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Editor DAYA KRISHNA

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Introduction

ROGER T. AMES
University of Hawaii, Honolulu

EAST-WEST PHILOSOPHERS' REGIONAL CONFERENCE MOUNT ABU, RAJASTHAN

The articles contained in this special issue of the *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research* and its companion issue of *Philosophy East & West* (42:4, October 1992) are the product of the Colloquium on Culture and Rationality held at Mount Abu in Rajasthan, from 7-10 January, 1991. The background of this colloquium places it, in its time, at the centre of the comparative philosophy movement. It also takes us back to 1939.

The East-West Philosophers' Conference series sponsored by the Department of Philosophy at the University of Hawaii is a tradition initiated more than half-a-century ago by Charles A. Moore and Wing-tsit Chan. This conference series, through the dissemination of its conference volumes which gave it permanent record, through the publication of *Philosophy East & West*, the international journal of comparative philosophy that was born from it, and through the East-West Center that was inspired by it, has done much to foster Western literacy in Asian traditions of thought.

The Sixth East-West Philosophers' Conference was held in July-August 1989 at the University of Hawaii, assembling 150-200 of the world's leading philosophers from many of the major cultural centres of the world. The theme of the conference was "Culture and Modernity: The Authority of the Past". The conference director, Eliot Deutsch, has collected many of the contributions made at the conference in his recently published volume, *Culture and Modernity: East-West Philosophic Perspectives* (University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1991).

India and Indian philosophy was well represented at the Sixth East-West Philosophers' Conference by a major delegation including many of the most distinguished of India's philosophers: D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Daya Krishna, Bimal Matilal, Margaret Chatterjee, Ramchandra Gandhi, R.R. Verma, G.C. Pande. The quality and kind of Western participation in this conference reflected a major sea-change which has been occurring over the last decade within the main currents of Western philosophy. On this occasion, and for the first time since the conference series began, Western philosophy was equal in distinction to its Asian guests in being represented by its current leadership—six of the past eight presidents of the American Philosophical Association (Eastern Division) were in attendance.

In order to continue, expand and intensify the impact of this conference series, smaller and more intimate East-West Philosophers' Regional Confer-

ences are being planned with leading philosophers in different quarters of the globe. These conferences are being organized as a forum to further forge a relationship between major Western philosophers and their counterparts in other cultural centres. They represent a sustained effort to broaden the purview of Western philosophic reflection to include traditions of thought previously marginalized by philosophical assumptions anathema to comparative philosophizing. They also provide a framework to explore culturally specific questions relating to the major theme of culture and modernity in areas of the world that are now experiencing rapid change, and in some cases, violent conflict between traditional and modern values.

The first of these East-West Philosophers' Regional Conferences was held in Moscow in June, 1990, jointly sponsored by the Institute of Philosophy at the USSR Academy of Sciences, and *Philosophy East & West*. The theme was "Feminist Issues in Culture and Modernity: East and West", and in addition to the conference organizer, Marietta Stepanyants, and a distinguished Soviet delegation, representatives from India, Mexico, the United Kingdom, China and the USA were invited. *Philosophy East & West* (42:2, April 1992) has a special issue devoted to this conference, and the USSR Academy of Sciences has translated the foreign presentations into Russian for a volume that includes all the articles presented at the conference.

The Second East-West Philosophers' Regional Conference was held at Mount Abu in Rajasthan in January 1991, jointly sponsored by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research and *Philosophy East & West*. This colloquium began from conversations between Daya Krishna, the current editor of the *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, conference director Eliot Deutsch, and myself as editor of *Philosophy East & West*, at the 1989 East-West Philosophers' Conference. During the planning stages, the then Chairman of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, D.P. Chattopadhyaya, was appointed Governor of Rajasthan. He generously offered his summer residence on the summit of the famous Jain centre, Mount Abu, as the venue for the seminar, and a colloquium quite unlike any other, was launched. The rich historic ambience of the Raj Bhavan and the seemingly inexhaustible hospitality of our hosts provided an immediate and indelible expression of living Indian culture as the positive authority of the past. At the same time, the animated discussion of the colloquium sessions suggested that 'rationality' of some order provided a basis for conversation and adjudication across very different cultures.

At the heart of the colloquium and the starting point of many of the papers included in these journal issues—Solomon, Lath, Rorty, Higgins—is the question: What do we mean by rationality? The responses to this basic question by colloquium participants contained in these papers makes it clear they do not share a common definition of 'rationality' or common assumptions about the value of 'rationality' in advancing the philosophic conversation. Some of the papers—those by Bhattacharyya, Hart, Hall—begin with the

other question: What is culture? And there is as much agreement on the perceived relationship between culture and rationality as there is on the definition of rationality.

One extreme position in evidence in some of the contributions argues that rationality, whatever it is, is a shared human faculty which justifies acultural and ahistorical claims about human nature and human equality. This seemingly shared rational capacity provides us with expectations of not only interpersonal, but also inter-cultural convergence. There are different culturally-specific 'styles' of thinking and different formulations of logical arguments, but ultimately thinking and arguing are responsible to an objective, univocal standard. The most obvious worry on this side is that without assuming some common ground—even if we reduce this ground to a few basic and incontrovertible rules of logic—we slide in the dangerous direction of cultural incommensurability.

The opposite extreme, pointing to an obvious logical problem in 'arguing' for the logical structure of arguments as the definition of rationality, advances the position that rationality entails a wide range of cognitive and affective elements that reflect culture-bound ways of thinking and living. There is a reluctance to allow that rationality is a superordinate faculty which defines the human being, and instead, a suggestion that what we think about and how we think about it are mutually shaping and determining experiences. Adherents of this kind of a position argue that alternative cultures in fact produce alternative rationalities.

From the earliest planning stages of the colloquium, Daya Krishna and D.P. Chattopadhyaya wanted the conference to be primarily open discussion with as little emphasis upon formal presentations as possible. In many ways, we achieved this goal, and much of the true value of the colloquium lies not so much in these collected papers, but rather in the extent to which the participants 'scratched' if not changed the minds of their interlocutors. The conversation on culture and rationality which began on Mount Abu continues in the ongoing relationships which were deepened and extended among the conference fellows, and is attended by the warm feelings of affection and respect between Western and Indian philosophers that the joint issues of the *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research* and *Philosophy East & West* are meant to represent.

Some philosophical problems concerning culture and rationality

SIBAJIBAN BHATTACHARYYA
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Introduction

The concept of culture can be, and has been, studied from various points of view in different disciplines: anthropology, sociology, history, economics, psychology, ethics and so on. We shall be concerned here only with some philosophical problems concerning culture and rationality.

There are different conceptions of culture, some of which we briefly examine.

In the usual, widest sense, the culture of a people consists of

> language, ideas, beliefs, customs, taboos, codes, institutions, tools, techniques, works of art, rituals, ceremonies and other related components. . . . Variation among socio-cultural systems is attributable to physical habitats and resources, to the range of possibilities inherent in various areas of activity, such as language, rituals and customs, the manufacture and use of tools, and to the degree of social development.[1]

There are two points to be noted about this conception of culture:

(*i*) Culture unifies men into one cultural group;
(*ii*) The development of many cultures is due to various causes—(*a*) external causes like 'physical habitats and resources'; (*b*) inner causes like 'range of possibilities inherent in various areas of activity'.

In one culture some of the possibilities are realized, in another some other. As different possibilities may be mutually exclusive, all cultures may not be consistent with one another. If, thus, conflict among cultures follows from the very concept of culture, then a type of philosophical theory of the relation between culture and rationality emerges.

A Philosophical Theory of Culture and Rationality

The theory makes the following basic assumption about rationality.

(*A*) There is one rationality common to all men, past, present and future.

A difference between cultures and rationality is, then, that a culture unifies all those who belong to that culture, whereas all men unite in rationality by

sharing this essential feature. Rationality is the essence of man. Thus cultural unification is confined to all and only those who share the culture, whereas rationality is the principle of unity of all men. This difference in extension between a culture and rationality is also reflected in the intensity of the unification. As a culture is restricted in extension, cultural unity is much more intense than the unity of rationality. Culture endows a people with their identity while all men are akin in rationality; the kinship of rationality is all-inclusive, and, for that very reason, cannot be the identity of a group of people. Thus the logical possibility of a plurality of cultures gives rise to more intense opposition between groups, societies or nations belonging to different cultures, whose identity is constituted by their cultures.

(*A*) is sought to be justified on empirical and also on *a priori* grounds; the empirical evidence is the development of science, technology, mathematics, logic—the rational activities *par excellence*—across cultures and across time. There is no physics which is culture-bound, to understand which it is necessary to study the culture in which it is developed. The *a priori* sciences like mathematics and logic are universally intelligible and their laws are recognized as valid. As an example we may mention that the Hindu numerals in decimal notation are universally understood and accepted.

Apart from these empirical considerations, there are also *a priori* grounds for justifying the assumption of one rationality in all men of all times. The necessity of this assumption follows from the possibility of rational discourse across cultures. Assuming that cultures differ and may even conflict with each other, there could not have been any cross-cultural rational activity if rationalities, too, differed with cultures.

From this basic assumption of the oneness of rationality various types of conclusions are drawn. One extreme conclusion is that cultures, being not merely many in number, but also incompatible with one another, divide men from men. Reason, or rationality, being the essence of man, is the principle of unity of all men. Another extreme conclusion is that rationality as the principle of unity is opposed to cultural plurality, that therefore there cannot be any rational study of culture as it is essentially irrational or at least non-rational.

This theory, though widely held, is not without serious difficulties.

The Concept of a Plurality of Cultures

There are theories which challenge, not cultural plurality, but the importance of this plurality. One basic difficulty is how to specify different cultures. It has been suggested by supporters of the theory of Kulturkreise, that there are only a few basically different cultures. But really the philosophical problem here is the problem of monism versus pluralism in the realm of cultures. It is emphasized that there is such a thing as culture as opposed to cultures. All cultures are cultures because, and only because, they have some essential elements in common. These essential elements common to all cultures will constitute the universal world culture analogous to the universal grammar in the sphere of languages. It is admitted that mere abstraction of the common elements of all cultures may not amount to much; and that a world culture is yet to be developed.[2] But that does not mean that the many cultures are opposed to one another, that their plurality is real, and their unity unreal. We shall presently see why the unity of all cultures is, in some sense, more basic than their difference. The problem is methodological—whether to begin with the actuality of many cultures, or to study cultures genetically as evolving from one basic culture and necessarily assuming different forms in the later stages only to tend towards a world culture as the end. The actuality of many conflicting cultures is not evidence either for plural origin or for the final goal of cultures. The actuality of cultures is not the same as their destiny.

A difficulty in this concept of culture is that it makes a study of the culture of any society a formidable, if not impossible, task. To study culture one has to study the language, understand different forms of art like music, dancing, painting, architecture, the different cognitive enterprises like the different sciences, mathematics, logic, etc., the value-system which is not merely lived, but believed, religious beliefs, dogmas, practices, and so on. No one person can study culture in this wide sense. It is necessary, therefore, that different groups study different aspects of the culture, and also at different levels—folk art, sophisticated art, and so on. But how can one have a vision of the culture which is lost in the aspects and levels?

A second conception of culture emphasizes another aspect—that it can be transmitted from generation to generation within a society and in this process develops and gets modified from time to time. Culture is teachable and learnable; it can be learnt from some gifted persons in a culture who are sometimes described as 'natural aristocrats' more efficiently than others. These gifted persons in a society constitute the class of cultural elites. In them the highest and deepest aspects of a culture are clearly and conspicuously manifested. Thus culture, in this narrow sense, may be conceived as the refinement of life at all levels attained by the cultural elites. Refinement, however, admits of degrees. It may be that there is, or there is not, a continuous gradation of refinement in a society. There will, however, be higher and lower levels of culture, so that there will always be a stratification of people living in any society according to the cultural excellence attained just as there is a classification of people in a society on the ground of wealth. Even though there is a difference in the quality of life and behaviour of the cultural elites and the common people, still the cultural excellence which the elites attain percolates to the common people. Thus it is said that the common people behave like the elites.[3] Now this tendency of the lesser people to try to rise to the level of the better ones in a society may be automatic, due merely to empathy, or to free will—the example of a better form of life having an intrinsic value

urges them to improve upon their experience of life. There is an inner urge in all men to improve, not merely material conditions, but also the quality of life, although this inner urge may not be consciously felt equally by all. Culture in this sense would open up a new boundless field for development of the essential dimension of life and enrichment of human life.[4]

The concept of refinement, and specially of refinement of life, requires elaboration. Refinement in music, or of concepts, can be objectively determined. Refinement presupposes perception of small but essential details which are apt to be overlooked by the unobservant. It is susceptibility to finer elements, a keener perception of distinctions between notes in music which are lost to the less susceptible. The general concept of truth may get differentiated into truth of science, truth of arts, truth of history and so on. The one concept of truth is shown to reveal inner distinctions when exact and historical sciences have been developed. Refinement allows a fine-grained analysis, a deeper insight, a more generalized yet richer comprehension.

Although there may be agreement on this analysis of the concept of refinement in general, still the concept of refinement of the quality of life will vary from culture to culture. It will depend upon the system of values which upholds a culture. Yet, in spite of differences in content, there is agreement in formal features. Culture 'entails deep changes in man's personality'[5] (*i*) by developing, as we have already mentioned, finer susceptibilities to physical, mental, moral and spiritual stimuli. (*ii*) This is because culture, in this sense, produces an openness of mind, which is the opposite of narrow-mindedness in thought and action, makes man surrender some of his self-love and self-seeking, and brings out the inherent nobility of man. (*iii*) A man of culture is a man of principles, totally committed to the realization of ideals, with improvement of intellect and opening of the individual's sense of values. 'Quality of social culture is measured by the yardstick of human happiness.'[6] (*iv*) Culture, by eliminating narrow egoism and personal prejudices, promotes rational search for the good of man. It fosters unity and identity of all fellow beings irrespective of differences in race, sex, etc. (*v*) It helps in the development of creative thinking and action. A man of culture is non-violent, tolerant, gentle, yet firm in his convictions. Culture, in this sense, is nearness to truth, beauty and goodness, is attainment of peace and tranquillity. Yet even this sense of culture cannot avoid pluralism of cultures, because truth, beauty, goodness are conceived differently and the ideal man understood differently in different cultures. Goodness in the sense of human happiness requires social justice, and in some cultures the only means of attaining social justice is revolution. It is only the end which is non-violent, not the means. There is also the theory of a final war to end all wars. Thus the logical possibility of a plurality of cultures based on alternative value-systems may become the source of practical conflicts.

In recent times there has been a change in theories, (*i*) of cultures supporting and even promoting violent revolutions as the only means of achieving

the ideal society, and (*ii*) of war as the only means of solving international disputes. This is mainly because the traditional concept of war has been replaced by a new concept of war where there are no victors, and which, therefore, has lost its use and charm and is replaced by the concept of peace (peaceful co-existence). This advance from war to peace is really due to a function of rationality which enables one to act in self-interest. Culture, and even cultures, cannot be non-rational because all rational activities are included in the wider and the narrower senses of 'culture'. We have to explain why the actuality of many cultures leads to a conflict among them.

Dynamics of Culture

To study the unity in diversity of different cultures, we may identify some universal spiritual values. What the future of a culture will be can be anticipated only when we understand the dynamic regulative principles of the culture. The following points are suggested for a brief examination.

Must Every Culture Change Over Time?

The question whether every culture necessarily changes over time arises because of what many scholars have held about Harappan culture.

> And of its subsequent history we know nothing. It is fully mature on its arrival and thereafter it stagnates . . . from top to bottom of the accumulated layers of debris no change can be detected in the content of material culture.[7]
>
> The entire civilization comes suddenly upon the scene already formed, *already, in fact, so stereotyped that although the city was to pass through vicissitudes which must represent many centuries of time, yet in that time there was no change in its arts and crafts; the various superimposed strata afford no typological sequence whatsoever*.[8]
>
> They ruled for at least seven hundred years and *during that time made no appreciable advance of any sort.*[9]

We may or may not accept this interpretation of the Harappan culture. But it at least shows the possibility of a culture not developing at all over a millennium. So we have a problem of explaining such a possibility, if not an actual historical fact. A culture of a people changes by its internal force and also by external influence. If the life of the people becomes more and more complex, culture, too, has to make corresponding changes to suit the new demands of the life of the people. Culture also changes under external influence—influence of another culture with which it comes into close contact. We shall explain in detail the exact process of external influence later on. But if a culture over a long period of time remains wholly static, then it must be internally stereotyped and frozen. It will also not be amenable to external

influence, even though it may influence other cultures. This means that there is a possibility of one-way influence of a culture. A static culture may be outwardly open allowing its influence on another culture but must itself be closed to prevent importation of foreign cultures. That the Harappan culture did influence other cultures with which it came into contact is justified by available evidence. For example, the *swastika* sign which originally belonged to the Harappan culture standing for a complex system of values and beliefs was exported to various cultures including the Aryan. Though export of culture is allowed import of culture is banned.

It is also possible that such an unchanging, stereotyped culture may be totally closed, forbidding both export and import of cultural influence. It may be that a part of a culture may be open while another part is closed or half-closed. It may be that so far as the sciences are concerned the culture is open both ways, yet in religion it may be half-closed, allowing for conversion of other people into it, yet it may itself be closed to external influence.

Integrating cultures into a universal world culture will not be possible if any culture is closed to external influence. It is, therefore, necessary to postulate that closure of a culture is accidental and not essential to it. No culture is essentially recalcitrant to integration into another culture.

Conditions of Change in a Culture

We now consider the conditions of change in one culture. Unless we understand how a culture changes, we shall not be able to understand how to unify world culture; for to achieve a world culture it is necessary to make suitable changes in all the component cultures so that they may together form a coherent whole. Changes in a culture may not be linear either forward towards progress or backward to decadence. It is very likely that there are ups and downs in the path of a culture which moves ahead.

Now the question is, why should a culture change at all? We have already mentioned some internal factors which make a culture change from within. If the life of the people becomes more and more complex demanding finer distinctions in a whole which previously appeared simple then the culture becomes more fine-grained and more perceptive. This makes for the progress of a culture. But it may so happen that a culturally superior people lose their grip over life and fall back from the height attained so that finer artistic creations lose their excellence and become crude. This is cultural decline and decadence. It is very likely that decadence is marked by a prior period of stagnation, the people losing their inventiveness, their progressive vision of finer distinctions and higher values. It appears impossible that a culture should completely die, for even when a seat of culture—a town or even a kingdom—is destroyed, it is unlikely that all the people are destroyed. It is only in recent times that the possibility of wiping out a whole population has become real.

Concepts of Cultural Development, Decadence and Integration

We shall analyse here the concepts of development of culture, interaction of cultures, and integration of cultures.

In order to talk of the development of a culture it is necessary to have a criterion or a set of criteria by which we can distinguish a relatively undeveloped stage of culture from a developed stage. It will not do to identify temporal succession as a criterion of development of culture. It cannot be held that the later stages of a culture are necessarily stages of development, for there is such a thing as cultural decadence. The concepts of cultural development and cultural decadence are essentially related. We shall analyse these two concepts together presently.

Development of culture cannot also be explained by the area of diffusion of the culture. It has been sometimes argued that the wider the area over which a culture is diffused, the earlier it is historically. It cannot be held that the earlier stage of a culture is necessarily its more developed stage.

Development of culture has to do with development in the complexity of the cultural system. The system of beliefs, hopes, aspirations as well as conceptual systems become more and more complex only by revealing inner distinctions within the system. For example, the concept of truth may get differentiated into truth of science, truth of arts, truth of history and so on. The one concept of truth is shown to reveal inner distinctions in a developed stage of the culture, which is also the development of inner distinctions of man's spiritual realization. Where sciences have been created and distinguished from painting, music, poetry, etc., and also from historical sciences, the concept of truth also reveals inner complexities. The advanced cultural tools allow a fine-grained analysis, a deeper insight, a more generalized vision. The cultural life becomes richer, more varied, more complex, yet more unified. These may be accepted as marks of progressive refinement of culture.

Decadence of a culture implies decadence of the development of man's spiritual progress. The period of decadence may extend over even a thousand years, called retrospectively the dark age followed by a renaissance. A decadent culture involves a loss of refinement in all spheres of life.

Integration may be internal or external. Human society involves differentiation of the people according to various principles—intellectual or moral or physical excellence, rich and poor, different castes and so on. A culture of a people integrates all these different elements into a unity. But it may so happen that even after hundreds of years the different elements of society fall apart and the culture disintegrates. Cultural disintegration is not the same as political disintegration, for even politically divided peoples may share the same culture. Cultural disintegration may be replaced by cultural differentiation in which one basic culture is differentiated into various specific cultures.

External integration is integration of one culture into another culture with

which it comes into close contact. The integrated culture absorbs as many elements from the other culture as possible. So integration of cultures admits of degrees. Total integration of two cultures results in the evolution of a new composite culture which again may have different forms. What elements of a culture will be integrated into another depends upon the nature of the two cultures concerned.

If one of the cultures is more refined than the other then integration involves loss of excellence on its part. Still integration itself is a valid process continuously realized always everywhere.

It has been said that culture in its very essence is cumulative and man-made. But if culture is man-made then it is also true that man is made by his culture. This is because the culture of a society is the expression of an inner urge of the essence of man. In and through culture man expresses his inner nature and culture develops as man succeeds in expressing himself more and more. It has also been said that culture depends upon society, but the truth seems to be that society itself develops as culture develops. Culture and society go together, there was no time when man was not in society or when man did not have any culture.

The cultural development of man in society is a spiritual development although there are auxiliary physical, social, economic and historical factors which help the manifestation of the spiritual development.

Cultural development is intimately connected with cultural integration. It has been pointed out by social anthropologists that one culture may be influenced by another dominant culture and made to develop in a certain direction, as it happens in a subject-nation being culturally dominated by the ruling culture. Still it is not always true that a subject-nation has its culture dominated by the culture of the ruler. In India it has often happened that the victorious forces were completely integrated into Indian culture, as in the case of the Kusans, Sakas, Huns, Mongols and others. It is the inherent worth of the culture that is the determining factor, rather than political supremacy. Still it remains true that any two cultures may be integrated and we shall have to explain the possibility of such integration.

It has sometimes been argued by scholars supporting the temporally oriented concept of *Kulturkreis* and spatially oriented concept of culture area which received a great deal of attention that whereas both approaches were attempts to explain the distribution of culture traits, they approached the phenomena from opposite philosophical and methodological directions. The culture area concept suggested, among other things, that there existed a body of inter-related culture elements that in interaction with the environment produced a culture complex that may or may not have been unique but that was produced *in situ*. Those who believed in *Kulturkreis* held that migration and diffusion accounted for the distribution of most culture traits and hence that independent invention was extremely rare. There was, in fact, only a limited number of *Kulturkreise*, or fonts of diffusion.

The possibility of integration of any two cultures is justified by the theory of *Kulturkreise* by postulating a very limited number of independent cultures. The great number of cultures found at present all over the world are really one at their source. Central to this concept of *Kulturkreise* is the concept of diffusion of culture.

But even supposing that there are very few independent cultures, there is still a problem of explaining how these cultures could be integrated into a more inclusive and more developed culture.

Some Universal Cultural Values

We have so far tried to show how far the basic unity of mankind can justify the possibility of world culture. Now we shall try to show that different cultures at the present state of their development exhibit unity in some essential aspects. There are some fundamental values which are accepted in all cultures, though they are realized in different forms. The following is a list, not at all exhaustive, of such universal cultural values.

(*i*) Peace (non-violence), harmony, freedom, whether individual or collective. Peace, which is the supreme value, is one and indivisible; it can only be global. Every culture has a particular point of view, works under the limitations of a partial vision. There is, therefore, an inner urge to wholeness, to a comprehensive vision. Thus there is an inevitableness of world unity. Already this irrepressible yearning is realizing itself in different spheres. In the political sphere, there is the UN, as also its agencies like UNESCO, UNICEF, WHO. In the economic sphere there are regional alliances like the EEC, OPEC, and more recently, SAARC. There are also organizations like the Red Cross, Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, International Court of Justice, and so on in other spheres.

(*ii*) Honesty to oneself and to others is also an important value. This is at the root of truth as an ideal to be realized in knowledge, and also speaking the truth as an important social value. We have already discussed these aspects of truth.

(*iii*) Justice as both a moral and a social value.

(*iv*) Love, friendship (*maitrī*), compassion (*karuṇā*) are values which are directly responsible for the integration of cultures. We shall see how these values may be realized even in an alien land.

Culture and Evolution of Man

Although human culture is conditioned by physical, geographical, social, moral, economic, historical, religious and other factors which vary from country to country, society to society, religion to religion and so on, there is a basic unity of all men. This basic unity may be analysed at different levels —physiological, psychological, social, moral and spiritual.

The Body and the Physical Environment

All men belong to one species; difference of races does not constitute a difference of species. Man, everywhere, has evolved from the same predecessor. This basic unity in the origin of man works for a basic unity in all human behaviour.

Then there is a common inheritance which, too, exerts a tremendous influence on the cultural development of man everywhere.

> The inheritance which the Prehistoric Age received from the Prehuman Age was immense and powerful. It was the whole body of man and the environment in which he was to live, that basic inheritance which at all later ages he could take for granted. It is in fact not only the basic inheritance but the most enduring. While civilizations have come and gone we still are born to the identical equipment of body and limbs already shaped a hundred thousand years or more ago—yes, down to our scratching nails and that tendency to long canine teeth. As for our environment, though we have vastly changed its surface and have learnt how to pass its barriers, the shapes formed by oceans and continents, mountain ranges, great rivers, together with the climatic zones of the world still powerfully affect our lives and determine the pattern of our communities great and small.[10]

We may mention here the importance of the human body in determining human nature. Many philosophers have traced the spiritual development of man to some special features of the human body. Erwin W. Straus, for example, has written extensively on the philosophical importance of 'the Upright Posture'. Herder was the first to note the importance of Standing Upright.

There have been scientists who have emphasized that the human body standing erect is responsible for various 'evils'. 'The blood that must accomplish its circulation in an upright machine, the heart crammed into an oblique position, the intestines that work in a standing container—certainly these parts are more exposed to "possibilities of disturbance than in an animal body".' The upright posture characterizes the human being, it elevates him above animals.

Griffith has emphasized the importance of the human foot. 'Whatever else the foot is, it occupies the unique position between me and the ground. Hence we begin there with what is underneath us, then turning upward, we will consider the relation of foot to body.'[11]

Theories of the biological evolution of man have emphasized the gradual primacy of sight over smell and hearing. This biological phenomenon is said to be a consequence of the forefathers of man being primates living on trees. Philosophers, however, have found a more profound influence of this primacy of sight on the spiritual nature of man. Hans Jones, for example, talks of 'the nobility of sight' and points out influences of sight in the intellectual and spiritual make-up of man.[12]

The Psychological Level

> What it will prove most important to remember is that our species did not only inherit from the past its bodily equipment, dominated by its subtly elaborated brain, but also highly charged emotional centres and all the strange ancient furniture of the unconscious mind. Man emerged bringing with him hate, fear and anger, together with love and the joy of life in their simple animal form. He also brought the social heritage of family affection and group loyalty. Today some of us believe (while others do not) that among the most elusive and yet the most precious heirlooms of all were shadowy, deep-seated memories of the experience of the evolving animal life during the vast stretches of its history, memories which enrich and unite modern man by throwing up from the unconscious the images and ideas that inspire our arts and help to make them universally evocative. Memory of this kind, if it exists, not only unites all men at a very profound level of their being through their common response to its images, but also can serve to make us aware of our old kinship with all of life and all beings—that blessed and also truthful sense of oneness of which our intellect, if granted too much power, quickly deprives us.
>
> There can be no question, whatever construction we put upon them, that these mental and emotional inheritances which man received from the pre-human past were to provide a most potent force in the creation of culture. We shall find them giving colour and form to all aspects of human life other than the purely rational and intellectual.[13]

Mind. The expansion of consciousness is a main theme of history. Nothing has greater significance than the development and exercise of the combined mental powers of intellect and imagination, the two springs of human greatness. This must be the estimate of the humanist; if it were added that it is through these gifts that God has made us aware of divinity, there are few people in the world who would challenge it.

In man's animal past as one of the primates, the sharpening of sight at the expense of the more lowly sense of smell that went with living in trees, contributed to a heightening of the mental faculties.

Once manufacture of tools began, our forebears stepped onto an altogether higher plane of concentrated visual attention and manipulative skill. It may be that the controlled use of the hand helped to develop another essential human faculty, that of speech. It has been found that movements of the hand provoke a sympathetic movement of the mouth, and it may be that a habit of communicating by gesture helped to induce the controlled emission of sounds.

Here again, however, there is need to be wary in any recognition of cause and effect. Just as monkeys and some other primates have hands capable of executing skilful tasks were their brains equal to it, so too, their lips, palates and vocal chords are probably capable of speech. It is the brain power that is lacking.

The great size of the frontal and temporal lobes of the human brain is particularly characteristic of men, and they include among their millions of nerve cells many groups not enslaved to exact functions but to the storing of memories and their association. Memory and association, leading to image-making powers, these are the abilities necessary for full self-consciousness, for awareness of the past and the future, intelligent anticipation and the building of traditions to bind the long life of the race. There is a sequence in the functioning of memory that can be seen passing from the biological into the cultural realm. First, the cerebral storing of innumerable items of experience; then their concentration into images that begins the breakdown of the wholeness of experience and hence to the control of life's matrix; next the formation of fixed symbols and more specially the sound symbols of language that make it possible to sharpen the identity of things by the giving of names and to transfer memories and images from one living human being to another; finally the invention of writing that extends memory outside the living group to all generations and all mankind. By these means that started with the momentary experiences of single individuals may be built into a greater and long-lived ~~cultural~~ tradition.

The self-consciousness that intensified with the elaboration of the cerebral cortex, making man more and more aware of his action and of his separation from nature, was to take two main and opposing directions. One was towards controlling the environment. This led immediately to tool-making and then on to the whole accelerating course of our technical and scientific advance. Here analysis, the breaking down of the whole into manageable parts, has been the means, and the ends are wholly practical and material. The other direction is towards re-uniting the part with the whole, man with the universe from which his consciousness seemed to divide him. This way led to ritual, art, religious faith, mysticism and some aspects of philosophy. Metaphor, simile, symbolical enactments and other unifying forms have been the means, and the ends, essentially, are not practical or material.

Theories of Socio-Cultural Evolution

Marxist thinkers emphasize that the evolution of man from pre-human forms is not so much a biological evolution as a socio-cultural one. According to biological theories the evolution of man was marked by (*i*) tool making, (*ii*) language, (*iii*) agriculture, (*iv*) domestication of animals. According to Marxist thinkers all these different levels are levels of social evolution. Thus, tool-making introduced new means of production, specially of killing animals for food. Supporters of biological theories of human evolution point out that the change in food habits from vegetarianism to non-vegetarianism meant relief from constant eating and that meat-eating might have developed the human brain. But gradually when agriculture was invented tool-making assumed more importance as a means of production of food. This early breakthrough has continued to develop into a major source of social evolution.

Supporters of the biological theory of evolution of man have tried to connect the emergence of language with the dexterity in hand movement involved in tool-making. But this ingenious suggestion is inadequate, for language is essentially a means of communication and has evolved only under the urge to communicate with others. Thus language in its motivation as well as actual emergence is a social phenomenon. Because articulate speech is often regarded as the differentia of man it is necessary to study in detail the phenomenon of articulate speech.

It is a well-known fact that even lower animals and birds have a method of communicating among themselves. Sometimes animals of one species understand the warning sounds made by animals of another species. Moreover there are talking birds which can reproduce human speech correctly and intelligibly. That shows that even in the early stages of biological evolution animals were endowed with physical organs of speech. Yet there is a fundamental difference between a parrot repeating words and sentences learnt from a man's speaking. A parrot cannot utter any new word or sentence whereas an essential feature of human speech is the capacity to form novel sentences from old words. Apart from articulate speech there is gesture language by which animals communicate with one another; in a strange country even men have to use this gesture language to communicate with other men. Thus human speech is fundamentally different from the gesture language of animals or even the talking of talking birds, because apart from the appropriate organs of speech, the human brain is vastly more complex than any animal's brain. Human speech is an intelligent activity which no other animal is capable of.

Science and Science-Culture

It is usual to suppose that science is culture neutral, objective, rational. That it is independent of race, religion, language, socio-political systems, in short, of difference in every respect. Scientists understand one another perfectly anywhere in the world, whether they accept, modify or even reject a theory. Because of this close unity among scientists the world over it may be supposed that as men become more and more scientific in their outlook, the closer becomes their unity. It is only in non-scientific spheres that men differ. Science is a great unifier of humanity. This, however, represents a very one-sided view of what science is. We shall examine in detail some problems concerning the nature of science and of the relation of science to culture, specially world-culture.

It is necessary to distinguish between science and science-culture. Science-culture comprises a world-view, an attitude to reality and to men. It is grounded in science and reflections on science. It is usually held that science is totally objective and rational, that it is culture-neutral. This is why science spreads all over the world and is developed in all countries, in all cultures.

This objectivity and rationality of the physical sciences are independent of race and religion.

There are, however, deeper problems about technology. "Modern technological science and society raise issues of freedom and control, of individuality and humanity. Corresponding to these concerns is the recognition of the political, moral, and ethical dimensions of inquiry and particularly the relationship between science and technology and the politics of control. Recognition of such issues is widespread, and solutions range from advanced cybernetics (Wiener, Beer) to anarchy (Feyerabend). Hannah Arendt views the situation in the following terms:

> This future man, whom the scientists tell us they will produce in no more than a hundred years, seems to be possessed by a rebellion against human existence as it has been given . . . which he wishes to exchange, as it were, for something he has made himself. There is no reason to doubt our abilities to accomplish such an exchange, just as there is no reason to doubt our present ability to destroy all organic life on earth. The only question is whether we wish to use our new scientific and technical knowledge in this direction, and this question cannot be decided by scientific means; it is a political question of the first order and therefore can hardly be left to the decision of professional scientists or professional politicians.

Certainly there is a sense in which the sciences have lost their relationship to everyday life. Through increasing sophistication and mathematization, coupled with intense specialization, the sciences have become meaningless to the non-specialist. Yet, because of their increasing ties with technology, business and government, the sciences have begun to influence everything man does.

The crisis of the sciences goes beyond even these claims, however, for the crisis is also an internal one. Questions have arisen about the basic relationship of science to its subject matter. This relationship has become insecure, leading to reflections on the basic structures of the sciences. Such reflections seek to dispel the insecurity over basic concepts or to secure those foundations anew in a more original understanding of the subject matter. The clarification of this primary field of subject matter requires methods different from those of the empirical sciences themselves. Since the empirical sciences are incapable of providing such self-clarification empirically in crisis scientific research turns to philosophical reflection. It is, Heidegger claims, through such reflections that genuine progress in the sciences can be said to occur. Yet such progress differs among the sciences themselves. As concrete possibilities of man speaking about the world in which he exists, the sciences stand in different relations to man. If they are not to be merely conventional enterprises, justified only by the prevailing tradition, then they must constantly seek to bring their subject matter to an original experience before it is

hidden by the essential objectifying and thematizing methods of each particular scientific inquiry."[14]

Rationality

So far it has been assumed that there is one rationality in all men, that rationality is independent of everything else—social, political, economic, moral, spiritual, or cultural. We shall now examine this assumption.

Mathematics is a rational science par excellence. All the sciences use mathematics to achieve 'rigour'. So let us examine the nature of mathematics in some detail. As a first point, I quote from a book on modern algebra written by a German expert who taught in Calcutta for several years.

> Western mathematicians may wonder why the 'method of identification' is discussed here in such an explicit manner. This item which was not treated in the lecture-notes has been introduced into the book because the experience of teaching showed its necessity. This is the only occasion where I came across an essential difference between the Indian way of thinking in mathematics and the Western one. It seems that the Western mind performs so to say automatically the operation of identification; even Edmund Landau whose rigour and explicitness have become proverbial used to pass it over without explanation. I remember a single case where I had to discuss this item with a student of Leipzig University, and on that occasion it was not my task to clear up the difficulty, but to show that there is one. When introducing the new course on Algebra in Calcutta I did not like to burden it with considerations which in Europe were thought to be unnecessary sophistries, and I was very astonished that every year, the students felt difficulties and asked for explanations at that particular point. I am stating this experience here without feeling competent to explain it. Scholars on Indology may find some clue in ancient Indian logic—though very few of our mathematics students have explicit knowledge of it. Similarly, I must leave it to Indian scholars to explore why Western people fail to recognize a difficulty which is so obvious even to an average mathematics student in this country.[15]

This is an example where mathematics students of different countries differ in their perception of mathematical problems. The traditional notion that mathematics being rational is culture-neutral is given up, at least by a wide range of mathematicians and philosophers of mathematics. I quote, again,

> This anthology delineates quasi-empiricism as a coherent and increasingly popular approach to the philosophy of mathematics. . . . Although realism and constructivism seem to be incompatible positions in the philosophy of mathematics, neither is incompatible with quasi-empiricism. In fact quasi-

empiricism is continuous with constructivism, both take their start from mathematical practice. A difference between the approaches is that quasi-empiricism views the constructions of mathematicians more as social products, while constructivism views them in more strictly mathematical terms.[16]

Now mathematics being a social product is conditioned by the society. But here we have to distinguish between Levi's problem and the problem of quasi-empiricism. Even though it be granted that mathematics is a social product, it does not follow that it will be understood only in the society whose product it is. If mathematics is intelligible to everyone having the capacity, then it does not much matter if its origin is rooted in a society. But Levi's problem is different, it concerns the intelligibility of mathematics in different cultural traditions.

Levi's suggestion is supported by Wittgenstein's concept of alien rationality. It is not that anyone having alien rationality misunderstands our rule, or that he is inconsistent overtly or covertly. And there is no way of showing him that he is not using the rule in 'the same way' as we do. For the very concept of using a rule in the same way is completely different for him. We do not, of course, understand him, nor does he understand us. The point is that there is no rationality which is the essence of man. Wittgenstein does not find any explanatory value of the concept of essences. That we do share the same rationality is to be explained by our common 'form of life'. Anyone who has a completely different way of life will have a different rationality which, of course, we shall not understand.

Whether Wittgenstein's concept of alien rationality is itself coherent or not, he at least bases rationality on the common way of life of man. This looks very much like asserting that all men share the same rationality only because human nature is the same everywhere.[17] The 'way of life' is culture-determined, and unless there is a common human culture, there cannot be one rationality.

Concepts of World Culture

One important question which may be asked at the outset is, what is the need for developing a concept of world culture over and above the concept of culture? In answering this question I shall quote from what Gennadi Yagodin, USSR minister of higher and specialized secondary education, once said:

> The assimilation of higher spiritual values of Russian and *world culture* by the young people, apart from producing immunity against the virus of petty-bourgeois and philistine attitudes will raise the professional standards of specialists, man's vocation being creation in all spheres of endeavour, not only in accordance with practical tasks, but also in accordance with the laws of beauty and loftiest moral ideals.[18]

As it has been noted 'we are undergoing not a cultural revolution, but a revolution by culture.'[19] The culture here is world culture. Thus the importance of world culture is gradually being realized. It is, therefore, important to be clear about the nature of world culture.

In analysing the concept of world culture, the first point to be clear about is whether world culture is culture at the same level as cultures of different societies. Many scholars have used the term 'super-culture' for a single culture of all societies. Now the concept of a super-culture belongs to a higher level than the concept of particular cultures. But it is also possible that world culture is the unity running through all the different cultures and is immanent in, and internal to, all the cultures, and therefore belongs to the same level as all the cultures.

The philosophical problem here is the problem of monism versus pluralism in the realm of cultures.

(*i*) According to the extreme form of pluralism, unity is illusory. The most trivial conception of world culture is that it is just a totality of different cultures of the world. This conception is inadequate for three major reasons. Firstly, it is not clear how different cultures which often exhibit incompatibilities of various aspects can yet be conceived together. Secondly, this conception of world culture is not a new concept but a mechanical aggregate of existing cultures without throwing any light on the concept. The most important point here is to determine in what sense cultures are conceptually incompatible. Can there be any culture which is so alien that it cannot be understood, appreciated by, or assimilated into, another culture? Moreover, there is always a risk of conflict in an unmitigated pluralism of cultures; unless they are somehow unified, the risk will always be a real possibility.

(*ii*) A second way of conceiving world culture is to attempt to find out common features of all cultures of the world. It may be argued that all cultures are cultures only because they have some essential features in common. A difficulty of this conception is that the common features may be so general as to make the concept almost empty. But as we have already seen, there are various ways of conceiving the basic unity of all cultures, and this unity is not nominal, but substantial.

(*iii*) A third way of conceiving world culture is the Hegelian dialectic. It is to hold that world culture is a concrete universal or a dialectical unity of opposites. A difficulty of this conception is how to understand in what sense one culture can be an 'opposite' of another culture. No culture can be contradictory to another. A conception of culture, even of extra-terrestrial beings, which is so alien to any culture of this world that there can be no mutual understanding between them, is not coherent.

(*iv*) A fourth conception of world culture is not to find essential features common to all cultures of the world, but to find 'family resemblances' among them. This Wittgensteinian conception is opposed to the essentialism of (*ii*) above.

(*v*) We may have another concept of world culture following Sri Rama-Krishna's very novel philosophy. World culture is not yet a reality, it is the common future goal of all cultures. World culture, therefore, is not what is common to all cultures as we find them now, not even their 'family resemblances', but it is that to which all cultures lead by developing in their own way. Ordinarily, cultures are conceived as belonging to different levels—primitive cultures, feudal cultures, urban culture, folk culture and so on. It is commonly believed that primitive culture, and other forms of culture belonging to *lower levels*, have to develop to the level of the modern culture of science and technology before they can reach their goal. That is, there is only one way of development of culture, from the lowest stage to the highest stage. Sri Ramakrishna's insight is opposite to this theory of evolution of cultures. According to him, different cultures may develop along their own different paths, yet they will reach the same goal; there are different paths all leading to the same goal, just as by digging deep enough from any point on the surface of the earth, one reaches the centre not along one single path, but by converging to the same point starting from different positions. As Pande has pointed out, culture as self-expression will ultimately lead to mystic communion,[20] which is the realization of one universal consciousness and it is therefore the same for all cultures, however different they may be at the present level of development. Every culture by its inner necessity will transcend its limits to attain a common perfection, for final perfection or ultimate truth or goodness is one.

This goal is immanent in all cultures and, therefore, is present in them at all levels of development. Thus the differences among cultures, which undoubtedly exist, must be due to the infinite possibility of every culture to develop freely. When they are thus developed to their limits, in all possible ways, they come to rest, find their fulfilment, in the infinite consciousness. Differences among cultures on the way to the goal are as inevitable as their transcendence in the end. If the differences among cultures are inherent in their very nature, so also is the transcendence. As it is this transcendence which manifests itself at all levels, in their differences the cultures share a basic identity. In our metaphor it is the centre which expands itself into the infinite points of the circumference; it is the one which becomes many, and holds the many together to constitute a cosmos.

It is usual to distinguish a horizontal and a vertical view of the ultimate realization.[21] From the point of view of horizontal development, different cultures are seen as they develop in history, cosmological myths, philosophical doctrines involving linear progress, etc. From the point of view of vertical growth the problem is to relate the individual to the absolute. But this vertical growth will necessarily transform the horizontal point of view of our understanding of history and of historical cultures, the significance of cosmological myths, of philosophical theories. We must note here that the words 'horizontal' and 'vertical' are used figuratively in this context; and by

ascending vertically the horizon is widened, the differences between cultures which seem important at the ground level of existence gradually vanish when seen from high above. The vertical ascent is the only way of widening the horizon.

We now summarize. There are two basically different conceptions of world culture. According to one, world culture is to be achieved through integration of all cultures, which however different and opposing they may be, are basically consistent having evolved from one culture. But this process of integration of all cultures is vitiated by forces of distintegration which are always active even in integrated societies which have survived thousands of years. Because of forces working for and against integration of cultures, world culture in this sense is likely to remain always an ideal which may be approached, but never realized. The second conception of world culture does not require any integration of all cultures, but emphasizes that every culture has possibilities or the potentiality of infinite development. By understanding one's own culture deeply and realizing its potentiality for infinite development, not physically, but in consciousness one attains a universality where all cultures are united. Parallel cultures meet at infinity.

Notes and References

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Reason and its rhyme

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> For reson can I non fynde
> Nor good ryme in your mater.
> JOHN SKELTON

ACCOUNTING FOR REASON

One of the surest signs that Enlightenment rationalism has lost its hold upon Anglo-European cultures is the changed attitude toward the Lexicon. Dictionaries and encyclopaediae, anchors of the Enlightenment, have been torn from their moorings. On the one hand, words are dissolving into their histories, their etymologies, while on the other, their meanings are ramified by myriad inter-textual loci. As a consequence, dictionaries serve as mere compendia of ambiguities.

The collapse of the dictionary is symptomatic of our altered conception of the activity of 'thinking'. We Anglo-Europeans are accustomed to giving accounts, making sense—being rational—either by tracing the history of our subject or by analysing its putatively logical structure. Our lexicons contain the paradigms of such accountings. Etymological accounts tell the story of the term while definitions characterize the properties common to the members of the class to which the item currently belongs.

But now neither the genetic nor morphological accountings provide us much lexical satisfaction. Few of us consult a dictionary any more to certify a univocal sense of '*x*'. We are much more concerned to uncover the unfamiliar senses of '*x*' that have been elided or ignored, the embarrassing denotations of '*x*' that undermine accepted usage, the diverse associations which constitute the almost always incoherent history of '*x*'. The more perverse among the lexical Luddites are particularly delighted to discover among the arcane advices of the OED that, once upon a time, '*x*' had the meaning 'not*x*'.

Continual challenges to this anarchic mentality on the part of the dogged heirs of the Enlightenment force us again and again into the fruitless dialectics of the relativity debates. The closed shop mentality of all parties to these debates—absolutists, relativists and sceptics—ensures that nothing will be resolved.

I hope to avoid as much as possible the tedious idiom of relativism by the admittedly desperate device of attempting to rename the condition characterizing Anglo-European culture. I will claim that Western intellectuals

ought to characterize their circumstances not in terms of relativity but by appeal to notions of conceptual and historical 'vagueness'. By vagueness I mean essentially what Charles Peirce meant by the term, namely, 'open to rich and diverse interpretations'.

The cultivation of historical and inter-theoretical vagueness would, I contend, offer a way around futile discussions of relativism and a way into productive inter-cultural conversation.

Historical vagueness is a consequence, first, of our ability to provide many interesting and, in their proper season, important narrative accounts each of which will include some items and exclude others, render some marginal and others central. Second, we ought to make every effort to maintain these accounts as a part of our funded experience, banking them until the season of their relevance. Thirdly, we should avoid separating these accounts whenever possible and cultivate the active entertainment of alternative narratives.

Conceptual or inter-theoretical vagueness suggests that while a term is specifiable from one theory to another, or one text or series of texts to another, outside any particular text or theory it lacks any specific demotic sense, but exists as an accreted cluster of meanings—to the eye of reason a mutated grotesque, but to the imagination a splendrous crystal with interestingly skewed facets.

Obviously such vague notions affect the integrity of the consciousness that recognizes their incoherent complexity. And though I would grant that the self-conscious celebrations of decentering celebrated by the deconstructionist contain more brag than fact, the contrasting senses stubbornly attaching to almost every important notion cannot but infect the consciousness of the literate among us sufficiently to ambiguate ourselves.

The decentered self, romantic hero of postmodernism, *becomes* decentered in the act of attempting to encompass the texts of his culture with either the metaphysical comfort of a final essence or the historical comfort of a single narrative thread. Such a vague self is the muddle-headed postmodern, successor to the simple-minded orphans of the Enlightenment.

Thus, at the rather formal level of theoretical discourse, Anglo-European philosophers have no difficulty understanding that 'Nature' can mean atoms in space, or teleologically interrelated organisms, or mathematical patterns, or the conventional object of rhetorical definition. 'God' can mean the Great Mechanic, Telos of Nature, Divine Mind, or Arbitrary Will. 'Freedom' can be associated with free choice amidst limiting conditions, power of the individual will, knowledge, or the realization of determination. 'History' can be the history of ideas, or a heroic narrative focusing upon individual 'greatness', or causal accounts of the contingencies of brute circumstance, or narratives associated with the professionalized discourses of art, science, ethics or religion. 'Reason' can be identified with the discovery and manipulation of essences or logical finalities, the discernment and co-ordination of

ends in nature, the analysis of material and efficient causes, or persuasive rhetoric.

The proponent of vagueness substitutes 'and' for 'or' in the above listings, judging the belief that the variant meanings of each of these terms must be presumed mutually exclusive to be motivated by what both the postmodern critic and the Zen Master would claim to be a persistent but arbitrary dependence upon logical consistency and coherence. This persistence, again both would assert, is itself more a consequence of a desire for self-identity and ego stability than of getting at any truth of the matter. It certainly can be disconcerting to *mean* inconsistently, to *assert* oxymoronically.

The *ad hoc* device of claiming to 'define our terms' prior to the act of communication is unavoidably duplicitous. We cannot help but mean more, or less—or differently—than we consciously intend. All speaking involves a slippage of the tongue. Parapraxis is the paradigm of communication since, except with respect to our most formalized communicative efforts, each of our names is legion.

I do not intend to appear flippant. I take the condition of cultural vagueness to be an easily recognizable consequence of the collapse of the Enlightenment sensibility: Ideas yield themselves up to their opposites (Hegel); truth is the sum of mutually incoherent interpretations (Nietzsche); a cigar is never just a cigar (*pace* Freud).

Reason and Rhyme

Whatever reason is decided to be in the context of an argument or theory, it is hardly the sole or even the primary source of meaningfulness. The imaginative, often spontaneous, juxtapositions of events called coincidence or correlation, or the same juxtapositions of sense and sound associated with parabolic, elliptical and metaphorical language of the poet; the sharply focused trauma of mystical experience, often accompanied by the obscure language of oracles and revelations—all these are extra or infra-rational. At the same time, these are often the meanings that enrich or delimit more ordinary sensibilities.

In the search for meaningfulness, there is the vague notion of reason and its equally vague supplement—its *rhyme*. The rational individual at the end of reason's rope, reaches out to metaphor. The poet, exhausting rhyme, descends by that same rope.

The strictly non-rational—the rhyme of reason—is associated with myth, poetry and rhetoric. A richly vague notion of rationality, one containing both reason and its rhyme—a notion we might call 'reasonableness'—allows for the parity of causal narrative and myth, of logic and metaphor.

Reason finds its rhyme in Plato's myth of Er, the imagery of the cave, the chariot, analogies of the Sun and the Good. In a more extended sense Plato

is rhyme to Aristotle's reason and *vice versa*. And Democritus the rhyme of both. Rhyme is reason's putatively meaningful other. A richly vague notion of either rhyme or reason contains the senses of both. Together reason and rhyme offer the sum of meaningfulness and the tools for achieving it.

A vague concept of rationality, in both its semantic and historicist senses, must permit the rhyme of reason into its realm of associations. But productive vagueness is harder to maintain among hyperconscious, 'belated'[1] intellectuals. The educated are quite aware of most, if not all, of the principal meanings associable with a given term in their professional discourse. Obedience to criteria such as 'clarity', 'coherence' 'consistency' lead to a delineation and specification of mutually exclusive meanings. Reason thus confounds its own ends.

Increasingly, survivors of the Enlightenment are disillusioned by the recognition that contemporary culture is a mélange of values and interests, each of which defines its own conceptual and historical route of meaning and interpretation. Poets, novelists and philosophers no longer offer a ladder of knowledge which may be used to arrive at significant values and understandings. Our contemporary world is decidedly horizontal; each of us moves along the surface of a web with diverse threads, leading in multiple directions. We confront an inexhaustible network of strands, with causes and conditions, with anchorings and functionings—each individually knowable, yet incomprehensible to the reasoning creature.

The sort of vagueness I am urging is achieved at only the very lowest level by meta-theoretical or taxonomic endeavours. The taxonomist constructs complex and nuanced classificatory schemes which are meant to chart all once and future meanings of any theoretical concept in a distinguishable array.

Schemes associated with the 'root metaphor' concept of Stephen Pepper[2] or grounded in Aristotelian categories such as Richard McKeon and his epigoni employ,[3] or produced by Robert Brumbaugh's use of Plato's Divided Line,[4] all provide maps or compasses permitting us to chart the important world-views. But the meta-discourse of the taxonomists is a logical one which would preclude recommendation of the clustering remedy. In fact, many taxonomists merely raise rationality to the second power by claiming that they have at least a *true* theory of the sorts of possible theories.

Vague notions as concept clusters lack logical coherence. Their significance is tropic—imagistic, metaphorical, even (and often especially) oxymoronic. The conventionally or theoretically stipulated senses of these clusters are arrived at by resort to synecdoche.

The same is true of vague historicist accounts. Properly appreciated, the interwoven conceptual and narrative strands of significance form a diachronous web of interpretations. This is the web of culture itself. The privileging of a single narrative or conceptual element construes the whole as one of its

parts. Thus, in an objectively vague culture the search for univocity is a special case of the employment of synecdoche which underlies all communication.

Owning so many answers to so few questions inverts the priorities associated with the search for knowledge. That search now is most satisfying when we find ourselves moving away from suspect clarity, away from coherent understanding, into an increasingly more complex muddle. We do not really wish to journey from darkness to light, if it is understood as a thousand points of light each of which urges our commitment but only one of which we feel justified in choosing. Relativism is, we know, the deadest of dead-ends. Properly understood, the world is *objectively vague* and getting vaguer. *Per obscurum ad obscurius*.

The hyperconscious suffer not only from an excess of history but equally from a surplus of stipulated meanings. Therefore, those who would avoid the 'anxiety of influence'[5] by recourse to vagueness must fray the boundaries of our sharply delineated concepts, fragment their polished surfaces, in order to rewin the original richness of the language. The return to the origins of imaginative richness requires something like Nietzsche's programme of 'active forgetting'. In fact, since the most important kinds of forgetting—repression, sublation, incorporation—are in fact acts of re-membering, of dissolving and reconstituting the connections among the elements of imagination and sense, the production of vagueness achieves a principal aim of active forgetting—namely, a world in which truth is the sum total of interpretations of its object.[6]

With regard to our most important concepts we should strive for vagueness by acceding to the Ch'an Buddhist advice: 'Avoid choosing by choosing both'—or, in our case, 'all'. Accepting terms as cluster concepts means accepting their meanings together in a single truncated gestalt in which all meanings are foregrounded. The consequence must be that one is propelled from reason in the narrow sense to imagination and accedes to the replacement of logical by aesthetic coherence.[7]

If we cannot achieve a single best theoretical context within which to understand rationality, neither can we depend upon historicist accounts to weed out currently irrelevant notions and provide us the understanding of reason best suited to our contemporary situation. Diachronic interpretations, however specific and nominalistic they appear, are themselves shaped by an antecedently selected vocabulary—idealist, behaviourist, existential—which construes the movement of past to present in a consciously tendentious manner. Historicists have no choice but to be partial. And with the aggressive candour hyperconsciousness enjoins, some openly celebrate the arbitrariness of their enterprise.

