Antisemitism Worldwide

2000/1

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Since 1913, the Anti-Defamation League has worked to promote its founding mission: “to stop the defamation of the Jewish people and to secure justice and fair treatment to all.”

Fulfilling this mandate has made ADL the premier civil rights/human relations agency in the United States fighting anti-Semitism, prejudice and bigotry, defending democratic ideals and safeguarding civil rights for all.

Our mandate is not restricted to the United States. As the haters around the world become more sophisticated, ADL monitors their activities on the ground and on-line.

To this end, we believe Anti-Semitism Worldwide 2000/01 is an invaluable resource for those interested in the study of international anti-Semitism and in assessing how the international community can best combat these trends around the globe.

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The Institute operates in cooperation with the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), headed by its international director Abraham Foxman and represented in Israel by Wayne Firestone. The ADL is known for its 80-year-long struggle for civil rights. The World Jewish Congress (WJC), the umbrella organization of Jewish communities in 80 countries around the world, participates in the Institute's work as well. The WJC, under President Edgar Bronfman and Secretary-General Israel Singer, is represented in Israel by Dr. Avi Beker. The Institute's data collection is assisted by the Coordination Forum for Countering Antisemitism, under Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Rabbi Michael Melchior.

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FOREWORD

Antisemitism Worldwide provides a forum for academic discussion of various historical aspects of antisemitism and racism in different places and periods; this discussion complements an analysis of these phenomena for the year in review. It is guided by the notion that no coherent examination and understanding of contemporary trends and developments is possible without a thorough acquaintance with the history and manifestations of antisemitism over the centuries.

The present volume is divided into four parts. The first consists of essays on relevant issues (antisemitism, American Jewry and the European crisis, 1933–1940; the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe; and the new terrorism of the 1990s and beginning of the third millennium). The second part consists of book reviews and a list of books received, with brief descriptions. The third part is a general analysis of trends that have emerged over the 1990s and beginning of the new millennium, as well as an examination of the link between the al-Aqsa intifada and the dramatic wave of antisemitic manifestations which swept the world in the autumn of 2000.

The last section is a country-by-country survey, divided according to region, since each part of the world has its own characteristic problems in addition to those common to all countries. The chapters provide information on extremist movements, antisemitic activities, attitudes toward the Nazi period and the Holocaust, and the struggle against antisemitism and racism. Countries where there was no evidence of antisemitism in 2000, or where it was not reported, are not included. The surveys present antisemitism in the various countries without delving into their history, and focus only on the situation in 2000 and early 2001. Consequently, a country with a long tradition of antisemitism but few antisemitic events in 2000 is likely to have relatively short coverage in the report, and vice versa.

Categorization of antisemitic activities sometimes varies from one source to another. Our classification scheme divides these activities into: a) all expressions and modes of propaganda, most notably Holocaust denial, b) violent acts without the use of a weapon, and c) attacks using violent means. It should be emphasized that the survey is based on reported cases only, and that the data presented in the appendices include only violent attacks intended to cause loss of life and cases of actual damage to property. In fact, many more hundreds of minor incidents, such as graffiti, slogans and swastikas painted on walls, and personal insults and harassment, were also registered by Jewish communities and individuals. In many cases, it is difficult to assess whether the
injury or damage was motivated by antisemitism, or was an act of hooliganism, since the identity of the perpetrators is often difficult to establish.

It should be noted that the variety of data and materials coming from different areas entails a diversified approach on the part of the authors and editors, thus ruling out complete uniformity in the presentation of the contents, especially with regard to names and references.

Israeli, Jewish and non-Jewish organizations, research institutes and individuals supply the relevant data and material, useful contacts, opinions and assessments, and above all the motivation, for combating antisemitism and racism. Thus, the annual review represents an international effort in this regard. We conclude by expressing our deepest gratitude to all the bodies and individuals who have taken part in this undertaking.
RESEARCH TOPICS
Happen Here!” Believing that Jews called too much attention to themselves, Cyrus Adler, then chancellor of the Jewish Theological Seminary, counseled “controlled silence.” He was not alone in urging “circumspect” public behavior while calling for Jews to “disassociate” themselves from “foreign groups,” lest they put Jewish loyalty in doubt. Particularly distressing for established “uptown” Jews associated with the AJC, was the activity of Jewish radicals and labor leaders. The Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), a more radical form of industrial unionism compared to the American Federation of Labor, was portrayed by the antisemitic press as a Jewish conspiracy, and indeed a disproportionate number of its field organizers were Jews. Jewish political radicalism caused endless distress which dated from the Palmer raids of 1919, when radicals, including a large number of Jews, among them “Red” Emma Goldman, were rounded up and shipped to the Soviet Union. It was at this historical juncture that the charge linking Judaism and bolshevism became a mainstay of the antisemitic imagination. During the 1930s the allegation of “Judeo-bolshevism,” now backed by Goebbels’ propaganda machine, became more pronounced. The AJC’s publication of the findings of its research division showing that Jews formed only a small portion of the Soviet leadership availed little. For Jews the old adage that “Bronstein and Martov make the revolution, Levy and Cohen pay the price,” seemed all too true.

The linkage between Jews and communism in the public mind came to a head in the famous Scottsboro case (1932–35) in which nine young black men were falsely accused of raping two white women. The case was seized upon by the Communist Party to demonstrate the party’s concern for civil rights and to fashion an alliance between the American worker and the black underclass. A flamboyant Jewish lawyer, Samuel Leibowitz, was retained to defend the “Scottsboro boys” while the Party promoted their case to the public. The guilty verdict went to the Supreme Court for review and the absence of blacks on the jury was enough to win a judgment for a new trial. But as a matter of pride the Alabama jury continued to find the defendants guilty and with each new trial the antisemitic fall-out grew more pronounced. For Jews in the South the linkage as defenders of the detested blacks was considered dangerous. Many remembered the fate of Leo Frank who was lynched in 1915. The following doggerel, representing an imaginary battle cry by Roosevelt to his wife, was widely circulated during the presidential campaign of 1936:

You kiss the niggers,
I’ll kiss the Jews.
We’ll stay in the Whitehouse
As long as we choose.

Employment discrimination based on antisemitism sharpened during the 1930s. Newspaper ads openly stated that “no Jews need apply.” Sometimes there were comical twists. The New York telephone company insisted that it could not hire Jewish women as operators because their arms were too short to
reach the switchboards. An ad in *Variety*, the show business newspaper, advertised for ushers with blond hair and straight noses. Employment discrimination was not unknown in the 1920s but its impact was balanced by the remarkable development of the Jewish ethnic economy, especially in small business, such as jewelry and tobacco stores and second-hand goods. Some of the unemployed could be absorbed by Jewish enterprise. But in the 1930s the depression hit first at these small, usually undercapitalized, businesses whose owners themselves had to join the unemployed. The introduction of the merit system for teaching and other civil service jobs offered more employment for Jews who had attained formal education and certification. But it often intensified antisemitism especially among the American Irish who considered the municipal and state civil service as a kind of monopoly. An official Diocese newspaper, *The Brooklyn Tablet*, complained that “in the professions, civil service, schools and public life they [Jews] are represented out of all proportion to their numbers.” In a 1938 public opinion survey over 25 percent agreed that Jews had too many government jobs. Unemployment in the Jewish community rose so steeply that Jewish communal philanthropy could not cope with it. In 1934 the Jewish jobless were transferred to the federal relief roles. The promise made to Dutch colonial governor Peter Stuyvesant that the Jews would always take care of their own which was sustained with such ethnic pride since 1654, had been broken.

But it was more than simply vitriolic hate rhetoric that Jews heard in the 1930s. The number of professional antisemitic organizations increased from about five to over one hundred. They were led by popular radio speakers such as Charles Coughlin, whose Christian Front goon squads caused havoc in Jewish neighborhoods, sometimes with the cooperation of the local police. In their violence and proto-military affectations they bore a similarity to Nazi storm troopers. This was especially true of William Dudley Pelley’s Silver Shirts and of Fritz Kuhn the “Führer” of the German American Bund, whose rallies could have been mistaken for a scene directly out of a Nuremberg Partei Tag. In the last mentioned case particularly noteworthy was the Madison Square Garden mass rally of 20 February 1939, which featured participants waving thousands of Nazi flags and a giant banner, saying: “Wake up America! Smash Jewish communism!” Yet these collective antisemitic voices were not as resonant as that of Ford’s *Dearborn Independent* during the 1920s. Jews were simply listening more intently and perhaps hearing more.

More disturbing was the antisemitism that made its debut in the political arena during the 1930s. The complaint that Jews had too much money and power was familiar. The difference during the depression decade was that the “Jewish question,” dealing with how much money and power Jews should be allowed to have, might be placed on the American political agenda as it had in Germany, Poland and other European nations. Except for Federal Order #11 which banned the Jews from the Eastern Mississippi department in 1862 there
had been few other examples in American history of the amplification of antisemitism through the political power of the state.

As in prior decades, candidates for office would occasionally employ antisemitic remarks to gain an edge. The presidential election campaign of 1936 witnessed an unusual amount of personal slander of Roosevelt for appointing too many Jews and for himself perhaps being a Jew in disguise. In the antisemitic imagination the welfare state was viewed as a form of “Jewish socialism.” The term “Jew deal,” which became common political currency, referred to people such as Henry Morgenthau, Felix Frankfurter, Samuel Rosenman, Benjamin Cohen, Isador Lubin and others prominent Jews in the judiciary and the highest echelons of the federal civil service, some of whom were members of Roosevelt’s inner circle.24 This imputation became so prevalent that when in 1938 Roosevelt proposed naming Felix Frankfurter to the Supreme Court to replace Benjamin Cardozo, some influential Jews became anxious. A.H. Sulzberger, editor of the New York Times led a group of leading Jews who urged Roosevelt not to make the appointment because “the present virulence of antisemitism is undefinable, its future unpredictable.”25 The owners of the New York Times had previously urged writers with Jewish surnames to identify themselves only by initials. Throughout the 1930s and the 1940s “Jewish” stories were consistently underplayed to avoid any suspicion that the paper favored Jews. Such apprehensiveness was not uncommon especially among Jews of high station who had much to lose and little to fall back on.26

The most likely area where normative antisemitism might overnight be converted into the dreaded political brand was in foreign policy. The threat should be viewed from two vantage points. The first concerns antisemitism affecting the makers of policy and the second, antisemitism within the policy itself, especially as it related to the problem of Jewish refugees. Though more Jews were employed in the federal civil service than ever before it was common knowledge that certain areas remained off-limits for Jews. The State Department was one of these and few Jews therefore applied for its foreign service. There is ample evidence in the diaries of Breckinridge Long, assistant secretary of the Special Problems Division and the key official responsible for the admission of Jewish refugees, of an abiding distaste for “New York Jew.”27 He was not alone among State Department officials in holding such sentiments. There were also occasional incidents of antisemitism among consular officials who by a peculiar twist in the immigration law had the final say on who received the, ultimately, life-saving visas. It was not a name-calling brand of antisemitism and therefore difficult to identify. Researchers differ in their judgment about whether antisemitism was a major factor in determining policy involving the rescue of Jewish refugees.28 The treatment of the refugees, which might have served as a litmus test of official antisemitism, was never a major foreign policy issue during the 1930s.
Still, had the American people been asked whether they favored admission of refugees, the response according to the available surveys, would have been overwhelmingly negative. The State Department was carrying out the wishes of the American Congress and beyond that of the American people. It was a case of democracy at work. The issue that revealed the deepest chasm between the Jews and the devoutly Catholic Irish Americans who dominated the powerful Church, was the Spanish Civil War, which had a much greater antisemitic fallout than the question of the admission of Jewish refugees. Catholics saw Franco as a crusader against "Godless communism." The disproportionate number of Jewish volunteers for the Lincoln Brigade, the American contingent of the International Brigade, was all the evidence they needed to prove the linkage between Jews and communism. Indeed, one anti-communist Jewish journalist pictured the brigade as the largest Jewish army since Bar Kochba. For Franco supporters the Jewish activity was evidence that Jews were hopelessly radical in politics and had not changed their ways since their support of persecution of the Mexican clergy during the regime of Plutarco Calles in 1921. The deep division between the two ethnic groups of the New Deal remained to plague the rescue effort during the war. When the Catholic prelates were approached for support for the refugees, some of whom were newly baptized Catholics, many proved to be indifferent.\textsuperscript{29}

It was the direction of foreign policy, rather than domestic questions of Jewish power, which became the likeliest instrument to bring the Jewish question onto the political agenda. The issue was joined during the "great debate" over intervention in the European war which predictably American Jewry favored. Jewish support of intervention put it in direct conflict with the America First Committee which carried the flag of isolationism. Until late 1940 the isolationists in Congress carried the day. The neutrality laws which succeeded the embargo on the sale of arms called for "cash and carry" which virtually sealed the fate of loyalist Spain. Popular support of the isolationist position persisted after Berlin broke the Munich agreement by occupying the rump of Czechoslovakia in March 1939.\textsuperscript{30} Revisionist historian Harry Elmer Barnes responded to Nazi brutality against Jews by stating that it was minor compared to the dire consequences of the British blockade of Germany between 1917 and 1918.\textsuperscript{31}

But with the outbreak of war in September the tide turned against isolationism. Paradoxically, it was precisely at this juncture that the antisemitic elements within the legitimate isolationist movement nearly prevailed. This possibility was very likely to occur in 1940 and helps explain the inordinate fear of American Jewry, which was related to what was happening in Germany to German Jewry.

The last throes of isolationism, which now clearly showed its antisemitic roots, occurred in September 1941 in Des Moines, Iowa, when Charles Lindbergh, still the most popular figure in America, warned that Jews and
Anglophiles were trying to bring the nation into war and would pay a price for it. But the Des Moines speech marked the end of Lindbergh's reign as an American hero and of any influence he might have projected on public policy. The press almost uniformly condemned the speech and Roosevelt viewed him as a fool and a traitor. The exact turning point was the Argentia conference of August 1941 in which the Atlantic Charter with its principles ringing the four freedoms was adopted. The aims of the war, embodied in the charter, played a similar role to Wilson's fourteen points. The ideological basis of America's eventual entry into the war resonate with principles, including freedom of religion, held dear by American Jewry and mark it off as a great victory. Unfortunately, Jewry still did not feel more secure since the news from Europe about the fate of their brethren was too bitter and in 1941 Hitler's armies still seemed invincible.

Their domestic situation was uncertain enough but it does not present sufficient cause for the Jewish reaction to it, especially when we consider that in both the economic and political sphere antisemitism was clearly a failure. Systemic employment discrimination could not prevent American Jewry from emerging from the Depression faster than other ethnic groups. The climb of American Jewry to becoming the most highly professionalized, wealthiest ethnic group in America began during the war. Despite the antisemitic cry that Jews had too much power, Roosevelt continued to use Jewish talent freely in his administration. Jewish appointments to posts within the upper echelons of the federal civil service and in the courts, as well as to his inner circle, compared favorably with those of other heretofore neglected ethnics. The newly empowered ethnic bloc was, after all, the essence of the New Deal. The possibility of a Jewish question appearing on the American political agenda, as it did in Germany and other European countries, was minimal in America. America's political structure, its heterogeneity, made it more resistant to political antisemitism which elsewhere posed the real threat to Jewish well-being.

Father Charles Coughlin, Gerald L.K. Smith, Joseph E. McWilliams, Fritz Kuhn, Gerald Winrod and others who captured public attention with their antisemitic message did not in the end fare well. Nor did the dozens of newly established antisemitic organizations. The latest research concludes that the demagogues that plagued the Roosevelt administration never posed a real threat of finding a place in the mainstream of American politics. Moreover the two most popular ones, Huey Long, with his "share the wealth" program, and Upton Sinclair, with his "end poverty in California" campaign, eschewed antisemitism. Coughlin's demagoguery was finally challenged by more liberal voices in the Catholic hierarchy such as Cardinal Mundelein of Chicago; his fell silent altogether after Pearl Harbor. Fritz Kuhn, the German American Bund "führer," was indicted and imprisoned in 1940 as a result of the efforts of Rep. Samuel Dickstein, who represented an almost all Jewish district on New York's
Lower East Side and was for a time chairman of the House Immigration and Naturalization Committee. As the war drew nearer, American public opinion gradually became aware that the threat Nazi Germany posed to the national interest outweighed other factors. American reaction to Kristallnacht on 9 November 1938 was so negative that Hans Dieckhoff, the German ambassador, complained that years of painstaking effort to build antisemitic opinion in America had been destroyed in a single night.33 Though Hitler’s legions had swiftly cut through France and the Low Countries, German casualties on the Russian front were unexpectedly high. More importantly, after America entered the war in December 1941 the antisemitic thrust was parried. The enemy the U.S. was fighting was after all a racist regime that had the murder of Jews as its ideological core.

By 1941, as if to prepare itself for the approaching war, American public opinion had begun to swing away from the most extreme forms of isolationism, although the isolationist impulse did not vanish totally with Pearl Harbor: it became the “Asia first” strategy pushed by General MacArthur. But Roosevelt, to the chagrin of Hitler’s high command, opted for a “Germany first” strategy. It was a decision made without the Jews specifically in mind but it went far toward hastening victory. Nor did the accompanying antisemitism totally disappear. According to available public opinion surveys antisemitism actually reached its zenith three years later, in 1944, and only declined sharply thereafter.34 That paradoxical juxtaposition might account for the confusion of Jewish recruits who encountered antisemitism in the armed forces. Americans were most antisemitic precisely at the juncture when they were expending their wealth and blood in a bitter fight against Nazi Germany, which was totally committed to destroying Jewry. As in most Western societies a degree of antisemitism was the normative condition. It was more an expression of an animus embedded in the culture than it was ideological. Physical confrontations occurred but they were the exception. There are few instances when antisemitism affected public policy or denied Jews access. During the 1930s American negative attitudes toward its Jews became more pronounced but political antisemitism itself remained latent.

As mentioned, antisemitism did not interfere with upward Jewish mobility. Jews did comparatively well in the 1920s and 1930s. In the realm of politics one could actually conclude that Jewish influence and leverage was heightened during the 1930s. Although there were undoubtedly some antisemites involved in decision making, clearly the Roosevelt administration was less antisemitic than the general American public, certainly less than the 76th Congress that killed the 1939 Wagner-Rogers Bill to admit Jewish refugee children outside the quotas. Merely a year later a veritable craze developed to admit non-Jewish British children, victims of the “Blitz.” It is possible to conclude that during the 1930s, as today, Jews perceived a greater threat from antisemitism than there actually was.
We have noted that by the 1930s Jewish defense agencies had learned how to use the courts and were on their way to deploying a public relations and public education strategy to promote tolerance and pluralism. Though Marshall died in 1929, the strategy he used to stop Henry Ford must still have been fresh in the minds of Jewish leadership. The AJC, under the direction of John Slawson, did in fact initiate a similar approach based on “education” in 1943, when it sponsored “action research” to study and suggest strategies to fight antisemitism. Max Hokheimer, a researcher associated with the Frankfurt school, became head of the AJC’s research department and brought colleagues such as Theodor Adorno with him. A massive five-volume study of antisemitism was planned. The wide publicity given to the four chaplains, one of whom was a rabbi, who went down with the sinking of the troop ship Dorchester in February 1943, did much to show the nation that Jews too were doing their part for the war effort. The customary antisemitic charges that Jews were malingering and profiting from the war were challenged. This “campaign” stands in sharp contrast to the silence counseled by Jewish leaders during the 1930s lest more antisemitic furor be aroused. But while Slawson’s activist strategy ultimately had an enormous impact on the civil rights struggle of the 1950s and 1960s, the efforts to “combat the disease of hate” came too late to counter the apprehensiveness of Jews during the 1930s. The realization that tolerance and pluralism could be marketed, just as Goebbels marketed antisemitism, accounts in some measure for the growing acceptance of Jews after World War II.

The impact of antisemitism on refugee policy needs to be considered to balance the picture. This was not antisemitism of the nation’s top decision makers, although some clearly were antisemitic. Rather, at a crucial period, when Jews needed to win support from other ethnic groups with whom they shared the New Deal coalition – the Irish, Italians, Germans, priests and Protestant ministers, and labor leaders – in order to urge the Roosevelt administration to liberalize implementation of the immigration laws, their help was not available. Failure to recognize that the Jewish genocide was a special case may not warrant the label “antisemitism” but insensitivity to the loss of Jewish life on an enormous scale may well be its precursor. During the depression decade Jews were simply not popular. But neither were the Italian Americans and certainly not the African-Americans.

Clearly American Jewry overestimated the impact of the organized antisemitic effort and underestimated its ability to counteract its pernicious effect. Some may attribute it to the impact of the Depression, which tended to privatize interest and disengage Jews from political activity. But this was hardly the case for left-wing Jews who actually became hyperactive in matters such as fighting “the scourge of fascism” in Spain. Nor was the threat posed by the virulence of domestic antisemitism, which was led by marginal leaders and did not prevent Jews from recovering from the Depression more rapidly than other
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Clearly American Jewry overestimated the impact of the organized antisemitic effort and underestimated its ability to counteract its pernicious effect. Some may attribute it to the impact of the Depression, which tended to privatize interest and disengage Jews from political activity. But this was hardly the case for left-wing Jews who actually became hyperactive in matters such as fighting “the scourge of fascism” in Spain. Nor was the threat posed by the virulence of domestic antisemitism, which was led by marginal leaders and did not prevent Jews from recovering from the Depression more rapidly than other
groups. We see that virtually every incident of what was loosely identified as antisemitism could be balanced by data which showed the threat as negligible. The antisemites argued that Jews were running the government and the Jews, in turn, were gratified that so many Jews had found high positions in the Roosevelt administration. In fact, the Jewish condition of the 1930s depended on one's perception. There was as much evidence that vis-à-vis the administration the Jewish condition was actually hopeful, as there was of perceiving a dire threat. Nevertheless, in the 1930s the Jewish perception of antisemitism tended toward the latter. Not only did they sense that antisemitism was everywhere but they also perceived the omnipresent normative antisemitism as more threatening than it actually was. It hampered their need to build coalitions with other ethnicities and to develop a strategy other than silence to combat it - a line of action that did not develop until the 1940s. This misperception would go far in explaining at least in part American Jewry's muted reaction to the Holocaust, if indeed it was such.

What frightened American Jewry so in the 1930s that they could not fulfill the leadership role thrust upon them by a cruel history? There is one explanation for this misperception that has received insufficient emphasis by researchers. Rhetorical antisemitism of speakers such as Charles Coughlin was familiar to Jews who had lived through the 1920s. What was new was not the message, but the historical context. It was not so much the rise of antisemitism at home which, as we have seen, brought Jews to a virtual standstill during the 1920s. It was the news of what was happening in Germany carried by the press and the steady stream of prominent Jewish refugees, that so aroused their apprehension. Despite the love-hate relationship the descendants of eastern Jewish immigrants had with the "uptown" Jews, the persecution of the Jews of Germany generated a more profound shock than did the virulent antisemitism in "backward" Poland, Romania or Hungary where antisemitism was always the norm. Like their parents, the children of the Ostjuden viewed Germany as an "advanced" country, more civilized, more cultured. It was moreover a society where the "emancipation" had gone furthest and where, at least for some Jews, there was evidence that one could be both Jewish and a loyal citizen of the state. The Weimar Constitution (1919), conceived and primarily written by a Jew (Hugo Preuss), was the most liberal document of its kind at the time. Germany represented the pinnacle of hope that one could live a full Jewish life in the Diaspora. When the Nuremberg Laws (1935) virtually read German Jewry out of the pays legal, completely reversing the emancipation transaction, it came as an awesome shock to American Jewry which viewed itself as following the same path. "It would be a miracle," declared a communal leader in 1939, "if the disease of antisemitism prevalent in fascist countries were not to make serious inroads in our own country." If it could happen in Germany, they thought, then it could happen anywhere, including America. Hence, they perceived the heightened antisemitism at home as evidence that it was
happening there. That is what the *Fortune* magazine article, mentioned at the outset, was addressing. Jews even believed, falsely, that the vigor of the domestic antisemitic movement was attributable to financing sneaked into the country via the German and Italian diplomatic pouch.38

Lastly, and particularly pertinent to our discussion, the rapid development of “refugee” Zionism among the masses of American Jewry can be correlated directly with the perception of a rising threat of antisemitism. Those historians who see that antisemitism and Zionism are inextricably linked may find no better evidence than the growth of American Zionism in the 1930s. When, after a painfully slow start, the American Zionist movement finally grew by leaps and bounds it was not rooted in some esoteric knowledge of Zionist ideology, but on the simple practical consideration that European Jewry needed some place to go. They understood that, given the virulence of antisemitism and the restrictive immigration laws, there could not be a Zion in America. Some undoubtedly feared such a massive influx of Jews. The answer was Palestine whose successor, Israel, became a defining element of their Judaism. But it leaves the question of whether America’s antisemitism in the 1930s was misperceived, unresolved. The only thing we can know for certain is that both its response to the Holocaust and its opening to Zionism were manifestations of a frightened apprehensive people.

