrine is a few lime-washed stones lying on the outskirts of the village. A newly married couple would go and bow to her. Occasionally the village women would throw a pitcher of water over her; but in most cases there is no regular worship or any officiating priest.

Mātā was there when the Indus Valley Civilization flourished. She is still there at the end of the twentieth century. The priestly caste, left out of making a living out of her, have tried to include her in their pantheon by calling her a part manifestation of Mahādevī.

Kalā yā yāh samudbhūtāḥ pūjitāstāśca bhārate
Pūjitā grāmadevyaśca grāme ca nagare mune
Devī-Bhāgavata (1. 1. 158)

All the village devīs which exist in the villages and towns of India are actually worshipped with full ritual as Mahādevī for they are (but) *kalā* (phase, part manifestation) of Mahādevī.

Book reviews

SUKHARANJAN SAHA, *Perspectives on Nyāya Logic and Epistemology* (K.P. Bagchi and Co., Calcutta, 1987).

This book is divided into two parts. The first part has two chapters: one entitled 'The Vaiśeṣika Scheme of Ontology' and the other, 'The Classical Nyāya Philosophy of Gautama'. Part Two has four chapters: 'Gautama's Existential Philosophy of Suffering', 'The Method of Demonstration', 'The Simulating Reasons' and 'The Technique of Refutation'. The last three chapters expound, according to the author, what Vātsyāyana calls '*ānvikṣiki*'. Chapters 2 and 3 discuss the Nyāya theory of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. Although in the author's view, the Nyāya logic and epistemology do not need the Vaiśeṣika ontology, Chapter 1 nevertheless expounds the latter just because the actual development of Nyāya utilized the Vaiśeṣika scheme.

An initial problem for the reader is how to get a grip on the structure of the book, its internal project and the arrangement of the chapters. Large parts of the book consist of free translations of selected *sūtras* of Gautama and Vātsyāyana's commentaries on them. Such free renderings and the author's own commentaries tend to get confusing for the reader. Another source of difficulty is due to the topics of Chapters 5 and 6. These topics are generally neglected by writers on Nyāya, and we owe it to the author that he has focused upon them. But why does he do so? There are scattered remarks which show the intention, but the reader has to be very discerning to be able to take note of them.

In this review, I shall not comment on the undoubted merit of the translations, and shall also desist from commenting on many of the details. I shall, instead, highlight the larger thesis that Dr Saha advances and add a few comments of my own to them.

In his introductory remarks, Dr Saha tells us that he has written the book from the point of view of Western philosophy. But is there anything straightforwardly characteristic of Western philosophy? A little later we begin to learn that what the author has in mind is the point of view of contemporary Western philosophy which, according to him, is Western philosophy at its best. It is from this point of view that we should, according to the author, interpret Indian philosophy. My guess is, he has some trends of contemporary analytic philosophy in mind. So, after all, the future of Indian philosophy lies in interpreting Indian thought from the point of view of contemporary analytic philosophy, let us say, as practised in Oxford and the Ivy League. I shall make here a few remarks on this project. First of all, it is all right if someone can carry out this project well. But there is no

reason why this is the way Indian philosophy should be done. Secondly, contemporary analytic philosophy itself is a mixed bag, and in choosing one's paradigm it is inevitable that one uses one's own preferences. Thirdly, if some ideas and theories of Indian philosophy can be expressed in the idiom of modern Western thought that does not by itself show why Western philosophers would be interested in Indian philosophy. For if the Indians did the same sort of thing, then why read them at all? As Davidson told Matilal—I am recalling Matilal's telling me this—Western philosophers would take Indian philosophy seriously only if they find that the Indians had solutions to some of their problems. It is important to show that the Indians had a way of solving precisely those problems with which the Western philosophers (of whatever persuasion you choose) are concerned. I would discuss one example of this later in this review. To Davidson's observation I shall add another: we may also need to show, first, that the Indian thinkers asked questions which the Western tradition did not ask, and second, that even when the very same questions are being asked, the Indians give it a slant, a twist, a formulation, which creates a new conceptual situation than is the case with Western philosophy. If all this be valid, then what we have on hand is not simply the task of interpreting Indian philosophy from the point of view of Western thought. We have the task of making Indian philosophy relevant for contemporary philosophy.

When Dr Saha comes to do his own work in this book, I am delighted to note that his most important thesis is advanced here quite independently of the point of view of Western thought. The central thesis of the book, to my mind, is that the Nyāya philosophy of the founding masters Gautama and Vātsyāyana is a *spiritual* philosophy whose central concern was the removal of human suffering. This fascinating claim, which brings Gautama and Śaṁkara closer than they are generally taken to be is, if valid, very significant. It is genuinely and deeply Indian. Only Indian philosophers and their point of view can make sense of it. But I must add, that is not an easy task. I leave open the further question, whether a philosophy should be called *spiritual* if its central concern is the removal of human suffering.

Dr Saha's second most important thesis is that Nyāya logic and epistemology are independent of the Vaiśeṣika ontology, although authors after Uddyotakara tended to club them together thereby helping the emergence of a syncretist school. This claim required him to appeal to Gautama's own list of entities (as given in *Nyāyasutra*, 1.1.1) by knowing which one can, according to Gautama, overcome all suffering. This list, clearly an odd one, does not present a categorial scheme as the Vaiśeṣika list does. I think one of Dr Saha's contributions to the exposition of Nyāya is to have drawn attention to the nature of this list and to some of its interesting features.

This last concern leads Dr Saha to identify what Vātsyāyana might have intended when he called Nyāya '*ānvikṣikividyā*'. It is important that Dr Saha raises this question which is often overlooked. Readers who want to consider other approaches to the concept of *ānvikṣiki* should consult Paul Hacker's 'Ānvikṣiki' (*Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens*, 2, 1958, pp. 54-83) and Wilhelm Halbfass's *Indien und Europa* (Schwabe & Co., Basel/Stuttgart, 1981, pp. 296-325).