All historicisms, however rhetorically robust, are conceptually wan and anaemic since the coherence and narrative unity they require depends upon

special pleadings generalized from a narrow selection of evidences. The historicist is unable to bypass the difficulties of pluralism. His narrative is simply the moving image of a provincial theory.

In the consideration of conceptual and historical vagueness, I have omitted mention of the richest source of meaningfulness—namely, the *ex nihilo* creation of vague metaphors. The reason for this omission is that there is very little to be said about the process whereby such metaphors come into being other than that it is contingent, serendipitous...and rare.

Until we are able to offer ourselves up to the naturally vague richness of novel metaphors we have no choice but to make do with the old. And since traditional modes of reconstruction merely provide a rehearsal of the ever same, I have sought to offer the resort to artificial vagueness as a means of giving those of us committed to the process of thinking something to do while we wait.

But I suggest that there is more at stake than merely the need to mark time. For without some resort to vagueness, the undegraded carcasses of our outworn metaphors will continue to clutter the brains of the bookish, enervating intellect by eliciting the production of tired analyses, unfruitful dialectic, clichéd speculations and impotent apologetics—in short, by perpetuating a philosophic tradition that has long since shown itself effete.

Inter-cultural Vagueness

One would think that inter-cultural conversation would offer philosophers a fresh field of endeavour. But if the troubled infancy of comparative philosophy is any indication, the same naive misconstruals and reductionist assaults that have punctuated the history of western philosophy threaten to shape comparative thinking as well.

The argument for conceptual and historical vagueness applies *a fortiori* to attempts at inter-cultural communication since the greater the differences one might plausibly presume among the parties to a conversation the more one needs vague notions to accommodate them.

The first step in developing inter-cultural vagueness requires that we defend the problematic status of the term 'culture'. This can be done most straightforwardly by asking whether it is reasonable to assume that there is more than one culture. If this question is to be addressed in the popular idiom of Anglo-European philosophic discourse, we must speak not of 'mind' or 'experience' but of 'language'. Thus the question whether there is one culture or many entails the query, 'Is there more than a single language?'

By attempting to define a natural language one is already isolating, identifying and characterizing elements presumed to be different among languages. But such an endeavour implies that translation has already taken place. Transformation rules, syntactical structures, semantic contextualizations, are common elements uncommonly applied within each language.

The problem lies, of course, with the assumption that context demands coherence and if logical coherence cannot be demonstrated, there must be alternative contexts in evidence. Thus, semantic, syntactical or grammatical incoherence would suggest alternative structures and, therefore, alternative languages.

One could easily argue that there are as many languages as language users. Defence of this 'idiolect view' would be couched in much the same terms as arguments concerning 'other minds'. If inter-personal communication is deemed problematic, it must be because the way one comes to be assured of the character of one's own self is not thought to be guaranteed with respect to the knowing of others. This is tantamount to the assumption that linguistic behaviour of the sort that presumes a distinction between communicants is both semantically and referentially problematic.

After all, questions of synonymy do not begin with the query whether different verbal locutions have the same meaning. The more primitive question is whether two utterances of the putatively same locution carry the same sense.

Perhaps each of us owns his or her own language. These private languages then beg for translations, each into the other. But, of course, no transformational rules or translation equivalents could be possible under such circumstances.

This solipsism results from Cartesianism gone mad. The recognition that such a consequence is inevitable on the Cartesian model leads to behaviourist and instrumental models of language which presumably do not require that one look inside one's own or another's 'mind' or 'experience' for 'meanings'.

A second understanding of language would have it that in some important sense there is only one language of which all putatively distinct languages are adumbrations and approximations. Whereas the idiolect view entails the consequence that communication is impossible because no one naturally 'means' the same as another and that the act of translation cannot be successfully performed, defenders of a universal language would claim that the potentialities of communication are always greater than we believe and that translation in the strictest of senses is unnecessary since there is no radically alternative language into which or from which translations could be made.

The universalist seeks both logical and grammatical constants. When such constants are discovered they are used as norms by which to construe the grammars of natural languages. The result of this approach is a syntactical and semantical rationalism which perpetuates the Enlightenment ideal of a universal language and logic.

Such an understanding of language is the motor of that cultural chauvinism associated with modernity. It is not just an ideal language, but the culture of such a language as well, that serves as norm. For the moderns, that

ideal culture is best approximated at this stage of history by the Western cultural milieu.

Between these two extremes lies the conception of 'language communities' within or among social or cultural contexts which are constituted by alternative rules. In the model Wittgenstein proposes, though there is never any final assurance that two people are playing precisely the same game, this must be the presumption in many cases. What makes two games similar is that they both have rules. The specificity of the rules of different games, however, militates against participation in both games at once.

The context which contains mutually incoherent games without attempting reduction or sublation, one may call 'culture'. Culture, therefore, cannot be defined by coherence of ideals or principles, concepts or values.

Obviously the incoherence among many sets of rule-defined behaviours in the same culture does not *per se* make the culture incoherent. But an extremely high degree of professionalization could in principle lead to a situation in which, effectively, no ordinary uses of language remain. If there is no viable realm of demotic discourse, cultural incoherence is incomplete since the constitutive rules of alternative discourses exclude communication across rule-defined boundaries. We see this phenomenon in the contrast of alternative axiomatic systems in terms of which inter-theoretical vagueness is consciously excluded.

Internal incoherence within a culture suggests the possibility of specialized cultures no longer emergent from, or dependent upon, a single natural language. The coherence among the practices of physical scientists in America, France, Britain, Germany, America, India, China, Japan, and so forth, indicates that the physical sciences may form a large segment of a 'scientific culture' which is not meaningfully reducible to any particular natural language. Likewise, a transnational culture of science, of literature, of religion, of art, of philosophy, defined by the professional interests of a plurality of countries may presently exist at least in adumbrated form.

Holistic or coherence-based interpretations of culture are reductive in one of two manners—namely, by reducing cultural significances to the formal rules of a single cultural interest, or by formalizing a general theory of the inter-relations of the natural and cultural sciences and presenting that as the theoretical structure expressive of the culture.

Perhaps the best way to understand 'culture' as a vague notion is to say that there is *at most* one language and *at most* one culture. The engagement between two cultures, then, is an articulation of alternative importances within a single (incoherent) complex. One needs make no drastic distinction among different cultures or their languages.[8]

A productively vague model of cultures would construe them as local distortions of a general field which is itself without specifiable boundary conditions. The field/focus model contrasts readily with both the positivist and idealist models by offering an alternative sense of abstraction.[9]

On the field/focus interpretation, culture is objectively vague in the sense discussed above. Any part 'abstracted' from the whole adumbrates the whole. As a consequence, the elements of a field are synecdoches whose partiality advertises the complexity of the whole. In place of precise 'locus' one employs vague 'focus'.

The focus/field model suggests that culture is potentially, and in practice almost always a chaos. Chaos is best construed as the sum of all orders which is itself not an order. It is Nietzsche's world wherein Truth is the additive sum of all interpretations.

Depending upon the degree of formalizability, the relatively stable distentions in the field of capital '*C*' Culture which we recognize as small '*c*' cultures, are themselves incommensurable. Likewise the distensions within a small '*c*' culture associated with the habits and institutions, the theoretical constructs, world-views, cultural interests, aims and activities may themselves be to a significant degree incommensurable. Thus Culture as a complex aggregate of significances cannot be characterized by coherence.

Small '*c*' cultures are indefinitely flexible. We must presume that each image, concept, proposition or argument extant in one culture might well be rendered in the language of another. The limits of this principle apply to the issues of *importance* only. An alien image, idea or ideology may be characterizable in the idiom of an alternative discourse, but still thought trivial by the users of that discourse.

Capital '*C*' Culture refers to a vague complex of significances focused in accordance with a variety of interests. In Anglo-European cultures these interests are called aesthetic, ethical, scientific, religious. Within a single culture there are priorities of interest, which may of course change from time to time. The boundaries of these cultural interests are potentially as vague and permeable as are the boundaries of cultures and languages themselves.

If the small '*c*' culture which contextualizes inter-cultural conversations is that of a trans-cultural interest—mathematics, physics, biology—inter-cultural conversations may be enhanced by a high incidence of specialized and professionalized discourse. Most inter-cultural conversations, however, particularly those associated with aesthetic, moral and religious interests, depend upon vagueness. Thus, inter-cultural communication may have little need to respond to the logical paradoxes of incommensurability except in so far as we are dealing with inter-theoretical conversations presupposing alternative professionalized or axiomatized language.

Communication patterned by productive vagueness is not a strictly rational process, but a *reasonable* one. Such communication is not logical but *analogical*, a clumsy process of fits and starts which involves the matching and mismatching of feelings and intentions, of images and actions. To communicate is to articulate differences, and the procedures involved in such articulation are themselves not wholly open to articulation.

Translation and communication are, of course, context-dependent. And

the context required for the most adequate translation and communication is that of the complex of values and interests that define and organize particular forms of social praxis. Knowledge of the possibilities and constraints of the relevant languages provide a sense of *potential* meanings. Knowledge of the cultural sensibility provides a sense of *relevant* meanings and their *import*.

I want to illustrate the need for vagueness in inter-cultural conversations by selecting two seemingly disparate issues which productively engage alternative cultural sensibilities in a manner that calls into question attempts to develop any univocal sense of reason and rationality.

My subjects are to be 'pain' and 'the copula'. I will begin with the latter.

China and the Verb 'To Be'

Mistaken assessments of alternative cultures can be more or less costly. Numerous examples of such mistakes may be cited. Looking at the Anglo-European construal of China, for example, one can note that late nineteenth and early twentieth century translations of classical Chinese texts, made by good Christian souls, introduced terms such as 'God', 'Truth' and 'Virtue' as translations of terms which more careful scrutiny reveals bear little resemblance to these concepts. Social psychologists and psycho-historians have sinned with equal egregiousness by presupposing notions such as the Oedipal situation in their interpretations of Chinese society with ridiculous consequences. Historians of science and political theorists conspire to ensure a misunderstanding of Chinese concepts of law by assuming the validity of transcendent forms of natural law, on the one hand, or positivist forms of imposed law, on the other. Both sociologists and political theorists perpetuate seriously flawed understandings of the Chinese political process by failing to note shifts in the meanings of power and authority as we move from West to East, or by presupposing the traditional western distinction of private and public spheres of social existence where no such distinction obtains, or by falsely assuming that the absence of a tradition of natural rights in China is a function of authoritarian or even totalitarian motivations. Some western historians have insisted upon importing into China irrelevant notions of history and historiography that make the Chinese appear to be silly and irresponsible caretakers of their own past.

Perhaps the most serious mistake is in assuming that Karl Marx is more important than Confucius—or Chuang-tzu—in understanding contemporary China. Effectively dead as a political philosophy, Marxism exists primarily as an effete ideology which rationalizes elitist, top-down forms of revolution. Its existence in China is little more than a curious anomaly. In instance after instance in recent Chinese history, the rhetoric has been Marxist while the motivation and sentiment have been decidedly Confucian. And we have

listened to China's rhetoric, thus misconstruing its sentiment and motivation.

Each of these errors is based upon a failure to realize the limitations of the Enlightenment perspective. When Anglo-European philosophy ranged itself on the side of science and logic, Chinese philosophy itself was thought to be a rather trivial moralistic pedagogy or a muddle-headed, 'Rorschach' mysticism—both irrelevant to western concerns. This evaluation was the cause and consequence of translations from classical Chinese into European languages which made them speak (badly) the language of the rational West.

To the extent that allegiances within western philosophy have shifted from science to literature, the value of Chinese philosophic discourse has been enhanced. The cultural interests of art, morality and religion, yes even science, are so interwoven in China that the recent dissolution of strict distinctions among such interests in the West has produced a mutual vagueness that enhances the possibility of communication between the two cultures.

Though there are surely interesting historical accounts of the differences between China and the West, a strictly conceptual accounting of these differences is, I believe, more striking. One can characterize this difference by claiming that 'rational' or 'causal' thinking dominates in western culture while the Chinese place greater emphasis upon what has come to be called 'correlative thinking'.[10]

Rational or logical thinking, in the non-vague, stricter sense, dominant among the Anglo-Europeans, is grounded in analytic, dialectical and analogical argumentation. It depends upon the explanatory power of physical causation. Correlative thinking involves the association of image or concept-clusters related not by physical causation but by meaningful disposition. Correlative thinking is a species of spontaneous thinking grounded in necessarily informal analogical procedures, presupposing both association and differentiation.

Correlations, such as those present in the humour theory of medicine, or illustrated by astrological charts, are not based upon dialectical principles of organization, nor is there any unified complex presumed whose analysis leads to the parsing of these components. They consist in elements selected and correlated from the perspective of the correlator.

Correlativity is most prominent in the cosmological speculations of the early Han dynasty (206 BCE-220 ACE), though the much older constructions of the *I Ching* provide perhaps the paradigmatic illustration of correlativity. Han speculations led to the creation of vast and complex tables of correspondences that organized the psychological, physiological, social and 'cosmic' ambience of human experience.

The basis of the Han correlations were the principles of *yin* and *yang* and the 'tables of five'. These tables compare the five phases (wood, fire, earth, metal, water), the five directions (north, east, south, west and centre), the five colours (green, red, yellow, white, black), and so forth. Such classifica-

tions include body parts, psycho-physical and affective states, styles of government, weather, domestic animals, technological instruments, heavenly bodies, and much more.[11]

The active (*yang*) and passive (*yin*) dynamics are employed in conjunction with these correspondences to characterize the transformations and interrelations of the elements within the system.[12]

The danger of overstatement cannot itself be overstated. By denying primary importance to causal thinking in classical China, I am neither claiming that such thinking was wholly absent among Chinese scholars, nor am I suggesting that the Chinese were any less subject to the rigours of causal determination. At the same time, the importance of the Chinese employment of the correlative mode should not be understated. Relative to the contrast of Chinese and Western sensibilities, perhaps we should assume there to be two principal modes of thinking—the aesthetic and the logical, or the correlative and the causal—and that an emphasis upon one mode in a given context leads to an attenuation *in that context* of the other mode. For example, the overall dominance of the correlative mode in China is attested by the extremely attenuated influence of schools of thought that experimented with causal thinking—Mohism and Han Fei's Legalism, for example.[13]

The relative unconcern of Chinese thinkers with semantic theories of truth provides direct evidence for the ubiquity of correlative thinking. For semantic truth theories are implicated in analytical, dialectical and (strict) analogical modes of argumentation. The undervaluing of speculations concerning 'truth' or 'falsity' in any strict sense in classical China is a consequence of correlative thinking which does not invite rational objectivity.[14]

Without the logical means of assessing propositional truth, it is unlikely that causal language could be deemed of much importance beyond the specific rigours of the everyday life. Characterizations of physical causation in formal theories require the logic of entailment. Alternatively said, without the concern for delineated relations among events in terms of efficient causation, a logic of entailment might be useless.

Correlatives are not logically or causally related. This is true even of the most pervasive of correlative pairings: *yin* and *yang*. There is no strict analogy between the logical '*p*' and 'not-*p*' (or '*p*' and 'non-*p*') and the contrast of *yin* and *yang*—either in the sense that one excludes the other, or in the sense that one logically entails the other, or in the sense that together (as in the '*p*' 'non-*p*' contrast) they logically entail self-containment, completeness or totality. *Yin* and *yang* are elements of a correlative pairing which is pragmatically useful in sorting out 'this' and 'that'.

In other contexts,[15] I have characterized the speculative model congenial to correlative thinking as *ars contextualis* in order to distinguish it from both *ontologia generalis* and *scientia universalis*, the two traditional modes of speculation. The 'art of contextualization' involves the analogical procedures that underlie correlative thinking.

Why the difference between causal and correlative emphases? The simplest answer concerns the distinct uses of the copula 'to be' and the Chinese '*yu*'. As Angus Graham has noted, the English language concepts of 'being' and 'not-being' have strikingly different associations than do the Chinese *yu* and *wu*.[16]

Indo-European languages may use the existential verb as copula. There are other language families, however, in which 'the existential verb tends to overlap our "have" rather than copulative "be".'[17] The Chinese words *yu* and *wu*, well illustrate this fact. For the classical Chinese, *yu* indicates that 'something is present'. 'To be' is 'to be around'. Likewise, 'not to be' means 'not to be around'.

Chinese is an aesthetic, correlative language to the extent that it privileges the classical meanings of *yu* and *wu*. It can be or become rational discourse to the extent that it adopts the Indo-European meanings of 'not' as distinguished from 'non'.[18] But I would suggest that the understanding and appropriation of Classical Chinese texts and the recognition of cultural and political differences in the present would be illumined by the recognition of this contingent contrast between Chinese and Western interpretations of the locutions *yu* and 'to be'.

One way to approach the subject of thinking from a correlative perspective is that of the Taoist for whom the world is a Vast Unorganized Indifference, a Blessed Multifariousness. Living an embodied, contextualized existence—whether as an eel, an elephant, a turtle dove or human being—means that we have automatic preferences for construing the world in accordance with the convenience of the beings we presume ourselves to be. It is not enough simply to recognize a plurality of ways of being; we must own up to our transient preferences and commitments; they are important as long as they last. The conflicts with other sorts of being are unavoidable. But for every loss there is a gain; nothing is finally tragic. For each being will have its turn at being its other.

This is Chuang-tzu's doctrine of the 'transformation of all things'—a sort of radicalized notion of the return of the same. It is the correlative thinker's transmogrification of the being/not-being distinction—everything will ultimately be and not-be. That is to say, everything will have its opportunity to be around and not to be around.

What this means, strictly speaking, is that *wu* does not indicate strict opposition or contradiction, but absence. In classical Chinese philosophical discourse the distinction between 'not-*p*' and 'non-*p*' is understandably elided. Contrary to the Parmenidean contrast which privileges the existential meaning of the copula, in the majority of classical Chinese discourse, 'nots' are effectively 'nons'. That is, *wu*/*yu* suggest mere contrast in the sense of the presence/absence of x rather than as the existence or non-existence of x.

The meanings of *yu* and *wu* render problematic any resort to counterfactuals, dualistic categories, claims to capital '*T*' Truth, abstract nouns—all of

the groundings and implications of logic and rationality in the stricter senses of those terms.

The correlative thinker may in fact wish to claim that the so-called logical relationships are more appropriately understood in correlative terms. In the absence of a single-ordered world manifesting unity, wholeness and/or completeness, the '*p*'/'non-*p*' contrast does not entail formal completeness. That is, '*p*' plus 'non-*p*' cannot add up to a world. And the correlative sense of 'not-*p*' is that '*p*' is not present or available.

The *yu/wu* problematic yields a vague supplement not only to modern western notions of reason but the postmodern critique of reason as well. For there is no need to overcome the 'logocentrism' of a 'language of presence' grounded in 'ontological difference' if no distinction between Being and beings is urged by the classical Chinese language. A Chinese 'language of presence' is a language of making present the item itself, not its essence.

Language which does not lead one to posit ontological difference between Being and beings, but only a difference between one being and another, suggests a decentered world whose centres and circumferences are always defined in an *ad hoc* manner. The mass of classical Chinese philosophical discourse, then, is already deconstructed. Or better said: the *yu/wu* problematic does not urge the creation of texts which can be victimized by the deconstructor.

Perhaps I should be a bit more 'vague' about the implications of vagueness in this context: I am not arguing for the substitution of a language of difference for a language of presence. I propose, rather, a language of *deference*, a language vague enough to include the nominalism of *yu* and the essentialism of the verb 'to be' without giving priority of place to either essentialist or nominalist understandings. Perhaps we could in this manner find a way of recycling the metaphors surrounding the being/non-being problematic.

In the West two sorts of language have dominated the tradition. The first, the language of ontological presence, is that against which the postmodern thinkers have revolted. Besides the language of presence, however, the Western tradition also allows the employment of language in a mystical or mythopoetic way. In this usage, language advertises the absence of the referent. This is the language of the mystical *via negativa* or the language of the poet who holds metaphor to be constitutive of discourse rather than merely parasitical upon a literal ground. We may call such expression the language of 'absence'.

A language of presence is grounded upon the possibility of univocal or unambiguous propositional expressions. This possibility requires criteria for determining the literalness of a proposition. For this to be so, literal language must have precedence over figurative or metaphorical language. This means that in addition to richly vague sorts of language associated with images and metaphors, there must be concepts as candidates for univocal meaning.

Derrida's well-rehearsed notion of *differance* tells the story.[19] The neologism, *differance*, is meant to suggest that the differences investigated with respect to language have both an active and a passive dimension.

Meaning is always deferred. It cannot be present in language as *structure*, when that is the focus—for that omits the meanings associated with the use of the language. But focusing upon language as *event*, language as constituted by speech acts, does not solve the problem because, once more, the supplemental character of language—this time its structure—has been shifted to an inaccessible background.

Derrida would have to accept an emendation to his notion of *differance* which would enrich the meaning of the deferring function. If one introduces the homonymic 'defer', meaning 'to yield', then the resultant notion of difference, as connoting both active and passive senses of differing and of deferring, well suits classical Chinese thinking.

In China the language of deference involves a yielding to the appropriate models of the received tradition and to the behaviours of those who resonate with those models. In the *Great Preface* to the *Book of Songs*, traditionally attributed to Confucius, we read:[20]

> poetry is the consequence of dispositions and is articulated in language as song. One's feelings stir within his breast and take the form of words. When words are inadequate, they are voiced as sighs. When sighs are inadequate, they are chanted. When chants are inadequate, unconsciously, the hands and feet begin to dance them. One's feelings are expressed in sounds, and when sounds are refined, they are called musical notes.

Confucius understands language after the analogy with music. Names are like notes. Harmony is a function of the particularity of names and notes and of their mutual resonances. Neither in Chinese music nor language is there the stress upon syntax one finds in the rationalistic languages of the West.

The Chinese language is the bearer of tradition, and tradition, made available through ritualistic evocation, is the primary context of linguistic behaviour. The sage appeals to present praxis and to the repository of significances realized in the traditional past in such a manner as to set up deferential relationships between himself, his communicants and the authoritative texts invoked.

The Chinese sage is not prone to tie the significances of language to the norms of the present praxis. He insists upon deferential access to the appropriate traditional models. If such models are not co-opted by an authoritarian government or a rigid bureaucratic elite, as has been the case in the tawdrier periods of Chinese history, there is a rich and varied resource for the criticism of the present praxis in spite of the fact that the language as a system lacks any transcendent reference.

The language of presence re-presents an otherwise absent object. The

language of absence uses indirect discourse to advertise the existence of a non-presentable subject. In either case there is a referent, real or putative, beyond the act of referencing. But the language of deference is based upon the recognition of mutual resonances among instances of communicative activity. There is no referencing beyond the act of communication as it resonates with the entertained meanings of the models from the tradition.

One of the signal consequences of a logocentric language is that there must be real independence of a proposition from the state of affairs it characterizes. This entails dualistic relations of propositions and states of affairs. Without such independence, in the senses of dualism and transcendence, nothing like logical truth may be formulated.

For a proposition to have a univocal sense, terms must be strictly delimitable. A polar sensibility precludes such delimitation in any but the grossest terms. Thus, the classical Chinese understanding of *yin* and *yang* as complementary concepts cannot coherently lead to dualistic translations or interpretations. *Yin* is a becoming-*yang*; *yang* is a becoming-*yin*. The locution 'as different as night and day' would then have to mean 'as different as night-becoming-day from day-becoming-night'.

In a polar sensibility terms are clustered with opposing or complementary alter-terms. Classical Chinese may be uncongenial to the development of univocal propositions for this reason. Without such propositions, semantic notions of truth are ultimately untenable. And without a capital '*T*' Truth lurking behind our acts of communication, notions such as 'logocentrism' and 'presence' cannot serve as standards for philosophical discourse. Language becomes an undulating sea of suggestiveness.

The crucial next step in my argument, one I shall not take here, would lead me to illustrate how even in the dialectical, agonistic tradition of the Anglo-European intellectual culture language is always vague and deferential in the manner rehearsed above. This would require a demonstration of the consequences of deferring to the incoherent complex of meanings associated with the more pluralistic character of western culture.

As I indicated in the first pages of this essay, such deference fractures and decentres the self, calling for a revaluation of the values of individuality, self-identity and integrity.

Reason and Pain

Understanding the contrast of being and *yu* can sensitize us to the limitations of causal language at a time when that language is being qualified by the rhetorical critiques coming from the literary elements of our literary/scinetific culture.

The phenomenon of pain, the subject of my second defence of inter-cultural vagueness, is an equally enlightening subject. Here, however, we are less

concerned with morphological distinctions than with a divergence in mythical narrative.

In 1988, at the Sixth East/West Conference held in Honolulu, Hawaii, a paper was delivered which concerned the relationship between mythical and philosophical interpretations of history.[21] Accounting for the meaning of historical narrative by appeal to mythical resources is a common convention of religion, literature and politics and is in itself quite unexceptional. In this instance, however, a rather dramatic incident occurred during the discussion of the paper. Ramachandra Gandhi responded to the presentation in something like the following manner:

'You have given us a myth', he said. 'I will offer another one. Very briefly. Suppose Brahmā allows, indeed, encourages the violence of human beings, one to the other. . . .Suppose Brahmā allows, indeed, encourages events such as the holocaust, and all the terrible violence witnessed in Europe in this century. . . . Suppose this is true . . . and suppose Brahma does this in order to sensitize us to the pain human beings cause the animals.'

My recollection is that these remarks occasioned only silence—a bemused, for some an embarrassed, silence.

Yet I think Gandhi's myth made its point rather well. It is conceivable that the Anglo-European interpretations of pain—and of history itself in so far as it is punctuated by terror, cruelty and suffering—would constitute an entirely different accounting were we to take seriously the most uncontroversial consequences of this narrative. Human beings may be inured to the pain of their fellows to some degree by remaining deaf to the squeals and moans that come from the slaughter-houses.

Can we who 'are born in another's pain and perish in our own'[22] and who live lives which in part owe their pleasures to pain of animals[23] feel altogether justified with the defence of our attitudes provided by the parodies of Samuel Butler and the sombre advices of the medical establishment concerning the need for protein? Or should we seek vindication from mythical resources, appealing to the *Genesis* narrative which makes the human creature lord over the 'beast of the fields and birds of the air', and supplementing our apologia by appeals to the Platonic association of soul with reason and reason exclusively with the human being?

Gandhi's myth would have to seem silly to those of us westerners who weigh its advices against the cold psychic, economic and gastronomic realities. The rational individual easily reduces such thoughts to absurdity by asking such scrupulous questions as 'Well, after all, plants are living, feeling creatures. Would you really condone the consumption of vegetables? And why stop with the organic realm? The destruction of the inorganic structures which increases entropy is strongly analogous to cruelty, is it not?'

Indeed, where does it end? Must we have a concept of cosmic *adiaphora* to get us off the hook? Or does the ecological movement which ultimately is

aimed at a resolution of the human being's responsibility in the entropy producing environment, preclude moral holidays?

Such reductios miss the point—namely, that we should consider silly certain valuations of the phenomenon of pain merely begs the question since that judgment is dependent, as is all thinking to some degree, on our understanding of pleasure and of pain.

As Samuel Johnson noted, 'We do not disturb ourselves with the detection of fallacies which do us no harm.' And Hume's more than casual identification of good and evil with pleasure and pain[24] suggests that in so far as reasonings are moral they are conditioned by the parameters of pleasure and pain. Certainly the pragmatist must consider reason and pain to be associated since the problematic situation from which thinking emerges is a more or less painful mixture of the stable and the precarious.

The Fall described in *Genesis* was the fall of the human being—he and she who had been made masters of the beasts and birds and fishes. The curse of labour placed upon the human being as punishment for that first sin cursed the animals as well who now had to suffer pain occasioned by no guilt of their own. The Fall brought on the struggle with nature and, ultimately, the victimization of the environment. Pain increased exponentially from that first fault.

And along with pain, human beings began to think. Thinking came first in the Garden, coincident with the sense of shame felt by the Primordial Pair at the recognition of their nakedness. Shame was born *pari passu* with the recognition of the distinction between good and evil which is, of course, a precondition of thinking.

Man (the 'rational animal') is a being capable of embarrassment. The most worthwhile thinking is of the form, 'Oh, dear I'm naked. What shall I do?' And all of our ideas, values, programmes, our art, our science, our social institutions, our religious doctrines, our philosophies are the garments that cover our nakedness, that mask our shame, that temporarily overcome our embarrassment. Little wonder that the thinking individual is one most easily brought to shame.

The word itself tells the story. The French *embarrasser* carries the meaning, 'to block or to obstruct, to impede, to place a barrier or obstacle in the way'. It also means 'to perplex, to throw into doubt'. No one actually thinks until faced with an obstacle. Embarrassment, one of the more refined of the species of pain, the gateway to humiliation, is the beginning of thought.

The Spanish word for embarrassment, *embaracer*, also has the meaning 'to impregnate'. The state of pregnancy, *embarazado*, is an embarrased, a potent, condition. The completely poised, polished, unflappable person is beyond the discomfiture of thinking. He is motivated by the residual insights of his culture in much the same way as a zombie is animated by a life-spirit not his own.

The painfulness of embarrassment and shame lead us to perplexity, to insecurity. Such pain enables us to think.

We cannot understand notions of rationality without asking about the meaning of pain and anguish, distress, suffering, grief, misery, worry, embarrassment, shame, humiliation, sorrow, trouble, torment. The question, of course, is not simply whether or the extent to which the other than human can experience these feelings, but also whether we ought to experience them in response to the fact of pain wherever it exists.

Reason, Pain and the Copula

I have tried to say something sensible about the relationships of 'reason', 'pain' and 'the copula' as a means of eliciting a productively vague notion of rationality. Ultimately, the diverse subjects of pain and the copula, of being and hurting, are profoundly connected to the chiefest mystery of reason—that of causality.

The most abstract issues surrounding the subject of the predicative and existential uses of the copula turn out to have consequences with respect to the ubiquity of causal thinking and the relation of correlativity and causality. And pain is a selective abstraction from the congeries of causal phenomena, a lowest level interpretation, which for sentient beings at least is the most concrete language can get without becoming the thing itself.

If we wish to preserve the term 'rationality' it can only be through a move toward productive vagueness which ambiguates the understanding of pain and the copula.

The necessity of vagueness is perhaps most crucially related to the subject of pain. As Richard Rorty indicates in his *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, humiliation is a consequence of forced redescription. The narrower senses of rationality, through the medium of rationalized technologies, often pander to the immediate, the puerile and the base. As an exported commodity, rationality—as opposed to a vague reasonableness—promises to humiliate. A reasonable response, one endorsed in these pages, is to fuzzy up the media through which we seek inter-cultural understanding.

Notes and References

1. 'Belatedness' is a term of art in Harold Bloom's *Anxiety of Influence*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1973.
2. Stephen Pepper's *World Hypotheses* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1942) contains the initial expression of his meta-theoretical ruminations. Twenty-five years later he elaborated his own version of a world hypothesis ('the purposive act') in his Paul Carus lectures, *Concept and Quality—A World Hypothesis* (La Salle, Illinois, 1966).
3. Most of McKeon's taxonomic work was presented in his 'Ideas and Methods' lectures during his tenure at the University of Chicago. McKeon's works, many long out of

print, are currently being reissued by the University of Chicago Press. See *Freedom and History and Other Essays*, edited by Zahava K. McKeon (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990), especially the essay entitled 'Philosophic Semantics and Philosophic Inquiry'. A disciple of McKeon, Walter Watson, has presented his version of the McKeon schema in his recent *Architectonics of Meaning* (SUNY Press, Albany, 1987). David Dilworth has applied the typology to comparative philosophy. See his *Philosophy in World Perspective—A Comparative Hermeneutic of the Major Themes* (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1989).

4. Robert Brumbaugh's typology is conveniently expressed in his *Compass of Philosophy*, written with Newton Stallknecht (Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1954). Brumbaugh's typology has influenced the constructive work of Robert Neville and George Allan, among others. See the former's *Reconstruction of Thinking* (SUNY Press, Albany, 1981) and the latter's *Importances of the Past* (SUNY Press, Albany, 1986).
5. Another of Harold Bloom's terms. See *Anxiety of Influence*, op. cit.
6. There are two dimensions of Nietzsche's notion of active forgetting. The first involves the excess of history which requires a suppression or 'strong misreading' (Harold Bloom) of any particular narrative which would threaten the sense of one's own creative agency. The second is the sort of foregrounding of all perspectives upon an object which establishes the truth of the object to be the sum total of its interpretations. In the latter sense the burden of the past is not felt since there is no single best manner of interpreting. Thus, for Nietzsche, by denying the exclusivity of a particular meaning or meanings, maintaining the sum of interpretations as a vague cluster achieves the ends of active forgetting.
7. See Gregory Bateson's *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* (Ballantine Books, New York, 1972). An essay in this volume, entitled 'The Logical Categories of Learning and Communication', pp. 279–308, discusses what I am calling vagueness as Learning III—an awareness of the contexts of contexts which leads to an experience of the parity of contexts. The self, as 'a habit of acting in contexts and of shaping and perceiving the contexts in which (it) act(s)', is radically redefined by such an experience. Indeed, the dissolution of the self sought by Ch'an and Zen Buddhism is thought to be achieved by the successful employment of the *kung-an* or *koan*—a conceptual puzzle that requires the compresent entertainment of inconsistent meanings.

   For a discussion of this sort of knowing as a means of decentering the self, see my *Eros and Irony* (SUNY Press, Albany, 1982) Chapter Six, 'From Otherness to Emptiness'.
8. See Donald Davidson's 'A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs' in Richard Granely and Richard Warner (ed.), *Philosophical Grounds for Rationality: Intentions, Categories, Ends*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, pp. 157–74, and Richard Rorty's use of the argument of this essay in his *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 14ff. In 'Solidarity or Objectivity?' in Rajchman, John and Cornel West (ed.), *Post-Analytic Philosophy* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1985), Rorty draws the same conclusions concerning the relations of the intra-cultural and the inter-cultural :

   > Part of the force of Quine's and Davidson's attack on the distinction between the conceptual and the empirical is that the distinction between different cultures does not differ in kind from the distinction between different theories held by members of a single culture....The same Quinean arguments which dispose of the positivists' distinction between analytic and synthetic truth dispose of the anthropoligists' distinction between the intercultural and the intracultural. (p. 9)

9. Roger Ames and I have adumbrated such a vision of culture in our *Thinking Through Confucius* (SUNY Press, Albany, N. Y., 1987). The focus/field model is not meant to be a metaphysical interpretation of the nature of things. It is simply a metaphor which expresses better than a 'part/whole' model the understanding of language and culture discussed in this essay.

10. It is not clear where the notion of correlative thinking originates. Perhaps it may be traced to Marcel Granet's *La pensee chinoise*, written in 1934 wherein correlativity is taken to be a characteristic of the 'Chinese mind'. Ernst Cassirer's *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, Vol. 2 (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1955), *Mythical Thought*, discusses, without using the term, the method of correlative thinking associated with mythopoetic thought. Levi-Strauss, familiar with Granet's work, employs the notion in his *The Savage Mind* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1966) to characterize *'la pensee sauvage'*. Joseph Needham, also influenced by Granet, discusses 'correlative thinking' in general and the specific 'symbolic correlations' associated with the Chinese cosmologists in *Science and Civilization in China*, Vol. 2. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1956), pp. 253–345, *passim*. Chang Tung-sun, in 'A Chinese Philosopher's Theory of Knowledge', in S.I. Hayakawa (ed.), *Our Language and Our World* (Harper, New York, 1959), pp. 299–324, contrasts a Western 'logic of identity' with a Chinese 'logic of correlation' which is neither monistic, nor dualistic, nor reductionistic, (quoted in Hwa Yol Jung, *The Question of Rationality and the Grammar of Intercultural Texts*, International University of Japan, 1989, p. 98). John B. Henderson's *The Development and Decline of Chinese Cosmology* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1984) provides an extensive treatment of correlative cosmologies. Benjamin Schwartz devotes a chapter to 'correlative cosmology' in his *The World of Thought in Ancient China* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1985).

    An extremely enlightening work which employs correlative thinking with reference primarily to Western thought is P.K. Feyerabend's *Farewell to Reason* (Verso Press, New York, 1987). What I am calling 'correlative thinking' Feyerabend simply designates 'empirical thinking'. G.E.R. Llyod's books *Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought* (Cambridge University Press, 1966, reprinted by Bristol Classical Press, 1987) and *Magic, Reason and Experience: Studies in the Origin and Development of Greek Science* (Cambridge University Press, 1979) articulate the correlative mode of thinking in the history of classical Greek thought.

    An excellent example of the employment of this mode of speculation in the Late Middle Period of European culture is Fernand Hallyn's *The Poetic Structure of the World—Copernicus and Kepler* (Zone Books, New York, 1990).

    By far the most sophisticated philosophical treatment of correlative thinking is provided by Angus Graham, first in *Reason and Spontaneity* (Curzon Press, London, 1985), pp. 57–60 and Section 1.5 *passim*. In this work the term 'analogical thinking' is used to describe what are later termed correlative procedures. Graham adopts Lèvi-Strauss' structuralist approach to correlativity in *Yin-Yang and the Nature of Correlative Thinking* (The Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1986), the substance of which is included in his *Disputers of the Tao* (Open Court, La Salle, Illinois, 1989), pp. 315–70.
11. A rather complete table of one variation of these correspondences is contained in Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, Vol. 2, pp. 262–63.
12. The identification of correlative thinking with the development of Han dynasty cosmologies has led most scholars to associate correlativity with a phase of proto-scientific thinking in China. And though its influence beyond the Han is well attested, earlier thinking, notably that of Confucius and his disciples as presented in the *Analects*, and even later thinkers who manifest little cosmological interest, notably the philosophical Taoists, are often thought to employ something other than correlative thinking.

    My view, however, is that Marcel Granet was essentially correct in identifying what we are here calling 'correlative thinking' with a fundamental characteristic of 'the Chinese mind'. This implies that even among those thinkers such as Confucius and the

philosophical Taoists who were not so concerned with physical cosmologies, the mode of correlative thinking dominates.

The primary evidence for this belief is that, as Roger Ames and I have argued in our *Thinking Through Confucius*, the most influential strains of classical Chinese thought illustrate the primary characteristics of problematic thinking—namely, the absence of belief in a single-ordered world and the employment of aesthetic over logical senses of order. Correlative thinking is an implication of these assumptions.

13. An elaboration of this point will be found in Roger Ames and my *Anticipations of Culture—China and the West*.
14. I have provided a lengthy discussion of the issue of 'truth theory' in classical China in my 'Cultural Requisites for a Theory of Truth in China', in Hans Lenk and Gregor Paul (ed.), *Epistemological Issues in Classical Chinese Philosophy*, forthcoming from SUNY Press.
15. See my 'Logos, Mythos, Chaos : Metaphysics as the Quest For Diversity', in Robert Neville (ed.), *New Essays in Metaphysics* (SUNY Press, Albany, 1987, pp. 1–24, *passim*), and Hall and Ames' *Thinking Through Confucious* (op. cit., Chapter Four, *passim*).
16. See his 'Being in Western Philosophy Compared with *Shih/Fei* and *Yu/Wu* in Chinese Philosophy', in *Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature* (The Institute of East Asian Philosophies, Singapore, 1986), pp 322-59 and 'The Relation of Chinese Thought to Chinese Language', Appendix 2, *Disputers of the Tao* (Open Court Press, La Salle, Illinois, 1989, pp. 408–12).
17. Ibid., p. 406.
18. An elaboration of this point will be found in Roger Ames' and my forthcoming sequel to *Thinking Through Confucius*, entitled *Anticipations of Culture—China and the West*.
19. See Derrida's *Writing and Difference*, translated by Alan Bass (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978, *passim*).
20. *Shih-ching*, Harvard-Yenching Institute of Sinological Index Series, Supp. 9, Harvard-Yenching Institute, Peking, 1934; Roger Ames' translation.
21. The paper was Agnes Heller's 'Moses, Hsuang-Tsang and History', forthcoming in the proceedings of the Sixth East West Conference entitled *Culture and Modernity*, University of Hawaii Press.
22. Nothing begins and ends
    which is not paid with moan.
    We are born in another's pain
    and perish in our own.
    —Francis Thompson.
23. 'Detested sport that owes its pleasures to another's pain.'—William Cowper.
24. *Treatise on Human Nature*, Book II, Part III, Section IX, p. 439.

Culture and rationality: an interpretation

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Whenever I think about any philosophical problem I feel that it can be interpreted from various perspectives. The same is my feeling when I ponder over the relation between the concepts of 'culture' and 'rationality'. For the meanings of the concerned concepts are open to diverse interpretation and are not fixed or rigid.

The concept of 'culture' is comprehensive and has various facets and levels: we speak of the culture of a nation, of a society, of a family, and of an individual. Also, we are used to talk about bourgeois culture and working-class culture. Within the culture of a nation one observes various sub-cultures and even within a sub-culture there are diverse family and individual cultures. 'Culture' or 'cultural', as distinguished from 'nature' or 'natural', encompasses all that is created and cultivated by individuals. Culture may be identified not only geographically, areawise, but also in terms of cognitive and non-cognitive domains. Often it has been described as the sum total of art, science, philosophy, religion, customs and other human achievements and capabilities. It is in everything *human*, yet it is not anything specific. It is something special. Culture is primarily the outcome of man's rational enterprise. It has become, like animality and rationality, an inalienable part of human nature. Culture is partly disclosed and partly dispositional. It is the *Gestalt* or structure of our being. We cannot specify its essence but we do experience and express its existence. Not only we create culture but we are *in* it and *live* it.

We call culture man's 'second nature', but I also feel that culture is a way of human interpretation that creates and re-creates all that is in and around him, from tools and machines to poetry, painting, music and literature. Culture is the expanding world of meanings and values. Since human actions are more or less rational, we notice its imprint in all spheres of human life. That however does not imply that human actions are necessarily rational. Just as we cannot be truly described as wholly animal, so also it would be difficult to deny that we are at least partly irrational. Rationality and irrationality are engaged in a conflict-cooperative relationship within human nature. Understandably then, human culture too is the product of dispositions and human actions bearing the mark of both these aspects. From language to technology everything is a mix of reason and unreason.

The history and taxonomy of cultural anthropology shows that there are different types and levels of culture. On the one hand, there is primitive cul-

ture, medieval culture and modern culture; on the other hand, there is agrarian culture, industrial culture and post-industrial culture. Also, one hears of urban culture and rural culture, of aesthetic culture and ethical culture. I do not know whether there is one single criterion by which we can assess the rationality or irrationality of these different levels and types of human culture.

The term 'rationality' too has been used in different senses in different contexts. The 'rationality' of science is not the same as the 'rationality' of art. Scientific methodologists themselves differ on the definition of what scientific rationality is. The same is true of artistic rationality. 'Rationality' in ethics is different from that in economics. Broadly speaking, again, there is a difference between epistemic rationality and practical rationality. Since culture encompasses both epistemic and non-epistemic practical spheres, all these types and levels of rationality have significant yet *different* roles in them.

Of the natural sciences physics is generally regarded as the paradigm instance of epistemic rationality and we are all aware of the growing tendency of modern scientific culture to impose its own model of rationality even in the realms of human and culture sciences—the *Geisteswissenschaften*. From that point of view it has often been argued that rationality is universal and culture-invariant, i.e., there is no separate scientific principle for America and India; the same theories and techniques are equally acceptable to different scientists of these two different cultures. But if we uncritically accept the propagated cause of universalization or globalization of science, do we not indirectly allow the 'rationality' of the indigenous and epoch-bound sciences of different cultures to be denigrated?

In Chinese medical science, for example, the technique called 'acupuncture' is very important; similar is the case with *yoga* or *āyurveda* in India. Can we say that these modes of treatment are either unscientific or irrational? The development of modern allopathic treatment may minimize the application of these modes of treatment but it can neither deny their utility nor derationalize them. On the contrary, we note the current tendency of reviving and returning to these indigenous modes of treatment as being safer and more suitable from the environmental point of view. However, it is not being suggested here that the Chinese system of acupuncture or the Indian system of *yoga* is superior to or inferior than other systems of medical treatment, or that it cannot be practised by peoples of other cultures. On the contrary, when these systems are used in alien countries, it is clear that *we* accept *their* rationality and mould them according to our *own* requirement. At first we accept them provisionally and then gradually by *understanding* their rationale we respect and follow them. This shows, among other things, that 'their rationality' and 'our rationality' are not necessarily incompatible. By implication we concede that these indigenous systems and techniques born out of different forms of life can be assessed properly only in terms of the rationality criterion relative to those specific forms of life and that the

same can hardly be ignored as irrational from the point of view of other cultures.

It is 'subjectively' imperative to recognize the 'objective' interface of different cultures and not to be blinded by cultural chauvinism or solipsism. The primary aim of mentioning these examples is only to remind us of the value and reasonableness of these indigenous techniques even if we partially admit the universality of scientific rationality. In brief, cultural relativism or localism and cultural globalism, rightly understood, go together. I use the word 'partially' in the context of scientific rationality because currently even among scientists and philosophers of science there is a widespread eagerness to accept such historicity and culture-specificity not only in the case of *Geisteswissenschaften* but also in the so-called 'objective' and 'exact' hardcore *Naturewissenschaften*. In the present paper I do not propose to recapitulate this otherwise interesting and ongoing debate between the philosophers of natural sciences and those of human sciences.

The purpose of the present paper is very limited: to point out that the so-called universal model of epistemic rationality, although partially applicable to the realm of the natural sciences, can hardly be of any significant use in the field of the human sciences and various art-forms like music, dance, painting, sculpture, etc., which, taken as a whole, constitute a very comprehensive area of human culture. The difference between the Chinese and the Indian art forms cannot be lightly dismissed. The same may be said of the difference between the Soviet ballet style and the Indian *Bharatanātyam* style. Even within the Indian dance forms one notices distinct trends and traditions. Scientificity and artistry cannot be brought under the same model of rationality without being unfair to the specifics of both. It is neither desirable nor possible to assess or evaluate the incommensurable 'rationality' of various art forms and such different structures of science as deductive, statistical and taxonomic, in terms of one and the same strait-jacketed paradigm. In the case of internally different cultural forms what is called for is to try to understand and appreciate them and to follow how they have evolved and differentiated themselves and what different senses they convey. A proper understanding and appreciation of these types of sub-cultures requires trained sensitivity and accultured initiation. It is not that we are unable to appreciate the art forms of alien cultures. Rather, we *understand* them and, in the process, *interpret* them and re-constitute *their* 'rationality' as *our* 'rationality'. We cannot understand the Russian ballet as the Russians do. When we understand and appreciate this art-form we are bound to interpret it from our own point of view. Difference of interpretation does not amount to cultural solipsism or blindness. Different interpretations exhibit a sort of 'family resemblance' and not strict universality. Cross-cultural interpretations bring about what is often called a 'fusion of cultures'.

When I emphasize the difference between different cultures I do not suggest even remotely that these cultures are *absolutely* unrelated to each other.

The defence of *cultural plurality* does not ignore the basic *unity of human understanding*, interpretive understanding. Because that would negate the very possibility of communication between and understanding of alien cultures. We *can* understand and interpret alien cultures or sub-cultures because we have something in common. But this common or general nature cannot or should not subsume the particularity and individuality of different cultures. We must recognize and respect both the universal and the particular aspects of human culture. The 'universals' of biology, psychology, linguistics, etc., that we hear of are not innate and fixed. These are ontologically-rooted human devices used for explanatory purposes.

Here I am reminded of what Rabindranath Tagore felt in the context of describing such a dual phase of human nature. While emphasizing the role of individuality in us what he wrote about our universal nature is also true about human culture. The duality of *vyakti mānav* (individual man) and *viśva mānav* (universal man) in us must be recognized. The interplay of individuality and universality in us makes us creative and connoisseurs.

> If this individuality be demolished, then though no material be lost, not an atom destroyed, the creative joy which was crystallized therein is gone. We are absolutely bankrupt if we are deprived of this speciality, this individuality, which is the only thing we can call our own; and which, if lost, is also a loss to the whole world. It is most valuable because it is not universal. And therefore only through it can we gain the universe more truly than if we were lying within its breast unconscious of our distinctiveness. The universal is ever seeking its consummation in the unique, and the desire we have to keep our uniqueness intact is really the desire of the universe acting in us.[1]

If we accept that there is only one universal culture and seek to describe it by one universal standard of rationality we already foreclose the possibility and necessity of any discussion/colloquium on their relation. If we admit the diversity of cultures, both national and individual, only then does the need for discussion, discourse and dialogue become significant.

One of the purposes of the present paper is to remind ourselves that the very possibility and also actuality of cross-cultural understanding do presuppose cultural diversity and that while understanding any culture or sub-culture we not only get involved in it but are also obliged to interpret it and, in the process, re-create it. Understanding is not merely, as Dilthey has rightly said, 'the rediscovery of the I in the Thou', but also of the Thou in Me. We can make sense of our own or other cultures not merely by rational analysis but also through passionate and sympathetic participation. This insight has been developed in the contemporary period by such thinkers as Hans Gadamer and Richard Rorty. While interpreting human experience and the world of tradition Gadamer uses the term 'participation', for 'its dialectic consists of the fact that participation is not taking parts, but in a

way taking the whole.... The whole life of tradition consists exactly in this enrichment so that life is our culture and our past: the whole inner store of our lives is always extending by participation'.[2]

Echoing a similar spirit Richard Rorty uses the term 'edification' and holds that 'the attempt to edify (ourselves or others) may consist in the hermeneutic activity of making connections between our own culture and some exotic culture or historical period, or between our own discipline and another discipline which seems to pursue incommensurable aims in an incommensurable vocabulary'.[3]

It is instructive to note that despite cultural and sub-cultural differences we can and in fact we do understand and even judge the art forms of alien cultures. We understand them and in the process interpret the same. By interpretation we create and constitute them anew. In this sense the critic and the interpreter is also the creator.

A few examples from our lived experience can reveal the interpretative aspects of human culture. As I get deeply enthralled by the 'perfect' (of course, according to my own taste and cultural perception) harmony or fusion of meaning, rhyme, and melody in the songs composed by Rabindranath Tagore, the experience becomes so transparently self-fulfilling that it needs neither explanation nor justification from outside. But the same song may be perceived quite differently by other people endowed with different tastes and cultural sensibilities. Many other comparable examples are available to show that our subjectively interpreted experiences cannot be universalized or translated without any loss of meaning.

While I maintain this subjectivistic attitude I for one am not forgetful of such extraordinary cultural objects as the symphony of Beethoven and the architecture of the Dilwara temple whose aesthetic appeal transcends the bounds of time and space. These objects of art not only delight some of us but also elevate us by the act of re-discovering the past in us. These cultural objects, like those of history, are simultaneously transcendental and contemporaneous. Though in a way perennial in their appeal, art objects are not devoid of historicity. In the process of appreciating their aesthetic qualities we participate in the same, gradually unfold their hidden meanings and contribute something of our *own* in re-constituting their value or disvalue. Our social background or cultural heritage has a bearing on how we de-constitute or re-constitute art objects. In other words, though time-invariant, these art objects are not taste- or culture-invariant.

It is not that I am unconcerned with the supposed 'limitations' of such cultural relativism. The critic may pertinently raise the question: Is there no art form which has universal appeal, irrespective of the connoisseur's cultural and sociological affiliation? It is again a matter of controversy whether there is any such thing as a universally accepted art form. But even if for the sake of argument I agree to accept (at least provisionally) this claim of so-called universal acceptability, do we not unwittingly land ourselves into other

difficulties which are equally disturbing? The least that we can accept is that every particular form of dance, for example, falls under what may be called the language of body. It has different styles or modes of representation. But the attempts at generalization and standardization tend to berate the importance of the *uniqueness* of every form of cultural articulation as well as the influence of *deśa* (particular place of origin) and *kāla* (historical affiliation) on it. One has to bear in mind that every cultural object has certain characteristics which reveal the spirit of the age (*yugadharma*) and yet it also reveals its intrinsic uniqueness (*svadharma*). The supporters of essentialism often forget the importance of creativity, spontaneity and individuality and highlight only the *unity* of all cultures and its forms, which result in the waning of humanness from our cultures. This orientation of 'universal' culture and 'universal' rationality is bound to ignore the cultural diversity and sub-cultural specificities of the life-world.

Here I must mention a very controversial issue of contemporary Indian culture. I have the *Rām Rathajātrā*, the chariot-procession, in mind. I am not considering it from any religious or political perspective. I am trying to take an 'impartial' view of the whole matter. Strictly speaking, I do not know to what extent one can be 'impartial', 'objective', 'rational' in a discussion of this sort of issue. One wonders if in this context we can at all be free from bias, prejudice, preference or political inclination. While the *Rathajātrā* launched by a particular group of people appears to be perfectly 'rational' and religious to *some*, especially to the sponsors and supporters, it appears 'irrational' and provocative to *others*, especially to 'secular minded' people. Some people may be indifferent to it. What appears as 'just' or 'justified' to some is regarded as 'harmful' to others, and 'motivated' or 'ideology-based' to many. These seemingly irreconcilable attitudes towards one and the same controversial issue show that one and the same standard of rationality may not be imposed from *outside*. For this sort of external rationality can neither be defined clearly nor made intelligible to 'outsiders' and is likely to lead to what may be called communication breakdown or cultural confusion. It has to be viewed *internally* from the points of view of the concerned but diverse groups. It evolves from *within*. The situational, intellectual and political factors often control and constitute the standard of evaluation. Attempts to lay down or discover a universal standard in this sort of emotionally and politically surcharged context are fated to prove futile.

