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LIFE-WORLDS

Edited by : Daya Krishna

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Continued on back cover

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The Life-World and its Metaphysical Significance

R.C. PRADHAN
Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi 110 062

Life-world is the framework or the horizon in which human beings live, work and think. It is this horizon which contains the human forms of life, the hopes, aspirations, beliefs and attitudes towards the world and other human beings. The life-world is the foundation of human life in general. It has an element of universality that transcends the boundaries of culture, language, race and religion.

In this paper I will enquire into the metaphysical significance of the life-world. I will argue that life-world constitutes the transcendental basis of our culture, social relationships, moral and metaphysical attitudes. I will also argue that ultimately there is the life-world, rather than life-worlds, which provides metaphysical foundations to our culture and society.

I. THE IDEA OF THE LIFE-WORLD

Husserl defines life-world as something pre-given, constitutive and self-evident. It is the one that needs no prior preparation, it being the very basis of all our activities. Life-world in this sense is the basic constitutive ground of all our thought and experience. Husserl's phenomenological discovery of the life-world in his early as well as later writings has shown that there is no particular channel through which we can discover the life-world. It is there already as a part of our life. Husserl writes:

> The life-world is the world that is constantly pregiven, valid constantly and in advance as existing, but not valid because of some purpose of investigation, according to some universal end. Every end presupposes it; even the universal end of knowing it in scientific truth presupposes it, and in advance; and in the course of (scientific) work it presupposes it ever anew, as a world existing, in its way (to be sure), but existing nonetheless.[1]

The life-world thus is presupposed by all our activities such as knowing, inferring, perceiving and so on. It is the basis on which the entire edifice of our cognitive life stands. In that sense we can say that the life-world is the foundation of all our intellectual and cultural life.

According to Husserl, we do not have to go through a process of ratiocination to discover the life-world. It reveals itself in our activities, in our everyday life and so on. This is a phenomenological fact that our experience itself is a part of our life-world. For example, the experience of a human being extends to the limit of his or her life-horizon. We can think and perceive only those items which are given in our life-world. Similarly, the life-world of a dog is one that determines the dog's perception of things. The dog cannot see many things which human beings can see. So there is here a difference between the dog's life-world and that of the human beings.

The pre-givenness of things is evident from the fact that neither the dog nor the human being is reflectively aware that there is a life-world in which either lives. It is only a phenomenological awareness that reveals that the life-world is present in all our life's activities. Thus it is indicated that life's activities, however complex, do have a reference to a life-world. The reference is to the background and to the presuppositions of all our thoughts and experiences. Our sophisticated thoughts like the logical and mathematical ideas are all products of our life-world. They are the constructs which we accomplish by reflective self-awareness. We do not have to presuppose that logical and mathematical reasoning is collateral with our life-world; the life-world rather makes it possible what logical and mathematical thought we have. Phenomenology does not require that logical and mathematical thoughts are transcendent to our life-worlds. In fact they can be recognized as the constructions only from out of our lived experience in the life-world.[2]

The self-evident character of the life-world is emphasized by Husserl only to point out that the life-world is never in a veil. It is the bedrock phenomenon and so it needs no unveiling by a logical argument. The life-world as a phenomenon is presented to our consciousness in a straightforward way. There is no logical inference for the availability of the life-world as a phenomenon. There are two points to be noted here. They are: (1) that there is an immediacy concerning the life-world; and (2) the life-world is *a priori*.[3] The immediacy is of the phenomena that are experiential in nature. The life-world is a part of our everyday experience

and hence the immediacy. Besides, it is logically prior to experience and so must be taken as non-empirical by nature. Thus the life-world is logically prior to all that we can claim to be our thought and experience.

The most important fact about our life-world is that it is the original presupposition of our thought and experience. It is the minimal condition of our conceptual world. The conceptual world is a later product in the sense that only when the life-world is formed there is the possibility of the conceptual structure taking off. In this sense the life-world is the 'originary'[4] life-world, that is, it is the fundamental source of the rest of our experience. The originary experiences are the foundational source of our conceptual and linguistic world. We live in a conceptual and linguistic world which itself presupposes the life-world. Thus Husserl's effort is to make the life-world the basis of the conceptual world which comprises the sciences including the mathematical sciences.

Husserl himself was not concerned with the ontology of the life-world. It was left to Heidegger to introduce life-world in an ontological sense. For him, the life-world is the positive way in which the being appears as the Dasein, i.e., the being-in-the-world.[5] The Dasein lives in the concrete world of temporality and history. It lives in time. Time is a part of its structure. Thus Heidegger no more sees in the Husserlian life-world the epistemological presupposition of sciences. Rather he treats the life-world as the ontological presupposition of our being in the world. A life-world for him is an ontological category signifying the constitutive elements of our being. Our being is not separated from our world. Being and the world are united in an ontological bond. The world is incomplete without our being in it and similarly our being is incomplete without the world which provides home for it. The world is not just an empty vessel floating in time. It is a concrete world which provides the life-world for man. Thus there takes place the ontological rooting of the being in the world.

II. THE ONTOLOGY OF THE LIFE-WORLD

Now the question is: Are there many life-worlds or only one in view of the fact that there are many forms of life and many species of living beings? Obviously there are many species of living beings who can be said to have their own life-worlds. The animals and other forms of biological species have their forms of life which have to be taken account of. It is the human beings who have the life-world in the true sense of the term.

The human species in a sense is one. But can we say that they have one life-world and the so-called many life-worlds are fragments of the one life-world?

One can argue that though it appears that human beings have many life-worlds, in reality there is only one life-world in view of the fact that all human forms of life show the same characteristics such as pre-givenness, self-evidentness and so on. Taken from the total standpoint, the human life-world can be considered as one in that all human beings share the same pre-given experience. First of all, all human beings think and live in a similar way. Their beliefs and attitudes are the same and they act in almost the similar way. In this sense they have the same pre-given world in which they live. The deeper we go into the structure of the life-world, the more unity we find in all the apparently different life-worlds. There is no reason why we can be satisfied with the plurality of the life-worlds since unity is so evident in the structure of the life-world.

There are no doubt many cultures and societies as there are different religions and moral codes. But from this it does not follow that we have different life-worlds. Life-worlds are not the same as the cultures and social systems. Life-world is more fundamental than culture. Cultures presuppose the life-world. That is, any culture must embody the fundamental attitudes and beliefs of people. Human beings in general have certain beliefs regarding themselves and the world around them. These beliefs and experiences constitute the life-world in which the cultures have a place. Thus we can say that cultures and societies are derived from the life-world.

Now, as regards the question of whether there are as many life-worlds as cultures, it can be said that cultures may be many, but the life-world cannot be many because in that case there is no difference between culture and life-world. The life-world would be contingent like the cultures and therefore would lose the necessity they have. The life-world is the manifestation of the original beliefs of mankind. The core beliefs constitute the life-world that underlies a culture and society. The core beliefs are everywhere the same though the cultures differ in how they project those beliefs. Thus there are many cultural manifestations of the human beliefs as they are originally with the human species.

Suppose we have many life-worlds such as LW_1, LW_2, LW_3, ..., LW_n. In that case we must find out the link between the LW_1 and the LW_n. The link must be in terms of the underlying unity among them. This unity lies

in the fact that there are certain necessary components which have a constitutive role to play in the formation of the life-worlds. These links are the ones which we find in the depth of the life-world formations. The life-world of the artist has the same core elements as the life-world of the philosopher in the sense that both share the same life-situations and the same biological origin. The philosopher does not live in a different world from that of the artist. Here there is unity in the lifestyles or the life-worlds of the human beings.

The notion of life-world is a transcendental concept and must not be placed on the same level as that of culture and society. Culture and society are empirical concepts whereas the concept of life-world carries non-empirical significance. Thus we can argue that life-world is a transcendental notion and is free from the contingency of the notions of cultures and societies.

III. THE LIFE-WORLD: BEYOND THE PRIVATE AND THE PUBLIC WORLDS

Now we can investigate whether the life-world can be a private world at all. That is, we can ask whether the life-world is personal and subjective in any sense of the term. If the life-world is private, then it cannot be common to many individuals, that is, it cannot be the life-world of many. If private, it will mean that it is the life-world of one individual who shares it with no one else. If the very idea of a private life-world has to be entertained, there is no way we can make it intelligible if we go by the arguments already adduced by Wittgenstein.[6] That is to say, we cannot, as argued by Wittgenstein, show that the private life-world can be intelligible at all. The life-world is public in the sense that many individuals can live in it and have their beings. This possibility is ruled out if we make the life-world a private entity. If private, it has to belong to one and one individual only and has to be contained in the consciousness of that individual. There has to be therefore a safeguard against the life-world being private and subjective.

It may be argued that Husserl has allowed for the possibility of the life-world being private in the sense that he is under obligation to make the conscious individual being the locus of the life-world. It is the ego which is the source of the life-world; therefore there are as many life-worlds as there are individual egos. However, this argument has negligible validity for the reason that we do not have evidence to support that Husserl is a

subjectivist and that he has entertained the possibility of the privacy of the life-world. Life-world for him is not the content of consciousness of an individual. It is rather the locus of the consciousness itself. We can search for consciousness only in the life-world which is already having conscious individuals as their inhabitants. Thus there has to be the recognition of the fact that life-world is basic to the very conception of an individual consciousness. Life-world is not itself the content of consciousness since it provides the form of all consciousness.

The privacy of the contents of consciousness is a matter to be tackled in the context of our overall picture of human consciousness. Certain of our conscious states can be called private in the sense that they are presented to our consciousness. Such phenomenal consciousness is subjective to say the least. But this does not prove that the whole of consciousness is private. The conscious states are open to inspection by others as much as ourselves. Thus there is reason to believe that human mind is not self-closed and that it can be studied by more than one individual. This suggests that even the individual consciousness is not private in the strict sense of the term. Therefore, the question of life-world being private does not arise at all. Life-world is a public entity to be open to inspection by all.

The public character of the life-world is to be noted in the following way. First, each life-world is a shared world-view—a shared form of life. It demands the participation of many individuals belonging to the same species or the same natural kind. Each such form of life evolves into its organized form by virtue of natural selection. Thus as a natural form of life, the life-world is public and shareable in structure. It makes its existence visible by virtue of the concrete shape it assumes in the cluster of the life-situations of the same genre. This makes the life-world the common property of all.

Second, the life-world is not the artificial creation of a society or culture; it is not a matter to be made dependent on what we do and think. In fact it is presupposed by all that we do not think. In this sense the life-world has a much larger role to play in the shaping of the society and culture. This it cannot do if it does not have public character, that is, if it does not have universal significance.

The thinkers who are sceptical about the whole idea of life-world may argue that the life-world is nothing but the construction which we make in the course of our abstract thinking. According to them, the people living in the world of concrete objects invent that life-world as the replica

of our concrete world. In this sense the life-world is not a concrete entity at all. This creates the impression that life-world is the imaginary product of a speculative mind. But the counter argument could be that we have the life-world at the bottom of our thinking rather than at the top because we have no means of getting beyond it. Life-world is the foundation-stone of our life and action.

The transcendental philosophers need not bother about the fact that the life-world is not a visible entity like our concrete world of objects. The latter is a spatio-temporal world while the life-world is pre-spatio-temporal. The temporal world is infested with changing properties while the life-world is not a matter of change. It has the non-changing properties of being the necessary condition of life and action. As already explained, these properties are presupposed by the fact that there is life at all, that is, that there are human beings at all. Thus the life-world is a logical framework of life as such. Transcendental logic knows no limits so far as the basic conditions of human life are concerned. In this way the transcendental philosopher is of the view that life-world is the foundation of our universe. Mohanty writes:

> There is, however, a sense in which the life-world is not just one of these worlds nor a sum total of them (a sum total would be an obscure concept, for these worlds do not all belong to the same logical space), but the universal, all-inclusive horizon (not the objective spatio-temporal framework) within which these worlds, or indeed any possible world, could at all be constituted as a world, and so given and experienced.[7]

The private–public controversy which may arise with regard to the outer universe does not arise with regard to the foundations of the universe. Foundations themselves do not need new foundations. They are the bedrock phenomena. In that sense the life-world cannot be either subjective or objective, private or public in the ordinary sense of the term. It is the logical ground of the above distinction itself. Therefore it is necessary that the life-world itself is not the subject-matter of the controversy between the private and the public. It being the fundamental reality, it cannot be subjected to the criteria of the public or of the private. Life-world is the metaphysical basis of the public world of mankind and also of the private world of our inner experience. David Carr writes:

> Different persons and different peoples live amongst different ideas and views, just as their surroundings are composed of different objects and

populated by different groups of people. But it is possible to reach beyond our particular enclaves and understand and communicate with representatives of different cultures, precisely in virtue of the common structure of the lifeworld.[8]

Thus the life-world cannot be either private or public in the ordinary sense. It is the presupposed background of our so-called public and private worlds. It is because of the life-world that interpersonal communication is possible. Thus the possibility of solipsism and subjectivism is ruled out if the life-world is taken as a transcendental presupposition of our thought and experience.

IV. THE HUMAN LIFE-WORLD AND THE VALUE-AWARENESS

The human life-world is the source of the very concept of social and moral life of the human beings. It is the source of the value-awareness which constitutes the foundation of morality. It leads to the sense of belonging to the human species and the human world. The sense of fellow-feeling is bred within the heart of man out of which the feelings like compassion, kindness, love, etc. arise. These feelings or moral emotions arise out of the matrix of the human situation. For example, if the human life-world would not have been what it is, that is, as it is constituted, it would have been difficult to imagine what the human moral virtues would have been. The idea of compassion, which is a universally recognized virtue, would not have been there if human beings would not have been so situated as they are in nature.

Human beings are very precariously situated so far as their species-specific life is concerned. They are dependent on others so much so that it is difficult to imagine our life without this dependence on others. From birth to death we are dependent on others for everything including our food, clothing and other necessities of life. Besides, our very rationality is a contribution by others. Others are responsible for our being rational. That is to say, the fact that we are rational is a matter solely dependent on how others behave with regard to us. MacIntyre in his book *Dependent Rational Animals*[9] has shown that man is basically a dependent animal who lives in the company of others and grows through interaction with others. This makes the life-world of man congenial for such virtues as love, compassion, sympathy, etc. MacIntyre argues that the human moral world is a gift of the natural life-world of man. The so-called rational life

and virtues of man are nothing but the products of the natural life-world of the human species. Thus we can see that the human life-situation is responsible for the morality that human beings have.

Human values have locus in the human situation. They arise from the matrix of human life. The values have no abstract origin in the reason or in the social life in general. They are directly located in the human life-world which is the store-house of the human values. The values of helping others, or contributing to the development of others are the values arising out of the life-world that is the symbol of the community of human beings. In this lies the significance of the human values. They are not the values for a life that is abstract and impractical, but are the values that pertain to the life here and now. That is why the life-world is the fountain of all values according to the phenomenologists.

The phenomenology of values reminds us of the fact that we need a deeper analysis of the values in terms of their experiential origin in human life. Values are experiential in nature, that is, they arise from the human situation. They do not transcend the horizon of the human life-world. That is, they are compressed into the space of our life-experiences. Thus we are led to believe that morality has no sanction except the one provided by the life-world. Here one must take note of the fact that morality has no meaning except in the human context and that the only touchstone of what is morally good is the fact that human life itself is valuable and that all the moral virtues have only a human significance. This itself vouchsafes for the fact that we cannot dissociate life from morality and the values.

There is another aspect to the moral situation; it is that the human life cannot be considered a mere physical phenomenon. It is no doubt a biological phenomenon but it is also a social and moral institution. That is why the problems of life have meaning only in the sense there is a higher quality of life which cannot easily be had from the physical facts. Physical facts have their place in life but they are not all; these facts themselves have significance in the overall totality of the life-world and the values derived from it. Values could not have been better defined than by the fact that they are human in character.

From the consideration of the values let us proceed to the fact that even religion is the product of the life-world. Man's search for God and his salvation is dictated by the fact that we are not mere objects in an objective world. It is the human subject that has primacy in the world of experience. It is because of this that we can say that religion has a human origin and

a human significance. Religions are for human use, they are meant for generating a feeling in man for the Divine. Religion bridges the gulf between Man and the Divine. The Divine has meaning only if the human being is prepared to conceive such an idea. Thus there is Divine–Man correlation in the very structure of religious experience and the religious life-world. Thus not only morality but also religion is a matter to be traced back into the very root of human life-world.

The human life-world is the repository of all that is grand and beautiful in the human society and culture. It is this that has made the life-world the foundation of all ethics, religion and culture. Religion has significance only to the extent there is a place for it in the human life. Similarly, human values have significance if they are placed in the mainstream of human life. In this sense life-world makes sense if it provides the foundation to all of our life's projects.

V. THE LIFE-WORLD AND THE HUMAN PROJECTS

The life-world is a human system. Each such system is based on a project that is deeply entrenched in the human world. There are many ways we can understand the human projects. First of all, they are ideal meaning-structures which are given in the human consciousness. Consciousness is the seat of all these ideal essences as Husserl has repeatedly said in his writings. These meanings are universal ideal entities which have no physical correlate in the real world. Hence these projects have to be understood as the human ideals that have to be given a concrete shape in the human life. Secondly, they are metaphysical entities in the sense that they constitute the life-world. They constitute the life-activities of the human beings. Meanings are ideal entities but are firmly rooted in the life of the human beings. In this sense the life-world is not bereft of the ideal structure of meanings.

The idea of the life-world brings in the metaphysical forms of the life-world. The metaphysical forms of the life-worlds lie in the way the life-world is organized. For example, in the life-world of the human beings, there is a certain way the human activities are organized. The hopes and aspirations of the human beings are crystallized in a certain way. This is markedly different from the life-world of the animals where the human hopes and desires have no place. Thus we face the different kinds of configuration of the life-world in different contexts.

The metaphysical structure of the life-world is built into the life-world in the way form is built into matter in Aristotle. We cannot conceive of matter without form because matter has already a form. The life-world similarly is without any structure in the absence of form. Form and content go together. This is obviously so in the case of the life-world which carries an ideal content. The moral and social content that is structured into life-worlds *a priori* has no parallel in the world of the empirical experience. Therefore the ideal content has to be a transcendental entity in Husserl's sense. What is transcendental is not generally located in the empirical world. It has to be given an ideal location. Thus metaphysics becomes inevitable in the understanding of the structure of the life-world.

The general metaphysical structure of the life-world is conditioned by the human conditions and the human projects. Human projects have been much emphasized by the existentialist affirmation of the life-world as primary. Heidegger and Sartre have made the human subject the pivotal principle of their philosophy. The human subject is made the source of the human meanings and the metaphysical significance of human life. In this context it can be said that human contingency and the finitude of the human activities go into the metaphysical structure of the human life-world. As Heidegger has pointed out, human life, that is, the life of the *Dasein* is limited by time and history.[10] Thus there is an underlying theme of the metaphysical reality of the life-world which is limited by time and historicity. Thus the metaphysics of the life-world has to take into account the factors such as time and history. But the question is: Can there be a pure transcendental subject or ego the way Husserl has conceived? Heidegger seems to have rejected such a transcendental subject in view of his leaning towards a historicist view of the subject of consciousness. Heidegger is of the opinion that man or the Dasein is only a temporal being and so cannot be taken as transcendental in character. That is why he has made the human subject a temporal and historical being.

However, there cannot be any doubt that the subject has both transcendental and historical roots.[11] The human life-world itself has both these elements in view of the fact that man lives in the pre-given life-world and at the same time shares the possibility of a higher life of universal significance. From the latter come his aspirations for morality, religion and spirituality.

VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The life-world is the bedrock phenomenon so far as the human beings are concerned. It is the basic ingredient of the human existence. Even our social existence depends on the life-world. Morality, religion and all other cultural activities are derived from the life-world. Thus there is reason to believe that the life-world must be given metaphysical primacy.

There are two theses that this essay has sought to uphold. They are: (a) the life-world cannot be construed sociologically or anthropologically, since it has to be taken as the primary phenomenon; (b) the life-world is the transcendental presupposition of our social and cultural experience, hence it must be studied as the *a priori* condition of our experience.

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Life-Worlds: Private and Public
(Love and Friendship: Power and Welfare)

RAMESH CHANDRA SHAH
M-4, Nirala Nagar, Bhadbhada Road, Bhopal 462 003

The expression 'Life-World' comes to us from the philosopher Edmund Husserl. I'm by no means an insider of the philosophy of Husserl or Heidegger: I heard of them first from the late Professor J.L. Mehta, whose friendship I had the privilege to have during the last years of his earthly existence. It was largely owing to the existential imperative of my private life-world that I once felt the urge to translate one of his seminal essays (called 'Life-Worlds, Sacrality and Interpretive Thinking') into Hindi. For, unless you translate thought into your own mother tongue, you can hardly be said to have achieved an inwardness with it. Why did I feel that urge at all? To answer this question, I must quote a few sentences from that original essay itself.

> In his lecture course entitled "Augustine and Neo-Platonism", Heidegger examined Book X of the 'confessions' to show how, despite his rootedness in factual life-experience, Augustine's thought is nevertheless misled by the intermixture of concepts imported from neo-Platonism. In order to reach primal experience, therefore, it is necessary to dismantle the conceptual superimpositions and then go on to an explication of that experience as a universal ingredient in the human life-world as such. Metaphysical conceptuality is not adequate to life-experience in its actuality since in the latter, what is important is not so much the content or a 'what' that can be encompassed in a concept as rather the unobjectifiable living through, the movement and unrest of life as essentially a process or happening, *as temporality itself*, not just something in time. Not only the happening character of the lived world, but God, Truth and World are experienced in their original character in this primal, factual life-experience. Metaphysical thinking, as the attempt to freeze into concepts and so immobilize what *is* as something present,

as eidos or as an objective presence in front of us, can only falsify and distort our apprehension of the movement that is life.

I have deliberately underlined the phrase, 'the movement and unrest of life as temporality itself', not just something in time. I think that is exactly the locus as well as the focus of the problem of bondage and freedom, and which, in fact has been the most abiding concern, not only of all Indian philosophies, but of all Indian literature before the modern age. It's not a mere accident that most of the modern Indian writers have been influenced either by existentialism or by Marxism—the two movements thrown up by the modern western mind in pursuit of what it was at last driven to acknowledge as the problem of problems—the problem precisely of the same freedom and bondage, which Indian metaphysics had encountered and solved at the very start of its adventure; but which the European consciousness hitherto, had never faced squarely.

Whither do we turn from here? An intellectual disgrace stares from every Marxist face. As for the heritage of the existentialists, it's the deconstructionists and the end of history, end of ideology, end of this and that-ists, who now enjoy a field day. All that tumult, all that passion seems to have led into a sunless sea. What do we do now? Whither shall we turn? Even Husserl's transcendental ego and his phenomenological 'science of the life-world' appear to be grossly inadequate substitutes for the metaphysical certainties which were available to our ancestors and which still appear to reverberate beyond the charmed circle of our intelligentsia in the live though heavily infected beliefs and gestures of the deaf and dumb millions surrounding us everywhere.

It is against this overwhelming and omnipresent backdrop of silence and destitution that the Word at last seems to have stopped haranguing the much-maligned quietists and underdeveloped children of dreamy immortality—at least for the time being. Meanwhile, it's the turn of the activists instead—the self-styled conceptual controllers of the universe. The Word, for a change now, seems to have started addressing itself to the Faustian Man instead. Professor Somraj Gupta, author of *The Word Speaks to the Faustian Man*—a translation and interpretation of the Prasthantrayi and Sankara's bhasya for the participation of contemporary man—says in his preface to the second volume:

> No civilisation can survive which is based on only knowledge, power and revisable system. For injustice will breed there and greed and non-feeling. Let us, even in this belated hour, learn to expand the bounds of our civilisation. For our home is not the human polis but the earth and the sky. And death. If we do not wish to commit collective suicide, we have to learn to find a place in our midst for these others. The Faustian Man must stop his prattle and wait in patience for the peal of the word.

Our immediate problem, however, is not the Faustian man as such, but we ourselves. W.B. Yeats blamed Huxley and Tyndal 'for depriving him of the beautiful religion of his childhood.' But he devoted a lifetime's struggle to conjure up 'A Vision', which could reconcile beauty and justice and enable him to write his poetry out of this 'satisfaction of the whole being'. What about the modern Indian intellectual—his own peculiar deprivation, his own brand of the disinherited mind? I may be forgiven for this sudden intrusion of personal reference but I can't resist this temptation of interrogating myself. How is it that in my long practice as a novelist, even when I am seeking to articulate and resolve the questions that torment my adult life, I am invariably impelled to reconstruct the life-world of my childhood and boyhood and not the life-world which I happen to inhabit now? Is it owing to a nostalgic clinging to a bygone, irretrievably lost world? Is it because it is the only authentic life-world I know and the only one, in which I can participate fully even now? Or is it because of a secret feeling that persists inspite of everything—inspite of all contrary evidence that it's not just a matter of my personal unconscious—that it is the collective unconscious that seeks to assert itself through me?

Gods with a room of their own in that childhood house (ours was a very very lower middle class house), a pot of basil in the very small open space in front of the kitchen, and a cow too with a closet to herself downstairs, that formed my idea—my first sensation—of a fully human life. For what after all was our human life worth, without participation in the subhuman as well as superhuman life? Even death anniversaries appeared to be festive occasions to the growing child. Time itself was a procession of eternally recurrent festivals beginning as well as ending with the festival of lights. Intellectuals all over the country now-a-days revel in their divide-and-rule distinctions of Margi and Desi and Mainstream and Subaltern and so on. But to a sensitive open-eyed, open-eared child of our generation, such distinctions simply did not exist in the oral culture that flooded our daily existence. My playmates often made fun of me because on certain days I missed their company to sit among the women listening with rapt attention to katha-sessions in the local Raghunath temple.

That's how I imbibed not only Padma-purana and Bhagavat, but also (imagine!) Yogavashishtha. None of these women including my mother could have gone beyond the primary school; in fact, many of them could neither read nor write. But how did that matter?

Religion meant life, meant colour, meant joy. Religion meant delicious prasad, delicious tears, delicious poetry and fiction. Religion meant reverence and piety, but never fear or self-torture. But what about the untouchables? What about the isolated and languishing, inauspicious widows? The gay stream of life had a sad undercurrent as well as a festering wound. Little room for privacy and little scope for cultivating that individuality which lessons of English literature beckoned to as the most covetable and most enriching good—something which seemed to have been sadly neglected and devalued in the smothering intimacies of our impersonal culture.

Very legitimate grievances indeed and most of us have spent our adult years seeking to redress those grievances and managing to cultivate a personality against heavy odds. To that extent, the encounter with and appropriation of the western enterprise seems to have produced tangible results. But, was it necessary and inevitable after all—one wonders—to surrender for the sake of such new acquisitions, those very advantages which distinguished our civilization from the rest of the world, and which in fact, as hindsight and sober reflection now reveals to us, constitutes the very basis of the survival of mankind upon this planet: the immemorial intuition of a holy and holistic universe and the civilizationally realized, still vibrant patterns of it?

Professor Mehta in the essay already referred to has quoted Peter Berger's discussion of the life-world as socially constructed and maintained. Berger says:

> It is not enough to understand the particular symbols or interaction patterns of individual situations. One must also understand the overall structure of meaning within which these particular patterns and symbols are located and from which they derive their collective shared significance ... The pre-theoretical consciousness of everyday life is the web of meanings that allow the individual to navigate his way through the ordinary events and encounters of his life with others. The totality of these meanings, which he shares with others, makes up a particular life-world. [*Philosophy & Religion*, p. 252.]

It is precisely this 'web of meanings', which has been threatened and jeopardized in the social life of India today. One's private and public worlds no longer nourish and sustain each other: on the other hand, they produce glaring contradictions. It's not just consumerism and globalization that are responsible for the overall deterioration in the quality of our life. These are only symptoms of a malaise that lies much deeper, in the Cartesian 'cogito' according to the author of *The Word Speaks to the Faustian Man*.

> For a man, who is a 'cogito', withdrawn and detached, a cause is truth and so is an effect; not what the tree does or the river or the sun but what he can make of the tree, of the river, of the sun ... nothing has self and being except the cogito; only it has the self, is the self, it alone. Every thing else turns into tools or into pleasures. [Vol. II, p. 52.]

Secularization has led to the privatization of religion and the pluralization of social life-world has made it increasingly difficult for religious traditions to integrate this plurality in one overarching and comprehensive world-view. One doesn't quite understand why this should have become such a problem in our own country which perhaps has provided a unique model in this respect for millennia. Here too, the failure of the intelligentsia—their complete lack of cultural self-confidence, and spineless surrender to forces that are patently divisive and disruptive—is responsible for most of the ills that beset our young democracy.

Recently I had an occasion to witness a play called 'The Mahatma'. It depicts the difficult relationship between Mahatma Gandhi and his eldest son Harilal. Father and son, such intimate friends once upon a time, had drifted apart most tragically. The play constitutes a sympathetic envisioning of the inevitable conflict between the private and the public life-worlds in the case of a world celebrity. Father and son, so tragically torn from each other in actual life, are then sought to be reconciled in an after-death scenario. Inspite of the writer's efforts to do justice to both characters and then forge a reconciliation, the overall impression is one of tragic waste—even of unnecessary suffering and dissolution. Is there something wanting in our very conception of the relation between tradition and individuality? Isn't personality, or, privacy for that matter, a value in and by itself? Isn't it important for a human ego to be nurtured carefully so as to attain its full growth and realize its individual worth and distinction before it can surrender itself to the community and the all-inclusive Self? Isn't some psychological violence implicit in a premature preoccupation with the

Self? Aren't we familiar with several tragic instances of seeking God too soon and are we sensitive enough to the human cost involved in such cases?

At this juncture, one involuntarily recalls those lines: private faces in public places are preferable to public faces in private places. A creative writer would instinctively recoil from the latter: Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina* has presented us with a rather curious portrait: that of Karenin—Anna's husband. He hardly has a private face and part of Anna's tragedy can be traced to that fact. But then, Karenin has an unsupected dimension to his otherwise disagreeable personality. He is a very honest official in a corrupt milieu. And there is a very queer element in his nature. He can't stand tears. Petitioners that approach him are strictly forbidden from crying in his presence. Now, this is the man whom the novelist has chosen to be exalted to sainthood in a moment of crisis. Anna is in a critical condition and Karenin is informed of that. He arrives and something miraculous happens. Looking at his suddenly transformed face, Anna shrieks in ecstasy 'He's a saint, He's a saint!' It's not a delirious exclamation at all. Something in Karenin has burst forth in glory. He does behave like a saint and forgives and blesses those who have grievously wronged him. Anna is saved, though only to commit suicide later on. And what awaits Karenin? Nothing but a most depressing 'fall' from the pinnacle, which his mortal nature is simply unable to retain or even to remember. He becomes senile, credulous and pitiable. Nothing in the world of fiction has so intrigued me as this creation of Tolstoy. But we are here concerned with the world of facts and not the world of fiction. And it's not a mere coincidence that the fact of the 'Mahatma'—a very relevant contemporary fact of our life-world—should make its presence felt in the present context. No one has wielded such power in his lifetime and no one seems to have possessed such a genius for friendship. No one could bring the private and the public realms of his life-world into such a creative unity. Allow me to conclude this rambling note, therefore, with yet another quotation from Professor Mehta's essay. Infact, these words themselves form part of the conclusion of that essay.

> Here, in India, the memory at least has not vanished of Gandhi whose own social life-world presents a proto-typical image of intense awareness of all that was in the process of being lost—the sacrality and truth of human living—and at the same time, a more than human effort in his own living of how it can and must be recovered, through social and political action, for the human life-world of today. For a poet, or a mere thinker or scholar, however, the task of new linguistic formulation, articulation or the way of conversation remains all-important.

Life-World—Private and Public

AMLAN DATTA
CB-110, Salt Lake, Kolkata 700 064

Life has to be lived in two different domains, the private and the public. Their requirements are different, sometimes seemingly irreconcilable. The private domain turns barren when it has no room for love. But love is not a sufficient basis for justice, which is a necessary condition for the good life in the public domain.

At an elementary level, our sense of responsibility towards others arises from natural sympathy. Thus it is that the family becomes the nursery of people's moral sentiments. Neighbours and others sharing a similar culture come to be included within the boundaries of our sympathy. Thus people come together, both by necessity and by instinct, to form communities or tribes, held together by customs and a sense of mutual obligations and loyalty. At this stage a problem arises. The boundaries harden. With the growth of tribalism, what started as a process of union becomes a source of division. The role of true morality is to carry the sense of caring for others beyond the limits set by tribal solidarity.

Here is an evolutionary problem which remains still unresolved all over the world. Tribalism has many incarnations. In different parts of the globe it is found in different forms. Moreover, it often manifests itself in diverse ways even within the same society.

Let us take the case of India. Corruption is rampant in our society at all levels, the more deplorably so at the higher and middle levels. Yet this country has seen even in the 20th century some of the tallest men the world has produced. How can we explain this contradiction? Most nationalists including the 'Leftists' blame it all on India's 'colonial heritage'. Very few of us care to turn the searchlight inwards.

Yet we cannot really cure our disease by simply blaming outsiders. We have to have the objectivity, courage and determination to discover and defeat what is false or wanting within our own tradition and society. For

centuries, the mainstream of the Indian tradition has lacked a clear recognition of the importance of civil rights, public duties and an impersonal dispensation of justice.

What existed instead was our own brand of tribalism, an emphasis on loyalty to the caste to which one belonged and the prescribed duties that went with it. Along with it came an acceptance of the value of familial sentiments and obligations, which traditionally included the virtue of hospitality but had little room for the idea of equality and impersonal justice. Special importance was also attached to the observance of religious rituals. Deploring the neglect of active social service by Hindu religious establishments, Raja Rammohan Roy very perceptively observed long ago that in the Hindu theology 'rites and ceremonies' had become virtually synonymous with 'action of moral merit'. Now, all these do not really add up even remotely to the moral requirements of modern society.

In a properly constituted civil society, a person holding a position of public responsibility is morally bound to give precedence to the public interest. In India as long as a person stays loyal to his family and his caste, his public image remains virtually untarnished however much he may neglect his public duties or misuse public funds. During the days when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was trying to build up Sanjay by dubious methods, I remember having overheard somebody arguing that if a mother would not help her son, who would? Politics has also given a new twist to the order of things. Robbing the public to help the party has come to be treated as acceptable practice by those who are engaged in the political struggle for power. Violence is on the increase and unbridled partisanship is pushing the country towards conditions of a thinly disguised civil war.

For the ancients, politics and ethics were cognate subjects concerned with an exploration of the conditions necessary for securing justice and achieving the good society. Economics too came under the umbrella of ethics.

It is no longer the same in our time, although a few are valiantly attempting to reconstruct the broken links. Ethical issues have been thrown into a sad state of disarray by politics, with its fevered pursuit of power, and economics, with its overemphasis on the importance of wealth. This makes it necessary to try and present the subject of morality and ethics in a proper perspective as concisely as possible before we conclude. What we will be attempting here is an exposition with practical implications.

Plato made a distinction between desires, passions and reason. There is an area of human relations where affective inclinations, desires and passions, normally prevail. At an early stage of social evolution, based on kinship ties, this looks natural. At higher stages of society, moral codes guided by reason become more important for the maintenance of justice and social cohesion.

Moral injunctions and activities can be divided into two categories. Some moral duties are mandatory. There are other activities inspired by goodwill which are laudatory; they may be noble, but they are not obligatory.

For instance, murder and rape are punishable crimes and the moral injunction against such acts is absolute. If somebody risks his own life to prevent such a crime done to a third person, his moral courage will deserve high praise.

But there is nothing in law which requires him so to risk his life and it is not considered a crime if he chooses not to take that risk. The mandatory duties of a citizen so sadly neglected in our society and the deepest promptings of love and compassion do not belong to the same level of reason and consciousness.

Religion is commonly regarded as a source of ethical teachings. The problem with the scriptures is that they include an extraordinary range of statements extending from the utterly superstitious to the truly spiritual. Aurobindo made a distinction between the infra-rational, the rational and the supra-rational. Racial hatred and sectarian fanaticism clearly belong to the infra-rational region of human consciousness.

A cardinal weakness of the Indian tradition is that it is too inclined to take a big leap from the infra-rational to the supra-rational and bypass the rational. The service of critical reason is necessary to purge human consciousness of its superstitious elements. The cleansing mission of the rational part of our mind needs to be combined with that grand vision of the spirit which urges us to love our enemies and seek union with the universe. Not everybody can rise to the height of that grand vision; but we cannot give up striving for reason and justice without grave peril to the fabric of human society.

Life-Worlds as the Experiential Basis of Philosophy

RAMAKANT SINARI
Centre for Consciousness Studies, Bhaktivedanta Institute, Juhu, Mumbai

The philosophical scenario in the world today shows no point of convergence of approaches or points of view. Philosophical works, articles published in philosophy journals, papers discussed in philosophy seminars and conferences, and the ways of doing philosophy university departments are known for, display variegated inquiries and arguments anchored in what can be called distinct ontological commitments. In the history of world's philosophical thought there seem to be as many schools and movements as there are pre-discursive ontological commitments.

In the course of philosophical discussions, one often observes combats between positivists and phenomenologists, analysts and existentialists, naturalists and Vedāntins, and, broadly speaking, between 'scientific' philosophers and metaphysicians. As a matter of fact, if Indian Sankarites were to debate the question 'What is the meaning of the world?' with A.J. Ayer or Nelson Goodman, or Husserlians were to argue on 'What is consciousness?' with physicalists and materialists, or African philosophers such as Paulin Hountondji and Wiredu were to discuss the mind-body problem with Wittgensteinians or Quinians, something beyond compromise would be going on and no consensus would emerge between one party and the other.

The word 'philosophy' figures in literature as a seminal inquiry, though the essence, the aim, and the utility of such an inquiry are discussed untiringly. At no stage we appear to be close to a conclusive answer to the question 'What makes a philosophical school or system different from a scientific view or system?' Or, to put the question slightly differently, 'How could we assess the large diversity of viewpoints (all claiming to be philosophical) toward the same issue?

Indeed in all philosophies in the world, some or all of the concepts like God, good, knowledge, existence, nature, mind, truth, beauty, right, life,

death, salvation, consciousness, human destination invariably appear. It is accepted that philosophers' vocation is to undertake intellectual journeys across these concepts—i.e., analyze them, define them, understand them—and formulate their insights in language. What singles out a philosophical enterprise from other intellectual enterprises is its persistent attempt to reach the seminal, to plumb deep beneath 'what goes on' on the canvas of the experiencer's consciousness, to try to know what appears to be obvious or is already claimed as known, to reflect on not only *what* is experienced but also on the very act of experiencing, and, as the highest point of all this, to communicate what one *sees* through an idiom effective enough to arouse in the reader a certain sort of knowledge or awareness. What Richard Rorty has written toward the end of his *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, both underlining the unique rigour of philosophers' thinking and challenging the sense of intellectual superiority philosophers ordinarily possess, is poignant. Rorty says:[1]

> To drop the notion of the philosopher as knowing something about knowing which nobody else knows so well would be to drop the notion that his voice always has an overriding claim on the attention of the other participants in the conversation. It would also be to drop the notion that there is something called 'philosophical method' or 'philosophical technique' or 'philosophical point of view' which enables the professional philosopher, *ex officio*, to have interesting views about, say, the respectability of psychoanalysis, the legitimacy of certain dubious laws, the resolution of moral dilemmas, the 'soundness' of schools of historiography or literary criticism, and the like. Philosophers often do have interesting views upon such questions, and their professional training as philosophers is often a necessary condition for having the views they do. But this is not to say that philosophers have a special kind of knowledge about knowledge (or anything else) from which they draw relevant corollaries.

Various philosophical works are thus intellectual and linguistic edifices built on the ground of certain experiences, individual or collective, by people trained in the art of reflection. What is meant by 'experience' is that field of 'givens' or that primordial situation of life which is a reality to the particular individual or group. The givens would consist of one's being in the world (what for Heidegger is ones 'fallenness'), ones being 'bodied' with all the biological, physiological and chemical properties this

bodied state may have, the awareness one possesses of the inner and the outer, ones being amidst others, ones fear and wonder and being awed and being sad or delighted, and ones sense of insecurity and helplessness. Just as the givens of man in a modern city are the technological devices which are constantly there for serving him, those of the Indian folks (Kasis, Nagas, Warlis, Kolis, Dhanagars), for instance, are the scarcity of clean drinking water, the presence of fierce animals in the environment, threats to life from their foes and trespassers, and hardships enveloping their life every day because of the total non-availability of scientific tools and skills to counter the cosmic forces. On somewhat different wavelengths, the life story of *dalits*[2] in India consists of pre-given experiences of distinct individuals and communities rejected by the privileged society, and the experience of being a black in the predominantly white society in the West is the seminal and sedimental mind-body stuff determining the *Weltanschauung* of the black community. On an essentially ontological plane the early Indian philosophers held that *samsara* (the worldly situation into which one is thrown and in which one is condemned to die) comprises the facts of a person's placement in the world as a mind-body unity, his time-consciousness, his being solitary in old age and in death, his living in the world and yet not being really in tune with it. This ontological, pre-reflective, and pre-thematic givenness of oneself in the world—the world about which science could formulate theories and explanatory models but which is given to one as ones natural milieu, almost like the extension of ones own life—was called by Husserl 'Life-World' (*Lebenswelt*).

Different communities are exposed to different experiences. It would not be possible to evolve what one could term as one single mathematics of experience. While religions and mythologies give us a glimpse of the original 'experienced givens' of various communities and tribes, adventures of reflection in the Upanisads (c. 2500 BC) and in the compositions of the pre-Socratics, such as Pythagoras, Heraclitus and Anaxagoras, represent the concern about grasping the very meaning of existence. To Indians of the time of the Vedas, nature was a conglomeration of forces to be appeased by means of prayer, sacrifice, entreaties, and meditation; but those Indians who authored Upanisads and later on *darsanas* (systems of thought) positively distanced themselves to produce what appear to be rational schemes of explanatory devices for their world-experience. Thus the language of the two endeavours—religion and mythology on the one hand and *darsanas* on the other—differ. The religious and mythological

expressions are found to be closer to the world of vicissitudes *lived* by man in the worldly situations than the reflective, theoretical models in which the worldly reality is ordered. The religious and mythological creations of ancient Indians, and also their artifacts, contain extremely suggestive symbolism, fables, anecdotes, and at the same time anthropomorphism, all these making their texts highly opaque and metaphorical. The style of thinking in the Upanisads, and in the *Sutras* (pithy texts) and *Bhashyas* (commentaries on the *Sutras*) that followed them, indicates rigor, discipline, the imminent awareness the author has got concerning his listener or reader, and some sort of dogged attempt to mould the syntax and logic to contain what is admittedly felt as being prior to thought and language.

There are unique experiences of being in the world which haunt a given community. The experiences, all of which are not amenable to rational consciousness, constitute the Life-World of that community. The concept of Life-World, which Husserl extensively used toward the end of his philosophical career, was thrown up by him as a challenge to the claim of modern science regarding the finality of their method of investigation. When he subjects the entire scientific undertaking of our time to a radical assessment—the relevance of science to human life, the aim of science vis-à-vis the ultimate goal of human life, the meaning of science in the sphere of interpersonal relationship and in the sphere of universally cherished individual and social values—he celebrates what he calls the 'ontology of the Life-Worlds' and condemns scientists for not taking cognizance of it.

Since the beginning of his phenomenological writings Husserl was convinced that science, confined as its method is to the 'natural attitude' or 'natural standpoint', cannot give us the *true* knowledge of the world. Scientists, he points out, are so enamoured by the ambition of attaining objectivity, the 'objective truth', that what it has succeeded in spreading is 'scientific objectivism', that is a paradigm to which nothing beyond the mathematization of the world is relevant to the scientific mission. It is natural that natural scientists and technologists, and the philosophers who came under their influence and tried to reduce philosophical thinking to a scientific discipline, were the real target of Husserl's attack. Husserl was more than sure that what was required was the suspension of the closed outlook of science, its underlying method of 'physicalization' and mathematization of nature, scientists' notable reluctance to raise questions

about the meaning of scientific knowledge, about the value of science to mankind, about the implications scientific objectivism would have in the total conduct of the human race.

For Husserl the crisis of science in Europe began when scientists allowed themselves to be so allured by the practical achievements of science and its application that the problem of the status of science vis-à-vis man, its originator and user, was shelved completely. Husserl's programme in *The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology* was to resurrect the lost focus of scientific knowledge, i.e., the significance of science to human existence, to human aspirations, to man's inner subjectivity, to his living in the world as a free person with a certain aim of his self-development.

The notion of Life-World has thrown open in philosophy and social sciences an arena of possibilities. We can now speak of directly acquired structures and modes of cognition to which various individuals, communities, ethnic groups may remain so glued that their thought and behaviour could be totally engineered by them. The Life-World of a group constitutes a layer of experiences ontologically prior to every form that group may take in its mental and physical carriage. When Husserl said that the world encountered, interpreted and lived by a human individual is not an objective world but one toward which his intentionality is directed before his thought and speech take over, he wanted to emphasize, against science, that the world is a subjectively and pre-predicatively cognized environment within whose compass one lives one's life. Husserl's complaint in *The Crisis* is that the explorations in science touch only the mathematizable external cover of existence, that the language of science is so formalized and the research procedure of scientists is so impersonal, and that the systems in sciences are so tacitly governed by the physico-mathematical-logical rules that any reference to man's pre-predicative, pre-scientific, pre-given and pre-modelled worldliness would be looked upon as uncalled-for. Husserl was so irked by those philosophers in his time who had adopted the logico-linguistic technique for solving their problems that it is they who were responsible for buttressing, according to him, scientific objectivism and naturalism. In one of the most forth-rightly written passages he says:[3]

> The contrast between the subjectivity of the Life-World and the 'objective', the 'true' world, lies in the fact that the latter is a theoretical-

logical substruction, the substruction of something that is in principle not perceivable, in principle not experienceable in its own proper being, whereas the subjective, in the Life-World, is distinguished in all respects precisely by its being actually experienceable.