Two brief remarks at the end about some interpretive issues. Dr Saha thinks that Gaṅgeśa offers an 'ontology of belief'. He regards Nyāya epistemology as being concerned with beliefs. *Pramā*, on the Nyāya theory, is taken to be true belief acquired through an accredited source of knowledge. I think the English word 'belief' has a quite different usage from the Sanskrit word '*jñāna*'. Most ascriptions of belief are dispositional, but *jñāna* is taken to be an occurrence. So I would replace 'belief' by 'cognition'.

The other remark concerns an example where one may try to show that the Indian philosophers not only raised some puzzles that the Western thinkers today are concerned with, but also offered interesting solutions to the puzzles. On pages 255-57 of his book, Dr Saha draws attention to cases which are very much like the Gettier counter-examples. It is for scholars of Indian philosophy to show how the Gettier-type cases can be dealt with in terms of Nyāya (or Navya-Nyāya). Matilal has made such an attempt in his *Perception* (Oxford, 1986, pp. 135-40), and I have tried my hand at it in 'Recollections and Response' (Daya Krishna and K. L. Sharma, eds., *The Philosophy of J.N. Mohanty*, New Delhi, 1991, pp. 217-18). Dr Saha would eminently serve the cause of Indian philosophy (and fulfil his own methodological promises) if he shows, in his ongoing work, how the Indian philosophical techniques can be used to answer, resolve or throw light on central problems of Western thought.

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ALBERT W.J. HARPER, *The Theodicy of Suffering* (Mellen Research University Press, San Francisco, 1990).

The Theodicy of Suffering by Albert W.J. Harper is a restatement of the age-old thesis of most theists who attach positive value to human suffering as necessary for participation in the 'enjoyment of conscious life'.

Harper makes the claim that theodicy, which seeks to vindicate God's holiness in the face of evil, can never pretend to explain adequately many aspects of suffering. For we as human beings in conscious deliberation have no understanding whatever of evil and its justification that allegedly might be due to God as God is in himself. Accordingly, Harper advises us to give up the stereotyped wisdom that is theology, as it serves not to give relief to suffering but only to relocate the centre of conflict in new areas. (p. 3). A mere articulated expression (which is what after all theology is) about the

unspeakable evil is never a resolution of it. Theodicy can only provide new procedural rules to launch the discussion on the evil of suffering in new directions, thus to perpetuate it afresh.

Hence instead of wasting our energies on defending God we should rather concentrate on reconciling man to all the vicissitudes to be met with in the conscious experience of his own world.

Our aim should be to (a) celebrate a type of suffering that in moderation may be of use to us, and (b) to avoid a misapprehension of the extremes of suffering that would threaten to destroy us. In other words, suffering which is inevitable must be channelled toward those ends that will benefit humanity.

However, contrary to expectation, Harper does not set aside the pursuit of justifying evil and suffering in relation to God's omnipotence. In Chapter II, he offers the unique thesis that we imperfect human beings are in some sense more powerful than God. In some absolute sense God is not as powerful as the finite creatures of his own creation because we, in a limited way, are able to foresee and thus to be forewarned of certain circumstances that are likely to occur in space and time.

'We as human beings in conscious forethought are powerful enough to stop some possible events from further occurrence while God in his absolute all-powerful state is powerless to stop all possible events from occurring' (p. 11). God being eternal bears no claim on time moments. He cannot contemplate events in the time milieu of occurrences in which he neither dwells nor exists. His all-knowledge and all-goodness is to be understood, thus, in relation to his own creation and not in respect of the created world. God's various attributes of divinity, of which power is one, must be seen as holding true eternally in his own supersensible realm of pure goodness. In other words, 'God is not sufficiently powerful to wipe out the pervasive time condition for all of reality itself, the ever-present conditionality which makes provision for all that may be said to happen in experience' (p. 13). God being eternal is utterly devoid of time, his absolute power, which is unlike any form of power that we are accustomed to experience in the time and places of ordinary experience, is eternal and actualized only absolutely.

Also, 'God, in and for creation . . ., should never be thought of as possessing the power to make choices' (p. 15), he does not have choice in the creation of either the supernatural or the natural world. Consequently God is unquestionably blameless for any wrongdoing and requires no justification for evil that may arise from either natural or human causes. It is man and not God who requires a theodicy, a theodicy of and for mankind.

An explanation of suffering is, he further adds, never a sufficient condition to accomplish the alleviation of suffering. We want a theodicy which will devise patterns of activity with the goal of making us accept suffering and other unpleasant experiences for the reason that eventually they lead to our benefit. Suffering which is indispensable to our well-being, when assessed in terms of an idealistic belief system, gives meaning, courage and otherwise brings to light, the virtues that lie dormant in us. Thus, suffering may be sanctioned for character development and its presence as evil be seen as a prerequisite to our freedom of choice.

And it is only the very adverse conditions of suffering, especially suffering that is uninvited and seems to fulfil no useful purpose, that may be called an evil: 'evil typifies the more vile, the more corrupt, the more savage and more loathsome forms of adverse circumstances and suffering to which the human creature is made susceptible' (p. 29). This evil deserves to be challenged and not suffering itself which may on occasion be open to invitation as a proving ground for some specific improvement of the self.

This leads him to the general conclusion that there is evil in the human purview of reality because we want it as a necessary means to moral progress, for instance. The rational end of suffering is to champion evil in so far as human talent and ability may be utilized for victory over greater evils which could do us harm.

Some form of irritant suffering must be accepted as a part of our life. Also, we must recognize that suffering 'is in reality no absolute, but is simply in some sense a form of suffering, a misplaced formality in appearance more or less intensely experienced by ourselves and observed by others' (p. 46). Once we start to comprehend it as life-supporting it could be seen in its full and intrinsic worth by mankind.

If we could observe suffering as life-supporting rather than as life-destroying, then it could become a universally shared enterprise. The comforting influence of an ever-present universal concept of suffering will help the individuals who, when alone, wander about misled and get lost in a wilderness of darkness. Since we can never annihilate suffering in its entirety, we should concentrate on forestalling spells of suffering of greater degree or of longer duration, what he calls remedial suffering to remedy our many ills and to enhance our capability of achieving a normal self-hood. Further, the evil that emanates from the forces of nature can in large measure be mitigated. Research into natural phenomena will furnish protection and afford some security against nature's aberrant behaviour.