NOTES

8. Ibid., pp. 11–12.


15. Quoted in Feingold, *Searching*, p. 34.

16. In 1938, the same year that he received a medal in Berlin, he told reporters that Jews were his most loyal workers and offered Fordlandia, his great rubber plantation in Brazil, to resettled Jews extruded from the Nazi Reich. Henry L. Feingold, *Bearing Witness: How America and Its Jews Responded to the Holocaust* (Syracuse University Press, 1995), pp. 106–7.


24. Arad, *America*, p. 130. While Jews constituted about 3.5 percent of the population in 1937, 15 percent of FDR’s appointments were Jewish. This estimate may be too high. See Jerold A. Auerbach, “From Rags to Robes: The Legal Profession, Social Mobility and the American Jewish Experience,” *American Jewish Historical Quarterly* 66 (Dec. 1976), pp. 265ff.


35. Cohen, Desist, p. 234; Svonkin, Against Prejudice, p. 31.


THE ROMA IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE:
THE PLAGUE OF A STATELESS MINORITY

Raphael Vago*

In a comprehensive study of the Roma (Gypsies) in former communist Eastern Europe, entitled “Orphans of Transition: Gypsies in Eastern Europe” (1998), Zoltan Barany, a noted researcher of the topic, claimed there were “approximately six million Roma,” a figure which stands somewhere between the lowest and highest estimates of the population1 (see table). According to Barany, the uniqueness of the Roma lies “in the fact that they are a transnational, non-territorially based people who do not have a ‘home state’ that can provide a haven or extend protection to them. For the Roma every country is a ‘foreign’ country, a country of ‘residence’, there is no homeland to go back to, or even turn to in a symbolic capacity.”2

Since the collapse of the communist regimes, these “orphans of transition” have become both a domestic and an international issue with important political, social and economic ramifications, one that has drawn increased international attention and monitoring, and constitutes an important factor in the “acceptance rating” of the various states seeking to integrate into European structures. For decades a taboo subject, long ignored by the communist regimes, since 1989 it has come to the fore, forming a significant part of the national discourse and creating a division between liberal, democratic forces within the developing civil society and extremist, xenophobic and racist elements.

This chapter describes the impact of the Roma problem on the domestic and foreign policies of the post-communist regimes and the growing “internationalization” of the issue. The increased interest of the public and of academics locally and in the West in the fate of the Roma during World War II, as well as Jewish-Roma contacts, are portrayed as important elements of the “Roma question” on the current agenda of the post-communist states.

**From Communist Taboos to Post-communist Stagnation**

The communist legacy regarding the Roma is an ambiguous one, with many negative and a few positive aspects. On the negative side, generally the communist regimes’ policies included “discriminatory and coercive elements… none of the communist states shielded away from institutionalized discrimination and persecution.”3 In fact none of the communist countries, except Yugoslavia

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after 1981, recognized the Roma as a national group. Definitions were kept intentionally unclear so that they would not have to be granted rights as a national minority. In many cases the Roma were characterized as a social group with peculiar social and behavioral characteristics – a hint that they were harming the efforts to create a “socialist society.” For years there were no public discussions, no sociological or anthropological surveys and no official statistics on Roma numbers; the only references to them were a few pictures or articles in the media which portrayed their lives as happy and prosperous under socialism.

On the positive side, the communists did try – to a limited extent – to reduce marginalization of the community and make them useful members of society. In some cases affirmative action in education raised their level of literacy. The overall results were mixed, but generally the communist legacy is a grim one. The price that the Roma had to pay – one that they quite often resisted – was their transformation from a traditional society into one more assimilated into local communities. In a clumsy attempt to break their nomadic way of life, they were banned from traveling and assigned the poorest housing. Thus, the Roma occupied the lowest rung on the socio-economic scale, living in sub-standard housing estates, that, nevertheless, often figured proudly in the communist propaganda. Their crafts, such as repairing pots and pans and basket weaving, were all endangered though not completely eradicated. Only the “musician Gypsies” – the upper stratum of Roma society – whose contribution to East European culture was immense, continued to thrive.

Thus, the Roma lived in limbo, on the fringes of society, outsiders compelled to shed parts of their identity, but never really integrated. Above all, as studies would show after the collapse of the communist regimes, the stereotypes remained, perpetuated in the classical image of the cunning Gypsy thief. The view of the Roma as “anti-social” criminals is yet another legacy of the communist regimes, which never really tackled the grave situation of these communities or formulated a clear picture of their problems and plight. According to a report by the United Nations’ High Commissioner for Refugees, there was no “major attempt by governments to understand the Roma, their culture and way of life.” Thus, in the post-communist period “lack of understanding and prejudice remain at the root of many discriminatory policies directed against them.”

Since 1989 their overall situation, as well as relations between society and the Roma, have deteriorated, although there have been a few positive developments which offer some hope for the future. In the transition to a market economy, the Roma’s economic structure underwent major changes. Most jobs in state-sponsored activities disappeared, and the “new capitalism” allowed the Roma to attempt to enter the competitive private economy and at the same time adjust to ongoing developments. Unemployment runs very high
in all countries of the region, the Roma constituting the largest category of unemployed in post-communist societies.

Due to economic priorities during the first years of post-communism and the lack of adequate funds, social services were not well organized and were slow to reach the Roma. For example, in Bulgaria, which has an estimated 500,000–800,000 Roma, only 7–8 percent of Roma children attended secondary school compared to 54 percent of ethnic Bulgarians. In 1990, some 80 percent of the prison population in Bulgaria were Roma. Without adequate social welfare, many turned to begging, prostitution and crime, further reinforcing traditional stereotypes, and thus creating a vicious circle of violence and counter-violence. The overall view by outside observers is rather pessimistic, as a report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees concludes:

More generally the Roma have continued to experience social discrimination and victimization. An indication of this problem is to be seen in the failure of local officials, security services and judges to apprehend and punish the perpetrators of racist attacks on the Roma and their property, examples of which have been reported in Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Poland and the Czech and Slovak Republics.

In many cases the East European experience demonstrates that the legal system is part of the problem and not the solution, because it treats anti-Roma violence more leniently than Roma crimes. Internal divisions and power struggles between clan leaders and local chieftains, as well as differences in customs and religion, have added to their weaknesses and ability to function as an organized community within the developing civil society. The media in particular perceive the differences between clans and local leaders as a symbol of a Mafiosi-style hierarchy and “division of labor” between crime groups, which indeed is often the case.

The whole issue of Roma political and social activism is a sensitive one. Most critics of the subject agree that “Roma politics” are often ineffective and in fact detrimental to the populations their leaders supposedly represent. In the post-communist era there are hundreds of Roma organizations and movements whose influence over the community is often slight. Political parties that have sprung up have not captured the imagination and votes of the Roma, and thus the number of Roma representatives in the legislative bodies is very low. In some countries, such as Hungary, a few Roma representatives were elected on the ticket of national parties, while in others, such as Romania, a Roma serves as representative of this recognized national minority. In general, Roma parties have neither succeeded in unifying their forces nor in cooperating with other political parties. Thus, political representation of the Roma in the region’s parliaments has generally failed; nor can one speak of the emergence of political parties which might be considered as representing the community’s interests.
On the other hand, the growing trend toward the establishment of NGOs (non-governmental organizations) and local bodies reflects a developing civil society. Mostly supported by local and Western organizations, a new generation of Roma activists monitors anti-Roma incidents, represents the community to local government agencies and official institutions and coordinates activities with civil groups involved in the struggle against intolerance and racism.

The Internet has contributed tremendously to the spread of information on Roma issues and government attitudes, and to monitoring racist activities against Roma. In this regard, mention should be made of the Roma Human Rights Center, the Patron Web Journal, RomNews.com, Amaro Drom (Hungary) and Roma Page (Hungary), as well as discussion forums such as Yahoo!’s “Managing Multiethnic Communities.”

The most significant development in the post-communist period has been the growth of extremist violence among skinheads and neo-Nazi groups, as well as a systematic anti-Roma campaign by right-wing extremist and nationalist organizations. The skinheads and other white supremacist groups present their attacks as a “defense” against Roma violence. Political movements such as the Assembly for the Republic—Czech Republican Party, the Slovak National Party, the Greater Romania Party and the Hungarian Justice and Life Party have all used the Roma question to promote their xenophobic and racist agenda. In the case of the Czech and Slovak extremists, the skinheads enjoy a degree of public understanding, and as opinion polls reveal in both states, some 65 percent of respondents believe that the primary – and positive – goal of the skinheads is “to deal with the Romanies [Roma].” As also documented, the skinheads are used by extremist groups to serve as a spearhead on racist issues (see ASW’ 1993 to 2001). In Hungary, former member of parliament Izabella Kiraly attempted to legitimize their activities by calling the skinheads “national-spirited youngsters.” Her small organization, the Hungarian Interest Party, conducts a relentless campaign against the Roma in its publication Kottot Keve (Tied Sheaf).

The extremist discourse in the area by parties whether within parliament or outside it ferments intolerance and racism which fuel acts of violence. Common to this discourse are several motifs allegedly characterizing the Roma:

a) Their inability, as a result of social, economic – and as often hinted, genetic – factors to act as useful members of society.

b) The Roma are an anti-social and parasitic people who do not contribute to the welfare of the nation, and live by crime, violence and begging.

c) Since the collapse of communism the depressed situation of the Roma – which the extremists acknowledge – is being exploited by “liberals” and Jews in order to conduct a smear campaign against national revival.

Thus the “Roma question” has become a political issue, dividing those who use the Roma’s condition to reinforce traditional stereotypes and foster intolerance, from others who wish not only to integrate them into society, but to conduct a full and open discussion of all aspects of their plight. The
extremists oppose any steps toward integrating the Roma into society, focus on their criminal acts and describe in gloomy terms the fate of neighborhoods inhabited by Roma. The considerable anti-Roma prejudice already existing among the general population of the countries of the region undoubtedly contributes to public support of extremist movements.

Since the collapse of the communist regimes the “Roma question” has emerged as a major social issue in the transition to post-communism. Ignorance and taboos have gradually been transformed into open discussion, especially among intellectuals, as well as attempts to tackle the problem, which in the long run might change basic attitudes toward the Roma and lead to better communication between society and this community. Both the electronic and printed media offer a wide range of information and research on the topic, including sociological, anthropological and psychological studies, as well as demonstrations of Roma art and writing and interviews with Roma. In Hungary, periodicals such as Elet és Irodalom and Kritika, and in Romania, Beszélő, Dilema, Romania Literara, Revista 22 and others devote considerable space to discussions about the Roma. The political center, and especially the left, have incorporated recent Western perceptions on multi-culturalism into their approaches, considering them relevant to Central and Eastern Europe. Various public bodies and government agencies often organize cultural events and festivals – “Romfests” – at which cultural diversity and multiculturalism are celebrated. Events organized by government agencies tend to emphasize the need for mutual acceptance and tolerance, while those arranged by public associations stress multicultural aspects and the need for a resolute struggle against extremism.

The dialogue with the Roma often reflects their frustration over the difficulties and failures since the collapse of the communist regimes. At a conference held at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in May 2001, Roma representatives from several major organizations – Hungary reportedly has some 250 Roma organizations and groups – stressed the following points:

- The Roma have been the major losers since the transformation in regime (from communism to post-communism) and also of the various government changes following elections.
- Integration is a two way road – society has to learn to accept the Roma just as the Roma have to show their willingness to integrate into society.
- The job market indicates covert discrimination; Roma above the age of 40 are very rarely hired.
- Governmental grants for 8,000 Roma students are small and consequently do not contribute to the emergence of a stratum of Roma intellectuals.
- Without the fostering of heritage and identity a person “cannot be physically and mentally healthy.”

This last point indicates one of the major unresolved issues of the Roma question – that of identity. Many of the debates within the Roma community
and outside it focus on the question of identity — "Who are we?" "What is our identity?" "How do we relate to Roma in other countries?" "What is our common language and heritage?" This issue has many practical implications. The declaration of Roma identity in states censuses may provide a clearer picture of their numbers. Local leaders and organizations are working toward this goal; for example, with regard to the 2001 census in Slovakia, Roma leaders warned that if Roma are described against their will as having anything other than Roma nationality, they would take the Slovak government to the European Court of Human Rights. In southern Slovakia, Roma traditionally declare their nationality as Hungarian, since many were Magyarized and regarded themselves as being closer to the ruling Hungarians than to the Slovaks (as was the case with the Jews during the Austro-Hungarian era). Some estimates place the number of Roma in Slovakia at between 458,000 and 520,000; yet, in the last census only 76,000 defined themselves as such. Roma leaders who launched a campaign for a "just census" were reported to be satisfied if some 300,000 proclaimed themselves to be Roma.10

The situation is similar in Hungary. In the 1990 census 142,683 citizens declared themselves of Roma nationality, while Hungarian estimates placed the number between 400,000 and 600,000 and Romani sources between 550,000 and 800,000 Roma.11

The Holocaust and Roma Historical Memory
The issue of Roma identity is closely linked to the perception of the Roma past and their fate in World War II, which in the last years has become a major issue, as well as a matter of historiographical dispute. The main focus has been on Nazi and local policies toward the Roma, and the relationship between the "Final Solution" of the "Jewish problem" and the fate of the Roma. Growing awareness among the Roma community in the former communist countries, as well as in Germany, to their fate during World War II has generated a wave of studies based on historical documents as well as testimonies of survivors. During the communist era references to the fate of Roma during the war were rare, selective and low key, as if intended to silence any questioning voices among the community.

The issue also has important practical implications — only in recent years has the matter of compensation been raised, parallel to Jewish claims for compensation, including for surviving slave laborers. Roma activists and organizations, often divided internally, have submitted material demands based on growing evidence that has come to light and been presented to public and official bodies. Roma representation at scientific conferences, public events and official forums has raised the level of awareness among non-Roma of the suffering of the community during the war. Unfortunately, the issue has also led to disagreement with the Jewish world, with the emergence of differences on the nature and extent of the extermination of the Roma. This, in spite of
numerous forms of cooperation between Jews and Roma, such as Jewish participation in Roma memorial activities and vice versa. The following brief review of the conflicting viewpoints will serve to highlight current attitudes toward this issue.

The *Patrin Web Journal*, which has devoted several studies to *O Porramjós* (the Roma Holocaust), stated that "Roma were the only other population besides the Jews who were targeted for extermination on racial grounds in the 'Final Solution'. Determining the percentage or number of Roma who died during the war is not easy. Much of the Nazi documentation still remains to be analyzed, and many murders were not recorded, since they took place in the fields and forests where Roma were apprehended." Zoltan Barany attributes ignorance of the Romani extermination partly to the fact that "the world has paid the most attention to the persecution of the Jews," while the extermination of the Roma "was far less meticulously documented by the Nazis and their collaborators." Moreover, he claims that unlike the Jews and other victims, many of whom were highly educated, Romani survivors did not leave behind diaries, write memoirs, or subsequently research this subject. In explaining Nazi policies, Barany notes that the "Roma were considered an inferior race whose most fundamental attributes were habitual criminality and social deviance. This racial and behavioral categorization made the Roma subject to extermination." Thus, the fate of the Roma became a focus not only of studies on the racist attitudes and policies of Nazi Germany and its allies, but also of the number of victims of this policy, since such data might indicate whether there was an overall attempt to exterminate the Gypsies as such, or would point to Nazi and others’ atrocities that were not aimed at the entire Gypsy population.

Barany drew up a comparative table of estimates on the number of victims, based on the works of several scholars – ranging from Yehuda Bauer’s figure of 200,000, through Isabela Fonseca’s of 500,000, to those of Ian Hancock, one of the most prolific activists and researchers of the Roma, who put their number at 600,000 in 1987, and between one million and 1.5 million in 1995. Barany supports the estimates of up to 500,000, while the higher ones “entirely lack supportive evidence.”

One of the strongest critics of works allegedly underestimating the number of Roma victims and doubting the Nazi intention to exterminate all Roma (see below) is Ian Hancock, the sole Romani member of the US Holocaust Memorial Council and Romani representative on UN and major US committees on human rights. In his "The Roots of Antigypsism: To the Holocaust and After,” Hancock writes that "Holocaust scholars are rapidly adding to their knowledge the details of the fate of the Romani people in Hitler’s Germany, and it is now generally acknowledged that together with Jews, the Romani victims were the only ethnic/racial population selected for total annihilation.” Hancock described Nazi racial policies of extermination
toward the Roma, and in discussing the various estimates of the number of victims, he concluded: "A guess as good as any is that there were perhaps three million Roma [sic] throughout the German-controlled territories at the period of their maximum extent, between one and one and a half a million of whom were murdered, i.e., between a third and a half of the population."  

Hancock criticized what he termed the "competitive" aspect of comparing genocides, and perceptions of the "uniqueness" of the Holocaust of the Jewish nation. He finds this feature "particularly explicit" in a study by Gilad Margalit, who states that "antigipsism and antisemitism are two very different phenomena of ethnic hatred, distinct in their content, dimension and appearance... antigipsism... is only a marginal preoccupation of the German extreme right, compared to the constant and latent and exposed preoccupation with Jews and Judaism."  

Hancock, whose views are well respected in academic circles, also bitterly criticized one of the latest works on the fate of the Roma, Guenther Lewy's *The Nazi Persecution of the Gypsies*, published in 2000. Lewy's work was generally well received by reviewers, one of whom wrote,  

Guenther Lewy has set a new standard for scholarship on Nazi policy toward the Gypsies. This meticulously and well written work challenges some traditional notions about the tragic history of this people and in doing so enhances our understanding of one of the less-studied aspects of the Third Reich. Lewy's account constitutes a balanced contribution to a field of study that in the past has often been affected by personal agendas and emotionally charged discourses.

In a review entitled "Downplaying the Porrajmos: The Trend to Minimize the Romani Holocaust," Hancock asserts that "this is a book which seeks not only to exclude the Nazis' Romani victims from the Holocaust – which is not anything new – but goes a step forward to say that they were not even the targets of attempted genocide." Hancock summarizes Lewy's arguments as follows:

... that there was no racially motivated general plan for the Final Solution of the Gypsy Question... that the estimated number of half a million Romanies is a gross exaggeration, and that "perhaps the majority" of them in Germany actually survived, and weren't even transported to the East, and because there was no intent to kill all Romanies, and because policies against them were not motivated by Nazi race theory, their treatment cannot be compared with that of the Jews and therefore they do not qualify for inclusion in the Holocaust. In sum, because their treatment did not constitute a genocide and it was not motivated by a policy based on Nazi race theory.
Describing Lewy’s *The Nazi Persecution of the Gypsies* as “a dangerous book,” Hancock stressed that the author “can feel no empathy for a people who remain complete strangers to him.” He voiced his concern over a “disturbing trend which seems to be emerging in Holocaust studies, most recently expressed on an Australian-based Holocaust website which ‘proclaims that just mentioning Gypsies in the same breath as the Jewish victims is an insult to their memory’.”

Yehuda Bauer’s *Rethinking the Holocaust* offers an updated review of recent scholarship, based on his own research and that of other scholars, and outlines various approaches to understanding the Holocaust. The chapter “Comparison with Other Genocides” deals with the fate of the Roma, based on the most updated data available and their interpretation by various scholars. Bauer believes that the “whole Gypsy problem was of marginal importance to the Nazi regime. Hitler himself appears to have mentioned the Gypsies only twice.” Bauer recounted the mass murders of Roma by Nazis and their allies, emphasizing that “there is no gradation of suffering and...the number of victims does not determine the cruelty of the onslaught.” As to Nazi aims, Bauer is of the opinion that “clearly the Nazis wanted to eliminate the Roma as an identifiable group of people, the bearer of a culture. They carried out this policy by mass murder, humiliation and the outmost brutality and sadism.” In summing up, Bauer writes: “What we have here is a genocide, not a Holocaust, that is, not an intent, not its implementation...to murder every single individual of the targeted population on a global scale. The Nazis did not intend to murder all Roma.” While sympathizing with the Roma, Bauer claims his main aim was to uncover the “dialectic relationship between the particularism and the universalism of the horror.”

While academic debates certainly have an impact on the way in which the media present the issues, the Roma community in general believes there was a “Roma Holocaust.” The growing number of commemorative events indicate the imprint of historical memory and the formulation of a commemorative tradition which is officially supported by the regimes concerned. Thus, in July 2001 a “Roma Holocaust memorial” ceremony, attended by high-ranking officials, was held in the town of Nagykanizsa in Hungary, and a message was read from the president of Hungary.

The memory of the past also has current significance in that it helps shape the agenda of world and local bodies in dealing with xenophobia and racism. This connection between past and present was evident in the disappointment voiced by Ian Hancock, who bitterly criticized the January 2000 Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust: “Sinti and Roma were not only Holocaust victims, but they are also the main targets of skinhead violence today – yet not even one session on Romanies was included in the entire Stockholm forum.”
The Internationalization of the Roma Issue

The "orphans of transition" – the Roma in the post-communist countries – are no longer an internal, sensitive issue enveloped in taboos and ignorance; they have become an international issue, monitored by factors outside the involved states. As Hungary's Foreign Minister Janos Martonyi wrote in the preface of an official publication: "Increasing international attention is focused on the situation of the Roma. Foreign and international decision-making organizations are continually engaged in analyzing the living conditions of the Roma in general, and the Roma living in Hungary in particular." 29

Several factors serve to explain the "internationalization" of the Roma problem. First, it is an organic part of the process of transition to post-communism; in fact, the fate of the Roma has become a "test case" for the success of the transition to a post-communist society. The issue involves all aspects of human and minority rights to which the world community, especially the European bodies of integration, became sensitive during the 1990s. Second, the level of violent extremism against Roma has prompted various agencies and organizations to monitor xenophobic activities. Further, many Roma have attempted to move to the West, some seeking for political asylum, others plainly seeking a better life, a trend which has caused friction between their countries of origin and the target countries of emigration. Last, but not least, the Roma have become the scapegoats and latest victims of the Balkan conflicts, within Kosovo and other parts of the region, which has led to an increase of international activity on their behalf.

Roma migration was the main topic at the world congress of the International Romani Union, held in Prague in July 2000. 30 To quote a report discussed at the conference: "The Roma, the world's greatest travelers, are once again on the move." The new patterns of Roma migration reflect not only – as some analysts have suggested – their nomadic way of life – but a yearning for a new life in the wake of further dislocations caused by the downfall of the communist regimes. The stream of Roma arriving from Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania since the early 1990s has raised sensitive issues in countries such as Great Britain, Canada, Belgium and France concerning the nature of the Roma plight, and the question as to whether they are political or economic refugees. Some Roma activists in Eastern Europe feel that many Roma are abusing international asylum protection, and thus making it more difficult for those who are genuinely fleeing from violence or persecution. 31 Successful integration into the educational system and the job market in comparison to other immigrant groups, which has been the case of 1,500 Roma accepted by Canada, places the issue of discrimination at the doorstep of the countries of origin.

The issue of Roma migration to the West has helped focus attention on the situation of the Roma in their countries of origin, serving to increase Western monitoring of extremist violence and of the legal status of the Roma. In turn,
closer monitoring influences the prospects of the states concerned to integrate into the West. Thus, a vicious circle has emerged in the past few years – Roma seeking asylum in the West have to prove that they suffered discrimination in their home countries; when their case is credible the image of the home country is damaged. The next, almost logical, development is that extremist factors would claim that the Roma were driven by powerful forces – including Jews – who try to manipulate the community into harming the interests of their home states. Such is the case of the Zamoly Roma from Hungary. A group of 39 Roma from Zamoly, western Hungary, arrived in Strasbourg in 2000 and asked for asylum. They filed complaints with the European Court of Human Rights, the Council of Europe and the European Parliament claiming they were persecuted in their home countries. In March 2001, initially three, then the majority of the group, were granted refugee status in France, a step which prompted debates in Hungary as to whether the French decision implied criticism of the country and whether it would affect Hungary’s prospects of joining the EU.

The Zamoly Roma issue has generated discussion in Hungary, ranging from character assassination of the leaders of the group to lively debates in the media on the situation of the Roma. The right-wing press latched onto supposed Jewish/Israeli involvement when it was reported that an Israeli academic, Katalin Katz, donated $4,000 to the Roma efforts in Strasbourg out of sympathy with their fate during the war. The “Israeli angle” emerged following allegations that the Mossad was involved in “attempts to destabilize” Hungary – a common theme of Istvan Csurka’s Magyar Forum and the weekly Demokrata. Further, the Hungarian right-wing alleged that the Russian secret service had encouraged the Roma to leave in order to damage Hungary’s human rights record and its prospects of joining the European Union (EU), an item first published in Britain by Jane’s Defence Digest and reprinted in the Hungarian media.

Similar conspiracy theories, minus the Jewish or Russian angle, were proposed in Slovakia, following new waves of asylum seekers in 1999 in Belgium. Allegations by Slovak nationalists that “extremist leftist” organizations in the West were contributing to the attempts to portray Slovakia as a “racist and nationalist state,” also appeared in the Belgian media. As a result, some segments of the Slovak public and the media believe that Roma emigration is coordinated from abroad, and that the Roma, who play an anti-social role at home, are carrying this activity beyond the borders in order to damage the interests of their countries of origin.