The impressions arising out of a community's primal and day-to-day encounter with the world are the 'stuff' around which that community's philosophy lies woven. These impressions are the Life-World, the down-to-earth reality, the matter-of-fact situation, some sort of ceaselessly moving spectrum of meanings grasped by all the members of the community but articulated by a few precocious ones among them. In the Life-World, there are natural and cultural entities, fragments of experiences lived by the community anchored in a specific 'space of history', and the physical world given to it by its spontaneous bodily contact with its surroundings. Although it is not a widespread fashion in the academic world of philosophy, largely dominated by the Western ways of doing philosophy, to acknowledge the philosophic worth of indigenous African philosophy or of indigenous Dalit[4] philosophy in India, for example, it cannot be ignored that these philosophies have for their 'soil' the African Life-World and the Dalit Life-World respectively. One of the renowned African writers speaks about the basic African Life-World thus:[5]

> I'm an Ibo writer, because this is my basic culture: Nigerian, African and a writer ... no, black first, then a writer. Each of these identities does call for a certain kind of commitment on my part. I must see what it is to be black—and this means being sufficiently intelligent to know how the world is moving and how the black people fare in the world. This is what it means to be black. Or an African—the same: what does Africa mean to the world? When you see an African what does it mean to a white man?

One can thus talk of folk philosophies as the reflective activity of the intelligent spokesmen of the folks to understand the givens, the Life-World of the folk experience. This activity may take different forms. But whatever form it may take, its main tenor would be to be true to the 'throb' of experience and at the same time to understand it by being outside the throb. The experience of what Heidegger calls 'being-in-the-world' a folk undergoes constitutes its ontological commitment, the sediments of that folk's style of understanding itself and the world.

How the Life-World of Dalits in India, like the Life-World of the African black, impinges on their perception and understanding of the world, on the meaning they attribute to the world, the tradition and culture they are born in, on their pronounced non-commitment to prevalent social values (occasionally some of the Dalits revolt against these values openly), is most forcefully brought out by Dalit writers in Maharashtra, Daya Powar, Laxman Mane and Shashikant Tasgaonkar being some of them.[6] All these three writers in Marathi, whose image of the Indian society is the projection of the wrath, the hatred, the contempt, the spite of the entire Dalit community to which they belong, have had a 'lived past' loaded with the memories of atrocities and loathsome treatment their elders had met at the hands of the orthodox *brahman* community, and of which later on they themselves became victims during their childhood and adulthood. These writers are so thoroughly soaked in their Life-World, through their witnessing the society around them, their thinking, their hearing, their fellowmen and expressing themselves to others, that they do not show any interest in reflecting over it. It is the Life-World which forms the matrix of their existence and their language. The three mentioned works carry a mood, an idiom, an imagery and a hermeneutic which are unimitably blended with a Life-World the Dalit community lives in, and the latter must have found it impossible to develop a point of view transcending one which is absolutely intertwined with their inner psyche and outer bodily existence.

Ontological commitments are the thrust of the whole edifice of reasoning, of symbols, of language, of the metaphors various social groups have generated and developed, and enriched by constantly innovating them. In fact the gap between 'experiencing life' and theorizing about it is so narrow even in ancient cultures that these both are found to arch each other, and it is not easy to separate one from the other. When this arching takes place the original world-experience, the Life-World, runs into the language and scheme of reflection, and the entire endeavour of philosophy becomes creative, artistic and poetic. This is precisely what has happened in the philosophical compositions of early Indians, the Vedas and the Upanisads. There is a fascinating blending of the religious Life-World and the philosophic reflection in these compositions, the blending verging on poetry. To state another illustration from African culture, what Hountondji says about African philosophy is a good reminder in the present context. He writes:[7]

> By 'African philosophy' I mean a set of texts, specifically the set of texts written by Africans themselves and described as philosophical by their authors themselves.

The highly condensed and poetically beautiful aphorisms which Indians of the Vedas and the Upanisads coined in order to explicate their everyday experience of 'the world as a bondage', 'Nature as harmony (*Rta*)', 'Living in the world as an unending suffering', 'Gods as the powers of Nature', 'the world as man's perpetual make-believe', 'Being (*Brahman*) as the hidden essence of the entire cosmic process', 'absolute stillness of the mind as the ultimate ideal (*purusartha*) of human life', and so on, have for their *élan* their Life-World experience. In Theravada (Mahayana) Buddhism as well, the experience of the Life-World of Buddha (born around 560 BC) when he was exposed to the sight of an old man, a diseased man, a dead man and a monk which shocked him and uprooted him from the luxuries he was to enjoy as a married prince, can be seen to be the original seed behind the well-known pessimism. For instance, the presuppositions in Buddhism that 'life is distressful', 'all earthly things are impermanent and their presence is confined to instants (*ksanas*)', reflect Buddha's original Life-World, and is the *raison d'être* of his search for Enlightenment. The story of the early Christian philosophical thought and of the Life-World forming its primitive background is not very different.

Husserl's insight into the structure and the pre-eminence of the Life-World in relation to the entire edifice of reflection influenced Merleau-Ponty, undoubtedly the most cogent propounder of the thesis that the seemingly impossible task philosophy is committed to performing is to reflect *over* the pre-reflective.

For Merleau-Ponty, the world which we perceive in our everyday life, the world which lies pre-set *there* for our entry so to say, the world of our commonsense and mundane concerns, is our Life-World. This Life-World, in its pre-given state, does not lie as a lay-out organized by our trained and scientific outlook. The world, totally unavoidable and unbracketable, the world as the immediately felt reality, the surrounding world (*Lebensumwelt*), the world of colours, forms, sizes, shapes, sounds, tastes, etc., the world which contains us as our abode or house, the world of 'utensils', to use Heidegger's term, is the Life-World. Thus, that for the omission of which Husserl repudiated science and scientists' perspective is made by Merleau-Ponty the very starting-point of his philosophical

thinking. Man's being-in-the-world, the way different societies structure their environment, the socio-cultural milieu in which people are born and situated by their birth, are not to be reduced, according to Merleau-Ponty, to essences. Unstructured with the help of scientific principles, unexplained by means of theories, the undefined world–man relationship, are the *real* world and the real world–man relationship. Before an analysis of this relationship is made, either in science or in philosophical investigation which is committed to rational procedure, it would be necessary to recognize, maintains Merleau-Ponty, the presence of the pre-reflective, the pre-predicative, the pre-thematic experience in which the living individual or the community leads its day-to-day existence. In philosophical anthropology one can speak of the original, untouched-by-civilization, pure nature of man experiencing the world in which he has somehow 'fallen' as his Life-World.

Every community, in this sense, has its own Life-World. It is so closely knitted with its primitive religiosity, its beliefs, mores, tradition and culture, its language, and its totally uninfluenced *Weltanschauung* in general, that it necessarily forms the fundamental base of its world-comprehension and its world-interpretation. It is this Life-World, however conglomerate it may be, that is the background of what Gadamer has called the 'prejudice' of a given community. Husserl's programme in his later writings was to unravel the Life-World of the universal man as such, to mark the very genesis and growth of it, to state not only its eidetic but also ethnophilosophic foundation, and to come out with an archaeology of the primeval structure of human consciousness. It is for this mission that phenomenology was first deployed by Husserl, and then by Claude Lévy-Strauss, the author of the *Structural Anthropology*, and by Merleau-Ponty.

Lévy-Strauss observes that humans from times immemorial have always taken immense interest in their environment. How animals move, whether they fly or crawl or run, whether they travel by land or by water, and whether they operate during the day or during the night, have held the attention of Navajo Indians, writes Lévy-Strauss.[8] Concern for the environment has formed the Life-World of these people. Not that primitive people were not capable of abstract thought. Lévy-Strauss argues that they were capable of elaborate moral and metaphysical concepts about life and the world. However, what they seem to have been not perturbed about is the theoretical representation of their practical life, their Life-World, which was a reality for them in their day-to-day life. Very much resembling

Lévy-Strauss's insistence on the original structures of the mind of the primitive tribes as their pre-given Life-World, Merleau-Ponty takes for granted the pre-offered reality of the Life-World and includes in it the dominance of the human body.

For Merleau-Ponty the study of human consciousness cannot be conducted unless this consciousness is regarded as 'embodied' and thus 'situated'. The experience of his or her own body an individual possesses is not like that of 'those bodies there' surrounding him or her. One is ones own body, one is ones own bodied being in the physical world, in the sense that ones life-awareness is not conceivable had one not been organically and physiologically constituted. Ones psyche is so to say married to ones state of incarnation, ones corporeal placement in the world, ones being inside the enclosure of ones own body, and therefore inside the world. In one of the most expressive paragraphs of his *Phenomenology of Perception* Merleau-Ponty writes:[9]

> Man taken as a concrete being is not a psyche joined to an organism, but the movement to and fro of existence which at one time allows itself to take corporeal form and at others moves towards personal acts ... there is not a single impulse in a living body which is entirely fortuitous in relation to psychic intentions, not a single mental act which has found at least its germ or its general outline in physiological tendencies.

To speak of the Life-World is to refer to one of the most enigmatic ways in which one as a nexus between the psyche and the body enters into the world and lives there. This entry and this act of living in the world are pre-reflective, Merleau-Ponty holds, because all forms of reflection are subsumed by them as the *sine qua non* of the very function of consciousness's stepping-out from the primordial *givenness* of life-experience. Perception, cognition and understanding, argues Merleau-Ponty, are not to be taken as mechanistically determined patterns of behaviour; they are extremely subtle expressions of the Life-World of the group in which one is born, a manner of carrying out that group's dialogue with the world. The entire process of theorization is erected on the ground of this dialogue, whose contents and meanings make the logic of theorization what it is. Whatever may be the degree of neutrality claimed by a philosopher—the scientificity pronounced by him, so to say—his problems and his way of meeting them are deeply rooted in the Life-World which

is a part and parcel of his encounter with the world. The Life-World, in this sense, plays a very significant role in the philosopher's interpretation, his hermeneutic, of the world's reality.

In the philosophy of early Indians, the preponderance of the Life-World over the style of thinking is easily noticeable. The sages who composed the Vedas and the Upanisads, and later on the epics *Mahabharata* and *Ramayana* and also the Puranas, were intensely aware of the condition of their mundane existence. The pathos, the ennui, the sense of resignation, the function of praying and propitiating supernatural agencies, the urge for emancipation (*moksa*) from the pain-generating worldly affairs, and the most overt stress on the stillness of the inner self, were the immediate reaction of the ancient Indian mind to its natural surroundings. The metaphysical and ethical theories this mind produced have to be understood in relation to its surroundings which were an unignorable fact for ancient Indians.

For instance, a scientifically oriented philosopher would find it impossible to explicate the theory of *karma* in the Indian philosophical tradition if what he keeps on looking for is a set of empirically determinable factors, such as the existence of consciousness after ones bodily death, the causal relation between the deeds a person might commit during his present life and their consequences on the quality of his next life, etc. Apart from its value as a pre-eminently rational device invented for understanding the very emergence of human consciousness in the world—individual bodied consciousnesses, so to say—the theory of *karma* is meant to account for a person's being what he is and thereby prepares him to accept the unalterable limitations to his existence. The *karma* law is a philosophically presented model for the explanation of the phenomenon of suffering which is a part of the Life-World of the Indian masses entangled today, as in ancient times, in a life of struggle. It regards ones present life not as the only possible life; it persuades one to believe that ones present life is merely a link in the chain of lives and deaths all of which are as sorrow-laden as the present one, and that ones liberation (*moksa*) lies in ones snapping the chain by means of a rigorous endeavour for attaining a unity with Being (*Brahman*). There is perhaps no similar philosophical undertaking in the ancient world—the undertaking in which the Life-World (comprising discontentedness of all sorts, inequality among members of the same group, ones fear that ones death is the termination of ones life, and also, however rarely, ones being lucky to have been born in a

state of riches, splendour and power) and the philosophical acumen of the time are so finely blended.

What Merleau-Ponty has called the body intentionality must be referred to in the present context. In phenomenology there is insistence on consciousness's being 'ontologically' directed toward phenomena—phenomena are the stuff which *appears* to consciousness. This insistence represents consciousness's natural tendency toward what Husserl terms as 'back to things themselves'. There is such a thing like consciousness's intuiting what 'appears' to it. In phenomenology, therefore, the world is not regarded as something existing independently but always as a correlate of consciousness. In other words, consciousness-of-the-world can be analyzed, for phenomenologists, primarily as consciousness being one pole and the world as the other pole. What distinguishes Merleau-Ponty's notion of intentionality from that of Husserl is that for Merleau-Ponty, unlike for Husserl, consciousness is necessarily incarnate and, being so, the physical, natural world is for it a given world. For Merleau-Ponty the world is not structured by consciousness in such a way that it can be said to have been brought into existence by consciousness. In Husserl's theory of consciousness—particularly, of transcendental consciousness—, if stretched to its extreme limit, it is not easy to maintain that Husserl had moderated his idealism and assigned an independent status to the world. Merleau-Ponty's image of human consciousness as essentially 'incarnate consciousness' has made him clearly an existentialist and given a new twist to his theory of Life-World. Merleau-Ponty, while writing on Husserl's famous method of phenomenological reduction, which is meant to put consciousness, by its own discipline, to a totally worldless, transcendental position, explains:[10]

> The most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction. ... If we were absolute mind, the reduction would present no problem. But since, on the contrary, we are in the world, since indeed our reflections are carried out in the temporal flux on to which we are trying to seize ... there is no thought that embraces all our thought.

For Merleau-Ponty consciousness is 'situated' in the world. The idea of situatedness implies, as it was already hinted at, consciousness's being incarnate, being spatio-temporally *there*, immersed in a Life-World in which the presence of other bodied consciousnesses is a reality. Ones own

body is a reality experienced by one as a private possession first and as a public or objective commodity, which observers, including scientists, can study, judge, pass remarks on, evaluate, medically treat, heal, injure, compel movements of, etc. later. Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that it is because of being bodied that I can observe things and place myself in relation to them. And the architecture of my body is such that I have to obey its rules while moving, relating myself to others, while living itself. Merleau-Ponty does not adopt the Cartesian, dualistic perspective about the mind–body relation in the sense that he refuses to recognize the opposition between the non-physical consciousness and the physical possession of it which is somehow obliterated by nature by bringing them together in man. He writes:[11]

> The outline of my body is a frontier which ordinary spatial relations do not cross. This is because its parts are interrelated in a peculiar way: they are not spread out side by side, but enveloped in each other ... my whole body for me is not an assemblage of organs juxtaposed in space. I am in undivided possession of it and I know where each of my limbs is through a *body image* in which all are included.

To philosophize is to reflect. The subject of the act of reflection is obviously the unreflected-on givens which consciousness encounters and over which consciousness dwells in a manner more radical than simple, spontaneous intuiting. Philosophy has the difficult task of arching the unreflected-on givens (i.e., the immediately perceived world, or the Life-World) on the one hand and the act of reflecting, theorizing, intellectual modelling, and comprehending, on the other. As Merleau-Ponty succinctly puts it:[12]

> Reflection cannot be thorough-going, or bring a complete elucidation to its object, if it does not arrive at awareness of itself as well of its results ... Reflection is truly reflection ... only if it knows itself as reflection-on-an-unreflective-experience, and consequently as a change in structure of our existence.

The main reason why Merleau-Ponty polarizes our scientific way of doing philosophy, our method of systematization in thinking and communication, on the one hand, and our Life-World in the form of sense-data, impressions, and the fact of our worldliness, on the other, is that the very activity of philosophization generates a puzzle: the puzzle is

that we want to contain inside the systematized thought and language what is in itself unsystematizable. Merleau-Ponty reasons:[13]

> To return to things themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the countryside in which we have learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is.

Today we cannot get away from the fact that the essential role of philosophy has to be to portray the life-experience, the Life-World, of individuals in diverse cultural groups, or of the cultural groups themselves. The Life-World of each one of the individuals represents a *Weltanschauung*, a manner of looking at the world, a style of cognizing the world and behaving toward it. The methods of doing philosophy institutionalized as positivist, empiricist, analytic, 'scientific', if regarded as the indubitable vantage-points for philosophical thinking, will have to exclude from their ambit the Vedic and Upanisadic philosophy, early and later Buddhist philosophy, and the entire explorative missions of philosophical anthropologists and ātmalogists.[14] What goes on in the so-called primitive religious practices of Indian tribes, of American Indians, of Latin Americans, and of Africans, and also in the life of women (as observed by feminists) facing the authority of the male-dominated society, must be reached not from any specific 'sophisticated' or 'established' paradigm but from some sort of rule-free passion of understanding, and with a desire to *see* as modes of experiencing and living the worldly situations. What Merleau-Ponty hints at, as 'what perception itself hides from itself', 'natural intuition as a dialect', 'symbols whose meaning we shall never finish developing', has to be the *raison d'être* for schematization, for systematic reflection, and verbalization. Unless the cultural underlayers of different communities, i.e., 'the *givens* in their everyday living', and their thinking and verbal habits are hermeneutically arched and placed in an attempted, but ever fluid, global framework of philosophical ideas and jargon, our intellectual exercise may possess mathematical rigour but will stay without what existentialists have invariably described as man's primordial discovery that he is *there* in the world of things and other humans, and has to have a way of befriending both.

Philosophy, as an open-ended intellectual activity of interpreting and understanding the 'texts' of human Life-Worlds has taken in our time a

form most liberal, universalist, and tolerant toward the multitude of cultures in the world. It has been recently the springboard of postmodern tendencies. With the powerful writings of Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur, the hermeneutical role of philosophy cannot leave any human individual or group in the world as having no philosophy, i.e., a reflective attempt to put its Life-World in a certain rational format. The so-called folk philosophies must thus be taken as diverse ways mankind has invented for dialoguing with the world, with the forces believed to be the controllers of the entire cosmic process, with itself and the world as two poles in the dialogue. Different belief- and thought-systems, and models for comprehending the reality of worldliness; the oral and written texts of different people forming their socio-cultural history; people's mythologies and religions; their occult and esoteric practices even if they are repudiated by their critics as bizarre and irrational; their world-views registered in their symbols and metaphors and arts; have to be unravelled and their hidden meanings are to be articulated. All these are in fact the ontological commitments of the people. They are what Gadamer very persuasively calls the 'horizon' within which each one of us moves and is moved. The Life-World of a community determines the matrix of its thought process, its range of vision. The worldly situation into which one is thrown and in which one lives represents the sphere and, emanating from the sphere, the standpoint which delimits the possibility of free vision. The horizon, for Gadamer, is the range of vision that compasses everything that can be perceived from a particular vantage-point. The Life-World in which an individual or a society is anchored figures, no doubt, as Gadamer indicates, as its 'prejudice'. And yet this prejudice never gets solidified as a fixed and unsurmountable bias. In fact there is something moving, volatile and open about the horizon. It is never rigidly bound to any particular viewpoint. Although the horizon has a history, a tradition, an expanse within the community which happens to have it, it is changeable—it can change with the change of the person. Therein lies the individual freedom. The very fact that we are able today to have an intellectual and cultural penetration into each other's paradigms, world-views, and visions of or about the destiny of human life, itself shows that minds, although prejudiced, are never 'windowless'.

Notes and References

1. Rorty, Richard, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Oxford, 1980, pp. 392–3.
2. The word 'dalit' means the oppressed. The life stories of Indian dalits are the narration of the pre-given experiences of the individuals and communities that belong to the class of *sudras*.
3. Husserl, Edmund, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, trans. Q. Lauer, New York, 1965, pp. 192 ff.
   See also Pivcevic, Edo: *Husserl and Phenomenology*, London, 1970, pp. 85 ff.
4. Ambedkar, B.R., *The Buddha and the Future of his Religion*, Jalandhar City, 1950. Also, Ambedkar, B.R., *The Buddha and his Dhamma*, Bombay, 1957. Ambedkar re-interpreted and gave a certain form to some of the ethical presuppositions of Buddhism in the light of the life of dalits and the atrocities committed by the *brahmana* class against them. Ambedkar could never reconcile with the Hindu precept of *Dharma*.
5. Appiah, Kwame Anthony, *My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture*, London, 1992, p. 116.
6. See Pawar, Daya, *Balutam* (Marathi), 6th Ed., Bombay, 1995. Mane, Laxman: *Upara* (Marathi), 4th Ed., Bombay, 1988. Tasgaonkar, Shashikant: *Gharanam Tamasguirachan* (Marathi), Bombay, 1989.
7. Hountondji, Paulin: *African Philosophy: Myth and Reality*, Bloomington, 1983, p. 33.
8. Lévy-Strauss, Claude, *The Savage Mind*, London, 1966, pp. 47 ff. See also Sturrock, John (Ed.): *Structuralism and Since*, Oxford, 1979, pp. 29 ff.
9. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith, New York, 1962, p. 88.
10. Ibid., pp. 14–15.
11. Ibid., p. 98.
12. Ibid., p. 88.
13. Ibid., p. ix.
14. Ātmalogy (the word used by me for the first time in the history of Indian thought) reflects a metaphysical tendency, inasmuch as it represents a distrust in the world of sense-perception, and a profound desire for self-exploration by means of radical trans-empirical concentration on one's own being. See Sinari, Ramakant: *The Structure of Indian Thought*, Oxford, 1970, pp. 74 ff.

The Public Sphere of Reason vs. the Nether World of the Family: Philosophies of the Modern Enlightenment

DEEPTI PRIYA MEHROTRA
B-26 Soami Nagar, New Delhi 110 017

POLES APART: PUBLIC, RATIONAL AND 'MASCULINE' VS. PRIVATE, EMOTIONAL AND 'FEMININE'[1]

In the worldview enshrined in European Enlightenment philosophies, public and private worlds emerged as sharply polarized. Both were understood to be essential to human life, yet bound together in a relation of opposition. The public was viewed as the superior realm, wherein rationality could be pursued, while the private was characterized as a realm preoccupied solely with emotional and bodily realities.

The public and private were conceptualized as asymmetric categories. Reason and the intellect were seen as far more valuable than emotion or the body. The two realms: of public, rational and masculine on the one hand, and private, emotional and feminine on the other: were delineated as mutually exclusive. A radical dichotomy was posited between the two.

In this understanding, dichotomies actually pervade and define the universe. Reason was opposed to emotion, public to private, objective to subjective, political to personal, intellectual to corporeal, masculine to feminine. One pole—reason/public/objective/political/intellectual/masculine—was rendered as positive and the other pole—emotion/private/subjective/personal/corporeal/feminine—as negative.

This rendition was not made directly or simplistically. Rather, it lies submerged within various works, emerging only when we carefully scrutinize those works, with the relevant tools and questions in mind.

INFLUENTIAL PHILOSOPHERS OF THE EUROPEAN ENLIGHTENMENT

A demarcation between the public and intellectual world on the one hand, and the private and emotional world on the other had already been posited

within Western philosophic tradition, as long back as Plato.[2] As we shall see, during the Enlightenment period the demarcation was sharpened. In the present paper, we will review the specific contributions made to defining and refining this demarcation, by five important philosophers of the Enlightenment: Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Marx and Mill.

Identifying rationality and public spaces with the human essence, and on the other hand with masculinity, led to an association of the 'masculine' with the 'fully human'. This legacy was validated by a series of philosophers and thinkers, each of whom introduced important variations upon the theme, and significant shifts in emphases and arguments. But they all shared, and strengthened, Plato's basic fallacy, that is the identification of the male human with the generic human.

What did the 'Enlightenment' imply for women? Hegel described the world of women in European society of the eighteenth century evocatively, as the 'nether world'.[3] Significantly, an element of factual accuracy clung to this description. He went on to provide elaborate justification for such a state of affairs: a justification that was fallacious because it was simply a vicious circle. Because women lived typically in the private realm of emotion and body, Hegel understood this as the realm they were fit to dwell in: thus rendering them a different, inferior kind of human being.

Descartes had already posited a radical divide between mind and body, and characterized intellectual activities as absolutely distinct from, and far superior to, non-intellectual. Moreover, any particular person was deemed fit to perform only one type of activity. This fitness was seen as naturally ordained.

Philosophers do not generally inaugurate injustice in social and political life. However, they have often provided significant intellectual resource for justifying such injustice. Philosophical systems of classic proportions, lofty and intricate, might yet suffer from very basic flaws. The philosophies we are here scrutinizing are often self-contradictory: champions of democratic and egalitarian principles on the one hand, but on the other hand complicitous in the perpetuation of regressive non-egalitarian norms and values.

It is true, surely, that 'there is a great deal to thought and action that is not the wilful product of any thinker's thoughts and intentions' ... Thinkers are often 'at least as much in the dark about the real source and significance of their thought and action as anyone else.'[4]

'CRYSTALLINE REALM OF PURE THOUGHT' VS. CONFUSED FEMALE WORLDS: RENE DESCARTES (1595–1650)

Descartes developed the notion of Reason as methodical thought.[5] He saw Reason as not only a distinguishing feature of human nature but an achievement, a skill to be learned and practised. The rational thinker had to break away from a more 'natural' condition, one associated with children, women, primitive peoples, physical labourers/slaves and servants.

In this framework, the achievement itself became associated with maleness, whereas the 'primordial' 'natural' condition got associated with being female. This might not have been Descartes' explicit intention. Yet the Descartian method, which proved crucial to the ideology of the modern Enlightenment, contributed to justifying the control of body by mind, nature by rational science, and feminine by masculine.

Descartes established the metaphysical doctrine of a radical separation of mind and body. This dichotomy between mind and body led to stark polarization of already existing contrasts, thus profoundly influencing the prevailing associations between gender and rational knowledge. The Descartian method was founded on the metaphysical doctrine of mind–body dualism. The non-rational was identified entirely with the body, with matter. To the body 'alone we must attribute everything which can be observed in us which is opposed to our reason.'[6] The mind—or soul—were characterized as rational. The encroachments of non-intellectual passion were characterized as being intrusions from the body, and in direct opposition to the working of the mind.

The Descartian method assumed an alignment between the bodily and non-rational. The method involved forming the habit of distinguishing intellectual matters from bodily matters. The effort was to search for, and concentrate the mind on, the purely intellectual—which would reveal itself by being clear and distinct. The method, he asserted, is unitary and would yield valid knowledge irrespective of the subject-matter.

Though Descartes allowed that all human beings possess the 'natural light of Reason', yet his method was so arduous as to make Reason practically inaccessible to most people. Sharply separated from the practical concerns of life, rational thought was delineated as a highly rarefied exercise of the intellect. The exercise required a complete transcendence of the sensuous. Descartes emphasized the contrast between the demands of an enquiry into truth and those attitudes necessitated by practical activities. In the pursuits of everyday life, mind intermingles with body. Only in the

arduous activity of pure contemplation is it possible, said he, to transcend the intrusions of the body. It is only pure thought of this rarefied kind that secures the foundations of knowledge.

Descartes characterized his method as essentially egalitarian, but paradoxically, in the context of already prevailing gender associations, his sharp polarization of mind and body resulted in an ever more acute exclusion and suppression of women from the sphere of higher intellectual pursuits. Given the realities of gender stratification, so long as women continued to undertake primary responsibility for the private realm of family and nurturance, they remained unable to withdraw into a separate realm of scholarly pursuits.

Most women, in the time Descartes lived and wrote, dwelt typically in the realm of practical everyday life, wherein mind and body comingle. But Descartes' method denied validity or dignity to this realm, categorizing it as a region immeasurably inferior to the intellect. His understanding clearly distinguished senses and emotions from the mind: 'Underlying the confusion of the senses there is a crystalline realm of order, where sharply articulated structures of thought match the structure of intelligible reality.'[7]

Women, in order to qualify for the intellectual life, would therefore need to *give up* various roles and conditions of life, which they did not have the liberty to do. Descartes hardly ventured into this realm, of the contexts and realities of women's lives. In sharply demarcating truth-seeking from the practical affairs of everyday life, the Descartian system reinforced the already existing demarcation between male and female roles, even opening the way to the idea of distinctive male and female consciousness.

Princess Elizabeth poignantly expressed in a letter to Descartes (dated 10/20 June 1643)—'the life I am constrained to lead does not allow me enough free time to acquire a habit of meditation in accordance with your rules. Sometimes the interests of my household, which I must not neglect, sometimes conversations and civilities I cannot eschew, so thoroughly deject this weak mind ... .'[8] If this was the situation of an elite woman from a royal household, even more skewed would be that of a lower class person: it is unlikely that a lower-class woman would even dare approach the portals of Rational Thought.

The realm of the feminine was defined on the basis of certain functions performed by many women—as private wives, mothers and housewives. While most women fitted neatly into the 'feminine' mould, a very small

number of exceptional women were thought of as being possibly 'superior', that is, capable of intellectual activity and the pursuit of rational knowledge. Even these were simply unable to completely break free of their feminine roles. Hardly were they in a position to join a community of intellectuals, and participate in collective intellectual production.

Descartes failed to appreciate the significance of the fact that women had already been assigned responsibility for the realm of the corporeal. It was woman's task to preserve and keep intact the 'private' sphere: the sphere in which mind and body intermingle, in which emotions and sensuousness abound. The 'Cartesian Man of Reason' was supposed to transcend this realm, moving on to the regions of pure thought, in order to attain true knowledge. Women, characterized as preservers of the inferior (yet necessary) realm, must remain essentially excluded from the higher realm of pure intellect. Man, exhausted from his intellectual labours, would retreat to this 'lower' realm for the fulfilment of physical and emotional needs.

In effect, the influence of the Descartian categories intensified the exclusion of the feminine—and therefore of most women—from the pursuit of knowledge. Women came to be conceived not just as less rational, but as possessing a different kind of intellectual character altogether, at best construed as complementary to 'masculine' Reason.

OBJECTIVE UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES VS. THE IMMATURITY OF SUBJECTIVE PERSONAL CONCERNS: IMMANUEL KANT (1724–1804)

In *An Answer to the Question What is Enlightenment?*, Kant defined the Enlightenment as 'man's emergence from his self-incurred immatuirty'.[9] Resistance, or inability, to use one's own understanding without guidance from another perpetuate immaturity. Lack of courage, and laziness, were identified as the reasons why a large proportion of humanity, 'including the entire female sex', fell so readily under the influence of guides and supervisors. The theme of Enlightenment as maturity was also directly connected to access to a public space, wherein men of learning address 'a reading public', utilizing an unlimited freedom to use their own Reason, and 'speak in their own person'.

Within this Kantian world, the characterization of women as immature followed from their systematic exclusion from the public world, understood to be the sphere in which Reason operates.

Elucidating in detail the nature of human Reason, Kant asserted that 'pure Reason' operates in the theoretical sphere. But 'understanding' depends on sensuous intuitions for its objects. While pure Reason is confined to the domain of thought, knowledge of the world is yielded through 'understanding', which includes the information obtained through the senses. However, in the practical sphere Reason is supposed to, of itself, yield moral, universal principles. This view fostered a conception of morality which tended to demarcate human life into, on the one hand, truly moral universal concerns and, on the other hand, the particularities of the 'merely' personal. Fitted upon a scenario of already prevailing gender differentiation, such a picture easily accommodated itself to accentuated demarcation along gender lines. That is, the truly moral universal attitude did become ever more associated with masculinity, and particular personal concerns with femininity. This developed into a notion of women as morally underdeveloped people, and the characterization of moral consciousness as, typically, a male attainment.

Kant understood human Reason as progressing within the framework of a rational, encompassing, and sustaining nature. Human history was conceived as a gradual progression of the realization of human capacities to reason. Conflict and resistance were seen as necessary conditions in this progression. Both conflict and resistance were marked as occurring only in the public sphere. The public sphere was characterized as the sphere of history. Women were excluded from the public sphere, and the sphere of human history.

Both were associated, in the Kantian frame, with men. Like ethical consciousness, so also 'enlightenment' demanded an emergence from the subjectivity of immature consciousness into a public space of universal principles, autonomously pursued. The metaphor of common intellectual space echoed the metaphor of universal ethical principles. Women were characterized as inevitably immature as well as morally underdeveloped, for they were typically engaged and absorbed in subjective, particular concerns.

In his political philosophy Kant insisted that women can only be passive, not active, citizens. He never explicitly spelt out why this should be so. It is quite possible that he was merely indulging in an 'unthinking endorsement of the prejudices of his day and an uncritical acceptance of the dogma of others ...'.[10] The exclusion of women from active citizenship was simply *assumed* to be appropriate.

The exclusion of women from active citizenship was extremely significant. All citizens were supposed to enjoy natural freedom and equality; however, passive citizens were denied the right to vote, frame laws or play any part in influencing or organizing the state itself. In *The Metaphysic of Morals*, Kant framed the criterion for active citizenship as being ones own master, or independent of the will of others: someone who neither takes orders nor receives protection from others. Passive citizens would therefore include 'apprentices to merchants or tradesmen, servants who are not employed by the state, minors, women in general, and all those who are obliged to depend on others for their living (i.e. for food and protection).'[11] Kant added that everyone should be able to work up from a passive to an active state. But in *Theory and Practice*, Kant made the *a priori* assumption that 'being an adult male' was an essential prerequisite for active citizenship.[12] Thus he explicitly precluded women from the possibility of ever becoming active citizens. In so doing, he tied himself up in contradictions from which he was nowhere able to emerge.

It is interesting to look at Kant's ideas with regard to women's nature as such. In *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, Kant equated women's notion of freedom with the capturing or seduction of men: 'By extending favours towards men, the feminine character lays claim to freedom and simultaneously to the conquest of the entire male species.'[13] He went on to identify women with 'inclination' and men with 'reason', recommending that the woman should reign and the man should rule, because inclination reigns and reason rules. He warned against the danger of allowing women too much education, and ridiculed women who attempted to study: 'for the scholarly woman, she uses her books in the same way as her watch, which she carries so that people will see that she has one.'[14]

He portrayed women as querulous, jealous and dominating. At the same time, women's lack of cold and speculative forms of thought was for Kant associated with adulation of them. A standard biography[15] notes that Kant enjoyed the company of women provided they did not pretend to understand the *Critique of Pure Reason*!

In *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*, Kant asserted that women have charm, beauty and a capacity to melt the heart, while men are more 'sublime ..., principled ... and practical'. His description of women here accords with his description of natural beauty; what she

lacks by way of abstract thought she makes up by those qualities of taste and feeling that she does possess.[16]

Kant looked upon sex as, basically, an animal activity. His sharp, value-loaded polarization between body and mind led to a characterization of body and bodily activities as sub-human, whereas mind and mental faculties are participants in the divine. As he clarified in his 'Doctrine of Virtue' (part 2 of *The Metaphysic of Morals*), he considered sexual activity to be incompatible with the dignity of human beings. In his opinion, yielding to sexual desire makes man not only an object of enjoyment, but still further an unnatural and loathsome object.

In general he asserted that sex is permissible within monogamous marriage although, because of the inherently loathsome nature of sex, there is a process of (mutual) objectification and dehumanization. At the same time, in *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*, he stated that husband and wife, are, because of their different natures, complementary to one another: 'In matrimonial life the united pair should, as it were, constitute a single moral person, which is animated and governed by the understanding of the man and the taste of the wife.' Convinced as he was about the 'natural superiority of the husband over the wife' he deemed it appropriate that upon entering marriage a woman should accept subjection and subordination to her husband. This is basically because the man was thought of as aligned to objective, universal moral principles, while the wife was associated with subjective, particularistic concerns.[17] Therefore, the husband enjoyed the right to command whereas it was the wife's duty to obey.

A contemporary critic notes that when it came to women, 'Kant's mind, almost wholly uncluttered by any actual experience, is laid bare and prejudice and bigotry are revealed.' In *The Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant noted that pure Reason cannot on its own give content to knowledge, without making reference to experience: and stated that all attempts to break through the limits set by experience end in self-contradiction![18]

As we have seen, although Kant was a critical thinker, he supported gender hierarchies—in ways sometimes subtle, at other times crude. He tended to elevate contingent practise—customs followed in the middle and upper classes of eighteenth-century Germany—to the level of requirements of Reason, undeniable and indubitable truths: thus justifying and rationalizing the status quo.

THE NETHER WORLD OF THE FAMILY—A NECESSARY EVIL: G.F.W. HEGEL (1770–1831)

Hegel, like Kant, saw human history as an unfolding of Nature, such that Reason realizes its oneness with the absolute. He too saw the paradigm of human Reason as an advance into a freedom which approximates the universal, and is detatched from the subjective and particular. In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel showed how nature unfolds through Reason into Spirit, in successive stages of human consciousness and their embodiment in social structures.[19] Advanced stages supersede and transcend the less advanced, which are thus preserved as well as subsumed. Immature forms of consciousness reveal their inner nature even as they are transcended.

Hegel explicitly related feminine consciousness to comparatively immature stages in the advance of Reason. He showed how 'womankind' is constituted through suppression. What is involved is a suppression of the private sphere—women's domain—by the public sphere—male domain. In his account of 'Family Life' in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel made a striking formulation of the relation between the feminine 'nether world' and the 'light of day' represented by the wider universe. He equated female consciousness with family life, characterized by particularity and subjectivity, and generally a less advanced stage of human consciousness. The life of 'Civil Society', of the community, was equated with male consciousness—a more advanced stage in which ethical principles are supposed to be consciously realized.

The ethical character of family life depended, for Hegel, on the family's involvement, through the husband, in a life external to the family, that is the wider public arena. Women's special domain, the family, which Hegel denoted as the 'nether world', consists primarily of duties and affections towards blood relatives.

Since women were not to be citizens, or participate in any community or domain beyond the particular family, they were deemed to lack access to the wider domain of self-conscious 'working for the universal'. They could have an ethical life only insofar as they were able to transform the particularity of family relationships into ethical, universal concerns. The man however, being a citizen, could exercise ethical principles in the wider domain. Through her relationship to a man, woman could participate in the 'upward movement of the law of the nether world to the actuality of the light of day and to conscious existence'. Through his relation to the

family and the feminine, man got implicated in a corresponding 'downward movement'. Female ethical consciousness remains vague and shadowy, when compared with what a man can achieve by breaking away from the 'immediate, elemental, and therefore, strictly speaking, negative ethical life of the family'. Female consciousness thus becomes dependent upon the 'objective' existence of male consciousness in the 'real' world.

Hegel's treatment of femininity rationalized and justified women's exclusion from the public and political domain, since their development was supposed to rest upon a 'vague unity of feeling' rather than any grasp of universality. At the same time, the family—the nether world—was recognized as necessary to the wider life of society. A complementarity was posited between feminine and masculine: a complementarity in which the two terms were unequal, one necessarily superior to the other. It was deemed appropriate that the male should draw sustenance from the female—from the natural feelings preserved by and through her. Her function was, aptly, the provision of sustenance to the male citizen.

At the same time, Hegel noted the existence of conflict. He identified not just family concerns but womankind itself as an 'internal enemy', which must be suppressed and contained. This suppression makes possible the very existence of the community, even while it constitutes womankind as what it is. Women's interests are identified with the interests of the family. Women defend these interests against the interests of a public, political community: 'Since the community only gets its existence through its interference with the happiness of the family ... it creates for itself what it suppresses and what is at the same time essential to it—an internal enemy—womankind in general.'

Although aware that there were tremendous variations in family and sexual relations in different parts of the world, Hegel considered only one set of family relationships and a particular division of labour between the sexes as rational and right. These were the monogamous sexual arrangements of the European nuclear, property-owning, family of the eighteenth century, in which women were confined to the private sphere while men had access to both private and public spheres.

In the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel wrote about the 'natural determinancies of the sexes', which are such that 'man has his actual substantive life in the state, in learning, and so forth, as well as in the family', while women's sphere is limited to the family.[20] The upshot is that women were not considered individuals, at least not in the same measure and to the same

extent as men. They were supposedly lesser human beings than men, who were characterized as active and powerful. Women were seen as passive, submerged in the life of the family, condemned to cyclically repeat activities required for reproduction, child-rearing, and satisfaction of their men's emotional and physical needs. Thus women, in Hegel's conception, play no part in history, which is concerned exclusively with changes that take place on the public stage.

In Hegel's political architectonic, the private family is important because it is the only sphere in which the right of the modern individual to particularity and subjectivity is realized. His interest in the family was therefore primarily from the viewpoint of the freedom and fulfilment of the male subject in the modern state.

Hegel wrote in favour of transformations initiated by the French Revolution, including women's rights to property; free choice of spouse, and divorce, yet at the same time criticized women's own attempts at emancipation. During the period in which he was writing, the ideas of liberty and equality swept over Europe, and 'the minds of intellectual women were stirred, they became more conscious of themselves, more philosophic, more independent ... France produced a writer of the calibre of Madame de Stael, England a Mary Summerville, a Jane Austen, and Germany, although the stronghold of the domestic ideal, also had her brilliant intellectual women ... .'[21] In their lives these women aspired to new models of gender relations, with equality, and reciprocity. But Hegel continued to staunchly defend women's traditional roles in the family, argued against their education except by way of learning household skills, and in effect opposed the changes progressive women were struggling to bring about.

Ultimately, he confined women to a grand but doomed sphere of the dialectic, that is of forever being 'minds in their infancy'. He wrote that, 'Women are capable of education, but they are not made for the activities which demand a universal faculty, such as the more advanced sciences, philosophy and certain forms of artistic production. Women may have happy ideas, taste and elegance, but they cannot attain to the ideal.'[22]

Hegel's distinction between men and women presupposed what it sought to establish: the inappropriateness of allowing women into public and political life. He fixed both men and women into stereotypes, with men dynamic and women static. He asserted that, in women, natural instinct

prevails, untempered by Reason and Spirit. In terms of how placid is their growth, he compared women to plants and men to animals.

In Hegel's understanding and definition, no work takes place in the domestic sphere. It is in civil society that there is work, and legal regulation, guilds and corporations. Women were excluded from the sphere of work, as they were excluded from the public and political realms. At the same time, for Hegel work was crucial for realizing freedom in the world. Work, fighting, and philosophizing were seen by him as the chief human activities, through which the process of moving away from natural instinct, and towards self-determination, could be accomplished. Women were excluded from all three activities. Implicit was the assumption that they could not possibly articulate their own experiences in any meaningful way, or move to change the status quo.

When a contemporary political thinker declares that 'Hegel's work can ... be used to show that it is Hegel, and political theory, not women, who are the enemy of the progress of reason and history in the world, since it is they who, against reason and justice, deny justice and reason to women'[23]—there is no reason to disagree!

LOVE'S LABOUR LOST: THE PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD REMAINS INVISIBLE: KARL MARX (1818–1883)

Marx, like Hegel before him, conceived of human history as rational progression. He concretized successive historical stages as advances in modes of production. Class struggle was central to this vision of progress. While he allowed women to be participants in struggle, it was only as part of an exploited class, not as members of an oppressed sex. He failed to recognize the crucial differentia between the situations of men and women within the same class.

Although Marx did not look upon the institution of the family as fixed, immutable or natural, he never carried this insight forward into an in-depth analysis of the patriarchal family structure. Instead he followed his predecessors in considering the public and political as far more important, worthy of much more attention, than the private or personal. He thought that class struggle, played out in the political arena, would as part of its consequences solve women's problems as much as men's. He failed to appreciate or grapple with 'the mutually reinforcing dialectical relationship between capitalist class structure and hierarchical sexual structuring.'[24]

Engels seemed to have an inkling of the separate and specific location of women when he compared woman to proletariat and man to bourgeoisie, positing that a 'world historical defeat of the female sex' had taken place simultaneously with the development of private property (in *The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State*[25]). But he did not carry this insight forward in subsequent analysis. In *The German Ideology*, Marx and Engels categorized family relations, including the sexual division of labour, as 'natural'.[26]

Marx's methodology focused on men's labour and ignored the specificities of women's labour. Despite his major differences with Hegel, in this aspect Marx's writings echoed Hegelian thought. Given, moreover, his ontological and materialist stress on the labouring activities of human beings, the invisibility of women is highly problematic. Typical 'women's work', that is unpaid domestic labour, was absent from the analysis, so we are left with an incomplete and skewed account of human labour. In effect, Marx eliminated from his theoretical focus all those activities connected with the reproduction of human beings—by adopting a very narrow definition of 'production' and the 'economic', such that the making or processing of goods that are not incorporated in the market system are not counted as 'work', and such goods are not conceived of as 'economic' products. In this scheme the socially necessary work that goes into child-bearing, child-rearing, household organization and drudgery, and maintenance of family relationships—was rendered invisible.

In Marx's interpretation of 'materialism', the activities related to reproduction and care/nurturance were relegated to a brute, physiological, and nonhistorical realm of human existence. Historical changes in these socially necessary activities were absent from his analysis. He defined history in terms of modes of production, but failed to recognize how these are themselves structured by, and structure, other institutions such as motherhood, the family and housewifery.

Consistently, within the Marxist framework, gender relations were obscured, and women's actual roles as well as potential misunderstood. Today as we begin to appreciate not just the importance of the sphere of reproduction but also the complex interplay between the spheres of production and reproduction, we realize how limiting and distorting were the consequences of excluding gender from his theoretical framework and analysis.[27]

While Marx analysed surplus labour and exploitation in terms of the market economy, he did not have a corresponding appreciation of women's surplus labour, which is unpaid, within the realm of the household. Had he paused to consider specifically women's labour, he would have had to rethink his account of labour to accommodate reproductive and emotional labour as well: which is constituted in a complex manner, by biology as well as by culture and history. Implicit in Marx's analysis is a characterization of such labour as less than human, *because it is so intimately associated with nature*. For Marx, the fully human is exclusively rational, planned and conscious. Thus the labour involved in human reproduction is relegated to a sub-human status.

Marx was complicitous with other philosophers of the Enlightenment in stressing the notion of nature as inanimate and controllable, and 'man' as superior, independent, self-created and self-sufficient. The idea of a close association between 'women' and 'nature' was reinforced. For Marx, nature and humanity were, in a significant sense, opposed. Necessity—nature—must be reduced, overcome or conquered, as history advances. Progress involved a steadily advancing control over nature. The reconciliation of humanity with nature takes place at the expense of nature controlled. Marx's concept of production necessarily entails this domination over nature. In the words of Marx and Engels (in *The German Ideology*), 'Communism ... treats all natural premises as the creatures of hitherto existing men, strips them of their natural character and subjugates them to the power of the united individual ... .'

In the young Marx, there were intimations of a yearning for a genuine, mutually reciprocal relationship between humanity and nature, as also, within the same theoretical framework, between men and women. This is clear from *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, wherein there were latent intimations of an alternative dialectical interplay between humanity and nature.[28] But his epistemological commitment to the arena of 'production' (narrowly defined) committed him to a detectably masculinist ontological reality. De Stefano argues that Marx is altogether 'profoundly embedded within a masculine horizon of meaning and sensibility ... It is part and parcel of a misogynist configuration of values, meanings and practices.'[29]

MASCULINE 'POWER' AND FEMININE 'LOVE': JOHN STUART MILL (1806–1873)

Mill, who championed utilitarianism and liberalism, set out to explicitly apply the principles of liberalism to women. Utilitarianism seemed to open a door through which women's emancipation could be voiced. This is because the principle of utility assumes a fundamental equality in human psychology. For utilitarians, each person—woman or man—is to be taken as a single unit. Mill consciously tried to incorporate the notion of women as men's equals and oppose prejudices and beliefs that keep women in a subordinate position.

