Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

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Subscription Department
CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY PRIVATE LIMITED
23/90 Connaught Circus
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All contributions to the Journal, other editorial enquiries and books for review are to be sent to the Editor, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Rajendra Bhavan (Fourth Floor), 210 Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Marg, New Delhi 110 002.

ISSN 0970-7794

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

JICPR

Editor DAYA KRISHNA

VOLUME IX NUMBER 3
MAY-AUGUST
1992

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Indian Council of Philosophical Research
Rajendra Bhavan (Fourth Floor), Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Marg, New Delhi 110 002

Printed in India
by Jainendra Prakash Jain at Shri Jainendra Press, A 45 Naraina
Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi 110028
and published by Member-Secretary
for Indian Council of Philosophical Research
Rajendra Bhavan (Fourth Floor), 210 Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Marg
New Delhi 110 002

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Articles published in this journal are indexed in the *Philosophers' Index*, USA.

Conceptions of language and of language use

ASHOK R. KELKAR
Pune

I

'Everyone thinks,' said Goethe, 'because he can speak, that he can therefore speak about language.' But this readiness on the part of people to speak about language is not matched by their performance! Language is so close to us that this very closeness may make it difficult for us to answer (or even to ask) the all important question, what precisely is language?

Like money or tooth-brushes, language is what it does. What language does for human beings has to do with the variety of things that pass through the human mind. These mental contents may be:

Observations of reality of varying degrees of exactitude, such as: it's raining; it's pouring; it's drizzling;

Observations *on* reality ranging from the delighted response to the disgruntled response, such as: ah rain!; rain—oh no!;

Wishes and hopes, such as: if only it would rain!; when the corn is ripe I do hope it won't rain;

Plain demands, such as: rain, rain, go to Spain; let me know how many millimetres of rain there was when I was away yesterday.

It is in order to convey these mental contents to one another and thus keep up a social give-and-take that man invented and perfected language as a means of communication. At least that is how the first conception of language could be set out.

The notion of communication is complex. Or rather, communication could be conceived of in successively more complex terms. At its simplest, communication consists in someone acting in some way or producing something with the intent to convey a certain mental content to someone. The next step involves a certain mutual recognition of this communicative intent—the recipient is aware of the other's intent and the communicator in turn is aware that the recipient is so aware and the recipient in turn is aware that the com-

*Earlier versions of portions of this were presented orally at the Department of Philosophy, University of Poona in February 1991; at the Central Institute of English and Foreign Languages, Hyderabad in July-August 1991; and at the Department of English, Nagpur University, in November 1991, and the present version stands benefited by the discussions that followed these. The present version was presented at the seminar on Language, Culture, and Cognition at Nehru Museum and Library, New Delhi, March 1992, under the auspices of the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla.

municator is so aware, and so forth. Finally, communication, at its most complex level, goes beyond this mutuality of recognition to the sharing of the message—what is being conveyed to the addressee is also being conveyed to the communicator.

Thus, a child shams distress for the benefit of the mother. This is no more than a subcommunicative event. But the experienced mother may see through the intent of the child and the child in turn may come to recognize that the mother has recognized this and so forth. However, this is still a subcommunicative event in which the child plays the distress-shamming game with the mother. (If a child cries genuinely out of distress, that will not qualify even as a subcommunicative event, since there is no communicative intent on the part of the child who is merely evincing a sign of distress.)

Again, a highway policeman may try to get the motorist to stop the car. He may do so by shooting a bullet into the tyre—this is not even subcommunicative; nothing is being conveyed to the motorist, the policeman's intent is one of controlling the movement of the car. This event involves not a communicative sign but a controlling move. If the policeman leaves a large, conspicuous boulder on the road, something is being intentionally conveyed to the motorist. In case the policeman himself stands in the way, the success of this move depends not so much on the controlling effect as on the mutuality of recognition of the policeman's communicative intent—the policeman is obviously trusting that the motorist is not a moron or a criminal. Finally, a communicative event properly so called occurs when the policeman waves his hand at the motorist. All three conditions are now being satisfied, namely, the presence of a communicative intent, its mutual recognition, and the sharing of the conveying. The recipient of the communicative intent can now truly qualify as the addressee of communication.

Language events are necessarily communicative events in the full sense, and not merely subcommunicative. They call for not only the presence of communicative intent and mutuality in its recognition, but also a sharing of the message between the addressee (listener or reader, as the case may be) and the communicator (speaker or writer, correspondingly). What one conveys to another by means of language, one also conveys to oneself.

So much for the first conception of language. Now let us consider an alternate conception of language.

II

Language is not merely a means but a medium as well. It does not merely convey mental contents but also arranges, indeed even shapes them, as in:

The dog bit the man: The man was bitten by the dog.

It isn't raining—it is pouring.

The first half of this last utterance is not so much a denial proper as an offer to reshape. In the earlier pair of utterances, the second can be seen to be a

rearrangement of the first. Language is more than a means of communication, it is a medium of understanding.

The notion of understanding is complex. As we have already seen, mental content may consist in observations of reality or observations on reality or entertaining designs on reality (by way of wishes and hopes) or making demands on reality. (And reality naturally includes fellow human beings—we could observe them, observe upon them, wish or hope things of or from them, and call upon them to do things or merely answer questions.) Whatever passes through our minds has to do with reality. As living beings, we not merely cope with the environment but keep trying to understand it with varying degrees of success.

Our understanding of the environment, of reality if you will, may move in the direction of abstraction. In the first phase of abstraction, we detect:

1. (*a*) resemblances and differences
   (*b*) contiguities and distances
   (*c*) foregrounding and backgrounding.

For the present purpose, (1*b*) comprehends contiguities and distances in any 'space'—inclusive of real time or real space. In the second phase of abstraction there is a weighing—for instance, if resemblances outweigh differences, homogeneities come into view and, if differences outweigh resemblances, heterogeneities come into view. So we detect:

2. (*a*) homogeneities and heterogeneities
   (*b*) cohesions and transitions
   (*c*) figures and grounds.

In the third phase of abstraction the simplification is even more drastic in each of the three parameters.

3. (*a*) identity and distinction
   (*b*) union and separation
   (*c*) presence and absence.

For the present purpose (3*c*) comprehends both actual presence and potential presence. The mode of abstraction also comprehends the relation of inferability (one quantity being a function of another, for instance).

But abstraction, successively greater abstraction, is not the only mode of human understanding. There is a second mode, the mode of concretion and 'participation'. In the first phase of concretion, we are impressed by

1. landscapes and scenarios;
   in the second phase by
2. pictures and stories;
   and in the third phase by
3. powers and mechanisms.

Concretions are the stuff of which myths and rites, scientific discoveries and technical inventions are made.

The two modes of understanding are co-present in the life-history of a person, of a whole people, indeed of mankind. Language is the medium of human understanding. It is through language that man makes himself 'at home' in the univers, starry heavens and all.

If language mediates understanding, is it wholly man-made? Is it wholly an acquisition or an achievement on the part of a person, of a people, indeed of mankind? Or does it rather devolve upon us as an inheritance or an innate gift? Is it as much a human attribute as it is a human artifact? Is it, in some deeper sense, nature-made in its essentials?

Small children come into language simply as listeners to begin with. Indeed mothers will even 'address' endearments to babies, who from an early age respond to speech sounds in a way that suggests that they recognize them to be quite distinct from other sounds, including other man-made sounds. (Even as adults we retain this capacity to spot language, even short, isolated snatches of a language we are not familiar with.) Speaking comes to the child much later. In the interval the child does not merely come to recognize the sound of speech and speech sound sequences. Even as it listens, these speech sound sequences, recurring sentences or phrases or words come to be associated with specific contexts and, what is more, specific mental contents arising in its mind (whether observations or responses, wishes and hopes or demands) come in for rearrangement and reshaping. The ordering of mental contents by way of abstraction and concretion goes on even otherwise, but language gives it a boost. (As adults some of us retain the capacity to bypass language for some time, as artists and musicians, engineers and scientists will often testify.)

Consider the speed and ease, the perfection and sweep with which a child acquires the language (or languages in a bilingual/multilingual environment) between the ages of one and five. Indeed every child that is not deaf or feeble-minded or deprived of language exposure (such as having been brought up in seclusion by deaf-mutes or wolves) comes to acquire nearly adult-like control of language well before it reaches the age of seven. If, for any reason, this fails to happen, the person has, so to say, missed the bus and cannot acquire more than the rudiments of a 'first language' past the age of seven or so. This is all the more remarkable if one considers how, most of the time, the child simply jumps to conclusions from bits and pieces of language use by way of clues. Suppose the child comes across the two following utterances in Hindi (or Urdu) at a short interval:

āyā nahĩⁿ, gayā (he-came not, he-went)
āyā, nahĩnⁿ gayā (he-came, not he-went)

The child goes by the rule that words placed together in speech hang together in sense and words hanging together in sense get placed together in speech. So the placement of the 'audible comma' in the two utterances proves to be of great help to the child in the correct linking of the negation. It is not as if the child has to make a wild guess to understand utterances in language any more than it has to in order to understand non-linguistic happenings and doings, things and people. A child of even moderate intelligence appears to have a headstart which even an adult of great intelligence in the face of a strange language has not. The child does better even in the recognition and reproduction of speech sounds and their sequences.

Consider, again, how the form assumed by mental contents, even when the contents are the same, differs from language to language. Thus, a dream 'falls' to me in Marathi, it 'comes' to me in Hindi-Urdu, and I dream a dream in English. Quite often, however, these language-imparted notional forms turn out to be similar if not the same from language to language. Thus, Marathi, Hindi, and English all permit us to 'see' a dream but not, apparently, to 'hear' a dream. And all three languages permit us to ask the question 'What happened?' when the expected answer is 'I saw a dream'. One does not expect to come across the following exchange:

What did you do?—I saw a dream.

Such an exchange will be as bizarre in English as it will be in Marathi or Hindi. And these resemblances (uncanny or natural, depending on one's expectations) are just what makes translation feasible, though by no means always easy. (How does one translate 'He has a sister, a servant, some property, and plenty of confidence' in Marathi or Hindi-Urdu?) This translatability between human languages extends to the oldest recorded languages and present-day languages of peoples with rudimentary technical and social ecology. The significance of this translatability between human languages is realized when one considers how even a working translation is not possible from Hindustani music to language or from Hindustani language to music.

Such are the considerations that lead one to the conclusion that language as a medium of understanding is more than a human acquisition or achievement and that it is a human endowment or inheritance—whether our point of reference is the life-history of a person, a people, or mankind.

III

Let us now sum up the two alternate conceptions of language.

1. (*a*) What does language do? It is a *means* of communicating the contents of the human mind.
   (*b*) To what effect? It thus helps people to understand one another and understand the community they are getting to be members of (that is, people as 'us'). In short, it helps one to gain social access.
   (*c*) And how does language get to be what it is in a person, in a community, in mankind? It is a human acquisition and achievement.

2. (*a*) What does language do? It is a *medium* of ordering (or imparting a form to) the contents of the human mind and, if desired, conveying them to other human beings.
   (*b*) To what effect? It thus helps people to understand the world they live in (and the world of course includes people as 'them'). In short, it helps one to gain access to the world.
   (*c*) And how does language get to be what it is in a person, in a community, in mankind? It is a human endowment from nature. The capacity to acquire language in childhood and the relative homogeneity of human languages is ensured by genetic endowment.

So stated, the two alternate views are mutually contradictory. (We shall keep returning to this point.)

Language is one's own language to begin with. Other languages come later and serve to introduce one to other peoples—and other worlds. Later language learning is then quite distinct from early language acquisition. Any individual differences in language proficiency are traceable to differences in later language learning—either to later phases in the learning of languages acquired in early childhood or to languages learned later in the first place. If 'first language' is the first language ever to which a speaker has been exposed long enough for him to acquire it, and 'own language' is a language that the speaker feels completely at home with so that he is never afraid of making errors in using it, it is only to be expected that, as a rule, one's first language is one's own language and that, most of the time, one's own language is one's first language.

In general, unreflective man probably thinks of language, his own language, as a transparent medium of human understanding and thus tends to the second conception. Two old English ladies have given classic expression to this second conception:

(*a*) How senseless can a Frenchman be? Can't he see that a shoe (*chou* in French) is not a cabbage?
(*b*) How do I know what I want to say till I say it?

They were presumably monolingual.

Awareness of foreign or earlier or local modes of speech makes even unreflective man aware of language variation and helps him take the first step forward from this sort of naiveté—and toward the conception of language as a means of communication. (Preoccupation with writing makes man oblivious of historical or local variation in language. Constant adaptation of spelling to changes in speech and the ritual prestige of speech prevents this from happening in India.)

Awareness of indirect or displaced or oblique modes of language use (like metaphor, metonymy, irony, circumlocution) or of enriched or evocative modes of language use (like polemical or rhetorical or poetic suggestivity) makes man acutely aware that not all language use is equally transparent.

It is only to be expected, therefore, that even people that are neither language scientists nor philosophers of language appear to base their language-related thinking on one or the other of these conceptions of language. In other words, these two conceptions, far from being abstrusely speculative, actually work hard for their livelihood! Consider some concrete examples of language-related debates:

(1*a*) Shouldn't a translator be content with decoding faithfully what is being communicated in the source language?
(1*b*) Shouldn't a translator rather aspire to re-encode the source text so as to be faithfully understood in the target language?

(2*a*) Shouldn't a second language teacher aspire to help the learner internalize the second language so well that he receives and produces as readily as a native speaker does and without interference from the learner's own language? Isn't the teacher aiming at parallel language control on the learner's part?
(2*b*) Shouldn't a second language teacher rather be content with building upon the learner's ready mastery of the first language and capacity to learn (or even discover) rules and apply them with some confidence? Isn't the teacher's job limited to instilling composite language control on the learner's part?

(3*a*) Couldn't the medium of teaching any subject be any language that is known to the learner and the teacher and that is otherwise expedient?
(3*b*) Shouldn't one rather insist on teaching a subject through a language that will ensure its assimilation on the part of the learner—especially when it comes to insights and attitudes as distinct from mere facts and skills?

(4) When a message is being produced for being rhetorically (or poetically) effective with many people—
(4*a*) Shouldn't the communicator be in full control of the linguistic means and its impact on the addressee?
(4*b*) Shouldn't the communicator rather allow for the variable impact of the linguistic medium on the addressee?

(5) Literary art works through a medium that is created out of language material and mental content material.
(5*a*) Isn't the medium of literature transitive in that it points away from itself as a means to some poetic end? Isn't the language vehicle so worked over and designed as to affect the addressee in a certain heightened manner? Isn't the experiential content so selected and organized as to invite the addressee into a certain poetic world? Isn't the literary art best seen as certain devices adding up to a technique?
(5*b*) Isn't the medium of literature intransitive in that the language material and the experiential material penetrate each other so as to fuse into the

autonomous medium in which the literary work has its being? Isn't the literary art best seen as the evocation of certain qualities integrated into a style?

As one might expect, these debates concerning language-related activities have been conducted in relative isolation from each other historically. And yet, significantly enough, certain themes recur. Broadly speaking, alternative (*a*) in each case will be favoured by those who look upon language as no more than a means of communication, while alternative (*b*) in each case will be favoured by those who look upon language as nothing less than a medium of human understanding. Practical exigency and the call for experiential authenticity, however, often reveal that the two conceptions are not all that mutually opposed.

In the more theoretical activity of the scientific analysis of language or of working out a certain philosophy of language the two have acted as rival conceptions. (We shall continue to mark the resulting alternative positions in a debate as (*a*) and (*b*) corresponding respectively to the 'means' conception of language and the 'medium' conception of language.)

(6) Language as the system to be analysed abuts upon reality at two places instead of one. Let the two ends be called the language vehicle and the message.

(6*a*) Shouldn't linguistic analysis be primarily concerned with the language vehicle end (speech or writing as the case may be) rather than the message end? After all it is the vehicle end that is the more accessible for study and that differentiates language from other message-conveying systems as a means of human communication.

(6*b*) Shouldn't linguistic analysis be primarily concerned with the message end rather than the language vehicle end? After all it is the message end that language is all about and that shows up how language mediates human understanding.

The philosophical ramifications of the two conceptions of language can now be seen in a better perspective. I hope that it will be appreciated that this apparent delay has been to the philosopher's advantage.

The obvious point of entry to the philosophy of language would be its traditional triad:

Language: Thought: Reality

The triad is best seen as a cyclical set of three dyads.

Language: Thought (the problem of meaning)
Thought: Reality (the problem of knowledge)
Reality: Language (the problem of reference)

The problem of reference will be seen to subsume at once the problem of

validation (or truth if you like) and the problem of fulfilment (or realization if you like). (Appropriate Sanskrit terms could be *yathārthatā* and *caritārthatā*.) Validation relates to linguistic messages conveying observations of reality and on reality, facts/insights and responses/attitudes. (Let us call such messages 'statements'.) Fulfilment relates to linguistic messages conveying wishes or hopes and plain demands. (Let us call such messages 'mands'; questions are a variety of mands.)

Many of the debates in the philosophy of language will be seen to fall under one or the other of the three rubrics.

Under Language and Thought

(7-11) (*a*) Isn't the whole message to be seen as made up of part messages? (*khaṇḍa-pakṣa*)
(*b*) Or rather aren't part messages to be seen as mere intersections of whole messages? (*akhaṇḍa-pakṣa*)

(7-12) (*a*) Isn't a phrase no more than a marginalized sentence?
(*b*) Or rather isn't a sentence no more than an enlarged phrase?

(7-13) (*a*) Isn't an operator (such as negation, implication, identity, or existence) nothing less than a logical device?
(*b*) Or rather isn't an operator no more than a predicate like any other? And as such merely reflecting differences in thought?

(7-1) Summing up,
(*a*) Language can be trusted to be revelatory of thought.
(*b*) Language cannot be trusted to be revelatory of thought.

Under Thought and Reality

(7-21) (*a*) Isn't the universal (*jāti*) to be understood as an intersection of individuals (*vyakti*)?
(*b*) Or rather isn't the individual to be understood as a bundle of universals?

(7-22) (*a*) Isn't the attribute (*guṇa*) to be understood as an abstraction from the substance (*dravya*)?
(*b*) Or rather isn't the substance to be understood as a mere place-and-time-holder for the attributes?

(7-23) (*a*) Isn't the relation (*saṁbandha*) to be understood as a juxtaposition of the relata (*saṁbandhin*)? Aren't relations essentially external? (*kārya-saṁbandha, saṁsarga*)
(*b*) Or rather isn't the relatum to be understood as a fulfiller of the relation? Aren't relations essentially internal? (*nitya-saṁbandha, samavāya*)

(7-2) Summing up,
(*a*) Thought can be trusted to be revelatory of reality.
(*b*) Thought cannot be trusted to be revelatory of reality.

Under Reality and Language

(7-31) (*a*) Isn't any middle ground between positive and negative to be totally excluded?
(*b*) Or rather aren't the positive and the negative poles to be both excluded by the 'vacuous'? And thus leaving room for 'presuppositions'?

(7-32) (*a*) Isn't any middle between necessary and contingent to be totally excluded?
(*b*) Or rather isn't there a middle ground between necessary and contingent consisting in what is contingently necessary? And thus leaving room for the 'meaning postulate' and the 'synthetic a priori' and the 'categorial predication'?

(7-3) Summing up,
(*a*) Language cannot be trusted to tailor its system to reality.
(*b*) Language can be trusted to tailor its system to reality.

It is reassuring to find that most of these debates together with their alignment to the two conceptions of language turn up in Western theorizing about language as well as in Indian theorizing about language. The debates, therefore, are presumably not merely local squabbles. It will be rewarding to show the connection in each case between the position in the debate and the relevant conception of language.

But then it is not so reassuring to find that these debates tend to remain inconclusive not for want of evidence but for want of a willingness to recognize that the other side may have a point. Thinkers tend to make up their minds in advance and this is rather unfortunate if only one realized that the two underlying conceptions are not all that mutually opposed. We have already noted this in relation to the relatively more practical debates concerning translation, second language teaching, teaching through a language, rhetoric and popular literature, and literary art.

It is possible to restate the two conceptions of language so as to open up the possibility of their being mutually complementary rather than opposed. The difference between them can be one of emphasis.

(1) Language is first and foremost a means of human communication.
(2) Language is nothing less than a medium of human understanding.

It is about time we moved from conceptions of language to conceptions of language use.

IV

Except for a passing reference or two, we have so far confined our attention to the language *system* rather than language *use*. The transition from language to language use is a passage along two axes—a passage from language generally and globally to language specifically and locally and at the same time a passage from the potentiality of language to language in actuality on a particular occasion. The passage from the generic-potential end to the specific-actual end could be set out in some such terms:

(1) man's capacity for language
(2) the community's language system
(3) the individual's language competence
(4) language use on a particular occasion

'Language' for us is (1-2), and 'language use' will be (3-4).

Saussure's *langue* and *parole* correspond roughly to (2) and (4); his *faculté de langage* corresponds to (1). Chomsky's 'language competence' and 'language performance' correspond roughly to (3) and (4); his later formulation of 'knowledge of the language' corresponds to (3) and to the earlier linguists' 'ideal language speaker-listener'.

Ancient Indians distinguished between *śabda-śakti* 'signifying power of speech' (also called *śabda-vṛtti* when the power is seen as directed) and *śabda-prayoga* 'exercise of this power' (also called *śabda-vyāpāra* by literary theorists rather than grammarians). The power and its exercise are directed to *artha*. The pair *śabda* and *artha* correspond roughly to our earlier 'vehicle' and 'message' respectively. The pair *śakti/vṛtti* and *prayoga/vyāpāra* corresponds roughly to the passage from potential to actual. The passage from global-general to local-specific is assimilated to the passage between what is inward and what is outward. So ancient Indians separated 'inner speech' (*paśyantī*), 'middle speech' (*madhyamā*), and 'outer speech' (*vaikharī*); this is the well-known speech triad (*vāṇī-traya*). The speaker starts from inner speech, our understanding as a specific visualization; this is enduringly abstract (*nitya*). The first transition takes him to middle speech, our shaping of that piece of understanding into a particular language; this is also enduringly abstract but at the same time becomes segmented (*khaṇḍita*) and sequential (*kramika*). The second transition takes him to outer speech, our giving utterance to that understanding as shaped into a particular language; this is no longer enduringly abstract, continues to be segmented and sequential, and becomes accessible to oneself and others (*sva-para-vedya*). The listener starts from outer speech, moves to middle speech, and finally recovers inner speech.

So much for the historical excursus on the distinction between language and language use. Before we take up conceptions of language use in some detail, let us take an overview of the general lie of the land. Earlier we spoke

of the traditional triad, namely, Language: Thought: Reality in conjunction with Language, that is, language system. Recall also the observation that, as living beings, human beings not merely cope with the environment but keep trying to understand environment with varying degrees of success. Thought is only an aspect of this attempt at understanding and the environment is only an aspect of reality. Reality is environment *sub specie aeternitatis*. We now need to speak of a second triad in conjunction with Language Use and the two triads can then be juxtaposed.

Language—Understanding—Reality
: : :
Language— Coping —Life
Use

Understanding has an aspect of reason (thought is rational understanding) and an aspect of imagination (there is no handy name for it—perhaps the ancient Greeks' distinction between *logos* and *mythos*, literally speech and story respectively, corresponds roughly to the distinction between the two aspects of understanding). Rational understanding favours the mode of abstraction and inferability. Imaginative understanding favours the mode of concretion and participation. Coping, likewise, has an aspect of reason—that is what work and production are all about; and also an aspect of imagination—that is what play and creativity are all about. ('Work' and 'play' are of course to be understood here in the large sense.) Work and production typically take the shape of 'routines'—unless we are thinking of open-ended, exploratory, innovative work or production. Play and creativity typically take the shape of 'games'—unless we are thinking of open-ended, casual, exploratory play or creativity. Language and Language Use embrace both reason and imagination. Reality transcends the distinction between reason and imagination; and so does Life. The distinction between reason and imagination could perhaps be thought of as one between delayed and on-the-spot processing of 'information'. Reality in relation to a message is the topic of that message. Life in relation to a message is the context of that message.

The distinction between topic and context is important. To revert to some of our earlier examples,

The dog bit the man.
The man was bitten by the dog.
When the corn is ripe, I do hope it won't rain!
Rain, rain, go to Spain!
How many millimetres of rain was there when I was away yesterday?

The following are the relevant matters in hand (but not necessarily *at* hand), in short, the Topic (*prakaraṇa*) respectively:

the observation of the biting by the dog of the man

the observation of the biting of the man by the dog
the hope for the absence of rain at the time of the corn being ripe
the demand that the rain stop
the demand (or the wish, as the case may be) from the addressee for supplying the information about the quantity of rain on the previous day

And the following in turn are the sort of situation at hand in which such an utterance might have figured, in short, the Context (*prasaṅga*) respectively:

the wish to know what the dog did
the wish to know what happened to the man
the worry about the danger of untimely rain for the standing crop
the child, John Brown, wants to play
the communicator's need to ascertain the amount of rain that fell during his/her absence

In the early stages of language acquisition the child draws upon the Context and manages to grasp the Topic in hand if it also happens to be, along with the Context, *at hand*. The child may not even see the Topic as distinct from the Context. But an important step forward in early language acquisition is for the child to realize that, while the Context is necessarily present or at hand (*prāpta*), the Topic is merely in hand or presented (*prastuta*) but not necessarily at hand or present—the rain whose amount is to be ascertained is no longer at hand. Once this momentous step is taken, there is no more excuse for the failure to distinguish between the Topic (and Topic-relevance) and the Context (and Context-relevance). (Some discourses about language inexcusably fail to do so.) Reality is simply Topic writ large and Life is simply Context writ large. (Parenthetically, one may wonder whether this step forward in the life-history of a child is but a recapitulation of a comparable step forward in the life-history of mankind, namely, getting to the point at which what is out of sight is not *eo ipso* out of mind.)

Let us now go back to the hexad, which could be seen either as a double triad or a triple dyad. Language Use is the exercise of Language and Language continually shapes itself in the course of Language Use. Coping is the exercise of Understanding and Understanding continually shapes itself in the course of Coping. (For Marx, thought continually shapes itself in the course of labour—and thought is an aspect of Understanding and labour of Coping.) Life is embedded in Reality and Reality is continually re-understood in the course of Life. (For Wittgenstein, thought too is embedded in forms of life and any form of life is but an aspect of Coping. If Marx appears to have highlighted labour to the neglect of language at the centrestage, there is an interesting disquisition in the *Śāntiparvan* of *Mahābhārata* (at 12.173. 11ff) on the tongue and the hand as the twin equipment of Man. If the eye is taken to be the universal emblem for understanding, one could say that the

eye understands and the hand copes—both being assisted by the tongue speaking.)

The stage is now set for introducing the two alternate conceptions of Language Use and these two are certainly not to be confused with the two alternate conceptions of Language.

V

As we have just seen, man's coping with life can be either in the nature of doing something—whether in the shape of work or play—or in the nature of making something—whether in the shape of production or creativity. Doing something is, so to say, intransitive, in that it is simply a part and parcel of man's interaction with reality and tends to bring about a certain restructuring of man himself and thus promote a smoother, harmonious interaction. Making something is, on the other hand, transitive, in that it is in the nature of man's imprint on reality and tends to bring about a certain restructuring of reality and thus promote a smoother, harmonious interaction.

Earlier, we asked ourselves a question about language—Is Language a man-made artifact or rather is it man's natural endowment? Now, we cannot ask ourselves an analogous question about Language Use. Language Use is palpably man-made. The question to ask then is rather—Is language use in the nature of making something or doing something? Is Language Use the making of an artifact or the performing of an act? In proposing these two alternate conceptions of Language Use, we are not thinking of the vehicle of speech and writing so much as of the message. If we were thinking of the vehicle, the answer would be rather simple—speaking is the performing of an act and writing is the making of an artifact. Rather, we are thinking of the message in proposing a conception of Language Use.

If we think of language use as the making of an artifact, the artifact in question is the Language Text that the speaker (or the writer as the case may be) makes or an Interpretation that the listener (or the reader) makes out from the text. Any making of an artifact is going to make a difference to Reality. A text is an artifact of a special kind—an artifact which is a prefiguring of the performance of an act. So the notion of a text extends beyond language texts—thus, a musical score is a text prefiguring a musical performance and a stage script is a text prefiguring a stage performance. In the case of a language text the message is being looked upon as the prefiguring of a speaking/listening performance or a writing/reading performance. But then language use may not be conceived in terms of an artifact at all but rather in terms of an act.

If we think of language use as the performing of an act, the act in question is the Language Act performed by the speaker (or the writer) or the active Response to that act offered by the listener (or the reader). Any performing of an act is going to make a difference to Life. The Language Act is of course

an act of a special kind—not the physical act of speech or writing but an act concerning the message as such.

The two alternate conceptions of language use can now be set out in some such terms:

(1) (*a*) Language Use is basically the making of an artifact.

(*b*) The speaker (or the writer, as the case may be) makes a Language Text and the listener (or the reader) makes out what it is and offers an Interpretation of that text.

(*c*) The making of a text and its interpretation may either be methodical and productive in character or be imaginative and creative in character.

(*d*) The making of an artifact to what effect? The making of the language text or its interpretation makes a difference to Reality as understood by the language user concerned (that is, the speaker/writer or the listener/reader).

(2) (*a*) Language Use is basically the performing of an act.

(*b*) The speaker (or the writer) performs a Language Act and the listener (or the reader) offers an active Response to that act.

(*c*) The performing of an act and the offering of a response to it may be undertaken either in the spirit of work (if not as routine work) or in the spirit of play (if not as a game).

(*d*) The performing of an act to what effect? The performing of a language act or the offering of a response to it makes a difference to Life as lived by the language user concerned in the course of coping-with.

Language is what language does. So Language Use, whether one thinks of it as an artifact or an act, will stand adapted to what language is supposed to do, whether one thinks of language as a means of human communication or as a medium of human understanding. Of course any human artifact or any human act can be put to non-standard uses. Thus, a hammer could be used not for driving nails but, say, as a paperweight. When the servant pounds coffee beans in a mortar, the Arab master may look not only for good coffee but also for the pleasing sound of rhythmic strokes. Likewise with Language Use. Ready examples are metaphors, rhetorical questions, innuendos—by way of displaced or enriched modes of Language Use.

Now, what bearing do these two alternate conceptions of Language Use have on the language-related practical activities, more specifically on the debates concerning translation, second language teaching, teaching through a language, rhetoric and popular literature, and literary art? That position in each debate that is expected to be favoured by the Text conception of language use is marked (*a*). And the position in the debate that is expected to be favoured by the Act conception of Language Use is marked (*b*).

(1*a*) Shouldn't the translator aspire to be faithful to the source Text even

in its grammatical and spoken/written form? (Thus, a phrase by phrase translation will be more faithful than a sentence by sentence translation.)

(*b*) Rather, shouldn't the translator aspire to ensure that the translation is viable in the target language? (Thus, a translation that doesn't even sound like a translation will be more viable in the target language than a translation that declares itself to be a translation.)

(2*a*) Shouldn't a second language teacher make the teaching text-centred and ensure repetitive, imitative practice based on the text?

(*b*) Rather, shouldn't a second language teacher make the teaching situation-centred and ensure in the learner the ability to improvise and cope with 'unseen' material?

(3*a*) Shouldn't the medium of teaching any subject be a language selected as suitable for the texts relating to the subject?

(*b*) Rather, shouldn't the medium of teaching any subject be a language selected as suitable for the learner concerned?

(4) When a message is being produced for being rhetorically (or poetically) effective with many people:

(*a*) Shouldn't the communicator be in control of the content in the interests of the addressee?

(*b*) Rather, shouldn't the content be adapted and made interesting to the addressee?

(5*a*) Isn't a work of literature a text transitively pointing away from itself and offering itself for our interpretation? And doesn't this 'room with a view' make a difference to reality as understood by us?

(*b*) Rather, isn't a work of literature an autonomous gesture inviting us to surrender ourselves to its vision of reality before we respond to this vision? And doesn't this enclosed 'hall of mirrors' make a difference to the life as lived by us?

What we have said earlier about the two rival conceptions of language in relation to such relatively practical concerns also applies to the two rival conceptions of language use, namely, that practical exigency and the call for experiential authenticity often reveal that the two conceptions are not all that mutually opposed.

Turning to the more theoretical activity of linguistic analysis, we find a similar alignment with conceptions of Language Use.

(6) Language is susceptible not only to the polarity of language vehicle (speech or writing as the case may be) and the message, but also to the polarity of topic and context aspects of the message and to the polarity of form and substance. Substance corresponds to the first phase of abstraction in linguistic analysis ('raw' speech/writing or

'raw' topic/context as the case may be) and form corresponds the second and third phases of abstraction in linguistic analysis ('processed' speech/writing or 'processed' topic/context as the case may be).

(*a*) Shouldn't linguistic analysis of the vehicle or the message be primarily concerned with their form aspect rather than their substance aspect? And shouldn't linguistic analysis of the message be primarily concerned with its topic aspect rather than its context aspect?

(*b*) Shouldn't linguistic analysis of the vehicle or the message be primarily concerned with their substance aspect rather than with their form aspect? And shouldn't linguistic analysis of the message be primarily concerned with its context aspect rather than its topic aspect?

When it comes to a certain philosophy of language use, we need to turn to the second triad, namely, Language Use: Coping: Life, seen as a cyclical set of three dyads.

Language: Coping (the problem of directionality)
Coping : Life (the problem of power)
Life : Language Use (the problem of worthwhileness)

Many of the debates concerning Language Use will be seen to fall under one or the other of the three rubrics. The alignment with the two conceptions of Language Use continues to be marked (*a*) and (*b*) as before.

Under Language Use and Coping

(7-11) (*a*) Isn't the Context implicit in the Topic? Doesn't the Topic call out some appropriate Context?

(*b*) Or rather doesn't the Topic arise out of the Context? Doesn't the Context yield the Topic?

(7-12) (*a*) Isn't any Mand, thought of as open to fulfilment, reducible to a Statement concerning the wish or the demand?

(*b*) Or rather isn't any Statement, thought of as open to validation, reducible to a Mand calling for suasion?

Note: Roughly speaking, with (*a*) 'Let this be the case' is seen as 'I want this to be the case'; but with (*b*) 'Such is the case' is seen as 'Let this be seen to be the case'.

(7-13) A sentence, whether a Statement or a Mand, is made of phrases. A phrase has both a definition and a range. A phrase is either a Name or Term. A Name is Statement-like in that any definition offered has to be validated by the range given. A term is Mand-like in that any range offered has to fulfil the definition given. Names and terms are rational symbols in the mode of concretion.

(*a*) Isn't any Term reducible to a Name for whatever fulfils the definition?

(*b*) Or rather isn't any Name reducible to a Term for whatever the range validates?

(7-14) A Language Text that is open to being considered as conveying a piece of imaginative understanding embeds imaginative symbols in the mode of concretion. Such a symbol is either Recreative or Creative. A Recreative imaginative-symbol is Term-like in that it lends itself readily to paraphrase and translation. A Creative imaginative-symbol is Name-like in that it resists paraphrase and translation.

(*a*) Isn't any Creative imaginative-symbol finally reducible to a Recreative imaginative-symbol with little or no residue?

(*b*) Or rather doesn't any Recreative imaginative-symbol have a residue that isn't reducible to rational-symbol paraphrase?

(7-1) Summing up,

(*a*) Reference controls Meaning.

(*b*) Meaning controls Reference.

Under Coping and Life

(7-21) A statement is descriptive if validation dominates if not controls suasion. A statement is ascriptive if suasion dominates if not controls validation.

(*a*) Isn't any ascriptive Statement finally reducible to a descriptive Statement?

(*b*) Or rather isn't any descriptive Statement finally reducible to an ascriptive Statement?

Likewise for descriptive and ascriptive terms.

(7-22) A Mand is prescriptive if fulfilment dominates if not controls suasion —and as such conveys nothing less than a demand. A Mand is inscriptive if suasion dominates if not controls fulfilment—and as such conveys nothing more than a wish.

(*a*) Isn't any inscriptive Mand finally reducible to a prescriptive Mand?

(*b*) Isn't any prescriptive Mand finally reducible to an inscriptive Mand?

Likewise for prescriptive and inscriptive names.

(7-2) Summing up,

(*a*) Reference controls suasion.

(*b*) Suasion controls reference.

Under Life and Language Use

(7-31) Any piece of language use has a genesis in life. It is motivated and as such relatable back to some *arkhē* (origin, *bīja*).

(*a*) A Language Text codifies some *arkhē* and as such subserves Coping.

(*b*) A Language Act justifies some *arkhē* and as such legitimates Coping.

(7-32) Any piece of language use has a design on life. It is intentional and as such relatable forward to some *telos* (end, *prayojana*).

(*a*) A Language Text codifies some *telos* and as such subserves Coping.

(*b*) A Language Act justifies some *telos* and as such legitimates Coping.

(7-3) Summing up,

(*a*) A piece of language use finally codifies Coping in relation to Life.

(*b*) A piece of language use finally justifies Coping in relation to Life.

It will be rewarding to track down the debates together with their alignment to the two conceptions of Language Use as Text and as Act respectively in Indian and Western theorizing about language among linguists and philosophers in the course of history. It will also be worthwhile to assess how far thinkers have succeeded in approaching if not reaching any conclusions, and in uncovering any motivations underlying the positions adopted.

VI

We have maintained that the two central questions, or central debates if you will, namely, 'What is language?' and 'What is language use?' are contiguous and yet distinct.

Since they are distinct, one would expect no positive (or negative) correlation between someone adopting the 'means of communication' position or the 'medium of understanding' position in respect of the first central question and his adopting the 'language text' position or the 'language act' position in respect of the second central question.

Consequently, one could reasonably expect all the four combinations to turn up in the course of human history—even in the course of Western history or of Indian history, considering that these two civilizations have constantly deliberated over language and its use.

And yet the two questions are contiguous. So one could not expect each of the four positions in the debates to readily appear to be a composite of positions in two distinct debates so much as one of four positions in a complex debate concerning translation or language analysis or whatever.

A rapid survey of the areas of debates—whether practical or theoretical—should bear this out in broad terms. (The specific assignment of a school or a thinker to one of the four positions may be debatable and as such even open to a setting straight of the historical record. But that of course is not the point at issue.) The four combinations will be marked as follows:

(*A*) Language is a means of human communication and its use is the making of a text.
(*B*) Language is a means of human communication and its use is the doing of an act.
(*C*) Language is a medium of human understanding and its use is the making of a text.
(*D*) Language is a medium of human understanding and its use is the doing of an act.

Let us take up the relatively more practical debates first.

(1) Translation: The Indian civilization has not been too active in and concerned about this language-related activity. So the examples will come more readily from the West.

(*A*) Translators of canonical and statutory texts.
(*B*) Translators of technical and discursive texts.
(*C*) Translators of poetry and other literary texts.
(*D*) Translators of utilitarian, persuasive, or factual texts.

Note: The cleavage (*A-C*) versus (*B-D*) appears to be salient.

(2) Second Language Teaching

(*A*) The mimicry-memorization-pattern-practice method, the method of the traditional school for teaching Sanskrit to the young (*pāṭha-šālā*).
(*B*) The direct method.
(*C*) Literary selection and grammar method (the traditional method in the West for teaching classical languages, also adopted in nineteenth-century India).
(*D*) The translation method.

Note: The cleavage (*A-B*) versus (*C-D*) appears to be salient.

(3) Teaching through a language

(*A*) The practical-minded choice of the more widely available language among the subject texts.
(*B*) The practical-minded choice of the more widely available language in the body of learners.
(*C*) The committed choice of the textually authentic language—as in the giving of prominence to Sanskrit in propagating Buddhist teaching.
(*D*) The committed choice of the learner's own language—as in Buddha's own policy, among Protestant proselytizers from the West.

Note: The cleavage (*A-B*) versus (*C-D*) appears to be salient.

(4) Persuasive and popular literature (inclusive of folk texts)

(*A*) Producers and receivers of didactic texts, say, of moral conformity or satire, political conformity or subversion (utopian or satirical as the case may be)
(*B*) Producers and receivers of indulgent texts, say, of wish-fulfilment or sentiment or titillation
(*C*) Producers and receivers of exhortative texts, say, of ideological persuasion or clinical diagnosis-and-therapy
(*D*) Producers and receivers of 'thought-provoking' texts, or texts of high comedy or tragedy.

Note: The cleavage (*A-C*) and (*B-D*) appears to be salient, especially in 'hard' and 'soft' salesmanship respectively.

(5) Literary art

(*A*) The proponents and adherents of Instruction, *vyutpatti* and Technique, *alaṁkaraṇa* as central.
(*B*) The proponents and adherents of Delight, *prīti* and Technique, *alaṁkaraṇa* as central.
(*C*) The proponents and adherents of Maturity (or *rasa-dhvani*) and Style, *rīti* as central.
(*D*) The proponents and adherents of Form and Style, *rīti* as central.

Note: The cleavage (*A-C*) and (*B-D*) appears to be salient in the West and the cleavage (*A-B*) and (*C-D*) appears to be salient in ancient India. 'Maturity' and '*rasa-dhvani*' are of course not meant to be synonymous.

Now the more theoretical language-related pursuits.

(6) Linguistic analysis

(*A*) Bloomfield, Pāṇini, the *šikṣā* phonologists.
(*B*) Saussure, the Prague School, Halliday, the *Kātantra* school, the *prātišākhya* phoneticians.
(*C*) Chomsky, Nageša.
(*D*) Sapir, the rebels against Chomsky, Bhartṛhari.

Note: The cleavage (*A-C*) and (*B-D*) appears to be salient in the contemporary West and ancient India.

(7) Philosophy of language

(*A*) Locke, *prācya nyāya* school.
(*B*) Ideal language philosophy, *mīmāṁsā* school.
(*C*) Descartes, Frege, *navya nyāya*.
(*D*) Kant, later Wittgenstein, Ordinary language philosophy, Humboldt, Bhartṛhari.

Note: The cleavage (*A-C*) and (*B-D*) appears to be salient.

We have suggested a positive correlation between positions concerning the two central questions and positions concerning various language-related practical and theoretical activities. At the same time, we have suggested a certain complementarity between opposite positions. Specifically, in case the cleavage (*A-C*) and (*B-D*) is salient, then this is indicative of the complementarity and consequent recumbency of the opposition between 'language text' and 'language act' conceptions of language use. And in case the cleavage (*A-D*) and (*C-D*) is salient, then this is indicative of the complementarity and consequent recumbency of the opposition between 'means of communication' and 'medium of understanding' conceptions of language. It will be seen that the complementarity is relative to the specific area of language-related activity. More generally, a thinker operating in more fields than one may not always adopt analogous positions.

Of course, there is more to philosophizing than the philosophy of language. We could additionally think of two areas of philosophizing: first, the philosophy of Understanding and Reality and, secondly, the philosophy of Coping and Life. (In the modern West the philosophy of Understanding and Reality tends to go under the rubrics, epistemology, aesthetics, ontology, and even cognitive science, while the philosophy of Coping and Life turns up as moral and political philosophy, philosophy of man. Finding correspondences in ancient India is more problematic.)

As one might expect, there is no simple correlation between the four combinatory positions (*A, B, C, D*) in the philosophy of Language and Language Use and the positions in the philosophy of Understanding and Reality (though, as we shall see presently, certain expectations of this kind do arise).

What are the pivotal questions in the philosophy of Understanding and Reality? Indeed philosophical doubt may assail us right at the start—Is there a philosophy of Reality at all? And even if there is one is it to be separated with profit from a philosophy of Understanding? Significantly enough, there have appeared two distinct, if not somewhat opposed, styles of philosophizing. Let us call them Style I and Style II. Blaise Pascal gave them two rather evocative names: I *esprit de géométrie* and II *esprit de finesse*. ('Finesse' here conveys not merely finesse but also shrewdness.) Similarly psychological in import is William James' distinction between I 'tough-minded' and II 'tender-minded' thinkers. Indians have used in a similar vein the terms I *ānvīkṣikī* and II *darśana*, literally search and vision respectively. But obviously this is more than a matter of temperament: what is more to the point, it is a matter of philosophical decision. Style I tends to be reductionist, sceptical, parsimonious, and to basing oneself upon observable, uninterpreted, bare actualities. Style II tends to be phenomenological in that it does not shirk giving ontic status to the 'face values' that human beings assign to actual entities and relations and that are often reflected in ordinary language. When faced with the Gödelian dilemma between creating a system that is consistent but

frankly incomplete and creating a system that is complete but frankly not wholly consistent, Style I tends to go for the first alternative and Style II for the second alternative.

Style I: At best we can aspire to an understanding of understanding. Any understanding of reality needs to flow from it.

Style II: Any understanding of reality comes first. Any understanding of understanding will flow from it.

The other pivotal question is—What does philosophizing do for us? And to what effect? Again, two alternative Missions have turned up for philosophical understanding. (Again two alternatives? *Mirabile dictu*, I can hear you saying under your breath. I don't blame you! But that's the way it appears to be.)

Mission I: Philosophizing yields to us nothing less than a Speculum. It holds a mirror to whatever it is about.

Mission II: Philosophizing yields to us nothing more than an Organum. It fashions for us a handy set of tools for understanding whatever it is about.

Together we have four combinations. To resume our rapid survey, again with the appropriate disclaimer about the assignments.

(*A*) Style I and Mission I: Locke, early Wittgenstein, Descartes fall here with their schemata.

(*B*) Style I and Mission II: Hume, Kant (after waking up from his 'dogmatic slumber'), later Wittgenstein fall here with their critiques.

(*C*) Style II and Mission I: Hegel falls here with his landscapes and scenarios.

(*D*) Style II and Mission II: Nietzsche, Marx fall here with their manifestos.

The absence of ancient Indian names could be made good by more competent hands. It will be interesting if not rewarding to compare these combinations in the philosophy of Understanding and Reality with those under the philosophy of Language and Language Use.

Turning to the philosophy of Coping and Life, what are the pivotal questions? There appear to be two distinct, if not somewhat opposed, styles of coping recommended in philosophical terms.

Style I: Let rational doing and making (work and actions, production and routines) be the mainstay of Coping.

Style II: Let imaginative doing and making (play and moves, creativity and games) set the tune for rational doing and making.

But then a radical spiritual doubt may assail us at the outset concerning the

very mission of the philosophy of Coping and Life. Optimism and pessimism may go far beyond a simple matter of temperament and style of functioning. So the other pivotal question is—Is a Coping with life given to man at all? Doesn't coping rather amount to coping with coping? To bracing of oneself against what life has to offer to us? Life presupposes the emergence of a working relationship, a modicum of harmony between human beings and the environment they have to cope with. Failing this, suicide and murder are round the corner.

Mission I: Let the restructuring of the environment be the mainstay of coping with life, so that we can wrest good from evil, violence, and suffering.

Mission II: Let the restructuring of ourselves be the mainstay of coping with life, so that we can salvage some dignity from what life has to offer to us.

If we were to continue with our rapid survey, which we do not propose to do, we shall have to cast our net very wide indeed—beyond professional philosophizing to moralities and polities, ideologies and religions, life-styles and programmes. Obviously we have moved even further away from the philosophy of Language and Language Use. But even here it will be of some interest to make cross-comparisons of the positions involved. Consider, for examples, the implications of silence as a gap in or around the Language Text and as a Language Act taking over from or yielding to the Language Text; or of communion as a supercommunicative event in which mere communicative intent give splace to the urge for one's 'participation' in the beloved or godhead or whatever. *Ityalam*!

Notes to Sections

Section I. What Goethe said is as follows:
'*Ein jeder, weil er spricht, glaubt auch über die Sprache sprechen zu können*'
I should be grateful if any reader could place it for me.

For the notion of communication, see Kelkar 1980a: chapter I, section D and the references therein—including Zipf 1967 from whom the policeman was borrowed.

Section II. The insights into the mode of abstraction and inferability come variously from Plato and Aristotle, British empiricists and associationists, Leibniz and Quine (identity of indiscernibles and indiscernibility of identicals), Renaissance pictorial artists and Gestalt psychologists (figure, foreground, background), the nineteenth century insight about differences of degree graduating into differences of kind, and the mathematical notion of 'function'.

The insights into the mode of concretion and 'participation' come variously from the German idealists and Coleridge and the nineteenth-century

reconstruction of 'primitive' mentality by certain students of antiquity and contemporary 'primitive' peoples.

The 'starry heavens' is, of course, in allusion to the conclusion of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason.*

The nineteenth-century West was, of course, much exercised over the question—Can human understanding bypass language? Can we think without language?

Descartes' 'innate ideas' and Kant's 'categories of understanding' introduce the notion that the furniture of man's understanding was given to him as natural and therefore universal endowment. Chomsky transferred the argument from categories of thought to categories of language being natural and universal. There was another line of thinking which thought of categories of understanding being inferable from language and so language-specific: Humboldt, Sapir, Whorf are the important names associated with it. The impossibility of translation without residue impressed not only poets and their translators but also a hard-headed thinker like Quine (1960: chapter 2). Finally, students of human speech were impressed by the early learning of sentence tone and emphasis and pauses and their widely shared patterns.

Section III. We have preferred the value-neutral terms 'first language' and 'own language' to the omnibus 'mother tongue'. (A mother tongue is of course not necessarily one's mother's tongue but one that, like one's motherland, a person expects to draw emotional sustenance from.)

Man's initial conception of language as an innate medium of understanding has been enshrined in myths of language being God's gift. (The myth of the Tower of Babel is of course of a quite different colour.) The conception of language as a means of communication became common wisdom in the West from the time of the Enlightenment—motivated by the impulse to desacralize and demystify language by showing it up as only a practical tool.

Indians have been acutely aware of language variation—consider the Hindi saying (which has equivalents in other Indians languages): *Kos kos par pānī badale, bārah kos par bānī*, i.e. '(underground) water differs every *kosa*, speech differs every twelve *kosas*' (*krośa* in Sanskrit is a little over three kilometres).

Ancient Indians distinguished between direct and displaced modes of speech (*vācyārtha-vṛtti* and *lakṣaṇā-vṛtti*) and again between bare and enriched modes of speech (*abhidhā-vṛtti* and *vyañjanā-vṛtti*).

In connection with the debates concerning language-related practical activities (sections III, V, VI), see Kelkar 1985 (on translation); 1969 (on second language teaching); 1982 (on the medium of teaching); 1984 (rhetoric and popular literature); 1983 and 1984b (literary medium and interpretation/response).

It was the linguist Joos (1950: p. 701) who reminds us that language is

'peculiar among mathematical systems in that it abuts upon reality in two places instead of one.'

The triad Language : Thought : Reality of contemporary western philosophy is comparable to Bhartṛhari's triad : *śabda* : *jñāna*: *artha* (*śabda* is speech, *jñāna* is understanding, and *artha* is message to which speech is directed).

The excluded middle of course alludes to the third Law of Thought in Aristotelian logic.

Section IV. In connection with the substitution of understanding for thought as the second member of the Language triad, consider the following: For the ancient Indians *jñāna* (understanding) was of two kinds: *smṛti* (recalled experience, memory) and *anubhava* (on-going experience). The latter in turn was of two kinds: *yathārtha, pramā* (valid understanding, knowledge) and *ayathārtha, bhrama* (invalid understanding, error). Further, the ancient Indians considered *śabda* (speech) to be an important source of *jñāna*, if not a source of *pramā* itself. The recognition of the vital rôle of imagination and creativity in human understanding came to ancient Indians with the doctrine of *pratibhā* (Bhartṛhari, Abhinavagupta, and others). In the West it came with the Romantics.

In connection with the distinction between Topic and Context, especially in relation to language and its use, consider the following: The distinction between *prakaraṇa* and *prasaṅga* has been traditional in India. The western thinkers to emphasize it initially were Peirce and the later Wittgenstein.

Section V. The choice of the term 'speech act' (Searle 1962) for what we have called language acts is rather unfortunate in that Bühler had earlier more appropriately used it for the act of speaking (at the level of the vehicle).

The distinction between Interpretation and Response followed in the wake of the one between Topic and Context.