In general, Western attitudes toward the fate of Roma in the former communist states remain critical, due to the slow improvement of their situation. The EU ambassador to Hungary stated that while rights for other minorities in the countries queueing to join the EU had improved, this was not the case for the Roma. EU pressure was felt by the Czech government when
in the town of Usti nad Labem, the site of numerous clashes between Roma and the local population, a wall was built to separate feuding neighborhoods. This step was branded by Roma and human rights organizations as "racial segregation." Following the statement by the Finnish foreign minister (whose country held the EU presidency at the time) that the "wall was not acceptable in today's Europe," and other EU criticism, the Czech government removed the wall.\textsuperscript{37}

The OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) is a major watchdog of the Roma situation. The reports of the OSCE high commissioner on national minorities are very critical of the situation of the Roma. In April 2001 US Congressman Christopher H. Smith, co-chairman of the US Mission to the OSCE, quoting the high commissioner's report, stated that "relatively little progress has been made by government authorities in addressing the problems," and listed numerous acts of violence and discrimination against Roma. Congressman Smith also asserted that "too often courts are part of the problem, not the solution."\textsuperscript{38} A noteworthy aspect of Congressman Smith's statement was mention of the plans in the Romanian town of Bacau to build a statue to Romania's war time dictator Ion Antonescu, "who deported 25,000 Roma to Transnistria, of whom 19,000 perished. Romanian officials who have pledged to the OSCE community to fight intolerance, should begin at home by ridding their country of every Antonescu statue built on public land."

An additional aspect of the internationalization of the Roma question in the former communist states, as well as in other countries, was the signing of a "memorandum of understanding and cooperation between the International Romani Union (IRU) and the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs" in May 2001, the first such agreement between the IRU with a government. Among several clauses dealing with forms of cooperation and steps to improve the situation of the Roma, the document clearly linked the international and domestic aspects of the issue, including European integration: "The MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) appreciates the IRU vision reflecting both the negative historical experience and the opportunities offered by the European integration process and are not tying the recognition of a nation to the establishment of a nation state."\textsuperscript{39}

The Balkan wars have also involved the Roma, an aspect that has been somewhat overlooked in the bloody conflicts of the area. Following the 1999 NATO campaign against Yugoslavia, the Roma in Kosovo were caught "between the hammer and the anvil": the Albanians accused them of collaborating with the Serbs in rape and murder, while the Serbs repelled Roma who were attempting to flee from Albanian revenge.\textsuperscript{40}

In Yugoslavia itself, where unofficial estimates place the number of Roma as high as 800,000, anti-Roma and antisemitic graffiti with fascist symbols appeared in 2000/1 in Belgrade, where an exhibition was held on the Roma.
President Kostunica apologized, but various incidents have highlighted the fate of the Roma, who as one Belgrade paper wrote, “live on the margins of society.” Yugoslav experts emphasize that the Roma “are caught in a vicious circle of poverty.” The international community has taken emergency steps to deal with the situation of the Roma in the Balkans, on the understanding that peace and stability in the area is partly contingent upon the fate of the Roma. Thus, the Stability Pact of the Council of Europe, which is the most significant long-range project of the European states in the Balkans, aside from the military presence in the area, has a special division on the Roma, which monitors, reports on and promotes Roma welfare.

From a Central and East European perspective, all factors involved understand that the situation of the Roma is a test case for acceptance by the West. Further negative developments on the issue, including an increase in extremist activity and the failure of the judicial system to deal with the legal aspects of the problem would harm the post-communist states’ image abroad and their attempts to integrate into the West. Thus, the respective governments realize that it is in their own interests to promote the integration of the Roma into society.

In conclusion, the Roma in post-communist societies remain one of the most urgent and acute social problems in the region, with implications for the political, social and economic life of the various states, as well as for their international standing. The “orphans of transition” have raised their voice; the public and the governments concerned are aware of the magnitude of the issue; the international community is involved – yet prospects for closer integration of the Roma into society still seem remote. In regard to Roma-Jewish relations, it remains to be seen to what extent the divisive viewpoints and interpretations will remain a bone of contention or will contribute to mutual understanding based on the tragic experience of both nations.
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Note:
NOTES


2. Ibid., p. 142.


8. See, for example, *Kottó Kéve* 3 (2001).


14. Ibid., p. 3.


18. Hancock, "The Roots of Antigypsyism."

Antisemitism 9, The Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1996, p. 3.


24. Ibid., p. 62.

25. Ibid., p. 66.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., p. 67.


29. “Measures Taken by the State,” p. 6.


31. Ibid.

32. For Western reports on the case, see, for example, BBC News online, 9 March 2001.

33. See, for example, Demokrata 22 (2001).

34. BBC News online, 9 March 2001.


42. See for example, Newsletter on activities of the Council of Europe under the project, “Roma under the Stability Pact,” June 2001, Migration and Roma/Gypsies Division – DGIII.
THE NEW TERRORISM

Michael Whine*

Introduction
The terrorism which prevailed in Europe and Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s tended to be an outgrowth of national liberation struggles, or of anti-capitalist movements, and it frequently had direct or indirect state backing, notably from the Soviet Union or from Soviet bloc countries such as East Germany. It was therefore often possible to observe the ideological steps through which the players passed in their conversion from political activism to terrorism. Generally, this transformation would include several of the following elements: opposition to the state or to perceived injustice, expressed through democratic means; a lack of response, or an inappropriate response, by authority; extreme, but not necessarily violent opposition to the authority; repression by that authority; terrorism against a specific target seen as a symbol of that authority; further repression.

According to terrorism expert Ehud Sprinzak, the common factor in all types of terrorism is an observable process of “de-legitimization” of the target by the terrorist or the terrorist group.¹ Moreover, he maintains that there are universal criteria by which the de-legitimization process can be observed and measured. First, there is the “crisis of confidence,” which may be the product of anger and which leads to extra-parliamentary action, but does not yet amount to total rejection of the target’s legitimacy. Second, there is the “conflict of legitimacy itself,” which is similar to the foregoing; here the opponent’s legitimacy is rejected although there may still be a gap between the intention and the capability of the “embryonic” terrorist. Finally, there is the “action,” which is a consequence of closing the gap between the words (or protests) and the action. According to Sprinzak, it is possible to analyze the nature of extra-parliamentary protest groups and determine which stage of the trajectory they have reached. He has suggested that the behavioral signs will indicate that an extremist group has passed the point of “conflict of legitimacy,” and is on its way to “action.”²

Sprinzak suggests that the most important indicators of the monitoring process are: previous involvement of the organization and/or its leaders in violence; conviction within the group that they can get away with violence; the presence, or absence, of charismatic, sometimes paranoiac, leaders who

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promote violence; a sense of looming disaster (e.g., an influx of foreign workers coinciding with an increase in unemployment); and recent humiliation and an urge for revenge.3

This chapter attempts to compare the new terrorism of today with pre-1990 terrorism, and to show that while the new terrorism still bears some features of the old terrorism, the most marked difference is that its new characteristics make it much more difficult to monitor and prevent.

**The New Terrorism – Characteristics**

The terrorism of the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium includes some elements of the aforementioned pre-1990 terrorism, but it is also characterized by new ones, which require explanation.

Two types of terrorism now predominate above all others: “new” far right terrorism and religious terrorism. Unlike the traditional far right, the new far right is not distinguished by membership in visible and well-organized groups with hierarchical structures, the most overt features of which are public manifestations, such as marching in uniform or rioting against immigrants, and an open adherence to Nazi or fascist ideology. The new ideology stems almost completely from the American far right and is influenced by concepts such as “leaderless resistance” and “lone wolf” or “individual acts of terrorism.” The ideological mentors are not Hitler and Mussolini, or other far right ideologues of the 1930s and 1940s (although they play a part), but the American white supremacists William Pierce, Louis Beam, and others.

William Pierce, a former member of both the John Birch Society and the American Nazi Party, now leads the National Alliance. In his fictional writing (using the *nom de plume* Andrew Macdonald) he promotes the concept of a “white race war” and the violent overthrow of the federal government. Beam, a former Ku Klux Klan instructor in guerrilla warfare, and now a leader in Aryan Nations, promotes the ideology of “leaderless resistance.”4

Religious terrorism promotes either a stark and uncompromising worldview dictated by the belief that religion has the sole key to a “messianic” age, or uses religion as a cloak for its revolutionary and violent theology. It may be anti-Western and anti-modemist, as in Islamism, or it may have developed as a reactionary response, as with Jewish and Hindu ultra-nationalists (e.g., Kahane-Chai, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Bajrang Dal).

The new terrorism is mostly played out on the domestic scene. Recent evidence suggest that acts of international terrorism now account for only 10 percent of all terrorist attacks.5 This applies even to Islamist terrorism, with the exception of the international, unaffiliated, jihadist Mujahideen organizations which operate worldwide. In the US, domestic (i.e., carried out by US nationals) terrorist bombings or attempted bombings increased by 52 percent from 1990 (2,098 incidents) to 1994 (3,199 incidents), even before the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995.6 In the same period international terrorist attacks declined by
24 percent, from 437 to 332 incidents. In the following four years they declined even further, by 46 percent, to 174 incidents.  

A second difference between "new" and "old" terrorism is that new terrorism tends to adopt a networked and less hierarchical form. Both the anti-capitalist and the national liberation terrorist groups of the 1970s and 1980s mostly had hierarchical forms and chains of command. Some even had identifiable operational leaders (e.g., Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof, of the German extreme left Rote Armee Fraktion; Ahmad Jibril, of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command; and Abimael Guzman, of the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso).  

Moreover, new terrorism tends to be diffused. In defining "leaderless resistance," Louis Beam, suggested that hierarchy be downplayed in favor of a network of "phantom cells," which would communicate covertly, allowing offensive flexibility while protecting the security of the organization as a whole. Utilizing the leaderless resistance concept, all individuals in groups operate independently of each other, and never report to a central headquarters or single leader for directional instruction... participants in a program of leaderless resistance through phantom cell or individual action, must know exactly what they are doing and exactly how to do it... all members of phantom cells or individuals, will tend to react to objective events in the same way through usual tactics of resistance. Organs of information distribution, such as newspapers, leaflets, computers etc which are widely available to all, keep each person informed of events allowing for a planned response that will take many variations. No one need issue an order to anyone. 

The far right Free Militia manual put it thus:  

The fundamental rule guiding the organization of the Free Militia is generalized principles and planning but decentralized tactics and action... What is meant by this key statement is that the whole Militia must be committed to the same cause and coordinated in their joint defense of a community. Thus, there must be allegiance to a higher command. But specific tactics should be left up to the individual elements so that compromise of the part does not compromise the whole. Furthermore, all training and combat actions should be up to the smaller elements, again so that isolation or decapitation does not render the smaller units inept.  

In his second, fictitious work Hunter, Pierce describes the mission white supremacist Oscar Yeager set himself in murdering mixed racial couples. Hunter has served as a model for recent acts of terrorism in the US and the UK to a greater extent than has The Turner Diaries. Yeager is described as a man compelled to fight the alleged evil which afflicted America in the 1990s, and
who declares war on “race-mixers,” homosexuals, drug-pushers and adherents of pluralism.\textsuperscript{10}

Eric Robert Rudolf (see below), Bufford Furrow and James Kopp all acted out the scenarios described in \textit{Hunter}.\textsuperscript{11} They sought no formal ties with organized far right groups, but all were influenced by them. More recently, in the UK, David Copeland, sentenced in June 2000 to four life terms for the London nail bombings in April 1999, acted alone but under the complete influence of Pierce’s writings, and various National Alliance postings he had downloaded from the Internet were found in his possession. Likewise, Cameron Martin Dudley, a former Ku Klux Klan supporter living in Grimsby, Lincolnshire, planned to murder blacks on the streets of his town and was in touch, via the Internet, with the National Alliance in the US. He had attempted to buy a hand-gun from an American far right website, but his postings were intercepted by US law enforcement officials and resulted in his arrest by British police and subsequent trial and conviction.\textsuperscript{12}

In a recent examination of far right terrorism in the US, triggered by Beam’s ideology, terrorism expert Gregory A. Walker stated:

A disturbing new offender profile is emerging with every successful terrorist attack within the United States. This profile is unlike the European offender model with its step-by-step progression involving the making of identification of a terrorist. The US model, as represented by bombers Timothy McVeigh, Eric Robert-Rudolf, James Leroy Moody and alleged abortion doctor sniper James Kopp, takes the form of violent actions being perpetrated independently by individuals with little or no ties with one particular group or ideology.

The analysis concludes:

Today’s terrorist actors seek no formal ties to any one composer’s organization, and indeed the composer may not invite such affiliation. Current FBI thinking concludes it is not possible nor effective to attempt to identify the new breed of offender by targeting extremist organizations and their followers. Ongoing case histories show those carrying out terrorist strikes in the US seldom have such traditionalist links, nor are they interested in being so categorized.\textsuperscript{13}

Much the same can be said of international terrorism which is now dominated by actions inspired by religious fervor. The shift is “from well-organized, localized groups supported by state-sponsors to loosely organized international networks of terrorists... This shift parallels a change from primarily politically motivated terrorism to terrorism that is more religiously or ideologically motivated.”\textsuperscript{14}
The State Department notes that the greatest terrorist threat comes from
the Middle East and southeast Asia (with Afghanistan and Pakistan the primary
sources). Here terrorism is almost completely Islamist. Islamist terrorists have
also adopted the network form, with disparate actors coming together to
commit a terrorist act. The GIA bombings in France in the early 1990s were
carried out by a networked organization with its command and control center
in London, safe-housing in Belgium and targets in France. Likewise the
American Jihad group of Shaykh Omar ‘Abd al-Rahman was composed of
members from disparate backgrounds, as is the al-Qa’ida group of Usama bin
Ladin, which was responsible for bombing the US embassies in East Africa in
1998, and the group arrested by police in January 2001 in Germany, Italy and
the UK, who were allegedly plotting to blow up the Strasbourg Cathedral.

Islamists have successfully demonstrated that geographical dispersion
provides the security that a rigid hierarchy does not. Hamas constitutes yet
another example of the network format, compared with, for instance, the
hierarchical format of Arafat’s al-Fatah. Hamas has separated its political and
military wings, and its leadership is divided between Gaza and (until their
exclusion) Jordan and now Syria. Yet, some of its political direction and most
of its fund-raising has been carried out in the US whilst its publications are
partly produced in the UK.\textsuperscript{15}

It must be stated, however, that Islamists have been more effective in their
coordination and networking than have the far right. The latter, particularly in
the US and Germany, have been unable to follow through with their stated
goals, and currently pose no effective terrorist challenge to the state. Because it
has been so individualistic and random, it has taken on a self-destructive and
nihilistic character. Islamists, even without state backing, have coordinated
terrorism transnationally in pursuit of pre-determined goals. Criminal activity by
Algerian Islamists in Canada and the UK to finance terrorism in a second
country, while retaining command and control in a third country, indicates a
sophisticated level of networking which so far the far right has been unable to
achieve.

Third, the networked form is assisted by the growing use of information
and communication technologies (ICTs). ICTs enable extremists to
communicate covertly and to bridge distances, and the far right was the first to
understand its potential. According to US far right expert Ken Stern, the use of
ICTs was one of the major reasons the militia movement expanded so rapidly.\textsuperscript{16}
A movement eschewing an organized national center or leadership nevertheless
needed to communicate its ideas and plans. The vast size of America
represented no communication problem for the new medium and meant that
an activist in a remote state in the Pacific North West could be as involved in
the movement as one on the east coast or deep south.

The former "Net Nazi Number One" Milton John Kleim, jr. described
these benefits, thus:
All my comrades and I, none of whom I have ever met face to face, share a unique camaraderie, feeling as though we have been friends for a long time. Selfless cooperation occurs regularly amongst my comrades for a variety of endeavors. This feeling of comradeship is irrespective of national identity or state borders. 17

ICTs allow the publication of material which in hard copy format would be illegal. They also allow encryption, thus frustrating the efforts of law enforcement agencies to investigate their plans.

Islamists have also seized on the advantages offered by ICTs, which allow advanced communications within the diaspora and between the military and religious leadership and their followers. As Middle East terrorism researcher Yehudit Barsky writes:

In contrast to the heavily surveilled, oppressive atmosphere within most Middle Eastern countries, terrorist leaders who have relocated in the West face no difficulties in acquiring state-of-the-art communications technology. They have spread throughout the West to make use of ever more advanced modes of communication – audio tapes, video tapes, fax machines, and now the Internet. 18

ICTs also allow diffused command and control previously only available within a single-theatre organization. In the early 1990s Hamas was able to collect and analyze field reports from Gaza in Chicago and send the resultant operational orders back to Gaza. 19

Fourth, the new terrorist frequently does not claim responsibility for the action and may even deny it. It is the act that is important and not the claim to it, exemplified in the 1998 East African bombings. The terrorism of the 1970s and 1980s was often marked by the issuing of post-factum communiqués, and indeed with the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and other terrorist groups, the issuing of coded warnings beforehand. The new terrorist intends to strike, and to go on striking without publicity for himself or his cause, until he is caught. He does not need to claim responsibility perhaps because he acknowledges only God as his master, and God has seen his action. No one else matters.

Willie Ray Lampley believes he is a brigadier general in the US militia and a prophet of God. His group was following God’s orders when its members assembled a huge fertilizer bomb last year in Oklahoma… The FBI says Lampley, his wife, Cecilia, 49 and three other men planned to blow up an office of the Anti-Defamation League or the Southern Poverty Law Center. Lampley disputes that… “I was working as a prophet of God.”
It transpired that one of Lampley’s co-conspirators was on the FBI payroll, and following Lampley’s conviction in 1996 he stated:

We were taught by other people involved with the militia that cells are small groups of people who can act independently… the smaller amount of people that know about what you’re doing, the better off you are.\(^{20}\)

Fifth, many of the new terrorists are amateurs or operate on a part-time basis. The terrorism of the 1970s and 1980s was characterized by professionalism in the sense that many of its actors had dropped out of society to concentrate on this activity. European anti-capitalist groups, in particular, were frequently composed of people living in communes. Therefore, law enforcers only had to infiltrate the commune to find out what their plans were. With the lone terrorist or small cell, this is now impossible.

It has been noted that law enforcement and security agencies now complain that while the new terrorists may have religious or quasi-religious motives they are not linked to any organization, have no base, raise their own funds and attack soft targets, leaving no trace. This has been described by Rand Corporation Director Bruce Hoffman as “a more amorphous, enigmatic, form of terrorism.”\(^{21}\)

Sixth, the new terrorism, especially religiously-impelled terrorism, does not confine itself to boundaries and possesses a terrifying lethality. When terrorism was backed by states, there were limits to the extent to which the perpetrators would go. These inhibitions no longer apply. Frequently the old terrorism sought out representative targets and made its point by one or two surgical strikes. The new terrorism tends to go for the highest possible body count (e.g., the Oklahoma City bombing, 1995; the World Trade Center bombing, 1993; and the Tokyo sarin gas attack, 1995). Some recent cases did involve covert state-sponsored terrorism, e.g., the explosion of Pan Am 102 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988, and of the UTA flight over Chad in August 1989, both perpetrated by Libya; and the bombing of the AMIA building in Buenos Aires in 1994, in which Iran is regarded as culpable, but these tend to be exceptions.

Not only are Islamists driven by religious motives, but also the American far right. The influence of Christian “Identity” ideology is vital to our understanding of modern far right terrorism. Christian “Identity” adherents believe that the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant is the true descendant of the lost tribes of Israel and that the Jews are impostors. They and the “Mud” people (Blacks and Asians) are polluting America and/or Europe, and their influence must be stopped. An even more extreme and violent variant of this is also emerging. Evidence suggests that several acts of terrorism in the US in recent years were committed by the Army of God, or the Phineas Priesthood. The Army of God is violently opposed to abortion, gays and lesbians, and promotes white supremacist teachings. It believes that government (including local
government) is the enemy to be attacked. The term “Army of God” was first coined in 1982 and the group is believed to have been responsible for a series of terrorist acts. Eric Robert Rudolf, for example, still sought in connection with the Olympics Centennial Park bombing (1996), was connected to the Army of God.22

The Phineas Priesthood, guided by Richard Kelly Hoskins’ book *Vigilantes of Christendom: The Story of the Phineas Priesthood*, perverts the biblical story of Phineas (Numbers, Ch. 25) to promote the idea of violence against Jews, abortion clinics and banks, *inter alia*. However the Phineas Priesthood cannot be classified as an extremist organization, since it has no organizational system at all, although its adherents, who take it upon themselves to carry out “God’s will” are thought to have been responsible for a series of terrorist acts, starting in 1963 with the murder of civil rights leader Medgar Evers.23

The World Church of the Creator (WCOTC) is yet another white supremacist group which believes itself to be a religion carrying out God’s work. Unlike the Phineas Priesthood or the Army of God, the WCOTC now has chapters throughout the world, including Australia and Scandinavia. An attempt to establish a British branch in the early 1990s failed partly as a consequence of police action, but the British National Party (BNP) still advertises its publications.24

The threat from the “religiously impelled” American far right and Islamists will continue for as long as its respective leaders make statements such as the following:

> There are Americans who care about these things as much as I do. And by God, we intend to do something about these things, even if we have to do it Timothy McVeigh’s way. I hope it doesn’t come to that, but we will break the grip of these Jews and their collaborators on our society.25

> ... their only strategic agenda is to wage *jihad* in order to reconstitute the Muslim community” (*ummah*) beyond the national and ethnic divides; hence their support for the various *jihad* at the periphery of the Muslim world: Kashmir, the Philippines, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Bosnia and so forth. In this sense, they are genuinely global... and quite logically, they recruit among uprooted cosmopolite, “de-territorialized” militants, themselves a sociological product of globalization: many migrated in order to find employment or education opportunities, they easily travel and change their citizenship. In their use of English, computers, satellite phones and other technology, they are an authentic product of the modern, globalized world. Their battlefield is the whole world from New Jersey to the Philippines.26

**Conclusion**

Terrorism is changing and acquiring new dimensions. The sometimes state-backed terrorism of the 1970s and 1980s, which grew out of observable and
publicized protest movements, has been replaced by the new terrorism. Its development at the micro, actor, level is more difficult to observe and analyze. The process which resulted in the political or religious extremist evolving into a terrorist has been foreshortened by easy access to technology and the materiel required to commit the act of terror. Moreover this process is now likely to take place in cyberspace, in a training camp or in a madrasa (Islamic religious seminary). Obviously, those attracted to extremist causes are, a priori, discontented or frustrated with the world as they see it, but the consequences of their conversion are likely to be played out in anonymity or in another country. The perpetrator will have left less of a trail and his contacts will be harder to find. His funding, if he requires any at all, may have been provided by a legitimate enterprise or from the proceeds of crime, but he is less likely to have a criminal record and therefore to be known to law enforcement agencies.

While the new terrorism still fundamentally resembles the old, the most dramatic difference lies in the diffusion of the groups involved and therefore the ability to track and interdict them. This poses a new and additional challenge, particularly to non-state targets such as Jewish communities. Penetrating such nomadic and amorphous networks requires a determined effort by national law enforcement agencies and coordination among them, which was lacking until recently.

NOTES

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.


11. Bufford Furrow, a former member of the Aryan Nations, was sentenced to life imprisonment in March 2001 for a shooting attack on a Jewish community center in Los Angeles in August 1999; James Kopp was arrested in March 2001 in France and has since been charged with the assassination of legal abortionist Dr. Barnett Slepian in New York in October 1998.


15. Filastin al-Muslima, the main Hamas paper, is published in London, as is Palestine Times, whose editorial line is pro-Hamas.


23. Richards, “Domestic Terrorism.”

24. In Spearhead, the monthly journal published by John Tyndall in support of the BNP.


BOOK REVIEWS
BOOK REVIEWS


Though differing in approach and theoretical discussion, both books are valuable contributions to the understanding of the extreme right. The standard problems faced by researchers when embarking on studies of the extreme right are present in both volumes, namely, those of definition and conceptual framework.

In The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe, editor Sabrina P. Ramet, one of the most prolific authors on Eastern Europe in general, has written the first chapter on “Defining the Radical Right.” Her main assertion is that the radical right is characterized by “organized intolerance” of “the Other.” In a sweeping tour d'horizon, Ramet outlines the characteristics of the extreme right in Central and Eastern Europe, concluding that it is not only hostile to the democratic process, but is populist, nationalist and obsessed by conspiracy theories. According to Ramet, “organized intolerance” in the post-communist states is divided into five sub-groups: ultra-nationalist, fascist or crypto-fascist, clerical, ultra-conservative and radical populist (pp. 24–5). Groups that fit into one of these categories, she claims, can be regarded as belonging to the far right. However, her attempt to label groups is risky, since the political map of the area is dynamic, and parties frequently redefine themselves. Thus, her placement of the Hungarian Independent Smallholders and Civic Party, led by Jozsef Torgyan, in the “radical populist” category is problematic because the party has toned down its extremist rhetoric since it joined the coalition government after the 1998 election (see Hungary). In his study on Hungary, written before that election, Hungarian historian Laszlo Karsai, referring to this party, writes that “one of the important political functions of the radical right is that it enables the slightly more moderate right to appear as a sober force, able to govern.” In light of the aforesaid, it might well be asked whether this party should be classified as part of the “radical right,” which as implied by Karsai, is divided between those worthy of governing and those who are not.