It is because we are able to effect a new natural ordering of nature's already ordered laws today that we are able to free ourselves from the tyranny of the strict causal laws. Challenges of nature when faced with considered endurance will not devastate us but strengthen us physically, morally, intellectually as well as spiritually.

Once again Harper indulges in a little theodicy in seeing God's allowing suffering for a worthwhile purpose, namely an end which has some positive value for humanity. 'The value of God's suffering for us lies just in the fact that suffering, to be of any positive value, must be carried out deliberately in the form of procedural rules believed to work to our optimum benefit' (p. 58), he claims.

Suffering of accountability is contrasted by Harper with wanton suffering which is purposeless. As some of nature's laws do result in wanton suffering, rebellion against them is tantamount to obedience to God's law of absolute goodness. Similarly, in case of suffering resulting from pain, the individual must welcome that which in the long run is advantageous to the life-bearing organism; 'what is advocated then is an agreed upon marginal suffering that contributes to the achievement of an ideal of a not unworthy self-identity' (p. 61).

The aim of the thesis is to champion a courageous and hence a moral approach to 'a suffering that is not suffering' for the realization of the highest in human affairs. There is nothing wrong in educating people to accept pain for possessing the ideal of a truly integrated character. It is God's bounden duty also to allow us freedom to achieve this end.

The author urges us to aim at, not annihilating suffering in its totality, but to the more practical goal of containing our distress and proving ourselves worthy of being God's creatures. God has granted suffering to mankind so that we can so 'fashion evil' that it ceases to frighten us and is brought to servitude in our best interests.

In the light of the above it is no surprise to read his confident claim that the holocaust (for instance of World War II) and such like disasters should not be allowed to rupture God's eternal providence from the goal of human welfare. God's personhood as well as his providence remain intact in face of the worst disaster, for the simple reason that we can never boast of a complete understanding of divine nature. Accordingly, we would best serve our human interests by (a) regarding cases of moderate human suffering as a legitimate test of human integrity, and (b) those of inhuman suffering as a test of human faith in the ultimate goodness of God.

This brings me to the last chapter of the work, where once again the main thesis—that suffering in most of its forms is not necessarily an evil—is reasserted, this time in the background of the religion of Christianity. The claims made can be summarized as follows. Theodicy may declare the goodness of God as an emblematic symbol. However, the goodness of God as a truth can be found with God alone and absolutely. Therefore, theodicy never can constitute an all-or-none remedy for the ills of mankind.

The Christian finds truth only where truth belongs to God. 'God's word must be assumed to be true to God alone and truly with God and thus indifferent with respect to all evidence. . .' (p. 85). The religion of Christianity is convinced that only our belief in a Supreme Being as seen in Jesus Christ can help us to cope with suffering and so in some degree at least effect some control over it.'

Harper concedes that such a statement smacks of prejudice towards the doctrine of Christianity alone. But he hastens to add, the atonement doctrine which teaches that salvation for all humanity is brought about uniquely through the Christ principle, must accept the presence of other faiths in

the world leading to the conclusion that the redemption of the human race must needs be non-denominationally provided for, and 'it must not come in any sectarian fashion', since any one narrowly conceived religious faith is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the redemption of the people of the world at all places and at all times in history, either past or future.

There are many examples of thinkers in the West and in India who have justified human suffering as somehow necessary for man's moral spiritual progress. John Hick, while expounding the Christian interpretation of the divine purpose in the world, sees the world as a place of soul-making in which free beings facing the challenge of their existence in a common environment may become the children of God. Kant too regarded the world of time as the training ground of the spirit. A man's painful history is but the long discipline by which a moral being is shaped out of a merely animal creature.

Then again the value of suffering as discipline is one of the major themes of the Book of Job. Sinners suffer as punishment for their sins but saints must bear affliction as the design of an inscrutable providence and strengthen the quality of the retribution.

Not only is Harper very much at home in this tradition, he is also right in emphasizing the possible good effects of suffering. The possibility of physical pain is necessary, for example, to the discipline of habit. The positive value of pain may be stated as a discipline necessary even for the elementary tasks of life. Moderate suffering may help man to steel his muscles and his character to withstand the world. But will not this admission lead some of us to make this an excuse for hardness towards the suffering of others?

I cannot help recalling *The Problem of Pain*, a book by C.L. Lewis, at this juncture. He too in his own way tried, like Harper, to show that the Christian doctrine of being made perfect through suffering is not incredible. Suffering is good but not good in itself, he asserted. What is good in a painful experience is, for the sufferer, his submission to the will of God, and for the spectators, the compassion aroused and the acts of mercy to which it leads.

The chief problem with both Lewis and Harper arises because both are concerned with somehow finding justification for the existence of suffering. Suffering seems to them to imply a disharmony in the total scheme of things and they wish to quickly find for suffering a rightful place. Thus for Harper suffering exists because not only is it connected with the notion of freedom but also, more importantly, the notion of suffering is logically bound up with the notions of certain virtues. The virtues of creativity and self-renewal could not exist without some amount of suffering.

The following observations can be made against the argument that suffering (though often an evil) has sometimes beneficial consequences which could not be achieved without it. (1) That the beneficial effects of suffering are often exaggerated and it is a common fact that its effects on character

are often extremely harmful. (2) That it is in any case not inconsistent with the belief that suffering is evil in itself to say that its existence may sometimes have good results. The virtue of forgiveness, for instance, could not exist if no one acted wrongly towards his fellowmen. But this does not make moral evil into moral good. In any case, the good effects of suffering do not occur necessarily, and therefore, do not detract from the evil character of suffering as such.

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JEH-TWEEN GONG, *Truth, Faith and Life—I understand; Therefore, I worship*, (Adams Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1990, vi+138pp.).