The anthropologists remind us that human artifacts and acts are open to non-standard uses. The two modes of non-standard use are of course comparable to *lakṣaṇā* and *vyañjanā* (see Note to Section III).

The French Structuralists emphasized and generalized the notion of the Text.

For the distinction between names and terms in language and the distinction between the three uses of language (technical use centring on rational understanding, poetic use centring on imaginative understanding, and ordinary use embracing both), see Kelkar 1984b. Consider also the ancient Indian distinction between *śāstra-pratyakṣa* (what is presented in a technical discipline) and *kāvya-pratyakṣa* (what is presented in a literary work) on the one hand and *loka-vārtta* (what is reported by people in the ordinary course) on the other hand.

The distinction proposed here between descriptive statements and ascriptive statements is an anthropologically slanted reformulation of the distinction between facts and interpretations and between value-neutral and evaluative-persuasive statements. Ascriptive statements convey insights rather than facts; they convey responses or attitudes rather than merely report on their presence.

While Kant argued that judgements of taste (one kind of ascriptive statements) cannot be reduced to conceptual descriptions (one kind of descriptive statements), Moore extended the argument to the domain of morality. For Kant moral judgements were essentially prescriptive rather than inscriptive or ascriptive.

For Freud, any piece of language use had a genesis in life: it was either a concealed codification of impulses (disguise) or a justification of impulses (rationalization).

For Marx, any piece of language use had a design on life: it was either a concealed codification of interests (false consciousness) or a justification of interests (legitimating ideology).

Section VI. For an earlier look at the two styles of the philosophy of understanding and reality, see Kelkar 1980b (where I associated these with certain debates in the philosophy of language).

Failing a modicum of harmony between man and the *condition humaine*, suicide and murder are round the corner. This alludes to Albert Camus' observation that the central question of ethics is suicide and the central question of politics is murder. (I should be grateful if any reader could place it for me.)

Human motivation gets crucially threaded into the maintenance of this harmony by way of the presupposition of our trust (or mistrust) in other people's understanding or coping or for that matter in our own, in the transparency and efficacy of language, and in the friendliness of life and reality. Our childhood matters.

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The problem of reality in physics

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Historical Background to the Problem

The problem of the nature of Reality is of recent origin so far as physics is concerned. This has always been considered a purely philosophical problem of ontology of the empirical world. Physics has concerned itself primarily with the laws governing the repetitive and repeatable observations in nature such as movements of heavenly bodies, motion of terrestrial bodies, expansion and contraction of bodies with temperature, the regularity of seasons, properties of light and sound, etc. Certainly there was the underlying assumption of a granular structure so far as the ontology was concerned, but it presented no problem for physics till quantum mechanics (QM) made its appearance in the early part of this century.

It has always been a belief with the scientists, particularly the physicists, that there are common basic constituents in the apparently baffling diversity of nature. That all materials in nature can be reduced to about 92 basic elements which can be arranged in a periodic table and which exhibit some symmetry was a major discovery. Later, when it was discovered that electron was a constituent of all atoms and that the nucleus of all elements was built up of common particles such as protons and neutrons, it appeared that physics was coming close to the understanding of the ontic essence of the world.

The problem began when experimental exploration of the elementary particles began. Even earlier the concept of quantum of action had become necessary in understanding black body radiation which alternately led to the theory that even radiation is granular, consisting of photons which cannot be split any further. However all these particles—electrons, photons, protons, etc.—behaved as particles in certain experimental arrangements and as waves in certain others. Neither of the descriptions, particle or wave, by itself could fully describe whatever that existed.

Quantum Mechanics and Reality

Quantum mechanics has been highly successful in providing the framework for the laws that govern the behaviour of elementary particles. The basic postulates on which quantum mechanics is based are:

(*a*) *Indivisibility of the quantum of action.* This indivisibility implies that transition between stationary states is discrete. Thus it has no meaning to say that a system passes through a continuous series of intermediate states,

similar to initial and final states, while in classical physics every transition implies such a continuous series of intermediate states.

(*b*) *Wave Particle duality of the properties of matter.* Under different experimental conditions matter behaves more like a wave or more like a particle, but always in certain ways like both together.

(*c*) *Properties of matter as statistically revealed potentialities.* The laws governing the observable properties of matter at the microlevel are statistical in nature even when they refer to an individual particle, unlike in classical physics whose laws are deterministic. The state of a microsystem is characterized in quantum mechanics by a wave function (more abstractly by a vector in Hilbert space). This wave function evolves in a deterministic way in time but the wave function is not related directly to the empirical properties of an individual object or event. Rather it has to be thought of as a description of the possibilities or propensities within the physical situation. Different and generally mutually incompatible propensities are actualized in different experimental arrangements. The wave function gives only a probability measure for the actualization of different propensities in a statistical ensemble of similar observations carried out under specified conditions and cannot predict what will happen in each individual observation.

Double Slit Electron Beam Experiment

It follows from the above that a model of the matter at the microlevel is not possible in terms of properties we are accustomed to in a sensory perception. Reality underlying the phenomenological or empirical world is not describable in terms of macroscopic properties. No analogue model can be constructed of the reality in terms of visualizable properties. This is most sharply brought out in the double slit electron beam experiment dealing with a single electron.



Fig. 1

In Fig. 1 we have a source S of electrons all having the same energy coming out of the slit at A to impinge on screen B having two slits 1 and 2. At plane C we have a detector of electrons which may be placed at various distances X from the centre of the screen Q. We keep the intensity of the source S very low and we observe that the detector (Geiger counter) records pulses representing the arrival of electrons at its position X separated by gaps in time during which nothing arrives. If we had detectors all over the screen C with a very weak source so that only single electrons are emitted, only one detector will respond indicating that electrons are behaving as particles. There would never be a half response of the detector; either an electron arrives or nothing happens.

If we measure the mean number of pulses recorded in the detector at different positions of the detector along the direction X in plane C in Fig. 1, we record a pattern as in A in Fig. 2.



(A) Both slits open (B) Slit No. 2 closed (C) Slit No. 1 closed (D) Sum of (B) & (C)

Fig. 2

The pattern (A) is familar and well-known in optics when we have a light source and is explained by its wave nature. Since we have assumed the electrons to be particles we would expect, according to classical mechanics, that the pattern would be the sum of the two patterns we would get by closing one of the slits at a time in (B) of Fig. 1. Electrons are supposed to go by either slit 1 or slit 2 and the probability of arrival at X would be the sum of the probabilities of arrival either through slit 1 or through slit 2. The patterns we get by closing either slit 2 or slit 1 are given in (B) and (C) of Fig. 2 and the sum of the patterns should be (D) whereas what we get is in fact (A).

Though quantum mechanics is able to explain this by its mathematical formalism (that in QM we do not sum the probabilities but the amplitudes of the probability given by the wave function), we are not in a position to form a mental picture of what is happening. It is clear that the electrons are not passing through *either* slit 1 *or* slit 2 when both of them are open. In fact if we try to know through which slit the electrons are passing by setting up optical detectors near the slits 1 and 2 (a source of light which the electron

scatters on passing through), we immediately lose the interference pattern and get the pattern (D) of Fig. 2. The very process of observation has disturbed the electrons and has destroyed the interference pattern.

One question still remains. Do the electrons in the double experiment go through slit 1 or slit 2 or does it behave like a wave in its passage from the source to the detector and pass through both the slits and change over to a particle like behaviour at the screen (detector)?

Heisenberg's Principle of Indeterminacy

An important consequence of complementarity of particle and wave nature of matter and the quantum nature of interaction between observer (measuring apparatus) and the observed (elementary particle) results in a minimum indeterminacy in the determination of certain properties of matter. Heisenberg showed that both position and momentum of a particle, for instance, cannot both be measured with exactitude at any instant of time no matter how refined a measurement technique is employed. The very process of measurement of one property affects another property of the particle which is its incompatible counterpart observable. In the case of position (q) and momentum (p) for instance the maximum accuracy with which both of them can be measured simultaneously is given by the relation $\triangle p \times \triangle q \geq h$ where $\triangle p$ and $\triangle q$ are the mean deviations (rms values) from the actual values of position and momentum and h is the Plancks constant. These are so far all incompatible observables of a particle such as energy (E) and time (t), components of the spin vector (S_x, S_y, S_z), etc. The product of the root mean square of the deviations of the incompatible observables from the mean value can never be less than the universal constant h. In the case of a single particle if one of these properties p and q or E and t etc. are determined with certainty, then the other is wholly indeterminate.

Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen Paradox

According to quantum mechanics, the maximum information that we can have of a microsystem is given by the state vector which can describe only the set of all compatible observables. If we have an experimental set up for position measurement, no information is available about the momentum of the microsystem; so also is it the other way about. The question is: does the system have a definite position and momentum simultaneously even though one may not be able to measure them? Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen proposed a thought experiment towards resolving this question.

Consider a molecule of zero total spin, a singlet consisting of two atoms of opposite spin of 1/2. Let this molecule be disintegrated by a method not influencing the spin of either atom. The total spin then remains zero even while the atoms are flying apart and have ceased to interact.

Now if any component of the spin of one of the atoms (say A) is measured, then because total spin is zero we can immediately consider that this component of the spin of the other atom (B) is precisely the opposite. Thus by measuring any component of the spin of atom A, we can obtain this component of the atom B without interacting with atom B in any way.

If this were a classical system no difficulties of interpretation would occur because each component of the spin of each atom is always well defined and always remains opposite in value to the same component of the spin of the opposite atom. However, in quantum mechanics, according to principle of indeterminacy only one component of spin can be sharply defined at one time while the other two are indeterminate at the same time. If we wish to interpret the fluctuations as arising out of the disturbances due to the measuring process, how could this disturn the other atom?

Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) postulated an important hypothesis by specifying a sufficient condition for physical reality. 'If without in any way disturbing a system we can predict with certainty (i.e. with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.'

Hence it follows from the thought experiment that the atoms have definite spin components in all the three directions since it is possible to determine any of the components by measuring that component on the other atom of the pair without any disturbance on itself.

The conclusion of Einstein and his co-authors was that QM was incomplete and a more fundamental theory was necessary. What is, however, relevant to our present discussion is what is implicit in the EPR paradox, namely that measured properties of matter are its inherent properties. This is the realist point of view.

The answer of Bohr representing the Copenhagen school was that it is inadmissible to consider the two atoms in the EPR thought experiment as two separate systems, and that they should rather be considered as a single system. No inherent properties are to be assumed for the particles but that they are the values the measuring process would give in a particular experimental set up. These properties are not counter-factuals, unlike macro-objects which have properties whether you observe them or not and can be expected to have the attributes independent of the observation. When one component of the spin is measured it has a definite value and the other two components are random. When any component of spin is measured randomness prevails regarding the unmeasured spin components. The same thing happens to the other atom in the pair of the EPR experiment as there are no inherent properties.

We could put the interpretations of the EPR experiment regarding nature of reality in the following categories:

(a) The realist interpretation that the 'particles' (the word is used though we know that they are not conventional particles but have the complemen-

tary properties of waves and particles) have inherent properties of definite values of even the incompatible observables. These 'particles' constitute reality though it is not possible to visualize them.

(*b*) The Copenhagen school interpretation that the only reality we can deal with is the empirical reality which is amenable to observation. Any attempt to find a substratum of reality underlying the empirical phenomena because the observation contradicts our common sense view or a macro-model view is bound to result in failure. Physics cannot deal with such questions. We should rather follow Wittgenstein's admonition 'Whereof we cannot speak of thereof we should be silent.'

(*c*) A third view would be that the 'particles' do not have inherent properties but have the potential or propensity to have one of the many possibilities which manifest in an experimental set up. The reality consist of these strange 'particles' whose observable properties are predictable by QM.

Inherent in the EPR paradox was another implication of quantum mechanics. If the measurement is being done on particle A in the thought experiment, how does the particle B which interacts neither with particle A nor with measuring apparatus, 'know' in what direction it should allow its spin to be definite and in what directions it should allow it to fluctuate at random. The problem is made even more difficult if we consider that while the particles are still in flight we are free to re-orient the observing apparatus and in this way measure the spin of particle A and in some other direction. This change should somehow be transmitted to particle B which responds correspondingly. The quantum mechanical explanation would thus violate the basic principle of relativity or alternatively we have to abandon the principle of locality. According to the principle of locality nothing that happens at a remote point can influence an object unless there is a causal relationship and which can be transmitted only at a velocity less than that of light.

Bell's Inequality Theorem

The EPR paradox arose out of a postulate that matter even at the microlevel has inherent properties corresponding to the observables measured by a complex system of measurement. In 1964, J.S. Bell elaborated the EPR thought experiment in a form that could be subjected to experimental verification. His suggestion was to test the correlation between spins of two particles branching off after decay or disintegration from a singlet (a molecule consisting of a pair of particles each with spin of 1/2 but in opposite directions so that the total spin of the molecule is zero). The spin is measured in any of the three directions perpendicular to the direction of flight of the particles (Fig. 3) at random for a large number of particles. The spin values can be either $+1/2$ or $-1/2$ and the measurement is done in the direction a or b or c at random for either of the particles. That is when spin for particle A is measured in direction 'a', particle B of the pair could be measured in a or b or c direction.



Fig. 3

The correlation is then examined as to whether it is in accordance with what would be expected if the particles had definite values in all three directions a, b and c as per the proposition of inherent properites.

We measure the spin components in three directions, a, b, and c, lying in a plane on particles arriving at A^{s1} and B^{s2} at random. Assuming that the particles have inherent properties of spin independent of observation, and we accept Einstein's locality principle, the pair of particles should match as follows:

Table 1

Population	*Particle* 1	*Particle* 2
N_1	(a^+, b^+, c^+)	(a^-, b^-, c^-)
N_2	(a^+, b^+, c^-)	(a^-, b^-, c^+)
N_3	(a^+, b^-, c^+)	(a^-, b^+, c^-)
N_4	(a^+, b^-, c^-)	(a^-, b^+, c^+)
N_5	(a^-, b^+, c^+)	(a^+, b^-, c^-)
N_6	(a^-, b^+, c^-)	(a^+, b^-, c^+)
N_7	(a^-, b^-, c^+)	(a^+, b^+, c^-)
N_8	(a^-, b^-, c^-)	(a^+, b^+, c^+)

For the random source we are considering, each of the $(N_1, N_2, N_3, \ldots N_8)$ populations are equal. If the spin in direction 'a' is measured for S_1 and is found to be + the spin for particles S_2 in a direction is certain to be − . The particles belong to one of the eight categories and if, for a particle in category (a^+, b^+, c^+) the spin component if measured in a, b, c directions gives + value, the corresponding S_2 particle in the pair must belong to (a^-, b^-, c^-) to ensure zero total angular momentum. In any given event the particle pair in question must belong to one of the eight categories shown in Table 1 above.

Let us suppose that observer A finds S_1; a (spin of S_1 in direction a) to be + and observer B measures spin in direction b for the other particles S_2 of

the pair and finds S_2; b also to be +. It is clear from the table that the particle belongs either to type 3 or type 4 so that the number of particles for which this situation is realized is N_3+N_4. If we make spin measurements at random in the three directions a, b, and c for the pairs of particles for a sufficiently large sample, we have the inequality relationship according to the Realist view of Einstein and others.

$$(N_3+N_4) \leqslant (N_2+N_4)+(N_3+N_7) \ldots (1)$$

In terms of probabilities, the probability that we measure the spin of S_1 in direction a as + and of the other particle of the pair S_2 in direction b as + viz. P (S_1 a^+; S_2 b^+) should be less than or equal to the sum of the probabilities of P(S_1 a^+; S_2c^+) and P (S_1c^+; S_2b^+), i.e.

$$P(S_1a^+; S_2b^+) \leqslant P(S_1a^+; S_2c^+)+P(S_1c^+; S_2b^+)$$

In quantum mechanics where we do not assign inherent properties but properties only on observation, and consider the pair of particles not as two separate systems but as a single system, the probability relation for Bell's, experiment would be different. The probability values would then be

$$P(S_1a^+; S_2b^+) = \frac{1}{2} \operatorname{Sin}^2 \frac{\theta ab}{2}$$

where θab is the angle between the axes a and b. Bell's Inequality relation would then appear as:

$$\operatorname{Sin}^2 \frac{\theta_{ab}}{2} \leqslant \operatorname{Sin}^2 \frac{\theta_{ac}}{2} + \operatorname{Sin}^2 \frac{\theta_{cb}}{2}$$

Let a, b and c lie in a single plane and let C bisect the two directions defined by a and b. Let $\theta_{ab} = 2\theta$; $\theta_{ac} = \theta_{cb} = \theta$. Bell's Inequality is then violated for $\theta = 0 < \theta < \pi/2$ as we get for $\theta = \pi/4$ the relation $0.5 \leqslant 0.292$ which is absurd. So quantum mechanical predictions are not compatible with Bell's Inequality.

Several experiments have been performed in recent years to test Bell's Inequality and they have all unequivocally confirmed that it is violated confirming correctness of quantum mechanical predictions. Experiments have been conducted where the choice of the direction to be measured is changed when the particles are on flight and yet the correlation between the particles are as expected by quantum mechanics.

We have given a rather detailed account of Bell's Inequality theorem and its experimental violation since it has very important implications regarding the nature of reality. The EPR paradox arose with the assumption of a reality independent of observer and consequently the matter or 'particles' constituting the world having inherent properties. Bell's theorem is only a logical consequence of such an assumption and its violation confirms that

matter cannot be regarded to have inherent properties at least those connected with space and time.

The Copenhagen school completely skirts the problem of ontology as it accords no meaning to such questions and concerns itself only with the results of measurements. The specifications of our ensemble of microsystems can have no reference to the results of *future measurements* that are to be performed on these systems. That means counter-factuality is denied. We can only know empirical reality which is revealed to us through observation and experiment. Quantum mechanics successfully gives the prediction of such observations and measurements.

If we consider the proposition of potential or propensity of matter to manifest one of the possibilities the violation of Bell's Inequality can be explained. However the correlation at a distance instantaneously as is implied in the violation of Bell's Inequality is still perplexing.

Is this action at a distance violating the special theory of relativity? No useful information has really passed between particles of A and B of the pair. The two observers do not know at any time what results to expect, i.e. Observer B does not know at any time that Observer A is measuring the spin in a certain axis and that if he measures it, the spin of the particle coming toward him should give a particular value if positioned in the same axis. Only when A and B get together and compare the results would they know that there is a definite correlation when measurements are made in the same axis while it is random in other axes. One can, therefore, argue that the theory of relativity is not violated. Shimony has termed the mysterious Bell correlation 'passion at a distance'.

To come back to our basic problem, physics is necessarily confronted with the ontological problem not out of choice but out of necessity. In its attempt to understand the laws relating the behaviours of matter at the microlevel, the 'particles' it postulates for explanation behave in a very peculiar way. It is not difficult to give up near objective reality which is that reality does not correspond to macroparticles of which we are aware by our sensual experience. After all, our senses are sensors of limited capability or limited spectral sensitivity, that it is unrealistic to expect the reality to be describable in terms of concepts derived from such sensors. Hence when the matter at microlevel was seen to behave both as particles and waves under different circumstances, it was not difficult to give up the mechanical analogue in its description.

The problem posed by inseparability and non-locality poses a greater challenge. If we accept the principle of causality (abandonment of this principle will undermine the entire edifice of science), how do we understand that two particles millions of miles away will always act in concert in certain situations? Quantum mechanics does not have an answer to this problem as

it completely bypasses the issue and takes an instrumentalist view. Would we say with Kant that the world as it is can never be understood?

In the spirit of realism, a fundamental science like physics can have value only if it bears an aspect of reality. This does not imply that it can give an accurate description of reality as it is, but it does mean that the description it gives should have some connection with reality. We have to necessarily believe as a scientific realist that there are laws of nature explaining regularities of phenomena independent of humans but are knowable by them even if it is in an approximate and perhaps abstract manner. So a scientist is expected to give a description of these regularities (laws of nature) without referring to the abilities or inabilities of the observer since these qualities obviously could not play any effective part in the regularities of the world.

The first, and perhaps the most significant, conclusion in an investigation of the behaviour of 'elementary particles' is that the world cannot be described as essentially a collection of physical objects of finite size which would each possess its own specific attributes—size, location, velocity, etc., even if these attributes are only approximately determined.

One line of investigation could be considered. The problems of indeterminacy, correlation at a distance, etc., seem to be concerned only with properties connected with location of matter in space and time like position and momentum, direction of spin, etc. Is this because the human mind sees the world as three-dimensional space only due to the peculiar combination of our sensory organs like two eyes, two ears, etc.? An ant will see the world only as two-dimensional if it had the necessary conceptual ability and would never understand what the third dimension would mean. Similarly we are perhaps seeing reality only in its projection in three dimensions or four-dimensional space time whereas in actuality it exists in more dimensions. The additional dimension need not be physical, but could include consciousness by which cogitation takes place.

Another way to understand the problem is that the human mind, evolved out of empirical needs of survival, can understand or even conceive only empirical reality; and empirical reality is to be defined in a strictly operational way, that is, to identify the concept of empirical reality with a mere set of predictive rules asserting what will be observed in such and such a situation. This is the attitude most physicists adopt today. Still, the way science has been able to evolve mathematical description such as general relativity gives us hope that the general description of empirical reality could be perhaps reflected in a mathematical structure.

I am grateful to Prof. A.D. Gangal of the Department of Physics, Poona University, for many discussions on the conceptual foundations of Quantum Mechanics, and Prof. R. Sundara Rajan of the Department of Philosophy, Poona University for going through the manuscript and offering his valuable comments.

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Wittgenstein on mathematical necessity: towards a grammatical perspective

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The Central Thread

Exploring a complex theme is not an easy task particularly when it is riddled with diverse and disconnected issues that apparently defy any coherent interpretation. Wittgenstein's view on necessity or mathematical necessity is such a theme where the absence of a systematic presentation gives rise to different conflicting interpretations of his view. However, the present reading of Wittgenstein differs from this perception. It argues that a systematic presentation of his views on mathematical necessity is indeed possible if we see the underlying theme that Wittgenstein maintains in spite of apparent diversities and looseness. This underlying theme is that of grammatical perspective on necessity.

The concept of mathematical necessity has been a constant source of trouble for philosophers and logicians. Theories have been offered which have subsequently proliferated throughout history. But Wittgenstein's approach, on the other hand, is radically different from the rest. For him, many of the problems that have perplexed philosophers can be shown to be spurious if we can settle beforehand what it is for a mathematical proposition to be necessary. This is essentially to understand the meaning of the concept of necessity and its function in language. In Wittgenstein's vocabulary the whole enterprise may be described as inquiring into the logical grammar of necessary propositions. Hence, mathematical propositions are treated by Wittgenstein as a sub-class of grammatical propositions.

In this paper the central idea that we have maintained is that mathematical propositions are grammatical propositions. This has been discussed in two subsequent parts. The first part is mainly concerned with showing that the question 'What are mathematical propositions about?' is a misleading one. This has been followed by a discussion that the grammar of mathematical propositions is different from the grammar of empirical propositions. The second part consists of two major discussions: One, Wittgenstein's grammatical perspective cannot be interpreted as that of expressing conventionalism;

This is a revised version of the paper presented in a National Seminar on *Wittgenstein, Logic and Mathematics* held at Jadavpur University, January 1990. I am grateful to Dr (Mrs) Amita Chatterjee, Dr (Mrs) Chhanda Gupta and Dr Tushar Sarkar for their critical comments. I am especially indebted to my colleague Dr R.C. Pradhan for clarifying a number of issues relating to Wittgenstein's notion of grammar.

and two, his rule-following nature of necessity has been construed in such a way that it does not allow scepticism to be possible.

'What Are Mathematical Propositions About?': A Wrong Question

Kant's question 'How can the necessary and a priori propositions of mathematics be applied to the world of facts'? may indeed be taken as the vantage point from which we can start our inquiry. To bring out the implication of this question: an a priori proposition of arithmatic such as $2+3=5$ is true in both ways: First, it is true no matter what the world of fact is and second, it is true at the same time about the world of facts, such as, if two apples are added to three apples then the collection will be that of five apples. But this gives rise to a conceptual puzzlement. The precise nature of this puzzlement is that if the truth value of a mathematical proposition is unaffected by any possible state of affairs and it can give no information about the actual world then how can it be about apples, or about observable objects? It is felt that the only way to resolve this puzzlement depends on our ability to understand the content of mathematical propositions. Is it about numbers or about apples? This calls for a detailed philosophical examination so that between these two seemingly incompatible accounts one can be discarded in favour of the other. Fixing of domain will help us see whether there is anything called mathematical necessity as such and, if there is, what its relationship to the world of facts is.

Historically, the radical position that Mill takes in this respect is notable. He banished altogether the notion of necessity from the realm of mathematics and defined mathematical propositions as empirical generalizations. But Mill's solution does not help the situation. In spite of Mill's rigorous refusal one can still see that the statement $2+3=5$ does possess all the properties that are normally ascribed to necessary truths. It is a truth which can be known independent of experience, its opposite will be self-contradictory and finally, no state of affairs can disconfirm it. This shows that the very nature of arithmetical propositions is such that they are characterized by a certain kind of built-in necessity. Hence any account concerning what mathematical propositions are about, must keep a place for necessity no matter what the nature and origin of this necessity may be. A failure to do this will be a falsification of what the nature of a mathematical proposition is. Mill's mistake is that he did not provide us with any proper use of the word 'necessary'. The acceptance of necessity is a part of the conceptual requirement of mathematics and, therefore, one cannot treat mathematical propositions as empirical generalizations in Mill's fashion.

Continuing with our question, what are mathematical propositions about?

We have seen that Mill's answer to this failed precisely on the ground that it left us with no conceivable notion of necessity. Now, if Mill's proposal is unacceptable the only way to save necessity will be to consider mathematical propositions as being about numbers rather than about apples. This is the source of the Platonist thesis on necessity in mathematics. To hold that mathematical propositions are about numbers is really to imply that necessity in mathematics can be explained on the ground that statement $2+3=5$ is really about an abstract object. This, in other words, is to claim that the existence of necessary truths in mathematics is bound up with the existence of such abstract objects. Hence, if there were no abstract objects there would not be any necessary truths. The second important aspect is that of features of these objects, since it is these features which logically ensure the necessity in mathematics. Following Frege,[1] some of the chief features of these objects can be thus identified. First, these objects have no temporal or spatial properties, and that is the reason why they are radically different from psychological and physical objects. Second, abstract objects are as objective as are physical objects. Third, abstract objects are changeless, meaning thereby that they are not different in different times. Note that the feature of changelessness also includes the cohesive character of abstract objects, that is, these objects retain all through certain logically inseparable properties so that for arithmetical objects there will always be arithmetical properties and for geometrical objects there will be geometrical properties. Thus, atemporality, aspatiality, objectivity and cohesiveness are regarded as the features of this category of objects. Given these characteristics, the Platonists make their fundamental claim that if a statement about an abstract object is true under one set of circumstances, it must be true under all because no property of the abstract object can be different in different circumstances. This works as the basis of the claim that a proposition like $2+3=5$ is true of all possible worlds and hence it is necessary.

The Platonist account of necessity, i.e. necessity exhibited as a consequence of the character of abstract objects, gives us the impression that this is a foolproof account of necessity. But according to Wittgenstein this is far from it. The ground that the Platonists offer for necessity can be contested. It can be shown that the existence of abstract objects cannot explain why mathematical propositions function as necessary rather than empirical propositions of matters of fact. The source of the problem lies in the very formulation of the problem. In this respect since both Mill and Plato share the same concern, therefore, they ask the same question, namely, what are mathematical propositions about? The only difference is between the two options which the respective philosophers suggest. Wittgenstein's concern, on the other hand, is not with the options or answers but with the question itself. Since he is arguing against the question the answers that follow from it are, therefore, not acceptable to him. The respective answers suggested (i.e., whether mathematical propositions are about numbers or about apples) can be

shown to be in no way substantially different from each other. In fact, they are variants of the same grammar.

What mathematical propositions are about is a question which presupposes that mathematical propositions are about something and to say this is really to claim that they are about certain domains. Hence on a conceptual ground there is no difference in saying whether mathematical propositions are about numbers or about apples. Note that the former option can be shown to be empirical in a manner similar to the way the latter option is obviously empirical. To elaborate, when we say 'What is $2+3=5$ about?' the most natural response will be to distinguish it from empirical propositions by characterizing it as being about numbers. But this way of characterizing will not make mathematical propositions distinct from empirical propositions. The *prima facie* reason is that we treat an arithmetical proposition such as $2+3=5$ as analogous to an empirical proposition. The only difference between them is that in one case it is about empirical entities whereas in the other case it is about non-empirical abstract entities. The two answers can be thus said to be the variants of the same grammar. Hence, to say that mathematical propositions are about numbers is in no way better than to say that mathematical propositions are about apples. Mill's account is untenable on the ground that it drops the notion of necessity. But to opt for the Platonist alternative is equally unsatisfactory since in this view mathematics turns out to be what Alice Ambrose calls 'a physics of mathematical entities and mathematical research an expedition of discovery'.[2] This testifies very aptly in G.H. Hardy's remark when he says,

> I have myself always thought of a mathematician as in the first instance an *observer*, a man who gazes at a distant range of mountains and notes down his observations. His job is simply to distinguish clearly and notify to others as many different peaks as he can . . .[3]

This is to take mathematical investigation at par with empirical investigation, the only difference being that it is an investigation of a non-empirical reality.

The empirical import of the Platonist position can be further vindicated if we approach the problem from the epistemological point of view. That is, along with the acceptance of abstract objects, the next question that comes is with regard to how human beings can know truths about these objects. In this respect, the tradition from Plato to Gödel proposes that there is a faculty of intuition through which we apprehend the truths of abstract objects. Notice that the conception of intuition proposed in this tradition is strikingly similar to that of introspection and perception. Intuition is conceived on analogy to perception and intuitive knowledge is thus made dependent on the knower who forms a direct contact with the object of knowledge. In the *Meno*, Plato, for example, says 'The soul, then, being immortal and having been born again many times, and having seen all things that exist, whether

in this world or in the world below, has knowledge of them all.' The same Platonic idea is found in Gödel when he writes,

> the objects of transfinite set theory . . . clearly do not belong to the physical world . . . But, despite their remoteness from sense experience, we do have a perception also of the objects of set theory, as is seen in the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us as being true. I don't see any reason why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception, i.e. in mathematical intuition, than in sense perception.[4]

The view expressed here may be correctly described as perceptually inspired accounts of intuition through which we obtain knowledge about abstract objects. But then, this view on intuition involves an inconsistency at a fundamental level. The Platonic claim that knowledge of an abstract object is knowledge by direct acquaintance cannot be reconciled with the atemporal and aspatial nature of these objects. The reason is that perception demands a causal relation between perceiver and the object perceived.[5] Hence, if intuition is defined as perceptual acquaintance, then abstract objects being outside space and time and being objective cannot enter into this causal relationship. The abstract objects, since they are objective, cannot be said to occur in the experience of the knower and since they are aspatial, they cannot produce a representation of themselves in the knower through a causal chain.[6] If intuition is understood in the analogy of perception then such incompatibility will be its inevitable outcome.

The failure to see this incompatibility has made many of the contemporary versions of Platonism incoherent. Among these, Karl Popper's version is prominent. In Popper's[7] reading his conception of the 'third world' is a contemporary form of the Platonist doctrines of Plato, the Stoics, Leibniz, Bolzano and Frege. Popper makes two claims. First, there are 'causal relations between the three worlds'[8] and second, the objects in the third world are 'the unplanned product of human action'.[9] This clearly exemplifies the sense of incompatibility that we were referring to. If Popper's third world is in the tradition from Plato to Frege, how can there be a causal connection between the third world and the other two worlds? Equally important is to note that if the objects of the third world are the products of human actions, then, Popper must accept that the objects of the third world, such as numbers, are contingent. But this is simply inconsistent with Popper's realism. The main defect of Popper's third world is its failure to see that aspatial and atemporal objects cannot enter into any form of causal relation.[10]

The epistemological corollary to the Platonist thesis on necessity conforms to our earlier discussion concerning the ontological dimension of necessity. The Platonists, both in the ontological and in the epistemological dimensions, treat implicitly the necessary propositions of mathematics in the pattern of empirical propositions. They have failed to see that the respective grammatical forms of these two types of propositions are different at a funda-

mental level. The failure of the Platonists is that they cannot do proper justice to the notion of necessity appropriate to mathematical propositions. For, to decide in what sense mathematical propositions are necessary and how they are applied to matters of fact, we need to see the meaning of mathematical propositions and their use, i.e. the function they perform. Necessity of a mathematical proposition cannot be explained through our attempt to find out what mathematical propositions are about. In fact, the very idea that mathematical propositions are about something is incorrect. It expresses what Wittgenstein says: our obsession for clinging to one paradigm, that is, influenced by the grammar of empirical propositions we tend to think that mathematical propositions, in a similar manner, are about certain specific domains. This obsession for a particular grammatical form does prevent us, from seeing first, in what sense mathematical propositions are necessary and second, how the harmony between the two different areas of logic and empirical fact is possible. Wittgenstein's suggestion is, therefore, that we should shift our attention from what mathematical propositions are about to the *use* we make of them. It is only by examining the use of mathematical propositions that we will be able to explain the connection between their necessity and their applications.

We all know that to say that a mathematical proposition is necessary is to imply that nothing can be held against the truth of a proposition. The consequence of it is that we never give up an arithmetical proposition such as $2+3=5$ in the face of any adverse facts. But what is it that makes the proposition so unassailable? Wittgenstein's answer is that we give a special role to the proposition in our language and giving a special role implies our decision to use the proposition in a certain way, i.e. as a rule for the use of expressions. Hence, a mathematical proposition is necessary because it functions as a rule for how to use the expression in a certain way. Let us illustrate the conceptual import of this point. Suppose there is a rectangle which is 15 squares long and 10 squares wide. Now, in order to find out the total number of squares in a rectangle, one needs to multiply 15 by 10—the answer is 150. To this there can be two distinctly identifiable scenarios. First, suppose I physically count the squares and find that the total number of squares is less than 150. I may thus hold that the result obtained by using the rule '$15\times 10=150$' is false. This is an empirical use of the proposition which is testable by experience. The second scenario is grammatical. Suppose I maintain that $15\times 10=150$ is correct no matter what the total number of squares I physically count. This will then be regarded as an instance of an use where the proposition '$15\times 10=150$' functions as a criterion of the correctness of my count. By using it as a criterion I make the proposition independent of experience. This is, in other words, to claim that I make the proposition '$15\times 10=150$' a rule for the use of numerical terms.

Here, what is crucial is to note the two logically distinct uses of the same proposition. The same proposition can be used either as a rule or as an empirical proposition and, therefore, the same proposition can be used to formulate a rule and to describe some state of affairs. The propositions of mathematics are thus said to be necessary by virtue of the grammatical fact. Their use is logically distinct from their empirical use. The failure to see these distinctive uses can lead to a lopsided understanding of necessity. In this respect Kripke's[11] argument that something which is known on the basis of a priori evidence can be equally known by a posteriori evidence is a clear case of such lopsided understanding of necessity. Kripke substantiates his argument by giving an example of a computing machine which tells us whether such and such a number is prime. Notice that one does not require to calculate or prove that the number is prime, instead the machine is programmed to do that. Thus we come to know that the number is prime on the basis of such knowledge like knowledge of the laws of physics, construction of the machine, and so on. This is an instance of knowledge based not on purely a priori evidence but on a posteriori evidence. Hence, Kripke's argument is that if something 'can be known a priori' it does not mean that it '*must* be known a priori'.[12]

The main problem with Kripke's argument is that it fails to see the distinction between, what Wittgenstein calls a *proof* and an *experiment*. It is true that the same proposition can be either used for a mathematical or for an empirical purpose. But this possibility, by no means, even remotely, suggests that a mathematical proposition can be known or used empirically. For a proposition to function as mathematical implies that it must be known a priori. Coming back to our earlier example '$15\times 10=150$', I understand the proposition on the basis of a rule that governs the use of symbols concerned. But to know the same on the basis of a calculator is different from when I know the proposition on the basis of a proof. In the context of a calculator the ability to read correctly, as Wittgenstein will say, is like performing an experiment. Essentially, this involves a probabilistic knowledge, because the notion of knowledge varies depending on user's background knowledge about the calculator. Hence, it may be said that the knowledge that is achieved is empirically but not mathematically reliable.

The distinction that we are pointing out is the consequence of certain linguistic use. In one instance the proposition is used as, what Wittgenstein calls, norms of representation and, therefore, it is treated as 'unshakably true'. In the other, it is used as a true or false description of reality and hence characterized as contingent. Wittgenstein's resolution is not that what is known a priori can also be known empirically. He is, on the other hand, suggesting that the same expression can be mathematical or empirical depending on its use. What matters here is use and it is the particular use that determines what question can or cannot be asked about the proposition. To illustrate, it makes no sense if I ask, for example, how can I be certain that an arithmetical propoietion such as $15\times 10=150$ is necessarily true? The very use of the proposition rules out such a question posing epistemological

doubt. But this is not so in the context of a calculator where it is perfectly legitimate to doubt the proposition concern. Here it does make sense to say: How can I be certain that pressing the following buttons such as '1', '5', '×', '1' and '0' will give me the result $15 \times 10 = 150$? Here, the claim is not that the same proposition can be known either a priori or a posteriori. On the contrary, it reveals that there are two different contexts where the same proposition is used and known in two different ways. Hence, in the Wittgensteinian framework of understanding, the necessity of mathematical propositions is explained on the ground that they are grammatical propositions. The truth of their assertions is dependent solely upon certain grammatical rules rather than upon empirical facts. This dispels the myth of Platonic realism and thus removes the idea that necessary propositions of mathematics are about mysterious things.

II

Grammatical Perspective and Conventionalism

Following the above line of interpretation it may be argued that Wittgenstein's grammatical perspective on necessity expresses the familiar, conventionalist thesis that logic and mathematics are true by fiat, i.e. true on the basis of conventions stipulated for the meanings of their terms. This straightforward conventionalist stance can indeed be shown to be incompatible with what Wittgenstein means when he says that mathematical propositions are rules of grammar. In our reading, Wittgenstein's rejection of Platonic realism and his acceptance of grammatical perspective on necessity does not, however, commit him either to full-blooded or to modified versions of conventionalism.

The question that Wittgenstein raised is how far is the construction of a conventional system such as the number system arbitrary? Wittgenstein's response to this question characterizes his unique brand of conventionalism. A conventional system, as he argues, has the feature of being both *arbitrary* and *non-arbitrary*. This appears to be an ambivalent position which does not make much sense unless it is properly clarified. The best way to do it will be, as Stuart Shankar[13] points out, by explaining in what sense the construction of a conventional system is arbitrary and in what sense it is non-arbitrary. Wittgenstein's own clarification on the issue may be presented in the following discussion.

In *Philosophical Grammar*, Wittgenstein considers rules of grammar to be arbitrary. But these rules are further characterized by him as being constitutive since they determine the structure or framework of rule-governed activities such as a game like cricket or chess. Now, Wittgenstein argues that suppose you change a constitutive rule, say a rule in cricket, you will then play a game which is other than cricket. Notice that Wittgenstein does

not say you are playing cricket wrongly; only that you are playing a different game. The relationship between the rule and the structure of the game is conceptual. That is why if the rule is changed the subsequent structure is also changed. He then contrasts these constitutive rules with regulative rules like the rules involved in cookery. These rules do not determine the structure within which subsequent activities like the activities of cookery are performed. Suppose while you are cooking, you follow the rules which are not the right rules of cookery. You will then cook badly but this by no means will involve different activity. Hence, the relationship between regulative rules and related activities is not conceptual but causal. Wittgenstein argues that rules of grammar should be seen as being constitutive rather than the regulative rules of cookery. To change the rules of a grammatical system is to construct a new grammatical system and it, therefore, should not be confused with the misuse of a rule.

The constitutive nature of grammatical rules, nevertheless, suggests that grammatical rules are conventions and, as conventions, they are arbitrary; but their arbitrariness is, what Peter Hacker[14] calls, 'the arbitrariness of autonomy'. Here, arbitrariness speaks for the autonomy of grammar. But what is this autonomy that grammar assumes through arbitrariness? Again, how are the two—autonomy and arbitrariness—related?

The rules of grammar, as Wittgenstein described, is something ultimate—the framework of reference under which all justification takes place but the framework itself is not justified. Rules are arbitrary but their arbitrariness follows from their being non-justified in the above sense. Thus when it is asked: why is this rule obeyed?, the only answer that we can give, for Wittgenstein, is 'that's how we do it'. (RFM, Part III, Sec. 74) This remark shows the arbitrariness involved in rules, but it will be a mistake if this arbitrariness is not seen in the proper Wittgensteinian perspective, i.e. arbitrariness of rules is the consequence of their non-justificatory autonomous nature. This exhibits that within rule-structure there is a peculiar blending of both arbitrariness and non-arbitrariness and, therefore, in our assessment of mathematical rules we must take this feature into account. In view of this feature Wittgenstein argues that the rule $2+3=5$ means neither that it is true only here and now nor does it mean that in all possible worlds there will always be $2+3=5$. The theoretical import of this claim is that both the stated positions and their respective denials are meant to be equally absurd for Wittgenstein. The mistake committed here is that both the positions have failed to grasp the nature of necessity appropriate to mathematical propositions. That is the reason why Wittgenstein seeks to evolve a new perspective on necessity. We find that at one point Wittgenstein denies the Platonist notion of necessity and at another point he insists that there must be some notion of necessity so that we can systematically maintain that $2+3=5$. The reason to do so is because of our rules. A man who denies this rule will be considered as operating with a different system of arithmetical rules from ours. The concept of necessity is

thus taken to be a matter of rule and rule-following. For example, to say that $2+3=5$ is to imply that we use this rule with a view to making a correct representation. This is the rationale behind Wittgenstein's claim that mathematical rules are the norms of representation. A rule is like a standard, a paradigm, without which there will be no meaningful action or discourse.

At this stage it may be pointed out that the non-justificatory/autonomous nature of grammar does not guarantee non-arbitrariness. The so-called autonomy is the other face of arbitrariness. Hence, apart from being autonomous, grammatical conventions have to be shown in what sense they are non-arbitrary. In this respect Wittgenstein has shown how non-arbitrariness gets involved in our construction of a new grammatical system. He argues that in the construction of a new grammatical system we are often guided by certain considerations which are crucial to the activity since they determine the course of events. Wittgenstein explains this point by comparing grammar with the representational style of painting. The unique feature of this model of painting is that it is arbitrary in so far as it is not guided by any external forces but is also at the same time non-arbitrary since it assumes a tradition that guides our aesthetic judgement. (P.I. Sec. 52) It is true that we construct rules of grammar freely but this does not imply that we do so blindly. To act freely is not to act blindly. Wittgenstein, therefore, says repeatedly that there are several important factors that guide us in the construction of a new grammatical system. But none of these factors compels us to construct one particular system rather than the other. We decide to construct a new system because we are interested in obtaining certain results. Wittgenstein expresses this idea in no uncertain terms when he says: 'A mathematician is always inventing new forms of description: some stimulated by practical needs, others from aesthetic needs,—yet others in a variety of ways'. (RFM, Part I, Sec. 167)

Wittgenstein's thesis on the autonomy of rules shows that his account of logical necessity cannot be claimed to be expressing conventionalism of any form. In fact, to construe Wittgenstein's account as conventionalistic is to undermine, if not grossly violate, his normative or grammatical conception of mathematics. In view of Wittgenstein's arguments, one must recognize that conventionalist and grammatical are the two different conceptions of necessary truths and accordingly they form two different frameworks. Hence the attempt to explain grammatical framework as merely conventional is wrong; it is wrong on a theoretical account. This is, for example, evidently obvious in the following two positions held by Wittgenstein and the logical positivists respectively.

The statement that mathematical propositions are rules of grammar and the statement that mathematical propositions are tautologies do not make similar claims. The idea of tautology expresses the logical positivists' conception of conventionalism. To say that a mathematical proposition is a tautology is to imply first that a compound proposition having no factual content is true solely by virtue of the meaning of its constituent words; and second,

that there are syntactic rules by which words are combined in a certain pattern. This approach in no way even remotely resembles Wittgenstein's conception of mathematical propositions as rules of grammar. One of the important assumptions in the positivist theory is that meaning is compositional. Whereas in Wittgenstein we do not find any such conception. For him the meaning of a sentence, no matter whether it expresses a rule or not, depends on the manner in which it is used. Hence in one case it is compositionality that matters in deciding the meaning of mathematical propositions and in the other case it is use that matters.

The next important difference between the two is that the positivist conception of mathematics as a system of tautology, fails to explain the growth of mathematics. This is because it cannot account for discoveries in mathematics. Wittgenstein, on the contrary, tries to give an account of what constitutes a discovery in mathematics. His position can be better understood if we recognize the distinction that he himself makes between operating with the established mathematical rules and constructing new mathematical rules. The distinction between the two can neither be eroded nor can the former be confused with the latter. Now, returning to our example of $2+3=5$, we find that it is the law of addition that enables us to say this and if a man denies this we say that he does not know how to add. But in Wittgenstein's reading this is only one side of the story. It does not explain what Wittgenstein describes as construction of new rules. A failure to recognize this will be to confuse one sort of activity with the other which is one of the major shortcomings of the logical positivists in their account of the discoveries in mathematics. Wittgenstein's strategy, on the other hand, is to suggest that we freely construct mathematical rules and it is this freedom which explains the genesis and growth of mathematical knowledge. However, as mentioned earlier, the freedom to construct rules is not meant to be a blind activity on the part of the mathematicians.

Dummett's threat

In view of the difference between Wittgenstein and the logical positivists one can now see that the problem raised by Dummett[15] no longer poses a threat to us. In fact his problem can be shown to be a non-problem if we understand properly what constitutes necessity in Wittgensteinian sense.

In Dummett's evaluation, Wittgenstein upholds a full-blooded conventionalism where mathematical necessity is regarded as a matter of decision. This is really to say, in concrete terms, that in a mathematical proof 'at each step we are free to accept or reject the proof'. The picture that emerges is that one can accept the axioms and rules of inference and yet reject the proof. Dummett's allegation is that one is not at all clear as to the nature and meaning of this possibility, i.e. one does not know what it would be like for one to accept the axioms and to reject the proof. In Dummett's opinion, Wittgenstein failed to offer any satisfactory account of it. But this assess-

ment of Dummett can be questioned on several grounds. In this respect Barry Stroud's work is notable. In our answer to Dummett's objection we will, therefore, follow some of the arguments of Barry Stroud.[16]

It is true that from Wittgenstein's account one gets the impression that he does not maintain uniformity in his position. This gives rise to innumerable confusions and misgivings. Here are two contrasting passages:

> . . . somebody may reply like a rational person and yet not be playing our game. (RFM, Part I, Sec. 115)

Next:

> So much is clear: when someone says 'If you follow the rule, it must be like this,' he does not have clear concept of what experience would correspond to the opposite. Or again, he has not any clear concept of what it would be like for it to be otherwise. And this is very important. (RFM, Part III, Sec. 29)

Now what do these two passages suggest? They suggest that Wittgenstein is holding simultaneously two conflicting positions on the same issue. But I think this so-called conflict should not blind us to the real import of Wittgenstein's point.

In his opposition to a Platonistic account of logical necessity, Wittgenstein says that it is always possible to think of alternative ways of counting, inferring, calculating, etc.—which are different from ours. But then the import of the second quoted passage is that the possibility of these alternatives do not suggest that our present way of counting, for example, is a result of an arbitrary convention. How will these two be reconciled? We have to think of a situation which allows alternatives to our present way of counting without violating the notion of logical necessity. Wittgenstein's solution to this will be three-fold.

First, it is always possible to imagine alternatives: in Wittgenstein's example, selling of wood in different ways, or amalgamating the + 2 series with the +4 series, etc. But do they, as Barry Stroud has pointed out, form intelligible alternatives? If we really try to understand the implication of these cases, we find ourselves at a loss. The reason is we cannot conceive of a world where people think and infer in this way. They become virtually unintelligible to us; however, they are unintelligible not because they are contradictory. This is where we see Wittgenstein's anti-Platonistic attitude and his own thesis on necessity. As against Platonism, he argues that it is always possible to conceive of alternatives. But these alternatives do not suggest that we human beings engage in practising different ways of counting or inferring. Now this possibility of alternatives speaks for contingency. So far as this possibility exists our present way of counting is a contingent fact though we do not have any clear idea about what these possibilities, other than the present one,

are. This takes us to the second and third arguments which are really thematic extensions of the first.

The second argument is related to Wittgenstein's notion of natural history of man—an expression he uses in order to describe the nature of his own work. In his words: 'What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of man: not curiosities however, but rather observations on facts which no one has doubted, and which have only gone unremarked because they are always before our eyes.' (RFM, Part I, Sec. 142)

This passage, though highly illuminating, needs clarification which may be best sought through the two following questions: first, what are those facts which are so obvious that they have never been doubted?; second, how are these facts related to the explanation of logical necessity?

The first question points out the dual nature of these facts. Since the facts are never doubted they must be constitutive of human nature, that is, they make human nature what it is. However, since these facts are described by Wittgenstein as facts of natural history they are, therefore, contingent. Their contingent nature arises due to the possibility that they may not be obtained. To elaborate, Wittgenstein argues that activities like calculating, inferring, etc., are possible due to certain constitutive facts that are physical, psychological and physiological. (RFM, V, I, 15) Hence, if these facts are not obtained an activity like calculating will not be possible. This is the reason why Wittgenstein says that 'mathematics is after all an anthropological phenomenon'. (RFM, V, 26).

But what is the bearing of this view on logical necessity? This takes us to the second question. In a +2 series when I say 1002 right after 1000 what does it mean? It means that I have understood the rule correctly but that the rule itself does not prevent us following it in a deviant way. So to continue the series correctly means that I am continuing in the same way—the most natural way. This enables me to be in agreement with others or with what Wittgenstein calls conforming to the 'judgement of sameness'. Now this is a contingent fact. People who do not share the same natural reactions like ours and thereby do not subscribe to our 'judgement of sameness' will take a different step, i.e. will follow different rules. But for Wittgenstein this contingency is a mere possibility. The reason is that one can neither understand such people nor can one communicate with them. For communication to be possible there must be 'agreement in judgements'. (P.I. Sec. 242) These shared judgements do not only work as the basis of communication but they also make such activities like calculating and inferring possible. These shared judgements are not conventions of the logical positivists. They are, on the other hand, regarded by Wittgenstein to be the fact of our natural history, i.e. while we follow a rule, for example, the + 2 series, we agree to take certain steps. This agreement is not based on convention because it is not an 'agreement in opinions but in forms of life'. (P.I. Sec. 241) This shows that there is an universality involved in such agreements. We agree to behave in

certain ways because we find that they are the natural reactions which we share with others as human beings.

The third argument is about the justification of following a rule. The precise nature of the problem is: what justification is there when I write 1002 right after 1000? To say that there is an universal agreement does not justify the procedure. Unless proved we can always imagine that this so-called universal agreement over the following of a rule is wrong. In his reply Wittgenstein rejects this sceptical objection and says that 'to use a word without a justification does not mean to use it wrongfully'. (RFM, V, Sec. 33) This is where empiricist justification fails right away. The rule to which we appeal to decide whether a particular calculation is right cannot itself be questioned, since it cannot be justified. But is this enough to make the sceptics silent? The reason is that even after all these arguments were given the sceptics can still doubt. To this Wittgenstein offers a novel answer to which we shall now turn.

Scepticism and Rule-following

'Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obvious nonsense if it tries to doubt where no question can be asked.' (NB 44) This remark of Wittgenstein can indeed be the guideline that helps us to show the futility of the sceptics' position. In the context of the present inquiry there are two important sceptical questions which may be specially identified.

First: Hilbert's question: How can I be certain that the axioms of a system do not contain a hidden contradiction?

Second: Kripke's question: How can I know whether my current use of the word (e.g. plus) coheres with what I previously meant by it?