He advocated greater rights for women, which would make women happier as well as enhance the well-being of society as such. Mill's essay *The Subjection of Women* was an influential document arguing for opening up opportunities for suffrage, education, and employment to women,[30] opportunities implying the difference between 'a life of subjection to the will of others, and a life of rational freedom' (Mill, ibid.: p. 542).

In *The Subjection of Women*, Mill emphasized the crucial importance of extending liberty (that is the opportunity for self-determination) and justice (i.e. equal and impartial consideration) to women. He discussed these specifically in terms of marriage, education, and occupational opportunities. He argued that, in their prevailing state of subjection and lack of opportunity, women act as a constant force against progress. Liberating them would reverse this force. Aware that nature had often been used to legitimize conventional gender arrangements, Mill sought to combat arguments about the 'naturalness' of the glaring inequalities between the sexes. Yet, very significant limitations, ambivalences, and contradictions characterized his approach.

Though he asserted the need to reform the family institution in a number of ways, yet he did not countenance any fundamental change in inter-familial gender roles. His concern was implicitly with middle- and upper-class families. He painted a picture of existing conjugal life reminiscent of Hegel's portrait of the master–slave relation. Yet whatever prescriptions he offered for altering the situation were totally inadequate.

He accepted the prevailing division of duties within the family as 'the most suitable division of labour between the two persons'. The mother, he asserted, is the person naturally fit to care for a child. He noted that in a home where there are no servants 'it is good and will naturally take place ... that the mistress of a family will herself do the work of servants', and

also that 'the great occupation of women should be to beautify life ... and to diffuse beauty, elegance and grace everywhere' (Mill, ibid.: pp. 473–4, 483).

He stated that women should have a real choice between career and marriage, but assumed, inexplicably and unrealistically, that most women would prefer marriage. He assumed married women would continue to be restricted to domesticity: 'Like a man when he chooses a profession, so, when a woman marries, it may in general be understood that she makes choice of the management of a household, and the bringing up of a family, as the first call upon her exertions, during as many years of her life as may be required for the purpose; and that she renounces, not all other objects and occupations, but all which are not consistent with the requirements of this' (Mill, ibid.: p. 484).

Ultimately Mill's arguments for women's emancipation were at best limited to a toothless plea for 'equal rights'—toothless and weak because of the lack of critique of the pervasive gender-based stratification of roles and labour.

In arguing for equal property rights he recommended that a woman have rights to property she inherits or earns, but did not consider the issue of property ownership in the marital home, if based on the husband's earnings or inheritance. Moreover, although he said that married women ought to be able to support themselves, he was convinced that they should not actually do so, since it would lead to the neglect of household and children. He did not perceive any injustice in institutions and practices which allowed a man to have access to a family as well as wider public and professional realm, whereas a woman must perforce make a choice between the two. In fact, he granted legitimacy to this basic choicelessness, propping it up as the best possible situation for women.

In effect, Mill condoned the continuation of very significant differences in power and opportunity, between men and women, despite his apparent concern for women's rights. Though accepting women's right to be citizens, he did not countenance such changes as would actually allow women to be equal. There was an unresolved tension in his depiction of the ideal and his prescriptions for his own society.

This was despite the fact that Mill was close to some women thinkers of his time, notably Harriet Taylor with whom he shared a long-standing intellectual relationship, and eventually a marriage. Mill emphatically asserted how much of his thoughts and ideas he owed her. He

acknowledged the help she rendered in transforming what had been for him 'little more than an abstract principle' into a real appreciation of the practical, day-to-day manifestations of women's subordination, and of 'the mode in which the consequences of the inferior position of women intertwine themselves with all the evils of existing society and with all the difficulties of human improvement.'[31]

He noted widespread male resistance and fear as regards the prospect of living with women as equals, and argued for the possibility of friendship between women and men, even envisioning marriage as a locus of sympathy and understanding between autonomous adults. However, despite these advances in thinking, the actualization of such possibilities was severely limited. Any significant change in the wife's position within a marriage could only be at the behest of the man, who would in any case retain his dominant position due to his strong linkages with the outside world. He was to continue unchallenged as head of the family. A plea merely to men's better nature and benevolence, such as Mill ended up making, was unlikely to achieve far-reaching changes.

The contradictions in Mill's thinking were so severe that his progressive recommendations actually sound flat and unconvincing. As Goldstein puts it, 'the restraints which Mill believed should be imposed on married women constitute a major exception to his argument for equality of individual liberty between the sexes—an exception so enormous that it threatens to swallow up the entire argument.'[32]

INFLUENCE OF ENLIGHTENMENT PHILOSOPHIES: GENDER AND OTHER DICHOTOMIES IN THE MODERN WORLD

Social and political philosophy does not always have clear and direct relation to the actual operations of society and polity. However, linkages do exist and can be traced, back and forth, from theory to practical realities, and from practice to theory. The linkages are clear and stronger in some cases. The philosophers studied in the present chapter, for instance, have all had a strong impact upon the social and political ethos. Together, they contributed to a mainstream, with deep underlying similarities in worldview and assumptions—despite the well-known differences between one and the other.[33]

Most of these philosophers based their thinking, as regards the public–private divide, within the particular social arrangements of the Europe of

the time, and that too within the middle classes. All of them displayed an abysmal lack of understanding of the scope and significance of existing structural arrangements vis-à-vis the dimensions of the public–private dichotomy. Particular delineations differed from one thinker to the next, but as we have seen there were common threads running throughout their works. Their arguments were often interlocking, reinforcing each other. Together, they managed to create an impressive corpus of intellectual resources justifying the dichotomization of public and private, reason and emotion.

In order to appreciate and deconstruct the implications of their work, detailed reading and concentrated scrutiny are indispensable. Typically the implications were woven into the very fabric of their works, rendering them virtually invisible. It requires patient unravelling and untying of knots in order to see, and expose, these implications. Once we begin to notice the patterns, however, the implications become quite obvious.

It is striking that these philosophers were frequently quite astute in analyzing some aspects of existing gender arrangements, for instance Hegel's characterization of women's 'nether world', and Mill's descriptions of the conjugal relationship: yet beyond a point they did not notice the injustice of the arrangements they are writing about. Even when they did try, like Mill, or were consciously progressive and revolutionary, like Marx, a deeper complicity with the prevailing order induced them to abandon the project half-way. They retraced their steps, the right hand taking back what the left had begun to offer.

Ultimately, each of these thinkers provided intellectual resources for the strengthening of dichotomies between public and private, and associated gender stereotypes and arrangements. They failed to question the structural arrangements deeply enough—a failure partially attributable to a lack of reflexivity as regards their own position of privilege. As 'rational' thinkers, they usurped for themselves and their kind the attributes of 'Reason', 'objectivity', and the domain of public space.

As philosophers—creators of 'high' discourse—they imputed to themselves an impartial, high-minded, rational and mature intelligence, and painted the 'other' as incompetent, non-rational, and purely negative. Paradoxically, the creators of discourse are often themselves under the power of that discourse—themselves circumscribed by, and within, its terms.

Certain values, interests and institutions were accepted and reaffirmed, without due consideration, analysis or philosophical scrutiny. None of these thinkers noticed the circular reasoning upon which their arguments for women's continued absorption within the private domain were based. They invoked the superiority of public to private, and championed male monopoly over the former. They acknowledged the functional complementarity of public-masculine and private-feminine domains, while simultaneously characterizing the former as far superior to the latter. They failed to notice the anomaly that in their philosophical systems, equality and liberty seemed to mean something very different for the two sexes.

Each of these philosophers was only one point in a rationalistic tradition that systematically categorized, divided, and hierarchized. This provided resources for validating unjust hierarchies based on gender (and on class, race, nationality).[34] There were obvious contradictions in the championing, on the one hand, of the Enlightenment notions of liberty, equality, fraternity, justice and democracy, and on the other hand the blatant exclusion of women from equal participation in socio-political institutions. Yet the assumptions made by our philosophers legitimized such exclusion.

The influence has been palpable, and far-reaching. For instance: in the social sciences, under pretext of universality, the dominant perspectives even today tend to validate the male and deny the female point of view. If we consider the situation of Durkheim, often described as the 'founding father' of sociology, we perceive that the discipline smoothly absorbed the prevalent intellectual prejudice dividing the world into mutually exclusive 'public' and 'private' realms, with associated gender hierarchies. A biographer notes vis-à-vis Durkheim's life: 'the domestic ideal that is evident in his writings was most clearly represented by his own home life ... . His wife created for him the respectable and quiet familial existence which he considered the best guarantee of morality and of life. She removed him from all material care and all frivolity, and for his sake took charge of the education of Marie and Andre Durkheim.'[35] Concrete sources of the sociologist's limitations in understanding as well as his personal stakes in maintaining a male-oriented world with a gender-based division of labour, are apparent. This glimpse into concealed aspects of academic production suggests one reason why the private realm, housework, childcare, emotion, et al. have been systematically underplayed and relegated to the immutable 'nether world' by academicians.

That millions of wives, with husbands in a wide variety of professions or jobs, have daily reproduced the labour force by performing emotional-supportive as well as material functions is a basic social fact, yet mainstream social scientists have refused to pay serious consideration to this. In thus refusing, they have demonstrated to the world at large that domestic labour as such is inferior, unworthy of serious study. The invisibilization of 'women's work' has been strongly reinforced in the sphere of economics. Domestic unpaid labour is trivialized. According to Economics, domestic labour, being typically unpaid, does not constitute 'work' at all, for work by definition is that activity which secures direct monetary benefits (echoes of Hegel ... !).

In fact, the philosophical justification for dividing the world into mutually exclusive categories of public-masculine on the one hand, and private-feminine on the other, has seeped into the very foundations of modern socio-economic and political thought, values and institutions. Justifications are available in an infinite variety of guises, in popular and everyday life.

Whether it is idealism, liberalism, Marxism, or some other version of Enlightenment thought, our minds and life-conditions are perceptibly influenced by these ideologies. They affect and condition not only from outside, but from deep within, ourselves. It is worth recalling that these thought-systems are not only complex, but also replete with self-contradiction. They contain resources for egalitarianism, and at the same time for its exact opposite: unjust hierarchies. The strain of inherent contradiction can contribute, in its own way, to nurturing seeds of internal protest and challenge.

Notes and References

1. 'Feminine' is understood, throughout the present paper, as 'that which is appropriate for women'—which might cover activities, attributes, a certain domain or space; while 'masculine' refers, similarly, to 'that which is appropriate for men'.
2. See Deepti Priya, 'The Ideal of Rationality and the Exclusion of the "Feminine": A Study in Plato's Theory of Knowledge', *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. XIII, Number 1, 1995.
3. G.W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, 1807, tr. A.V. Miller, O.U.P., Oxford, 1977.
4. Joan Cocks, *The Oppositional Imagination*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, New York, 1992, pp. 187–8.

5. Rene Descartes, 'Discourse on Reason', in E.S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, eds, *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, Vol. 1, Dover, 1995.
6. Rene Descartes, 'The Passions of the Soul', in Haldane and Ross, ibid.
7. Genevieve Lloyd, *The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy*, Methuen, London, 1984, p. 47.
8. Lloyd, ibid., pp. 48–9, citing 'Princess Elizabeth to Descartes, 10/20 June 1643', tr. Blom, in *Descartes*, 1978, p. 111.
9. Kant, 'An Answer to the Question What Is Enlightenment?' in Reiss, ed., tr. Nisbet, *Kant's Political Writings*, 1970.
10. Susan Mendus, 'Kant: An Honest But Narrow-Minded Bourgeois?', in Ellen Kennedy and Susan Mendus, *Women in Western Political Philosophy—Kant to Nietzsche*, Wheatsheaf, Sussex, 1987.
11. Kant, 'Metaphysic of Morals', sec 46, in Reiss, op. cit.
12. Kant, 'Theory and Practice', in Reiss, ibid.
13. Mendus, op. cit., citing Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, tr. Gregor, 1974, p. 167.
14. Mendus, citing Kant, ibid., p. 172.
15. Roger Scruton, *Kant*, O.U.P., Oxford, 1977.
16. Kant, *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*, tr. Goldthwait, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1960.
17. Mendus, op. cit., citing Kant, *Metaphysical Elements of Justice*, Ch. III, sec. 26.
18. Mendus, ibid., p. 35.
19. G.F.W. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, 1807, tr. A.V. Miller, O.U.P., Oxford, 1977.
20. G.F.W. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, tr. and ed. T.M. Knox, O.U.P., Oxford, 1973.
21. Seyla Benhabib, 'On Hegel, Women and Irony', in Mary Lyndon Shanley and Carole Pateman, eds, *Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991.
22. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, ibid., p. 263.
23. Susan Mendus, 'Women and the Hegelian State', in Kennedy and Mendus, op. cit.
24. Zillah Eisenstein, 'Developing a Theory of Capitalist Patriarchy', in Eisenstein, ed., *Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism*, 1979, p. 5.
25. Friedrich Engels, 'The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State', in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. III, 1986.
26. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, ed. C.J. Arthur, International, New York, 1979.
27. See Linda Nicholson, 'Feminism and Marx—Integrating Kinship with the Economic', in Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, *Feminism As Critique—Essays on the Politics of Gender in Late-Capitalist Societies*, Polity, Cambridge, 1987.

28. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977.
29. Christine De Stefano, 'Masculine Marx', in Shanley and Pateman, eds, op. cit.
30. J.S. Mill, *The Subjection of Women*, O.U.P., Oxford, 1975.
31. J.S. Mill, *Autobiography*, London, 1973, cited in Susan Moller Okin, *Women in Western Political Thought*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1984.
32. Leslie Goldstein, 'Mill, Marx and Women's Liberation', in *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 18, 1980, pp. 319–34, cited in Mary Lyndon Shanley, 'Marital Slavery and Friendship: John Stuart Mill's *The Subjection of Women*', in Shanley and Pateman, eds. op. cit.
33. The broad differences are significant and well-known: for instance Marx and Hegel are often discussed as polar opposites opposed to each other, with Marx a materialist and Hegel an idealist. Similarly, Marx and Mill espouse frameworks so different as to have led to the mutually warring ideologies of historical materialism on the one hand, and liberalism on the other. Yet, all three are almost identical in their assumption, ultimately, of the immutability of existing gender-based roles and structures.
34. See Deepti Priya Mehrotra, *Western Philosophy and Indian Feminism*, Aravali Books, New Delhi, 1998: for discussion on the links with other unjust hierarchies: based on class, race and so on.
35. Steven Lukes, *Emile Durkheim*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1975, p. 104.

Rationalization of the Life-World

S. PANNEERSELVAM
Professor of Philosophy, University of Madras, Chennai 600 005

I

System and life-world are the two aspects of human existence. In the writings of Schutz and Goffman, we can see these two-fold aspects of human existence playing an important role. Schutz's *The Structures of the Life-World*,[1] and Goffman's *Frame Analysis*[2] deal with the intersubjective experience depicted in the life-world. Schutz argues that all the modes of intersubjectivity pre-suppose the life-worldly presence of the other. This means intersubjectivity presupposes the framework of natural world in which we give meaning to the experience of others. According to Goffman, the method in frame analysis is the intersubjective experience, which is both constituted and made significant by means of conceptual framework. There is always a tension between these two aspects of life, namely, the system and life-world. This is explained in Kantian writings also. Kantian deduction is the basis for the above distinction. Kant identified the life-world with the Newtonian world. He assimilated the life-world with the world of natural science, says Husserl. Kant failed to make a distinction between *a priori* of science and *a priori* of the life-world. Space, time and causality of the life-world are not to be identified with the space, time and causality of mathematical natural science. But Kant believed that the space of our immediate experience is the same as that of Newtonian space. Kant failed to note that the life-world is more basic and primordial than that of the objects of science. Life-world is first and foremost intersubjective. Kant wrongly identified the world of mathematical science with the life-world. A system is always defined in terms of structures and life-world by hermeneutics. Truly speaking, these two aspects are not opposite to each other. It is the one world, which is pictured, in two different perspectives. In the system or structural perspective, otherwise known as the 'perspective of nature', the categories like space, time, causality etc., are discussed. In

the life-world, the end and means, norms and values and their meaning are important. Goffman also explains the above distinction in terms of natural and social. A close observation of this would reveal that both are intimately connected and both represent different dimensions of human existence. Whether it is dichotomy between the objective and subjective, or the causal and meaningful, or the nature and life-world, it must be admitted that both are invariably important. *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, written by Husserl in his mid-seventies and published posthumously, has a revised version of phenomenology and it adopts Dilthey's notion of life-world (*Lebenswelt*) as a basic concept. Dilthey's life-world had a methodology for social sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*) which is different from that of the natural or physical science (*Naturwissenschaften*). Life-world is a world of experiences, and not a mere collection of objects and things of the world.

The life-world shows different dimensions. David Carr[3] deals with two senses of the life-world, the anthropological and the philosophical. Similarly, Aron Gurwitsch[4] makes a distinction between culture-sensitive and culture-relative. Goffman also talks about the pluralization of the life-worlds. Husserl introduces the notion of 'ontology of the life world'. The notion of life-world occupies a prominent place in the writings of Habermas. He has given a new dimension to this by relating it with communicative action. He elaborately deals with the life-world in the second volume of *The Theory of Communicative Action*,[5] which is subtitled: 'Life-world and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason'. He talks about life-world assuming a form of 'colonization' and also about what is known as 'uncoupling of system and life-world'. He quotes Hobbes who defines the life-world negatively which encompasses everything excluded from the administrative system and left to private discretion. The life-world is that from which civil law and legal authority emancipate the citizen; its essence lies in the corporatively bound, status-dependent conditions of life that had found their particularistic expression in feudal laws concerning person, profession, trade, and land.[6] 'Without this life-world substratum, the state in its absolutist form could not have found a basis for its legitimation, nor could it have functioned,' says Habermas.[7]

In his important work, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*,[8] Habermas talks about the relationship between state and society in which the notion of life-world is implied. Here the distinction between the private and the public law is maintained to explain the relationship

between state and a society. For him, the 'public opinion' takes on a different meaning depending on 'whether it is brought into play as a critical authority in connection with the normative mandate that the exercise of political and social power be subject to publicity or as the object to be moulded in connection with a staged display of, and manipulative propagation of, publicity in the service of persons and institutions, consumer goods, and programmes.' Habermas has given the kind of analysis to the concept of public opinion, which he had earlier given to political participation. Similarly, in his work, *Student and Politics*, also he talks about the relationship between state and society. In *Structural Transformation*, Habermas explains the role of publicity and public opinion in changed conditions. His theorization of the private–public division takes on a new form in relation to the opposition between 'system' and 'life-world', which is prominent in his later works. Social systems follow functional imperatives and serve as 'formally organized systems of action based on media steering'. The life-world is viewed in terms of communicative action, whereas social systems are viewed in terms of instrumental action. This is what he has developed in his later works.

In this context, Habermas explains the need for the shift from purposive rationality to communicative action. The different approaches to the problem of rationality are studied by him to analyze the nature of communicative action. The relation between rationality and knowledge suggests that the rationality of an expression depends on the reliability of the knowledge embodied in it. 'The concept of communicative rationality carries with it connotations based ultimately on the central experience of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus bringing force of argumentative speech, in which different participants overcome their merely subjective views and owing to the mutuality of rationally motivated conviction, assure themselves of both the unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of their life-world,' says Habermas.[9] An assertion can be called rational only if the speaker satisfies the conditions necessary to achieve the illocutionary goal of reaching an understanding about something in the world with at least one other participant in communication. Also Habermas makes a study of the distinction between action theory and system theory. Action and system are the two levels of analysis. He criticizes Marx for his attempt to understand the communicative action in terms of systems functioning and instrumental action. According to him, we can have both system concept of society and life-world concept of society. Habermas

proposes that we could conceive of societies simultaneously as systems and life-worlds through the rationalization of the life-world.

What exactly does Habermas mean by life-world? Life-world according to him is a concept complementary to that of communicative action. 'Like the phenomenological life-world analysis of the late Husserl, or the late Wittgenstein's analysis of forms of life, formal-pragmatic analysis aims at structures that, in contrast to the historical shapes of particular life-worlds and life-forms, are put forward as invariant.'[10] Habermas analyzes how the life-world is related to the three worlds on which subjects with an orientation to mutual understanding base their common definitions of situation. These three are: (1) the objective world, (2) the social world, and (3) subjective world. Communicative utterances are always embedded in various world relations. Communicative action relies on a cooperative process of interpretation in which participants relate simultaneously to something in the objective, the social and the subjective worlds, even when they thematically stress only one of the three components in their utterances. Here both the speaker and the hearer use the reference system of the three worlds as an interpretive framework. For those involved, the action situation is the centre of their life-world. It has a movable horizon because it points to the complexity of the life-world. In Habermas' view, the life-world to which participants in communication belong is always present, but only in such a way that it forms the background for an actual sense. The communicative actors always prove within the horizon of their life-world and cannot step outside of it. They themselves belong to the life-world. Habermas contends: 'The life-world is the transcendental site where speaker and hearer meet, where they can reciprocally raise claims that their utterances fit the world, and where they can criticize and confirm those validity claims, settle their disagreements, and arrive at agreements.'[11]

The concept of life-world always presents itself as a context in communicative action. By examining Schutz's *The Structures of the Life-World*, Habermas argues that hitherto we have conceived of action in terms of dealing with situations. The notion of communicative action singles out two aspects of this situation: (1) the teleological aspect of realizing ones aims, and (2) the communicative aspect of interpreting a situation and arriving at some agreement. In communicative action, the participants plan cooperatively on the basis of a shared definition of the situation. A situation represents a segment of the life-world delimited in relation to a theme. Habermas quotes Schutz and Luckmann who claim

that the actor constitutes the world from out of which he lives from the basic elements of this stock of knowledge. Schutz says: 'In every situation only a certain segment of the world is given to me. Only a part of the world is in actual reach. But around this province, other provinces of restorable or attainable reach are differentiated, their spheres of reach exhibiting a temporal as well as a social structure. Further, I can operate only in one segment of the world.'[12] This is what is known as the '*communication-theoretic concept of the life-world*', which is developed from the participants' perspective. There is also the '*everyday concept of life-world*' which must be taken into account because communicative actors locate and record their utterances in social space and historical times. What is important here is how persons give narrative presentations of events which take place in the context of their life-world. The narrative practices mainly function in the self-understanding of persons. In the previous, i.e., *communication-theoretic concept of the life-world*, the life-world is approached from the perspective of participants whereas in the present, i.e., *everyday concept of life-world*, it is from the perspective of narrators.

Traditional and mythical societies, Habermas believes, rest upon an uncritical acceptance of meanings taken over from the life-world. Their linguistic worldview is 'reified as the world order and cannot be seen as an interpretive system open to criticism'.[13] In such societies, 'actions cannot reach that critical zone in which communicatively achieved agreement depends upon autonomous yes/no responses to criticisable validity claims.'[14] Against this background, cultural traditions as carried by life-world structures allow for: (i) the expression for the objective, social and subjective worlds, (ii) a reflective relation to itself, (iii) a differentiation of cognitive, moral and evaluative components and institutionalization of specialized forms of argumentation for each, and, finally (iv) interpretation of the life-world in such a way that action oriented to success can be freed from the imperatives of an understanding that is to be communicatively renewed over and over again and can be at least partially uncoupled from action oriented to reaching understanding. Modern society, is marked by 'rationalization of the life-world' and by the growing differentiation of social systems. Habermas' study of Mead and Durkheim helps him to understand the concept of life-world from a new dimension. He differs from Dilthey and Husserl in defining life-world as a collective linguistic context similar to Durkheim's collective consciousness in which the self achieves its identity. For Habermas, the components of the life-world,

namely, at the level of culture, society and personality, depend upon communicative action and can be correlated with the reproduction process as follows:

STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS

Reproduction process	*Culture*	*Society*	*Personality*
Cultural reproduction	**Interpretation schemata susceptible to consensus ('valid knowledge')**	Legitimations	Behavioural patterns influential in self-formation, educational goals
Social integration	Obligations	**Legitimately ordered interpersonal relations**	Social memberships
Socialization	Interpretive Accomplishments	Motivations for norm-conformative actions	**Capacity for interaction ('personal identity')**

According to Habermas, the above individual reproduction processes can be evaluated on the basis of: (i) rationality of knowledge, (ii) the solidarity of members, and (iii) accountability of the person. This is what Habermas calls 'structural differentiation of the life-world'. Disturbances in the cultural, social and personality would lead to loss of meaning, anomie or psychopathologies. Habermas explains this as follows:

STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS

Disturbances in the domain of	*Culture*	*Society*	*Personality*	*Evaluative dimension*
Cultural reproduction	**Loss of meaning**	Withdrawal of legiti-mation	Crisis in orientation and education	Rationality of knowledge
Social integration	Insecurity of of collective identity	**Anomie**	Alienation	Solidarity of members
Socialization	Breakdown of tradition	Withdrawal of motivation	**Psychopa-thologies**	Personal responsibility

The concept of life-world is essential for explaining social evolution. It is a social, linguistic and phenomenological concept, according to Habermas. The rationalization of the life-world is the characteristic of modernity. It is visible in the structural components of the life-world in the process of social rationalization as explained by him. He has shown in the above that the rationalization of the life-world, in the transition from the traditional to modern societies has led to some disturbances.

Habermas wants to explain the importance of communicative rationality through growing rationalization of world views. The world views are important because they represent a culture. The world views are to be actualized by the subjects in everyday interpretation. This is important because otherwise traditions break down. A critical approach to the tradition is essential for him. But what is interesting is that Habermas defines the life-world in the context of language, which stands behind each participant in communication and supports the process of understanding. The life-world supports social collective and cultural groups by providing a resource of meaning and situation definitions, which are drawn upon for social reproduction. This means that for Habermas life-world is crucial for the reproduction of culture, society and personality insofar as it is the carrier of personal, social and cultural traditions.

The relation as well as the distinction between the life-world and the social system has been shown by Habermas in detail. He undertakes the study of Niklas Luhmann, the system theorist, to explain the distinction between the rationalized life-world and organized systems of action based on money and power. These two subsystems, namely, the economic and the political which are complementary to one another, are reproduced by way of purposive-rational action, whereas the life-world is reproduced by way of communicative action. 'Money and power can be calculated and are tailored to purposive-rational action.'[15] The two media, namely, the economic and the political subsystems are normatively anchored in the life-world.[16] In other worlds, the economic, i.e., the institutionalization of money and the administrative, i.e., the institutionalization of power is dependent on the symbolic reproduction of the life-world. What is important here is that Habermas talks of the interactions between the life-world and the social system. The life-world depends on the social system in terms of material production and the organization. Similarly, the social system takes support from the life-world for the reproduction of the socialized individuals and the continuation of coherent cultural traditions. In this

interrelation, disturbances in the process of social rationalization lead to pathologies or disequilibriums. This is what Habermas means by the 'colonization of the life-world' which is manifested in the loss of meaning, anomie and psychopathologies. These disturbances will lead to the destruction of traditional forms of life. In other words, it disturbs the cultural traditions and the socialization processes.

Though Habermas talks about the relation between life-world and system, differentiation between the life-world and system aspects of society is also explained by him as 'decoupling of system and life-world'. Habermas says: 'The uncoupling of system and life-world is depicted in such a way that the life-world, which is at first coextensive with a scarcely differentiated social system, gets cut down more and more to one subsystem among others.'[17] He goes on to say: 'The rationalized life-world makes possible the rise and growth of subsystems whose independent imperatives strike back at it in a destructive fashion.'[18] The 'mediatization of the life-world' turns into a 'colonization of the life-world'. Different aspects of reason demand a decolonization of the life-world not in the sense of insulating it altogether from processes of modernization, says McCarthy. There is a type of rationalization proper to the life-world. McCarthy says: 'A communicatively rationalized life-world would have to develop institutions out of itself through which to set limits to the inner dynamic of media-steered subsystems and to subordinate them to decisions arrived at in unconstrained communication.'[19] Habermas also speaks about the interdependence of life-world and communicative action and this is central to his notion of life-world. The components of the life-world are directly involved in the production and communicate interweaving of interactions.

The guiding thread in Habermas is 'the linguistification of the sacred', according to McCarthy. It otherwise means a rationalization of the life-world. In order to understand the communicative action, he introduces the ideal of the life-world. It links the concept firmly to the concept of society. To the different structural components of the life-world, namely culture, society, personality, there correspond reproduction processes, namely, cultural reproduction, social integration, socialization based on the different aspects of communicative action, i.e., understanding, coordination and socialization, which in turn makes communicative action possible. When it is disturbed, it will lead to loss of meaning, withdrawal of legitimation, alienation, breakdown in tradition etc. For him, both the concept of

communicative action and the life-world concept can serve as basic categories of social theory. In short, for Habermas the social systems are intimately related to the life-world. Social systems give a new method of rationalization of the life-world. Similarly, life-world shapes the social systems. The life-world in the communicative context carries the tradition. It makes possible the material reproduction of culture, society and personality. The rationalization of the life-world is an expression of the growth of communicative rationality, and it is the positive side of modernity.

Is the above notion of life-world suggested and supported by Habermas free from defects? No doubt it has many advantages. For example, the life-world here is related to language. It is not a mere language, but a communicative action. This means that life-world is made transparent. This means all of us can evaluate it in the present historical situations. Secondly, it emphasizes the need for the participants to have a dialogue with others so that the self achieves its identity. But the critics argue that some of the social processes, which Habermas prescribes, are ambiguous and contradictory. Also the relation between communicative action and life-world is incomplete. It is said that he speaks of different worlds. The claim that the life-world is linguistically constituted, is questioned. For example he remarks: '... The medium of language and the telos of reaching understanding intrinsic to it reciprocally constitute one another. ... For the actor, the aims of action oriented towards success and reaching understanding are situated on different levels; either in the objective world or, beyond all entities, in the linguistically constituted life-world.'[20] Further he says: '... action domains of the life-world, which are primarily integrated socially, are ... neither free of power nor of strategic action'.[21] These remarks are always challenged. Another important criticism is with regard to the distinction between life-world and system. Some critics claim that his concept of the life-world is incoherent and unclear. It is also said that Habermas is not consistent in his usage of the term life-world. The critics say that it is not clear whether he uses the life-world in two different senses. For example, there is a formal-pragmatic concept of life-world in which it forms shared background to communicative action and also there is a sociological aspect, which is concerned with the colonization.

II

This part of the paper deals with the application of Habermasian life-world in the context of the Indian situation. I would like to see the relevance of life-world of Habermas and analyze how far we go further to interpret and understand tradition in better a way. My concern here is to see the way in which religion enters into the life-world, into man's mode of being-in-the world. Life-world is included in myths and beliefs in God etc., and is always characterized by tradition and historicity. In other words, it can be said that tradition is the constitution of the life-world and language is the vehicle of tradition. It is language which gives unity to tradition by taking into account of its historical dimension.

Being situated in Hindu tradition, I would like to see how far tradition allows new interpretation and understanding. I feel that it allows the participant to see the different dimensions of understanding. Habermasian distinction between system and life-world is useful here. The uncoupling of the system and life-world is essential so that one can know the importance of life-world. We have already seen that a system has structure and the life-world has hermeneutic interpretation. A system is always rigid and fixed and allows no changes, whereas life-world is flexible and allows changes and hence it is hermeneutical. It allows a discourse of understanding. Tradition is always hermeneutical and accommodates new interpretation and understanding. Here it may be mentioned that though in Habermas we find the distinction between structure and life-world and the tension involved between them, scholars like S.S. Barlingay attempt to overcome this tension by presenting the unified perspective of both.[22] The life-world of my tradition always allows interpretation and reinterpretation since life-world is always linguistically constituted. The Hindu tradition appreciates the role of language and also how language can be viewed as a pointer to the knowledge of God. Thinkers like, Dilthey, Husserl, Heidegger, Habermas and others have shown the way to go from consciousness to language, from egoity to intersubjectivity, from fact to meaning and from system to life-world. The life-world is a shared one and it alone can explain how shared meanings are transmitted in religious traditions. Multiple expressions of human life are made possible by it. The stories, legends and myths need interpretation. They need some sort of constructive, interpretive activity of thinking to arrive at a coherent understanding in ordinary language of the life-world from which they

sprang. What it means is that to interpret the stories, legends, and myths in a new perspective, one must be in the present situation and context.

Life-world is a critique of functionalist reason. It allows for evaluation of tradition. Man's mode of being-in-the world helps a person to evaluate the tradition. It is not possible for me to simply follow the tradition, but I have the right to evaluate my tradition, which those who are outside of the tradition cannot do. Moreover, it is for the good of my tradition to grow and adopt the changes whenever necessary. The surrounding world or the world of historicity will have an impact on the tradition and it accepts evaluation and reinterpretation. This means that when I try to understand my religious tradition I may have to reject some dogmas which are not necessary. This means that I have the capacity or right to transcend some of the unaccepted dogmas, which are not acceptable at present. This does not mean that I am revolting against my religious tradition, but interpreting it in the context of present historicity. The life-world, which I belong to, allows a radical interpretation of the tradition. This sort of interpretation teaches a way of looking at the tradition afresh from a new perspective, which will suit our present situation. Husserl, for example, who used phenomenology to investigate the *a priori* of the life-world, made a systematic understanding of the life-world or worked for an 'ontology of the life-world purely as experiential world'. He develops a concept, 'the surrounding world', to explain this. It is a concept that has its place exclusively in the mental-spiritual sphere. He argues that we live in our particular surrounding world, which is the locus of all our cares and endeavours. Our surrounding world, according to Husserl, has a spiritual structure in us and in our historical life. It is absurd to look upon the nature of the surrounding world as something alien to the spirit. This explains how a particular person is placed in the surrounding world or tradition. Every man is placed in a tradition, which cannot be avoided. Tradition and historicity play a significant role in the understanding of the myths and symbols of a religion that is expressed by language. It is language which carries the tradition from one to the other. In the life-world it is language which ultimately interprets things and passes the message from one generation to the other. It is the hermeneutics of facticity, which interprets factual life afresh. The tradition which I belong to shapes my life-world and this is common to all traditions.

All the time the myths, legends, stories connected with a particular religious tradition need interpretation and it is inevitable because of the

fact that the life-world demands it and hence there is a connection between a particular religious tradition and a particular life-world. For example, a hermeneutical understanding of the study of myths would suggest that it is used as a form of discourse. The role of myths in human experience and reality cannot be easily rejected because, to some extent it shapes our life-world. Myths have relevance in the social context. They transcend time and also first order reference. They are always used as a form of symbolism and ordinary language. They suggest something invisible. Mircea Eliade says: 'Images, symbols and myths are not irresponsible creations of the psyche; they fulfil a function, that of bringing to light the most hidden modalities of being.'[23] Life-world is concerned with the phenomenology of religion. It is the sharing of religious life-world—shared life-world with others. There can be friction but not a collision. It can be explained in this way. Religion contains certain mythical modes of experience. The relation between them is so implicit that one cannot be isolated from the other. The myths are taken away from its religious content and the world tries to give a new meaning. The individuals and the collective interact with each other; thus there is a dialectical movement. It is the philosophy of participation. It is the transformation of meaning. In a philosophy of participation, criticisms are inevitable. Criticizability is the essence of free and rational creativity of 'what is objective' and also of 'what is subjective'.[24]

It should be remembered that there may be different approaches to the tradition but the inner meaning should not be lost. For example, a text like *Bhagavad-Gītā* has different approaches. It is said that according to Gandhi, *Gītā* is a move in *dharma*, i.e., a move in religion and morality. But for Bankim, *Gītā* is a move in history. In other words, Gandhi had never placed *Gītā* in the history, but Bankim did. For Bankim, Krishna was a historical person, and the *Mahābhārata* was a real war. But Gandhi believed that this sort of understanding would deprive the *Gītā* of its status as a religious text of the Hindus.[25] The question whether the text is a historical or religious one is not very important in this context. What is important is the truth conveyed by the text. Bankim tries to emphasize the fact that his historical interpretation would substantiate the truth, namely the text has some purpose for which it is written. This means whether it is historical or religious, a text which has some sacredness in it must be understood by the role it plays in the life-world situation. Similarly, the mythologies must be interpreted in the life-world situation. The stories mentioned in it

need not be true, but the inner meaning, which is conveyed, must be understood to preserve the tradition.

Faith is essential for life-world. We can go back to the sacred texts of our own tradition and creatively interpret them afresh and make them more meaningful to the existing situation. For this one must have faith in the tradition. It is reconstructing of the tradition. This will make tradition more meaningful. For this, we must disregard or bracket the conceptual elaborations imposed on them, dismantle some of the concepts or ideas which are no more relevant and acceptable and then interpret them afresh from a new perspective to suit our present situation. Since understanding is ever new and always creative, this must be done to preserve the tradition to which we belong. But here one may ask the question whether our understanding is always complete. Two scholars who have discussed this issue explain the role of participational understanding in the following way. For example, D.P. Chattopadhyaya says that when people understand meanings by participating in a life-form, their participation can never be complete or total ensuring unanimity in their understanding of the concerned cluster of meanings.[26] Similarly, Margaret Chatterjee says: 'The participation-understanding of a live tradition may be partial; it may show differences from the participant understanding of an earlier generation, but it would illustrate neither "distancing" nor fusion of horizons, but a continuity which would accommodate both change and encapsulation of the experience of earlier generations.'[27] The above two views must be taken seriously in the interpretational understanding of the tradition.

The basic question which one faces while grasping the meaning of the tradition is this: what are the conditions of possibility of discursive understanding and of the correctness of validity of interpretations? The role of objectivity and intersubjectivity may be the answer. Already we have seen that in the Habermasian conception of the life-world, the objective, social and subjective worlds operate at the level of culture, society and personality. In my dialogue with others, I take the responsibility for rational persuasion by which I try to understand and interact with others. In other words, in my dialogue with others two things are taking place: (1) I persuade others, and (2) I am also persuaded by others. Therefore while dialoguing with others, I make certain claims and they become not only my claims but are claims made for the sake of others. Very rightly Schutz says that the intersubjective experience involves the bodily presence of the other. This implies that in intersubjectivity, there

is always life-worldly presence of the other. Husserl's approach to this is interesting. '... this world is there for me not only as a world of mere things, but also with the same immediacy as a world of objects with values, a world of goods, a practical world ... All that which holds me for myself holds, as I know, for all other human beings whom I find present in my surrounding world ... the surrounding world and mine are objectively one and the same world of which we are all conscious.'[28] The life-world is the basic structure of understanding. It is that by which the social, political and cultural gain their meaning. It is that which relates the individual to the society and vice-versa. The private and the public are united by the life-world. Habermas also says that it is the ground for the speaker and hearer to meet. Based on their validity claims they either agree or disagree and settle their dispute in a meaningful way. In the life-world it is the communicative action which plays a significant role. Only in the context of life-world is there narrative presentation of events, which makes the self-understanding possible and acceptable. Here one can think of Sundara Rajan's: (1) distantiating, and (2) participatory modes of thinking. In the former, the object is held at a distance, there is a dissociation of the self from the object and the bond between them is replaced by a spectational mode of understanding, whereas in the latter there is a fellowship with the other. There is an interior or indwelling understanding of the object.[29]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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Life-Worlds: One, Two, How Many?

RAJNI BAKSHI
17, Sneha Sagar, P. Balu Marg, Prabhadevi, Mumbai 400 025

The Hancock Tower is one of the tallest skyscrapers in downtown Chicago. Its top floor is maintained as a public gallery. People pay to go up there and gaze down from a level that comes naturally only to eagles. Some years ago I had an opportunity to stand on that gallery leaning gingerly forward on its entirely glass wall. On a clear day you can find yourself towering over not only the city of Chicago and its ocean-like Lake Michigan but the endless plains of mid-America.

The grip of this view was soon broken by another feature of that gallery---a large video screen showing a short film on a loop. The film was an invitation to examine distances at multiples of ten. Its opening scene showed the close-up of a man asleep. At a distance of ten feet, we see that he is lying on grass. As the camera rises to a hundred feet we see that he is lying in a large public park. At a thousand feet the man is barely visible and the park appears dwarfed by the buildings and streets around it. At a hundred thousand feet even the city has vanished and we are gazing upon the earth through swirls of clouds and wind currents.

As this process of multiplying distance continues we see the entire earth, blue and gem-like, floating in dark space. Soon, even the earth fades to less than a speck as this visual-journey of growing distance continues till we are flung beyond our solar system, even beyond the Milky Way. The journey finally comes to a halt in the vast glimmering stretches of deep space. This visual, presumably an amalgam of images now being recorded by incredibly powerful telescopes, was astounding. Against the back-drop of black nothingness was a dense mass of dull blobs of light.

Before I could catch my breath the film moved into reverse gear. At a much faster speed than the outer journey, all the scenes flashed by till we were back in the park gazing upon that man relaxing on the grass. Now,

said the somewhat sparse commentary in the film, let us undertake the same journey inside this man's body. So the telesopic journey was turned into a microscopic journey. It began with a visual of the man's hand at a distance of about 10 cm and then a visual of what lies beneath—layers of skin, then the network of veins, arteries, nerves and so on. This journey, presumably using actual micro-biological photos and/or drawings, finally took us inside a single human cell. And there lay the stunning discovery. That image inside the single cell was astoundingly similar to the earlier visual of deep space—blobs of particles amid a back-drop of seeming nothingness.

I have no idea who was responsible for this remarkable film or what their purpose was in putting it together. But for me it was an amazingly accessible demonstration of how the macro-cosmos and micro-cosmos are akin. It needed no verbal commentary. The visuals spoke for themselves and showed how we are but a speck in the universe and yet each cell in our body is like a universe.

This experience came to the surface immediately as I pondered the theme of this issue, Life-Worlds: Private and Public.

Before going any further, it is important to clarify that though I have had the privilege of studying philosophy with exceptionally fine teachers, I remain a journalist and story teller. Therefore, I am perhaps not qualified to engage in an academically sound discussion of philosophy. However, since the emphasis here is on our own existential reflections and this is a theme that is constantly with me in daily life, I feel encouraged to make this attempt.

Firstly, my understanding of the question we are exploring.

The life process, or rather the journey we call 'life', has simultaneously an inner and outer dimension. There is the temporally and spatially bound 'I', whose only absolute certainty is a finite existence. There is the World, or stage, of this existence. Then there is eternity or the unknown, limitless, timeless expanse of the universe—infinity. Every living being simultaneously inhabits all three dimensions. Human beings are unique among sentient creatures for pondering: 'why am I here?', 'who am I?'. These existential questions lie at the base of all human endeavours, whatever the level of self-awareness.

From the very moment of birth, the needs, wants, compulsions of this 'I' quite involuntarily condition our view of the world. Witness the burgeoning attachment of the infant child towards whoever provides for

his or her needs—regardless of whether it is the biological parent, adoptive parent or hired help. However, within the first few weeks the infant responds to much more than fulfilment of basic needs. It smiles, gurgles and reaches out towards all forms of amusement, stimulation and affection entirely unrelated to hunger or other physical comforts. Later, all of childhood is filled with the wonder of the mysterious, unfathomable ways in which the external World presents itself to us. I have vivid childhood memories of wondering if perhaps the blue sky is the inside of a huge ball in which this world and my life are encased.

In some ways this 'wonder' remains throughout life, however much data, details and sophisticated analysis we add on. Perhaps it is the nature and quality of this wonder that colours how we make our way through the world and determines how we balance the 'private' and the 'public'. That is, the tussle between the compulsions of our inner journey and the demands of the external reality.

The question here is: why is this a tussle and what is its nature? What is the 'bondage' that we struggle with?

The roots of this tussle lie in a rather elementary paradox: 'I' want to enjoy this world and yet I also want freedom from it. There is one, a lower order of needs and wants related not only to bodily comfort and sensory pleasures but a sense of achievement and self-expression. These needs and wants must necessarily be played-out on the World's stage. Then there is two, the higher order need for freedom from circumstance. This is essentially an inner journey for which the world is at best a testing, training ground.

It follows that the problem of bondage has broadly two dimensions. The first is that the 'I' struggles with, or against, all the many limitations presented to it by circumstance, i.e. limits of our own abilities, material resources, opportunities and so on. The struggle to overcome these limitations, or narrow the gap between my Life's desires and their physical fulfilment possible in the World, is in many cases sufficient to fill a lifetime.

The second, far more profound and excruciating experience of bondage arises from the need to go beyond circumstances, instead of being a slave to circumstance. This sense of bondage is rooted in the awareness of (panic about) my finite, perhaps utterly insignificant, existence in the infinitude of the cosmos.

Having stated these general truths as preliminaries I will now attempt to respond to the specific invitation to share reflections on one's own experience. At this point a brief self-introduction and statement of purpose seems to be in order.

For most of the last twenty years I have worked as a journalist on two assumptions. One, it is a ring-side view to virtually the entire gamut of contemporary events and trends, thus it is a lively way of observing and understanding human nature. And two, more importantly, journalism is an important field in the battle of ideas and thus can be a vital instrument in the struggle for building a more humane and just world. Over the years writing has become part of a larger endeavour which is to explore how lines of communication, and even dialogue, can be established across lines of apparent conflict.

The fundamental premise of this endeavour, towards dialogue, is that there can be no positive social change without internal individual change. That is, you have to be the change you wish to see in the world. The private 'I' has to be what it wishes the public realm, i.e. the World, to be.

In response to the question outlined above I will attempt to deal with just two aspects of bondage here. One, there is a tension between ones 'Public' role and duty as a social activist and the need for meditative withdrawal, for solitude. Two, there is the constant struggle to narrow the gap between the qualities one seeks to cultivate and the actual 'self' that interacts with the World. It is fair to warn the reader at the outset that this is an articulation of puzzles and questions for I am short of answers and know primarily that I do not know.

The earliest memories of locating my 'self' in the World are crowded by the awareness of enormous privilege bestowed upon me. In a world where so many people are deprived of so many essentials, I am endowed with much more than the basics of a comfortable life. This is the starting point of most social activists. The search for purpose in life is moulded by the possibility that perhaps one has been endowed with so much extra so that one may undertake to change things for the better.