In the work under review, the author builds his architectonic on the following fundamental assumptions and conclusions:

(1) The most self-evident fact is the existence of one and only one God who is the one and only one utmost truth. Traditional religions, being culture-bonded and believer-bonded, are trapped in empty truths and traditional sciences, being instrument-bonded and domain-bonded, are trapped in limited truths, and are unable to understand and reach the utmost truth. We shall be able to attain this truth with the help of a new truth machine consisting of three parts: the self-evidence principle, the hypothesis principle and the indivisibility (unification) principle.

(2) 'Nothingness' and the Almighty God, are both perfect symmetry and the utmost chaos. All materials were manifested out of 'nothing' and will reduce into it in the end. Material and its ghost partner came out of nothing because of chaos.

(3) Eleven dimensions which are labels for labelling 'things' and 'events' are needed to describe the entire universe, such as forces between particles, numbers, cultures, lives, death of a life and everything else.

(4) The colour system is the same in numbers (mathematics), elementary particles (physics) and lives (biology).

(5) Physics and mathematics deal with a very small part of the entire world. Their realm is the finite and orderly state of the visible universe and their results are based on the reduction methodology which is unsuitable for the invisible, immutable and immaterial world whose nature is chaotic, infinite and paradoxical and where the principle of the unobservable reigns.

The bulk of the book is concerned with God, the Supreme Self, Supreme Creator, Supreme Love, Supreme Intelligence, Supreme Righteousness, etc. and is replete with many glittering ideas; but all that glitters is not gold. The author's main contribution lies in the careful and detailed exposition of his views about the symmetry breaking; the transformation of the 'nothing-

something-ghost partner'; the creation of the universe; the creation before the first creation; the relationship between colours, numbers, forces, building blocks, dimensions, souls, eternity and infinities, nothingness, chaos and its implications for physics and mathematics (e.g., the intrinsic impossibility of any precise scientific or mathematical prediction because according to the Second Law of Thermodynamics all systems are going from orderliness to chaos constantly and so we should not expect strict determinism and complete predictability even in mathematics—the little orderliness visible in the universe is just an outcome of symmetry breaking); the inability of traditional religions and sciences to reach the utmost truth; the strengths and weaknesses of Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism and Christianity; the nature of God and his manifestations in providing ten new commandments as code of conduct for us; and ultimately in the formulation of the Super Unified Theory, a theory about the origin and nature of God, universe and man, through which he claims to unify not only all the four fundamental forces of physics (in which even Einstein failed!) but also the mental and socio-cultural forces and all seeming opposites, viz. reasoning and faith, science and religion, finite and infinite, individuality and totality, religion and religions, etc. (forming a *new* culture, a *new* civilization). As it is a theory of everything, it alone deserves to be called a true theory, a Unification Theory, an enchanting theory blending, encompassing and going far beyond the oriental and occidental sciences, mathematics and religions.

If God is self-evident, i.e. clear enough to need no proof, what is the sense in demonstrating or raising the question: Where does He come from? It is just a rhetorical question which does not need an answer. Is it meaningful to ask 'Where does He come from' when He transcends all space and time, and reasoning, faith, understanding, etc. are just God-sent gifts, their validity being dependent on God Himself? To accept God as the ultimate truth and then to begin the inquiry is nothing but a pseudo-quest to my mind and this unnecessarily creates a false hope in the mind of the reader for understanding (!) God. Although the author intends to help the reader to attain the same understanding, his book rather coerces the reader to accept the Almighty willy-nilly, if not through understanding, then with faith, and if the reader questions His existence, he would be committing felony.

Gong has described God in so many words and has proposed his worship for all of us. For the believers it is all right for they would be truly exalted to read all this. But to the intelligent non-believer and the sceptic God is neither self-evident nor so easy to comprehend; He is most elusive, a will-o'-the-wisp, very difficult to understand. The die-hard atheist would not be convinced by Gong's jugglery with epithets such as the high-sounding Super-Unification.

God is the touchstone and the mainstay of Gong's conceptual framework and if this is removed, his architectonic would fall like a house of cards.

The universal acceptance of God is the *sine qua non* of his system and we could attain Him either through meditation and enlightenment or through understanding along with faith. God is needed for the unification of everything and also an outcome of our limited ability. What unique logic!

Gong's acceptance of God is not because of His holy simplicity or childlike innocence, *sancta simplicitas*, but because he thinks that His will stands in place of reason, *stat pro ratione voluntas*. The author appears to be a God-intoxicated person, like Spinoza, but God for him is a *deus ex machina*. The whole book is nothing but a tomtoming of God which does not impress the intelligent modern reader and the author appears to be a day-dreamer, a *rêveur*, a most impractical and dogmatic person.

It is very difficult to know why there is suffering and evil in the world when the universe and all of us are God's creation and will ultimately return to him. If free will, reasoning, faith, etc. are God-sent gifts, why and in what sense can evil be our creation? Why does God allow mad men to exist and why has He created them? If God, is so good, why are there catastrophes and calamities, earthquakes and thunderbolts, floods and famines, volcanoes and sea-storms, plagues and other fatal diseases, vultures and ferocious animals, hunger, hurricanes and heinous crimes, world wars and bloodshed and long holy wars in His name? The author keeps a mystic silence on such fundamental issues which are very important from the point of view of us poor mortals.

The sub-title of the book—I understand; Therefore, I worship—suggests that the reader will get some new arguments in justification of the Lord's worship, that Gong must have thought *de novo* on the subject and that he is kind enough to share the same with us. But after a thorough and in-depth study of the work, the reader gets nothing which may enhance his understanding of the truth or can throw some new light on the subject. In place of a sense of satisfaction, what he feels is nothing but irritation and frustration and it appears to him to have been a waste of time. When all religions and sciences (including mathematics of course) and their leaders have failed to understand or know the truth, what hope is there for ordinary people like us? The arguments of the author, if you want to call them arguments, are either circular, e.g. all forces are unified because there is only one God and God is one because of unification of all forces, or technically speaking, the fallacy of *petitio principii* is being committed.