Hilbert's Solution

Hilbert's basic philosophical position is that all mathematical truths must be justified. This philosophical or epistemological belief led Hilbert to think of a procedure that can render mathematics free of all doubts. To this effect he, therefore, starts by assuming that there are certain basic mathematical truths which are intuitively self-evident. However, it is obvious that all of mathematics cannot be grasped within the framework of those intuitively self-evident truths. The trouble occurs when we come to higher mathematics, which denies those intuitive procedures. Hence, for the non-finitary propositions of higher mathematics we cannot know their truth without proof. However a problem remains, as Hilbert points out. We cannot have faith in the truth of a proof unless we can justify it. This leads him to think of a mathematical proof that alone can establish the reliability of a formal proof. Hence, in Hilbert's proposal, in order to know the truth of a non-finitary formula we require both a proof of the theorems and a consistency proof of the system.

This, of course, is not the last step. His final attempt is to show how the consistency proof can be understood in finitary terms. The consistency proof is thus able to provide the justification for higher mathematics.

Kripke's Solution

In Kripke's reading, Wittgenstein raises a sceptical doubt and also offers a solution to it framed in terms of a community of language users. 'Our community can assert of any individual that he follows a rule if he passes the test for rule-following applied to any member of the community'.[19] Thus the statement 'Jones is following rule R' does not satisfy any truth conditions because there is no fact in the matter; but on the contrary it satisfies justification or assertability conditions. The purpose of justification condition is to show the circumstances under which we are allowed to make a given assertion. This is the essence of the communitarian model of rule following which Kripke suggests in order to refute scepticism.

Wittgenstein's Reply

In his reply to Hilbert's doubt, Wittgenstein concentrates mainly on the philosophical presuppositions of Hilbert's programme. We should note that Wittgenstein's worry is not with the technical accuracy of consistency proof but with the philosophical motivation that works behind this proof. With this view in mind Wittgenstein examines the grammar of such concepts like *justification* and *reliability* in mathematics.

Like in other places, here too Wittgenstein undertakes a grammatical investigation into the problem. As against the sceptics Wittgenstein claims that mathematical truths are necessarily true by virtue of their logical grammar. Philosophers have failed to see the logical grammar of necessary propositions, viz. what it is for a proposition to be necessary. The ontological and epistemological problems of necessity are subsidiary to grammatical inquiry. If one can settle the grammatical question the ontological and the epistemological problems will no longer trouble us. The grammatical inquiry shows that mathematical propositions being descriptions of reality are rules of grammar or norms of representation. They determine the use of mathematical concepts. In view of the thesis that mathematical propositions are rules of grammar Hilbert's scepticism does not seem to have much ground. His failure is that he could not distinguish between the certainty of a normative system and certainly that is associated with empirical science.

Wittgenstein made it absolutely clear that the concept of a hidden contradiction—the central concern of the sceptics—is not a meaningful concern. The reason is the idea of a hidden contradiction is unintelligible. We do not know what it means when someone says that there is a contradiction but he does not know it and it may be discovered some time in the future. Wittgenstein denies this whole possibility of having a hidden contradiction on the

simple ground that the existence of such a possibility carries no sense. We can talk of a contradiction only when we know that there is a method that can detect it, just as, 'we can ask a question only when we know that there is a method for answering'. (WVC, R, 127-8) This situation can be compared to a parallel situation where I say I have overlooked a contradiction. I can say that I have overlooked a contradiction only on the basis of scrutinizing the rules that enable me to discover this omission. But I cannot, on the other hand, say that I have scrutinized the rules and yet overlooked the contradiction. To speak of such a possibility makes no sense because the grammar of the word 'scrutinize' does not allow such a situation. This point relates to Wittgenstein's notion of surveyability of rules. (WVC) Hilbert's mistake is that he thought that one could survey the rules of a system. Yet it is possible that he has overlooked a contradiction. This means that surveyability, for Hilbert, is a matter of our perceptual ability where the possibility of such an oversight is always assumed. This expresses the traditional epistemological standpoint. But surveyability, on the other hand, is a grammatical notion which says that if a question is surveyable there must be a method to answer it.

In the recent anti-realist interpretation of later Wittgenstein, the notion of surveyability has been viewed in purely epistemological terms. Surveyability is thus meant to be a matter of our ability to recognize or grasp a string of symbols as being meaningful. Accordingly, the meaning of a sentence cannot transcend our verificational ability and hence cannot go beyond what we cannot comprehend. That which cannot be grasped is something unanswerable, unsurveyable and, therefore, does not have any meaning. The basic point is that the surveyability/unsurveyability question is framed in the light of our recognitional capacity and this capacity varies as our perceptual ability varies.

Wittgenstein, of course, will readily accept that a significant sentence must be graspable but he will not subscribe to this on an epistemological consideration. An expression is meaningful on the consideration of its logical grammar. One of the most important thrusts of later Wittgenstein beginning from *Philosophical Remark* is that the meaning of a sentence cannot be decided in isolation. As he claims, sentences describing colour such as 'x is red', 'x is green', 'x is blue' and so on do not correspond to independent states of affairs. They are intrinsically connected to one another as possible alternatives. These sentences are logically connected with others and thus form a system of sentences (*Satzsystem*). Hence the meaning of a sentence is decided by the grammar of a *Satzsystem* and this is in no way connected with our perceptual capability. When Wittgenstein says that the concept of infinity transcends our power of comprehension, he does not take it to be a perceptual or verificational problem. For him, it is a logical problem—a problem to be decided by grammar.

Finally, when we come to Kripke we do not have much to say. Kripke's

construal of sceptical doubt is a misguided attempt.[20] Wittgenstein will neither accept a sceptical argument nor will he try to offer any solution. The rationale behind communitarian model is that it is able to offer justification for rule-following. But their idea of justification can be criticized from the point of view of autonomy of rules.

It is true that rule-following is a social activity, public behaviour where the question of following a rule privately does not arise. But this cannot be construed as a justification for rule-following. Social nature is only the consequence of rule-following. Rule-following, so conceived, is something that is given and, therefore, 'when I obey a rule I do not choose. I obey rule blindly'. (P.I., Sec. 218) The institution of rule-following is not a derivative concept; it is something basic to our thought and life—a part and parcel of our form of life. Hence in view of its constitutive nature nothing can be cited as a justification for rule-following.

The Concluding Note

The main contention of the present paper is to explore Wittgenstein's idea that the notion of mathematical necessity can best be understood by studying what constitutes the grammar of mathematical propositions. This is really to evoke what has been termed as the grammatical perspective on necessity—the perspective that Wittgenstein himself assumes in philosophy of mathematics. To this effect, this paper draws the three following conclusions:

First: The study of the grammar of mathematical propositions shows that Platonism in mathematics does not offer a correct perspective on mathematical necessity.

Second: The grammatical perspective on mathematical necessity does not assume conventionalism. Wittgenstein's idea of the autonomy of rules carefully avoids the misleading belief that rules are arbitrary conventions.

Third: The grammar of rule-following does not allow scepticism in any form to be possible. The grammatical perspective, so defined, can indeed be claimed to be offering a new conception of mathematical necessity.

List of abbreviations

PI *Philosophical Investigation*
PG *Philosophical Grammar*
RFM *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*
WVC *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle.*

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Derrida's deconstruction of Husserl's theory of meaning

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INTRODUCTION

In this paper I propose to discuss the Husserl-Derrida controversy regarding the nature of meaning. In the first half of this paper I shall analyze Husserl's position (mainly from the first Investigation of his *Logical Investigations*), where he makes a rigid distinction between expression and indication and suggests that only signs which express something are meaningful. Signs which do not express but indicate something are not meaningful and hence not expressions at all. In the second half of this paper I will apply Derridean deconstruction to Husserl's theory of meaning. Following Derrida I will show that Husserl's distinction between expression and indication is not tenable. Moreover, the way Husserl makes this distinction would lead to certain inconsistencies, one of which is that meaning would turn out to be an internal monologue or talking to oneself, some sort of murmuring. In the concluding portion of this paper I will show that the theory that meaning or thinking is an internal monologue or talking to oneself would give rise to certain misconceptions about the nature of meaning. This soliloquy theory of meaning cannot render proper justice to the concept of thinking or meaning.

ANALYSIS OF HUSSERL'S POSITION

Let us start with Husserl's analysis. Husserl starts the first chapter of first Investigation (of his *Logical Investigations*) by making us aware of the ambiguity in the term 'sign'. 'Every sign is a sign for something, but not every sign has "meaning", a "sense" that the sign "expresses" '.[1] To be a sign is to be a sign of something.

A sign always points to something else, of which it is a sign. So the term 'sign' always carries a reference to other than itself with it. However, this way of referring is not the same in all signs. Some signs refer to something by way of expressing a meaning, while some other signs refer by way of indicating. But from this it does not follow that expression is a species of sign, in so far as the sign indicates or signifies something. Hence, it would not be proper to say that while some signs only indicate, some others indicate and also express the meaning. For Husserl, expression and indication are 'totally different functions'.[2] The signs which indicate do not express any meaning,

while the signs which express their meanings do not possess any indicative function. The expressive and indicative functions are mutually exclusive of each other. Thus it seems to me that, for Husserl, there are two types of signs: (*a*) signs that indicate or point out, which he later calls 'marks', and (*b*) signs which express meanings.

One of the reasons for distinguishing these two types of signs is that '*Expressions* function meaningfully even in *isolated mental life, where they no* longer serve to indicate anything'.[3] Husserl thinks that signs (by 'signs' here he means words) express meaning even when the speaker uses those signs not in order to communicate with others but in his/her internal monologue, in his/her talking to himself/herself. However, in this talking to oneself, signs do not indicate anything, the indicative function of the sign ceases to act.

But why not does the sign indicate anything when it is used in soliloquy? In order to get an answer to this question, we have to understand Husserl's notion of indication.

Husserl discusses two types of indication: (*a*) Mark and (*b*) Indication which 'extends more widely than that of a mark'.[4] A flag is the sign of a country in the sense of a mark which helps us to recognize the country to which that flag is attached. For example, in a meeting of Commonwealth countries where representatives of different countries are sitting around the table, each representative has his/her own country's flag in front of his/her table, which helps us to recognize the country which he/she represents. Thus the flag indicates the country, of which it is a mark.

But there are indications which are something more than a mark. Husserl gives us the examples of scientific hypotheses which belong to this group. Canals on planet Mars are the signs of or indications of intelligent beings on Mars. The way the flag is a mark of the country is different from the way the canals on planet Mars are the signs of intelligent beings. Mere marks do not require any insight into the connection between the mark and that of which it is a mark. In order to know that this particular flag belongs to Canada, one does not need to know the history of the flag, the significance of the different colours and symbols printed on the flag, etc. But on the other hand, knowledge of canals on Mars indicating the presence of intelligent beings on that planet requires a sufficient insight into the relevant scientific truths.

Moreover, as a mere mark there is no rational necessity between the mark and that of which it is a mark. There is no logical necessity between Canada as a country and its flag having a maple leaf imprinted on it. Canada might have a different flag with a different symbol. But when we say that the canals on Mars indicate the presence of intelligent inhabitants there, there is some sort of rational necessity between the two. Theoretically the presence of the one demands the presence of the other. We can say that the flag 'points to' the country of which it is the flag, whereas the presence of canals 'proves that'[5] there are intelligent beings on Mars. Therefore, the function of indication as a mere mark is the function of 'pointing to', but the function of indication which extends beyond the mark is a function of 'proving that'.

But whatever the difference between these signs of 'pointing to' and 'proving that' might be,

> In these we discover as a common circumstance the fact that certain objects or states of affairs *of whose reality someone has actual knowledge* indicate to him *the reality of certain other objects or states of affairs,* in the state that *his belief in the reality of the one is experienced* (though not all evidently) *as motivating a belief or surmise in the reality of the other.*[6]

From this remark, it is clear that for Husserl, both the functions of 'pointing to' and 'proving that' motivate us to jump from one state of affairs to the other and the essence of indication lies in this motivation. Hence both 'pointing to' and 'proving that' belong to the indicative aspect of a sign.

So much for the indicative aspect of sign. Let us now discuss the other function of sign, viz. expression of meaning. For Husserl, the signs which we use in our speech, i.e. the spoken words, are capable of expressing meaning. Hence only the uttered words are meaningful signs, as distinct from indicating signs. Husserl excludes facial expressions and pantomimes from the region of meaningful signs.

Facial expressions and gestures are not felt by the person who produces them as 'phenomenally one with the experiences made manifest in them . . .'[7] Whereas speech is felt to be 'indistinguishable' from that which is sought to be expressed by that speech, 'genuine expressions, it may be said, are not felt to be other than what is expressed through them.'[8]

Gestures, etc., have no meaning by themselves; they function as marks or signs only in so far as they are placed in a proper situation and interpreted by the hearer. Such 'expressions', in short, have properly speaking, *no meaning*.[9] Hence, for Husserl, the only signs which express meaning is speech. Or, to put it in other words, language is the only means of expression in the sense that it is by language alone we can express meaning.

So far Husserl was maintaining a clear-cut distinction between indication and expression. But after considering the role of expression in communication, Husserl comes to think that 'all expressions in *communicative* speech function as *indications*.'[10] In communication, speech serves as the mark of the speaker's thoughts, desires, beliefs, etc. Certain mental experiences are 'intimated' to the hearer through expressions. When a speaker utters 'The table is brown', the speaker 'intimates' the hearer of his/her perceptual experience.

This notion of intimation can be understood either in a broader perspective or in a narrow sense. 'The narrower sense we may restrict to *acts which impart sense*, while the *wider* sense will cover *all* acts that a hearer may introject into a speaker on the basis of what he says (possibly because he tells us

of such acts).'[11] When the speaker utters 'The table is brown', in the narrow sense of the term 'intimation' the speaker intimates his/her act of judgement or believing. But in the wider sense of the term 'intimation', the speaker intimates many other associated beliefs, for example, that the speaker knows what a table is, that he/she knows what a brown colour is, that he/she also knows that a brown colour is a suitable predicate of the table, etc. I think that Husserl is talking about a holistic structure of beliefs. Ascription of a single belief presupposes ascription of a related set of beliefs. Thus when the speaker utters 'The table is brown', the speaker does not express only this particular belief, viz, that the table is brown; the speaker is also 'intimating' certain other associated beliefs, in the broad sense of the term 'intimation'.

Some interpreters[12] of Husserl have made a further distinction in this 'intimating function' of expressions in communicative speech. They have drawn a distinction between the 'intimated' and 'objectively apprehended'. In a perceptual statement, what is 'objectively apprehended' is not the speaker's own perceptual experience, but the corresponding state of affairs. Whereas in the statements of wish, order, question, etc., what are 'intimated' are the speaker's wishing, ordering, questioning, etc., and 'it is precisely these that are also objectively apprehended'.[13] Thus in the perceptual statements, the 'objectively apprehended' and the 'intimated' fall apart, whereas in statements of desire, question, order, etc., they become identical with each other.

This difference between 'objectively apprehended' and 'intimated' can also be explained with reference to the difference between 'pronouncing' and 'naming'. In the case of a perceptual statement, we pronounce our beliefs but name the state of affairs. But in the statements of wish, order, etc., we both pronounce and name our mental states of wishing, ordering, etc.

That these two types of statements, the perceptual statements and the statements of wish, order, belief, etc., are not equivalent, can be explained with reference to the disparity in their respective truth-values. 'I believe that the table is brown' would turn out to be false, if I do not believe that the table is brown. But even then 'The table is brown' might be true. Hence the falsity of one does not imply the falsity of the other and also the truth of the one does not entail the truth of the other.

That Husserl is very keen to keep the two functions of sign, that of indicating or being a mark of and that of expressing meaning apart, can be shown from his criticism of J.S. Mill's theory of proper names. According to Mill, the meaning of an expression lies in its connotative nature. By connotative names, he means those expressions that not only designate something but also inform us about certain qualities or attributes of the designated object. As proper names do not inform us of anything about the person referred to, but just pick the proper object out of manifold objects, proper names are non-connotative in nature and hence meaningless. Using Husserl's

terminology, we can say that, according to Mill, proper names are expressions but they do not express any meaning; they act as indicators or marks. Thus Mill's analysis of proper names seems to threaten Husserl's distinction between expression and indication.

Husserl argues against Mill's blurring the distinction between indication and expression. Husserl thinks that Mill 'confuses distinctions that should in principle be kept apart.'[14] He, of course, accepts that like every other expression proper names also act as indications in its intimating role. But 'a name, however, has an additional expressiveness to which the intimating function is merely auxiliary.'[15] Proper names, as a species of expression, intimate the 'representation' or the idea in the speaker's mind to the hearer. Proper names do not primarily refer to these representations or ideas as Mill thinks,[16] but to the represented object. In proper name, we are concerned with the object to which the name refers, and not with the idea of the object. And in its relation to the object (not to the idea of the object) the proper name is not a mere mark; it does not only indicate. It also expresses a meaning.

Moreover, in order to be a mark, it must be a mark of something existent. But the objects referred to by proper names need not exist at all. We have fictitious names in our language, which do not refer to existing people. Hence proper names cannot be regarded as mere marks. Thus Mill's distinction between connotative and non-connotative terms is really a difference between 'attributive' and 'non-attributive' names, and in that case both 'attributive' and 'non-attributive' names fall under the genus of expressions, which are meaningful. Thus Husserl thinks that Mill's theory of proper names does not actually vitiate the distinction between expression and indication.

So far we are concerned with the role of expressions in our communicative speech. Let us now turn our attention to our internal mental life. We have mentioned earlier that one of the main reasons for distinguishing indication from expression is that Husserl thinks that in our solitary internal monologue expressions continue to have meanings. But they no longer function as marks of or indications of one's own inner experiences. In soliloquy, the expression and what it points to, viz. its sense, are so intimately related that we cannot say that the one indicates the other. Husserl wants to say that our experiences, our expressions of those experiences and the senses or meanings of those expressions are so 'unified' that it is hardly possible to say that one indicates the other in the true sense of the term. Indication involves two polarities: (*i*) that which indicates, and (*ii*) that which is indicated. In internal monologue this binary division cannot be maintained. That which indicates and that which is indicated are so closely related as a result of which the function of indication ceases to be felt.

Moreover, Husserl argues, in an indication that which indicates must be perceived by us as existent. But in soliloquy 'we are in general content with

imagined rather than with actual words'.[17] Since in internal monologue we do not deal with real existent words, these words cannot serve as indications.

But I think this position would be inconsistent with Husserl's earlier position. If it is true that in soliloquy we are not dealing with actual or existent words, from this it follows that in soliloquy we are not dealing with actual or existent meanings. But in communicative speech we are dealing with real, existent meanings. This goes against Husserl's earlier position where he says that 'Expressions continue to have meanings (in solitary life) as they had before, and the same meanings as in dialogue.'[18] But, according to Husserl's later suggestion, we are no more dealing with the same meanings in monologue and dialogue.

It seems to me that one of the most important consequences of Husserl's denial of the function of indication in inner mental life would be that the essence of an expression as conveying meaning would be found in internal monologue, which in its turn would lead to the theory that meaning or thinking in its purity can be found in private thinking or soliloquy.

Derrida's Deconstruction

From the above discussion it is clear that Husserl is trying to maintain a clear-cut distinction between the two functions of sign: (*i*) Expression and (*ii*) Indication, which, according to Derrida, shows that Husserl is working within the range of the traditional metaphysics of presence. Derrida thinks that throughout his philosophical writings Husserl invites the traditional concepts of western metaphysics in order to provide a solid foundation for his phenomenology.

In Husserl and also in the traditional western metaphysics, being is interpreted as presence, and this presence manifests itself in two ways, (*i*) something which is capable of presenting itself as a present object of intuition and in this sense the objectivity of the presence is manifest, and (*ii*) something which is capable of presenting itself to itself in the immediacy of a conscious act and in this sense the subjectivity of the presence is manifest. This notion of being as presence, either in objectivity or in subjectivity, entails a series of philosophical consequences and conceptual oppositions one of which is the opposition of expression and indication. As a part of his critical project of deconstruction of Husserl's philosophy, Derrida tries to analyse different concepts, takes them apart and shows us the source of confusion and contradiction.

As a result of his long criticism against all sorts of psychologism, Husserl finds knowledge to be present in its paradigmatic form in logic and mathematics. Hence, for Husserl, language serves scientific thought, it acts in the form of logical predication with possible reference to an object. It is through language only that meaningful statements can be made, that scientific knowledge can be conveyed from one generation to another. The objectivity of

scientific knowledge becomes possible only through the expression of meaning by statements of language. This is where Husserl invokes his first 'essential distinction' of expressing a meaning and mere indication.

Derrida, applying his method of deconstruction, tries to show that this distinction is not tenable. While establishing his thesis, Derrida makes two steps. He shows (*i*) that the instances of indication involve expression of meaning, and (*ii*) that the instances of expression of meaning involve indication. Hence one cannot draw any line of demarcation between expression and indication.

We have seen earlier that Husserl defines expression as a meaningful sign. So it is the meaning which distinguishes meaningful signs from indicative signs. Indicative signs do not express any meaning, whereas expressions do convey meaning, they 'want to say' something.

But why does an expression only convey meaning? 'Expression is exteriorization'.[19] Expression of a meaning presupposes an outside, something other than the one who is expressing. Meaning is necessarily related to something other than itself. This outside then transcends itself and reaches another outside, which is another subject of consciousness. In communicative speech, this subject of consciousness is other than the subject which expresses the meaning. But 'in solitary mental life' this subject becomes identical with the subject who expresses the meaning. Hence, 'expressions as meaningful signs are a two-fold going-forth beyond itself'.[20] First, the expression transcends itself to express the meaning and then the meaning, in order to be grasped, goes beyond itself and expresses itself in some other consciousness.

We have seen that expression is an exteriorization. It 'is a voluntary exteriorization.'[21] Expression is a conscious act. Expression of meaning animates from the intention of a speaker. The speaker must be conscious of the meaning expressed by his/her expression. That is why, even if birds can say 'Good morning', they cannot claim to express the meaning of what they are expressing. The birds do not utter 'Good morning' with the 'meaning-intention'; they simulate instinctively. In expression intention is explicitly present. Utterance of a certain sound on the part of a speaker remains internal in the absence of communicative speech. Derrida thinks that the reason why Husserl attaches voluntary intention to expression is that, for Husserl, speech or oral discourse is the only place where we can primarily speak of interpretation or understanding of meaning. Meaning is what the speaker wants to say, intends to express. In this sense, speech is the primary area where we place the function of meaning. The meaning of writing is derivative of the meaning of the corresponding speech.[22]

Husserl thinks that all speech will be counted as expression (i.e. expressing meaning) even if such speech is not uttered with communicative intention. From this it follows that the physical body of speech or the physical incarnation of meaning, which constitutes the 'factual totality of speech', have

nothing to do with expression as such in its purity because they are all absent in non-communicative speech. Hence all these physical aspects of speech belong to indication.

Derrida thinks that in the field of expressive experience 'Husserl regards intentional consciousness and voluntary consciousness as synonymous.'[23] Since meaning is what the speaker intends to mean or wants to say by his/her expressions, the Husserlean notion of meaning would turn out to be a 'voluntaristic metaphysics' as Derrida calls it, which is another version of the metaphysics of presence.

In Husserl's theory, meaning is a pure presence to the speaker 'which is nothing more than a wanting-to-tell-itself proper to the presence of sense.'[24] Since facial expression, gestures or the different bodily movements which accompany our speech are not pure self-presence to the speaker, they are not felt to be 'phenomenally one' with meaning-giving expressions; they are excluded from the meaning and hence from the expression. All these visible and spatial aspects of language destroy the self-presence of meaning and hence fall outside it. 'They do not have anything to say, for they do not want to say anything.'[25]

But the question is: Can there be any language or expression which is altogether free from its spatial and visible aspects, where we can have the meaning aspect in its purity? In so far as communicative speech is concerned, the answer is no. It is impossible to communicate something through language without getting involved in some sort of facial expression or gesture. As these physical aspects of language are not pure self-presence to the speaker, Husserl kept these physical aspects out of the realm of meaning. But by applying the post-modern logic of binary opposition, Derrida tries to show that these alleged indications are also expressions; they also express meaning in so far as they are interpreted by the hearer.

It is true that these facial expressions or gestures do not possess any meaning independent of the hearer who interprets them. But do expressions also have their meaning independent of the speaker-hearer situation? Husserl could say that other than certain parts of our language, e.g. occasional expressions or metaphorical speech, the lion's share of our language possesses meaning independent of the context. But then the problem is: How can we account for the difference between the expressions uttered in a stage (in a theatrical performance) and the same expressions uttered in our real life? When, in a drama, an actor cries out 'Fire! Fire!', nobody from the spectators runs to rescue the actor, but in our real life we do so. The same expression calls for different behaviours in two situations. Thus it seems to me that no expression can possess a meaning which is absolutely independent of any context whatsoever. Language, in so far as it is a means of communication, is necessarily context-sensitive. Hence Husserl's argument that facial expressions and gestures serve merely as indication since they do not have any meaning independent of their interpretative context cannot stand the

scrutiny. For then expressions can be regarded as indications in so far as they are not context-independent. So from the context-sensitivity of language, we can show that the so-called indications, in Husserlean terminology, involve expressions and perform the meaning-bestowing acts and that the so-called expressions also involve indication; they fail to express their proper meaning or, better to say, they cease to perform a speech-act. 'For all these reasons, the distinction between indication and expression cannot rightfully be made as one between a non-linguistic and linguistic sign.'[26]

If we follow Husserl in excluding the physical aspect of speech as extrinsic to it, then we have to exclude a considerable area of speech itself as expressing meaning since 'there still remains a considerable sphere of the non-expressive within speech itself.'[27] In fact, Husserl himself agrees that all speech, in so far as engaged in communication, act as indications. Husserl admits that 'expressions were originally framed to fulfil a communicative function,'[28] and at the same time he thinks that expression is never a pure expression as long as it does not withdraw itself from its original function and acts in internal monologue, where communication is suspended.

What does, in fact, happen in a communication? The speaker produces certain sounds and he/she also wants to speak something, express something by his/her sense-giving act through those sounds. After hearing those sounds, the hearer comes to know the content of the speaker's physical or mental experiences. The sounds which the speaker makes in order to communicate are the indications of his/her experiences. Experiences are otherwise private and an unshareable property of an individual. It is through the indicative function of the sounds only, that we come to know others' experiences. This irreducible mediation of the indicative function of the sounds 'involves every expression in an indicative operation.'[29] Here again, the expression and indication of a sign intermingle with each other.

Derrida thinks that the notion of presence is very much involved in Husserl's theory. To put Husserl's argument in post-modern terminology, what distinguishes expression from indication is 'the immediate non-self-presence of the living present.'[30] The physical aspect of the speech, i.e. the facial expressions and gestures, which serve as mere indications, are not present to the intentional or voluntary consciousness of the speaker. Hence the concept of indication lies in this non-presence. The non-presence of the living present (the physical aspect of the speech) determines the indicative function of the sign, whereas pure expression will be an act of meaning which animates a speech, whose content is present to the intentional consciousness of the speaker. Thus expression of meaning is 'present to an "inner" intuition or perception.'[31] The meaning is present to the speaker in the life of a present, so that the speaker is conscious of the meaning which he/she expresses by the speech. As soon as communication starts, the non-presence of the facial expressions, gestures, etc. come into the picture and indication starts functioning. 'The relation with the other as non-presence

is thus impure expression.'[32] To get the pure expression, communication must be suspended. In non-communicative solitary mental life, we get the ideal meaning as the pure presence, whereas in communicative speech, the ideal meaning being actually uttered involves itself in the non-presence of the physical aspect of speech and thus becomes impure.

In order to show that indication does not function in the solitary mental life, Husserl makes a distinction between two types of reference, (i) reference as showing (*Hinzeigen*), and (ii) reference as indication (*Anzeigen*). Husserl thinks that in soliloquy even if the words refer, they refer not as indication but as showing. In monologue, the reference of a word is so intimately related to the speaker or 'intrinsically indifferent' from the speaker's own experience, that the passage from the expression to its sense is no longer an indication. Indication would be quite purposeless there, 'for the acts in question are themselves experienced by us at that very moment.'[33]

Conclusion

From the above discussion it is clear that Husserl finds the essence of expression *qua* expression in internal monologue. The essence of expression is its meaning function and this meaning function can be found in its purity in soliloquy. Husserl thereby reduces meaning to the fantasized inner speech or 'voice' as Derrida calls it, which is immediately present to the speaker in his/her solitary mental life.

Some commentators, however, have tried to rescue Husserl from his solipsistic subjectivistic notion of meaning. Prof. J. N. Mohanty[34] thinks that Husserl distinguishes three different functions of expression, (i) meaning, (ii) referring, and (iii) announcing. In communicative speech, all these three functions are present. In soliloquy, the speaker and the hearer being identical, the announcing function is redundant and hence falls away. However, both meaning and referring functions are present in soliloquy. Prof. Mohanty thinks that even in internal monologue, the 'speech refers to the world'.[35] For Husserl, the referring function is to be distinguished from the announcing or indicating function, because in indication, the indicating and the indicated must be believed to be existent. But in referring, the referent of a word might very well be known to be non-existent. Like Frege, Husserl also distinguishes the referring from the meaning function. Hence Mohanty thinks that Derrida is mistaken when he takes Husserl's move of lifting meaning from communicative speech and confining it in soliloquy as an application of *epoché*, which excludes any reference to the factual world.

Even if Mohanty's analysis is correct, it seems to me that the way Husserl distinguishes expression from indication in a sign, thereby imprisoning meaning in soliloquy, is not at all justified. Even Mohanty himself agrees that 'Husserl's abstracting from communicative speech was an unnecessary, and even for his own purposes, a misleading move'.[36]

I shall discuss two reasons why this is a misleading move. One of the

theoretical barnacles of Husserl's notion of meaning is that in soliloquy (where expression in its purity, in meaning giving act, is found) when we talk to ourselves, actually we are conversing with ourselves. Soliloquy might mean a 'colloquy with one's alter ego'.[37] Monologue is actually a dialogue between the two aspects of the same person. If it is true that in soliloquy we express meaning, as Husserl thinks, it follows that in monologue we express meaning to ourselves, we talk to ourselves, as if there are two egos residing in the same person, one talking to another.

It seems to me that this is a confusion, which arises due to the apparent structure of the language which we use. In order to analyse soliloquy, we use the expression 'talking to oneself'. Let us concentrate on the phrase 'to oneself'. Suppose, in the dressing room of a theatre hall, the dancer dances in solitude. We might say that the dancer is dancing to herself. But can she literally be amusing or entertaining herself in the sense in which she would have entertained the spectators that evening? Can the beautiful bodily postures and physical movements, expressive of different sentiments and emotions of the human mind, be really surprising to herself? 'If these entertainers are entertaining themselves, why is there not even minimally thin cheer from their minimally thin audience?'[38] What the dancer is actually doing is rehearsing the performance which she is going to perform that evening. The term 'to' in the phrase 'dancing to herself' does not mean what it means in the phrase 'to the audience'. 'To the audience' means in front of the audience and for their entertainment, whereas 'dancing to herself' means dancing by herself or in solitude. Though 'thinly' the moves and bodily postures made during the rehearsal and those made during the evening show are the same, yet 'thickly' they are different, for they have quite different purposes. The former aims at practising while the latter aims at entertaining the spectators. Similarly, when thinking or meaning is reduced to talking to oneself, this does not mean that when I am thinking, I am talking to my 'alter ego'. I might simply be rehearsing the speech in solitude and in silence, which I am going to deliver tonight. My rehearsal would not be counted as a failure even if I hardly hear my own mutterings, but my rehearsal would surely be counted as a failure if I falter during the delivery of my speech. If 'talking to oneself' were a conversation between two persons, then I might 'be surprised, intrigued, flattered, offended, mystified or even interrupted by my own interjections',[39] which I am clearly not. When the dancer is practising, the orator is rehearsing, or the chess player is making dummy moves, all these may be called 'parasite-actions' and when all these 'parasite-actions' are performed on stage in front of spectators, the 'parasite-actions' will be turned into 'host-actions'.[40] However, the main point is that 'talking to oneself' does not mean conversing with one's 'alter ego'. Monologue and dialogue differ from each other according to their different purposes and each has its own criteria of success.

Another consequence of Husserl's 'misleading' move is that the objectivity

and communicability of meaning is destroyed. Meaning is not to be equated with any mental idea or image. Everyone's idea is uniquely owned by them. Everybody is completely shut in with his/her own ideas. We can never have any access to other persons' ideas.

But the very essence of meaning is its communicability. I cannot convey the very same idea which I have to others. But I can convey the very same meaning to others without any residue. In fact, the whole communicative process depends upon the conveyance of meanings from person to person.

Moreover, every idea has only one bearer. When both my friends and I are having a glimpse of a scenic beauty, we perceive the same objects. But the idea of scenic beauty which I form in my mind cannot be identical with that of my friend. None can share another's ideas. My ideas are uniquely owned by me.

But meaning is just the opposite. Meanings cannot be borne by a single person. 'Private meaning' is a contradiction in terms, if by 'private' it is meant that only one person owns that thought. Even disagreement among each other presupposes a vast area of shared meaning. In fact, if every meaning requires a separate bearer, then there would be no common objective science (I am taking 'science' to mean any systematic study) which we all can discuss. Then there would be no more 'the science' but 'my science', 'his science', etc.

Notes

1. E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, vol. 1, J.N. Findlay (trans.), Humanities Press, New York, 1970, p. 269.
2. J.N. Mohanty, *Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1964, p. 8.
3. E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, p. 269.
4. Ibid., p. 270.
5. J.N. Mohanty, *Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning*, p. 8.
6. E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, p. 270.
7. Ibid., p. 275.
8. J.N. Mohanty, *Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning*, p. 9.
9. E. Husserl. *Logical Investigations*, p. 275.
10. Ibid., p. 277.
11. Ibid., p. 277.
12. J.N. Mohanty, *Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning*, p. 10.
13. Ibid., p. 11.
14. E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, p. 296.
15. Ibid.
16. Mill says, 'A proper name is but an unmeaning mark which we connect in our minds with the idea of the object', in his *System of Logic*, Bk. 1, C. II, Section 5.
17. E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, p. 279.
18. Ibid., p. 278.
19. J. Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, David B. Allison (trans.), Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1973, p. 32.

20. Ibid., p. 33.
21. Ibid., p. 33.
22. Derrida differs from Husserl on this point. Derrida thinks that writing in a sense precedes speech.
23. J. Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, p. 34.
24. Ibid., p. 35.
25. Ibid., p. 35.
26. Ibid., p. 36.
27. Ibid., p. 37.
28. E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, p. 276.
29. J. Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, p. 38.
30. Ibid., p. 37.
31. Ibid., p. 40.
32. Ibid., p. 40.
33. E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, p. 280.
34. J.N. Mohanty, 'On Husserl's Theory of Meaning,' *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, vol. V, 1974, p. 240.
35. Ibid., p. 240.
36. Ibid., p 241.
37. G. Ryle, *On Thinking*, Rowman and Littlefield, New Jersey, 1979, p. 34.
38. Ibid., p. 35.
39. Ibid., p. 37.
40. Ibid., p. 38.

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5. ———, *Of Grammatology*, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, (trans.) The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1976.
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8. E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, J.N. Findlay (trans.), Humanities Press, New York, 1970.
9. John Llewelyn, *Derrida on the Threshold of Sense*, St. Martins' Press, New York, 1986.
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11. ———, 'On Husserl's Theory of Meaning', *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, vol. V, 1974, pp. 238-44.
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Home-world and foreign ethos: a phenomenological attempt to ethical problems of intercultural exchange

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In a time of more or less peaceful cooperation between nations—primarily in the field of economics—there is an undeniable comprehensive adjustment and equalization of lifestyle. This leads to a certain loss of cultural identity. In the ecological movement, there are many encouraging utterances which demand the maintenance of the manifold of species in the name of just this manifold. You may think, for example, of the manifold of biological species in the tropical rain forest. However, there is no lobby which criticizes the impoverishment and equalization of concrete life-worlds. The main-stream philosophy is quite disinterested in this theme. One important reason for this attitude might be that by equalization, some grotesque practices are vanishing, practices which disrespect elementary human rights in the name of religiously determined ethical and judical standards (Sharia, caste system, etc.).

We have to ask two questions: (1) Can we reach this pleasant outcome of equalization in another way, which has fewer unintended side-effects? (2) Are there rational reasons to stop at some point with the respective adjustment of lifestyle? Is there a concrete utility of the manifold of different life-worlds for our attempt to live morally? The question of acceptable ways for regional worlds to meet and confront one another (i.e. nations and cultures) arises anew.

In this paper I will try to work out this theme from a phenomenological point of view. I will try to utilize some of Edmund Husserl's experiments with the concepts of 'Heimwelt' (home-world) and 'Fremdwelt' (foreign world) and the related phenomena. Both terms are to be found in some Manuscripts of 1931/32 which are published in Vol. XV of the Husserliana Series.[1]

My paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, I shall explain the concepts of 'home-world' and 'foreign world'. The enlargement of home-world to the point of contact with a foreign world leads to the question: How is the specific unfamiliarity of 'foreign worlds' experienced? Could it be, that even in everyday experience within our own home-world there are prefigurations of this unfamiliarity?

In a second part entitled 'Meeting and synthesis of home-worlds' I consi-

der problems which arise out of this meeting between different home-worlds, an encounter which includes elements of acceptance. Different strategies to dissolve the experience of unfamiliarity lead us to one of the 'hard cores' of experience of 'the foreign': to unsolvable differences in forms of ethos. Husserl's experimental manuscripts reveal solutions to this conflict, which are to be taken as phenomenological models for a joining of different forms of ethos.

In the third part 'The Problem of one world and the idea of supra-nation' I try to transfer the *idea of founded knowledge* (episteme) to the conflict between home-world-bounded forms of ethos. This will lead to the *idea of supra-nation*. I then discuss some objections against Husserl's identification of this idea with European humanity. In the end, the importance of the manifold of home-worlds will be worked out. It consists not only in an aestheticism which is more or less exotic but it is a concrete condition for realizing supra-national ethics.

1. Home-world, Enlargement of Home-world and Foreign World

Husserl uses the phenomenological concept of home-world to describe certain substructures in the universal horizon of the world. Like its correlative concept foreign world, it clearly has a sociological connotation. It is used to differentiate structures in the field of what is constantly and hiddenly admitted as 'self-evident'. In the *Crisis* Husserl calls it life-world (Hua. VI, § 34).[2]

The most important characteristics of the home-world are *cognitive knowledge* and more *affective confidential familiarity* with it elements. This is a very concrete knowledge concerning aims of actions and use of objects. We 'know' about the use of things and aims of persons. (430f.) If communication is strictly limited to the inhabitants of our home-world it might appear as if our concrete surrounding is the whole world. Husserl named this a 'closed humanity'. (431) Additional conditions of familiarity and confidence are language and gestures. (220f., 224f.)

In a *narrow sense*, the home-world is the realm of personal connections in which we are born and grew up, that is, home in a literal sense.[3] It means primarily the family but in a *wider sense*, also those who communicate with us (221, also 'Heimat', cf. 205, 627f.). It is the community in which we live everyday (629). In this surrounding world (cultural environment), we know what is expected from us and what we could reasonably expect from others. We know the moral standards, the ethos.[4]

Within every home-world, there are circles of relative closeness and distance which have primarily a spatial sense but are also understandable in a personal sense. (428ff.) The different ways of closeness and distance within the home-world differ basically from 'the foreign', which is a fixed element

in the horizon of each home-world. It is a correlative idea of consciousness of companionship and could be completely vague.[5]

In one manuscript (No. 27, 429ff.) Husserl outlines the concentric enlargement of surroundings, which centres round its starting point in my lived body ('Leib'). Due to its character as a horizon, none of the surroundings could be thought of as closed universes. Each contains the essential indication of the possibility of 'ever and ever' further experiences.

An enlargement of the familiar environment could take place in different styles. If we reach an unknown area the horizon could expand in an usual *concrete analogy* without a single fracture. This analogy expects 'the unknown in mode of the known'. (430) This signifies, for example, that persons act and use things in the same way as in our home-world. And it is possible that these expectations are fulfilled. It is 'as expected'. But it may also happen that the meeting with a foreign world disappoints my expectations. It breaches this concrete analogy. This leads to a modification of horizon-intentions. In spite of concrete expectations there arises a very abstract analogy. We furthermore expect only sensibilia, human persons, grassland, wood, etc. (431f.)

Remark on the relation between home-world and life-world

Usually Husserl's investigations in home-world are regarded as directed towards the concept of life-world established in the *Crisis*. But we have to pay attention to differences between them. In the *Crisis*, life-world names the non-thematic ground of all hiddenly admitted beliefs ('Selbstverständlichkeiten'). It contains all beliefs we share commonly in *natural attitude*—even as scientists. One could therefore call life-world the correlate of natural attitude. The first level of this 'ground of all experiences' consists in immediate sensible things, which scientists use unreflected in viewing instruments. (Hua. VI, § 28ff.)[6]

The texts from Husserliana XV, on which my paper concentrates, belong to the first attempts to explicate the horizon of world. They are less interested in the founding of theoretical knowledge—as it is the case later on in the discussion of life-world in the *Crisis*—and focus more on the constitution of social (human) worlds. Within these texts, it is quite obvious, that Husserl is in search of usable concepts. At the same time, his *termini technici* reveal a much wider scope than the concept of life-world in the *Crisis*. They concern, for example, explicit discrepancies between different home-worlds and they are also usable to thematise the problems of their meeting. In contrast to this, in *Crisis* life-world is only regarded in its function as the basis of beliefs on which sciences are founded. Husserl mentions the differences between concrete life-worlds only in some rare remarks. (Hua. VI, 150, 158) Thus the concept of life-world is losing its ability to thematise problems of meeting between cultural and ethical different home-worlds.

2. What is the Experience of 'Foreignness'?

What is it that makes the above-mentioned break in the concrete analogy an experience of 'foreignness' in meeting with a foreign world? The disappointment of intentions is a regular element in our everyday experience and it usually does not lead to such an experience of feeling foreign. On the other hand there are situations within our everyday life, which alienate us from others. This might be a hint that there are prefigurations of the experience of estrangement leading to 'foreignness' *within* everyday life.

From a phenomenological point of view, everyday experience is always functioning. It is a certain style of non-conflicting interaction between concrete expectations and successive fulfilments of them. I expect real objects or events, for example, walking along a street, new houses, courtyards, fields and meadows. I know beforehand which motives could lead persons to actions.

Following Husserl's analyses in everyday experience we anticipate the yet unknown in the mode of the already known. Our concrete expectations of 'what will come' centre hierarchically around a core of concretely determined expectations (analogy: qualified target). They derive from already experienced acts and events. But these relatively concentrated expectations can be disappointed. A broad street ends in front of a barrier. A person acts in a strange way. In these cases everyday experience turns out to be very flexible: 'of course' there can be reasons why a broad street could suddenly end. Our expectations are simply expanded (analogy: next circle of the target).

It turns out that everyday experience is strongly interested in remaining 'normal'. The basic presumption 'it will go on like before' corresponds to the practical, normative attitude 'it should go on like before'. Thus it is at the same time a method of *re-creating normality*. If there is a very strange act far from our expectations, it will take very 'strong' normalizing reactions. I could understand it as eccentric or more radically as crazy. In such situations we like to say: *Your act alienates (estranges) me*. And we have the experience of alienation. The degrees of this alienation correspond to the 'strength' of normalizing reactions. Thus the first degrees of alienation are to be found in a familiar home-world. The expression of this experience in concepts of alienation and foreignness also corresponds to a *shift of attitude*: I am no longer interested in holding normality unbroken in practical personal exchange and communication. But principally alienating behaviour is open to 'normalizing' interpretation. It is possible that the person has motives of which I am not yet aware, which might be nonetheless understandable (perhaps even reasonable). It is the same situation as in meeting a foreign world.

Thus, 'the foreign' appears to be a vanishing category. It seems to us as if only the inhabitants of a small village in the Black Forest at the beginning of our century could feel as home-world-companions opposing a strange and

foreign surrounding area. Our possibilities of information dissolve ignorance as a ground of foreignity. Still, we have to ask ourselves whether there remains an unsolvable, 'hard core' of his experience, which we have not already detected.

3. Meeting and Synthesis of Home-worlds

Thus we turn back to Husserl's analysis of the exchange with foreigners (Text No. 27). In extending the home-world 'in direction of the foreign' there can be two possible events: (1) The extension of the horizon goes on without a break in the concrete analogy. People behave, gesture, speak and live 'just as expected'—this motivates us to a further pre-lineation of experience in the same way. It is only an expansion of the same environment. (2) The meeting with a foreign world breaks with our concrete analogous expectation. But the irritation caused by non-fulfilment of expectations is not only due to a singular disappointment. We meet an *unknown unity*, of which the reflection is shining in every single object.[7]

Husserl is talking neither about alien people, nor about strange deeds or things. It becomes clear that in the encounter with a foreign world we lose a certain *sense* which every object bears in the context of the unknown unity. It is a foreign *world* which we meet. I catch its world-character not by inspection of single things by myself but basically by noticing gestures of its inhabitants which show that they agree with one another—even in the way to handle obvious conflicts. But they can also agree on states of social or political affairs and on personal deeds, which I cannot append to my expectations of my own world. This usually happens to mythical, metaphysical, religious and moral beliefs. For example: We cannot consider Indian cows and rats as 'holy', as the people of this 'foreign world' can and *vice versa*. In the same way we could be alienated (estranged) by deeds, which are not understandable for us, because they are contrary to our own ethos. Nevertheless we feel and recognize them to be suitable and accepted in the foreign world.

On the other hand, in spite of the large disagreement and misunderstanding there is a *core of familiarity*, without which this foreign world could not even be experienced as a *world*. There are several possible ways to understand the origin of this familiarity and to answer the question how it might be broadened. Husserl usually sees the sensuous things as having a common givenness in every home-world. It seems to him to be a suitable root for further communication. Additionally the apprehension of other bodies as 'lived bodies' ('Leib') with a soul and ego is a possibility to overcome the alienation. A further useful way appears in everyday common procedures and practices. From this 'arc-generative' ('Urgeneratives') acting according to periodical needs there 'spreads a formal, common, understandability over nature in time and space'. (433, 435f.) Through everyday behaviour, under-

stood as deeds in favour of universal 'anthropological' necessities, our knowledge of the foreign world and the foreign sense of things is broadened. Sometimes Husserl compares this 'step by step' overcoming of estrangement with the process of cultural education ('Bildung'). The process of becoming familiar with a foreign world depends much on the already known facts like the revealing of the manifold implications of a work of art, for example, a symphony. If I arrive at a foreign world. I first take the foreign as 'different from my home-world'. The knowledge of concrete contents, which corresponds to explicit authentic understanding is only available through enlargement of the minimal information I had in the beginning. But even a detailed knowledge concerning the foreign world does not solve all problems. Long before we are looking for forms of *practical connections* we have to ask, how it is possible to *think together* our beliefs and the beliefs of this foreign world. This is the *broadest* sense of the problem of the *synthesis of home-worlds*. My home-world and its beliefs are already accepted as *being the real world* ('unsere seiende Welt'). If I meet a foreign world and its inhabitants it is first only 'the doxic world they believe in' ('ihre vermeinte Welt'). Husserl asks: 'How far can I accept their (the foreigners) beliefs in understanding them, that means, how far can I come to a synthesis of their home-world with mine.' (233f.)

By searching for a comprehensive unity which could unify concurrent and different views of the world it seems, that there is no solution possible. The agreement within a home-world does not mean universal agreement. Furthermore it is not certain, that it is just *my* world of beliefs and experiences, that stays acceptable in the synthesis of home-worlds. (234) We have to ask, whether one world with unified beliefs is possible.

Husserl reveals the strength of this conflict in a small manuscript entitled 'Home-world, foreign world, "the" world' (Hua. XV, Beilage XI, 214-18). The strangeness of foreigners is not only to be seen in the fact, that they have different experiences and a different natural surrounding. They have 'other aims in life, different beliefs of various sorts, different habits, different practical or moral behaviours, different traditionrs'. (214) They have a different *cultural world*, different *ethos*, different *metaphysical and religious beliefs*, different *myths*, etc. In their home-world, they understand 'the' world in a different way. (214, 217) Husserl asks 'what can I accept (further on), facing the differences between my and the other persons' universal experiences, universal beliefs?' (217) (We should add: and *vice versa*). Concerning the religious beliefs, he puts it even more sharply: 'If I hold on to my belief (they may take it only as mythology), then their belief is superstition, if I hold on to my being world as the real world, so their world is not being.' (217)

But in this aporetic situation something has happened, which Husserl speaks about but which he does not discuss further.[8] If I call the beliefs of the foreign world concerning *gods* and their causalities 'their mythological concepts of world' and at the same time I don't reject their beliefs, then I

have already 'modified correspondingly' ('entsprechend modifiziert', 217) *our* beliefs concerning God and his causality. Now they are '*our mythical* conception of the world'. In first place this modification concerns their *sense* ('Seinssinn'). But now there is missing the additional sentence: 'Only our belief in revealed religion is true, all others are mythical narrations', which was self-evident in my home-world before.

In the case of religious beliefs it becomes clear, that it is not only the *noematic sense* which is hit by this modification. In the meeting with the foreign world we learn, that our beliefs are only opinions, that is, *doxa*. In the contrast between the struggling beliefs we learn to see *our accepted world* as *the world, how we think it to be*, that means, we come to know the doxic character of our beliefs. The single belief in our world as being, from now on is only a *pretension for acceptance* ('Geltungsanspruch'). In this way we are able to *think together* our beliefs and the beliefs of the other world, without their non-congruence implying the falsity of the other.

If we transfer this insight to ethics, the 'bracketing', putting in parenthesis ('Einklammerung') of the pretension for acceptance ('Geltungsanspruch') of our home-worldly ethos is a necessary condition for the coexistence of incongruent moral beliefs.[9] But it is important to stress: This peace is only usable *within* and *for the sake* of theory, for example to make a cultural or historical comparison. In practical life one can never be an uninterested spectator ('uninteressierter Zuschauer'). We therefore have to think about how to use this insight to cultivate our exchange with other and different moral beliefs. It might be practicable to take it as an *accompaniment* or *shadow*, which always accompanies our moral judgements concerning a foreign world.[10] We have always to remember, that our own moral beliefs are bound to a specific home-world.

Putting our beliefs in parenthesis is an element of a so-called *dis-owning hermeneutic* (*dis-propriation*, 'enteignende Hermeneutik'), which is very often implied in a non-violent exchange of different and therefore conflicting home-worlds.[11] It does not want to reign over the foreign world or to occupy (absorb) it, not even by naming it as a deficient mode of one's own concepts. To give some examples for the widespread but not appropriate hermeneutical method: our true revealed belief versus the superstition of the foreign world, our philosophy versus their practical oriented wisdom, etc. But on the other hand it does not want to give up the *Gestalt* of one's own beliefs.

What happens in dis-propriation is no loss of 'the own' but a new functional view of 'the own' and of the foreign beliefs. In this process there is a metamorphosis of the concepts of religion, ethos, etc., to real common-concepts. Within the domain of the own home-world these concepts are usually used as a kind of collecting-concept or extensional concept. 'Cult-object' is the common name of a variety of objects, of which one knows the use within a certain religious procedure. The concepts receive a kind of equalizing

function: even a thing within the foreign world can be an object of cultus if it is used in the same function. The foreign myths are also used to explain the questions, which one's own religion answers—though differently. The not yet understood foreign beliefs ('das Fremde') become the own ('das Eigene') beliefs of the foreign world. Thus, it may be in principle something which becomes my own. The *function* of myth, of ethos and cultus as *supra-cultural common* forces opens up.

Religious beliefs are only one important field in which foreign worlds and ours can move into undissolvable struggle. In the same way, in the field of political and moral convictions, information about the other beliefs does not lead always to a common and peaceful exchange.