The diversity of the standards of rationality may be shown to cut across many other events like the *Rām Rathajātrā*. The resulting charge of relativism does not stand in the way of successful communication between the defenders of the diverse standards of rationality. The charge of relativism cannot and practically does not prevent those who defend it openly, formulate and support it persuasively. Take, for example, the ongoing debates on relativism for and against in the realms of cultural anthropology and sociology of science. These show at least that interest in relativism is perennial

and we are practically obliged to live with it. That we, belonging to different cultures, can and do live with the so-called problem demonstrates that it works despite the theoretical objections raised against it. It has now been clearly established that 'other minds, other cultures, other languages and theoretical schemes call for understanding from within. Seen from within, they make us doubt whether there is anything universal under the sun.'[4] Attempts at making hard and fast objective distinctions between rational and irrational, true and false are of little interest to many historians and sociologists of science and anthropologists of morals. The changes in scientific paradigms as evident from the history of science makes the point abundantly clear. The beliefs and practices, principles and customs of any culture are open to different but not antagonistic interpretations and pragmatic evaluations. It would have been 'ideal' to some absolutists and transcendentalists if all such interpretations could converge and the unity between different cultures could be totally conflict-free. But, given the culture-bound nature of human freedom, this regulative ideal, like a mirage, is bound to be elusive. Rationality, as we understand, experience and practise it, has to be context-bound and culture-sensitive. Cultural pluralism or relativism does *not* mean 'everything goes'. What it means is this: cross-cultural discussion is a human imperative and it is not only possible but also has been taking place all the time and at all places.

Hence, I feel that as the cultivated form of our rationality culture has an inalienable connection with it. But the relation between culture and rationality is not uni-dimensional, rather it is progressively or creatively circular. Whereas rationality makes culture possible, culture continues to influence rationality, making their relation dialectical, inevitable and endless.

Notes and References

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2. Hans-Georg Gadamer, 'The Hermeneutics of Suspicion', in *Hermeneutics: Questions and Prospects*, edited by Gary Shapiro and Alan Sica, The University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1984, p. 64.
3. Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1980, p. 360.
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Aristotle and the roots of western rationality

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There is a strange idea which deserves to be called a cultural myth, though presented in a rational, 'scientific' garb, that is dominant in the thinking of the West concerning society and culture. The idea is that the culture of the West is distinguished from all other cultures in being rational. Philosophers, historians, sociologists and others of a similar tribe in the West have reiterated the idea in one form or another for the last two centuries or more, since what is sometimes called the Age of Reason. The idea has almost the status of a proved mathematical theorem for some and is an unquestioned dogma for many, not only in the West but among the 'educated' in other cultures too, who have been socialized into Western modes of thought.

Western notions of society, theirs and those of others, hinge foundationally on the concept of rationality. The whole scheme of stacking societies and cultures under the labels of 'modern', 'traditional', 'primitive', so central to Western thought concerning man, is based on this criterion. These labels are often varied and modulated, given more future-oriented names based on economic and political structures, such as 'first-world', 'third-world', 'developed', 'developing', 'backward' and the like. Or we have a somewhat subtler more 'academic'-sounding categorization using epithets such as 'written', 'oral', 'historic', 'ahistoric' and the like. But whatever the variation on the theme, the basis of classification remains constant, namely, the function of rationality.

The march of Western rationality is traced back to Greece, and sometimes more specifically to Aristotle, often considered the prime mover, the major guru of Western rational thought. There is a dictum, common in the West, in which Aristotle too was a great believer, that to understand a thing we must reach back to its source. If there is any wisdom in this dictum our exercise here may be instructive in understanding the Western notion of rationality as it relates to societies other than theirs. So, what we would like to do here is to present Aristotle's thought on the subject, showing how many of the major themes of modern Western sociological thought on the matter can be traced back to him. We believe that the contours, or the seeds, of the idea of demarcating societies on the basis of rationality and the notion of the West as a uniquely rational society, with all the prejudices and problems such a concept presents, is first articulated in Aristotle from whom it has entered later thought. In presenting Aristotle's ideas we would at the same time like

to raise some basic questions and point at unresolved tensions in Aristotle's scheme which still remain so in Western thought.

Let us begin with two famous definitions of man in Aristotle: (1) Man is a rational animal. (2) Man is a social, meaning a political, animal, politics or the use of power, the ruler-ruled relation, being the principle by which he organizes his social life. For Aristotle, these are foundational concepts in understanding, analysing and categorizing culture, his own and those of others, both for the purpose of description and prescription. These two assumptions still remain the basis of Western thought about man in most of its ramifications in the fields of history, society and culture.

However, to assume that man is both rational and political in an essential sense gives rise to inconsistencies and wild paradoxes in Aristotle's framework that continue in later tradition, vitiating thought in various ways. This we shall try to show.

Our study is based on two famous works by Aristotle, *The Politics* and *The Nicomachean Ethics*.[1] The two belong together, *The Ethics* being a prologue to *The Politics*. Aristotle himself points this out right at the beginning of *The Ethics*, calling a study of ethics a branch of the study of politics. Ethics, he says, is a study of the good aimed at by human action, it is a practical science. And though there is a multiplicity of practical sciences each aiming at a different good, politics includes them all. 'Politics', he says, 'makes use of the other practical sciences, and lays its own besides what we must do and what we must not do, its end must include theirs.' (*Ethics*, p. 27). Politics, in other words, is the *dharma* of all *dharmas*. Such being the case, he concludes, the investigation he is undertaking in *The Ethics* 'may fairly be represented as the study of politics' (ibid.).

Ethics, then, is a science of man in action, it deals with what in India has been called *karma*. In Aristotle it is a reflection on the question, what is good for man as man? Such a reflection would inevitably lead to a consideration of politics if man were to be seen as an essentially social being as he is in Aristotle's scheme; politics, for Aristotle, being an exercise in discovering the best manner in which society can be organized for the good of man.

In arguing for the essential sociality of man, Aristotle makes use of the concept of self-sufficiency. Man, he asserts, can achieve happiness, the final good for man, only in association with other human beings. The seeking for the good, he argues, is not an individual seeking since no man is sufficient in himself. At the beginning of *Ethics* we find him saying: 'It is a generally accepted view that the final good is self-sufficient.' He has, obviously, no quarrels with this view, at least not at this point, for he moves on to explain how the term 'self-sufficient' should be understood: 'By self-sufficient is meant not what is sufficient for oneself living the life of a solitary but includes parents, wife and children, friends and fellow-citizens in general.' He does not give us reasons for coming to this central conclusion, but immediately

pronounces a principle from which, in his view, this obviously follows. His very next sentence is: 'For man is a social animal.' (*The Ethics*, p. 37.)

Later, however, at the end of *The Ethics*, a tension becomes apparent in Aristotle's thought between man's rationality and his sociality. He now uses the term 'self-sufficient' for the contemplative man, speaking of contemplation as the highest activity for man. This purest of activities is the very essence of rational activity and is also essentially non-social. 'Self-sufficiency' he observes, 'will be found to belong in the exceptional degree to the exercise of the speculative intellect.' And for a man who engages in such an activity, he adds, other humans, fellow-beings, are redundant. They may be needed in a peripheral sense, but they are certainly not essential or necessary for his activity.[2] Let us quote him:

> The wise man, as much as the just man, and everyone else, must have the necessaries of life. But, given an adequate supply of these, the just man also needs people with and towards whom he can put his justice into operation; and we can use similar language about the temperate man, the brave man and so on. But the wise man can do more. He can speculate all by himself and the wiser he is the better he can do it. Doubtless it helps to have fellow-workers, but for all that he is the most self-sufficing of men. (*The Ethics*, book 10, ch. 7, pp. 303-4.)

The question that immediately arises is: how can man's sociality, which necessarily needs fellow-beings, then be essentially related to man's rationality if man can be self-sufficient and rational in the best of senses without fellow-beings? For if man is both essentially social and rational then the relation between man's sociality and his rationality, too, must be essential. What is this essential relation?

The question of the relation between the active and the contemplative life has troubled man in many different cultures, despite differing views on the essential nature of man. In India, where the essential nature of man was taken to be spiritual rather than rational, the tension arising out of the asymmetry between man's social and spiritual life has been articulated for centuries. In early literature it expresses itself as the hostility between the 'social' goals of *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma* on the one hand and the transcendental goal of *mokṣa* on the other, as *puruṣārthas* or ends of human seeking. Later, more philosophically, it is debated upon in terms of the relation between *jñāna* and *karma*, action and knowledge, the knowledge meant here being supra-rational.

Aristotle does not seem to have really wanted to face the question of the relation between *jñāna* and *karma*, in whatever sense *jñāna* may be understood, whether spiritual or rational. He is content merely to assert that man is both rational and social. And as social he is political.

In the beginning of *The Politics*, almost immediately after the passage on

contemplation we have just discussed (taking *The Politics* to be a continuation of *The Ethics*), we find that the term 'social' is firmly narrowed down to 'political'. *The Politics* begins with the argument that among man's social associations the political association is sovereign, embracing all the others and aiming at the highest good. (*The Politics*, li, p. 54) Consequently, Aristotle also narrows down his definition of man from a social to a political animal. (Ibid., lii, p. 59; a definition repeated later again in chapter 3, vi, p. 187)

As a political being, the hierarchical relation between the ruler and the ruled is essential to man. Such a relation, Aristotle argues, exists in nature both as a fact and a *telos*. In nature, he observes, we can perceive the genesis of political forms and the direction of growth that they assume. Observation, he says, reveals two basic pairs among humans in which the one is incapable of existing without the other. These are the pairs of man-woman and master-slave. They are formed on the basis of necessary and essential relations. The man-woman relation is necessary for the continuance of mankind. Equally necessary is the other pair of master and slave. The essential purpose it serves is the self-preservation of both the partners. The master is the man with intelligence who can see ahead and decide what is to be done; the slave has bodily strength and can do the actual work. Both thus serve a single purpose which unites them into a single, necessary whole.

In these two pairs, man-woman and master-slave, the master remains the same. He is the rational agent. It is the purpose of the master that both the woman and the slave serve through different functions and abilities. The slave is purely a tool, an object, useful because of his muscle-power. He is close to the beast and it is for this reason, Aristotle adds, that the ox is called a poor man's slave. The woman or the wife not only serves a different purpose but she is also not purely an object or a mere tool. Though not capable of being a true rational agent, a woman is yet capable of running a household; she has a modicum of agency.

Whatever the merit of these observations, we can see however that their very logical basis is questionable in Aristotle's scheme, implying a palpable contradiction: if all men are rational how can some escape from being such and be more like beasts? Patently, man cannot be both rational and political on Aristotle's terms without serious inconsistencies arising in the very foundations of his thought.

Aristotle sees the problem but tries to hedge it. He takes recourse to nature for a solution, asking himself the question whether the master-slave relation is really 'natural', which for him also meant 'essential', or whether it is merely conventional, consisting of man made rules and laws, hence accidental or arbitrary.

Quoting a view contrary to his own, a *pūrvapakṣa*, Aristotle remarks: 'Others say that it is contrary to nature to rule as master over slave, because the distinction between slave and free is one of convention only, and in nature there is no difference, so that this form of rule is based on force and is therefore not just.' This passage occurs in *The Politics* at the end of Chapter liii. It could have made Aristotle take a second look at his scheme or ask himself whether the concept of justice could really be deduced through observation of facts or what he called 'nature'. But it leads him rather to further re-assertions. He goes on to demonstrate the master-slave relation as given in the very nature of things, hence not arbitrary but essential and necessary. His arguments proceed in a circular manner assuming the equation between the rational and the political as given. Curiously, but expectedly, they move him to argue for the rationality of power. Let us follow his moves.

In Chapter liv of *The Politics* Aristotle argues that the minimum a man needs for a good life is the household which is also the basis of his social being, sustenance and continuation as a species. The household consists of various properties, the slave being one such, which are tools enabling the master, the man of the house, to live. However, we can distinguish between two kinds of tools. One helps to make something. The other is used by life itself in its act of living. To explain, he points at the difference between the shuttle which helps to produce cloth and a garment made of cloth which is used by man in his process of living. The garment is an object of *bhoga*, one might say, to use the more succinct Sanskrit term. The slave is also an object of *bhoga*, necessary for the very act of living, like the garment, or the bed. In what sense he is so, Aristotle does not make clear. He is clear, however, in stating that the slave is a piece of property that belongs to another and is meant for *bhoga* by nature, the only difference is that he is not a thing but a man.

The next chapter of *The Politics*, Chapter lv, begins by questioning this idea: 'But whether anyone does in fact by nature answer to this description, and whether or not it is just and better for one man to be slave to another, or whether all slavery is contrary to nature—these are the questions which must be considered next.'

The answer, in his view, presents no difficulties, neither logical nor in terms of empirical observation. 'That one should command and another obey is both necessary and expedient', he says, adding that, 'indeed some things are so divided right from birth, some to rule some to be ruled'. (*The Politics*, lv, p. 67.) Thus convinced that the ruler-ruled relation is natural, and therefore necessary, Aristotle goes on to argue that the quality of the relation depends on the quality of the ruled, and so rule over man is better than rule over animals.

A relation of hierarchy, he further argues, is always to be found in combinations of distinct things where such a combination produces a unity such as that of the master-slave pair. It is immaterial whether such a combination is that of parts within a single object or of distinct entities conjoined as parts into a unit. The master-slave relation is of the latter category. The slave is not a part of the master's body and yet acts as one.

In order to illustrate his notion of natural hierarchy, Aristotle begins by taking up an interesting analogy from music only to give it up immediately as irrelevant. In musical structures, which consist of many notes, he says, there is a note called the dominant which rules over others, giving unity to the structure as a whole which would otherwise fall apart. Why does Aristotle give up this example? He does not tell us. Even worse, if the example went against his thesis, he should have treated it as a counter-example and showed why it was irrelevant, which he does not even consider doing. The reason why he gives up the example, I think, is that it carries with it an ambivalence quite counter to his essentialism. But let us pursue his analogy ourselves; it can be a fruitful non-Aristotelian exercise in the study of culture. Greek music was, evidently, more similar to Indian music than the current Western music, so let me take the example of the *rāga* and the function of the *vadi*, the dominant, in it. A *rāga* is formed with a scale, an ascending or descending order of tones with specific pitch values. This is a neutral, almost theoretical structure, quite lifeless as music. Something has to be done to it in order to create patterns out of it. One way this can be done is to make a note dominant, a treatment which can give rise to endless new patterns. This is, in fact, an important step in turning a scale into a *rāga*. But different *rāgas* can arise out of the same scale with different notes functioning as dominant; the master, in other words, can be made a slave, since the notion of the dominant in music is not an essentialist notion: there are no 'natural' dominants. This notion can be extended to the understanding of man and the cultures he creates. One way to understand the difference between men can be to think of man as a scale of faculties, with different faculties being allowed to dominate in different cultures. It seems to me that the concept of culture held in some circles, as of three major kinds, the rational, the spiritual and the moral, often identified with the Western, the Indian and the Chinese, is conceived in some such manner. The analogy poses problems, no doubt. What human dispositions are to count as faculties? What is to be understood as the relation between faculties such as that of tones in a scale? Can we at all speak of a scale of faculties? And so forth.

But, in any case, the notion of dominance as understood in this musical example is a notion of play, not of natural hierarchy and power. And so Aristotle, naturally, gives up the musical analogy. The true analogy, he says, for understanding the master-slave relation is the natural rule of the soul over the body. 'It is', he points out, 'both natural and expedient for the body to be ruled by the soul'. (*The Politics*, Iv, p. 68.)

An irksome question might still remain. Granted that the relation of power is natural and 'expedient', but is it rational? For the rational, apparently, demands a relation of equality, not of power.[4]

Yet, of course, power seems necessary to run a society, a fact which presents a moral predicament. This dilemma was articulated by Yudhiṣṭhira in the *Mahābhārata* in slightly different terms. If the relation between men, he

argued, is essentially that of *dharma* or justice (which was considered a non-natural quality), then wielding power is essentially inconsistent with it.

For Aristotle there is no dilemma. Nature shows him the way. Since the master-slave relation is given in nature, it follows that this must be just. It also follows that there must be such a thing as the natural slave. Aristotle then seeks to identify them; and discovers them in the non-Greeks.

The non-Greeks are natural slaves because they lack reason. They do not have the vision to perceive distinctions given in nature which rational men, namely the Greeks, can easily see. We have seen that according to Aristotle there was distinction given in nature between the woman and the slave as the ruled. 'But the non-Greeks', he submits, 'assign female and slave exactly the same status. This is because', he adds, 'they have nothing which is by nature fitted to rule, their association consists of a male slave and a female slave'. (*The Politics*, Iii, p. 57.)

What is bizarre in this argument is not its bias, which is understandable, but the equation between reason and power: rationality affords not only knowledge but the right to rule over those who lack in reason. What is also peculiarly interesting is the fact that Aristotle makes the social structure of a people an index to their rationality, a thesis which was to become one of the pillars of 'modern' Western sociological theory as well as a basic element of historical, Indological, Sinological and other cognitive studies of non-Western cultures. I need not illustrate, yet let me mention one illustrious instance, namely, Weber's introduction to his well-known *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Weber discovers the unique rationality of the West in its social structures. He goes even further and finds a unique rationality in Western aesthetic structures, too. Other cultures by contrast lack this quality.[5]

I need not point out that underlying the argument from social structure to rationality lies the assumption that there is an essential relation between the rationality and sociality of man. A basic attempt of Western sociology is the quest to give observational substance to this assumption, except that the role given to nature in Aristotle is often transferred to history. Another assumption underlies much of the quest, which can again be traced back to Aristotle. The assumption is that there is only one form of rationality and thus a unique form of rational social organization, others being non-rational. The roots of this belief seem to lie in the fact that Greek rationality took mathematics to be the paradigm of knowledge. Had Aristotle pursued his musical example further, taking aesthetic forms as his paradigm, the results might have been happier.

But looking as he was for the uniquely rational structure, he discards the idea of slavery as convention. Conventions can be many, but nature in his view had a single one-pointed *telos*. The modern Western mind has drained nature of its *telos*, transferring it to the world of culture and finds the uniquely rational in history rather than nature.

To come back to *The Politics* we do find Aristotle uneasy over his notion of the natural slave: how can slaves be men and yet lack the basic human quality of rationality? He puts this question to himself and his answer is revealing. Let me quote his own words:

> About slaves the first question to be asked is whether in addition to their virtue as tools and servants they have another and more valuable one. Can they possess restraint, courage, justice, and every other condition of that kind, or have they in fact nothing but the serviceable quality of their persons?
>
> The question may be answered in either of two ways, but both present a difficulty. If we say that slaves have these virtues, how then will they differ from free men? If we say they have not, the position is anomalous, *since they are human beings and share in reason* (emphasis mine). Roughly the same question can be put in relation to wife and child. Have not these also virtues? Ought a woman to be 'restrained', 'brave' and 'just', and is a child sometimes 'intemperate', sometimes 'restrained', or not?
>
> All these questions might be regarded as part of our wider inquiry into the natural ruler and ruled, and in particular whether or not the virtue of the one is the same as the virtue of the other. For if the highest excellence is required of both, why should one rule unqualifiedly and the other unqualifiedly obey? (A distinction of more or less will not do here; the difference between ruling and obeying is one of kind and quantitative difference is simply not that at all.) If on the other hand the one is to have virtues and the others not, we have a surprising state of affairs. For if he that rules is not to be restrained and just, how shall he rule well? And if the ruled lacks these virtues, how shall he *be* ruled well? For if he is intemperate and feckless, he will perform none of his duties. Thus it becomes clear that both ruler and ruled must have share in virtue, but that there are differences in virtue in each case, as there are also among those who by nature rule. *An immediate indication of this is afforded by the soul, where we find natural ruler and natural subject, whose virtues we regard as different—one being that of the rational element, the other that of the non-rational* (emphasis mine). It is therefore, clear that the same feature will be found in the other cases too, so that most instances of ruling and being ruled are natural. For rule of free over slave, male over female, man over boy, are all different, because, while parts of the soul are present in each case, the distribution is different. Thus the deliberative faculty in the soul is not present at all in a slave, in a female it is present but ineffective, in a child present but undeveloped.

Curiously, we see that Aristotle does not really question his scheme but only seems to do so. For him the conclusion is unquestionable: there *must* be a natural ruler and ruled relation and so there *is* one. His remarks are, however, interesting in more than one way. Aristotle can see that in order to

call slaves men he must give them a share in rationality but he is unable to find a way for doing so. One answer could have been to speak of degrees of rationality. But this he rejects outright. He also makes a move towards distinguishing between manifest and unmanifest rationality in speaking of the difference between woman and (male) child, but the difference, in his view, between the ruler and the ruled is so categorical, such a difference of *kind*, that the slave cannot even be allowed unmanifest rationality. Indeed, his paradigm for the ruler-ruled relation, the relation between the soul and the body, leaves no room, for him, to think of the relation as one of quality rather than kind. Yet he realizes that a difference of kind will not do either. For if the ruler and the ruled do not share in anything, how can they be related at all? His answer is to give the slave a share in other human virtues such as justice, temperance, courage and the like, but not in reason, where, for him, the categorical difference is really operative. We find him asserting (in the long passage we have emphasized) that the virtues of the slave are non-rational virtues. He lacks the deliberative faculty.[6]

There exist interesting parallels between modern Western views of non-Western societies and this passage from Aristotle. We notice that Aristotle wants to be generous towards the natural slave, the non-Greek, who is allowed to have qualities of action and feeling even though he lacks rationality. Some modern notions concerning the non-rationality of non-Western societies share a similar generosity. Other cultures may not be rational, but they *are* quite human despite this. Some romantically inclined Western thinkers oppressed by the rationality of their own culture, even believe that 'primitive' and 'traditional' cultures, lacking in rationality, have, for this reason, more than their share of the other human qualities and admire them for this.

Let us, however, return to Aristotle's answer to those who believed not only that the master-slave relation was conventional but also that it was unjust. The notion of the natural slave takes care of the first part of the objection. The ruler rules because of his reason. Given this, the question of justice also presents no difficulties. For if reason entitles one to power, power, too, must be a mode of reason, its exercise cannot be unjust in the hands of the natural ruler. It is right, he says in a startling passage, for the natural ruler to acquire slaves through warfare 'against such men as are by nature intended to be ruled over but refuse; for that is the kind of warfare which is by nature just'. (*The Politics*, Iviii, p. 79.)

It is just because it is virtuous; virtue here obviously being the virtue of the natural master, in effect, his rationality which, to quote again, 'when it acquires resources is best able actually to use force; and anything which conquers does so because it excels in some good'. (*The Politics*, Ivi, p. 72.)

This brutal argument did seem a little questionable to Aristotle, yet reasonable enough. He goes on to say:

> It seems therefore that force is not without virtue, and the only dispute is

> about what is just. Consequently, some think that 'just' in this connection is a nonsense, others that it means precisely this that the stronger shall rule. But when these propositions are disentangled the other arguments have no validity or power to show that the superior in virtue ought not to rule and be master. (*The Politics*, lvi, p. 72.)

We have, I think, disentangled Aristotle's arguments enough on our own. Given his equation of a natural relation between reason and power this seems quite in order, except for its bias. One might think that arguments of this kind are best forgotten today and committed to the dustbin of history. But let me reproduce here a modern offspring of this argument which bears a great family resemblance to it. The argument comes from no less a person than Claude Levi-Strauss. Equating power with knowledge, he has argued for the epistemological superiority of the rulers, the West over those it has ruled.

In a remarkable speech reproduced in the April 1966 issue of *Current Anthropology*, Levi-Strauss dismissed the suggestion that the West allow itself to be studied sociologically by those whom it has hitherto had the monopoly of both ruling and studying and thus redress the balance. This, he argued, would not do because the context of sociological knowledge is a context of power in which only the ruler can be the knower, since he has treated the ruled as an object. Thus treated as a natural object the ruled has appropriately *become* an object of knowledge. To quote: 'Anthropology is a daughter of this era of violence: its capacity to assess more objectively the facts pertaining to the human condition reflects on the epistemological level a state of affairs in which (one) part of mankind treated the other as an object.'[7]

One can surely see the shadow of Aristotle here. Other modern Western thinkers, however, are willing to grant a higher rational status to the non-West than Aristotle would allow. They are willing to promote it from the staus of a slave to that of a growing, 'developing' child, who is potentially rational. It *can* follow in the footsteps of its guru, the West. But their slogan is clear: All roads to the civilization of the future must lead through the 'rational' West. This has many propagators both in the West and in India and elsewhere. These I need not name here. It will take up too much space and will be tangential to our purpose here.

Yet before finally closing, I cannot resist from pointing out another remarkable parallel between Levi-Strauss and Aristotle. The idea Levi-Strauss argues for is the idea of the true *adhikārī* of *jñāna*, he who is worthy and deserving of knowledge. Aristotle's criteria for the true *adhikārī* of social and political *jñāna* are not dissimilar to those of Levi-Strauss. Who, he asks at the beginning of *The Ethics*, has the *adhikāra* to acquire the knowledge contained in *The Ethics* and by implication, *The Politics*? His answer can be

anticipated. The *adhikārī*, for him is the well-born Greek, the natural ruler, the student at his academy, the Lyceum.

Aristotle begins his *Ethics* by distinguishing politics from those sciences which can be deduced from first principles. In politics, he says, one can only argue *from* known facts *to* first principles. But what is the known, he asks. And in answer says:

> But this is an ambiguous expression, for things are known in two ways. Some are known 'to us' and some are known absolutely. For members of the Lyceum there can be little doubt that we must start from what is known to us. So the future student of ethics and politics, if he is to study them to advantage must have been well brought-up. For we begin with the *fact* and if there is sufficient reason for accepting it as such, there will be no need to ascertain the why of the fact. Now a lad with such an upbringing will have no difficulty in grasping the first principles of morals if he is not in possession of these already. (*The Ethics*, book I, ch. 4, pp. 29-30.)

So the well-born Greek is not only a natural ruler; he is also epistemologically superior, a natural knower.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. We shall, in referring to *The Nicomachean Ethics* (or *The Ethics* or simply, *Ethics*) and *The Politics* (or *Politics*), refer to the two following English translations of these works: (i) *The Nicomachean Ethics*, published in the Penguin Classics Series as *The Ethics of Aristotle*, translated by J.A.K. Thompson, Penguin Books, 1955; (ii) *The Politics*, revised edition, also published in the Penguin Classics Series translated by T.A. Sinclair, revised and re-presented by Trevor J. Saunders, Penguin Books, 1981.
2. Perhaps the reflective man might need slaves to look after his physical needs, but slaves, for Aristotle, cannot be 'fellow-workers' in his act of reflection, since, as we shall see, they are by nature incapable of such an act. Indeed, it is questionable whether they can be called fellow-beings at all.
3. There is strong leaning towards the idea of *varṇa* or *jāti* in Aristotle which needs to be highlighted. The slave and the free, that is, the citizen, are for him created primarily through birth. The idea is present as a presupposition in many of his thoughts, but let me quote a more articulate statement of it. A citizen, he says, is one who has the characteristics, the *guṇadharma*, of a ruler, but his primary *adhikāra*, which makes him eligible to acquire other characteristics, as in the case of a brāhamaṇa, comes through birth : 'For practical purposes a citizen is defined as one of citizen birth on *both* his father's *and* his mother's side....' (*Politics*, III ii, pp. 171-72; emphases not mine). He does not take the requirement to the very beginning of time as it is sometimes done for a brāhmaṇa, but is satisfied if the parentage can be traced to the original founding fathers of a state's constitution. But, as we shall further see, the role of 'noble' birth as an essential qualification for more 'learned' characteristics is of prime importance for Aristotle.
4. The equation made here between rationality and equality was questioned by Prof. Richard Sorabjee in his pointed comments on the paper during the discussion. I would

like to attempt an answer. It appears to me obvious that rationality should imply equality. But that is no argument. Let me attempt to give one.

Rationality presupposes a subject who is free to know, to choose between the true and the false, the just and the unjust and the like through a process of validation or, in other words, through reasoning. This is not a causally determined process but a process where the subject is free to discriminate.

The process, moreover, not only calls for a free subject but a multiplicity of free subjects. For the process is one of evaluation based on the free *criticism* of one knowledge by another. A discriminating subject is, in this sense, essentially a split-subject who not only argues but counter-argues from *another* standpoint, holding a multiplicity of subjects, so to say, within a single self. In practice, or normal *vyavahāra*, the multiplicity of subjects is found in a multiplicity of persons. These are all free subjects capable of independent deliberation, equal participants in the rational process. It would, consequently, be irrational, inimical to the rational process iself, to treat them as inequal, since this would amount to denying their subjecthood and treating them as objects rather than subjects.

5. Let me quote. I quote from the edition translated by Talcott Parsons and published by Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1958, pp. 13-15.

The very first paragraph of Weber's introduction reads:

A product of modern European civilization, studying any problem of universal history, is bound to ask himself to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilization, and in Western civilization only, cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of development having universal significance and value.

He moves on to further assert :

Machiavelli, it is true, had predecessors in India; but all Indian political thought was lacking in a systematic method comparable to that of Aristotle, and, indeed in the possession of rational concepts. Not all the anticipations in India (School of Mīmāṃsā), nor the extensive codification, especially in the Near East, nor all the Indian and other books of law, had the strictly systematic forms of thought, so essential to a rational jurisprudence, of the Roman law and of the Western law under its influence. A structure like the canon law is known only to the West.

A similar statement is true of art. The musical ear of other peoples has probably been even more sensitively developed than our own, certainly not less so. Polyphonic music of various kinds has been widely distributed over the earth. The co-operation of a number of instruments and also the singing of parts have existed elsewhere. All our rational tone intervals have been known and calculated. But rational harmonious music both counter-point and harmony, formation of the tone material on the basis of three triads with the harmonic third; our chromatics and enharmonics, not interpreted in terms of space, but, since the Renaissance, of harmony; our orchestra, with its string quartet as a nucleus, and the organization of ensembles of wind instruments; our base accompaniment; our system of notation, which has made possible the composition and production of modern musical works, and thus their very survival; our sonatas, symphonies, operas; and finally as means to all this, our fundamental instruments, the organ, piano, violin, etc.; all these things are known only in the Occident, although programme music, tone poetry, alteration of tones and chromatics, have existed in various musical traditions as means of expression.

In Architecture, pointed arches have been used elsewhere as a means of decoration, in antiquity and in Asia; presumably the combination of pointed arch and cross-arched vault was not unknown in the Orient. But the rational use of the Gothic vault as a means of distributing pressure and of roofing spaces of all forms and above all as the constructive principle of great monumental buildings and the foundation of a style extending to sculpture and painting, such as that created by our Middle Ages, does not occur elsewhere. The technical basis of our architecture came from the Orient. But the Orient lacked the solution of the problem of the dome and that type of classic rationalization of all art—in painting by the rational utilization of lines and spatial perspective—which the Renaissance created for us.

6. Richard Sorabjee again tried valiantly to come to Aristotle's defence. What Aristotle is doing, he said, is to make a distinction between two kinds of rationality: active and passive. There are, as we know from experience, men with an active reason who can deliberate, see ahead and set the path. Others can only follow, for theirs is a passive reason. They can understand the active reason but cannot deliberate for themselves. Some of Aristotle's own statements, made elsewhere, seem to favour such an interpretation of his thought. In *Politics*, iv (p. 69), for example, he says: 'For the slave by nature is he that can and therefore does belong to another, and he that participates in reason so far as to recognize it but not so far as to possess it whereas the other animals obey not reason but emotions).'

In other words, the slave has a passive reason which can be stamped upon by the active, even though it cannot deliberate for itself. There are other passages where the slave is placed in the same category as the beast and rationality is positively denied to him (see, for example, *Politics*, III, ix, p. 196, besides what we have already quoted). But the real question is: can we at all make a distinction of kind between an active and a passive reason? Can we conceive of a reason which cannot deliberate for itself?

Such a conception, I think, is not possible. I would like to argue my point with the help of a passage from Aristotle himself. He speaks, in this passage, of spech as one of the *vyāvartaka lakṣaṇas*, definitive characteristics, of man (I must thank Sorabjee for pointing out the passage to me). The passage occurs early in *The Politics* at lii, p. 60 :

Nature, as we say, does nothing without purpose; and she has endowed man alone among the animals with the power of speech. Speech is something different from voice which is possessed by other animals also and used by them to express pain or pleasure; for their nature does indeed enable them not only to feel pleasure and pain but to communicate these feelings to each other. Speech on the other hand serves to indicate what is useful and what is harmful and also what is just and what is unjust, etc.

One is bound to ask : What is the relation between these two definitive characteristics of man, speech and rationality? An intimate connection is assumed between the two in this passage: speech, unlike voice, which is a characteristic of animals, expresses what is patently the very stuff of rationality, *ideas* concerning the useful and the harmful, the just and the unjust—and the 'etc.', at the end of the passage, is surely meant also to include the true and the false. Also for Aristotle speech seems to be an *active* principle, a medium for the *act* of expressing reason. However, what he says is not enough to deny a distinction between an active and a passive reason. So let me offer an argument from a thinker older than Aristotle to demonstrate that *understanding* language is also an *act* of deliberation.

The thinker I have in mind is the ancient Indian Kautsa, whose views are discussed by Yāska in his *Nirukta* (*circa*. seventh century BC). Yāska discusses a contemporary controversy concerning the *Veda*. The question was whether these revealed texts were meaningful or not. Kautsa had an ingenious, insightful argument to prove that the *Veda* could not be meaningful. The *Veda*, when the controversy arose, was taken to be a fixed text, fixed, literally, to the letter: no syllable in it could be altered.

This, Kautsa argues, is a sure sign of non-speech, since any string of letters that forms meaningful *words* can be altered, indeed, must be altered in the very process of understanding, this being the sign that a string of syllables is meaningful. A meaningful set

of letters is, in other words, necessarily translated and thus transformed by anyone who understands it into his own words. A set of syllables which cannot be so transformed through restatement is mere gibberish.

A slave who has understood the deliberation of his master will be able to restate it in his own words, words which would not be a mere rechanting of his master's words but products of his own deliberation. This alone would indicate that he has understood what he was told. But if this is so the slave's understanding cannot be merely passive for it *acts* upon what it understands, transforming it in the very act of understanding. This is an act which requires *participation* in the thought of another, the capacity to actively make the moves which the other had made. Understanding thus needs a deliberation which can *re-enact* another's thought through an independent act of its own. This cannot be a passive process like a mirror registering an image. One who can understand a deliberation must be able to deliberate himself.

7. I quote not directly from *Current Anthropology* where Levi-Strauss' article appeared in Vol. 7, No. 2, April 1966, under the title: 'Anthropology: Its Achievements and Future', but from Dr Daya Krishna's preface to his collection of articles entitled, *The Art of the Conceptual*, ICPR and Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi, 1989, p. xvi. Readers interested in a more detailed discussion of Levi-Strauss' article can refer to Dr Daya's book.

The trouble with truth: Heidegger on *Aletheia*, Buddhist thinkers on *satya*

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> What is questionable can sometimes be worthy of thought, and what is unthinkable can sometimes be glimpsed as that which thinking is about. Both Heidegger and Vedānta thought amply illustrate this. No other justification can be offered for the following very questionable enterprise of bringing together two disparate ways of thinking, so wide apart in time and in their entire context.[1]

In these words, the late J.L. Mehta set the appropriate cautionary tone for the dialogue which we are here attempting, thereby echoing Heidegger's own tentative explorations of the possibility for such dialogue. In the 1947 'Letter on Humanism' Heidegger had written:

> But even the Western world is not thought of regionally as the Occident in contrast to the Orient, nor merely as Europe, but in the frame of world history from the closeness to its origin. We have hardly begun to think of the mysterious relations to the East, which find expression in Hölderlin's poetry.[2]

During the next decade Heidegger would begin to disclose some of these 'mysterious relations' himself, most famously in the 1953 'A Dialogue on Language', and in several allusions to Laotze.[3] Nonetheless, his reflections both on the historicity of human thought and on the uniquely intimate relationship between language and Being seem to have counselled cautious restraint here: 'comparative philosophy' would play no role in Heidegger's enterprise, and indeed, as Mehta clearly suggests in the perceptive essay cited above, his way of thinking would appear to raise several questions regarding the very possibility of 'comparative philosophy'. In *What is Philosophy?* (1956) he writes:

> The word *philosophia* tells us that philosophy is something which, first of all, determines the existence of the Greek world. Not only that—*philosophia* also determines the innermost basic feature of our Western-European history. The often heard expression 'Western-European philosophy' is, in truth, a tautology.[4]

'Philosophy', Heidegger tells us, 'is speaking Greek'. As Evan Thompson rightly notes, Heidegger is not here arguing jingoistically for the superiority

of Western thought. Rather, 'Heidegger's conception is . . . a philosophical one: it is a conception of the form or *eidos* of a culture and the *essential relation* of philosophy to that form.'[5]

The task of engaging together in dialogue the thought of Martin Heidegger and Buddhism is, therefore, something of a quixotic enterprise. This is so for many reasons, of which, at the outset at least, the most formidable will be the sheer difficulty for us of both ways of thought. And this difficulty stems not just from terminological and conceptual complexity and subtlety of reason in each instance, but is intensified also by the problematic nature of our own historical and cultural relationships with the parties we wish to engage in dialogue here.

Heidegger, to begin, assumed something of mythic proportion even during his own life; and he shows little sign yet of shrinking to a more manageable dimension. To put the point somewhat whimsically: Martin Heidegger has become the Darth Vader of contemporary intellectual life. At once regarded by some as the supreme exponent of the force of authentic thinking-and-Being, he appears also to have been turned, terrifyingly, to the dark side of that force. Whether our inquiry be in the domain of philosophy, religion, history, or criticism, he looms above our path as one with whom we must struggle, if only to avoid; and in struggling with him we will likely face some disconcerting revelations of our own intellectual paternity.

Our other difficult conversation partner is 'Buddhist thought'. Of course, there is no way for us to enter into dialogue with Buddhist thought *überhaupt*. We must choose either to engage the thought of a single individual, or perhaps that of a well-defined group of some sort, and our decision about our symposium's guest-list will, to a very great extent, skew the course of the entire enterprise: in searching for aspects of Buddhism to introduce in dialogue with Martin Heidegger we will almost inevitably set our sights on those which seem, superficially at least, to have the greatest affinity with his thought. Because we engage in the conversation in this manner, we have determined even before the onset of the dialogue that it should be relatively harmonious in nature, that it should underscore fraternity and not incompatibility. It is difficult to imagine that, under the rubric of 'Heidegger and Buddhist Thought', one might attempt to contemplate the *abhidharma*, Tibetan logic, or Nichiren, for instance.

These considerations by no means discredit the present effort, but they should make us very humble about what we are willing to claim for it: the rubric of 'Heidegger and Buddhist Thought' (how much more does this apply to 'Heidegger and *Asian* Thought'!) is a denomination of convenience, referring to what necessarily will be a severely restricted undertaking. In point of fact, the dialogue between Heideggerian and Buddhist thought, as it has evolved to date, has involved almost exclusive representation, on the Buddhist side, of the more philosophically oriented aspects of Mahāyāna thought, above all the exponents of the Madhyamaka tradition, or of traditions in which Madhyamaka thought plays a particularly prominent role: consider Sprung or Sinari on Nāgārjuna, Guenther on Mahāmudrā, or the thinkers of the Kyoto school on Zen.[6] In surveying the contributions emerging from these quarters, it is impossible to avoid the suspicion that, besides a genuine philosophical dialogue, what we have here represents in part the growth of a peculiar brand of contemporary apologetics. And it is apparent, too, that in this effort representatives of East Asian, and particularly Japanese Buddhist, traditions have been pre-eminent.

One of the initial difficulties we face in attempting to reflect on Buddhist thought in relation to Heidegger is thus partially circumvented, when we recognize the severe and inevitable cultural/historical/doctrinal limitations of the project. The apparent simplification of our problem in this sense, however, does not by any means yield a corresponding simplification of philosophical content: Madhyamaka and the traditions closely allied to it embody highly complex currents in the history of ideas, extended through some two millennia, intermingling with the major cultural traditions of South, Central and East Asia, and articulated in half a dozen or so languages. In attempting to understand this movement in human thought, we are faced—the Kyoto school philosophers are among the partial exceptions here—with what Louis O. Gomez has felicitously termed the 'double distance', historical and cultural, between ourselves and the tradition into which we inquire.[7]

With this in mind, the present essay may be placed in the forum of the discussion as only a very tentative experiment. We may ask: For one engaged in the study of the philosophical aspects of Indian Buddhism from a historically and philosophically rigorous perspective, does the encounter with Heidegger offer a possibly fruitful path through the wilderness of interpretations? And does that encounter further advance our understanding of Heidegger? Because no simple and straightforward answer can be offered in response to such questions, it will be preferable to choose one precise and well-defined area in Heidegger's thought that seems to correspond or contrast in an interesting fashion with some equally well-defined aspect of Indian Buddhist thought. In this manner, a dialectical pathway may begin to open before us; but like the *Holzwege* of which Heidegger speaks, it is a path whose destination we cannot determine in advance, and which very possibly has no fixed destination at all. For the purposes of this experiment, then, the topic to which we shall address our inquiries will be the concept of truth.

Heidegger's radical, and much criticized, interpretation of the Greek concept of *aletheia*, which is developed in considerable detail in his 1943 essay, *Plato's Doctrine of Truth*,[8] presents us with a central theme in Heidegger's historical critique of Western philosophy: Greek thought bears witness to a great upheaval in the history of Being, characterized by the growing alienation of thought from an authentic engagement in Being and by the rise of metaphysics; and this alienation is epitomized in a shift in the very meaning

of truth. Plato's parable of the Cave (*Republic*, VII, p. 514 sq.) is significant to us not only owing to what Plato seeks to convey through its explicit symbolism, but even more so because of its unspoken revelation of that shift in meaning.

Heidegger, treating the Greek *aletheia* as a term composed with the *alpha*-privative particle and thus literally meaning '*un*hiddenness' or '*un*concealment', identifies four stages in the career of the prisoner of the Cave.[9] At first, he is chained, seeing only shadows, hearing only echoes. These are the things which seem to him to be 'unhidden' (*alethes*, 515c, 1-2). Then, he is freed from his bonds and permitted to turn towards the fire and the objects whose reflected shadows he had previously beheld. These things, painfully regarded through blinded eyes, are now 'unhidden', in a certain respect, but it is the shadows dancing on the wall, seen with ease rather than pain, that appear to be 'more unhidden' (*alethestera*, 515d, 6). In the third stage the prisoner is dragged out into the open, where his eyes, gradually growing strong, come to see that which is 'most unhidden'[10] of all, the solar orb that is the 'Idea of the Good'. Witnessing it in its radiant splendour the former prisoner now recognizes the true order of things and the fact that all that he had seen in the Cave, though false, was nonetheless dependent on this for its shadowy existence.

The fourth, and final, stage occurs when the prisoner returns to the Cave to free his former companions. No longer able to see 'correctly' in the Cave's dark recesses, he courts death by proclaiming a truth to which the still chained prisoners react as to the ravings of a madman.

The transformation of the soul which has progressed through these stages consists in a reorientation through which one comes to behold the 'unhidden', the truth which was previously concealed, precisely because one's gaze was turned in the wrong direction. In becoming thus reoriented the truth is laid bare, or, in Heidegger's words, it is 'wrested from a base and stubborn concealment'.[11] Moreover, '[W]here there is pure education the soul itself is seized and transformed as a whole, while at the same time man is transplanted to the region of his essence and oriented to it'.[12] Thus, the revelation of the 'unhidden' has two aspects: it involves the radiant presence of the 'unhidden' itself; and it requires a proper human orientation, one which faces the 'unhidden' directly. Heidegger contends, in effect, that the historical shift in the concept of truth, Plato's 'unspoken' doctrine of truth, is to be found in a shift in emphasis to the second of these aspects, to the 'correctness' of the human glance, and that as a result of this shift sight has been lost of that which was, in the first place, to be beheld in its mysterious self-disclosure.[13] The result of this transition, as George Steiner expresses it, is the emergence of 'the Aristotelian-Thomistic view of truth as that of an agreement or adequation between subject and object . . . [which] places man at the commanding fulcrum of being. It must lead', he continues, 'to that pragmatic and technological imperialism over knowledge which proceeds via Cartesian rationality to the Nietzschean exaltation of will and modern nihilism.'[14]

Whatever we may conclude with regard to the full details of Heidegger's account, we must concede to him at the outset that the Greek notion of *aletheia*, 'truth', cannot be thought of reductively as signifying only *adaequatio intellectus et rei*. Even in the writings of Aristotle, who sought to disambiguate the term to the extent possible, *aletheia* remains a problematic concept. This was almost certainly brought to Heidegger's attention when he was still quite young, through his reading, in 1907, of Brentano's *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*, the third chapter of which is entitled, 'Being in the Sense of Being True' (*on hos alethes*, *ens tanquam verum*).[15] Further reflections of Brentano on truth became available posthumously, in 1930, with the publication of *The True and the Evident* (*Wahrheit und Evidenz*).[16] In 1889 Brentano presented the Vienna Philosophical Society with a lecture on 'The Concept of Truth'—this was among the pieces later published in *The True and the Evident*—in which he elaborates in popular terms some of the ambiguity with which, he maintained, Aristotle had been struggling:

> We call many *thoughts*, ideas, or presentations (*Vorstellungen*) true, and we call others false (hallucinations, for example, we call false); we call concepts true or false, we call *judgements* true or false; we call conjectures, hopes, and anxieties true or false; we call a heart, a mind, true or false (*un esprit faux*); we call external things true or false, we call sayings true or false; we call conduct true or false; we call expressions, letters of the alphabet, and many other signs, true or false; we call a friend, we call gold, true or false. We speak of true happiness and of false happiness . . . Similarly, we say on occasion: a false woman . . . , but in another sense a false woman would be a man posing as a woman . . . ; and still in another sense a false woman would be a man who has no thought of pretending to be a woman but nonetheless is taken for one, a thing that actually happened to me at dawn one morning in the entrance to the Würzburg fortress. At that time I was wearing a cassock . . .[17]

As Brentano argues, Aristotle sought to resolve some of the difficulties flowing from the ambiguity of the concept of truth by reference to his doctrine of analogy. What is true in the primary sense is the judgement that accords with its object. Other sorts of truth are so-called only in so much as they 'all stand in close relation to' such judgement. This is similar to the manner in which a concept such as 'healthy' is to be explained: in this case, one thinks primarily of the healthy animal body, but the parts of that body, as well as foods, medicines, exercise routines and attitudes may all be called 'healthy' too, owing to their close relations to the health of the body.

By the time Brentano delivered his talk on truth in Vienna, several of his

senior contemporaries had already challenged the Aristotelian doctrine of truth, above all the historian of philosophy, Windelband, and the father of contemporary philsophical hermeneutics, Wilhelm Dilthey.[18] While Brentano ultimately defends in that lecture a version of the Aristotelian doctrine against them, it is already clear that he regards that doctrine as a troubled one. By 1915 he would abandon the correspondence theory altogether, saying:

> [W]e cannot possibly know that there is an agreement between things unless we know each of the things between which the agreement holds. Hence if all knowledge were thought of as knowledge of agreement, we would be required to complete an impossible *regressus ad infinitum*. The real guarantee of the truth of a judgement lies in the judgement's being evident. . . . Truth pertains to the judgement of the person who judges correctly—to the judgement of the person who judges about a thing in the way in which anyone whose judgements were *evident* would judge about the thing; hence it pertains to the judgement of one who asserts what the person whose judgements are evident would also assert.[19]

But though Brentano has now abandoned the doctrine of adequation, he retains, as had Windelband and Dilthey, Aristotle's view that truth primarily pertains to the true judgement. It is here that the genuine radicalism of Heidegger's thesis concerning *aletheia* becomes apparent, even without regard to its historical ramifications, though we must note, in Brentano's invocation of the 'evident', a striking anticipation of Heidegger's notion, first introduced in *Sein und Zeit*, of Being-true as disclosedness.[20]

* * *

The Sanskrit term most frequently rendered in English as 'truth' and in German as '*Wahrheit*' is *satya*. A comparative inquiry into the conceptual nexus associated with this term must begin by asking: what does the word *satya* literally mean, and how was its basic meaning understood in India? Only when we know this, will we be able to investigate particular instances of the 'philosophical'[21] use of the term in question without that investigation being from the outset unacceptably tendentious.

There can be no question of *satya* having ever meant anything like 'unhidden'. As is well-known, it is derived in an altogether straightforward manner from a participial form of the verb 'to be', and can be traced right back to the Indo-European copula, which is preserved in the Sanskrit *as*, Greek *eimi*, Latin *esse*, English *is*, German *Sein*. This is not merely a discovery of modern comparative philology: Sanskrit grammarians, though not engaged in Indo-European historical linguistics, were always acutely sensitive to the derivational principles of their own language, and they explain the term *satya* thus: *sate hitaṃ yat*.[22] This terse formula means: [the secondary derivational suffix] *ya* has been applied to [the present participle] *sat*. The suffix *ya* has several functions; typically, it expresses derivation, affinity, relatedness. It may express this rather strongly, for instance, in the formation of patronymics—e.g. 'son of so-and-so', 'descendent of so-and-so'—or so weakly that the derived term is virtually synonymous with its etymon. *Satya*, therefore, given a strong interpretation of the semantic influence of the derivational suffix is 'what stands in relation to, has affinity with, being'. Read more weakly it is simply 'what has being'.

From the Vedic period onwards, Indian thinkers regarded speech as one of the things that, in some instances at least, could be characterized as *satya*, 'related to being'.[23] The epithet *satyavādī*—truth-speaker, one who 'tells it like it is'[24]—comes into use during the same early period, and suggests that true speech was regarded as that speech which discloses what is through some sort of correspondence thereto, a conception that was later given systematic expression in Hindu philosophical literature.[25] That very early Indian thinkers *did* regard language as capable of standing in a relationship of correspondence or adequation to being is confirmed beyond reasonable doubt by even so ancient a text as the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, where the apparent *impossibility* of designating some objects—*brahman* or *ātman*—in this manner had already become a topic of lively discussion.[26] It was here that the seed was planted, for the eventual emergence of the theory of 'two truths' (*satyadvaya*) that became prominent in much later Buddhist and Vedāntic scholasticism, and to which we shall return below.

Throughout the history of Indian Buddhism the paradigmatic notion of 'truth' (Sanskrit *satya*, Pali *sacca*) was revealed in the teaching of the 'Four Noble Truths'. Even so late a Mahāyāna epistemologist as Mokṣakaragupta (twelfth century), separated from the age of the Buddha by no less a span of time than was Luther from Jesus, in his exposition of the peculiar mode of perception or knowledge possessed uniquely by the insightful sage, refers to the four noble truths as the 'genuine objective', contemplation of which is productive of the knowledge in question.[27] When we inquire into what 'truth' meant to Indian Buddhists, therefore, we would do well to begin by asking, what sort of 'truth' is meant when one speaks of 'four noble truths'?

The *sūtra* in which the Buddha first reveals his teaching of the four truths is reported universally to have been his first sermon. Though the various available redactions in the surviving canons of the early Buddhist schools reveal some discrepancies in the precise wording of the text, one is nonetheless struck by its relative stability in its several transmissions.[28] The best known version is the *Dhammacakka-ppavattanasutta* of the Pali canon, where the crucial passage with which we are here concerned reads as follows:

> Now this, O monks, is suffering, a noble truth: birth is suffering; ageing is suffering; illness is suffering; death is suffering; coming into contact with what is unpleasant is suffering; separation from what is pleasant is suffer-

ing; not getting what one desires is suffering; in short, the five acquisitive bundles [of form, sensation, perception, volition and consciousness] are suffering. Now this, O monks, is the origination of suffering, a noble truth: it is this thirst, causing further birth, accompanied by delight and desire, taking pleasure here and there, namely, erotic thirst, thirst for being, thirst for annihilation. Now this, O monks, is the cessation of suffering, a noble truth: it is that thirst's cessation due to dispassion without remainder, [its] abandonment, releasement, liberation, removal. Now this, O monks, is the path conducing to the cessation of suffering, a noble truth: it is this eight-limbed path, namely, correct view, correct intention, correct speech, correct limits on action, correct livelihood, correct effort, correct presence of mind, correct meditation.[29]

It seems by no means certain that the term 'truth' is used univocally in these passages. The manner in which the first truth, that of suffering, is expressed, suggests above all a roughly propositional conception of truth: *it is true that X* is suffering, *Y* is suffering, etc. But in the case of the second truth, that of the origination of suffering, it is a particular property, 'thirst', that is identified with the truth in question; and in the third the cessation of that property. Finally, the fourth truth embodies a recommended course of action. 'Truth', therefore, would appear to be what is really the case, or a fact about the world, or an appropriate course of human action, or else it is a proposition or assertion corresponding to such a reality or fact or action. 'Noble Truths' are those truths, contemplation of which culminates in the attainment of the status of a 'noble' in the classical Buddhist sense, that is, one whose final liberation is secure.

In the scholastic literature of early Buddhism a distinction is sometimes made between those terms or statements that are of 'ultimate significance' (*paramattha*) and those which are matters only of conventional usage (*sammuti*). Thus, for instance, the *Questions of Milinda* (*Milindapañha*), paraphrasing here the much earlier *Kathāvatthu*: 'In an ultimate sense, no person is apprehended . . . "there is a being" is conventional usage.'[30] It is this distinction that, refined and further developed, becomes a distinction of 'two truths'. Nāgārjuna (Second century C.E.) introduces it thus:

Relying on two truths is the Dharma—instruction of the Buddhas:
The truth of the world's conventional usage, and the truth in an ultimate sense.[31]

Though I do not accept the general thesis of those who seek to disassociate Nāgārjuna from the Mahāyāna, I can see no reason not to take the technical terms in this verse as meaning just what they do in the tradition represented by *The Questions of Milinda.* It is true that Pali *sammuti* is here represented by Sanskrit *saṃvṛti*,[6] but, as will become apparent below, that should not in itself convince us that any semantic shift has yet taken place.