If the mission of the author is to prove that his worship of God is based on a thorough knowledge or comprehension of God, he has utterly failed. He had better leave the claim of understanding and be satisfied with faith or belief, which to my mind are no less important and significant as far as the domain of God is concerned. He should give up his 'I' in 'I understand; Therefore, I worship', and should join the camp of 'you' whom he rightly advises: 'If you don't understand, you should worship God with faith' (pp. 109, 116). But if understanding means 'to take for granted as part of an

agreement', if there is some sort of secret contract between Mr. Gong and God, then we have nothing to say and Gong is free to worship so long as it remains a personal affair. But why he compels the reader to accept and worship God is not very clear to me as these are strictly private affairs and one cannot and should not try to enter into them, however much zest one may have or feel for the Almighty. His repetition of 'I understand; Therefore, I worship' in almost every chapter is nothing but arrogance which generates some sort of malediction in the minds of the readers. His repetition of the word 'Understanding' is nothing but hyporcisy of the highest order because God is an axiom or postulate of his system and He is self-evident by definition. Would it not be an enormity of the highest degree to question His existence who is the source and basis for all other existence? Is it not surprising that despite all of us being His creations and our understanding being His gift to us, it is most difficult for us to have His understanding? How can we understand our lack of understanding as far as 'God is concerned'? The author is wise enough to avoid such perplexing questions.

For the lay reader it is very difficult to judge up to which stage or to what extent Gong's theories and conclusions are based on scientific truths and where he is taking liberties in fabricating his own theories which cannot be sustained through experiments and observations. This is true of his notions and ideas regarding the ghost-partner, the decay and death of proton, the big crunch, the next creation with anti-matter, colours, dimensions, pre-quarks, nothingness, chaos, forces, numbers, etc. The book is full of various stratagems, feigned theories and curious statements about so many things. And that is why it is not always easy for the ordinary reader to see his way clearly through this mixture of facts and fiction, well-founded on hypotheses and imagination. There are too many assertions and statements in the book for which no arguments have been offered.

The author has tried to weave a new fabric with the woof and warp of different faiths and religions of the orient and the occident. For him, Brahmanism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism and Christianity have identical structures, the difference lies only in exterior decorations. His observations and conclusions regarding religions are interesting and some of them remarkable. But for him, religious freedom is also a gift from God. Now if everything is a God-sent gift and you understood Him only because of His grace, what sort of understanding is this? The author hypothecates all of us to the Almighty in the name of a new truth machine, a new science, a unified religion, a new culture and a new civilization.

The author appears to be an ascerbic critic of physicists—he calls them stiff-necked, stupid, idiots, more ignorant than children, and he intends to throttle their voices by calling their acts sinful. His strictures against scientists are not only unwarranted but also undesirable. He does not miss a single chance to denounce their discipline; he reprimands them, but also grants them reprieve out of generosity. His remarks are not *obiter dicta* but are so

deprecatory in this context that they smack of bad taste. At the same time, his profuse use of foul language creates suspicion in the mind of the reader about the real knowledge of the author of these subjects. If it is described as just 'a tongue-in-cheek chiding of people who are locked into traditional thought patterns' (p. 138) we would be shielding the author unnecessarily.

If in response to all the scolding and stigmatizing, the scientists call Mr Gong a filcher who has stolen their terminology and methodology making a few additions here and there, and consequently arriving at a false sense of unification, what would Mr Gong say? They would be justified in seeing him as a filibuster who is unnecessarily trying to enter their discipline which is well-defined. To them his theories would appear funny, strange, unusual and absurd at times, for they seem to be the outcome of his whims, with no rational justification; he takes unwarranted leaps and jumps from the observed to the unobserved, from the many to the one, from evil to good, from orderliness to chaos, from something to 'nothing', and so on.

Gong's unified force equation is meant to explain physical, mental and cultural forces. But this violates the principle of 'equality of dimensions' of the natural sciences which states that space, time and mass dimensions on the left and right sides should be equal—in Gong's equations, the coupling factor or constant has different dimensions each time.

In conclusion, we may say that the super unification of everything, viz. science and religion, religion and religions, faith and understanding, finite and infinite, chaos and orderliness, one and many, evil and goodness, wickedness and righteousness, remains a mere pious hope. It will never be a reality so long as we remain what we are. To say that the author has unified science and religion is not correct rather, it is an extirpation of both because the traditional sciences are trapped in limited truths and traditional religions are trapped in empty truths. The key term to understand Gong's book is God and unification in his name.

The language Gong uses for God is undoubtedly very powerful, sonorous and full of vivacity and this is an outcome of his deep-rooted conviction as confessed by him in his exordium. He intends to persuade us to accept God out of the sentimentality and thrill which all of us feel when we confront the word 'God'. But it simply remains an emotional appeal and has nothing to do with understanding. We have been worshipping God from time immemorial but our problems have not only not diminished but have increased both in intensity and diversity. So, though we may get solace or psychological satisfaction by accepting the friend behind the phenomenon, it is not going to help us on a global level.

The pith and marrow of the book under review is to show God's greatness and the author's yen for worshipping God. While it may provide amusing reading, it cannot be recommended as serious reading as the author, consciously or unconsciously, is fully enthralled by God. These days, one should know, it is very difficult to sustain theism on rational grounds—it has become a vulnerable doctrine. After reading between the lines of the book what appears to be the desideratum is that we should worship God, if not because of understanding, then at least out of faith.

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S.M. SRINIVASA CHARI, *Fundamentals of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta: A Study Based on Vedānta Deśika's Tattvamuktākalāpa* (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1987, pp. xix+423).

The *Tattvamuktākalāpa* is an advanced *prakaraṇa-grantha* of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school, composed by the illustrious Vedāntadeśika. It provides a critical insight into the chief concepts of the Viśiṣṭādvaita system, covering all the essential aspects—philosophical, ontological and epistemological. The original text comprises five hundred verses in the long-winding Sragdharā metre, divided into five major sections: Jaḍadravya-sara (substance), Jivasara (individual self), Nāyakasara (the Lord), Buddhisara (knowledge) and Adravyasara (non-substance). The *Tattvamuktākalāpa* is indispensable for any one who wants to have a clear and logical understanding of the different facets of Viśiṣṭādvaita. But the terse style of the text makes it difficult to follow for an ordinary student of philosophy. It is in this light that the present study by S.M. Srinivasa Chari is to be welcomed. It is useful both for the beginner and an advanced student of the school.