Thus we have to ask how we are able not only to *understand* a moral judgement, which stems from a foreign world and differs from our own beliefs, but to *accept* it. If I want to understand my own and the contradictory foreign judgement as moral judgements, I have to put in parenthesis, that the one appears to me as right, the other as wrong. This could be understood as temporary abstinence of judgement (epoché), which is thematically focused on moral judgements. In the meeting of different cultures and religions, this attitude can lead to *tolerance*. But we cannot identify tolerance with an unlimited *laissez faire*.

At the same time we can claim, that there is the possibility of *justified influence* on *each* kind of home-world bounded ethos. (Principle of constant Non-non-intervention) Or should it be a kind of imperialism to push South Africa to change its race politics? Should it not be justified in the same sense to claim the right of self-determination for women in the Islamic world? But we have to remember: for such a justified intervention there has to be a measure which is not bound to a certain home-world.

There were and are attempts to intervene between home-worldly forms of ethos. A necessary condition, for making sense of these attempts is the possibility of collective change in moral attitudes. In Europe this collective change is historically known as the Age of Enlightenment, which is still alive today. A trivial explanation for the possibility of collective change of moral attitudes accepts our ethos simply as right and reasonable and interprets the conversion of foreigners as self-clarification of reason ('the' reason = our reason). Thus we have to search for explanations, which try consciously to avoid the influence of home-world bounded moral beliefs. Such models for a change of ethos could be useful as ground for decision even after the relativizing of the home-world bounded forms of ethos.

To show the possibility of *non-home-world-bound ethics* I am now exposing a *theory of reflected moral feeling*. (But this is not the only way to reach this aim.) Let us for the argument accept that there is an *immediate experience* of acceptance or rejection of acts or state of affairs in the direct confrontation with the persons or other sensuous creatures which have to suffer the effects of deed or states of affairs. As an immediate experience it has to

avoid the influence of all 'accepted customs' and try to 'listen' to one's own felt reaction. In this way David Hume argues in his famous *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*. This moral feeling could oppose *every* accepted home-world bounded ethos, even my own.

In this simple explanatory model there is justified intervention in every form of home-world bounded ethos. The burning of witches and widows and many other forms of violence and violent suppression may have had their religious or metaphysical reasons within a home-world, but they cannot stand in the face of the *idea* of a non-home-world-bound ethos.

We can call such an unprejudiced listening to our immediate moral feeling a *Basic-decision*. It is not only characterized by diverging from the prevailing ethos, nor simply through the fact that the decision has to be justified against the community. The difference is only due to the way of deciding. The decision relies on the immediate moral feeling of acceptance or rejection. In contrast, a *Standard-decision* lies in the straightforward unreflected orientation towards the common ethos. Here one has only to recollect, 'what *one* has to do' in a certain situation.[12]

The practical reason of phenomenology is grounded in the striving for originary intuition and tries to avoid a misinterpretation by unreflected and non-thematic prejudices. The experiential basis of a Basic-decision is not a home-world definition of reason by the means of a list or a fixed hierarchy of values. Phenomenology is searching for reason by evaluating original experience. Thematizing unthematic beliefs by putting them into brackets is a well established style of phenomenological work. The *immediate experience* had to happen in a field free from home-world prejudices. To hold this state of immediate feeling one has to put the home-world standard-judgement (of the form 'one has to . . .') into parenthesis in a constant way. But it is in no way a retreat from the field of moral judgement.

One might object that this theory is too simple, and furthermore it is just *feeling*, which is to a large extent influenced by the home-world community and their standard-judgements. This objection touches most of the naïve forms of theories of moral feeling, but not in the same way critical and self-reflecting forms. The conceptual difference of Basic-Judgement and Standard-Judgement is proposed to loosen the strong connection of our feelings to the home-world-bound ethos. What appears on the first and unreflected attempt to be our emotional reaction might, in a more reflected attitude, turn out to be bound to the home-world ethos. One can think for example of our changing attitude to homosexuality. We are able to purify our immediate moral feelings by reason.

Kant's *categorical imperative* might possibly be an appropriate criteria for a non-home-world-bound ethos—if one could employ it without stepping back into that bounded ethos. The problem consists in recognizing the 'contradiction in will', which arises in imagining the common acceptance of a special rule for acting. It might have an acceptable formal-logical or mate-

rial-practical sense. The first is too strange, and we know that Kant does not like the second alternative, for we cannot decide from the effects a priori. Thus, for example, in the case of lying there remains only the idea that a common permission to lie would destroy the faith and confidence in the truth of speech, which is an important but not necessary condition for communication. Kant does not want to live in such a community and he presupposes this to be universal. Thus, if the felt inconsistency in will hints back to the standards in which I am educated, the categorical imperative is synonymous with a special historically and geographically fixed home-world-bound ethos. On the other hand Kant *wants* to outline a *universal* ethics. For example the so-called formula of 'the person as goal in itself' is not so tight as the *categorical imperative.* The felt inconsistency might also rest on a kind of a implicit 'anthropology of natural interests' (freedom, enough food, not to be injured, to be helped in need of help, etc.), with which the universalization of certain maxims may struggle. For example the hope of getting aid if I am helpless may not be consistent with a universal maxim only to act according to my own interest.[13]

Even *utilitarianism* is a possible alternative to our 'theory of reflected moral feeling'. As *hedonistic* and *stoic* ethics it tries to build up ethics 'from the roots', i.e. the fundamental needs and feelings of persons. A necessary condition for an acceptable concept would be to get rid of some strange forms of calculating the utility of deeds and states of affairs, and to stress the importance of basic human rights as *J. Rawls* did.

4. The Problem of One World and the Idea of Supra-nation

We don't have to consider the problematic meeting of different home-worlds on a principal level. We already have successful pragmatic solutions: strict *separation* of different home-worlds on the same territory (ghettos).[14] *Assimilation* one-sided or complementary leads to a compromise, in which extreme beliefs, which cause most conflicts, are taken back. Still there remains the *violent conversion.*

In the face of the difficulties in bringing about a practical synthesis in living together with the foreign world we have to ask whether it is *rational* to move towards *one united* world. One might think this question is already answered. The melting of home-worlds to one universal unity might be an unavoidable effect of the expansion of our everyday interests. One possible parameter for a demarcation of the home-world are my everyday commercial interests. The age of airplanes, therefore, could signify a break in history, which forces the earth to *one* unity. But on the other hand, the expansion of my commercial interests does not necessarily imply cultural uniformity with my business partners. Raw materials and goods can pass frontiers without a touch of the connected home-worlds. The necessary experts could

live in ghettos. One could imagine the earth consisting of strictly separated territories. If we don't want one world we don't have to have it.

One might also answer the above question with the argument that the striving of man to higher cultural forms of existence is only fulfilable in a united world. Max Scheler tries this in 1927 in a very speculative paper 'Man in the age of adjustment'.[15] He points out that it is an unavoidable task (nearly fate) to come to a global adjustment in several field (culture, wealth, education, lifestyle, . . .).

In a quite similar way Husserl argues in the famous *Vienna Lecture* (7.5.1935, Hua. VI, 314-48), where he interprets the growing together of territories into one world under the guidance of infinite Greek philosophical ideas as Europeanization ('Europäisierung'). It is the *telos* of man which is realized in this way. Husserl strongly insists on the uniqueness of the Greek creation ('Urstiftung') of philosophy. Its essential characteristics are the uninterested curiosity (*theoria* versus *praxis*) in connection with the idea of justified knowledge (*episteme*). This is the fundament to interpret every opinion about the world (*doxa*) to be only a step on the way to an ultimate justification. *Episteme* is an infinite idea.

Husserl is convinced of the absolute uniqueness of this first founding of philosophy by the Greek mind. Other 'philosophies' like Indian and Chinese are therefore not in the same sense philosophy. This might be interpreted as a sublime kind of violence by the use of definitions. For Husserl, the infinite ideas are exclusively incorporated in *European mankind.* He identifies both to an extent, that it seems to be that *all* outcomes of the European mankind are appropriate fillings of this *idea of justified knowledge and acting.* On the other hand he criticizes wrong developments in our own culture, for example the positivistic turn in sciences. Husserl interprets the prevailing global tendency to adjust to the European shape of culture as a confirmation for the appropriateness of this incarnation ('Ausfüllung'), of the *idea of justified knowledge and acting.*[16] He is convinced, that 'we Europeans' never would like to adjust to Indian or Chinese cultural ideas, 'as long as we understand ourselves correctly'. (Hua. VI, 320) As the personal conviction of Edmund Husserl we have to respect this opinion. But as cooperating in the same project of phenomenology we have to loosen this identification. To do this we go back to the concrete source of the Greek ideas and stay there 'for a while'. Episteme is a kind of supra-opinion, that is, a tool to overcome the opinions (*doxa*), which are fixed in a single subject or a single home-world community. Its concrete origin is in the mediation between conflicting claims on truth. But it is not a search for a compromise. As long as it concerns opinions of individuals in the same home-world, the main function of this idea is to push back the wrong and the unjustified opinions. It leads persons who are convinced (right or wrong) but who are without insight, to the reasonable justification. It makes them listen to reason. The function of mediation becomes difficult and challenging in the field of ethical beliefs

which belong to different and respectively coherent home-worlds. In this context each of the conflicting beliefs could be 'reasonably justified'.

It may be objected that the idea of justified knowledge in its European, enlighted version strives to dissolve critically all opinions which are not related to sensible experience and to send all mythological, religious and metaphysical arguments off the field of reasonable 'grounds'. But this presupposes that we are able to recognize all home-world bounded beliefs. Just this is to be doubted in a home-world, which takes the possible 'fillings' for infinite ideas only out of itself, because other cultures appear as weak and not 'ripe'.

In contrast to this subtle form of euro-centrism ('Eurozentrismus') we hold on to the claim of justified intervention in face of every home-world bounded ethos. In the intention to be as neutral as possible, we take an example of Catholic politics (not from Islam or Hinduism). On one side it is true that some of the roots of the modern idea of *human rights* are to be found in Christian tradition.[17] But in contrast to this appropriate instanciation of the idea we can point to the explicit rejection of all contraceptives by the Roman Catholic church. Against the background of a possible and nowadays real overcrowding of the world, we cannot accept this attempt in the same sense as non-home-world-bounded and appropriate.

The *idea of justified knowledge and acting* works (functions) in the mediation between different claims of truth on the basis of experience. In a phenomenological point of view it is the idea that in every conflict of opinions it is possible to arrive at a basic of experience which both parties will accept. Even the one who errs must be *convinced* of his being in error. In the critical mediation between different claims of moral judgements it is much more difficult to reach a common ground of experience. Each opinion can lead back to a conviction, which does not rest on experience and therefore cannot be decided on it. In this field the performance of the idea of episteme is more or less to reject metaphysical or religious grounds. In the field of ethical conflicts one could signify the *idea of justified knowledge and acting* as the *idea of supra-nation*. (The name 'supra-nation' is oriented on the meaning of *nation* as the place of birth and education, the home-world.)

The signification of *supra-nation* ('Übernationalität', Hua. VI, 336) is also to be found in Husserl. But he uses it to signify the broad coincidence between the European nations, which he interprets as a common striving to infinite ideals. Although Husserl uses the concept in a different way we have to anticipate and reject the possible identification of the *idea of supra-nation* with the factual, historical shape of Europe. This idea has no preference for special regional instanciations. Even if we could state that many of the appropriate attempts to fill the idea have their origin in Greek or Christian tradition, we cannot identify the idea with this single realization. To fulfil its genuine function, the *idea of supra-nation* has to stay at the place of its origin. It functions in the mediation between conflicting claims on truth. It

cannot orientate exclusively to *one* form of home-world, even if it is very successful and attractive. There appears the danger of a new global but provincially bound home-world.

Let us put it in a methodological way. We cannot identify an infinite idea of reason with a historically fixed mankind. Such an identification would still claim a critique of special instanciations in the name of the ideal. But it will cause a certain style in the search for possible adequate instanciations: The suggestions are limited and bound to the accidental historical process.

Finally I wish to propose a thesis on the utility of the manifold of home-worlds for the realization of the *idea of supra-nation*: We can only recognize the doxical character of our own opinions, if we are confronted with a consistent but different system of beliefs. We can only recognize our home-world-bounded and unthematised standards *as such*, by getting knowledge of a consistent and different home-world, which reveals to us the relativity of our beliefs. In this way we can see the utility of the manifold of home-worlds without trying to escape into a romantic aestheticism of an exotic sort.

Notes and References

1. All numbers in brackets are directed to Vol. XV (E. Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Dritter Teil*: 1929-35, Den Haag, 1973). If other volumes of the Husserliana-Series are cited, I will use the convention: (Hua. Vol. -Nr., Page). Some of my points are directed to an excellent paper held by Prof. Dr. Klaus Held, *Heimwelt, Fremdwelt, die eine Welt*, at a conference 'Husserl Forschung und Husserl-Ausgabe' 1988 in Leuven (in French: *Le monde natale, le monde étranger, le monde un.* In: S. IJsseling (Ed.) *Husserl-Ausgabe und Husserl-Forschung*. Phaenomenologica 115. Dordrecht 1990, S, 1-21). Comp. also E. Holenstein, *Europa und die Menschheit. Husserls kultur-philosophische Meditationen.* In: *Phänomenologie im, Widerstreit.* Ed. by Chr. Jamme u. O. Pöggeler. Frankfurt 1989, S, 40-64.

   I would like to mention gratefully the discussions with Prof. Dr. K. Held, Prof. Dr. A. Aguirre, Prof. Dr. R.A. Mall, Dr. J. Santos, U. Claaßen and M. Gajimpour which gave helpful critique on this paper. I have also to thank the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung, which I owe a research fellowship during 1991-92, and the kind support by Prof. Dr. C. Steel, Prof. Dr. R. Bernet und Prof. Dr. S. IJsseling (Leuven)
2. In Husserliana XV there are also many other concepts of world: near-world, far-away-world, world of interests, world of opinions, world of experience, cultural world, life-world etc.
3. Cf. L. Landgrebe, *Welt als phänomenologisches Problem*, in ibid., *Der Weg der Phänomenologie*, Gütersloh, 1978, S. 50.
4. Husserl takes ethical standards very rarely into account (214 f., 629). Later phenomenological approaches place the rules of personal exchange in a community much more into the foreground. Cf. the writings of L. Landgrebe, A. Schütz, N. Luhmann, B. Waldenfels, E. Holenstein and others.
5. This image of foreign persons could be directed to 'well known foreigners' for example the French, Germans, Japanese, Russians, Texans, the people from South-

Dakota, the Coloured, Hispanics, Hindus, Muslims, etc. from which we try to separate our home ('Heimat'). It is quite doubtful whether and how one could separate closeness and distance within the home-world from the foreignness ('Fremdheit') of such 'well known foreigners'.

A. Schütz has pointed out, that our knowledge concerning 'well known foreigners' usually is not appropriate and tends to provoke conflicts (Cf. A. Schütz, *The foreigner*, in *Collected Papers II. Studies in Sociological Theory*. Den Haag 1964, pp. 91-105). Home-world-bound prejudices are useful only within home-worlds (internal use). Ethnocentrism is always prepared to devalue foreign ways of life. Without the possibility to correct this opinions slightly 'well known foreigners' could become 'well known enemies'. Due to symmetry of situation this could end up in a vicious circle of violence (cf. A. Schütz, *Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World*. In: a.a.O., S. 244-48). A similar relation causes discrimination of ethnical or religious groups of a society (cf. ibid. S. 258-266).

Cf. also B. Waldenfels, *Das Zwischenreich des Dialogs. Sozial-philosophische Untersuchungen im Anschluß an Edmund Husserl*. Den Haag, 1971, S. 361ff.; *Heimat in der Fremde*, in *In den Netzen der Lebenswelt*. Frankfurt, 1985, S. 199f.; *Der Stachel des Fremden*. Frankfurt, 1990.

6. The task of revealing and describing this 'world of experience' Husserl sometimes calls 'transcendental aesthetics' (227, 234). In *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (trans. by D. Cairns, The Hague, 1969) this entails a *mundane* (i.e. without use of the epoché) but *eidetic* description of the basic *precategorical* level of experience (Hua. XVII, 256f). It is also called 'mundane ontology'. This programme is worked out in the I. Part of *Experience and Judgment* (trans. by J.S. Churchill and K Ameriks, London, 1973) and in readings on genetic logic, from which parts of this tex originate (published in *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*, Hua. XI, XIII ff.). In *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, (trans. by D. Carr, Evanston, 1970) there is the "ontology of life-world" (Hua. VI, 176f.) which should reveal in *natural attitude* an *eidetically* essential structure of the world of experience.
7. Husserl points to this unknown unity by continually using the neuter gender 'das Fremde' (432f.) and not using the masculine or feminine ('der Fremde' or 'die Fremde') or the personal plural ('die Fremden'). One could say, foreigners even 'see' the objects of their world in a different way, because they are apperceived in connection with a cultural sense ('geistiger Sinn', 433f.) which could differ from the sense in the framework of our own home-world. Usually these implications and connections are learned from childhood on by living in a community. If I try to become familiar with it, I have to go through a similar process of education. Husserl writes in manuscript A VII 9, Transc. p. 15: 'As I was educated as a child into my generative human world, if I am trying to understand the Chinese and the Chinese world, I had to be educated into this world. Living in it, I had to learn the apperceptions of this foreign world, how and in so far as it is possible . . .'.
8. 'Foreigners are there for me as facts and as subjects of factual beliefs, factual believed worlds, which I designate their mythical conceptions of the world. I designate them in this way, because I have already modified the sense of being (*Seinssinn*) of my own world, clinging essentially to my beliefs, by taking the beliefs of these other persons as valid (*Ingeltungsetzung*) within my spacious-world.' ('Die fremden Menschheiten sind für mich als Tatsachen und als Subjekte tatsächlicher überzeugungen, tatsächlich vermeinter Welten, die ich als ihre mythischen Weltvorstellungen bezeichne. Ich bezeichne sie so, weil ich schon meine Welt, im wesentlichen meine Überzeugungen festhaltend, in ihrem Seinssinn entsprechend modifiziert habe, eben durch Ingeltungsetzung dieser anderen Menschen innerhalb meiner Raumwelt, . . .', my translation, 217:20-26).

9. In the meeting with a foreign world there is to be found an everyday motive to perform a *phenomenological epoché*, although it is thematically limited to beliefs within the field of morals.
10. Comp. R.A. Mall, *Zur vergleichenden Kultur und Philosophie*, Klagenfurter Beiträge zur Technikdiskussion, Heft 49, S. 1-52, ibid.: *Die orthafte Ortlosigkeit der Hermeneutik. Zur Kritik der reduktiven Hermeneutik*. In: Widerspruch, Jg. 8 (1988), S. 38-49.
11. This expression is derived from B. Waldenfels and G. Bataille. Comp. B. Waldenfels, *Der Stachel des Fremden*. Frankfurt, 1990, S. 62ff.
12. We are living in the rules of home-world ethos since our childhood. They are constantly affirmed and honoured. There is a fixed catalogue of *do's* and *don'ts* furthermore a comprehensive casuistic.
13. An interpretation in this way is suggested by the *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, In Akademie Ausgabe Bd. IV, S. 421-24, (trans. by H. J. Paton, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. New York, 1964) and a very carefully compiled script of a lecture by I. Kant, *Eine Vorlesung über Ethik*. (first ed. by P. Menzer, Berlin: Heise 1924, trans. as *Lectures on Ethics* by L. Infield, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1981, new ed. by G. Gerhardt, Frankfurt, Fischer, 1990, S. 51-53).
14. At some occasions Husserl hints to this solution. He points out the argument, that each home-world (as mental entity) is connected with a community of persons and by means of this incorporation is individuated at a place and time (216 f.). To put it more easy: There are different home-worlds with conflicting ethical beliefs, but—thank God!—they are not at the same place.
15. M. Scheler, *Der Mensch im Zeitalter des Ausgleichs*. (5.11.27), in M. Scheler, *Späte Schriften*. Gesammelte Werke Bd. 9, Bern/München, 1976. Comp. also R. A. Mall, *Schelers Konzept der kosmopolitischen Philosophie*. In: Trierer Beiträge, Heft XI (1982) S. 1-10.
16. Klaus Held argues in a similar way in his paper on *Husserls These von der Europäisierung der Menschheit*, in: *Phänomenologie im Widerstreit*. Hrsg- Chr. Jamme u. O. Pöggeler, Frankfurt, 1989, S. 7-39.
17. Cf. K. Held, *Husserls These von der Europäisierung*, mentioned above, S. 26 f.

Metonymic reflections on Śaṁkara's concept of Brahman and Plato's Seventh Epistle

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I. What the Paper is About

Both Śaṁkara and Plato struggle hard to say something positive about the Ultimate One Reality which still resists linguisticality. *Brahma-jijñāsā*, the innermost desire to know Brahman, the non-dual one, is to Śaṁkara and to his entire philosophy what soul's desire to know the one ultimate reality, the Hen, the Agathon is to Plato and to his philosophy. Both Śaṁkara and Plato situate the one ultimate reality beyond language, logic, categories and predication. In spite of its non-availability to language, the non-dual one is not equated with bare nothing. A theory of knowledge is worked out by both to pave the way for a better understanding and grasp of it. What defies language does not thereby necessarily defy its reality.

The paper focuses here on one particular but most important aspect of this reality in relation to its availability to language and predicational judgment. Metonymy is the indubitable consciousness of the difference between the name and the named, concept and reality which induces us to take recourse to negative expressions in order to describe something which claims to be positive. The metonymic figure of speech in its ultimately metaphysical import stresses the fact that the ultimate one, though in need of expression, resists the very possibility of its expressibility through language. Thus it comes to the paradoxical situation inherent in all metaphysical teachings of this type: How to explain that which explains everything? How to say and not to say at the same time?

In the course of our metonymic reflections we shall see that the act of negation has two aspects:[1] the 'denial' aspect which rests satisfied in rejecting any referential or experiential content and the 'commitment' aspect of it which testifies to some noetic experience whose object is not really adequately available to language, logic, and predication. It is the second aspect of negation which is at work in the philosophy of Śaṁkara as well as in that of Plato. The negativity of the judgements aims at a logic of negativity without negativity. The negative descriptions of the ultimate reality are meant to draw our attention to its non-phenomenal character.

II. Śaṁkara's Concept of the Non-dual, the Nirguṇa Brahman[2]

The nature of Brahman and its relation to the human soul is one of the cen-

A part of the paper was read and discussed at the International Congress of Vedānta, April 5-8, 1990, Miami University, Ohio, USA.

tral themes of Śaṁkara's philosophy. The upaniṣadic teachings like '*tat tvam asi*'[3] (that thou art) or '*aham Brahma asmi*'[4] (I am Brahman) get special treatment in his philosophy of non-duality. The type of monism taught by Śaṁkara is non-dualistic par excellence. On the theoretical side it is the conception of the *nirguṇa* Brahman, of Brahman beyond the reach of any qualification as the ultimate reality. His central teaching is the *ātmādvaita* which is the thesis of one, universal eternal, non-dual, and self-illuminating self. The reality of this self consists in pure consciousness without a subject (*āśraya*) and an object (*viṣaya*). This consciousness alone is real. On the practical side, it is an exclusive advocacy for *jñāna-mārga*, i.e. for the metaphysical knowledge as experienced to be the sole means of release. Śaṁkara aims at an applied metaphysics.

His non-dualistic philosophy which describes the one metaphysical reality in the spirit of the upaniṣadic methodology of *neti, neti* (not this, not this) stresses over and over again the anti-nihilistic character of Brahman lest his teaching be identified with the *Mādhyamika* form of nihilism or negativism. Irrespective of Śaṁkara's rather too negative reading of the *Mādhyamika* teaching, the point to be noted in our context is that his is a positive teaching regarding the nature of Brahman clothed in negative language.

The upaniṣadic reply to the question as to what is ultimately real is not always unanimous. One of the outstanding ways to characterize Brahman was the famous *neti, neti*, and Śaṁkara took it really in a strictly literal sense and arrived thus at his concept of nirguṇa Brahman.[5]

The method which Śaṁkara uses in order to substantiate his thesis of the reality of the one universal, self-illuminating consciousness is the analysis of our common experience. The methodological principle which he sets down is not the total rejection of reason. He allows the use of reason but only as a means in the service of truth revealed in the scriptures and experienced by seers.

Śaṁkara's philosophy stands and falls by the acceptance or rejection of the criterion of reality which may be formulated as follows: What is real cannot be negated. What cannot be negated is the consciousness, because denial of consciousness presupposes the consciousness which denies. The absence of anything is conceivable except that of consciousness. Negation may be the antecedent non-existence (*prāgabhāva*) before the object comes into being. It may be subsequent non-existence (*dhvaṁsābhāva*) after the object is destroyed. Negation may as well be mutual negation of difference or absence (*anyonyābhāva*) or it may be absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*). Since the negation of consciousness is not conceivable, none of these various kinds of negations can be legitimately predicated about it. If no difference can be predicated about it and if the self-luminous, undeniable consciousness is the only reality which satisfies the criterion to be beyond negation, then things different from it are not real, cannot be real. Such a consciousness must be timeless and ubiquitous. All objects in order to be known must depend on it.[6]

The unity of consciousness which is its non-duality par excellence knows no parts within itself. The consciousness of blue and that of red does not mean a difference in consciousness but one superimposed on it by a distinction between its objects, blue and red. So also is the case with the consciousness of right and wrong, truth and falsity. Śaṁkara does claim to have established his thesis of reality as one, infinite, eternal and self-illuminating spirit against the pluralism of *Sāṁkhya*, Buddhists and *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*. No determination of such a reality is possible, for that would amount to negation, and negation, as we have seen, is not possible.

To Śaṁkara, all knowledge commonly points to a subject as well as an object. This double implication is necessary in the emergence of knowledge. The knowledge of the round square and the son of a barren woman is really verbal. Even in the case of an illusion, there is an objective counterpart which, of course, may not be common to several persons. Anything which is a fact of experience must somehow be real. It may be rationally unintelligible and to that extent false. But for Śaṁkara even the false appearance is a positive entity which defies all description, for it is somewhere in between the two categories of existence and non-existence. When he passes the judgement about the falsity of the world and the empirical individual self, he really points to this third category. Śaṁkara would rather inverse the Berkleyean formula and maintain: to be perceived is to be. When we see silver instead of shell, the error is, as he maintains in his introduction to *Vedānta-Sūtra*, a case of an illegitimate transference or *adhyāsa*. But knowing that something is false is another knowledge which then allows us the discovery of the falsity of the previous knowledge. The ignorance is the cause of this *adhyāsa*, superimposition.

Common knowledge is true so long as the identity of oneself with Brahman is not realized, as dreams are until we are awake. Śaṁkara distinguishes between three senses of being: the merely illusory (*prātibhāṣika*), the empirical (*vyāvahārika*) and the transcendental being of one, non-dual, indeterminate Brahman (*pāramārthika*). This Brahman is designated the *svarūpjñāna*, the pure consciousness in the Advaita-Vedānta of Śaṁkara. The recognition of this highest form of reality is what reveals that the world is not real (*mithyā*) and that Brahman is the only reality. Śaṁkara's epistemology prepares the way to his metaphysics which in its turn comes to an application through the constant meditation on the non-duality between Ātman and Brahman. And it is this applied metaphysics which is the religion of Śaṁkara with moral life as a necessary preliminary to experienced metaphysical knowledge.

The theistic conception of the Absolute is not the advaitic conception of Śaṁkara. For him, the theistic conception fails to solve satisfactorily the

age old problem of theodicy of reconciling the assumed goodness of God with the undeniable presence of evil in the world.[7]

To regard the Absolute of Śaṁkara as the philosophic, speculative Absolute is also not very satisfactory to him. Brahman as *saguṇa* cannot be identified with the *jīvas* or with the totality of them. The universe emerging from *saguṇa* Brahman is not identical with it. Thus, the phenomenon of *adhyāsa* prevails in the sphere of *jīvas*, the world and the *saguṇa* Brahman. It is through *māyā* that the impersonal Brahman of Śaṁkara becomes a personal God.[8] But the advaitic Brahman is what is beyond all determinations. It is for this reason that Śaṁkara describes his doctrine as a-dvaita or non-dual and not *aikya* or unitary. In the name of his *māyā*-doctrine, he pleads for *vivarta-vāda* which assumes the world to be a phenomenal appearance depending on Brahman as silver on the shell, the appearance of the snake on the rope. The doctrine of *māyā* fulfils just the very function so urgently needed, namely the function of judging the status of the world neither as really real nor fully illusory. The well-known distinction regarding the three dimensions of reality is the very ingenious way to solve or to avoid this difficulty.

The most important and perplexing question for Śaṁkara and for us remains nevertheless: What is the nature of the ultimate reality? As an infinite consciousness implied by all empirical knowledge, it is not available to empirical knowledge. When it is termed as indeterminate (*nirguṇa*), it does not amount to nothing; it only means that all that mind can think of does not really positively belong to it. Since it can never be presented as an object of knowledge, it is beyond the reach of the familiar categories of thought. Hence no direct, positive description is available.

The Absolute of Śaṁkara is not only indefinable, it is also unknowable because to be known is to be made determinate. The Absolute is also not just a speculative idea elaborated in thought and therefore only a reality in and for thought. But the fact of its unknowability does not exclude the possibility of its being realized in the sense of having a 'felt knowledge' of it.

Every negation has some positive implication, and the negative definition of Brahman does not make it a blank. The two upaniṣadic statements '*tat tvam asi*' and '*aham Brahma asmi*' must be read, interpreted and understood together. The first one points to and testifies the positive reality in us whereas the second one denies the possibility of any predication. The Absolute of Śaṁkara is, thus, something revealing itself within us. This is why his teaching cannot be regarded as agnostic. It is outside the reach of thought and reason but not outside the world of an immediate, intuitive, inner experience. This realization of Brahman is not something to be achieved; it is the ever present essential reality of one's own self to be realized through the destruction of the veil of ignorance. Its nature is self-illuminating (*svayaṁprakāśatva*) like the moon behind the clouds. The metaphor of light

which seems to be a topos inherent to human thought irrespective of culture, creed and religion is used by Śaṁkara (similar to Plato) to denote the real nature of the ultimate Reality.[9] The type of experience which Śaṁkara really refers to points to a form of experience where to realize Brahman is by being Brahman. This higher type of experience may be rare but it is not totally unfamiliar to us to feel one with all that exists beyond all differences.[10]

Saguṇa Brahman as God of religion is lower than the *nirguṇa* Brahman. God is how Brahman really appears to an ignorant person. Our religious life is full of *adhyāsas* and is sustained by very many dualistic concepts. Śaṁkara, of course, does not subscribe to the view that *saguṇa* Brahman is useless. All that he maintains is to show its inadequacy for the high goal of philosophy (*ādhyātmavidyā*). *Aparā-vidyā*, the teaching of the *saguṇa* Brahman need not be given up; it should only be practised in an attitude that this is not *para-vidyā*, the teaching of the *nirguṇa* Brahman.

We have seen that liberation for Śaṁkara is not a state to be newly obtained. It is knowing and realizing by becoming what one has ever been but forgotten. The state of final release is nothing but Brahman.[11] The moral and religious discipline which is prescribed here to realize this goal does not so much lead us to the identity of Ātman and Brahman but does dispel the obstacles concealing the truth from us. The knowledge resulting from the removal of the obstacles must be direct and intuitive (*sākṣātkāra*). It must be the name of some *anubhava*, intuitive, mystic experience which is the sole means of liberation. Moral perfection and religious acts may be conducive to such an experience but they are not the *sine qua non* of it. Only the morally corrupt and the religiously impious will not find any taste in Brahman-*jijñāsā*.

The discipline to be followed comprises two stages—one preliminary qualifying us for a serious study of Advaita, and the other is the vedāntic training proper which finally aims at self-realization. The first stage is the cultivation of detachment as taught in the *Gītā*. The latter consists of three methodical steps of *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*. The first step is the sincere study of the Upaniṣads with the assistance of a spiritual guru who has himself realized the truth. Besides the fact that the ultimate truth is to be learned from the revealed text, Śaṁkara also wants to emphasize the need of a personal intercourse with a competent teacher, here very much akin to Plato. Mere book learning does not lead us to the goal. The second step is discussing and arguing with oneself. The main aim here is to remove the doubt which might still linger (*asaṁbhāvanā*) regarding the truth learned to be the right one at the first step. This is the place where reason steps in and plays its quite important role to transform a teaching received on trust and faith into one's own true conviction. This is also the step where the autonomous thinking is at work. The last step means the constant meditation upon the identity between Ātman and Brahman. Such a practical step

of meditation is needed to dispel the diverse unconscious reassertions of old habits of thought (*viparitabhāvanā*) incompatible with what has been learned as the right teaching. To know the right teaching is not necessarily to follow it. Some other mediating step must come into play to link the two. This *nididhyāsana* should be continued till the desired intuitive mystic experience takes place. There seems to be an element of dogmatism in Śaṁkara in so far as the philosophic truth is to be known through the testimony of the Upaniṣads, but this initial dogmatism vanishes altogether when the self-same truth has to be verified by one's own living experience in the form of '*tat tvam asi*' or '*aham Brahma asmi*'.[12]

Śaṁkara's is a religion without God. His Advaitavāda is a comprehensive philosophical-metaphysical system, and its centre is the view of the ultimate Reality as One without a second. Śaṁkara steers clear between the theistic absolutism of other vedāntic schools and the nihilistic absolutism of the *Mādhyamikas*.

III. Plato's Concept of the One and the Good (Hen and Agathon) and His Epistle VII[13]

There is now a general agreement among scholars about the authenticity and overall importance of the Seventh Epistle of Plato for his entire philosophy. It is a letter containing, no doubt, Plato's political views, his connection with Athenian politics and his relations with the Dionysii and Dion. It is full of political advice written in reply to an appeal for help from Dion's friends and followers. The letter must have been completed by the end of 354 or the beginning of 353 a.C.[14]

It is generally felt that those who write dialogues do not want to come forward with their ideas directly and consequently make use of various characters in order to say or not to say what they really want to say. This seems to hold true from Plato to Hume. *The Seventh Epistle*, one of the longest, is written in the first person and portrays a Plato who seems to maintain that his main teaching remains untaught and unwritten not because he did not do it but because it cannot be done. There is a short autobiographical sketch inserted by Plato at the beginning of the epistle which shows his earnestness in matters of political principles.

The philosophical quest according to Plato is not meant for persons who stop short of going deep enough in search of the ultimate principle. It is a marvellous quest for a true lover of wisdom who is capable of soberly reasoning with himself. 'Those who are really not philosophers,' Plato writes, 'but have only a coating of opinions, like men whose bodies are tanned by the sun . . ., conclude that the task is too difficult for their powers; and rightly so, for they are not equipped for this pursuit.'[15]

Plato knew very well the taste of the tyrant whose head is full of half-understood doctrines and who, nevertheless, claims to have a full understanding of the subject. It is in this fashion that Plato spoke to Dionysius. He clearly says that he did not explain everything to him, nor did he ask for it. But it is the same Dionysius who is said to have written a book on matters Plato and he talked about. For Plato it is incredible that anyone can write a book on matters which defy being put in linguistic forms. Others have written books on such matters, but Plato is sure that they do not know what they do. Plato takes this injustice done to the highest principles of philosophy as an opportunity to have the last word on matters of ultimate philosophical principles. 'So much at least I can affirm with confidence about any who have written or proposed writing on these questions, pretending to a knowledge of the problem with which I am concerned. . . : it is impossible, in my opinion, that they have learnt anything at all about the subject. There is no way of expressing in writing about these matters, nor will there ever be one. For this knowledge is not something that can be put into words like other sciences; but after long-continued intercourse between teacher and pupil, in joint pursuit of the subject, suddenly, like light flashing forth when a fire is kindled, it is born in the soul and straightaway nourishes itself.'[16]

This is the heart of *The Seventh Epistle* in regard to the teaching of that ultimate principle of philosophy which for Plato remains his 'unwritten doctrine.'[17] Plato does not leave the matter undiscussed. He presents us with a theory of knowledge, and it is this epistemology which paves the way for learning something about the One which is beyond words. The book of Dionysius on the first and highest principle of philosophy which Plato mentioned cannot, according to him, contain an exposition of his views. The simple reason for this is that anyone who claims to know anything about these ultimate principles also knows that they cannot be expounded in writing like other knowledge. This must be the reason why Plato himself refrained from writing a book about these matters. Still they can be learned through long, sincere association between teacher and pupil. Plato condemns not only Dionysius but anyone who has written or proposes to write a book on these ultimate matters. The question which here forces itself on us is: What has then Plato done in all his *Dialogues* after all? We shall see in the course of our discussion and analysis that *The Seventh Epistle* is the key to understanding the entire structure of Plato's philosophy which is then a prelude to say what ultimately cannot be said. And the literary form of dialogue seems to be the best way to do this.

But the question still remains: How to understand Plato's own emphatic statement that he has never written anything on matters of ultimate principles? If by the first principles we understand his theory and teaching of the ideas, then clearly it hardly makes any sense, for Plato did write about the ideas in many of his *Dialogues*. There is one train of thought which rather implicitly runs in between the lines of his several *Dialogues* as the red tape, and it is this: Plato feels the need of some more ultimate doctrine to support his theory of ideas. If the ideas are ultimate principles, then the ultimate principles

referred to as beyond the reach of words in his *Seventh Epistle* are more ultimate than the ideas. The idea of the One (hen), of the Good (agaton) seems to be the ultimate source of all being, and Plato's Socrates does refuse to state it more fully. Plato's lectures on the Good in the Academy in the midst of his pupils are not available in black and white. In his later years, Plato seems to traverse on the border line between philosophy and poetry. In his *Dialogues*, he does differentiate between the philosophical wisdom and the inspired guesses of the poet. The earlier Plato wants to be a philosopher minus a poet, whereas the later Plato is a poet-philosopher or a philosopher-poet.

The later Plato takes recourse to a poetical version of the One which he thinks beyond the reach of logic and language, even dialectics. It is therefore quite certain that Plato has noetically experienced the sudden light flashing forth like a fire in his soul, and it is this lived experience, intuition in his philosophy which is more ultimate than anything we find in his *Dialogues* and other writings. We also know that the intimate association among the members of the Academy did deal with unwritten doctrines. They were unwritten and remained so, not because of the fear of divulging a secret but because of the intrinsic difficulty of adequately putting them into writing. The way to learn it is rather analogous to upaniṣadic learning.

That the words like idea and dialectic, so frequently in use in other *Dialogues* of Plato totally fail in this long *Epistle* may be taken as a device of Plato to show that the principles he is now trying to talk about lie far deeper than the ideas. *The Seventh Epistle* is less concerned with discovering the truth, a goal Plato pursued earlier, than with the teaching and the exposition of it. Thus, this letter contains a pedagogy and dialectics in the name of an epitemology. If we are to grasp the nature of any object there are three instruments to be employed: names, definitions and diagrams or images. Plato does not totally deny the usefulness of these instruments; he only discovers that they are as indispensable as defective. Every teacher experiences the difficulty he faces when he wants to present his views. The terms he uses have different connotations. The metonymic chasm between the name and the named, words and things, concepts and reality, seems to be one of the main lessons of this letter, and in an indirect way of all the Platonic *Dialogues*.

It is a constantly recurring theme in the various *Dialogues* of Plato that our ordinary language is incapable of adequately putting the ultimate matters into words. The words and concepts we use are vested with their accidental and conventional characters. Very clearly, in the 'Sophist' this is exemplified in the verb 'is' which may stand for the relation of identity as well as for a form of predication. The philosophy of language which Plato here envisages is not one which can be developed in time to meet the need of an adequate formulation; it is rather the very inherently defective nature of language not to be able to express ultimate matters adequately.

The Seventh Epistle also makes it clear that Plato certainly is in possession of an esoteric, felt knowledge, for he mentions the inadequacies and weaknesses mainly of the medium in which to impart the knowledge and not of the knowledge of the speaker as such. Of course, Plato of *The Seventh Epistle* does not deny the possibility of real knowledge, yet he is not very optimistic about his attainability. Plato's philosophy has reserved a place for dialectic as the science on the way to truth. The central teaching of the Platonic dialectic is that it is an ascent from plurality to unity, from the world of the many to that of the one. But even dialectic falls short of reaching into the heart of the ultimate principle; it rather places itself in the forecourt of the area of the One and the Good. At its best, dialectic prepares our mind for illumination; it lets us be better suited for an intuitive, noetic experience of the one Ultimate Reality. It is not so much a mystic experience than an insight which goes by the name of illumination.[18] The vision of the One, the Absolute which flashes into the mind of the seeker cannot itself be communicated. The One of Plato is more ultimate than the ideas in the 'Republic'. The One as the Ultimate is beyond the being, non-being (*epekeina te ousia*). The ultimate object of the soul's quest is the One. Plato does believe that the realization of this goal means an all-round contentment of the whole man—reason, imagination and emotion. Not everybody is in a position to experience such a complete satisfaction; it remains the privilege of the few. Everybody is not, cannot be a philosopher.

Reason does not become jobless in the philosophy of Plato even after an assessment of his *Seventh Epistle*. All that happens is the indubitable insight that the One is beyond the reach of dialectic, reason, logic and language. In 'Timaeus' Plato puts it thus: 'To discover the Maker and Father of this whole is a hard task, and when one has found him he cannot tell of him to all.'[19]

Plato though leaves it open to guess whether this 'finding him' is just beyond language or because one finds him by being him. The latter possibility would be parallel to that of Śaṁkara. It amounts to a certain 'Platonic irony, which recognizes the difficulty of penetrating to the real nature of justice, and the impossibility, having once penetrated there, of expounding the truth in anything but imperfect figure'.[20]

If we take the main teaching of this letter to be our point of departure and try to review the entire Platonic philosophy, we are forced to conclude that it is not the *Dialogues* which prepare the way for the noetic, esoteric, illuminatory sudden insight of light flashing into the soul, but it is just the other way round. The theology implied in the Platonic philosophy places the One, the Good above the God of religion, although Plato rather mythologically talks of the Maker and Father of this whole (comparable to Śaṁkara's *Īśvara*). There is no doubt, that Plato's philosophy is basically rationalistic, strikingly ethical, but in the heart of its heart thought it is mythical and esoteric.[21]

IV. Śaṁkara and Plato: Compared and Contrasted

There seems to be a technique as old as human thinking itself which tries to say what cannot be said. In other words, it is negative in so far as it emphasizes the incapacities of language. But at the same time, there is left a persistent and legitimate feeling of the difference between what is really said and what ought to have been said in order that this feeling of difference is not there.The famous technique of negative theology is one of the most important ones belonging to this paradigm.

The Hen, the One of Plato, plays a similar role in his philosophy as the non-dual consciousness in that of Śaṁkara. Of course, Śaṁkara is linguistically more negative in his definition of the Absolute than Plato, for he terms it as non-dual, *a-dvaita*.

Śaṁkara and Plato seem to deny the possibility of predication with regard to the Absolute more or less on the same ground of its being one, unique and beyond comparison. Of course, for Plato there is his copy theory which connects the phenomenal world of empirical changing things with the perfect ideas which in their turn are grounded in the One. For Śaṁkara, on the other hand, the world of empirical things and beings shows its illusory character when it is judged from the absolute point of view. Not Plato, but Śaṁkara postulates a non-dual identity between the human soul and Brahman, an identity which lies hidden and only needs to be laid bare in the intuition of the ever-present identity. If the One of Plato is understood as the not-many of the changeable empirical world then of course it comes very near to Śaṁkara's non-dual One. The One is equated here with not-two, not-three and so on.

If the real teaching of the One, as the *Seventh Epistle* amply shows, cannot be written and communicated through discursive thought, reasoning, logic and language, the question arises: Is Plato then speaking just playfully in his different *Dialogues*? Is he really not taking things solemnly and seriously? If he knew about the fundamental inexpressibility of the One, why did he write and lead astray, if not himself, then the reader of his writings? Plato seems to have realized that all that is historical betrays the character of playfulness, and the One which is beyond the reach of language, time and history defies any and every written exposition.

Śaṁkara rather than Plato presents us with better worked out methodical steps on our way towards the realization of the ever present non-duality between the human soul and Brahman. The esoteric element makes its appearance more prominently in the philosophy of Plato than in that of Śaṁkara. In the spirit of Plato's teaching we should not be bound to the shadows of the cave but get to see the reality. But this transformation needs an illuminating revelation.

Both Śaṁkara and Plato subscribe to the idea of some sort of mysticism which, of course, is not crude and allows some role for reason and discursive thinking to play.[22] They do not just sit and hope for the mystic experience

to happen. They would have been crude mystics had they really done so. Still there seems to be a very characteristic and fundamental difference between the mysticism of Śaṁkara and that of Plato. The mystic experience of *advaita-vedānta* does not really bring about any identity; it simply lets the thick clouds of superimposition vanish. Nothing remains to be rejoined or explained, for the illusory character of everything except the pure the consciousness is laid bare. The Platonic mystic, on the other hand, establishes a unity forming the whole cosmos to a harmonious organic one. There is nothing in Plato which corresponds to the concept of *māyā* in Śaṁkara. Plato traverses a path of ascent from plurality to unity; Śaṁkara from an ever present non-dual unity to a not really real plurality.

V. Concluding Remarks

Recently Derrida has critically picked out as a central theme the technique of negative theology to say something positive on something by saying that nothing positive can be said about it. Both Śaṁkara and Plato subscribe to this paradigm. Derrida asks a very simple question: *Comment ne pas parler*? In other words, he asks how to avoid speaking. We want to put the same question in our present context and try to find out what Śaṁkara and Plato really want to say or aim at with their negative technique.

If to speak negatively means that there is nothing to speak about, the troubles these philosophers take to do so is not worth even the nihilism in which they may land: That something they seem to have an intuition of is worth the trouble to express it negatively. It seems that both Śaṁkara and Plato seem committed to do it. The negative technique is used with the intention of teaching, communicating, conversing and even changing the political society, at least in case of Plato. It is Śaṁkara, not Plato who became a *sanyāsin* very early in his life and leads the life of a monk. Plato in his *Seventh Epistle* speaks about his ambition as a young man to enter public life and politics.

The question, why they do not avoid speaking by not-speaking at all can only be answered by a commitment thesis to speak about it, a commitment they feel in themselves and which they cannot avoid fulfilling even if they so desire to keep mum. There seems to be an element of inner voice which is betrayed in case they really remain silent. The further question which is of interest here is: Where does this commitment come from? Is it something noetic, transcendental or something transcendent? If it be something transcendent and if the acceptance of this transcendence is a sine qua non for the intuition of it, then, of course, it is not far from an ontology or theology. The identity of Ātman and Brahman is something noetic without its being arbitrarily subjective. Both, Śaṁkara and Plato seem to subscribe some form of mystic philosophy as a way of life (over and above the philosophy as a way of thought) which steers clear between a purely speculative philosophy

of the Absolute *à la* Hegel and a mystic theology which still leaves room for acts of faith and prayer. The question of a religious faith and an attitude of prayer are, of course, foreign to both, Śaṁkara and Plato. Both of them seem to plead for a *jñāna-mārg*, but with a difference.

From what has been said above about the One of Plato and the nirguṇa Brahman of Śaṁkara, it follows that the negative description does not mean nothing, and negation is not its own telos. Since it is something which is not available to positive description, and since it is also not something just to be recognized on grounds of faith, the act of negation, of some noetically felt and intended negation to speak about the unspeakable seems to fulfil some intention in and through this very act without thereby necessarily thinking of the ultimate reality as God, nature and so on. The question which then arises is: Is this Absolute then just a linguistic event? It would go against the spirit of the philosophy of Śaṁkara as well as that of Plato to relegate the ultimate principle to something which takes place only in and through language. The felt-knowledge of the Absolute is something which happens.

The pure consciousness (*śuddha-caitanya*) of Śaṁkara is the underlying reality of the world, of the actual as well as of the possible worlds. It has nothing to do with the creation of the world. In this point, Śaṁkara seems to fare better, for he does not resort to any of the allegorical, mythical explanations which Plato often mentions in his works (the myth of creation in Timaeus). Śaṁkara rather takes the bull by the horns and lets everything be dependent on Brahman but not vice versa. All the problems Plato takes the trouble to solve by bringing in the myths to play their role cease to be problems for Śaṁkara the moment the identity with Brahman is realized. the vedāntic Śaṁkarite mystic may intuite, experience, see and realize the presence of Brahman along with its identity to human soul in all beings.

In spite of striking similarities and characteristics and illuminating differences between the monistic concept of the One (Hen) of Plato and the non-dualistic Pure Consciousness of Śaṁkara, they meet to differ in their concept of the mystic vision, experience. This experience teaches Plato that unity and diversity, one and all join hands and are ultimately reconciled; it teaches Śaṁkara, on the other hand, that there is nothing with which to be reconciled and the parasitically illusory character of all appearances is done away with for all time. Irrespective of the controversy whether the world is ultimately real or illusory, the noetically mystic character of the above experience seems to be its own ground for justification, legitimacy and truth with the additional apprehension of being in the state of perfect conciliation. Plato may join in Śaṁkara's conviction that the illuminatory experience of the One without a second is of self-certifying character. Both may deny the opponent the right to dispute and contest the truth of another possessing such a knowledge of Brahman and Hen respectively even at the risk of being branded as subjectivist.

There are two Śaṁkaras as there are two Platos: the exoteric and the esoteric one. The exoteric Śaṁkara in his hermeneutic of Indian thinking very often refers to the unquestionable authority of the Śrutis and takes them to be the ground of justification and legitimization of his views. The esoteric Śaṁkara, on the contrary, refers to the intuition, noetic experience (*sākṣātkāra*) of the non-duality between Ātman and Brahman. The latter move is an antidote to his rather dogmatic view. The Plato of the Academy in deep intercourse with his pupils is the esoteric one experiencing the One (Hen) as a sudden insight of light flashing into the soul. The Plato of the *Dialogues* is the exoteric one believing in the power of dialectics and reason to reach the truth of the One and for that matter taking even the help of myths.

There seems to be an inherent irony in human quest for the Absolute. Those who have realized it cannot tell what it is really like and those who have not cannot really know what it is like. The future of Indian as well as of European philosophy seems to lie in a balanced and critical synthesis of the roles played by authority, reason, experience and self-knowledge.

Notes and References

1. I am indebted for this hint to Matilal who differentiates these two aspects of negation in his discussion of negation and the *Mādhyamika* dialectic. Cf. B. K. Matilal, 'Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar' in *Indian Philosophical Analysis*, The Hague, 1971, 162f.
2. The following exposition is based mainly on 'The Vedānta Sūtras with the Commentary by Śaṅkarācārya", tr. by George Thibaut, Sacred Books of the East, XXXIV and XXXVIII, Oxford, 1890, 1896 (VS); Die Sūtras des Vedânta Oder die Çâriraka-Mîmâṁsâ des Bâdarâyaṇa nebst dem vollständigen Commentare des Caṅkara, aus dem Sanskrit übersetzt von Paul Deussen, Leipzig, 1897.
3. Chāndogya Upaniṣad, VI, 13, 3.
4. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, I, 4, 10.
5. Cf. Radhakrishnan, S., *The Brahma Sūtra*, London, 1960; K. C. Bhattacharyya, *Studies in Vedāntism*, Calcutta, 1909.
6. Cf. VS, XXXVIII, 11, 3, 7. (*ya eva hi nirākartā tadeva tasya svarūpam.*)
7. Cf. *Vedānta-sūtra* by Bādarāyaṇa, II, 1, 34-36.
8. Cf. VS, XXXIV, XXX.
9. Cf. VS, XXXVIII, IV, 4, 3.
10. Cf. VS, XXXIV, 25, 29f.; XXXVIII, IV, 2, 14.
11. Cf. VS, XXXV, 28; XXXVIII, III, 4, 52.
12. Cf. *Vedānta Sūtra* by Bādarāyaṇa, I, 1, 2. And VS, XXXVIII, III, 2, 24.
13. The following exposition is mainly based on: *Plato's Epistles, A Translation, with Critical Essays and Notes* by G. R. Morrow, New York, 1962.
14. In his Epistle VII, Plato contrasts the impact of his written work with that of the direct and esoteric contact with his pupil in the Academy and favours the latter way to be the most adequate and the real vehicle of philosophy. Cf. U. V. Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Platon, Sein Leben und seine Werke*, Bd. II, Frankfurt a. M. 1969; J. Stenzel, *Platon der Erzieher*, Leipzig, 1928; H. Richard, *Platonica*, London 1911;

F. Egermann: *Die Platonischen* Briefe VII und VIII, Berlin, 1928; L.A. Post, *Thirteen Epistles of Plato*, Oxford, 1925; G. Hell, *Untersuchungen und Beobachtungen zu den Platonischen Briefen*, Berlin 1933.
15. *Plato's Epistles*, 340 de.
16. Ibid., 341, bcd.
17. Cf. K. Gaiser, *Platons ungeschriebene Lehre*, Stuttgart 1968.
18. Cf. J. Stenzel, 'Der Begriff der Erleuchtung bei Platon', in: *Kleine Schriften Zur griechischen Philosophie*, Darmstadt, 1956.
19. Timaeus: 28c.
20. Plato's Epistles (trans.), G. R. Morrow, 80.
21. Cf. H. J. Krämer, 'Das Problem des esoterischen Platons', in *Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles*, Heidelberg, 1959.
22. Cf. R. Otto: Mysticism East and West, New York, 1932; K. Albert: Über Platons Begriff der Philosophie, St. Augustin, 1989.