The country-by-country analysis in Ramet’s book enables the various authors to examine more closely the troubled waters of the post-communist era. All chapters include in their title the words “the radical right.” Most present an analysis and narrative of post-communist politics and societies, but lack a
conceptual framework. The main exception is Michael Shafir’s chapter, “The Mind of Romania’s Radical Right,” which uses the model he developed in several studies, distinguishing between parties of “radical continuity” and those of “radical return.” The “radical return” parties look to the values associated with the interwar years, emulating figures such as Tiso, Antonescu, Pavelic, Szalasi and Codreanu; the “radical continuity” ones take their “bearings from the communist legacy itself” (p. 213).

Shafir’s study, which is the soundest, points out that conspiracy theories involving the Jews are central to the ideologies of many radical right parties in East and Central European states. His discussion of the Greater Romania Party is especially important since it became the second largest party after the 2000 general elections.

Discussion of ethnic hatred, especially antisemitism, figures in all chapters in various forms. In his chapter on Poland, David Ost states that “disliking Jews serves little political purpose today,” which explains the failure of political parties that have targeted Jews. Although he refers to the debates in Poland on the past and present role of antisemitism in Polish society and to antisemitic statements by Church leaders such as Father Jankowski from Gdansk, these are not presented in the context of the “radical right,” since the people concerned do not belong to extremist organizations.

The chapter on Hungary by Laszlo Karsai examines in depth post-communist antisemitism, but some of his conclusions seem rather too optimistic. Karsai writes that “what sets apart Istvan Csurka and his tiny little Hungarian Justice and Life Party from the ‘real’ extreme right is that they rarely, if ever, use abusive language about Jews in the public [tár]”. Since Csurka’s party entered parliament, the center-right coalition has not clearly denounced Csurka’s line, and more importantly, Csurka’s weekly Magyar Forum has become a mouthpiece for vehement attacks on a variety of issues related to conspiracy theories, Jewish power, Jewish financial interests and the role of Jewish communists. In a typical article published on 14 December 2000, Magyar Forum wrote of “Satan’s agents,” who “live here in Hungary, speak Hungarian but hate us. Money is their God... The look in their eyes, the pale skin, sweaty palms, cold feet, twisted smile betrays them. They can be found all over the world.”

Frank Cibulka’s study of Slovakia discusses the Tiso cult and its role among the various formations of the radical right. Anti-Roma, anti-Hungarian and antisemitic groups have played a major role in the difficult transition of the Slovak Republic to the post-communist era, especially in the Meciar years when the Slovak National Party (belonging to the “radical return” category, according to Shafir’s model), was in the government coalition. Cibulka analyzes the anti-minority stance of extremist formations, but underplays the role of xenophobic discourse in securing their legitimacy.
Ivan Grdesic's study on Croatia is useful in understanding patterns of continuity and change in Croat nationalism and radical right activity. The attempts to deny the fascist character of the wartime Croat state and the rehabilitation of persons and ideas linked to the Ustasha were evident during the Tudjman years.

Two chapters are devoted to Russia and Ukraine. Both present a solid overview of Pamyat and of Zhirinovskii’s Liberal Democratic Party, as well as other radical groups that emerged in both states. In contrast to the studies on Romania and Hungary, both chapters are based more on an analysis of election performance and less on the nature of the far right-wing discourse.

The various chapters also focus on the personal impact of the area’s post-communist leaders, such as Milosevic, Tudjman and Meciar, who manipulated extremist views. All three were in power when the book was published. As the analyses of the political situation were made at the time of their writing, the effect of changes could not have been taken into consideration. Thus, it might be asked what would happen to Serbian, Croat and Slovak extremism when those fueling ethno-centrist feelings were removed from power by one means or another.

Roger Griffin’s excellent “Afterword” sums up the various arguments from the studies, and offers useful thoughts, for example on the chapters “Taxing Taxonomy” and “Ethnocracy - The Fascism of the Postwar Era?”

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The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties has a much broader geographical focus, including also countries such as the United States and South Africa. The chapters on Western Europe and Eastern Europe provide the reader with a broad comparative framework. In the first two chapters, Peter H. Merkl and Piero Ignazi present some reflections on the revival of the radical right in Europe, and a survey of the extreme right in Europe, respectively. While both studies argue that postwar far right extremism is unlike interwar right extremism, Michael Minkenberg, in “The New Right in France and Germany. Nouvelle Droite, Neue Rechte, and the New Radical Parties,” contends that the difference is not as great as one might think. He speaks of the prospects of Weimarization of contemporary European politics. According to Peter Merkl in the Introduction, the specter of “Weimarization” haunts Russia more than other countries of Europe; however, comparisons between Russia and Western Europe are in some respects an “overkill” of the subject. Vera Tolz, too, in her examination of Russia, rejects the comparison with Weimar (p. 197) as “superficial... with striking similarities notwithstanding.”

Fortunately, the volume does not adhere to a single conceptual approach to and definition of right-wing extremism in the 1990s, since a wide spectrum of issues and areas are involved. However, a conceptual framework may be found
in some chapters, such as Thomas S. Szayna’s study on post-communist Central Europe. The author defines the extreme right as “political movements characterized by suspect allegiance or downright rejection of pluralism and democratic institutions, combined with a proclivity towards authoritarian modes of rule” (p. 113). The author does not underestimate the role of antisemitism in the extremists’ discourse; for example, when discussing Slovakia he writes of “deep anti-Semitism, both religious and ethnic-based [which] pervades the views of the Slovak extreme right” (p. 129).

Problems of definition continue to haunt this volume as well. According to Szayna, Csurka has “professed clearly extreme nationalist views that bordered on neo-fascist” (p. 139). In contrast to Laszlo Karsai’s study mentioned above, the author does not focus on the antisemitism of the extreme right, but on the extremists’ political manipulation of anti-Roma and anti-Hungarian attitudes, as well as other ethnic issues, in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania.

The study on Romania by Henry F. Carey uses Michael Shafir’s model of the “radical return” and “radical continuity” to distinguish between the various movements and their points of reference. Carey describes the early years of the Antonescu cult in Romania and the vitriolic antisemitic language used by the Greater Romania Party, both of which continue in 2001 (see Romania).

Most of the chapters refer to the conspiracy theories that abound, especially in post-communist states such as Russia, where “ideologists of the right have to promote fantastic CIA and Judeo-Masonic plots” (Vera Tolz, p. 197). Such language is central to the discourse of Csurka’s Hungarian Justice and Life Party and to that of Romanian extremists, especially the Greater Romania Party.

Leonard Weinberg’s “The American Right in Comparative Perspective” offers some very interesting and challenging views on the emergence of the radical right in the US, using sources up to 1993. His conclusion is that “if a Euro-American radical right has not emerged as yet, one certainly appears to be on the horizon” (p. 251). His data on race crimes and hate violence indicated a rising trend up to 1993.

Both books provide valuable information and ideas on the “radical right” and “right-wing extremism.” As in most volumes authored by several writers, there are marked differences between the level of studies and the conceptual frameworks used. The comparative approach in the volume edited by Merkl and Weinberg is the stronger of the two, both in terms of analogies between historical periods and between regions and states.

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The dramatic and widespread intensification of antisemitism since October 2000 – both propagandistic and violent – could promptly render a book published that year obsolete. Still, Chaim Ufaz, until recently director of the publication service in the Ministry of Education Information Center in Israel, presents the general readership with a solid and helpful book. His work remains relevant because his goal was not to produce a basic textbook for the study of antisemitism, its roots and development, but rather “to survey the events and tendencies that characterize this phenomenon during recent years, and to concentrate on a number of issues and aspects that are of public interest in Israel and abroad.”

The survey includes six chapters: antisemitism as a reflection of recent political and social developments, especially in Europe; Holocaust denial; the Holy See; antisemitism in the Arab world; the restitution of Jewish property; and a very short chapter on the use of the Internet.

Indeed, each issue has undergone developments in recent years. The attitude toward foreigners, especially foreign workers, created tensions within the rich industrial European countries, which try to tackle the problem by means of legislation without violating basic human rights. On the other hand, right-wing extremists promptly pointed out the threat of the influx of foreigners to national and local cultural structures, thought to be the traditional adversaries of international Jewry. Myth and memory are examined in democracies such as Germany, Austria and Holland as well as in the former Soviet republics, challenged by their fascist and communist past.

Holocaust denial has suffered a number of blows recently: the visit by Pope John Paul II to Yad Vashem and his position on antisemitism and racism in general; the Stockholm First International Forum on the Holocaust; commemoration dates set across the world – notably 29 January, the day Auschwitz was liberated – and the establishment of institutions for teaching the lessons of World War II; and David Irving’s failed libel suit in a British court, which declared him a racist, a falsifier of historical facts and a promoter of Hitler.

Antisemitism in the Arab world, imported from Western Christian societies and adapted to the needs of the political-military-territorial Middle East struggle, as extreme Muslim movements perceive them, and the incorporation of Christian anti-Jewish motifs into the educational systems of Arab countries, particularly in the Palestinian Authority, are dealt with, alongside the issue of
Jewish property, and the possible impact of all these factors on the recent increase in antisemitic activity.

Could the topics Ufaz chose as being relevant to the State of Israel and its citizens as well as to Jewish communities and individuals abroad, be presented objectively by a civil servant, working in a center affiliated with the Ministry of Education? Does he possess the conceptual framework and a familiarity with comparative studies? Ufaz did not, in fact, presume to reach a level of academic analysis, and his work is a fair and intelligent presentation of information on recent developments, neither emotional nor politically slanted. If his goal was to reach an interested readership, providing it with a solid background for further discussion – then one could say it was fully achieved. His style in Hebrew is fluent and devoid of errors, and the printing and cover are remarkably aesthetic. The author uses the most relevant sources for the study of contemporary antisemitism, which he indicates in an adequate manner.

Out of the six chapters of the book, the first two (dealing with recent political and social developments as a background, and Holocaust denial) are the largest, about 50 pages each; the others are shorter, presenting information rather than analyzing it. The author is at his best in the first, describing the support gained by the extreme right movement. Right-wing extremism, says the author, was cemented by the foreign worker problem, around which they could gather public support; societies absorbing various ethnic minorities, in an atmosphere of doubt regarding the future of the national culture, are bound to breed xenophobia. Unemployment, economic stress and unrest all lead to embittered citizens, who feel the establishment has forsaken them, while strangers invade their economic, cultural and social spaces. The extreme right takes advantage of this situation, blaming every local malady on the newcomers.

Ufaz fares well in analyzing the connection between European societies and their attitudes toward “the Other,” and less well in pointing out the role and place of antisemitism in these attitudes. “It is self-evident that antisemitism is part of hatred of foreigners,” he says (p. 13), because the foreigner is the symbol of the invading Other, who uses the language, tools and customs of the host society to destroy its values from within. True – yet it seems that this explanation has been coupled recently with a more modern one: fear of globalization and of international and European unions, portrayed by the extreme right as an attempt, led by the Jews, to destroy traditional national structures, with the supposed profits going to the Jews and their state.

Occasionally the prose is overemotional. Describing antisemitism as “a virus that is carried by the wind and infects national entities” and that it “causes epidemics,” is out of place (pp. 9 and 53). Another example is the title “The Jew as a Scapegoat Is Still Here to Be Used” (p. 42), as well as the clichés “Every antisemite has his own Jews” (p. 27), and “Antisemitism in Russia raised its head” (p. 48). Names of individuals, groups and places, in their original non-
Hebrew form, were not always given in full. Aside from these points, this work soberly describes painful issues for a wide readership.

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BOOKS RECEIVED


Probing the Depth of German Antisemitism is a collection of essays on various aspects of antisemitism in Nazi Germany in the years preceding the “Final Solution.” With Daniel J. Goldhagen’s controversial Hitler’s Willing Executioners in the background, the essays assembled in this collection analyze the depth and extent of radical antisemitism in German society under the Nazi regime. The contributors probed the antisemitic policy of the Nazi party on the national and regional level, as well as the attitudes of German society toward the official anti-Jewish policy. They examine the popular response and the reaction of specific segments of German society, such as Germany’s elite, churches, workers, Social Democrats and the local resistance, as well as the participation of “ordinary German” in the persecutions.


German antisemitism as the unique seedbed of the Holocaust is a proposition debated by scholars of modern antisemitism and the Holocaust. In recent years the debate has intensified considerably in the wake of Daniel J. Goldhagen’s arguable thesis of the eliminationist character of antisemitism in Germany. The essays included in German Antisemitism analyze numerous aspects of modern antisemitism in Germany preceding the Nazi era. The five topics include: a comparison of antisemitism in Germany with countries such as France and an examination of the conceptual linkage between antisemitism in the Second Reich and the Weimar Republic and the annihilation of the Jews; an analysis of the attitudes of several defined cultural and political minorities, such as Catholics and Social Democrats, toward Jews and antisemitism; the role of antisemitism in the intellectual and cultural life of Germany; antisemitism in local perspective during the period of the Weimar republic, in cities such as Hamburg, Nuremberg and Dusseldorf; and the antisemitic experiences of Jews in the Weimar Republic era, based on the recollections of Jews who lived in Germany in the interwar years.

The work of Pavol Mestan, Director of the Museum of Jewish Culture in Bratislava, is one of the first monographs to be published on antisemitism in the former communist states during the first decade of transition. Mestan gives both an analytical and a chronological framework for the discussion of such topics as the image of the Jew in the Slovak Republic, the background to antisemitism in Slovakia and the various attempts by nationalist elements to rehabilitate wartime fascist leader Jozef Tiso, his ideas and regime. Mestan presents a broad picture of the various forces active in Slovak politics after 1989, and especially after the split from the Czech Republic in 1993. The key role of émigrés from the West in the revival of antisemitism and Slovak extremism is portrayed against the background of the emergence of post-communist Slovak politics and the formation of new parties and movements. Slovak extremism, its discourse and its role in the media are all discussed. While there is no comparative analysis with other post-communist states, such as Romania, Hungary or Croatia – where the rehabilitation of the past and attitudes toward the Holocaust are similar – the volume does break new ground in the research of post-communist antisemitism and extremism. The English translation from the Slovak enables the Western reader to study patterns of Slovak antisemitism written by a local scholar who has a broad knowledge of Slovak realities and access to a wide variety of sources.


The attitude of the Argentinean Catholic Church toward the Jews and Judaism is surveyed in this book, which covers the years 1933 until the end of World War II, the period of the Nazi Holocaust of the Jews. The book begins with an examination of the attitude of the Church toward antisemitism and proceeds to its views on Nazism, the war and the Holocaust.

Antisemitism in the Argentinean Church was based on the anti-Jewish theological position held by priests and intellectual Catholic laymen close to the Church hierarchy. The historical continuum of traditional and modern antisemitism is described. Influential Catholic writers and the clergy gave credence to The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, while the lower clergy used the terms “Jew” and “communist” synonymously. After the coup d’état of June 1943, the antisemitic measures taken by the state meant that the conjunction of the aims of army and the Church would produce a “Catholic Argentina.” Naturally, the Catholic Church opposed Jewish immigration to the country,
which would have upset this homogeneity. In the 1930s and 1940s the antisemitism of the lower clergy was expressed in parochial bulletins, while intellectual Catholics had a strong influence on society in general, partly through their contributions to Catholic newspapers and journals. The author examines the theological antisemitism of those years during which Pius XII maintained his silence on the issue.

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GENERAL ANALYSIS
GENERAL ANALYSIS

OVERVIEW

The scope and violence of the antisemitic wave that swept Europe and North America concurrent with the second intifada, beginning in autumn 2000, was regarded by some Jewish leaders as unprecedented since World War II. This, in spite of the fact that in terms of numbers, 1994 was the worst year for violent antisemitism, witnessing 300 such incidents (the year 1993 was not far behind with 270 incidents), whereas in 2000, 255 cases were recorded: 66 major attacks (involving the use of a weapon, including knives and stones, or arson) and 189 other major violent incidents. Why, then, was it perceived as the worst year since 1945?

First, the many events which took place within a brief period, namely in October and November 2000, altered familiar patterns. The 1990s opened with an increase in the number of antisemitic incidents, due largely to the Gulf War. The period 1995–97 was relatively quiet, whereas 1998–99 were years of intensified antisemitic activity. Yet even this escalation was dwarfed by the year 2000 when major violent attacks more than doubled, from 32 in 1999 to 66, as stated, and other acts of violence increased by 50 percent, from 114 to 189. Thus, at the end of the decade, the achievements reached after 1994, thanks to better legislation and law enforcement, as well as intensified police activity and increased public awareness, seem to have been erased. It should be noted that during 1995–97 antisemitism, along with racism and xenophobia, was regarded by Jewish organizations as well as by governmental agencies, especially in democratic countries, as part of the global threat to public order.

The steep rise in numbers of cases perpetrated against Jews between 1999 and 2000 was not paralleled by anti-foreigner hostility. Moreover, 180 of these acts were concentrated in about six weeks, beginning during the High Holidays, and were directed mostly against synagogues and worshipers (about 60 in France alone), evoking concern that Jews and their religious sites might once again be considered easy prey.

The numerous threats, insults and calls to kill Jews, made in public speeches, in the media and on the Internet (which is used for anti-Jewish propaganda and for coordination among radical groups and individuals) were not included in the numbers presented here because of the difficulty in counting them. Moreover, the situation should not be analyzed by number of cases, but by their severity and the level of violence. Serious incidents, in which several people were killed, such as the attack in Pittsburgh in April or the complete razing of a synagogue, such as in Tashkent, Buchara, or Trappes (in the
Versailles region), characterized the events of the year, although this tendency was already manifest in 1998–99.

Since the wave of antisemitism in 2000 was evidently inspired by the Palestinian intifada, which began in late September, one of the main issues analyzed here will be the link between events in the Middle East and Jews worldwide, and the relations between extremist Muslims and radical right-wing antisemitic activity. There is little doubt that the rise in antisemitic violence during the first years of the 1990s originated in Muslim extremist groups in Europe and the Americas and was connected to Middle East events. Yet it should be emphasized that during those years right-wing radicals, too, following their own agenda, were active against Jews and foreigners alike, especially in Europe. When, during the mid-1990s, curtailing the activities of extreme rightists was the primary concern of the police and of legislative action, Muslim violence against Jewish targets came to the fore, despite the fact that in the Middle East the years 1995–97 following the Oslo accords were relatively quiet ones. In 1998–99, the ideological and active resurgence of the extreme right, both in Europe and the United States, resulted in a large number of casualties. This tendency continued during 2000, until October, when neo-Nazis were arrested in Germany and Switzerland where it was discovered that they were stockpiling weapons for future actions in these countries and in others. Up to October some 90 cases of extreme right violence were recorded.

Since October Muslim activity has predominated. Nevertheless, increased efforts by the extreme right, possibly inspired and encouraged by Muslims, and of the extreme left, now revived after its decline in the 1970s, should not be ruled out. The central issue discussed in the following pages is whether cooperation between Muslims and rightists, hinted at in former years, will intensify.

Muslim attacks on Jews and synagogues in October and November were labeled as the work of individuals, motivated by identification with their counterparts in the Middle East and by deep religious emotions. Relating to these findings, Henri Hajdenberg, president of the Jewish communities in France, claimed that the attacks did not constitute an antisemitic wave, but a spontaneous outburst by frustrated immigrants living on the fringes of society. Yet, antisemitism had been evidenced previously by non-organized individuals from such circles. Comparisons to pre-World War II realities are not valid since radical circles, lacking pre-war charismatic leadership or ideologies, embrace instead so-called leaderless resistance: acting individually or in small groups that are easily organized and hard to expose, in the attempt to enforce a basic “anti-foreigner” worldview.

Another claim raised by observers was that the antisemitic outburst was rooted in religious feelings. According to this view, visits by non-Muslims to the courtyard of the al-Aqsa mosque and the Temple Mount, ignited the fire; thus, the violent reactions were directed mainly against Jewish religious sites
and worshipers. This scenario brings to mind the prediction of Prof. Samuel P. Huntington of Harvard University that the next world clash would be one of civilizations, religions and cultures, principally between Islam and the West, represented by Jews and Israelis.

The violent incidents of October soon died down. The question, then, concerns the linkage between local interests of Muslim European and American communities and Muslim extremists recruiting support for their needs and using familiar antisemitic modes of operation. It should be remembered that October, a month of Jewish holidays, has for many years been the worst period for antisemitic incidents, because gatherings in closed buildings constitute an easy target. The fact that this was the common practice of Nazi troopers adds a darker significance to the present occurrences.

The year 2000 began with several hopeful signs: the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust, the clear-cut condemnation of Holocaust denier David Irving by a British court, and the visit of Pope John Paul II to Israel, including Yad Vashem. But the tide quickly turned: Irving was hailed as a hero by his admirers, the Vatican high echelons did not condemn the violent antisemitic attacks worldwide (although the Anglicans, for instance, did), and Jewish radical leftist anti-Zionist manifestations, such as Prof. Norman Finkelstein's book *The Holocaust Industry*, were enthusiastically welcomed, especially in Germany, and by the extreme right in particular. True to its sub-title, "Reflection on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering," the essay claims that the Holocaust is being exploited by American Jewish organizations to promote economic and political interests and by Israel for its anti-Palestinian policies. His arguments, even though completely refuted by serious researchers and publicists, have rekindled the image of the manipulative, greedy, power-hungry Jew.

During 2000 the Holocaust and antisemitism were important issues in election campaigns and the public discourse in several countries. The Jedwabne affair, for instance, triggered a stormy public debate, hitherto unknown in intensity in postwar Poland: the brutal torture and burning alive of 1,600 Jews of the shetle by their Polish neighbors in 1941, revealed in a recently published research work, shocked Polish society because the Poles had not considered themselves killers in World War II. Still, the familiar pretext of Jewish collaboration with the Soviet occupiers prior to the German invasion, was reused in the debate.

In Greece, ultra-right-wing members of parliament sympathetic to the Greek Orthodox Church blamed world Jewry for the socialist government's decision to erase religious affiliation from state-issued identity cards, as requested by the European Community. Following a huge demonstration orchestrated by the Church and extreme right-wing circles, the small Jewish community suffered intimidation and vandalism.
In Romania, the chauvinist antisemitic Greater Romania Party became the second largest party in the parliament, with 21 percent of the vote, following the general election of 25 November, although its leader Corneliu Vadim Tudor was defeated in the second round of the presidential elections. In December, two visitors, who demanded to see “Auschwitz soap” with their own eyes, choked and seriously injured the security guard of the Jewish Historical Museum in Bucharest and vandalized the premises.

In recent years antisemitism has been a major political weapon of the nationalist and the communist opposition in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The new Russian president, Vladimir Putin, has restricted the activities of the extreme right and hence the number of antisemitic incidents in 2000 was lower than in 1999. However, hundreds of antisemitic publications can be openly purchased, and Jewish leaders are concerned about Putin’s authoritarian regime, which might diminish the involvement of world Jewish organizations and of Israel in Jewish life in Russia.

The severity of the situation in 2000, especially its last months, prompted Jewish leaders to express their fear that the immediate memory of the Holocaust and World War II, which had set certain taboos and barriers against antisemitism, was beginning to fade, opening the door to a new and more dangerous era for the Jewish people.

**ANTISEMITIC MANIFESTATIONS WORLDWIDE AS A COROLLARY OF THE AL-AQSA INTIFADA**

During the year 2000 events in the Middle East and in the world converged, igniting concurrently anti-Israel as well as antisemitic manifestations. In the first part of the year, issues beyond the scope of the Middle East were brought into the Middle East discourse, triggering debates that combined anti-Israel with anti-Jewish expressions. In the last quarter of the year, however, after the outbreak of the Palestinian *al-Aqsa intifada*, events in the Middle East were extended to other parts of the world.

The aim of this survey is to investigate the link between the *intifada* and the dramatic wave of antisemitic incidents worldwide in the autumn of 2000. It will discuss the impact of Islamic antisemitic agitation, as well as the part played by extremist Muslims in perpetrating violent incidents. In addition, it will examine the role of extreme left and extreme right activists in these occurrences.

**Islamic Agitation and Antisemitic Incidents**

Over 250 violent antisemitic incidents against Jewish sites worldwide were perpetrated in the weeks that followed the outbreak of the *intifada* at the end of September. In contrast to former Arab-Israeli clashes, the main targets of these attacks were not institutions identified with the State of Israel, but Jews and Jewish sites. These acts of violence indicated a strong linkage between Arab and
Muslim communities and events in the Middle East, and perceived identification on the part of these communities between the Jews and Israel.

The incidents took the form of:

- anti-Israel and anti-Jewish incitement, including calls to kill Jews;
- acts of vandalism against synagogues and Jewish buildings;
- physical assaults and harassment of Jews by Arab individuals.

During the first few weeks after the eruption of the al-Aqsa intifada pro-Palestinian demonstrators took to the streets of major cities in the West chanting anti-Israel and anti-Jewish slogans, including the battle cry Ithab al-Yahud (Slaughter the Jews). Responding to this jihad-like atmosphere, some Muslim believers considered themselves to be part of an anti-Jewish crusade. Consequently, violent incidents against Jews and Jewish targets were perpetrated in numerous countries.