The context of Nāgārjuna's verse is also worth noting: it occurs in the middle of his discussion of the Four Noble Truths, and is clearly introduced here, as it had been in *Milinda*, to provide a meta-linguistic device through which to interpret differing, apparently incompatible, assertions of doctrine, in this case the teaching of emptiness and that of the Four Truths. The two truths can plausibly be regarded as originally hermeneutical categories, and not as a metaphysical theory at all, much less a theory about the general concept of 'truth'. Nonetheless, it would appear that during the first centuries C.E., Buddhist scholasts came increasingly to regard the two truths as a scheme parallelling, or supplementing, that of the Four Noble Truths. Vasubandhu writes:

Four truths were uttered by the Lord, and also two truths: the truth of conventional usage and the truth of ultimate significance. What is the defining characteristic of those two?—

With reference to some thing, upon there being a breaking up or mental reduction to other [constituent elements], if no perception of that [thing remains], as in the case of a pot or of water,

Then it is truth of conventional usage; otherwise, the truth of ultimate significance.[32]

In his commentary which follows, he makes clear that truth is conceived according to a linguistic paradigm: *satyam evāhur na mṛṣā*, 'they speak truth, indeed, not lies'. And Yaśomitra, in his sub-commentary (which incidentally quotes in full the verse of Nāgārjuna that we have already cited above), glosses *saṃvṛti* with the expression *saṃvyavahāreṇa*, 'according to common usage'.[33]

If Nāgārjuna's *explicit* doctrine of the two truths can thus be plausibly understood as simply a variant on early Buddhist scholastic usage, is it not yet possible that his teaching as a whole nonetheless necessitated a transformation in the understanding of that doctrine? As Heidegger tells us: 'The "doctrine" of a thinker is that which is left unsaid in what he says, to which man is exposed in order to expand himself upon it.'[34] Indeed, the later history of Mahāyāna thought, above all within the Madhyamaka tradition, reveals a deepening and ever-widening preoccupation with the problem of the two truths, as that tradition expands itself upon what remains unsaid in Nāgārjuna's doctrine. The history is long and complex, but thanks to the recent intensification of research in the sphere of the history of Indian Madhyamaka philosophy, many significant details have now come into view.[35] It will not be possible to survey this material at all within the limits of the present essay, so to adduce the great changes that were to take place, we shall leap ahead to the final phase in the history of Indian Madhyamaka, and consider briefly some of the remarks on the two truths found in Prajñākaramati's (tenth or eleventh century) commentary on Śāntideva's (seventh

century) *Introduction to Enlightened Conduct*. Śāntideva's evocative verses, Prajñākaramati's comments on which will concern us here, are these:

> Convention and ultimate significance—this is thought to be the pair of truths.
> Reality is not in the intellect's scope; intellect is said to be conventional usage. (9.2)
> The world is twofold, for there are adepts and commoners.
> The world of the commoner is defeated by the adept's world. (9.3)
> Defeated, too, according to distinction of thought, are the adepts in ascending succession. (9.4ab)[36]

A superficial resemblance with the parable of the Cave will be noticed immediately: as the condition of the prisoners is separated from that of the realizer of the 'Idea of the Good' by an intervening realm in which one has turned painfully away from the shadows flickering on the wall, so here the commoner who knows only convention is separated from the realizer of the truth of ultimate significance by a hierarchically ordered realm of adepts, who, though free from the constraints of the commoner, have not yet realized that reality which is the truth of ultimate significance. Thus, the apparent bivalence of the two truths notwithstanding, the scheme, as presented here, can be made out to comport rather well with Heidegger's reading of the Platonic progression from that which merely appears to be 'unhidden'—Plato's *alethes*, Śāntideva's *saṃvṛtisatya*—through that which is 'more unhidden'—*alethestera, yogīsaṃvṛti*[37]—to that which is 'most unhidden'—to *alethestaton, paramārthasatya*. Let us turn now to Prajñākaramati's discussions of the essential concept of the two truths.[38]

Prajñākaramati opens his comments on verse 9.2 by explaining the term *saṃvṛtti*, so far translated as 'conventional usage'. He writes:

> *Saṃvṛti* is so-called because by it the comprehension of what is as it is, is concealed, occluded, because of the occlusion of essential being, and because of its disclosing [what is itself] occluded. Ignorance, stupefaction and error are synonyms. For ignorance, being the imputation of the forms of non-being things, and of the nature of occlusion of the vision of inherent being, is *saṃvṛti*.[39]

Concealment has now displaced convention as the primary signification of *saṃvṛti*. It is not without interest to note that here, as in Heidegger's novel interpretation of *aletheia*, the rhetorical medium for the reassessment of the word's meaning is etymological explanation—by explaining, or seeming to explain, a word from its root, we seek to probe its archaic resonances, to uncover in its depths a message lost to the commerce of ordinary chatter. The later Madhyamaka interpretation of *saṃvṛti*, it should be emphasized, is etymologically correct: the root-form from which it is derived, *saṃ-vṛ*, means

essentially 'to cover over, to close'. Hence, 'closing of the throat, articulation',[40] but also 'concealment'. That Madhyamaka thinkers came in time to emphasize the latter signification was a historical decision, linguistically correct to be sure, but not given unto them by the language even prior to their reflection upon it.

Prajñākaramati's discussion of *paramārtha* reveals a subtle intermingling of two themes that had been associated with this term from antiquity. On the one hand, following a tradition established in the analytical aspects of *abhidharma* thought, as represented above primarily in the selection from Vasubandhu, it is that which is ultimately real, that which is not destroyed through a reductive analytical procedure. For Vasubandhu this means that it was paradigmatically two sorts of things: physical atoms and phenomenal atoms or *dharmas*. For Prajñākaramati, as a Madhyamaka thinker, analysis can find no such points of termination; it must proceed until it reveals the radical contingency of all conditioned phenomena, their ultimate emptiness:

> The ultimate, highest, significance, is . . . the uncontrived form of things owing to the comprehension of which there is the abandonment of affliction that is bound up with all dispositions [involving] obscuration. It is the absence of inherent being of all *dharmas*, [their] emptiness, just-so-ness, genuine limit, the sphere of *dharma*—these are among its synonyms.[41]

As this passage makes clear, however, analytical ultimacy is closely associated with soteriological ultimacy—at the limit of analysis there is an 'abandonment of affliction'. While the Buddhist tradition seems to have always associated the two, the later Madhyamaka tradition accentuates this in a manner that is in certain respects to be distinguished from the earlier tradition. For *paramārtha* can mean not just 'ultimate significance' in an analytic sense, but equally it can stand for *paramapuruṣārtha*, that is, the highest end of man, *mokṣa*, liberation. In the tradition represented by Prajñākaramati, there is an apparently perfect convergence between these notions. One result is that the two truths scheme is no longer essentially a hermeneutical device used to interpret Four Truths discourse, nor is it an alternative classificatory scheme: rather, the two truths embrace and include the Four Noble Truths themselves:

> Four Noble Truths have been explained in the *abhidharma* by the Lord, whose defining characteristics are suffering, origination, cessation and the path. How, therefore, can there be just two truths? . . . it is because of their being included in the two. In this manner—the truths of suffering, origination, and the path, being essentially concealment, are included in the truth of concealment, and the truth of cessation in the truth of ultimate significance. Thus there is no contradiction [between the two schemes].[42]

The doctrine of two truths, having assumed an all-embracing character,

begins to look increasingly like a general doctrine of truth. But we have not yet said just how it is that truth, *satya*, is here to be understood. In particular, if *saṃvṛti* is concealment, occlusion, then in what sense is it *satya*, truth, at all?

> *Saṃvṛti* is one truth, inerrant and *paramārtha* is the other truth. 'And' conjoins them as being equivalent in so much as they are just truth. Here the truth of concealment is the non-inadequate form [adhered to by] the common world. The truth of ultimate significance is the incorrigible reality [realized by] the nobles.[43]

The world of common experience, including its linguistic and cognitive experiences, is true just in so far as it is not actually falsified. Its 'truth' is not a question of adequation, but rather of non-inadequation: whether my concept of a vase involves a relationship of adequation to that vase, in the Aristotelian-Scholastic sense, can never be established,[44] but the Mādhyamika's notion of non-inadequation (*avitatha*, lit. 'non-not-thus') is not the straightforward double negation of the Western scholastic concept. So long as my concept of the vase is not defeated in experience, it is not inadequate. In quotidian life that is generally all the truth we need. Prajñākaramati adds:

> It may be [objected], how is it that *saṃvṛti*, being of the nature of what is revealed in ignorance, and which is devastated by hundreds of investigations, because its nature is the imputation of what is not, is truth? This too is truth. For it is spoken of as the truth of concealment in that it is a determination of the common world. For it is the world that is here the truth of concealment. In conformity with it, the Lord too has just so spoken [in terms of] the truth of concealment, without reference to those seeking reality. Hence, the qualification 'and the truth of the world's conventional usage' has been asserted by the venerable teacher [Nāgārjuna]. In reality, ultimate significance is the only truth.[45]

It is precisely here that we may return to Heidegger's reflections on *aletheia*, for it is the concealment that is the world, that is known as truth in so far as there is no deprivation of adequation, that is the ground realized also as the truth of ultimate significance. In the two truths doctrine dualism is overcome, much as it is in Heidegger's thinking on the unhidden, which is vouchsafed to the thinker in virtue of its very concealment. Concealment *is* the abode of emptiness, that which is of ultimate significance; and because its abode is concealment 'in reality, ultimate significance is the only truth'.

In the soteriological dimension of the two truths doctrine as well, some will be inclined to find some harmony with the later Heidegger's reflections on 'releasement'. The possible points of harmonious contact now seem to be many, and the path that seems to find its beginning in these reflections urges us forward. However, in accord with the spirit of the wanderer on the *Holzwege* of thought, I must end by abruptly changing my course.

Heidegger's reinterpretation of the Greek notion of *aletheia* was offered in part as a *historical* thesis. It is not, in this case, a matter of a philosopher's historical accuracy or inaccuracy, being to all intents and purposes irrelevant to his philosophical intentions, for Heidegger's interpretations of history are absolutely central to his thought; and his thinking on the historicity of the concept of truth contains the distilled essence of his historical vision. The archaic conception of the unhiddenness of Being was, at some point and time in the history of Being, namely Greece in the last half of the last millennium BC, transformed into and supplanted by the notion of truth as a correspondence between idea and object; and it was this transformation that betokened the entire later development of western 'rationality', under the banner of 'metaphysics'. This is pretty strong stuff, and we need to ask what, if any, bearing our Indian Buddhist researches might have here.

It seems fairly certain that the doctrine of two truths, in the developed form in which we have described it above, represents not the archaic thought of India, which regarded truth loosely as 'that which has affinity to being', and more precisely as the real state of affairs obtaining in the world, or as speech or thought according with that reality. This is not to say, of course, that there was an archaic *doctrine* of truth, and that that doctrine corresponded more or less to the correspondence theory. Rather, the archaic conceptual nexus associated with the notion of truth was somewhat indefinite, pregnant with possibilities of reflective and theoretical disclosure. Our conclusions about this thus conform quite closely to those of Charles Kahn regarding the relationship between the concepts of truth and being in Greece,[46] so that, because Sanskrit and Greek are closely related cognate tongues, we have some reason to be sceptical of Heidegger's arguments concerning the *historical* primordiality of truth-as-unhiddenness.

Because archaic Indo-European notions of truth were indefinite, and thus offered many avenues for possible development, it should not be too astonishing that reflective civilizations, such as those of India and Greece, generated diverse theories or doctrines of truth. Plato's interest in the theory of knowledge may perhaps be traced in part to the polysemy of 'truth' in his time. Consider too that in India, epistemologists and logicians of the Nyāya and allied schools, among Hindus, Buddhists and Jains, advanced markedly positivistic theories of truth, which traditions of thought like the Madhyamaka and Vedānta were, in part, determined to overcome. Again, the evidence may be read so as to undercut Heidegger's account.

But does it? Granting that 'unhiddenness' can be accorded no historical priority, at least among Greeks and Indians, we must not conclude that it is therefore without priority in the unfolding of that thinking in which the Being of beings announces itself. Despite the evident fact that the ontological separation of subject and object, with its attendant repercussions for thinking on truth, was no less prominent a theme in Indian thought than in Greek, we cannot conclude that Heidegger has failed to identify a crucial feature of

Western-Hellenic-Christian thought, crucial precisely because that tradition itself fatefully chose that it should be pre-eminent, much as the Madhyamaka tradition fatefully chose to destroy classical Indian 'metaphysical' thought by means of the antidote offered by its doctrine of two truths.[47]

Notes and References

1. J.L. Mehta, 'Heidegger and Vedanta : Reflections on a Questionable Theme', p. 221, in J.L. Mehta, *India and the West : The Problem of Understanding* (Scholars Press, Chico, California, 1985). The article here cited was originally published in *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 18, 1978, pp. 121-49. It has also been reproduced in Graham Parkes (ed.), *Heidegger and Asian Thought*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1987, pp. 15-45.
2. Martin Heidegger, 'Letter on Humanism', translated by Edger Lohner, in William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken, eds., *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century*, Vol. 3, Contemporary European Thought, Harper & Row, New York, 1971, p. 208.
3. The 'Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer' has appeared in Martin Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, translated by Peter D. Hertz, Harper & Row, New York, 1971. For valuable information on Heidegger's knowledge of and interest in East Asian thought, see Otto Pöggeler, 'West-East Dialogue: Heidegger and Lao-tzu'; Joan Stambaugh, 'Heidegger, Taoism, and the Question of Metaphysics'; and Paul Shih-yi Hsiao, 'Heidegger and Our Translation of the *Tao Te Ching*', all in Graham Parkes, *Heidegger and Asian Thought*.
4. Martin Heidegger, *What is Philosophy?*, translated by William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde, Twayne Publishers, 1958, pp. 29–31.
5. Evan Thompson, 'Planetary thinking/planetary building: An essay on Martin Heidegger and Nishitani Keiji', *Philosophy East and West*, XXXVI/3, 1986, p. 235.
6. Mervyn Sprung, *Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way*, Prajñā Press, Boulder, 1979, pp. 1–27; Ramakant A. Sinari, *The Structure of Indian Thought*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1984, Ch. 6; Herbert V. Guenther, *The Life and Teaching of Nāropa*, Oxford University Press, London, 1963; Takeuchi Yoshinari, 'The Philosophy of Nishida', in Frederick Franck, ed., *The Buddha Eye*, Crossroad, New York, 1982, pp. 179–202; Masao Abe, *Zen and Western Thought*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1989, Ch. 5.
7. Gōmez's remarks on this were made to the conference on Buddhist hermeneutics held at the Kuroda Institute in Los Angeles during the spring of 1984.
8. Martin Heidegger, '*Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit*', translated by John Barlow as 'Plato's Doctrine of Truth', in Barrett and Aiken, op. cit., pp. 173-92.
9. Ibid., pp. 180–83.
10. *to alethestaton*. Unlike the two preceding, this term is not actually used in the parable of the Cave. As source for it Heidegger gives Book VI, 484c, 5 seq., where the context does seem to support Heidegger's use of it here.
11. Heidegger, 'Plato's Doctrine', op. cit., p. 182.
12. Ibid., p. 178.
13. Ibid., pp. 187–89.
14. George Steiner, *Heidegger*, Fontana, London, 1978.
15. Franz Brentano, *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*, translated by Rolf George, University of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles London, 1975.
16. Franz Brentano, *The True and the Evident*, translated by Roderick M. Chisholm, Ilse Politzer and Kurt R. Fischer, Humanities Press, New York, 1966. I do not yet know whether or not Heidegger had any familiarity with this work, which in any case first appeared in print after Heidegger's own *Sein und Zeit*, in which his interpretation of *aletheia* is first articulated.

17. Ibid., p. 5.
18. Ibid., pp. 9–15.
19. Ibid., pp. 120–22.
20. *Sein und Zeit*, pp. 219ff.; *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Harper & Row, New York, 1962, pp. 261ff.
21. While the use of the word 'philosophy' to chatacterize non-Western ways of thought must always be regarded as questionable—i.e. worthy of thoughtful and critical inquiry—it seems difficult to entirely dispense with it, or with the corresponding adjective, in contexts such as the present one.
22. Apte's *Sanskrit–English Dictionary*, edited by P. K. Gode and C. G. Karve, Prasad Prakashan, Poona, 1958, Part III.
23. 'Being' is here intended only in its participial sense, and by no means as a substantive. A good example of an early text concerning true and false speech is *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, II.2.2, where truth-speaking is compared to an oblation of butter poured on the sacred fire, and falsehood to extinguishing it with water.
24. Cf. Charles H. Kahn's remarks on this colloquial English phrase, and its relationship to Greek notions of truth and being, in his 'Linguistic Relativism and the Greek Project of Ontology', in Mervyn Sprung, ed., *The Question of Being*, The Pennsylvania State University Press, Penn, and London, 1978, pp. 31-44.
25. Thus, for example, Bhīmācārya Jhalakīkar in *Nyāyakośa*, (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, No. XLIX, 1893, reprinted on the basis of the 1928 revised edition, The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1978, p. 945), lists *yathārthajñānam*, 'knowledge that accords with its object', among the technical definitions of *satya*.
26. Matthew Kapstein, 'Indra's Search for the Self and the Beginnings of Philosophical Perplexity in India', *Religious Studies*, 24, pp. 244-45.
27. B.N. Singh, ed., *Tarkabhāṣā: A Manual of Buddhist Logic*, Asha Prakashan, Varanasi, 1988, p. 24 : *bhūtārthabhāvanāprakarṣaparyantajaṃ yogijñānaṃ...bhūtārthas caturāryasatyam.*
28. For a convenient edition of the Pāli text, based on the Pāli Text Society edition, see Dines Anderson, *A Pāli Reader*, Part I, (Copenhagen, 1917; reprint, Rinsen-Shoten, Kyoto, 1968, pp. 66-67. The versions given in the *Mahāvastu and Lalitavistara* are most easily available in Franklin Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Reader* Yale University Press, New Haven, 1953; reprint, Motilal Banasidass, Delhi, 1972, pp. 17–23.
29. *Idam kho pana bhikkhave dukkham ariyasaccaṃ: jāti pi dukkhā, jarā pi dukkhā, vyādhi pi dukkhā, maraṇaṃ pi dukkhaṃ. appiyehi sampayogo dukkho. piyehi vippayogo dukkho, yam p'iccham na labhati tam pi dukkhaṃ, saṃkhittena pañc'upādānakkhandhā pi dukkhā. Idaṃ kho pana bhikkhave dukkhasamudayaṃ ariyasaccaṃ: yāyaṃ taṇhā ponobbhavikā nandirāgasahagatā tatratatrābhinandinī, seyyath'īdaṃ: kāmaaṇhā bhavataṇhā vibhavataṇhā. Idaṃ kho pana bhikkhave dukkhanirodhaṃ ariyasaccaṃ: yo tassā yeva taṇhāya asesavirāganirodho cāgo paṭinissaggo mutti anālayo. Idaṃ kho pana bhikkhave dukkhanirodhagāminī patipadā ariyasaccaṃ, ayam eva ariyo aṭṭhangiko maggo, seyyath'idaṃ: sammādiṭṭhi sammāsaṃkappo sammāvacā sammākammanto sammāājivo sammāvāyāmo sammāsati sammāsamādhi.*
30. Svāmī Dvārikādāsaśāstrī, ed., *Milindapañho*, Bauddha Bharati Series 13, Varanasi, 1979, p. 21 : *paramatthato panettha puggalo nūpalabbhati...hoti satto ti sammuti.*
31. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, 24.8, in P. L. Vaidya, ed., *Madhyamakaśāśtram*, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, No. 18, Mithila Institute, Darbhanga, 1960, p. 215 :

dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā |
lokasaṃvṛtisatyaṃ ca satyaṃ paramārthataḥ ||

32. Svāmī Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī, ed., *Abhidharmakośam*, Vol. 3, Bauddha Bharati Series 7, Varanasi, 1972, p. 889 :
catvāry api satāny uktyāni bhagavatā, dve api satye
saṃvṛtisatyaṃ paramārthasatyaṃ ca. tayoḥ kiṃ lakṣaṇam?
yatra bhinne na tadbuddhir anyāpohe dhiyā ca tat |
ghaṭāmbuvat saṃvṛtisat paramārthasad anyathā || [6.4]
33. Ibid., p. 890.
34. Heidegger, 'Plato's Doctrine', op. cit., p. 173.
35. See, especially, David Seyfort Ruegg, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India*, Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1981; Christian Lindtner, 'Atiśa's Introduction to the Two Truths, and Its Sources', *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 9, 1981, pp. 161–214; Malcolm David Eckel, *Jñānagarbha's Commentary on the Distinction Between the Two Truths*, SUNY Press, Albany, 1987; Paul Williams, *Mahāyāna Buddhism*, RKP, London, 1989; C.W. Huntington, *The Emptiness of Emptiness*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1990.
36. P. L. Vaidya, ed., *Bodhicaryāvatāraḥ*, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, No. 12, Mithila Institute, Darbhanga, 1960, pp. 170, 177-78 :
saṃvṛtiḥ paramārthaś ca satyadvayam idaṃ matam |
buddher agocaras tattvaṃ buddhiḥ saṃvṛtir ucyate || 9.2. ||
tatra loko dividhā dṛṣṭo yogī prākṛtakas tathā |
tatra prākṛtako loko yogilokena bādhyate || 9.3. ||
bādhyante dhīviseṣeṇa yogino'py uttarottaraiḥ |9.4ab.
37. This term is actually introduced by Śāntideva in *Bodhicaryāvatāraḥ*, op. cit., 9.8a.
38. In the interest of simplicity and brevity the topic of *yogīsaṃvṛti* will be omitted from this discussion.
39. P. L. Vaidya, ed., *Bodhicaryāvatāraḥ*, p. 170 :
saṃvriyate āvriyate yathābhūtaparijñaṃ svabhāvāvaraṇād āvartaprakāsanāc ca anayeti saṃvṛtiḥ. avidyā moho viparyāsa iti paryāyāḥ. avidyā hi asatpadārtharūpāropikā svabhāvadarśanāvaraṇātmikā ca satī saṃvṛtir upapadyate.
40. For the main derivatives used in the technical vocabulary of Indian linguistic science, see Kashinath Vasudev Abhyankar, *A Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar*, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. 134, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1961, p. 379, entries for *saṃvaraṇa*, *saṃvāra*, and *saṃvṛta*.
41. P. L. Vaidya, ed., *Bodhicāryāvatāraḥ*, op. cit., p. 171.
paramaḥ uttamaḥ arthaḥ paramārthaḥ, akṛtrimaṃ vasturūpam,
yad adhigamāt sarvāvṛtivāsanānusaṃdhikleśaprahāṇaṃ bhavati |
sarvadharmāṇāṃ niḥsvabhāvatā, sūnyatā, tathatā, bhūtakoṭiḥ,
dharmadhātur ityādiparyāyāḥ |
42. Ibid., p. 175 :
...catvāri āryasatyāni duḥkhasamudayanirodhamārgalakṣaṇāni abhidharme kathitāni bhagavatā, tat kathaṃ dve eva satye iti?...amiṣāṃ dvayor evāntarbhāvāt|tathā hiduḥkhasamudayamārgasatyāni saṃvṛtisavabhāvatayā saṃvṛtisatye'ntarbhāvānti, nirodhasatyaṃ tu paramārthasatye, iti na kascid virodhaḥ||
43. Ibid., p. 174 :
saṃvṛtir ekaṃ satyam aviparītam, paramārthaś ca aparaṃ satyam iti | cakāraḥ satyatāmātreṇa tulyabalatāṃ samuccinoti | tatra saṃvṛtisatyam avitathaṃ rūpaṃ lokasya, paramārthasatyaṃ ca satyam avisaṃvādakaṃ tattvam āryāṇām |
44. Cf. the argument of Brentano, cited above.
45. P. L. Vaidya, ed., *Bodhicaryāvatāraḥ*, op. cit., p. 175 :

syād etat—saṃvṛtir avidyopadarśitātmatayā abhūtasamāropasvarūpatvād vicārāt sataso visīryamāṇāpi kathaṃ satyam iti | etad api satyam | kiṃ tu lokādhyavasāyataḥ saṃvṛtisatyam ityucyate | loka eva hi saṃvṛtisatyam iha pratīpannaḥ | tadanuvṛttyā bhagavadbhir api tathaiva anapekṣitatattvārthābhiḥ saṃvṛtisatyam ucyate | ata eva lokasaṃvṛtisatyaṃ ceti sāstre'pi viśeṣa ukta ācāryapādaiḥ | vastutas paramārtha eva ekaṃ satyam |

46. Charles H. Kahn, *The Verb 'Be' in Ancient Greek*, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1973; 'Linguistic Relativism and the Greek Project of Ontology', in Mervyn Sprung, ed., *The Question of Being: East-West Perspectives*, op. cit., pp. 31-44.
47. In its first incarnation this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Religion held in Chicago in November, 1988. I am grateful for the comments I have received from many scholars at and since that time, that have contributed to guiding this essay towards its present rebirth. Because it is not now possible to present a complete list of all such benefactors, I hope that this expression of thanks to all in common will suffice. I am further indebted to Columbia University's Council on Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences for assistance enabling me to revise this work for the present publication.

On certain intellectual stereotypes in Buddhist studies as exemplified in Th. Stcherbatsky's works

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We may identify three kinds of problems every Western researcher of Buddhism, as well as of any other non-European thought, has to deal with. Questions of the first kind originate from imperfect information about the object of research, it having been insufficiently explored due to incomplete or lack of available sources. Second come quests provoked by the quality, not quantity, of the knowledge acquired. To the fore comes not the volume of it but its structure as arranged by the researcher in accordance with his or her culture-bound presuppositions, attitudes and values. And it is here that we come across what is commonly glossed over as stereotypes, that is, configurations of concepts and ideas used in an unquestionable and unproblematic manner as being something 'known' through which one can get knowledge of the 'unknown'. When the Western researcher applies his or her more or less stereotyped heuristic model to a non-European system, certain queries may arise that are easily mistaken for problems of the system itself. These sham queries being in fact not grounded in the system they are linked to, allow only for illusory solutions. Such are the logical reconstructions of Buddhist system on the basis of what European thinkers believe it to be like, for instance, the Pāli Text Society reconstruction of 'primitive' or 'original' Buddhism.

The third kind of problems are those elicited by researchers from the premises of the system itself. To my mind, it is in moving from a consideration of the first and second kind of problems to those of the third kind that progress in comprehending Buddhism consists.

Theodor Ippolitovich Stcherbatsky, a famous Russian Buddhologist, is a scholar with quite a rich and diverse research experience, but here I confine myself to his engagement with the second kind of Westerners' questioning of Buddhism. This questioning may be conventionally treated as a Western type of rationality, displaying itself in the belief in a universal cross-cultural character of its own, hence, culture-bound, modes of reasoning.

It is commonly known that Stcherbatsky was one of the pioneers in the Western study of Buddhist philosophy. Taking issue with the Pāli Text Society views and those of the Franco-Belgian school, he argued that Buddhism arose as a philosophical doctrine. He wrote:

That the essence and the starting point of Buddhism were speculative appears very clearly, if we give credit to the records about the other wandering teachers who were the contemporaries of the Buddha and often engaged in controversies with him. The questions at issue between them were of a speculative nature. Ethical questions, the explanation of retribution, were predominant, but they always were closely linked together with some system of ontology and some doctrine of a Final Release. (*The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, 1927, p. 3.)

Stcherbatsky's eminence lies in his having put Buddhist philosophy and logic at the centre of Buddhological interest, conceiving it indeed to be the main achievement of Indian thinking on the whole, the conceptual nucleus through which all other aspects of Indian thought should be considered. As the result of an examination of Buddhist literature of different schools and of the main sources of the *āstika* schools of Hinduism, he has come to a momentous conclusion: that Buddhist philosophy had a considerable impact on brahmanical doctrines which developed into valid philosophical systems in the course of, and due to, their polemics with Buddhism.

This conclusion of Stcherbatsky has received support in all later studies of Indian philosophy. But as far as his interpretation of the contents of Buddhist philosophy is concerned, we should acknowledge that they reflect the historical and cultural situation he was in. Russian Buddhology of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had to deal with intricate and involved tasks, hardly reducible at the time. On the one hand, the stereotyped, generally fixed in the public mind, treatment of Indian thought as second-rate and backward, had to be overturned. On the other hand, it was necessary to cool down the over-exalted fervour of numerous devotees of Indian wisdom who eagerly extolled its mysticism and spirituality. Russian Buddhologists were engaged in the difficult and frequently vexatious enlightenment enterprise of arguing and demonstrating that Indian culture was not any 'worse' than the European one, that it had achieved egregious results in all spheres of human activity. The chief method was establishing analogies and parallels between Indian and Western ideas and doctrines, as well as expounding the peculiarly construed reasonings and other samples of the original thinking of Indian thinkers in language that was intelligible to the Russian educated public. That is why in Stcherbatsky's books Buddhist philosophers speak—it is generally asserted—in the manner of Kant, Hegel, Hume, Bergson and Russell. Yet it would be an over-simplification to explain away—as Ya. Vasilkov, a modern Soviet researcher is apt to do—the 'Europization' of the Indian thinker's style occurring in Stcherbatsky's works, by the author's endeavour to find a mode of translation and commentary that would ensure comprehension of modern Western philosophers. Vasilkov states quite correctly that the great Russian Buddhologist was far from identifying European and Buddhist systems, but we can hardly consider

as being well-grounded his insistence that Stcherbatsky kept equally aloof from ideas of cyclism and *ewige Wiederkehr*, eternal return, in the history of philosophy.

It seems, on the contrary, that Stcherbatsky accepted the idea that there do exist certain paradigms of philosophical thinking that are reproduced in different cultures and civilizations in different periods of history. He found congenial and quoted with evident sympathy (the context makes it manifest), W. Freitag's maxim that the process of development of philosophy is ruled neither by chance nor by arbitrary command, but by the internal law of human nature, due to which similar results are achieved by the philosophic thinking of quite different peoples in quite different circumstances. If that does not indicate pure cyclism, it signifies, at least, admission of the parallel run of the principal ways along which philosophy is developing in the cultures that gave rise to it—no matter in what place or time, some kind of *ewige Wiederkehr* (Wilhelm Halbfass denoted it in N. Hartman's terms as 'cognition of what has been cognized' or *Wiedererkentniss*).

It would hardly be a mistake to claim that Stcherbatsky was among the first thinkers to undertake one of the most significant of twentieth century cultural projects: the East-West dialogue. In his 'Indo-European Symposium on the Reality of the External World' (*Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I, Pt. V, pp. 536-45) he assembled in a sort of 'debating contest' representatives of the different Indian and European traditions, each participant arguing and maintaining his point of view in a common philosophical (European) language equally efficient and intelligible to all of them. An essential premise for such a confrontation of the two philosophical cultures was acknowledging the one and the other as being equally independent, possessing equal rights and being equally valuable.

Stcherbatsky himself presented a fine example of such a 'dialogue'. He belonged to the category of scholars who 'held firmly two worlds within themselves', as V.M. Alekseev, an eminent Russian Sinologist, most appropriately described it. We may say that the West and the East have practically come together in his scholarly work. His brilliant Orientalist education (under such remarkable scholars of the time as I.P. Minayev, S.F. Oldenburg, H. Bühler and H. Jacobi), deep knowledge of European cultures, the spirit of Oriental wisdom acquired from Indian *śāstrins*, masters of traditional lore, and his proficiency in the newest achievements of European science—all these gave him an equal right to speak in the name of modern European knowledge as well as to represent the views of people nurtured in Buddhist culture.

Still, though the significance of the 'dialogue of cultures' in the process of developing the means of their mutual understanding and cognition be ever so great, the concomitant damages of cross-cultural enthusiasm should not be overlooked. The primary danger is that of falling into the habit of ignoring the distance between 'one's own' and 'foreign' ideas—which may result

in mistaking the desirable state of things for the real one. Even Stcherbatsky, the great and proficient scholar, was unable to escape the fallacy.

He was guided by European ideas of the structure, functions and problems of philosophical cognition in his analysis of Buddhist texts. In this context, however, what matters is that classifying Buddhist knowledge into ontology (metaphysics), logic, epistemology and ethics, he believed he was dealing with methodological principles of Indian thought itself, but in fact he was caught in habitual European frameworks. A corollary of the transference of the European attitude to philosophy to the study of Buddhist thought (logic in particular) was a 'secularization' of the latter in Stcherbatsky's works.

The Parallels that the scholar discovered between Buddhist and European logic convinced him that the system of Buddhist logic 'in the intention of its promoters had apparently no special connection with Buddhism as a religion, i.e. as a teaching of path towards Salvation. It claims to be natural and general logic of the human understanding' (*Buddhist Logic*, Vol. 1, p. 2). V. Toporov, in his comments on this statement, remarks that it

> may be true if we assert that neither did Buddhist epistemology co-ordinate with its own logic, but it would be wrong in the light of vaster tasks by which Buddhist scientific structures were inspired. Since Buddhism—as practically most of other ancient Indian religio-philosophic systems—steered characteristically for a definite goal, that of *mokṣa*, salvation,. . . Buddhist logic (taking into consideration specially that it dealt with all kinds of cognition) naturally made part of Buddhism, the religious doctrine of Salvation (being a condition necessary to achieve that aim). (Th. I. Stcherbatsky, *Izbrannye trudy po buddhismu*, Selected Works on Buddhism, Moscow, 1988, pp. 298-99.)

Stcherbatsky might not have intended it but the fact was that in his studies European ideas did officiate as norms, standards, in our terms 'stereotypes', which allowed to the logical reconstruction of the system of the *unknown*, i.e. of Buddhist doctrines, ideas and principles. One may also say that a purposeful search for elements of the *known* went on within the *unknown*. 'From under the cover of an exotic terminology he (i.e. the philosopher) will discern features which he is accustomed to see differently treated, differently arranged, assigned different places in the system and put into quite different contexts'. (*Buddhist Logic*, p. xii)

Naturally, reconstruction 'according to pattern' does not mean that 'shape and image' are to be resuscitated literally; only the structure or functions of the pattern may be reproduced, not its contents. Still, the pattern remains, in a sense, a canon, a principle, the definite fulcrum and standard of measure containing, even when used in an auxiliary and subservient role, a grave and impressive charge of ideas and views, as we find it in Stcherbatsky's works (and those of most other Western Buddhologists as well).

While discussing Stcherbatsky's methodology—which is of great interest

to us—his principles of translation should be taken note of. In his attitude towards the practice of translation Eugene Burnouf's reflection about the inevitable connection between the learning of words and mastering ideas in the study of non-European thought gets a new meaning. The Russian scholar designated his translation strategy as 'philosophic', contrasting it with the devices of 'literary' (word for word) translation generally in use at the time.

Translators who chose the 'literary' way concentrated their attention primarily on words (frequently deviating into an exploration of their etymology) and the *idea* denoted by the *word* was often overshadowed by it or even quite lost. Stcherbatsky founded, in opposition to that, the tradition of explanatory interpretation in which the sense, the *ideas*, contained in the text came foremost.

He explained his attitude to translation thus: 'It is only by way of reconstructing hypothetically the philosophical system in question that the idea metaphorically designated by the term to be translated can be identified, at first but approximately' (*Teoria poznania i logica po ucheniu pozdnich buddhistov*, Theory of Cognition and Logic of the latest Buddhists, St. Petersburg, 1903, Vol. 1, p, LV). He qualified the ideal (perfect) translation as the text which might have been created by an ancient Indian thinker had he known Russian and translated his treatise into it. 'We have left not a single term untranslated. In general we endeavoured as far as it was possible to fully comprehend the author's idea and render it in Russian in such a manner as the author himself would have construed it if we might suppose that he was to write in that tongue' (ibid.). This suggests, as V. Toporov correctly points out, that 'the meta-language of European logic was chosen for translation' (*Izbrannye Trudy*, p. 296). The translator's 'full comprehension of the author's idea' allows for, in Stcherbatsky's opinion, an exactly opposite operation, that of construing European philosophic ideas in the meta-language of Indian philosophy. Thus, for example, to prove the similarity of certain maxims of Buddhist logic to those of European philosophy, he rendered into Sanskrit Henri Bergson's phrase about the mathematician's outlook (from his '*L'Evolution Créatrice*')—'The world the mathematician deals with is a world that dies and is reborn at every instant'—and claimed that, 'This being the precise rendering of Bergson's words, sounds like a quotation from an Indian text'. (*Buddhist Logic*, pp. 107-8.)

Still, such translations that render the idea with fullest completion, 'without any residue left', in spite of their evident advantages in representing the developement of ideas in the original text, can hardly be considered to be translations, properly speaking. It would be more expedient to treat them as interpretations or logical reconstructions of what *the translator had comprehended*. The tendency to render only ideas and senses expressed in the original text, whatever be the words, is fraught, to my mind, with too great a danger of modernization. An idea divorced from its primary lexical attire and inserted in strange linguistic garb may get quite lost among the shadows

of sense associations belonging to the conceptual structures of another language, alien to it.

Another point of importance is that—beside the semantic aspect of the text which cannot be accounted for completely in such translations—the 'philosophical' translation-reconstruction proves to be too subjectively selective for its dependence on philosophic erudition and even on the intellectual tastes of the translator, as the practice of Stcherbatsky himself evidences. His insight into and proficiency in different systems of European philosophy was imprinted in the translations and comments he prepared in the corresponding periods of time: observant readers take note of the Kantian and Neo-Kantian styles giving way to the style of Henri Bergson and Edmund Husserl.

One can arrive at his views and beliefs by studying closely the ideas he singled out as exemplifying the similarity between Buddhist and European thinking. An interesting sample of his reasoning deserves to be quoted here. Discussing Buddhist philosophical systems he remarked that

> when correctly comprehended and rendered into our philosophic parlance they display a wonderful likeness to the latest and newest achievements in the sphere of our scientific views.... World outlook without God, psychology without soul, perpetuity of elements of matter and of spirit—being a peculiar expression of the Causality law, heredity, the process of existence instead of existence of things, and, if we turn to practical life,—abjuration of private property, disavowal of national boundaries, acknowledgement of universal fraternity of all people, and, last of all, our common belief, essential to all of us, that we are progressing and should progress towards perfecting ourselves—independently of God, soul and freedom of will, these are the main features of both Buddhism and our modern, newest outlook. (*Filosofskoye uchenie buddisma*, Philosophical Teachings of Buddhism, 1919).

The passage makes clear that Stcherbatsky had many views in common with the pre-revolutionary Russian liberal intelligentsia, namely, belief in the omnipotence of science—or as we would put it now, scientism, life-affirming atheism, and belief in the general progress of human perfection. Needless to say, all these views turned to be illusions, as far as the history of post-revolutionary Soviet Russia is concerned.

A.I. Pyatigorsky, a modern Buddhologist, thus appreciated Stcherbatsky's strategy of drawing the Buddhist-European science parallel:

> Stcherbatsky never managed to hammer out a completely autonomous point of view. To be sure, he was the most resultative of all Buddhologists perceiving Buddhism from their standpoint in the world of European culture. His parallels are greatly convincing (e.g., the parallel between the Buddhist theory of instantaneousness and Henri Bergson's conception, the parallel between the Buddhist principle of voidness with the Theory of Relativity, etc.), yet they are no more than parallels, not connected with the immanent contents of Buddhist philosophy. ('O.O. Rosenberg and a Problem of Descriptive Language in Buddhology, in *Acta et Commentationes Universitatis Tartuensis, Works on Signs Systems*, 5, Tartu, 1973, *c*. 433.)

But the latter conclusion of the otherwise very perceptive Pyatigorsky, is somehow undermined by the fact that in India Stcherbatsky was appreciated not simply as a researcher of Buddhism, but as a *Buddhist philosopher*; for instance, the great Indian scholar Dharmendra Nath Shastri believed Stcherbatsky to have contributed to the development of Indian philosophy in general (D.N. Shastri, 'Contribution of Th. Stcherbatsky to Indian Philosophy', *The Modern Review*, Calcutta, 1955, Vol. 93, No. 2, PP. 117-20). It seems that Stcherbatsky's 'Europization' of Buddhist and Indian philosophy did not run counter to the principles of philosophizing accepted in the Indian tradition itself, that of commenting on some authoritative text of the past in terms of a descriptive language enriched by the philosophical thinking of the present time. Thus, Stcherbatsky's renderings of Sanskrit terms and his reasoning about the subjects of Indian philosophy might be treated as a certain, European, version of Indian philosophical commentaries. There is one more respect in which he may remind us of an Indian philosopher: his claims on the eminent role of Indian philosophy and his attempts to popularize it among European thinkers are very close to those of Indian intellectuals and neo-Hindu leaders of the early twentieth century.

And it is at this juncture that we must raise the question ourselves: should we consider Stcherbatsky to be an Indian philosopher expressing himself in a European language, or should we treat him as a Western researcher of Indian philosophy? This question seems to bring us back to the initial uncertainty characteristic of the tasks of the history of philosophy as a discipline of study —whether it is actual philosophizing on the subjects of philosophical systems of the past in modern terms, or a historical account of these systems with their concepts and methods. The latest Asian studies in comparative philosophy demonstrate both the approaches as being distinct and from each other as well as inter-woven. But still, my point is that if we pretend to be *historians* of non-European philosophical thought, we should always be aware of the issues arising from our research position as being distinct from those of this thought itself. In default of such distinction any attempt to comprehand and explain the latter may result not in an appropriate historical account of this thought but in one more 'self-image' revealing only our strong yearning for 'the existence of other minds' while quite unable to detect it.

Chinese rationality: an oxymoron?

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An Ambiguity of Order

In this essay, I want to argue that if Aristotle and much of the tradition that followed in his wake has been right in asserting that rationality is the defining essence of humanity, and if we accept Aristotle's standards of rationality, then we will be hard pressed to include the Chinese at the human table. At the very least, we will have to seat them at the far end as a radically different order of humankind.

The degree of this philosophic difference (and indifference) can be anticipated historically. The civilizations that share the Indo-European group of languages are certainly many and diverse, but by virtue of trade, war, population movements, and the imperceptible dissemination of ideas entailed by such contact, they have, over the past millennia, developed a cultural family resemblance. The movement among these cognate Indo-European languages lulls us into a sense of shared conceptual ground that is illusory when addressing the more exotic traditions.

Philosophers such as Nietzsche and Heidegger return to the conceptual clusters of pre-Socratic Greek as a strategy for getting behind the dualistic metaphysics dominant in the received Platonic-Aristotelian-Christian tradition, and for recovering alternative philosophical possibilities. Both philosophers are persuaded that a particular world-view is sedimented in the language of a culture and the systematic structure of its concepts, encouraging certain philosophical possibilities while discouraging others. As Nietzsche speculates,

> The strange family resemblance of all Indian, Greek and German philosophizing is explained easily enough. Where there is an affinity of languages, it cannot fail, owing to the common philosophy of grammar—I mean, owing to the unconscious domination and guidance by similar grammatical functions—that everything is prepared at the outset for a similar development and sequence of philosophical systems; just as the way seems barred against certain other possibilities of world-interpretation.[1]

In exploring Chinese philosophy in search of rationality, we need to guard against universalizing assumptions prompted by what we as members of only one language family, take to be the nature of language itself.

Other western thinkers who have been self-conscious about side-stepping the underlying dualistic tendencies of Western philosophy have produced alternative linguistic strategies. Whitehead and Pierce invented neologistic categories which could be defined in such a way as to skirt traditional presuppositions. The phenomenologists proposed an explicit methodology for precluding implicit metaphysical assumptions. The hermeneuticists, in challenging 'method' itself, have sought to expose 'the myth of the given'.

The Chinese, having developed the technology to explore the world earlier than the European powers, have been resolutely centripetal and parochial—a 'stay-at-home' culture. For them, the Great Wall has, over the millennia, served as a man-made reiteration of mountain, desert and sea to isolate their subcontinent—serving them as much as a cultural screen as a physical barrier against foreign invasion.[2]

The prominent French sinologist, Jacques Gernet, argues that when the two civilizations of China and Europe, having developed almost entirely independently of each other, first made contact in about 1600, the seeming inaptitude of the Chinese for understanding Christianity and the philosophic edifice that undergirded it was not simply an uneasy difference in the encounter between disparate intellectual traditions, but a far more profound difference in mental categories and modes of thought, and particularly, a fundamental difference in the Chinese conception of human agency.[3] Much of what Christianity and Western philosophy had to say to the Chinese was, for the Chinese, quite literally nonsense—given their own philosophic commitments, they could not think it. And the Jesuits interpreted this difference in ways of thinking quite specifically as ineptness in reasoning, logic and dialectic.[4]

The West fared little better in its opportunity to appreciate and to appropriate Chinese culture. In fact, it fared so badly that the very word 'Chinese' in the English language has come to denote 'confusion', 'incomprehensibility', 'impenetrability'—a sense of order inaccessible to the Western mind.[5] The degree of difference between our dominant sense of order and the 'aesthetic' order prevalent in the Chinese world-view has plagued our encounter with this antique culture from the start. With Eurocentric savants seeking corroboration for our own universal indices in the seventeenth century, we idealized China as a remarkable and 'curious land' requiring the utmost scrutiny.[6] Our esteem for this 'curious land' plummeted from these 'Cathay' idealizations to the depths of disaffection for the inertia of what, in the context of our own industrial revolution, was cast as a moribund, backward-looking and fundamentally stagnant culture.[7]

To explore Chinese philosophy in pursuit of some functional equivalent of rationality, then, we will, at the very least, have to recognize that we are dealing with a fundamentally different world-view. As such, we will certainly require a vigilant hermeneutical sensitivity to stave off facile comparisons. And the more distant Chinese 'rationality' is from our own conceptions, the more likely it is that our own languages will have difficulty in accommodating our discussion of it. After all, each of the world's languages is 'specialized' in saying particularly well those things necessary to address the unique features of its own natural and social conditions, and hence, the greater the degree of difference among cultures, the greater the degree of difference in translating among the languages that express them. To avoid importing inappropriate philosophical assumptions to the Chinese case, then, it will be necessary to reconstruct a small cluster of Chinese terms as a medium for reflecting on the meaning of reasoning within the culture.

In our recent study, *Thinking Through Confucius*, David Hall and I elaborated a distinction between a logical and an aesthetic sense of order. This distinction was useful in bringing into contrast certain features of the dominant Indo-European world-view and the Chinese alternative to it, and can be extended to focus important differences between dualistic and correlative modalities of thinking, and the kinds of 'reasoning' that attend them.

To establish a working contrast, the gross lines of the sense of order dominant in the western tradition might be sketched in the following terms. I say 'gross lines' because the tradition is of course rich and varied, and counter-examples abound. Still, I would claim that one real contribution of comparative philosophy is that it does enable us to identify certain continuities and emphases in the dialectic of Western thought which are peculiar to it. And this brief characterization is made more persuasive by virtue of the fact that it is this dualistic sense of order, so prominent in Western philosophic thinking, which has been the target of its own internal critique—Vico, Nietzsche, the Pragmatists and the Existentialists, and much of contemporary continental reflection.

The western cultural experience, going back to ancient Greece, is grounded in a two-world reality-appearance distinction. This distinction challenges the ultimate reality of change, and has largely defined the work of philosophy as the pursuit of the permanent behind the transitory. In Plato, this proclivity separated an immortal soul from the temporality of physical, sensual existence; it separated the universal and objective form of beauty and justice and all things good from their shadowy reflections in particular phenomena; it separated the rational principle as some Archimedean point in the changing world of experience; it separated and elevated 'scientific' knowledge available for discovery and contemplation (*theoria*) over practical and productive knowledge. With the melding of Greek philosophy and the Christian tradition, the immortality of the soul was guaranteed, the universal principles of truth, beauty and goodness came to reside in a transcendent godhead, and a rational theology promised that an understanding of the world constructed by the light of reason was consistent with and a complement to that higher knowledge available through revelation and faith. In this tradition, just as God's punishment imposed on human beings for their initial sin has been mortality and change, so His reward for obedience is permanence.

The signal and recurring feature of what we have called the 'logical' sense of order dominating the development of our philosophical and religious orthodoxy is the presumption that there is something permanent, perfect, objective and universal that disciplines the world of change and guarantees natural and moral order—some originative and determinative *arche*, an eternal realm of Platonic *eidos* or 'ideas', the One True God of the Judaeo-Christian universe, a transcendental strongbox of invariable principles or laws, an analytic method for discerning clear and distinct ideas. The model of a single-ordered world where the unchanging source of order stands independent of, sustains, and ultimately provides explanation for the sensible world is a familiar and dominant presupposition in our tradition.

Our sense of order, then, dating back to a pre-Socratic pursuit of some underlying *arche*, tends to be cosmogonic, assuming an initial beginning and privileging the primal, unchanging principle that causes and explains that origin and everything that issues from it. Hence the weight given to analytic thinking, linear, causal explanations and the dualistic categories in which these explanations are couched. There is implicit in this world-view a primacy given to some transcendent principle which presides as a top-down, disciplining order guaranteeing unity and intelligibility, whether this principle exists external to us as Deity or internal to us as the hardwiring of some essential nature. It is a 'given'—a source of order independent of our own actions and experience.

The dominance in our own tradition of what, for want of a better term, we have called the logical sense of order, is apparent when we reflect on the skewed technical development of the vocabulary that has been used to interpret our Greek ancestors. It is often forgotten that in its original intention, *kosmos* refers to both an *ordered* and an *elegant* universe. The 'ornamental' and 'cosmetic' implications of 'kosmos' are seldom advertised. Similarly, *logos* is not simply *ratio*, but also *oratio*—not just reason, but rhetoric; not just the ordered expression of the word, but the word itself. Similarly, *phusis* is not simply, in Aristotle's language, 'the principle (*arche*) and cause (*aitia*) of motion and rest for the things in which it is immediately present',[8] but the process and career of life itself. If we rehearse the inventory of our philosophic vocabulary in this manner, it becomes apparent that order is most often construed in terms of some independent generative principle which, immune from change itself, disciplines, regulates, and controls its universe.[9]

How do we escape these presuppositions of our own tradition, then, to discern and articulate the internal, what we have called the 'aesthetic' impetus, that gives definition to both change and order in the Chinese world-view? Jacques Gernet, in comparing the two traditions, observes that:[10] '. . . according to Aristotle, it is normal for all things to be at rest, whereas for the Chinese, in contrast universal dynamism is the primary assumption'. In describing the largely failed encounter between the Jesuit missionaries and the Chinese intellectuals, Gernet ascribes the mutual misunderstanding

to this contrast between externally imposed order assumed in our tradition, and the Chinese assumption that order is immanent in and inseparable from a spontaneously changing world:

> Believing that the universe possesses within itself its own organizational principles and its own creative energy, the Chinese maintained something that was quite scandalous from the point of view of scholastic reason, namely that 'matter' itself is intelligent—not, clearly enough, with a conscious and reflective intelligence as we usually conceive it, but with a spontaneous intelligence which makes it possible for the *yin* and the *yang* to come together and guides the infinite combinations of these two opposite sources of energy.[11]

Even the most fundamental ontological categories of 'Being' and 'Non-Being' as some common quality shared by real things are alien to the classical Chinese world-view. Where the vast majority of interpreters of Chinese classics have used Being and Non-Being as equivalents for *yu* and *wu*, the more philosophically astute follow D.C. Lau who has consistently used 'Something' and 'Nothing' instead. Being and Non-Being are fraught with the assumptions of an essentialist ontology. Being is the abstract quality shared by all things that are. Non-Being is the opposite abstract quality of all things that are not. The Chinese *yu*, by contrast, is not a shared abstract quality of things, but 'some things that are on hand' (for example, *wan yu*), or all things that are on hand. In the classical Chinese view, you are not dealing with qualities of things, but particular things themselves.

We begin, then, from a dynamic, auto-generative, and self-directing world of uniquely different particulars where order is immanent and emergent. *Yin* and *yang* is a familiar metaphor in the tradition—literally, the shady side and the sunny side of a hill—which is used to express contrast and difference. The nature of the opposition captured in this metaphor is fundamental in the culture. It is a basic correlative pairing which expresses the mutuality, interdependence, diversity and creative efficacy of the dynamic *relationships* that are deemed immanent in, pattern and valorize the world. The full range of difference in the world—intellectual and physical, change and continuity, quality and quantity, nobility and baseness, fact and value, substance and accident—is explicable through these correlative and complementary relationships. *Yin* and *yang* as correlatives are not universal principles characterizing some essential feature of phenomena, but are *ad hoc* explanatory categories that report on interactions among immediate concrete things of the world. For example, in a given relationship, *this* older woman might by virtue of her wisdom be regarded as *yang* in contrast to *that* younger woman who is *yin*. But if we were to focus on their fecundity, the correlation would probably be the opposite. Because things are at most similar, they are resolutely hierarchical, and since no one thing is dominant in all respects, there is at the same time a basis for complementarity.

Important here is the primacy of particular difference and the absence of any assumed sameness or identity. Things of the same kind are not defined in terms of essences or natural kinds, but by virtue of the kinship resemblances that evoke associations—'family resemblances'. Hence, describing any particular phenomenon does not require the discovery of some underlying determinative and originative principle—a basis for making many one—but a tracing out and unravelling of the relationships and conditions of the phenomenon's context, and its multiple correlations.[12] As D.C. Lau has many times pointed out, the language of a classical Chinese epistemology has more to do with 'mapping' and 'unravelling' than with the grasping of some underlying formal essence presupposed in classical western epistemology. Where in the classical western model, the formal essence reduces the many to one, in the Chinese model, one evokes many. Each phenomenon in suggesting other similar phenomena has the multivalence of poetic images. *Yin* and *yang* as the characterization of a particular relationship invariably entail a perception from some particular perspective that enables us to unravel patterns of relatedness and interpret our circumstances. They provide a vocabulary for sorting out the relationships among things as they come together and constitute themselves in unique compositions.

In the immediately human world of the Confucian, these compositions are reflected in an irreducibly social conception of person, families and communities, where the social grammar is necessarily participatory ritual practices and social roles. It is because of the immanence and hence uniqueness of an order so defined that Confucius, rather than appealing to transcendent beings or principles, can describe the process of learning in terms of 'starting from what is most basic and immediate, and penetrating through to what is most elevated.'[13] The Confucian assumption traditionally has been that personal, familial, societal, political, and ultimately, cosmic order, are coterminous and mutually entailing, and further, from the personal perspective, is emergent in the process of one's own self-cultivation and articulation. From the perspective of any person, order begins here and extends there.

The explanation of the creative process in terms of the interaction of complementary opposition is fundamental to the Chinese tradition.[14] In the absence of the Western-style dualisms that establish an ontological separation between some determinative principle and that which it determines, the inter-connectedness and inter-dependence of all things promote a correlative mode of philosophizing and of explaining order in the world. Angus Graham in his recent study of correlative thinking is persuasive in arguing for the primacy of such correlations with respect to analytic thinking.[15]

> The commonsense thinking of daily life may be conceived as a stream of correlation redirected by analysis whenever we have occasion to doubt a comparison or connexion. . . . The Chinese assumption seems to be that you can criticize correlations but you cannot dispense with them. The Western tradition, on the other hand, has long persisted in trying to detach the analytic completely from its background in the correlative, dismissing the latter as loose argument from analogy which we need in practical life but exclude from strict logic. It is only in the last half-century, with Ryle's exposure of the category mistake, Kuhn's proposal that all science assumes paradigms subverted not by demonstration but by correlative switches, Derrida's uncovering of chains of oppositions at the back of logocentric thought, that the West seems finally to be losing faith in its two-thousand-year-old enterprise.