Mīmāṁsā before Jaimini: some problems in the interpretation of Śruti in the Indian tradition

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Mīmāṁsā as a school of Indian philosophy is too closely identified with Jaimini's *Mīmāṁsā Sūtra* as if there was no thinking about what the *Mīmāṁsā* dealt with before him. In a sense this is true of the other so-called schools of Indian philosophy also, even though each one of them refers in a greater or lesser degree to other thinkers before the crystallization of their position in the various *Sūtras*. Jaimini however may be considered as an exception among them, for he not only gives the '*pūrvapakṣa*' of the position he has expounded, but also gives the name of the person to whom the *pūrvapakṣa* is ascribed. The authority of Jaimini seems to have obliterated the memory of those who hold positions different from that of Jaimini.

However, there should be little difficulty in reconstructing their positions regarding the issues that Jaimini discusses in his *Mīmāṁsā Sūtra*. These may be regarded as alternative *Mīmāṁsā* positions held by *Mīmāṁsakas* other than Jaimini, and thus we may have pre-Jaimini *Mīmāṁsā* positions which were considered as legitimate or correct at least by the thinkers to whom he ascribes these positions.

These positions, however, are not about any theoretical issues regarding, say, epistemology or metaphysics. They are concerned with the procedure or the *Vidhi** according to which the Vedic *Yajña* is to be performed. *Mīmāṁsā*, it should be remembered, is not concerned, at least directly, with any theoretical issues whether in Jaimini or anyone else. Its main interest is to determine the correct procedure with which a 'Vedic *Yajña*' is to be performed and as far as it is concerned, the *mantras* and the *Brāhmaṇas* are the final authority for deciding the issues regarding the correctness of any procedure that is advocated. This is the sole task that Jaimini conceives for himself. The rest is all subsidiary. Each *siddhānta* that he propounds relates to the exact procedure with which a particular Vedic *Yajña* is to be performed, for without proper performance of the *Yajña* the desired result cannot be obtained.

* The term "Vidhi" in *Mīmāṁsā* is technically used to mean an injunction only. But as an injunction can be with regard to a procedure to be adopted or avoided and as Jaimini is primarily interested in laying down the correct procedure for the performance of the various *Yajñas* in the Vedic texts, there is little harm in using it in that extended sense also. In any case, the context should make clear the sense in which the term is being used in this paper, and it is hoped that no confusion will be generated on this account.

In fact even if the *Yajña* is performed without the desire for any specific fruit or which the *Śruti* has prescribed just for the sake of attaining merit or of warding off the undesirable consequences if it is not performed, it would not attain its purpose, unless it is performed in the proper prescribed way. In fact, in that case it cannot even be called a 'Vedic *Yajña*' in the proper sense of the word. This would, in principle, apply equally to the daily *Agnihotra*, for unless it is performed in the proper way, it is as good as not performed at all and hence cannot ward off the *pratyavāya* which it is supposed to do.

The *Yajñas* performed according to the *pūrvapakṣas* which Jaimini refutes in his *Mīmāṁsā Sūtras*, therefore, were not Vedic *Yajñas* at all, since they were not performed according to the correct procedure laid down by the *Śruti*. They obviously could not therefore have attained the results for which they were performed. The recourse to the idea of *vikalpa* or as permissible alternatives would not help as the situations in which a *vikalpa* is allowed is itself determined by the *Śruti*. In fact, if a sacred ritual is wrongly performed it may be expected to give results opposed to those than the ones for the sake of which it was done and if this is accepted for the Vedic *Yajña* then it would imply that all those *Ṛṣis* whose views Jaimini refutes did not only not get the fruit for which they performed the *Yajña* but got the opposite of that for which they had performed it. This would also apply to all those *Yajñas* which were performed to attain heaven and to which the well-known injunction *Svargakāmo Yajet* applies. One would, therefore, have to reluctantly conclude that all those *Ṛṣis* whom Jaimini refutes attained not heaven but hell by performing the *Yajña* in the wrong way.

The usual defence of many traditional Pandits confronted with such a situation has been to say that many of the *Pūrvapakṣas* which are refuted in the *Śāstra* are the *pūrvapakṣas* which have been *imagined* by the concerned thinker as a *possible* objection to what he is trying to establish and thus rendering his position more secure that it would otherwise be. This is evident from the fact that many a time they give more than one *pūrvapakṣa* and sometime even treat the *pūrvapakṣa* as a *siddhānta* and imagine possible *pūrvapakṣas* to it. Jaimini himself does so at many places.

The objection pertains to an important character of the philosophical enterprise in India where philosophy was seen essentially as a *vyāpāra* of the intellect (*Buddhi*) which consisted in establishing a position, through evidence and arguments which involved the refutation of all actual and possible objections that could be raised against that position. The Indian philosopher liked not only to imagine counter-arguments to his position and tried to refute them but also tried to imagine possible counter-evidence to what he was saying and tried to show that it did not affect his position substantially. But this is irrelevant as far as Jaimini is concerned for most of the *pūrvapakṣas* are explicitly ascribed by him by name to a particular thinker before him. They cannot, therefore, be regarded as imagined *pūrvapakṣas*. Rather, they

were the actual *pūrvapakṣas* held by particular persons who had argued that the correct procedure of performing the Vedic *Yajña* was according to the way they had interpreted the *Śruti*. And, as the dispute between Jaimini and his predecessors concerned the correct interpretation of the *Śruti* with respect to the *vidhi* which was prescribed for the various *Yajñas*, the question of animagined *pūrvapakṣa* does not arise in this case at all.

The distinction between the *Nitya* and the *Kāmya Yajñas* would also not be relevant in this context, as the *vidhi* prescribed for those *Yajñas* which can be either *Nitya* or *Kāmya*, such as the *Agnihotra* or the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* have also the same problem as regards the proper *vidhi* according to which they should be performed. As the *Nitya Yajñas* which are to be performed throughout one's life are supposed to destroy accumulated sins of last life, they would obviously not do so if performed in the wrong manner. All the earlier *ṛṣis* who performed the *Darśapūrṇamāsa* or the *Agnihotra*, according to the *vidhis* refuted by Jaimini in his *Mīmāṁsā Sūtras*, would therefore have wasted their whole life performing something which would not only not have washed away the sins of their previous life but perhaps added to them further by doing something which was not in accordance with the *Śruti* and thus violated in the opposite direction.

The problem in a sense does not arise only with respect to the thinkers before Jaimini who had argued for a particular *vidhi* concerning any of the *Yajñas* which happened to be different from that of Jaimini and which was explicitly rejected by him in the *Mīmāṁsā Sūtras*. It continues even after Jaimini, though in a minor manner. It is, for example, well-known that according to Kumārila, some of the views regarding the *vidhi* of the Vedic *Yajñas* propounded as *siddhānta* according to Śabara's understanding of Jaimini are to be treated as *pūrvapakṣa* and not *siddhānta*. But if this is true then all *Yajñas* which were performed according to the *vidhi* understood as *siddhānta* by Śabara would share the same fate as had been the case with the pre-Jaimini performers of the Vedic *Yajñas*, if we accept Jaimini's interpretation regarding the correct *vidhi* for performing these *Yajñas*. The reason why Kumārila's observations and the theoretical and practical problems it raises have not been paid sufficient attention in *Mīmāṁsā* literature may perhaps be because of the fact that, firstly, they are so few in number and, secondly, because they are confined only to one or two *Yajñas* which were not regarded as very important in the Vedic corpus by the actual performers of the Vedic *Yajñas*. Kumārila's authority in any case never surpassed Jaimini as interpreted by Śabara, particularly as far as the actual performance of the Vedic *Yajñas* was concerned.

The question of the actual authority of Jaimini as interpreted by Śabara with regard to the actual performance of the *Yajñas* is, of course, a highly debatable issue, particularly in the light of the fact that there not only are differences in the way some *Yajñas* are performed, but that as far as the actual procedure for the performance of any *Yajña* was concerned, it was the

authority of the *Yājñika* and not the Mīmāṁsaka which prevailed in such matters. Prof. Staal has reported such an incident in his book on *Agni* where he states that the *Yājñika* on being told that the texts prescribed a different procedure continued to do the things in the way he considered to be correct which, most probably, was taught to him by the teacher who had trained him in the performance of the Vedic ritual.

The question, however, is not whether the pre-Jaimini Mīmāṁsakas were correct in their interpretation of the texts which had given the various procedures for performing the Vedic *yajñas* or it was Jaimini as understood by Śabara who interpreted them correctly just as it has usually not been considered important amongst the Mīmāṁsakas whether Kumārila was correct in his contention against Śabara that what he had taken as *siddhānta* was really a *pūrvapakṣa*. The real problem is how to decide between different interpretations of a text, particularly when it is accorded the status of *Śruti*. Jaimini is rightly regarded in the tradition as being the first person who gave explicit rules for the interpretation of what he regarded as *Śruti* proper. As for the pre-Jaimini interpreters whom Jaimini had referred to in his *Mīmāṁsā Sūtra*, they are not known for having formulated any explicit rules on the basis of which they gave their interpretation of the concerned texts. As for Kumārila, he must have given some reasons for his opinion but, as far as I know, there has been no serious discussion about what he has said in this context. But even with respect to the principles formulated by Jaimini for the correct interpretation of the text, we must distinguish the principles he has formulated and the conclusions he has derived from them, as it is inconceivable that different conclusions could not be derived from the same principles. Such a situation is not entirely unknown in the Indian tradition. The *Brahma Sūtras* are a classic example of a text which has been diversely interpreted by the various *ācāryas* from Śaṁkara onwards. The principles which Jaimini has formulated with respect to the interpretation of the *Śruti* had no intrinsic relationship to the *Śruti* alone in the context of which they were developed, but had a wider relevance for the interpretation of any text whatsoever.

And that is what actually happened to the principles of interpretation formulated by Jaimini. They became the basis of legal and juristic interpretation in India, as has been shown by Kisori Lal Sarkar in his work entitled *The Mīmāṁsā Rules of Interpretation*. Even Bādarāyaṇa adopts some of the principles, particularly the one relating to the role of the context in correctly interpreting any particular statement in a text, in his work known as the *Brahma-Sūtra*. He even added some principles of his own though they are not explicitly mentioned by him as such. One such principle to which he refers in the first chapter very often may be formulated as 'All entities having the same predicates may be regarded as the same, even though they may have different names.'

The problem of the interpretation of the *Śruti* is further complicated by the fact that Jaimini considered only the *Vidhi Vākyas* or the imperative sentences to constitute the *Śruti* and all the other sentences as being essentially ancillary or subsidiary to them. But the principles themselves do not necessarily entail such a position and hence Jaimini's interpretation is influenced not only by the interpretative principles he articulates, but also by his theory of language. He sees verb as the centre of meaning in a sentence. Bādarāyaṇa, on the other hand, opts for a different theory of language. For him it is the noun which carries the central core of the meaning and, therefore, he sees the *Śruti* in a different light and, accordingly, interprets it differently. What is *arthavāda* for Jaimini becomes central to Bādarāyaṇa and what is central to Jaimini, that is *Yajña*, becomes peripheral to Bādarāyaṇa. Thus, it is not only the principles of interpretation that determine the interpretation of the *Śruti*, but also a theory of linguistic meaning which affects not only what is regarded as the central meaning of the text, but also how the rest of the corpus is to be interpreted as related to it.

The problem of the interpretation of the *Śruti* texts is, thus, bedevilled by the differences amongst the two schools of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa regarding what is to be treated as the central purport of the *Śruti* text, that is, whether their central meaning is concerned with the *Yajñas* and the *vidhis* relating to them, or the *Brahman* as the ultimate, foundational, metaphysical reality. Surprisingly, both Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa believe that the descriptive empirical statements with which the *Śruti* texts are replete have no independent sense of their own and, according to them, their meaning is to be understood only in relation to either *Yajña* or *Brahman* as the case may be. This, it may be noted, is in sharp contrast to the modern orthodox opinion regarding the Vedas which regards them as the storehouse of all empirical and transcendental knowledge.

Bādarāyaṇa's Brahman-centric interpretation of the *Śruti* based on his two interpretative principles that (1) the context should determine the meaning of the specific terms which are used in a discussion, and (2) that if the same predicates are used to characterize different entities then they should be treated not as different but as one and the same, did not however stop the diversity in the interpretations of the *Śruti* text, as is evidenced by the history of the development of Vedānta in India. In contrast, Jaimini's authority was accepted almost without question and no rival schools arose with regard to the problem of determining what is the correct *vidhi* according to which the Vedic *Yajñas* were to be performed. There is, of course, an occasional instance of a Kumārila treating what Jaimini, according to Śabara, propounded as a *siddhānta* to be really a *pūrvapakṣa*. But, as we pointed out earlier, these are rare instances and do not affect the situation substantially. The so-called Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara schools of *Mīmāṁsā* do not differ about the *vidhi* according to which the Vedic *Yajñas* were to be performed, but about other matters. But though at the theoretical level it appears to be so, at the ground

level, the situation seems to be different. It was the *yājñika* and not the *mīmāṁsaka* who determined what was to count as the correct *vidhi* in the *Yajña* which was to be performed. And as the *yājñika* tradition not only differed in different regions of India but also changed over a period of time, the correct *vidhi* of performing a *Yajña* also differed from region to region and period to period.[1]

The problem raised by the diversity of actual practice as against the theoretical unity derived from the *mīmāṁsā* text of Jaimini should have found some discussion in the *Śabara Bhāṣya* itself as even at that time it was an accepted fact that the Vedas had different *śākhās* and that each of the *śākhā* had its own *Brāhmaṇa* which presumably must have differed regarding the *vidhis* to be adopted for performing the particular *yajñas*.

In fact the problem of the Vedic *śākhās* has not been squarely faced in the context of the so-called *Śruti Prāmāṇya* of the Veda or of its alleged *apauruṣeyatva*. How can, for example, all the *śākhās* be held to be equally authentic when they differ in essential respects? The problem would arise equally whether we accept the Jaimini interpretation of the *Śruti* or the Bādarāyaṇa interpretation of the *Śruti*. However, it should be obvious that the problem is even more pressing in the case of the Jaimini interpretation of the *Śruti* as it deliberately and self-consciously confined itself to prescribing the *vidhis* for the various *yajñas* and the result one may expect from their performance alone. The *śākhās* must differ about something and in the context of what Jaimini is saying they can relevantly differ only with respect to the *vidhi* according to which the *yajñas* are to be performed. Thus each *śākhā* would have its own *vidhi* of performing the *yajñas* and would be distinguished by the others on this basis alone.

There is another problem which arises from the existence of the different *śākhās* of the Vedas which has recently been brought to my notice by Dr Mukund Lath in a personal conversation which relates to the unchangeable *śabdānupūrvī* character of the Veda, that is, the unchangeable sequence of the *varṇa* and the *śabda* in a Vedic *mantra*, for in case it is not so, it cannot be regarded as the same *mantra*. The Vedic *mantras*, on this view, are treated as consisting only of *Śabda* and *Śabda* alone. It has got nothing to do with *artha* or meaning, for in case it was the *artha* that was central to it, it could be said in a different way resulting in a different order of the word sequence, a possibility which is generally not accepted with regard to the text of the Veda.[2]

But as it is usually accepted, even by the most orthodox interpreters of the Vedas, that such an invariant sequence of the *varṇa* and the *śabda* is a characteristic only of the *mantras*, it would follow that for anyone who regards the *mantras* as alone constituting the *Veda*, they at least would have no meaning. But as hardly anyone regards the Vedas as completely meaningless, and as most traditional interpreters of the Veda subscribe to the doctrine of the invariant nature of the sequence of *śabda* and the *varṇa* in the *mantras*,

it follows that for most of them the essential part of the Veda does not lie in the *Saṁhitā* or the *mantra* portion of it, but somewhere else. For Jaimini and his followers, it lies in what are called the *Brāhamaṇas*,[3] while, for the followers of Bādarāyaṇa, it lies in what are called the *Āraṇyakas* and the *Upaniṣads*. However, as there are different *Brāhmaṇas* belonging to the different *śākhās*, the *yajña*-centric interpretation of the Veda would either have to accept a plurality among the correct *vidhis* with regard to the performance of the various *yajñas* depending upon the *śākhā* to which one belongs and the authority of the *Brāhmaṇa* which one accepts or to argue that there are no differences with regard to the correct procedure prescribed for the performance of the different *yajñas* in the different *śākhās* of the Veda and their *Brāhmaṇas*. But if the latter alternative is accepted, then the question arises as to what are the differences between the different *śākhās*, if it is held that they are not in respect of the *vidhis* according to which a *yajña* is to be performed. However, as far as I know, these two alternatives, which alone obtain in the situation created by the existence of the different *śākhās* of the Veda, have not been squarely faced in the orthodox *mīmāṁsā* tradition of Vedic interpretation.

For Bādarāyaṇa and his followers, the problem is of a different order. Firstly, they have to delimit the *Upaniṣads* whose authority as *Śruti* they would accept, as the *Upaniṣads* continued to be composed till as late as the thirteenth century. Most of the so-called major *Upaniṣads* to which Bādarāyaṇa is supposed to refer to in his *Brahma Sūtras* and on which Śaṁkara has written independent commentaries of his own, are not independent works but selections from a pre-existent text. One of them, the Īśopaniṣad is in fact a part of the Śukla Yajurveda *Saṁhitā* itself. It is not quite clear whether Bādarāyaṇa or Śaṁkara or any of their innumerable followers subscribe to the doctrine of the invariance of the *śabda* and the *varṇa* sequences of the *mantras*. But if they do, then it is obvious that they cannot treat at least the *Īśopaniṣad* as having a meaning of its own which could be explicated by writing a *bhāṣya* on it.

The problem of the interpretation of the *Śruti*, therefore, is far more complex than has usually been thought in the tradition or even in modern times. A number of preliminary questions have to be settled before the various issues relating to the interpretation of the *śruti* can even be raised. The following are, perhaps, the most important of them which demand prior consideration and decision:

1. Which, amongst the existing texts, is the corpus that shall be regarded as *Śruti* proper? In other words, shall it be the *Saṁhitās* alone or the *Saṁhitās* and the *Brāhmaṇas* or the *Saṁhitās*, the *Brāhmaṇas* and the *Āraṇyakas* or the *Saṁhitās*, the *Brāhmaṇas*, the *Āraṇyakas* and the *Upaniṣads* which are not a part of either the *Saṁhitās* or the *Brāhmaṇas* or the *Āraṇyakas* proper? In case we treat only the *Saṁhitās* as *Śrūti*, what shall we do with

the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* which has its *mantra* and *Brāhamaṇa* portions mixed up together? Shall we treat only the *mantra* portions of the *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda* as *Śrūti* proper?

2. What shall we do with the *śākhās* which have their own versions of the *Saṁhitās* and the *Brāhmaṇas*? Shall we treat them all as *Śruti* equally or only the portion common to them all? If we include the *Upaniṣads* which are not integral parts of the *Saṁhitās* or the *Brāhmaṇas* or the *Āraṇyakas*, then which of them should be excluded from the *Śruti* and on what grounds? Shall we accept the *Yajña*-centric interpretation of the Vedic Corpus, particularly when it relegates the *Saṁhitās* to a secondary status and makes *Brāhmaṇas* the central part of the Veda? But in case *Brāhmaṇas* are treated as the central part of the Veda, how can it be regarded as *apauruṣeya*? The *Brahma*-centric interpretation of Bādarāyaṇa relegates both the *Saṁhitās* and the *Brāhmaṇas* to a secondary status in the Corpus and treats all statements in the Vedic Corpus which do not concern *Brahman* directly or indirectly as meaningless. What is the status of all those statements which are neither concerned directly or indirectly with the *yajña*, or directly and indirectly with Brahman and which in many cases deal specifically with a description of some empirical state of affairs?

These issues are independent of those relating to the establishment of the correct rendering of the text by a proper collection of different manuscripts relating to them and preparing a critical edition of them for scholarly purposes.

Notes

1. For a recent example of this, see the statement of Fritz Staal, who in his *Introduction* to the volume entitled *Agni* which he edited, writes 'When the Nambudiri ritualists are told that, according to classical texts, certain rites used to be performed differently in the past, they say, "Interesting". Not for a moment would they consider changing their own ritual practice in the light of such information. They perform the ritual as they have learnt from their preceptors. It is *their* tradition.' (p. 3, Italics added)
2. It is, of course, true that Jaimini treats the view that the *mantras* have no meaning as a *pūrvapakṣa* and tries to establish the *siddhānta* that it is not so. The whole of *Adhyāya* I, pāda (II), *adhikaraṇa* (4) is concerned with this issue (*sūtras* 31-53). But as it is conceded in *sūtra* 46, that the so-called meaning of the *mantra* may be purely an *arthavāda*, and as it is primarily argued in *Adhyāya* II, pāda I, *adhikaraṇa* (6) that *mantras* are not injunctive, the verb occurring in them being merely expressive of assertion, the whole significance of *siddhānta* is completely lost. For, if *mantras* are not expressive of injunctions, then they cannot have anything to do with *dharma*, for *dharma* is supposed to consist only of *vidhi* or *niṣedha*, that is, of prescriptions and prohibitions.

   Kumārila suggests in his *Tantravārtika* that Śabara is mistaken in thinking that the *adhikaraṇa* has anything to do with *mantras*, but then he does not make clear what does the meaning of *mantras* consist in? Prabhākara, on the other hand, is fairly clear that 'From the very nature of *mantras* it is clear that they cannot be taken as injunctions being as they are entirely devoid of any kind of injunctive word; also because all *Mantras* are found to be construable,—either by direct syntactical connection or by indirect implication, with other passages which are injunctive. So if the *Mantras* themselves were to enjoin another action, there would be two actions enjoined by what is practically only "one sentence". Nor are the *Mantras* found to contain any *commendation* or *condemnation*; so they cannot be taken as *arthavāda*' either. He, of course, adds, 'with all this, however, *Mantras* cannot be regarded as absolutely meaningless or useless; forming an integral part of the Veda, they must have some useful purpose, they must have some meaning, expressing something that is needful in the acts prescribed by the injunctive passages' (*Śabara-Bhāṣya* (trans.) Gangānātha Jhā, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1973, p. 201).

   The confusion could not be compounded further. If the *mantras* are not injunctive, and do not have even any *arthavāda*, what other meaning can they have? The trouble is that the *mīmāṁsaka* is led by the inexorable logic of his position to the denial of any meaningfulness to the *mantras*, but he cannot accept the conclusion of his premises as it will render the very foundation of what he wants to build upon, meaningless.

   The debate regarding the meaninglessness of the *Saṁhitā* or the *mantra* portion of the Veda is very old. One finds various arguments for this position ascribed to Kautsa by Yāska in his *Nirukta*, and it is surprising to find that Jaimini gives no new arguments in the statement of the positions of the so-called *pūrvapakṣa* in his *Mimāṁsā Sūtras*, nor does he seem to find any new replies to them than those which Yāska had already given to Kautsa in his *Nirukta* (Lakshman Sarup, *The Nighaṇṭu and the Nirukta*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1984, p. 16 (English trans.) pp. 37-38 (Sanskrit text). But Jaimini created an insuperable difficulty for himself and his successors by opting for Śākaṭāyana's position that all nouns can be reduced to verbs, which Yāska had refuted (pp. 13-14 and p. 36). Jaimini, of course, could not have done otherwise, as he could not have maintained the *yajña*-centric interpretation of the Veda if he had done so. But he did not see that he was landing himself in a contradiction by holding to Śākaṭāyana's position and opposing Kautsa's as propounded in the *Nirukta* of Yāska. Prabhākara seems to have suggested a way out of the seemingly insoluble dilemma by suggesting that the *mantras*, though meaningless in themselves, find their use in the function they perform in the sacrificial ritual. Surprisingly, neither Jaimini nor Śabara refers to the earlier discussion of Yāska on the subject.
3. It is sometimes argued that the term '*Brāhmaṇa*' in the context of the *Mīmāṁsā* includes besides what are usually called the *Brāhmaṇas*, the *Āraṇyakas* and the *Upaniṣads* also. The *Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra* II. I. 33 seems to provide a justification for this, as it defines *Brāhmaṇa* as a residual category, that is, those which are not the *mantras*. But such a construal is basically forced, as neither the *Āraṇyakas* nor the *Upaniṣads* (or the texts known by these names) would be of much help in determining the correct *vidhi* according to which any particular *yajña* has to be performed. And, if they cannot do that, they can at best be *arthavāda* which would be of little solace to those who want to see them treated as the *Śruti*. In fact, even the stray reference to an *Upaniṣad* or an *Āraṇyaka* by Śabara would not prove much for not only a few swallows do not make a summer, but the passages quoted are bound to be of the type usually found in the texts designated as *Brāhmaṇas* for, otherwise, they will be of no use to Śabara. The fact of the matter is that the usual fourfold division of the so-called *Śruti* is not only overlapping, but has no clear-cut criteria to commend itself. The *Īśopaniṣad*, which is accepted by everybody to be an integral part of the *Śukla Yajurveda Saṁhitā*, is the clearest example of this. But there are examples galore, and the fact that the so-called believers in the authority of the *Śruti* have put up with this situation only shows how little they really believe in its authority. It is time that those who really care for the foundations of thought and culture in India re-edit the texts on the basis of criteria which are explicitly stated and rationally justified.

The concept of bliss

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There are two phrases which are used quite often in interpreting what Śaṅkara means when he says that bliss is intrinsically good or bliss is an intrinsic value: 'for its own sake' and 'in itself'. Those who use the phrase 'for its own sake' in interpreting the notion of the intrinsic value of bliss maintain that when Śaṅkara says that bliss is intrinsically good or bliss is an intrinsic value, that simply means that bliss is desired or desirable for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else. They define the notion of 'good' or 'value' in terms of 'desired' or 'desirable' and 'intrinsic' in terms of 'for its own sake'. But those who use the phrase 'in itself' in interpreting the notion of the intrinsic value of bliss, hold the view that when Śaṅkara says that bliss is intrinsically good or bliss is an intrinsic value, that simply means that bliss is an end in itself. It is not a means to some other end. They define the notion of 'good' or 'value' in terms of 'end' and 'intrinsic' in terms of 'in itself'. Sometimes both the phrases are used interchangeably and no distinction is maintained between them while interpreting and analysing the notion of the intrinsic value of bliss. The statement that 'Bliss is desired or desirable for its own sake' is interpreted to mean that it is an end in itself. Whether both the phrases have the same meaning or not, is a matter of investigation. Nonetheless, it is true that both the phrases are quite often used in interpreting and analysing what Śaṅkara means when he says that bliss is intrinsically good or bliss is an intrinsic value. So, to judge whether Śaṅkara's conception of the intrinsic value of bliss could legitimately be interpreted in terms of 'being desired or desirable for its own sake' or 'end in itself' the philosophical analysis of both the phrases is essential and that is what the present paper aims. This paper does not aim to give a historical account of the theories of bliss, nor does it trace any hitherto unknown truth about it. Rather, this paper is an analytical attempt to show that *Advaita Vedānta's* conception of bliss cannot legitimately be interpreted or defined in terms of 'being desired or desirable for its own sake' or 'end in itself'.

To begin with, let us consider the first form of interpretation in which the use of the phrase 'for its own sake' occurs. There are two forms of this interpretation. According to one, when it is maintained that bliss is intrinsically good or that bliss is an intrinsic value, it simply means that bliss is desired for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else. For one to say that bliss is desired for its own sake is to say that bliss is sought (by men) for its own sake. To be desired is to be sought. According to the other form of

interpretation, when one says that bliss is intrinsically good or bliss is an intrinsic value, what is meant is that bliss is desirable for its own sake, and not for the sake of anything else. For to say that bliss is desirable for its own sake is to say that bliss is worthy of being desired or ought to be desired for its own sake. To be desirable is to be worthy of being desired or ought to be desired. Both the forms of interpretation are, no doubt, different. That is because the expressions 'desired' and 'desirable' which occur in them have different connotations. 'Desired' is a descriptive expression. Its logical form is a form of 'is', not of 'ought'. For this reason the judgement in which its use occurs merely describes or reports as to what men actually seek or what is sought by them. It does not say anything implicitly or explicitly as to what men ought to seek or what ought to be sought by them. But in the case of the expression 'desirable' the position is just the opposite. 'Desirable' is a value expression. Its logical form is a form of 'ought', not of 'is'. Because of this, the judgement in which its use occurs merely prescribes as to what men ought to seek or what ought to be sought by them or is worthy of being desired by them. It does not say anything as to what men actually seek or what is sought by them. Since the notion of 'is sought' is logically different from the notion of 'ought to be sought', to say that bliss is desired for its own sake is not to say that bliss ought to be desired for its own sake, nor does one follow from the other. But this, however, does not mean that a thing which is desired cannot be desirable. A thing which is desired can also be desirable. Because factually, though not logically, it is quite possible that a thing which is sought may also be that which ought to sought. The expressions, 'desired' and 'desirable', even though they have different connotations and there is no logical connection between them, are yet mutually quite compatible. The use of one does not negate the use of the other. The notion of 'desired' is not opposed to the notion of 'desirable'. Desired is opposed to undesired. 'Desirable' is opposed to undesirable. Since desired is not opposed to desirable, both the expressions can legitimately be applied to one and the same thing without committing a logical mistake. So it could be said very well that bliss is not only desired but is also desirable even if there is no logical connection between them. From this point of view, both the forms of interpretation could be said to be consistent. The interpretations would have been fallacious if it were claimed that what is desired is always desirable or bliss is desirable because it is desired. But since no such claim is made by the interpreters while interpreting the notion of the intrinsic value of bliss, they cannot be charged with committing a logical mistake. But to say this is not to say that their interpretations of the intrinsic value of bliss are also correct and that the conception of the 'intrinsic value of bliss' could be interpreted and analysed properly in terms of 'being desired and/or desirable for its own sake'. Both the forms of interpretation seem to me to be incorrect for the following reasons.

The notion of the 'intrinsic value of bliss' does not necessarily involve in it the notion of 'being desired or desirable for its own sake', nor is it identical with them. If it were so, bliss would have had no goodness or value on Śaṅkara's account when no one desires it for its own sake or it is not an object of desirability to any one for its own sake. But since bliss, on Śaṅkara's account, continues to be good and valuable even if nothing else existed or no one desired it for its own sake or is not an object of desirability to anyone for its own sake, both the forms of interpretation in which an attempt is made to define the notion of the 'intrinsic value of bliss' in terms of 'being desired or desirable for its own sake' cannot be said to be correct. To say this does not mean that intrinsic goodness of bliss cannot be desired by anyone for its own sake or it cannot be the object of desirability to anyone for its own sake. The intrinsic goodness of bliss not only can be desired but also can be the object of desirability for its own sake because the notion of 'intrinsic value of bliss' is quite consistent with the notions of 'desiring' and 'desirability' in spite of that it is logically independent of and unconnected with them. Had they been inconsistent notions, the statement 'Bliss is not only desired but also is desirable for its own sake' would have had no meaning on Śaṅkara's account. But since such statement on his account is quite meaningful, the notion of 'intrinsic value of bliss' cannot be said to be inconsistent with the notions of 'desiring' and 'desirability'. This follows from Śaṅkara's notion of *mumukṣā* (the desire for *mokṣa*) itself whose object is *mokṣa* which is positively characterized as blissful in a phenomenal sense. So it can be said very well that bliss is not only desired but also is an object of desirability for its own sake without defining the former in terms of the latter. A thing which is an object of desire or desirability cannot be inconsistent with it. To say so would amount to committing a self-contradictory mistake.

For the sake of argument, if it is admitted that the interpretation or the analysis of the notion of 'intrinsic value of bliss' in terms of 'being desired and/or desirable for its own sake' is correct, it would amount to mean that bliss is not a non-relational value. It is a relational value because it derives value from its relation to something else, i.e. men to whom it is an object of desire or desirability. And that would mean that bliss cannot conceivably exist unless besides it and its being an object of desire or desirability, something else existed, i.e. men to whom it is an object of desire or desirability. But to accept this view would mean that goodness of bliss is extrinsic to it. Goodness is not its nature. And that will go against Śaṅkara's conception of bliss itself because bliss for him is a non-relational and absolute value. Its value is not conditional. It is unconditionally good. And being a non-relational, absolute, unconditional value, it continues to be good and valuable even when it is not related to men and their desires or desirability or anything else in the universe. Its goodness is non-relational and unconditional

is quite evident from Śaṅkara's conception of bliss itself. Because bliss for him conceivably exists even when nothing else is related to it. In the state of *Videhmukti* when no body is attached to *Atmā*, bliss still is conceived to have its goodness. And that is a good reason to say that the goodness of bliss does not consist in or depend upon men's existence and their desiring or desirability of it for its own sake. No men can conceivably exist and desire or a thing cannot be the object of their desire or desirability unless they possess the body. But since bliss, on Śaṅkara's account, can conceivably exist even when nobody is attached to it, the interpretation of Śaṅkara's conception of the intrinsic value of bliss in terms of 'being desired and/or desirable for its own sake' cannot be said to be correct.

Further, desiring bliss for its own sake and finding it intrinsically good are two different things. We can think of its goodness without necessarily desiring it for its own sake or prescribing that it ought to be desired for its own sake which would have not been possible if the notion of the 'intrinsic value of bliss' had been identical with the notion of 'being desired and/or desirable for its own sake' or the latter had been a part of the meaning of the former. Desiring bliss (for its own sake) itself is not bliss. The 'desire of bliss' includes in two different elements; the act of desire and bliss. Bliss is that which is desired and what is desired cannot be said to be identical with the desire of it. To say this would amount to committing a self-contradictory mistake. Similarly, the 'prescription that bliss ought to be sought' includes in it two different elements: the act of prescription and bliss. Bliss is that which ought to be sought and what ought to be sought cannot be said to be identical with the prescription of it. To say this would again amount to committing a self-contradictory mistake. Above all, bliss does not become good by our desiring or prescribing it. Bliss is conceived to have its goodness even before our desiring or prescribing it for its own sake and would have had it if we had not desired or prescribed it for its own sake. Neither desire nor desirability can be the ground of the goodness of bliss. Because the notion of 'the goodness of bliss' comes not only ontologically but also logically prior to the notion of 'desire' or 'desirability' of it, and what comes ontologically and logically prior to cannot be established on the basis of what comes later. Bliss, on Śaṅkara's account, is good not because men desire it or it is an object of desirability for its own sake. Rather it is its very nature to be such. Men desire bliss or bliss becomes an object of their desirability for its own sake, because it is conceived to be good in its nature.

There is no doubt that when it is said that bliss is desired or desirable for its own sake, it simply means that bliss is desired or desirable for the sake of bliss, and not for the sake of anything else because the use of the word 'its' in the statement 'Bliss is desired or desirable for its own sake' refers to bliss and not anything else beyond it. But this would be quite different from saying that bliss is intrinsically good. On this account, it cannot be established that the notion of the 'intrinsic value of bliss' is analysable and interpretable

in terms of 'being desired or desirable for its own sake'. The notion of the 'intrinsic goodness of bliss' does not conceptually involve in it the notion of 'desiring' or 'desirability' of it; nor does it imply them. The intrinsic goodness of bliss is conceivable without necessarily desiring it for its own sake or prescribing that it ought to be desired for its own sake. If it were not the case, there would have been no possibility of its thinking without the other. The latter does not follow from the former since there is no logical connection between them. They are logically independent notions. This, however, does not mean that they cannot be related. They can be related since relatedness is not opposed to independency. Bliss not only can be conceived to be intrinsically good but also can be said to be an object of desire or desirability without any logical error. The *advaitins* cannot be charged on this account. They would have committed a mistake if it were said that what is intrinsically good is always desired or prescribed. But since they do not say it nor do they infer it, they cannot be charged on this account. Moreover, the notion of 'is desired or desirable for the sake of bliss' involves in it a reference of something, i.e. men who desire it or for whom it is an object of desirability which the notion of 'intrinsic value of bliss' does not. As a result, the notion of 'intrinsic goodness of bliss' cannot be said to be identical with or definable in term of 'being desired or desirable for the sake of bliss'.

Let us consider the second form of interpretation in which the use of the phrase 'in itself' occurs. According to this form of interpretation, when it is said that bliss is intrinsically good or bliss is an intrinsic value, that simply means that bliss is an end in itself. So to judge whether this form of interpretation is correct or not, it is necessary that we must know what they mean when they say that bliss is an end in itself, or how they interpret the notion of 'end in itself'. If they interpret the notion of 'end' in the sense of 'that which is desired or is desirable' and the notion of 'in itself' in the sense of 'for its own sake' then to say that bliss is an end in itself would mean to say that bliss is desired or is desirable for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else. And in that case this form of interpretation would not be different from the first form of interpretation and the objections which are levelled against the first form of interpretation would equally be fatal to this form of interpretation. But if they use the phrase 'end in itself' in some other sense than the one just mentioned, then the question would arise: What is that sense in terms of which they define or interpret the notion of 'end in itself'? It could be said that when they use the phrase 'end in itself', they use it in the sense of 'that which is not a means to any further end' and it is in this sense that their statement should be interpreted when they say that bliss is an end in itself. If that be so, then to say that bliss is an end in itself would mean that bliss is an ultimate end. And to say that bliss is an ultimate end is to say that there is no other end beyond it to which it could be used as a means. But this line of interpretation does not seem to me to be correct. That is because the notion of 'ultimate end' is quite a different form and

independent of the notion of the 'intrinsic value of bliss'. The notion of 'ultimate end' involves in it the notion of 'hierarchy of ends' which the notion of 'intrinsic value of bliss' does not involve in it. As a result, the latter cannot be defined in terms of the former, nor can it be said that the former is the ground of the latter since they are two logically independent notions. This, however, does not mean that what is intrinsically good cannot be the highest end. A thing which is intrinsically good can also be the highest end. This is perfectly conceivable, because factually, though not logically, it is quite possible that a thing which is intrinsically good may also be that which is an ultimate end. The expressions, 'intrinsically good' and the 'ultimate end', even though they have different connotations and there is no conceptual or logical connection between them, are yet mutually quite compatible. The use of one does not negate the use of the other. Both the expressions can be applied to one and the same thing without committing a logical mistake. So bliss could be said very well that it is not only intrinsically good but is also an ultimate end even if there is no logical connection between them. The mistake occurs when an attempt is made to deduce the intrinsic goodness of bliss from its ultimacy or the former is identified with the latter.

One might say that the interpretation of 'end in itself' in terms of 'ultimate end' is fallacious because those who interpret 'intrinsic goodness of bliss' in terms of 'end in itself', do not say that bliss is an ultimate end. What they say is that bliss is not a means to anything and to say this is not to say that bliss is an ultimate end. There is no doubt that the notion of 'end in itself' does not necessarily involve in it the notion of 'ultimacy' because a thing could be end in itself (in the sense that it is not a means to anything) without its being ultimate. There could be different things which are intrinsically good or are end in themselves. Bliss need not be the only thing or state which is intrinsically good or is an end itself as Śaṅkara says. Even if we admit that the interpretation of 'end in itself' in terms of 'ultimate end' is fallacious and there could be different things which are intrinsically good and bliss need not be the only thing or state which is intrinsically good, the fact remains that the notion of the 'intrinsic goodness of bliss' cannot be analysed or interpreted in terms of 'end in itself' if it means that which is not a means to anything. Because the notion of 'end in itself' involves in it a reference of some means in relation to which it is an end in itself which the notion of 'intrinsic goodness of bliss' does not. Because one can think of the goodness of bliss without necessarily relating to other things as means to it which would have not been possible if the notion of the intrinsic value of bliss had been identical with the notion of end in itself or the latter had been a part of the meaning of the former.

There could be another possible line of interpretation of the phrase 'in itself'. It could be said that when the phrase 'in itself' is used in defining or interpreting the notion of the intrinsic value of bliss, it is used in the sense

of 'on its own account', and it is in this sense that their statement should be interpreted when they say that bliss is an end in itself. If this be so, then to say that bliss is an end in itself would mean that bliss is good on its own account, that is, on account of its own characteristic, and not on account of anything else and the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic goodness merely consists in regard to their sources or grounds. The ground of the goodness of bliss consists in bliss itself while the ground of the goodness of the other values like *artha*, *kāma* consists outside of them. But if the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic goodness consists only in regard to their grounds, it would imply that intrinsic and extrinsic goodness are not two different kinds of goodness because in both the cases goodness depends on something other than itself, no matter whether that thing is internal or external. What is important to note here is their dependency. In the case of intrinsic goodness, the ground of goodness lies in the object itself to which the notion of goodness is applied, whereas in the case of extrinsic goodness, the ground of goodness lies outside the object in question to which the notion of goodness is applied. But since in both the cases goodness is derived from or dependent on something, intrinsic and extrinsic goodness cannot be said to be different in kind. Their goodness is relative to the extent to which it is derived from or dependent on something. Intrinsic and extrinsic values are relational values because they are derived from something other than themselves, no matter whether that thing is internal or external. But to accept this line of argument would go against Śaṅkara's conception of bliss because, on his account, goodness is not the name of a quality, natural or non-natural which could be said to be dependent on bliss intrinsically. When he says that bliss is intrinsically good, that does not mean that the quality of the goodness of bliss is different from bliss even if it is intrinsically connected with it. It only means that bliss is good in its essence or nature. And to say this is not to say that goodness of bliss is dependent on bliss. The question of bliss' goodness depending on bliss does not arise at all. Because the goodness of bliss is the essence of bliss and the essence of bliss cannot be a separate characterization from bliss. The goodness of bliss, on Śaṅkara's account, is not a separate characterization of bliss but is only characterization from a particular point of view. The goodness of bliss being only a characterization of bliss always remains a non-relational value on Śaṅkara's account. Hence, his account of intrinsic goodness of bliss cannot be defined or analysed in terms of 'end in itself' nor the latter can be said to be a part of the former.

For the sake of argument, let us assume that the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic goodness lies in regard to their grounds or sources. But the very moment when we accept this, the question arises: what is it there in bliss which makes bliss intrinsically good or from which the goodness of bliss is derived? Or what is the ground of the goodness of bliss on the account of which bliss is characterized to be intrinsically good? The ground of the good-

ness of bliss surely cannot be good itself. It must be different from good. It cannot be identified with it. We cannot say that the eternity of bliss is the ground of its intrinsic goodness because both the notions are different and logically unconnected. It is quite possible for a thing to be eternal without its being intrinsically good. One can think of eternity of something without necessarily thinking of its goodness which would not have been possible if the notion of the intrinsic goodness of bliss had been conceptually connected with the notion of the eternity of bliss or the latter had been a part of the meaning of the former. The notion of 'eternity' does not involve in it the notion of 'intrinsic goodness', nor is it identical with it. To say this does not mean that bliss, on Śaṅkara's account, is not eternal in character. Bliss, on his account, no doubt is eternal. But this does not amount to mean that the eternity of bliss for him is the ground of its intrinsic goodness, nor does it mean that they are identical. For him both the notions are different and logically unconnected with each other, though they are applied to the notion of bliss. Śaṅkara does not commit any logical mistake when he characterizes bliss as eternal because both the expressions, 'eternity' and 'intrinsicality', even though they have different connotations and there is no logical connection between them, are yet mutually quite compatible. The use of one does not prevent us from using the other. Both the expressions, since they are mutually compatible, can be applied to one and the same thing without committing a logical mistake. A thing which is intrinsically good can also be eternal in character. So Śaṅkara can say very well that bliss is not only intrinsically good but is also eternal in character and in saying so he does not commit any mistake. He would have committed a logical mistake if he had defined the notion of 'intrinsic goodness' in terms of 'eternity' or had inferred the former from the latter which he does not do. So, on this account he cannot be charged with committing a logical mistake. But then can we say that bliss is intrinsically good because it is an ultimate end. Definitely not. Because both the notions are logically unconnected. A thing can be intrinsically good without its being an ultimate end. There could be different things which are intrinsically good, and yet they need not be an ultimate end. This is quite perfectly conceivable. Besides, the notion of 'ultimate end' involves in it the notion of 'hierarchy of ends' which the notion of 'intrinsic value' does not involve in it. It also cannot be said that bliss is intrinsically good because it is an end in itself. Because the notion of 'end' is conceptually tied with the notion of 'means', besides the existence of some beings to whom it is an end in itself, i.e. men, with which the notion of 'intrinsic value' is not necessarily connected. This does not mean that a thing which is intrinsically good cannot be an end in itself. A thing which is intrinsically good can also be an end in itself. This is perfectly possible since both the notions are mutually compatible. The use of one does not prevent us from using the other. So bliss could be intrinsically good and at the same time it can also be an end in itself. But the former cannot be said to be grounded in the latter

since the latter is logically unconnected with former. The *Brahman* (or the *Ātman*) cannot be said to be the ground of bliss' goodness because the goodness of bliss is not different from the *Brahman* on Śaṅkara's account. To admit that the goodness of bliss is different from the *Brahman* is to admit duality in *Brahman* which Śaṅkara denies. For him bliss is not a separate characterization of the *Brahman* but is only characterization from a particular point of view. Therefore, it cannot be said to be grounded in *Brahman*. When we experience bliss in the state of *Brahman* realization, bliss does not acquire its goodness from our experiencing of it. We rather apprehend or experience it in the state of realization. Bliss is conceived to have its goodness before we apprehended or realized it, and would have had it if we had not apprehended or realized it. Bliss is the phenomenal characterization of the *Brahman*. But it is not a separate phenomenal characterization of the *Brahman*. It cannot be thought to be different from the *Brahman* from the *Advaita Vedānta* point of view. It has its own ontological existence independent of our experiencing of it. This is the reason why the goodness of bliss cannot be defined in terms of 'our experiencing of it', nor can it be said to be grounded in it. On Śaṅkara's account, the goodness of bliss can conceivably exist even when none of us is aware or conscious of it. The notion of the goodness of bliss comes logically and ontologically prior to our knowing of it.

In view of the above discussions, we may now conclude that the *advaitin* conception of 'intrinsic goodness of bliss' cannot be defined or interpreted in terms of any other concept, nor can it be said to be grounded in other things whatsoever. It is a non-relational value. Goodness is its very nature to be such. When bliss is characterized as an end in itself, the notion of 'end' is not used in the sense of 'purpose' or 'goal' because bliss cannot be its own purpose or goal. The purpose or goal of something cannot be the thing itself. It lies outside the thing in question. So the notion of 'end' occurring in the expression 'end in itself' should not be understood in the sense of 'purpose' or 'goal' as it is ordinarily thought.

Some dimensions of the universality of philosophical hermeneutics: a conversation with Hans-Georg Gadamer

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Professor Hans-Georg Gadamer (born February 11, 1900) is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, University of Heidelberg, where he taught from 1948 to 1968.[1] He was previously professor at the universities of Marburg (1929 to 1937), Leipzig (1938 to 1947, as Rector of the University from 1945 to 1947) and Frankfurt (1947 to 1949). He has been importantly influenced by Martin Heidegger, with whom he studied for some years, and by Plato and Aristotle. Gadamer's reflections on his own philosophical journey and some of his works are cited in Notes 1, 2 and 6 below.

TP: I would like to begin by saying how delighted I am to know that your "Reflections on My Philosophical Journey" will soon be published.[2] Professor Richard Palmer gave me a copy of the draft translation to read. I find in it a masterly reflection on the major philosophical currents of this century. Coming as I do from India, I was struck by what you write about the broadening effect that Theodore Lessing's *Europe and Asia* had on your thinking in the immediate post-World War I period of philosophical disorientation and rethinking. You point out that Lessing used Eastern thought to question the achievement-oriented thought of European modernity.[3] You also indicate that Rabindranath Tagore had some influence on you in those years. Could you tell me how that came about?

HGG: Yes, my teacher at Marburg, Paul Natorp, was a friend of Tagore.[4] I attended reading of Tagore's works at Natorp's home. . . . This morning I read your paper on relativism which you had sent me.[5] I notice that you have quoted some Mehta (V.R. Mehta) a few times. I knew one J.L. Mehta, who has written books on Heidegger. I met him several times in the U.S.

TP: I have seen in your office copies of the two editions of his book on Heidegger.

HGG: I received them a long time ago. I am no longer able to read many of the books I receive. My eyes are becoming very weak. But I feel that for this old head, it is better to have a presence of mind than sharpness of eyes.

TP: You seem to have plenty of it. I saw it in evidence when I attended your public lecture on human solidarity on November 11. I have recorded it and am hoping that someone will translate it into English for me; I do not know German.

HGG: In my first year at Breslau University, I studied Sanskrit for one term. My teacher, Otto Schrader, was one of the famous Sanskritists in Germany at that time. He gave us a very good course. As I already knew Greek, I did not experience any particular difficulty in learning Sanskrit. . . . In my second semester, I attended some lectures on the Koran. All that was possible in those times when the university was not just a school !

TP: You have told me about the deep impression left on you by Rabindranath Tagore. Could you also tell me if you have any recollections of Mahatma Gandhi?

HGG: Yes, indeed. I came to know of the success of Gandhi's liberation struggle from an excellent book on the subject by Professor Wilhelm Muhlmann, who was a sociologist. I do not remember the details now, but I think that Muhlmann's argument was that Gandhi's non-violent form of resistance to imperialism was a realistic and effective strategy, given the peculiar situation of the British colonial government, which was uncomfortably placed between the Maharajas and the native bourgeoisie.

TP: As I understand it, Gandhi's *satyagraha* way of resistance or conflict-resolution is informed by philosophical hermeneutics or hermeneutical intersubjectivity. Shall I say that satyagraha is "hermeneutic praxis" *par excellence*? That is why I am drawn to your writings.

HGG: I would hope so, but I do not know enough about *satyagraha* to be sure that you are right! I would like to say that while reading your paper this morning, I understood why you were interested in meeting me. Your exposition of the problem of relativism and your attempt to overcome relativism without ending up in positivist dogmatism—that has indeed been the concern of the hermeneutical tradition in Germany since Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey, who was a big source of inspiration to Heidegger, was a follower of Schleiermacher. And German romanticism, as a protest against foundational metaphysics, initiated the movement towards universal hermeneutics. In other words, the "destruction" of dogmatic metaphysics by Kant had an "opening" or "reaching out" effect on the first generation of German romanticists. Thus, there was an India—focus in Schlegel and Schopenhauer. While Schlegel was a friend of Schleiermacher, Schopenhauer's disciple, Paul Deussen, had some influence on Heidegger.

I have referred to these names only to indicate that the problem that you address in your paper, namely the problem of relativism vs. positivist dogmatism, has been our problem too. In dealing with it, I think, we have much to learn from Martin Heidegger. Although I have departed from Heidegger in a number of important ways, I must emphasize that it was he who opened for me and for many others the profound insight or understanding that relativism is related to the dogmatism of the absolute, and without a critique or "destructing" of the idealistic concept of the absolute there could be no overcoming of absolutism or relativism. He saw that the phenomenology of Husserl in which he was schooled was itself idealistic in its foundations. He therefore tried to free himself from its transcendentalism. He did not fully succeed in doing so in his *Being and Time* and so he later turned his attention to the play between philosophy and poetry. I could not follow him into poetry.