This line of reasoning can also be boosted by a nagging sense of disenchantment with conventional success—top marks in college or a high-flying job with some top-notch company. The answer to this disenchantment seems to lie in striving for some larger, higher goal. So you seek to link yourself to a dream that is beyond just your individual Life and extends to the World. An engagement in making revolution or

even moderate social change can for some people, permanently, meet the need for giving their Life a purpose in this World.

Others soon find that this is not enough. For them the phenomenal World is inherently lacking as a source of fulfilment or even sustenance. This experience inevitably also gives rise to an awareness of the limits of the intellect. The essence of my own Life, and thus the larger reality of which even this vast World is only a part, appears to be beyond the cognitive and analytical machinery of the intellect.

At this point some people can be drawn fully into the contemplative life—with a neatly defined area of work in the World which is just enough to ensure livelihood. Yet others feel compelled to both engage in the pursuit of justice through social activism and also nurture the inner quest which is beyond the phenomenal realm. This latter condition is aided by many guiding lights. 'Engaged Buddhism' is a powerful example of this, where both monks and lay Buddhists are engaged in simultaneously the contemplative life and a wide variety of social actions.

However much one may have reasoned out the balance between action in the World and the inner contemplative quest of one's Life, a lingering sense of bondage persists for most of us. This has to do with a conflict that we generate for ourselves, i.e., I cannot bring myself to withdraw from social action and yet I weary of all its hurly-burly and hassles and long for a simpler life which has more space for solitude.

Most of us muddle along on this path attempting constantly to strike a balance between engagement and withdrawal. Perhaps the greatest aid to this process, also the biggest challenge, is the realization that without this World as testing ground I have no way of gauging my inner quest. That is, the World presents itself as a laboratory in which I am invited to perfect myself through a ceaseless process of trial and error.

This brings us to the second aspect of the question we are exploring here, that is the constant struggle to narrow the gap between the qualities one seeks to cultivate and the actual 'self' that interacts with the World. There are two aspects of this struggle that I will focus on here. One is the effort to be transparent, i.e., the same on the inside and outside, so that the Private and Public persona are one. Two, is the effort to seek within oneself those qualities which are actually in consonance with the ideals one 'believes-in'—such as the capacity for true listening.

Before discussing the challenge this presents, here is a passage that has inspired me, informed my search and speaks volumes about the two points mentioned above:

> He had great charm. He was a remarkable natural phenomenon, quiet and insidiously overwhelming. Intellectual contact with him was a delight because he opened his mind and allowed one to see how the machine works. He did not attempt to express his ideas in finished form. He thought aloud; he revealed each step in his thinking. You heard not only worlds but also his thoughts. You could therefore follow him as he moved to a conclusion. This prevented him from talking like a propagandist; he talked like a friend. He was interested in an exchange of views, but much more in the establishment of a personal relationship.

There are no prizes for knowing, or guessing, that the person described here is Mahatma Gandhi. The passage is taken from the chapter 'My Week With Gandhi' in Louis Fischer's *The Life of Mahatma Gandhi* [p. 377; Harper and Row, 1983]. It is starkly obvious that Gandhi's entire life gave new depth and richness to the perennial equation between Private and Public. The two realms were seamlessly welded in this one life, with a bold openness that even his devoted admirers often found embarrassing.

The truth which Gandhi lived did not first come to me from reading about his life, though readings later reaffirmed and gave greater depth to these ideals. Early in my working life, when I was struggling to combine journalism with political activism, I learnt this vital principle from my friend and colleague Vijay Pratap, who was by then already a seasoned political activist. Why, asked Vijay, should there be any gap or difference between our personal and public position on anything. For it takes enormous amounts of intellectual and psychic energy to manage such a gap; while being the same on the inside and outside not only saves energy but builds enduring strength. However, knowing the merit of this principle and living by it are two different things altogether. The sheer attempt to approximate this ideal is a life-long endeavour.

One is constantly falling short in numerous different ways—even without intending any active deception. Why does this happen? Partly this is a consequence of the fact that the self is simultaneously drawn by and attracted to multiple sources of stimulation—the endless stream of possibilities that float by it in this World. Out of this multitude of urges

the private 'self' forges a contained, qualified pattern of response and action which is manifested as the public 'self'. There is a life-long process of cultivating a creative harmony within so that there is less and less friction between the spontaneous urges and the more reasoned public manifestations.

Since our private self is constantly a work-in-progress it inevitably finds itself caught in, bound by, painful contradictions between the intention and the reality. I may reflect endlessly upon the beauty of true listening and make every effort to cultivate this quality and yet find myself, seemingly quite involuntarily, turning a conversation into a sermon or worse still a harangue. The resulting experience of frustration and anger against myself also feels like a kind of bondage.

Now the question here is: to what extent should I just accept that my spontaneous response in a certain situation is to verbally-intellectually brow-beat the 'other', i.e. accept that this is just how I am. Or, is the movement toward answering those basic existential questions of 'why' dependent on my active cultivation of such qualities in the World-as-Laboratory?

Of course this question itself is a kind of decoy. Perhaps the real issue, the core concern, is the relation between the 'I' and the 'other'—that multitude of others which makes up the World. And here we hit one of our most painful contradictions. Both intuitively and through reasoned conviction I may feel the oneness of all creation, or at least be firm in the knowledge that all sentient beings seek happiness just like me. But this knowledge does not always help in everyday life where a plethora of other sentient beings can sometimes make my life difficult through their acts of omission or commission.

This condition was most starkly manifest in a conversation with a veteran political activist who had also been practising Vipassana meditation for many years. We agreed that in essence there are no 'enemies'. At one level there is no fundamental difference between the most committed humanitarian activist and a ruthless corporate chief bent upon earning profits by any possible means. But, said the activist, in the thick of battle I cannot afford to act on this conviction—I have to see the corporate chief as the 'enemy'.

In our everyday life conflict often does seem more real than apparent, thus that activist is just being faithful to that reality. We assume that it takes a Jesus Christ to see no enemy, where even the executioner appears

as a being in need of love and forgiveness. Let us, for the moment, agree that the bliss of universal love, in its purest form, is restricted to saints and mystics. But aren't we all free to work towards rough approximations of it? Isn't this just what Gandhi's life demonstrates? This is particularly so when you look beyond the epic scale on which it is usually presented and focus instead on the everyday life of Gandhi as an ordinary man who knew that life consists of the details of life.

Perhaps being immersed in those details is one way of retaining the unbounded wonder in which the World first presents itself to us in early life. For the range and depth of that wonder appears to be the key to the work-in-progress of life and its place in the World. Events like that unusual short film which took us from deep space to the inside of a human cell dramatically reinforce that wonder. They jolt the Private 'I' into ever relocating itself in the World and beyond.

The Life-World and Practical Philosophy

PRABHAT MISRA

Professor of Philosophy, Vidyasagar University, Midnapore 721 102, West Bengal

I

The expression 'Life-world' (*Lebenswelt* in German) is a contribution of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938). He introduced and conceptualized this expression in his last work: *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1936). The expression simply means the lived world of human beings, or it refers to 'world-experiencing life'. Technically speaking, the life-world is the human life of pre-scientific experience. It is the immediate experience of common life. As against the experiences of abstract objectivity and the theorization of sciences and philosophical systems, it emphasizes the concrete experiences of the world lived by human beings. Such experiences are said to be the original source or foundation of all the sciences and scientific knowledge. According to Husserl, this basic foundation has so long been ignored even by the philosophers. Gerd Brand, a German philosopher is the author of a significant book, *Die Lebenswelt* (1971, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin). Ludwig Landgrebe in his article 'Life-world and historicity of human existence' states Brand's view about Husserl's life-world as follows. 'Husserl, for the first time in the history of philosophy pinpoints a problem in something which upto then had not even been seen, because of its obviousness, it is so close to us that we overlook it. This is the fact that we always live in a world which we presuppose as a matter of course as the ground of our questions and that all achievements of science refer back to this world out of which they receive their sense.'[1]

Kant in his *First Critique* declared that the scepticism of David Hume had awakened him from the dogmatic slumber of pure rationalism. Husserl, in like manner declared in his notes on *The Crisis*, 'Philosophy as science, as serious rigorous, is a dream from which we have not awaken.'[2] With

this quote Rudiger Bubner remarks that according to Husserl, ethical demand must instead be made on the sciences, which have resolutely distanced themselves from the life and interest of human beings. The connection of scientific activity with the prior pragmatic sphere of life must be consciously established.[3] This type of life-oriented philosophy was found in Dilthey's (1833–1914) thought, although he had a peculiar socio-spiritual point of view. According to Dilthey, man's spiritual life is the life of his participations in a great social totality, participations in living experience. He in his *Introduction to Humanistic Sciences* emphatically replaced the famous maxim of Descartes 'I think, therefore, I am' with 'I live, therefore, I am.' Dilthey, it is now accepted by many philosophers, tried to revive the ancient form of hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is the interpretation of texts of different subjects. 'Hermeneutic interpretation,' Rudiger Bubner has pointedly said, 'is thus an act in which we make living contact with a life which has become historical, and in which we who come later recognise ourselves.'[4] The history-based philosophy of an all-embracing life led Dilthey to a spiritual reality. It appeared to some as Hegelian. But Dilthey did not want to accept Hegelian metaphysics. He always emphasized the pragmatic reality of everyone's direct experience. 'There is a certain resemblance,' says John Laird, 'between Dilthey's philosophy and Husserl's later phenomenology. According to Dilthey, however, the understanding of these matters is cumulative, massive and brooding. According to Husserl, it is rather the immediate insight into some shining essence too often hidden from the careless eye.'[5]

Husserl's philosophy of the life-world, like the philosophies of Neo-Hegelianism and Neo-Hegelian Marxism may be influenced by Dilthey's life-philosophy. To Dilthey, the reality of history has no connection with the speculative idealism of Hegel. The reality of history lies in the concrete understanding of each actual individual. In his opinion, '*life*' is the right word for a history being the carrier of scientific enquiries and philosophical speculation. Yet in the history of philosophy, the all-embracing concept of life of Dilthey has been regarded as vague. So has been the fate of the speculations of pre-*Crisis* Husserl as well as Neo-Hegelianism and Neo-Hegelian Marxism. Husserl's phenomenology as expressed in his *Logical Investigations* and *Ideas*, emphasizes the intuition of essence. Hegelian Marxism in general has attempted to produce a view of the totality of social tendencies. Both these schools of thought, strictly speaking consider

the concept of life to be too vague for the purposes of philosophical or social theory. It is only in *Crisis* that Husserl's introduction of the concept of the life-world has thrown some light on the meaning of life that can be understood from the standpoint of practice.

II

In this connection, the contributions of Buddha of our country may be remembered. Buddha started his journey towards philosophical speculation from the concrete experience of suffering of human life and the authentic experience of the lived world. The experience, which has been shared by all the classical Indian philosophers, excepting the Cārvāka. Buddha ultimately realized the four Noble truths: (i) there is suffering, (ii) there is cause of suffering, (iii) there is cessation of suffering, (iv) there is a way to the cessation of suffering. The First Truth is certainly the truth of the world-experiencing life. The Second Truth, which implicitly contains the *bhavacakra* (the wheel of rebirth) comprising of *dvādaśa-nidāna* (the twelve links) gives us the basic circle of the life-world that includes past, present and future life of a human being. The Second Truth has a spiritual aspect as it emphasizes the laws of karma and rebirth.

It is interesting to note that Husserl was acquainted with some portion of the Buddhist text, *The Suttapitaka*, in Neumann's German translation (reprint in 1922 by Piper Publishing House, Germany). In 1925, requested by Piper Publishing House, Husserl wrote a review of Neumann's translation of *The Suttapitaka* and by that time (in 1925) Husserl presented a discussion on Buddhism in a long-term seminar. The sketch of the discussion as outlined by Karl Schuhmann in his article *Husserl and Indian Thought* is as follows:

> I shall try, first of all, to sketch the framework of Husserl's discussion of Buddhism in this seminar. On the first days of December 1925 there was discussed the 'theoretical relation to the mythical attitude'. This concerned the contrast between the goal of an exhaustive, rational explanation of the world as this is achieved by (phenomenological) philosophy, and that way of understanding things which is current in pre-scientific mode of thought. Husserl goes on to distinguish two paths leading to the 'rationalism' of phenomenology. The first starts from the science as they are actually given, i.e., from a partial realization of the idea of philosophy, and radicalizes their demand of rationality; the

second sets out from those occurrences in practical life which are apt to a universal reflection upon life, and thus to the conception of the idea of philosophy. Husserl here gives a first hint as to how to understand the goal of life as proposed by Buddhism. In his naive practical existence, man lives as it were in 'practical positivity'; that is he acts in a world of unquestioned basic certainties. But cleavage in this certainty, even universal ones, may occur at any given moment, and are therefore, at least as possibilities, part and parcel of the 'essentialities of human existence'. Such are, for example, moments of desperations, where man suddenly feels the impulse to raise fundamental questions like 'What can I still do, What is left to be hoped for, can I go on living? Would not a voluntary death be the best thing, or a complete renunciation of the world after the manner of Buddhist salvation?' This shows that for Husserl the Buddhist goal of bringing about a universal reflection upon the world flows from the experience of a crisis in the practical existence of man—a conception clearly influenced by the familiar stories about the Buddha's own experiences, experiences which induced him to leave behind this initial pattern of life.[6]

The Third and Fourth Noble Truths realized by Buddha we know, are concerned with salvation and the ways to attain it. So the concrete experiences of the lived world lead to some practical aim in Buddhism.

In his subsequent discussion in the seminar, Husserl made a contrast between the 'two alternative ways into phenomenology: (1) through a critique of the sciences, and (2) "through the mythical-practical world-view" to which "the world-view of theoretical interest" becomes opposed."[7] In Husserl's view 'Indian philosophy, that is to say, is in the last instance motivated by the goal of salvation, and develops its theories only in so far as they are subservient to this *practical* aim. European philosophy, in contrast, pursues the goal of *pure* theory, for no external purpose and without any ancillary functions being assigned to theory as a whole.'[8]

Also in another article (written in 1926) entitled 'Socrates-Buddha', Husserl tried to compare Indian thought with European thought. In analyzing the article, Karl Schuhmann opines, according to Husserl, 'No matter how universal Buddhist science may become it will forever be overshadowed by this practical aim of establishing a certain blissful style of life, albeit as something universally justified. Socratic science, in contrast—though one is to concede that "Socrates" himself was not aware

of this—goes beyond this practical interest by adopting "an interest in truth" purely for the sake of truths.'[9]

It is to be noted that by Indian thought Husserl meant only the Buddhist thought. He had gone through no Indian philosophical text other than the Buddhist text. To him both phenomenology and Buddhism are transcendental (looking inward and assiging to subjectivity—the constitutive principles of reality). Secondly, the resolute eliminations of the natural life-interest of Buddhism,[10] resembles Husserl's theory of phenomenological reduction. However, the practical aim of Buddhism, according to Husserl, has distinguished it from the European philosophy in which 'positive scientific thought and knowledge depart radically from the knowledge of (daily) life, and they do so by means of a form and method which are in principle logical.'[11]

As mentioned by Karl Schuhmann Husserl in his later phase of life, '... when he once more began to reflect on *European* thought in its totality, and he then introduced the Indian way of looking at the world as a useful contrast. This occurred in the last years of Husserl's life when he wrote *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1936). It is in this work that he solemnly declared European mankind to be the bearer of an absolute idea, where India or China represent only an empirical anthropological type? Can one explain away this remark as an old man's slip of the pen?'[12]

Now it may be thought that Husserl's introduction of the life-world in *Crisis* has been influenced by the practical aim envisaged in Indian philosophy. The concept of the life-world in *Crisis* does not directly aim at any practical concern. It is implicitly contained in it, since the concept has been understood as the concrete experiences of day-to-day life of the human beings. Consequently the utmost emphasis on and the single direction to the concept of the life-world have influenced a number of present-day social philosophers like Brand, Landgrebe, Habermas and others to look into it as related to the life-problems. Undoubtedly Husserl's idea of the life-world is based on the individual's pure intuition and so is merely a subjective concept. But this concept may necessarily receive its real importance, if philosophical enquiries about it are made in relation to the practical problems of human life. What is more, the very term 'life-world' invariably refers to the lived world, i.e. the practical world-field of living human beings. Ludwig Landgrebe estimates, 'The complex of problems which is indicated by the title "life-world" is more or less

omnipresent in contemporary discussion, if not always under the title. With regard to its relations to the problem of history and historicity, it is not only the often unnoticed background of all attempts to develop a philosophical anthropology, but also of the methodological discussions with American and German Sociology as well as of the debates with structuralism and with the development of a systematic theory of society. In as much as all of these are concerned with human behaviour and actions, the problem must be understood as one of the central problems of practical philosophy and its questions concerning the fundamental principles of action.'[13]

III

It is generally believed that philosophy is the most abstract, theoretical subject, which has no concern with our practical life. Some may treat is as idle business. But since the time of Socrates till date, we see that philosophy is not only *philos* for *sophia*—love for knowledge. It has also made a contribution to solving the life-problems of man. Socrates tried to influence the practical human life by living a philosophical life and ultimately he had to drink hemlock. It is narrated in an Indian epic that Bṛhaspati, the preceptor of the deities, preached the hedonistic philosophy before the demons with a view to destroy them. The philosophy of Buddha with its ethico-religious codes and conduct influenced the practical life of many people of the world, who ultimately became Buddhists. Indian philosophy with its theory of *puruṣārtha* and *parama puruṣārtha* is essentially practical, at least from the spiritualistic point of view.

To Aristotle, ethics was practical philosophy. Kant regarded ethics or moral philosophy as practical philosophy. In fact, ethics as an important branch of philosophy deals with human action in the lived world. Ethics, or moral philosophy, is a normative science. It, though theoretical to some, certainly has practical implication. The utilitarian philosophy of the 18th century not only influenced the socio-political atmosphere of Europe, but also other parts of the world.

Recently, practical philosophy has been named as applied philosophy. Of course, it should be remembered that whatever be the name, applied philosophy or practical philosophy, it tries to give some solution of issue-oriented problems of human life. Being basically philosophy it raises questions about different problems of human life in a dialectical manner

and furnishes different sets of replies, any one or none of which may or may not be accepted unanimously. It necessarily takes a holistic and humanistic approach. It avoids taking a partial and mechanistic approach. It deals with equality and discrimination, affluence and poverty, termination of life, terrorism, environment, business, profession and many other life-oriented problems. R.M. Hare, Anthony Quinton, G.E.M. Anscombe, Tom Campbell, R. Scruton, R. Chadwick, A. Phillips Griffith, Peter Singer, Brenda Almond and others have now been engaged in doing practical philosophy. The topics of their discussion are very interesting and closely related to life and its problems, such as madness, metaphor we live by, the right to strike, human bond, parental rights, love and lust, market equality and social freedom, the market for bodily parts etc. In connection with the fate of practical or applied philosophy, the words of Brenda Almond and Donald Hill are worth mentioning. 'It is in this way too that "applied philosophy" is already widely understood as the name for philosophical engagement with the many issues of practical life that hinge upon ethical considerations, and are capable of being illuminated by deeper conceptual understanding and by critical analysis of the arguments they involve. Philosophy approaches issues in these areas not merely from a technical point of view, taking ends for granted and looking only for practically effective solutions, but from a holistic and humanistic perspective, sometimes challenging presuppositions, but always keeping in view the question of ends or ideas.'[14]

In support of a philosophy of this type—practical or applied, another argument, given by A. Phillips Griffith, is very sound. In his editorial to *Philosophy and Practice*, a supplement to the famous journal *Philosophy*, Professor Griffith advocates that philosophers or metaphysicians are generally engaged in pondering over substance, universals, thing-in-itself etc. or investigating some purely theoretical concepts in the sciences, or in literary or art criticism. But there are concepts embedded in people's lives and practice, which would go on living if everyone who called himself a philosopher or a theoretician were dead, such as sexual desire, dishonesty, madness and so on.[15] What Professor Griffith wants to say is that these life-oriented concepts must be taken into consideration by the philosophers in their philosophical discussion.

IV

Now the question is: Is the life-world of Husserl the same as the practical life of man with which practical philosophy is concerned? That there is no difference between the life-world and the problematic life dealt with in practical philosophy can be shown from Husserl's own statement in his *Crisis*, 'All our theoretical and practical themes ... lie always within the normal coherence of the life-horizon "world". World is the universal field into which all our acts, whether of experiencing, of knowing, or of outward action, are directed. From this field, or from objects in each case already given, come all affections transforming themselves in each case into actions.'[16]

According to Husserl, as Landgrebe explains, 'Every individual has his or her surrounding world, and within it his or her "special world" the intimate "world" of family, the "professional world", the world of hobbies, sport or politics, if the individual is politically active. He can play his "roles" in each of them, after shifting roles many times during the day. All of this takes place on the ground of the world in which he lives in his epoch, in his encompassing group and in this sense the determination of his world as concrete universality in the sense of a total horizon can be immediately intelligible to him. It refers to his own self-identity in which he performs these shifts of role.'[17]

Moreover, although to some, 'the concept of the life-world in Husserl's work is an ontological transcendental hybrid',[18] it cannot be understood by means of the ontological concept 'totality of beings'. Rather it is 'the absolute *singularity* of the world, for this signifies nothing other than *the manner in which every individual has his world*'.[19]

But the question may arise: Practical philosophy has always objective reference. Dealing with social, moral, economic and many such empirical issues it seeks to establish objective value. Husserl's life-world, on the other hand, is a matter of subjective awareness; it is necessarily pure intuition of each individual in his lived world. So according to some, the concept of the life-world in *Crisis* has its indirect connection with Husserl's method of bracketing the empirical world found in his earlier works. So is it right to hold that the life-world, in the Husserlian sense, is the field of practical philosophy?

In reply, it may be suggested that the subjective awareness in respect of Husserl's life-world is not the awareness of God, Absolute, substance

or any other metaphysical category or even some epistemological categories which manifest themselves through some theory. This subjective awareness is the awareness of events, issues originated from an individual's contact with his society, state; in a word, the world in which he lives in different times and different places. This interaction, finally gives rise to different theories, doctrines, methods both in science and philosophy. Thus the philosophy of the life-world cannot be kept apart from the domain of practical philosophy. The life-world is a subjective as well as an objective concept. The very world 'life-world' signifies that it is both life and world—referring to both subject and object.

A practical philosophy, so to say, should not be accepted as having only objective reference. The reaction of objective reality certainly influences an individual's subjective awareness. In the history of philosophy the clearest practical philosophy is the philosophy of Karl Marx. The theory of class-struggle in his philosophy refers to objective reality. But his theory of alienation undoubtedly reveals the subjective world of the individual. Above all, the social, political and moral issues that come under the range of practical philosophy, invariably first come into contact with the individual life-worlds as immediate concrete experiences. Discussion on those issues also follows such concrete experiences. But the justification for and against any problematic issue and the evaluation may give rise to a generalization, a universal experience or an objective truth. So it may be said that the objective truth which expresses some moral judgement in practical philosophy has its source in the life-world of the individual.

Enzo Paci is a left-wing Husserlian and Marxist of Italy. Though a Marxist, he has high respect for Husserl. In his opinion, the western civilization has been suffering from a deeper crisis. The crisis has arisen from the capitalist mode of production and that of scientific technology. That crisis has given rise to alienation in human relations. Man has been reduced to an object among objects. To Paci, 'Husserl's *Crisis* and Marx's *Capital* are the beacons of this renewal.'[20]

In this connection, Paci emphasizes on the concept of the life-world. He asserts that phenomenological subjectivity which embraces the concept of the life-world is not merely mythological. It includes both transcendental consciousness and the concrete 'subject of flesh and blood'. 'Subjectivity', Paci estimates, 'is the origin of intentional in the world, a sense which is, as it were, latently present in the concrete life-world and merely awaits

conscious articulations.'[21] Paci admits that Husserl had paid no attention to the matter of forces of production and the relations of production. But economic needs are an integrating element of everyday experience in the life-world. From this point of view, Husserl's intentionality and Marx's notion of class-struggle may certainly go hand-in-hand.[22] Even 'Merleau-Ponty expanded the range of phenomenological method from the pure theory of knowledge to the concrete 'life-world' and the realm of practical social questions, but without identifying phenomenology with subjective intentional practice (and without ever losing sight of Husserl's emphasis on the necessity of careful description and analysis).'[23]

V

To some, philosophy is not only abstract theory, it has practical value. As J.P. Thiroux states in his *Philosophy: Theory and Practice*, philosophy makes people think and be more aware. It can help people become more tolerant. It can provide systematic methods to solve problems in life-situations. It can provide consistency in life.[24]

As a human science, philosophy can play such a role in our life. But this is not the real meaning of what is today established as practical or applied philosophy. The cultivation of practical philosophy is based on the interdisciplinary study with a humanistic approach. Practical philosophy aims at the application of moral judgement on the action of a human being arising out of the problems of his real social, political and moral life. It is not a new system of thought. There is practical philosophy in the ethics of different classical Indian systems of philosophy including the *Dharmaśāstras* and the *Arthaśāstra* of Kautilya. If we look at the west, Thales thought about practical philosophy. Once he decided that he would be engaged in some business and would apply philosophical judgement on the matters of commerce and business. Pythagoras, Epicurus and the Stoics advocated practical philosophy. Socrates influenced people by his philosophical life. Plato and Aristotle were not only engaged in speculative philosophy, but also in practical philosophy. Thomas Aquinas wrote a treatise on family life (*Summa Theologica*). John Locke wrote essays on tolerance, education and other practical matters of life. David Hume expressed his opinion on many matters of practical life, even on suicide. Kant, the great speculative philosopher, wrote essays on religion, suicide,

even on telling a lie in benevolent work. Bentham, Mill, Dewey and many others were obviously practical philosophers.

So practical philosophy is not a new branch of study. From the time of cultivation of speculative metaphysics of the 19th century to the time of materialistic scientism of the 20th century, philosophers, in general, were indifferent to the matters of practical life. But within a short period of time the inhuman cruelty of America in the Vietnam war, racial discrimination in America and Africa, preparation for nuclear war, looseness of family-relations, discoveries of medical technology, technology's attack on the environment, violation of human rights in different countries and many other issues of practical life moved the philosophers to contribute their thoughts on practical philosophy.

Thus we see practical philosophy is the philosophy of the life-world. It necessarily penetrates the moral nerves of the philosophers. Generally it does not prescribe any immediate solution to us. It only demands our rationalized morality. Husserl also thought of ethical demands on the sciences by introducing the concept of the life-world in *Crisis*. So it is obvious that the crisis of humanity and immoral loyalty to science and power-loving politics and at the same time thoughtless negligence towards the lived world of concrete experience is the basic field of both the life-world philosophy and practical philosophy. Both of the systems of thought emphasize on five practical approaches of philosophy—holistic, humanistic, rational, ethical and teleological. So it would not be wrong to think that the practical life with which practical philosophy is concerned is the life-world of Husserl's *Crisis*.

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Book Reviews

J.N. MOHANTY: *Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought: An Essay on the Nature of Indian Philosophical Thinking*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992.

The book *Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought: An Essay on the Nature of Indian Philosophical Thinking* by J.N. Mohanty is a novel attempt to put forth his earlier writings on Indian philosophy in a coherent whole so as to present a total picture of Indian philosophy with the emphasis on the Indian mode of rationality. The book is terse and is part of a larger project viewing Indian philosophy in parallel with Kant's division of reason. In his words, 'While the present volume deals with what may be called "theoretical reason" the second volume, which I hope will be complete in a year's time, will be devoted to exploring practical and aesthetic reason in Indian thought, completing the Kantian sounding division between morality, art and religion,' (Preface). This view of Mohanty, in the Indian context, seems partly similar to Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya's views on modes of consciousness. One could also consider Mohanty's book as an excellent attempt to answer western charges against Indian philosophy. It is a remarkable defence of Indian philosophy as philosophy par excellence. For this, the author has put forth some popular clichés used about Indian philosophy. He has not only shown the emptiness of these clichés but has also shown how they are philosophically unhealthy and positively misleading in creating and presenting a picture of Indian philosophical thinking. While doing so the author has warned against all attempts at comparing Indian and Western philosophy by either correlating or contrasting issues and theories of different traditions. Mohanty has articulated the differences of both the traditions not only in terms of the dominance of the concepts but also in the light of their different concerns. He has tried to seek rapprochement among various issues underlying Indian philosophical thinking, e.g. on the issues of extensionalism—intensionalism and intentional—pure awareness aspects of consciousness. In this review article we will try to focus only on some of the issues discussed in the first, third, fourth, seventh and ninth chapters. The book consists of the following chapters:

1. Indian Philosophy; Between Tradition and Modernity

2. Consciousness and Knowledge
3. Language and Meaning
4. The Nature of Indian Logic
5. Indian Theories of Truth; Their Common Framework
6. The Concept of Being and the Ontologies
7. Time, History, Man and Nature
8. Remarks on the *Pramāṇa* Theory
9. The Nature of Indian Philosophical Thinking.

The book provokes discussion on some important insights of the author relating to the theory of language, ontology, logic and the theory of consciousness. One of the novel contributions of Mohanty can be seen in his analysis of consciousness given in the second chapter, 'Consciousness and Knowledge'. Here we will not deal with his theory of consciousness. A true appreciation of the theory requires a separate article. Mohanty seems to view the theory of consciousness as a global theory as it provides foundational basis of both the spheres of reason, i.e., theoretical and practical. In fact a prior acquaintance with his views on the nature and function of reason in the realm of art, religion and morality is needed to appreciate his views on consciousness and on practical reason although Mohanty in the Preface has promised that the second volume of *Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought* will be published soon and will be exclusively devoted to the nature of practical reason in Indian thought.

The first and the last chapters of this book are concerned with the nature of Indian philosophy in general. Here, Mohanty has indicated future prospects of Indian philosophy by providing an outline of new avenues for research in this field. Chapters 5, 6 and 8 deal with the theories of truth, ontology and *pramāṇa* respectively. The author in an excellent way explicates the major underlying presuppositions and arguments of Nyāya, Buddhism, Advaita, Sāṁkhya, etc., on these theories. Anyone who wants to have glimpses of some major Indian philosophical thoughts on these theories may go through these chapters. One can find several issues in these chapters. They need a detailed exposition in accordance with the guidelines given by him.

The main title of the book appears to be ambitious as it gives the impression that the author would give an account of reason and tradition in Indian thought as a whole, including the areas of science, literature, music, *nātya*, poetry, medicine, agriculture, polity, etc., as all these areas were in focus in Indian thought. But the author in the sub-title confines

himself to the area of philosophical thinking only. However, for carving out the nature of theoretical reason in this area, he has confined himself not only to certain systems of philosophy but also to their theories of consciousness, *pramāṇa* evidence, inference and ontology. There is scope for looking for the nature of rationality or the role of theoretical reason in those systems and theories which have been left out by him. Here questions like the following arise: Is Mohanty articulating the principle of theoretical reasoning underlying the various disciplines of Indian thought in general? Or, is he claiming that this abstract principle of rationality maximally manifested only in certain systems and theories of Indian philosophical thought? Does it mean that the theoretical reason found in other areas or theories is the pseudo-image of the paradigm of rationality found in the selected systems and theories of Indian philosophical thought? If not, what is the relationship between the different manifestations of the principle of theoretical reason in different disciplines of Indian thought? Moreover, Mohanty's claim regarding articulation of theoretical reason in the present volume and devoting a separate volume to what Kant has called practical or aesthetic reason needs further elaboration as the question arises: Doesn't every practical sphere have to have some theoretical grounding and vice-versa?

In trying to substantiate the nature of theoretical reason in Indian philosophical thinking, Mohanty seems to look at Indian philosophy from the Western perspective and tries to establish Indian philosophy as a rational critical enterprise only. He has identified Indian philosophy (*darśana*) with *ānvīkṣikī*, which for him is equivalent to the term philosophy used in the Western sense, i.e., as a critical rational enterprise. He has made a distinction between *ātmavidhyā*, *adhyātmavidhyā* or *upaniṣadic* philosophy on the one hand and *ānvīkṣikī* on the other. The former deals with the spiritual psychology while the latter is related to the critical evaluation or justification of only those ideas or issues which are grasped by perception, inference and verbal testimony of the empirical level alone. But in the Indian philosophical tradition *ānvīkṣikī* has also been used as an investigative science to evaluate the revealed tradition of *śruti* and *āgama*. If so, his attempt at equating Indian philosophy (*darśana*) with *ānvīkṣikī* alone, defining *ānvīkṣikī* as an enquiry having no concern with *ātmavidhyā* and considering Indian philosophy on a par with Western philosophy needs re-thinking. It seems that *ānvīkṣikī* is one of the patterns or models of Indian philosophical thinking and not the only pattern of it

as Mohanty thinks. Interestingly, his suggestion that spiritual psychology is one of the areas of potential scope for further work in Indian philosophy needs elaboration to make his position consistent in the light of the above remarks concerning *ānvīkṣikī*.

If one looks at Mohanty's attempt at seeking the three-fold or two-fold structure of reason in the Indian context on the Kantian model, his claim needs reconsideration in the light of his views: 'One thing appears undeniable: the Hindu and the Buddhist philosophers did not have the tripartite faculty of psychology so familiar in classical Western thought. Volition was often a function of *buddhi*, often of *manas* or *antaḥkaraṇa* (the inner sense). If the same concept of will was not available, the problem of freedom could not be the same ...' (262). Further he says, '... the word "reason" has no Sanskrit synonym. Buddhi may translate into "intellect", but the principal epistemological and metaphysical associations of "reason" are missing' (269). In view of these statements, questions like the following arise: Can we maintain that the division of tripartite faculty of psychology into feeling, willing and knowing is parallel to the Kantian division of theoretical, practical and aesthetic reason? Should we accept the tripartite division as categorical in nature? Or, can one say that these three aspects, though ontologically inseparable, are yet distinguished for practical purposes? If so, does the project of viewing Indian philosophy as a parallel to Kant's division still remain viable? Further, can we think of *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda* aspects of *brahman* respectively as cognitive, conative and affective aspects of supreme consciousness? If so, can we also think that parallel to *ānanda* aspects, where *ānanda* in the *upaniṣadic* tradition is considered fundamental and extensive to include *cit* and *sat* aspects into it, the affective or feeling aspects are also fundamental and extensive to include the cognitive and conative aspects?

At the end of this chapter he draws the reader's attention to the various concepts and issues which are in his view richly available in the tradition. He also points out that there are many problems of great philosophical importance which the Indian philosophical tradition did not concern itself with at all, but he has not told us what these problems are. In the first section of the last chapter entitled, 'The Nature of Indian Philosophical Thinking', Mohanty makes certain important observations regarding the concept of *a priori*. He has earlier argued against the possibility of aprioricity in the context of transcendental deduction of a system and has allowed the possibility of the emergence of other systems also. It is not

clear whether we can think of his own system as an illustration of it. However, his view of the concept of *a priori* in Indian philosophy needs some more elaboration as he says: 'If the idea of *a priori* is relativized to each system, then, I should think each *darśana's* own *pramāṇa* theory and the list of *prameyas* is an *a priori* structure that it only elaborates and dialectically defends against the critics' (270). The last section on the nature of Indian philosophical thinking is divided into various sections. Here, we would mention only one of the issues dealing with Mohanty's idea of pointing out the equivalence of Patañjali's notion of *vikalpa* with the Western notion of imagination which may give interesting results if one analyzes different cases of *vikalpa* in the light of the analysis of the types of imagination found in Western philosophical, art and literary traditions.

Mohanty thinks that the constitutive subjectivity, which is available in Husserlian theory, is not available in Indian thinking. In this regard the following quotations from Mohanty are to be noticed: 'The foundational nature of consciousness (*cit*) which almost every Indian philosophy (except the *cārvāka*) recognizes concerns its evidential role, but not its alleged constitutive role, ..., I have remarked that consciousness, in the Indian systems, is evidentially primary, but not foundational as the constitutive source of the world' (236). 'One of the goals which philosophy in the West has set itself is to provide all human experiences—cognitive, moral, aesthetic—and itself a secure foundation. ... This radical thesis of "transcendental phenomenology" has never showed up in the Indian thought-world. As emphasized by me earlier, the foundational consciousness, for Indian thought, is an evidencing and/or grounding consciousness, but not quite a universal constituting subjectivity' (271). He further says, 'Thus Indian philosophical literature abounds in a descriptive phenomenology of consciousness (recall the Buddhist classification of cognitions) the sāṁkhya-yoga theory of the various kinds of mental states (*cittavṛtti*), the Vedānta theory of the various (real or apparent) modalities of consciousness but these do not—save possibly in certain Buddhist theories—amount to transcendental-constitutive phenomenology. They oscillate between descriptive, psychology and metaphysics of consciousness' (237–8). There is a need for a detailed elaboration of Mohanty's view on the nature of consciousness as well as the nature and inter-relationship of its evidential, grounding and constitutive role. Can one talk about these roles of consciousness without discussing the locus

of consciousness? It seems that Mohanty's view about the foundational nature of consciousness in Indian thought may be true in respect of *sāṁkhya*, but it seems dubious in the light of theistic and *śaivitic* views on consciousness and the *Upaniṣadic* sayings of '*Saḥakāmyati*' and *Saḥaīchhati*. All these examples support the embodiment of intentionality at the ultimate level, that is, at the level of universal subjectivity and give a clue to the thesis that consciousness is both constitutive and evidential in character. In some of the Indian systems even non-distinguishability of material cause from efficient cause supports the phenomenon of co-presence of grounding and constitutive as well as evidential character of consciousness.

In the section of Metaphilosophical Thinking: Theory, Practice and Mystical Experience, Mohanty points out that in the beginning Indian philosophy was fused with science as well as with as theology or spirituality (*mokṣa*). With regard to the latter he says clearly that Indian philosophy should be freed from spirituality but it is not clear whether he would make a similar remark regarding the distinction between philosophy and science and would say that Indian philosophy should also be freed from science? However, with regard to the fusion of philosophy and spirituality, Mohanty claims that in the tradition 'there is a strong belief that knowledge of philosophical *tattva* would yield spiritual freedom'. Mohanty argues against it. He re-expressed the distinction between *manana* and *nididhyāsana* and says: '... so I would venture to conclude that philosophical knowledge by itself ends with *manana*; something else, some other sort of cognitive achievement, brings that practical realization, but this sense of "knowledge" is beyond philosophy, and philosophy is in no interesting sense practical' (281). Mohanty seems to distinguish reflective consciousness from meditative or contemplative consciousness or philosophy from spirituality on the basis of the distinction available in the tradition between *manana* and *nididhyāsana*. It seems that the Vedantic model of *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*, which has been initially construed as a method for realization of knowledge of the self has been used by Mohanty as the method to support his division between philosophy and spirituality. It seems that this method should be seen as a universal method of any theoretical or cognitive inquiry where *śravaṇa* is the first step of the inquiry, which helps to provide raw material in terms of compilation of facts, whereas the second, i.e., *manana*, is a speculative/critical or conceptual step of inquiry and the third, i.e., *nididhyāsana* is a verification process or experiential (experimental) aspect of the correctness of the hypothesis under consideration.

Philosophical thinking, which is the realm of reflective thinking for Mohanty, is confined only to *manana* while spirituality (or *mokṣa*) which is a result of contemplation or meditation or contemplative or meditative consciousness, is a realm of *nididhyāsana* only. But can one sharply distinguish contemplation from reflection or *manana* from *nididhyāsana*? Mohanty seems to believe that the distinction between them is of kind or categorical in nature. If so, does Mohanty want to say that *upaniṣadic* thinking of Patañjali in *Yogasūtra* are not examples of philosophical thinking, i.e. they are examples of meditative consciousness and hence are categorically distinct from the thinking underlying Sāṁkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika systems which for Mohanty are examples of reflective consciousness or *manana* or philosophical thinking. If so, can one get philosophical truth, as seen by the founders of these systems, without contemplation or contemplative consciousness? Further, is there any cognition, which is not directly or indirectly related to practice or vice versa? What is the nature of knowledge, which brings practical realization? What is the difference between two sorts of cognition; cognition that does not lead to practical realizability and that which brings practical realizability? These need to be answered. It seems that to answer we should make a distinction, which is not made by Mohanty, between theoretical enterprise and practical enterprise on the one hand and theoretical enterprise and experiential enterprise on the other. The former distinction is similar to the distinction between science and technology and is acceptable while the latter distinction is implausible at least in the case when the object of knowledge is consciousness or self. It seems that consciousness at the reflective level, which is considered theoretical consciousness and confines itself to theoretical reason, has to have an element of experience, that is, an experiential aspect has to be built into it.

Mohanty seems to question the contention of the tradition that, '... the texts of scriptures express the spiritual experience of their authors' (281). Mohanty says, '... I do not think it right to say that a sentence expresses an experience. ..., what it expresses, is a thought' (281). Here, the distinction between experiencing the spiritual experience and expressing a thought needs elaboration. Is the distinction similar to the distinction between *de re* knowledge and *de dicto* knowledge? Mohanty's characterization of the

scriptures as being the expression of spiritual experience of their authors together with his view that intuitive experience as experience can never be expressed in a sentence and whatever is expressed is only a thought are debatable. Moreover, Mohanty not only claims that: The 'words are prior to experience' (258), as in his view, each tradition or culture has different sets of words prior to experience so that experience being the same yet interpretations are different in different traditions, but also claims that: 'An experience does not tell its own tale. It is interpreted, transformed into a thought, brought under a conceptual framework, to be put in words' (258). It means that spiritual experience cannot be communicated or expressed, only thought regarding them can be expressed in a sentence. Is Mohanty's latter contention similar to the contention of the tradition where experience of the ultimate reality can only be realized or experienced but can't be expressed in a sentence? The reality is ineffable and can never be comprehended in conceptual categories. If Mohanty's claim is true of any experience and not of spiritual experience alone, then it means that there cannot be any possibility of pure experience. Otherwise, in his view thought is a kind of entity which is experienced as well as can be expressed in a sentence while experience can never be expressed in a sentence and can only be a matter of realization, as words are not able to express, report or convey any experience. Doesn't each experience itself have a corresponding thought built in its very structure? Mohanty's thesis of priority of 'words' to 'experience' and of the thesis of inexpressbility of experience (spiritual) in a sentence need further elaboration. In the latter case a question arises: Does it mean that one needs a different kind of sentence, a sentence different from an ordinary sentence of ordinary language, i.e., only a non-ordinary sentence is capable of expressing a non-ordinary experience.

In spite of Mohanty's claim of the separation of theoretical thinking from the practical goal of spiritual freedom, he seems to point to an intimate relation between knowledge and action in general. For example, he says: 'It is obvious that the two, the subject and the person, cannot be entirely distinct entities, for no other reason than that knowledge is inextricably linked with action' (32). Does it mean that Mohanty is using the word 'practical' in more than one sense? Moreover, can one reasonably argue for the separation of *darśana* from spirituality? If one believes that one of the tasks of philosophy is to give a theory of consciousness or modalities of consciousness, i.e., descriptive phenomenology of

consciousness, as well as to inquire about the 'grounding of consciousness', doesn't one come closer to the realm of spirituality or to the field of non-empirical psychology? If one says so, how can one sustain the distinction between philosophy and spirituality, which, for Mohanty, is analogous respectively to the distinction between *ānvīkṣikī* and *ādhyātmika*? It is significant to note that Mohanty has neither ruled out spirituality as a meaningless endeavour nor considered the expression like transcendental/ spiritual psychology as a meaningless expression as has been the case with some Western thinkers like logical positivists. It seems that concepts, such as pure consciousness, intuitive experience (or *aparokṣānubhūti*), *rasa*, *brahmabhāva*, *ātmabhāva* for Mohanty belong to the realm of practical philosophy or spiritual psychology but not to the realm of theoretical philosophy or *ānvīkṣikī* as a discursive philosophy.

In the chapter on 'Language and Meaning' Mohanty has shown how Fregean distinction of Sense-Reference is available in Indian philosophy. He also points out how the well-known semantical principles of context and composition are available in the Indian context in terms of *Abhihitānvayavāda* and *Anvitābhidhānavāda*. It seems that Mohanty has argued for a reconciliation between them. However, Mohanty's view regarding the reconciliation between both the principles needs further elaboration from him, that is, about the manner in which Mohanty's view regarding *vākyārtha*, i.e. the theory of sentence meaning gives a reasonable theory which accommodates or reconciles both the theses of *Abhihitānvayavāda* and *Anvitābhidhānavāda*? Besides, it seems that the major contribution of Mohanty on the issues of semantics in the Indian context lies in his attempt to make a place for a theory of understanding, which was not clearly focused in the tradition. It is a theory, which accepts the meaning of a sentence even if the sentence is false or the reliability condition of the speaker is violated. For this, Mohanty has highlighted the notion of a cognitive state, a notion, which is available in *Yogasūtra* in terms of *vikalpa*. He says, 'Furthermore, we are in need of a cognitive state whose "form" would be independent of the real existence or non-existence of the object which is being designated. A cognitive state corresponding to perceptual experience, for example, cannot be the same as the cognitive state that is expressed by language' (64). Similarly, in his words, 'A *vikalpa*, then, is a cognitive state that accompanies a purely linguistic use, and to which, as well as to the animated linguistic expression, there corresponds no real object' (64).

Mohanty has introduced a distinction between *śābdabodha* as linguistic understanding, which for him encompasses the understanding of a false sentence, and *śābdabodha* as linguistic knowledge, which does not do so. On the basis of this distinction Mohanty has not only made place for meaningfulness of a false sentence but also for Frege's *sinn* in the Indian context in a new way. Mohanty says: 'If there is a doubt about the competency, there cannot be *śābdabodha* as a mode of knowing but there can be *śābdabodha* as a mode of linguistic understanding' (89). Mohanty has devoted an independent section to deal with linguistic understanding. He has not dealt with it in the section on sentence meaning, i.e., *vākyārtha*, as in the Indian context in Mohanty's view the meaningfulness of a false sentence is denied. *Śābdabodha* in the Indian tradition means linguistic knowledge which coincides with the *pramā-vākya* only. In Mohanty's view *śābdabodha* as linguistic understanding is distinguished from *vākyārtha* as well as from *śābdabodha* as linguistic knowledge. *Vākyārtha* is considered identical with *śābdabodha* as linguistic knowledge. In Mohanty's view *vākyārtha* deals with the idea of a relational entity which is known when one hears a grammatically meaningful sentence. The same is true for *śābdabodha* also. He says: 'The standard construal would be that the account of *śābdabodha* is an account of what relational structure is known by means of hearing the sentence concerned' (84). One can see whether or not Mohanty's distinction between linguistic understanding and linguistic knowledge is parallel to the distinction made in the Western epistemology between knowledge as *de-re* and knowledge as *de-dicto*.