'Reasoning' as Mapping a World

Order is not imposed from without, but is inherent in the process of existence itself, as are the rings of the tree trunk, the veins of the stone, the cadence of the ocean. 'Causes' are not external to act upon an inert world, but internal to a dynamic process of change in which 'that which causes' and 'that which is caused' is not a legitimate distinction. If 'reasoning' is the discovery of reasons or causes, how does it work in such a world? And how is it different from our own? It is essential we ask this question if only to rescue the Chinese tradition and its corpus from the inadvertent 'rationalization' it has suffered from the first substantive contacts between Western cultures and the Chinese world. David Mungello, in exploring the origins of European sinology, contrasts the first western translation of the opening lines of *Chung-yung*, one of the Confucian *Four Books*, edited by the Jesuits Philippe Couplet *et al.* in their *Confucius Sinarum Philosophus* (1697), with his own rendering of the same passage.

> *Philippe Couplet*:
> That which is placed into man by Heaven (*t'ien ming*) is called the rational nature (*hsing*). Because this is fashioned by means of nature and imitates it, it is called a rule (*tao*) or is said to be in harmony with reason. Repetition to the point of diligently practicing this rule (*hsiu tao*) and one's own regulating of it is called education (*chiao*) or the learning of virtue.
>
> *David Mungello*:
> That which is mandated by Heaven is called one's inherent nature. Fulfilling one's inherent nature is called the *Tao* (the way). Cultivating *Tao* is called philosophy/religion.

There is no question Mungello's translation attempts to avoid the rationalistic assumptions of the seventeenth-century Jesuits, but I would suggest even Mungello's translation, while syntactically accurate and certainly representative among contemporary English versions, is still burdened by a set of essentialistic presuppositions which do not belong to the Chinese world-view. Implicit in his language is a teleological conception of 'human

nature', a separation between Creator and creature, and a notion of univocal Truth (*the Tao*), entirely alien to the Chinese world-view. A rendering which, although contesting our present lexicon and the kind of formularistic translation that it encourages, is more responsive to the underlying Confucian assumptions outlined above, might be:[16] 'The constitutive relationships between human beings and their world are what is meant by the nature and character of human life; according with and developing this character is called one's way; and the cultivation of one's way is called learning.'

In both the classical Chinese corpus and the modern language, the closest term that approximates 'reason' is *li*. I want to give an account of how the conventional translations of *li* as either 'reason' or 'principle', while foregrounding our philosophical importances, pays the unacceptable penalty of concealing precisely those meanings which are most essential to an appreciation of its differences.

My concern then, is, through conceptual reconstruction, to identify and lift to the surface those peculiar features of a Confucian 'rationality' that are in danger of receding in our reading and interpretation of the texts.

In reconstructing *li*, I want to try to recover what has been lost in traditional translation. To do this, the first step must be to establish the range and depth of meaning encompassed by *li*. This will entail not only the gathering of an inventory of alternative meanings, but also the discovery and articulation of those presuppositions which make it fundamentally different from what we mean by 'to reason'.

In its earliest occurrences, *li* has both a nominal and verbal function as 'order', 'pattern', or 'markings' and 'to order', 'to pattern', or 'to mark'. Actually, the earliest occurrence uses the image of 'dividing up land into cultivated fields *in a way consistent with the natural topography*.'[17] *Shuo Wen*, one of the earliest Chinese lexicons, inspired perhaps by the fact that this character is classified under the 'jade' signific, suggests that 'dressing or polishing jade' and the 'veins or striations within the jade' are its most fundamental meanings.[18] Significantly, the dressing of jade requires the craftsman to conform his creative expression to those possibilities resident in the natural striations of the stone. In fact, the best lapidary is the one whose art maximizes the richest possibilities of the stone itself.

In expressing the notion of coherence and intelligibility, no severe distinction is made between 'natural' coherence (*t'ien li* or *tao li*) and 'cultural' coherence (*wen li* or *tao li*). Just as nature and culture are embraced within the notion of *tao*, so they are integral to *li*. All of these expressions—*tao*, *wen* and *li*—overlap in evoking a sense of pattern and markings.

Philosophically, the most familiar uses of *li* lie somewhere in the cluster 'reasoning' or 'rationale' (A.S. Cua), 'principle' (W.T. Chan), 'organism' (J. Needham) and 'coherence' (W. Peterson).[19] To focus the meaning of this term, we need to first identify what is inappropriate in each of these renderings, and then to determine how *li* in fact expresses something of each of them.

In studying the Chinese corpus, one consults dictionaries that encourage us to believe that many if not most of the terms such as *li* have 'multiple' alternative meanings from which the translator, informed by the context, is required to select the most appropriate one. This approach to the language, so familiar to the translator, signals precisely the problem that I have worried over in these introductory comments. The irony is that we serve clarity in highlighting what makes sense in our own conceptual vocabulary only to bury the unfamiliar implications which, in themselves, are the most important justification for the translation.

I would suggest that with the appearance of any given term in the text, with varying degree of emphasis, the full seamless range of meaning is introduced. And our project as interpreters and translators is to negotiate an understanding and rendering that is sensitive to both context and to this full undifferentiated range of meaning. In fact, it is this effort to reconstitute the several meanings as an integrated whole and to fathom how the character in question can carry what for us might well be a curious, often unexpected, and sometimes even incongruous combination of meanings that leads us most directly to a recognition of difference.[20]

The most common translation of *li* is 'principle', or Needham's biological twist on 'principle'—'organism'. This rendering is appropriate to the extent that *li* identifies an inherent structure of organization and development in the world. The inappropriate side of this rendering is that from the early days of Matteo Ricci, it has, for the western student of Chinese culture, evoked an unfortunate association with the Platonic *eidos* or its Aristotelian variant to translate Chinese philosophy into an alternative hypostatized idealism.[21]

Li, far from being some independent and immutable originative principle that disciplines a recalcitrant world, is the fabric of order immanent in the dynamic process of experience. For this reason, it is neither exclusively subjective or objective—'psychology' is translated into Chinese as 'the *li* of the heart-and-mind', but then 'physics' is the 'the study of the *li* of things and events'. *Li* then does not entail the distinction between the intelligible and the sensible so familiar to us from the Greek and Christian traditions.

Another condition of *li* which separates it rather clearly from our common understanding of 'principle' is that *li* is both a unity and a multiplicity. For Allen Wittenborn in his analysis of *li*, this characterization presents us with a major problem.[22] 'The problem, then, is whether *li* is a unity, or a multiplicity. It cannot be both. If it were then our entire way of thinking, our complete thought processes and forms of reasoning would have to be seriously reconsidered, and probably discarded.' This is precisely the point. As Willard Peterson observes, *li* is the coherence of any 'member of a set, all the members of a set, or the set as whole.'[23] This description reflects both the uniqueness of each particular and the continuities that obtain among them.

A similar point is made by A.S. Cua who has reservations about 'principle' as a translation of *li* because principle 'is often used as a context-independent

notion that can be employed as referring to a basis for justifying particular moral rules or notions. . . . For the Confucian, duty and obligation are tied to the roles and positions of persons in the community'.[24] *Li* then is the defining character or ethos of a given community, or any other such composition.

There is another point at which *li* departs from 'principle'. In our tradition, the discovery of originative and determinative principle enables us to give causal and rational accounts. Principle, in addition to being a basis for causal explanations, provides us with a schema for classifying things and subsuming one thing under another. The investigation of *li*, by contrast, is to seek out patterns which relate things, and to discover resonances between things that make correlations and categorization possible. The nature of classification in the Chinese case is juxtaposition through some identifiable similarity—putting different things side by side—rather than identifying essentially determined 'kinds' of things. And as Needham points out, 'things influence one another not by acts of mechanical causation, but by a kind of "inductance" . . . ..'[25] Things are continuous with one another, and thus are interdependent conditions for each other. In a tradition which begins from the assumption that existence is a dynamic process, the 'causes' of things are resident in themselves rather than being external to them, and the project of giving reasons for things or events requires a mapping out of the conditions that sponsor them. If we report night follows day, we are pointing at a contrast and complementarity we detect in the passing of a day which provides some kind of understanding, and where we are identifying this day as a condition of this night, we are not asserting that night is 'caused' by day in any strict sense. This day causes itself. Ironically, the more comprehensive we are in this project of mapping—the more *yins* and *yangs* we call into service in establishing both contrast and complement—the more complex and in some ways more ambiguous our explanation becomes.

Among these several alternative translations used for *li*, 'reason' or 'rationale', although philosophically as protean as 'principle' for our own tradition, unwarrantedly restricts *li* to a notion of human consciousness and tends to introduce distinctions such as animate and inanimate, agency and act, intelligible and sensible. In fact, *li* denotes a coherence and regularity which, although brought into greatest focus by the human mind, is characteristic of the world at large. Perhaps one of the closest resonances to this aspect of *li* within our own tradition which underscores the ubiquity and mutuality of relationships is the notion of 'prehending' we find in Whiteheadean panpsychism, where all things and events are 'aware' of each other as the extension and continuity of their own process of being. This is not to suggest that this tradition denies the biological basis of human experience, but to claim that for it the structure of human rationality is importantly contingent—an ongoing process specific to social, cultural, and of course, natural conditions. Rather than entailing the discovery of reasons that reveal some pattern of

linear causality as a basis for understanding, *li* suggests an awareness of those constitutive relationships which condition each thing and which, through patterns of correlation, make its world meaningful and intelligible. All things evidence a degree of coherence as their claim to uniqueness and complexity, as well as their claim to continuity with the rest of their world.

Li is an 'aesthetic' coherence in the sense that it begins from the uniqueness of any particular as a condition of individuation, and is at the same time a basis for continuity through various forms of collaboration between the given particular and others with which it can be correlated. It is this collaboration which provides a ground for the various modes of analogical projection that are the closest approximation to the 'reasoning' available in this tradition.[26]

In contrast with knowing as the grasping of what is essential—the making present of the Being or *logos* of beings—knowing in a Confucian world involves a tracing out without obstruction of the correlated details and the extended pattern of relationships which obtain among them. Instead of a classical rationalistic epistemology dependent upon the categories of rational faculty, substance and accident, necessity and contingency, essence and attribute and linear causal chains, Confucian knowing has as its goal a comprehensive and unobstructed awareness of inter-dependent conditions and their latent, vague possibilities, where the meaning and value of each element is a function of its own particular network of relationships.

Such 'reasoning' permits direct access to concrete detail and nuance—the immediate non-inferential intuition of a world—unmediated by abstract and intellectualized discourse. For example, one may appeal to the categories of correlative 'kinds (*lei*)' to organize and explain items in the world. But the inclusion in any particular 'kind' is a function of analogy and a dynamic mutual responsiveness rather than any set-theoretical identity.[27] These correlations are effective to the extent that some interpretations tend to maximize difference, diversity and opportunity, and hence, are more productive of harmony than others. And the correlations that one can pursue among the welter of concrete details serves an analogous function to concept, where clarity is necessarily the high price paid for concreteness and immediacy.

The Chinese have traditionally attracted respect for their compilations of a quite astounding variety of data, which, by virtue of their concreteness, discloses the subtlety, detail and particular relief of the historical terrain. On the other hand, they do not have the same pride of place when it comes to the broad strokes of theory, sweeping generalizations and grand methodological programmes which are willing to sacrifice a degree of nuance for the power to elucidate over vast tracks. The commentarial tradition that attends Confucius, for example, is a sustained effort to clarify richly vague images. The *hsün-ku* approach entails '*hsün*', the tracking down of a particular meaning at a particular place and time, and '*ku*', the identification and explana-

tion of old objects: plants, minerals, animals, and so on. This approach stands in obvious contrast to a more conceptual and theoretically-oriented methodology.

Another feature of *li* that requires mention is the often noted fact: it is both descriptive and normative—both how things are and how they ought to be. The 'oughtness' here, however, does not entail some ideal order beyond that which is available through analogizing with and aspiring after cultural and historical models. The ideals reside in history. In this sense, *li* must be clearly distinguished from teleological design. In this hierarchical world-view, things are most easily construed teleonomically at the basest levels. Human beings are much more predicable biologically than they are culturally.

Reasoning and Imaging

One important consequence that follows from this alternative notion of 'reasoning' is a far less severe separation between reasoning as discovery and imaging as creativity. In a world-view that does not entertain as fundamental a reality/appearance distinction, imagination has a more respectable status.

Let us take a familiar example. A careful reading of the *Analects* reveals that an extraordinary amount of the vocabulary used to present Confucius' philosophical insights is concrete 'way' imagery—a characteristic that our standard English translations have yet to reflect.[28] Much of the text is given over to the notion of following the Confucian way of life, extending it, going out from it, going against it, quitting it, confusion over it, obstructions on it, having company on it, finding a place on it, dwelling or lodging along it, having the strength to continue the journey along it, driving a chariot on it, moving ahead on it, clearing and cultivating it, and so on. When Confucius modestly describes his own project, he literally says: 'I follow along this way, I don't construct it.'[29]

The contemporary philosopher, Feng Ch'i, appeals to the *Analects* passage, 'as for my Way (*tao*), there is a consistency that runs through it',[30] to argue that Confucius must be treated as a systematic philosopher.[31] But I think that this rationalization of Confucius privileges concept over image in a text that can most profitably be read as sustained image. This sustained image, like the detailed biographical portrait of Confucius in the central chapters, is a signature of the text. In insisting that coherence makes Confucius a systematic philosopher, Feng Ch'i seems to overlook an important distinction between the conceptual edifice of systematic philosophy constructed from a ground of univocal meanings, and an aesthetic coherence which eschews meaning understood as objective reference in favour of meaning inherent in the process of imaging.

It is important at this juncture to clarify the meaning and status of 'image'. In our tradition, image in the vernacular combines the notions of

perception and imagination, where the mimetic, representative, figurative and fictive connotations of image are derived from the ontological disparity between a transcendentally 'real' world and the concrete world of experience. The absence of such ontological disparity in the Confucian model will mean that image is the presentation rather than re-presentation of a configured world at concrete, literal and historical level. Disengaged from an ontological prejudice that renders image fictive in some process of comparison and substitution, or of transference and analogy, the *poiesis* and the constructed image assume considerably more force as a mode of evidence alternative to *logos* in understanding and articulating our world.[32] As the act of generating meaning by circumscribing, isolating and compositing 'things', it is the very differentia and character of reality.

Willard Peterson in fact argues that the term *hsiang*, generally translated as 'image' or 'model' in the *Book of Changes*, ought to be rendered as 'figure' in the sense of 'to give or to bring into shape'.[33] This is what is meant in the *Book of Changes* when it states.[34] 'The Sages having the means whereby to perceive the mysteries of the world and to calculate[35] their shapes and contents, they "imaged (*hsiang*)" what is appropriate for things. For this reason, we call them images (*hsiang*).' In fact, there is a reported conversation in the *Book of Changes* between Confucius and his disciples that is an encouragement to read the *Analects* itself as a sustained image:[36]

> The Master said: 'Writing cannot give a full account of words, and words cannot give a full account of meaning'.[37]
>
> 'Then one cannot grasp the meaning of the superior persons and sages?'
>
> 'The superior persons and sages established images to give a full account of their meaning.'

The meaning resident in the image as established, is the act of establishing the image itself. Contrary to one's own naive expectations—and the advice of many subtle aesthetic theories—what one finally 'sees' in a work of art is the creative act that produced it. The creative process, not the object, is the repository of meaning. What is imaged is the process.

Perhaps a useful analogy for this sense of imaging is the traditional art of calligraphy. The personal style of the calligraphy as contrasted with the text is non-referential and non-representational—yet it is revealing of the artist himself. His moods, his time, his joy and pain, his place, are all resident in the Chinese character. One's calligraphy is biographical. But in much the same way as the Confucian sage, one's biography transmits the tradition rather than one's own idiosyncracies.

George Lakoff most recently, and Stephen Pepper before him, are persuasive in arguing that the development and extension of metaphors is one of the most fundamental ways through which a culture interprets and understands its world.[38] As a third century statement of this same insight, Wang

Pi in his commentary to the *Book of Changes* attempted to explain the relationship between image (which in this tradition does the work of metaphor), word and meaning:[39]

> The image gives off meaning; words elucidate the image. To give a full account of the meaning, nothing is as good as the image; to give a full account of the image, nothing is as good as words. Because words are produced from images, we can seek out words as a window on the image. And because the image is produced from meaning, we can seek out the image as a window on meaning. Meaning is given full account with the image, and the image is articulated with words. Hence, words are whereby we elucidate the image. Having gotten the image, we can forget the words. The image is whereby we preserve meanings. Having gotten the meaning, we can forget the image.... For this reason, preserving the words is not getting to the image; preserving the image is not getting to the meaning.

In classical western epistemology, a distinction between object and idea is assumed. Idea is a representation of the essential structure of the object in the subject. Essentialistic 'things' can be explained by causal chains, and allow for the isolation of reasons or causes. Language mediates this distinction between object and subject, and derives its meaning and its clarity as the articulation of what is essential in the world for the mind. Language is not reality, but is an instrument for capturing and explaining what is univocal and essential about it. 'Knowing' occurs through the categories of language as a valid explanation of the correspondence between world and idea.

In this model, the limits of our language are indeed the limits of our world, because beyond explanation there is only indeterminacy. It is this disjunction between objective world and subjective representation which grounds the classical epistemic vocabulary of 'to conceive, to comprehend, to perceive' which etymologically combines the notions of 'to take effectively', 'to take to oneself', 'to take in and hold' with the sense of 'formal, in set form'. In this model, concepts are necessary conditions for knowing. A concept is a grasping of the form of thing, what is essential to it.

In the Confucian world, as expressed here by Wang Pi, there is not the familiar disjunction between reality and the concrete world of phenomena. There is an unbroken line between image as what is real, image as the presentation (*not* re-presentation) of what is real, and image as the meaning of what is real. Image *is* reality. It is because this line is unbroken that the epistemic vocabulary of the *Analects* and classical Chinese more broadly is a language of tracing relationships—of 'unravelling (*chieh**)', and 'getting through (*ta* or *t'ung*)' without obstruction. Perhaps one of the more vivid images is the frequently encountered appeal to the chariot metaphor where, with varying degrees of facility and varying pedigrees of horses, one courses through the cosmos from one end to the other, partaking of all its mysteries.[40]

The construction of human imagery is natural, pursued as a complement to the patterning of the heavens and the veins and relief of earth's topography.[41] Importantly, the human enterprise of configuring the world takes the structures implicit in the heavens and the earth as models to inspire rather than as objects of imitation and replication. Further, where a continuum is assumed between subject and object and the subject thus participates in the imagistic play which configures the world, images, far from being identical, are necessarily multivalent.[42]

Words as the articulation of the image do not identify and describe an independent reality, but inscribe it and participate in it. What is 'known' exists as a function of being able to know—it does not exist prior to it.[43] There is a natural 'awakening to and manifesting (*chüeh*)' of a reality to which one has immediate access as something between 'within' and 'without' as opposed to the conceptual notion of 'grasping something from without'. And it is only by following the inscription—the image, the words, the path—that one comes to know the world.

Chinese Reasoning and the Chinese Language

Jacques Gernet observes that in the manipulation of the Chinese language, meaning is achieved in precisely the same correlative way that combines reasoning (*li*) and imaging (*hsiang*):[44]

> Given that Chinese is an uninflected language, all that helps to guide one through a phrase, with the aid of a very limited number of particles, are the links between terms of similar meaning, the oppositions between terms of opposite meaning, the rhythms and parallelisms, the position of 'words' or semantic units and the types of relationship between them; and yet the infinite possible combinations of two semantic units are the source of an inexhaustible fund of meaning. At every level, meaning stems from the way terms are combined. No doubt this is what accounts for the predominant role played by complementary pairs of opposites and correspondences in Chinese thought and above all for its fundamental relativism. Nothing has meaning except through opposition to its contrary. Everything depends upon position (*wei*) and timing (*shi*).

I cite Gernet at such length here because what he has to say about the Chinese language can be applied broadly to the Chinese sense of order. He himself describes the Chinese culture as 'a global universe where all things—dominant ideas, morality, religion, politics—were mutually related and echoed one another'.[45]

In Gernet's analysis of the relationship between the Chinese language and correlative thinking, perhaps his sensitivity is most in evidence when, even though he believes this correlative world of the Chinese contrasts so starkly

with our own that we find ourselves 'in the presence of a different kind of humanity',[46] he still stretches his own efforts at understanding to conclude:[47]

> The lack of those mental categories which we take to be constitutive of all rational thought does not imply an essential inferiority, but rather different modalities of thought, the strength and flexibility of which may, on further consideration, be seen as advantages. In the manipulation of the Chinese language, the mental mechanisms and aptitudes that are at work are different from those which have been favoured in the West.

By contrast with Gernet, Hellmut Wilhelm tends to characterize correlative thinking as proto-conceptual.[48]

> What we observe here is apparently an attempt to create and formulate concepts for specific purposes, if not to define them. We stand witness here to the first manifestation of a new stage in the self-realization of the human mind in which the faculty of judgment is first exercised and leads to abstractions distinct from images.... It would be a fallacy, however, to reduce these concepts entirely to their image antecedents and to deny to the authors of these early texts the faculty of abstraction that is reflected in these terms. It is a different mental faculty, newly awakened, than the one that contemplates and represents images. A realization of this faculty only renders to the hexagrams their tension, their clarity, and their authority.

In Wilhelm's discussion of the polarity in the human mind between the 'contemplated' image and the 'reflective' concept, the reduction of the dynamic and performative effort of 'imaging' to passive contemplation privileges conceptual thinking—the awakening of some hitherto unstimulated faculty. That is to say, the 'compositioning' of particulars in the process of imaging is the functional equivalent of conceptual 'judgments'. It would seem that the operative difference between image and concept in Confucius could be more clearly construed culturally and historically where authoritative images gradually lose their specificity and detail in the process of appropriating them from one concrete situation and applying them analogously to another. *Hsiang* as particular images emerge to become models.[49] Through analogizing, then, models come to do the work that we expect of concepts. What is significant here is the fact that, given the historical and emergent nature of the Confucian 'model', the assumption that these generalizations are in any sense univocal—justified either by some self-same identical characteristic or by some shared rational faculty—is simply not present. As one would anticipate in the classical Confucian context, the relationship between 'image' and 'model' is appropriately described in the language of polar opposition rather than dualism.[50]

Reasoning as Historical Experience

I want to recall that in the Confucian model, reasoning does not refer to the application or operation of some essentialistic intellect or faculty of mind. For this reason, the early tradition will not support a rationalist/empiricist kind of distinction. Reasoning is irreducibly experiential. And as experience, it is culturally and historically constructed. While we tend to associate 'knowing' with the mind of the individual knower, an alternative model would see knowledge, especially where it is importantly imagistic, emerging from out of the social and cultural dynamics of experience in the world. 'Knowing' is *chih tao*—knowing the 'way', a specific cultural tradition. My claim is not that reasoning is some universal human enterprise which, in different situations and under varied conditions, takes on its cultural particularity. Rather, I want to underscore the extent to which a career of experience shapes one's reasoning and makes it profoundly particular. Rationality is formed dialectically amid cultural and social forces, both shaping and being shaped by them.

In A.S. Cua's analysis of argumentation in Hsün Tzu, the most 'rationalistic' of the classical Confucians, Cua is concerned that the function of history, the repository of experience which makes the exercise of Confucian rationality invariably 'concrete', be fully appreciated. He states:[51]

> The Confucian emphasis on the role of historical knowledge, given the backward character of analogical projection, is a useful reminder that any piece of ethical reasoning, if it is to claim inter-personal significance, though itself occasioned by a present perplexity, must have some contact with the cultural-historical experience of the people. It is in culture and history that an analogical projection finds its anchorage and not in rules and principles of *a priori* ratiocination. In this basic way, the prospective significance of analogical projection is rooted in retrospective ethical thinking.

Valid reasoning in Confucius is the discovery and articulation of appropriate and efficacious historical instances of reasonableness.

Maureen Robertson, in her discussion of different historiographical models, demonstrates that the application of selective historical standards, like philosophical standards, is an attempt to recover an intelligible pattern in the treatment of a large mass of data which otherwise remains formless and meaningless. 'When historians claim a close fit between their patterned or periodized accounts and actualities of the past, it is often easy to forget how highly selective a body of historical data is, how compelling the need to construct meanings is, and how processes of historical generalization and cultural coding work to shape that body.' Interestingly, and perhaps not unexpectedly, the directional and conceptual periodizations familiar in the

West 'have had a teleological character; movement is toward an anticipated end—the perfection of human reason, the Last Judgment, utopian social order, or the triumph of technology'. By contrast, the model of irregular periodization that one would associate with the Chinese tradition 'claims strict dependence upon the configurations of the data studied, and does not, in its structure at least, display a belief that change obeys laws of regularity or directionality'. Instead, 'the historian is likely to discover patterns he is culturally predisposed to see'.[52]

Reasoning as Social

With respect to the locus of reasoning, we must begin from the commonly observed feature of classical Confucianism that person is irreducibly social. The arguments for the composite, aggregate and relationally defined person have been made rather persuasively, and yet the implications of this relational definition of person have not been very vigorously pursued.[53] For example, this definition of person applied to an epistemological model would mean that those psychological assumptions dependent upon the existence of some discrete *psyche* as locus of 'the solitary knower' would lose place to a sociology of knowledge. Epistemic terminology certainly defines the relationship between oneself and one's world, but what is at issue here is the extent to which the Confucian focus is on the self or on the world, and the extent to which the self is to be understood as private and autonomous. The problem that I want to pursue is this: where in our tradition, to whatever degree, 'knowing' may be construed as the condition of an individual mind and knowledge as a kind of private property, this characterization would serve poorly as an explanation for Chinese rationality. In fact, as we shall discover, rationality is not only communal, but its status and value is a function of the extent to which it fosters social cohesiveness. To interiorize reason is to degrade it.

Given that a person is irreducibly social and relational, he can trace reasons within the *ethos* or character of the culture in which he lives. In fact, rather than thinking in terms of the characteristics of sovereign individuals who cumulatively constitute a cultured community, we must reverse the gestalt, and think of the cultural ambience in its 'personal' character. One clear signal of this Confucian sociology of knowledge is the presumption that 'knowing' is productive of communal harmony and enjoyment.

Reasoning and the Affective

Among the many dualisms that have structured our early philosophic dialectic, one of considerable prominence that has pervasive implications is our willing separation of the cognitive and the affective. This dualism has many labels: thinking and feeling, reason and passion, mentality and sentimentality, thought and emotion. As was observed above, it is typical of these dualistic categories that one—in this case, the cognitive element—is valued over the other—the affective. Catherine Lutz, in her synopsis of the traditional western attitudes towards thinking and emotion, lays out a complex picture which, for want of space, can be summarized as contrasting sets of associations:

THOUGHT (COGNITIVE)	EMOTIONS (AFFECTIVE)
rational	irrational
intentional	unintentional
mental	physical
cultural	natural
universal	personal
predictable	unpredictable
controlling	uncontrollable
detachment	attachment
fact	value
logic	rhetoric
decisive	dispositional

This is not intended to paint an overly simple picture, but merely is a point of departure for understanding the contrast between Western and Confucian contextualizations of emotion.

The first indication that this dualism is not operative in the classical Confucian world is the identification of both the cognitive and affective with the *hsin*, requiring that we translate what is physically the heart as the 'heart-and-mind'.[54] As Benjamin Schwartz observes:[55]

> Its [*hsin*'s] range is equally broad in the *Analects*. At one point, it refers to desires, when Confucius informs us that at seventy he could follow his heart's desires without going astray. At another it is the seat of *jen*. We are told that in the case of Yen Hui, 'His heart would not stray from *jen* for three months.' At another point, it clearly applies to intellectual effort, when Confucius asserts that it would be better to use one's mind (*hsin*) on 'Chinese' chess rather than waste it in idleness.

But this is really the wrong way to put it. It is not that *hsin* sometimes means one thing, and sometimes the other, but rather that it always means both. Mental events do not simply evoke an emotion—they are not attended by an emotion. Rather, the cognitive and the affective are integrally and inextricably entwined: one 'feels' one's thoughts. Thoughts are coloured rather than black and white.

This claim that the passions are not separate from thinking is borne out by A.C. Graham's insistence that *ch'ing*, conventionally rendered as 'passions' in our translations of classical texts, may *refer* to the passions as integral to our genuine selves, but in the pre-Han literature it never *means* 'pas-

sions'.[56] This means that there is no superordinate category that translates 'emotions' or 'passions' in counter-distinction to 'cognition'. Situations are always experienced and interpreted both cognitively and emotionally.

Above, in the discussion of 'imaging' a world, I observed that the underlying image in the *Analects* is *tao*—the 'way'. It is important in the context of recognizing the affective dimension of tracing the *tao* to understand that in addition to emerging as a determinate 'model' for being human, *tao* also refers to the 'mode' and 'mood' of being human—the indicative (fact) and subjunctive (desire) as well as the imperative (command) moods. *Tao* refers to the emotional consciousness or temper that attends and shapes all human experience, including mental acts.

In the classical language, and in the language of the *Analects* more specifically, there is no indication that reasoning is dispassionate. On the contrary, there are repeated cases where Confucius himself expresses the gamut of emotions, from humour[57] to anger to exasperation. What is different about this celebration of the passions is that those which are encouraged are invariably productive and pro-social—emotions reflecting broad community concerns stimulated by a sense of what is appropriate (*yi*), as opposed to idiosyncratic, disruptive responses that are at best self-serving (*li**), if not even anti-social. Even anger can be educated to become a generous passion where it really does represent a just cause. Community leadership—social, political and moral—is always emotional leadership.[58]

It is because reason, resisting dualistic distinctions, is both cognitive and affective that the holistic process of achieving authoritative personhood (*jen*) in Confucius is repeatedly defined in tandem with 'knowing' (*chih*). For Confucius, knowing (*chih*) is a necessary condition for *jen*.[59] Feng Ch'i insisting that *jen* entails both emotion and rationality, collects the many passages in the *Analects* which treat *jen* and *chih* together in his section on 'A Discourse on the Unity of Authoritative Person (*jen*) and *chih*'.[60] Confucius' two most prominent disciples in the classical period—Mencius and Hsün Tzu—both describe Confucius as 'both *jen* and *chih*'.[61] Feng Ch'i concludes that, since *chih* and *jen* are mutually entailing, this is the same as saying that for Confucius, epistemology and ethics are inseparable as a moral epistemology.[62]

Conclusion

In this essay, I have attempted to recover those dimensions of the classical Chinese term, *li*, that have been concealed by the conventional translation, 'to reason' or 'principle'. From this exploration of *li*, its range of meaning, and its implications, it becomes clear at least that a formularistic translation of this term puts at risk a great deal that is philosophically significant. Without detailing the welter of competing theories of knowledge which comprise the inventory of Western philosophy, it still is apparent that *li* denotes a cluster of meanings that are not all coincident with any in our tradition.

Given the implications of *li*—viz., performative, productive, social, affective, and, above all, fundamentally aesthetic as well as cognitive—it would seem that as a term it comes closer to a broad notion of cultivation rather than some more sharply defined cognitive exercise. This seeming broadness, of course, is much muted by the parochializing constraints that these implications impose on the range of knowledge. That is, for the same reasons that early Confucianism sponsors a graduated rather than a universal notion of love, it also sponsors a kind of knowledge that is narrowly focused. If the degree of 'cultivation-as-knowledge' is burdened by participatory and productive demands, the penalty one pays for the depth and quality of detail is the range of jurisdiction and validity.

It is indisputably the case that such a definition of *li* at least problematizes if not precludes the project of translation. Having gone through this exercise, our choices of how to resolve this translation problem are several, and yet all are terribly inadequate. The easiest move is to select that equivalent most familiar from our own philosophic experience—in this case, 'to know' —while realizing that we are resolving ambiguity at the expense of equivocation. A second option is to muddle through, attempting to do justice to as many of the different connotations as possible by providing novel terminological equivalents—'realizing', to do justice to the performative implications, or perhaps 'figuring out' in order to lift the imagistic and creative connotations to foreground. But this effort usually leads to the danger of creating clumsy neologisms that impress our impatient readers only as mystifications. Finally, we may try to avoid begging the question by simply retaining the original language in the form of a transliterated symbol of the word or character in question as we do with *tao*, *feng-sui*, *ch'i* and so on.

While the resolution of the translation problem remains beyond the ambitions of this paper, my purpose has been served to the extent that I have been successful in sounding a philosophical caution, and in encouraging, as well, a very cautious reading of the Chinese corpus.

Notes and References

1. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, translated by Walter Kaufmann, Vintage, New York, 1966, p. 20.
2. Perhaps the transmission of Buddhism from India to China beginning in the Han dynasty is a counter-example to this claim of cultural indifference. And yet the perplexing absence of mutual interest between these two great cultures in our present historical moment suggests first the influence moved in only one direction, and also that Buddhism was so transformed by indigenous Chinese patterns of thought that it left little of its Indian roots in place.
3. Jacques Gernet, *China and the Christian Impact*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, pp. 3-4.

4. Ibid., p. 242.
5. The examples of such a usage are many and varied : a Chinese puzzle (an intricate maze), Chinese revenge (doing mischief to oneself to spite another), a Chinese flush in poker (a hand with no discernible sequence or pattern), a Chinese screwdriver (Australian slang for a 'hammer') and the ever popular Chinese fire-drill (a college prank: stopped at a traffic signal, students leap from an automobile, run around in circles, and then as the light changes, they re-enter the automobile in an utterly different order, much to the perplexity of other motorists).
6. See the Introduction to D.E. Mungello's *Curious Land: Jesuit Accommodation and the Origins of Sinology*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1985, for a discussion of the 'curious' (L. *curiosus*) inquiry of the seventeenth century intellectuals.
7. Emerson, Mill and Other Leading Western Intellectuals.
8. Aristotle, *Physics*, II, 192b.
9. It is encouraging that Angus Graham in his recent work on correlative thinking corroborates this insight :
   Now that the links [at the back of Western thought] are becoming visible one begins to see an affinity even between Western attitudes as far apart as the Christian faith in the immortality of the soul and the scientist's (before quantum mechanics) in universal causation; given the pairs 'life/death' and 'necessity/chance', the West strives to abolish B and preserve only A. David Hall and Roger Ames, in *Thinking Through Confucius*, suggest that the whole reductionist enterprise in Western philosophy may be seen as the conquest of B by a transcendent A.
10. Jacques Gernet, op. cit., p. 210.
11. Ibid., p. 204.
12. See my 'Knowing as Imaging: Prolegomena to a Confucian Epistemology', in *Culture and Modernity: The Authority of the Past*, edited by Eliot Deutsch, University of Hawaii Pres., Honolulu, 1991.
13. *Analects*, 14/35.
14. See Hellmut Wilhelm, *Heaven, Earth, and Man in the Book of Changes*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1977, pp. 35–40.
15. Angus Graham, *Disputers of the Tao*, Open Court, La Salle, Illinois, 1989, pp. 322-23.
16. See the discussion of T'ang Chun-i's insights applied to this passage in Roger T. Ames, 'The Mencian Conception of Renxing : Does it Mean "Human Nature" ?' in *Chinese Texts and Contexts*, edited by H. Rosemont, Open Court, La Salle, Illinois, 1991.
17. See *Book of Songs*, p. 210.
18. There are several good discussions of the origins of the important philosophical notion, *li*. See A.C. Graham, *Two Chinese Philosophers* (Lund Humpheries, London, 1958); W. T. Chan, 'The Evolution of the Neo-Confucian Concept *Li* as Principle', in *Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies* (n.s. 4.2, February 1964, pp. 124-29); Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilisation*, II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1956, pp. 472-75; Allen Wittenborn, '*Li* Revisited and Other Explorations', in *The Bulletin of Sung-Yuan Studies* (17, 1981, pp. 32-48); Willard Peterson, 'Another Look at *Li*', in *The Bulletin of Sung-Yuan Studies* (1986, pp. 13-31).
19. A. S. Cua's discussion of *Hsün Tzu* as the most important locus of *li* as a term of philosophical import is both thorough and sensitive to the tradition broadly. See *Ethical Argumentation: A Study in Hsün Tzu's Moral Epistemology*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1985. For the Neo-Confucian extension of this term, see Willard Peterson's arguments, op. cit. Peterson, having reflected on the import of this term in the texts of Sung Neo-Confucianism, arrives at a set of propositions from which we can borrow in defining the more classical sensibility. The major difference lies in what seems to be a transcendentalism in the texts of Neo-Confucianism.
20. How, for example, can the single term *shen* mean both 'divine' and 'human spirituality' in the Chinese tradition, and what does this reveal about Chinese religiousness? How can the term *yi* mean both 'appropriateness' and 'meaningfulness', and what does this say about the place of correlative modalities of thinking within this tradition? If I were to find fault with an otherwise exemplary treatment of *li* in the *Hsün Tzu*, I would question A. S. Cua's willingness to separate out instances of *li* under the headings of purportedly different meanings. See Cua, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

21. Gernet, op. cit., p. 245.
22. Wittenborn, op. cit., p. 42.
23. Willard Peterson, op. cit., p. 18.
24. A. S. Cua, op. cit., pp. 22-23.
25. See J. Needham, op. cit., p. 280.
26. See A. S. Cua, op. cit., for a discussion of the various modes of analogical thinking associated with *li*.
27. A. S. Cua is sensitive to this basic meaning of *lei* when he states that 'a *lei* is formed by way of comparison or analogy between similarities and differences (p. 55)'. He further qualifies his usage of *lei* when he states : 'In this essay, I have used "sort", "kind", and "class" interchangeably without implying that *lei* is a set-theoretical notion. So also, my occasional use of "category" must not be construed as an ascription of a general doctrine of categories to Hsün Tzu (pp. 178-79)'. See *Ethical Argumentation: A Study in Hsün Tzu's Moral Epistemology*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1985.
28. The degree to which the *Analects* is constructed out of a concrete 'path' vocabulary has not been fairly noticed. Consider the number of key terms that focus this image : 'to go against, to deviate from (*wei***)'; 'to go out from, follow (*yu*)', '(to line shoulder to shoulder=), to order (*ch'i*)'; 'gate (*men*)'; 'to reach (*chih***** or *chi*)'; 'to dwell or abide (*chü* or *ch'u*)'; 'to look out over (*lin*)'; 'to err by overstepping (*kuo*)'; 'to get through (=to understand thoroughly) (*ta*)', 'to go straight (*chih******)'; 'to pass (*shih**)'; 'to ford a stream (=to help)(*chi**)'; 'to follow the proper way (*shu*)'; 'to repair, construct, clear (*hsiu*)'; 'to be at a distance (*yüan*)'; 'to be near at hand (*chin*)'; 'to leave behind (*yi*)'; 'to leave tracks (*chi***)'; 'to move ahead (*chin**)'; 'to retire (*t'ui*); 'followers (=disciples) (*t'u*)'; 'a roundabout way, astray (*yü*)'; 'to move to (*hsi*)' and so on.
   In addition to the "path" imagery, there are others: archery (*she*), the vessel (*ch'i**), design (*wen*).
29. *Analects* 7/1. The primary meaning of *shu* is 'to follow along the path'. By extension, it means 'to record', 'to transmit'.
30. The expression *yi*** *yi**** *kuan chih* occurs twice. See *Analects* 4/15 and particularly 15/3. The 15/3 passage reads:
   'Do you, Ssu, take me to be one who learns a great deal and then remembers it all by heart?'
   'Yes, indeed I do. Is this not the case?'
   'It is not. Rather, there is a consistency that runs through it.'
31. See Feng Ch'i, *Chung-kuo-ku-tai che-hsüeh te lo-chi-fa-chan* [The logical development of ancient Chinese philosophy], Shanghai Peoples' Press, Shanghai, 1983, Vol. 1, p. 84.
32. In fact, just as *cosmos* means an elegant as well as an ordered world, so *logos* means *oratio* as well as *ratio*. That is, the aesthetic and rhetorical side of cosmology tends to go unnoticed in our contemporary interpretation of the classical tradition.
33. See Willard J. Peterson, 'Making Connections: Commentary on the Attached Verbalizations' of the *Book of Change*', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 42 : 1, June 1982, pp. 67–116, especially pp. 80-81.
34. See *Yi-ching* 41/*hsishang*/6. Cf. ibid., p. 114.

35. Note that *ni* means 'to calculate' or 'to estimate' as well as 'to imitate'. 'To imitate' makes the exercise too passive.
36. See the *Chou-yi*, Harvard-Yenching Index Series, 44/*hsi shang*/12. Cf. *The I Ching or Book of Changes* by Richard Wilhelm, translated into English by Cary F. Baynes, 3rd edn., Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1967, p. 322.
37. The character *yi** is translated variously as 'concept' (S. Owen), 'thought/s' (R. Wilhelm-C. Baynes, P. Yu, W. Peterson), and 'ideas' (H. Wilhelm, A. C. Graham, B. Schwartz). This character is glossed in the *Shuowen* lexicon as 'intended meaning, purpose' (*chih****), reflecting its performative connotation. It is in this sense that I understand it.
38. See George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980, and more recently, George Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987. See also Stephen C. Pepper's classic treatment of metaphors underlying our metaphysical traditions in *World Hypotheses*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1942.
39. See Wang Pi, 'Ming Hsiang' [Elucidating the Image], in his *Chou Yi lüeh-li* (A Summary Introduction to the *Book of Change*], in the *Pai-pu ts'ung-shu chi ch'eng*, 10b-11b.
40. The *Huai Nan Tzu* is replete with this epistemic imagery in the most hyperbolic terms.
41. Hellmut Wilhelm in his discussion of imagery in the *I Ching* [*Book of Change*] collects passages from the text that connect the formulation of human imagery with the patterning of heaven and earth. See *Heaven, Earth, and Man in the Book of Changes*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1977, especially pp. 198-99.
42. For a discussion of the function of image in Chinese thought, see Pauline Yu's *The Reading of Imagery in the Chinese Poetic Tradition*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1987, especially Chapter One: 'Setting the Terms'. See also Stephen Owen, *Traditional Chinese Poetry and Poetics*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1985, especially Chapter One: 'Omen of the World: Meaning in the Chinese Lyric'.
43. Chang Tai-nien's position is that it is not until Buddhism enters China that what is known is inextricably bound to the knower, but Confucius in defining *chih* as dynamic and performative clearly represents this relationship. At the beginning of *Chuang Tzu* 6 it states that 'there must be the authentic person (*chen jen*) before there can be authentic *chih* (*chen chih*).' See Chang Tainien, *Chung-kuo che-hsüeh ta-kang*, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Press, Peking, 1982, p. 497.
44. See Jacques Gernet, *China and the Christian Impact: A Conflict of Cultures*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, (first published as *Chine et christianisme* by Editions Gallimard in 1982), p. 242.
45. Ibid., p. 247. For an alternative way of reflecting on what Gernet is describing here as correlative thinking, see our development of the notion of aesthetic order in *Thinking Through Confucius*, especially pp. 131-38.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., p. 242.
48. H. Wilhelm, op. cit., pp. 200-01.
49. It is no surprise that the term, *hsiang*, means both 'image' and 'model'.
50. See *Thinking Through Confucius*, pp. 17–21 for an elaboration of this distinction.
51. A. S. Cua, *Ethical Argumentation*, pp. 96-97.
52. See Maureen Robertson, 'Periodization, in the Arts and Patterns of Change in Traditional Chinese Literary History', in Susan Bush and Christian Murck (eds.), *Theories of the Arts in China*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1983, pp. 3-4.
53. For example, any discussion of anthropomorphism that attends notions of deity in the classical period must surely take this alternative definition of person into account. Doing so would, of course, favour an immanental rather than a transcendental understanding of deity, and would inform the expression *t'ien-jen ho-yi*—the unity of deity and man.

54. In conversation with A. C. Graham, I remarked that it would require quite an effort on our part to abandon the heart/mind distinction and to relocate our centre of thought in the physical heart. Graham agreed, commenting that while one looks down to one's feet as being at some distance from one's thoughts, it would be curious if not disconcerting to find oneself looking up to one's head through one's neck!
55. See Benjamin J. Schwartz, op. cit., p. 185.
56. See A. C. Graham, op. cit., pp. 59–65.
57. See Christoph Harbsmeier's recent work on Confucius and humour. For a general discussion, see his article 'Humour in Ancient Chinese Philosophy', in *Philosophy East and West*, 39: 3, July, 1989, and for a more specific discussion, see his article on Confucius and Humour in the *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*.
58. See Catherine Lutz, op. cit. p. 160.
59. In *Analects* 5/19, Confucius says of Ling Yin Tzu-wen and Ch'en Wen Tzu, 'They are not *chih*—how could they be *jen*?'
60. Feng Ch'i, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 82-89.
61. See *Mencius*, 2A/2, and *Hsün Tzu*.
62. Feng Ch'i, op. cit., pp. 89-90.

Specific cultures and the coexistence of alternative rationalities: a case study of the contact of Indian and Greco-European cultures*

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The growth of *a* universal human culture is an 'organic' process that occurs through specific cultural unities. All beginnings of histories of various societies are marked by a lack of cultural communication with other simultaneously existent societies. As the inter-communication gradually increases, the phenomenon of cultural synthesis occurs which is extremely complex and involves simultaneous coexistence of alternative rationalities within any given society. What form the new rationality that may emerge in the future may take is a question of speculation. It may, however, be of benefit to investigate the central characteristics of the phenomenon of coexistence of alternative rationalities with the stresses and strains it involves.

1. The assumptions[1] that all cultures are marked by finite life-spans and that specific cultures never influence one another in essentials are questionable. The first assumption is falsified by the empirical evidence of the continuance of Indian and Chinese cultures. Also, the life of a culture is sustained by the characteristic inner experience of the spirit and if such experience is 'timeless', the life of the culture will be eternal too. Further, such inner experience may cross the geographic boundaries of the society of its origin and spread to other lands and peoples receptive of it (example, the Buddhist experience in China and Japan) so that the cultural whole grows physically and chances of its 'physical' elimination are thus diminished. The second assumption is also empirically falsified by the historically well-known influence of Indian Buddhism on pre-existent Chinese culture and the mutual interaction of European Christianity and Greek culture. Further, the inner experience that is the foundation of and characterizes the core of specific cultures is such that it can always be shared to a lesser or greater degree. Thus the experience of space, time, self, nothingness, 'transcendent reality', etc. is conceptualized with the help of available linguistic apparatus and elaborated and translated. Participation in the life of other culture and utilization of available concepts and allegories there makes such translation and communication possible, so that what is said and meant is grasped to a lesser or greater extent. The interaction is thus actualized which is further intensified by the imitation of the physical—the art, external modes of behaviour, customs and habits, and stimuli and

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reactions. It may be true that specific cultures grow around some core concepts regarding space, time, reality, etc., but they are quickly transformed and transmitted so that their grasp by other specific cultures and their employment in life and incorporation in viewpoint gives rise to a process of synthesis.

The internal experience of the spirit being the foundation on which external art and science and technique grow, the deeper this experience, the surer will be the foundations. Continued *cultivation* of this internal experience flourishes into an enveloping world-view which is *total* and in which answers are sought for every question that matters in human life: the nature of self, the meaning and purpose of life, the nature of world and its relation to self. Thus, the more such inner experience is cultivated, the better is reality understood. Such conceptualization has an inner demand of *consistency* so that new conceptualizations remain forged to the original. The culture-specific modes thus acquire identities of their own.

With reference to any given culture, the thought that is systematized into various interlinked disciplines and synthesized into one *saṁhitā* or *veda,* or treatise, may be called the *cultural form* whereas the civilization that emerges through praxis by construction and amassing of materials, may be called the *cultural matter*. The cultural form renews, expands and grows but remains wedded to the inner experience forever, since that alone gives it meaning. The cultural materials are rearranged, reconstructed, synthesized and renovated. What is novel in cultural form is a novel conceptualization, a novel formulation, a novel demonstration of consistency. What is novel in cultural matter is a novel reconstruction, a novel restructuring. Thus, for example, the image of a contemplative Buddha is the construction of an inner experience of the spirit that is conceptualized in terms of some facial features reflecting inner peace and harmony and 'emptiness'—it is immaterial whether it is a Chinese or an Indian face.

The cultural form is the work of reason and crystallizes into theorization. Cultivation of inner experience of spirit has a direct bearing on reason and activates it, gives it vigour, makes it purer and purer. The reason thus endeavours to express itself as art and science and technique. What is performed as art is mastered as technique and systematized as theory, and what is discovered as *cause* is again mastered as technique and incorporated into a network that is 'science'-as-theory. The techniques get mastered by a natural process of alternative formulations and descriptions of inner experience and subsequent disagreements or failures in grasping, giving rise to questioning. Thus, it is quickly learnt that to describe or formulate without convincing evidence is to say nothing. The process of *manan,* or *uha,* or rational self-conviction, thus arises and spreads in the society. It is the diffusion of matured reason. The formulations with evidence may not be merely linguistic but may involve diverse artistic forms of expression which are also *rational* in so far as their justification and critical evaluation is concerned. Theorization, however, may be said to be the highest form of rational activity: it is indeed the incarnation of the rationality of grown-up man. The more rational, therefore, a culture, the more widespread is the activity of theorization carried out by it in science, and art and technique, culminating eventually in a theory of theorization itself.

The assumption of immutability of reason,[2] of eternal 'principles of reason', is shown to be false if we take note of the possibility of ever-deepening inner experience and its ever-newer formulations. The dynamic purity of reason thus points to a cultural *historicity* of reason that has a span of cosmic temporality. The inner experience of spirit endows man with better and better rational capacity so that reason is employed as an instrument for structuring conceptualizations into more and more consistent truth-systems. The general historical pattern of development of cultural form proceeds from poetic expression of inner experience, to concise expression of truths or *upadeśa,* to classifications and definitions, to explanations by reasons as causes and purposes. Once this is accomplished for arriving at a general view of reality, alternative views start emerging on the one hand, and theoretic systems consistent with the ground view of reality are constructed in other areas of life such as the fine arts, medicine, law, etc. Reason is thus transformed, manipulated and mutated in accordance with the demands of theoretic construction and appraisal and the ensuing dialectic that goes on between contending alternative views of reality. This is the cultural drama of reason at its best where the ever-youthful rationality of the sciences and the arts shows its forms and colours with all the multifariousness. How many diverse forms rationality may take is impossible to know, nor can one give determinate criteria for distinguishing scientific rationality from artistic rationality. However, the recent distinction between external history and internal history made particularly with reference to scientific theorization,[3] can be of considerable help in understanding rationality with reference to cultures.

If we thus start from a study of the diverse cultures[4] of man and go into the internal history of each culture in respect of its accomplishments in the arts and the sciences, we will discover a process of history within history within history. . . . The rationality of culture-science manifests as rational culture-theories that seek to unveil the rational patterns in the over-arching history of man whereby diverse cultures have appeared on the scene, some of which continue yet, others have vanished after completing a full life-span, and yet others have died a premature death. Such a theory answers the most fundamental questions not only about the origin and growth and decay of human cultures, but also about why and how a certain view of reality was arrived at, why and how certain conceptualizations were considered pre-eminent, and why and how certain specific techniques of theory construction and appraisal originated in any given culture. Then, within any given culture, upon investigating its internal history, we may characterize specific models of scientific and artistic rationality,[5] as these attained maturity and

continue unabated the long march of history or languished in the darkness of time. This will answer various questions about the internal history of artistic and scientific theorization and how external cultural history influenced and worked upon its evolution. External histories of cultures criss-cross and mix and cause a change in their internal histories. Such interaction and change of internal histories indirectly, via the external histories, would explain why a specific *style* of rationality emerged and what factors were influencing the activity of theoretic construction and appraisal within a given domain, over and above the demands of characteristic objects of investigation and their characteristic amenability to human reason and sense-experience in the arts and the sciences.

2. The beginnings of Indian culture are generally traced to between 1500-1000 BC when the Vedas started coming into being, which contain a poetic apprehension of various truths such as reality, human life and death, and universal law or *ṛta*. The processes of nature at cosmic as well as microscopic levels are conceived here as *yajña*: the active fire-energy assimilating things and transforming them into new subtle substances, continuously. It was claimed that sound energy which also manifests as the spoken word, when properly structured and associated with this fire-energy, gives rise to causal processes of control and thus various *yajña* techniques developed later and were given a cosmo-psychic interpretation in the Upaniṣads contemporaneously. The beginnings of an inner experience of the poet or *kavi* and the seer or *ṛṣi* that we notice in the Vedas and the Upaniṣads led to a great flourishing and spread of creativity in diverse areas: grammar, medicine, astronomy, law, the state, music, dramatics, yoga, nyāya, etc. The subsequent phase was naturally that of consolidation of this knowledge so that treatises or *saṁhitās* were written, which were also called *śāstras* and *smṛtis*. A *saṁhitā*, or *śāstra*, or *smṛti* is not a text in one specialized area, but a holistic work complete in certain respects, linking itself with questions of liberation, merit, welfare and fulfilment of desires, yet emphasizing a specific *approach* such as of the word (*śabda*), or the herb (*auṣadha*), or light (*jyoti*), or *dharma*, or *nāda*, or *artha*, and so on. Thus, it was thought that one could choose any one of these approaches and attain merit and highest good in one's life. All the sciences that developed thus ultimately had meaning only in the context of human life and its highest good. That is why the strange phenomenon of 'curative' employment of even astronomy for the human good. Knowledge therefore has a value in so far as it gives man *power* to attain merit and the highest good not only in one's life but also for establishing the rule of the good and the just in society as a whole. The subsequent phases of development of knowledge are merely of its perfection, classification, restructuring, critical evaluation and crystallization in the *sutra* form. Diverse schools thus flourished within and outside the vedic fold and diverse methods of theorization developed in the pure and applied sciences and arts.

Briefly, the earliest theories were the Sāṁkhya[6] and Vaiśeṣika[7] theories of reality in which two fundamental pre-requisites of theorization, namely analysis by discovery of causes and epistemology, were developed—the former leading to a theory of causation and the latter to a theory of knowledge generation and appraisal. These were subsequently supplemented by two methodological theories of discovery of truth: the former, Sāṁkhya theory, recommended the Yoga *method*[8] and the latter, Vaiśeṣika theory, recommended the Nyāya *method*[9]. The Yoga method essentially involves inner analysis of the psyche, leading to the discovery of one ultimate cause (namely, *prkṛti*), whereas the Nyāya method, being a theory of the art of theorization, involves dialectical analysis and appraisal of propositional elements of theories claiming truth. What is remarkable about these theories is that firstly, conjointly they represent a complete system in so far as the *darśan* approach to human good is concerned and, secondly, these are two sets of *alternative* models of theorization and discovery of the nature of reality as a whole—Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya. One may even take these two models as representing two distinct *rationalities*,[10] yet always taken as coeval, the differences ignored as due to the specificities of human *reason* (*buddhi bheda*). The two theoretic approaches jointly and significantly influenced widespread activity of theorization in other areas.