The author of the book under review has succeeded in making an exhaustive and in-depth study of the original text along with its commentary, *Sarvārthasiddhi*, by Deśika himself. He has arranged the five sections of the original into twelve chapters with a view to presenting a logical account of the different theories of the system. The arrangement is based on a scientific analysis, wherein one argument naturally leads to the succeeding one.

The first chapter, entitled 'The Fundamental Metaphysical Categories', deals with the true nature of *tattvas* or categories essential for a fuller knowledge of Vedānta, which leads to spiritual realization. The definition of *tattva*, its division as *dravya* and *adravya*, their definitions, the nature of the six *dravyas* and the ten *adravyas*—are all briefly given in this chapter. Underlying these *tattvas* are the three metaphysical concepts which constitute the pivot of the school. They are: (1) the concept of substance-attribute, (2) the concept of relation, and (3) the concept of cause-effect. The theory of the Advaitins that the concept of difference (*bheda*) is illusory is criticized. It is shown that difference is established by perception and approved by scripture. Consequently, the Advaitic view that Brahman has no attributes is shown to be untenable, and the substance-attribute relation of Brahman and the world of men and matter is shown to be meaningful and plausible.

The well-known doctrine of Viśiṣṭādvaita, viz. the 'body-soul relation' (*śarīra-śarīri-bhāva*) between the world and Brahman is explained in great detail. The concept of '*apṛthaksiddhi*' (inseparable relation), which forms the basis of the body-soul relation, is shown to explain satisfactorily both unity and difference between the two inseparable entities by virtue of their intrinsic nature. There is also unity between them when one entity is taken as an adjective of the other.

S.M. Srinivasa Chari explains that the *śarīra-śarīri* relation is not different from the logical relation of substance-attribute which is referred to as '*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya*', or '*prakāra-prakārin*' or '*aṁśa-aṁśin*' relation. Where an integral relation exists between a sentient and a substance, it is termed *śarīra-śarīri* relation. If such a relation is found only between a substance and its essential attribute or even between two substances, the other terms are employed.

The author then proceeds to show that the *satkāryavāda* of the Viśiṣṭādvaitins is logically sound while the *asatkāryavāda* of the Naiyāyikas, the view of the Cārvākas denying the basic concept of cause-effect and the Advaitic theory of the illusoriness of the effect are all logically unsound. The Buddhist theory of the momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) of the universe also comes under severe criticism here.

Chapters II to V correspond to the *buddhisara* of the original text, the *Tattvamuktākalāpa*. Chapter II, entitled '*Pramāṇas* and Their Validity', deals with the three valid means of knowledge accepted in this school, viz. *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda*. Other means like *upamāna*, *arthāpatti* and *anupalabdhi* can be included in Inference or Verbal testimony. *Smṛti* (recollection) is shown to be not different from Perception. While dealing with *anupalabdhi*, it is pointed out that *abhāva* (non-existence) is just another form of *bhāva* (existence) and that it does not constitute a separate category. The validity of the Pāñcarātra texts is also dealt with in this chapter.

The view of the Mīmāṁsakas that words which denote action (*kārya*) alone are valid, and the *sphoṭavāda* of the Grammarians come under severe criticism in the third chapter entitled 'Logical Import of Words and Sentences'. The *anvitābhidhāna* theory of the Prābhākaras with reference to the function of words in a sentence is shown to be more valid than the *abhihitānvaya-vāda* of the Bhāṭṭas.

The definition of the term '*sāmānādhikaraṇya*' (coordinate predication) as given by Patañjali is discussed in detail and it is shown that words in coordinate predication denote only a qualified entity but not a pure substantive devoid of all characteristics. The implication of this theory is that scriptural sentences which define the nature of the ultimate Reality present Brahman as possessing a body (*saśarīra*) and as qualified by attributes (*saguṇa*).

That knowledge constitutes an inseparable attribute (*dharmabhūtajñāna*) of the *jīvas* is an important concept of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school. The self-luminous nature and eternity of this knowledge are explained in detail in the fourth chapter entitled 'Theory of Knowledge'. The most important aspect of knowledge in which Vedāntadeśika differs from others, including some Viśiṣṭādvaitins, is the postulation of knowledge as a *dravya* and not merely a quality. *Dravya* (substance) is defined as that which is the substratum of modification. Knowledge is a *dravya* since it undergoes contraction and expansion, depending upon the *karma* of a particular *jīva*. Also it is a *dravya* because it is self-luminous. The contentless, transcendental nature of knowledge as advocated by the Advaitins come under criticism in this context. It is shown that all knowledge is spoken of only with reference to some subject or object.

The theories of knowledge put forth by the Yogācāra Buddhists denying reality of the external objects, of the Sautrāntikas speaking of the momentariness of the objects and the knowledge concerning them, and the Śūnyavāda of the Mādhyamikas are all shown to be riddled with contradictions and it is established that knowledge in the absence of a 'real' object is inconceivable. All knowledge is *of* the real. Likewise, the *anirvacanīyakhyāti* of the Advaitins, the *akhyāti* of the Prābhākaras and the *anyathākhyāti* of the Naiyāyikas are all shown to be baseless and the *satkhyāti* of the Viśiṣṭādvaitins alone is shown to account for the perception of objects in illusion. On the basis of this it is shown that all knowledge, including erroneous cognition, is *of* the real.

According to the Advaitins, Brahman alone is real. The objects of the world are empirically real and the objects found in dreams are phenomenally real. The knowledge of objects as being real is caused by *avidyā* according to this system. This doctrine is criticized at length in the eighth chapter entitled 'Brahman and the Universe'.

The sixth chapter, entitled 'The Doctrine of *Jīva*', deals with the nature of the *jīvas* as being different from the body, mind and vital airs, as the subjects of knowledge, self-luminous and eternal, as the agents of action and enjoyers of the fruits thereof, and as being atomic in size. The nature of the *jīva* as advocated by the Advaitins, Jains and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas is also discussed at length in this chapter.