In the fourth chapter the author has articulated the nature of Indian logic and Western logic, which he respectively named logical_2 and logical_1, and focused on the question: How is logical_2 related to logical_1? We will here use L2 and L1 for Indian logic and Western logic respectively. Mohanty has articulated the nature of L2 by rejecting the following well-known pairs of opposites considered largely as the characterization of the nature of L1; 'logical and psychological', 'formal validity and the material truth', 'necessary and contingent' and 'logical and real'. The first element of each pair of the opposites, in Mohanty's view, determines the characterization of western logic. The questions arise: Are the opposites to be treated as really determining features of L1? Doesn't one find any attempt at synthesis or distinction of degrees with respect to each of the pairs of the opposites in L1 itself? In other words, can L1 never be intensional or have any concern with the real or material truth? Are these

determining features of L1 fixed for ever or are they true only in some period in the history of Western logic? It seems that Mohanty's characterization of the features of L1 is based only on modern formal logic as laid down by Boole, Frege, Russell and Tarski, where it is claimed that the primary aim of logic is to give a theory of valid arguments and validity of an argument is solely determined by the logical form of the argument and not by the material truth or content of it. However, Mohanty's following views need reconsideration.

(i) L1 is based on the analysis of proposition, while L2 is based on cognition and is called the logic of cognition. In the case of proposition, the objective content is unaffected by the changes in the knower's epistemic attitude. By epistemic attitude Mohanty means an inclination to believe or disbelieve or even to doubt an assertion. In this sense epistemic attitude is something personal or subjective while proposition is something objective and accessible to all. Thus, it seems that for Mohanty the analysis of cognition is not the analysis of a proposition. For, a proposition would remain the same with respect to the object of different epistemic attitudes like believing, affirming, denying etc. whereas with the change of the mental attitude the content of cognition changes accordingly. In Mohanty's view, the cognition, 'This is a pot' has different structure from 'Is this a pot?' or 'Is this not a pot?' Whereas the affirmative categorical proposition like S is P expresses the same content irrespective of speaker, hearer, place, time or even the difference of cognitive types such as perception, inference etc.

(ii) In Mohanty's view, in Nyāya logic a distinction is made between logical or epistemic structure of a sentence or cognition and ontological, grammatical or sentential structure of the sentence. The former structure is a concatenation of epistemic/logical entities such as, qualifier, qualificandum and relation which are also called respectively *viśeṣyatā*, *prakārtā* and *saṁsargatā*. Here the first, that is, qualifier determines the second, that is, qualificandum and both are related to the relation R. It seems that Nyāya's analysis of the logical structure of a sentence is as content-neutral as the logical form of a sentence in classical western logic is. In the latter, content-neutral formal concepts like propositional connectives etc. are used while in the former logico-epistemic categories, like *viśeṣyatā*, *prakārta* and *saṁsargatā* are used. The difference is that in Nyāya, this logical form is not explicitly given in a sentential or linguistic expression, which expresses cognition, but is revealed only after the

reflection or analysis of the statement through these epistemic categories. These categories are not given in a linguistic expression and do not have ontological correlates. In Mohanty's view this is considered as a unique feature of L2 where there is no one-to-one correspondence between the epistemic, logical structure of cognition and its corresponding ontological, sentential or grammatical structure. In his words: '... there will always be constituents of the cognition—e.g. the mode of presentation (the Fregean *Sinn*)—which cannot be expressed in that sentence but can only be shown in that sentence' (114–15). It seems that in Nyāya this aspect of cognition, that is unexpressed epistemic constituents, can be captured through the logical analysis of the sentence or cognition.

(iii) Mohanty points out that in L2 the notions of logical, causal and essential necessity are available while in L1 only logical necessity is prevalent. He remarks that in Nyāya when inference is for oneself, it exhibits a process of causal necessity. For causal relations hold only in sequence of inner episodes like perception, remembrance, recognition and intuitive perception, whereas the inference process for others would exhibit logical necessity as he says, 'I have already shown that inference-for-oneself is a causally necessitated sequence of inner episodes. Of such a succession of inner episodes, it makes no sense to say that it is logically necessitated' (118). He further says, 'If the sequence of episodes constituting inference-for-oneself is causal, the sequence of cognitive structures expressed by inference-for-another is logical' (119). He further says, 'However, inference-for-another is a discourse whose components are sentences; it is only to this structure that one may want to ascribe necessity of a non-causal sort' (119).

The questions like the following need further explanation: what is the distinction between cognition and proposition? Isn't cognition expressed in a proposition? Aren't inner episodes expressed by propositions? Moreover, what kind of distinction is the distinction between sequences of inner episodes and the sequences of propositions? If all cognitive events are real things then why is the same not true for propositions also? Do propositions too ultimately not refer to reality, i.e., facts? Are propositions not about cognitive events or real things? If so, could his distinction between logical and causal necessity be still held on the basis of the distinction between proposition and cognition? Or, does Mohanty want to say that if the propositions are non-empirical or analytic in character, logical necessity holds and if propositions are empirical of factual, causal

necessity holds? Is the difference between the two conceptions of necessity merely a matter of different descriptions or of linguistic formulations and not a substantial one? Can we also say that the distinction between the two types of necessity in the Indian context is also based on the notion of a possible world where causal necessity is true in the actual world while logical necessity is true in all possible worlds. Moreover, there is a need to show how the relata of causal necessity are ontologically different from the relata of logical necessity? In fact, a detailed account is needed on the variety of necessities not only from Nyāya standpoint but also from the point of view of other Indian systems, such as Buddhism, Jainism, Vaiṣṇavism. One can also ask as to how the discussion of causal necessity in the Indian context is different from the discussions going on in Western philosophy under the name of scientific realism. According to Mohanty, L2 is not closer to Aristotelian logic of syllogism but is closer to modern mathematical logic. If so, how can one sustain Mohanty's view about the relationship of L1 and L2, where logic or logical_1 for Mohanty is derived by abstraction from logic or logical_2. In his words, '... the logical_2 may in fact be the original structure from which the logical_1 is derived by abstraction' (120).

In the last section, Mohanty has raised the issue: Is Indian logic intensional or extensional? He answered it by saying that the notion of intensionalism in Nyāya is a unique type of intensionalism and should be differentiated from other well known varieties of it. With regard to the determining feature of L2 in terms of extensionalism-intensionalism, certain clarifications are needed with regard to the ways in which both the terms have taken different formulations. It seems that Mohanty, on this issue, wants to say that L1 deals with extensionalism while in L2, bits of both the terms are available, that is instead of finding a contrast between the two in Mohanty's view in L2 one can have grades of extensionality and intensionality. In his words: 'There are intermediate grades between the two extremes; there are both hard and soft extensionalists as well as hard and soft intensionalists' (125–6). It seems that there is a reconciliation between intensionalism and extensionalism in the Indian context where the straight dichotomous view of either intensionalism or extensionalism does not make any sense. There is, however, a lot of further work to be done on the issues raised in this chapter. Mohanty has given a general characterization of L2 in terms of Nyāya system, as it is widely accepted as a paradigm of Indian logic. The question arises: Do we find any change

or growth in the nature of L2, the way in which we find changes in L1 from the Aristotelian logic to the modern mathematical logic? One can also see the difference of views, if any, on the nature of logic of Nyāya Buddhist, Madhava and Jain logic.

Chapter six on the concept of 'Being and Ontologies' is descriptive as well as explanatory. In an excellent way the author has explicated the major underlying presuppositions of Indian ontologies of Nyāya, Advaita and Buddhism. The contents of this chapter would interest anyone wanting a glimpse of these Indian ontologies.

Chapter seven on 'Time, History, Man and Nature' deals with three major issues: The first two concern the following three clichés while the last one deals with the distinction between the concept of person and subject in the Indian context. The following are the three clichés:

1. In Indian philosophy time is unreal or appearance.
2. Indian philosophy holds a cyclic concept of time as distinguished from the linear concept of the Judaeo-Christian tradition.
3. Indian philosophy has no concern with history and historical knowledge.

With regard to the first cliché regarding the ontological status of time, Mohanty has made two contentions: (i) In Indian philosophy the priority of time is replaced by the priority of being, and (ii) Indian philosophy does not accord to time that central place in ontology which the modern Western philosophy does. Both of Mohanty's contentions are crucial and interrelated yet they need further elaboration.

With regard to the second cliché, Mohanty has given a subtle analysis of the various issues related to the notion of time. He seems to say that the very fact of treating time as *anādi-anant* suffices to show that the Indian concept of time is primarily a linear concept. Moreover, he also seems to say that identifying cyclic, and change of birth-death, creation-dissolution, and pleasure-pain with the notion of time led to the misconception that the Indian philosophical notion of time is cyclic. He has mentioned the distinction between the 'sacred time' of religious mythologies and the 'profane time' of natural and historical order. Does it mean that Mohanty is arguing for a two-fold theory of time where profane time, i.e. time of natural and of historical order is linear in character while the sacred time, i.e. time underlined religious mythologies is a cyclic view of time? By accepting the distinction between profane and sacred time is Mohanty accepting a correlative distinction between eternality of self or consciousness and temporality of consciousness?

The third cliché again seems to be related to the first one. It seems that the latter provides justification for the former. However, with regard to this Mohanty seems to say that the history of Indian philosophical schools (*Darśana*) is indeed missing in the tradition. But still there is a space for historical knowledge in the Indian context. In his view, we should make a distinction between writing history and talking history as philosophically significant. It would have been beneficial had Mohanty elaborated his important remarks on the recognition of the history of man as a history of consciousness and on an essential temporality of *ātman* that is historicity of consciousness as a necessary presupposition of a serious philosophical concern for history at the empirical level.

The third major issue is centred on the distinction between subject and person. One of the novel contributions of Mohanty lies in his analysis of the role and place of the concept of person vis-à-vis subject in Indian philosophical thought. In Mohanty's view the word *ātman* is ambiguous. The ambiguity of the word *ātman* seems to be seen by him in the distinction between 'subject' and 'person' in the Indian context. Subject for him is understood as spirit or consciousness which reveals the knowledge of an object, as the object does not reveal itself. While the person is a concrete corporeal entity called 'I'. About the person he says, 'It is in the world, and with others. Its mode of being in the world is not an epistemological subject's having a world stand over against it, but a concernful, caring, willing and acting—temporally structured by systems of recalling, anticipating, and lack of fulfilment' (196). Before we focus on his view on the distinction and its related issues, the following questions need some clarifications: What is the need of using 'man' as apart from subject and person in the title of the section on page 192? Aren't words man and person synonymous? Does the ambiguity of the word *ātman* mean that we can talk of *ātman* of a subject as well as of a person? If so does it mean that *ātman* is different from pure consciousness or *cit*. Is not *ātman* a name for locus of spirit or pure consciousness? Can the latter be considered as a disembodied state of the former? If so, does it also mean that the term spirit stands for infinite consciousness only, and not for the consciousness confined to a limited body, i.e., finite consciousness. But spirit in the tradition is also supposed to play a role of *sākṣī chaitanya* or of witness consciousness. It can play such a role only when it is associated with body

or *karaṇa* (*antaḥkaraṇa*) where body may be subtle, gross or of any other type. If so, what is the purpose of making a distinction between subject and person? Even if we confined ourselves to Mohanty's view on the distinction between subject and person, we find that it is not only based on the nature of the subject of knowledge, i.e. subjectivity or pure consciousness and the subject of feeling and willing, i.e., person, but also on the basis of the nature of their respective objects. About the nature of the object of knowledge for subject Mohanty says that, '... what is for a subject is not relative to it, but may be the content of a universally valid cognition' (195). '... what he knows should be an objective truth, which could be known by any other person as well' (196). In order to get this objective truth or universality, the subject of knowledge, in Mohanty's view, must transcend ones personal interest. Transcendence is neither required nor possible for a person as in his view: 'For the person, objects are primarily not objects (*viṣayāṇi*) of knowledge, but objects of affective-volitional concern (*arthyate anena*). They are either attractive or repulsive, either to be acquired or reached or to be shunned or avoided' (196). Further he says 'From the point of view of the person, knowledge is an event which impinges into the affective-volitional structure, giving rise to desire, appropriate action, success and failure, pleasure and pain' (196–7). Further he says: 'whereas from the point of view of the subject, knowledge is manifestation of the object; its entire purpose, its total *telos*, is fulfiled in manifestation' (196).

About the nature of person Mohanty says, 'In the language of the Indian philosophers, the person is characterized to agency (*kartṛtva*) and being an enjoyer (*bhoktṛtva*)' (196). While about the nature of subject or subjectivity of knowledge Mohanty says, 'Thus, the epistemological subject is disinterested' (195). Mohanty's view on the distinction is similar to the distinction, found in one of the systems of Indian philosophy, between *asmad-yuṣmad* and *jñāna-kriyā*. It also seems similar to the sāṁkhyan interpretation of *draṣṭā*. That is, like the sāṁkhyan interpretation of *draṣṭā*, Mohanty is viewing the subject-person distinction from the two alternative interpretations of knowledge; knowledge viewed from subject and knowledge viewed from person. The former is true of subject, that is, *puruṣa* at the transcendental level, while the latter is true of person, that is, *puruṣa* at the empirical level. If so, how can one consistently make a distinction between *ānvīkṣikī* and spiritual psychology? It seems that what Mohanty says about knowledge is also true of feeling, that is, one can also

talk of feeling at two levels. If so, how can one make a sharp distinction between knowing and feeling? Otherwise, questions like the following need some clarification: Isn't what Mohanty says about the objects of knowledge true for subject and vice versa? Isn't subject also an aspiring or caring being like person? Isn't object of a subject, which for Mohanty has a content of universality or valid cognition true of a person also? Isn't person's transcendence from ones belief and prejudices also a necessary requirement for the realm of values? Don't the areas of axiology, aesthetics, religion or art require universality or objectivity of truths? As stated earlier, it seems that an understanding of Mohanty's view on these concepts requires a detailed analysis of the following: (i) his explanation of the nature of practical reason, that is, his attempt at classifying, paralleled to Kant, the areas of art, religion and morality under practical and aesthetic reason; (ii) his analysis of different aspects of consciousness that is: (a) the nature of intentional consciousness, (b) the nature of non-intentional consciousness, (c) the nature of intentional consciousness when it plays a transcendental role, that is, when intentionality of consciousness, instead of directing towards a specific object, directed towards Object-in-General, and (d) his views on the correlation of intentional and pure awareness/consciousness aspects of consciousness to the theoretical reason and practical reason or to the knowing (cognition) and feeling, willing in Indian thought respectively.

Department of Philosophy, YOGESH GUPTA
University of Rajasthan, Jaipur 302 004

DAYA KRISHNA: *The Problematic and Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought About Man, Society and Polity*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1996, pp. x + 198.

Continual creative assimilation of one's culture is an essential condition for its life and enrichment. Such an assimilation presupposes a certain self-consciousness of the intelligentsia which generally arises when the identity of the nation is to be established, maintained, restored or defended. Such a need is felt when the image of one's culture is a target of some critique either because of some inner contradictions, deviations or practices no more of any healthy use, or owing to encounter with other cultures.

Artists, literateurs, reformers, thinkers have contributed to this process in various ways. Daya Krishna's recent book *The Problematic and Conceptual Structure of Classical Indian Thought About Men, Society and Polity* is an important and significant contribution giving further impetus to the said process though in a characteristically individual and unique way. It is different from other similar attempts in several respects. It does not recount the past glories or achievements, nor recite euphoric encomium on ancient civilization, nor attempt to establish any claim to spiritual or religious superiority justifying us for the global gurudom. It is basically an attempt to identify key concepts and their theoretical structure underlying various aspects of our life as a civilization. Besides the conceptual structures, certain problematics are shown to inform the content and process of Indian thinking in several domains throughout. The significance of this book lies in its provocative tone which is to stir our awareness in such a way that we feel compelled to look at several basic issues relating to our culture afresh. We are invited to build and create with this material offered to us by our rich heritage as a living potential.

I do not intend to offer here a systematic account of the text or a summary of its varied contents richly flowing in quick succession on every page, I would content myself to mention and discuss some problems and features which to my mind illustrate the general spirit of the work under following heads: 1. Four-fold Problematic, 2. *Dharma*, 3. Man and *Puruṣārtha*, 4. Society, 5. Polity, and 6. A Point of Method.

FOUR-FOLD PROBLEMATIC

A civilization acquires its identity over a long period running through generation after generation of self-conscious people who attempt to conceptualize their experiences and in this process some dilemmas or problematics also come to the surface which, sort of, continually provide food for reflection and further reflection of their living world. In order to have insight into a civilization, therefore, it is necessary that the problems posing dilemmas are identified and their career through the ages is tracked down. While the specific articulation of these dilemmas and the attempt to wrestle with them may particularize a civilization or a culture, they also point to a common ground as issuing out of similar concerns of mankind. Such an awareness counters the parochial or chauvinistic attitude.

Understanding a civilization as a self-reflective process is presupposed in its creative assimilation. The supposedly dead past assumes a living significance both for the present and future as it is critically sifted. This also suggests that it is important to realize that object-oriented epistemology is a trap from which one has to emancipate especially when it comes to the understanding of a living substance. In a context of this kind knowing is experiencing—a more intimate relationship between the object and the subject.

In the Indian context it is the *śāstric* form, as Daya Krishna points out, which manifests the self-reflective process and which specifies this context. The *śāstric* culture reveals a dynamic continuity involving internecine debates, attempts to work out better and stronger arguments and answers, overcoming counter-positions, both actual and hypothetical. For Daya Krishna the cognitive venture so emerging has its root in a fourfold problematic and can be traced back right into the Vedic texts. He identifies them as (i) the transcendental reflection on the ultimate origins of things; (ii) the immanent-transcendent gods of the visible, the sensuously apprehended universe; (iii) the *yajña* or sacrifice linking man to the universe with its multifarious gods in terms of his diverse physical, mental and spiritual needs; and (iv) the concept of the body-social or the four-fold *puruṣa* adumbrated in the *Puruṣa Sūkta* (8--9).

Nāsadiya Sūkta in the *Ṛgveda* is supposed to illustrate transcendental reference. However, it is not clear why the author characterizes such a reflection as transcendental, unless transcendental refers to an object not available either to perception or inference based on perception. In that case any enquiry into the ultimate origin of things will have to be called transcendental. There is nothing to suggest that such an enquiry aims at some presuppositional condition or principle. The various possibilities envisaged in the hymn and leaving them all at the level of possibilities also do not point to anything transcendental. The fact that for an Indian the 'innermost being' can not be defined in terms of the relationship with nature and society, as the author remarks in the 'Introduction' to his book, does refer to a factor which transcends the mundane and in this way indicates a transcendental component but this does not seem to have a direct or indirect relationship with the question of the origin or beginning. Thus one fails to see any problematicality in the first part of the four-fold problematic.

The problematic component seems to be missing in the second part of the four-fold problematic also, since on the author's own description, the association of a *ṛṣi* and a *devatā* with a *mantra* as a sacred enchantment encompassing whatever an individual encountered 'both outside and within himself' made him *feel at home* in the universe (9). Not merely this, the author himself points out that the 'conflict between the sacred and secular' was 'a recent invention of the western intellect, otherwise, most cultures in the past appear to have happily integrated the two together' (10). If that is so, where is the problem?

It is in the third part that one can discern some sort of problem. The *yajña*-centric interpretation later on left no room for cognitive meaning if one goes by the position of a *mīmāṁsaka*. However, the problematicality entirely escaped the notice of the *mīmāṁsaka*. He did not find anything odd about it, but consistently tried to account for seemingly cognitively meaningful sentences by relegating them to an ancillary category subordinate to imperative sentences. Looking at the matter from a non-*mīmāṁsaka* point of view, it is, of course, clear that any theory as a whole has to be cognitively meaningful and in that respect the position that a *mīmāṁsaka* would continue to maintain can be maintained only by a fiat. So far as we know, the problem was not noticed in the tradition even by the non-*mīmāṁsakas*.

The fourth part, i.e., legislating social structure with *Puruṣa Sūkta* as a ground support did pose a little problem for Manu but he managed to side-track it by confining his law to a limited region and the inhabitants of that region and letting those who could not be squarely accommodated in his scheme remain outside it and leaving them to their own ways (*Manusmṛti*, 2.17–23). The varna concept, as detailed historical sociology might reveal, was never fully actualized. Moreover there are several episodes to be found in epics which indicate mobility from one *varṇa* to another.

But the *varṇa* concept has the seeds of infinite divisions in social structure. Locales, manners and patterns of speech, hierarchy of power, desire for greater cohesion coupled with mixing of *varṇas* have increasingly generated a very complex caste structure. The trouble with this complex ramification was the creation of bitter asymmetries and consequently a diseased social system which came to be perpetuated till date.

The ambivalent attitude to 'desire' as the author rightly shows forms a constant challenge to thinkers. On the one hand the advice to give up all

desires and *saṁkalpas* and on the other to admit a longing for *mokṣa* involves a problematic of action. Can there be a *karma* at all possible without there being *kāma* or *saṁkalpa*? The question has been answered in two diametrically opposed ways if one thinks of *Gīta* (6.4) and *Manusmṛti* (2.4). Perhaps one can relate the ambiguous relationship between action and bondage as a consequence of a transcendental pull *vis-à-vis* the mundane demands. In this sense the first part of the four-fold problematic becomes intelligible as posing a basic dilemma.

The dual pulls as indicated in the beginning of the text in terms of problematics seem to have been managed in terms of the first two and the last two stages of life—the first two *āśramas* and the last two. In the words of the author, 'The student and the householder stages of life seem to fall into a separate category from the last two which are only progressive stages in withdrawal from active involvement in worldly life and an increasing absorption in a life devoted to the transformation of consciousness and the establishment of a relationship with the transcendent' (55).

But the matter is of restricted application. Since *āśramas* are meant for Brahmins only, the problem would persist for non-Brahmins. However, later '*dwija*' replaced 'Brahmin', thus bringing in the fold all the first three.

Transition from *viṣaya sukha* to *nirviṣaya sukha* though meant to lead to independence is a move that renders the pursuit of *artha* as having no meaning and leads to a complete unconcern towards other fellow beings. It is important to realize that what is not self is not merely an object but may also be an other self or subject as the author rightly points out. (The tradition disregards this possibility by pointing to essential ideality of all selves.) The realization that the non-self may be the other self would have permitted one 'to see the "other" as a subject in his or her own right and capable of being affected by ones actions or behaviour in terms of pleasure or pain, one will begin to see the self as "responsible" to the "other" and not just be concerned with the state of ones own being' (57).

The neglect of the 'other' as subject pervades most trends, be they *śramaṇic*, *āgamic* or *vedāntic*. Even *Gīta* leads to the same result. Though *vaiṣṇavites*, as is evidenced by Narsingh Mehta's famous lines—*vaiṣṇavajana tene kahiya* ..., show their concern for the other, yet the thought has not seeped down to the level of practice. Here, it seems, it would have been more rewarding if the author had kept the theoretic

demands apart from the actual practice in living and had examined the theoretic concerns more closely. So far as the latter is concerned the *niśreyas* involves two directions: (i) exclusive concern with ones own liberation coupled with complete indifference to ones duties to other members of society, what to say of a positive concern for other's *abhyudaya* or *niśreyas*, (ii) concern for *niśreyas* as generating an awareness which in its very being is well-wishing, as could be instantiated by Buddha's *mahākaruṇa*. In other words, theoretically there is no contradiction involved in visualizing a state of consciousness which is at once directed to transcendence and the well-being-causing so far as the other is concerned. Looking from the other side, the causing of well-being for others also presupposes an absence of exclusive concern with ones own well-being as distinct from the orientation to transcendence.

It is a different matter that the living practice barring exceptions is generally opposite to what the theory demands. In fact, it would be more interesting to think that it is because of the selfish lifestyles totally unconcerned with the well-being of others (nay the styles operate even at the cost of others' suffering) that constant reminders to selfless thought and action are made.

DHARMA

The many-sided undertaking of *yajña*—involving knowledge, social relations, relation with nature, and economic interchange, and the notion of *karma*, *dharma* and *varṇa* in their mutual relationship form a running thread throughout the text, as involving problems of various kinds. One particular oddity that the author has pointed out in this connection has to do with the notion of *dharma*. The main theme of *Mīmāṁsa Sūtra* was supposed to be *dharma*. Yet, according to the author, they only attended what we now call hypothetical imperative (11). There was no awareness of categorical imperative. This is true that the deontological concern in ethical thinking has enjoyed a prestigious place, at least in one stream of thought, which is not altogether absent in the Indian tradition. For, doing duty for the sake of duty, conforming to *dharma* for the sake of *dharma*, can be illustrated by moral injunctions from various sources including *Gītā*. But this line of thought does not exhaust moral thinking. In this wider perspective, the author's stricture of negligence of categorical imperative by *Śabar* looses its dent. *Yajña* has been conceived as a

prototype of moral action as leading to and supporting moral equilibrium. The more serious stricture against the concept of *yajña* is that it was permitted to only some *varṇas*, which fact, obviously, robs it of its moral significance.

The manner in which moral dilemmas are mentioned and discussed in *Mahābhārata* and the notion of *kartavya* as propounded in *Gītā* are nearer the approach from which the author's strictures on *mīmāṁsaka* seem to issue forth. In fact, the author himself indicates that the sense in which *dharma* has been dealt with in *Mīmāṁsa Sūtras* and *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* is different from the one that one encounters in the epics (12).

Vedic *ṛta* had later come to be associated both with *dharma* and *karma*. *Dharma* was conceived as seeking a state 'completely bereft of any negative element' (21). In relation to beings endowed with consciousness it assumed the form of *ahiṁsa* and in relation to beings who were self-conscious Beings it meant an effort to help them attain non-negative consciousness. The latter had its classic exemplification in Buddha's *mahākarunā* (21). However, a question arises here as to how such an effort could be made without violating the basic freedom an individual has in respect of the choices that he may make.

The author's comments on and brief elaboration of the notion of *satya* in connection with five *mahāvratas* as characterizing *dharma* are illuminating. In the context of human relationship, i.e., *dharma* as related to consciousness, he remarks that *satya* means 'the quality of consciousness and being from which words and action emanate' and suggests that 'they should have such a quality about them that others may naturally rely on them' (22). This is also linked to *śabda pramāṇa*, which according to him is not merely a matter of word but also involves *karma* and *bhāva*. *Dharma* here has been understood as consisting of five *mahavratas*, the other three—*asteya*, *aparigraha* and *brahmacarya*, are also shown to be closely related to the first two. *Asteya* being connected with trustworthiness, *brahmacarya* with *ahiṁsa* in sexual relationship and *aparigraha* as shown to be a quality of consciousness in the sense of 'non-domination of the psyche by the calculus of gain and loss, specially in the material domain'. Thus *satya* and *ahimsā* are treated as basic but considered as a whole, the author thinks, the notion of *mahāvratas* as elaboration of *dharma*, is 'too negative' (24) and 'minimal'. He rightly points out that the positive aspect as related to joy, creativity and innovation has not received the attention

it deserved. This comment, as a matter of fact, applies to 'morality' as understood in the Indian tradition in general.

The notion of *dharma* becomes problematic in view of some other ideas, such as *ṛṇa*, *dāna*, *gārhasthya*, if it were to remain confined only to five *mahāvratas* the author comments. But why should this be so? *Brahmacarya* as interpreted by the author would go very well with *gārhasthya*. It is interesting to note that it is sometimes said that if a man remains faithful to his consort and is not given to indulgence he should be considered a *brahmacāri*. Similarly *dāna* would easily accompany *aparigraha*. There seems to be no incompatibility between doing one's duty towards gods, parents and the teacher and the *vratas*.

There are problems when *dharma* is considered vis-à-vis *mokṣa* and *ṛta*. At times the direction of *dharma* seems to terminate in an end indicative of a state of consciousness while on other occasions it raises issues in which it becomes difficult to identify it particularly when the consciousness of others is involved. The notion of *dharma* being amenable to multiple orientations and interpretation becomes more enigmatic when compared with *ṛta* which has to do more with a cosmic order the knowledge of which is accessible to only a few who are qualified with a desired state of consciousness. *Dharma* has to conform to *ṛta* in an essential sense but this did not prevent the *mīmāṁsaka* belief that through *yajña* intervention in such an order is possible as the author points out. One is reminded here of a famous episode relating to *Viśwāmitra* who created an alternate *swarga* for *Triṣanku* where he could go and live bodily. This exemplifies the idea of intervention in an extreme form. Obviously, freedom of initiative and action goes with the idea of intervention.

The wider application of the concept of *yajña* as available in *Gītā* leaves the relation between *yajña* and *ṛta* open to not only different but opposed interpretations. This, incidentally, also exemplifies the dynamic nature of spiritual thought in the tradition which is usually not brought into focus as the author suggests. The sameness of the word *yajña* in vedic literature and in *Gītā* should not be taken as mere extension of the same concept but should be understood altogether as an innovative use (30–31).

There is one more and important contradiction that is inbuilt in the early notion of *yajña*. The processes of performance of a *yajña* permit the fruits of the action performed to be transferred from one person (*ṛtvka*) to the other (*yajmāna*) and this directly contradicts the *karmaphala* theory.

As the author observes the problem requires an analysis of the ownership of the action. What the author has called 'moral monadism' has a restricted application in practice for in general most actions require involvement of others. The monadic condition is required as a fiction to sort out the matter of responsibility which is obviously extremely important in social relationship and social organization.

Perhaps the claim that every culture has a theory of *āśramas* and *puruṣārthas* is meant to assert only that every culture provides for the management of the various stages of life and its main objectives (54). There is a pun involved in the use of these terms which leads to the author's complaint that *puruṣārthas* and *āśramas* in other cultures have not been studied. We have *brahmins* and *kṣatriyas* who were supposed to take care of knowledge and valour. Knowledge and valour are valued and found all over. But then does such a universality requires us to ask further whether there were *brahmins* and *kṣatriyas* in other civilizations and if they were there, then how did they fare there and what did they contribute? On the contrary it would be wrong to think or claim that scholars did not ask about the rules, norms and ends and lifestyles as relating to other cultures.

Later, the author comments that, while *dharma* was a *puruṣārtha* concerned with the other, yet even that was construed as primarily concerned with self. He cites *yama*, *niyama* and *śīla* as examples of self-relating concern. The so-called other centric virtues—promising, truth speaking, and *dāna* were exemplified by characters who were exceptions. Even these were self-centric. For they were not worried as to what happened to others in their trying to conform to these virtues. They 'do not take into account the consequences of their actions on others in deciding what is *dharma* and what is *adharma*' (58). But a few pages earlier, the author himself has taken the *mīmāṁsaka* to task for ignoring categorical imperative. He believes that the right locus to trace other-centric dharma would be the realms of *vyavahāra* and *daṇḍanīti* (59). While these latter may be based on some moral considerations largely, yet they cannot be identified with *dharma* in the moral sense.

The author's observations on moral consciousness invite a whole separate debate. As he puts it '... moral consciousness is a troubled consciousness, the guilty consciousness *par excellence*, for it makes one continuously *feel* that one is not doing all that one could or ought to do for others. Even in the pursuit of knowledge or the creation and appreciation of works of

art, or while engaging in sheer fun or play or social get-togethers or sport, one has to *forget* the immense misery in the world, and the only way one *justifies* it to oneself is that these activities are perhaps indirectly helpful in alleviating the misery of mankind to some extent and that, in any case, one cannot do much to help mankind' (6).

Now it seems that it is a kind of 'ought' which, when it becomes an object to consciousness, disturbs it. Those who are happy with themselves and are not concerned with what happens or is happening to others are not troubled with such an awareness at all. They may not even be aware that their happiness or pleasure or comfort has for its cost the unhappiness or misery or discomfort of others. The escape that the author has suggested for one who has such a troubled concept by realizing that after all the activities comprising cognitive venture, creative exercises, sports etc., do really in some way help lessen the misery. Apart from it they seem to be essential to the fabric of culture. But then as he has himself at a number of places in the text pointed out, the conception of emancipaton as the freedom from *dukha* of this world and attaining the pristine state of self as the highest concern of an individual, would prevent the individual from having any concern for the other. In fact, such a state is sometimes characterized as beyond the moral point of view.

In fact the issue is so crucial and disturbing that the author has unconsciously by-passed it by saying that it is rather an abstract way to conceive moral consciousness. He moves on to another characteristic of moral consciousness, that 'demands of the object with which one is concerned and of the type of activity one is engaged in' (60). While one may be able to meet these demands of object or activity, yet in acting one is likely to hurt someone or the other which situation leads to moral dilemmas—*dharmasaṁkata*. This sort of understanding of moral consciousness is no less perturbing. Both these ways indicate highly complex and serious situations from the point of view of understanding moral consciousness and require deeper probe which requires a separate exercise.

The irrelevance of the distinction between *dharma* and *adharma* at the transcendental level leads to the denial of ontological significance of others altogether thus leading to the minimization of moral concern, as the author has pointed out (63–64). Thus the notions of *puruṣārthas*, *mokṣa* and *dharma* pose a basic problematic. Yet the author also holds that the ideal of *moksa* involved a help to others on the same path (98).

MAN AND PURUṢĀRTHA

The more interesting discussion or rather the creative extension of the concept of *puruṣārtha* has to do not merely with the individual as individual (in the sense of an integral unit) but also with several other aspects relating to an individual as parts do to the whole. Thus the question is raised whether body, *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra* can be said to have their specific *puruṣārthas* respectively. The description that follows centres around what we understand as the function of each of these in their excellence, though in some cases definite and precise articulation has not been possible. For example, take *manas*. It is regarded as desire or *kāma* in the sense of being 'free from its biological roots in the body and becomes a subject of elaboration by the imagination or fancy' (136). The 'world of desires spawned by imagination based on the experience of sensuous satisfactions and delights is so vast and varied that little can be said about it except that perhaps the world of ideal objects is richer and more positive than the world of concrete, sensuous, empirical objects, and that desire for goods that are essentially competitive is less positive than desire for those that are non-competitive in nature' (139–140). However, the world of desire contains such a variety and diversity and, one might add in terms of desirability, heteronomy that the articulation of the *puruṣārtha* of *manas* becomes very difficult. The author has assimilated various aspects and approaches to *kāma* as available in the tradition which include discussion on *kāma* itself as a *puruṣārtha*. It is surprising that the author has not noticed the strange situation leading to asking for a *puruṣārtha* of a *puruṣārtha*. For if *kāma* itself is a *puruṣārtha*, then asking for the *puruṣārtha* of this *kāma* would be to ask for the *puruṣārtha* of *puruṣārtha*. This is a consequence of blurring the distinction between *manas* and *kāma*. If we remind ourselves of the constant injunction to keep the *manas* in control, *kāma* would cease to be operative which indicates the sharp distinction between *manas* and *kāma* as accepted in the tradition. The author is aware of this fact for he has talked about *tṛṣnā* as being the cause of bondage and has consequently described the desire to give up all desires as a second level desire. *Manas* as being a constituent of the individual psyche can not be given up at any level. It can at most be rendered ineffective.

While *buddhi*'s function (*puruṣārtha* in the author's words) is to discriminate and relate in various ways through the categories and concepts

it provides to itself, it also involves a 'distancing of ego from itself'. Though the tradition exhibits self-reflection on its intellectual creations it did not consider *buddhi* as having *puruṣārtha* in an independent way as the author points out. The magic of number four did not permit the awareness that there can be as many *puruṣārthas* as the major objectives of human seeking. This, of course, also involved the problem of the conflict or incompatibility between certain given objectives as the author himself has shown in the context of *bhakti* and *mokṣa*.

It seems that the normative aspect of *puruṣārtha* while considering it, is not taken into account by our author. This creates a serious difficulty. The various functions that are attributed to *buddhi* only constitute its normal functions, we don't say that *buddhi* ought to discriminate or relate for that is what it normally does. We might, however, visualize what ought to be the direction of discriminating or relating. There must be some overall intellectual purpose which *buddhi* should help to attain. Only this latter can be treated as a *puruṣārtha*. Perhaps it is in this sense that the author speaks of its task, '... its task is to understand what every faculty of man has tried to build and thus raise it to the level of self-consciousness without which man finds not only the world, but also all that he does, dark, opaque and alien' (142). And further, 'The task of *buddhi* and thus its *param puruṣārtha* is to reflect and interrelate and these worlds that man creates so that they may become transparently intelligible to ones self-consciousness' (143).

The distinction between how in fact the function of a component takes place and what one would desire it to be is more clear in the case of *Ahaṁkāra*. Normally *ahaṁkāra* is associated with egoism, vanity, possessiveness etc., while the injunctions are that it should get rid of such perverseness and realize its proper state that is self-awareness, i.e., the realization of the shadowness of ego, having no reality of its own, except facilitating the 'organization' of *jiva* or empirical ego. (Incidentally, does it not sound a little odd that the excellence of *ahaṁkāra* lies in its cessation?)

The author rightly points out that *ahaṁkāra* is to be distinguished from *ātman* or *jiva*, hence the *puruṣārtha* of *ahaṁkāra* is to be distinguished from that of *ātman* or *jiva*. *Ātman* in association with *manas*, *buddhi* and *ahamkāra* is normally understood as *jiva*. Once again, the distinction between what obtains in practice and what is desirable comes into focus when it is said that the *puruṣārtha* of *ātman* is 'supposed to be to get rid

of this entanglement and association in which it finds itself and become established in its own pristine, pure state which is called *mokṣa*, *nirvāṇa* or *kaivalya*.' The author observes that such a view leads to negation of the fulfilment of the various *puruṣārthas* of other components, which really generates the 'insoluble problems for a culture, and the history of Indian civilization may be understood in terms of the various attempts made to come to terms with it' (148).

If *ātman* is conceived as something completely dissociated from body, *manas*, *buddhi* and *ahaṁkāra* the complex of which is generally called *jiva*, then the *puruṣārtha* of *ātman* cannot be conceived in any other way than a return to its own pristine state. In fact, in that case, it would not make any sense to speak of the *puruṣārtha* of *ātman*. (If *puruṣārtha* is to be understood as the end or ideal of *puruṣa* and *puruṣa* is just another term for *ātman*, then the very notion of *puruṣārtha* is an absurdity.) If the traditional way of conceiving *puruṣārtha* of the self is not accepted, then the notion of *puruṣārtha* would be completely irrelevant in relation to *ātman*. Whether one believes in *ātman* or not, *puruṣārtha* can only be meaningfully talked of in relation to *jīva*. The author conceives the *puruṣārtha* of *jīva* in terms of a quality of a consciousness in which an individual would like to be or remain. Peace, joy, clarity, enthusiasm and freedom are some of the feelings which he thinks to be available from the tradition itself which characterize such a state of consciousness (148). One can notice that all of these feelings are not compatible amongst themselves. But, as the author points out, the desirable consciousness may not always be 'of the same type, nor do they (such moments) display any uniform relationship with the objects and persons' ... Such a *puruṣārtha* 'should not override other *puruṣārthas*' (148) that have to do with other fellow beings. However, this can at best be a pious and liberal hope for the inter-relation between these various *puruṣārthas* is not going to be so easily determined (149). *Puruṣārthas*, as values sought for, do not exhibit precise and definite relationship unless a hierarchical order in which they could be organized, is not visualized.

The way in which the author poses the problem for the thinkers today shows that according to him *puruṣārthas* as conceived in the tradition had no room for the collective *puruṣārtha* or the *puruṣārtha* of other beings. This much is true that no explicit mention of the collective *puruṣārtha* or the *puruṣārtha* of other *jīvas* in *puruṣārtha*-terminology is to be found in the tradition. But does that also imply that there was no *idea* of collective well-being or progress or the well-being of other? It might be argued that

puruṣārtha is not just well-being only. *Puruṣārtha* conceived as a specific value sought for in relation to collectivities and other beings has not drawn the attention of Indian thinkers, the author holds. To my mind, *puruṣārtha* in relation to collectivities and in relation to the other beings need to be treated differently.

It may be suggested that some sort of orientation for the society in its totality must have occupied ones thought—especially of those who were concerned with norms and values. We do think of the good of the family, of the institution, of the country, even that of mankind. There is also a vague awareness that ones own good cannot exist apart from the good of the whole of which we are members. When it is said that the good of an individual should be sacrificed for the sake of the good of the family and the good of the family should be given up for the good of the village, and the good of the village should be renounced for the good of *janapada* and, finally, the good of the self should be preferred to the good of the *janapada*, then, if we ignore for a while the last, the good related to various collectivities increasing in their extent is taken into account. What precisely the good would be in each case has to be determined independently and for such a notion *puruṣārtha* would come handy. If the traditional schemes appear to be inadequate further investigation is warranted.

So far as the *puruṣārtha* of other beings is concerned, one cannot and should not take it upon oneself to determine the *puruṣārtha* of the other individual. What is reasonable or what one can reasonably do in such a context is to see that the *puruṣārtha* of the other individual as conceived by the other individual is respected and one does not become a hindrance in the pursuit of the other individual at least. At the maximum one can be of help in such a pursuit or may even share in it depending on the specific situation. This does not prevent us from investigating the worthwhile pursuits for men in general and that is what has been done in the tradition.

While it seems to be exciting and provoking in the first instance to visualize the *puruṣārthas* of the so-called constituents of the *jīva*, at the second thought the attempt seems to involve several problems. The crucial point is whether a constituent can have a *puruṣārtha* independently? *Puruṣārtha* as the word indicates is related to *puruṣa* and not to its constituent. Further *puruṣārtha* cannot be an objective of seeking unless it is consciously sought. Strictly speaking *mana*, *buddhi* and *ahaṁkāra* as belonging to *prakṛti* are said to be devoid of consciousness. Even if we think of them as independent of *sāṁkhyan* framework, they cannot be said

to function as independent conscious beings. While presenting the discussion in this respect, we have noticed that what are being described as *puruṣārthas* of *mana*, *buddhi*, and *ahaṁkāra* are how they actually function or what we would desire them to do. Even if we take the latter view we would be talking of their *puruṣārtha* in a metaphorical way which would be largely misleading. In the western thinking the term *telos* has been applied much more generally as compared to a conscious objective. It seems '*puruṣārtha* is being used by the author just as *telos* would be used elsewhere. But in that case one would not stop at body and may even move to the cells. The extension of the concept of *puruṣārtha* is basically a creative exercise but having a tentative character for the author suggests that one need not take *puruṣārtha* to be the central concept as far as the understanding of man is concerned. One may have similar exercises done with the concept of *varṇa*, *karma*, *guna*, *saṁskāra* etc.

The accent on *sādhana* in terms of *yoga* constituting eight-fold discipline leading to ones emancipation from all objects of the world and worldly concerns coupled with the belief that this world is transitory and so of secondary importance, if not completely illusory, leads to a negative ethics and this seems to dominate Indian psyche as our author feels.

Although he has dealt with the tension between self-centredness and the concern for others throughout the text yet he seems to be inclined towards the view that the concern for ones own emancipation from miseries and attainment of ones transcendent status constitute primary orientation so far as the Indian tradition is concerned.

Moving from *sādharana dharma*, which is binding on all human beings by virtue of the fact that they are human beings, to *yuga dharma*, *varṇa dharma*, *jāti dharma* and ultimately *svadharma*, one moves from universal to particular or most general to most specific or from ethics to casuistry. The author observes that for the Indian thinker there was nothing strange in the indissolubility of universal, particular and individual at the level of action, and adds to it that in spite of that he was aware that ultimately it is the individual who would decide to act and on whom the responsibility for what he does rests.

The trouble here is in respect of author's use of the word 'strange'. Why and what should be strange in summoning a universal in a particular situation and attempting to act accordingly? The problem lies elsewhere, i.e., whether one can apply a universal principle in every particular situation or at the level of particularity where one situation differs from another.

Knowledge when sought in order to act would always involve this difficulty and this would not be a problem for an Indian thinker alone.

There is however, another more enigmatic problem which seems to defy solution. And that is, even the apprehension of *dharma* or the knowledge of the distinction between *dharma* and *adharma* is not a *sufficient condition* for acting according to *dharma* as the author has rightly indicated.

Viewed from the angle of actual practice of living it would not be difficult to see that Indian society and polity have been, right from the earliest known history, materialistic and consumer-minded as any other society in existence. Why after all have there been constant injunctions from the earliest times to contain greed, not to covet the share of the other and work for ones own livelihood and not be swayed by passions in an unrestrained way, to keep the ego and its aggressiveness under control and prevent oneself from excessive attachment to ones own near and dear ones, if deviations from the norm were not frequent?

The distinction between moral and rational raises a question: is moral not rational? Or, is rational irrelevant to moral? That reason does not discriminate between *dharma* and *adharma* would suggest that the two domains are completely distinct (123). The rational has nothing to do with moral. But this would be a narrow construal for the assertion that moral is not rational would hardly be acceptable. Moreover, it is only partially true that reason does not enable us to distinguish between *dharma* and *adharma*. The emphasis on *jñāna* and *buddhi* in relation to right living indicates another and perhaps a more dominant trend in the tradition.

In fact a little later the author himself speaks of the *viveka* combining with *buddhi* in which case knowledge would supervene action and metaphysical would acquire primacy over ethical (121–122). But besides *śruti* as a source of knowledge of what *dharma* is, some other sources of such knowledge are also recognized, such as *sadācāra* (which must be accessible to perceptual experience in the sense that one can observe how *śiṣtas* behave in a given situation), *smṛti* and *ātmtuṣti*. The last, though not fully explained or elaborated, yet must involve rational faculty if it has to carry any weight for it cannot be just the subjective feeling alone.

There is some ambiguity in the notion of *śruti*. As a source of knowledge it seems to function like other sources of knowledge. The word is also used as the content so known as is evident from the author's own observation 'new *śrutis* come into being'. The trouble with *śruti* is that

according to some legislators it is not available or accessible to all. As a consequence moral knowledge becomes esoteric for the large section of society which must be an absurdity for its general accessibility cannot be blocked in principle.