TP: You turned to language rather than to poetry?

HGG: That is a good way to put it. I never tried to be poetical in my thinking and writing, though poetry is also for me an instance of practical wisdom and judgement. And philosophy, when it is not empty, is like a poem!

TP: You maintain that language in the sense of "linguisticality" (*sprachlichkeit*) is a *universal* human capacity and that the experience of hermeneutical intersubjectivity offers a way to escape both the prison of cultural or historicist relativism and the ethnocentric chains of positivist reason. In other words, it seems to me that you claim for philosophical hermeneutics, a higher or superior universality. But some of your critics say that your hermeneutics is conservative in that it lacks an explicit standard of critique by which the various traditions or cultures could be evaluated.

HGG: That is Habermas' criticism, at least.

TP: I am aware of your responses to that criticism.[6] I would however seek from you a further clarification on the following points:

You write somewhere that the Enlightenment principle that *all* human beings are free is a *new world-historical* principle that can never again be shaken. The practice of philosophical hermeneutics, as I see it, combines this Enlightenment principle of freedom with the concepts of dialogic truth (from Socrates and Plato) and *phronesis* (from Aristotle). If this is

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TP: You have told me about the deep impression left on you by Rabindranath Tagore. Could you also tell me if you have any recollections of Mahatma Gandhi?

HGG: Yes, indeed. I came to know of the success of Gandhi's liberation struggle from an excellent book on the subject by Professor Wilhelm Muhlmann, who was a sociologist. I do not remember the details now, but I think that Muhlmann's argument was that Gandhi's non-violent form of resistance to imperialism was a realistic and effective strategy, given the peculiar situation of the British colonial government, which was uncomfortably placed between the Maharajas and the native bourgeoisie.

TP: As I understand it, Gandhi's *satyagraha* way of resistance or conflict-resolution is informed by philosophical hermeneutics or hermeneutical intersubjectivity. Shall I say that satyagraha is "hermeneutic praxis" *par excellence*? That is why I am drawn to your writings.

HGG: I would hope so, but I do not know enough about *satyagraha* to be sure that you are right! I would like to say that while reading your paper this morning, I understood why you were interested in meeting me. Your exposition of the problem of relativism and your attempt to overcome relativism without ending up in positivist dogmatism—that has indeed been the concern of the hermeneutical tradition in Germany since Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey, who was a big source of inspiration to Heidegger, was a follower of Schleiermacher. And German romanticism, as a protest against foundational metaphysics, initiated the movement towards universal hermeneutics. In other words, the "destruction" of dogmatic metaphysics by Kant had an "opening" or "reaching out" effect on the first generation of German romanticists. Thus, there was an India—focus in Schlegel and Schopenhauer. While Schlegel was a friend of Schleiermacher, Schopenhauer's disciple, Paul Deussen, had some influence on Heidegger.

I have referred to these names only to indicate that the problem that you address in your paper, namely the problem of relativism vs. positivist dogmatism, has been our problem too. In dealing with it, I think, we have much to learn from Martin Heidegger. Although I have departed from Heidegger in a number of important ways, I must emphasize that it was he who opened for me and for many others the profound insight or understanding that relativism is related to the dogmatism of the absolute, and without a critique or "destructing" of the idealistic concept of the absolute there could be no overcoming of absolutism or relativism. He saw that the phenomenology of Husserl in which he was schooled was itself idealistic in its foundations. He therefore tried to free himself from its transcendentalism. He did not fully succeed in doing so in his *Being and Time* and so he later turned his attention to the play between philosophy and poetry. I could not follow him into poetry.

TP: You turned to language rather than to poetry?

HGG: That is a good way to put it. I never tried to be poetical in my thinking and writing, though poetry is also for me an instance of practical wisdom and judgement. And philosophy, when it is not empty, is like a poem!

TP: You maintain that language in the sense of "linguisticality" (*sprachlichkeit*) is a *universal* human capacity and that the experience of hermeneutical intersubjectivity offers a way to escape both the prison of cultural or historicist relativism and the ethnocentric chains of positivist reason. In other words, it seems to me that you claim for philosophical hermeneutics, a higher or superior universality. But some of your critics say that your hermeneutics is conservative in that it lacks an explicit standard of critique by which the various traditions or cultures could be evaluated.

HGG: That is Habermas' criticism, at least.

TP: I am aware of your responses to that criticism.[6] I would however seek from you a further clarification on the following points:

You write somewhere that the Enlightenment principle that *all* human beings are free is a *new world-historical* principle that can never again be shaken. The practice of philosophical hermeneutics, as I see it, combines this Enlightenment principle of freedom with the concepts of dialogic truth (from Socrates and Plato) and *phronesis* (from Aristotle). If this is

so, I do not quite see how philosophical hermeneutics can be charged with conservatism and the lack of any critical standard.

HGG: This is an issue on which Habermas and I continue to differ. It seems to me he is insisting on rationality in the scientific sense. His way of thinking does not lead to the kind of dialogue that I have been advocating on the basis of Aristotelian prudence (*phronesis*). I often say: "Rationality is good, but reasonableness is better."

TP: Is that the reason why the idea of *phronesis* figures so prominently in your writing?

HGG: Yes, of course. Also remember that dialogue is central to the culture of classical Greece. Not just some written dialogues, but the practice of dialogue in reading and speaking, in which the exercise of *phronesis*, i.e. prudence or practical wisdom, is of crucial importance. By the way, it is only in the middle of the Middle Ages that reading became "silent reading", i.e. reading without the practice of speaking. The modern sciences overcame the cultural history of humanism by *methodology*, but so far there has not been enough realization of the importance of *phronesis*. Philosophical hermeneutics restores *speaking*. For hermeneutics, the text is not a closed text that has *simply* to be read; rather it is an utterance, in which the reader is addressed or engaged in a real to-and-fro process of communication.

TP: You speak of the *universality* of hermeneutics as demonstrated by the human capacity for dialogue across cultures. Are you not assuming a transcultural hermeneutical intersubjectivity? Would this not be more or less the same as Habermas' view on communicative ethics and ideal speech situation?

HGG: No. But it is true that some of the things I have written about the universality of the hermeneutical capacity of human beings were, in a sense, a *response* to Habermas' criticism. What Habermas seeks, however, are critical standards for dealing with distorted communication. I maintain that through philosophical-hermeneutical praxis one can overcome distortions in communication.

TP: Could you elaborate a little on the distinction you draw between the "mixed" or, shall I say, "prejudiced" reason of ontological hermeneutics and the idealistic and methodistic notions of reason that are abstracted from all prejudices?

HGG: My use of the term "ontological" was perhaps not very intelligent or prudent; because of it, my position is too closely identified with Heidegger's position. True, I benefited from five years of lectures by Heidegger and have been very greatly inspired and stimulated by his *Being and Time*. Yet my work is a departure from Heidegger's in some important ways. I took my point of departure from the *rhetorical* character of Greek philosophy, in which dialogue, discussion and the exchange of views are of central importance. It is this *rhetorical* truth that I have contrasted with the "method" of modern rationality. My philological understanding of Greek philosophy enabled me break free from the essentialism and the abstractness of Latinized scholasticism in philosophy and to get back to or at least nearer to the primordial experience of life-in-the-world.

In fact, the relevance of philosophical hermeneutics in taking us closer to the primordial experiences of life is now being recognized in ethnology. It is now being realized that the accounts of the life-styles of the "natives" of other cultures based on the answers provided by local "informants" to *our* questions are devoid of hermeneutical understanding between the ethnologist and the "other". One Professor Watson and his wife, from Berkeley, as I remember, have written a good book on ethnology from a hermeneutical perspective. And they even dedicated the book to me.

TP: What you have just said about dialogic truth in Greek philosophy prompts me to mention that Mahatma Gandhi too was inspired by it. In fact some months before he wrote his celebrated dialogue, *Hind Swaraj* (1908), he had written and published an abridged Gujarati translation of Plato's *Apology* in which Socrates is appreciated as a non-violent resister. Now, the question I wish to put to you is this: What do you *add* to classical Greek philosophy in order to arrive at philosophical hermeneutics? I ask this because the Enlightenment idea that *all* human beings are free is not contained in classical Greek philosophy, which as you know, drew essential differences between citizens on the one hand and slaves and aliens on the other. I recall the famous advice given by Aristotle to Alexander: to deal with the Greeks and the Persians very differently. I do see the place of Socratic dialogue and Aristotelian *phronesis* in your philosophical hermeneutics, but what I wish to know is: *what else* is there in it which is not derived from Greek philosophy? May I rephrase my question as: Are you not *adding* the post-Enlightenment principle of the freedom of *all* human beings to the classical Greek conception of practical reason centred on dialogue and *phronesis*?

HGG: First of all, it must be granted that Greek thought is of very special importance for modern philosophy. In Europe, the Latin translations of Greek thought provided the initial vocabulary of philosophy. It is only since Kant, Hegel, and the Romantics that we have a genuine German philosophical language. For example, in his *Wissenschaft der Logik*,

Hegel gave us such important and very good philosophical words as *Sein*, *Wesen* and *Begriff*. As a philosophical word, *Wesen* [becoming, is-ing, occurring] is very rich. It is not an *essentia* . . . When something is stinking of foul smell, we refer to it as *verwesen* (something whose active presence as *Wesen* has passed away). Heidegger used *Anwesen* (another form of *Wesen*) to indicate living presence. It conveys the idea of something coming and filling the space with *presence*, and not of an *essentia*. So, the first function of Greek philosophy is to free us from artificial, Latinized abstractions and to move us closer to the primordial experiences of life and to the virtue of practical reason. Take the case of the Roman philosophers, Cicero, or Seneca or whoever—they learned from Greece. While the Romans gave us organizational innovations, culture has come to us from the Greeks.

TP: I get your point that classical Greek philosophy helps us to overcome the abstractions or essentialisms of Latinized scholasticism and thereby to get closer to the primordial, lived experiences of people. But what I would like to know is this: Is your philosophical hermeneutics a mere reinterpretation of Socratic dialogue and Aristotelian *phronesis* or are you not adding some new principles or values to them?

HGG: First of all, language. The German tradition of idealist philosophy, which has come down from the Latinized metaphysics of Acquinas, did not recognize the centrality of *language*. Even Hegel who was a genius in so far as he modified the function of logical propositions by his laws of the dialectic remained bound by the limits of the Latinized system of thought. In the last analysis, the Hegelian dialectic was a form of escape from, rather than an opening to, our experience-in-the-world! It is from here that German romanticism takes off.

You ask about what I *add* to Greek philosophy. The third part of my book, *Truth and Method*, is on language as the element in which human life takes place.

Also, in my reinterpretation of Plato, I think my training in classical philology enabled me to hold my own and in some ways even do better than Heidegger. Heidegger had great philosophical imagination, but he could not listen closely to the intention of the author of a text. He was a genius when it came to elaborating the implications of philosophical concepts but he could not engage in a discourse; when I read him interpreting a text, I only hear Heidegger speaking. *He* is interpreting Heraclitus or Parmenides, but he is not reading the texts in their original meaning. And yet we owe to Heidegger the realization that a reinterpreted Greek philosophy can free us from Latinized, Christian dogmatism.

Indeed Heidegger remained throughout his life a very religious person,

and he sought to penetrate the deeper or broader experiences of human life from which words acquired their meaning. For him, for instance, *physis* meant not "nature" in any static sense but in the sense of planting and conception, as the-coming-out-of-the-seed, or the "opening itself" of a plant. More importantly, he spoke of "being" as a sort of self-presencing, coming out, *Ereignis* (appropriative event), a movement or event, rather than as mere presence.

TP: As contrasted with the essentialist notion of being?

HGG: Precisely. Heidegger has pointed out for us that essentialist thinking is the basis of the modern dichotomy between subjectivism and objectivism.

TP: And you claim to have gone on to develop the philosophical-hermeneutical way of overcoming the objectivism vs. subjectivism dilemma.

HGG: Yes, I do. Here I would refer you to a book by Richard Bernstein on this subject.[7] Philosophical hermeneutics does not restrict the meaning of a text to the subjectivity of either the author or the interpreter. What is emphasized in philosophical hermeneutics is the phenomenology of "play" or "game" of interaction.

TP: Going back to Heidegger: He is said to have undertaken to "destructure" the whole tradition of Western metaphysics since Plato. And yet it would seem he has only gone back to classical Greek philosophy to make a fresh start. Is such "deconstruction", then, an exclusive, within-the-West exercise in philosophy or does it also entail the *reaching out* to the non-Western traditions of thought and life?

HGG: It is quite clear that Heidegger does engage in a "destruction" of the European tradition of metaphysics. But we must try to understand his reason or objective for doing so. He does it, I think, in order to open up what was closed previously—to open up philosophy to the primordial, lived life of human beings-in-the-world. This meant in a sense to break free of the Western tradition as it has developed. You may perhaps be aware of Heidegger's famous dialogue with a Japanese professor.

TP: Yes, I know of it.

HGG: We Europeans belong to the tradition which began with the Greeks. We have for centuries been educated in Greek, Latin and European languages. This is how we have developed as a people. Our conceptual world is shaped by our historical experiences. Now we know—and Nietzsche taught us this—that this conceptual world has pre-shaped our

understanding and restricted our thinking very considerably. And although I do not have, to the same extent, the power of philosophical imagination which Heidegger had, I do share in his sensitivity to that which occurs *beyond* our particular linguistic tradition. From the standpoint of philosophical hermeneutics as I have tried to develop it, I would say that in some ultimate sense, we need not remain completely bound or "formed" by language. We have the freedom to recognize our own boundness and to reshape it.

TP: Could you briefly indicate how what you have just said about our not being completely bound by language in some ultimate sense would compare with Derrida's view on the matter?

HGG: You may perhaps be aware of some recent literature on this.[8] I find more of the poetical and literary element than the philosophical in Derrida's writings. Also, the emphasis he gives to Nietzsche's thought, as *against* Heidegger's philosophy, does not make sense to me. I do not find any consistent, philosophical thesis in Nietzsche. When I say this, Derrida would retort that I am falling *back* or regressing into metaphysics. I would respond that this is not *going back* to metaphysics but *continuing* philosophy as hermeneutical reflection. In some of my own writings, I have shown that it makes no sense to speak of Plato's "metaphysics". What Plato has in mind is meta-mathematics, and not any physics. Also, in my view, language is always limited. At some point, we have to look *beyond* language.

TP: Also beyond Eurocentrism?

HGG: Yes, indeed. In my book on the heritage of Europe, I have discussed the role of Europe in the world.[9] Europe, I argue, is not *the* world; there are, besides, Africa, South America, India, China and so on. Eurocentrism cannot last. We even need to consider if the European civilization can perhaps develop on different grounds than that of the Christian tradition.

TP: I see the conflict between Eurocentrism and nativist fundamentalism as a central problem of our times.

HGG: True. I say "no" to Eurocentrism. I also say that we *all* must learn as members of *one* humanity, tolerating cultural differences. In some ways, Europeans have learned that despite their different languages they have one civilization, so to speak. This means that mankind can have an education in tolerance.

TP: As you mention tolerance, could you also reflect on non-violence?

HGG: Non-violence is wonderful as a principle. It is not altogether impossible to practice it. It is also mentioned in the charter of the U.N.O. But I see violence operating in many places—in the Balkans, in El Salvador, the Middle East, the former USSR, etc. It seems that human beings have not reached the cultural maturity necessary for a non-violent world order. Perhaps it is too much to expect. But we must at least vigorously espouse and advance the principle of tolerance. It must also be recognized that the principle of violence is today becoming dangerous for the aggressors too.

TP: In this context, could you reflect a little on the political implications of Heidegger's notions of human finitude, temporality and historicity. What bearing would these have, say, on tolerance *and* non-violence? I recall your stating somewhere that you are an advocate of "bad infinity", that philosophical hermeneutics is a never-ending dialogue and that in an hermeneutical praxis one always assumes that one's dialogue-partner or opponent may be right after all.

HGG: The idea of human temporality and finitude has important implications for political conduct. Firstly, being as a movement or coming-to-be is a better foundation for conceiving human political agency than being as mere static presence. Indeed, I would say there is also a sense in which our beingness is constituted in dialogue with others. I am very fond of Kierkegaard's dictum: we are always wrong compared with God. What this adds up to is tolerance. Tolerance and self-critique are always involved in hermeneutical thinking and living.

TP: From non-violence let me now turn to the Gandhian idea of *sarvodaya*, i.e. the welfare of all. In your "Reflections on my Philosophical Journey", you refer to Kant's *Foundation for a Metaphysics of Morals*. You write that you are inspired by Kant when he, following Rousseau, point out that the course of post-Enlightenment modernity should be made to avoid the path of utilitarianism and to take the path of the common good of all. Incidentally, you have yourself written about human solidarity. For instance, you write somewhere that the problem of poverty in some countries cannot be eliminated unless the lavish wastefulness of some other countries is given up. Could you reflect a little on the bearing of hermeneutic philosophy on the Gandhian or communitarian ideal of the welfare of all?

HGG: Post-Enlightenment modernity did contain, among other things, possessive individualistic values. In that sense, imperialism is a result of the Enlightenment. But the Enlightenment also gave us excellent ideals: freedom/rights of *all*. I firmly believe that the global *status quo* must be

changed and that a new world-order of human solidarity must be brought about. In some ways, it is already happening. The ever-increasing danger of catastrophic events for humanity as a whole is already working to bring about transnational co-operation. There is European unity in the making, and there is also increasing cooperation among the Big Powers. I think there will increasingly be forms of transnational cooperation. I think that for our own survival and well-being we will have to contribute financially toward the survival and well-being of peoples in other parts of the world—say, in Russia, in China, and elsewhere. The world has become interconnected in complex ways: aggression has become in important ways self-destructive in that it destroys the aggressors too. The ecological problem has also increased the inter-connectedness of the different parts of the world. And of course there is the universal human need to control or eliminate destructive weapons.

TP: How will this human solidarity come about?

HGG: The human solidarity that I envisage is not a global uniformity but unity in diversity. We must learn to appreciate and tolerate pluralities, multiplicities, cultural differences. The hegemony or unchallengeable power of any one single nation—as we now have with just *one* superpower—is dangerous for humanity. It would go against human freedom. Liberty lies in balancing. Loss of balance means loss of freedom.

Unity in diversity, and *not* uniformity or hegemony—that is the heritage of Europe. Such unity-in-diversity has to be "extended" to the whole world—to include Japan, China, India, and also Muslim cultures. Every culture, every people has something distinctive to offer for the solidarity and welfare of humanity.

TP: You referred to the imperative of human solidarity arising out of the threat of nuclear destruction and the increasing destruction of nature or the ecological balance. You have also written about the tasks of hermeneutical philosophy *vis-à-vis* the methodological self-consciousness of modern science and technology, which has contributed to the threat of destruction that we face. If I understand you correctly, your position is that scientism or technocracy represents the unwarranted extension or application of *partial* and abstracted reason into various aspects of our life, whereas philosophical hermeneutical reflection tries to pay attention to the totality of human life in its given finitude, temporality, historicity, etc. You specify two tasks for philosophical hermeneutics, namely: first to address and educate the general public in the limits and dangers of our scientistic and technocratic civilization; and secondly, to address and advise those who make the decisions about the *applications* of science and technology in the industrial and strategic-military areas. If these tasks are increasingly attended to, would philosophical hermeneutics be able to get us out of, or away from, the path of technocracy?

HGG: I think it would, though the process would be long and slow. Nobody imagines that an idea or book of some intelligent professor can change the world instantly. Ideas and books can only contribute to the needed process of education, which has to be seen in a long-term perspective. I repeat: We need education not about in the dangers of science, but about the dangers of technocracy.

TP: You have questioned the philosophical idea of a purposive science, which you point out is a romantic illusion. In your view, philosophical hermeneutics does not prescribe a new methodology for the conduct of scientific research, which you say must follow its own methodology. Shall I say that your hopes are pinned on altering the *application* of science from the technocratic way to a philosophical-hermeneutical way? This distinction between the *conduct* of scientific research and its *application* in industrial and military areas does not appear to me to be a terribly sharp distinction. Moreover, is the task of philosophical hermeneutics restricted just to the application-side of science and technology?

HGG: No, indeed! Philosophical hermeneutics assumes that the existing situation can and must be changed through the politics of dialogue and *phronesis* (practical wisdom). As discussed by Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, it is political vision and practical wisdom that must decide on and control the role of technology. Philosophical hermeneutics does not operate, in some kind of ideal situation that one may like to be in, but rather in the actual, existing, present situation. In our present situation, institutions or establishments of science and technology are already functioning each according to a specific methodology. And during the last three centuries, science and technology have indeed given to Europe enormous power over nature. But unfortunately this mastery or domination of nature has gotten extended into domination also over peoples. What this means is that European education in the priority of *social and political life* has remained underdeveloped or distorted. Some of the social functions which the Christian religion used to perform in the broad field of education are not being performed any more. What we now have is the hegemony of technocratic thinking and organization. In Germany, we had it in a very corrupt form under Nazism. As Rector of a university (Leipzig) in the first two years after World War II, I had first-hand knowledge of the pressures of technocracy and also the pulls of idealism. Against this background, I see philosophical hermeneutics as offering an alternative way, the way of dialogue and political wisdom.

TP: Thank you, Professor Gadamer, for giving me the privilege of this hermeneutical experience with you.

Notes and References

1. I express my very deep gratitude to Professor Hans-Georg Gadamer for the privilege of this conversation and for other kindnesses and hospitality. The conversation was held in his house at Heidelberg (Ziegelhausen) on 7 January 1992. It was continued in an informal way on the following day in his office in the University Department of Philosophy when Professor Richard Palmer and Dr. Etsuro Makita were also present. Besides assisting Professor Gadamer in editing volumes VIII to X of his Collected Works, Professor Palmer is writing a book on Gadamer's poetics. Dr. Makita is preparing a complete bibliography of Gadamer's writings, their translations into other languages and the secondary literature on Gadamer. The present edited transcript, originally prepared by me, has been reviewed and further edited by Professor Palmer, who also got several points orally clarified by Professor Gadamer. I must however clarify that the present transcript is not to be regarded as one that has been reviewed and endorsed by Professor Gadamer himself. Besides expressing my indebtedness to Professor Palmer, I also wish to thank the UGC and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for sponsoring my visit to Germany, where I was affiliated with Professor Dietmar Rothermund at the South Asia Institute of Heidelberg University.
2. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Reflections on my Philosophical Journey". Translated by Richard Palmer. (Library of Living Philosophers series, Southern Illinois University Press, *forthcoming*). In this text, Professor Gadamer draws from and supplements the material contained in volume 2 of his *Gesammelte Werke* (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1984). See also Gadamer's *Philosophical Apprenticeships*. Trans. by Robert R. Sullivan (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985).
3. In this context, it is pertinent to mention that I had an opportunity (on 3 January 1992) to accompany Professor Gadamer's young visiting friend from Italy, Dr. Sebastian Kunkler, who, during the drive to the latter's house, spoke to me insightfully about the limits of Western philosophy when it is seen from the standpoint of Indian philosophy (and *vice versa*). This he (Dr. Kunkler) has explored in his Ph.D. dissertation on the Indian philosopher, Prakashananda.
4. See Paul Natorp, "Hours with Rabindranath Tagore", in Dietmar Rothermund, ed. and trans., *Rabindranath Tagore in Germany* (New Delhi: Max Mueller Bhavan, 1962).
5. Thomas Pantham, "Postrelativism in Emancipatory Thought: Gandhi's Swaraj and Satyagraha", in Ashis Nandy and D.L. Sheth, eds., *The Multiverse of Democracy: Festschrift for Rajni Kothari* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, *in press*).
6. The major texts of the Gadamer-Habermas debate available in English are: Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth aud Method*. Second rev. ed. revised translation by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall. (New York: Seabury Press, 1989; First edition, translated by G. Barden and J. Cumming, 1975); Jurgen Habermas, "A Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method", translated by Fred R. Dallmayr and Thomas McCarthy, in Dallmayr and McCarthy, eds. *Understanding and Social Inquiry* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977); Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, translated and edited by David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), chapters 1 and 2; Habermas, "The Hermeneutic claim to universality", translated by Joseph Bleicher, in G.L. Ormiston and A.D. Schrift, eds. *The Hermeneutic Tradition: from Ast to Ricoeur* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990); and Gadamer, "Reply to My Critics", translated by George H. Leiner, in Ormiston and Schrift, eds., *op. cit.* See also K. Mueller-Vollmer, ed., *The Hermeneutics Reader: Texts of the German Tradition from the Enlightenment to the Present* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
7. Richard Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983).
8. Fred R. Dallmayr, *Critical Encounters* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), chapter 5: "Hermeneutics and Deconstruction: Gadamer and Derrida in Dialogue"; Diane Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer, eds., *Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989).
9. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Das Erbe Europas: Beitrage* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989). See also Gadamer, *Reason in the Age of Science*. Translated by Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981).

Discussion and comments

THE DIVORCE BETWEEN THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES

The title of this paper is borrowed from a paper of Isaiah Berlin.[1] For Berlin the subject has been a historical one even in the strong sense that the divorce between the sciences and the humanities has been a unique process in the history of western thought. It is identical with or at any rate closely related to the so-called counter-enlightenment, and thus happened during the second half of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century. Berlin does not make it entirely clear for what time the marriage between the two intellectual realms had lasted before they became divorced. It may even be asked who the partners were that had been married and whether there were really two of them and not only one. It seems that Berlin identifies science with a tradition that can be traced back at least as far as Plato. The thinkers belonging to it believe in 'steady progress in the entire sphere of human knowledge' provided the only true rational method existing is applied in our scientific endeavours. The world is seen as a single system governed by principles and laws and in particular 'man's life, if it is to be organized at all, can be organized only in the light of such principles and laws.' According to Berlin this view 'was most strongly held and most influential in the hour of the greatest triumph of the natural sciences', i.e. during the scientific revolution in the seventeenth century. It was, of course, also held after and is held by some people, including scientists, even today. However, beginning with the Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico and reaching its climax with the German romantic movement *Sturm und Drang* a humanistic counter-revolution came into existence. It was a forceful reaction against and critical attack upon the all-conquering advance of the physical sciences and their total claim to dominate the entire field of human life and knowledge. And in due course it led to the great divorce in question.

The following considerations are not confined to this process that has been so aptly described by Berlin and others. It will be good to widen the horizon and include our own time as well as the very origin of European thought: the ancient Greeks. We then easily realize that in this tradition the process in question is not the only one of its kind. It seems that within the scope of man's intellectual endeavours the interest in nature has a certain priority or primacy such that the turn to problems posed by the human mind or by the practical affairs of man's life is always a *reaction* to a previous effort concerning nature which in some respect did not meet with the success that was expected for it. The theories of mind and human existence coming out of this reaction often are incompatible or at least not integrable with the already

existing views on nature. In some cases the resulting antagonism leads to the attempt to find a synthesis between the conflicting views. However, up to this very day these attempts have not been entirely successful.

Behind the present divorce between the sciences and the humanities and its various forerunners there is, then, a certain *opposition* between man and nature or at any rate there is the experience of this opposition. As a consequence we find that unending struggle to overcome it by rational means. The key concepts by which the situation can be described are the concepts of *unity* and *delimitation*. They cover the attempts in question in the sense that at one extreme position we find, for instance, the belief in the basic identity of matter and mind and as opposed to this there is, for instance, Descartes' sharp distinction between the two. Between such extreme views there is a whole spectrum of intermediate solutions of the problem, or, at the very least, of aspects of such solutions.

The aim of this paper is to present two recent attempts to bridge the present gulf between the sciences and the humanities. Both are meant to be partial solutions only. In my opinion one of them is no solution at all. But its mere existence deserves attention because it is a typical outcome of an attitude characterizing the German branch of the humanities usually called *Geisteswissenschaften*.[2] Presupposing (1) the (undeniable) observation that the humanities are younger than the sciences, and (2) the interpretation (which I endorse) that the former came into existence as a response to the challenge of the sciences, some German philosophers try to assign a *new role to the humanities* in relation to the sciences: the humanities have to compensate for certain losses that mankind has to suffer from as a consequence of the technological transformation of its environment. The compensation is made by means of certain narrative techniques that the humanities and only they are master of.

The other attempt which I want to talk about mirrors the first one in so far as it assigns a *new role to the natural sciences* and to physics in particular in the perspective of the humanities. The attempt is based on an analysis and a hypothesis due to the physico-chemist Ilya Prigogine[3] and concerns the relation between the two fields in question. This approach I am ready to adopt in part, and I even shall try to elaborate on it. As everybody else, Prigogine is aware of the separation between the sciences and the humanities. But a thoroughgoing analysis of its reasons as well as the present stage of physics and chemistry makes him believe that we are on our way to overcome the separation. '[It] must be overcome—says he—and it seems that finally the requirements are met to enable science to talk about the world in which we live without negating it or reducing it to an illusion.' Indeed Prigogine believes that the sciences, and physics in particular, are presently undergoing a revolution comparable to the one that brought them into existence and that this revolution means, or can be used to initiate, an approach of the sciences towards the humanities. I shall take up Prigogine's ideas mainly

in so far as his emphasis on a thoroughgoing *physical* analysis of complex systems meets with my belief that the epoch in which basic physical theory aimed at finding the fundamental *laws* of nature comes to an end and is more and more replaced by investigations into the *contingent* aspects of nature—thus approaching what had been the object of the humanities all he time.

I. An Old Problem: Man and Nature

Before dealing with the present situation as it is characterized by the two recent approaches mentioned, a retrospective glance at some points in history is in order. If the relation between the sciences and the humanities is seen as a relation of tensions and contrasts, the period that comes to mind in the first place is the second half of the nineteenth century. Then the German scientists—men like Helmholtz and Liebig—disappointed by the idealistic *Naturphilosophie*, turned away from it and, on the other hand, the new *Geisteswissenschaften* lined up under the leadership of Droysen and Dilthey. Indeed this is the period in which the divorce that had already taken place in the heads of the men that were involved began to become established also in the institutions in which they worked. However, as I said, the matter itself is much older and goes in fact back to the beginnings of Western thinking. The Pythagoreans, one of the earliest Greek schools, seem to have developed an admirable unity of religious belief, scientific knowledge and practical conduct of life. Yet on the whole Greek philosophy of the sixth and fifth century B.C. was concentrated on natural philosophy and cosmology. It were only the sophists and Socrates who began to criticize the one-sidedness of this approach and to complement, if not replace, it by practical philosophy concerning the social affairs of man. In a sense it was the first humanistic enlightenment in Western history, and it came about by the tension between humanly irrelevant speculations on nature and a very natural feeling of responsibility for mankind. The natural philosophers still had a hard time because their theoretical efforts were viewed as being practically useless. Diogenes could ask a speaker of that branch: Since when are you back from heaven? So for the first time a practically-minded, optimistic and self-confident humanism successfully challenged the hopeless cosmological rubbish of the natural philosophers. The contrast is wonderfully captured in the opening scene of Plato's 'Phaidros' where Phaidros takes Socrates out of town at the banks of the Ilissos and Socrates, usually irritating people on the market place, this time surrenders to the loveliness of the landscape. However, as if excusing himself, he addresses the astonished Phaidros with the words: I am eager to learn but the trees don't teach me anything as do men in the city.

The effort of Greek philosophy was not exhausted by creating the opposition of man and nature as a subject of human thinking. Plato and Aristotle, each in his own way, have shown us for the first time what it means to overcome this opposition in a unifying world view. However, in spite of important differences, the common element in their philosophies is the priority

that is given to *man*. Even the principles for explaining nature are modelled after characteristic features of human existence as, for instance, the capability of acting intentionally. In the last analysis, therefore, man remains the measure of *all* things as it had been in Protagoras. In particular, what is most irritating for a modern commentator of Plato and Aristotle is the complete failure to develop an adequate theory of nature. It is this circumstance that today prevents us from getting any help by the philosophies of these towering minds in our own endeavours to build a unifying world view.

Before we enter modern times I would like to insert an interlude concerning European renaissance, i.e. that immensely important process of rediscovery, translation and adoption of the ancient scriptures. This happened since the twelfth century in a Christian world and soon led to heretic threat. However, I do not want to take up the struggle between Christianity and the new sciences, important as it was. As some scholars conjecture this struggle could have happened at least hundred years earlier had there not been a movement reacting against the renewed interest in a science of nature. This movement, the renaissance-humanism, began to cultivate the *individual* interests, inclinations, beliefs and capabilities of men and appraised them according to standards set by the ancient literature and poetry of a devotional kind. As with the Greek sophists we again meet with a humanistic enlightenment and a polarization between it and the early beginnings of modern science. It is true that we are warned by the experts[4] not to reproach the classical humanists to have delayed the progress of the natural sciences by hundred years. But the same experts have to admit that many humanists, on behalf of the moral concerns of man and of literary scholarship, closed their minds to the revived Aristotelean tradition of natural philosophy. So we here have on a smaller scale a similar rivalry of interests, divided between nature and man, as we found with the ancient Greeks.

In spite of their gradual amplification these perhaps rather atmospheric than substantial differences fade against the most momentous event in the history of ideas: the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. Its basic idea was to submit nature to experiment and mathematics in a systematic way. It gradually led to that series of successes, unprecedented in the history of ideas, that established the eventual powerful intellectual leadership of the natural sciences as we find it at the end of the nineteenth century. However, the price paid for this triumph was that the order between man and nature, as it had been determined by the Greeks, had to be reversed: the anthropocentric world view is replaced by a cosmological one in which man plays no role except in a tiny fragment of infinite space-time, randomly chosen by nature. Accordingly, the enlightenment of the eighteenth century no longer is a humanistic one. It is marked by a new kind of scientific progress and by a corresponding attitude of men who feel that they have the future in the bones. Even the literary world of refined taste is seized by this movement and an *homme de lettre* like Voltaire serves to popularize Newtonian physics.

However, even in this situation a counterpart is raised and strikes up a tune that did not grow silent up to the present time. *Giambattista Vico*, a lonely thinker in southern Italy, develops the idea, coming down from hellenistic time, that man is capable of understanding only what he himself produced. And this is his own *history* and *not* nature as a creation of God: One simply cannot doubt—says Vico—'that this historical world is made by man. It is for this reason that we can find its principles in the modifications of our own mind. Every thoughtful man must be filled with amazement to see all philosophers seriously exerted for attaining a science of . . . nature, that, being created by God, can be known only by him, and neglecting to think about the . . . historical world that, being created by man, could be known by him'.[5]

Curiously enough, with his view, again contrasting history and natural science, Vico is not too far away from the way of thinking that characterizes the creators of modern science. Even before he got the insight that man can understand history because it is he who creates it, Vico had submitted *mathematics* to the same rule: we understand the mathematical because we ourselves are its creators. Why, then, do we not understand nature? The physicists of the seventeenth century had shown after all that—in the words of Galileo—the Great Book of Nature is written in the language of mathematics. According to Kepler and Galileo one indeed could speak of an understanding here, if only on a different, theological view of mathematics. 'Geometry', says Kepler, 'before the creation of things from eternity belonging to the spirit of God, has given to Him the paradigms for the creation of the universe, and it has been transferred to man being God's image.'[6] In Kepler's view we understand nature because we see in it God through the medium of mathematics. By contrast, Vico holds the highly modern view, not only that mathematics is made by man, but also that consequently 'the truths that are ascribed to physics on account of the geometrical method [are] nothing but so many probable conjectures owing to geometry only the method and not the evidence of proof. The geometrical we prove because we produce it; if we were to prove the physical we would have to produce it, [too].'[7] But we don't, and the high road via mathematics doesn't help. This passage is almost an anticipation of the famous saying by Einstein: 'As far as the propositions of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality.'[8]

Thus Vico, apart from his insistence on the subjective priority of history over nature, gave an important argument for the limitation of the mathematical method in science. The hermeneutics of the nineteenth century intended to be a methodology for the humanities. Though it was not aware of Vico's achievements, it was quite close to them in essential respects. It made the internal relationship to past events, secured by historical continuity, become the centre of a conception of understanding that would remain inaccessible to the natural sciences. 'The possibility of understanding', said

Droysen, 'consists in the kind of statements, congenial to us, that exist as historical material.' Man observing himself is a preferred observer for whom it is possible to have an interior view of human past that we do not have in the case of animals, plants or other natural objects.

II. A New Role for the Humanities: Compensation

My considerations have now reached a period in history that even today can be made the starting point for systematic investigations into the relation between the sciences and the humanities. As stated in my Introduction, I want to deal with two recent contributions to our understanding of this relation: one originating in the humanities, the other one in the sciences. Let me begin with the first one. Its main thesis and argument is as follows. Contrary to what some people seem to think, the humanities are not undergoing a crisis but rather the sciences. Moreover, this crisis proves, more than anything else could do, the legitimacy and even necessity of the humanities in our modern world. The crisis of the sciences is an external, not an internal one. Internally science is doing quite well, and progress could go on for ever. But it is in trouble *relative* to its cultural environment. And this trouble is even twofold. First, science is no longer capable of making essential contributions to our general world view although this view is still incomplete. Second, technology, the most important outcome of science, has become a serious threat to mankind at least in some respects. The crisis afflicts society as a whole, and the only help can come from the humanities. It consists in *compensating* the losses, theoretical and practical, that men have to suffer from as a consequence of the sciences' failure. This is the new role for the humanities.[9]

Let us now run through this argument in some more detail. The crisis in question has recently been called an *isolation* of the sciences from the rest of human culture. This is remarkable if only because it suggests the question why we do not choose the alternative and label the non-scientific part of our culture as being isolated from the sciences. The conspicuously asymmetric way of putting the matter seems to be the consequence of a twofold disappointment. The sciences could not solve, as some had hoped, all problems of human existence and man's life, and the technology based on the sciences was not always, as some had promised, to the benefit of mankind. In this way the sciences appeared to be *guilty* of something, and pretty soon the formula of *their* isolation was coined. Let us see whether this was justified.

At present mutual understanding between any two scientists by far exceeds that between the members of any other grouping, e.g. one science and one liberal arts discipline or even two of the latter. However, in spite of their worldwide technological presence the sciences did not develop the same easiness of outward self-representation that is characteristic of them internally. There is certainly a (relative) isolation. At the beginning of modern science

the situation was different. Descartes published his law of inertia and his collision laws in a book the first part of which deals with the principles of human knowledge, and he deduced the conservation laws of mechanics from the immutability of God. Today nothing could be farther from any scientist's mind than the establishment or even the discussion of such bold connections. Again, even in the Germany of 1883, caused by a confession-like obituary on Darwin by du Bois-Reymond, the theory of evolution became the subject of a heated debate in the Prussian Parliament. Today, it seems the public submits unmoved to every world view revolution. The theoretical results of the sciences, in spite of their dramatically increasing practical relevance, no longer have any cultural or political excitement value.

How did this neutralization come about? Three features of the development may be mentioned. Firstly, in the cause of their history the natural sciences defeated their early competitors: two or three ancient world views and the Christian doctrine of creation. And this happened without any new competitors being added. In matters of nature the presently institutionalized science is the only world view agency. This does not mean that our general world view was not determined also by other forces. But these act on other points, left untouched by science, and complete the picture rather than modify it. Furthermore, not only does science not meet any longer with external resistances. The internal ones are also missing. Though the development of science was characterized by internal revolutions they did not lead to any esoteric branchings. On a not too fine scale the stream of growing knowledge behaves like our real streams: they mostly join each other, and rarely separate. As a consequence the educated layman, to satisfy his needs, cannot choose between several, equally reputable world views. Again the probability of cultural relevance is decreased. Finally in the meantime the average representative of a distinguished cultural will is no longer seized or even sprinkled by the main stream of scientific progress. One should never underrate the possible impact of a new scientific theory on the general world view. But it is hard to imagine which common cultural consequences the discovery of new elementary particles could have. It may very well be that we already are in possession of the culturally relevant theoretical achievements that ever can come from the natural sciences. Their cultural mission may be done.

Complementary to the process of cultural neutralization or isolation of the theoretical progress of science is the process of—as it has been called—the gradual loss of men's worlds of historical origin, caused by the technological transformation of our natural environment. It is complementary to the first mentioned process in the sense that whereas this one is a process of decreasing theoretical relevance of science, the other one is proportional to its increasing practical importance: It is the acceleration of technological progress that is painfully felt by more and more people as a heavy loss of their life quality in several respects. There is first the scientist himself who

is afflicted. The private sacrifice of the great scientist, bent over his test-tubes around the clock and yearning for the final breakthrough, is already an older cliché. Today social conscience takes care also of the nameless experimentalist serving in the almost uncountable army of scientists. And our present humanists now see this man give up his individuality on the threshold of his laboratory for the sake of absolute objectivity and exactness—renouncing of his normal way of life for methodological reasons. Moreover, besides the scientists there is the rest of mankind being made the slaves of all kinds of technological sorcery—the slaves even in the case where this sorcery seems pleasing and delightful. For also the entertaining side of the matter has its own danger by seductively transforming life in an uncontrolled way and with unpredictable consequences.

The global description of the two processes that led to the isolation of science certainly is open to all kinds of objections as soon as it comes to a more refined presentation. But nobody will deny that there is a grain of truth in it, and even if we decide to believe this story the really amazing thing is still to come: It is the kind of *reaction* of some philosophers in my country to this mutual recession of science and traditional culture. These philosophers conclude that here we have the very situation where the humanities' time has come: 'the more modern our modern world becomes the more indispensible become the humanities.' Their specific role is to *compensate* for the various losses men have to suffer from as a consequence of the impasse that science led into by telling people appropriately chosen stories about their own past or about what that past could have been. The humanities are capable of doing this because they know the hermeneutic technique of telling stories, and thus 'can save men from dying of narrative atrophy.'

There are three kinds of stories all of which have the function to re-familiarize men with the alienating worlds of their true origin. There are stories by which 'the modern disenchantment of the world is compensated—in a modern way—by the substitute enchantment of the aesthetic.' By increasing our sensitivity, by developing our aesthetic sense, we learn to see art as an autonomous creation which it had never been before. Second, there are maintaining stories to counteract the denaturalization and dehistorization of our world. Whether in a national park, in an art museum or some other monument, we learn to retard the progressive destruction of our environment by creating institutions for its protection. Finally, the humanities tell us orienting stories that could encourage us to identify ourselves with existing traditions such as Christianity, humanism, enlightenment, etc. The encouragement comes about by revealing the ambiguity of the documents of those traditions—a genuine achievement of the humanities which enables us always to reinterpret the old stories as the circumstances may require.

What shall we say about this compensation model? In my opinion it is totally insufficient to solve our problems. And this opinion is not shaken by

the fact that some natural scientists will find the model attractive. Indeed, not few scientists seem to dislike any intrusion into their work by philosophers or other people trying to understand science within the wider scope of human culture. They seem to fear that this interest could eventually lead to unpleasant modifications of science, and prefer to relax with those compensations offered to them by the humanities. But compensation alone will not do. The very offer of the humanities makes it imperative to question again their legitimacy—besides that of the sciences. And the philosophy of compensation, it seems to me, is a misunderstanding of both.

According to the normal understanding compensation means that what is compensated for remains unchanged. As a consequence, science would remain unchanged, and that would be fine for all who accept it as it is. But for them nothing were to be compensated any way. On the other side, whoever complains of losses of life quality, of disturbances of an existence worthy of human beings, will not satisfy himself with comforting compensations that make him forget about what cannot be changed. It is absurd to imagine our scientists trotting grudgingly into their laboratories in the morning, grimly doing their degrading work all day long in order to finally being permitted to listen to *geisteswissenschaftliche* fairytales in the evening. If we do no longer feel able to appreciate our sciences we must *change* them, and if we decide to change them we have to think about *their* role in the first place. In doing this it will certainly be useful to widen our view and to sharpen our historical consciousness, not however in order to compensate for the damage done by the sciences but in order to *re-integrate* them into intellectual life. We would render also the humanities a bad service were we to use them mainly to compensate for the gaps torn up by the sciences. Rather we have to articulate the intrinsic importance of their genuine subject. We have to realize anew that we live in *one* world and that, therefore, the least we can expect to understand is the compatibility of the two camps. Again, however, no solution will be possible without a thoroughgoing comparative analysis.

III. A New Role for the Sciences: The Delight in Contingency

We have seen that even the compensation model includes a piece of analysis in so far as it rests on what was called 'the isolation of the sciences'. In the last part of my paper I am going to deepen this analysis, and the starting point will again be natural science. But this time we shall end up with the observation that a new role for *it* has been found, and that in playing this role natural science is about to approach the humanities. The new role may be most appropriately characterized by calling it 'the delight in *contingency*'. In playing this role modern natural science says goodbye to the kind of pleasure that has dominated its development since its very beginning—the pleasure of finding the fundamental *laws* of nature. Even in this century one of our great physicists could say:[10] 'The age in which we live is the age in

which we are discovering the fundamental laws of nature.' However, it may very well be that this age now comes to an end, and one of those who do believe this is Ilya Prigogine.[11] 'The great founders', says he, 'of western science emphasized universality and the eternal character of the natural laws . . . [Einstein attempted] to condense all laws of physics to one single "unifying field theory". This gigantic dream has failed . . . one has given up the hope to subsume all natural processes under a small number of "eternal" laws.'

More specifically it is *deterministic atomism* that had been the heuristic guide for the development of physical theories. Atomism is the belief that natural laws are simple *and* fundamental if they directly refer to the elementary constituents of matter. Determinism is the belief in a sharp distinction between lawful and contingent features of nature and in the reducibility of the contingent behaviour of a physical system to one single point in time by time-independent laws. However, according to Prigogine it was precisely in following up these beliefs that physics was led astray. Not, of course, in regard to its internal goals but with respect to an eventual theory of human existence. In this respect Prigogine affirms the thesis of the isolation of the sciences. The road taken by classical science inevitably led to a break between man and nature.

However, Prigogine's main thesis is that present science undergoes a *revolution* that has every chance to bridge the gulf that classical science had caused. To this revolution relativity theory and quantum mechanics—usually quoted as the major novelties of our century—were but a prelude. For the classical world view, though already badly shaken by those theories, was not improved in some respects essential for the wanted integration. The truely decisive weakness, according to Prigogine, of deterministic atomism had been not only that it neglected the real aspects of time, complexity and contingency but that it degraded these aspects by declaring them to be mere appearances that had to be eliminated from a true picture of reality. By contrast, what is going on in the new fields of typically interdisciplinary character, like physical chemistry, biochemistry, chemical physiology, etc. is precisely a rehabilitation of those aspects as irreducible features of the natural world.

In a sense Prigogine's revolution consists, then, simply in this that, as he himself expresses it, 'scientists have only ceased to deny what *everybody knew*.' The revolution has its roots in classical thermodynamics of the nineteenth century. In particular the second law of thermodynamics, as Eddington put it,[12] 'marked a reaction from the view that everything to which science need pay attention is discovered by a microscopic dissection of objects. It provided an alternative standpoint in which the centre of interest is shifted from the entities reached by the customary analysis (atoms . . . etc.) to qualities possessed by the system as a whole . . .' To this recent thermodynamics of irreversible processes added our understanding of processes in which, sufficiently far away from equilibrium, the creation of *novel states of order* as we know them from living organisms is possible. It is hoped that by a thoroughgoing investigation of complex systems we eventually will find an unbroken chain of phenomena that, beginning with lasers and chemical clocks and leading all the way up to processes in human society, will show man and nature united in one understandable unitary hierarchy. Prigogine himself is very ambitious indeed. In his view the revolution should include even such a fundamental concept as time. This concept, deteriorated by determinism to a mere parameter, should be raised to become again a category of reality. And the new reality is not one of being but of *becoming*.

At present it is still an open question whether the recent development of physics as the basic natural science that Prigogine likes to give the importance of a revolution will be more than an inner scientific process and eventually concern also the humanities in an essential way. In conclusion I want to consider one particular aspect of this development: the aspect of *contingency* as opposed to lawfulness. It seems that our ancestors whom we owe the beautiful building of the physical science did over-rate the importance of the physical laws in it. This can be seen even in our context by the attempt of neo-Kantianism to make the distinction between lawfulness and contingency a *criterion* of the distinction between the sciences and the humanities. In a speech of 1894 bearing the title 'History and Natural Science' Windelband has done this by coining the terms of 'nomothetic' and 'idiographic' thinking. He found all kinds of reasons to reject the attempts to base the distinction between the sciences and the humanities on differences concerning their *contents* as it, for instance, had been expressed by such terms as 'nature' and 'mind'. With psychology as his test case Windelband tried to shift the emphasis from the contents to the *methods* and the *aims* of the two fields. In doing this he found that psychology agrees with natural science therein 'that both observe, gather and digest their facts only under the aspect and to the end of understanding the *general laws* to which those facts are submitted . . . By contrast, the majority of those disciplines that we are used to count as humanities is focused on the complete and final presentation of a *single*, more or less extended *event* of unique and timely restricted realization.'[13]

Does Windelband's criterion—this is my concluding question—adequately describe the essence of natural science as being the search for general laws *as distinct* from our knowledge of contingent facts? Nobody will deny that there is a grain of truth in this description. However, there is also some reason, entrenched in the development of physical science, to draw its attention more and more to contingent facts of nature, *not* in order to subsume them under laws, but to display them as *parts* of the laws. Indeed the development of physics can be understood under the aspect that, again and again, a typical step in the development is the recognition that what so far had been taken to be a lawlike affair really is a matter of contingency while the reverse

of this step never occurs. The progress of science thus includes the increase of contingencies recognized as such.[14] Let us look at some examples.

The first example is the development of our insight into the structure of matter. This development has passed through the four levels of state transformations of substances, of chemical reactions, of radioactivity as the spontaneous decay of heavy atomic nuclei and of the decay of elementary particles first observed in cosmic rays. In each of these cases it was recognized that what at first had been conceived to be an unalterable structure—a state, a chemical compound, an atomic nucleus, an elementary particle—finally turned out to be changeable in time. In each case a deeper structure was discovered *not* changing during the respective transformations: the chemical constitution is not changed in a state transformation, the atomic nuclei are essentially stable during a chemical reaction. Processes within nuclei usually *are* accompanied by transformations of elementary particles. But at least some quantities characteristic for this level are conserved. Altogether, we here have a succession of theories—classical mechanics, thermodynamics, chemistry, nuclear physics and elementary particle physics—having had their *floruit* in this order and each explaining a new kind of process that was veiled by assumptions made by the preceding theory.

My second example is the history of cosmology. Apart from some singular movements the predominant world view of antiquity and its Christian version renewed during the Middle Ages were essentially static. The earth was thought to be at rest in the centre of the universe, the celestial sphere revolving in uniform circular motion with the stars fixed to it. There were the planets exhibiting their rather irregular motions. However, saving the phenomena these motions were explained by reducing them again to constant circular motion. The development starting with Copernicus is a gradual destruction of these simple structures in favour of more and more changes in time and other contingencies. The earth moves, the stars move. Theories about the genesis of the solar system come up, the stars are declared to be alterable products with birth and death. Finally, gravitation, the new static quantity, and Euclidean space, the time-honoured structure, are merged into one time-dependent metric in general relativity. And this theory tells a story about the universe according to which its original state was *toto coelo* different from what it is now.

In these examples my paradigm of a contingent entity is some part of an object that may be different from what it in fact is just because it may undergo a change in time. As opposed to this a lawlike entity would be a timeless structure—timeless in the strong sense that here a change in time is excluded not merely as a matter of fact but as a matter of principle. Hypotheses and discoveries resolving timeless structures into processes often are of incisive importance because they often lead to the assumption of new and more basic structures. More generally, the frequent concomitant of the replacement of one theory by another one is the emergence of a new contingency in

the sense that some part of the old theory can be seen to correspond to some part of the new theory which according to this theory for the first time is recognized and explicitly admitted to have genuine *alternatives* not only in the sense of possible change, but also in the more general sense of logical alternatives.