Another equally fundamental and influential theory that developed almost simultaneously with the above two, is the theory of linguistic usage or grammar or *vyākaraṇa*.[11] In certain respects, this grammatic theory represents the ideal of rationality for Indian thought and has been methodologically influential in other important theories such as of medicine, law, music and dramatics. The main theory is basically a descriptive one arrived at by empirical study of human linguistic conduct and subsequent analysis, classification and generalization—of linguistic phenomena.[12] Though the two methods of analysis and classification have always served an important methodological purpose in later theorization in other areas, what is of greater significance is the characteristic method of generalization of the grammarians called the method of *utsarg* and *apavād*. Indeed the entire rationality of Indian mind may be characterized by this method which is briefly as follows: study the facts, generalize on the basis of the similarity of the largest set ignoring for the moment the anomalous set, then also generalize for each anomalous fact; the two kinds of generalizations conjointly give the law at work. The former may be called unrestricted generalization or *utsarg* and the latter restricted generalization or *apavād*. This method made Indians recognize very early that there is no such thing as a pure, absolutely general law, involving no anomalies: all general laws are attended by anomalies. A similar insight was reached by the latter Vaiśeṣika theoreticians: that there is *sāmānya* or universal, but it has no meaning if it does not contain in it *a viśeṣa* or particular (so that imperceptible *viśeṣas* alone are the ultimate bedrocks of reality). Thus, all unrestricted generalizations give only *ideal* laws; in the

actual world, if all the given perceptible facts are to be accounted for, restricted generalizations must be conjointly made. Or, if the reality—in this case linguistic reality—is to be grasped in entirety, an ideal network must be supplemented by some patchwork. A great advantage of this method of theorization is that if and when new anomalies come to light, which escaped scrutiny earlier, the theory may be *extended* by adding new restricted generalizations without changing its basic structure. Moreover, once the model is complete, it serves as a prescription for the linguistic conduct of man now and for ever. Further, since the theory satisfactorily understands a cross-section of natural human conduct, it could obviously serve as a model for theories seeking to grasp other areas of natural human conduct such as the state, law, music and dramatics.

We can notice some influence of the methods of grammar, apart from analysis and classification, even in medicine—a complex science that is at once natural and human. The Indian science of medicine is part of a vast treatise on life-span or *āyu-veda*,[13] in which the central problem is how best can a man spend his life (-span) in this world? A pre-requisite of this is that man enjoy good health which is constantly influenced by three factors, namely time, *karma* and the contact of human senses (of knowledge and action) with the world. Man is thus seen as an integral part of nature and with the changing seasons and climate and human activity, human health is also constantly changing more or less. The structure of the *āyu*-theory is vast and we can only briefly analyse it into three concentric components. At the outermost periphery are discussed climatological and environmental questions, as also man's purposes and goals and the criteria of good and proper conduct. This relates the theory with the Sāṁkhya-Vaiśeṣika world-view and consistency is therefore sought with it. Then, in the middle periphery, a distinction is drawn between preventive and curative conduct on the one hand, and three kinds of curative therapies on the other hand. Of these therapies, medicinal therapy is only one, the other two being *karma* therapy and the ultimate, *yoga* therapy. The innermost core[14] of the theory consists of the causal theory of disease, the *dhātu*-theory, the *doṣa*-theory and the *rasa*-theory, various diseases and their classification, various herbs and their classification, and methods of symptomatic diagnosis and therapeutic success. From this vast structure of the *āyu*-theory, it is quite obvious that rarely has a theory at such a grand scale been achieved in human history. The inner core of the theory employs largely empiricist and to some extent intuitionist methods of theory generation and appraisal, whereas the outer peripherial structure by and large employs rationalist methods. Thus, for example, in so far as the theory is informally logically consistent with the Sāṁkhya-Vaiśeṣika world-view, it is rationally valid, and in so far as the causal theory of disease, *dhātu*-theory, *rasa*-theory, etc. are concerned, it is empirically valid. In its conception of rationality, rationalist and empiricist criteria do not exclude each other, nor is one more pre-eminent than the other. Indeed,

according to it, sense-experience, dialectical reason, and intuitive reason must all work in coordination if truth is to be attained and our knowledge has to acquire a certain completeness.

Whereas the sciences of grammar and life-span may be said to be *inexact* sciences because of the very nature of their subject-matter, such is not the case with the science of shining bodies or *Jyoti Śāstra*, also known as the science of constitution of time (*kāla vidhān śāstra*),[15] which is perhaps the only *exact* science available in Indian thought. Since arithmetical, geometric and algebraic methods were employed in this science, mathematics developed under the aegis of it and could become an independent science only very late (ninth century AD). Accepting the basic premise that there is a unity of natural, celestial history and the earthly history of man (during his journey of life-on-the-earth), the science seeks to attain human good by studying and inferring the dynamics of individual humans—*karma*—from the dynamics of shining bodies in the celestial sphere, or *khagol*. It is thus divided into the theoretical (*gaṇit*) and the applied (*phalit*). The theoretical further has two components: dynamics of averages (*madhyam gaṇit*) and the exact dynamics (*spaṣṭa gaṇit*). The knowledge of average positions and movements of planetary bodies is achieved by ordinary sense-experience and certain intuited truths regarding the origin of the world, classification of constellations (*nakṣatra*) and the number of revolutions of each in one *mahāyuga*, law of attraction and repulsion between the *nakṣatras* and the planets, and so on. No *data* of observation are employed in this part. Correspondence of these results with actual motions *observed* by simple instruments—called *dṛga-gaṇit-aikya*—is achieved by certain mathematical techniques applied uniformly to all the planets. The geocentric model seems to have been adopted purely for purposes of observational convenience. Yet the predictions that are made regarding eclipses and occurrence of other astral events on the basis of the theory are surprisingly accurate. The calendar seeks to achieve observational correspondence not only with the occurrence of six weathers and the rising and setting of *nakṣatras*, but also with the movements of both the sun and moon. The method by which such rational structure of the theory is achieved, is as follows: The theory of average movements and positions is generated by accepting certain *intuitions* regarding the origin of the world, time-spans involved, etc. On the basis of these intuited truths, certain mathematical techniques, without employment of any observational data, yield the *madhyam gaṇit*. Then, certain observational data along with further mathematical operations on the *madhyam gaṇit* yield the *spaṣṭ gaṇit*, having exact correspondence with actual positions and movements of the planets. Whatever changes are introduced for purposes of more and more exact correspondence are only at the level of *spaṣṭa gaṇit* and *madhyam gaṇit* is *given* once and for all containing unchangeable and eternal truths. Dialectical reason employed with intuited reason gives the *madhyam gaṇit*; whereas the same dialectical reason, formalized and em-

ployed in conjunction with observational experience, gives the *spaṣṭ gaṇit*. Once the *gaṇit* is satisfactorily formulated, it is subsequently employed for understanding the occurrence of events in the past, present and future of the life of the individual; predicting auspicious or good moments for initiating various goals and purposes; cure of '*karmic* ill-health' by use of adequate gems, metals and other objects for propitiating the planets concerned, etc. Doubts regarding the rationality of this applied aspect of Jyoti Vidyā are often raised, but we will not enter into that debate here.[16] What may be noted is that the concept of *karma* therapy itself is revolutionary as well as shrouded in mystery partly due to its basis in the 'principle of *karma*' which, though mysterious, is uniformly accepted in *all* the theories—orthodox or unorthodox, of science or art.

The above are the three typical models of scientific rationality that may be taken as representative of the highest development of Indian cultural form. All the other sciences of Indian origin may be subsumed under this or that model. Thus, for example, the legal science is by and large modelled on *āyurveda* lines; and the science of music and dramatics developed on the lines of *vyākaraṇa*, particularly with regard to the method of analysis of the empirically given in terms of basic units.

The reason why the internal history of these sciences remained stagnant after a certain level of development, must be traced to the history of the world-view itself which is the history external to these sciences. The Sāṁkhya-Vaiśeṣika world-view first contended with an alternative Buddhist[17] world-view for nearly half a millennium. Though this alternative world-view gained wide support and spread to distant places, the available literature gives no indication of development of similar sciences under alternative models of rationality consistent with this Buddhist world-view. Thus, no challenge was offered to the scientific theories as such from any other quarter. Secondly, the methods of investigation that the Sāṁkhya-Vaiśeṣika world-view offered had a ring of *ultimacy*—such as Yoga and the cultivation of intuition as well as purification of dialectical reason—which made alternative methods of investigation (such as experimentation) redundant. Finally, the occultist and mystical trends in the culture itself led to the replacement of the two contending world-views by an illusionist world-view which seemed to imply that the sciences themselves were redundant, if not meaningless. This attitude in Indian culture seems to have prevailed until the arrival and spread of modern science and techniques of Greco-European origin.

The characteristics common to these three typical models of rationality are as follows. First, intuition cultivated by seekers of knowledge and inherited from the records left by such men of the past, is as infallible and reliable as dialectical reason itself for generation and construction of systematic theories of multiple aspects of reality—though it should be resorted to only where perception and reason are found inadequate. Second, the theories do not merely serve to satisfy the human quest for explanation but they acquire meaning only in the context of the ultimate goals and purposes of humans themselves. Third, the theories can claim to be rational if and only if these can be satisfactorily appraised to be valid by dialectical reason as well as (ordinary) sense experience, there being no other human means for appraising them. Fourth and final, any distinction between the natural and human sciences is arbitrary, all sciences being natural as well as human sciences ultimately; the only distinction that may be drawn meaningfully is between exact and inexact sciences, the latter employing computational methods due to the involvement of time, space and motion in the objects of investigation.

3. In so far as the internal history of the classical Indian sciences is concerned, the contact of Indian culture with Greco-Arabic culture bears no historical significance. This is also true to a great degree for the history of the world-view that prevailed during this contact. The cultural form, though largely stagnant, thus remained uninformed of the presence of Arabic culture, though cultural material seems to have been transformed to a certain degree due to the sheer presence of Arabic technique.

But the situation was not the same in so far as the contact with Greco-European culture was concerned. There may be noticed not only the flourishing of Greco-European cultural forms within Indian culture but also a new and unprecedented revitalization and dynamism in the native cultural form itself. Just as Greco-European science made its place in Europe on its own grounds, in spite of persistent opposition by the Church, it has similarly made its place in India (as everywhere else) and has perhaps also become the dominant paradigm as seems evident by the great blossoming of natural and human sciences. Greco-European world-views are also studied with interest and persistence as is evident by great efflorescence of comparative studies. The contemporary dominant concern of Greco-European thought seems to be the study of the nature and the methods of modern science itself which has led to the formulation of diverse interpretations of the models of *scientific rationality*. This concern has made a remarkable impact in India, so that not only are the models of rationality of modern science being examined,[18] but also it is being asked what kinds of models of rationality do the classical Indian sciences offer.[19] Since the models of rationality of the classical Indian sciences are different and since these sciences themselves are being pursued with renewed vitality today (except, perhaps, astronomy), it is evident that two types of scientific communities live side by side in the same society, one having the advantage of cultural heritage and the other of modernity and novelty of methods and techniques of Greco-European science.

In so far as the Greco-European world-views are concerned, apart from the Greek schools of the Atomists, Plato and Aristotle,[20] there are the eminent school of Idealism, Realism and Materialism on the one hand, and of Ratio-

nalism, Empiricism, Logical Positivism, Phenomenology, and Existentialism on the other hand. In so far as the sciences and their distinct models of rationality are concerned, we have the well-known Greek[21] Geometry of Euclid, Archimedesean Mechanics, Ptolemaic Astronomy, and Hippocratic Medicine on the one hand, and Greco-European[22] Galilean-Newtonian Mechanics, Darwinian Biology, and Quantum Mechanics on the other hand. Contemporary Greco-European culture has displayed a lively interest in the study of the internal histories of the world-views as well as the sciences, the former bringing out the conflicts between Judaic-Christian *faith* and Greek world-views, and the latter bringing out numerous interpretations of scientific rationality and its relation to the history (of world-views) external to these sciences.

As regards the central characteristics of Greco-European world-views as expressed in the above-mentioned schools, there is no unanimity about the means of knowledge, or about the principle of causation as a governing principle of the living and the lifeless world, or about the definite goals, purposes and meanings of human life, while these features are present in the Greek world-views themselves (like in the Indian world-views). But unlike the Greco-European world-views, we may notice certain dominant features in the sciences. First, cultivated intuition has no place whatsoever in these sciences but is replaced by ordinary intuition (by enumeration in induction) in the form of *hypotheses* or highly informed guesses or conjectures. Second, natural dialectical reason is by and large replaced by *formal* dialectical reason both for generation as well as appraisal of theories. Third, ordinary sense-experience is replaced by *instrumental* sense-experience, to be renamed *observation* and *measurement*, which plays as significant a role in generation and appraisal of theories as formal dialectical reason, if not more. Fourth, a sharp distinction is drawn between the natural and human sciences, all contending to become *exact* sciences, there being no notion of inherently inexact sciences. Fifth, the natural sciences at a microscopic level must employ the notion of *probablistic knowledge* (in formal dialectical reason) due to the inherent limitations of observation and measurement by human observers, which does not in any way mar the *rationality* of their theories but rather forces new thinking on rationality itself, giving rise to many-valued logic and multiple logical systems. Final, scientific knowledge is pursued as quest for *truth* as well as *power* which alone gives it meaning, there being no agreement in the world-views regarding any other context of human life which may provide them a meaning; both truth and power in their *totality* are likely to be attained in a *future* to come as the *history* of human knowledge unfolds.

4. If we evaluate Indian and Greco-European cultural rationalities on the basis of the above analysis, it is obvious that cultural form may be said to involve two types of rationalities: a *foundational* rationality manifesting as the world view(s) embraced by the culture in question and presenting a measure of growth of rationality itself, and a *structural* rationality manifesting

as scientific theories developed within the culture. Advanced cultural form seeks consistency of structural with foundational rationality as also it continuously aspires to make them transparent and without fissures. Other cultures not so advanced, may seek to build structures without foundations, or, if some foundations do exist, these may have fissures in them. In such a situation, the quest for truth may be undermined by a predominant quest for power and wealth which then serves as a primary motive force, spurring dynamism of structural rationality without impressive achievements in foundational rationality. Further, since the future hides itself, perhaps maliciously, from the Greco-European culture, it finds itself engrossed in *history*, with every hope lying in the future to come. Such cultures, then, give rise to a *futurist* rationality which is different from the *eternalist* rationality of the Indian culture type in which past, present and future intermingle and time, so to say, stands still. The eternalist rationality is like the transparent and still water in a lake for which the danger of getting frozen lurks every moment.

Since the two types of rationality coexist side by side in the same Indian society today, one may ask if any mutation has taken or can take place between them? With reference to Indian culture, it may be said that the dialogue between the two communities is still in its infancy and it is too early to say anything about a mutation. But we may notice a clear recognition of the significance of history—particularly social and cultural history—as a theory of social and cultural change and the basic role that social, political and material conditions play in shaping human life. This historicist consciousness has taught the Indian mind that cultural material does have a telling influence on cultural form and its dynamics. A serious inquiry into the politics and theories of state and law has thus become incumbent. It is under the same historicist consciousness that we have to assess the contemporary historical reconstruction of foundational and structural rationalities in India.

Notes and References

1. O. Spengler, *Decline of the West*, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1918.
2. R. Blanche, *Science and Contemporary Rationalism*, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1968.
3. I. Lakatos, 'History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions', in Colin Howson (ed.), *Method and Appraisal in the Physical Sciences*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967.

4. One may choose to study, for a wider canvas, some aspects of the histories of Indian, Greek, Chinese, and modern Greco-European cultures, if and in what way their rationalities differ and what are the consequences of coexistence of such rationalities—perceptible and possible. Briefly, a cross-section of multifareous Indian culture came into contact with well-developed Chinese culture in the first century AD, the European culture (under the aegis of Judaic-Christianity) came into contact with Greek culture in

about AD 8, and finally Indian culture came into contact with modern Greco-European culture in AD 17. Before these contacts, each culture was following its own course (except for Indian culture which had an earlier contact with Greco-Arabic culture in AD 10), carrying out the activity of theoretic construction and appraisal in *their* arts and sciences without any significant borrowings from other autonomous cultures. In spite of such autonomous pursuit, we find several universal elements common in the scientific and artistic theories of these cultures. Thus, for example, employment of the dialectical method, emphasis on the concepts of evidence, argument and proof in theorizing, construction of views of reality, development of arithmetical and geometrical methods, search for the criteria of the good and the meritorious for human life, and so on. Further, many conclusions are common in the views of reality of Sāṁkhya theory, Buddhist theory, Taoist theory, Greek Atomism and Aristotelian theory: Vedopaniṣadic and Platonic theories of law are naturalistic; Greek and Indian astronomies are geocentric; the *rasa-doṣa* theory of Indian medicine is similar to the taste-bile theory of the Hippocratic corpus, and so on.

5. V. Shekhawat, 'Alternative Models of Scientific Rationality', *Diogenes*, 144, 1989.
6. Panchasikha, *Sāṃkhya Sūtra*, translated by R. Bhattacharya, Bhartiya Vidya Prakasan, Varanasi, 1964.
7. Kanad, *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*, translated by S. N. Misra, Chowkhamba Samskrit Samsthan, Varanasi, 1980.
8. H. Aranya, *Patanjali Yoga Darsana*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1974.
9. Gautam, *Nyāy Sūtra*, translated by Arya Muni, Jhajjar Gurukula, Haryana Sahitya Samsthan, Rohtak, 1980.
10. The two rationalities differ as follows: Sāṁkhya theory establishes the elements of its analysis by inference and reasoning alone, though it does admit intuition or *śabda* as a means of knowledge where perception and inference are inadequate; it, moreover, admits knowledge alone as a means of release from suffering, rejecting ritual categorically. Vaiśeṣika theory, on the other hand, proceeds by *intuitively* positing the six ultimate universals (or categories), as also it admits ritual and other forms of action as contributing to progress towards the highest good if not essential to it. We may, however, say that the Sāṁkhya-Vaiśeṣika world-view conjointly forms the barometer of the rationality of classical Indian culture, other theoretic systems being consistent with it, or, at least one of these, and manifesting more refined rationality. Thus, for example, the grammatic theory is consistent maximally with the Vaiśeṣika view of reality and minimally with the Buddhist view.
11. Panini, *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, edited by M. P. Misra, Chowkhamba Vidya Bhawan, Varanasi, 1967.
12. In fact there are two parts of the theory: the one explaining the origin of word and its meaning and the other laying bare the underlying regularity in linguistic usage. The former theory employs intuition in positing a *śabda brahma* as an underlying reality, giving rise to sounds and their meanings. According to this theory sound-energy has various definite manifestations—unheard and unuttered—before it acquires the level of utterance. It is by this theory that *swaras* and *varṇas* as basic sound-units are posited.
13. Charak, *Charak Saṃhitā*, Gulabkunwarba Ayurvedic Society, Jamnagar, 1949.
14. V. Shekhawat, 'Art of Theory Construction in Charak Samhita', *Ind. Jr. Hist. Sc.*, 21(2), 1986, pp. 99–112.
15. Maya, *Sūrya Siddhānta*, commentary by M. P. Srivastava, Ratnakumari Swadhya Samsthan, Allahabad, 1982.
16. In applied astronomy, we find ritual, 'curative therapy' and mathematical computations coexisting. Thus, planetary gods are to be propitiated; wearing gems and metals and appropriate colours and chanting *mantras* corresponding to each planet has a curative effect on the ills caused by it in certain states; but when the closeness or nearness of a planet is to be worked out, it transforms into a natural object and becomes amenable to mathematical computations. A similar attitude may be noticed in some aspects of later science of medicine centring on the use of mercury which is both worshipped and administered in the body for curative purposes.
17. Early Buddhist theory was dualistic, like Sāṁkhya theory—it proposed a dualism of *citta* and *bhūtas*. But it refused to accept anything as permanent and changeless. Yet it accepted the principles of causation and *karma* as universal. The purpose of life is to attain *nirvāna* whereby the process of change stops and suffering ends as the source itself is extinguished giving rise to no further origination or emanation of succeeding moment from the preceding one.
18. V. Shekhawat, 'Some Epistemological Trends in Philosophy of Science', *Diogenes*, 128, 1984 pp. 77-102; G. L. Pandit, *Structure and Growth of Scientific Knowledge*.
19. V. Shekhawat, in *Diogenes*, 144, 1989.
20. Of the Greek world-views only the Atomistic, Platonic and Aristotelian may be said to be systematic. The Atomists sought to explain the origin of living and the lifeless world in terms of eternal atoms in eternal motion. Atomistic ethics explains the good and just life by means of a harmony between atomic motions in man, which therefore is the ideal to be achieved in the present and only life governed by causal necessity.

    The Platonic world view sees eternal universals or forms as the fundamental constituents (or sources) of the ever-changing world of experience consisting of particulars. Humans are eternal souls that have strayed away from the world of forms into the world of particulars and have to attain that status again by reactivating the knowledge of forms by means of a virtuous life that sharpens reason, which alone can spur the reactivation. Acquiring such status and state of knowledge is the highest good.

    The Aristotelian world-view accepts the principle of four-fold causation as the governing principle of the world which has originated from five eternal elements. Change or generation and corruption are explained by the matter-form principle so that everything living and lifeless tends towards a pure form. To know is to know by means of causes and causes are isomorphic with reasons. A life of knowledge by reasoning is the highest good, more so because it gives happiness not obtainable by sense-experience.
21. Euclidean geometry is a science that employs purely rational methods of theory generation and appraisal. From common notions or axioms and definitions as *archai*, it generates, postulates and thence the theorems by pure deduction which are established by the method of proof. The theorems deal with ideal forms constructed from ideal points and lines which, under suitable interpretation apply to concrete objects of the world.

    Archimedesean mechanics is a science of simple but ideal machines such as the lever, balance, pulley, etc., which employs Euclidean geometry for explaining their mechanism.

    Ptolemaic astronomy is the culmination of Greek astronomy that explains the positions and motions of planets on the hypothesis of a geocentric solar system, employing mostly Euclidean geometric methods of theoretic construction and experienced movements of planets for theory appraisal.

    Hippocratic medicine is based on the therapeutic theory giving a causal explanation of disease and the methods of its cure on the basis of the bile-taste theory which are empirically observable.
22. Galilean-Newtonian mechanics is a continuation of Archimedesean mechanics on the one hand and Copernican and Keplerian astronomy on the other hand. It explains earthly and heavenly motions in a single theory that employs integral and differential calculus in addition to Euclidean geometrical methods of theory construction; experimental methods are employed for theory appraisal.

Darwinian biology is a theory of evolution of living species (plants and animals) employing a large mass of empirical data of varieties of species and environments. The two basic principles of the theory that establish evolution as a *natural* process are the well-known principle of natural selection and the principle of survival of the fittest by struggle for existence.

Quantum mechanics is a theory of the dynamics of microscopic particles as fundamental constituents of the world of experience. It employs the probability theory and the uncertainty principle for theory construction whereas theory appraisal is effected by microscopic observation of probable positions and motions of fundamental particles.

Discussion and comments

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADVAITA VEDĀNTA AS A SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY

When we examine the rise and fall of philosophical schools, whether in European or Asian contexts, we regularly find, it seems to me, a pattern which may be said to have five major phases. The time taken for a school to pass through all five phases varies widely. Some schools rise and fall in a matter of a few decades, perhaps less. Consider the school of logical positivism, or perhaps we should better say, reconstructive analytical philosophy, which had its inception not much before Frege at the end of the nineteenth century, and appears to decline from Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* in the 1940s: a period, then, of fifty years of life. Again, the Cartesian philosophy originated in the seventeenth century with Descartes but soon disappealed as such, replaced by variations as widely divergent as continental rationalism and British empiricism, each of which arose less than a century after Descartes' *Meditations*. On the other hand, there are other, particularly the more ancient schools—e.g. that of Aristotle and the Peripatetics—which arguably maintain themselves for a period of several centuries. Thomism, which originated with Aquinas, lives on intermittently and is alive today as a school of philosophy.

Of course, these generalizations depend essentially on what our conception of a 'school' of philosophy is. In each of the above examples some will argue that the rubric ('logical positivism', 'Cartesianism', 'Thomism') is the result of confused thinking, of mixed categories, and that some other historical unit, or none at all, is the more meaningful one. What are the marks of a 'school' of philosophy?

I should list, among relevant features which indicate a school, first, its having one or more *fundamental insights*—an allegiance to which, binds together those who subscribe to the school's doctrines whatever variations they may otherwise be able to discern amongst themselves. Secondly, these insights must be taken, both by the followers themselves and by others, to demarcate the position of the school from positions taken by others. Thirdly, its self-awareness as a school should be historically discernible; there will usually be institutional factors which serve to bring the theoretical insights and commitments into relation with life pursuits.

These three characteristics do not serve to settle once and for all questions of the sort I alluded to a moment ago, for example, about whether the

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proper way to view the Cartesian philosophy is as inclusive or exclusive of movements, such as occasionalism, rationalism and empiricism, that followed Descartes. But then, perhaps these questions do not much matter for my present purpose. For let us allow that a school may comprise sub-schools, and that schools may overlap each other. Still, one can discuss the development and deterioration of schools while taking into account such further complexities of their identification.

In India, even more than in the West, philosophy is organized by schools. There are fundamental insights, recognized as such by followers and by rivals as demarcating the position of that school from others, and these schools are, or were, in every case connected with institutional mechanisms by which the school was maintained and made a living reality to its members. Classically, these institutional supports included traditional training grounds and methods, ranging from a single teacher-pupil arrangement through *āśramas* and *maṭhas*—perhaps a small group of teachers and a larger set of pupils—to large universities such as Taxilā and Nālandā in ancient times. Other support was provided in many cases by religious affiliation to temples or monastic orders. Various features of religious organization were assembled around the fundamental insights of the philosophy, and worship paid to the founders, divine and human, who discovered those insights and/or promulgated them.

All of the three features of philosophical schools that I mentioned can easily be seen to apply to the great classical Hindu *darśanas* (as they are now-a-days termed) of Indian thought. These included Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya and Yoga, Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Vedānta, each of which is born around fundamental insights taken as distinctive by followers and rivals, and each of which was passed on through traditional institutions of learning. The features also apply to the various types of Vedānta, such as the Advaita of Śaṅkara, Viśiṣṭa-Advaita of Rāmānuja, Dvaita of Madhva, and the myriad others of which perhaps those associated with the names of Nimbārka and Vallabha are the best known. It also applies to the many sectarian philosophies such as those associated with Kashmir *Śaivism*, Śaiva *Siddhānta Vīraśaivism*, Bengal *Vaiṣṇavism*, etc. Jain philosophy is identifiable in these terms also, as is Buddhist philosophy generally, and some of the main schools within Buddhism such as Mādhyamika, Vijñānavāda, *Theravāda*, though there are special problems connected with the precise limitations of some of these schools because of our lack of clarity about the precise nature of their fundamental insights.

It has been regularly pointed out that in India philosophical schools have a much longer life than in the West. Indeed, institutional support for most if not all of the schools just named still exists today, if only to a minimal degree, and a survey of Indian philosophy of today can still to a great extent be organized in terms of schools by which such a survey would have been, and sometimes was, carried out 500 years ago. (For an example, look at the *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* of Mādhavācārya.) Nevertheless, it seems to me that we can find the same pattern of rise and fall in Indian schools of philosophy that I suggested we can find in Western schools. The difference is not so much in the patterns of rise and fall, but in the Indian versus the Western attitude toward a school which has 'fallen', and is now in a state of decline. In India, such schools are maintained; in the West they tend to be forgotten. This says something about comparative attitudes in India and the West toward progress, toward whether ultimate value is to be found in the future or by a rediscovery of the past. But this is not my concern at the moment.

I suggested there are five phases in the 'life' of a philosophical school. What are they?

First, and obviously, there is the 'Discovery Stage', where the Fundamental Insights of the school first appear to its founders. Very frequently, though not always, this stage is identified with the experience and work of a single great individual. And where we have sufficient historical information, there is a strong tendency to try to find the single individual to whom the credit should be given. Thus Platonism, Aristotelianism, Thomism, Cartesianism, Buddhism, Jainism and many others, are actually named after their founders. In the case of some of the Indian schools, a founder is invented and made responsible for the composition of a basic text—characteristically a set of aphoristic utterances in which the fundamental insights are briefly set forth. Such seems to have been the case with Nyāya (Gautama), Vaiśeṣika (Kaṇāda) and Sāṃkhya (Kapila). In the case of Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta, since a characteristic doctrine there involves the beginninglessness of language, the origination of their fundamental insights is not credited to a person—being embedded in the natural things and represented in language—but those who first represented it linguistically are sometimes named, such as the sages Yājñavalkya and Uddālaka in the older *Upaniṣads*, or Jaimini for Pūrvamīmāṃsā. In most cases a founder is identified—probably not always with great accuracy—and the entire credit for arriving at the fundamental insight goes to him, to the disparagement of others who in some cases should undoubtedly get as much, or more, credit. We find this the case for Mādhyamika Buddhism, the Fundamental Insight of which is credited to Nāgārjuna, though it is present extensively in the *Prajñapāramitā* literature; for Viśiṣṭa Advaita, where Rāmānuja was far from being the first to recognize the point of the school; and for Advaita, where Śaṅkarācārya has received all the credit to the detriment of Maṇḍana Miśra, or for that matter Gauḍapāda.

In fact, this first stage, of discovery, characteristically takes some time, and the combined efforts of several persons over that period. The first stage of the histories of the Hindu *darśanas* seems in every case to have spanned several centuries. We cannot be sure just how far back the beginnings of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya and Yoga, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta should be traced, but it seems likely they all had their origins in the thought of pre-

Christian era India. The *sūtra* or aphorisms which constitute the supposed beginnings of these systems are actually redactions of views already in place. Indeed, it is a problem how to distinguish any precise point at which this first stage of discovery should be said to end and the second stage, of development, begin. However, it is of no great importance to find such a precise point; indeed, the stages I am delineating are not so much chronological periods, as they are overlapping tendencies as displayed in the literature of the schools.

In the second or development stage, the Fundamental Insight begins to be set forth in a self-conscious way as doctrine. Most frequently, this stage finds its writers occupied with the following sorts of things.

First, there is usually a concerted attempt at legitimization. Only in unusual circumstances will the early propounders of an insight attempt to divorce it from all that went before, even though the Fundamental Insight may indeed have been revolutionary and represented as such. Rather, the attempt is to show the continuity of the Fundamental Insight with the features in prevailing or preceding ways of thinking. There may be appeals to authorities likely to be accepted by one's audience. One can easily guess that if such legitimization does not occur, the Fundamental Insight may fall on deaf ears and so be lost to posterity; indeed, one may well opine that there are many such Insights that have been lost for that reason.

Secondly, the style of development is characteristically unsystematic. In India, it frequently took the form of commentaries composed on the *sūtras* in which the Fundamental Insight was taken to be formulated. In the West, this was sometimes the case, depending on current notions of philosophical style, but even where it was not, there are only infrequently found early attempts to present a full-blown systematic account of the world keyed to the Fundamental Insight. This is partly because of the requirements of style posed by the previously mentioned aim: one who is desirous of legitimization will not normally gain his ends by publishing a self-contained tract in which the accepted precepts are compendiously overthrown in favour of unfamiliar corollaries of the new Fundamental Insight.

Thirdly, though the exposition is unsystematic and the continuity with the accepted wisdom of the age stressed, there is little attempt to give due attention and respect to the nuances and variations possible within the limits of the Fundamental Insight. To attempt this would spoil the force of the exposition, the purpose of which is to show the superiority of the Fundamental Insight over its predecessors' insights. To emphasize or even spend much time on internal variations within the school, blunts the cutting edge of the development. There may be implicit or even explicit rehearsals of arguments with opposing points of view, but these are likely to be guarded. Polemics, though it may be presaged here, is not strategically the best line as yet, and for the same reason, attention to internal variations, which may

suggest to the audience the possibility of internal inconsistency, or worst of all, squabbling, is minimized.

Fourthly, the standpoint of the writer of a development stage treatise is likely to be that of a specialist addressing an audience of non-specialist pupils from whom the Fundamental Insight is being elicited in the fashion made famous by Plato/Socrates when he elicited the Pythagorean Theorem from the slave boy. That being the purpose, there will be less drawing of hard lines of definition and distinction, and more general characterizations of the Fundamental Insight in ways which enable the reader to warm to it and make it his own. Arguments and definitions, then, the standard counters in systematization, are only sparingly adduced at this stage.

Fifthly and finally, there will likely be an attempt to relate the theoretical aspects of the Fundamental Insight to practical concerns and aims, and specifically to those concerns and aims that others are not yet convinced of as worthwhile in themselves or as ends to be achieved. The emphasis will, therefore, be on pragmatics. The Fundamental Insight will be justified by its being shown to be relevant to accepted concerns. Though the eventual upshot will be to specify new categories in which a world-view incorporating the Fundamental Insight can be couched—categories which will then come to replace those in current use—the writer of a development stage work will avoid addressing himself to that aspect of the matter explicitly, contenting himself with hinting at the possibilities for clarification and the new horizons of explanation stemming from the acceptance of the Fundamental Insight. Thus there are certain categories and concepts, whose recognition is required by the nature of the Fundamental Insight itself (and the exigencies of exposition) that the author in this stage will work with—and other categories and concepts, related to but different from those in use in the rival established systems, that he will avoid. The strategy is, first, to make the Fundamental Insight plausible, indeed compelling; then the system will develop naturally.

As the school becomes established by these methods, transition to a third stage occurs, which I shall call the polemical stage. We can usefully compare the five features of the development stage with five features of the polemical stage which show some similarities but mainly differences to the preceding ones.

First, whereas the development of the school emphasized continuity with the previously established views in order not to frighten off possible converts, in the polemical stage there is a concerted attempt to distinguish the school's position on all relevant matters from those of others, both from the previous establishment as well as any rivals which have sprung up to challenge the Fundamental Insight. The Fundamental Insight no longer needs to be legitimized, but it does need to be defended. Consequently, in literature characteristic of this stage it is the priorities of the *opponents*

addressed, and the contrasting views of the school, which dominate the *organization* of the work. For the same reason, great effort may be made to marshal the best possible case for the opponent in order to gain greater credibility for the superiority of one's own school, so that the reader realizes the strength of the arguments and counter arguments that stem from the standpoint of the Fundamental Insight in overcoming the opponent's formidable-sounding case.

Secondly, the *style* in which these polemical works are written, is a function of the order of the arguments offered—of that order as conceived by the author. It may reflect the priorities of the opponents, especially if the opponents are conceived to be only of one rival school, or it may be organized according to the categories now offered by the school as preferable to the traditional categories of the established view or views of the rival(s). Or it may be organized in a more traditional manner, say, as a commentary, but with the emphasis now shifting from the exegesis of the Fundamental Insight to the introduction and clarification of distinctions designed to round out the position into one which promises an adequate account of the entire subject-matter to which the philosophy addresses itself.

Thirdly, there is likely to be a greater self-awareness of the nature of and possibilities in the school's views taken as a system, i.e. as an interconnected set of concepts which, as a whole, explain things better than any rival does or could. Thus in this stage we find more attention paid not only to the specific historistic accounts of rival views—so that references are made by name to authors and works of other schools—but there is also more awareness of the flexibility of one's own school's doctrines, of the variations within the views of those who developed the view in the second stage, and of the possible alternative ways of making sense of things while remaining within the limits of the Fundamental Insight.

Fourthly, the standpoint is not now that of a teacher to a pupil, but rather that of a debater. The purpose of the literature is to win the argument, and by so doing to prove the supremacy of the Fundamental Insight. Thus, in a sense, both opponents and *aficionados* are addressed, the former explicitly and the latter implicitly. The arguments are such as should convince the unbeliever; in any case, they will reinforce the believer in case of any doubts he may have. As a debater, the writer in this stage makes whatever distinctions he needs which are consistent with his other views, and he will develop definitions to keep these distinctions clear in his and his reader's minds.

Fifthly, whereas in the development stage, the approach was dominated by practical concerns, in the polemical stage the emphasis is clearly on theory. The writer is rationalizing the Fundamental Insight by showing its superiority through argument. Special attention is paid to what may appear to its detractors to be its most vulnerable aspects. There is every reason to glory in the ability of the system to handle all the topics that the rival views treat, to delineate just which concepts of the opposition are totally wrong-

headed, which ones are thus partially mistaken, which ones can be incorporated into the school's categories and by what sorts of revisions and excisions. The ultimate purpose of the Fundamental Insight is taken for granted but is not at this stage much on one's mind. The tensions in this polemical stage however inevitably lead (so my hypothesis suggests) to a fourth stage, the systematic state.

Here, first attention swings back from the opposition to the inner workings of the school's doctrines themselves. If the work of the previous stages has been done well, the school is itself now the establishment. It no longer requires legitimization nor defence. What it now requires is justification of another sort, in which its future stature is guaranteed against overthrow by new insights to come. The task, then, is on the one hand to strip the doctrines down to their essentials and to provide handbooks with which to instruct future generations in the system, and secondly, by demonstrating that the system is rigorously accurate, adequate, consistent and economical, to induce conviction on all sides, that will carry such weight in the future as to preclude doubts, at least among those who are intelligent enough to understand the system.

Secondly, the style of treatises stemming from this stage is, as one would expect, systematic, not expository or polemical. There may well be expository and polemical material embellishing the systematic material, but it is the latter around which the work gathers itself. And the sense of 'system' here is indicated by the interconnectedness of definitions. The organization tends to be dictated not by pragmatic considerations, not by the order of things conceived in rival accounts, but rather by the connections among the definitions of the key concepts in the school itself. Before, technical concepts and definitions were, as it were, forced on the school by the exigencies of exposition and argument; now there is a stripping down of all the concepts—whether those accompanying the Fundamental Insight or those which came to the fore during the polemical stage—to a bare minimum.

Thirdly, though the exposition of the system may continue to be in the terms of a dialogue between opponent and author, thus continuing the appearance of polemics, this style is now made subservient to the clarification and explanation of the technical concepts and their definitions. It is a springboard for demonstrating the interconnectedness, and so the systematicity, of the system. Likewise, though variations corresponding to factional opinions within the school may be introduced on occasion, the general thrust is toward streamlining the system in such a way that only one of the rival internal views prevails—being the one called for by the rest of the system's definitions and their connections. There is once again, as in the second stage of development, little concern for the details of the opposition or, for that matter, for the details of development within the system. But whereas in the development stage this was because the Fundamental Insight was what mattered, in the systematic stage the same kind of indifference to

detail arises for a different reason—because of the requirements of system-building.

Fourthly, the stance of the writer is neither that of teacher to pupil, nor of debator. Rather it is that of the scholastic systematizer. Definitions are central, arguments and explanations ancillary. The works produced from this stage may be shorter or longer depending on the extent to which the author wishes to combine systematic economy with expository clarity and polemical argument. Thus it may be difficult to place a given work entirely or unreservedly in one stage rather than another. But the extent to which a work belongs in the systematic stage depends on the extent to which its author is guided, consciously or unconsciously, by a concern for satisfaction of systematic criteria of success—accuracy, adequacy, consistency and economy, as mentioned earlier.

Fifthly, inasmuch as the concerns are oriented toward the criteria of systematic success just mentioned, and not to the practical concerns which led to the Fundamental Insight in the first place, the systematic stage is super-theoretical, not pragmatic. Still, it may be argued, and I think correctly, the entire systematic edifice is intended to contribute to the final justification of the Fundamental Insight, and thus its necessary triumph consists in its providing the best means for getting the ends desired, whatever they are. The systematic stage, while super-theoretical, is also super-pragmatic.

The fifth and final stage in the history of a school is the stage of decline. The decline may take several forms. The school may be overthrown by a new Fundamental Insight; this is the kind of case which has been viewed by Thomas Kuhn as constituting a paradigm shift and which he illustrates by adducing certain key turning points in the history of science. In such a case, the school in decline will merely cease to produce any more literature, to have any more believers. In short, it will terminate as a school. Or, the community may lose interest in the purpose which the school proposed to serve. Or, for other reasons, the school's doctrines may be muzzled, its members successfully persecuted, or just ignored. Or, the school may be merged into another and lose its identity. In any case, the termination is not the decline. The decline is the period, however long or short, following the systematization and preceding termination. During the decline stage nothing much happens, or at any rate, nothing new and different. Old territory may be explored, introductions written, specific small points discussed and clarified or obfuscated. This is the period of 'scholasticism' in that sense of the term which suggests degeneration and decay. It may take the form of gradual or sudden mergence with other schools, of a watering-down process in which the distinctions from other schools are disregarded, or of the development of a gap between the philosopher and the Fundamental Insight such that we find the members of the school doing history rather than contributing further to the system itself.

These five stages, then, are proposed as calibrations of the life-history of a philosophical school. I should emphasize that I am not claiming that every school's history displays all five stages, or that the stages are so patently discrete that one can easily discover which stage the school is in at a given point in time. There can be, and frequently there are disputes about such questions. However, the specification of the detailed features of each stage should help one to make a case, as a historian, that a school is in that stage at a certain point in its history. To show this I need to discuss some illustrations.

I shall make these illustrations brief, and once more, I realize that the details of classification in each case are, or may by, controversial. Part of the controversy turns on just what constitutes a particular school with an accepted rubric; another part turns on which authors and works belong to which of the stages I have distinguished; still another source of controversy may arise as to whether a given school is presently in decline or indeed is defunct. My present purpose is not served by debating these points about my examples: these examples are offered merely to suggest that it is not far-fetched to view the history of a school in my way.

Let me begin with the 'school' which in America we sometimes call 'analytic philosophy' or 'philosophical analysis', more specifically 'rational reconstruction' or the 'ideal language' movement. By and large, it is this (as contrasted with the movement of 'ordinary language philosophy' associated with the later Wittgenstein) that is discussed in books on philosophical analysis. Its Fundamental Insight may be taken to be the idea that symbolic logic (perhaps among other things) provides the key to the development of an improved way of discovering and expressing truths, so that philosophical progress, and indeed ultimate success in philosophy, stems from precise analyses of concepts using the tools of mathematical logic. Though it is quite arguable that this Fundamental Insight was founded prior to the end of the nineteenth century, it is now fashionable to consider Gottlob Frege to be the first champion of the movement, so we may associate him with the discovery phase of this movement.

The acknowledged master of the development stage that follows is Bertrand Russell. Reading, for example, his *Problems of Philosophy* one can see the attempts at legitimization by tracing aspects of the Fundamental Insight back to more classical empiricist, rationalist and even ancient origins. The style is unpolemical and unsystematic, the conception of where the movement is going amorphous. The triumph of this stage is the putting forward of certain paradigmatic analyses which, by their alleged success, show the virtues of the approach discovered in the Fundamental Insight. Of these paradigmatic analyses, the best known is Russell's theory of descriptions, although there are numerous others, such as the theory of types, which are offered in the same spirit.

The third stage, of polemics, is found in the Vienna Circle positivists, and in England in A.J. Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic*. These writers attacked metaphysics as practised by the absolute idealists. They emphasized distinctions rather than similarities, were self-consciously aware both of the contrasts between their approach and that of their rivals, as well as of the varieties of points of view within their own school. The style is argumentative. The Fundamental Insight becomes identified with the positivists' push toward a unified science.

As for the fourth stage, the systematic stage, its best-known document is Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, but a less well-known example is to be found in Rudolf Carnap's *Die Logische Aufbau der Welt*, a work in turn emulated and improved upon by Nelson Goodman in his *Structure of Appearance*. In these works a system is created, an interlocking set of definitions which is consciously intended to provide an holistic explanation of a subject-matter answering to the criteria of successful system-making. In the school presently being discussed, the three works I have just mentioned are probably the most clearcut instances of system construction, but there is a sizable literature that concerns aspects of these systems, and of others like them but with differences brought out in specific discussions of key points. That is, there are discussions of what alternative systems, reflecting the Fundamental Insight, would be like if they were to be constructed.

With Wittgenstein's change of mind—or heart—the fifth stage, of decline, may be said to begin. The pattern of decline in this case combines a kind of revolution, that of the ordinary language as of Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin and others, with a mergence (in this case with pragmatism) through such figures as Clarence Irving Lewis, Willard Van Orman Quine, and Nelson Goodman. Even Carnap himself contributes significantly to this merger, and thus to this phase. When I say that this group contributes to the decline, I should emphasize that what I mean is that the allegiance to the Fundamental Insight wanes, not that the philosophers are themselves deficient. The Fundamental Insight, as I explicated it, involved a certain programme which it was hoped would lead to an improved way of discovering and expressing truths through dependence on symbolic logic and precise analyses of concepts. Ordinary language philosophy revolted against this dependence on symbolic logic, and the pragmatist tendencies soften the precision of certain key concepts (e.g. 'analyticity' at the hands of Quine; the positivist insistence on the difference between natural and normative concepts). The resulting amalgam may or may not represent an improvement; in any case, its Fundamental Insight has shifted to such an extent that it is hard to say whether the school is in decline or had terminated. And this, it seems to me, is typical of the decline of schools in general; it is the exception, rather than the rule, when we can identify a school that has ceased altogether, in the sense of having no adherents whatsoever.

Speaking of pragmatism, one can find my five stages exemplified in that school also. Once again, it is unclear where the Fundamental Insight is first formulated, but it is clearly formulated by Charles Sanders Peirce. This Fundamental Insight, put in its simplest form, is the notion that the meaning of a concept is the difference it makes to action. That thought is developed (the second stage) by William James, George Herbert Mead, John Dewey, F.S.C. Schiller and others in the early twentieth century. James and Dewey, in particular, write in their later years in polemical vein (stage three), e.g. when James addresses his critics in *The Meaning of Truth*, and in Dewey's many polemical exercises in the 1920s and 1930s such as *The Quest for Certainty*, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, and so on. The systematic stage is exemplified in Charles Morris's work, and in C.I. Lewis's *Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*. Goodman's *Structure of Appearance* may also count as a systematic work in the pragmatist tradition, one in which the confluence noted above between pragmatism and philosophical analysis is well illustrated. Again, it is unclear whether pragmatism is in a decline or not; in a certain way it has received a shot in the arm from the later Wittgensteinian doctrine of meaning as use, and one might well picture the dominant strain in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy as combining into a single amalgam elements of all three of the following: philosophical analysis, pragmatism, and ordinary language philosophy. It is difficult for one whose own convictions are involved to assess the extent to which the Fundamental Insight of present-day Anglo-American philosophy is itself an uncertain combination of these three schools, or whether there is or is about to be a recognition of a new Fundamental Insight which has its source, in some manner or other, in the Fundamental Insights of these schools.

I have cited philosophical analysis and pragmatism as examples mainly because they are the schools I know best outside of Indian philosophy. They are also schools which flourish today, or did so recently, and thus it is relatively easy to appreciate their Fundamental Insights and stages. When one turns to older schools one has more difficulty in identifying what should count as a 'school', in part because it is no longer known to us in an immediate way what the participants in the tradition thought of as the real key to their allegiance. For example, if Cartesianism is a school, as reported to us by historians, it is either a very vague movement which comprehends both British empiricists such as Locke, Berkeley and Hume, as well as the continental rationalists such as Spinoza and Leibniz, or else it is a very brief movement, or better perhaps, three distinct brief movements, one taking up Descartes's thoughts on physics (Regius, Clauberg, Huygens), another his positive epistemological notions (Malebranche, Foucher, Arnauld), and a third his metaphysical thoughts (de la Forge, Cordemoy, Geulincx, the occasionalists). Thomism, another alleged 'school', waxes and wanes at

least three times over the centuries, and it is hard to tell whether one should treat these as three distinct schools or as one overall school.

I shall not try to perform further exercises to test my hypothesis in Western philosophy concerning the five-stage process characterizing the rise and fall of philosophical schools. The purpose I do wish to put it to, to which I will now turn, is to give some shape to the history of Advaita Vedānta through distinguishing these five stages within it. I should perhaps conclude here by reiterating and emphasizing that I hold no particular store for these five stages, and certainly not for the specific characteristics of each stage that I have distinguished. I suspect those better acquainted with the broad expanse of the history of philosophy will be able to improve on my suggestions in a number of ways. The tool I have fashioned here is intended to shed light on Indian philosophy, which is organized in schools to a degree significantly greater than in Western thought. Even so, the purpose is mainly to provide handles on which to hang the names and contributions of a number of Indian writers, handles without which it is difficult to appreciate their place in the tradition they represent.

I turn to consider the history of that school of Indian philosophy which is regularly identified by contemporary Indian intellectuals as the most powerful among the several viewpoints (*darśana*, or schools) into which Indian philosophy is regularly classified. The name of the school is Advaita Vedānta. Its founder is regularly said to be India's most famous and powerful philosopher, Śaṅkarācārya, who probably lived in the late seventh and early eighth centuries A.D.

There is no question that Advaita, as I shall refer to that school for short, is and has been for many centuries a school. Earlier I listed three features of a philosophical school: first, that it pays allegiance to one or more Fundamental Insights; secondly, that these Insights are taken to demarcate the school's position as distinct from other positions; and thirdly, that its self-awareness as a school should be discernible by organizations and institutions around which the activities of the philosophers and their students and followers tend to revolve. Advaita satisfies these criteria. I shall in a moment outline the fundamental insights it promulgates, and at length describe the stages in the processes of development, defence and systematization it went through. As for the third feature, there have been since at least Śaṅkara's time, perhaps earlier, teaching institutions, called *maṭhas* or *āśramas*, committed to instructing solely in Advaita in some cases, or committed to Advaita while serving other further goals in others. A famous Brahmanical tradition claims to descend from Śaṅkara, who is credited with having founded four (or perhaps more) *pīṭhas*, central *maṭhas*, in the four corners of the subcontinent of India, and who is also credited with initiating a famous monastic line, that of the 'ten-named ones' or *Dasanāmin*. Though there is some doubt, at least in my mind, that Śaṅkara the philosopher did these things, there is evidence that a tradition enshrining the tenets of Advaita did exist in those days, whoever was actually responsible (if indeed it was any one person) for establishing these organizational accompaniments. And it is evident that a line (*paramparā*) of *guru*-pupil relationships extends from Śaṅkara the philosopher through many centuries of instruction.

However, the Fundamental Insights of Advaita are clearly not Śaṅkara's invention, as he himself insists. They go back to time immemorial, probably at least to the period of the *Upaniṣads*, nowadays dated by scholars as stemming from the early part of the first millennium B.C. The oldest *Upaniṣads* make pronouncements which Advaita philosophers interpret as enunciating their Fundamental Insight. While other schools of Vedānta question that interpretation, it seems reasonably clear that the following characterization of the Advaita interpretation is known to some writers by the beginning of the Christian era, if not well before.

Advaitins, whatever else they believe, are committed to the following four propositions, which I shall take as the Fundamental Insights of Advaita. First, there is only one Reality (*sat*), which they call *brahman*, and it is unchanging, undifferentiated, free from any distinctions which might separate It from another Real—since there is no other Real. Secondly, this Reality, *brahman*, is pure consciousness (*cit*), the real Self. Thirdly, the differences that we observe and conceive as distinguishing things, persons, etc. from others are imposed upon our consciousness by or through a power called *avidyā* or *māyā*. Both the power and its apparent products are not real. Fourthly, it is the removal of this *avidyā* (literally, 'lack of understanding'; popularly translated 'ignorance') through self-knowledge that constitutes liberation, the supreme purpose of sentient beings, and this liberation is bliss (*ānanda*).

The basic terminology in which these propositions are couched is in place at the time of the *Upaniṣads* The so-called 'great sentences' (*mahāvākya*) of Advaita are Upaniṣadic utterances which enunciate one or another aspect of the propositions just summarized. For example, 'That art thou' (*tat tvam asi*) enunciates the second (the identification of *brahman* with *ātman*), while '*satyam anantaṃ brahma*' expounds the first point, that *brahman* is Real, as well as implying the third and fourth points, that differences (which have an end) are due to that *avidyā*, whose removal unveils the pure endless *brahman* (whose unveiling amounts to the realization of the bliss of liberation).

Whether the Advaita propositions represent the correct interpretation of the message of the *Upaniṣads* is of course a much-debated point over which the various Vedāntic philosophies diverge. The very term 'Vedānta' means the concluding portions of the *Vedas*, i.e. the *Upaniṣads*. Every Vedāntist, in the proper sense of the term at least, is engaged in exegesis of the *Upaniṣads*' message. Vedānta is sometimes termed 'Uttaramīmāṃsā', that is, the later exegesis, for that reason. Like the Pūrvamīmāṃsā on earlier exegesis, Vedāntins apply principles of exegetical interpretation to

Śruti, that is, the Vedic scriptural literature. This process of exegesis has been going on ever since the time the *Upaniṣads* were enunciated (Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins deny it was ever composed). By a time shortly after the first century A.D. we know of writers by name, whose works are now lost, who developed an interpretation of the *Upaniṣads* featuring the propositions which make up the Advaitin's Fundamental Insight.

The earliest extant document which clearly expounds Advaita tenets is attributed to Gauḍapāda, a personage whom Śaṅkara twice refers to as his teacher's teacher. Gauḍapāda's *Kārikās* on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* develop the Advaita Fundamental Insight, though not without some puzzling features, one of the most notorious being the extensive use of Buddhist terminology in the fourth and final chapter of the work. It is, I believe, appropriate to consider Gauḍapāda's *Kārikās* as the first known work in stage two, the development stage of Advaita. It is clear that Gauḍapāda didn't discover Advaita. He considers himself to be expounding the doctrine of the *Upaniṣads*, and we hear elsewhere of Advaitins prior to Gauḍapāda. The Buddhistic nature of the latter portion of his work might be considered as pertinent to one of the features I have associated with this stage, namely, the attempt to legitimize. It is possible, that is, that Gauḍapāda is addressing an audience of Buddhists or of those influenced by Buddhism, and the use of Buddhist terminology may be calculated to indicate continuity of Advaita with Buddhist ways of thinking. The *Kārikās* display the other marks of stage two to which I alluded; it is unsystematic in style, disinterested in internal varieties of Advaita thought and yet not excessively polemical. There is in it a spirit of leading the listener or the reader on from his acceptance of more general notions—the Buddhist onces mentioned, and in the earlier portion of the work, some very ancient and somewhat mysterious technical terms for various aspects of the cosmos. And there is no attempt to develop new categories or distinctions. Gauḍapāda's purpose is to convince, not to defend or systematize.

A large problem in assessing Śaṅkara's own place in his system is created by the difficulty of identifying his authentic writings. Recent scholarship, by Paul Hacker and Sengaku Mayeda in particular, has suggested that only a small number of the hundreds of works ascribed by tradition to Śaṅkara were in actuality composed by the same person. The paradigmatic work, by definition that of the philosopher Śaṅkara, is the *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*, a commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras* which are themselves a condensation of the Upaniṣadic teachings the authority of which is claimed by each of the several Vedāntic schools. Hacker and Mayeda's work strongly suggests that Śaṅkara wrote a few commentaries on the older *Upaniṣads* and probably portions of a treatise entitled *Upadeśasāhasrī*, 'a thousand teachings'.