There is usually a difficulty to be faced when a definition is sought. A definition is stated in terms of some essential property of the thing to be defined. The assumption is that if the thing in question is to be identified it must exhibit the related property. Now, to say that man is to be defined in terms of *dharma* at least two things are being stated. First, that if a man is to be identified he must exhibit the property of being *dhārmika* and, secondly, that the property is distinct and can be described with precision. We have noticed the problem with respect to second. It seems that the author has noticed the first problem for he later modifies the definition by saying that he is not characterizing man as essentially moral but as a being who 'inevitably *judges* all actions, whether his own or those of others, as right or wrong, evil or virtuous, or that it would have been better if the "right" action had been done rather that the "wrong" one, and that this consciousness does not, and cannot ever leave him for it characterizes him as a special human being and not just as this or that person' (119).

SOCIETY

According to the author, *samāj*, *loka*, *samaṣti* and *paramparā* together help describe society. These concepts are not merely exclusively applicable to Indian context alone but can also be explicated for understanding society as such or anywhere. They are useful in the sense that conventions, norms, institutionalization, rituals, invisible checks and controls which regulate the lives of individuals in a wide-ranging way can be traced to them and explicated by them.

The notion of *saṁskaras* defined the process of acculturation and socialization, and the notion of *prāyścitta* provided for the possible deviation or transgression of the norms. *Prāyścitta* being an individualized process of punishment, correction and purification can be seen as minimizing the need for external legal and social control (73).

What distinguishes the Indian concept of society is the transcendental reference and the origin of the structure of Indian society being explained in terms of a *yajña* or primeval sacrifice, embedded in the picturesque myth of *Puruṣa sūkta*. The important aspect towards which the author has

drawn attention is the belief that three-fourth of *puruṣa* or the primeval being remains outside the empirical world which can be understood as a repertoire of immense possibilities, but there needs to be a rider. If the three-fourth is conceived as lying outside the empirical eternally then this idea cannot fructify. For basically possibilities have to be visualized in terms of the empirical (or what may be actual).

The other aspect is the well-known division of society into four segments of *Brahmins*, *Kṣatriyas*, *Vaisyas* and *Śudras* each having its origin from the forehead, arms, belly and feet of *puruṣa*, having for their distinctive functions knowledge, power, production and service respectively.

The myth serves more as a norm than as a fact. Though the four divisions did exist in the society and constant attempts were made to maintain these divisions intact yet the existing situation did never correspond to this ideal fully. This is evident from the times of the Vedas themselves. As the author has pointed out, in *Yajurveda* numerous professions are mentioned whose practitioners do not fall within the four-fold scheme. There is a mention of certain denominations in *Manusmṛti* which again are shown to be outside this division. The offspring of any two different *varṇas* led to numerous subdivisions which came to be named as various *jātis*. It seems that both the processes remained in force—attempts to keep each division as rigidly closed and in opposition to it mixing of the members of any two divisions. If we do not accept the latter process, continuous proliferation of *jātis* would be difficult to explain. One has also to consider the locale of a group as well as the profession which were additional factors responsible for the group identification.

What is interesting and exciting in the author's treatment of the concept of *varṇa*, is his creative explication of some possibilities of each *varṇa*. If a society is structured on the *varṇa* pattern it is possible to think of different models in which one or the other function relating to the *varṇa* concerned dominates in terms of priority or importance. Thus knowledge, valour, wealth and service may respectively define such models.

The idea of dominance and importance reveals another aspect which did not draw the attention of our author. In the earlier pages he has already pointed out how *śudras* are debarred from certain kinds of knowledge. It is primarily this kind of knowledge to which *brahmins* had exclusive access. This idea coupled with the idea of the genesis of each *varṇa* seem to suggest that *brahmins* would not touch arms, *kṣatriyas* would not touch *śāstras*, *vaiśyas* would have neither knowledge or valour

as their specific functions, and *śudras* would only serve the other three, especially the *brahmins*. That *brahmins* would not touch arms is exemplified by *Viswāmitra* who having attained brahminhood sought Rama's help to subdue and control *rākṣasas*. We do not have actual mention of differential restrictions in case of other *varṇas* except of course *śudras*. On the contrary, there are numerous episodes which evince the fact that *kṣatriyas* and *vaiṣyas* were acquainted with *śāstras*. Strictly speaking this must have been a departure from the basic theory of *varṇa*. Now the idea of dominance may help in explaining the anomaly, but the absurd and ridiculous implication of the *varṇa* myth if strictly applied has not been noticed at all so far as I know. If the *varṇa* myth were strictly applied, then *brahmins* must not do anything that requires manual, productive or any serving function, *kṣatriya* must not use mind, *vaiṣya* must be deprived of both mental and manual functions, and *śudras* have only body to work with. This description sounds as a mischievous parody of the *varṇa* concept, but in fact this is what the legislator of the *varṇa* should have desired. In *Mahābhārata* one of the running strains is that *brahmin* and *kṣatriyas* (knowledge and valour) should combine and work in harmony relegating the other two instrumental functions to oblivion. The *vaiśya* must support the alliance and see that the ground level needs of society and *śudras* had no other function except being the slaves of the other three. The idea of dominance ultimately is of no help for it would presuppose that everyone can acquire knowledge to some extent, work with weapons to some degree (think of the ordinary soldier having no possibility of ever being a king) be able to produce something, and do some manual work. This would in some sense be contrary to the idea of the *varṇa* myth.

The most interesting model based on the idea of dominance that has been discussed by the author is that of *sewa*. In the most general connotation *sewa* would apply to any activity which one undertakes for the other fellow-beings whether with the idea of having a return for what is done or without any such expectation, the latter being the ideal. Such an extension of the application of the notion of *sewa* would include functions which are generally assigned to other *varṇas* as well. Obviously this could not have been the intention of the traditional legislator. Paradoxically the notion of *sādhārana dharma* applicable to human beings in virtue of their being human beings would in some sense include the notion of doing something for the other without any idea of return. This too comes to us from the tradition.

As is evident, *sewa* or service rendered for some return or gain is ubiquitous in every society. In the narrow sense in which *śudra* segment is visualized certain specific sort of functions—mainly manual ones are attributed to them. It may even be possible that in some cases no compensation is made to them for such services. In theory however, there is a mention of the wages/compensation for services rendered by *śudras*.

It has rightly been pointed out that the exclusion of *śudras* from *yajña* as well as denying them access to vedic lore militate against the claim to universality which was made on behalf of the *Vedas*. Yet within the *Brahman* and *Upaniṣada* portions of *Vedas*, episodes are found which go against the restrictions of *Jaimini* and *Badarayana*. It is interesting and instructive in this connection to note the variations between a possible interpretation of a text and the interpretation as approved by orthodoxy.

As the author remarks, in *Puruṣa Sūkta* not only four-fold *varṇas* are shown to be grounded in *Puruṣa* but also other components of the universe and this entire existence (mundane existence) is covered by *puruṣa* as only one-fourth of what he occupies in totality—the rest or the three-fourth being as transcendent. However, there is nothing in the grounding of the four *varṇas* in *Puruṣa* which would render the division as incompatible with the complementariness of all the four divisions. Such an integral concept of *varṇas*, obviously, does not permit the exclusion of *śudras* which the orthodox tradition legislated—exclusion in the sense of prohibiting them from access to *śruti*, *yajña* etc. This also indicates the extrinsic social deterrent on interpretation as pointed out by the author.

While mentioning the challenging approach of *Nātya Śāstra* against orthodoxy and its comprehensive coverage of various aspects of life in the mundane sphere, the author observes that the challenging reaction did not filter down at the living level in a large way. Similar comment can also be made, I think, about the *śāstric* injunctions, notwithstanding their restricted access, filtering down at the living level not in a large way, in view of the fact that most people (including brahmins also) did not actually know as to what is the *śāstric* ruling in a given situation, for it was the right of the brahmin *priests* alone to tell people what *śāstra* says. People at large did not have access to *śāstras* and then people with power or associated with power loci normally managed to have their own way. It would not be a poor guess to imagine that every pandit that is brahmin could not have been fully conversant with all the *dharma* texts.

The author has added to the source *Vedas*, *śramanic* tradition as well as *Gītā*. However, he has restricted the matter of access to divine themes only and as not affecting the social reality largely. Yet he has admitted the possibility of people of different *varṇas* coming together from different *varnas* who were attracted by the thought of access to 'spiritual' or 'divine' path. In their spiritual quest they later led to movements in respect of wide-ranging changes in the social organization. While orthodoxy barred access to *śruti* so far as *śudras* were concerned, it allowed a different channel in its lieu—*itihās* and *purāna*. The point is of some importance in view of the fact that social mobility, as the author points out, is effective mainly through knowledge besides wealth and valour.

Āgamic tradition both *śramanic* and non-*śramanic* being *sarva-varnika* posed a challenge to *varṇa* theory and compelled the protagonists to re-assert or revise their stand, the diversity as a consequence led to multifarious divisions in society. The author does not tell us how this diversity modified the *varṇa* hierarchy—whether it did or did not.

Attitude to women also took a distinctive turn under *śramanic* and *āgamic* impact. However, in the wider perspective of living, the counter-current remained only marginal as is proved by several reform movements initiated in the late eighteenth century and onward. The author refers to recent feminine critique clubbing it with Marxian *exposé* in case of oppressed and exploited classes in the society.

An interesting contrast has been indicated to characterize the two pairs Buddha and Mahavira, and Rama and Krishna. The first two fight with inner psychic evil forces while the latter two fight with the external evil enemies. The idea of incarnate gods in the form of Rama and Krishna is distinctive of Indian culture. There are important questions in this connection on which the reader expected the author's views. First, it seems strange that in a culture in which, particularly in one major strand, the constant attempts to place *brahmin varṇa* on the highest pedestal, the major and most popular *avatāras* came from the *kṣatriya varṇa*. Does that point to the idea that the highest *varṇa* had no other role than that of counselling, while the field of action was mainly left to *kṣatriyas*? Secondly, how is it that the other incarnations gradually came to be relegated to oblivion?

The tension between knowledge and action appears in another form also. The *śramanic* strand generated the problem of reconciliation between the obligation of a householder and the ideal of renouncer. In spite of

Gandhi and Sri Aurobindo this tension between *jñāna* and *karma* persists. It is said that *saṁkarite* order has room for the householder. In fact the householder's life is the pivot of the socio-political wheel and its uncertain place leaves the spectrum of socio-political too as neglected and of secondary importance as our author remarks. The two concerns were sought to be integral in the theory of *puruṣārthas* and *āśramas*.

POLITY

While questions regarding the constitution, function, war and peace are raised in the context of polity, the relevant set of concepts which illuminate the answer to these questions are discussed. Some other questions which relate to a feature regarding polity which is absent elsewhere, i.e., the question relating to non-monarchical polities and also relating to the possibility of dethroning a king remain unasked. Thus the account of polity in ancient India as presented in this book is basically king-centred.

Theoretically the objectives like *prajāhita*, *prajāsukha* involved in *prajāpālana*, welfare of people, their protection, maintenance of a desirable deportment—*maryāda*, as well as protection of a directing code, i.e. *dharma*, were in themselves not only the rules of guidance, but they also served as checks on and control of the king's behaviour. There were, of course, other ways also to assist the king and prevent him from behaving in an arbitrary manner, such as there being an advisory council of ministers. One might add to the author's list the concern of *ṛṣies* or *sanyāsies* who generally had their habitat in the sylvan surroundings—away from the noise and din of the cities including capitals, who would sometimes visit the king and would enquire about the proper discharge of his duties and about the welfare of the people besides providing help and guidance in times of need. Such is the picture which emerges from epics, pauranic literature and the texts dealing with *dharma*.

Examples are also found of kings who were unduly ambitious, willful, mischievous, soaked in vanity and were unconcerned about the welfare of people. They were, however, shown to have come to grief in several ways either by being defeated by a righteous king or meeting some natural calamity. Obviously the idea that ultimately it is truth, *dharma* or justice that prevails runs through both in thought and fancy.

The questions of origin and justification were hardly distinguished in early thought about the society and polity. In the Indian tradition the question of justification occurs in a different form than asking simply for

the origin and that is, what to do when the reign of a king becomes intolerable. Unfortunately this aspect has escaped the attention of our author. Indicative signs of a bad reign are frequently mentioned which necessitate a change of the ruler. Several alternatives have been suggested in such crises. The text goes to the extent of suggesting that anyone irrespective of *varṇa* who can help in tiding over such a crisis and restore order can become the ruler. The *Karan* episode in *Mahābharata* in a cryptic form suggests that an individual belonging to a class different from the four-fold *varṇas* can also be a ruler and a good ruler at that.

It is to be noted that the justification for ruler/king is grounded in the welfare of people, their protection from all kinds of ills, preserving conditions in which people are able to perform and discharge their assigned duties. While the description of a desirable state may be a matter of debate and investigation, *that* it is a desirable state of society which provides the source of legitimacy to a ruler and his state is explicitly recognized. In a situation in which contrary state of affairs obtains, removal of the king is justifiable. This in a way also indicates that the main plank on which a polity is to be grounded comes in the form of *dharma* itself.

In fact in recent times Gandhi's insistence to bring over-riding moral considerations to bear on the realm of polities, nay, his attempt to actually demonstrate the possibility of actualization of such an idea are glaring examples of the ancient idea that *dharma* must restrain and direct even political moves both in thought and practice.

The concepts with which we are more familiar today such as justice, fair dealings, and a constant effort to bring them in operation at international level on global fora show that *dhārmic* determination is not an antiquated whim. This of course is true that what is desirable is yet far from having been achieved.

Daya Krishna's description of polity, in the Indian traditional context, as already noted, is basically king-centred. He himself observes that the concepts centering around polity are king-centred. Obviously, for that very reason, they are of limited value for the contemporary thought as he has himself pointed out. But the fact that other forms of polity did exist in ancient times points to the fact that the political thought in Indian tradition must have had other strands also than those that were king centred.

The problematic rooted in transcendental did not much affect the polity as is evident from the author's own treatment of the matter. *Mokṣa* was ignored or marginalized and in *āśramas grahastha āśrama* was considered of

central importance. That one should give up everything for *ātmā* was hardly ever taken seriously by rulers known in history.

The author has rightly pointed out that the concepts relating to polity are much more specific and differentiated as compared to those relating to society. This permits us to notice an important feature in respect of theorizing about polity and that is the distinction between state and society. In Greece 'polis' did not provide for such a distinction. That is why Plato's treatise *Politea* (*Republic*) is both a treatise on society as well as state. Later also, the concept of nation-state erased the distinction between state and society. It was only in recent political thought that the distinction came to be in focus. The recognition of polity as a sub-system although the most important sub-system can well be considered as a significant contribution to political thought in the Indian tradition.

A POINT OF METHOD

Besides tracing the career of the problematic underlying the vicissitudes of Indian tradition the author emphasizes a methodological feature concerning the approach to conceptual and theoretical corpus relating to the past of a culture. He has tried to show that the non-participant or pseudo-participant student of Indian culture, studying it, without realizing that they are dealing with a part of lived experience of a people, as a consequence they approach it as if it had nothing to do with the present. Such students think that they are dealing with something finished and final—an object which is devoid of possibilities and is dead. There is no awareness of a potential in the concept relating to past in respect of contemporary present.

His criticism of Marriott throws further light on what he thinks to be a wrong approach to Indian culture particularly. Approaching culture as an object—dead object, one may miss important concepts and issues which may be distinctive of a certain culture and fail to realize their resourcefulness for our own times. Indian thinking about society and polity is entirely missed by investigators like Marriott as if such a thing didn't exist at all, he observes.

Positively he suggests that investigators should study the conceptual and theoretical material as available from the past in respect of a culture attempting to realize its unactualized potentialities, how can it be developed and shape the future of man, society and polity. The implication is that a

set of concepts as belonging to one culture may have relevance in terms of their unexploited possibilities for other cultures also. The worry about objectivity makes an investigator apprehensive of going wrong in his judgement and this, thinks the author, prevents the investigator taking both creative leaps having the given concepts as take-off points.

Towards the end, the author remarks, that 'cognitive enterprises of the Indian civilization are not closed and their traditional formulations need not become an intellectual prison-house for us' ... 'while learning from past discussions on various issues that concern man, society and polity, not feel bound by them, but rather treat them as providing a firm foothold to walk cognitively into the future' (192).

In the last three chapters, excluding the epilogue, he has himself provided examples of how the traditional concepts can be explored creatively as we have already noticed in the case of *puruṣārtha*, *varṇa* and several others. However, in these exercises the first part constitutes the understanding of the concept as it is available in the tradition. It is but inevitable to treat a concept at that stage just as an object, as something given. This is perhaps the only way to identify the concept and distinguish it from other concepts. It is again, at the level that one becomes aware of the various ways in which some basic and crucial concepts have been dealt with in the various strands in the Indian tradition. In fact it is this polysemic scene which must trigger off innovative extensions of the concept. The alien investigator stops short at the first step and does not move further as the situation would demand *à la* our author. But then this happens with those investigators also who belong to the tradition and yet see it as closed. Similarly, it is not necessary that aliens who study Indian culture as something final may not have the same attitude towards their own culture.

It seems that it is not so much a matter of studying one's own culture or some other culture as that of an awareness of an epistemological trap which prevents one from attending to the dynamic aspect or the multifacetedness of an object in which subject and object may become strands of the same thread and may undergo fantastic transformation as they proceed.

10/558, Kaveri Path, Mansarovar
Jaipur 302 020

R.S. BHATNAGAR

MUKUND LATH: *Transformation as Creation*, Aditya Prakashan, New Delhi, 1998, Rs 450.

This neatly produced book is a collection of essays on a rich variety of topics. Most of them are products of long and devoted research. The work is therefore *very* impressive. It indeed deserves the notice *and regard* of all those who are interested in the history, theory and aesthetics of Indian (North Indian, essentially) music, dance and drama. The reader who turns to this book with the hope of finding some thoughtful writing on the subjects just distinguished, as they have been discussed in our texts of revered antiquity, is bound to be amply rewarded. Unluckily, however, I cannot give a similar assurance to those who may expect the work to throw some light on how *precisely* our traditional writing is or can be of help to us in our concern with music and dance *as we find them today*. But I do not wish this remark to be taken as adverse criticism, for the simple reason that a single book cannot be expected to do justice to both traditional aesthetic theory and its relevance to our arts today. At the same time, I cannot close my eyes to those points of detail where I fail to agree, or to follow what the author says or has in mind. His own unambiguous emphasis that criticism has ever been a part of our traditions forbids glib acceptance. But I want to make it very clear that whatever I am going to say by way of disagreement is to be taken not so much as a categorical rejection of the author's views as an index of the work's quickening impact on my mind; and that, in spite of all my critical remarks, the work may be said to be quite significant, not so much because of any unusual depth or clarity of *thinking* as because it teems with multi-directional *content*, and is therefore indicative of the author's wide scholarship. My only unrelieved regret is that whereas he does not miss any chance to acclaim our hoary texts on the arts and aesthetic theory, the author does not even put such sceptical questions about them as are likely to appear quite obvious and relevant to a careful reader. Consider, for instance, the following remark which the author cites on p. 76:

> All dance, as Abhinav says, is stillness coupled with movement.

Here, what is expressed is a view of the author himself; but its air of untroubled confidence arises from his reliance on Abhinavagupta, and surely not on the hard evidence of what dancing actually is. Now, I have the highest regard for our traditions of *sangeet* because, in the last fifty

years, I have not only heard quite a few excellent *dhruvapad* and *khyāl* compositions from acknowledged doyens of some *gharānā*-s, but have tried to subject them to aesthetic analysis with fair success. Our dances have also fascinated me, and I continue to marvel at the beauty of individual postures, coupled with adroit and accordant handling of rhythm, that distinguishes our classical dances like Bharata Nātyam, Kuchipudi and Mohini Attam. But the assertion I have cited only bewilders me. No one who has actually seen our dances, even once, will agree that they are nothing but (or essentially) 'stillness coupled with movement'. How are we enlightened by the remark in question? Does it in any way distinguish dancing as art from a normal day of house-keeping in the life of an average Indian housewife? She too is not seen to be active ceaselessly. And is the stillness that punctuates our dances mere absence or negation of movement, or a recurring moment of the self-completion of a rhythmic pattern or of a posture, or at least a getting set, thoughtfully, to begin a new passage? And does not the utterance in question merely ignore the role of *abhinaya* in our dances? I admit that even *abhinaya* is seen to involve both movement and stillness. But in emphasizing such inartistic, literal details, are we in any way closer to the distinctive character of dance *as art* than in characterizing *abhinaya* as *āngika* or *vāchika*, or as representation and expression?

From *Abhinava*, let me now turn to the present, namely, to some such thinking in the book as is directly relevant to my own current interest in aesthetics and criticism. Insofar as I have just completed a small book on *Hindustani Music and the Critical Idiom*, I find the following remarks of the author very timely, if not quite acceptable:

> ... (1) The needed intellectual effort to make ... in-depth [analytic studies of] a great deal ... of the music of our own century ... [with] *a history of arts approach* ... is possible. [But so far it] remains largely a mere possibility ... Ever since Pandit Bhātkhande ... there has been a growing interest in musical theory and musical textual history.
>
> (2) But an analogous renewal in music criticism and aesthetics has yet to take place ...
>
> (3) The *oral* tradition of music criticism as carried on among artists and sensitive listeners has a rich vocabulary based on *tradition* [,] though it lacks a systematics ... Newspapers have [surely] necessitated [a] written tradition of criticism ... But ... [by and large newspaper criticism of the

present] has no touch with the *oral vocabulary of the tradition* ... What a modern music critic in India can learn from the west is *an approach, forging a history of the art.*

(4) Paramparā seeks continuance ... but what it seeks to preserve is the essence ... of an activity, not every detail of its content.

(5) Criticism is an essential part of the *paramparā*, in the light of which it can be changed and transformed ...

(6) The artist works with the forms he or she inherits, continuing or transforming it [or them?] in the light of *vyutpatti* and *pratibhā* ... *Vyutpatti* means an understanding of the manner in which the artist works upon the forms he [or she] receives *with the little amount of modification, any true preservation necessarily calls for* ... *Pratibhā*, parallel to 'genius' ... is ... that faculty ... which introduces innovations, opens new vistas. *Pratibhā* is not limited to the artist. The *sahṛdaya*, the sensitive critic [,] can also have it though of course, *vyutpatti* is ... perhaps even more important for him than it is to the artist (7, 8, 14, 15).

(I hasten to add that the *order* of words as I have cited them here deviates from the way they occur in the book. But no violence has been done to the author's own words or intended meaning.)

Now, all the above extracts are clearly significant; and they impel me into a good deal of questioning as I try to understand them before nodding my agreement. So, to help proper thinking, *I* have distinguished them with the help of bracketed numbers. I may now rearrange and (in a way) distil them clearly, as follows:

> No. (1) rightly acknowledges the intellectual fillip given to our concern with music by Pdt. Bhātkhande. It also emphasizes the possibility of a 'history of arts approach' to in-depth studies of our music. This emphasis recurs in (3); and there it is expressly related to the (proper) practice of music criticism *in our newspapers*. (I propose to focus on this particular emphasis at some length, a little later.) (2) is again right in complaining that an awakening of systematic theoretical interest in music criticism and aesthetics of music is yet to take shape. (I welcome this complaint, importantly because these two ways of looking at our music have both been my special interests for more than forty years; and I would be happy to advance in these directions, possibly in the light of Dr. Lath's

suggestions, *if I am able to make sense of them.*) (3) speaks of a rich vocabulary relating to music and 'based on tradition' which operates in the circle of 'artists and sensitive learners', and which (in Dr. Lath's view) our critics of today would do well to use and systematize, 'forging (incidentally) a history of the art [of music]'.

Now I react as follows to the points made above:

On the one hand, Dr. Lath emphasizes the need to put the art of (Indian) music and our criticism of this art in (what is, in his view), the right direction. This direction, he believes, can be provided by 'an history of art approach'. On the other hand, he also points out that 'artists and sensitive learners' already possess (and avail of) a rich vocabulary relating to music and 'based on tradition'. Now, when I put all this together and reflect on the amalgam, some basic questions readily arise. What exactly is Dr. Lath's view of the *aesthetics* (of music) which he wants us to evolve? Does he regard it as an analytic study of the language that our musician and *rasika*-s freely use in their talk about this art? Perhaps he does. I say so because his complaint (on p. 14) that a renewal of serious 'music criticism and aesthetics has yet to take place' is followed almost at once by the remark that 'the *oral* tradition of music criticism as carried on among artists and sensitive listeners [already] has *a rich vocabulary* based on tradition ...' (2nd italics added). So aesthetics of music (of Dr. Lath's view) may be taken (quite properly) as the study of *first order* musical discourse, that is, of the language used by musicians and *rasika*-s in the immediate context of their personal contemplation of music—contemplation regarded as both thinking about, *and* listening discriminately to music. Now, such discourse generally relates to *particular* recitals, and only occasionally to concepts or norms, such as *rāga*, *tāla* and *bandish* which determine all individual performances of classical music. *Detailed* reflection on these regulative concepts is, by and large, the work of musicologists; and *this* reflection which constitutes the larger part of what is today called aesthetics as metacriticism—that is, a philosophical study of the concepts and problems relating to criticism—may well make it necessary for us to go back to the hoary traditions Dr. Lath has in mind. But the bulk of the language used by musicians and *rasika*-s is plainly 'first-order', relating *directly to this or that presented recital*; and I can only wonder how this language may be said to be a vocabulary *based on the traditions which Dr. Lath has in mind.* In my personal experience as an attentive listener at the late Ustad Bade Ghulam Ali's recitals, a remark that I have freely

heard from *rasika*-s would run thus: 'क्या बात है! सम पर फुररर से आ जाते हैं!', the reference being to the meteoric pace at which the maestro could attain to the *sama* by means of a well-oriented passage of pearly *swara*-s. Aesthetical reflection (of the phenomenological kind) on such 'first order' talk could well here lead one to say that the pace in such cases is so quick that, in spite of the literally before-after order of the notes that in fact make the passage in question, a compelling semblance of instantaneity is evoked. But in such aesthetical talk references to *traditional* musicology are neither present nor necessary. Further, I admit that practising musicians also occasionally try to clarify *concepts* relating to music—may be in their own non-academic, but insightful language. For instance, when I once asked the late Ustad Chand Khan as to what made an *āmad* admirable as a distinct segment of a *khyāl sthāyī*, his answer was ready, if cryptic: 'आमद ऐसी हो कि वहां से ये लगे कि ये आई!' Now, as a student of philosophical aesthetics, I have not failed to unpack the ideas implicit in this remark; in fact, the resulting interpretation—along with references to actual compositions presented (with some live illustrative singing) on the occasion of a Seminar (on Science and Music, Sangeet Natak Akademi, 28.3.70 morning session: tape recordings, 742–784) was published in the April–June, 1970 issue of *Sangeet Natak* (No. 16; pp. 38–42). But all this was done in direct relation to *sthāyī*-s as they are heard today, quite without any reference to the tradition that Dr. Lath has in mind; and one can only wonder how *such* references could be brought in here. And I feel all the more uneasy when I look at his suggestion that the *newspaper music critic of today* would do well to relate his critical pieces to traditional vocabulary *in such a way that a history of the art of music* may be incidentally forged. I happen to be a practising music critic even today, and my write-ups appear in *Sruti* (Madras), if not very regularly; but, though they have been generally accepted by *rasika*-s, they do not at all meet *the requirement on which Dr. Lath insists*. Nor is it met by the music critic of *The Hindu* (New Delhi) whose reviews appear almost every Friday, and are not only detailed, grammatically authentic, and at times brilliant in respect of phenomenological analysis. I admit that the regular and better known newspaper music critics of today, who mostly write in English, have surely not reached the pinnacle; but I do not so far understand how the path of progress could be the one which Dr. Lath advocates. Perhaps his future writing will help. Till then I can only wait hopefully for the opening of an untrodden avenue. But not merely the critics (and aestheticians) of

today, even general readers need a little patience in going through the work under review. Why exactly I say so may be brought out by reflecting on the points I have distinguished as (4), (5), (6). Here again, for the sake of clarity, I may proceed in a piecemeal way:

[The book says that] *Paramparā*, 'seeks to preserve (only) the essence ... of an activity' (4); and that 'true preservation necessarily calls for' some slight modification (6). Now, what could this possibly mean—in the context of the art being discussed? I think the *activity* here referred to has to be taken as the making and presentation of music; and the word *essence*, as the principles that determine this dual activity unavoidably. But the book says nothing about *principles* helpfully, that is, in relation to present-day music. I expected some reflection on them in the fourth chapter which deals with *words and music*; for, if not the principle of sound–sense harmony, at least the norm which enjoins that the semantic in music should not dominate the melodic aspect of the art is binding on all vocal compositions which use language. Our Ustads of old would freely insist that 'अलफाज़ की तरतीब एसी हो कि तान कटे नहीं'. During the course of my Bhātkhande Memorial Lecture at the University of Delhi on 1.12.98, I tried to illustrate the operation of this principle by inviting listeners to mark that in a *bhairav dhruvapad* as actually sung, in the segment following the first line—and comprising the words: सकल ताप नाम हरत—the order नाम हरत was preferable to हरत नाम because, though the two arrangements did not make any difference to verbal meaning, the utterance of the letter र *in the second order* tended to ruffle the openness of the ascending *dagar* passage which the word नाम in *the first disposition* duly provided. But, in the chapter I have referred to (4th), the author says nothing at all about the *disposition* of words in a *bandish*, which surprises me. On the other hand, what he does say here is not all along unquestionable. Consider, for instance, the following:

> ... Singing *always* has to make use of words ... But when I say words are necessary in music, what *I mean*, strictly, is that syllables or vocables are necessary for singing (p. 51).

Now, the first sentence shocked me; for everybody knows (the author too, surely: see p. 211, last para, 1st line) that the most respectable kind of *ālāpa* is vocal, and that such *ālāpa* does not use words as we commonly take them. Nor did the second sentence (in the extract just cited) let me

recover. In fact, I felt disturbed, momentarily, by the thought that using *words* in the sense of mere vocables was too much of a licence. But, thinking that the second sentence could also be taken to have a corrective relation to the first, I quietly proceeded further. However, the attentive reader is likely to get another similar shock from the following on p. 90:

> A composition or *bandhish* as it is called, is an aesthetic epitome of a *rāga*, with all its salient features as captured by the vision of a master musician.

A *bandhish without* any *tāla*! But the very next sentence should cancel out the reader's wonder. So he has to be patient. But, of course, the author could have easily conjoined the content of the two sentences, avoiding thereby to ruffle our reading ease. (I hasten to inform the reader that the author *has* done it himself, in a footnote on p. 32.)

But there *are* places in the text where I cannot be of any help to those readers who look for clear and consistent thinking. These relate mostly to the author's remarks on music and concepts, form and content, and *rāga*. Here are some specimens:

a. '*Music does not embody concepts*. It cannot. Only language embodies concepts' (39, italics added).

b. 'Besides forms, *music has a conceptual framework* with multiple functions ...' (67, italics added).

c. 'A composition of *bandhish* ... is an aesthetic epitome of a *rāga* ...' (90).

d. 'A *rāga* is perhaps closer to an idea or concept' (87: f.n.1).

e. 'Music is form alone, or at least, *the content in it is inseparable from form*. The distinction of word and meaning [,] so essential in poetry [,] is meaningless in music' (31).

f. 'In music, where form and content are inextricably merged, the style is the sensibility. We cannot separate the expression from what it expresses' (35).

Now, I see no way to reconcile the italicized words in *a* with similar ones in *b*. The latter affirm what the former vigorously deny. (Perhaps the difficulty can be overcome by inserting the words 'our talk about' before 'music' in *b*.) *a* cannot be at peace with *c* and *d* either. 'Epitome' (*c*) means 'embodiment'. And if a *bandhish* embodies a *rāga* (*c*); and if a *rāga* is 'perhaps closer to ... a concept' (*d*), how can we say, in the same breath, that music (by which the author very probably means *rāga*-music) does not embody any concept? Here, indeed, I am faced with a quandary. Luckily, in *e* the second segment of the first sentence (italicized by me) provides some welcome evidence of the author's watchfulness. But the second sentence here (in *e*) is too categorical, and it makes me feel uneasy anew. Here the author may be said to be talking of music taken generally, for he does not specify any particular kind of it. Now (upon the author's own view, p. 34), *thumri* is an acknowledged and important genre of our music and *bol-banānā* is an important artistic device it employs. But what does this artistic practice mean except adapting the manner of singing, varyingly, to the shades of ideal and emotive meaning implicit in the text of the song? And is such adaptation possible unless the singer is clearly aware of the *meaning* of the words used *as distinguished from their merely phonetic aspect*? Or does the author mean *separation* by the word *distinction* in the following: 'the *distinction* of word and meaning so essential in poetry is meaningless in music'? I hesitate to say *yes*, *even in respect of poetry*; for the meaning (or rather the *import*) of words in poetry is *in*separable from their sound, associated images, and placement in the total poetic line. So, how exactly is the reader to interpret, reasonably, the thesis that the distinction of word and meaning ... is meaningless in music?

Let me now look at *f*. Here, the author speaks of the impossibility of extricating (or *separating*), *not of distinguishing* 'expression from what it expresses.' (In the second sentence, too, the author emphasizes the impossibility of *separating* ... .) So I am forced to conclude that the author is using *distinguishing* and *separating* interchangeably. This saddens me, for it detracts from the author's overall clarity of writing.

Unhappily, there is something else too to add to the reader's puzzlement. What is he to make of the emphasis that 'the style *is* the sensibility'? Sensibility is the *delicacy* of emotional response, the ability or capacity to feel or have sensation or emotions. It is a part of our inner being, though it operates in relation to what is external to us. Style, on the other hand, is a manner or way of doing something, say, writing, speaking, painting, or designing buildings. Sensibility may well be said to be *a part determinant of* style but it is surely *not the same thing* as style. Quite unlike the former, the latter is always open to public view. Incidentally, the author himself seems to admit the distinction I am pressing where he speaks

thus: 'A change in style is an index of a change in sensibility (p. 34; an indicator is surely not the same thing as what is indicated). But perhaps I am wrong in taking the *is* as an *is* of identity; for the second sentence here (*f*) harps on inseparability. So, once again, I see no way to decide if the author sees any difference between *separate* and *distinguish*.

Nor are the closing words of *f* of any help to me. 'We cannot separate the expression', we are told, 'from what it expresses'. Here the author himself is *distinguishing*, 'the expression' from 'what it expresses'. As for the impossibility of *separating* the two, the matter has to be looked at in the light of what meaning is here given to *expression*. In the present context, the word can only be taken to mean a manner of singing (or playing), possibly with some indication of feeling as well, as when singing is made to look plaintive or frolicsome. But, if this is so, the author's insistence seems to be needless; for no *rasika* thinks of *separating* the affective look of a song from the singer's *gāyaki*.

It would here be germane if I made two distinct remarks, one with the dual purpose of putting up some defence *and* voicing a concern. First, the thinking I have just done may not be dismissed as mere quibbling. The present-day emphasis on clarity of meaning is no innovation, and least for the *rasika* who is conversant with our age-old scholarly traditions. At times, as we know, they have even sanctified the word–meaning relation. Second, I earnestly wish the author had devoted a separate, if brief, chapter to a clear *and integrated* indication of what he means by the basic concepts that keep recurring in the work, instead of *scattering* his remarks on them at different places. I have here the following specially in mind: form and content, expression (in art), *rasa*, and (above all) *creation* and *transformation* which make the title of the book, along with *art*. The author has of course not failed to make some remarks on these concepts, but they have nowhere been given the steadfast and concentrated attention that they surely deserved in a work so serious and scholarly as the present one. And the few remarks he has made on them do not all admit of easy integration. But let me explain.

Take *art*, to begin with. The author is surely right in insisting that though 'viewing objects of art with some understanding of their history ... adds a new magnitude to our awareness of their nature' (57), 'the secret of art lies in the actual object of art, something which can be directly, *sensuously* apprehended' (57; italics added). Here, it is obvious, the author is leaving out works of literary art, for our apprehension of *their* meaning

cannot be said to be essentially sensuous. What he may be said to have in mind, here, are the arts of painting, architecture, sculpture, and music. But if, in accord with the author's main interest in the book, we confine ourselves to music, what essential meaning could be given to *transformation, in keeping with the author's concern (in the extract cited) with the 'secret' of art*? A secret is a fact or purpose that remains unexplained or unidentified (by people in general); and when it is unravelled our experience is always one of wonder, tinged with some delight or fear or disgust. Let us now see if any relation to the *secret* of art—which, according to the author, lies in the actual object of art as directly and sensuously apprehended—is visualized on even hinted at in what the author has to say about *transformation* at different places in the book.

In this context we do not have to dwell on what the author says (on pp. 124 and 127) about the amusing transformation that we find in Hindi films—namely, the sudden and rather improbable change-over of actors into 'songsters and dancers' and an equally abrupt return to normal modes of acting; for the change referred to is not itself *an* object (or work) of art, but only a recurring detail of it. Nor does the way in which it is explained by the author—say, as a hangover from the traditional presentation of dramatic plays (122, 150), and as a reflex of the film-makers' desire to avail of some material of easy appeal (137)—give us the gratifying feeling that a mystery is being unravelled. One is left equally untouched by the mere statement that 'in ... sixteenth century we witness a transformation in *rāga-portraiture*' (174). To say that '*rāga*—images [now] acquire movement' (ibid.) is not at all to provide any *secret* information about them. And when I turn to Dr. Lath's remarks on transformation *in relation to music*, I cannot help making the same complaint. But let me pick some of them for individual attention, to check if my reaction is justified:

> 1. [In] the west ... [only] the composer ... may transform some given material to create something new. (30)

Here a question may be put at once. Does this remark at all distinguish *transformation* (in art) from mere making in daily life? Where a carpenter creates a new table out of the wood provided to him, is it to be taken as a case of *transformation*? Everybody, including the author (I hope), would here say, no; but then (I repeat) we must be told how transformation in art differs from the making of things; but this is precisely what is nowhere done in the book under review.

2. ... *Dhrupad*, is a closed, confined style. *Transformations* are strictly circumscribed and not allowed to stray beyond prescribed limits (36, second italics added).

This is quite an unilluminating remark. Transformation of what? Of the four *pad*-s? If the author hereby wishes to distinguish *dhruvapad* from *khyāl*, I would readily rejoin with a question. Does the *Sadārang* composition, *Kareem naam tero* (in *mian ki malhār*) admit of any *transformation* when it is sung by different singers, barring the quite minor differences of their vocal quality? And if the remark being discussed is meant to be taken as merely a general complaint of lack of variety in *dhruvapad*-singing, how would the author justify his own following remarks:

> a. Improvisation is central to ... Khyāl *and dhrupad*. Transformation [,] in other words, is built into the very making of any particular performance in any of these forms (31).

Here, the author appears to equate *transformation* with *improvization*; but this is very questionable. To transform is to *change* in appearance, nature, function, etc., often completely and dramatically. To improvize, on the other hand, is to compose, recite, or perform (seemingly) *without preparing it in advance*. The former emphasizes *extent of change*; the latter, *absence of prior preparation*. A familiar kind of improvization which is freely found in our music—say in the sitar playing of Ustads Wilayat Khan and Abdul Halim Jaffer Khan—is what is called जगह निकलना, that is, producing a quite unexpected turn of phrase on the limited melodic range provided by a few adjacent *swara*-s. But this is not transformation at all. Here, nothing given is changed into something else; only something quite unexpected is produced.

Be that as it may, if (as the author himself has said) transformation is basic (also) to *dhruvapad*, what exactly is the point in saying that *dhruvapad* is a closed form? The question becomes even harder to answer when we take note of the fact that (in the following) the author himself admits the presence of (an indeterminate measure of) variety in *dhruvapad*-singing:

> b. We find that the same Tansen dhrupad is sung to one *rāga* in the Dagar *gharānā*, but to a different *rāga* in Vishnupur. A further complexity is added by the presence in the past of four *bānis* ... *which must also have multiplied mutations* (62, italics added).

'Mutations', in the present context, can only be taken to mean phonetic/musical changes. Does this not further cancel the author's insistence that *dhrupad* is a closed form? I know there *is* a rigidity which distinguishes *dhruvapad* from *khyāl*, but the author only insists (inconsistently) that it is there; he has not been able to locate or specify it.

What is more regrettable, however, is that he has nowhere tried to distinguish the concepts of creation, transformation, and improvization; he only uses them together, indiscriminately. Thus, see the following:

> It was always the practice in our music that [in due course] a *śiṣya* could become a master ... [that is, capable of] handling forms he had learnt in such a manner as to *transform them creatively* (60–61).

The italicized words imply that transformation can also be non-creative. But I cannot be sure that the author will allow this; for, in the following, he refuses to separate creation from transformation, and even from improvization:

> Every creation involves transformation, using improvization as it does (32).

At this point, the reader will perhaps be impatient to know how this conceptual hurdle could be cleared, and some rays of understanding let in. So I venture to help him as follows:

In everyday talk we do not generally distinguish creating from making. 'To create, to form' are indeed two admitted meanings of *make*. A quarrelsome person is freely said to be fond of making *or* creating trouble. But if we take due notice of the way in which a (good) work of art is brought into being *and* of the commonly accepted reason of its being significant or valuable, a distinction would surely seem demanded between the *creation* of works of art and the *making* of everyday objects. It is easy to argue for this. Things (which are *made*) serve some *practical* purpose. Works of art (*created* by artists) do not serve any *such* purpose. Yet they cannot be dismissed as being quite without value; for they provide what has been commonly called distinterested delight. Or, like some works of Mondrian, they at least tease perception, agreeably. More generally, they may be said to give us the happy feeling that attention to them puts an edge on our percipience. Indeed, the very basic equipment without which the aesthetic experience of music is just not possible—namely, the ability to perceive whether or not the ongoing music is quite in accord with *sur*

and *tāla*—is cherished by a *rasika* as the fruit of intense and recurring attention to individual recitals for years.

Further, quite unlike the making of a thing of daily use, the process of creating a work of art is not essentially pre-fixed. (Here, I hasten to except *solo tablā* recitals of the strictly traditional kind, as distinguished from *tablā*-playing as *accompaniment.*) Generally speaking, without of course deviating from the basic requirements of *rāga* and *tāla*, a sensitive musician regulates the details of his performance not merely in accordance with the way he has been trained, but by focusing on what the individual melodic moments, as they strike his ear immediately—that is, as determined by the acoustics and mike arrangements at the particular hall he finds himself in—themselves appear to suggest or demand as the next step. The actual course and duration of the recital may also be determined, in a measure, by the performing artist's sensibility to audience-responses. *Tādātmya* with the ongoing run of music is quite as essential for the musician at work as for the listening *rasika*; and the well-known thesis of Coleridge that the creative process is no mere making, but an alternation of making with recurring moments of contemplation, is quite as applicable to Hindustani music as to any other art.

It is this intense focusing of attention by the musician himself on the present form and flow of music which enables him to improvize a melodic or ṛhythmic turn. My own experience indeed is that, though it surely looks unexpected to the *rasika*, an improvization is always preceded by a momentary pause, *and often even a look* of intense concentration on the musician's part. So it is no mere accident of random deviation from a set course; and it even appears winsome to the *rasika*.

Yet, I repeat, *it is no transformation* in the basic artistic sense. As it *distinguishes* the inside of a particular work in the region of any art and not as the mere emergence of variety in overall artistic form or structure (such as we find in the change of music from the *dhruvapad* to *khyāl*-form), and remains a secret till it is revealed to us by some explicit reflection, *transformation* is something utterly different from improvization. It is rather the evocation of an intended semblance without any actual representation of it; it works by producing an *equivalent* sense-impression rather than *a literally similar one*; and the artist's skill, here is highlighted by the fact that the material at his disposal is yet strictly native to, and legitimate for the art he is dealing with, and is also basically limited in the sense that it cannot directly copy the desired property of the model. Silence

does not asseverate any view or belief; but, in place of exciting statements, *well timed silences* can surely be used to heighten a dramatic situation. Canvases and colours do not actually recede into the distance; but horizon in a painting can be made to look very far away from what meets the eye immediately, through an adroit softening of colour and superposition of objects. Rodin could polish *inert* marble so finely that it would appear like *living* feminine flesh. The human voice as such relates to the ear, and not to touch. Nor is it a source of light. But I was not beside the mark when I once acclaimed Ustad Bade Ghulam Ali for the *pulpy luminosity* of his *akara*. Goethe acclaimed the magical power of music to evoke suggestions of infinite stretches of depth and height, of power and gentility, and of every possible emotion known to humankind, by building upon its limited material of just seven notes. Our own music provides quite a few examples of this evocative power of music. To take a quite simple instance, during the course of doing *ālāpa* in *raga sohini*, if one just touches the *taar shadj* sweetly, but for a mere moment, and then readily elongates the *komal re* in a thin, but sweet and steady *akāra*, the *rishabh* will appear to be looking far into the distance, though the literal distance (on the scale) between *sa* and *re* is, as we know, minimal. To *rasikas* with a religious bent of mind it may even suggest detachment, which is why the late Ustad Rahimuddin Khan Dagar would speak of such a *rishabh* as *sanyastha*. Dr. Lath points out that 'the *rasa* mode of aesthetic perception cannot take history into account (57). My regret is that a purely historical approach just misses the glories of our music today, such as the ones I have just pointed out; and that unless some explicit attention is given to them, it remains quite unconvincing to say that 'the secret of art lies in the actual object of art, something that can be directly, sensuously, apprehended' (58). But, at this point, my own limitation irks me. I am not able to relate semblances like the one I just specified to the concept of *rasa*. Maybe, the word is to be taken here as the agreeable feeling that surely goes with the experience visualized. But even then a difficulty would persist. *Rasa*-experience has been said to be *nirvichhinna* or intense, non-discursive. The *rishabh* of the kind I have tried to visualize is, on the other hand, outstanding—far more striking than the other notes. This indeed is why, quite unlike the other *swaras* which may be otherwise perfectly in tune, it alone elicits an *āhā* of spontaneous applause. But if it is sensed as something distinct, does not the total experience become, in a measure,

discursive? But let us see what Dr. Lath has to say about this prime concept of traditional Indian aesthetics:

> a. A *rasa* was what made a whole hang together as a composite body combining disparate parts ... (93).
>
> b. *Rasa* ... was for Bharata the principle through which different arts could be successfully combined into a single whole (95).
>
> c. *Rasa* for Bharata was clearly an art of making a good mixture ... (96).