Most attacks took place in countries with large Jewish and Muslim communities, notably France, as well as Britain, the US and Canada. In France and Britain alone during the first three weeks of the intifada, six synagogues were burned down and arson attempts were made on another 24 synagogues and Jewish schools. Stones were thrown at people identifiable as Jews, and Jewish schoolchildren were hounded on their way to school. In France the most serious attacks occurred in the Paris area, home to a large Muslim immigrant population from North Africa. On 9 October, a sniper fired an M-16 automatic rifle into the Paris Great Synagogue during the Yom Kippur service.

The UK witnessed a 400 percent rise in anti-Jewish incidents for the month of October compared with the same month in 1999. Synagogues were vandalized in London; for example, the ark and children’s Torah scrolls at the Elstree and Burehamwood synagogues were completely destroyed. In addition, individual Jews were seriously injured following attacks, including a yeshiva student who was stabbed by an Algerian while on a bus, apparently in direct response to incitement by the London-based Islamist group al-Muhajiroun.

Attempts to murder Jews occurred at the same time in other parts of the world as well. In Montreal assailants, reportedly Canadian Arabs, beat a Jew until he lost consciousness and then tried to throw him onto the subway tracks. In New York a Hassidic Jew was stabbed, allegedly by a Palestinian. These incidents in North America were part of a series of violent acts, mostly against Jewish sites, particularly synagogues, such as the Molotov cocktail attack on the Beth Shalom synagogue in Edmonton, Canada, and the arson of Adat Israel synagogue in the Bronx.

In Germany, shortly before Yom Kippur, a crowd of about 100 Palestinian and Lebanese demonstrators tried to storm the old synagogue in Essen, today a Jewish museum and Holocaust memorial center. Other incidents in Germany in October — in which members of the extreme right were involved as well (see below) — included the brutal assault on a Jewish couple in Schwerin, attacks on
synagogues in Dusseldorf and Berlin, desecration of cemeteries, and threats and fake letter bombs addressed to the leaders of the Jewish community.

In Belgium, radical leaders of the local Muslim communities incited anti-Jewish violence. In Antwerp demonstrators shouted anti-Jewish curses and threatened worshipers at a synagogue. In Brussels an elderly Jewish man was hospitalized after being assaulted by Arabs; synagogues and the Holocaust memorial in the Anderlecht quarter were stoned, vandalized or attacked with Molotov cocktails; and the Jewish library in Antwerp was vandalized. Similar events were reported from Salonika; Florence, Venice and Rome; Emmen and Oss in the Netherlands; Madrid; Malmö; Geneva; and Capetown in South Africa, as well as from Latin America. In Mexico City for example, the Beth Jacob school was vandalized. In Venezuela, graffiti equating Jews with Nazis appeared, a message disseminated also by the local media. This campaign was led by FEARAB, the umbrella organization of Arab Muslims. Comparisons were made between the Jews and Hitler, and the Star of David was juxtaposed with the swastika. Antisemitic manifestations were reported from Sao Paulo, Brazil, as well. In October, some 1,500 people marched down Avenida Paulista to the US consulate carrying antisemitic placards saying "Jews=Hitler II."

The Arab/Muslim reaction worldwide to the intifada, particularly in Western Europe and North America, raised several questions, such as: Were the attacks on Jewish targets organized, or were they spontaneous acts of individuals? Were the perpetrators Arabs or Muslims from the local communities or had they come from the Middle East to carry out these attacks? Do these events necessarily prove cooperation or coordination between activists in the Middle East and Muslims in the diaspora? Do the Muslim communities at large condone or support these acts? Why did Muslim communities react so strongly? Did the incidents against the Jews mirror a deeper antagonism within the Muslim and Arab communities? How does the relationship with the Jewish communities reflect the wider dilemma of Arab and Muslim communities in the host societies regarding the question of integration or segregation?

There are no definite answers to most of these questions; some have diverse answers, which not only derive from differing reports, opinions and assessments, but also from the clandestine activity of the groups involved. The following observations throw light on Islamist activity in the world, particularly in Western Europe and North America and on the Muslim communities there.

Most Islamist groups began operating in different parts of the world during the last decade of the 20th century. Members of these groups had fled their countries of origin after committing subversive or terrorist acts for which sentences were passed upon them. Most notable among these groups were the Egyptian Jama'a Islamiyya, the Jihad and the Vanguards of Conquest, the Algerian FIS (Front Islamiique du Salut) and GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé), HUT (Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami) and al-Muhajiroun (see below). All these groups have branches in most European countries, but they enjoyed the greatest
freedom in Britain, which had relatively lenient asylum seeking and extradition laws. Members of Egyptian groups joined the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders, founded in 1998 by Usama bin Ladin, the mastermind behind the terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Tanzania in that same year. These Islamist movements originally directed their activity against their indigenous states which, they claimed, had failed to address pressing socio-economic issues, and against the importation of Western ideologies and values, which were allegedly incompatible with Islamic tradition. Even bin Ladin's paramount aim is still to remove the Saudi royal family because of what he labels their corruption, heresy and collaboration with the Americans. At the same time, hostility toward the Jews is part and parcel of their anti-Western/American worldview.

Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hizbollah are active particularly in Western Europe and the US. They are mainly involved in clandestine activities behind front associations, which raise funds for the movements and mobilize support. Head of Hamas Political Bureau Musa Abu Marzuq spent several years in the US until his arrest in 1995 and deportation in 1997. 'Abdallah Shalah, who replaced Fathi al-Shiqaki, who was assassinated in October 1995, as secretary general of the Islamic Jihad, also studied for several years in Florida. After a series of suicide bombings in 1995 in Israel, President Bill Clinton froze Hamas’ assets in the US. Although Hamas members in Britain were involved in terrorist attacks on Jewish and Israeli targets in 1994, the movement has generally refrained from acting outside Israel.

Two patterns can be discerned in the Arab/Muslim response in the West to the Middle East crisis: a) protests, demonstrations and submission of petitions against Israeli policies, which involved large segments of the Arab and Muslim populations in the West; b) calls for jihad and for killing Jews by leaders of radical Islamist groups, reflecting their own perception of the Arab-Israeli conflict but not necessarily that of the Muslim population at large.

On 13 October Ahmad Abu Halabiyya, a preacher in Gaza, incited Muslims on Palestinian television, claiming that “Almighty Allah” desired them “not to ally themselves with Jews and Christians, not to love them, not to enter into partnerships with them, not to support them, and not to enter into any contract with them.” He went so far as to instruct Muslims “not to pity the Jews but to fight them and to kill them wherever they are to be found.” Omar Bakri Muhammad, the leader of the London-based al-Muhajiroun, a group associated with bin Ladin, issued a fatwa (religious edict), calling for jihad against the Jews, which was disseminated through the Internet. Consequently, Muslim extremist groups organized a poster and leaflet campaign targeting Jews, some explicitly calling for their killing. Leaflets linked to al-Muhajiroun which were distributed in North London apparently led to the stabbing of the yeshiva student in mid-October. In the US, Shaykh Omar 'Abd al-Rahman, spiritual leader of the militant Egyptian Islamist group al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya, who is serving a life
sentence for the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, called on Muslim clerics to issue a fatwa to sanctify the indiscriminate killing of Jews. "Jihad is now a duty for the entire [Islamic] nation until Palestine and the Aqsa mosque are liberated and Jews are either pushed into their graves or back where they came from," declared the shaykh (CNN, 5 Oct.; Jerusalem Post [JP], 6 Oct.)." Hizb ut-Tahrir held a meeting in Copenhagen on 21 October under the banner "Jews Slaughter Muslims in Palestine – Is There a Savior?" Hizb-ut-Tahrir called on Palestinians living in Denmark to jihad. On 29 September, one day after the beginning of the intifada, muezzins in two Brussels mosques called their congregants to take revenge on the Jews. In Spain, a local Moroccan-born imam alleged that "a world without Jews would be a paradise"; that Hitler "only threw insecticide on the worm which was growing in the plant of Germany"; and that Jews opposed peace in the Middle East and only understood "the language of violence." These calls echoed edicts issued in Arab countries, which endorsed suicide attacks and an all-out war against Israel and the Jews to save al-Aqsa and Palestine from Jewish occupation. Violent incidents, however, subsided despite the continuing violence in the territories. The reduction in numbers of attacks may be seen as a result of diminishing media interest in the intifada as well as increased security measures, and of the gradual decline in centrality of the religious dimension.

In contrast to the attacks on Jews and Jewish sites which, based on the evidence gathered so far appear to have been carried out by individuals, the demonstrations were partly organized expressions of popular protest, designed to show solidarity with the Palestinian struggle. The intensive preoccupation of the media with the events and the considerable Muslim/Palestinian propaganda fell on attentive ears. However, the Arab/Muslim response cannot be explained merely in terms of anger at the upsurge of tensions in the Middle East and opposition to Israel’s policies; it was also the result of deep frustration among Muslims over broad social and economic discrimination in Europe, and a renewed attempt by Islamist groups to exploit the situation in order to impose their militant agenda on Muslim communities in the world at large. They perceive the Arab-Israeli conflict as insoluble and the destruction of Israel not only as predetermined but as imperative in order to save humanity and civilization. During crises such as the al-Aqsa intifada, extremist fringe groups tend to gain support, using the opportunity to reassert their agenda. Observers note that whenever there are clashes between Arabs and Israelis, "extremist elements that have targeted Americans, Israelis, Jews and sometimes other identifiable groups are mobilized" (CNN, 5 Oct.). As noted above, the violent incidents against Jews should not be seen as endemic antisemitism, characterizing the entire Muslim and Arab communities throughout the world. In fact, Muslims who are willing to commit themselves to violence against Jews are marginal among these populations.
The strong Arab/Muslim reaction to the intifada was further proof of the power of religion to awaken and mobilize Muslims worldwide. Anthropologist Rema Hamami and sociologist Salim Tamari, both affiliated with Bir Zeit University, claimed that "the idea of shared sovereignty over Haram al-Sahrif [the Temple Mount] raised the sensitive religious dimension – control over a highly contested sacred site – in the public arena (Arab as well as Israeli)." They claimed that by granting a police permit and protection to then opposition leader Ariel Sharon to visit the site, Prime Minister Ehud Barak linked the "humiliating deal offered at Camp David" to the event that galvanized the Palestinian street. In the process, it was inevitable that the protests would take on a religious character. Heavy media emphasis on the religious dimension of the intifada, they asserted, has encouraged popular notions in Israel, in the Arab world and among Muslim communities in the world, that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is "a Jewish-Muslim conflict: eternal and insoluble" (Rema Hamami and Salim Tamari, "Anatomy of Another Rebellion," MERIP, p. 7).

The only other precedent that aroused a similarly angry response by Muslim communities – especially the British one – was the publication of Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses in 1988. In that case, too, alleged defamation of the Prophet and of Islam triggered the outburst of protests and the issuing of the fatwa by Ayatollah Khomeini sanctioning the killing of Rushdie. During the Rushdie affair hatred was also directed at Jews, considered to be behind the publication of the book. The protests and demonstrations served then as a springboard for uniting and reorganizing the Muslim community so that it might gain greater power and influence in the British political arena.

This same phenomenon could be discerned in the wake of recent events in the US and Britain. Aside from ad hoc organization for immediate action, representatives of Arab and Muslim national organizations sought to set up umbrella groups which would continue operating on a permanent basis, such as the meeting of representatives of ten Arab national organizations and a number of local organizations, which convened in Washington in December to develop a consensus agenda and initiate meetings with White House and State Department officials. Arab American leaders who held their meeting against the backdrop of the continuing Palestinian intifada and growing anti-US sentiment in the Arab world, hoped to use these as a lever to bring about a change in the US approach to critical Middle East issues (al-Sharq al-Awsat, 11 Dec.). Similarly, in Britain an Arab Communities Forum was set up at the end of December to enhance cooperation and communications between British institutions and the Arab communities (Arab Communities Forum in the United Kingdom, 25 Dec. – MSANews).

According to Prof. Abdul Hadi Palazzi of the University of Velletri in Rome, contrary to the assumption of Israeli researcher Esther Webman that Islamists are marginal groups in Muslim communities in the West, over 80 percent of European mosques are controlled by extremists who belong to
radical pseudo-Islamic movements that have absorbed antisemitic motifs, such as the Jewish world conspiracy, to justify so-called political anti-Zionism. Similarly, Daniel Pipes, director of the Philadelphia-based Middle East Forum, considers all Muslim and Arab American organizations to be Islamist, and claims that moderate Muslims are rarely heard. Reviewing the reactions of leading Islamic institutions in the US to Joseph Lieberman’s appointment as the Democratic candidate for vice president, Pipes offered “an insight into the fears, hopes, and priorities of the radicals who speak for American Islam.” He contended that the differing responses to the nomination revealed that American Muslims are divided in their priorities. Some see the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as other issues, such as Kashmir and Kosovo, as their primary concern. Others insist that the American community’s interests come first. Muslims also disagree on the issue of participation in American politics. One trend supports the notion of integration into the American system, whereas the other, more militant one resists any involvement in American political life. He believes, however, that both trends reflect the same Islamist ambition – the “Islamization of America” (JP, 16 Aug.). These tendencies, which stem from the basic Islamic approach to living in the abode of war (dar al-harb) – the territory of unbelievers – seem to typify other Muslim communities in the West as well. Hence, Muslims waver between segregation and integration.

The Jewish community example serves as a model of integration to Muslim and Arab communities in the West. Three aspects of the Jewish experience are especially emulated: their almost unconditional support of Israel, their social and economic integration while preserving their identity, and their political leverage in the countries they live in. There are about six million Muslims in the US, mostly non-Arabs, and about two million Christian Arabs. Together, argued Palestinian American author Ray Hanania, “this constituency could become an effective voice influencing American politics.” Hanania considered Lieberman’s appointment as a failure of Arab American politics, citing in contrast the example of American Jewish influence over the US political scene. The key to their success, he said, lay in coalitions. American Jews by themselves are not powerful, but they build coalitions with other ethnic groups, setting aside their own interests in certain areas while demanding support in others. Another explanation was communications. American Jews understand the relationship between perception and reality, and invest in public relations, he said, whereas the Arabs have not succeeded in influencing the media and in establishing an Arab voice. Afraid to admit that the prominence of Jewish issues in the American media correlates directly with their own failure, they argue that “Jews control the media.” “The Arab American community could be the vanguard of a successful campaign to transform the US Congress and direct White House foreign policy on the Middle East,” he asserted, but instead, it makes excuses and blames “the Jews” (Ray Hanania, “Lieberman and the Failure of Arab American Politics,” 8 Aug. – hanania.com).
Instead of bemoaning the political influence of “Jewish Americans” in the US, suggested Jordanian journalist Rami Khouri, the Arab world should “rigorously analyze the American Jewish experience, understand the causes of their success, strength and prosperity, and make a serious effort to match their achievements” (Jordan Times, 8 Aug.). Although Khouri referred to Arab societies in general, his comments apply in particular to the Arab American community, if not to all Arab and Muslim communities in the West where there are large Jewish communities.

The Extreme Right and the Extreme Left – Cooperation and Moral Support

Muslim fury directed against Jewish communities was exploited by activists of the extreme right and the extreme left worldwide in order to vent their own criticism and hatred of Israel and Jews. It may be assumed that some of the violent incidents in autumn 2000 were perpetrated by right-wing extremists. Still beyond moral support, notably on the Internet, the extent of their operational cooperation with extreme Muslim groups remains unclear. Although common ideological grounds for such cooperation exists, at least in reference to Israel and Jews, overt evidence of this is scant.

_The Extreme Left._ The anti-Israel demonstrations in the autumn of 2000 were characterized by increasing participation of extreme left activists. In Buenos Aires, for example, a few days after the beginning of the intifada, radical Muslim groups organized a demonstration, with the aid of leftist organizations, in front of the Israeli embassy. In Rome, thirty thousand persons affiliated with the political left participated in an anti-Israel demonstration, while in Copenhagen the far left United List suggested during a session of the City Council that Israel Square in Copenhagen be renamed Palestine Square.

In keeping with the traditional rhetoric of the extreme left, comparisons of Israel with Nazi Germany and Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians with the Holocaust were frequent. In some demonstrations in which both extreme left activists and Muslims participated, calls to kill the Jew were heard.

In Austria demands for the “destruction of the illegal racist-imperialist formation ‘Israel’” were reported at a demonstration organized by Austrian anti-imperialists together with Palestinian nationalists in Vienna in October. Austrian anti-Zionist hardliners and their Palestinian counterparts have built up close links, as could be observed during an “anti-imperialist summer camp” in Italy, organized by the Austrian Revolutionär Kommunistische Liga (Revolutionary Communist League – RKL), which hosted a Hamas delegation. In numerous propaganda leaflets distributed at the time, Israel was accused of the systematic “murder of children” and compared to the Nazi regime: “The capitalist-imperialist genocide of the Jews cannot justify the capitalist-imperialist
genocide of the Palestinians. The victims of fascism become the new perpetrators through Zionism.” “Death to the Jews” was also shouted in France at an anti-Israel demonstration of the leftist anti-fascist MRAP (Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l’amitié entre les peuples), as well as at other joint demonstrations of Islamists and the extreme left, including in Auckland, New Zealand.

The Extreme Right. The attitude of the extreme right toward Islamist activities is complex. On the one hand, Islam and the Muslim populations in general are considered a threat to the white race and its values. The extreme right incites equally against what they call the Islamization of the West and the so-called world Jewish conspiracy. Thus, it is understandable that Islamists, aware of the anti-Muslim and anti-foreigner sentiments among these groups, might refrain from aligning with them. On the other hand, since the early 1990s some right-wing extremists have expressed their admiration for Arab countries such as Iraq and Iran as well as for extremist Muslim groups which resist Israel and the US and struggle against “world Jewish domination.”

Today Holocaust deniers from Europe, the US and Australia are assisted by radical Muslim countries such as Iran. In Germany, security experts warn of possible cooperation between Islamist and far right extremists. In 1998, vice chairman of the radical right-wing NPD Hans-Günther Eisenecker described his vision of an “antisemitic internationale”: a worldwide alliance against liberal capitalism, embodied by Israel and the US. As potential partners Eisenecker named the Islamist movements, North Korea and Cuba. These ideas, however, are not widely accepted by right-wing circles.

The complicated relationship between the far right and Islamist groups is illustrated by the case of Hamas, whose activists cooperated with left-wing sympathizers (see above) and also took part in demonstrations of the JN (youth organization of the German NPD). The Internet site of White Youth 88 has links to the Hizballah and Hamas, and Thüringer Heimatschutz welcomes Internet users with the call “Freedom for Palestine.” In Sweden Radio Islam has for years been a forum for antisemitic and Holocaust denial activity of Arab nationalists and Islamists, as well as of the extreme right. According to the TV report Kennzeichen D. (6 Dec.), the Swiss Islamist Ahmed Huber lectured at the JN European convention on “Islam and the New Right.”

Antisemitic incidents in Germany rose throughout the year, most being attributed to radical right-wing activists. An analysis of the events which occurred in the autumn reveals that Islamist activities as a result of the hostilities in the Middle East coincided with traditional action days of the extreme right, i.e., Jewish holy days (Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur), as well as with the anniversaries of the German unification (3 Oct.) and of the Reichskristallnacht (9 Nov.). Thus, it seems that radical Islamists and right-wing extremists inspired each other to carry out anti-Jewish attacks. Another
example of the support of the extreme right for the Palestinian cause was a demonstration on 28 October in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho, in which Michael A. Hoffman II, director of Idaho’s Center for Revisionist Studies, protested the “Jewish Holocaust against the Palestinian people.” He carried a placard showing the Jewish Star of David equated with the Nazi swastika. Likewise, the Latin American extreme right website Ciudad Libertad de Opinión, headed by Argentinean neo-Nazi Alejandro Biondini, published the battle cry “Zionist committers of genocide, get out!” The website regularly updates surfers on events in Israel, supports the “Palestinian struggle for independence,” and publishes some of the harshest Arab and Palestinian anti-Israel propaganda, as well as the calls of Iranian Supreme Leader Khamene’i for jihad against Israel. During the month of February 2001, an anti-Israel Internet game, “The Stone Throwers,” was chosen by surfers as the “pick of the summer.” Similarly, in Brazil, a neo-fascist group, Acao Nacional, distributed pamphlets headed: “Zionists are killing Palestinian children.”

In Eastern Europe, the extreme right media was very swift in linking traditional antisemitic motifs with the outbreak of violence in the Middle East. Nationalist and extremist parties and movements combined their bitter criticism of Jews and Israeli policies with a sympathetic attitude to the Arabs in general and to Palestinians in particular. The Greater Romania Party in Romania and the Hungarian Justice and Life Party have for years championed the Iraqis under Western attacks as well as the Palestinians, claiming that Israeli interests dominate and dictate US actions. While the real attitude of these right extremists toward Arabs, Palestinians and Muslims may not be reflected in their verbal support for them, the intensity of their anti-Jewish feelings appear to overcome their racist and xenophobic aversion to Arabs and Muslims.

Antisemitic incidents in Eastern and Central Europe should not be connected automatically with events in the Middle East, although in some cases the connection is evident. Racist violence against Jews in the region does not need a Middle East pretext, but it certainly acts as a catalyst. Thus, in November members of the National Rebirth of Poland (NOP) demonstrated with pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel and anti-Jewish slogans, including the demand that all Jews be deported from the country.

A typical example linking Palestinian-Israeli-Jewish and East European perspectives can be found in one of the first reports on the tensions between Israel and the Palestinians, published in the far right Hungarian journal Demokrata. In its weekly review of 12 October, Demokrata wrote of the Palestinian boy killed while caught in Palestinian-Israeli crossfire: “… he died because he was Palestinian, he died because for a child who does not belong to the ruling minority it is dangerous to live.” This was followed by criticism of Hungarian-Israeli ties: “The child victim of this daily fascism and racism did not awaken Hungary’s civic leaders to the fact that the an enormous amount of capital flows to Hungary from Israel, a country rife with discrimination and
state terror.” Istvan Csurka, leader of the extremist Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP), also linked the violence in the Middle East to Israeli investments in Hungary as well as the “military training in Israel of Hungarian citizens [of Jewish origin] who are returning to Hungary.” Csurka warned of the “danger” of the flow of Israeli economic interests to Hungary since “they [the Israelis] could finance an eventual war from Hungarian sources, and also the Middle Eastern crisis could spread to Hungary.” On 19 October 2000, as an expression of solidarity with the Palestinian cause, the MIEP organ Magyar Forum reported on blood donations by both Arabs living in Budapest and Hungarians to wounded Palestinians. Commenting on the screening on one of Hungary’s TV channels of the US movie Delta Force, Magyar Forum (12 Oct. 2000) mocked Jewish-Israeli film makers in Hollywood (Menahem Golan and Yoram Globus) for using racist stereotypes in portraying Arab hijackers: “Knowing who is directing the American film industry, it is just a matter of time until the child-murdering Israeli soldiers will be portrayed as heroes and defenders of the weak. In a lengthy article on the violence in the same issue, the author writes: “In spite of the warnings by [Israeli] Chief Rabbi Meir Lau, in Israel there is an atmosphere of Lynch against the Arab population: Arabs are caught in the streets at random, knifed, and beaten almost to death; shops owned by Palestinians are burned, and Christian cemeteries are desecrated.”

Before the November 2000 elections in Romania, the Greater Romania Party moderated its tone, for tactical reasons. However, in its coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its paper Romania Mare continued to link international Jewish interests with Israeli policies. An interesting twist is its claim that Arafat’s demand for an international force in the area is in fact the fulfillment of biblical prophecies in the books of Zacharia and the Apocalypse: the war “between Arabs [sic] and Jews will degenerate into a world war” (Romania Mare, 16 March 2001).

Conclusion
The dramatic wave of violent incidents against Jewish targets in the autumn of 2000 confirmed the potential of the Arab-Israeli conflict to escalate ethno-religious enmity between Jews and Muslims worldwide. Since the beginning of the 1990s Middle East events, particularly the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, have been interpreted by extremist Muslims and Arab nationalists as a world Arab/Muslim-Jewish conflict and their fury has thus been directed against the Jewish communities. The wave of violent incidents and demonstrations in October 2000 were influenced considerably by the religious dimension of the conflict, which has the power to mobilize the masses and instigate extremist believers into committing violent acts.

The latest antisemitic wave has demonstrated the solidarity of the extreme right with the Palestinian struggle against Israel. This solidarity has become central in extreme right propaganda since the beginning of the 1980s and
especially in the 1990s. To the rightists, the struggle against Israel is an integral part of their antisemitic world view, and the crimes they perpetrate against Jews worldwide are encouraged by the anti-Jewish activities of extremist Muslims. The extreme left, whose role in anti-Jewish activities decreased considerably in the last two decades, again became a factor in organizing anti-Israeli demonstrations in which, as in the 1970s and early 1980s, anti-Zionist and antisemitic slogans were frequently intermingled.

As the past has shown, cooperation among extremist elements poses a real threat to the well-being and safety of Jewish communities and Jewish individuals in the world. Unremitting monitoring of this phenomenon is thus of utmost importance.
COUNTRY AND REGIONAL SURVEYS
Western Europe
AUSTRIA

The European Union report prepared by observers appointed to monitor the sanctions against Austria labeled the FPÖ “a right-wing populist party with radical elements,” and claimed it used “extremist language.” During the year the FPÖ demonstrated its close links with National Socialism and with right-wing extremists. Extreme rightists and neo-Nazis intensified their activity in 2000. Contacts between Austrian and German right-wing extremists were also strengthened. The agreement on restitution payments to victims of National Socialism announced in early 2001 was criticized directly or indirectly by FPÖ members, including former party leader Jörg Haider.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

Austria has a Jewish population of 10,000 out of a total population of 8 million, most of whom live in Vienna. The present community is made up of several distinct groups, the most numerous being returnee Austrians and their families, as well as former refugees from Eastern Europe. A Jewish primary school and high school, as well as several Jewish publications, serve the needs of the community.