The relation between the *jīvas* and Brahman is that which subsists between the *ādhāra* and the *ādheya*, the *niyantṛ* and the *niyāmya*, the *śeṣin* and the *śeṣa*. This threefold relationship is known as the *śarīra-śarīri-bhāva*, or the relation between the body and the soul. This central concept of Viśiṣṭādvaita is dealt with in the first chapter on 'Fundamental Metaphysical Categories' and the scriptural basis for this is shown in the eighth chapter entitled 'Brahman and the Universe'.

Issues connected with the Absolute of Vedānta form the subject-matter of the seventh chapter entitled 'The Doctrine of Īśvara'. These discussions are based on the Nāyakasara of the *Tattvamuktākalāpa*. The main issue discussed is whether the Absolute of the *Upaniṣads* is the same as Īśvara

or the personal God of Religion. In this regard, the Advaitic doctrine of two Brahmans, i.e. Saguṇa and Nirguṇa, is criticized and it is established that the Absolute of the Vedānta is the God (Īśvara) of Religion, who has innumerable auspicious attributes. The Advaitic view of two Brahmans as '*para*' and '*apara*' and the theory of the Naiyāyikas that Inference alone can prove the existence of God are criticized in this context.

The supremacy of Viṣṇu is then established on the strength of scriptural texts and it is shown that words like Śiva and Śambhu, Hiraṇyagarbha and Indra, which apparently refer to other gods, are shown to refer to Viṣṇu alone.

Different attributes of Lord Viṣṇu, His five aspects (*para, vyūha, vibhava, arcā* and *antaryāmin*), and Īśvara's being both the material and efficient cause of the universe, are the other issues dealt with in this chapter.

The ninth chapter, '*Sādhana* and *Mukti*', discusses the role of *bhakti* as the means to *mokṣa*. The main issue is whether Knowledge is the means to liberation as the Advaitins contend, or *bhakti* is the direct means. In this connection, the place of *karma* in the spiritual discipline is also examined in great detail. This forms the subject-matter of the latter half of the Jīvasara of *Tattvamuktākalāpa*.

The tenth chapter entitled '*Prakṛti* and Its Evolutes' deals with *prakṛti*, its evolutes and the process of quintuplication (*pañcīkaraṇa*). The nature of the different elements, the concept of Time and the doctrine of *nityavibhūti* are the other topics dealt with in this chapter. The Jaḍadravyasara (section 1) of the *Tattvamuktākalāpa* provides this discussion.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitins accept ten material attributes—*sattva, rajas, tamas* (belonging to *prakṛti*), the attributes of the five elements, i.e. *rūpa, rasa, gandha, sparśa* and *śabda*, the relation called *saṁyoga* (conjunction) and *śakti* (potency) inherent in each substance. All these are dealt with in the eleventh chapter entitled 'Fundamental Attributes'. The other attributes accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas can well be included in one of the *adravyas* accepted by the Viśiṣṭādvaitins. The concept of *dharma, adharma* and *adṛṣṭa* are also briefly dealt with in this chapter.

The Nyāya theory of fivefold *karma* (action), accepted as a separate category, is criticized as unsound. Vedāntadeśika points out that *karma* is that which causes in us the awareness that an object is in motion. In other words, it is movement (*calana*).

As for the *sāmānya* (generality) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, it is same as '*jāti*' which is the *asādhāraṇa-dharma* (exclusive feature) inherent in an object. So it is not a separate category. Likewise, *viśeṣa* is not a separate category in the Viśiṣṭādvaita system. It is nothing but the distinctive feature of a given object, which differentiates it from other objects. *Abhāva* is just another form of *bhāva*. The Law of Conservation of Mass comes closer to this. *Samavāya* (inherence) is not a separate category since it leads to the

fallacy of *anavasthā*. All these issues are dealt with in the final section *Adravyasara* of the *Tattvamuktākalāpa*.

The twelfth chapter, entitled 'General Estimate and Conclusion', makes a critical evaluation of Viśiṣṭādvaita as a sound system of philosophy.

The author, S.M. Srinivasa Chari, has done an excellent job in presenting a valuable, exhaustive and reliable account of the *Tattvamuktākalāpa*, one of the best philosophical treatises of the Viśiṣṭādvaita in a logical, simple and convincing style. The book is certainly a valuable addition to the literature of Viśiṣṭādvaita. The aim of the author, viz. to bring out the logical soundness of the concepts of this system, is more than fulfilled in this excellent book.

University of Madras, Madras M. NARASIMHACHARY

Obituary

DR KRISHNA SIVARAMAN

Coming in the wake of the sad demise of Professor B. K. Matilal in June, 1991, the passing away of Dr Krishna Sivaraman in Canada on 30 October 1991 is yet another grievous loss to Indian philosophy. In his lifetime Professor Sivaraman was known and respected as an authentic interpreter of Hindu philosophy and religion, but now his numerous friends and students in India, Canada and America mourn the loss also because the distinguished academic was a very amiable and helpful person. Those who were taught philosophy of religion by him at Banares Hindu University in 1966-67 still fondly recall how he would make it a point to invite hostellers to dinner every now and then so as to give them a little homelike feeling. Mrs Parvathy Sivaraman's grief is therefore widely shared.

Born at Vellore on 11 September 1922, Professor Sivaraman did his B.A. from Annamalai University in 1945; M.A. from Madras University in 1947; and Ph.D., in Śaiva Siddhānta philosophy from Banares Hindu University in 1963. This was followed by a fellowship from Harvard University for post-doctoral work in 1963-64. It was probably his work at Harvard that made Professor Sivaraman widely known to western students of Indian religious philosophies.

Professor Sivaraman published numerous articles on Hindu philosophy and religion, translated many a Sanskrit and Tamil text, and edited some volumes of essays on philosophy and religion, besides presenting quite a few papers at symposia and seminars, in India and abroad. He wrote a major text on Śaiva philosophy which was well received; but as for his own philosophical and religious faiths, they are perhaps most aptly documented in his last edited work: *Hindu Spirituality—Vedas Through Vedānta*, Cross-road Publishing Co., New York, 1989.