These three extracts are likely to make the reader wonder if *rasa* (according to the author) is merely a kind of wrapper, so to say, which just enfolds disparate parts from the outside, and so holds them as one, with no substantial, unified content of its own. But here one has to be patient with the author. The words that he actually uses—like *hang together*, *combine* and *mixture*—do not fail to suggest that *rasa* unites the 'disparate parts' internally, instead of merely putting them together. And as for the doubt that the author perhaps thinks of *rasa* as a merely skeletal link, it should quickly disappear if we turn to consider the following remarks of the author:

> The affective principle is described by Bharata in what can be meaningfully termed his theory of *bhāvas*, which is an essential part of his *rasa*-theory (114, f.n. 114).
>
> [*Rasa* is] a complex concept which ... is definitive of the aesthetic realm in general as well as of the emotions savoured through the experience of *kāvya*, emotion thus rendered ... being in some sense 'trans' or 'extra-normal' (18–19).

Here, it is obvious, *rasa* is duly said to have a rich emotive content. Even apart from this there is a good deal in the work which deserves our notice, and so I now turn to list some of its more likeable details.

The distinction between *paramparā* and *rūḍhi* is obvious. But it is good that the author reminds us of it (7); for it is very freely forgotten. It does not make me happy to be told that, regarded 'as impressionistic, imaginative reactions of an individual *sahṛdaya* to [specific] works of art ...' criticism 'was an exception rather than the rule' in ancient India, specially in the context of music (9–10). But, on the other hand, I am also relieved to learn that, if only in respect of general questions of aesthetic theory, our top musicological texts of olden days abound in 'richness, width and

penetration of analysis' (68), though here at once I cannot help wishing that the author had also given at least one example of such analytic writing.

As for his *protest* against the demand that all singing should seek to express the feelings of the sung poem (53), it could perhaps be made more acceptable than it presently is by inserting the word *primarily* after 'seek'; for if the manner of singing is at times so adapted to words that verbal meaning may be projected without at all interfering with the demands of melody, why should it not be acceptable to us? Does not the author himself appear to agree with Bharata's view that (if not every composition of vocal music) at least 'a *dhruvā* ... should be so composed that its music ... [may have] an affinity with the meaning (of the sung text); [and that] it should be able to project the meaning'? (102). At quite a few other places, however, what the author says is clearly true. He rightly complains of a paradox that infects our attitude to music. On the one hand, we take pride in declaring that our music has a very long history; but, on the other hand, we are not duly devoted to a study of our authentic musicological texts of the past (54). It also seems true to fact that quarrels over the precise way in which the 'purity' of a *rāga* can be kept 'usually boil down to quarrels over favourites' (56); and that 'Indian culture ... is the only culture where transcendental revelation has taken the form not only of words but also of music: pure music undiluted by words' (285).

But I repeat (what I have already said at the very outset) that if the book is estimable, as it surely is, it is essentially because of the richness of its content. Only the fourth and seventh chapters—namely, the ones that deal with words and music, and improvization—can be said to be rather sketchy. Chapters 9 and 10, which seek to relate our films of today with Bharata Muni and our theatrical traditions, are both well-reasoned and interesting. But for sheer richness of substance chapter 8 (Bharata and the Fine Art of Mixing Structures); and chapter 4 (The Music of Gitagovinda ...) have struck me as outstanding. Chapters which are bound to impress the reader *because of the very rarity of their concern* are chapter 13 (Some Reflections on the Vīṇā in Gupta Coinage); chapter 15 (Music in the Ṭhāṇaṁga Sūtra); chapter 16 (The Body as an Instrument ...), which has gratified me specially because of what it says ... (in the closing para, p. 263) about the *Śikṣā* picture—that is, how it focuses on the details of the way every distinct syllable is produced, 'noting the exact placement of the tongue in the cavity of the mouth and the distinct effort required'—

provides academic support to a *dhruvapad* and some allied talk recorded by me at the Central Production Centre of Delhi Doordarshan (July 19, 20, 24), on behalf of the Indira National Centre for the Arts, the artist 'interviewed' on this occasion being Ustad R. Fahimuddin Dagar. Chapter 17 (Reflections on the Logos of Music) contains some very fascinating remarks on Confucius's ideas concerning music, such as the following:

> ... What makes Confucius really great as a musicologist is not his work as a scholar and collector of music, but his larger vision regarding the role of music in the life of man. Music, for him, reflected the deepest principle of harmony in the soul, a principle that could serve as the ground for true order among men. (269–70)

The ideal here envisaged is surely more credible than the one which looks on music as a disciplined pathway to spiritual liberation; for, if only a passing consequence, the shared relish of a glorious music recital truly makes the listening *rasika*-s feel pretty close to one another.

What is more, there are passages in the book which are bound to serve as a kind of intellectual teaser, and so to stimulate our thinking. I have here in mind what the book says (on p. 226) about *swaras* as they relate to individuals of different dispositions.

All in all, I expect the book to be well received, and to need a second edition in the course of time. But if this comes to pass, very careful proof-reading of the entire text will be necessary; because, in its present form, the book abounds in printing errors, some of which I may list hereunder, just to lighten the burden on the author:

7, last para, replace *it* (after *transforming*) with *them*; 9, 2nd para, replace *s* in *practise* with *c*; 31, 1st para, last line, the needed comma before *in* is missing; 68, 3rd para, 3rd line, please delete the comma after *before*; 68, 2nd para, 5th line, *text* should be *texts*; same page, last para, the comma after *too* is a sheer intruder; 71, 4th para, 1st line *view-point*, delete the hyphen; 91, 2nd para, 2nd line, *it* is needed after *yet*; 108, 7th line from the foot, *for* has to be prefaced with a comma; 105, opening line, delete the 2nd *r* in *trransformations*; 128, f.n. 4th line, delete one *t* from *combatted*; 311, 3rd para, 1st line, *two* or *three*?

I also wish that some of the bigger footnotes (on p. 313, for example) could somehow be incorporated into the text. They are, however, nowhere irrelevant or prolix.

2/81, Roop Nagar, Delhi 110 007 S.K. Saxena

Kapil Kapoor: *Literary Theory—Indian Conceptual Framework*, Affiliated East-West Press Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1998.

Alaṅkāraśāstra is one of the very fertile areas in Indian Śāstric traditions. It has ever been vibrating with new conceptualizations, facing new challenges, imbued with creativity and alive to the new problems and perspectives in the society. In our times, however, this Śāstra appears to have come to stagnation, although its creativity continues. Sanskrit Pundits who are still writing new Śāstric works in this discipline or composing fresh commentaries on the old texts have not made themselves conversant with the latest developments in literary theories at the global level, and also, the modern scholars who have made studies on Alaṅkāraśāstra could not extend the frontiers of its possibilities through up-to-date interpretations and hermaneutics. G.T. Deshpande was one of the pioneer scholars who raised some fundamental questions and interpretative problems in this field in his *Bhāratīya Sāhityaśāstra*. Recently, Ashok Kelkar has attempted a study of Sanskrit Poetics with a view to re-organize it and interpret its systems for the readers who are basically not trained in Kāvyaśāstra.[1] Such study had to be equipped with different methodology in contrast to the prevailing methods of teaching or studying Kāvyaśāstra. Kelkar tried to present the background of Alaṅkāraśāstra by discussing the world-view of the ancients and the development of various other disciplines in ancient times. Also, attempt was made to make Alaṅkāraśāstra more palatable by putting its categories through new tables or graphic representations. In two seminars organized by this author the issue of re-organizing Alaṅkāraśāstra and re-discovering its viability also figured.[2] *Literary Theory—Indian Conceptual Framework* by Kapil Kapoor is another attempt in this direction, with of course a wider scope. It not only introduces the major literary theories of Alaṅkāraśāstra to a modern reader, it also critically analyzes them in the light of their philosophical background and intellectual traditions. For the first time an attempt has been made to explain the undercurrents of Indian theories of Poetics in the background of Vedic Philosophy of Ṛta and the treatment of Daivī Sampat in Bhagavadgītā. Unlike the monumental works of great savants like P.V. Kane and S.K. De, both Kelkar and Kapoor have avoided the task of surveying or writing the History of Sanskrit Poetics, concerning themselves more with the interpretative study. It is but natural that in Kapoor's book (as well as in some of the papers prepared for the seminars as referred above) Rājaśēkhara

has occupied a focal point, because in the ninth century Rājaśēkhara himself had made an attempt to re-organize the systems of Kāvyaśāstra and re-examine their position in the context of other disciplines.

This book was prepared as a *Saṅgraha* text (as per its author's concept; see below) basically for the students of English literature who offered the course in *Comparative Poetics*. These students were not exposed to the textual tradition of Alaṅkāraśāstra. Nor has their teacher (Dr. Kapoor) made an in-depth study of original texts. It is precisely for this reason that many of the interpretations and explanations in this book appear quite baffling to me. While I admit that the book is perhaps the only one of its kind, I am myself more concerned with the points of difference or amendments for further debate and corrections.

In the beginning Kapoor has discussed 'the wide spectrum of *dṛṣṭibhēda*, perspectives or points of view, i.e., the co-existing but competing systems of Indian thought and 'Indian Intellectual Tradition' (pp. 5–8). These systems percolate in the literary theories through discussions on the concept of word and meaning. Vākyapadīyam of Bhartṛhari has rightly been brought into focus here, as 'the Indian intellectual tradition is language-centred'. An attempt has been made to define and put up the whole tradition in a terminology which the reader conversant with modern concepts will understand. Dr. Kapoor rightly talks of 'continuity and cumulativeness of texts and thinkers'; of source texts, primary texts and *saṅgraha* texts, recensions and long line of commentaries; of 'powerful interperative literature built around the primary texts.' He finds the whole tradition empirical, i.e., 'the conceptual structures propounded by primary texts are products of actual practice observations' (p. 8).

However, in presenting the picture of Indian literary theories, in relation to the growth of intellectual traditions, he has accepted certain wide (or wild) generalizations, so that the picture acquires different colours. 'Indian thought has moved over time from materialism to idealism, from empiricism to transcendentalism. This is true of philosophy—if we examine Mādhavācārya's treatment of sixteen philosophical systems in his *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*' (p. 12). I do not think Mādhavācārya has presented any sort of historical development of ideas in his *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*. But this concept of development of Indian thought from materialism to idealism has been applied by our author to the growth of linguistic and literary theories also. This is just in opposition to Dr. G.C. Pande's thesis which finds Indian thought moving from the early spiritualism to materialism.

Rasa is an objective phenomenon in Bharata whereas in Abhinavagupta's Abhinavabhāratī (eleventh century AD) it is a 'subjective experience of the viewer/hearer' (p. 12). Even though Kapoor finds that 'This linearity in thought is only an interpretive construct and is no more than a characterization of dominant models at a given moment in history,' he is still guided by this 'imaginative construct' throughout, confirming the erroneous and prevailing notion that the theories of Alaṅākāraśāstra reached a sort of zenith with the advent of Dhvani-theory and nothing substantial could be added in the theory after Abhinavagupta. Both Kelkar and Kapoor therefore do not refer to any Ācārya of Alaṅkāraśāstra after Abhinavagupta, except Viśvanātha (author of *Sāhityadarpaṅa*) and Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha. Even Appaya Dīkṣita, a senior contemporary of Paṇḍitarāja who is far superior as a philosopher and as a rhetorician also, and refutations of whose views by Paṇḍitarāja led to the controversies which raged for a century or two, figures nowhere in both the works by our authors. Acceptance of a fixed and prevailing notion regarding the development or decline of Sanskrit Kāvyaśāstra remains behind both studies by Kelkar and Kapoor.

In the preface, Dr. Kapoor says, 'there is at least one *Saṅgraha* text, a pedagogical text, that puts together and elucidates the major theories—Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa*;—and at least one theoretical survey of issues in literary theory—Rājaśēkhara's *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*. If a text which 'puts together and elucidates' major theories is termed as a *Saṅgraha* text Kāvyaprakāśa cannot be called a *Saṅgraha* text. It does not put together and elucidate all the major theories. It hardly takes any notice of Kuntaka's *Vakrōkti* theory or Kṣēmēndra's theory of *Oucitya*. (Dr. Kapoor has cited these theories as major schools of Sanskrit poetics.) Mammaṭa has presented some of the systems of *Alaṅkāraśāstra* from the perspective of a committed Dhvanivādin. The extent to which the *Kāvyaprakāśa* of Mammaṭa serves the purpose of a *Saṅgraha* text should be examined with reference to the concept of *Saṅgraha* in Sāstric tradition also. Bharata's Nāṭyaśāśtra is one of the earliest texts defining *Saṅgraha* as a methodology in a Śāstra. Accordingly, when the theories or principles presented earlier through *Sūtras* and *Bhāṣyas* are put in a nutshell, that is called Saṅgraha.[3] If *Kāvyaprakāśa* of Mammaṭa can be termed as a *Saṅgraha* text, then there are several other texts which could better stand the criteria of a *Saṅgraha* text in the tradition of Sanskrit *Kāvyaśāstra*, particularly the texts of Bhoja, Vidyānātha, Viśvanātha and a host of others. If a text presenting the

comprehensive picture of all the systems and traditions of a particular Śāstra is *Saṅgraha* text, then *Mandāramarandacampū*, a later text, is an excellent example of a *Saṅgraha* text in *Kāvyāśastra*. Its author, Śrīkṛṣṇa Kavi, (around 17th century) has given a detailed exposition of all the systems of Kāvyaśāstra including the forgotten systems like *Kāvyapāka* and *Śaiyā*; and he has included the categories and varieties belonging to *Nāṭyaśastra*, *Chandaḥśāstra* (Prosody) and *Kaviśikṣā* also.

The preface also discusses the question whether *Alaṅkāraśāstra* is a Vidyā or a Śāstra. Dr. Kapoor thinks that 'literary theory was denied an unambiguous status as a discipline' (Śāstra) and Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha 'tried to overcome this lacuna by composing *Rasagaṅgādhara* in the style and language of *Navyanyāya* (Preface, pp. xi–xii). The fact is that the Navyanyāya style had crept in the texts of Alaṅkāraśāstra much before Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha. *Sāhityamīmāṃsā* of Maṅkha (12th century) as available to us is composed in this style. If Navyanyāya style is held as a criterion for providing the status of a Śāstra to a text or system of thought, then all the works or systems which had emerged before the tenth century will not enjoy this status, as the Navyanyāya style came in vogue after the tenth century.

Early attempts to elevate *Alaṅkāraśāstra* to the status of a standard discipline were made by composing texts in Sūtra-style. Much before Vāmana's *Kāvyālaṅkārasūtra* (eighth century), Śauddhōdani had composed a Sūtra-work on Alaṅkāra, and his text has been adopted by Kēśavamiśra in *Alaṅkāraśēkhara*. In fact, Dr. Kapoor's statement regarding the status of Alaṅkāraśāstra here is extremely misleading. He says, 'That part of Poetics which deals with the figural mode is accorded the status of a *Śāstra* (*Alaṅkāraśāstra*) and the whole discipline is more frequently referred to as Vidyā (Sāhityavidyā)' (Preface, p. xi). Alaṅkāra or Alaṅkāraśāstra does not mean 'that part of Poetics which deals with figural mode' only. Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana and Kuntaka, all these Ācāryas insist on taking the term Alaṅkāra at par with the whole concept of poetic beauty or aesthetics. Daṇḍin emphatically says that Alaṅkāra in its wider concept is something much different and bigger than the common (Sādhāraṇa) Alaṅkāras or figures of speech, so that in this tradition, the texts of Ānandavardhana or Abhinavagupta are also regarded as the texts on *Alaṅkāraśāstra*. The fifteen sections of *Kāvyavidyā* or *Alaṅkāraśāstra* as enumerated by Rājaśēkhara at the very outset of his *magnum opus* include all the categories like Rasa, Guṇa, Rīti. The reason behind the denial of

'an unambiguous status as a discipline' to Alaṅkāra lies in various prejudices issuing from particular moralist thinking, Rājaśēkhara has elaborated upon them as prima facie views.

Besides such sweeping generalizations, there are mistakes in presenting the textual tradition of Sanskrit poetics. These mistakes may appear to be immaterial to the class of readers for whom this book has been written, but I think they would appear to be glaring mistakes to the traditional scholars of Sanskrit Kāvyaśāstra. I will cite some of them.

Exemplifying the Indian intellectual traditions, Dr. Kapoor has listed some disciplines and basic (?) texts on them. For *Dhamaśāstra*, only *Manusmṛti* and *Pārāśarasaṃhitā* have been cited, *Kāvyaśāstra* is represented by *Nāṭyasāstra* and *Rasagaṅgādhara*, *Mahābhārata* and Purāṇas are referred to as *Itihāsa-Purāṇa*. For each one of these disciplines, hundreds of texts in Sanskrit are available. Dr. Kapoor has not specified any reason for picking and choosing just two texts to represent them, i.e., the reason for excluding Yājñavalkya from Dharmaśāstra; for not mentioning the texts of Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana, Kuntaka, Ānandavardhana or several others to represent the traditions of Kāvyaśāstra. Nāṭyaśāstra which has been retained by him is not basically taken up as a work on *Alaṅkāraśāstra* (or *Kāvyaśastra*). *Rāmāyaṇa* is always mentioned as *Itihāsa* alongside the *Mahābhārata*. If Dr. Kapoor intends to cite only primary texts for each discipline, as he mentions the *Sutras* of *Ṣaḍdarśanas* for the discipline under Philosophy, *Rasagaṅgādhara* cannot be called a primary text that way in the realm of Poetics.

A table of major schools, thinkers and texts is further produced (p. 14). This table is also incomplete and defective. Dr. Kapoor has listed seven schools (of Sanskrit Poetics). Mahimabhaṭṭa, one of the greatest opponents of Dhvani-theory, is listed under Dhvani-school. Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin are advocates of Alaṅkāra-school, at the same time they figure as thinkers under Guṇa Dōṣa-school also. Elsewhere,[4] with reference to (late) Professor R.C. Dwivedi, I have discussed the division of Sanskrit Poetics into so-called six schools. The whole tradition of Ācāryas in *Alaṅkāraśāstra* has been against any such division into six schools. That apart, it is only from Dr. Kapoor's work that I have come to know that there is a theory of a seventh (major) school of Guṇa-Dōṣa also. In Bharata the concept of Guṇa is supposed to be invariably linked with the words and their meanings in poetry. Ācāryas like Vāmana found the Guṇas as inseparably connected with the *Rītis* whereas the Dhvanivādins like Mammaṭa said that the Guṇas

are qualities of Rasa. In the same way Dōṣas or poetic blemishes may belong to words, meanings or Rasas. So far as I know, Mammaṭa, the greatest advocate of Dhvani-theory has defined and discussed the largest number of Dōṣas in poetry. It is difficult to understand how can the concepts of Guṇa and Dōṣa, joined together, form a school in Sanskrit Poetics. The expression 'Guṇa-Dōṣa' may be used as a combine for practical purposes or for the other Śāstras, but the *Guṇas* and the *Dōṣas* do not form a pair or a school in *Kāvyaśāstra*. Also, the Ācāryas are against linking them together, the mere absence of *Dōṣa* does not imbue the poetic piece with *Guṇa* or quality.

On p. 13, Dr. Kapoor suggests that Lōllaṭa whose work is available to us as incorporated in another text Abhinavabhāratī, could have been included in his list of thinkers. This is a very misleading statement. Lōllaṭa's work is not incorporated in Abhinavabhāratī, an excellent commentary on Nāṭyaśāstra, Lōllaṭa has been referred to or his statements have been reproduced as prima facie views at quite a few places in this voluminous commentary. Anyway, if Lōllaṭa is worth mentioning why omit the great savants like Śaṅkuka and Bhaṭṭanāyaka, whose interpretations of the concept of Rasa are as important as Lōllaṭa's? Like Lōllaṭa, more than twenty great Ācāryas have been referred to or cited by Abhinavagupta in his Abhinavabhāratī who significantly contributed to the Ontology of Rasa. Dr. Kapoor has not adopted a valid and convincing logic for the pick and choose method in preparing various tables of names in this book.

The statement—'*Rasa-theory originates with Bharata in Nāṭyaśāstra*'—(p. 15) is also an example of such wide generalization. The fact is that the theory of rasa does not originate with Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*. The famous Rasasūtra (*Vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārīsaṃyōgādrasaniṣpattiḥ*) was not given by Bharata, it was handed over to him by the tradition of earlier Ācāryas.

'*Bhāmaha is the first Ālaṅkārika* poetician' (p. 16)—this statement is totally baseless, because the word *Ālaṅkārika* does not mean a theorist who has discussed the figures of speech only. In fact, all the poeticians in our tradition are Ālaṅkārikas. Strangely, Dr. Kapoor rightly quotes Professor R.C. Dwivedi for understanding the true nature of *Alaṅkāra*—i.e., *Alaṅkāra* is the *Dharma* of poetry, and not a mere embellishment, and it is the perception itself and not just the method of representing a perception; and then misses the significance of the word *Ālaṅkārika*. Even if the word *Alaṅkāra* is just taken in its restricted sense, i.e., to denote the

figures of speech only, and an Ālaṅkārika is also taken to mean an Ācārya who has mostly discussed the figures of speech, Bhāmaha certainly is not the first Ālaṅkārika in this narrow sense also. Bhāmaha himself has cited Ācāryas like Mēdhāvin who had discussed the *Alaṅkāras* (in the narrow sense of the term) before him. Apart from this, the question of Bhāmaha's priority to Daṇḍin still remains unsettled.

Dr. Kapoor has not referred to *Viṣṇudharmōttarapurāṇa* (III Khaṇḍa) which is definitely an important text in the field of *Nāṭyaśāstra* and *Kāvyaśāstra* as well as allied arts like Mūrti, Citra, Nṛtya and Vāstu etc. The *Alaṅkārādhyāya* of *Viṣṇudharmōttara* provides the definitions of 18 *Alaṅkāras*, and there are separate chapters in it on Rasa and Bhāva. This Purāṇa had come into existence before Bhāmaha.

'*Mammaṭa enumerates sixty-one figures and groups them into seven types*' (p. 17). Mammaṭa has not given any such classification of figures in seven types (*Upamā*, *Rūpaka* etc.). Again on p. 20 Mammaṭa is said to have propounded three Rītis in the eighth chapter of his *Kāvyaprakāśa*—*Upanāgarikā*, '*Prasāda*' (?) and '*Kōmala*' (?). Mammaṭa has not discussed these so-called names as Rītis. In the ninth chapter of his Kāvyaprakāśa of course he refers to *Upanāgarikā*, *Paruṣā* (not *Prasāda*) and Kōmalā (not *Kōmala*) as three *Vṛttis* (arrangement of syllables), and then says that the other Ācāryas like Vāmana incorporate these three *Vṛttis* under their treatment of *Rītis*.

Explaining Rasa-theory, Dr. Kapoor says: '*Bharata, the first enouncer of the theory gives the most comprehensive analysis of its sources, nature and categories. Subsequently the theory found major commentators in Dhanika-Dhanañjaya who re-explained Bharata's typology of drama and added to it a new typology of Uparūpakas, sub-plays, plays within plays and one act plays.*'

Dhanika-Dhanañjaya are not major commentators of Rasa-theory. They have endorsed the interpretation of Bhaṭṭanāyaka. They have not added the category of *Uparūpaka* in Bharata's typology of drama. They have not used the term *Uparūpaka* anywhere in their works—*Dhaśarūpaka* (by Dhanañjaya) and *Dhaśarūpakāvalōka* (commentary on the same by Dhanika). The term *Uparūpaka* occurs for the first time in *Alaṅkārasaṅgraha* of Amṛtānandayōgin (around 13th century), who has also defined some *Uparūpakas* or minor plays. An *Uparūpaka* is not a play-within-a-play (as Dr. Kapoor understands). It is not always a one-act play (whereas some of the major forms of drama or Rūpakas like *Bhāṇa*,

Vyāyōga and *Prahasana* are one-act plays). Before the first use of the term Uparūpaka (by Amṛtānanda) these minor plays were known by various names like *Nṛttaprabandha*, *Gēyaprabandha*, *Gēyarūpaka* etc. Out of numerous minor plays, Bharata in his Nāṭyaśāstra has discussed the characteristics of *Nāṭikā* only, leaving the task of defining other minor plays to his successors or disciples. He has also named Kōhala as one of his worthy disciples, who was supposed to complete the task left by himself (Bharata). In the vast range of Ācāryas of Nāṭyasāstra, Kōhala is cited as an authority on minor plays, and his definitions are quoted by several Ācāryas.[5] Out of the vast number of these minor plays, both *Dhanañjaya* and Dhanika simply define and discuss Nāṭikā only. Dhanika, commenting on Daśarūpaka I.VIII, has just cited the names of seven types of Nṛtyas, and these seven types are defined as minor plays by other Ācāryas. The above-quoted statement by Dr. Kapoor therefore needs thorough revision.

The Śāstras present some such categories which may form a potential ground to examine the new trends in present-day literature. The concept of Mahāvākya is definitely one of such theories. Dr. Kapoor has given a scanty note on Mahāvākya (p. 29), which could have been supplemented with references from the Mīmāṃsā and Vēdānta.[6]

In the discussion on discourse analysis (p. 31), Dr. Kapoor has rightly presented the concept of *Tantrayukti* and the 32 types of *Tantrayuktis* as defined in Kauṭalya's[7] *Arthaśāstra*. Again, mention of *Viṣṇu-dharmōttarapurāṇa* could have been made here, which amongst the ancient texts on art and aesthetics, defines the 32 *Tantrayuktis*, with slight variation in the denomination and definitions. Prior to the concept of *Tantrayukti*, the tradition had developed another category for discourse analysis, particularly with reference to Brāhmaṇa texts. Śabarasvāmī in his *Mīmāṃsābhāṣya* explains ten *Vidhis* of the *Bhārmaṇa* texts (Śabara on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 2.1.8).

'*Ādi Śaṅkara's various commentaries on diverse Smṛti texts are supreme examples of Darśana-Smṛti exegesis*', Dr. Kapoor says on p. 42. I am not aware whether Ādi Śaṅkara has commented on any of the Smṛtis (in the sense the word Smṛti has been used by Dr. Kapoor himself in this very para). Ādi Śaṅkara's commentaries on Upaniṣads (*Śruti*) are known to me, but I do not know whether the Upaniṣads are termed as *Smṛtis* anywhere in our tradition. However, Dr. Kapoor provides a definition of *Smṛti* texts on p. 51: '*Smṛti literally means memory. So many compositions that are products of* recall *are* Smṛti *texts. The knowledge contained therein was already available or known for other means of knowledge. The Śruti-Smṛti combine is also described as Āgama-Nigama combine*' (p. 51). To Dr. Kapoor, a text with a known origin and associated with a particular composer is Āgama or Smṛti. Applying this definition of Smṛti, Dr. Kapoor designates the texts by 'Jaimini, Manu, Kauṭilya, Pāṇini etc.' all as Smṛtis; and also '*All reasoned texts*—Darśanas Dharmaśāstras *and* Vēdāṅgas—*belong here*'. If a text with a 'known origin' and 'associated with a particular composer' can be called a Smṛti, then the whole mass of Kāvya in classical Sanskrit literature beginning from Vālmīki and Vyāsa would fall under the category of Smṛti literature. In our tradition, *Smṛti* is synonymous to Dharmaśāstra (*Śabdakalpadruma* pt. II, p. 787) and in this context all the texts depending on recall or memory are not Smṛtis. A text leading to the recall of Veda is supposed to be a Smṛti—*Smaranti Vēdamanayā Iti Smṛtiḥ* (*Śabdakalpadruma*, pt. IV, p. 464). It is equally wrong to take *Smṛti* and *Āgama* as one and the same thing.

Dr. Kapoor has given a convincing exposition of five classes of literature on the basis of Pāṇini. Under the category of Prōkta (spoken, expounded or taught), he has mentioned Purāṇas, Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads and Āraṇyakas; and included Nāṭyasāstra of Bharatamuni in the category of Upajñāta (found, systematized or re-organized). Is it proper to incorporate the Brāhmaṇas under Prōkta literature? The Brāhmaṇas were not supposed to have been spoken. Also, the whole text of Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharatamuni is in fact a discourse delivered by the sage in reply to the queries of some other sages, and it is structured in the form of dialogues between Bharata and these sages, comprising questions, cross-questions and answers. Therefore, it can better be classed as a Prōkta text.

Considering the origin and development of literary compositions, Dr. Kapoor remarks—'*Brāhṇaṇa texts constitute the oldest existing prose document*' (p. 53). Again a factual error. The bulk of *Kṛṣṇa Yajurvēda* consists of prose. On p. 60, Dr. Kapoor himself adjusts the prose part of the Veda as *Yajuṣ*. Tracing the development of literary tradition (*Laukika Kāvya*) further, Kapoor refers to Rājaśēkhara's reference to Uśanas as the first poet, '*whose work however, is not available*'. This is true. However, many verses composed by Uśanas are quoted in Mahābhārata, and from these it appears that he must have been a very popular poet of yore justifying Kṛṣṇa's claim that he is poet Uśanas amongst the poets (in the Vibhūtiyōga of Gītā). The stanzas attributed to Uśanas or Śukrācārya in

Mahābhārata do not belong to Śukranīti. Śukranīti is supposed to have been composed around the ninth century AD. Kapoor further commits a mistake by taking this Uśanas or Śukrācārya and the author of *Śukranīti* as one and the same person.

On p. 60, there is a reference to a school proposing the status of the seventh *Vēdāṅga* for Alaṅkāraśāstra. I do not think there is any such school. In fact, Rājaśēkhara alone wanted this status to be bestowed on Alaṅkāraśāstra, and the example for establishing the need of Alaṅkāraśāstra for Vedic interpretation (*Dvā Supaṃā*) has been quoted by Rājaśēkhara from Ṛgvēda (and not from *Śvētāśvaratarōpaniṣd* as Dr. Kapoor suggests. (To find out the source of this assumption by Kapoor, I consulted the edition of Kāvyamīmāṃsā with a Hindi translation by Devendranath Sharma. Sharma has also assumed that Rājaśēkhara has quoted this Mantra from Śvētāśvaratara. Rājaśēkhara here is suggesting that the knowledge of Alaṅkāraśāstra is useful even for a better understanding of the Vēda. If the Mantra quoted by him in this context occurs in Ṛgvēda itself, and Śvētāśvaratara also reproduces it, then he must be supposed to have quoted it from the original source.)

The tendency towards explaining the concepts of poetics in terms of philosophy or certain philosophical systems has created misrepresentations. In their search for the essential or fundamental elements of poetry, the Ācāryas used the term 'Ātman', but I do not think they accepted this term strictly in Vēdāntic sense. At least the Ācāryas who flourished prior to the advent of Śaṅkarācārya's *Advaitavāda* should not be branded as monists in Vēdāntic sense. Dr. Kapoor explains the discussions on Kāvyātmā as '*a reflex of that typical Indian intellectual monistic search for one single explanatory principle*' (p. 71). When Vāmana is adjusting Rīti as the Ātman of Kāvya, he is treating Rīti at par with the structure of poetry. Rīti manifests in a specific arrangement of words. In the very first *Sūtra* of his *Kāvyālaṅkārasūtra*, he defines *Alaṅkāra* as the most essential element in Kāvya. If Kāvya is a painting, Rīti is compared to the lines drawn for this painting. The lines in a painting are not its soul in the sense of Ātmā in Advaita Vēdānta. Ānandavardhana says that *Vācya* (primary meaning) and *Pratīyamāna* (suggested sense) are two types of *Dhvani* and this *Dhvani* is the Ātman of Kāvya. Ānandavardhana here is talking of a duality. Ātman to him in poetry in inclusive of Vācya or primary meaning also. And this primary meaning is also said to be the body (Śarīra) of poetry. Concluding this discussion of the soul of poetry, Dr. Kapoor says:

'It can be said that finally Rasa has been accepted as the Ātmā, the defining property of Kāvya' (p. 72). This acceptance of a linear order is self-contradictory.

It is perhaps owing to this acceptance of a linear development of theories of Sanskrit Poetics, i.e., their final consumation in Rasa, that has led Dr. Kapoor to accept the status of Vēda for Kāvya. 'Kāvya has been called fifth Vēda,' he says (on p. 101). I am not aware of any tradition elevating Kāvya in general to the status of Vēda. Mahābhārata is designated as the fifth Vēda; in the tradition of Nāṭyaśāstra, Nāṭya is described as the fifth Vēda. Sāhityavidyā has been described as the fifth Vidyā [the for accepted Vidyās being (i) three Vedas, (ii) Ānvīkṣikī or logic, (iii) Vārtā or agriculture and animal-husbandry, and (iv) Daṇḍanīti or polity]. However, as Dr. Kapoor himself has stated, the tradition distinguished between Vēda and Kāvya, on the ground that the former admonished *Prabhusammita Upadēśa*, whereas the latter gives *Kāntāsammita Upadeśa*; and also unlike Vēda, the words and syllables in Kāvya do not form an irreversible order.

Dr. Kapoor has made a fine analysis of Chekhov's story 'Grief' and Wordsworth's 'Michael' on the basis of his understanding of Rasa as bliss or Ānanda. He is right in suggesting that 'Ānanda arises from a narrative deep grief as well' (p. 102). (The sentence is incomplete here.) We feel the grief and a deep sense of compassion for the cab driver in Chekhov's story. We are deeply moved at the way the story comes to an end. But then how do we get that equipoise which Dr. Kapoor finds so essential in Rasa-experience? In fact, even the plays of Kālidāsa and Bhavabhūti may leave a modern viewer shaken and disturbed and not in the state of equipoise.

Bhaṭṭanāyaka has been misrepresented in the suggestion (p. 122) that he makes a distinction between *Kāvya* and *Nāṭya* in respect to *Rasabōdha*, and holds the three *Vyāpāras—Abhidhā*, *Bhāvanā* and *Bhōga* as belonging to *Śravyakāvya* (poetry) only. In fact, Bhaṭṭanāyaka, as presented by Mammaṭa has accepted the triple process of Abhidhā, Bhāvanā, and Bhōga for *Kāvya* and *Nāṭya* both. Again the following remark by Kapoor is questionable—'*Kāvya* is *Jñāna* (knowledge). For this *Jñāna* (Dharma) *Alaṅkāra* (figurativeness) is *Dharmī* (attribute or substance). That is, the figural mode is the mode of cognition in Kāvya' (p. 127). I fail to understand what forms the basis for such a wonderful description which hardly makes any sense to me. The word *Dharmī* does not denote attribute or substance. It would have been quite simple to say that Kāvya is *Dharmī* (a substance possessing some Dharma) and *Alaṅkāra* is its *Dharma*. Again, Kapoor's

suggestion that most of the categories of this so-called Jñāna (that is Kāvya) have come from logic and grammar is equally presumptuous. Such categories were already treated in the description of the *Vidhis* of Brāhmaṇa texts, or the concept of *Tantrayuktis*, as referred to above.

It must be admitted that in presenting the hermeneutics of Sanskrit Poetics, Dr. Kapoor has at some places offered quite novel interpretations. 'Bhāva is not in opposition to intellection, but a stage in total intellection'—he says. This appears to be an excellent exposition of Mīmāṃsā's definition of Bhāvanā—'*Bhaviturbhavanānukūlō Vyāpāraḥ*'. Rasa has been presented as an altered condition of the self according to Abhinavagupta. In explaining the relationship between Rasa and Bhāva, Kapoor calls them as mutual illuminators.

There are mistakes of spelling in Sanskrit words. *Sāttvatī* has been spelled as *Sattavatī*, *Ārabhaṭī* as *Ārabhaṭṭī*. *Tiṅanta* as *Tiṅgarta*, *Vāṅmanasī* as *Vāṅamanasī*. The verse quoted on p. 49 from Vivēkacūḍāmaṇi and the line quoted from Nāṭyaśāstra on p. 103 first para needs thorough correction in the spellings. '*Rasō Vai Saḥ*'—has become '*Rasōvaisā*' on p. 116, and *Viparyaya* has become *Viprayāya* on p. 121. At some places these blunders have become appalling. On p. 106, it is said that the word Bhāva has been derived from the root *Abhu* (there is no such root in Dhātupāṭha as far as I know). Immediately before, on p. 104, the word *Bhāva* has been explained to have been derived from the root *Bhū* (which is correct).

Dharmī has been translated as 'actors' (p. 104) with reference to *Nāṭyaśāstra*. *Dharmī* does not at all mean the actors or an actor anywhere in *Nāṭyasāstra*. Dharmī is one of the fundamental principles in the practice of theatre. With its two-fold division in Nāṭyadharmī and Lōkadharmī; both of which are invariably linked together, Dharmī is the very *modus operandi* in theatre. Dr. Manmohan Ghosh, whose English translation of Nāṭyaśāstra Dr. Kapoor seems to have consulted, has given the word 'practice' only for Dharmī. In the glossary given at the end, Dharmī has been translated as 'actor' with reference to *Nāṭyasāstra* and as attribute or substance with reference to Yōga philosophy. The word Dharma occurs in Yōgasūtra IV.12 in the sense of property, but it may mean attribute in general.

The Glossary at the end of this work, prepared by Nalini M. Ratnam, could have been useful for those who have not studied Sanskrit texts in original. Unfortunately, it has been prepared in a most careless manner, and the connotations of several terms as given here are totally wrong. I

will omit the mistakes of spellings and cite a few examples of misrepresentation. Ākhyāyikā here is said to be 'a narrative of imaginary events' whereas in the standard definition of Ākhyāyikā as accepted by Daṇḍin and others, it is a narrative based on history, and Kathā is a narrative based on imaginary events. Campū has been explained as 'an oral-visual folk literary form from Kerala'. Like *Mahākāvya* and *Nāṭaka* the Campūḥ is a well-defined category in Sanskrit Poetics amidst the literary forms and there is a rich and prolonged tradition of Campūs in classical Sanskrit literature. *Uparūpaka* here has been rendered as a play within a play, which is wrong. *Kaiśikī* is defined as 'a style (*Rīti*) of literary language according to Bharata', which is absolutely wrong. *Kaisikī* is one of the four *Vṛttis* in Nāṭya, and *Vṛtti* is the mode of presentation in a dramatic performance, it is different from *Rīti*. *Rīti* may be rendered as literary style, but Bharatamuni nowhere refers to it in this sense in his *Nāṭyaśāstra*. Similar is the case with Sāttvatī (wrongly spelled as 'Sattavatī' here also). The glossary explains it as a 'mode of literary expression' which precisely it is not. Besides the technical terms, some of the rulings in fragmentary sentences (*Sūtras*) have been collected in this glossary. (They have been perhaps mistaken as singular technical terms, which they are not.) For example the first Sūtra in Vāmana's *Kāvyālaṅkārasūtra* (*Kāvyam Grāhyam Alaṅkārāt*) has been retained here with of course a wrong spelling and has been translated as 'by literature is understood the figural mode' (p. 160). Vāmana here simply says that *Alaṅkāra* is the essence of *Kāvya*, and in the very next Sūtra he defines *Alaṅkāra* as *Saundaryamalaṅkāraḥ—Alaṅkāra* is *Saundarya* or beauty. Thus the *Sūtra* of Vāmana which figures in this glossary actually means—beauty is the essence of poetry. A fragment of some sentence perhaps from *Kāvyamīmāṃsā* of Rājaśēkhara has been retained as a term in this glossary spelt as '*Kāvyavidyā Snātakēbhyā*' (p. 160). *Nāṭaka* is explained as a play meant to be staged (!); are there plays not meant to be staged according to Nāṭyasāstra? Nāṭya is defined as drama by the author of this glossary. Nāṭya actually incorporates all the activity of a Naṭa or an actor also, and it is something much wider than a drama. *Nāṭyarāsaka* is defined here as a form of play (*Rūpaka*), whereas *Nāṭyarāsaka* is actually an *Uparūpaka*. After all the discussion on the Vedic concept of *Ṛta* by Dr. Kapoor, it is surprising to find *Ṛta* explained here as a 'fixed rule; unchanging, unchangeable law' (p. 170). The word *Ṛta* has been derived from a root which means 'to move'. Ṛta of course is the Cosmic Law governing this

Universe, but it is imbued with kinetics and change, and cannot be called fixed or unchangeable. The definition of Samāsōkti—'a figure of speech that has a multiplicity of meaning' is technically incorrect. The haste and unscrupulousness in preparing the glossary is evident to some extent in the bibliography also, which is appended with this book. '*Chaukhambha Orientalia*' here is cited as the name of the author of a text '*Tantrayuktivicāra*'! The coming generations, relying on this book, would regard so-called Mr. 'Chaukhamba Orientalia' as some great pundit of ancient times!

Notes and References

1. Kelkar's work was written in the form of some essays in Marathi. The Hindi translation was brought out in book form under the title 'Prācīna Bhāratīya Sāhitya Mīmaṃsā-Eka Ākalana' (Rajkamal Prakashan, Dehi, 1994). A review of this book in *Pūrvagraha Hindi* Journal No. 102 by me may also be referred to.
2. *Re-organising Indian Śāstric Traditions* (Delhi, 1998) and *Turning Points in Indian Śāstric Traditions* (Delhi, 1999).
3. विस्तरेणोपदिष्टानामर्थानां सूत्रभाष्ययोः। निबन्धो यः समासेन सङ्ग्रहं तं विदुर्बुधाः।।-. Nāṭyaśāstra, VI.9.
4. See my paper 'On Re-organising Alaṅkāraśāstra' (pp. 134–43) in *Re-organising Indian Śāstric Traditions*.
5. See Uparūpaka in my *Nāṭyaśastraviśvakōśa* (Delhi, 1999), Vol. II, pp. 521–62.
6. For details see papers on Discourse Analysis and Mahāvākya in *Turning Points in Indian Śāstric Traditions* (pp. 143–57).
7. आसु तिसृषु रीतिषु रेखास्विव चित्रं काव्यं प्रतिष्ठितम्—*Kāvyālaṅkārasūtravṛtti*, I.II. 13.

Department of Sanskrit
Dr. H.S. Gour University
Sagar, M.P. 470 003

Radhavallabh Tripathi

Daya Krishna, Mukund Lath and F.E. Krishna (eds.): *Bhakti: A Contemporary Discussion*, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, 2000, pp. vi + 257, PB, Rs 300.

This is a transcript of the discussion that took place in a Seminar/Saṁvāda held at Vrindavan in October 1986. There was a certain experimental

aspect to this Seminar/Saṁvāda. There was none of the usual paper-reading nor quoting from authoritative texts, and so on. What was expected was the free and direct expression of ones views, opinions, arguments from ones own experience. In a sense, the discussion was to be in the tradition of the philosophical dialogues common in the earlier times in India. Again, a dialogue on the philosophical dimensions of bhakti at a place like Vrindavan is in itself a singular feature that is bound to be experimental, even perhaps path-breaking.

The first few sessions were more given to questioning in an exploratory manner with little of a sequential order, being a preliminary skirting round the problem. There were more questions than answers, but answers did filter through as the questioning proceeded. Is bhakti culture-specific or universal? If the latter, it should have analogues in other cultures. If it treats feelings as the basic instrument or means of grasping ultimate reality how can philosophic discussion on it serve any purpose? What exactly is the *pūrvapakṣa* of bhakti? Is jñāna essential for it? Or is it that an element of jñāna inheres in bhakti itself though it may not be identified externally? And is there not an element of feeling associated with reasoning itself? Talking points being conceived as fluid and changeable, after much pondering on what is bhakti's *vyavartika laksana* it is recognized to be a variegated concept with many dimensions.

A member makes the point that where there is bhakti there is jñāna and where there is jñāna there is bhakti. Questions like these arise: If there is profound love of God but no philosophic understanding of the truth of things—or *tatva-jñāna*—could one call it bhakti? Similarly, can an atheist be a bhakta? Would one call that bhakti where an emotional relationship is cultivated towards whatever is regarded as real, whether that reality is considered as God or not? Do we have to assume that belief in God in a personal form (*saguna*) is an essential ingredient of bhakti? What about religions without a God? India has had three of them—that of the early *mimamsakas*, Jainism and Buddhism. It is difficult to say there is no concept of bhakti in them. And some were of the opinion that the place of bhakti is somewhere between jñāna and feeling.

The Chairman raises the point: does bhakti postulate a basic emotion in all human beings towards what is ultimately real and can be only conceived in personal terms? Feeling grasps things in a way that reason never does. Reason grasps reality as a law, a universal principle. Feeling grasps it as an *alambana*, which may be a person. If such a feeling is

universal, as was said earlier, there must be analogous forms of it in other cultures. The common man's understanding is that bhakti is a presence among devout Muslims, Christians and others. And again, to talk about knowledge of feeling without having the feeling is nonsense.

A member who is a knowledgeable exponent of bhakti, suggests it could be called '*rahasyanubhava*' on the experimental side. To know *rahasyanubhava*, it is said, one has to go back to *rahasyanubhava* itself; there is no short-cut. But there may be a possibility to reflect upon it by means of reason and intellect. And the clue for such reflection is in the word '*darśana*'. *Darśana*, *muktidarśana*, refers back to the philosophical process of *sravana, manana* and *nididhyāśana*. The term *darśana* itself reveals how we come to apprehend reality. How do we know reality? Can we know feeling or do we just feel the feeling? To know the feeling that may be called religious consciousness, we have to just dig deeper into it. At the same time tradition says, till one has the grace of God one cannot be a bhakta.

To understand bhakti as a feeling what one looks for is a way of characterizing emotions which do not arise in the context of other human beings. In music, for instance, a little tune gives rise to feelings that do arise from a human situation. How will we characterize emotions aroused by pure pattern as in the plastic arts? Still there is a *viśaya* involved—an expert creates beautiful patterns, forms in sound or stone which give rise to emotions. Could we say, in bhakti, this *viśaya* is *mokṣa*—the condition of becoming independent of all things human and nonhuman? But there a member raises the question: Is there anything for us human beings that is nonhuman? Even the example of music, plastic arts, maths, reason etc. are human situations. Who will take away the human ingredient from them?

The way I am related to God in bhakti is not the same as the way I am related to human beings. Take the example of *parakīyābhāva*—Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā, nāyaka-nāyaki, a totally strange and unorthodox model. Rādhā is *parakīyā*, *praudhā* and also *paroudhā*, not *anudhā*. It is just as strange for rasa-raja Kṛṣṇa to be involved in such a situation. Sociologically it is like putting the whole world upside down creating chaos! Can I have a feeling which is not determined by any object at all as the ultimate ideal of bhakti?

In the bhakti tradition the change from ordinary human feeling to bhakti is that between the *laukika* and the *alukika*. The latter is something like

absolute feeling, in itself, though inexpressible. That is what is called *rahasyānubhava*. When we have that the subject and object melt into each other. It is a different kind of thinking process. When the feeling is real in itself it is also a mode of knowing reality. Feeling shares this double characteristic. That feeling functions in two ways. In itself it is real and the world it creates is a reality of a different order. That feeling simultaneously creates it and also apprehends it.