An example of the latter kind is Kepler's theory of planetary motion *vis-à-vis* Newton's law of gravitation combined with his general mechanics. For Kepler, who, although he was a Copernican, still believed in the old cosmology of the celestial sphere, the sun and the planets known at his time had a quite unique and exceptional position in the universe. Kepler found the beautiful regularities expressed in the laws named after him and, although he already entertained the notion of a force exercised by the sun on the planets, he still tried to understand the relative distances of the planets from the sun. In his view the solar system was an essential constituent of the structure of the universe that was to be understood precisely as it is given to us. Accordingly, it would not have made much sense for Kepler to have entertained any alternative or to have asked for the particular conditions under which the planets showed the regularities that were discovered by him. This was left to Newton and his followers in the eighteenth century. They found that Kepler's laws can be explained by Newton's gravitational law *together* with certain additional assumptions. Roughly put, these assumptions are that the mass of the sun is large as compared with that of any planet and that any two planets do not approach each other beyond a certain limit. As seen from Newton's theory these are contingent assumptions, and the lesson of this explanation therefore is that Kepler's laws had no importance whatever in our universe *unless* certain contingent *facts* occurred, *not* as such that could be subsumed under Kepler's laws but rather as their presuppositions that could not even be formulated in Kepler's theory.

Generalizing, it seems fair to say that *all* natural laws have a contingent, factlike component that cannot be recognized as such as long as a law is not explained by a more general one. But if it is explained then this component is made explicit as the factlike additional assumption under which the old law holds as seen from the new one. In this way we see that the realization of laws in nature depends on facts, and natural science being described as essentially aiming at laws is successful in its endeavours only to an extent that is dictated by a certain amount of contingent facts in the universe. This can be seen with particular clearness from the recent investigations of complex systems: The more our investigations were focused on complex systems *as such* the more contingent aspects came to the fore. Moreover, so far this result is not the outcome of a new science but at best a new insight into a consequence of what physics had been like all the time.

In this paper I presented some aspects of the wide range of questions concerning the relations between the sciences and the humanities. In particular the isolation of the natural sciences was treated and two suggestions were

discussed to find a way out. That all its specialities be relevant to the general world view of the time and that this be proved before the public, certainly is a hard demand for any scientific discipline. But history seems to teach that its fulfilment pays and that our natural sciences owe their success not least the fact that their cultural environment forced them to articulate themselves in view of possible or actual rivals and to defend their position. They became great precisely because they were *not* isolated. As Schrödinger put it: '. . . there is a tendency to forget that all science is bound up with human culture in general, and that scientific findings, even those which at the moment appear the most advanced and esoteric and difficult to grasp, are meaningless outside their cultural context. A theoretical science, unaware that those of its constructs considered relevant and momentous are destined eventually to be framed in concepts and words that have a grip on the educated community and become part and parcel of the general world picture—a theoretical science, I say, where this is forgotten, . . . will necessarily be cut off from the rest of cultural mankind; in the long run it is bound to atrophy and ossify.'[15]

NOTES

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7. G.B. Vico, *Vom Wesen und Weg der geistigen Bildung* (1708). F. Schalk, (Ed.) Godesberg, 1947, p. 41.
8. A. Einstein, *Mein Weltbild. Ullstein Materialien*, 1983, pp. 119f.
9. For the following see the papers in no. 2.
10. R. Feynman, *The Character of Physical Law*, Cambridge, Mass., 1965, p.172.
11. For the following see the papers in no. 3.
12. A.S. Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World*, CUP, 1929, p. 103.
13. W. Windelband, *Präludien*. Tubingen, 1924, Vol. II, p. 143f.
14. E. Scheibe, *The Increase of Contingencies*, *Epistemologia X*, 1987, pp. 171-86.
15. E. Schrödinger, 'Are there Quantum Jumps?' *Brit. J. Phil. Sci.*, 3 (1952-53), p. 109f.

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THE METHOD OF HYPOTHESIS IN PLATO'S PHAEDO 100A AND 101D: ITS PROBLEMS AND AN ATTEMPTED SOLUTION

Plato has discussed the method of hypothesis in the passage 100A and 101D of his *Phaedo*. The passage, as it has been seen hitherto, has given rise to controversies. It has been held that here Plato has committed some crude logical mistakes such as that of assuming contraries to be contradictories. As Robinson remarked: 'The two things he really has in his mind, namely deducibility and inconsistency, cannot be neatly expressed by a single verb and its negative, because they are not contradictories but contraries. So he drops something of his meaning, trusting to its being "divined", and takes consistency and inconsistency, which are contradictories and can be thus compactly expressed'.[1] Moreover it is held that the hypothetical method is pre-supposed, not proved. In the words of Scolnicov: 'The procedure adopted in *Phaedo* 100A cannot ever give us the truth but only the possibility of truth. The basis of the reality of each hypothesis in the dialectical ascension is only supposed, not given'.[2] However, these criticisms seem to have ignored the lexical complexities and elliptical nature of Platonic writing. An attempt will be made here to show that once we get rid of the lexical complexities and ellipsis involved in Plato's description of the method of hypothesis the above-mentioned criticisms would lose much of their point.

Plato introduced the method of hypothesis in *Phaedo* 100A and 101D. The method is stated in the following words:

> I started off in this way and in every case I first lay down the theory[3] which I judge to be the soundest and then whatever seems to agree (symphonein) with it—with regard either to causes or to anything else—I assume to be true, and whatever does not I assume not to be true...If anyone should fasten upon the hypothesis itself, you would disregard him and refuse to answer until you could consider whether its consequences were mutually consistent or not. And when you had to substantiate the hypothesis itself you would proceed in the same way, assuming whatever more ultimate hypothesis commended itself most to you, until you reached one which was satisfactory. (*Phaedo* 100A and 101D)

The method of hypothesis involves two procedures:

(1) Test the truth value and soundness of the hypothesis.
(2) Substantiate the hypothesis.

The first procedure further consists of four steps:

(*i*) Lay down a hypothesis which appears to be the most probable and sound and which explains most satisfactorily the thing in question.
(*ii*) Deduce consequences from the hypothesis.

(*iii*) Check the mutual consistency of these consequences.

(*iv*) If the consequences are found inconsistent replace the original hypothesis by a more sound hypothesis and apply (ii) and (iii) again. This procedure will continue till we reach a hypothesis of which all the consequences derived are mutually consistent.

In the second procedure, i.e. the substantiation of the hypothesis, consists of two steps.

(1) Posit a more general hypothesis than the hypothesis (all the consequences derived from which are mutually consistent) where the latter can be derived from the former.

(2) Repeat (1) till one arrives at a statement on proposition which is true by itself and needs no further justification.

Thus both the procedures show a common technique of resorting to an 'upward movement'. The first procedure represents the Socratic method of *elenchus*[4] which was so extensively used in the earlier dialogues. The second one seems to have its source in the geometrical method of analysis, which was so popularly used in Plato's time*.[5] The first procedure keeps the hypothesis free from contradiction by ensuring that all its consequences are mutually consistent. However, the second procedure is a positive one. It provides proof or demonstrates the truth of the hypothesis by showing that it is deduced from something which is true by itself and needs no further justification.[6] Plato in his method of hypothesis very exquisitely combined the Socratic method of elenchus and geometrical method of analysis to achieve his objective. That the first procedure rests on the method of elenchus and the geometrical method of analysis is quite evident in the second procedure. But unfortunately the hypothetical method has been identified either with the elenchus or with the geometrical method of analysis.

According to Crombie[7] it is not a special method that he is adopting, except in so far as it is special to make up one's mind as to what is most probable and to abide by that decision until one sees grounds for it. On the other hand, Sayer[8] seems to have held that the method described at *Phaedo* 100A and 101D resembles the geometrical method of analysis. As a matter of fact,

* The geometrical method of analysis as enunciated by Pappu, a contemporary of Plato, who in his book *Treasury of Analysis* (S.T. Heath, *A History of Greek Mathematics*, Dover Publication, New York, 1981, p. 400) was a heuristic technique practiced by Plato's contemporaries to demonstrate the proof of a proposition by tracing it back to something which is true by itself. In other words, the method of analysis provides certainty to some propositions that we know to be true. Secondly, the power of the method also lies in the fact that it helps us know some other propositions that we did not know before. But obviously this geometrical method of analysis is different from the modern notion of analysis which roughly consists in breaking the complex or composite into the simples and thereby brings clarity in our understanding of something and makes things properly intelligible.

the approaches of Crombie and Sayer to understand the method of hypothesis are partial and it seems that both are indispensible for a proper comprehension of the method.

But this method of hypothesis, as Robinson points out, involves a fundamental logical problem: 'The statement "whatever agree with it is true" and "whatever does not is false", cannot be interpreted by one logical relationship.'[9] If it (the word 'Symphonein' or agrees with) is to be interpreted as 'consistent with' which seems natural and obvious then the statement 'I put down as true whatever agrees with it' seems to be very wild as it is unnecessary and unjustifiable to consider all those propositions not inconsistent with our hypothesis to be true. Moreover, a proposition which may not be inconsistent with a hypothesis nonetheless can be false. Again if we interpret the phrase 'agrees with' in the sense of being 'deducible from' or 'entailed by' then the first statement 'whatever agrees with it is true' is all right. But the second statement 'whatever does not agree with it is false', gives rise to serious logical difficulty. Because there are many propositions which are not deducible from our hypothesis, yet they are not false. Robinson, unable to find solution, concluded: 'Plato here does not say quite all that he means: . . . Plato chooses to be inaccurate, or at least inadequate, in order to preserve conversational simplicity. The two things he really has in mind, namely deducibility and inconsistency, cannot be neatly expressed by a single verb and its negative, because they are not contradictories but contraries. So he drops something of his meaning, trusting to its being "divined" and takes consistency and inconsistency which are contradictories and can be thus compactly expressed.'[10]

K.M. Sayer tried to find out some alternative interpretation of Plato's intended meaning at *Phaedo* 100A. He believed that Plato's use of expression 'to agree with' in this passage is both logically sound and relatively precise. He says, 'But if we think of the relationship of agreement of 100A as holding between convertible propositions, then the difficulties disappear and Socrates' comments on the method become perfectly lucid.'[11] Two propositions are convertible when they are mutually deducible or replaceable without a change in the truth value of the original. For example from the assertions $(P \rightarrow Q)$, $(P \vee Q)$ and $(P \& Q)$, we can deduce, viz. $(\sim P \vee Q)$, $\sim(\sim P \& \sim Q)$ and $\sim(\sim P \vee \sim Q)$ respectively by the help of material implication and Demorgan's rule. In exactly the same way, however, the former can be deduced from the latter as well. Besides, in the ancient Greek geometry we can find that a large number of geometrical propositions were convertible.[12]

But, whatever the case may be, Sayer's notion of convertibility does not help us solve the logical incongruity of the passage at *Phaedo* 100A. It suffers from exactly the same difficulty that it claims to have got over. As far as the principle of convertibility is concerned, the first statement 'whatever agrees with it is true' seems alright but the second statement 'whatever does

not agree with it is false' is not free from absurdity. This is because there can be many propositions which are not convertible with the original hypothesis and yet may be true.

But all these uncertainties about the logical propriety of this problem vanish when we turn to the genesis of the problem, i.e. the use of the Greek word 'Symphonein' in the description of the method of hypothesis and context in which the method is being adopted.

After giving the description of the method of hypothesis Socrates immediately made use of the method to understand the notion of beauty. He pointed out, 'It seems to me that whatever else is beautiful apart from absolute beauty is beautiful because it partakes of that absolute beauty and for no other reason.' (*Phaedo*, 100 C) From this use of the method it appears that Plato applied the method to get hold of the underlying nature and structure of the thing he wanted to inquire about. He believed that the truth value of all these statements concerning beauty, justice, good, etc. could be determined in the same way as the truth value of the descriptive statements are determined.

Secondly, as far as the description of this method is concerned, Plato seems to be quite elliptical. If one gets over the ellipsis and unfolds the different features of the method we can see that the word 'Symphonein' would have to be mentioned twice instead of once. Again if we go through the Greek-English Lexicon then we find that the Greek word 'symphonein' has got more than one meaning. In the Greek language 'symphonein' has been used in the sense of harmony, symmetry, consistency, equivalence, entailment, etc. And it is not unlikely that Plato had used the word 'symphonein' in the sense of entailment in the first statement and in the sense of consistency in the second statement. The propensity to use a single word in different senses is also evident in the use of such words as 'eidos' and 'logos' with diverse senses in the Platonic corpus. Thus once we get over this elliptical nature of the description of the method of hypothesis, we can see that the logical relationship holding between the hypothesis and its consequences are not expressed by a single verb and its negative but by different verbs. The apparent logical problem pointed out by Robinson is nothing but a lexical misunderstanding and it is largely due to the fact that the word 'symphonein' and 'not-symphonein' are being arbitrarily understood in one sense only without keeping in mind the elliptical nature of the description, the diverse senses of the word and the context in which the method is being used. Moreover, if we go by Robinson's interpretation, we will have to end up by saying that the entire Platonic corpus is trusted because of its being 'divined'.

Again it has been pointed out that the method does not bridge the gap between true opinion and knowledge which is considered to be the basic purpose of the method. In other words, this method does not prove its results but merely assumes them. Scolnicov holds that the procedure adopted in *Phaedo* 100A cannot ever give us the truth but only the possibility of

truth. He says, 'The basis of the reality of each hypothesis in the dialectical ascension is only supposed, not given. As long as the upward chain of hypotheses is not concluded, the reality of each and every hypothesis is never given but merely postulated. However, the basic Platonic distinction which was the reason for developing the method of hypothesis itself—the distinction between knowledge and opinion—necessitates that reality be given, not merely postulated.'[13] Rose[14] and Sayer[15] hold the view that the method of *Phaedo* does not guarantee the unhypothetical starting point, and it is from the *Republic* that we learn that the terminus of the dialectical procedure is in a starting point which itself stands beyond the need of justification.

But the paramount importance Plato laid on this method by treating it above the elenctic method combined with the statement of Socrates at *Phaedo* 107B—'Subjective validity is not sufficient as a foundation of knowledge'—raise serious misgivings about these criticisms. It compels us to examine these criticisms closely.

As far as the first procedure of the method is concerned, there is almost a consensus that it helps discover the underlying nature and structure of the thing which makes the thing what it is. But the problem lies at the proof, i.e. the second procedure. In *Phaedo* 101D, it is clearly stated: 'And when you have to substantiate the hypothesis itself, you would proceed in the same way assuming whatever more ultimate hypothesis commend itself most to you, until you reached one which was satisfactory.' Here we should take the word 'satisfactory' seriously. This procedure of the method is directed to provide a proof of certain assertion or to demonstrate its truth. There are several steps of demonstration and the demonstration ends only at a satisfactory point. Had it not striven for an unhypothetical starting point, it would have stopped at any point without reaching the satisfactory step. This is exactly the point where the hypothetical method has got an edge over the method of elenchus. It helps in providing a ground for the assertions which are taken to be true opinion in order for them to get transformed into knowledge.

Besides, the method of hypothesis as it is claimed has got its source in the geometrical method of analysis, very popularly used in Plato's time.[16] 'In analysis we suppose the desired result to be already accomplished, and look for that (prior proposition) from which it results, and then again from the prior proposition leading to that, until, by tracing our steps backward in this way, we meet with something already known or holding the rank of first principle.'[17] Here the satisfactory steps are not assumed but admitted. Since the method of hypothesis and geometrical method of analysis have a similar structure, there is sufficient reason to believe that in the method of hypothesis the satisfactory assertion is not merely postulated but given.

In defending the method against all these criticisms, it is not the purpose of the paper to agree with Bluck[18] or Robinson[19] who hold the view that the method leads to an absolute foundationalism, i.e. the principle of good. In

fact, it is very difficult to find evidence either from the text or from the context for this claim.

With all said, one must admit that the passages 100A and 101D in *Phaedo*, if properly understood, are not unworthy of Plato's methodological acumen. The reader can now see why the claim is made and may assess its merits for himself. If the reinterpretation made in this paper is successful. Plato's remarks on the method, i.e. the method of hypothesis, emerge as flawless and compact, and the result of the method is really proved not supposed.

Notes and References

1. R. Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1953, p. 129.
2. S. Scolnicov, 'Hypothetical Method and Rationality in *Phaedo*', *Kant Studien*, Vol. 66, 1975, pp. 157-8.
3. Here the original word is 'logos'. It has led to a variety of translations: 'propositions' by Hackforth and Sayer, 'definitions' by Bluck, 'judgement' by Burnet, and 'accounts', 'concepts' or definition' by Crombie. Since we have followed Hamilton, E. and Crains, H. (ed.) *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, Princeton University Press, (Thirteen Printing), Princeton, 1987, for all our internal references, we have preserved the word 'theory'.
4. Socrates has used this method to test the truth value of any statement by putting it to the test of questioning.
5. As it is narrated in S.T. Heath, *A History of Greak Mathematics*, Vol. II, Dover Publications, New York, 1981, p. 400.
6. It transforms the true opinion into knowledge.
7. I.M. Crombie, *An Examination of Plato's Doctrines*, Vol. II, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962, p. 540.
8. K.M. Sayer, *Plato's Analytic Method*, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1961, p. 22.
9. R. Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, pp. 126-27.
10. Ibid., p. 129.
11. K.M. Sayer, *Plato's Analytic Method*, p. 16.
12. N. Gully, 'Greek Geometrical Analysis', *Phronesis*, Vol. 3:1, 1958: p. 4.
13. S. Scolnicov, 'Hypothetical Method and Rationality in Plato', p. 159.
14. L. Rose, 'The Deuteros Polous in Plato's Phaedo', *Monist*, Vol. 50, No. 3, 1966, p. 466.
15. K.M. Sayer, *Plato's Analytical Method*, p. 56.
16. Ibid., p. 22.
17. Here I have accepted the view of F.M. Cornford, 'Mathematic and Dialectic in the *Republic*,' *Mind*, Vol. 41, 1932, p. 39.
18. R.S. Bluck, *Plato's Phaedo*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1965, p. 12.
19. R. Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialetic*, p. 151.

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DEFINING VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT ACTS

I would define violent and non-violent acts both positively and negatively.

In the positive sense, I define a violent act as (1) one of which it is a constitutive part (or to the essence of which it belongs) that its very performance will cause hurt; or (2) as one of which it is not a constitutive part that its very performance will cause hurt, but knowing that its performance will or is likely to cause hurt to someone or the other whom one may have in mind, it is performed with that intention.

Again, in the positive sense, I define a non-violent act as (1) one of which it is a constitutive part that its very performance will cause comfort; or (2) as one of which it is not a constitutive part that its very performance will cause comfort, but knowing that its performance will or is likely to cause comfort to someone or the other whom one may have in mind, it is performed with that intention.

There is a word of explanation here. In the definition of violent act, within the act of which it is not a constitutive part that its very performance will cause hurt, I include the act of which it is a constitutive part that its very performance will cause comfort and the act of which it is not a constitutive part that its very performance will cause comfort. That is to say, briefly speaking, within the non-hurt causing act, I include the comfort causing act and the non-comfort causing act. Likewise, in the definition of non-violent act, within the act of which it is not a constitutive part that its very performance will cause comfort, I include the act of which it is a constitutive part that its very performance will cause hurt and the act of which it is not a constitutive part that its very performance will cause hurt. That is to say, within the non-comfort causing act, I include the hurt causing act and the non-hurt causing act.

Let me now cite some examples of the above-mentioned two kinds of acts. I take it that the acts of scolding, abusing, beating, assaulting, harassing, molesting, raping, torturing, undergoing penance, insulting, thinking ill of somebody with that person's knowledge, withdrawing help when that help is still needed and not doing what one is required to do to help somebody, are acts of which it is a constitutive part that their very performance will cause hurt. And I take it that the acts of being respectful, being loving or affectionate, being accommodating, showing appreciation for somebody's work or achievements, showing humility, exercising tolerance, giving a patient hearing, making efforts to understand somebody, saving somebody from danger, helping somebody in need, taking an interest in and working for somebody's welfare and looking after one's own preservation and well-being, are acts of which it is a constitutive part that their very performance will cause comfort.

Further I take the following two things to be the cases. Suppose, among non-hurt causing acts, one performs a comfort causing act, like being res-

pectful, say, to the person B, or a non-comfort causing act, like just being quiet in some particular situation, with the intention of hurting the person C who one knows will or is likely to be hurt by them. Then both these acts would be violent acts in relation to C, whatever else they may be otherwise. In the same way, suppose, among non-comfort causing acts, one performs a hurt causing act, like living a life of deprivation for a longer or shorter period, or a non-hurt causing act, like again just keeping quiet in some particular situation, with the intention of causing comfort to some specific person who one knows will or is likely to be comforted by them. Then both these acts would be non-violent acts in relation to that specific person, whatever else they may be otherwise.

In the negative sense, I define a violent act as (1) not doing or refraining from doing an act of which it is a constitutive part that its very performance will cause comfort; or (2) not doing or refraining from doing an act, namely 'the one of which it is not a constitutive part that its very performance will cause comfort, but knowing that its performance will or is likely to cause comfort to somebody or the other whom one may have in mind, it is performed with that intention'. And, in that same sense, I define a non-violent act as (1) not doing or refraining from doing an act of which it is a constitutive part that its very performance will cause hurt; or (2) not doing or refraining from doing an act, namely 'the one of which it is not a constitutive part that its very performance will cause hurt, but knowing that its performance will or is likely to cause hurt to somebody or the other whom one may have in mind, it is performed with that intention'.

It will be seen here that I define a violent act in the negative sense as the contradictory of performing a non-violent act in the positive sense, and a non-violent act in the negative sense as the contradictory of performing a violent act in positive sense. Let me now illustrate each of these two kinds of acts. One performs a violent act in the negative sense, if one does not give or refrains from giving a patient hearing to someone who may have a worry to share with him, or does not perform or refrains from performing an act, namely 'that of just being quiet, knowing that his doing so will or is likely to cause comfort to somebody or the other whom one may have in mind, with the intention of doing so'. One performs a non-violent act in the negative sense, if one does not indulge or refrains from indulging in being abusive to someone, or does not perform or refrains from performing an act, namely 'that of again just being quiet, knowing that his doing so will or is likely to cause hurt to somebody or the other whom one may have in mind, with the intention of doing so'.

I may briefly represent violent and non-violent acts as I understand them as follows:



Now, it is possible that one performs a violent act in the positive sense, like that of slapping or abusing, but the person in relation to whom this act is performed, although he is hurt by it, disregards it. It is even possible that, although again he is hurt by it, a person goes as far as to perform this kind of act in relation to himself, like that of tormenting himself in one way or another, which he may do for whatever reason. Likewise it is possible that one performs a non-violent act in the positive sense, like complimenting somebody on his attainments, but the person in relation to whom this act is performed, although he feels well about it, does not show any excitement. Further it is possible that, by nature or as a result of some eventuality in the course of one's life, one does not have or does not have any longer the capacity to feel hurt or comfort in some particular respect, physical or mental. Still further it is said to be possible that, for one reason or another, one tries to train or discipline himself less or more, and more and more, not to feel hurt or comfort, tries to acquire control over his body and mind to a lesser or greater or even to the greatest extent.

Now, I have mentioned these cases to show that they do not go against the thesis that there are acts of which it is a constitutive part (or to the essence of which it belongs) that their very performance will cause hurt or comfort. It is clear that in the first three cases which I have mentioned, the acts concerned do indeed cause hurt or comfort as the case may be, but the scheme of things, the way of life, of the people affected makes them treat them in a certain way, as, for example, matters to be disregarded or not to get excited about or useful for one thing or another. As far as the last two cases which I have mentioned are concerned, it is again clear that one will feel hurt or comfort, if and only if one has the capacity to feel hurt or comfort or has this capacity in operation; but what we find in the cases under discussion is that the people involved, in one respect or more, do not have any longer or have rendered inactive through self-control this capacity. These people, in one respect or more, are, at any rate in effect, at par with those beings in the world, like stones and trees, which presumably do not

also have the capacity to feel hurt or comfort, and therefore in whose case also the question of their feeling hurt or comfort does not simply arise.

At this point I would like to take up and define (1) a couple of examples of acts of which it is a constitutive part that their very performance will cause hurt, i.e. examples of acts which are among the acts which I have called violent in the positive sense; and (2) a couple of examples of acts of which it is a constitutive part that their very performance will cause comfort, i.e. examples of acts which are among the acts which I have called non-violent in the positive sense. The examples of acts of the former kind which I wish to take up and define are abusing and slapping, and those of the latter kind which I wish to take up and define are being loving or affectionate and complimenting somebody on his attainments.

Now, one may define abusing, in one sense, as using a word or set of words in speech or writing, comparing a person or persons with something, such that they find this comparison below their dignity, their true position, and consequently hurtful, as for instance, calling a person or persons barbarians or as no better than mules.

One may define slapping as giving a blow with the palm of one's hand, generally on the face, hard enough to cause hurt.

One may define being loving or affectionate, like an act of a man of compassion or charity or benevolence, as an act of coming closer and caring in which people to whom one comes closer and for whom one cares find comfort.

One may define complimenting somebody on his attainments as giving expression in speech or writing or in some other way that one thinks well or highly of that person on what he has done which causes in him a feeling of elation.

Before concluding this short paper, I would like to add a remark which may be treated as an appendix to it. It is as follows: when I talk of an act as being a non-violent act, whether in the negative or even in the positive sense, I do not wish to assert that it is necessarily a moral act or at least not an immoral one; and likewise when I talk of an act as being a violent act, again whether in the negative or even in the positive sense, I do not wish to assert that it is necessarily an immoral act or at least not a moral one—in the application of the terms moral and immoral which is not unusual. Firstly, I am aware of the logical argument that from an act being a non-violent or a violent act, it does not yet follow that it is a moral or an immoral or an amoral act. That a non-violent or a violent act is a moral or an immoral or an amoral act, whether necessarily or otherwise, has to be established by a separate argument. Secondly, suppose there to be the following situation: there is a band of terrorists in a state working for the conversion of the state according to their own ideas, whatever those ideas may be. They indulge in indiscriminate destruction of life and property in order to let loose a reign of terror which they think would enable them

sooner or later to usurp power and then to mould things according to their ways. Now, imagine that (1) these terrorists do not respond to any non-violent approach which may be made to them, or they respond to it but not before there has taken place so much of harm that one wonders what their response really amounts to; or (2) these terrorists respond to some or the other violent approach which may be made to them, at least for the foreseeable future. Now, in connection with this situation, concerning these two possibilities, the following questions arise: Is it moral to employ some or the other non-violent method when the response of these terrorists to this method is nil or more or less inconsequential? And, further is it immoral to employ some or the other violent method when the response of these terrorists to this method is positive, at least for the foreseeable future? It would, I think, be dogmatic to answer these questions in the affirmative without careful reflection.

It is indeed possible that we do not yet have at our disposal a non-violent method of dealing with the said terrorists, but we may do so some day. For this purpose, it should not be difficult to see, we would need to have a greater understanding of human beings, a greater understanding of the kind of things which would make them respond in a positive way without our making them, say, an object of hurt in any sense. Further, it is possible that if we have at our disposal a non-violent method which would make the said terrorists respond in a positive way and a violent method which would produce the same result, then the former is morally better than the latter.

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'FOUNDATIONS OF INDIAN CULTURE: FACT OR FICTION?'— A REVIEW OR A BIZARRERIE?

I happened to see a review of Professor G. C. Pande's book *Foundations of Indian Culture* (Vols. I & II, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 2nd edition, 1990) in *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research* (Vol. IX, No. 1, 1991, pp. 145-51), which can hardly fail to catch attention on account of some cocksure assertions of the reviewer. Some of them are just impressionistic or based on received opinions, while others reflect misunderstanding, misinterpretation, or overlooking of evidence. A few examples of the same are as under:—

(1) "The book is totally materialistic. It has little time to discuss spiritual things" (*JICPR*, IX (1), p. 147).

This is what has most confidently been pronounced by the reviewer on the *Manusmṛti*. This is indeed unique, but such an idea can hardly find a taker. Every one conversant with ancient Indian social history knows it

fully well that in Discourse VI of the text (Ed. & Tr. Ganganatha Jha) Manu did deal, in a general way, with *saṁnyāsa* (*Manusmṛti*, VI. 94 etc.), spiritual knowledge (*adhyātma-jñāna*, *ibid.*, VI. 49 etc.), *mokṣa* (VI. 35ff) and freedom from the bondage of the world (VI. 74): for details in this connection he has referred to Vedānta (VI. 82, 83, 94). According to Medhātithi, the well-known commentator of Manu, it is the way of *jñāna-karma-samuccayavāda*, which has been upheld in the *Manusmṛti* (Ed. & Tr. G. N. Jha, VI. 75) for the attainment of *mokṣa* (the summum bonum).

Does all this not show a marked concern for spiritual welfare in the *Manusmṛti*? Then again, how can any knowledgeable person expect a detailed discussion of spiritual things in a *Dharmaśāstra* work (law-book)?

(2) "Manu ridicules the great idea of the *Bhagavadgītā* that one should work without worrying about the fruits of one's actions" (*JICPR*, IX (1), p. 147).

This is another unique and misleading assertion of the reviewer. In support of this he cites a translation of a verse of the *Manusmṛti* (II. 4)—"Not a single act here (below) appears ever to be done by a man free from (desire for rewards), for whatever (man) does, it is the result of the impulse for desire".

The above verse of the *Manusmṛti* occurs in a particular context, which has altogether been ignored by the reviewer. According to Medhātithi, this as well as the preceding two verses (II. 2 & 3) represent the *pūrvapakṣa*: the *uttarapakṣa* (representing the view of Manu) is found in the succeeding verse (II. 5). Strangely enough, it is a part of *pūrvapakṣa* which has been ascribed to Manu by the reviewer. It is either a case of genuine misunderstanding or a conscious attempt at caricaturing Manu.

The position of Manu, according to Medhātithi, is that he tries to bring about (*Manusmṛti*, (II. 5) a synthesis of the two extremes of *nivṛtti* and *pravṛtti* by striking the middle course—the two extremes being:

(*i*) It is not right to be absorbed in desires—
kāmātmatā na praśastā (*Manusmṛti*, II. 2).
(*ii*) There is no activity without desires (*Manusmṛti*, II. 4).

According to Manu, however, one should behave in the right manner in regard to these desires (*Manusmṛti*, II. 5). As expounded by Medhātithi, the right behaviour in this context means that one should not think of rewards at all in regard to the compulsory (*nitya*) acts—rewards are to be thought of in regard to the *kāmya* acts only. By the way, this vindicates the position of Prof. Pande in respect of his view of synthesis in the *smṛtis*.

(3) ". . ., and nobody lived like an ascetic in his old age (*JICPR*, IX (I), p. 148).

This statement of the reviewer is totally impressionistic.

(4) "On the other hand, the idea of the four *varṇas* was always a fiction. . .

In fact some of the Purāṇas assert that in the Kali Age Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas were not found in the country" (*JICPR*, IX (1), p. 148).

This statement is baseless; to the best of my knowledge none of the early Purāṇa texts makes such a statement. Moreover, it is disproved by the evidence of other literary texts, inscriptions and foreign accounts.

(5) "All the Vedānta doctrines thus appear to be empty semantics" (*JICPR*, IX (1), p. 148).

Can such an assertion deserve any comment?

(6) "That Vedānta and Sāṅkhya are false systems of philosophy is no more a matter of dispute" (*JICPR*, IX (1), p. 149).

This is of course a received opinion, the source of which (a letter of Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar) has duly been mentioned. Is this opinion intended to be accepted as the statement of a historical fact?

(7) "It is sad to think that our philosophers never asked the perennial questions of philosophy, 'What can human beings know? How do they come to know?'. . .(*JICPR*, IX (1), p. 149).

This is how the reviewer has bewailed! Can anyone else ignore *Anvīkṣikī* and *pramāṇa-mīmāṁsā* in this way?

(8) "As a guide to human conduct it (the *Bhagavadgītā*) is perhaps not very helpful" (*JICPR*, IX (1), p. 149).

But how can the well-known examples of Tilak, Gandhi, Vinoba, etc., be brushed aside or explained away?

(9) "Can it be said that these texts (of the Vedic and post-Vedic religions in Vedic or Sanskrit language) are the foundation of Indian culture when the vast majority of Indians were not even allowed to have any access to them?" (*JICPR*, IX (1), p. 150).

This is the main, though pointless, question raised by the reviewer against the view of Prof. Pande that the Vedic culture was a major integrant of Indian culture at the foundation stage. But it goes without saying that the point at issue in this context is not about the texts being the foundation of Indian culture. It is about the basic values and traditions enshrined in these texts, which could percolate downward to the level of the common masses through more than one agency.

The reviewer fails to rise above the level of his fact and fiction, and to see the question of fact and value.

(10) The reviewer would have us believe that the first part of Vol. I of Prof. Pande's work is "almost a history of Indian philosophy, albeit in a condensed form" (*JICPR*, Vol. IX (1), p. 145). But it is not a history of philosophy as such: in fact, as it is evident, it deals with spiritual praxis (*sādhanā*) and vision (*parāvidyā*), the relation between them, and their progress and development in historical sequence. This may naturally give rise to the question whether the reviewer has cared seriously to grasp and then to assess the nature, scope, and contents of the work reviewed by him.

(11) "Dr. Pande in the present work says that it (the Śramaṇa tradition) arose in the post-Vedic age. . .", (*JICPR*, IX (1), p. 147).

The reviewer after making this remark tries in vain to fault Dr. Pande by drawing attention to his own view in one of his works regarding the earlier antiquity of the Śramaṇa tradition. But Prof. Pande has not said anywhere in the work reviewed that the tradition *arose* in the post-Vedic period. Thus he has either been misunderstood or misrepresented.

(12) "Perhaps many volumes can be written on what culture is. . . ." (*JICPR*, IX (1), p. 151).

Perhaps this is an innocent boast, hardly deserving any comment or even notice.

The reviewer has tried to belittle the contribution of the Indians to arithmetic, algebra, astronomy, etc., by ignoring their well-known achievements in this respect and by unduly exaggerating their indebtedness to the Greeks (*JICPR*, IX (1), p. 150). He has also failed to see the distinction between culture and civilization. His view of culture appears to be not of an integrate but of an aggregate of language, food habits, clothes, styles of music, etc., which vary from place to place: the cultural uniformity, as he thinks, was due to 'folk religion'. This is indeed strange. How can the numerous local and regional religious cults, which differed from one another, be regarded as constituting the basis of cultural uniformity. In fact the review lacks cogent arguments, focus and consistency.

So far as the work of Prof. Pande is concerned, I need not say anything about it in the present context. It has already been reviewed in the *Hindu* (dated October 2, 1984), the *Indian Historical Review* (Vol. XIV, Nos. 1-2, pp. 285-90), etc. It has been prominently noticed by K.S. Murty in his *Philosophy in India* (Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1985, pp. 45f, 120), who has acclaimed it as "the most important work of its genre since the publications of Sri Aurobindo and A.K. Coomaraswamy on Indian Culture" (*ibid.*, p. 46).

Allahabad B. N. S. YADAVA

SOME COMMENTS ON EARL R. MAC CORMAC'S 'VALUES IN SCIENCE EDUCATION—AN INDIAN DILEMMA' (JICPR, VOL. VIII, No. 3, May-August, 1991)

First, let me state that there had not been any science education in India: what goes in the name of science education is really producing specialised technicians, students learn the facts, learn experimental techniques and then carry out in a limited way some experiments to get a degree, and then using

the techniques undertake some research. Those who are inquisitive, learn the European history of science and philosophical views as expressed in different periods. This they do without realising that the perspectives of science which were developed in Europe were consolidated in the second half of the nineteenth century when Europe had established its hegemony over Asia and Africa, to suit its political objectives. In this framework it is made out that European mind was precise, objective and capable of producing science. See, for instance, Whitehead in *Science and the Modern World* or Sir Peter Madawar's review of my essay in the Needham Volume. They categorically state that Indian or Chinese mind could not have produced modern science.

European science and technology were introduced in India as an instrument of domination and exploitation. Introduced in English, they created a gulf between the Indian tradition and what was introduced. Those who learnt science became unaware of their heritage, and those who were repositories of heritage ignored the new development of knowledge. This division continues to this day, despite, in my opinion, the major effort which Professor Earl R. Maccorman has made to initiate the dialogue between the two. This is mainly because the two speak two different languages. This would also be evident from the fact that India has not been able to provide, in spite of the efforts made, historical studies of science and technology from its own point of view. Much of the literature, with few exceptions, is primarily defensive in character.

When science began to emerge in Europe, three features became dominant:

1. It aimed at marginalising the Asian scientific tradition in order to show that European science did neither owe any debt to, nor was built upon, the foundations of Asian science. For this purpose, as it has been shown by Martin Bernal in *Black Athena*, it Europeanised Greece and made it the fountainhead of European science;

2. It was a revolt against the power complex of the nobility and the church and it provided an alternative in every field: art, literature, philosophy, science and technology, management system, production system and values and ethics; and

3. Science and technology was linked with armament industry and became an instrument of European hegemony, and exploitation of Asian, African and American resources.

It was hoped and expected that when India would embark on scientific and technological development, it would include a critical analysis of the European framework and perspective on science, its values and ethics and incorporate them in the teaching of science and technology in their country. But, unfortunately, it was not done. We in India retained the institutional and ideological framework created by the British and only expanded it, like the Indian army whose regiments even now take pride in their victories over those Indians who were fighting against British domination.

Scientific and technical education, imparted to Indians in the English language rendered them incommunicado with artisans and craftsmen. The absence of contact with them was also due to social prejudice against working with one's hands, and a tradition of looking down upon craftsmen and artisans as inferior people. This was in sharp contrast to Europe, where industrial revolution took place as a result of technological improvements in arts and crafts, as a result of scientists' and engineers' interaction with artisans and craftsmen. The same process took place in Japan. In the absence of this interaction, science and technology, instead of becoming an instrument of social transformation, became merely a bookish activity. Consequently, unlike the industrialised countries, most of those who were trained in science sought their career in the universities and newly established laboratories to continue the work they had learned from the professor.

I had carried out a survey of research in the Universities and discovered that depending upon the narrow field of specialisation of the Head of the Department, students were trained in just that very field and that became the field of specialisation of the department, since the students coming out of the department were absorbed as staff members there. The Indian scientists, thus, were unable to interact with the philosophical and cultural heritage of the country, or with the technological traditions. And, because of this basic inability they became totally isolated from the people. Even after independence, they continued to be protected in this isolation by the political leadership in the euphoria phase when it was believed the scientific development and technology would usher paradise on earth. When this did not materialise, they tried to find new alibis for themselves.

In the absence of any interaction with their heritage, and evolving a path for themselves within the framework of their culture, and trying to solve their problems for themselves, the Indian scientists always looked outside, to advanced and not-so-advanced countries to provide them with a formula for objectives of research. Consequently, major policy frameworks were borrowed from outside. Intermediate technology, later called appropriate technology, small is beautiful, walking on two legs, grassroot workers, learning from people, rural development, preservation of environment, sustainable development etc. are a few examples of the borrowing of such frame-works.

When Gandhiji promoted biogas he was primitive, but when China and the U.N. adopted and promoted it, it became the thing to talk about. Pillai's work at the Indian Institute of Science on sewage utilisation lies submerged, but when similar work is promoted by Europe or USA we proclaim its utility and promote it. The blind acceptance of the developments in Europe and USA, divorced from their cultural, social, economic and political context created for Indian scientists some serious problems. For instance, the chemical industry programme advocated by scientists in the Fourth Five Year Plan, suggested that India should use petroleum as a base for developing her chemical industries, such as fertilisers, pesticides and other chemicals since the USA had so developed, without realising that:

1. India at that time was deficient in petroleum and also did not have necessary expertise and manpower in the field. In contrast, it had the expertise, the necessary manpower and abundance of coal, for developing coal-based products.

2. That USA had developed petroleum based chemical industry and the necessary expertise to compete with Germany which had coal-based chemical industry.

As a result of adopting the policy, India faced a serious problem when the oil shock came. Such examples can easily be multiplied.

There has been a lot of literature and talk about science serving the poor. Science, in my opinion, by itself cannot do it. Science is an elitist activity. But the results of science are an input to intellectual activity as well as to artifacts. The way these results are utilised depends upon the culture, social framework and political objectives of the society which produces these results. Scientific activity cannot be isolated from other human activities in the field of art, literature, philosophy, industry, economic, social and political thinking and activity and all these areas have an implicit ethics and value system which provide underpinning to it. Raymond Williams in his book *Culture and Society* has pointed this out for the English society during the industrial revolution. But the method and content of science education in India deprived Indian scientists of this understanding and the insight which such an understanding would have given them.

A cursory glance at the historical development of science would reveal that the growth of science in a particular area tends to lend development to the language in which the activity is carried out. And when this activity becomes dominant, that language becomes the dominant language also. But the language is moulded by philosophical ideas, culture, social and political framework. A linguistic study of Sanskrit, Greek, Latin and Arabic would reveal the truth of this statement. When science developed after the renaissance in Europe, it used different languages, Italian, French, German, English and the technology which developed represented the cultural differences in them. In the contemporary period after the World War II, English has become the dominant language of scientific communication. And an analysis of its terminology would reveal the ethics, philosophy, cultural and social values and the politicals dimensions involved in this change also.

As a reaction to his subserviance to Europe and American traditions, some scientists have opted out of the institutionalised research and are endeavouring to promote traditional science. However, in doing so there is an element of rejection of contemporary scientific developments as well as technology. However these efforts to distance themselves from contemporary science, seem to ignore the historical context of Indian science without analysing the philosophical and ethical traditions which produced it. The under-

standing of ancient and medieval science has to be developed by the educational system by providing the historical perspective, the sociological framework and the philosophical and ethical basis, in the context of a wholistic perspective of human activities in different periods of human history. Unless this is done, the efforts are not going to usher in a new era for Indian science and technology.

The crisis of contemporary science and the deleterious effects of technology have created a new awareness and search for alternatives. But piecemeal efforts can contribute only marginally; what requires to be done, is to see that the educational system which is responsible for science education creates the awareness of the various dimensions of this crisis and provide the analytical tools and philosophical ethical framework for providing an alternative.

Just as science developed in Europe by challenging the power complex of the nobility and the church and provided an alternative framework, as mentioned earlier, for futuristic development, similarly, we in India have to challenge the power complex of the western military and industrial complex and provide an alternative framework. And in that context Indian culture and tradition will have to provide the necessary base. Of course, not everything in our culture and tradition is of value. But just as Europe picked up the philosophical and rational dimension of Greek culture and made it a base of its development, rejecting the superstitious and other irrational elements in it, we will have to do the same in respect of our own tradition.

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A superlative volume

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A signal service to the cause of philosophy! This was my grateful feeling after going through the book, *The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne* (edited by L.E. Hahn, The Library of Living Philosophers, La Salle, Illinois, Open Court, 1991, PB).

Before, however, I set out to say something about the contents and general features of the book, let me explain why I have thought it necessary to write on it at some length.

As far as I can see, the philosophy of Charles Hartshorne receives but little attention in our universities; and this is, as I now realize, a clear defect, for Hartshorne *is* a great thinker. The eminent scholars who have contributed to the volume do not merely make, but have been largely able to substantiate, the following laudatory remarks on this philosopher:

> Charles Hartshorne is *the only philosopher* who designed and carried out an empirical investigation that quantified certain aspects of the characteristic expressions of a group of species and correlated these quantities to aesthetic judgements of these expressions made by another species. The expressions in question were bird song and the judgements were human. (77)
>
> Hartshorne has had as many valuable and indispensable insights about free will as *any* philosopher of his generation. (154)
>
> During the heyday of renewed traditionalism in philosophical theology, of the rejection of philosophy by much of the rest of the theological community, and of the narrowing of the scope of its task to philosophical analysis . . . there have been some who continued to ask the questions these traditions discouraged. Among them *none have proved more creative, original and important for Christian theology than Charles Hartshorne.* (185)
>
> *No other living philosopher has done more* to eliminate the old liabilities and to elucidate the new assets of metaphysics in our time than Charles Hartshorne. (291)
>
> Hartshorne's philosophy . . .is . . .*one of the best systems in philosophy of religion we have at this moment.* (371)
>
> Charles Hartshorne is a *focal* thinker for our century on the topic of

time . . . (He) has articulated . . .the essential twentieth-century contribution to a metaphysical theory of time . . . (377)

Hartshorne is *very probably the most important living metaphysician. He has developed a metaphysical system in the great tradition of such thinkers as Spinoza and Leibniz, but which breaks fundamentally new ground.* From his writings a new theology has been born. (397)

Few philosophers have written so broadly about *order. Charles Hartshorne's philosophy is in a class with St. Augustine's De Ordine* and the writings of Whitehead since both of them write of different kinds of order. (415)

As for the philosophic substance of the book, I see it clearly that it abounds in fascinating ideas, justifying the work's inclusion in the prestigious series: *The Library of Living Philosophers.* Here is a random picking from the book—of Hartshorne's own innovative views:

God is the great *persuader* of His creation, rather than its all-powerful manipulator, 'providing its entities with specific goals or purposes and *co-ordinating* the activity of all' (58). Chance plays a vital role in the natural order, for without it 'there could be no freedom' (54). *Aesthetic principles work even in bird song* which is one reason why 'the unity of all life and all creation' may not be dismissed as a mere metaphor (60, 75). There is a wide diffusion of 'feeling and value . . . through the cosmos . . . (even) in non-living matter', for otherwise 'its annihilation could cause no decrease in value, already at the zero point' (76). Intelligence is a *process* 'that steers a course between monotony and chaos' (79), and 'order and chaos arise from interprocess relations' (87). The hypothesis of 'intersensory continuity' is supported (even) by such metaphors of common speech as 'sweet sounds', and 'warm and cold colours' (93) An affective tone seems to be inherent in all sensory activity. For instance, we freely speak of say, pain, as excruciating, tearing, stabbing, etc. (97); and 'the world of sound (too) provides rich examples of stimuli that appear to have an inherent capacity to startle, relax, activate, instill fear, or arrest attention' (102). One may even hazard the generalization that *all conscious experience is essentially valuational in nature.*

Like other volumes in the Series, the present work includes an intellectual autobiography by the philosopher himself, "a series of expository and critical essays (all alike readable and scholarly, I may add) written by a wide range of leading exponents and opponents of the philosopher's thought, and the philosopher's replies to the interpretations and queries in these articles". The work admirably serves the basic purpose of the Series, that is, to make the meaning of a towering thinker clearer while he is still alive. The up-to-date bibliography of Charles Hartshorne's writings, at the end, should be a great help to serious students of his many-sided thought.

As the Preface rightly says, Hartshorne is 'internationally known for his contributions to philosophy of creativity and for his distinctive brand of process philosophy and theology'. It is also widely admitted in philosophical circles that there is unmistakable freshness in his interpretations of quite a few notions, such as the following: the conception of God; feeling and feeling of feeling (or sympathy), freedom, chance, and creativity; the primacy of aesthetic meaning or affective tone; the social character of experience; sympathy as self-creative; the unity of life, and the need for an ecological approach to the world . . .; and 'generalized causal possibility with a place for probabilities and open possibilities'. Happily, all these interpretations find their due places in the present volume.

The 'intellectual autobiography' which follows the Preface is a gem. Hartshorne begins by declaring that in the subsequent pages he hopes 'to be interesting, and to achieve some touches of beauty as well as a reasonable amount of truth' (4); and the hope is nowhere belied by this fairly detailed account of 'some causes of (his) intellectual growth'. The whole piece, indeed, is a source of both instruction and delight. The delight comes mainly from the philosopher's breezy style of writing. Indeed, where it does not seek to make a point of theory, the narrative runs with the ease and intimacy of story-telling to a circle of kindred spirits. There are a few touches of humour too, such as the following:

'In retrospect (Peirce) once described his youthful manner as he entered the London Athenaeum Club, "I am Charles Peirce (etc. etc.), and above all I yield to no one in my ineffable modesty'. (5)

And of his wife, Dorothy Eleanore Cooper, Hartshorne says:

"She was also a trained botanist and . . . musician (pianist and singer) who was sincerely devoted to the ideals of art and science (specially in the biological form). What more could a philosopher who was also an embryo-ornithologist wish for in an intellectual companion? As for an unintellectual one, I have managed rather well without that!" (27)

Instruction in the essay is wedded all along to fact and incident. So it is nowhere arid. At places, it interests us by focusing on some little error that we all freely commit. Here are some samples:

a. "I hope to make plausible that what happened before and around my childhood, youth, and early manhood causally conditioned, made possible my philosophical career, *but left it concretely free in specifics and details* . . . The presence of chance or causal indeterminacy (is) a negative but necessary aspect of significant freedom . . . The specific or individual instances of (abstract universals) are never deducible from the universals. 'I must have protein' does not entail 'I must have meat', still less, 'I must have *this* meat'. *The more abstract our goals, the less can they determine concrete actions or decisions.*" (5-6 italics added)

b. "One day, looking at a beautiful French landscape, I had a vivid experience. A phrase of Santayana . . . defining beauty as 'objectified pleasure' popped into my mind. 'No', I said to myself, . . . 'the pleasure is not first in me as subject of experience and then projected on to the object as in the experience. It is given as in the object, or at any rate some sort of feeling is so given. Nature comes to us as constituted by feelings, not as constituted by mere lifeless, insentient matter. *That* is a product of thought, not of perception. *Matter as dualists describe it is never a datum, it is a construct*". (17-18, italics added)

"Both science and philosophy make Wordsworth easier to take seriously now than when he wrote . . . He was describing physical nature as it is given to our direct intuitions, apart from pragmatic and presumably scientific abstractions, . . . *Wordsworth was doing a phenomenology of direct experience far better than Husserl ever did.* The famous phenomenologist was too addicted to certain abstractions for that." (13, italics added)

c. "At the end of the first summer I finally hit upon my major discovery . . . called 'the monotony threshold' . . . a contingent and empirically testable specialization of my metaphysical belief—that *the aim of all nature is beauty, aesthetic value.* Whitehead said so; I would show how the fact of a branch of psychology or biology, animal behaviour and animal mind illustrated this principle and were illuminated by it." (30, italics added)

d. "Strictly speaking, of concrete actualities there are no temporally antecedent yet 'sufficient' conditions. Emergence is involved in *all* causation. Many quantum physicists admit this . . . Atomic freedom is insignificant in comparison with human freedom; but it is not zero freedom. *People are far too casual in affirming zero where 'very little' is all that the evidence supports.*" (5, second italics added)

e. "For me sensation has always been, since my experience in France in the war years, a special form of feeling or intuitive *valuation.* The sweetness of fruit and other sugars is an organism's sense of 'good to eat'. Even horses have it. The bitterness or sourness of some substances found in nature is a feeling of 'bad to eat', the saltiness of sea water, a feeling of 'bad to drink'. This is a biologically intelligible view of sensation . . . *Sensory qualities are intrinsically adaptive.* Evolution has brought this about . . . (We should not ignore) *the basically emotive content of perception.*" (23, italics added)

f. Royce's . . . The Problem of Christianity . . . was the first book by a professional philosopher that I read. The great essay on 'Community' definitely settled once for all in my mind the falsity of the doctrine of enlightened self-interest as *the* motivation. Without a sense of and sympathy for others there is no personal self. *Nothing is more directly natural and rational than interest in others.*" (14, second italics added)

Above all, the Preface gives us a very good idea of the number of diverse influences that make for the emergence of a great mind. 'At Harvard . . . a minor in English literature with two distinguished teachers, a standard course on zoology, and W.E. Hocking's metaphysical course (20); the poetry of Wordsworth and *Emerson's Essays* (13); the writings of Whitehead and the impression of his personality, 'the most all-round perfect one I have met in a person of genius' (25); the art of music serving as a warrant for the thesis that sensation is a form of feeling (27); and encounter with many a great contemporary mind,—it is all this and much more that enables Hartshorne to attain and project the fresh metaphysical insights that he does.