Parliament approved a compensation package that was criticized by the Jewish community for withholding property. The new legislation provided a $7,000 lump sum payment to Austrian survivors, no matter where they are domiciled today.

In October 2000, British artist Rachel Whiteread’s monument “Nameless Library” was unveiled in Judenplatz in Vienna on the remains of a synagogue in which Jews had been killed in 1421.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS

The FPÖ

When the right-wing extremist Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Austrian Freedom Party – FPÖ) joined the federal coalition government in February 2000, the other members of the European Union (EU) (as well as the Czech Republic and Norway) responded by imposing sanctions on Austria.

Although, and maybe even because, the sanctions isolated the new government internationally, they were exploited by the coalition to consolidate a large part of the population against “Austria’s enemies,” so branded by Carinthian governor Jörg Haider. For tactical reasons, in order to reduce international criticism, Haider, who had led the FPÖ for 14 years, resigned as chairman in May; he was replaced by Suzanne Riess-Passer. In September, the
three EU observers appointed to monitor the sanctions, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, former Spanish Foreign Minister Marcelino Oreja and German Human Rights expert Jochen Frohwein, recommended lifting them.

While commending some governmental measures, especially in the area of minority rights and the restitution agreement for victims of the Third Reich (see below), the EU report considered the FPÖ a "right-wing populist party with radical elements" which used "extremist language." It also stated that FPÖ members had exploited and reinforced xenophobic sentiments in propaganda campaigns, that the language they used had nationalist undertones, sometimes echoing National Socialist (NS) expressions, and that they trivialized the history of that period.

The observers also voiced concern about the state of democracy in Austria, especially in light of attempts by leading FPÖ members, including Minister of Justice Dieter Böhmdorfer, to silence or sue political opponents who criticized the Austrian government. Pointing out that an unprecedented number of libel suits had been brought by FPÖ politicians, the observers expressed fears that freedom of expression was endangered. After publication of the report, reservations were voiced by representatives of Austrian minorities. The gist of the criticism was the contention that the report focused on the legal protection of minorities, but not on its implementation.

In May, the Lower Austrian chairman of the FPÖ Ernest Windholz demonstrated the existence of close links between the FPÖ and National Socialism. In a ceremony honoring veteran FPÖ activists he quoted the SS motto *Unsere Ehre heisst Treue* (Our honor is loyalty). This slogan, slightly modified, appeared on banners carried at the *Ulrichsbergtreffen* in October. This annual meeting of former Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS men, many of them members of the extremist Kameradschaft IV (K IV), takes place at Ulrichsberg in Carinthia. Addressing the veterans, Jörg Haider said: "It can't be that the history of our fathers and grandfathers has turned into a rogues' gallery because of a strange zeitgeist and the fact that their achievements have been trampled on."

**Far Right Activity**

Emboldened no doubt by the FPÖ's success, far rightists and neo-Nazis intensified their activity in 2000. Contacts between Austrian and German right-wing extremists were strengthened, especially with the NPD. Numerous Austrian extremists were guests of honor at the NPD's "Second Day of National Resistance" in Passau (27 May). These included Hemma Tiffner, publisher of the magazine *Die Umwelt*, Robert Dürr of the Partei der Neuen Ordnung, Bruno Haas, formerly leader of the neo-Nazi Aktion Neue Rechte, Helmut Müller, publisher of *Eckartbote*, and Herbert Schweiger of the Nationalistische Front and Deutsche Kulturgemeinschaft (see below).
Helmut Müller is considered to be the main NPD contact in Austria. Like the Viennese FPÖ politicians Helmut Kovarik, Johann Herzog and Bärbel Schöffnagl, he is a leading activist of the far right Österreichische Landsmannschaft (ÖLM). Müller, who is editor-in-chief of the ÖLM magazine Ecktate, spoke in Germany at several NPD district associations in 2000. He writes regularly for the NPD party organ Deutsche Stimme. Assessing the first 100 days of the government in the June issue, Müller stated that the FPÖ had not quite come up to the expectations of the far right, blaming "international blackmailers." In the October issue, Müller referred to violent neo-Nazis as "mostly decent 'bald heads'" and "people who care about their homeland and culture." Former SS-member and co-founder of the FPÖ Herbert Schweiger lectured on "national unity" (völkische Zusammengehörigkeit) between Germany and Austria at the "Second Day of National Resistance" (see above). In an interview with the Austrian magazine News (37/00), Schweiger, a senior NPD ideologue, openly admitted to having "trained thousands of young men in accordance with national values." Schweiger argued against setting up an Austrian branch of the NPD, on the one hand, "because Haider was still the vacuum cleaner of the right-wing potential," and on the other, because the NS-Verbotsgesetz (the law prohibiting National Socialist activities) could be an impediment. Asked about his relationship with the FPÖ, Schweiger replied that the FPÖ was merely an interim project that did not question the system and did not have solutions for the "big problems."

Schweiger also holds a leading position in the extremist German cultural association Deutsche Kulturgemeinschaft (DKG), which held its annual "guest week" from 27 October to 1 November, together with the Freundeskreis Ulrich von Hutten (Friends of Ulrich von Hutten; Von Hutten [1488–1523], a German patriot and poet, was a key figure of the German Reformation). According to the DKG organ Huttenbriefe (5–6/2000), "the Nordic man" who lives "in harmony with nature" was the focus of the speeches.

Another guest of the NPD was Robert Dürr, a leading activist of the Austrian extreme right scene. In 2000, he was accused of infringing the NS-Verbotsgesetz, mainly through his party paper PNO-Nachrichten, but also through the conspiracy theory handbook Antifas-Handbuch distributed and possibly co-authored by him. On 7 November 2000 Dürr was found guilty in Eisenstadt of NS-Wiederbetätigung (reviving Nazi ideology) and sentenced to three years in prison, two years of which were suspended. Dürr immediately appealed. During the trial, the neo-Nazi Hilfsgemeinschaft für nationale Gefangene (HNG – Support Organization for National Political Prisoners and Their Relatives) in Germany issued an extensive dossier about alleged political prosecution of Dürr, which documented his position in the neo-Nazi network. Despite his conviction, Dürr continued his activities. Issue no. 20 of PNO-Nachrichten was
devoted almost exclusively to an alleged anti-fascist conspiracy, directed at the *Völkserverichtung* (the destruction of the [Germanic] people).

The singer and NPD activist Frank Rennicke paid another visit to Austria in 2000. He was the guest of the ultra-right study group *Arbeitsgemeinschaft für demokratische Politik* (AFP) and the *Olympia* fraternity, to which FPÖ member of parliament Martin Graf also belongs. While the authorities tolerated Rennicke’s performance at the meeting of the Olympia fraternity, on 17 June 2000, they tried to arrest him at the 35th “political academy” meeting of the AFP. His tapes were confiscated, but Rennicke managed to escape. In the meantime, he has been sentenced in Germany (see *Germany*).

Another far right group is the *Kritische Demokraten* (Critical Democrats), led by Horst-Jakob Rosenkranz, which publishes the magazine *Fakten*. Its May issue reports on a “victim” of the *NS-Verbotsgesetz*: Wolfgang Fröhlich, a former FPÖ politician in Vienna with connections to international Holocaust deniers, who has been under investigation for some time. In early May 2000 he asked for political asylum in the Iranian embassy. Fröhlich was especially active in promoting his antisemitic pamphlets in schools, recommending his book *The Gas Chamber Swindle*, and urging teachers to refuse to teach pupils the “Holocaust swindle.”

As early as 1990 neo-Nazi Gerd Honsik, who fled to Spain in 1992, wanted to run in the parliamentary elections, together with Horst-Jakob Rosenkranz and Franz Radljun, jr., on the *Liste NEIN zur Ausländerflut* (NO to Foreigner Flood List), but the election authorities prohibited his candidature. Nevertheless, several issues of Honsik's magazine *Halt* reached Austria from abroad in 2000. Honsik also published the latest antisemitic pamphlet written by NPD activist Horst Mahler. In his book *Hello, Mr. Friedman*, Mahler – says Honsik’s advertising campaign – brings to an end the “fairy tale of Jewish innocence” and unmask the “double standard of the reminder of German guilt’, Michel Friedman,” vice chairman of the German Zentralrat der Juden.

The right-wing extremist and former FPÖ official Peter Kurt Weiss from Salzburg has appealed a 15-month suspended sentence decreed in November 2000 under the *NS-Verbotsgesetz*. Weiss is national chairman of the far right *Bürgerschutz Österreich* (Protection of Citizens Austria – BSÖ), which tries to win support through anti-EU propaganda. In addition to lecturing throughout Austria, Weiss publishes extensively, including the book *The Secret of Power*, which reproduces *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and *The Power of the Zionists* by Ahmed Rami of Radio Islam. Since the mid-1990s, Weiss, together with Frank Swoboda, has been using the Internet Ostara websites and mailing lists to spread his philosophy of conspiracy myths and open antisemitism. Weiss is also behind the publications *Die Hyäne* (The Hyena), *Die Kralle* (The Claw) and *Bürgerschutz Österreich*, all of which warn of a “chosen Hebrew master race,” which has attained “world domination through a network of
Freemasonry” and which “holds almost all peoples” under their sway (Zinspeitsche).

In 2000 skinheads numbered about 300 hard-core activists and 1,000 sympathizers. Personal and ideological links with neo-Nazi groups have been strengthened, especially since the establishment of the Austrian Blood & Honour (B&H) section in 1998. B&H successfully combine the violent subculture of the skinheads with neo-Nazi ideology and terrorist strategy.

Vorarlberg and Tyrol are strongholds of the skinhead and B&H movement. At the end of August 2000 about 60 neoNazis held a funeral march in Bregenz in memory of a comrade who committed suicide in detention. He was arrested after a violent clash among soccer fans in Innsbruck. After the parade, B&H organized a concert in a nearby town, which was attended by about 300 neo-Nazis from all over Europe.

The neo-Nazi-concept of conspiratorial, independent, but small organized groups, the so-called free fraternities (Freie Kameradschaften) is manifested in the Internet. In 2000 alone, 20 websites created by Austrian neo-Nazis went online. Most of these websites are located on foreign servers, because Austrian law prohibits NS propaganda on the Internet. In addition, they recruit followers at concerts, claimed to be private parties.

Members of the older generation of neo-Nazi cadres, who dominated the scene until the early 1990s, were marginalized by these developments. Most of them had served prison sentences and after their release tried to renew their contacts. In November 2000 founder and leader of the neo-Nazi Volkstreue Ausserrparlamentarische Opposition (VAPO) Gottfried Küssel, given an early release in summer 1999, met with about 50 neo-Nazis in the AFP clubhouse. The meeting, organized by Viennese B&H members and attended by Küssel’s former second-in-command Gerd Endres, was broken up by the police. Other ex-VAPO activists such as Günther Reinhalter (Salzburg) and Rene Lang, leader of the so-called Förderwerk Junge Familien (Support Organization for Young Families) in Marchtrenk, Upper Austria, have also been attempting to reconnect to the neo-Nazi-scene. A demonstration planned for August 2000 by Lang and by German neo-Nazis from Nationaler Widerstand in the Bavarian border town of Freilassing against “EU dictatorship” and “the boycott against Austria,” was banned by the German authorities.

RACIST AND ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITY

Violence and Threats
According to official figures, 13 violent racist and antisemitic crimes were committed, including six attacks on immigrants, four serious acts of vandalism of Jewish cemeteries, two attempted arson attacks against restaurants run by immigrants and one “serious threat” (a statutory offense according to Austrian
criminal law). In addition, 450 violations of the NS-Verbotsgesetz and the law against incitement to hatred were reported.

Threats and insulting letters were received by critics of the FPÖ. Gertrude Knoll, a bishop in Burgenland, for example, was the target of such letters, which read, inter alia: “A pity Adolf isn’t still around. You and your brood should be gassed.” The FPÖ demanded that she be removed from her position for participating in protests against the coalition. In contrast to the majority of Protestant Church dignitaries, the Catholic Church did not speak out in her support, with the exception of one bishop.

**Propaganda**
As mentioned above, antisemitism is a main ideological component of most extreme right-wing groups in Austria. In 2000, in spite of condemnation by the Austrian Presserat (Press Complaints Commission), the weekly newspaper Zur Zeit (published by FPÖ Bundesrat member John Gudenus and Haider advisor Andreas Mölzer) continued its antisemitic attacks. In issue 10/2000, an anonymous writer expressed approval for the newspaper, which is financially supported by the FPÖ: “Today few – except you – dare to touch on the de facto world domination of the Jews and their extension, Free Masonry.” In issue 16-17/2000, the Catholic fundamentalist Friedrich Romig blamed Jews for the death of Jesus.

Echoing the entire far right scene, Zur Zeit used the suicide of the right-wing extremist Werner Pfeifenberger, shortly before his trial for violation of the NS-Verbotsgesetz, to attack the “Jewish journalist Karl Pfeifer” (23/2000). He was accused of “launching a manhunt that would lead consequentially to the death of the hunted.” Pfeifer had stated in the newspaper of the Israelitische Kulturgemeinde (IKG) that Pfeifenberger had used Nazi tones in the 1995 FPÖ yearbook and stirred up “the old Nazi legend of the world Jewish conspiracy.” Pfeifenberger sued Pfeifer and lost on all counts. The case was wound up in May 1998. Pfeifer then sued Zur Zeit for alleging that he had caused Pfeifenberger’s suicide. He lost the lawsuit and could be attributed “moral responsibility” for Pfeifenberger’s death.

The involvement of several FPÖ members with the Freiheitliche Akademikerverbände and their magazine Aula is evidence of an important link between the FPÖ and extra-parliamentary right-wing extremists (see ASW 1998/9, 1999/2000). Aula continued to publish antisemitic articles in 2000. In the May issue, for instance, Jews were blamed by German right-wing extremist Rigolf Henning for both world wars and, according to him, were likely to cause a third one. In order to circumvent the law, he refers to Jewish stereotypes as “those who make money out of war, who do not tolerate any powers besides them and mercilessly attack anyone who opposes their ‘world order’.” Radical rightist Hemma Tiffner and her magazine Die Umwelt, too, mobilized antisemitic resentment in 2000. Issues 3–4/2000 published an “appeal to
commemorate Anderl in the church of Rinn, 16 July” (see ASW 1997/8): “When Old Bishop Stecher of Innsbruck prohibited the ritual murder cult in Rinn, he intended this as a step in reconciliation between the restitution-hunters [the Jews] and those who pay – and that means: those who are unjustly presented with the bill, the defeated, the shamefully betrayed German people.” In the following issue (5/2000), Tiffner defends the NPD, as “the only ones who supported Austrian interests openly, loudly and clearly.”

After having kept a relatively low profile since the 1998 conviction of one of their leading activists Konrad Windisch, the AFP intensified its activity in 2000. Windisch himself wrote in the July issue of the current affairs publication Kommentare zum Zeitgeschehen: “After fifty years of brainwashing, many of our compatriots (and most of our German brothers as well) have developed an apology syndrome.” The AFP’s Wiener Beobachter (Vienna Observer) is even blunter in rejecting guilt and memory. Issue 5/2000 features the following lines entitled “Feigenbaum’s Prayer”: “Lieber Jahwe, mach mich fromm, / dass ich zu mehr Dollars kommi! / Büsen, trauern und erinnern, / daran lässt sich toll verdienen! / Sieh’, wie grämen die sich sehr, / und mein Geld wird immer mehr! / Und dass es so bleibt noch lang, bin gewiss mir ist nicht bang…” (Dear Yahweh, make me pious / so that I can make more dollars. / Repentance, grief and memorizing / help me earn a lot! / Look how troubled they are / and I have more and more money. / I am sure that this will go on…).

NPD activist Horst Mahler contributes to publications of the right-wing extremist Walter Ochenschberger from Vorarlberg. In Top Secret, the supplement of Pöönix which specializes in conspiracy myths, he blames Jews not only for increasing antisemitism, but also for the entire wave of racist violence in Germany. Ochenschberger himself wrote in the March supplement about the ban on the NPD: “Now the vassals of USreal [sic – US/Israel] see the center of resistance in the organized will of German youth. Blinded, they believe that they can deal with the growing national resistance by banning parties and demonstrations.” In the following issue Ochenschberger claims “organized Jewry” were the wire-pullers behind the NPD ban. They “don’t like nationalists because they are the only ones who dare to talk about Jewish crimes.” He alleges that the bomb attack in Düsseldorf (see Germany) was part of the Jewish campaign to get the NPD banned. In the same issue he reproduced an article from Syria Times denying the Holocaust. In early 2001 Ochenschberger was charged with denying NS crimes.

Apart from skinhead and Freie Kameradschaften websites (which are usually on line only for short periods), Ostara disseminates arguably the most virulent antisemitic propaganda in the German language (see ASW 1998/9). Open ritual murder accusations can be found there at Easter time: “They also slaughter according to Jewish rites in order to bake matzah – bread… Do you have blond, blue-eyed beautiful children at home? Watch out especially around Easter! They could easily end up as matzah-bread in the oven.”
Intensified left-wing support for the Palestinian liberation struggle in Austria is reflected in virulent anti-Zionism which is sometimes interchangeable with antisemitism. At a demonstration in October, following the upsurge in violence between Palestinians and Israelis, Austrian leftists and Palestinian nationalists called for the “destruction of the illegal racist-imperialist formation ‘Israel’.” Some Austrian leftists even cooperate with terrorist groups such as Hamas. A Hamas delegation was welcomed at an “anti-imperialist summer camp” in Italy, which was organized in large part by the Austrian Revolutionär Kommunistische Liga (Revolutionary Communist League – RKL). In numerous leaflets they accuse Israelis of systematic “murder of children” and openly equate this with the Holocaust. According to the RKL, “the capitalist imperialist genocide of the Jews cannot justify the capitalist imperialist genocide of the Palestinians. The victims of fascism have become the new perpetrators through Zionism.”

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HOLOCAUST AND THE NAZI ERA

Restitution and the Extreme Right Response
In May, Austria set up a $477.7 million fund as compensation to surviving Austrian former forced laborers. The agreement, which was finalized under the ÖVP (Austrian People’s Party) –FPÖ coalition government, was denounced by FPÖ Bundesrat member John Gudenus as “Schutzgeld” (protection money). Interviewed by Profil, a liberal magazine, he said the payments were necessary to maintain trade relations, especially with the US. Referring to New York lawyer Ed Fagan who represented the victims, he said in this interview: “He is a good businessman... But I believe that he does not help to raise sympathy for him and his kind.”

Haider also referred to the agreement at a FPÖ event in Vienna in October: “Let’s talk about restitution: Not only those in New York and in the East are affected here, but above all our Sudeten German friends as well. We want to take care of our own people first.” Haider called Jewish victims of National Socialism “those in New York,” comparing them with “friends” and “our own people” who should get priority in obtaining restitution.

At another FPÖ event in Vienna on 21 January 2001, Haider attacked Ariel Muzicant, president of the Israelitische Kulturgemeinde, who had criticized the restitution agreement: “Mr. Muzicant will only be content, when they also repay his 600 million shilling debt which he has piled up in Vienna.” German Bundestag member Volker Beck (The Greens) labeled Haider an “antisemitic agitator.”

Following the announcement of the agreement on restitution payments to Jewish victims of National Socialism in early 2001, FPÖ MPs bombarded responsible ministers with questions such as, “How much longer do we have to pay?”
The nationalistic Kärntner Heimatdienst (KHD), a leading umbrella organization of the extreme right, announced that it, too, would intensify “the struggle against Sippenhaftung (collective guilt) for Nazi crimes” and against the “extravagant” claims for restitution.

In order to appease those voices, the government passed a restitution law (Heimkehrerentschädigungsgesetz) for former soldiers of the Wehrmacht and even former Waffen-SS members who were prisoners of war in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. This law adds an additional monthly payment to their pension. Excluded are former National Socialists convicted by an Austrian court.

Holocaust Commemoration
In October a Holocaust memorial was unveiled in Vienna in the presence of President Thomas Klestil. In his speech, Klestil acknowledged that many Austrians were guilty of collaboration with the Nazis and underlined the necessity of fighting Nazism and xenophobia.

In April, Helene Partik-Pable, chairwoman of FPÖ-Vienna, caused a stir in the discussion about the cancellation of services at memorial sites abroad for victims of National Socialism by rejecting the idea that “our community servants look after commemorative plaques in Jerusalem.”

The Israeli embassy in Austria issued a statement questioning the “willingness” of the Austrian government to “sincerely and honestly come to terms with the past.” In an interview to The Jerusalem Post on 9 November, Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) had reiterated the claim that the Austrian state was the “very first victim” of National Socialism.

RESPONSES TO RACISM AND ANTISEMITISM

During the year 2000, demonstrations against the FPÖ’s membership in the government coalition took place on a weekly basis in Vienna from the moment of its formation. On 19 February, some 200,000 gathered in protest.

Individual acts of protest were also reported. Gerard Mortier, for example, resigned as director of the Salzburg Festival. The inhabitants of the town of Braunau am Inn, Hitler’s birthplace, decided to counter international criticism of Austria by making it a center of international understanding, in an attempt to prove that Austria is ready to confront its past and take part in the struggle against fascism.
BELGIUM

Belgium has witnessed an increase in discrimination against foreigners. Several serious violent antisemitic incidents were recorded following the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada. The number of anti-fascist demonstrations increased in 2000 in response to the rise in extremism.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

Some 35,000 Jewish citizens live in Belgium out of a total population of 10 million. The two main centers of Belgian Jewry are Antwerp (15,000) and Brussels (15,000). The Comité de Coordination des Organizations Juives de Belgique (Coordinating Committee of Jewish Organizations in Belgium – CCOJB), in Brussels, is the community’s umbrella organization. Because many European Union institutions are located in Brussels, the community plays an important role in hosting European Jewish events and in advocating the interests of communities across Europe.

On 24 September 2000, Belgium Premier Guy Verhofstadt announced that Belgium would set up a fund to compensate the Jewish community for their losses and suffering during World War II. The fund will be used, inter alia, for projects to fight antisemitism, racism and other hate crimes.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS

Introduction
In the last few years, biological racism, which was the bedrock of Nazism, has increasingly gained ground among neo-fascist far right political forces. In 2000 the Centre for Equal Opportunity and Combating Racism (le Centre pour l’égalité des chances et la lutte contre le racisme), a federal government agency, expressed its concern at the increase in discrimination against individuals of foreign origin generally, and against Arabs in particular. Although racist activities of extreme right organizations in Belgium are directed mainly against Arabs, all extreme right organizations, groups and publications have antisemitic tendencies, which they refrain from disseminating overtly. Instead they use euphemisms such as “high finance,” “itinerant and anonymous high finance,” “cosmopolitanism,” or “internationalism.”

The Jews are perceived by some racist groups as the main enemy, and the “international conspiracy” of the “Jewish International” is one of the main themes of antisemitic propaganda. Thus, not infrequently, direct references to so-called Jewish plans to dominate the world by wiping out the white race
appear in the publications of Belgian racist groups. Similar foreign journals, such as the French weekly *Rivol*, are recommended to readers by these groups.

**Political Parties**
The current leadership of the extreme right *Vlaams Blok* (Flemish Bloc – VB) – which enjoys over 15 percent of popular support throughout the entire Flemish Region, reaching 33 percent in Antwerp (see *ASW 1999/2000*) – is attempting to present a more respectable image in order to further increase its electoral strength. However, the VB, headed by Philip Dewinter, is aware that it will have to attract new voters and enter into alliances with the conservative wings of democratic parties. Thus, it must moderate its language on certain topics, notably antisemitism. During the October 2000 municipal elections the VB claimed that it wished to do away with all visible references to its antisemitic legacy.

The question remains whether these attempts at reform are sincere or for propaganda purposes only. It should be noted that antisemites who were involved in the establishment of the VB in 1978, as well as young militants from neo-Nazi groups, are still part of its innermost circles.

**Extra-parliamentary Groups**
A number of militant structures and think-tanks close to the VB continue to foster antisemitism, among them *Voorpost*, which acts as a link between the VB and even more extremist groups. An action group with pagan tendencies, Voorpost was set up in 1976 by young nationalist leaders close to the French New Right (in particular GRECE – see *France*) and neo-Nazi organizations abroad. Voorpost was also involved in distributing publications denying crimes of the Nazi regime. In 2000/1 Voorpost is run by senior members of the VB leadership, such as former Senator Roeland Raes (its vice-president from 1978 to February 2001) and member of parliament Francis Vanden Eynde (current vice-president of the country’s Chamber of Deputies).