Confining ourselves to these authentic works, we can find various features of Śaṅkara's work which indicate his role as a developer of the school. We find there various strategies for linking Advaita with traditional elements,

strategies which add up to a penchant for legitimization. First and foremost, Śaṅkara is a Mīmāṃsaka. His concern is to interpret the scriptural texts so as to reflect the Fundamental Insight of Advaita. In doing this, he utilizes the exegetical rules developed by Pūrvamīmāṃsā. Though his main themes—repeated almost obsessively throughout his writings—is to urge that the *karmakāṇḍa*, the section of scripture enjoining actions, and the *jñānakāṇḍa*, the section providing knowledge are actually aimed at different audiences, he is in no way a radical as far as his attitude toward scriptural authority goes. His position is that the Advaitin insights are precisely those that the *Upaniṣads* express.

In other ways Śaṅkara is also a legitimizer, not an innovator. At the opening of the *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*, as has been noticed by many scholars, Śaṅkara begins by contrasting the self and the not-self in a way which is reminiscent of Sāṃkhya. When he talks of causality it is in terms of *pariṇāma* or transformation, a technical Sāṃkhya term describing how the basic stuff of the universe, *prakṛti*, transforms itself into the mental and material evolutes which constitute the Sāṃkhya scheme of categories. And in so far as he talks at all about mundane matters having to do with the makeup of the empirical world, his language is largely borrowed from Sāṃkhya, a habit adopted in turn by practically all Advaitins from his time forward. It is only gradually that he shows us the vast gulf that actually separates Advaita from Sāṃkhya.

Another aspect of his conservatism concerns his attitude toward the nature of the *saṃnyāsin*, or the renunciate. Hindu tradition identifies the *saṃnyāsin* as the fourth of four stages of an ideal life, the stage following studentship, householdership and retirement to the forest. In that fourth state the ideal man is held by tradition to turn his thoughts to liberation and to abandon all his belongings (except those required for modesty and cleanliness) as a symbol of his non-attachment to desires. The *saṃnyāsin* is the holy man, the wandering mendicant still found in the Indian countryside today. The traditional notion of this holy man is that he is seeking liberation by combining desireless action with study and meditation. Śaṅkara's position, which he forcefully argues is a direct corollary of Advaita tenets, is that it is impossible to combine action with knowledge. If one acts, one cannot know, and if one knows, one cannot act. Therefore, the traditional way of understanding the holy man is antithetical to Śaṅkara's understanding of Advaita. Still, Śaṅkara does not straight-forwardly challenge the traditional notion of *saṃnyāsa*. Instead, he reinterprets *saṃnyāsa* as the stage of Self-knowledge, which for him is identical with liberation-while-living or *jīvanmukti*. He finds a different classification of stages of life in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, one which suits his understanding better. According to it, there are four ways of life conducive to merit, the first involving sacrifice, study and charity, the second requiring asceticism, the third consisting of commitment to a teacher, and the fourth described as being 'fixed in

brahman' (*brahmasaṃstha*) and reaching 'immortality' (*amṛtatva*). Śaṅkara, in his commentary on the *Chāndogya*, interprets the first as the householder, the second as the wandering mendicant or holy man, the third as the life-long student, and the final one as the liberated person. In all the first three, renunciation of one sort or another is to be practised; so in different ways those three are *saṃnyāsa*. The final stage, however, since it precludes acting, is not a stage of renunciation at all. This position of Śaṅkara's is a very radical one: even Maṇḍana Miśra, the other great Advaitin of Śaṅkara's time, does not go so far. Despite the extreme nature of Śaṅkara's interpretation, however, he only reverts to it when he has to, e.g. when commenting on passages like the *Chāndogya* passage where the text itself clearly favours his account, or when resolving difficult points, such as in his commentary on the *Bhagavad Gītā* passage where Arjuna asks: 'You recommend both renunciation and activity. Tell me for sure which of these is the better way.' (*Saṃnyāsam karmaṇam kṛṣṇa punar yogam ca śaṃsasi. Yac chreya etayor ekam tan me brūhi suniścitam.*) Śaṅkara utilizes his extreme doctrine to resolve the puzzle by interpreting Kṛṣṇa's answer (that action is better, so fight!) as addressed only to non-knowers.

Śaṅkara's reputation over the centuries has been so powerful that it has over-shadowed another equally important figure in the development stage of Advaita, Maṇḍana Miśra. Maṇḍana is probably an elder contemporary of Śaṅkara's (and probably not identical with Śaṅkara's pupil Sureśvara, despite Advaita tradition). Maṇḍana started out as a Pūrva Mīmāṃsaka, and only wrote one treatise that we know of on Advaita. But the *Brahmasiddhi* is an extremely important work, anticipating as it does some of the most notable tendencies in the later polemical and systematic stages. It is a difficult work, and one which only scholars are likely to warm to. But it too has elements of compromise: long sections on Pūrvamīmāṃsā rules of exegesis and a remarkable passage in which Maṇḍana propounds the doctrine of *śabdabrahman*, of *brahman* as Language, a view most notably associated with Bhartṛhari and the Vyākaraṇa of the grammarian philosophical school.

Maṇḍana's style compares favourably with that of the best Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya works of his time, and is in a certain sense somewhat systematic; Śaṅkara's style is commentarial and thus unsystematic; even the *Upadeśasāhasrī* is written as a charming set of dialogues between teacher and pupil.

In philosophical works of classical Indian philosophy there is a regular use of a form of presentation in which an opponent, called a *pūrvapakṣin*, is answered by the proponent or author, called the *siddhāntin*. In the development stage one regularly finds no identification of who the *pūrvapakṣin* in a given argument is, certainly not by name, and most frequently not by title either. One has to guess whether the opponent being presented is a Naiyāyika, a Mīmāṃsaka, a Sāṃkhya or a member of some other school. This reinforces the continuity between Advaita and other schools, since it provides an opportunity to show an alleged natural development from the opponent's position to that of the proponent. But it also allows for another typical feature of the development stage, an indifference to internal variation within the school. Śaṅkara, for example, considers several opponents to his main thesis that action and knowledge are incompatible. These *pūrvapakṣins* would appear to be various sorts of Mīmāṃsakas, various sorts of Vedāntins of the sort traditionally called '*bhedābhedavādins*', and proponents of a third view, titled by commentators as '*Prasaṃkhyānavāda*'. The position of this last theory is that in liberation one must still at least practise meditation, and it turns out to be a view that Maṇḍana espouses. Thus Śaṅkara appears to be alluding to Maṇḍana or Maṇḍana's type of view among his opponents. Maṇḍana likewise alludes to views of Śaṅkara's sort in his work, again avoiding any explicit identification of the source of that view.

Still another illustration of this feature of indifference to internal variation can be found in Śaṅkara's use of variety of analogies, the logic of each of which would, if followed out strictly, take the Advaita in different directions. Śaṅkara is not bothered by this. Later on, in post Śaṅkara Advaita, one subschool of Advaita fastens on one type of analogy, another on a different one, as we shall see.

The fourth feature of the development stage was that of the standpoint adopted by the author toward his audience. Śaṅkara clearly takes a position of specialist addressing non-specialists—pupils and others—who are nevertheless insiders. They see, or can be made to recall, the Advaita insight, and so it is a matter of leading them on from what they accept to what they have forgotten but really knew before. So definitions, where offered at all, are provided merely in the spirit of demarcations, that is, giving just enough of the characteristic marks of a kind of thing to enable the hearer to recognize it and to distinguish it from whatever is, in the context, apt to be confused with it. Arguments, in Śaṅkara, are likewise offered for edification only: though there are polemical passages, they are always in the service of a larger cause. Though less true for Maṇḍana, who has lengthy passages which are overtly polemical, Śaṅkara's way is taken up by his pupils and the later members of the development stage.

Finally, fifthly, the entire exercise is practical for Śaṅkara. It is as if he were saying to his audience, 'We are all aiming at the same end, but perhaps we are at different junctures along the way. So here is what may help you with your particular hangup.' Thus the meaning of the expositions offered by writers of this stage are best analysed in pragmatic terms, perhaps in terms of their functions as speech-acts. Śaṅkara is not really much interested in the classical topics of Indian philosophy—the sources of knowledge, the problem of universals, even the nature of difference—for their own sake. He takes them up more or less in passing, in order to clear them out of the way, as if they were generically likely to distract the audience from the main pursuit, the gain of self-knowledge. (This feature is just not true for

Maṇḍana, who in many ways, most notably this one, looks forward to the future stages.)

Śaṅkara had at least two pupils who wrote Advaita treatises, named Padmapāda and Sureśvara. In different ways, we already begin to see a transition from the development stage features characterizing Śaṅkara's work toward the polemical state to come.

Padmapāda carries forward Maṇḍana's more systematic style. There is greater emphasis in Padmapāda on problem areas of Advaita, e.g. the theory of error, how *avidyā* works, its locus, the implications of the various analogies Śaṅkara used, the nature of perception and the other sources of knowledge or *pramāṇas*. Padmapāda also polemicizes more pointedly and accurately against Buddhists, Mīmāṃsakas and others. His interests do seem to be geared to the standard problems of Indian philosophy. We only have the first portion of what was probably an extended subcommentary on the *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*. Though Padmapāda is still a developer inasmuch as he is taking his mentor's stances of necessity, if we had more to go on we might grant him a place with Maṇḍana as an avant-garde polemicist.

Sureśvara, by contrast, though he sometimes polemicizes, avoids most of the classical problems of Indian philosophy. He argues mainly with Mīmāṃsā and over the same questions on which Śaṅkara concentrates. He is very clearly continuing the note struck in the *Upadeśasāhasrī*: as Mysore Hiriyanna remarks, the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, Sureśvara's *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, and Sureśvara's follower Sarvajñātman's *Saṃkṣepasārīraka* make up a related group of texts.

This takes us to the middle of the eighth century A.D. A gap now appears, of over a century, during which no works were written of which we have any knowledge. Furthermore, what may seem surprising in hindsight, the other classical schools of Indian philosophy seem not to know of an Advaita school as yet. There is no mention of Śaṅkara, and only an occasional awareness of Maṇḍana. It is only in the tenth century that there is a revival of Advaita, or at least the production of new Advaita treatises, and the school begins to be recognized by other philosophers.

Five major works of the tenth century should be mentioned briefly. Two are important commentaries, the titles of which became the names of the two major sub-schools of post-Śaṅkara Advaita. One of these is by Vācaspati Miśra, a commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* named after his wife, *Bhāmatī*. The *Bhāmatī* school of Advaita becomes one of the major sub-schools in later years. The other commentary is by Prakāśātman; it is called *Vivaraṇa* and is a commentary on Padmapāda's *Pañcapādikā*. There are attempts by subsequent scholars in the tradition, right up to the present, to classify each subsequent writer on Advaita into either the *Bhāmatī* or the *Vivaraṇa* tradition.

The other three works of the tenth century deserving notice are independent treatises—i.e. not commentaries. I have already mentioned Sarvajñātman's *Saṃkṣepaśārīraka*, which continues the type of development found in Sureśvara and in Śaṅkara himself. A little-known work called *Tattvaśuddhi*, by Jñānaghana, seems—on the basis of references to it by others—to develop the line of Maṇḍana and perhaps Padmapāda. Most interesting of the three, perhaps, is the *Iṣṭasiddhi* by Vimuktātman, a treatise on epistemology dedicated to exploring and vindicating the theory of *māyā* by positive argument. Topics treated here include; the *pramāṇas* and the doctrine of the intrinsic validity of knowledge; the degrees of truth and/or being; the theory that the empirical and dream worlds have an ontological status which is neither real nor unreal, and so is technically labelled *anirvacanīya*; the critique of difference as necessarily not real; the existence of the external world; the positive rather than negative nature of *avidyā*; theories of error; how *avidyā* can be removed. These topics are ones more or less ignored by Śaṅkara himself; they become the major preoccupation of later post-Śaṅkara Advaitins.

The next important text in the Advaita literature ushers us directly and totally into the polemical stage. This is probably the most celebrated dialectical treatise in Hindu philosophy, Śrīharṣa's *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, dating from the twelfth century. Śrīharṣa identifies his opponent very clearly; it is the Nyāya, and most notably the great Udayana, a pivotal figure in the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. Apparently Udayana had criticized Śrīharṣa's father, and so this work was written by way of revenge. It is self-consciously patterned after the arguments of Nāgārjuna, one of the greatest names in Buddhist philosophy, whose method consisted in showing up the pretensions of all positive philosophical systems by a negative dialectical method. While other Hindu philosophers had criticized Nāgārjuna as being a *vaitaṇḍika*, a wrangling sophist who argues merely for the purpose of victory, having no positive theses to put forward in place of those he refutes, Śrīharṣa extols the method of *vitaṇḍā*, holding in a similar vein with Nāgārjuna that removal of the veil of *avidyā* from the pure consciousness that is *brahman* requires a negative method. As a result, Śrīharṣa takes up practically every Nyāya tenet of any consequence and subjects it to extensive criticism, mainly of the *reductio ad absurdum* variety.

Śrīharṣa's work is one of three recognized widely by Advaitins and Advaita scholars as the triumphant masterpieces of Advaita polemical literature. The other two are the *Tattvaprakāśikā* of Citsukha (fourteenth century), popularly known as *Citsukhī*, and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's (sixteenth century) *Advaitasiddhi*. While Citsukha and Madhusūdana are not as exclusively negative in their polemics as Śrīharṣa, it is clear that the major sections of their works are devoted exclusively to refutations. Citsukha, like Śrīharṣa, takes as his prime opponent the Naiyāyikas, while Madhusūdana is answering a direct challenge by a polemical Dvaita Vedāntin, Vyāsarāja. The three works here cited are only the most famous of a genre which comprises many other treatises.

These three works, and the others like them, have a style that is determined in the main by the arguments of their opponents. This is most true of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, which is confessedly exhaustively polemical. Here the topics treated are in the main Nyāya topics, only tangentially Advaitin, and the arguments are connected and organized by the logic that the Naiyāyikas accept rather than by any Advaita concerns. By contrast, Citsukha's and Madhusūdana's treatises provide a combination of Advaita exposition with polemics. Their organization, too, reflects Advaita priorities. Nevertheless, the style is unsystematic in the sense that there is no attempt to organize either Advaita tenets, or those of the opposition, according to an interconnected set of rubrics or definitions or even arguments. The style runs from one thing to another as the author happens to think of them.

A second point about polemical stage works. Whereas in the development stage the continuities with other doctrine and arguments was emphasized where possible, the polemical writers emphasize the *contrasts* between Advaita and the other *darśanas*. The purpose is no longer, as Śaṅkara's was, to justify the Fundamental Insight. Rather, these writers are defending that Insight indirectly by parrying every objection posed to Advaita by its most intelligent opponents. That these opponents are intelligent is made evident by picking arguments which relate to the most abstruse aspects of Advaita thought, such as those developed by Maṇḍana, Padmapāda, in the *Bhāmatī* and *Vivaraṇa* literature, and in works such as we saw the *Iṣṭasiddhi* to be, where technical concepts and problems were gloried in. There is very little common ground admitted with any opponent.

The style used is still that of *pūrvapakṣa* and *siddhānta*, a sort of dialogue, but now there is more willingness to identify the opponents by name or by school, so that the contrast with Advaita positions will be the more evident. Concomitant with this admission of the identity of other schools and authors, there is a recognition shown of the varieties of views comprehendable within one's own position, a willingness to allow diversity within Advaita. Especially in the *Advaitasiddhi* we find references to various views in past Advaita literature. To a lesser extent this occurs as well in *Citsukhī*. Other works of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries also show this feature, for example, Madhusūdana's *Siddhāntabindu* and Appayya Dīkṣita's *Siddhāntaleśasaṃgraha*. It is from works such as these that scholars can best guess at the way in which an Advaitin of that period and the preceding several centuries may have viewed his own school. The emphasis, then, in works of this stage is on a show of scholarship. But there is no eclecticism, Advaita *per se* is defended, the particular version being that deemed most effective in meeting the positions of the opponents.

Whereas the style of the works of the previous stage was didactic, addressed to those within the fold, the works of the polemical stage are scholastic. They address both opponents and *aficionados*, but not pupils. Authors expend much effort in developing many arguments to make the same point. The emphasis is on the arguments. But the arguments are not for edification only. They are part of the polemics.

Another aspect of this feature is the polemical stage attitude toward definitions. Definitions are offered in the course of argument to meet the challenge posed by an opponent's offering of a definition, or the requesting of one from the Advaitin. Frequently, one will find one party in a discussion in these texts asking the other party for a definition of a term. However, unlike in a Platonic dialogue, where Socrates will explore to what extent the definition is satisfactory, examining not only whether its application fits the definiendum but also whether the definition's sense—its intension—coincides with that of the definiendum, definitions when offered in Advaita polemics are clearly at the service of arguments. They are not themselves arguments, but merely serve as springboards for argument. Śrīharṣa, as a matter of fact, takes an extreme position against definitions, no doubt motivated by the Naiyāyika's penchant for providing them. He says flatly at one point: 'No definitions are acceptable', meaning that it is impossible to specify a definition which will be entirely satisfactory.

The polemical exercises of this literature are theoretical, not practical. In contrast to Śaṅkara and the writers of the development stage, the polemicists are caught up in the attempt to rationalize the system, especially its putatively vulnerable aspects, and to show Advaita's superiority in explaining those topics that every *darśana* is expected to address. Though liberation, and the progress toward it, are not altogether forgotten, the action is elsewhere.

During the period from the twelfth through to the seventeenth centuries, while polemics were dominating the Advaita scene, and while commentaries of the development stage continued to be composed, there is another type of literature which begins to become more frequently assayed. That is the handbook, the succinct introduction of Advaita. I believe this type of literature provides a transition from the third, or polemical stage, to the fourth, or systematic stage, by habituating Advaita writers to the charms of brevity in exposition and thus, perhaps inadvertently, forcing them to pay attention to the problem of finding an economical method of presenting the fundamental insight and its most important corollaries within brief compass.

Probably the three most famous handbooks produced in this period are the *Pañcadaśī* of Vidyāraṇya (fourteenth century), the *Vedāntasāra* of Sadānanda (sixteenth century), and Dharmarāja's *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (seventeenth century). As we shall see, the last of these is a lot more than merely a handbook: in fact, I shall argue, it is the most important, possibly the only, developed treatise of the systematic stage in Advaita. But it, and the other two, are handbooks which are regularly read first by those uninitiated in Advaita views.

The *Pañcadaśī* is organized into three chapters: the first on Reality (*sat*),

the second on consciousness (*cit*), and the third on bliss (*ānanda*). Its approach expounds the Fundamental Insights with little detail about the categories of the later polemical stage. Where such matters are broached, there is only brief discussion and what there is is carried on mainly through metaphors.

The *Vedāntasāra* is even briefer, and it is not at all concerned with the categories and problems of the polemical stage. It is a piece typical of the commonest Advaita genre, repeated over and over by countless authors, many unidentified. A large number of these brief works have been attributed to Śaṅkara (e.g., the *ātmabodha*, the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*), though there is no firm evidence to suggest he wrote any and internal stylistic evidence to suggest he did not.

Which brings us, then, to the fourth stage, of system. As I mentioned, I know of only one work which clearly stems from this stage, and that is the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* of Dharmarāja. This is a handbook of a quite different sort. Unlike all previous Advaita works, it has a style that is neither expository and commentarial nor polemical and historical. Rather, Dharmarāja's style features *interconnected definitions*. The organization of the work is dictated essentially by the nature of such a system. Its logic, its primitive terms, determines which concepts will be explained first, which later, and this is a choice made by the system's creator. Polemics, where they are indulged in, arise from the system rather than *vice versa*, as was the case in the preceding stage.

Both the Fundamental Insight and the polemical categories are expounded in Dharmarāja system. By this time it is not necessary to legitimize the school: it is entirely confident of its superiority. Nor is it now necessary any longer to develop many arguments to refute the opponent. Arguments are provided only where it is helpful to compare or contrast an Advaita notion with those of others in order to explicate the notion being explained. The difference between a systematic treatise, like Dharmarāja's and the handbooks such as *Pañcadaśī* and *Vedāntasāra* is that the systematic treatise not only serves to introduce neophytes to the Fundamental Insight but it also systematizes the categories in a way which will stand up in the future as a monument to the worth of the school's views, as well as a challenge to any rivals who will have to refute not merely a few arguments but the entire interconnected set of definitions in order to remove Advaita from the scene.

The use of the dialogue (*pūrvapakṣa/siddhānta*) style is made subservient here to the definitions themselves. The *pūrvapakṣin* is one who finds fault with a definition offered by the *siddhāntin*. He alleges that the proffered definition over-extends (*ativyāpti*) to things other than the definiendum, or under-extends (*avyāpti*) by failing to encompass a part of the definiendum. His complaints are used either as a foil to point out the merits of the definition, or as an occasion to improve the definition through added qualifications. A measure of the confidence with which Dharmarāja operates is that he is willing to admit a fault in a definition. A *prima facie* defect in a definition causes no demerit, provided the fault is reparable through qualification. This attitude contrasts sharply with that of say, Śrīharṣa, in whose exposition no fault will be allowed at all, all faults being found in the opponent's definitions, and one's own position being ultimately safeguarded by disallowing its dependence on any definitions whatsoever.

In the development stage internal variations within the Advaita school were ignored or intentionally overlooked, and in the polemical stage they were subsequently noticed and accepted. In the systematic stage, Dharmarāja shows no concern for internal variations, though occasionally he will indicate alternative definitions to encompass cases where genuine and important internal disagreements are known to him. But these constitute only a kind of aside: the emphasis is rather on the extent to which the system adjudicates between successful understandings and less successful ones, in the light of the overall adequacy, accuracy, and economy of the system.

Dharmarāja's standpoint combines the scholastic and the specialist in the systematizer. Definitions are central. They are not merely demarcative, though they are certainly that too. The approach, in fact, is that found in the sophisticated treatment of things by *Navya-Nyāya*, and indeed, Dharmarāja's training was in *Navya-Nyāya* and he wrote some treatises explicating that school's doctrines. Dharmarāja addresses himself to the smart student who knows some logic of the sort he might have learned from a Naiyāyika.

The exercise is certainly not practical. It is rather super-theoretical. The progress from insight to further and further rationalization, a process informing the history of the school throughout its various stages, reaches its pinnacle here.

I know of no other systematic work like Dharmarāja's in Advaita though the *Bhāṣāpariccheda* and *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* occupy a similar position in Nyāya. Advaita literature from the seventeenth century to the present, although vast, is with little exception a non-systematic literature. Writers return to rehearse over and over the Fundamental Insights, and with little imagination. Toward the end of the nineteenth century we have a recurrence of the scholastic touch, but it is essentially at the hands of pandits responding to a surge of interest in tradition as India comes face to face with western thought, the presence of British academics and scholars (followed by others from the European continent).

What happened? Why did Dharmarāja's work suddenly (apparently) terminate the systematic development of Advaita? Here are some possible answers, and some problems with each answer.

(*i*) 'Dharmarāja was a Naiyāyika as much as an Advaitin. His *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* may have been a kind of *tour de force* emanating from a "foreign" source, viz. Nyāya. This was recognized, and Dharmarāja was not emulated.

Writers returned to the basics.' The trouble with this explanation of the Advaita decline is that Dharmarāja was hardly rejected by posterity: his is one of the most popular and frequently used handbooks.

(*ii*) 'Dharmarāja was so successful that nothing was left to be done. The critics were silenced. Writers returned to simple expositions of the truth, realizing that nothing more needs to be done along systematic lines.' The trouble with this is that if it were correct, Dharmarāja's stature among Advaitins ought to be much higher than it in fact is. The fact is that among modern Advaitins of a scholarly bent it is Citsukha and Madhusūdana who were regularly held up as the paragons of post-Śaṅkara Advaita scholasticism, not Dharmarāja.

(*iii*) 'Advaita scholasticism was merely swallowed up by Nyāya, or more specifically, Navya-Nyāya, which was also at the same time invading and permeating not only philosophical schools but a variety of other disciplines such as literary criticism, jurisprudence and grammar.' Though this explanation may have some merit, thelack of any other work to achieve anything like the systematic stature of Dharmarāja's gives one pause for thought.

(*iv*) 'Systematization is regularly followed by a paradigm shift, as Thomas Kuhn calls it. This is a sort of historical law. Here the shift was from intellectualism of the Advaita sort to devotionalism, a shift which can also be seen in the history of Nyāya in this period in Bengal, where logicians and dialecticians "got religious" and embraced Bengal *Vaiṣṇavism*, for example.' There is probably something in this answer; it certainly seems that devotionalism is increasingly explicit as we come toward the present in all the philosophical schools.

(*v*) 'The original premiss is incorrect. There *are* other systematic works like Dharmarāja's—it's just that we haven't found them yet, or at least if they've been discovered they haven't been properly noticed.' This is possible, though not terribly likely, it seems to me. It is clear that there are a very large number of Advaita works still in manuscript form, unpublished, and certainly unstudied. Whether they are unnoticed is less clear. Currently, there is a research project in progress geared to photographing every known *Advaita* work in manuscript form. When this project is complete, it will be possible to assess the extent to which this answer is feasible.

(*vi*) 'As is usual, the development of Dharmarāja's systematic work should be sought in the commentarial literature.' The trouble is that there are not a great many commentaries on the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*.

(*vii*) 'Advaita died, for other reasons, and was only resurrected in the nineteenth century because it most closely resembled the reigning Western doctrine, namely, absolute idealism.' There is probably some truth in this: certainly, the inordinate attention paid to Advaita by British and European scholars who considered it the most advanced philosophy in India derived in part from their belief that Hegel and Bradley represented the pinnacle of achievement in philosophy generally.

(*viii*) 'We are victimized by a foreshortened historical perspective. Development of systematic *Advaita is* going on, but (*a*) the time between one giant—like a Maṇḍana or a Dharmarāja—and the next one can be several centuries, so we need not expect to have another Advaita giant in the time since Dharmarāja (although one may soon appear); (*b*) We may have had some giants without recognizing them. Philosophers are frequently only discovered posthumously.' However, between Maṇḍana and (say) Vimuktātman, two and a half centuries later, there was little Advaita literature at all, whereas since Dharmarāja there has been a great deal, so that if a giant is sleeping there, we should be able to wake him.

(*ix*) 'Systematizing is an unimportant task, or at least unrecognized, and hard at that. No one wanted to make the effort it takes to construct new and more complex systems. And it didn't matter. It is the Fundamental Insight that counts. Systems are frills.' That is a standard anti-intellectual response, and there is no brief answer to it that can be calculated to convince or even satisfy the sceptic. One must show that the system—or at least some kinds of system—necessarily satisfies worthwhile goals, worthwhile even for the sceptical anti-intellectual.

KARL POTTER

COMMENTS

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I first take up Prof. Potter's basic concept of five stages for in-depth scrutiny. The five stages of development of philosophical schools—European or Indian—posed by Potter may be summarized as follows:

1. The *Discovery* stage, where a single great individual visualizes the fundamental insight or insights which eventually go to make the future school.
2. The *Development* stage, where the school is apparently in the making. Prof. Potter has spoken of five special characteristics of this stage: (i) attempt to legitimize; (ii) unsystematic style (in India, style of writing commentaries); (iii) no effort towards internal variations and very little of polemics, as it is likely to hamper the force of the exposition; (iv) attitude of a specialist (teacher) addressing non-specialists (pupils); (v) stress on practice as opposed to mere theory.
3. The *Polemical* stage, also marked by five features, which are similar in some respects to those of the Development stage but have some sharp dissimilarities: (i) a concerted effort to defend (in place of legitimizing) the standpoint of the opponents of the Fundamental Insights and to uphold their superiority; (ii) in point of style,

emphasis shifts from exposition to finding new distinctions or categories or clarifying them with a clear orientation towards meeting the arguments of the opponents; (iii) clear awareness as a school, taking advantage of internal variations and flexibility of doctrines; (iv) attitude of a debater addressing an opponent, in place of the attitude of a teacher and pupil; (v) stress reversed from the practical to the theoretical.

4. The *Systematic* stage. This stage too has five features, like the two previous stages, and most of them concern the same points: (i) the effort is not to legitimize or to defend but to seek justification of another sort, to protect it from being overthrown by new insights; (ii) the style is not expository or polemical, but systematic, showing interconnectedness of definitions; (iii) though the approach has an appearance of polemics, it is made subservient to clarification and explanation; (iv) the attitude is not that of teacher to pupil or debater to opponent, but of scholastic systematizer; (v) in terms of practice versus theory, it is 'super-theoretical, not pragmatic'. But it is also possible to argue differently, in which case, it would be super-theoretical *and* super-pragmatic.
5. The stage of *Decline*. This is the period between systematization and termination, which may be caused by one or more of the following four factors: (i) overthrow by a new Fundamental Insight; (ii) decline of people's interest; (iii) suppression by force; (iv) merger with another school and consequent loss of identity. During this period no original or significant contribution is made.

I have made this summary somewhat long, so that nothing of consequence is omitted. I have also tried to put it in the author's own words, as far as possible, so that the hypothesis is faithfully projected without overplaying or underplaying anything. In this I have tried to emulate the example of our illustrious *śāstra-kāras*, who are, by and large, scrupulously fair in presenting the strong points of the *pūrvapakṣa* and do full justice to the opponent's point of view before exposing its weaknesses or hollowness from the standpoint of the *siddhānta*.

I shall now proceed to examine, first, how far the basic hypothesis of a five-stage development for philosophical schools is itself logically sound, and second, how far this five-stage hypothesis holds good in the case of Advaita Vedānta, which has been singled out by Prof. Potter as a particularly apt illustration for his hypothesis.

Taking the hypothesis first, the one glaring thing that struck my attention on a close perusal of the presentation of his hypothesis by Prof. Potter is that he himself is not quite sure of the need for the five stages he advocates.

The following statements made by Prof. Potter, read with my comments thereon, will clearly bear this out:

(1) The very opening sentence of his article, in which he spells out the final upshot of his hypothesis, highlights this uncertainty. He speaks here of a regular pattern of 'five *major* [*sic*, emphasis mine] phases'. Does this not imply that he admits the possibility of some more stages, though they may be minor? If he concedes that there are, or can be, more minor stages, in addition to the five stages he has posited, what happens to his hypothesis of five stages of rise and fall, which he is at great pains to propound for all philosophical schools in the European and Asian contexts, with added emphasis in the case of all Indian philosophical schools and which he is anxious to prove with substantial evidence in the case of Advaita Vedānta? Furthermore, he has not explained or even dimly hinted anywhere in his article what the minor stage or stages could possibly be and where they could be fitted in his five-stage scheme. This leaves the inevitable impression that, not being sure of his final count of five stages, he has chosen to take shelter behind the expression 'major phases', employing 'major' as a sort of safety-valve to save his hypothesis, in the event of anyone posing a sixth or even seventh stage. Should anyone succeed in making a reasonable case for an additional stage, he could still save his hypothesis by simply branding it as 'minor'.

(2) Apart from this diplomatic use of the epithet 'major' to describe the five stages of his hypothesis, the language Prof. Potter uses to spell out his final opinion here also shows the same hesitation, diffidence or even indecision. He speaks of it as 'a pattern which *may be said to have* [emphasis mine] five phases'. Mark his tactful phraseology here too. He is unable to muster the confidence required to say, 'which *has* five phases' or even 'which *may have* five phases', but settles for '*which may be said to have*'. His vacillation about his own five stages is so patent here that there is no need to labour the point any further. It leads to an inescapable feeling that the learned professor has, in his zeal for propounding a novel thesis, hurried it through, without himself making sure of all its details and implications.

(3) Here is a third instance—an even more glaring one, at that—of the prevailing uncertainty clouding his exposition of the five stages. Before proceeding to apply his five-stage hypothesis to Advaita Vedānta, he concludes his discussion on Western philosophical schools by 'reiterating and emphasizing' that he holds 'no particular store for these five stages and certainly not for the specific characteristics of each stage' (p. 83). Here is an unequivocal and emphatic statement from the very propounder of the five-stage hypothesis that all the five stages are not obligatory for all philosophical schools, let alone the distinctive characteristics by which they are to be identified and distinguished. What is particularly noteworthy is that, by this declaration, he has not only diluted his five-stage hypothesis, but has sought to *reiterate* and *emphasize* the dilution of his five stages to anywhere less than five. This obviously implies that he does envisage the possibility of some philosophical schools with only four or three of his stages. Many ques-

tions arise here. If Prof. Potter does not hold particular store for all his five stages, does he do so for four, three or at least two of these stages? Moreover, if he does hold any store for some of the five stages, what are the stages which could be dispensed with in either of these cases? Prof. Potter has not addressed himself to questions such as these. Short of admitting the possibility of schools with less than five stages, he has not drawn the line anywhere to indicate his idea of the minimum number of stages essential to make a philosophical school or what these stages are. It is possible to argue —if only for the sake of the argument—that he has deliberately left such questions unanswered and conveniently allowed it all to remain vague, so that his hypothesis would still be safe, without this or that stage in any particular school or schools. But I shall not make the mistake of casting the slightest aspersion on the sincerity of Prof. Potter's effort and the considerable pains he has taken to unfold a new hypothesis. I would rather put it down as the result of unceremonious haste in proposing his hypothesis without applying himself to all its relevant aspects and the issues connected with it.

Since Prof. Potter is silent about the minimum number of stages, the only course open to us is to consider the three possible alternatives of four, three and two stages and see how the hypothesis fares in each case.

(*i*) If he would admit the possibility of a philosophical school with only two stages, the stages should obviously be Discovery and Decline. It will then turn out to be a sort of still-born school, discovered only to decline and die! Though such a contingency cannot be summarily ruled out and it may be possible to think of such developments in the history of Indian philosophy also when an apparently new insight died with its founder, these do not merit any serious attention in a survey of philosophical schools, as such.

(*ii*) Assuming that he holds the position that there should be at least three stages, the stages would perforce be Discovery, Development and Decline. The question, then, is: have we to look to a professor of philosophy from the USA to propound a separate hypothesis to say that Indian philosophical schools pass through the three stages of Discovery, Development and Decline? Is it not a simple natural law that anything under the sun is born to grow for a time and decay at last—irrespective of sharply contrasted variations in the period covered by growth and decay, which could, as the poet says, be precious brief with 'a lily of a day' or 'three hundred year' with an oak?

(*iii*) The case for two and three stages having been thus discredited, only the case for a four-stage rise and fall remains. In fact, this appears to be the only logical alternative of less than five stages. And in all probability, Prof. Potter had only this in mind, when he wrote about not holding store for all five stages. Here again, the question is, which could be the four stages? I am inclined to think that Prof. Potter could have it both ways; namely, the three

basic stages mentioned earlier along with the Polemical stage *or* the Systematic stage. Following this line of thinking, it should be possible to locate philosophical schools with only one out of these two stages, Polemical and Systematic.

(*iv*) I wish to draw attention to a certain oddity that is inherent in Prof. Potter's treatment of his hypothesis. On the one hand, he is constrained to provide for more than five stages; on the other hand, he admits the possibility of philosophical schools with less than five stages. Placed in such an awkward situation, where he finds it necessary to concede both possibilities, of more than five stages as well as less than five stages, he has to make his hypothesis cut both ways. He has successfully contrived to do so by the subtle stroke of first calling them 'major' stages and then by affirming that he holds 'no particular store for the five stages'. The moot question is, if he tacitly admits that the stages can be more than five in some cases and less than five in others, where does his five-stage hypothesis stand?

I do not think it proper to justify this vacillating attitude by saying that it is after all a hypothesis and that a little looseness or flexibility partakes of the character of hypotheses. It should be remembered that the five stages form the pivotal point of his hypothesis. Flexibility in a hypothesis ought not to be carried to such an extent that the hypothesis itself collapses. I have already shown that if you make the number of stages flexible and admit less than five stages, nothing is left of it and the hypothesis itself melts into thin air.

There is yet another hazard in letting such basically unacceptable hypotheses pass muster on the score that they are, after all, only hypotheses. Though the authors of such hastily conceived hypotheses propose them with many reservations and do not wish to claim any finality for them, they are often passed off later as their accredited opinions and tend to be taken as proven theories. This is precisely what happened with what Max Muller first proposed as a mere conjectural hypothesis, as a possible approach to find a date for the *Ṛgveda Saṁhitā*. He made two purely arbitrary assumptions: that (1) there were four distinct epochs in the evolution of the entire Vedic literature, and that (2) each of these epochs extended up to two hundred years. He then arrived at 1200 BC as the date for the earliest hymns of the *Ṛgveda* by calculating backwards from 500 BC as the time of Buddha. What started in this form as mere speculation came to be quoted by his blind followers as his view and gradually became known as Max Muller's theory of the date of the *Ṛgveda* and passes off as a theory to this day, in spite of some sane voices like those of Whitney that were raised against making a theory out of what was just a tentative hypothesis. Such a risk becomes all the greater, when the author of the hypothesis is an eminent person like Prof. Max Muller. One would not be surprised if a similar favourable wind confers on this halting hypothesis of Prof. Potter the stature of Potter's

theory of five-stage development of Advaita Vedānta, thanks to the high esteem he has already earned, quite deservedly, as the compiler of the *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies*.

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Prof. Potter's paper is clearly divisible into two parts. The first part argues that the history of philosophical schools shows a 'regular pattern' of 'five major phases' and looks like a theory of history. The second part deals with Advaita Vedānta and seeks to present a thumbnail sketch of its history as a school. Although the second part looks like an application of the 'model' in the first part, there is a certain hiatus between the two where Prof. Potter appears to discount the seriousness of his own model, saying,

> I hold no particular store for these five stages, and certainly not for the specific characteristics of each stage that I have distinguished . . . The tool I have fashioned here is intended to shed light on Indian philosophy, which is organized in schools to a degree significantly greater than in Western thought. Even so, the purpose is mainly to provide handles on which to hang the names and contributions of a number of Indian writers.

This is modest indeed and should disarm all critics. However, if this is all that Prof. Potter means, more than 40 per cent of his paper would be grossly depreciated. No one need dispute a scheme so general that it could be freely modified in different cases.

Any historical presentation today tends to use some kind of general and flexible scheme of presenting the 'development' of its subject. In earlier ages when the concept of 'development' in human society and culture was unknown, history as a story of action tended to adopt the perspective used in more literary narratives or dramatic works. Action begins, moves towards some central climax or crisis and ends in happy resolution or tragic catastrophe. Indian dramaturgists conceived of five *sandhis*, viz. *mukha*, *pratimukha*, *garbha*, *vimarśa* and *nirvahana*, though it was admitted that all dramatic action does not show all the *sandhis*. Modern development theories have appealed to a variety of processes of change ranging from the biological to the logical. The names of Comte and Spencer, Hegel and Marx, Vico and Spengler may be picked up at random to illustrate the variety of development theories over the last two centuries. In India diverse traditions are occasionally conceived as manifesting, growing, declining, disappearing, though they might be revived, re-formed. Usually, however, they are contemplated only in their classic and static forms. It is possibly true that the developmental aspect of philosophy is not a fashionable subject even now

among either historians or philosophers, except for those who belong to the 'schools' of Hegel or Marx. Most histories of philosophy are a series of philosophical summaries in chronological order plus some comparisons and biographical material. They could rise to the level of serious history only to the extent they are able to trace the logical development of philosophical ideas and locate them within the larger context of intellectual trends, social attitudes, religious faith and scientific knowledge. The understanding of the logical processes of formulating, discussing and systematizing ideas is doubtless of central importance but it is not a historical necessity that philosophers should always actually follow the path of universally acceptable logic or dialectic. As a result, to understand the history of philosophy one must attend not only to the force of logic but also to that of general circumstances. Philosophy is not merely the expression of the logical Idea but also of the unpredictable human Spirit. Since philosophical ideas function in a dual context—logical and cultural—it is difficult to discover any simple or common pattern in their history.

Prof. Potter suggests that philosophical schools begin with the discovery of one or more Fundamental Insights. This is the first or the Discovery stage. Usually some single, great individual is responsible for it but it may also be the work of many carried on even anonymously over centuries. Realizing that this makes the hypothesis of a recognizably distinct Discovery stage unconvincing, Prof. Potter remarks,

> Indeed, it is a problem how to distinguish any precise point at which this first stage of discovery should be said to end and the second stage, of development, begin. However, it is of no great importance to find such a precise point; indeed, the stages I am delineating are not so much chronological periods, as they are overlapping tendencies as displayed in the literature of the schools.

This, again, has the effect of putting Prof. Potter's hypothesis beyond the pale of criticism. If the phases are merely overlapping tendencies, accepting them could not be objectionable especially when one has the freedom to modify them.

'In the second or Development stage, the Fundamental Insight begins to be set forth in a self-conscious way as doctrine.' This stage is unsystematic and avoids definitions and arguments, but shows an attempt at legitimization and at relating the theoretical aspects of the Fundamental Insight to practical concerns. If the *sūtras* represent the first stage, the commentaries represent the second stage. The third stage is Polemical which is predominantly theoretical and argumentative. The fourth stage is the 'Systematic' stage, the fifth is that of Decline.

It would be obvious that formulation, elaboration, argumentation and systematization are simultaneous tendencies. Prof. Potter himself calls them overlapping. Even if it were argued that the different phases are characteriz-

ed by the relative predominance of one of these different processes, it is not necessary that such phases must actually be historical and constitute a unique sequence. Prof. Potter thus regards the history of Advaita from the *sūtras* to Gauḍapāda as its Discovery stage, from Gauḍapāda to *c.* AD 1000 as the Development stage, from Śrī Harṣa to *c.* AD 1600 as the Polemical stage, Dharmarāja as representative of the stage of Systematization, followed since then by the stage of Decline. This is not very different from what is normally accepted—scriptural Vedānta, Pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta, Śaṅkara, Post-Śaṅkara Vedānta. The polemical aspect of Śrī Harṣa, Citsukha and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī is well-recognized. Dharmarāja's VP is used as a standard and introductory text-book, but rarely given the honour which Prof. Potter bestows on it. But the *sūtras* themselves could well be described as the final systematization of a long period of anterior formulation, elaboration and argumentation. Bādarāyaṇa's *sūtras*, for example, appear to have been preceded by other similar attempts and debates with rival schools. It could be argued that when new challenges arose. the 'system' had to be reformulated and re-argued, which was done by a series of commentators from Upavarṣa to Śaṅkara. When the Buddhist challenge was replaced by that of the Dualists and a new philosophical idiom came into vogue, the medieval polemic of Advaita was produced. It is not clear why *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* should be regarded as *the* systematization of Advaita Vedānta. It is doubtless a popular and concise text written in an intellectual milieu dominated by Navya-Nyāya but it is distinctly odd to think of it as the last word on Vedānta. Its detailed concern with *pramāṇa*, in fact, makes it an introduction to philosophy from a Vedāntic point of view.

Prof. Potter's conception of the ideal state of philosophy seems to be that of a set of interconnected definitions (*vyavasthita lakṣaṇāvali*) bringing out the implications of certain primitive terms and propositions (*mūla-padārthānvīkṣā*). But this conception is too formalistic to account for the vitality or felt significance of philosophy. It is difficult to think of actual historical schools of philosophy as simply deductive systems in the making since their insights and their assessment of reasons function within a context of cultural attitudes. This is implicit in the traditional conception of *īkṣa* or *śravaṇa* preceding *anvīkṣā* or *manana*. If a philosophical school perfects a pseudo-formal system, it is likely to be bogged down in formal or logical enquiries in place of substantive philosophical enquiries, which is what appears to have happened to late medieval Indian schools.

Perhaps Prof. Potter has been inspired by attempts to build models about the history of science. However, as hardcore science remains closely attached to empirical testability, its history shows marked linearity, despite a certain relevance of the notion of paradigm shift. The history of philosophy, on the other hand, regularly shows numerous alternative ways of thinking in chaotic conflict.

It is not merely that Prof. Potter begins with a scheme of the historical

development of philosophical schools which is too abstract and general to yield any specific insight into them. His focus of attention in philosophy too tends to be on its formal side so that its cultural context being neglected its history becomes unreal. The emphasis on the institutional aspect of the school is only an identifying device for Prof. Potter but it has the unfortunate effect of identifying Advaita with the teachings of the Śaṅkarite monasteries. If *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* represents the climax of Vedānta and these monasteries the Advaitic school, what doubt can there be that the school is dead and fossilized? On Prof. Potter's assumptions, his final question is really rhetorical, 'What happened? Why did Dharmarāja's work (apparently) terminate the systematic development of Advaita?'

The *Prasthāna-trayī* and Śaṅkara constitute the major sources of *Advaita* and it is these which continue to be its living roots. The work of monasteries between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries is coloured by a medieval monastic-scholastic ethos which is far from Śaṅkara. But *Advaita* is not simply a system of definitions for *śāstrārtha* or the monastically regulated life of *saṃnyāsa*, it is a widely prevalent religious philosophy as well as a philosophical religion. Numerous academic and monastic schools professing it have appeared and disappeared in the course of its history of three millennia. Its fundamental insights are not logically formulated, unambiguous propositions, but foundational intuitions or spiritual vision. Its innovative intellectual expression since the eighteenth century has largely occurred outside the traditional monastic or modern educational institutions. Rammohun Roy and Vivekananda recognized the challenge of new social conditions to Advaita. Ramana Maharshi has historically rediscovered its spirituality. As for what is taught as *Vedānta in the pāṭhaśālās* or colleges, it is professedly the dead learning of the past as understood in the eighteenth century.

Indeed, Prof. Potter's question is amazing. He seems oblivious of the obvious fact that the whole of Indian civilization has been declining since the eighteenth century. How could schools of philosophy be an exception? It is not merely *Advaita* but *all traditional schools* of philosophy, education, art, literature and science which have ceased to be areas of creative social interest During the last two centuries in India there have been many great religious, social and political leaders but the realms of intellectual creativity have been relatively barren. Traditional education was profoundly and adversely altered by its re-organization under the East India Company. Real innovation was discouraged by a new system of examinations, degrees and official recognition, and few ambitious, rebellious or creative minds were attracted to it. The creative rediscovery and progressive interpretation of traditional insights has taken on directions outside the sphere of official or academic recognition. This is true of *Advaita* too which should not be put into the Procrustean bed of monastic schools or scholastic text-books.

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Dr Potter's synoptic article entitled 'The Development of Advaita Vedānta as a School of Philosophy', in the Radhakrishnan Centenary Volume (edited by G. Parthasarathi and D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1989), deserves the attention of every student of Advaita Vedānta, coming as it does from the pen of the reputed and dedicated editor of the *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies*. He has developed there a theory of five stages in the history of every school of philosophy and applied it meticulously to Advaita Vedānta. The stages he sets up are those of Discovery, Development, Polemics, Systematization and Decline. At the first stage there appear certain fundamental insights which are legitimatized through commentaries at the second stage. They are further defended by debates with their adversaries at the third stage, after which they are systematized according to logical requirements at the fourth stage, which leads to the decline of the school. The classical Upaniṣads and their pre-Gauḍapāda commentators are placed in the first stage; Gauḍapāda, Maṇḍana, Śaṅkara, Padmapāda, Sureśvara, Vācaspati, Prakāśātmā, Jñānaghana, Sarvajñātma Muni and Vimukātmā in the second stage; Śrī Harṣa, Citsukha and Madhusūdana in the third stage; and Vidyāraṇya, Sadānanda and Dharmarāja, all authors of Vedāntic handbooks, in the fourth stage. Dharmarāja's *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, a manual of a sub-school, is disproportionately eulogized as a 'super-theoretical' exercise informing the history of the school throughout its various stages, where the progress from insight is further and further as rationalization reaches its pinnacle (p. 97). After it Dr Potter sees the end of Advaita Vedānta in the seventeenth century and tries to give reasons why Advaita died after *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*.

The theoretical formulations of Dr Potter, however, are unlikely to be accepted in India, where Advaita Vedānta 'lives on intermittently and is alive today as a school of philosophy' (p. 71), a description that he himself reserves for Thomism, but fails to see as being also true of Advaita Vedānta. His account, in fact, suffers from many flaws, some of which may be shown here.

First, it is too naive and simplistic, and does not explain the development of a single concept, category, definition or argument that has been advanced throughout the history of Advaita Vedānta. Take for example, the argument for Advaitic Absolutism which is not the same from the Upaniṣadic period to modern times. But not even a mention of it or reference to it is made in his article, to speak nothing of explaining its variation and vindication. Similarly, take the doctrine of *māyā* or *avidyā*. Dr Potter's model fails to account for how this concept originated and developed and how *māyāvāda* was stipulated, supported, opposed and restrengthened through refutations of its refutations. The development of philosophical concepts and arguments does not follow the linear development of the origin, growth and decline of a plant, as their texture is too complex and multilateral to conform to such linearity. Furthermore, Dr Potter's theory does not explain the rise and development of the sub-schools of Advaita Vedānta like *Bhāmatī Prasthāna*, *Vivaraṇa Prasthāna* and *Vārttika Prasthāna*. To take them as merely internal variations at the level of legitimization is simplistic, if not fallacious.

Secondly, Dr Potter's approach is primarily theological. The ascertainment of the fundamental insights from the Upaniṣads, their rational exposition, their critical defence and finally their logical systematization—all these are basically the activities of theologians. But Advaita Vedānta is not theology. Śaṅkara himself has rejected theology in his comments on the first and fourth *Brahmasūtras* and formulated an epoch-making theory that Advaita Vedānta is independent of Pūrvamīmāṁsā, the paragon of all Indian theologies. Post-Śaṅkara Vaiṣṇava theologians disputed with Śaṅkara and his followers over this issue for several centuries. Hence it has become a criterion of demarcation between Advaita Vedānta and other schools of Vedānta. Dr Potter overlooks this criteriological divide and handles all schools of Vedānta with the same theological brush. Furthermore, Advaita Vedānta is not an attempt *to explain* the insight that Reality is one and without a second, but to *gain* the insight, *to comprehend* the Reality that is one and without a second. It is a philosophical exercise for conceptualization of the Absolute and not a theological exercise for vindication of the Upaniṣadic propositions which are found to be irrelevant by a philosopher who has got even a tentative glimpse of the Absolute. Advaita Vedānta treatises are for *darśana*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*, like Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Descartes' *Meditations* or Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, and not like Paul Tillich's *Biblical Riligion and the Search for Ultimate Reality*, Martin Buber's *Prophetic Faith* or Karl Barth's *Evangelical Theology: An Introduction*.

Thirdly, Dr Potter seems to have less than needed awareness of the continued debate between Advaita Vedānta and Navya Nyāya, otherwise he would not have recognized the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* of Dharmarāja as the most systematic work of Advaita Vedānta, since it has made none too right concessions to Navya Nyāya, as for example, over the interpretation of the statement 'That Thou Art'. It has, therefore, been rejected or ignored by many Advaitins, chief among them being Mahādeva Sarasvatī of the eighteenth century, whose *Tattvānusandhāna* has become more popular than *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* among the seekers after truth, as it has four commentaries in Sanskrit and is one of the earliest works to be translated into Hindi in the early nineteenth century.

Fourthly, Dr Potter's perception that Advaita died after *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* is historically incorrect. He is blissfully ignorant of the Advaitic works of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such as *Tattvānusandhāna* of Mahādeva Sarasvatī, an important vade-mecum; *Bodhasāra* of Narahari, an

encyclopaedia of Advaitic doctrines and disciplines; *Svārājyasiddhi* of Gaṅgādharendra Sarasvatī; *Brahmasūtravṛtti* and *Ātmavidyāvilāsa* of Sadāśivendra Sarasvatī and many other *prakaraṇa granthas* which are already published. Furthermore, he has not noticed the Hindi classics of Niścaladāsa, Vicārasāgara and Vṛtti Prābhākara, written in the mid-nineteenth century and translated into Sanskrit on account of their original contributions to Advaita Vedānta which was fully alive when the Britishers introduced English education in India in the nineteenth century. The Advaitins did not receive any patronage from the British rulers and academicians or Christian missionaries. As a matter of fact, their philosophy was often criticized or even ridiculed in those circles. But truth does not live on patronage or regard. It is self-sufficient and powerful and needs no external stimulus for its survival. Consequently, Advaita Vedānta is recognized as a perennial philosophy in India even today. There has been no question of its death or termination at any time.

Fifthly, Dr Potter does not recognize the *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa as an Advaita Vedānta tract, apparently because it has several non-Advaitic commentaries. But this betrays his bias against Advaita Vedānta. The number of Advaitic commentaries on this work is far greater than all non-Advaitic commentaries put together. Moreover, the growth of non-Advaitic commentaries has not stopped even today and their target is not to refute the formulations of any previous non-Advaitic commentary but those of the commentary of Śaṅkara. This shows that Śaṅkara is still alive or relevant today, whereas his earlier detractors like Rāmānuja, Madhva, Vallabha and Nimbārka are, by and large, dead and irrelevant; they may still be alive and relevant for their followers, undoubtedly, but the point that is to be specially stressed concerns Dr Potter's omission of the *sūtra* literature. He has failed to indicate any *sūtra* manual of Advaita Vedānta. How can a school of Indian philosophy live without a *sūtra* treatise? If *Śārīraka Bhāṣya* is accepted, then the *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa cannot be set aside as non-Advaitic.

Furthermore, no attempt to explain the history of Advaita Vedānta can be credible unless it takes into cognizance its *sūtra* and the *bhāṣya, vārttika, ṭīkā* and *ṭipaṇṇīs* thereon. Dr Potter refers neither to the *sūtra* of Advaita Vedānta nor to its *vārtika*. It is well-known that Śaṅkara wrote commentaries on three *prasthānas*: the *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa (*Nyāya Prasthāna*), the Upaniṣads (*Śruti Prasthāna* and the *Bhagavadgītā* (*Smṛti Prasthāna*). In the case of *Śruti Prasthāna, Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, Śaṅkara's commentary and Sureśvara's sub-commentary on it are usually regarded as its *sūtra, bhāṣya* and *vārtika*. Similarly, in the case of *Nyāya Prasthāna, Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa, Śaṅkara's *Śārīraka Bhāṣya* and Sarvajñātma Muni's *Saṁkṣepa Śārīraka* are regarded as its *sūtra, bhāṣya* and *vārttika*. Likewise, in the case of *Smṛti Prasthāna* the *Bhagavadgītā*, Śaṅkara's commentary on it and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's commentary thereon are regarded as its *sūtra*,

bhāṣya and *vārtika*. Thus these three original sources of Vedānta are continuing vigorously. Particularly the *Smṛti Prasthāna* of the *Bhagavadgītā* has been pursued more widely during the last three centuries than the other two *prasthānas*. Consequently *Gītā*-literature has become the focus of Advaita Vedāntists. Unfortunately this fact is totally missed by Dr Potter. Lastly, there is the growth of *Prakaraṇa granthas*. Dr Potter has mixed some of them with the literature of *Nyāya prasthāna*. But they can be allied with the literature of *Śruti prasthāna* or *Smṛti prasthāna* also. Or, alternatively, their origin, growth and development can be explained independently of this triple literature. At any rate, Dr Potter's model leaves out a number of Advaita works which do not suit the main purpose of his demonstration, i.e., the legitimatization of Advaita Vedānta by Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara and its termination in the seventeenth century after its systematization in *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*.