Professor Sivaraman's career as a teacher has been just as impressive. Beginning as a lecturer, and later as a Reader, in Philosophy at Banares Hindu University he taught, with distinction, at the following centres of learning: Elmira College, New York (1964-66); University of North Dakota, U.S.A. (1970-71); MacMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario (as Associate Professor 1972-81; and as Professor 1981-89); and Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec (1989-91).

The Indian Council of Philosophical Research offers its sincerest condolences to the bereaved family. Professor Sivaraman will surely be remembered for long as a very helpful teacher, and indeed quite as much for his outreaching gifts of love and hospitality as for his academic competence.

Roop Nagar, Delhi S. K. SAXENA

NOTE: Professor Sivaraman's bio-data was kindly supplied to us by Mrs Parvathy Sivaraman, 25 Garrow Drive, Unit 46, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada L9C-2X2

Books received

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Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's Advaita-Siddhiḥ
Translated by KARUNA BHATTACHARYA. General Editor: SIBAJIBAN BHATTACHARYYA (Indian Council of Philosophical Research and Motilal Banarsidass, New Delhi, 1991).

The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne
by LEWIS E. HANN (Open Court Publishing Company, La Salle, Illinois).

समाज-दार्शनिक परिशीलन
श्री यशदेव शल्य (रावत पब्लिशर्स दिल्ली, 1991)।

ANNOUNCEMENT

A selection of the papers presented at the Mount Abu Colloquium (Jan. 7-10, 1991) on *Culture and Rationality* will be published jointly in the September, 1992 issue of the *Philosophy—East and West* and the April, 1992 issue of *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research.* All subscribers to the JICPR will get a *free* copy of the September, 1992 issue of the PEW carrying those papers presented at the Colloquium which are not included in the issue of the JICPR.

ANNOUNCEMENT

The JICPR announces the publication of a Special Issue on *Philosophy of Law—Some Indian Perspectives* under the Guest Editorship of Professor Chhatrapati Singh. The volume shall be devoted mainly to the following issues:

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Scholars in the field of classical *Dharma Śāstra* and *Vyavahāra* texts on the one hand, and modern Indian Jurisprudence on the other, are invited to send papers latest by 31 July 1992. For more details please write at the following address: Professor Chhatrapati Singh
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ANNOUNCEMENT

The JICPR announces the publication of a Special Issue on 'Professional Ethics' under the Guest Editorship of Dr Rajendra Prasad. The volume shall be devoted mainly to the issues arising from the increasing professionalisation in modern life and the claim of such professional associations that the norms governing their conduct *override* the general norms which are supposed to define 'right' or 'wrong', or 'good' or 'bad' in human conduct. There is also the problem of the relationship between the diverse norms obtaining in different professions. In traditional terminology, the problems clustering around the issue may be said to relate to the relationship between '*sādhāraṇa dharma*' and '*viśiṣṭa dharma*' and the relationship between conflicting '*viśiṣṭa dharmas*' on the other.

For more details, scholars may write to Dr Rajendra Prasad, at the following address: Dr Rajendra Prasad
Opposite Stadium, Premchand Marg
Rajendra Nagar, Patna 800016 (Bihar)

The last date for the receipt of articles for the issue is 31st December, 1992.

JICPR

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

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ANNOUNCING

A forthcoming issue of the

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on the Philosophy of K.C. Bhattacharyya

The community of philosophers in India and abroad who have been interested in the work of Professor K.C. Bhattacharyya are invited to contribute articles on various facets of the writings of this seminal thinker from India.

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EXTRACTS FROM REVIEWS

Surendranath Dasgupta, *A Study of Patañjali*, Second edition (in association with the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi), 1989, xv+181pp., Rs. 18.00

The particular strength of *A Study of Patañjali* is its detailed unfolding of *Prakṛti* in terms of the evolution of the *Guṇas* from *Mahat* through *Buddhi*, *Ahaṅkāra*, *Manas*, the sense faculties and organs, and, in an outward direction to the *Tanmātras* and gross matter. Dasgupta helps the modern thinker to visualize this complex process by presenting it as a kind of reverse version of Darwinian cosmic evolution. The book is also unique in its highlighting of the *Sphoṭavāda* semantic theory of the *Yoga Sūtras*, an aspect of Yoga theory other secondary sources ignore. This book is essential for college and university libraries and can be effectively used as a text for students alongside Gerald Larsen's *Classical Sāṁkhya*.

HAROLD COWARD, *South Asia Books*

G.C. Nayak, *Philosophical Reflections*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research and Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1987, viii+166pp.

Les philosophes indiens d'ajuour' hui en leur majorité se situent dans la tradition de la penses classique de l'Inde, tendis qu'une minorité adopte les perspectives de l'analyse linguistique anglo-americaine. G.C. Nayak occupe une position plus originale: tout ten etant profondement enracine dans la grande philosophie indienne, il a une reelle maitrise de l'analyse linguistique qu'll ne pratique d'ailleure qu'avec des reserves critiques.

MIKLOS VITO
Revue Philosophique, Paris

* * *

The eighteen chapter of this book range over a number of significant topics in Indian philosophy and religion.

It is typical of Nayak's work that he inserts illuminating comparative comments at many points and he uses his knowledge of western philosophy and religion to compare between cultures as well as within cultures.

Nayak's range is vast but he has a good touch throughout and he brings together in an interesting manner thinkers and topics from different religious traditions. He is aware of and he uses recent developments in the philosophy of science.

FRANK WHAILING, *Scattish Journal of Religious Studies*

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Vol. III, No. 1, 1991

Journal of Indian Philosophy

The *Journal of Indian Philosophy* encourages creative activities among orientalists and philosophers along with the various combinations that the two classes can form. Contributions to the journal are bounded by the limits of rational enquiry and avoid questions that lie in the fields of speculative sociology and parapsychology. In a very general sense, the method is analytical and comparative, aiming at a rigorous precision in the translation of terms and statements. Space is devoted to the works of philosophers of the past as well as to the creative researches of contemporary scholars on such philosophic problems as were addressed by past philosophers.

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