Before its formation, Voorpost was part of another nationalist group, *Were Di* (Verbond van Nederlandse Werkgemeenschappen). Were Di was created in 1962 by former pro-Nazi collaborators, including members of the Flemish Waffen-SS and founder of the VB Karel Dille. The theoretical works of this think-tank constituted the basis of the VB’s founding manifesto. Like the VB, Were Di aims at overthrowing the Belgian state and creating an independent Flemish state based upon a “homogeneous community” of the “white race.” Several of VB’s parliamentary members still serve on the editorial committee of *Diestland-Europa*, Were Di’s monthly publication. *Diestland-Europa* is a staunch defender of leading French Holocaust denier Robert Faurisson and the National Socialist (NS) heritage.

The **Nationalistische Studenten Verbond** (NSV) is an association of extreme right university students founded in 1976. A number of the VB’s
leaders began their political activity in the NSV, including current leaders Philip Dewinter and Franck Van Hecke. The NSV’s emblem is the Celtic cross, adopted by the neo-Nazis. After the law against denial of the Holocaust was passed on 23 March 1995, the NJSV (the high-school branch of the NSV) distributed a “Revisionism is no crime!” sticker. The last demonstration held by NSV – in March 2001 in Antwerp – was supported by the VB.

Another youth organization, which is officially independent of the VB (but whose leaders are former heads of the VB youth organization), is the Vlaamse Jongeren Mechelen (VJM), a small skinhead group active in the town of Malines (Mechelen), which has contacts with several other neo-Nazi and antisemitic movements in Wallonia and abroad (see below).

In 2000, a Flemish section of the British skinhead movement Blood & Honour (B&H) was set up in Belgium a few months after the voluntary liquidation of the Odal Aktiekomitee, a small neo-Nazi group which aimed at recreating the Vlaamse Militanten Orde (VMO). Known as Blood & Honour Flanders, its emblem is the swastika. A first unsuccessful attempt to found a section of B&H was made on the basis of the former VMO in the 1980s. The British-based Combat 18 (see UK) has several supporters recruited from Belgian extreme right-wing organizations such as B&H Flanders.

Many Flemish neo-Nazis who profess their own “racial religion” belong to the official Flemish section of the World Church of the Creator (WCOTC – see USA). The semi-clandestine Belgian-Dutch network Consortium-De Levensboom and a new NS skinhead group, the Flanders White Nationalists (FWN), appear to have links to the Flemish section of WCOTC. The webmaster of the neo-Nazi Internet site Aryan Nightmare is thought to be one of the leaders of the WCOTC.

The WCOTC section in France is led by Olivier Devalez, who has contacts in several neo-Nazi groups, both Flemish and French-speaking, among them the VHO, the l’Assaut group and NS skinhead groups.

When it became known that Dimitri Vandenheede, a candidate on the VB list in the 2000 municipal elections, belonged to the WCOTC, the VB expelled him to avoid adversely affecting its new “moderate” image and deterring possible future political partners. However, this did not prevent the VB from leaving other militants close to neo-Nazis as candidates on their electoral lists.

Efforts to establish the Ku Klux Klan in France and Belgium, with the support of Belgian sympathizers, were unsuccessful.

The Fundamentalist Christian Right
One of the main disseminators of classical antisemitism is Polemique-Info. This integrast Christian publication was set up in 1995 by Alain Escada, who split from the ultra-rightist Pro Belgica (a Belgian royalist and unitarian association). Escada first headed the youth section of the Belgique-Europe-België party (formed in 1989), became founding president of its splinter group Unie, and
then official spokesman of the Front Nouveau de Belgique (FNB; from 1995 on). A sympathizer of the Front National, Escada also heads Belgique et Chrétienté and is a member of the Fraternité Saint-Pie X (see France). Documents of the Fraternité, which is active in Brussels and in the Flemish and Walloon regions, contain clearly antisemitic references, including praise of Marshal Phillipe Pétain and support for the judeophbic theories of the French Catholic nationalist theoretician Charles Maurras.

At the end of July 2000, the Belgian French-language daily newspaper Le Soir reported that the Belgian branch of the Contre-Reforme Catholique (CRF, also known as the Communion phalangiste) was intending to gain a more solid foothold in Belgium. The goal of the CRF, which came into being in France under the inspiration of "Abbot" Georges de Nantes, is to continue the "Crusades" against the Jews. This sectarian Catholic group is apparently linked to two Belgian groups: Heusy (Liège province), and Westmalle (Antwerp province). Today, utterly isolated from the Catholic Church, the Belgian followers of "Abbot" Georges de Nantes are said to number about one hundred.

Neo-pagan Groups
Supporters of neo-pagan groups have been re-structuring themselves over the last years within the far right. Most oppose so-called Judeo-Christianity, the globalization of the economy led by the United States, the Americanization of society and international communism. The primary target of these groups is Judaism as the main monotheistic religion, viewed as being responsible for "repression" of the followers of polytheism. These politico-religious groups are active within nationalist organizations with a more general agenda. Several of the latter, including Voorpost and les Amis de la Renaissance Européenne (which has ties with the Bloc Wallon party – see below), have a manifest bent toward various pagan cults. However, while representing a particular way of thinking, the extent of neo-pagan activities remains limited. The Association des Successeurs des Ases (ASA), known as the Fils des Ases, for example, has been active since 1992. Based in Brussels this small group which seeks to defend the "Nordic race," evolved from neo-Nazi groups of the New Right. Recently, publications ascribed to the ASA or to its spokesman, Bernard Mengal, have unmistakably endorsed a shift toward armed combat against the establishment. Mengal was also the initiator of works based on biological racism and an obsessive antisemitism. The main contributor to Mengal's publications is the Frenchman Pierre Chassard. Together, from June 1998 onwards, they issued the journal Contre-Thèses.

The Vlaams Heidens Front (Flemish Pagan Front – VHF) is another neo-pagan group which has stepped up its activity in Flanders (see ASW 1999/2000). NS in outlook, its main headquarters are in Torhouts.
The Influence of Foreign Ultra-right Antisemitic Groups
As mentioned above, several Belgian groups have ties with antisemitic and Holocaust denial organizations abroad, among them, the Fraternité Saint-Pie X and the WCOTC. Other contacts include the NSDAP-AO (United States), Unité radicale and Groupe Union Défense (France), Aktiefront Nationale Socialisten and Nederlandse Volksunie (Netherlands), and the NPD (Germany). In October 2000, a campaign to support the NPD was organized after Germany decided to take steps to ban this party. Belgian publications, the nationalist revolutionary Devenir in particular, supported a solidarity campaign with the NPD.

The ideological trend of Belgian far right publications is apparent in their references to antisemitic papers and activists abroad. The Brussels paper Polemique-Info, for example, has in recent months made frequent mention of the French antisemitic agitator Henry Coston, who contributed to the antisemitic propaganda which paved the way for the deportation of French Jewry during the Nazi occupation. Lecture et Tradition, Lectures francaises, and Faits et Documents (see France) are also ideological sources of Belgian extreme right publications.

Alain Escada (founder of Polemique-Info) once represented the French publication Révoir in Belgium. Since its founding in France in 1952, this antisemitic and Holocaust denying weekly has enjoyed the support of various groups and publications of the Belgian extreme right, such as the FNB, Devenir, the Flemish satirical journal t’Palibeterke and the association les Amis de la Renaissance Européenne.

Fundamentalist Islamic Networks
In 1998, the report on Belgium drawn up by the European Centre for Research and Action against Racism and Antisemitism (CERA) noted the existence of fundamentalist Islamist groups with a radical anti-Jewish stance. These included offshoots of the various Muslim Brotherhood branches: Talia (affiliated with Syria), le Parti de la Libération Islamique (affiliated with the Palestinians), and le Secours Islamique (affiliated with Egypt).

The annual report of the Centre for Equal Opportunity and Combating Racism, issued in May 2001, noted antisemitic slogans used during demonstrations organized in Brussels and Antwerp following the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada. Activists operating within the Maghreb community disseminated anti-Jewish propaganda, despite the calls for calm issued by various Muslim religious and cultural bodies, such as l’Exécutif des Musulmans de Belgique, the official body of the Belgium Muslim community.

ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITIES
Following the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in September/October 2000 several violent incidents against Jewish institutions were recorded. An arson attempt was made on a Brussels synagogue and the monument to Jewish
Martyrs in Anderlecht was defaced. On 28 September worshipers during Friday prayers at two mosques in Brussels were urged to take revenge against the Jews for their treatment of the Palestinians. Various Muslim religious and cultural authorities condemned the anti-Jewish attacks.

There were several serious incidents in October. A Jew was hospitalized after being severely beaten by a group of Arabs near a Brussels synagogue. On 15 October four Molotov cocktails were thrown at the Sephardi synagogue in the Schaerbeek quarter of Brussels. In addition, in Brussels stones were thrown at a synagogue, smashing several windows, antisemitic slogans were smeared on the Holocaust memorial and a large swastika was drawn on the main entrance of the Maimonides synagogue. A window of a Jewish library in Antwerp was also smashed.

Most of these acts were allegedly perpetrated by Arabs and Muslims. However, some elements of the extreme right took advantage of the situation to launch an “anti-Zionist” campaign. In November posters with the slogan “Israel – Murderer!” bore the signature of Intifada Européenne, an offshoot of the Nation movement (see ASW 1999/2000). Intifada Européenne appears to have succeeded the Anti-Zionistische Aktie (AZA), a neo-Nazi group which was active at the end of the 1990s in Belgium and the Netherlands (see ASW 1998/9).

Propaganda
Dissemination on the Internet, via independent sites or discussion forums, of racist and/or antisemitic texts of Belgian origin, has increased steadily in recent years. A number of sites created by Belgian organizations are devoted in their entirety to this genre. This applies to the websites of the VB, the Front National, the Front Nouveau de Belgique, the Bloc Wallon, the VHO, Blood & Honour Flanders, Aryan Nightmare and others. In 2000, the Centre for Equal Opportunity and Combating Racism identified more than 82 Belgian sites which they categorized as far right, racist, and/or undemocratic.

As in other European countries, racist and antisemitic slogans are often used in the soccer stadium. In December 2000, Marc Degryse, team leader of the GB Antwerp team, condemned fan club members who took advantage of sports events to hurl racist insults at other supporters or at the players of opposing teams. For example, at a match in 2000 between Bruges and Antwerp, the stands were filled with supporters making Nazi salutes and shouting antisemitic slogans. This is not surprising given the fact that soccer fan clubs have been systematically infiltrated by extreme right activists for several years. In Charleroi, for example, members of a gang of hooligans, the Wallon Boys, participate regularly in the demonstrations of the REF (see ASW 1999/2000) and other nationalist groups.

As mentioned above, antisemitic slogans were used against Israel by Islamist demonstrators. The radical left in Belgium, among them Jewish organizations
such as the Union des Progressistes Juifs de Belgique (UPJB) and the Cercle Communautaire Laic Juif (CCLJ), makes a principled distinction between resistance to Israel and antisemitism, expressed in their opposition to antisemitic groups of the extreme right. Nevertheless, at the demonstrations against the Israeli government in late 2000, explicitly antisemitic leaflets were circulated, despite the presence of Jewish participants. In October, one such demonstration was followed by disturbances accompanied also by antisemitic rallying cries.

OPINION POLL

As confirmed by opinion polls, antisemitism is not shared by the majority of the country’s population. On the other hand, either because of ignorance or the influence of extreme right or fundamentalist propaganda (notably, the antisemitic writings of Charles Maurras on politicians from observant Catholic ultra-right circles), antisemitism is fostered in certain limited spheres of society. An academic publication, issued jointly by the King Baudouin Foundation and De Boeck Publishers in early 2001, reports that 13 percent of Belgians would prefer not to have Jews as neighbors; 17 percent preferred not to have people of another race, 18 percent, foreign or immigrant workers, 22 percent, Muslims, and 35 percent, Gypsies (Roma).

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HOLOCAUST

In 1995, Belgium adopted legislation against Holocaust denial. Nevertheless, the Vrij Historisch Onderzoek (Free Historical Research – VHO) organization, founded in Antwerp in 1983 by Siegfried Verbeke and other supporters of the VB, works intensively to distribute its pamphlets denying Nazi crimes, especially the Holocaust; in February, for instance, it carried out a large-scale dissemination campaign in three Brussels communes.

Although, because of the 1995 law, the VHO no longer receives official support from nationalist movements, close ties exist between this semi-clandestine organization and senior leaders of these groups. In October 2000, VB vice-president Roeland Raes expressed doubts, not for the first time, about the existence of the Nazi gas chambers during a Dutch TV broadcast.

In fall 2000 well-known French Holocaust denier Vincent Reynouard joined forces with this organization. Reynouard had chosen to go into exile in Belgium because he was being investigated by the French justice authorities. Reynouard found refuge in Ixelles (Brussels) in a fundamentalist Christian community close to the Fraternité Saint-Pie X (see above). In the early 1990s, Olivier Mathieu, another antisemitic French agitator, sought refuge with the same community. Reynouard’s presence in Brussels demonstrates that Belgium has remained an international center of Holocaust denial and neo-Nazism.
The VHO shares its website with Bradley Smith’s Holocaust denial site CODOH. This site, uniting the most active Holocaust deniers worldwide, is operated by German denier Germar Rudolf (see Germany).

It should be noted that some organizations which do not promote Holocaust denial, nonetheless have ties with denial groups. This applies, in particular, to les Amis de la Renaissance Européenne. Established by the current leaders of the Bloc Wallon party, which appeared during the October 2000 municipal elections, this association is in contact with the editor of l’autre histoire (a Holocaust revisionist publication issued in Brittany) and Jean-Robert Debbaut (see ASW 1998/9).

In November 2000 a Brussels court found David Vercruysse guilty of charges of violating the law against Holocaust denial. A member of the VB, Vercruysse campaigned among French-speaking organizations, including Robert Steuckers’ Synergies Européennes.

RESPONSES TO RACISM AND ANTISEMITISM

Several sectors of Belgian society have organized to counter the phenomenon of intensified extremism. The number of anti-fascist demonstrations increased in 2000, with trade unions, as well as many political parties, mobilizing their forces. The “cordon sanitaire,” an agreement between all the democratic parties in order to isolate the VB and the far right politically in Wallonia, has been reinforced. Legal complaints and proceedings against far right leaders have increased in recent years. Educational establishments disseminate information in order to make students of all ages aware of relevant issues. According to the Centre for Equal Opportunity and Combating Racism, there has been an increase in the federal government’s, as well as parliament’s, use of powers to combat discrimination on a wider level.
DENMARK

The al-Aqsa intifada generated violent anti-Israel demonstrations and speeches in Denmark, which included antisemitic manifestations. Continuing support for the Danish People's Party reflects the persistence of strong anti-immigrant feeling in the country.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

There are 7,000 Jews in Denmark, out of a total population of 5.25 million. Most Jews are concentrated in Copenhagen, but smaller communities exist in Odense and Aarhus. About one-third are Polish Jews (or their children) who found sanctuary in Denmark after the antisemitic campaign in communist Poland in 1968. The central communal organization is the Mosaiske Troessamfund. The community operates several synagogues as well as the Caroline Jewish Day School (established in 1805). Jødisk Orientering is the main Jewish publication.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS

Despite the relatively low percentage of immigrants in Denmark compared with other EU countries, anti-foreigner feeling is reflected in the strong support for the Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People's Party – DPP), now the third largest party in Denmark (see ASW 1999/2000). Fearful of losing votes to the DPP, which has been highlighting street violence by young Muslim Arabs, the Danish government, under Social Democratic Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, submitted a bill, on 10 February 2000, tightening Denmark's immigration laws. Inter alia, the law granting automatic citizenship after a certain period in the country would be repealed.

Activities of Extreme Right Groups

A few members of the neo-Nazi Danish Front are concentrated in the town of Svendborg on the island of Fyn. After an anti-Nazi group called Rebel demonstrated against them, the neo-Nazis broke windows in their homes and were probably behind anonymous phone threats received by members of Rebel. It should be noted that the Danish Front, which has about 50 members, split from Jonni Hansen's antisemitic and racist Danish National Socialist Party (DNSB), and is more violent and radical than the latter.
Student members of **Dansk Forum** (Danish Forum), founded by members of the youth wing of the moribund neo-Nazi **Danske Forening** (Danish Society), have been allowed to resume distributing their magazine *Atheism* at the University of Copenhagen. In 1999 the university ordered them to cease distribution after they were involved in violent clashes with anti-racist students.

**ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITY**

The most serious antisemitic incident was the desecration of the Jewish cemetery in the provincial town of Randers, in Jutland in February. About 70 gravestones were damaged; the perpetrators are unknown. In addition, a window of the Great Synagogue in Copenhagen was smashed on the night of Hitler’s birthday, 20 April.

The **al-Aqsa intifada** generated violent anti-Israel demonstrations and speeches, which included anti-semitic manifestations. On 4 October, 5,000 Palestinians demonstrated in the center of Copenhagen. At the parliament building demonstrators burned the Israeli and American flags as well as an effigy of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Firearms were brandished and police and random individuals were attacked with rocks, sticks and bottles. A day later an elderly Jewish woman was confronted by three Muslim girls at the gate of a synagogue. The girls spat on her and called her ”Jew-bitch.”

Under the title “Jews Slaughter Muslims in Palestine – Is There a Savior?” the trans-national Islamist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir (see **United Kingdom**) held a meeting in Copenhagen on 21 October. About 200 people heard speakers call on Palestinians living in Denmark to jihad. The Palestinian imam Ahmad Abu Laban of the Danish Islamic Society is one of the most militant Islamist activists. Omar ‘Abd al-Rahman, who masterminded the World Trade Center bombing in New York, spoke in Abu Laban’s mosque in the late 1980s.

After the outbreak of the intifada there was a heated debate on who was to blame for the violence. One Arab accused Denmark of responsibility for the plight of the Palestinians because Denmark voted for the establishment of Israel in 1948. The far left Unity List party suggested in the city council that Israel Square in Copenhagen be renamed Palestine Square. It received support in the council only from the other left-wing party, the Socialist Peoples’ Party.

Some inflammatory expressions were reported prior to the outbreak of the intifada. In March the Danish Church Emergency Help group, which is unaffiliated with any established church, published a pamphlet portraying the three religions of Jerusalem. Christianity was represented by a cross, Islam by the Dome of the Rock and Judaism by barbed wire and the inscription on the grave of Baruch Goldstein, the 1994 murderer of 29 Muslim worshippers in Hebron. The church organization rejected protests by the Jewish community.

Anne Grethe Holmsgaard, a militant leftist and for many years a pro-Palestinian activist, announced that she would run for parliament as a candidate of the Socialist Peoples’ Party in 2002. It was brought to public attention that
Holmsgaard had expressed antisemitic views in her 1983 book Zionism’s Israel, where she described the Jews as the natural enemy of “progressive” ideas. Holmsgaard was also criticized for her sympathy with the Palestinian murderers of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics.

The Danish aid organization Immigranthjælpen (Immigrant Aid), which supports the integration of Jewish immigrants in Israel, received threatening letters at their Internet address, apparently from Danish neo-Nazis (the name of DNSB leader Jonni Hansen is mentioned). The messages referred to the staff of the organization as "Jewish pigs" and other epithets, and ended with a swastika. The police are investigating.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HOLOCAUST AND THE NAZI ERA

The Danish Center for the Study of Holocaust and Genocide opened in Copenhagen in August. Center Democratic Party member Peter Duettoft and Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen had initiated the project. The center will document the Holocaust and carry out research on genocide in general.

A study of Denmark’s treatment of Jewish refugees prior to and during World War II by the Icelandic historian Vilhjalmur Órn Vilhalmsson (see also ASW 1999/2000) came out in 2000. Vilhalmsson claims that Denmark returned at least 21 Jewish refugees to Nazi Germany in the late 1930s, although it had not been asked to do so by Germany.

Also published in 2000 was the book Denmark and the Jewish Refugees, 1933–1940, by the Danish historian Lone Rünnitz. The study revealed that several groups and individuals, including a group of Danish police detectives, had smuggled Jews to safety at great personal risk to themselves.

The website run by Mikkel Andersson combats Holocaust denial.

RESPONSES TO RACISM AND ANTISEMITISM

Court Cases
DNSB leader Jonni Hansen was convicted and given a one and a half year sentence and loss of his driving license for attempted manslaughter, after he drove his car into a left-wing group engaged in sawing down the fence around his house, which serves as the neo-Nazi headquarters in Greve, south of Copenhagen, in late 1999.

The German-Danish Nazi Marcel Schilf was acquitted by a court in Helsingbor of the charge of distributing racist and antisemitic music CDs.

The public prosecutor for Sealand has begun legal proceedings against Danish and Swedish neo-Nazis for wearing T-shirts at the Rudolph Hess march in Roskilde in 1998, with the inscription “Smash the Jews – Kill ‘em all.”

Official and Public Activity
The Danish town Farum has signed a friendship agreement with the Israeli regional council of Emek Hefer. The mayor of Farum Peter Brixtofte has
allotted a portion of the 2001 budget to send all of the town’s 6th grade classes to Israel as part of the curriculum.

In February over 500 people participated in a “sing-in” to mark the one-year anniversary of protests against a disputed neo-Nazi house in Aalborg, northern Jutland. The house had been bequeathed by the late Nazi Gennar Gram to the DNSB. In a civil action, a local court, declaring the will null and void, handed the house over to the half-sister of the deceased in the US, who has no neo-Nazi connections.
FRANCE

The results of the March local elections in France confirmed that the extreme right is still a force to be reckoned with, despite the split of the Front National. There is a growing call from rank and file members for reunification of the two parties. The largest number of violent antisemitic incidents in a decade was recorded in 2000, the majority in the last three months of the year when 43 synagogues and 3 cemeteries were attacked. The French government declared 16 July Holocaust Commemoration Day.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

The French Jewish community numbers between 600,000 and 700,000 out of a total population of 60 million. The largest community is in the Paris area (300–350,000), followed by Marseille (80,000), Lyon (30,000), Nice and Toulouse (20,000). Strasbourg, where 12,000 Jews live, is a major religious and cultural center.

The three main organizations of French Jewry are the Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France (CRIF), the Consistoire Central and the Fonds Social Juif Unifié (FSJU).

There has been a dramatic revitalization of communal life since the early 1980s, which is reflected in the large number of Jewish private schools (over 80, attended by 5 percent of Jewish schoolchildren) and synagogues (over 150 in the Paris area). In 2001 the first license for AM private broadcasting in France was granted to a Jewish Paris-based radio station, Ciel AM.

As a result of the Matteoli Commission’s report on stolen Jewish property (see ASW 1999/2000), financial compensation for the heirs of Jewish victims of the Holocaust was granted in a decree issued on 14 July 2000 (France’s National Day). A Fondation pour la Mémoire de la Shoah, chaired by former center-right minister Simone Veil, has been set up to supervise the distribution of reparation funds.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS

The French extreme right has weakened since the split of the Front National in December 1998/January 1999 into Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National (FN) and Bruno Mégret’s Mouvement National Républicain (MNR) (see ASW 1998/99, 1999/2000). Despite the decline of both parties in the June 1999 European Parliament elections and in most local by-elections held during 2000, the extreme right is still a force to be reckoned with.
The results of the local elections of 11 and 18 March 2001 confirmed this: in many cities and in several towns it fared even better than in 1995 (for example, Noyon – 34.12 percent; Cluses – 39.93 percent; Bollène, near Orange – 46.90 percent). The extreme right retained three out of the four city councils it controls in southern France, namely Orange (with FN mayor Jacques Bompard, supported by MNR, winning on the first ballot with 59.87 percent); Marignane (62.52 percent) and Vitrolles (45.32 percent).

Moreover, in some cities, the conservative right had agreements with former or current FN/MNR members. For example, a former FN/MNR executive was nominated as the candidate of the nationalist Gaullist party Rassemblement du Peuple Français (RPF), led by Charles Pasqua, in Valenciennes. In some cities such as Versailles and Montfermeil, near Paris, MNR candidates were elected on a rightist slate, namely, that of Club de l’Horloge president Henry de Lesquen and Catholic fundamentalist mayor Pierre Bernard.

There is a growing call from rank and file members for reunification of the two parties on the basis of a radical, racist and strongly anti-Zionist platform. The rationale behind such a move is that 5 percent of the national vote on a race-conscious platform is preferable to 15 percent on a moderate, populist stand.

**Political Parties**

Membership of the *Front National* (FN), led by Jean-Marie Le Pen, stands at 20,000, down from 42,000 before the split. The official policy of FN has always been to recognize the right of foreign-born people to become French citizens, provided they assimilate completely; indeed, a significant portion of party executives is of foreign, albeit European, origin. However, the party only paid lip service to this policy for the sake of “political correctness.” In the mind of the rank and file, as well as in that of most party executives, foreigners, especially Arabs, were thought to be incapable of assimilating. This prejudice was also extended to Jews. One of the most controversial issues in 2000 was that of accepting Frenchmen of non-European origin as members of the party executive. At the party convention which took place in Paris on 28–30 April 2000, Guillaume Luyt, leader of the youth movement *Front National de la Jeunesse*, was ousted because of his refusal to accept the election of Algerian-born Farid Smahi, a hard-line anti-Zionist, to the party’s political bureau. The Catholic fundamentalist wing embodied in the movement *Chrétiénété-Solidarité* (see also below), led by former Euro-MP Bernard Antony, is now heavily represented in the party’s national leadership. This wing of the party does not see race as the hallmark of identity: it believes that any human being who is, or becomes, a Christian (preferably, a Roman Catholic) deserves to become a French citizen.