Sixth and final, Dr Potter shows his awareness of Thomas Kuhn's historical law of paradigm shift, but he applies it only to the shift of Advaita Vedānta from intellectualism to devotionalism (p. 98). He does not perceive that Kuhn's law provides a better model to explain the entire history of Advaita Vedānta than his own theory, for there are at least five earlier paradigm shifts determined by the confrontations of Advaita Vedānta first with Mīmāṃsā, second with Sāṁkhya, third with Buddhism, fourth with Vaiṣṇava theologians and fifth with Navya Nyāya. These encounters cannot be brushed aside as mere debates or polemics, for they are essentially accompanied with the strategies of re-systematization and re-organization of the prevailing ideas of Advaita Vedānta. In fact, discussion with opponents and re-systematization of one's own system are simultaneous adventures. Contemporarily this is taking place between Advaita Vedānta and the prevailing systems of Western philosophy. Moreover, paradigm shift is not only conceptual but linguistic also. The shift from Sanskrit to English or from Sanskrit to Hindi does not spell the death of Advaita Vedānta. These conceptual and linguistic shifts indicate that Advaita Vedānta is ever alive and the declaration of its death or termination in the seventeenth century is nonsense. The human urge to be free will always keep Advaita Vedānta alive, for no curtailment of freedom is tolerable for long. Even a few utterances expressing freedom have more worth than a billion of books on its negation.

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I appreciate the keen interest shown by Prof. Karl Potter in his treatment of The Development of Advaita Vedānta as a School of Philosophy. In this article the renowned author has made an effort to trace the development of

the Vedānta school on the criterion of the external development of the school. Accordingly, his method is to trace the morphology of its development, the original shape of Advaita, for instance, and its developmental positions, numbering them. In numbering the developmental positions such as fundamental insights, the following of these insights by followers of the school and by others, demarcating the position of the school from others' positions, its self awareness as a school and institutional factors are significant. While setting forth the developmental history of Advaita, Prof. Potter has exemplified the developmental positions of schools of Western philosophy like Cartesian philosophy and the philosophy of Platonism, Aristotelianism and Thomism. Through this approach Prof. Potter reaches the conclusion that Advaita has passed through various stages in its development. For instance, there is the stage of fundamental insight discovery, the stage of the *sūtras*, the stage of legitimatization, minimizing the possibility of internal inconsistencies and squabbling, the style of a specialist who addresses mainly his pupils as did, say, Socrates and Plato (*guru-śiṣya paraṁparā*), and finally an attempt to relate the theoretical aspects of the fundamental insights to practical purposes and aims. With regard to the development of Advaita, Prof. Potter says that decidedly Śaṅkarācārya is the most famous and powerful philosopher. He says that the school of Vedānta was not known as a school for many centuries. Tracing the historical development of 'Advaita', he says that it was Śaṅkarācārya who developed it into a school. He says that, 'confining ourselves to these authentic works we can find various features in Śaṅkara's work which indicate his role as a developer of the school.' He further says, 'Śaṅkara is also a legitimizer, not an innovator.' In this regard, Prof. Potter quotes the opening of the *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*, which contrasts the self and non-self. This is reminiscent of Sāṁkhya. 'When he (Śāṅkara) talks of causality, it is in terms of 'pariṇāma" or transformation—a technical Sāṁkhya term, describing how the basic stuff of the universe, *prakṛti*, transforms itself into the mental and material evolutes which constitute the Sāṁkhya scheme of categories.' Thus, Prof. Potter finds a great influence of Sāṁkhya thought and terminology on Vedānta. 'It is only gradually that he (Śaṅkara) shows us the vast gulf that actually separates Advaita from Sāṁkhya.' In this connection, it may be mentioned that Śaṅkara nowhere indicates his view of causality in terms of *pariṇāma*. He only says that the world is *vivarta*. On the other hand, he refutes the *Pariṇāma* or *Vikāra* theory of Sāṁkhya. To support this view, he may be quoted as follows:

'न हि परिणामवत्त्व विज्ञानात् परिणामनत्व मात्मन: फलं स्यादिनि वक्तं युक्तम्' ।
(*Brahmasūtra, Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, 2.1.14)

Thus, Potter's statement that Śaṅkara was not an innovator, but only a legitimizer, is wrong because it was he mainly who propounded the doctrine of Advaita on the basis of innovations like *Adhyāsa*, and *Vivarta*. Also, Potter's statement that Śaṅkara's beginning of the '*Adhyāsabhāṣya*' by

making a distinction between *ātman* and *anātman* is reminiscent of Sāṁkhya is not quite correct. A scholar like Potter should remember the fact that Śaṅkara's elaboration of *ātman* and *anātman* in the *Adhyāsabhāṣya* is based on *Adhyāsa* and, needless to say, that the *Sāṁkhya-Vādin* is not a believer of *Adhyāsa* at all. Furthermore, Potter's flat statement that Śaṅkara is a Mīmāṃsaka, is entirely erroneous. To support his statement, he says, 'He (Śaṅkara) utilizes the exegetical rules developed by Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā.' This is unreasonable, for it is the method of Śaṅkara's exposition that prior to expounding his own version he exhaustively presents the viewpoint of the *Pūrva-Pakṣin* and it is in this way that the Mīmāṃsā-rules are quoted by him. But this does not make Śaṅkara *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsaka*.

While tracing the history of the development of Advaita, Potter unjustly comments on a prominent pre-Śaṅkara Advaitin, Gauḍapāda, the grand-guru of Śaṅkarācārya, when he says, 'it is clear that Gauḍapāda did not discover Advaita. The Kārikās display the other marks of stage two, to which alluded.' It is unsystematic in style and disinterested in internal variety of Advaita thought. 'Gauḍapāda's purpose is to convince, not to defend or systematize' (p. 86). On these comments, it may be remarked that it is not proper to say that Gauḍapāda did not discover Advaita as a doctrine. No doubt there were some *ācāryas* like Bodhāyana and others who spoke from time to time in their commentaries about Advaitic tenets, but it was Gauḍapāda who presented the concept of Advaita on the basis of the tenet of *ajāti*: 'अद्वैत: सर्वं भावानां देवस्तुर्यो विभु: स्मृत:' (*Gauḍapāda-Kārikā*, 1.10). On the basis of this concept of the unborn he propounded the eternity of *ātman* and *brahman* and justified the status of the world with the help of his concept of *māyā*. The *jīva's* existence has been mentioned by him as based on *upādhi*. Hence, it cannot be said that Gauḍapāda did not give a systematic exposition of Advaita or that the *Gauḍapāda-Kārikā* does not take into account the internal variety of Advaita thought as claimed by Potter. The sound scholarship and original as well as systematic expounding of Advaita by Gauḍapādācārya can be further evinced by the following statement of Śaṅkarācārya who very respectfully mentions him (Gauḍapāda) as *Sampradāyavit*, a scholar of the Advaitic school: 'अत्रोक्तं सम्प्रदाय विदभिराचार्यै:' (*Brahmasūtra-Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, 2.1.9).

On the style of Śaṅkarācārya, Potter's comment that it is commentarial and thus unsystematic, that even the *Upadeśa-Sāhaṣrī* is written as a charming set of dialogues between teacher and pupil (p. 89), is not reasonable. It can be said that Prof. Potter has not tried to understand the difference between a *bhāṣya* and a commentary. While a *bhāṣya* makes an essay-type exposition of the subject, a commentary highlights in its study some particular terms or words. Had the distinction been clear to Potter, he would not have described Śaṅkara's style as commentarial. The adverse comment on the *Upadeśa-Sāhasrī's* style is further unreasonable. One must understand that the *Upadeśa-Sāhasrī* is one of the hand-books (*prakaraṇa-granthas*) of

Śaṅkarācārya through which he has made the subject easy to understand; the reader is able to grasp the contents easily because it is set forth in a convincing manner. Thus the style of the *Upadeśa-Sāhasrī* is quite natural and appropriate for the purpose for which it is written.

On page 92, Potter writes, 'Topics treated here include the *pramāṇas* and the doctrine of the intrinsic validity of knowledge; the degrees of truth and/or being; the theory that the empirical and dream worlds have an ontological status which is neither real nor unreal, and so is technically labelled *anirvacanīya*; the critique of difference as necessarily not real; the existence of the external world; the positive rather than negative nature of *avidyā*; theories of error; how *avidyā* can be removed. These topics are more or less ignored by Śaṅkara himself; they become the major pre-occupations of later post-Śaṅkara Advaitins.'

Regarding the above, it may be said that the doctrine of the intrinsic validity of knowledge has been treated very well by Śaṅkara in his *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*: that the supreme knowledge or *Ātmabodha* is the subject of intuition and thus has self-validity. As for the degrees of truth, Śaṅkara does not believe in that doctrine, as there is only one reality, the permanent truth or *Brahman* in his Advaitic philosophy. He defines truth as 'यद्विषया बुद्धिर्न व्यभिचरति तत्सत्' (*Gītā-Bhāṣya*). So far as the question of the phenomenality and illusoriness of the world is concerned, they are not accepted as truth in the philosophy of Śaṅkarācārya. Their existence is merely empirical and illusory respectively. To clear the concept of *vyavahāra* (experience) in his *Adhyāsa-Bhāṣya*, Śaṅkara clearly says that it (worldly experience) is the result of the combination of *satya* and *anṛta* (*Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, 1.1.1).

Potter's comment that 'empirical and dream worlds have an ontological status which is neither real nor unreal . . . has more or less been ignored by Śaṅkara', also does not seem correct. Śaṅkarācārya in his *Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā Bhāṣya* clearly finds the waking state and the dream state as being similar, and then describes their falsehood, and also propounds their *anirvacanīya* character. He says: 'जाग्रद दृश्यानां भावाना नेतथ्या मिति प्रतिज्ञ, दृश्यत्वादिति हेतुः स्वप्नदृश्य भाव वदिति दृष्टान्तः। यथा तत्र स्वपने दृश्यानां भावानां वैतथ्यं तथा जागरितेऽपि दृश्यत्वः मिति निगमनम्। (*Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, 2.4).

To say that Śaṅkara ignores the positive nature of *avidyā* is again groundless, because, in his *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya* (1-4-3) Śaṅkarācārya clearly says that *avidyā* is the seed power (*Avidyātmikā hi Bījaśaktiḥ*). It is also unreasonable to say that he has ignored the theories of error and the way of removing *avidyā*. It is in the *Adhyāsa-Bhāṣya* where the *khyātis* are studied; he has very clearly mentioned that *avidyā*, the *bījaśakti* can be removed by *vidyā* or knowledge; '*Vidyayā tasyā bījaśakterdāhāt* (*B.S.S.B.*, 1-4-3). In his *Adhyāsa-Bhāṣya* too, he mentions the nature of *vidyā* which is realized after realizing the discrimination between the real and the unreal; for example between *śukti* (conch-shell) and *rajata* (silver).

Potter has expressed some doubt and difficulty regarding the authenticity of Śaṅkara's work, and has referred to the studies made in this respect by Paul Hacker and S. Mayeda in particular. Quoting the same scholars, he further says that it is only some portions of the *Upadeśa-Sāhasrī* that has been written by Ādi Śaṅkara (pp. 86-87). To prove this point Mayeda says that the *Upadeśa-Sāhasrī* is written both in prose and verses and hence cannot be by the same author. To my mind, this argument is not convincing. The reason for writing the Vedāntic teachings in prose is that they are more convincing because of the lucidity of exposition in prose, which is not possible in verse. It may also be added that the Vedāntic views explained in prose and verse in the *Upadeśa-Sāhasrī* do not contradict one another.

As regards the date of Śaṅkara, Potter places him in the late seventh and early eighth centuries AD, while AD 788-820 is generally accepted by most scholars. While presenting a brief history of Advaita, the author also says that works like *Advaita-Siddhi*, *Citsukhī*, *Siddhānta-bindu*, and *Siddhāntaleśa-Saṁgraha* are merely a show of scholarship (p. 94). As far as I understand these works, in them, the Advaitic tenets have been studied in minute detail and so they cannot be regarded as a mere display of scholarship.

Thus, it may be said that Prof. Potter has studied the development of the Advaita-Vedānta school of philosophy according to his own personal views and according to the methodology usually adopted by Western scholars to judge the suitability of a thought or system to be designated as a school. To me, it appears that for any Indian thought or system to be regarded as a school it should be done on the basis of the principles of scholarship generally accepted in the Indian philosophical tradition itself. This is the reason why Gauḍapāda has been counted by Śaṅkara himself as *sampradāyavit*, while according to Potter he is merely a 'legitimizer'. Likewise, to describe Śaṅkara as a 'stylist' and not a sound propounder of Advaita also does not seem correct. A great number of scholars both from the East and the West have accepted Śaṅkara as a great Advaitin on the basis of his exposition of Advaita in his *Bhāṣya-Granthas*. Perhaps, the history of Advaita Vedānta has to be written differently than the way Potter has done. But there can be little doubt that this is the first challenging formulation of it, demanding attention from all scholars interested in the subject concerned.

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Prof. Karl Potter has distinguished five phases in the 'life' of a philosophical system: (1) the 'Discovery stage' where the Fundamental Insights of the school first appear to its founders; (2) the Development stage where the Fundamental Insight begins to be set forth in a self-conscious way as a doc-

trine; (3) the Polemical stage; (4) the Systematic stage which is super-theoretical; and (5) the last stage which is the stage of Decline. These five broad stages are, again, analysed into many sub-stages.* I shall offer some brief comments on Potter's analysis.

(1) It is not clear about the first stage whether the Fundamental Insights of a system are to be credited to someone or to none in particular. 'In the case of some Indian schools, a founder is invented and made responsible for the composition of a basic text—characteristically a set of aphoristic utterances in which the fundamental insights are set forth.' It seems that the Fundamental Insights are expressed in the aphorisms. But Potter does not accept this view as correct. 'The *sūtras* or aphorisms which constitute the supposed beginnings of these systems are actually redactions of views already in place.'

But to trace the first stage beyond the *sūtras*, in many cases even of the *āstika darśanas*, is to make the Discovery stage itself mythical. In the case of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems, for example, it is not clear whether there were views already in place. It seems Potter wants to go beyond the *sūtras* to find the Discovery stage because in the *sūtras* of all the systems there are polemics against rival theories. It is not clear if the discovery of the Fundamental Insights of a system cannot come from critical reflection on rival theories, if the discovery has always to be made by intuition or in any direct, non-critical, way. Potter has not mentioned the *Vedānta Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa on which Śaṅkara wrote his commentary. In the section called '*Tarkapāda*', the author of the *sūtras* argues against rival theories. Moreover, the *sūtras* themselves are often written in the manner of arguments, having the fifth declension of compound words (*hatvārthe pañcamī*). Potter has traced the Discovery stage of Advaita Vedānta to the Upaniṣads. This is not unwarranted because Advaita Vedānta claims to capture the insights embodied in the Upaniṣads. To go beyond the *sūtras* to trace the Discovery stage of the Fundamental Insights of all the systems is fraught with difficulties.

(2) I am not sure if the Discovery stage cannot reappear after the Systematic and even the Polemical stage. The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems developed and were systematized as different systems; still very late in the history of the systems they were united into the 'syncretic school' of Navya-Nyāya. Gāṅgeśa had fundamental insights of various new topics, like *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa*, *vypāti*, *parāmarśa* etc. and they were discovered, developed and

*It is interesting to note that this kind of study has been done long before in the case of religions. 'If you study the history of any religious movement, you will trace three stages, three periods. The first period is the period of the Teacher, the Reformer, the Prophet... Then comes the second period: after his death, the true disciples, apostles, try to systematize the teachings and to promote them as faithfully as possible...In the third period the priest comes and organizes out of the teachings another religious creed' (quoted from 'a Christian mystic' by Swami Tejasananda in his address on 'Sri Ramakrishna and the Unity of Religions' delivered on 22nd February, 1958).

systematized by criticizing the views of opponents, especially the Prābhākara-Mīmāṁsā philosophers.

(3) Potter has mentioned that in *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, 'the approach in fact, is that found in the sophisticated treatment of things by Navya-Nyāya.' But he has not noticed that Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's *Advaitasiddhi* is written in the language of Navya-Nyāya. As a matter of fact, all philosophical systems used the language of Navya-Nyāya when it was developed. So whether in the Systematic stage or in the Polemical stage, the use of the Navya-Nyāya conceptual system and language was almost universal. The conceptual system and technical language of Navya-Nyāya made systematization (for example, by refining the concept of relevance, *saṅgati*) and refutation of rival theories more rigorous.

(4) There is a peculiarity of the Sāṁkhya system. The *sūtras* and the commentaries on them, as published, are very defective. The only text that was, and is, widely used is the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and Vācaspati's commentary on it. The discovery of *Yuktidīpikā* gave a new impetus to studies in Sāṁkhya; yet the published text is very defective. The point is that systems like Advaita Vedānta and Nyāya criticize various aspects of the Sāṁkhya system in detail; yet there has been no attempt on the part of the Sāṁkhya philosophers to reply to them. But the system had not declined; its influence on Indian culture is pervasive, and there are many who practise, even now, the Sāṁkhya method of self-realization.

(5) In the second stage of development, there is an attempt to 'relate the theoretical aspect of the Fundamental Insights to practical concerns and aims'. It is interesting to note that both Gautama and Kaṇāda have explicitly stated that by studying these systems one realizes the *summum bonum* (*niḥśreyasa*). Yet there has been no one studying Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems who has followed the methods of realizing the true nature of the self as propounded in these systems. As a matter of fact, of the six orthodox systems, only Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika have not been able to draw anyone to the practice of self-realization. On the other hand, Nyāya was regarded as *ānvīkṣikī*, the science of argumentation and debate, and Vaiśeṣika as systematic ontology, but not as spiritual disciplines. Thus the stated practical aim in the *sūtras* was never recognized as constituting the value of the system.

Book reviews

MARGARET CHATTERJEE (ed.): *The Philosophy of Nikunja Vihari Banerjee*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research in association with Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi, 1990, pp. 210, Rs 150.

Nikunja Vihari Banerjee's interest in the different schools of Indian and Western philosophy is well-known. He delved into the intricacies of philosophical systems with an intellectual honesty that is rarely seen, but he emerged unscathed and kept intact the humanistic tendency which has deeply coloured his thought. The philosophy of Banerjee cannot be accounted for in isolation from the whole gamut of the historical and philosophical tradition of India; a piecemeal dissection of his thought cannot bring out the spirit and meaning of the expression of problems in the philosophy of Banerjee. He has made it clear that there ought to be no confusion in issues analysed through the epistemological or metaphysical angles; similarly ethical values cannot be overlooked under the guise of the logic of science. His penchant to save the human being from all sorts of encroachments on his freedom and rights gives a human touch to the problems dealt with by him. It is in the unity of thought and action that he finds the fulfilment of all philosophizing, and it is this essential characteristic which is the hallmark of the philosophy of Banerjee.

Nikunja Vihari Banerjee writes with conviction and his approach is always direct and well supported by experience and reason. He is never esoteric, and does not believe in giving his arguments a technical face-lift. His statements throb with the vitality of life, and are above all artificial demarcations. Banerjee did not believe in turning philosophy into barren speculations. In his writings a clear distinction is made between the role and function of philosophy and science, and the benefits of both in the removal of superstitions from human life and society has been underlined by him. It augurs well for contemporary philosophizing in India that Banerjee has delineated the basic trends that could provide a viable foundation for the emergence of Indian philosophy on the world scene. Banerjee has absorbed the vitality of the Indian philosophical tradition in a way which is not merely innovative, but is essentially creative. His thought will therefore remain the beginning point for those who are interested in the advancement of the Indian philosophical tradition on sound lines.

Banerjee has affirmed that no one can grow in isolation and that as an ardent participant in social activities, one can realize one's full potential and creativity. He has maintained that it is in the web of human relationships that one fully knows his own kind, and which will pave the way for both

personal and social development. For him the depth of cooperation and love among individuals will determine the strength of society and state on national and international levels. It follows that individuals are makers of their own fortune and destiny. In his extensive writings Banerjee has given a blueprint of a new society whose members, through their enlightened action and love, move towards greater heights of achievement and all-round development. He has tried to instil a new hope amongst people who are troubled by sagging morale, an existential predicament and lack of confidence in the efficacy of human action. The humanistic approach of Banerjee is comprehensive and it covers all human endeavour for the attainment of social good. For him the good of the individual cannot be different from the good of all members of society.

Banerjee has indicated that the scientist and the philosopher are confronted with a core content which may be understood or interpreted by them through varied expressions and terminology. According to him, so long as science and philosophy continue to unravel the actual data available for study and analysis, the functions of both are not poles apart, though their methods of analysis may differ radically. The changing conditions and situations in nature and history, and the threat to human existence and culture pose a challenge to all thinking minds, maintains Banerjee.

The obvious purpose in publishing books on leading philosophers is to evaluate their contributions on the divergent problems of philosophy. Therefore, the concepts of the philosopher ought to receive specific attention while doing a comparative estimate of his philosophy in relation to the thoughts of other philosophers, past and present. The ideas of the philosopher have to be analysed with utmost attention, and the minutest connotations and contexts in the thought structure of the philosopher have to be presented without harming the unity of his system. In spite of common concepts or methodologies, no two systems of philosophy can be similar, and each philosopher may express his mind with a flavour and style of his own, which the authors of essays on the philosopher have to convey with critical acumen. This will pave the way for a critical assessment of the contribution made by the philosopher in clarification of the basic problems of philosophy.

Religio-spiritualistic solutions to ease tensions and conflicts in human societies and for the realization of peace and harmony are not acceptable to Banerjee. Some phases of the Indian tradition have fascinated him, just as some have left him in utter dismay regarding their efficacy in today's context. These tendencies in the philosophy of Banerjee have been analysed by well-known scholars in this book.

B.K. Matilal's paper, 'Images of India: Problems and Perceptions', throws light on the several falsifications perpetuated by persons who had only incomplete knowledge of the Indian tradition. He has brought to the fore the relevance of Banerjee's contribution in the removal of wrong notions regarding the different aspects of Indian tradition. His paper takes one into the basic philosophical works and mythology of India to show the shallowness of the hasty generalizations made by some writers from within and outside India. The consistent effort of Banerjee in the removal of wrong notions about Indian philosophy has been mentioned by Matilal. However, his paper does not contain any critical and specific elaboration of Banerjee's viewpoints as expressed by him in his writings.

Pradip Kumar Sengupta's paper, 'The Human Situation', deals with this problem in Banerjee's philosophy in a way which is exhaustive, comparative as well as critical.

In his paper on 'The Concept of Philosophy', A.G. Javadekar analyses the definition of philosophy given by Banerjee. His affirmation that the basis of Banerjee's humanism derives its nourishment from the dominant traits of Indian tradition is well supported by facts.

The brief paper by J.N. Mohanty, 'N.V. Banerjee's Critique of Advaita Vedānta', is clear and logical. He deals with the approach of Banerjee towards the central themes of Advaita. The burden of Banerjee to rescue the human being from the onslaught of absolutism, including that of Advaita, looms large in Mohanty's paper.

N.S. Dravid's paper, 'Professor Banerjee on Sense-Perception', is a convincing analysis of Banerjee's realism. He clarifies Banerjee's approach towards the problem of sense-perception, but does not compare it with the theories of some leading exponents of this problem like Russell and Ayer.

The distinction made by Banerjee in the modes of acquiring knowledge about the subject and object is well presented by Hiranmoy Banerjee in his paper, 'Some Aspects of Nikunja Vihari Banerjee's Theory of the Self'. But his brief paper does not give an adequate picture of the main problem. Abani Ghosh has analysed the views of N.V. Banerjee on Kant's approach to the problem of the self. The innovative views of Banerjee on the central themes of epistemology have been well brought out by K.K. Bagchi in his paper, 'The Primitiveness of the "I" as Speaker'. Banerjee's concept of 'I' with others—'WE' and the human implications of it has been compared and contrasted by him with the meanings of 'I' given by other philosophers. Banerjee's views on Kant expressed in his work *Kant's Philosophy of the Self* have been minutely analysed by Mrinal Miri in his paper 'Kant's Refutation of Idealism'. The brevity of the paper however does not give enough dexterity to Mrinal Miri's analysis to focus attention on the pluralistic aspects of Banerjee's philosophy.

Margaret Chatterjee has an intuitive understanding of the different aspects of Banerjee's philosophy and the basis of the influences in the making of his mind. Her paper, 'Intersubjectivity and Essentiality' is a lucid treatment of the various themes in the philosophy of Banerjee. It is a valuable exposition of the humanistic trends initiated by Banerjee. The two papers by Margaret Chatterjee in the book, 'Intersubjectivity and Essentiality' and 'Reflections on Justice within the Framework of N.V. Banerjee's Thought',

along with her 'Editor's Preface', comprise a three-pronged analysis and introduction to the important concepts embedded in the philosophy of Banerjee.

Banerjee's thesis that art will facilitate the passage from bondage to liberation has been presented by Pabitrakumar Roy in his paper 'Art and Bondage'. He indicates the common links between Banerjee and western thinkers like Bradley and Cassirer on the role and function of art.

The comprehensive nature of Banerjee's theory of education has been presented by Amiya Kumar Mazumdar in his paper, 'N.V. Banerjee Looks at Education'. The proposition of Banerjee that education is the tool to enhance the quatity of human life and society has been thoroughly analysed by Mazumdar.

Banerjee's intellectual moorings in the concepts of the Buddha and Marx have been discussed by Sanghasena Singh in his paper, 'N.V. Banerjee on the Reconstruction of Humanism'. The assertion of Banerjee that the power of love can truly bind all mankind together expresses the new thrust given by him in the philosophy of humanism. The deep impact of Banerjee's ideas on academic philosophizing, and his indebtedness to the thoughts of the Buddha and Marx have been described in detail by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya in his well-documented paper, 'N.V. Banerjee on Buddha and Marx'. The basis of the humanism visualised by Banerjee emerges clearly in Chattopadhyaya's paper.

Banerjee's interest in the ideological structure and development of Indian society, and his critical analysis of social injunctions have been mentioned by Chhatrapati Singh in his paper, '*Dharmaśāstra* and the Philosophy of Law'. Banerjee's evaluation of the *Dharmaśāstra* tradition has relevance in the fast-changing human situation of today. The different issues involved in Banerjee's concept of peace have been discussed at length by S.K. Saxena in his paper, 'The Peace-Making Utopia: An Essay in Understanding Part III of Banerjee's Book *Towards Perpetual Peace*'. Banerjee has offered his own solution for the attainment of peace in human societies within the framework of his realistic-humanistic world-view. Banerjee's stress on the need to overcome blind, instinctual and narrow considerations endow his philosophy with a concreteness highly relevant to meet the exigencies of human life.

The dominant aspect of Banerjee's philosophy is aptly defined by Daya Krishna as being anthropocentric. In his article on Banerjee's book, *Knowledge, Reason and Human Autonomy*, Daya Krishna deals with the crucial issues in the philosophy of Banerjee. He underlines the essentials in Banerjee's philosophy by maintaining that it is in closer affinity with his own kind, and through individual action as well as collective action, that the human being becomes creative, and the tone and quality of human relationships gains a new relevance. The characteristics of Banerjee's epistemology have been discussed by Daya Krishna in his article.

This book brought out by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research under the editorship of Margaret Chatterjee will be helpful in outlining the dimensions of contemporary philosophizing in India.

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G.L. PANDIT: *The Structure and Growth of Scientific Knowledge: A Study in the Methodology of Epistemic Appraisal*, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1983.

The seventy-third volume in the series Boston Studies in Philosophy of Science, Prof. G.L. Pandit's book entitled *The Structure and Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, is a contribution to the study of 'philosophy of science' as understood by Western, Greco-European intellectuals. This is also certified by the editors of the series in the Editorial Preface: '. . .a fundamental criticism and a constructive re-interpretation of all that has been preserved as serious epistemological and methodological reflections on the sciences in modern Western philosophy . . .' Further, 'His themes are intriguing, set forth as they are, with masterly case studies of physics and the life sciences . . . .' Indeed there can be no two opinions that Prof. Pandit has laboured hard and produced a fine examination of some of the major views, as also he has presented more fine-tuned 'model' of the knowledge systematizing activity of the modern empirical sciences. For this reason, the book ought to have been noticed very early by Indian intellectuals and we owe an apology to him for reviewing the book so late in the present journal which is by and large representative of the philosophical activity going on in India.

What, however, amazed us as we went through the pages of the book is that Prof. Pandit has shown more or less total lack of awareness of 'Indian' sciences such as Ayurveda or Jyotirveda or Vyakarana, where a conception of *science* is presupposed as also a conception of a proper *scientific method* of generation, presentation or construction and appraisal of *scientific* knowledge can be found. The grave limitation of his book as we see it, belonging as we do to an independent culture-matrix, is that it appears like a scene of battle between a mercenary and adversary soldiers; it is a fine job that Prof. Pandit has done *for* Greco-European culture, without giving even the slightest hint that he in fact belongs to, has been educated and brought up in, a different and independent culture-matrix. We may thus bluntly ask: what contribution does the study make to present-day Indian philosophy? Indeed Prof. Pandit had a good opportunity in the publication of this book to draw the attention of Western intellectuals to methodological thought in the old Indian sciences from which even they could perhaps benefit. We are unable to understand why he so completely ignored them as if these never existed/

exist. Does he think that these are not even 'sciences' properly so understood?

If philosophy of science today means philosophy of modern science (of Greco-European origin) alone, as it seems it does, since most contemporary philosophers of science do not go beyond Copernicus and Galileo in their study of the history of science, then the subject provides a very limited framework of study as one may doubt whether modern science provides an adequate, if not ideal, conception of science and the scientific method. In fact it appears strange to us as we study the history of modern science that Greco-European *scientists* have displayed a suicidal lack of concern for *method*, as if when one does something significant one can afford to miss the question of *how* best it could be done. Contrary to this, as one studies the works of Indian sciences such as Ayurveda, one notices a remarkable awareness of the *method* of doing what is sought to be done, of a prior inquiry about *how* best the goal of the science can be achieved. As one studies the Indian sciences, of which about a dozen are available for study, one askes: can a scientific enterprise as a systematized body of knowledge be possible without a definite *goal*? And can a goal be thought to be achieved without a *characteristic* method? And can a *theory* arise without the context of goal and method? There is only one answer to all these questions: without awareness of goals and methods, the enterprise would be haphazard.

Prof. Pandit's construction being a fine example of an exercise in thinking and critical examination undertaken as it is *within* and *for* a limited framework of contemporary Greco-European thought on the *specific* Greco-European sciences, it can be critically examined from the standpoint of the Indian conception of science as a goal-seeking, method-conscious, theoretic systematization of knowledge in a well-defined area of interest. What he says is briefly this: One must distinguish between ideology and the 'canonical system of description' plus 'epistemic structure' of science. Methodology must be based in the epistemic structure of science. The epistemic structure of science is at the same time its developmental structure having as its chief elements *problems* and *theories*. Growth (or development) of science may be understood as a function of the dynamic interaction between theories and problems. This is called the *objectivist* enterprise of epistemology. However, there is also the received enterprise of epistemology in which theories and problems are not the chief elements but the knowing-subject is the chief element. This *subjectivist* epistemology can also be de-psychologized so that a growing epistemology may itself be understood as 'interaction' or 'parallelism' between objectivist and subjectivist interpretation of knowledge. Most confusions in contemporary philosophy of science arise because, according to Prof. Pandit, the requisite distinctions are not made and scientific methodology is not understood as based on a rule in the epistemic structures of science.

The concept of *epistemic structure* is central to Prof. Pandit's construction. In order to develop this, he reviews the historical background of Western epistemology and its growth (Chapter 2). Then he constructs this epistemic structuralism as theory-problem interaction and provides explanatory power and resolving power of theory as criteria of epistemic appraisal (Chapter 3). Subsequently, he examines the prevalent methodological models in the light of the epistemic structuralist model and his distinction between ideology and CSD+ES, showing how methodological variance is strictly so only if triggered by CSD-variance and ES-variance (Chapters 4 and 5).

The above is *a* model of *a* science, namely post-Renaissance, Greco-European science, Galileo onwards, generally acclaimed as an achievement of this culture. The model is claimed to be superior to other such models which it perhaps is in so far as it makes explicit the implicit and unfounded assumptions of other models. Such model-building activity is one of the several other activities that philosophers engage in and it is always grounded in a definite *picture* of science. The picture of Greco-European science as evidenced from its historical study is as follows. Scientific enterprise is broadly the exploratory conduct of scientists—they explore facts and formulate problems in some specific area of interest such as physics or biology. In order to understand these facts and resolved the problems, they construct theories without any precise method-awareness. As 'newer' facts are noticed and 'newer' problems formulated, they often abandon old theories and construct new ones. In this way the scientific enterprise advances. Transition from one theory to another sometimes compels the scientists to raise questions of method during theory appraisal. The philosopher takes up for himself the task of building a systematic *model* of this activity, thus uncovering some systematic *method* in it.

Consider, however, another picture of science such as what follows. Scientific enterprise is essentially the goal-seeking conduct of scientists. They inquire about various natural goals that humans seek and pursue specific sciences characterized by specific goals. A more or less precise definition of goal defines the field of interest of specific sciences. How best can the goal be attained? Inquiry into natural principles underlying the goal-seeking conduct of seekers provides an optimally efficient *method* as well as it gives rise to theoretic considerations relating to the goal. Methods of generation, construction and appraisal of theory itself are sought. Finally, methods of presentation of the whole science may be sought. The enterprise grows by goal-inquiry, method-inquiry, theory-inquiry, as well as by facts and problems of the field of interest.

This picture of science will not give rise to a philosophy of science of Greco-European variety. In so far as the philosopher is interested in the study of such science, he need not discover the methodology of it, for the specific methodology of science forms a part of it. He can present a *model* of the

science by critically evaluating its goals, methods and theoretic structure, giving at the same time the main modes by which the enterprise advances in its knowledge-systematizing activity. Since scientists of the field are aware of the optimal method by which inquiry is to advance, their natural conduct is itself methodical and the philosopher need not study it for uncovering of underlying natural principles that govern it. We have to remember that it is not the business of philosophers to *advise* scientists what they *ought* to do—they can only critically evaluate what scientists do.

If we contrast the two pictures of science given above, it is clear that in the former picture not only do scientists not inquire about the adequate methods of doing what they are doing but also the scientific enterprise itself arises without the context of any human goal. Thus, theory in this enterprise arises by hit-and-try, as facts are explored and problems are formulated. By the time the theory acquires a definite structure, some new, unnoticed fact emerges, forcing a theory-change or even abandoning of the present theory and theorizing all over again. This process goes on. The only goal or purpose of this enterprise is theorizing. However, since theorizing for the sake of theorizing can hardly be a purposeful human activity, the enterprise advances without purpose—haphazardly, so to say.

The reason why Prof. Pandit fails to notice these features of modern science is that he has ignored the study of Indian sciences. Had he noticed these features of modern science, he would have perhaps criticized the earlier models from an altogether different standpoint and would have perhaps suggested a different model himself. Consider, for example, his distinction between ideology and CSD-ES. The justification of CSD-variance and ES-variance is presumably regulated by the methodologically invariant framework of theoretical universals. Such is, however, not the case with ideological variance—it has perhaps no criterion of justification in the strict sense of the term (pp. 182-83). One must not confuse between the three kinds of variance, the author advises. While the first two kinds of variance are mutually related by objectivistic epistemology as a rational enterprise, the third kind of variance has to do with subjectivistic epistemology. OE and SE are, however, said to be 'parallel'. This compartmentalization of ideology and CSD-ES on the one hand, and of OE and SE on the other hand would create 'strange' tensions in the monolith of knowledge systematization itself, not to talk of doing away with some overarching criterion of rationality. If we study the growth of knowledge in Indian culture, its history indicates that ideological clarity is generally achieved first and scientific enterprises such as CSD-ES systems originate and grow later by informal consistency with and under the overarching guidance of such ideological systems.

Consider, further, Prof. Pandit's requirement that in science 'methodology of epistemic appraisal *should* invariably be embedded in the philosophical framework of a sound model of *epistemic structure and growth* of scientific knowledge' as a (methodological) *rule* (pp. 40-42). What if the reverse is the case, that is, if *as a rule* the 'model of epistemic structure and growth of scientific knowledge' is embedded invariably in the 'methodology of epistemic appraisal'? Indeed, if a science begins with clarification and the defining of *goals* and thus of commensurate methods, the epistemic structures will be invariably influenced if not determined by these—albeit the methods are not merely those of appraisal but also of generation and presentation of theories. When we thus present *a model of a* science as a systematic description of its structure and growth, purported to be systematic itself by virtue of underlying natural principles governing it, we presume a definite picture of the science under study obtained by a study of its history. Thus, if for example, there is already a conception of methodology in the picture, the model would not have to discover the underlying principles of method; or if there is no conception of goals in the picture the model has to discover if some implicit goal(s) is working. Model building in philosophy may aim at a *universal* model of *sciences*—sciences that are both culturally characterized and characterized by specific fields of interest. If all humans without exception naturally pursue certain universal goals—irrespective of the specific culture-matrix *in* which the pursuit is taken up—then there can be disagreement only about *interpretation* of the goals, not about the goals themselves. Scientific activity itself is part of a natural pursuit seeking natural goals, though the modes of its affectivity may differ from culture to culture. Only if humans achieve a measure of clarity about goals and the optimal methods for attaining these goals, can they possibly attain them quicker, with much less labour, the latter being indispensable in any case.

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RAMAKANT SINARI (ed.): *Concept of Man in Philosophy*, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla in association with B. R. Publishing Corporation, Delhi, 1991, 164 pp., Rs. 140.

Concept of Man in Philosophy, the proceedings of a seminar organized by the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, comprises sixteen papers written on specific topics within the broad area covered by the subject of the title. The approaches are varied: we have the Anglo-American analytical approach, the continental phenomenological-existential approach and the Indian speculative approach. Almost all aspects of theorizing about man and his place in the world have been discussed. Let us glance through the essays collected in the book.

Prof. D.P. Chattopadhyaya's article, 'Man: An Essay in Philosophical Anthropology', opens the collection. The essay has seven sub-sections: (1) Mainly Anthropological, (2) Mainly Archaeological and Historical, (3) The Identity of Man, (4) From Social Anthropology to Epistemology, (5) Man in the Quest of Ought, (6) Man in the Quest of Perfection, (7) Man in the Quest of a Just Society. Aristotle had told us long back that man is a social animal; Prof. Chattopadhyaya has here worked out the logical implications of this definition. Society itself is an evolute and man is the result of an evolution and should be studied as such. Justifying his approach, Prof. Chattopadhyaya says, 'the very idea of studying man in a cosmogenetic context rather than in a cosmological one is prompted by an obvious dynamic consideration. The human phenomenon can certainly be studied in a static cosmological or physical framework. But by following the hominization or evolutionary process perhaps we could have a clearer image of what man is and what possibly he can be.'

What sort of just society should man try to realize, keeping in view the fact of his being mortal and fallible is the question the author raises towards the end of his essay. Being mortal, time is the most important consideration for man. The fallibility of man, according to the author, is the strongest available argument in support of a truly democratic society. He also holds that freedom is the most important element of the ideal society. Man cannot develop his rationality without freedom and cannot enjoy his freedom in the absence of rationality. But there is no universal formula for establishing such a social system. Apparently these seem to be truisms but what is disturbing to the present reviewer is the fact that concepts like rationality, social self and freedom are taken for granted along with the sedimentation of meaning these have acquired through centuries of speculation.

Prof. Ramchandra Gandhi in his essay examines the question, what is it like to be a human being? After an elaborate analysis he concludes that it is a spurious question, as a human being cannot contrast his experiences with non-human experiences. Yet this is what is required to answer the question.

Rejecting the case for immediate and inward acquaintance with what it is like to be a human being, Prof. Gandhi attributes it to a misunderstanding of the nature of self-consciousness. He asserts, 'our mental lives are indeed haunted by a sense of deep and final self-acquaintance. But this fact constitutes a mode of being, not a mode of knowing, not even a mode of understanding.' But the sense of these modes is neither explained nor differentiated. Prof. Gandhi does not produce any arguments in support of his assertion that self-consciousness is a mode of being and not a mode of knowing. He does not discuss the relationship between these two modes, even though for most creative writers of the world self-consciousness is the mode of knowing par excellence.

Towards the end of his essay Prof. Gandhi says that 'What is a human being?' and 'What are human beings?' are genuine questions and they simply mean, 'What are we?'. And after analysing these questions, he asserts, 'for if this question is the same as the question, "what are we?" Where "we" means ourselves, then any satisfactory answer to this question must exhibit the following features: It must not merely have the form, "we are such-and-such". It must explain how being such-and-such equips us with the ability to think of one another non-predicatively, i.e. quite simply as one another and not as being such-and-such or anything else. The only answer capable of fulfilling this expectation is this: "We are communicative beings".' So the essay concludes with the suggestion that the human phenomenon can best be understood in terms of communication. But how this is to be done is not explained. Thus Prof. Gandhi's neo-empiricist and neo-behaviourist explanation of human phenomena remains incomplete.

Prof. Rama Kant Sinari, in his article 'The Ontological Structure of Man', talks about two approaches for understanding human reality: outside-in and inside-out. At first it seems that he is describing the two approaches, but soon pre-suppositions creep in and his language becomes evaluative. One of his main pre-suppositions is that man has an 'inner space' which cannot be comprehended through an outside-in approach. While describing evaluating the outside-in approach the author writes, 'It is the basic requirement of this view to objectify man, to investigate him by divorcing him from his inwardness, to attempt not to state the unstatable existential meaning of being human.'

The author admits that the scientists outside-in approach has advanced our knowledge of various characteristics of the human species. And he also admits that the explanations so achieved are logically flawless. At the same time he maintains that the tragic aspect of this knowledge-situation is that every statement referring to man's 'inside' is translated into statements of behaviour and 'in the process man's subjectivity—his inner space—one of the eternal mysteries into which our inward-seeking sensibility continually runs, is lost.'

Describing/evaluating the inside-out approach the author writes, 'the design of the inside-out study of human consciousness is to bring out the ontological structure of what we are. In fact this study is more than scientific for it proceeds from the "roots" of consciousness' very act of experiencing.'

The method Sinari is advocating for bringing out the ontological structure of human reality borders on mysticism. 'The inside of man is to be seen first and articulated later, to be felt before it is ratiocinated. It is to be mapped out by what I have called the inward-seeing sensibility, i.e. a sort of transcendented vision—whether the findings of such sensibility satisfy or not the requirements of logic and language and reason.'

Towards the end, Sinari speaks in metaphors and the essay turns into a poem; in the process philosophical communication breaks down.

In his article, 'Some Methodological Observations Regarding the Study of Man and Human Actions', N.S.S. Raman considers as being unfortunate the fact that philosophers are taken in by the trend of thought in vogue during a particular period and become fond of thrashing out the same familiar issues from the point of view that the trend offers. He promises that he will not fall prey to such fashions and will 'attempt to postulate a methodology free from ideology and metaphysics'.

But when we proceed, we find that no new methodology is proposed. Instead we are told that it is necessary to return to the phenomenological ideal of scientific rigour as formulated by Husserl. In his quest for understanding human reality without any 'isms', Raman is hopeful that a 'scientific methodology is possible in terms of phenomenology, if of course we could somehow get over the Platonic metaphysics of Husserl and Hartmann.'

Raman, who in the beginning promises to give us a pre-suppositionless methodology, writes towards the end of his essay, 'the return to the primordial structure of language is an important step towards understanding the inner potentialities of man.' After committing himself to this primordial structure of language and after talking about the blinding effects of logic since the time of Aristotle and after a promise of liberating human beings from the state of their surrender to logic, how can Raman talk about his being ontologically non-committed, and methodologically pre-suppositionless?

Prof. Suresh Chandra's article, 'Scepticism, Identity and Interrupted Existence', is a well-argued rebuttal of P.F. Strawson's arguments for the equation of the concept of identity with the concept of spatio-temporal continuity. To my mind this essay is the best specimen of philosophizing in this collection.

In the course of his discussion Prof. Suresh Chandra refers to after-images and hallucinatory objects in order to differentiate between the concept of identity and the concept of continuity, for he considers them good examples of the sorts of objects to which identity could be ascribed without ascribing continuity. However, by bringing in the phenomenon of hallucinations and after-images, the author has exposed his critique to the dangers of psychologism.

Prof. Suresh Chandra's argument to the effect that Strawson's metaphysics cannot afford to have the pre-supposition which ties the concept of identity to the concept of continuity, because he holds the view that one can significantly talk about a disembodied person, and a disembodied person cannot be spatio-temporally continuous with an embodied person, is a valid and forceful argument and uncovers a flaw in Strawsonian metaphysics.

Prof. R.K. Gupta in his article, 'Towards Ethical Knowledge: Some Exploratory Reflections', delineates the conceptual intricacies of an inescapable dilemma that every moral theorist faces in choosing between ethical intuitionism which harbours the dangers of ethical subjectivism and ethical naturalism which does not seem a sound position in view of the fact that it tries to deduce an ethical concept from a non-ethical concept, thus violating the law of identity.

Prof. Gupta does not suggest any way out of the dilemma though he considers ethical intuitionism preferable to ethical naturalism on the basis of its 'logical coherence'. But this comparative logical coherence is not worked out in the essay.

In his article entitled 'Means and Ends', Y.N. Chopra raises the issue much debated in modern ethical thought that if ends are good, one may take recourse to all sorts of means without any discrimination, and whether means that may be regarded as bad can lead to ends that are worthy and moral. Invoking Aristotle's theory of practical knowledge and critically evaluating its extension by some contemporary analytical philosophers like G.E.M. Anscombe and von Wright, Chopra describes his own notion of practical knowlege as 'the form of what it brings about'. After analysing concepts like 'intention', 'want' and 'will', he concludes that there is need to break the link between intention and pleasure *via* appetite. If this is done, it will become clear that there is no real opposition between means and ends. The problematics of means and ends thus can be approached from a totally different perspective, it is suggested.

S.S. Barlingay, in his article entitled 'The Concept of Freedom', analyses the term as a concept and as a linguistic expression. The essay also discusses the concept of freedom as put forward by different traditional schools of Indian philosophy, and hints at the social implications and determinations of freedom. But the theme has not been fully developed. Considering the fact that freedom is not merely a psychological phenomenon, but is predominantly social in character, the theme should have been more fully developed.

Prof. A.K. Sinha's article, 'The Tekic Concept of Human Personality' is high-flown rhetoric and reads like a sermon. He writes, for example, 'the orient is not merely the region where the sun rises first and radiates physical light, but it is also the region which has been especially chosen by the pure universal consciousness for descent as finite beings.' And again, 'in sum. . .an individual is a sojourner in the world which has been created by personalized pure universal consciousness (God) for his play (līlā)'; and so on. If one has a taste for sermons one may enjoy reading the article.

'Freedom: An Indian Perspective' by S.N. Mahajan is again an exercise in high-flown rhetoric. Concepts like universal self, pure subject, *brahman* and *ātman* need to be deconstructed and metaphysical sedimentation laid bare. Instead what we have here is the binary opposition of true self and false self, pure consciousness and empirical ego, temporal and atemporal. These oppositions try to create (false) gaps and aim at (false) bridging. If one is not on one's guard the rhetoric may blind one and one may never be able to find one's way out of it.

In her article 'The Exceptional Man and Nietzche', Sujata Miri gives a

brief exposition and interpretation of Nietzche's concept of average and exceptional man. But her claim that a general acceptance of Nietzche's theories would not lead to any kind of totalitarianism or to social chaos is unwarranted in the practical domain and unprovable in the theoretical domain.

Sisir Kumar Ghose in his article, 'The Image of Man Today: The Literary Evidence', presents a picture of the images of man in contemporary Western and Soviet literature. These images and projections are varied, but share the characteristics of being unsatisfactory and fragmentary, according to the author. He longs for a Dante or a Sri Aurobindo on the modern scene, 'who will tell us, in modern idiom, of the luminous self beyond the darkest night'. But he does not take cognizance of such modern thinkers as Saussure, Derrida or Lacan, who have been dismantling all the structures of self-presence and have been ruling out any possibility of an ultimate and extra-linguistic signified. There is no reference to the contemporary Indian literary scene in the essay.

'The Concept of Man in Psychology: The Savage, the Robot, and the Noble Savage', is a descriptive essay by Amar Kumar Singh. There is a brief description of these three concepts with reference to various trends in modern psychology. But there is no analysis or critical evaluation of these concepts, and the author concludes with the remark that, 'it is premature to evaluate the adequacy of the three concepts of man in psychology, we know very little about him.'

'The Buddhist Concept of Man', by Pratap Chandra, is again an uncritical exposition of the earliest stratum of Buddhism represented by Pali texts. More attention has been paid to describing the concepts than to developing philosophical analysis and criticism of the material. For instance it is stated that, '*Nibbāna* (*nirvāṇa*) deliverance is the freeing of the personal sequence from the causes of its bondage', but no analysis has been given of the so-called personal sequence. As the very texture of an empirical sequence is woven with time, how can there be an atemporal sequence? Moreover, it is a contradiction in terms to assert that a sequence is free from causal determinations. These and other such issues are not even raised in the essay.

L. P. Singh's essay, 'Some Modern Critiques and the Indian Archetypal Evidence', is an attempt to demonstrate the relevance of the basic insights of Indian culture in the light of the modern critiques of the Western concept of man.

The author has chosen the Freudian, Marxian and Darwinian concepts of man and regards them as unsatisfactory and fragmentary, and as such rejects them in the quest of the 'total man'. Then the so-called basic insights of Indian culture are paraded, without any critical comment, as the best possible candidate for the prestigious position of the concept of 'total man'. The author concludes his essay with the following piece of wishful thinking. 'In spite of their apparent difference, Vedānta, tantra, yoga, Buddhism and Vaishnavism bring the same evidence, an evidence with which the latest tendencies in the sciences seem to agree.' If this is philosophy, what is gossip?

V.N. Tiwari's essay, 'Gurbani and Man' reads like a piece of journalistic writing. It is a simple and informative description of ideas concerning man and his place in the world as visualized in the *Gurbani*. No philosophical analysis, evaluation or comparison is undertaken.

The book is full of printing mistakes, but as I do not want this review to turn into a corrigendum, I shall not mention them. Moreover, since the book is meant for students and scholars of philosophy, I hope they will be able to make the required corrections for themselves.

Reviews usually highlight the negative, but let me point out in the end that the collection is stimulating and thought-provoking and will definitely regard anyone who reads it.

Government Women's College, Srinagar MUSTAFA KHAWAJA

KISHORE NATH JHA (ed.): *Gautamīyasūtraprakāśaḥ* (*Keśavamīśrapraṇītaḥ*), Ganganatha Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth, Allahabad, 1978.

It is indeed heartening to see that the *Gautamīyasūtraprakāśaḥ* of Keśavamiśra has seen the light of day. Dr Kishore Nath Jha deserves congratulations, and so also the Ganganath Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth, for bringing it out. This publication will encourage better study of the *Prācīnanyāya* tradition, for it throws ample light on the history of development of *Prācīnanyāya* thought.

There have been two types of writing in Nyāya: one, the *sūtra-bhāṣya-ṭīkā-pariśuddhi* tradition of writing commentary and commentary thereon, and two, the tradition of writing a *vṛtti* directly on the *sūtras*. The text under review belongs to the second category of writing.

The *vṛtti* style of writing is very useful for grasping the content and context of the *sūtras*. Keśavamiśra's present *vṛtti* is an ideal example of this type. He provides *avatārikā* for each *sūtra* and points out the link between one *sūtra* and another. Thus, a reader can read the text as a continuous text.

This text provides a gist of the main arguments of his predecessors, the writers of what is known as *Nyāya-caturgranthikā*. Keśavamiśra has referred to his *pūrvācāryas*. This will help in studying the development of Nyāya thought through the ages.

The editor deserves our appreciation for making this text available to us. He deserves further appreciation because he has added no less than five indices: critical notes on the *sūtras*, the alphabatical index of the *Gautama-*

sūtras, an index of authors and works, and also an index of important words. These indices have certainly improved the utility of the edition.

University of Poona, Pune V.N. JHA

V.S. RANGANATHACHARYA (ed.): *Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛttiḥ* by Deśika Tirumalai Ṭāṭācārya, Ganganatha Jha Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth, Allahabad, 1979.

The text under review is a direct commentary on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* of Kaṇāda, written in the *vṛtti* style by a twentieth century traditional *paṇḍita*. The *vṛttikāra* has tried to explain the meaning of the *sūtras* in lucid Sanskrit and has also tried to show the link of one *sūtra* with the other. The name of the *vṛtti* is *sugamā*. A reader will find that the name is quite apt.

The *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* are very old; in content they are even earlier than the *Nyāyasūtras*. These *sūtras* are not always transparent in their meaning and connotation. Therefore, the students of the Vaiśeṣika school of Indian philosophy always face the difficulty of interpreting and understanding the intention of Kaṇāda. Pandit Tatacharya's *vṛtti* will help in removing that difficulty to some extent. Hence scholars will certainly welcome this edition. The editor, Pandit Ranganathacharya, has taken care to present the text of Pandit Tatacharya faithfully, although, here and there, printing mistakes have cropped in.

The edition will be useful for those who want to begin the study of the Vaiśeṣika system right from the *sūtras* of Kaṇāda.

University of Poona, Pune V.N. JHA

Books received

Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy
edited by D.P. CHATTOPADHYAYA, Lester Embree and Jitendranath Mohanty, published by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research in association with Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited, Delhi.

Essays on Dependent Origination and Momentariness
by RITA GUPTA, published by Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta.

Consciousness and the Integrated Being—Sartre and Krishnamurti
by M.M. AGRAWAL, published by the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla and National Publishing House, New Delhi.

The Divine Constitution
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Liberty and Nature: An Aristotelian Defence of Liberal Order
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For more details, scholars may write to Dr Rajendra Prasad, at the following address: Dr Rajendra Prasad
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