The close of the 'autobiography' is a moving plea for freedom and peace:

"Metaphysical insight . . . is a privilege. . .(but) brute force is not the way to promote it. Of all the great international traditions, the Buddhist has shown the most consistent understanding of this truth. Theist though I am, I never long forget that the misuse of force has rather persistently occurred in groups very free with the name of God. There are tyrant ideas of deity and tyrant ways of professedly doing the will of God. In the nuclear age we must take a fresh look at these matters. The price of mistakes has reached a new hight." (45)

The second part of the book, comprising some essays on the philosophy of Hartshorne, opens with 'empirical inquiries'. Here, the first essay dwells on his key thesis that 'neither pure chance nor the pure absence of chance can explain the world'; and the essayist, Charles Birch, ends with the conclusion that by virtue of its reasoned emphasis on the unity of all life—and on the possibility of extending human love to the whole creation—the philosophy of Charles Hartshorne serves 'to deepen the *extent*' of the concerns of our 'animal liberation' and 'conservation movements whose objective is to save nature from annihilation' (62). A.F. Skutch's essay, Bird Song and Philosophy, which follows, discusses the philosopher's thought on the subject under three heads: '(1) as a contribution to ornithology as a science based upon observation and experimentation, (2) as an essay in aesthetics or musicology as applied to bird song, and (3) as a contribution to the philosophy of nature'. In respect of the third aspect of enquiry I feel impelled to cite the following from the closing para of the essay:

"By giving cogent reasons for believing that not only we who hear the songs of birds but they who sing them find aesthetic value in them, (Hartshorne) makes feathered creatures seem close to us. For value is experienced only by beings that are conscious or feel." (75)

It may here be noted, in passing, that aesthetic principles dominate the entire range of Hartshorne's philosophy. Intelligence, for example, is (in his view) relational, applying to processes, in the main. Quite generally, 'an intelligent process is one that steers a course between monotony and chaos' (Lucio Chiaraviglio's essay on Hartshorne's *Aesthetic* Theory of Intelligence, p. 79, italics added). In this context, it is also important to note that this view of intelligence which makes processes *fundamental* obviates the need to posit some receptacle like 'mind' or 'psyche' to hold them together. (79, 89, italics added). Some common and important interprocess relations, according to Hartshorne, are reproduction, simulation and mimicry. Mimicry, he believes, may be taken to be 'instrumental to achieving the aesthetically satisfying middle ground between monotony and chaos, where song lies'. (88)

In a philosophy where aesthetic principles sway, sensations may well be expected to get more attention than they have commonly received. This, indeed, is so in the work of Hartshorne. William James turned the focus of psychology '*away from sensation* and toward such topics as learning, psychopathology, educational improvement, and emotion' (107, italics added). Hartshorne, on the other hand, argues, with considerable success, that the contents of sensations form *an affective continuum of aesthetically meaningful, socially expressive, organically adaptive and evolving experience functions.* (Essay 4, by Wayne Viney, p. 92, italics added). 'Taste sensations, even in the newborn, are hedonically toned and lead to identifiable approach or avoidance behaviours'. (99) As for the thesis of *intersensory continuity*, corroborative evidence is provided not only by such facts of everyday experience as a smell's appearing to be sweet or a colour's being sensed as warm, but by studies of individuals with congenital sensory defects. (93)

The relation of sensation to affect, rather than to cognition, is argued for as follows by John Hospers in the very opening of his essay on Hartshorne's aesthetics:

> "Phenomenologically—(that is, what it is) 'experienced as'—. . .sensation belongs with feeling and not with cognition. Sensing is simply a kind of experience as is feeling; both are immediate experience. . .It is, in fact, often difficult to distinguish a sensation from a feeling. Is a pleasure a sensation or a feeling? We speak both of 'a sensation of pleasure' and 'a feeling of pleasure'." (113-14)

Hospers, however, points out that though

> 'sensing is not a form of knowing (Cf. Price),. . .and. . .is like feeling in its utter immediacy and. . .non-inferential character. . .(one cannot say) that sensing *is* feeling. . .True. . .there are borderline cases in which we cannot make the distinction . . . But in other cases the distinction seems clear enough: color-experiences and sound-experiences are surely sensations, and exhilaration and depression are feelings. Does one really want to say that the experience of yellow is a feeling?" (114)

But if, as is likely, Hartshorne only wishes to insist on the closeness of the relation of sensation *to feeling*, the emphasis (says Hospers) is to be welcomed as not merely a radical, but defensible, departure from traditional psychology (114). This attitude of careful and qualified acceptance of Hartshorne's aesthetical views, I may add, distinguishes the essay in question (No. 5) all along. Let me illustrate this by putting the essayist's protests (all a little indented) immediately after a formulation of Hartshorne's individual views:

a. 'Aesthetic value . . . is intrinsic, immediately felt value . . . Aesthetic objects (scenes in nature, works of art) do not possess the intrinsic value; it is the *experience* of them that does' (125)

> But is aesthetic value really intrinsic *in every case*? What about tragedy? Does it not 'remind us of features of the human condition'? 'What a waste, that the good should be destroyed with the bad' is A.C. Bradley's theory of what all tragedy is . . .'

b. The most important feature that makes aesthetic objects suitable for the enjoyment of intrinsic (immediately felt) value is unity-in-diversity (125)

> True, 'this has been the testimony of aestheticians and critics for more than two thousand years'. (127) Yet, 'may not a diamond or ruby be beautiful—but where is its complexity?' (128)

c. "The entire warp and woof of aesthetic intuition, its sole content, is feeling" (128)

> This, again, is a sweeping generalization. 'Some works of art hardly touch 'the life of feeling' at all, but simply tease the eye or the ear; their impact is perceptual rather than emotional; consider some of Gauguin's and Matisse's color-harmonies or Mondrian's arrangements of straight lines intersecting at right angles' (128)

On the whole, however, Hospers may be said to look on Hartshorne as a pioneer even in the field of aesthetics:

> "It was easy for Santayana to say that beauty is pleasure seen as the quality of the object; since different persons take pleasure in different objects, the subjectivity of aesthetic judegments follows naturally. It is more difficult, but I believe more in accord with the facts, to take Hartshorne's more heroic course: to give a variety of reasons for insisting that in our judgement of affect it is not true that 'anything goes'. Many aestheticians . . . (Langer, Sircello, Tormey, and others) have followed Hartshorne in

pursuing. . . this more difficult course; but *it was Hartshorne who blazed the trail* . . ." (125, italics added)

The essay which follows—a critical evaluation of Hartshorne's philosophy of 'free will, determinism and creativity'—is also of crucial importance; for, in his own view, 'his entire philosophy could be called a "metaphysics of freedom" or a "metaphysics of creativity.' (135) The essayist, R.H. Kane, begins by pointing out that the notion of an immutable God is unacceptable to Hartshorne, for we cannot deny free will to God. Believing that 'the best compliment one can pay an important philosopher is to use his work as a stimulus to one's own thinking', Kane also makes 'some constructive proposals about the free will issue itself that go beyond, but are in part inspired by, Hartshorne's views'. (136) At the same time, the essayist takes pains to project, with due sympathy, the principal philosopher's own views, the more striking ones of which may be listed as follows:

> The uncertainty relations of quantum physics do not merely define the limits of our ability to know the physical world, they signify genuine indeterminacy in the physical world itself. (138)
>
> All events have causes, or causal conditions . . . but these causes are *necessary* conditions for the *occurrence* of their effects, not *sufficient determining* conditions (of their concrete, individual character) (140) italics and bracketted words added). Causation is not the same thing as determination. (144)
>
> God could not have created a strictly determined world, for in such a world there would be no free will, 'no creature would be ultimately responsible for the good or evil created; the ultimate responsibility would be God's.' (148)

Section B of the book comprises seven essays on the philosophy of religion. The first of these—written by H.T. Engelhardt, Jr., and entitled: 'Natural Theology and Bioethics'—concludes by saying that 'bioethics has a great deal to learn from his (Hartshorne's) work'. Earlier, we are told that Hartshorne

> has shown how reality can be convincingly portrayed in terms novel to, and corrective of inadequacies in, traditional Judaeo-Christian theological reflection (162)

Of the many bioethical issues which Hartshorne has addressed, the question of abortion is perhaps pre-eminent. He deals with it with the true dispassion of a philosopher:

> "In sober truth, how can one love a fetus, by all evidence with less actual intelligence than a cat, *as one loves oneself*? . . . I am negatively impressed by the idea that the proper conclusion of the 'rights' of the 'innocent' in the womb is to be arrived by looking with horror at moving pictures of a living, dying, or newly dead embryo. There are probably many more people rather than few who would have trouble eating meat if they had spent an hour or two in some giant slaughter-house. The cattle also are 'innocent', and they may well suffer on their way to our tables, as much as, or more than, aborted fetuses. Cattle, too, are intricate, wonderfully organized creatures." (163)

As for Hartshorne's thinking on God and allied matters, excellent instances of its freshness are to be found in J.B. Cobb's essay: 'Hartshorne's Importance for Theology'. I can here provide but a brief glimpse of it:

> God does not merely act, but is acted upon. If He knows and loves the world perfectly, God must also be affected by the world. If true human excellence does not involve insensitivity to others but resides in acting for the benefit of others and 'feeling their feelings with them' how can we accept Aristotle's God who is 'completely unaffected by what takes place in the world? 'A 'love' that leaves the lover unaffected by the joys and sufferings of the one who is loved is not worthy of being called love at all.' On the other hand, to be affected by the world is necessarily to change along with changes in the world. *God's character* may not be said to change, for 'He is faithful to what (He) promises', but He is not eternal in the Greek sense, that is, as being timelessly eternal and free from *all* change. (177-79) Nor can we acquiesce in the *omnipotence* of God, if it is taken to mean "that there is no power except God's power. (For) if creatures have no power at all then the power exercised by God in absolute control over them seems at best infinitesimal. We are impressed by God's power only because it seems effective in relation to (our) great powers." (181)

Enough has now been said, I may hope, to excite the Indian reader's interest in Hartshorne's thought; and I think I can now quicken the pace and be a little briefer in my comments on the remaining contents of the book.

The Whitehead-Hartshorne framework of *theism* has been discussed in the ninth essay, with both clarity and penetration, by W.L. Reese who collaborated with Hartshorne in the writing of the book: *Philosophers Speak of God*. Reese does not hesitate to point out that Hartshorne's account is confronted with the same problem as faces theism quite generally,—the problem, that is, which 'arises from situating intentionality in the heart of the universe, and calls for clarity with respect to the manner in which divine and human interests interrelate'. (201) Incidentally, a little earlier on the same page, the essayist provides a corrective to those who continue to labour under the illusion that Wittgenstein is not quite alive to the value of the *non*-verbal:

". . . In his comments about religion the non-verbal is featured. He suggested that one should take note of the gestures of prayer behind the words. And he at least once asserted that Mozart and Beethoven are *the actual sons of God* . . . Musical inspiration, this is surely obvious, both begins and ends non-verbally". (201, italics added)

The question, whether God and Ultimate Reality are identical or different, is discussed in the next essay. The author here begins by hinting at the facileness of Hartshorne's following argument:

The referent of worship is: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart . . . mind. . .soul. . .(and) strength" (Such an absorbing object of *all* human powers) 'cannot be less than all-inclusive reality'.

So, 'God is the all-inclusive reality'.

And next, quite fairly, emphasis is put on the need to *clarify* 'the relationship between the philosophical absolute and the religious absolute'. (203) The close of the essay, however, tilts towards the need to *distinguish* the two. Hartshorne, we are told, takes metaphysics as an attempt 'to clarify our conception of the absolute, necessary, strictly universal, infinite or perfect'. The essayist argues for an *addition* to 'Absolute' or 'all-encompassive Reality'—*from the viewpoint of religion*:

Reality does not seem perfect, even as all-inclusive Reality—now . . .The *believer* . . .(on the other hand) trusts that Reality is permeated by an Instance, Force, or loving, compassionate Concern that makes it worthwhile to hope *in spite of* the evident non-perfection of the world. (212, first italics added)

As if to redeem the balance, the essay which follows opens with an eloquent avowal (by Royce) of the value of a *philosopher's* enterprise:

(His) work is not lost when, in one sense, his system seems to have been refuted by death and when time seems to have scattered to scorn the words of his dust-filled mouth. His immediate end may have been unattained, but thousands of years may not be long enough to develop for humanity the full significance of his reflective thought. (215)

Allied to this is the conviction, which Hartshorne shares with Royce, that '(an) ongoing expansion of meaning, truth, and experience . . .(is) at the heart of reality' itself (ibid.). So the author, J.A. Kegley, purposely develops his essay (No. 11) as a kind of creative encounter between the two philosophers. But the writing is by no means merely expository. Kegley raises quite a few critical questions and suggests 'several avenues of further exploration for Hartshorne and process thought'. But what has struck *me* in the essay is also the parallel that the author visualizes between Royce's ethical maxim,

'loyalty to loyalty', and Hartshorne's own commitment to concern 'for life in all its forms':

"Not just tomorrow concerns me but my life as a whole is not just one human being which I am, or my little circle, but human beings generally, so far as I have dealings with them or can influence them. Indeed, not human life only but *life as such is the final reference of thought*". (229, italics added)

Royce is, however, not the only philosopher with whom Hartshorne's thought may be linked. S.B. King, in the next essay, seeks to explore at some length 'the deep and extensive areas of agreement' between the process philosopher *and Buddhism*. It is also argued that both stand to gain from each other. The extremely vast Buddhist writings constitute a veritable 'gold mine for Western philosophers interested in working out a viable anthropological philosophy'. On the other hand, Hartshorne's work in particular can do much to temper the lack of clarity and consistency in Buddhist thought. Above all,

"the ongoing dialogue between Buddhism and process philosophy is one more contribution to the mutual . . . understanding and sympathetic acceptance of world cultures." (250)

The mention of 'world cultures' may well remind us of Vedantic philosophy. This, however, is not the reason why J.G. Arapura's essay: 'Hartshorne's response to Vedanta' has been included in the volume. The explanation rather is that whereas

'Buddhism . . . (is) the truest precursor in antiquity of modern Process philosophy . . . Vedanta is viewed in ways befitting an utter opponent and repository of antithetical ideas'. (252)

However, Hartshorne himself focuses on the

'significant fact that ancient India produced both the most radical of monisms and the most radical of pluralisms',

the reference here being to Vedanta and Buddhism. The essayist too reveals a balanced attitude, if differently. He notices not only what opposes Vedanta to Hartshorne's thought but what the two may be said to share in a measure:

Hartshorne's view that God's must be effect as well as cause is very familiar to Vedanta as the causal (*kāraṇa*) Brahman and effect (*kārya*) Brahman, but with a very different meaning . . . (Moreover,) the inner thrusts are different. Hartshorne's call to combine 'sublime symmetry and sublime asymmetry in this (cause-effect) relationship' is quite new. (266-67)

Hartshorne's concept of metaphysical *asymmetry* is the subject of Essay

No. 14, by J.P. Devlin. The focus of this essay is on Hartshorne's substantial contribution to the theory of relations, that is, *his logic of ultimate contrasts.* But its content also includes individual treatment of the following important concepts, arguments, and problems; which means that the whole essay calls for a careful reading:

> asymmetric time as objective modality, the actual and the potential, the mind-body problem, the 'individual', the ontological argument and God's consequent nature, the priority of the relative and the actual in ethics and aesthetics, and metaphysics' logical cues.

As for Hartshorne's work in the field of metaphysics, N. Frankberry believes (Essay No. 15) that it deserves careful attention, for 'metaphysics has had a hard go of it in this century, having been treated too unsympathetically or indifferently by logical positivism and analytic philosophy (291). For the sake of brevity, however, from the rich content of Frankberry's essay, I may only pick the following views of Hartshorne for special mention:

> Properly understood, metaphysics is 'the unrestrictive or completely general theory of concreteness' or of process *qua* process. (293)
>
> 'A metaphysician. . .should be a logician, phenomenologist, linguistic analyst, and pragmatist. . .' (298-99)
>
> 'Only becoming...can be taken as inclusive of the contrast between being and becoming, without losing the contrast between them. . .From pure being, dialectics can arrive, at best, only at the idea of limited, determinate being—a far cry from becoming, or creativity.' (Ibid.)
>
> 'Something exists', 'experience occurs', and 'creative synthesis occurs',—propositions such as these may well be regarded as 'unconditionally necessary existential statements.' (297)

L.S. Ford's essay: 'Hartshorne's interpretation of Whitehead' is also germane to the volume, for Hartshorne is commonly regarded as one of the leading 'proponents and interpreters of Whitehead's philosophy'. (313) The substance of the essay is provided by a comparative account of the views of the two philosophers on four topics: God, eternal objects, prehension, and 'perishing'. The close of the essay invites attention to a subtle distinction between 'actualization as definition and actualization as determination'.

The next article (No. 17, by N.M. Martin) comprising 'some observations on the logical structure of Hartshorne's philosophy' opens with a touching reminiscence culminating in the reasoned compliment that, because of his readiness to profit from criticism—and also in virtue of his resolution to care for nothing but truth—Hartshorne may be said to be 'admirable in the creativeness of his thought. . .(and) in the beauty of his soul'. (340) Essay No. 18 explains how Hartshorne has contributed to the 'astonishing revival

of interest in the proofs of God's existence (not only) by his reconstruction of the ontological argument but even more by his showing that the neoclassical concept of God is able to face many critical questions'. (355)

One of the many interesting details of Hartshorne's thought projected in this essay is what he calls the *law of inclusive contrast*:

> "The relation between the two contrasts is not that of a conjunction, but that of inclusion: not A *and* B, but A *in* B. Being is in becoming, the necessary in the contingent . . . An example: The statement: 'two dodos + two dodos = four dodos' contains a contingent constituent, viz. the existence of dodos. Still it contains at the same time an absolute necessary truth, viz. that '2+2=4'. 'Being', 'necessary', 'unchangeable' . . .etc. are abstract terms. Their opposites are concrete . . . The abstract is *in* the concrete." (359)

According to Hartshorne, 'the concrete terms are fundamental, the abstract ones are derived from them'. (Ibid.) So, it is in the fitness of things that a full essay (No. 19, by R.C. Neville) is devoted to a discussion of Hartshorne's views on 'time, temporality, and ontology'. Here, again, some helpful distinctions are drawn and explained, say, between present timeliness, present temporality, past timeliness (377-78); or between 'the perishing of subjectivity and the perishing of achieved value'. (383) As for the more important conclusions of the essay, the following two are perhaps most relevant to human life:

a. Present temporality displays the only time in which people are *free to do something about their circumstances.*

b. But, take as a whole, human being in time has three temporalities. None of these can be ignored with impunity. "The age of science emphasized the temporality of the past, and translated the other temporalities into past terms in so far as it recognized them (e.g., deterministic interpretations of choice). The jaded post scientific age of our own time emphasizes present temporality where the translation of truth and moral values into aesthetics seems proof against de-existentialized past temporality. Not since the Christian middle ages has *a concern for the normative future* dominated the sense for truth." (393, italics added)

The past too, we may note, has received due philosophic attention from Hartshorne. This is borne out by T.L.S. Sprigge's essay (No. 20) on the process philosopher's conception of the past. Essentially, however, the essay is a reasoned criticism of Hartshorne's 'view of time and his closely related views about relations and the way in which the universe as a whole is in God'. (398) Essay No. 21, by P.G. Kuntz, discusses 'Hartshorne's theory of Order and Disorder'. Here, a notable detail of the theory is the emphasis

that " 'disorder' is not the mere denial or negate of 'order' ". (415) Hartshorne believes that one reason why we have 'so far failed to do justice to chaos' is 'that we often identify the orderly as alone intelligible'. But chaos may also be taken as chance or randomness; and in so far as, according to Hartshorne, randomness as a form of chaos is present in all nature, it is 'knowable by forms of thought appropriate to such happenings'. (421-22) 'What is possible is an infinite range between absolute order and absolute chaos. What is impossible is absolute order or absolute chaos'. (422) Hartshorne goes to the extent of insisting that even in the being of God both order *and chance* must be said to be there. We 'never . . . have a dilemma with regard to man, is he (or his act) determined or voluntary? We must always say, to a degree spontaneous, and to a degree, within limits'. (423) Why should it be otherwise in the case of God? Hartshorne does not hesitate to put this question even to Einstein:

> "Einstein said, against indeterminism, that he could not believe 'in a dice-throwing God'. But to have free creatures is, in effect, to throw dice. *So why not a dice-throwing God*?' I fear the great Albert—and he was indeed great—fell into the idolatory of identifying deity with absolute law or non-chance. We may be afraid of chance, but God need not be afraid even of that." (423, italics added)

Hartshorne's avowed opposition to the idea of a *changeless* God may well make us wonder if he is really a believer himself. But, on his own admission (see the last para of my summary of his autobiography in the book) he *is* one. It is indeed possible to argue not only that

> "his theology, despite the logical structuring of his philosophy, is not originally a deduction from his metaphysics', but that 'his ideas on the nature of God . . . (and) his position on the existence of God, despite his attachment to the ontological *argument*, are grounded more in a basically religious faith than in logic." (433, italics added.)

This is indeed the burthen of S.M. McMurrin's essay (No. 22) on Hartshorne's views on 'classical metaphysics and theology'. An interesting detail of this essay is Hartshorne's own list of what he has rightly called the 'deficiencies of inherited religions':

> Other-worldliness, Power Worship, Asceticism, Moralism ("the notion that serving God is almost entirely a matter of avoiding theft and adultery and the like, together with dispensing charity, leaving noble-hearted courageous creative action in art, science, and statesmanship as religiously neutral or secondary"), Optimism ("the denial that tragedy is fundamental in the nature of existence and God"), and Obscurantism ("the theory that we can best praise God by indulging in contradiction and semantical nonsense"). (435)

R. Wiehl's essay: 'Hartshorne's Panpsychism' discusses the subject under four heads: Rational and Empirical Metaphysics; Is Panpsychism a Monism or a Dualism?; The several Meanings of Panpsychism; and The Philosophy of Organism as Alternative to a Metaphysical Panpsychism. The second and third sections are devoted to a comparative discussion of the metaphysics of Hartshorne and Whitehead; and the final one ends with an expression of the wonder if 'Hartshorne has succeeded in justifying panpsychism on the basis of a process ontology, without becoming involved in the antinomies which Whitehead through his philosophy of organism wanted to eliminate'. (462)

Whitehead, however, is not the only philosopher to whom Hartshorne is related philosophically. Plato is another; and the whole of Essay No. 24 (by D.A. Dombrowski) is an attempt to vindicate, with due reason, Hartshorne's own admission: "I have always been something of a Platonist. (484) Two important areas of the relationship in question have, however, been left out: '(*a*) love and ethics; and (*b*) the *history of philosophy*, whose progress is judged by Hartshorne against the standard of "the genuinely Platonic program.' " (487, italics added)

In respect of history of philosophy, Hartshorne's 'three-fold complaint' has been interestingly brought out by J.E. Smith in his essay: 'Neoclassical Metaphysics and the History of Philosophy':

> First, history of philosophy has so far confined itself to 'influential views and arguments'; the 'possible ones' have been merely ignored. To take an example, whereas the views of Spinoza and Leibniz on God have received plenty of attention because they were 'most influential thinkers', Socinus, who refuses to accept 'the long-standing conception of God as the unmoved Mover'—and is quite alive to the possibility that God may well gain '*new* knowledge through the medium of the emergence of new facts and creative human actions and decisions' (491)—did *not* get the notice he deserved.
>
> Second, 'the majority of those writing the history of philosophy have not been . . . analytic' enough. They have presented philosophies 'en bloc'—Platonism, Aristotelian, Hegelianism, etc.—as if they were organisms all of whose features are interdependent and equally important . . . (What we really need) . . . is the history of problems rather than of systems'. (491)
>
> Thirdly, 'many historians of philosophy . . . have given insufficient help in the difficult matter of deciding what positions should be taken seriously and which may be safely discarded'. (492)

The essay ends with the comment that whereas Hartshorne is to be admired for

> (his) seriousness and. . .candor. . .(as against many) who tend to mistake intellectual fireworks for philosophical illumination, he betrays an exces-

sive self-confidence in his logical argumentation, and a severity in exposing the oversights of others which at times borders on the sort of moralism we associate with Fichte for whom philosophical error was tantamount to moral deficiency. (506)

At the same time, it must be admitted that besides contributing substantially to the *tradition* of process philosophy' Hartshorne has made earnest and effective attempts to interpret its historical development. (510) This development, and Hartshorne's own contribution to the tradition in question, have been discussed in detail by G.R. Lucas, Jr. in Essay No. 26 under the following heads: 'From Pre-Darwinian Evolutionists to Hegel', 'Post-Hegelian Idealism and Later Evolutionary Cosmology', 'The Realist Revolt and the Reformulation of Idealism', and 'Whitehead and Hartshorne'. 'This analysis (the essayist concludes) suggests in particular that post-Hegelian idealism represents a legitimate but quite distinct school of process philosophy of which Hartshorne has emerged as one of a very few surviving contemporary representatives'. (523)

Hartshorne may also be regarded, quite fairly, 'as a distinctly American philosopher'. (529) This is what D.S. Lee seeks to show in his essay (No. 27) on Hartshorne and pragmatic metaphysics. Quite generally, America may be said to be a country which worships 'political liberty and psychological freedom of choice'. Hartshorne has not written persuasive tracts on these values, but he *has* 'penetrated through the everyday experience of free choice and self-determination to a ground of metaphysically real freedom'. (529) But for projecting 'Hartshorne's distinct American flavor. . .the essayist has thought it proper to look at it 'against the school of thought in American philosophy which best captures its spirit, pragmatism' (531); and the approach seems warranted, for Hartshorne himself says:

> "From Peirce and James I accept a basic pragmatism . . . ideas must be expressible in living and behavior or they are merely verbal". (Ibid.)

Consider, for instance, the case of God-talk. 'What is it *in human experience* that indicates to someone that he is referring to God? Hartshorne's answer is: our '*experiences* of worship, nature's regularity, and participation . . . in a reality wider than personal experience'. (541, italics added)

The penultimate para of this essay should make for a better understanding of Hartshorne's philosophy:

> "How can the universe escape being completely determined? Process philosophy, taking chance variation and so genuine novelty and emergence seriously, reconciles the new permanence and the new change by shifting from individual substances being basic to events being basic. Timelessness gets replaced by time passage (beforeness and afterness) as fundamental." (548)

Essay No. 28, 'A Historian's sketch of Hartshorne's Metaphysics', makes two main points:

(*a*) Hartshorne's *Insights and Oversights of Great Thinkers* is a remarkable history of philosophy, for here he 'never fails to speak out his own evaluation of relevant points of each system',—a trait in which the work 'is only equalled by those of Hegel and . . . Bertrand Russell' (552); and

(*b*) Hartshorne is 'remarkably free from the traditional prejudice in the West against atomism'. (556)

The final article, by K. Matsunobu, is rather thin in philosophic content, but it *is* able to do what it aims at, that is, to give us an account of 'Hartshorne's impression on the Kyoto School' in Japan. (564)

Part III of the book, 'The Philosopher Replies', is a model of clear, systematic, penetrating, and on the whole very helpful writing. It is remarkable also because of the balance of its attitude to other philosophers, frank in disagreement but also unfailing in acknowledgement of excellence wherever it is due, most noticeably, perhaps, in his 'response' to Hospers (600-606). All this should be easily clear to the reader. What *I* may now attempt in the closing part of this review is only to focus on some such *views* of Hartshorne himself as may be implicit in his replies to criticism and are yet of help in improving our understanding of his philosophy. Re-statement of his argument can only be very infrequent, for a fuller account of the thrust and parry of debate would call for repetition of a good deal of what I have already said.

Now, the very opening of the Reply shows laudable method. Hartshorne not only groups his responses into 'four major classes' but gives reasons for the *order* in which he puts and follows them. (569-70) Next, to show how he stands for both 'the old and the new', he puts forth his own answer, by way of supporting the 'ancient' view on the matter, to 'the supposedly genuine question, "why is there something rather than nothing?'; and also outlines his own unorthodox attitude to the view that the Bible is the Word of God:

> My answer is there is something rather than nothing because the 'being of total non-being' is contradiction or mere nonsense. 'Nothing' is an essentially negative term . . . and absolutizing it destroys its legitimate meaning . . . (As for the view that) the Bible is *literally* the Word of God, it is Bibliolatory, not worship of God . . . It is God, not any book or set of books, that loves us and all beings as we cannot love ourselves or any human or subhuman reality. (Further), it is only God we should love 'with *all* our being'. It cannot be done with our species, as the beloved, for something in us will love the other non-human animals and much more besides . . . (I am) not for secular *humanism*. I am for too much a

biologist as well as too much a metaphysician to take that seriously, except as a danger. And the same for so-called fundamentalism, in which also I see a serious danger for us all." (571)

This is followed by a lucid account (by Hartshorne) of the principles which have regulated his philosophical thinking. Here, in projecting his fourth principle he makes some remarks, by way of arguing that 'causes are to be defined as necessary *but not strictly sufficient* conditions for what concretely occurs' which express a basic conviction and make eminent sense:

"It is a fallacy of ultra-rationalism (from the Stoics to Kant, Fichte, and, I think, Hegel) to exalt necessity as the key to intelligibility . . . Initially given only necessity there is no way to go to find the real world. Life is a dealing with contingencies presented by the creative process which is the positive locus of possibility . . . Events have *enabling* conditions. But whether or not their conditions make them happen *just as they do* is a distinct question . . . We do make successful predictions. But . . . no one in his or her senses sees it as a goal of life to acquire power to predict *all* happenings in detail. We know that the experience of *un-anticipated* novelties is a good part of the charm of life, including the life of scientists who hope to make *surprising* discoveries." (575, all italics added, except the first)

Explanation of the next principle too contains some reflections which are both sane and quite neatly put:

"Errors come in pairs of opposite extremes, the truth being somehow *between the extremes* . . . Respect for those holding an extreme view, say . . . radical pluralism. (Of Hume, followed by Russell, etc.) should lead us to reject the extreme opposite view, radical monism, similarly, respect for radical monism . . . leads us to reject radical pluralism. If we adopt either extreme, we imply that those holding the opposite view must be hopelessly irrational. Instead, we should say, "These people, (on either side) may have been a bit crazy or odd, but not that crazy or odd . . . Doctrinal contraries may both be wrong, but cannot both be right. This elementary logical truth is remarkably neglected in metaphysics, for example by F.H. Bradley and Bertrand Russell." (576)

An instance of how some significance may be seen even in what one rejects, on the whole and definitely, occurs in Hartshorne's succinct statement of his thirteenth principle:

"To say that 'everything' is such and such—for example, is necessary, or is contingent . . .—is scarcely to say anything . . . Blanshard's 'to understand is to see to be necessary' is a perfect example of a metaphysical error ('Perfect' here is meant as a compliment. . .Clarity is a virtue. Only good

writers can be so clearly wrong as he is on this issue.) To understand is to see some things or aspects of things as necessary and some as contingent; neither term would function *existentially* if the other did not."(579, italics added)

The remaining 'principles' too, as Hartshorne states and explains them, provide solid argument for looking askance at the views of some eminent philosophers; but because I cannot go on indefinitely I may confine myself to the following extracts from P (for 'principle') 15, P 16 and P 19:

"Among the necessary truths this must be one: necessarily there are some positive contingent truths. The job of the metaphysician is to make as clear as possible, rather than to blur or deny, the distinction between the two sorts of truths. Hegelians have tended to deny, or at best to blur hopelessly, this distinction . . . William James, by trying to treat *all* truth as contingent and empirically testable . . . got into what Montague called the 'pragmire of confusion that made some of James's writings on pragmatism largely a sad wasteland." (580, italics added)

"The principle of sufficient reason in its strong Leibnizian form must be given up. It not only *contradicts freedom* or (if you prefer) hopelessly trivializes it, but also raises the question, does the sufficient reason itself have a sufficient reason? If there is an infinite regress of reasons, what is the reason for the entire series?" (580-81, italics added)

"*The history of ideas is a testing ground.* Consider, for example, the following: Greek materialism began as deterministic (Democritus). Epicurus took chance to be an aspect of freedom, as much later did Peirce and James. Whitehead agreed with them, though he prefers 'disorder' to 'chance' or 'randomness' . . . Probability (not necessity of events) is the guide of life. Again, modern science began as strictly deterministic and modern theology as largely so. First the Socinian theologians, then Kierkegaard, then more and more theologians; first Maxwell and Peirce, then Heisenberg, then more and more scientists, broke with the tradition of unfreedom. Sheer determinism is not a survivor in the evolution of ideas." (583)

Hartshorne, I conclude, does not only argue. He is able to offer quite a few truths that illuminate our mind. But *argument* too, both clear and incisive, abounds in the way he reacts to the twenty-nine essays. It is, however, too ample and various to admit of a quick summary.

But I am anxious to show, before I close, that Hartshorne is perhaps as much a man of *faith* as a man of thought. He himself tells us:

"I do argue for psychicalism *from my theism* and have from the beginning. For example in a 1912 poem:

There's a spirit in the mountain,
In every living thing,
And it sparkles in the fountains
That from the hillsides spring . . .
It's the spirit of God's love.

If there are literary sources for this, they are the Bible, Emerson, Wordsworth, and Shelley. In my poem, as a fifteen-year-old, I did not mean simply that nature is beautiful and useful to human beings. I was already focusing on bird song as a revelation of aesthetic feeling in animals far from the human kind." (692)

The hint that all life is perhaps one may well be expected to tickle the Indian mind, but here is something to tease it too:

"I find . . . a kind of false rationalism in the doctrine of *karma* . . . I regard as superstition the attempt to find moral explanations for all evils . . . I hold that it tends to discourage sympathy to give moral justifications for what comes to us from without. To say, 'he deserved to be born blind' does not promote sympathy, but rather a smug, 'That's his *karma*' . . . Common sense with its ideas of good and bad 'luck' is sounder than deterministic theories. Our weal and woe depend partly on what happens around us, and partly on how we use our freedom in responding to what happens." (627)

On the whole, I repeat, the book is an excellent presentation of a philosopher's life-work. It is truly what the editor has striven to make it: a work of remarkable 'clarity, comprehensiveness, and accuracy'. Its price is not mentioned, but its size (785 pages) and quality make it obvious that very few students and teachers of philosophy in India will be able to buy it. Our libraries have to help.

Book reviews

G.C. NAYAK, *Philosophical Reflections*, Delhi, Indian Council of Philosophical Research/Motilal Banarsidass, 1987, pp. ix+166, Rs. 65.

This stimulating collection of essays on various topics, mostly within the field of Indian philosophy, by Professor Nayak, is aptly characterised as 'reflections' since they result from a primarily analytical and critical approach to the topics addressed. The title also serves to indicate that the book is not a tightly structured whole but a collection; nevertheless, there is a definite progression to the work as a whole. One is tempted, indeed, to apply to its eighteen chapters the division into three sets of six so familiar in exegesis of the *Bhagavadgītā* and to declare that its first third deals with basic issues in Advaita Vedānta and in Mahāyāna Buddhism, the middle third discusses themes relating to the development of Indian thought, and the final third moves on to look at several issues in the field of philosophy in general (culminating in a final chapter entitled 'Can There Be a Synthesis of Eastern and Western Thought?'). Professor Nayak, who is the author of several previous books in both English and Oriya, is thoroughly at home in both Indian philosophy, where his personal inclinations obviously lean towards the Advaita, and in contemporary Western philosophy, while at the same time he writes in a very clear, incisive style; the result is that, although this book ranges so widely in its relatively brief compass, it has a number of interesting and stimulating points to make throughout.

The collection begins with a study of the views on enlightenment of the Advaita and the Mādhyamika, which emphasises the significant differences while recognising 'a remarkable affinity'. This leads naturally into the next study on the philosophy of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, which starts from the Mahāyāna reinterpretation of *pratītyasamutpāda* as a logical theory of interdependence of concepts as a necessary preliminary to a proper understanding of *prajñā and śūnyatā*. The third chapter takes us further east with a discussion of *Satori* in Zen Buddhism and the fourth chapter rounds off the group of essays on Buddhist topics with an examination of the Four Noble Truths, which concentrates in particular on what was unique about the Buddha's views on the problem of suffering. The next chapter incisively tackles a similarly fundamental issue with an examination of 'the Gordian Knot of *māyā*' in Advaita, where Nayak's highlighting of the differences between Śaṅkara himself and later Advaitins inevitably is reminiscent of D.H.H. Ingalls' well-known paper, 'Śaṅkara on the question: Whose is *Avidyā*?' (*Philosophy East and West* 3, 1953, pp. 69-72), to which however he makes no reference (in fact all the footnotes in this chapter are citations

of the original texts, and in general Nayak is sparing of secondary references, though clearly fully conversant with the literature). The sixth chapter is then devoted to the significance of knowledge in Śaṅkara and Yājñavalkya and similarly concentrates on analysis of their own statements.

The seventh chapter on tolerance in Advaita opens strikingly with Karl Popper's account of a meeting with Ludwig Wittgenstein as an illustration of the failure of philosophers to live up to their own views, which enables him to dismiss quite effectively limited evidence of intolerance within the Advaita system, while affirming that 'tolerance is the natural concomitant of transcendental form of monism'. Already in this chapter he introduces the concept of transcendental secularism which forms the subject of the next chapter, where he argues that monism (and especially the Advaita) is secular in that it is not tied to any religious dogma or ritual. This is followed quite naturally by a consideration of some highlights of the concept of freedom in Indian thought in the ninth chapter and by a study of rationalism in the *Bhagavadgītā* in the tenth; the latter emphasises the role of reason in Kṛṣṇa's message and of rationality in the devotee's response to him, drawing in part on the views of Bairāgī Miśra and providing a worthwhile corrective to the tendency to see the *Bhagavadgītā* as a *bhakti* text exclusively. Next come two chapters on the thought of individual philosophers: one on Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa, an eighteenth-century Orissan philosopher belonging to the school of Caitanya (a comparatively neglected figure, of whose philosophical views he gives a clear and sympathetic account), and one on Aurobindo (where Nayak stresses the mystical, rather than philosophical, element in his thought, especially by reference to his poem *Savitri*).

The last six chapters are then devoted to broader issues: the multiple facets of analytical philosophy (essentially a defence of its relevance to the contemporary situation), the problem of universals (a brief but trenchant critique of much past obscurantism on the topic), what is living and what is dead in religion (observations on the decline in religious observances and a plea for the ethical side of concern for all), a plea for 'common-ism' (Nayak's term for a deliberate orientation towards the needs and aspirations of the common people, examples of which he then seeks in the Indian tradition), *dharma* and *mokṣa* as values (a particularly wide-ranging discussion), and the possibility of a synthesis of Eastern and Western thought (here, as elsewhere in the work, Eastern means in practice Indian, and especially Advaitin, thought; a powerful plea for caution in the attempt to find exact parallels, coupled with a number of acute observations on past attempts). The final chapter provides a fitting conclusion to the whole, demonstrating its relevance to the present, as well as showing the author's ability to bring together concisely the most diverse material. It is to be regretted that the number of misprints is quite high and some are obstrusive, though fortunately not (so far as I noticed) destroying the sense on any occasion. Professor Nayak has produced an interesting and stimulating set of essays here, which deserves a wide audience.

University of Edinburgh, U.K. J.L. BROCKINGTON

RONALD ENGLEFIELD: *Critique of Pure Verbiage* (ed.) G.A. Wells and D.R. Oppenheimer. La Salla, Illinois, Open Court, 1990. pp. xvii+119, Paperback.

The author of this book, though not a celebrity, is an interesting person. Born exactly a century ago, in 1891, he won a scholarship to St. John's College, Cambridge in 1909 where he studied French and German. He fought in the First World War, taking part in the Bulgarian campaign, and was mentioned in a Despatch from Gen. Sir A.F. Miles, for gallant and distinguished service. Around 1919 "He underwent an intellectual and emotional upheaval." From 1920 he taught French and German in schools for more than three decades and "acquired an astonishing stock of learning in history, psychology, philosophy, mathematics and natural sciences." He died in 1974 at the age of 84.

Brought up as a practising Christian he encountered Tolstoy's "heretical brand of Christianity." Later he read the works of Guyau and J.N. Robertson, the historian of Freethought. These readings brought about a change in his attitude towards Christianity. As the editor observes, (p. xv) "Robertson remained one of Englefield's intellectual heroes." Who else did Englefield admire? Condillac, Diderot and Voltaire. Among historians, H.T. Buckle; among psychologists he had great respect for Köhler and Ernst Mach, and he was beholden to neurophysiologists like Pavlov and Sherrington.

The editors observe (p. xiv) that Englefield did not see "humankind as a uniquely privileged species of animal . . . Language was a human invention, like wheel, and its existence did not require a mystical explanation." Englefield thought of the "trial-and-error behaviour" as significant; he coined the word "peirasis" which, "in its simplest form, consists in playing around with the environment until satisfaction of the animal's needs is achieved." The development of human inventions, tools and techniques, language, mathematics and scientific method are all sought to be explained by "peirasis".

One is tempted to ask: Does the (human) animal remain the same when his needs are satisfied? Must we assume that the needs of a Socrates are the same as the needs of an Ox? Perhaps satisfaction, in turn, brings about an abiding change in the life of the 'satisfied animal'; perhaps the surroundings too undergo change. These changes nudge the 'satisfied' animal to play around, once again, in a renewed environment brought into existence by the animal himself.

To one of the editors Englefield wrote in 1940, "I cannot accept the view according to which there is more than one rational way of studying the world and science is the only one way." (p. xvi) In the final paragraph of 'Conclusions' the author reiterates, "There is no fundamental distinction that separates the anthropological from the physical sciences." (p. 110) He is particularly unhappy "with Kant and his followers" because "neither their admirers nor their critics have been able to understand what they are trying to say." (p. xvi)

Hasn't 'Science' acquired new meanings over the centuries? How do we, in any case, identify what should be christened as the "one rational way"?

The book consists of three parts. In part one, entitled 'Verbiage and Literature' Englefield deals with the abuses of language in the writings of George Kenneth Burks, (*The Philosophy of Literary From, Studies in Symboiic Action* and T. S. Eliot. He is particularly critical of Eliot's estimate of Pascal. His irreverence towards I.A. Richards, Croce, Wimsatt and Brooks, (*Literary Criticism: A Short History*) F. R. Leavis, (*New Bearings in English Poetry*) Ruskin, (*The Crown of Wild Olive*) go to reveal Englefield's stolid iconoclasm, I can only recommend the inquisitive rather to go through Englefield's observations, too numerous to be quoted.

Speaking generally I must confess that Englefield is not always off the mark. His detestation for the use of pretentious words and the habit of taking shelter behind verbiage and pomposity either to decry or adulate an author, are indeed praiseworthy.

In part two, 'Verbiage and Religion' Englefield takes authors like Cardinal Newman and Kant to task. He quotes De Quincey, Carlyle and Macaulay who were critical of Kant's Prose and Philosophy which, incidentally, are not one and the same thing. Englefield, naturally, could not resist the temptation of repeating the well-known joke that Sterling never divulged the secret of Hegel. He found Whitehead's attempt at reconciling science and religion wholly unacceptable. In his chapter on 'Whitehead' (Chapter 5) Englefield offers "Straightforward English" translations of some of the passages taken from whitehead. I quote a couple of examples:

Whitehead: "Religion is the translation of general ideas into particular thoughts, particular emotions, and particular purposes: it is directed to the end of stretching individual interest beyond its self-defeating particularity."

Englefield's translation: Religion teaches us to behave ourselves. Here is another passage from *Whitehead*: "The two sides of the organism require a reconciliation in which emotional experiences illustrate a conceptual justification and conceptual experiences find an emotional illustration."

Englefield's translation: "It would be nice if one could enjoy the pleasures of scientific speculation without being depressed by the implications of one's conclusion."

At one place Englefield observes that "he (Whitehead) is merely reiterating that religion is concerned with the validity of the dream-world and science with that of the real world."

I fear that in translating Englefield has trivialized Whitehead's views.

Part three, 'Verbiage and Philosophy' is perhaps the most interesting for the readers of this journal. The chapter entitled 'Things, Ideas and Words', I am afraid, is a little too naive in that the author's observations about "the secret of linguistic communication" (p. 77) are a little too simple to be true. This is what he says, "All the pompous paraphernalia of description and verbal definition, unless it rests upon a basis of recoverable concrete experience, can convey nothing. Since experience can be recalled by association, when conventional signs or sounds have become associated with particular experiences, the latter can be recalled by the former." (p. 77)

Englefield's criticisms of Ryle's views, especially the later's notion of 'Category-mistake' are neither illuminating nor incisive. I do not mean to suggest that Ryle is beyond criticism. But Englefield's approach does not seem to be significant. Chapter 9, dealing with Heidegger is a little too brief. The notion of Being has kept the philosophers preoccupied since the time of the Greeks as Charles H. Kahn has shown in his famous paper entitled "The Greek Verb 'To Be' and The Concept of Being." (see *Foundations of Language* 2 (1966) 245-65)

The subjects which, according to Englefield, mostly excite the curiosity of the reflective people are "the problems of health and sickness, social and political organisation, and the nature, origins and destiny of man and the universe around him". (p. 107) Fair enough. But 'rock paintings' of the primitive men found in the different parts of the world and the oral poetical traditions and several dance forms found in 'primitive civilizations' certainly reveal different dimensions.

Sentences (even words), it is believed, encode messages which wait to be decoded by their readers or listeners. The authors of the sentences 'interpret' the world around them. This would, let me add, not exclude their own thoughts, feelings, hopes, aspirations and frustrations. These 'interpretations' conveyed in language and speech are, once again, interpreted by the countless readers and listeners. Obviously these readers and listeners are not necessarily unanimous (and they need not be) in their respective 'interpretations'. Hence in an important sense there are 'interpretations' all the way. The search for an Ur-message (an uninterpretable and uninterpreted message) which is sought to be communicated is, indeed, a hopeless task.

At the one end of the spectrum there is the view that anything worthwhile in the realm of thought (and also perhaps feeling) can and must be expressed in language. What, in other words, is not expressible in 'speech' is not worthy of examination and response.

At the other end, there is the view that language, even when it is handled with great skill and care, falls short of the intentions of the author. Plato, we all know, acknowledged the limitations of the written message. Being a

Greek he could not set aside 'speech' altogether. But many thinkers in the East, going the whole hog, recommended 'silence', in so far at least, as the foundational issues are concerned.

Perhaps the truth, as it is perceived and examined by the 'human' mind, lies somewhere in between these two extremes. Language, written as well as spoken, with all the suggestiveness and nuances, does bring about unwanted ossification, as it were. But, paradoxically, these expressions are amenable to fresh and unforeseen interpretations. By acknowledging the various ways his message is interpretable, the author grants freedom to his readers, his critics as well as his admirers. After all, an informed and enlightened author should not expect his readers to be passive receptacles. According to the Indian tradition the reader, on his part, is not expected merely to hear the message; he is also expected to reflect on what he has heard and, finally, must proceed to deeply meditate on the contents of what he has heard. He will have received the message only on the completion of the third step. Language, as it is wielded by the literary artists and scholars of the humanistic disciplines must be viewed, both by the authors who fashion their thoughts as well as by the readers who are believed to be at the receiving end, as singularly pliant and versatile in nature and character. In other words, precision, or *akribeia* as the Greeks said, which has such an important place in the realm of scientific, mathematical and legal discourses, cannot be expected to have an analogous significance in the humanistic disciplines. This, however, does not mean that verbiage, loquacity and long-windedness should be admired as virtues or marks of erudition.

[The reviewer of this book, Shri A.M. Ghosh, has unfortunately passed away since the review was written.—Editor]

Obituary

MAHĀMAHOPĀDHYĀYA PANDIT P.N. PAṬṬĀBHIRĀMA ŚĀSTRĪ

Śāstrī Jī passed away on 1st September, 1992 at 11.15 p.m. in a private hospital in Delhi. He was born in Pwlasur village near Kanchipuram in 1908 and educated at Tirupati and Varanasi under M.M. Chinnaswami Śāstrī whose daughter he married later on. At the time of his sad demise he was the Chancellor of the Rashtriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Tirupati and National Professor of Veda appointed by the Rashtriya Veda Vidya Pratishthan.

Initially he served Banaras Hindu University and later on was appointed Principal of Maharaja Sanskrit College, Jaipur by Sir Mirza Ismail on the recommendation of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya. In 1952 Śāstrī Jī was invited by the University of Calcutta to grace the Chair of Mīmāṁsā. He wished to spend last years of his career in Varanasi where he was appointed as Professor and Head, Department of Sāhitya, Mīmāṁsā and Tantra in 1975. He was honoured by the President of India in 1973, by Jagadguru Sri Sankaracharya of Kanchipuram, Kanchi and he received the award of Padmabhushan from the Government of India. U.P. Sanskrit Academy gave him Vishva Bharati award for international eminence which carried a cash prize of Rs. 1 lakh, Sampurnananda Sanskrit University and the University of Burdwan conferred upon him Mahamahopadhyaya and D. Litt. degrees (*honoris causa*) respectively. Various other academic bodies and organisations honoured him with titles.

Born, and initially educated, in South India, he spent his life in East, West and North and thus represented a real unity and integrity of this country in his person and disposition. He has numerous *śiṣyas* in Jaipur, Calcutta and Varanasi and particularly in the centres of traditional learning pursuing various śāstras, more particulary Mīmāṁsā. Śāstrī Jī's contribution to Mīmāṁsā is unique in many respects. His writings (also editions of Mīmāṁsā texts) which are nearly fifty in number and lectures, spread over half a century, demonstrate his absolute mastery of the śāstric tradition of India, pre-eminence of Mīmāṁsā therein and its contemporary relevance. This is fully borne out by his works, such as Mīmāṁsānyāya Mañjarī and the exposition of the Artha-saṁgraha. His discovery of several texts of Mīmāṁsā and their scholarly editions has enriched the extant literature. He has shown applicability of Mīmāṁsā principles in other śāstras and shown their usefulness in present democratic and egalitarian structure of the country. This is a unique contribution.

Śāstrī Jī was a living symbol of the glorious tradition of a Pandit who could weave the past into the present fabric of thought and culture. Till his last day, there was not a single moment of his wakeful state when he was not either editing a text, correcting a proof, writing a paper or giving instructions to his very old and very young pupils in Varanasi where he was directing the activities of Veda Mīmāṁsā Anusandhāna Kendra. India has lost a Pandit of unique achievements who had shown the path for India's unity and integrity through learning and culture on traditional lines. In his death the country has lost a great Sanskrit scholar and champion of Indian heritage and culture. As an erudite scholar in Vedas, Vedāṅgas, Upaniṣads and Darśanas, he has contributed substantially to the correct interpretation and appreciation of ancient knowledge inherited by us from our ancient seers and philosophers.

Rajasthan University, Jaipur R.C. DWIVEDI

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Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

Editor: DAYA KRISHNA

Volume X Number 1 Sept.-Dec. 1992

Annual Subscriptions: Institutions Rs 150 (*inland*), US, $ 20 (foreign); individuals Rs 100 (*inland*), US $ 15 (*foreign*); Students and retired teachers Rs 50 (*inland*), US $ 10 (foreign); Single issue Rs 50 (*inland*), US $ 10 (*foreign*); Life membership Rs 750.

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This book shows the close relation between the phenomenology of the West and the phenomenological approach taken by Indian thinkers, both classical and modern. It illustrates that the underlying spirit of phenomenology and hermeneutics has been consciously followed by Indian philosophers for centuries and is not peculiar to western thinkers. It also shows that Edmund Husserl and K.C. Bhattacharyya were aware of these parallel trends of thought.

Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy addresses not only the basic theme of phenomenology, but its aesthetic, social, psychological, scientific, and technological aspects as well. *Royal 8vo 376 Pages Rs 290*

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INDIAN COUNCIL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH . NEW DELHI
in association with
MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED . DELHI

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Subscription Information **ISSN** 0022-1791
1992, Volume 20 (4 issues)
Subscription rate: Dfl.304.00/US$155.00
incl. postage and handling

P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, The Netherlands
P.O. Box 358, Accord Station, Hingham, MA 02018-0358, U.S.A.

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