However, it is pointed out, the notion that ordinary human feeling is *laukika* while feeling that is bhakti is *alaukika* is not philosophically tenable. *Alaukika*, by definition, is something we cannot talk about or know. So we can only describe it as a kind of *laukika* feeling we can know and talk about. Again, what is called *alaukika* or *lokottara*. *Brahmānand sahodara* and so forth, poses certain problems for a philosophical inquiry. Would the criteria of correctness or incorrectness, adequacy or inadequacy as applied to ordinary human feeling also apply to the *alaukika* feeling? And further the question whether there is a radical break between the two or there is continuity is left unanswered.

A member made the point that in the bhakti that Chaitanya spoke of, the ego is totally dissolved. 'Unless we break the ego we can never imagine what bhakti is. There is no "I", no "me". That is the most important point. So long as the ego is there, I may utter certain words but they aren't the *nama*. The *nama* really appears in the heart of the bhakta.' At this the Chairman voiced his reaction: 'What is the notion of giving up egoity or the notion of agency? If the distinction between *laukika* and *alaukika* is sought to be made in terms of existence or lack of self, egoity, what happens to the *Karma Siddhanta* if there is no agency?'

However, misunderstandings arising on the issue of the total dissolution of ego in bhakti were removed by a member's clarification that a clear distinction has to be made between ego and the self. 'The corresponding notion of the ego is *ahankara*, while the self is part of the Lord.' In the same way, another member's clarification that the distinction between *laukika* and *alaukika* or *lokottara* has to be seen with reference to the distinction between bondage and liberation, proved a help to settle that controversy. At the same time, the point is stressed that it involves a leap from one stage to another. The self enjoys the *bhāva* at the transcendental level but cannot always stay there. It comes down, continuing to be the same self.

But this latter stage, being one that transcends our understanding, poses a question: Are there not experiences that are beyond the power of language to express? That may be so as a result of our mostly limiting ourselves to the cognitive domain of expression. But the aesthetic disciplines provide media of non-cognitive communication such as music, dance, painting, bhajan, sankīrtan, incantation etc., to express bhakti feeling's *alaukika* stage.

A whole session (VIII) is devoted to K.C. Bhattacharya's philosophical thinking on what may be called the problematics of self-consciousness, since it has an important bearing on the subject of discussion, the main line of argument runs like this: In knowing, willing and feeling our self-consciousness feels three different demands on itself. In the field of knowing, the demand is complete liberation of the subject from the object. In the realm of willing and action, the demand is a complete overcoming of the objecthood of the object. And in the realm of feeling, it feels the demand for a completely balanced relationship in which consciousness and content are indistinguishable though the elements should be distinguished.

Since bhakti builds around it a whole world-view on the life of feeling it is essential to see how such a life can meet the claims of knowledge and of moral action in society harmoniously and without conflict or compromise. The last two sessions (IX and X) take up themes related to social, political, and intellectual problems projected by the protagonists of bhakti. Having recognized the *alaukika* or *lōkōttara* status of bhakti's realm of feeling as an ideal it is natural to ask how that ideal is related to other ideals such as jñānā and science, for instance, to Karma and action in the workaday world. What is also important to ask is how does it improve ones relationship with 'the other' in the collectivity aspect of society?

At this point a certain change of tone in the debate is evident as the focus shifts to the present-day situation. What is now foregrounded is immediate concern for the social living conditions of the people *vis-à-vis* the bhakti. The Chairman himself highlights the problem in a forthright manner: 'What is the knowledge that is commensurate with the ideal of bhakti? How shall science with the spirit of bhakti be different from what it is? What shall be the action, what shall be the nature of the state and what shall be the nature of society and polity? If *Vrindavan* must be *Vrindavanasthali*, could it mean this *Vrindavan* where there are open

drains, where people are begging? Will you have this kind of *Vrindavan* as the ideal *Vrindavan*? Is Kṛṣṇa really satisfied with it? ... What sort of Gopis are those who are only in the *viraha* of Kṛṣṇa and not in the *viraha* of hundreds of persons who aren't allowed in the temple of the Lord?'

Simultaneously with this depressing picture what is brought to attention is bhakti's emphasis on the spiritual equality among human beings. A member cites the Shandilya Sutra's definition of bhakti as *sa parānurakti iśvare* which may be taken to mean 'great *anurakti* in *Iśvara* is bhakti, assuming *para* to mean *parama*. What is even more important is that para also means 'the other'. Hence *parā anurakti* also means love for the other. So we have 'Bhakti is *anurakti*, love, for the other in the context of God or in the presence of God'. *Iśvara* is the matrix, the ground, on the basis of which the equality of human beings is to be realized. True fellow-feeling between *atmans*, the individual selves, can be derived only through a sense of spirituality amongst them.

So on the one hand, spiritual equality of man is accepted not only by the bhakti tradition but also by the jñāna and karma traditions; yet on the other hand, a preposterous travesty is made of it by turning a blind eye to all the human misery around and perpetrating such inhuman practices as denying the untouchables (so-called) entry into the temple of the Lord. In fact, the entire discussion of the last two sessions gets drawn into confrontation with this central issue in various forms directly or indirectly.

It was pointed out that the core motivation and distinguishing feature of all bhakti movements has always been the social uplift of the down-trodden and a resuscitation of the principle of equality with 'the other'. Originally that seems to have been a reaction to Vedic Brahminism's total lack of feeling for the equality of relation with 'the other' or sympathy for the commonalty and the depressed communities and *jatis*. In this respect, it is significant that Kṛṣṇa was a Yadav, a kśatriya while Nanda and Yashoda were Abhir, a low, depressed *Jati* with whom Kṛṣṇa aligns himself.

No doubt, the dynamism of bhakti movements like those of Basava of the 12th century AD. in Karnataka and Ramanuja of the 11th century AD. in Tamil Nadu evidence the vitality inherent in bhakti. Still conservative elements generally seem to prevail, so that every reformist movement starts with a protest against social evils but gets bogged down into some sort of ritual process. They start as liberation agencies and end up, as Tagore and lamented, 'as a vast prison-house'. The ideals still remain in the scriptures but miserably belied in practice.

Not that various forms of bhakti did nothing to instil a social dimension in thinking minds. There were elements of it noticeable in the sarvavarnika concept of the *Nātyaśāstra* or the description of the *Mahābhārata* as the *panchama Veda.* Also a sense of sarvavarnika participation was realized in practices like Sankīrtana or Ramakatha. Still these were only of marginal significance and didn't make any difference to tradition-ruled *Varna* exclusiveness. None of this helped solve the main problem—the contradiction between the spiritual claims and the actual life situation, with its absurd perplexities. Against bhakti's sponsoring of the equality of the 'the other' the conservative could always run for shelter to *Manusmriti* which was written not by a Manu or a Bhrigu but by some pundit in later years, one who was far from being a samadarshi or a seer.

The question uppermost in the minds of the participants was the relevance of the bhakti movements for restructuring and regenerating of Hindu society. Can a bhakti-oriented vision 'permeate our society, our economy, our polity in a systematic manner both institutionally and in structures of thought?' The real vitality of bhakti will be tested in these fields. This issue posed in the Chairman's words evoked a response full of uncertainty. A member voiced the view that there is something in the structure of our society itself that comes in the way. To what extent can bhakti bring society together as a whole transforming our theory into practice?

If bhakti stands for other-relatedness it should lead to tolerance; but the history of bhakti *sampradayas* is full of disputes, even violence. 'There is not always tolerance. In fact, I would say, bhakti essentially is self-centered, selfish in a way, because "I want to achieve *nirvana* or *mokṣa* for myself" is the goal. There is no consideration for the others. Each one is for himself ... They have no concern for external things. But is this not a kind of escapism? Should we really approve of a doctrine which leads us necessarily, logically to egocentrism, to escapism from problems of real existence? ... How has this kind of indifference to misery, to the human situation, been going hand-in-hand with bhakti or bhakti movements?'

At this plain-speaking, a member—a knowledgeable bhakti-exponent himself—comes out with the hidden canker in the mind that has been the real hurdle, namely, the problem of *adhikara-bheda* and *avasta-bheda.* 'Unfortunately', he says, 'what Indian social thought does is that it interprets *adhikara-bheda* in terms of *jativada* or what is called *purvajanma.* So a brahmin is supposed to be different from other *jatis.* By being born in a

certain *jati* one becomes a better *adhikari* or one who has a better *avastha-bheda*, and not by ones own endeavour. And that is the real problem. When *adhikara-bheda* is crystallized as *jati-bheda*, it becomes a great block in any social thought. Bhaktas should be able to get rid of it. But they have not been able to do so. We need *adhikara-bheda*, but we do not need it in terms of birth. How to get rid of that?' On that note, the Chairman closes the session posing the question: 'Is *Punarjanmavada* necessary for bhakti?' And that question remains unanswered, to this day!

The last session (X) continues discussion on bhakti as a feeling which implies equality of all persons in the context of God, *Isvara sandarbha*, in a spiritual perspective of the universe. In all other contexts persons are unequal. And the whole Western concept of equality arising from a secular framework is intrinsically untenable. But how is it that though all our sacred traditions accepted equality there was no concern for it socially or politically? One can see that any such move gives rise to tension with the Karma doctrine, with *adhikara-bheda* and the *varna* system. All bhakti texts betray this tension on the issue of social equality and tend to be ambivalent. It is visible notably in the first few pages of the *Bhagawatam.* The overriding consideration seems to be to safeguard the *varna-jati vyavastha* at all costs. To this day, this tension remains unresolved and continues in people's minds.

It was felt, there is no gainsaying that in our tradition we have neglected the social aspect and that the personal aspect has been over-emphasized. Ones own individual salvation takes precedence always. The individual is the great concern, and at the most how one must behave with other individuals. As to the concept of society it doesn't seem to come within the ambit of our thought. No *dharmasastra* has ever given thought to it. If there are neighbours belonging to other religions we get into a shell of self-defence. The only proper thing to do is not to talk to them. So, don't talk to a Jain or a Buddhist. And all this though from the time of Buddha there has been a stress on how to behave with others.

There was also a certain specious argument used in discussing this issue. One could take the stand that there are two levels, namely, *vyavahara-satya* (worldly truth) and *paramartha-satya* (supreme truth). In spirituality, equality among persons is all right, but in practice, it would be held, there has to be discrimination. The tendency was to keep the two levels in utterly separate water- and air-tight compartments; which was convenient for maintaining a conservative façade and served as subterfuge for lack of

courage. Thus by postulating the two entirely opposed levels or worlds, an inexorable block to progress was created. It doesn't occur to us that the block is of our own making. How to resolve it experientially is the problem. There are at least two unique examples that could serve as guides.

In the first place, we have had saints like Ramakrishna. In the Ramakrishna Mission there are people who are engaged in social work for their lifetime. And then there is Gandhi who challenged the supposed irreconcilability of the two truths in his own forthright fashion. For Gandhi equality of man necessarily emanates from his *Ahimsa* doctrine. That was a great experiment carried out through the spiritual doctrine of *Ahimsa* in the field of both society and politics. He said, 'I am proud to be a religious person. Dharma is my commitment. My politics is Rama-rajya. I will not be doing politics if I keep away from religion which is the commitment of my being.' Then with this kind of *samagra* or holistic approach all his political meetings became *prarthana sabhas* so that the *vyavahara-satya* has become wholly compatible and indeed congruous with the *parmartha-satya*. What we need for an understanding of their mutual relationship is an image of transcendence that is inclusive, not exclusive. Such an image is bhakti. It is something which includes and transcends; it is an inclusive transcendence.

So, finally, what the participants have arrived at is this, our mental habit of 'compartmentalizing' of our experience. That's what ails us. That is also what cuts us off from our own cultural resources. And in this, one suspects, there is a *videsi hath*—which is to say, intellectually we have mortgaged ourselves to the West, blindly accepting what originates in some high seat of learning there.

The Chairman, Professor Daya Krisna, admits to having suffered a twinge of conscience: 'Are we not committing a fundamental mistake in projecting the very terms of the debate in categories, problems and questions that have been given to us by a whole Western tradition and thought?' Even so we have discovered that we have to regain a certain wholeness of view which we had squandered as a result of the Western impact. It is almost as though we have to be claiming back our own birthright. With that, the Seminar/Saṁvāda came to a close on the note of hopeful suggestions for rectifying the erroneous approach:

'If we wish to create a holistic, co-ordinating viewpoint we shall have to bring about the union of the *laukika* and the *alaukika*; we shall have to integrate feeling, karma and jñāna ... we shall have to build a bond between the timeless and the time-bound, and between what is qualified by the three (*traigunya*) and what is beyond the gunas (*gunatīta*).' So did the Chairman bring the Saṁvāda to a conclusion.

Participants had reason to be gratified with the kind of intellectual exercise and stimulation the Saṁvāda provided. There were lessons to be learnt both for the scripture-quoting, true-blue conservative and for the modern intellectual devoted to unrelenting reasoning. One cannot admire enough the intellectual integrity of the participants who didn't flinch from acknowledging, maybe with some frustration, the crass negative elements that have plagued the Indian psyche for centuries; but the plus points too were evident; and notably this: The Indian intellectual is becoming increasingly aware that the foreign system from which he has received his mental disciplining has also bred in him the feeling that the Western way of knowledge is the only way there is. He is making the discovery that the Indian way of knowledge too may be deep and distinctive. This *saṁvāda* may prove a meaningful effort towards it—tentative but trend-setting.

50, Yoginagar Society V.Y. KANTAK
Fatehganj, Baroda 390 002

1. R. TRIPATHI AND A. DASH (EDS.): *Reorganising Indian Śāstric Traditions*, Delhi: Pratibha Prakashan, 1998.
2. R. TRIPATHI AND N. DASH (EDS.): *Turning Points in Indian Śāstric Tradition*, Delhi: Pratibha Prakashan, 1999.

These two edited books have resulted from national seminars organized by the Department of Śaṁkrta, H.G. University, Sagar under Special Assistance Programme (SAP) of the UGC. These then represent a preliminary attempt at exploration of *some* of the *śāstras* and require a follow-up research work on more comprehensive works by authors on each individual *śāstra*. It is by now clear that ten *śāstras* had come into existence by about 500–400 BCE, each with a *model* of systematization employing logical (*ānvīkṣikī*) and analytical (*vyākaraṇa*) techniques for arriving at rational systems of knowledge. All other *śāstras*, such as *alankāra śāstra* or *dhvani śāstra* or *vyāpti grah* or *śabda bodha*, are to be treated as *angavidyās* of these ten *śāstras* howsoever remote the ideas of the former may be traced. A clear picture of historical emergence of the *śāstras* upon scepsis and debates after the *Vidyās* of *samhitā* phase is an

absolutely indispensable prerequisite of any inquiry or reorganization or reconstruction of these *śāstras*. Thus, one can clearly notice the confusion of classification and lack of proper historical understanding of Indian cognitive enterprise in both the books.

The terms *vidyā*, *śāstra* and *tantra* are ancient and the seers or seer-thinkers often employed these as synonyms for referring to reliable, consistent and true knowledge. The criteria for reliability, truth, validity and consistency, however, changed over time as these concepts were gradually refined and made logically clear. It is precisely these criteria which allow us to distinguish the *vidyās* from the *śāstras*. The *logical* purport of the criteria of truth, validity/proof and consistency must always be borne in mind while studying and trying to understand the knowledge-systems known as *śāstras* strictly. Thus, each of the ten *śāstras* as a systematic body of knowledge clearly displays awareness of these criteria.

It may also be borne in mind that although the conception of *śāstra* was fashioned largely by the seers of the Ārṣa trend, the Bauddhas and the Jainas accepted it as such and worked out their independent Darśana-Śabda-Dharma-*Śāstras,* there being no evidence of their independent works on the rest of these *śāstras*. However, in these three *śāstras* they have displayed profound innovations. Thus, in the Darśana Śāstra, both Bauddhas and Jainas innovated multi-valued logics for purposes of rationalizing their cosmologies. The Bauddhas developed a process psychology consistent with their process cosmology. In Śabda Śāstra, both developed grammars for their respective languages, namely *Pāli* and *Māgadhi*, on Pāṇinian lines. Study of these grammars and contrasting these with Pāṇinian grammar can help a great deal in the search for a universal computer language for diverse natural languages. In the Dharma Śāstra, both worked out a 'secular' conception of good conduct grounded primarily in the concept of virtues rejecting *yajña* or *śruti*-insights as trans-rational, indubitable truths.

Now, in the first book, articles by K.C. Dash, A. Dash, K. Kapoor, B. Biswal, R.S. Pathak, C. Rajendran, S.P. Bhatt and R. Tripathi are quite impressive and indicate the trends of research in Darśana-Śabda-Nāṭya-*Śāstras*. In the second book, the articles by V.N. Jha, A. Dash and R. Pandey are important. The limitation of these books is that these remain by-and-large confined to the above three *śāstras* only and have nothing to say about other *śāstras* such as Artha Śāstra, Kāma Śāstra, Ārogya Śāstra, Kāla Śāstra, and Vāstu Śāstra. A vast amount of literature on all these various *śāstras* has been received and in fact a more fundamental task

than reorganization is to classify the available works in these disciplines in respect of their *angavidyas*. Independent works on *dhvani* or *alankāra* or *gaṇita* or *nidāna* or *pratimā* etc. These ought to be treated as *angavidyas* within the fold of the foundational and original comprehensive *śāstras* which, so to say, flourished subsequently to *śāstra*-systematization in the form of diverse ancillary sciences. Thus, for example, if *rasa*-theory is central to Nāṭya Śāstra and if Alankāra Śāstra is founded on the *rasa*-theory itself, then the latter has to be treated as ancillary to be former.

Now, K.C. Dash in his 'Logical Principles in Navya-Nyāya', indicates how inference, validity, truth-functionality and relation-functionality have been conceived in Navya-Nyāya (NN). If, however, NN is a 'meta language' built over Nyaya aiming at making of the concepts involved more precise, then formalization of the former is impossible without formalization of the latter. And while formalizing the latter, we have to keep in mind that, within a two-valued framework, Nyaya-logic does not commit itself to *ṣaḍapdārthavāda* or *dvaita*; or for that matter to *tripramāṇa* or *pramāṇa catustava*. It is so-to-say trans-systematic requiring only that a distinction between *sat* and *asat* be made for working-out criteria of truth and falsity; and that whatever inferences/derivations are accepted be logically permissible. Thus, any attempt at accommodating Vaisesika in Nyāya or Nyāya in Vaisesika is a misplaced one as A. Dash points out in his '*Pariṣkāra Prakṛiyā* in Navya Nyāya'. The *pariṣkāra prakṛiyā* is affected in NN by introducing new concepts such as *avacchedaktā, pratiyogitā, anuyogitā, visayatā-visayitā, prakāratā, viśeṣyatā, kāryatā* etc. These concepts are employed not only for clarifying the *logical* purport of names things but also of definitions and assertions/claims/propositions. As if the *loka* when understood *logically* consists essentially of logical elements such as *avacchedaktā, prakāratā* etc. and whatever is *sat* can clearly and precisely and definitively be expressed in terms of such elements. But, we may ask what are these elements themselves? Are these general properties or functions or connectives or sets or something else? How can these elements themselves be formalized? If the aim of logic is to provide a precise description of the world experienced-as-such or the *loka*, then certainly these elements seem to help us achieve the aim to a satisfactory degree. The crux of the matter, however, is: how is the description to be formalized, to a satisfactory degree?

The two articles by K. Kapoor, 'Reconstituting *Aṣṭādhyāyī* Materials' and by B. Biswal, 'Reorgaṿ vation of *Avyayibhāva*-Rules in Panini's

Aṣṭādhyāyī', deal with the Śabda Śāstra and the major thrust/concern of their research is the search for adequate computer language for various natural languages with the help of the Pāṇinian model of systematization of laws/rules underlying language expressions. It has to be kept in mind that Panini's *samāsa-sandhi*-theory and *kāraka-vibhakti*-theory were centered largely on the analysis of *padas* as they perhaps thought that since the *vākya* is constituted of *padas*, the analysis and understanding of the latter will suffice to explain the structure of *vākya*. This is, however, not true as the attempts by Patanjali later to tackle some of the *vākya*-related issues indicates. Though the entire Śabda Śāstra of Patanjali is no longer available, we can get some idea of important problems and issues from the available materials. Though Panini Vyākaraṇa presents a lucid, 'formal' structure of rules, it can be more beneficial to study these in the Śabda Śāstra framework of Patanjali for gaining deeper insight into the nature of language in general. Thus, while Kapoor presents an impressive computer programme for storage of Pāṇinian exegesis for purposes of learning and research, he misses the important characteristics of '*śāstra paddhati*' in it. The *logic* of Pāṇinian structure is not the *ānvīkṣikī* of Nyāya for the simple reason that the former was systematized at least two centuries before the emergence of satisfactory formulations in *ānvīkṣikī*. The logical devices Panini employed were naming (*sanjñākaraṇa*), defining (*lakśaṇa)*, classification (*gaṇapātha*), unrestricted generalization (*utsarga*) and restricted generalization (*apavāda*). Indeed, Panini was employing *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda pramāṇas* but without any self-conscious formulation of these. Thus, his '*pratyakṣa*' is the heard utterance—the object being a transitory phenomenon; his '*anumāna*' is generalization, that is, arriving at just-universal propositions from particular perceived utterances—whether of unrestricted or of restricted variety; and his *śabda-pramāṇa* is received insights of seers collected for centuries under the aegis of Vyākaraṇa/Prātiśākhya Vedānga. Now, *utsarga* and *apavāda* are employed in the study of language-phenomenon for uncovering the underlying *vidhāna* in it and the *vidhāna* is such that laws/rules grounded in *utsarga* coexist with the laws/rules grounded in *apavāda*—in the *loka*. The latter do not *falsify* the former. The latter do not give rise to the *rejection* of the former in actual linguistic conduct of the *loka*. Therefore, the logic of Pāṇinian systematization is such that an *apavāda*-proposition, though apparently a contradictory-proposition, does not falsify the *utsarga*-proposition.

The *concising* of *avyayibhāva*-rules that was attempted by various *ācāryas* and *śāstrīs* later was in view of the difficult task of *memorizing* the rules of Panini's system which are over four thousand. However, with the availability of the computer, this problem no longer exists. Thus, it need not be stressed that the reorganization and storage of *sūtras* ought to be affected without any loss of content whatsoever—rather the reorganization ought to serve to further enrich the understanding by making information available regarding comparable rules in the grammars of other languages.

The articles pertaining to Nāṭya Śāstra concern *rasa*-theory, *dhvani*-theory and *alankāra*-theory. C. Rajendran, in his 'Re-organising the Rasa-theory', suggests tabulations and classifications for computer storage of data pertaining to the subject in particular and Nāṭya Śāstra in general. *Rasa*-theory, though less well-known, has been one of the greatest innovations of the Indian mind. As interpretation of deep aesthetic experience, it integrates not only *nṛtta, gandharva* and *abhinaya* but also *chanda, dhvani* and *alankāra* in a single system—a feat achieved nowhere in any known human culture. The culmination of aesthetic-experience as a psychological state of mind, named *rasānubhūti*, presumably originates in the *bhāvas*. The identification of different natures of *rasa* state is a discovery of fundamental significance as these states differ from non-emotional *natural* state of mind. A fundamental theoretical problem then is whether contemporary neuroscience can identify these states? If yes, then *rasa*-theory will conclusively be established as valuable explanation and understanding of a very important aspect of human nature, namely the aspect of feeling or emotion.

S.P. Bhatta, in his 'Re-organisation of *Dhvani*-theory', presents the analysis of poetry as consisting of expressed meaning and suggested meaning—the latter, *dhvani*, being three-fold, namely *vastu-dhvani, alankāra-dhvani* and *rasa-dhvani*. We have to grant that *chanda, vastu, alankāra, rasa* and *dhvani* are autonomous *elements* manifesting in poetic expression—that is, distinct from factual description, inference, validity, consistency, contradiction etc. This much must, however, be agreed that *all* these elements are geared to *rasānubhūti* at the root as culmination of certain emotional-aesthetic experience and the extent to which any work of poetry fails to achieve such culmination, to that extent it is deficient in its elements. [The same criterion applies to *nṛtta, gandharva* and *abhinaya.*] Therefore, the controversy whether *alankāra/dhavni*/etc. are more

fundamental/significant than *rasa* seems to be a misplaced one. The article by R.S. Pathak, 'Re-organisation of Conceptual Framework in Saṁskṛta Poetics', in his enthusiasm for comparison with Western poetics, fails to highlight the central *rasa*-characteristic of Saṁskṛta poetics. A. Tripathi in his 'Re-organisation of Alankāra Śāstra' traces ancient origins of *alankāra* thought implying its independence from Nāṭya Śāstra but failing to underline its relation with *rasa*-theory.

The second book tries to bring to focus various *turning points* in Indian cognitive history but these cannot be adequately understood and appreciated without the availability of a broader historical framework of the cognitive enterprise. Without explaining how and why the turning points arose, these appear more like arbitrary selections of the respective authors. Thus, V.N. Jha in his 'Turning Points in the History and Development of Nyāya-Vaisesika System' accepts the 'school' perspective of Indian 'philosophical thought' considering Nyāya-Vaisesika as one of the 'schools'. If, however, we explore the history of origins of Vaisesika Sutra and Nyāya Sutra as also explore their contents, then a different picture emerges. The picture that emerges is that both Samkhya and Vaisesika cosmologies are treated as fields of discourse by Nyāya and thus all subsequent attempts to tie it up with Vaisesika cosmology *alone* were actually misdirected attempts or wrong turning points. A. Dash in his 'Sense-Object-Contact' presents how Indian thinkers effected an elaborate analysis of perceptual knowledge. The idea that *sāmānya lakśaṇas* are also *perceived* when the *viśeṣa* object is perceived is very important in Indian thought for in Western thought these are generally admitted to be inferred inductively, or, more precisely, by inductive enumeration. But how is the preception of *sāmānya lakśaṇa* to be explained? If it occurs after repeated perception, then it is the same as induction. If it be said that the knowledge of *sāmānya lakśaṇa* is already there and it is only triggered by the perception of *viśeṣa*, then it has to be explained how the knowledge arises. Is it innate or pregiven or learnt/acquired? If the former, then it amounts to explaining away the problem; if the latter is the case, then the same induction crops up. R. Pandey in his, *'Rupāvatāra'* brings out the history of growth of *prakṛiyā* style in Śabda Śāstra and traces its origins to Dharmakirti and non-Pāṇinian grammars such as Kātantra and Cāndra. Though selection and reorganization of *sūtras* can generate simplicity and conceptual clarity, what is required to be spelt out clearly and in detail is in what fundamental sense the non-Paninian theorization differed from the dominantly pursued Paninian theorization?

University of Rajasthan, Jaipur

VIRENDRA SHEKHAWAT

AZIZ KRISTOFF: *Transmission of Awakening*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1999, pp. 305, Rs 225.

Aziz Kristoff in his book titled *Transmission of Awakening* intends to put forward a revolutionary concept of knowing the Reality. In his attempt he tries to remodel the Advaitic and Buddhistic ideals. From the introductory part of the book itself it can be known that he is highly influenced by the philosophy moulded by Sri J. Krishnamurti. Aziz seems to justify his theories as a new beginning to modern scientific philosophy. His attempt is commendable. But as one goes through the book, it appears that his views on reality, soul, mind, consciousness and such symbolic and philosophical facts need further clarification because of their vagueness inherently seen in western outlook. His lack of in-depth understanding of Advaita philosophy as well as the Buddhistic one is evident from his writings. His exemplification of the ideas of Reality seems to be superficial in many aspects because of their western orientation.

Before re-interpreting Indian philosophical systems one has to bear in mind that they are not merely the hypothetical ones. They represent the genuine experiences of ancient philosophers of India. Nothing is hypothesized here. Buddha enunciates his philosophy through his own personal experience. The ancient philosophers in India tried hard in an eco-friendly way to discover the essence behind the natural phenomena and succeeded in their attempt. They were attentive to foresee the doubts and illusory knowledge that may occur in the philosophical discussions and moulded their systems of philosophy in a most clear way that helps to avoid all vagueness in doctrines. The descriptions of several concepts presented by the author in this book seem to be highly contradictory. Even the 'question-answer' part too failed in a clear exposition of original ideals. Reality should be viewed with deepening levels of penetration. Every theory will become fruitful only by the strength of its right experience.

The core word in the book 'Awakening' depicts the sphere of 'Nididhyasana' which cannot be the final goal of human life as conceived in Advaita Vedanta and Yoga. Only with a very shrewd intelligence, can the final goal be attained or experienced. Mere exercise with language fails to help one know ones own self. Words are to be very carefully used in this context for the complete disillusionment and the smooth interpretation of the reality. The author attempts to extract a new vision by the amalgamation of Advaita, Buddhist and Yoga systems of philosophy with a western outlook. At the same time, the Vedanta highlighted by the author are the views propagated by Sri J. Krishnamurti which do not fully reflect the factual resources in many aspects and which represent the revitalization of Advaita in a sociological realm.

The author elucidates an unconscious and fragmented principle as 'Me'. How is it possible for one to awaken the unconscious principle by any means of transformation? In Advaita, 'Me' is the projection created by ignorance by concealing its own nature. Realization should be the identified knowledge of Me and the Universal I am as exposited in Advaita Vedanta. 'To be aware' points to the awareness of something. Awakening signifies generality in the world, but not the true identity of 'Me' with 'I Am'.

Not self-conscious is equated with non-consciousness (p. 9). Qualities always relate to objects. In this sense, awareness and being cannot be said to be the qualities of I Am, for they form the very essence of the universal principle.

The idea of 'Awakening of Heart' throughout the book appears to be opaque. Because the Heart can neither be awakened nor need be awakened, it is the consciousness aspect in it that is to be awakened solely by dispelling the cover of ignorance veiled over it. The scriptures also proclaim. (By the knowledge [direct experience] of that supreme Being, all bonds of heart will be broken, all doubts will be cleared and all actions of one will be eliminated [Mund. Up. II.ii.8].) Heart is the peculiar space which is identified as the spot of the soul that is devoid of all attributes.

The feminine gender used to refer the soul seems not at all desirable. Contrary to Advaita Vedanta in which 'beloved' is the existent nature of the soul, the author differentiates soul form the 'Beloved'. Generally speaking, in the chapter 'The Absolute Meditation' Aziz has westernized the tenets of Advaita Vedanta in the absence of an in-depth study and further knowledge.

In 'The Map of Awakening' no clear distinction between 'enlightenment' and 'awareness' is stated (p. 15). Creator is stated at first as the blueprint of the consciousness. Then there is no need for the soul to reach unity with the creator. On p. 18, Universal I Am is equated with the Beloved. Thus such contradictions are visible throughout the book.

The various states of awakening described here are in fact the various stages in the process of meditation which are briefly pointed out by Patanjali himself in his Yogasutras (ref. Yogasutras of Patanjali, I. 17 and 18). The eighth state may refer to 'Turiya as conceived in Advaita Vedanta' (Ref. Mandukyopanisad 7).

In the Meditative state, one cannot be called 'consciousness without content'. It is the final becoming of one who goes through various stages of meditation. 'The reality is below the conscious level' (p. 22)—How can the reality be subverted to a lower level than the conscious level? If it is below the conscious level, how can it be called 'reality'?

In the chapter 'Intuitive Intelligence' the awakening of the 'State of Presence' is denoted only as a beginning stage in the realization of Me. Then it cannot be said to be 'remembering to bring back the Inner state', for remembering presupposes experience of the final realization. The statement 'Most of the elements which create our life and our psychology take place beyond our control' signifies the preparedness of the author to accept a controller beyond our life. Scriptures also proclaim. (From that one who knows all generally and specifically and whose supposition for creation involves the knowledge that multiplicity precedes falseness, there occurs the first individual soul, Hiranyagarbha, names, forms and the world consisting of food [Mund. Up. I.i.9].)

The theory that 'Intuitive Intelligence' is the creator of individual existence shows an implication to the doctrine of Maya in Advaita philosophy. 'The reality of Me is multidimensional'. Here the multidimensionality is explained in a better way. However, this idea can be found in the Advaitic outlook and in the Vijnanavada school of Buddhism. Existence is explicitly made clear in Advaita philosophy by elucidating its three-fold nature of illusory, empirical and absolute. The three-fold modifications of reality are recognized by Trimsika in his Vijnanavada (ref. C.D. Sharma, *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, p. 117).

The observer described in the chapter 'Who is the Observer?' is none other than the witness of Advaita Vedanta. The inquiry after the inside

self (who) points out a unitary reality as in Advaita Vedanta. Such ideas are repeated in terms like 'observer', 'Centre' and 'thinker'.

In the chapter 'Self-control and Spontaneity', the observer is described as not existing in the dream state. But in dream state, there is in fact not the absence of the observer, for he is the permanent existent being. It is better to say 'the observer is not experienced in the dream state' instead of saying 'the observer does not exist'. The changing aspect of initiative intelligence reveals the influence of the Buddhistic doctrine of constant flux (spontaneity). 'Attention has the centralising quality—but at the same time attention is centralised in attention'—such views seem contradictory because a quality requires something to activate itself. Attention cannot be centralized in attention. 'Always using this intuitive intelligence brings excessive self-control'—since I is not constant, self-control is momentary only. It is closely akin to the doctrine of momentariness of the Vijnanavada school of Buddhism.

'Freedom from mind' should imply 'freedom from the afflictions of mind' which itself is the state of presence. During that stage, the mind becomes attentive (stabilized).

'Where does Me exist?' and 'Me Meets the Beloved' reveal the pure Advaitic concepts in a westernized outlook.

The exposition of the ideal of Karma in 'Karma and Grace' is defined in a more agreeable way. This chapter seems to be very interesting.

In the chapter 'The Over-Soul' the over-soul is described as the parent of the soul. If we recognize a parent to the soul, that parent also should have another parent. Thus there occurs *regressus ad infinitum*.

As pointed out by the author in the chapter 'Pure Me and the Psyche', is the Grace of Divine required in the transformation of ones soul into its real form? Is it not through ones own effort? Aziz says that at the radical and full transformation stage, one needs to invite consciously the help of the Divine. This part seems to lack the spirit of reflective thought. The words 'Soul', 'Beloved', and 'Over-soul' seem to be perplexing. According to Advaita Vedanta, the soul itself is the source of light and the consciousness. It is self-effulgent. When soul is the consciousness itself, there is no need to contemplate upon any higher concept. The soul is described as the reflection of the Beloved. Then Over-soul is to be the reflecting medium of the Beloved. All these presentations create utter confusion.

In Advaita Vedanta, it is generally believed that soul is the essence of all beings and is self-conscious. The essence of that essence is an unnecessary inquiry. Also, the statement 'The ego is the mind of the soul' reveals the miserable state that 'the eternal and changeless soul is dependent on impermanent and changing mind'.

In the chapter 'Incarnation of the Soul', the idea behind the 'incarnation of the soul' to experience forgetfulness and separation is not at all clear. The separation from the Divine, according to the author, was not made in a conscious way without an agent to decide. In fact, it cannot be possible without a conscious principle. Advaita Vedanta asserts that the supreme soul willed to multiply itself. 'तदैक्षत बहुस्यां प्रजायेय' (Cha. Up.VI.ii.3). Accordingly apparent change (Vivarta) took place in association with the limiting adjunct, Maya. The complete denial of the original condition also is untenable on the part of the soul, since entire leaving will cause emptiness and thereby further multiplication will cease.

In the chapter 'The Realm of Polarities: Role of Imperfection' it is found that 'the reality of imperfection has been designed for a number of souls'. Here, in such a case, a designer should be there who is the supreme Being in Advaita Vedanta. He wishes, wills and designs in a relative sense. But here, there is no clear mention about the designer of the reality of imperfection.

'The existence of imperfection has a purpose'. This implies that creation is made purposefully. But whose purpose? The understanding of various spheres of reality is put forth in a very Vague manner. The conclusion of this chapter also should be exposited in a clearer way to avoid confusion.

In 'Absolute Meditation' a simple method of meditation and thereby practical realization of the reality is disclosed by the author. The science of yoga as expounded by Patanjali is developed in a different but desirable way by Aziz. He also admits the experience of brilliant, serene and luminous awareness at a higher level of meditation. The one major distinctive feature of the absolute meditation described here is the self-guidance in the path of meditation without the direction of a preceptor.

In 'Absolute Meditation—Advanced I', 'To experience Being, you do not need to do anything'. Here more explanation is necessary in presenting the idea behind it. But theory of non-action is logically dealt with within the realm of Advaita Vedanta. The stages of meditation corresponding to the various steps in Yoga are elucidated in a different way.

In 'Absolute Meditation—Advanced II', the idea expressed in 'Meditation is like a time for prayer' reveals the influence of Christianity in Aziz. In the process of meditation, the concentration of mind is the sole prerequisite. The final stage of meditation is possible only by recognizing the concepts of the supreme soul and individual soul. This part requires a deeper understanding and exposition.

'Ignorance is real' (pp. 218, 223). Here the reality should be in the relative sense itself. The author is totally mistaken in his interpretation of 'Me' in Advaita Vedanta. In Advaita Vedanta those who realize Brahman will become Brahman itself—ब्रह्म विद्वह्यैव भवति (मुण्ड. उ. III. ii. 9). It is not the annihilation of Me, but the dissolution of it into the supreme reality. Hence 'self-referral in the mind and a certain intimate feeling of Me in a seeker' shows that he has not reached the absolute state of being (realization). According to Shunyavada also, 'Reality transcends all the categories and reconciles all the antinomies of intellect. It is to be realized directly through spiritual experience. It is the non-dual absolute in which all plurality is merged. We must rise above the subject–object duality of the intellect and the plurality of the phenomena (C.D. Sharma, ibid., p. 87).

It is pointed out on p. 224 that the 'purpose of spiritual path is not liberation but wholeness ... wholeness is beyond liberation, for it includes imperfection and includes human nature'. The idea presented here is clearly misguiding. What liberation should mean is complete freedom from bondage of all kinds. The famous verse at the beginning of many Vedic as well as worldly functions reveal the wholeness as the nature of Brahman that is attained by everybody in the time of liberation.

'ॐ पूर्णमदः पूर्णमिदं पूर्णात्पूर्णमुदच्यते।
पूर्णस्य पूर्णमादाय पूर्णमेवावशिष्यते।।'

Sureswara also observes—

'अविद्यास्तमयो मोक्षः सा च बन्ध उदाहृतः।
अयमेव हि नोऽनर्थो यत्संसार्यात्मदर्शनम्।।'

(Liberation is the end of ignorance which itself is described as bondage. This is our fault that we used to see Atman as empirical.)

Therefore liberation cannot be negative in its ultimate sense. Instead, in liberation, all the imperfections and human nature will be eliminated and only the perfect Being will remain as the essence. This experience of the

essence should imply the wholeness. As observed by Aziz, the idea of liberation refers to that of gross body and wholeness to that of subtle body. From such interpretations, it becomes clear that the author has failed miserably in understanding the true import behind the philosophy of language in Advaita Vedanta. Besides, liberation which points to Brahmanhood is in fact beyond wholeness due to the absence of all attributes in that stage.

On p. 225, the concept of 'I Am' as enunciated by the author seems contradictory to its true sense. Being cannot be the link of quality of I am, it signifies the ultimate Truth. Moreover, if it is considered as a link, it cannot be the Highest Being. Being, Beloved, Consciousness, all these if they refer to the supreme being, nothing Superior is essential for further reference. Thus Being should be the highest concept.

There is a contradiction on p. 233 in describing Being, Awareness and Heart. At first they are said to be the three centres of I am and separate subjects. Then they are called the three aspects of the one subject, the complete I Am. This will create confusion in readers. According to Advaita philosophy, there can be only one subject and the empirical aspects that seem to relate with it can be multiple. That one subject is the Being.

As described on p. 234, Being, if it remains as an aspect of I am, Me cannot exist in it. Instead, Me can exist in it only if Being is to be recognized as the supreme principle. The absolute state (p. 235) cannot be distinguished from pure consciousness. On p. 254, the awakening of the soul is described as a creation. But in the view of Indian tradition, there cannot be creation of anything by anyone. There is only reproduction or discovering of the already present facts or objects. Hence there cannot be a 'creation of ourselves' in the process of awakening, as misconceived by the author.

On p. 263, the answer to a question relating to the vibration of the centre of awareness, is described by using two levels of recognition. Also, in the example of driving a car, are there two attentions possible? Once you are in a state of presence, is there any other thought possible, since one gets completely absorbed in it?

As enunciated by the author, the soul cannot be conceived as one who experiences all (p. 264). It cannot be the experiencers since all actions are related to material things like body and mind.

Contrary to the explanation by the author on p. 272, actual realization discards the qualities of sex, money and such material wishes as evil. If

there is a slight presence of any such evil, no realization can be possible since it will create interest in worldly affairs and thereby helps to grow the tendency in favour of them instead of spiritual progress.

The author observes on p. 275—'Even in the state of perfection, a little imperfection remains'. To this opinion, it can only be said that this is not an outlook in tune with Indian philosophical conceptions. Moreover, every philosophical system in India aims at reaching perfection with the total annihilation of all imperfections.

The author admits that 'the universal intelligence is the creator and you are just a tiny part of the reality' (p. 277). But in the earlier part, he observed that 'You are the whole reality, I am Nothing exists beyond that'. This shows a serious divergence form the original viewpoint about the reality. This universal intelligence is regarded as the Ultimate Truth by Advaitins and Buddhists.

On p. 278 'The ultimate is more than the Absolute'. Here the author's purpose behind the terms 'ultimate' and 'absolute' is absolutely vague. In fact absolute and ultimate are one and the same and also is partless and unborn.

On p. 279, the author's remark on Advaita philosophy is an utter mistake. The philosophy of Non-duality never contains the question 'who is asking the question?' Instead, in many Upanisads the question is 'who am I?' The absolute cannot ask any question or indulge in any activity, for it is beyond all those worldly conceptions and empirical truths. 'The final enlightenment is not to the absolute but to Me'. This is not an original conception by the author. Because, in Siddhantabinduh, the commentary of Sri Sankara's 'Dasasloki', its author, Madhusudana Saraswati had doubtlessly expressed this idea of 'Me' as assumed by Sri Sankara (ref. Introductory part of Siddhantabinduh). The importance given to the individual soul more than the Absolute tempted Sri Sankara to elucidate the individual soul at first, says Madhusudana Saraswati.

The last part discloses the author's lack of understanding of Advaita Philosophy and hurry for the presentation of an original outlook which itself seems to be a pseudo-concept. The practising is never conducted by the Absolute consciousness. It is the Advaitic theory itself. Presenting it in a reverse direction, the author tries to put forth the real advaitic views as his own.

His 'Last Blessing' indirectly involves the advaitic vision of the identified knowledge of individual soul and supreme soul and one of the prevalent

concepts of traditional Advaita 'ईश्वरानुग्रहादेव पुंसामद्वैतवासना'—'Man will be interested in Advaita only by the blessing of God'.

In this way, the author's attempt to present an original doctrine seems to fail in a scholarly realm. It may be enjoyed by people who are strangers in Indian philosophy or especially Advaita. At that level, this book may be useful for practical purposes like meditation.

Nandanam, P.O. Kidangoor N. Usha Devi
Angamaly, Kerala

Diacritical Marks

Vowels

आ ā
ई ī
ऊ ū
ए,ऐ ē } (long)
ओ ō } (N.B. long ē and ō are for the particular syllables in Dravidic languages.)
ऋ ṛ and not ṛi; (long ॠ, which rarely figures, may be rendered as ṝ) .

Nasals

Anusvāra

(ं) ṁ and not ṃ

anunāsikas

ङ् ṅ
ञ् ñ
ण् ṇ (or ṇa as the case may be)

Hard aspirate

Visarga

(ः) ḥ

Consonants

Palatals

च ca and not cha
छ cha and not chha

Linguals

ट ṭa
ठ ṭha
ड ḍa
ढ ḍha and not ḷha

Sibilants

श śa
ष ṣa
स sa

Unclassified

ळ ḷa
क्ष kṣa and not ksha
ज्ञ jña and not djña
ऌ ḷṛ and not ḷṛi

General Examples

kṣamā and not *kshamā, jñāna* and not *djñāna, Kṛṣṇa* and not *Kṛishṇa, sucāru chatra* and not *suchāru chhatra* etc. etc., *gaḍha* and not *gaḷha* or *garha*, (except in Hindi)

Dravidic (conjuncts and *specific) characters*

ள ḷ
ழ ḷ.
ன ṉ
ற ṟ.

Examples

Iḷaṅ-Gautaman, Cōḷa (and not Choḷa),

Miscellaneous

Where the second vowel in juxtaposition is clearly pronounced:
e.g. *jāṇaï* and not jāṇai
Seũṇa and not Seuṇa

Also, for English words showing similar or parallel situations:
e.g. Preëminence and not preeminence or pre-eminence
cóöperation and not cooperation or co-operation

For the Simhalese, excepting where the words are in Sanskrit, the con-ventions of rendering Simhalese in Roman are to be followed:
e.g. *dàgaba* and not *dagaba*
veve or *véve* and not *vev*

Quotations from old Indian sources involving long passages, complete verses etc., should be rendered in Nāgarī script.
(The western writers, however, may render these in Roman script if they wish; these will be re-rendered in Nāgarī if necessary, by the editors.) Sanskrit quotations rendered in Roman are to be transliterated with *sandhi-viccheda* (disjoining), following the conventions of the *Epigraphia Indica*, but the signs for
laghu-guru of the syllables in a meter (when the citation is in verse) are not to be used.

Place Names

These are to be diacriticised, excepting the anglicised modern:
Examples: Mathurā, Kauśāmbī, Valabhī, Kāñcī, Uraiyūr, Tiḷevalli etc., but Allahabad (not Allāhābād), Calcutta (not Calcaṭṭā), Madras (and not Madrāsa).

Annotations

There will not be footnotes; but annotations (or notes and references), serially arranged, will appear *en masse* at the end of the text in each article.

References to published works

Those pertaining to articles, books etc., appearing in the main body of the text, or annotations, or otherwise:
Title of Book, Author's name (beginning with his initials) title, edition (if any) used, the name of the series (if it appears within it); next the place of publication along with year of publication, but without a comma in between; finally the page (or pages) from where the citation is taken or to which a reference is made.