A few days prior to his re-election as president of the party at the April convention, Le Pen was deprived of his last elected post – in the European
Parliament. This was a result of a November 1999 court decision to ban him from public office for one year for assaulting a Socialist opponent.

Following the 1998 split, the Euronat network, created to unite FN and similar foreign right-wing groups, lost most of its relevance (see ASW 1999/2000).

Chaired by Bruno Mégret, the Mouvemen National Républicain (MNR) has fewer than 5,000 active members and publishes Le Chêne. MNR presents itself as a force of renewal on the far right, but the party platform, especially on the issue of immigration, is similar to that of FN. On the race issue, the party is more radical than FN, in that it publicly states that immigrants of non-European origin are incapable of integrating into French society. Thus, racialism and militant anti-Zionism are more fundamental elements in the party program than in the FN’s. This approach appeals to the most radical groups on the far right, which have supported MNR from the outset. Pierre Vial, one of the leaders of MNR, for example, heads the Volksch Terre et Peuple movement (see below); the former Renouveau Étudiant and its publication Offensive are also part of MNR. The party’s youth wing, Mouvemen National de la Jeunesse (MNJ), chaired by Philippe Schleitter, nephew of French Holocaust denier Robert Faurisson, claims 1,500 members and publishes the monthly Robur. Another youth group on the fringes of MNR is Jeunesse Action Chrétienté (JAC), a Catholic fundamentalist group which publishes the quarterly Force catholique, edited by Thierry Bouzard.

The MNR, which staged a low-key campaign in the March 2001 local elections because of lack of funds, fared better than predicted, obtaining over 20 percent of the vote in 20 of the 216 cities in which it ran candidates, and between 10 and 20 percent in 56, mostly in northern France, the Paris and Marseille areas and Alsace. Many MNR candidates were national revolutionary radicals from groups such as MNJ and Unité radicale (see below).

Having established links with the Flemish Vlaams Blok (VB), the MNR is planning to expand its foreign contacts. However, an October 2000 meeting in Vienna between the VB, MNR and FPÖ, which had been planned by Haider’s adviser Andreas Mölzer, was eventually canceled by the FPÖ.

An interesting development took place regarding the attitude of both parties toward the Israel-Palestine issue. Following the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in September/October 2000, the FN organ Français d’abord adopted a strongly anti-Israel position, which was challenged by subscribers (including party members and sympathizers) in letters to the paper. The rationale behind their pro-Israel stand was that the Palestinians were Arabs, Muslims and often fundamentalists, and thus enemies of the West. Even Terre et Peuple (see below) admitted that both the Palestinians and the Jews had a legitimate claim on the land and that since neither was willing to accept a binational state, partition was the only solution.
Extra-parliamentary Groups

There is a growing trend within the radical right favoring the creation of small locally-based groups (usually around a bulletin) over large nation-wide movements. Further, many radical groups now support regionalist, ethnic/nationalist movements such as Alternative Europe in Alsace, Mouvement Régionaliste de Bretagne and Adsav in Brittany, and Corsican groups. This interest in Völkisch ideas derives from the influence of the **Terre et Peuple** movement. With a membership of 250–300 members, Terre et Peuple publishes a magazine by the same name and believes in the inevitability of a racial war in France between native Frenchmen and immigrants. At its annual conference on 28 May 2000, the key speaker was former New Right ideologue Guillaume Faye, author of *The Colonization of Europe* (2000), which describes an insurrection of white nationals against immigrants. After it became a bestseller on the far right and aroused controversy within far right circles, Faye was indicted for incitement to racial hatred. **Terre et Peuple**, which follows an anti-Israel, anti-Jewish line, has carried articles by French Holocaust denier Roger Garaudy.

Another virulently anti-Israel and anti-Zionist group is the national revolutionary ("proletarian fascist") **Unité radicale** (Radical Unity – UR), which has a membership of about 300 and publishes the bimonthly **Résistance**. Issues of the magazine for 2000 featured interviews with Adriano Tilgher, head of the Italian Fronte Nazionale, and Horst Mahler, the former Rote Armee Frakion terrorist turned National Socialist. Young members of UR publish **Jeune Résistance**, edited by Fabrice Robert. The January 2001 issue was entitled "Against Zionism." UR is the driving force behind the European Liberation Front and the movement CoordiNation, which calls for unified action among all radical right groups and for reunification of FN and MNR. In 2000, UR established links with the Italian Forza Nuova.

The faction-ridden student **Groupe Union Défense** (GUD), which has a record of violence against left-wing, foreign and Jewish students on university campuses, is now incorporated into UR, under the name **Union des Etudiants Nationalistes** (UDEN). A public controversy erupted in autumn 2000 when it was discovered that Benoît Fleury, the outgoing GUD leader, who has several convictions for physical violence and antisemitism, had been named as a lecturer in law by the Paris-Assas University. The appointment was subsequently revoked. Additionally, the group was allegedly connected to the painting of swastikas on several Jewish institutions in Marseille in May.

**Oeuvre Française** (French Society), headed by former collaborationist Pierre Sidos, and the neo-Nazi **Parti Nationaliste Français** (French Nationalist Party – PNF) and **Parti Nationaliste Français et Européen** (French and European Nationalist Party – PNFE), are near extinction, with fewer than 50 members each. The PNFE was disbanded by what remained of its leadership in 2001.
The skinhead scene, formerly closely linked to PNFE, has been in steady decline since the mid-1990s. Both Blood & Honour and the Charlemagne Hammerskins are represented in France. In mid-October 2000, police raided a network of neo-Nazi/skinhead militants in the Vosges department (near Alsace), including a FN local branch chairman who had celebrated a winter solstice (pagan celebration) during which Nazi salutes were given. Also in 2000, the trial was held of several PNFE- and Blood & Honour-oriented skinheads in Le Havre who, eight years earlier, had brutally murdered a Mauritian immigrant.

Far right activists are increasingly organized around small, locally-targeted publications (with the exception of the rather glossy Réfléchir et Agir), aimed at younger militants disillusioned by the split of FN. Such publications include Le Lansquenet in Aix-en-Provence, Montségur in Nimes, and Fier de l'être near Paris. All three are philosophically neo-pagan, believing either in Nordic gods or in other local divinities, but L'Éperon, in Châteauroux, follows a Catholic fundamentalist line. Rock Identitaire Français is a growing means of disseminating radical ideas of the far right. Tribune musicale, launched in April 2000, is devoted solely to this medium. The main distribution and production labels are Bleu Blanc Rock, in Châteauroux (close to UR) and Memorial Records in Paris. The major group on this scene is Fraction, which, according to its own figures, sold some 5000 CDs in the past three years.

Although as a pagan movement, the New Right opposes all monotheist creeds, antisemitism is no longer a cornerstone of the political agenda of its more moderate wing, GRECE (Groupement de Recherche et d'Étude pour la Civilisation Européenne). GRECE is a think-tank headed by Alain de Benoist and Charles Champetier, which supports an anti-egalitarian, anti-free market economic stand, and believes in the necessity of freeing Europe from the grip of American influence, both strategically and culturally. While in the 1970s GRECE maintained a racialist worldview, in the 1980s it adopted a communitarian policy, recognizing the right of each culture/ethnic group to live in accordance with its own standards and customs. Thus, for example, it acknowledges the right of both Muslims and Jews to have their own state-recognized legal systems (Sha'ria and Halakha, respectively) in their host countries.

The radical wing of the New Right is now represented by the Synergies Européennes network, led by Robert Steuckers (Belgium), which publishes Nouvelles de Synergies européennes. At the summer university of the Synergies network, in August 2000, held in northern Italy, key speakers included former Terza Posizione activist Gabriele Adinolfi and Maurizio Murelli, of the Holocaust denial publication Orion. In 2000, a controversy arose in Lyon about the facilities granted by the University of Lyon III to New Right activists, among them Prof. Jean-Paul Allard, a German studies professor. The network he built around the Institute of Indo-European Studies within this university is
very clearly connected to Synergies Européennes. (Economist and Holocaust
denier Bernard Notin writes under the alias Frédéric Valentin in Synergies.)

The antisemitism of the Royalists is derived from the writings of Charles
Maurras and from the traditional, pre-Vatican II anti-Jewish teachings of the
Roman Catholic Church. The main royalist groups are the anti-European
Union Restauration Nationale (weekly publication, Aspects de la France), the heir
of Action Française, chaired by Pierre Pujo, and the Legitimists, who are close
to Catholic fundamentalism (see below).

The Catholic fundamentalist movement is a peculiarity of the French far
right dating back to the counter-revolutionary school of thought of the 1789
Revolution. The movement is divided between two branches which share a
common belief in theological anti-Judaism. Fraternité Saint-Pie X (Fraternity
of St. Pius X) is composed of followers of the late Bishop Marcel Lefebvre who
refuse to accept the validity of the 1965 Vatican Council II reforms.
Numbering in the tens of thousands, they publish numerous periodicals such as
the bi-monthly Fideliter (Faithfully) and the quarterly Certitudes (Certainties), and
have worldwide headquarters in Ecône (Switzerland). Lay supporters belong to
the religious/political movement Renaissance Catholique (Catholic Rebirth)
and Mouvement de la Jeunesse Catholique de France (Movement of Catholic French Youth — MJCF). In 2000/1, the request by the various
branches of the fraternity worldwide for reintegration into the Roman Catholic
Church was being considered positively by the Vatican. However, the fraternity
has not repudiated its anti-Jewish stand.

Fundamentalists who remained faithful to the Vatican belong to the
Fraternité Saint Pierre (Fraternity of St. Peter), which is associated with the
political and pro-FN movement Chrétienté-Solidarité (publication, Reconquête).
The semi-secret group ICTUS (Institut culturel et technique d’utilité sociale),
successor to the most influential fundamentalist movement of the post-World
War II period Cité catholique, is led by Jacques Trémollet de Villers, once the
lawyer of Nazi collaborator Paul Touvier. It publishes Civitas.

The conspiracy theory is central to French radical right thought, illustrated
in the periodical Lectures françaises (founded in 1958 by Henry Coston, 1910–
2001; circulation about 8,000 copies), as well as the works of other veteran
antisemites and anti-Freemasons such as Jacques Ploncard d’Assac and of the
younger Emmanuel Ratier, publisher of the monthly Faits et Documents. These
publications, which are inspired by The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, devote
considerable space to vilifying B’nai B’rith, in particular, and anything Jewish, in
general. Other pseudo-historical publications promoting Jewish conspiracy
theories include L’autre histoire and Dualpha. Roger Garaudy’s new publication A
contre-nuit, which includes, inter alia, articles by the far-left pro-Palestinian
barrister Isabelle Coutant-Peyre, serves as a bridge between extremists on both
sides of the political spectrum.
ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITIES

Violence, Vandalism and Abuse
The annual report of the Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l'Homme (CNCDH) for 2000, released in March 2001, revealed a sharp increase in antisemitic activity. Out of 216 racist actions (including violence, vandalism and threats) recorded in 2000, 146, the largest number in a decade, were antisemitically motivated. Most violent antisemitic incidents took place during the last three months of the year, at the time of the al-Aqsa intifada, when 43 synagogues and 3 Jewish cemeteries were attacked. The peak was reached during the High Holy Days in October, with 61 incidents, one-third of the worldwide total. These included arson and petrol bomb attacks against synagogues and Jewish schools: in Trappes (suburb of Paris) – where the synagogue was razed to the ground, and in Villepinte (near Paris), Clichy, Creil, Les Lilas and Les Ulis (three attacks); the stoning of worshippers outside synagogues in the Pantin and Bondy suburbs of Paris, and in Nice; a rifle attack by a sniper into the Paris Great Synagogue during the Yom Kippur service; and attacks on Jewish property, such as the torching of a Jewish bakery in Strasbourg and the Molotov cocktail attack on a Jewish restaurant in the mixed Arab-Jewish Belleville neighborhood of Paris. According to the Coordination Forum for Countering Antisemitism, in contrast to previous year when most acts were perpetrated by the far right, the autumn 2000 wave was the work of unorganized and non-affiliated youth of Arab/Muslim origin, mainly in the suburbs of major cities with large Muslim populations. Similarly, these elements were also found to be responsible for the large number of cases of verbal abuse.

Propaganda
Numerous virulently anti-Israel demonstrations took place in France during this period. The anti-racist group MRAP (see below) was the co-organizer of one such demonstration in October (together with the Green Party) at which shouts of “Death to the Jews” were shouted by Muslim extremists who had joined it.

Since late September numerous cases of biased coverage of the Palestinian intifada, including anti-Jewish slurs, were recorded in the French media. The Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel (equivalent to the US Federal Communications Commission) received complaints about the bilingual FM station Radio Orient, owned by Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, because of the transmission of a sermon in Arabic from a Gaza mosque, urging worshippers to kill Jews; about the state-owned France-Info, because of a blatantly anti-Jewish on-the-spot report from Israel; and about the state-owned TV channel France 3, for broadcasting an interview with Raymonda Tawil, Arafat’s mother-in-law, who said that “the Jews should return to their ghettos.”

The appearance of the book La campagne de France, by Renaud Camus, a novelist with no known political affiliation, stirred up controversy among
French intellectuals because it allegedly contains antisemitic passages. Camus complained that Jews were over-represented in the media and that there was too much emphasis on Jewish culture there. The publisher withdrew the book when the minister of culture supported Camus' opponents, a move which was condemned by philosophers and public figures, including Jews. Camus claims that the past humiliations of a people should not protect them from criticism today.

Besides the far right publications mentioned above, others which disseminate antisemitism and which are sold at news stands, include:

- **Présent**: published since 1982 and edited by Jean Madiran, a wartime supporter of the Vichy regime; now faces closure due to a loss of readership following its refusal to back a particular faction in the FN feud.
- **Rivarol**: published since 1951, with a circulation of about 2,000; edited by Camille Galic; remains uncommitted to either FN or MNR. Although taking care not to infringe the anti-racism laws, this weekly expresses racist and anti-Jewish prejudices as well as Holocaust denial beliefs.
- **National-Hebdo**: weekly organ of FN, with which it shares offices; directed by party official Jean-Claude Varanne and edited by Yves Daoudal, a Catholic fundamentalist; has a dwindling circulation.
- **Minute-La France**: weekly founded in 1962; maintains a position half-way between the FN/MNR and the anti-Gaullist right, favoring an agreement between them and the mainstream right; taken over by Catherine Barnay, former executive of Ordre Nouveau and the Parti des Forces Nouvelles, after its bankruptcy in 1999; circulation has reached an all-time low (no verified figures available).
- **Monde et Vie**: Catholic fundamentalist monthly supporting St. Pius X Fraternity and FN; edited by Claude Giraud; promotes the conspiracy theory.
- **Le Libre Journal**: Catholic fundamentalist newspaper available only on the web; edited by Serge de Beketch, former spokesman for city of Toulon; pro-MNR but promotes reunification of former FN.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HOLOCAUST AND THE NAZI ERA

**Holocaust Commemoration/Education**

The French government declared 16 July Holocaust Commemoration Day in memory of the 13,000 French Jews forced to assemble on this day in 1942 in the Vélodrome d'Hiver stadium and sent to Nazi concentration camps.

In September the French Nazi hunter Serge Klarsfeld received the country's highest award, the Legion of Honour, for his 50-year campaign to bring Nazi criminals to justice.
French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin announced, on the eve of his visit to Israel in February 2000, that the French high school curriculum would now include a program on French complicity in the Holocaust, including the roundup in the Vélodrome d’Hiver stadium. A textbook written by the Swedish researchers Stéphane Bruchfeld and Paul Levine, with a section on police complicity by Serge Klarsfeld, has been translated.

FN leader Le Pen objects to including the Holocaust in the curriculum. He claims anti-Nazism is becoming an international obsession liable to depress national aspirations.

**War Criminals**
Appeals for a presidential pardon and for the release of former junior Vichy official Maurice Papon were rejected by the French Higher Court of Justice in 2000. The trial, in absentia, of the Nazi war criminal Alois Brunner opened in Paris in March 2001.

**RESPONSES TO RACISM AND ANTISEMITISM**
The FN split resulted in diminished activity by the main anti-fascist organizations. The left-wing Ras L’Front network remains the main anti-fascist force, publishing a monthly newspaper by the same name. LICRA (Ligue internationale contre le racisme et l’antisémitisme), under Patrick Gaubert, now focuses mainly on combating hate on the Internet and has set up branches abroad. MRAP (Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l’amitié entre les peuples), close to the Communist Party, is led by Mouloud Aounit. The Ligue des Droits de l’Homme, dating from the Dreyfus affair and headed by lawyer Michel Tubiana, took a stand in favor of Papon’s release from jail (see above). SOS-Racisme, chaired by Malek Boutih, works against all forms of racial discrimination and extremism. The Centre Européen de Recherche et d’Action sur le Racisme et l’Antisémitisme (CERA), created in 1992 by the European Jewish Congress and now independently run, publishes a yearly report on right-wing and left-wing extremism in Europe.

Much human rights activity in 2000 was focused on combating hate on the Internet. The court action of Union des Etudiants Juifs de France (UEJF) against Yahoo! received considerable media coverage. UEJF accused Yahoo! of auctioning Nazi memorabilia on the Internet, when sales of such items are illegal in France. The court warned Yahoo! in May that if it persisted in the sales, it would face a fine of 100,000 francs a day.

A Paris court convicted Radio Islam Internet site director Ahmed Rami of antisemitism and fined him 300,000 francs, in absentia, in October, for incitement to racial hatred. The Swiss Holocaust denier Jürgen Graf, was fined 50,000 francs, also in absentia, for sending his book *The Holocaust on the Witness Stand* to several French parliamentarians in an attempt to have the Gayssot law forbidding Holocaust denial repealed.
GERMANY

The electoral decline of Germany’s three extreme right-wing parties in 2000 was in marked contrast to the growing attraction of far right individuals and groups who incite to violence. Moreover, their potential to commit violence increased drastically. The dramatic increase in antisemitic acts in the last quarter of 2000 by both radical Islamists and right-wing extremists was largely attributable to the impact of the al-Aqsa intifada in Germany. The number of websites operated by German right-wing extremists rose to 800 compared with 330 in 1999. The increasing radicalism of the NPD has raised the discussion about banning this party to the top of the public agenda.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

The Jewish community has more than doubled since 1989, when mass immigration of Jews from the former Soviet Union began, and is now about 100,000. The largest Jewish centers are Berlin, Frankfurt, Munich and Hamburg, but Jewish communities are active in most other large cities. Very few of the German Jews who survived World War II or their descendents returned to Germany.

The weekly Allgemeine Jüdische Wochenzeitung is the most prominent of a number of publications which serve the needs of Jews in Germany. The Zentralrat, the umbrella organization of German Jewry, has moved its headquarters to Berlin.

In November 2000, Germany’s first rabbinical school since the Holocaust was established in Potsdam. The Abraham Geiger Rabbinical College is affiliated with the Jewish Studies Center at the University of Potsdam, and is only the second rabbinical seminary in continental Europe. In September 2001, the new Jewish Museum in Berlin, housed in a building designed by architect Daniel Liesbeskind, was opened.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS

In 2000 the estimated number of extreme right activists (members of political parties as well as extra-parliamentary groups) rose only slightly, from 50,400 in 1999 to 50,900. According to the security authorities, however, their potential to commit violence had increased drastically.

Political Parties
There was a decline in the electoral achievements of the three main extreme right parties in 2000. This is in marked contrast to the growing attraction of
violence among far right individuals and groups (see below). While not always expressed openly, all three parties remain xenophobic and antisemitic in their outlook.

The Deutsche Volksunion (German Peoples’ Union – DVU), led by the millionaire publisher Dr. Gerhard Frey, has been the most successful in the polls in recent years and is currently represented in both the Saxony-Anhalt and Brandenburg state legislatures. Founded in 1987, the DVU is today the largest extreme right-wing political party in Germany, with about 17,000 members. Its chairman provides the funds required to organize expensive propaganda campaigns (see ASW 1989/9). Its organ, the weekly National-Zeitung/Deutsche Wochenzeitung, has a circulation of 45,000. Xenophobia, antisemitism, questioning the Holocaust and National Socialist (NS) apologetics (“Was Hitler the only one responsible for the outbreak of World War II?”) are important components of their ideology. Besides Norman Finkelstein’s controversial Holocaust Industry (see below), books offered for sale on the DVU homepage include Helden der Wehrmacht (Heroes of the Wehrmacht), KZ-Lügen (KZ-Lies), Verbrechen an der Wehrmacht (Crimes against the Wehrmacht), Die Wehrmacht als Befreirin (The Wehrmacht as Liberator), and Freispruch für Deutschland (Verdict Not Guilty for Germany).

In 1964 Adolf von Thadden, Friedrich Thielen and Waldemar Schütz founded the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German National Democratic Party – NPD), which had some brief electoral gains in the 1970s. Under Udo Voigt – who has been a member of the party since 1968 (when he was 16-years-old) and became chairman in 1996 – the party began attracting young skinheads and neo-Nazis and focused its activities in the former GDR. Most members are now under 30.

In the year 2000, party membership rose from 6,000 to 6,500. Approximately 1,000 of the 6,500 members are from Saxony (former GDR), where the party is represented in several local councils. Ideologically, the NPD stands for a “German völkisch socialism,” which it promotes through the dissemination of anti-capitalist and anti-Western slogans “against globalization and European Union dictatorship.”

The NPD and its youth organization Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN; see below) have been classified by the Federal Office for the Defense of the Constitution (BfV – Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) as a threat to democratic values. Since 1998 they have intensified their struggle to mobilize the street. Most of the violent demonstrations which took place throughout Germany in 2000 were organized by the NPD or the JN. Their aim is to enlarge the “NAPO” – Nationale Ausser-parlamentarische Opposition (National Extra-Parliamentary Opposition).

Lawyer Horst Mahler, a former left-wing activist of the Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction – RAF), joined the NPD in August 2000 and was appointed to handle its defense during the debate over banning the party (see
below). Mahler himself was expelled from the professional association of lawyers of Berlin in February because of his racist and antisemitic activities, but is still able to practice law.

The NPD organ, *Deutsche Stimme*, has a circulation of about 10,000, while its Internet site has become the party’s electronic mouthpiece, providing links to the 15 NPD state (lander) organizations, the online edition of *Deutsche Stimme* and the neo-Nazi news service Nachrichten-Informationen-Theorie (NIT).

According to the BfV, membership of the NPD youth organization, Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN), founded in 1969, rose from 350 to 500 in 2000. *Der Aktivist*, the JN organ, sells 1,000 copies per edition. The NPD has close links to right-wing extremists and neo-Nazi organizations worldwide (for its relationship to the FPÖ, see Austria), including to the US National Alliance leader William Pierce. Proceedings to ban the party have been initiated by the federal government (see below).

The Republikaner (REPS), founded in 1983 by former CSU member and Waffen-SS officer Franz Schönhuber, was successful at the polls in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Since the party’s electoral decline, the REPS have tried to move closer to the political mainstream. Under the slogan “Socialist – Patriotic – Ecologic,” they try to present a respectable façade, dissociating themselves from extremists such as the NPD and DVU and officially repudiating violence. Rolf Schlierer has been chairman of the party since 1994.

Some 13,000 members were registered in 2000 compared with 14,000 in 1999. The youth organization is the Republikaner Jugend (RJ). The REPS use the Internet extensively, and their website provides links to the FPÖ as well as to the Partei für die Einheit Tirols (Party for Unity of the Tyrol). *Der Republikaner*, the party organ, with a circulation of 20,000 copies, also appears online. Subjects treated include the struggle against the Euro, which allegedly threatens Germany’s economy and society, opposition to the erection of a Holocaust memorial and the party’s campaign to build a memorial for German victims of World War II.

**Extra-parliamentary Groups**

Although there is still uncertainty about the existence of a far right terrorist infrastructure in Germany, the number of militant right-wing extremists has doubled since 1994. Since 1995 there have been intense efforts to organize extreme right Freie Kameradschaften (free associations). With no apparent centralized structure, they maintain close contact mainly via the Internet. Over 150 such Kameradschaften exist nationwide.

The BfV differentiates between “neo-Nazis” and “right-wing extremists with a propensity to violence.” In its 2000 report, the BfV calculated that the first group numbered about 2,200 and the second 9,700 (compared to 9,000 in 1999), mostly “extremist right-wing skinheads” who were ready to use violence
to achieve their aims. At the end of 2000, 144 (134 in 1999) extreme right-wing groups were registered by the authorities.

In addition to a steep rise in extreme right-wing manifestations, one of the most serious problems of contemporary Germany, especially east Germany, is the growing acceptability of far right-wing opinions. A survey of young people's attitudes carried out by the Forsa Institute demonstrated this regional divide: 47 percent of 14–25-year-old east Germans found something positive in Nazi ideology compared to 35 percent of young west Germans. Right-wing views seem to be particularly strong among east German high school students: 61 percent think there are too many foreigners, 62 percent that there was some good in Nazism and 15 percent that the Nazi ideology is "in itself a good idea." Forty-six per cent of east Germans surveyed said there were too many foreigners in Germany, compared with 40 percent of west Germans. The Forsa Institute also revealed that at least one out of ten Germans favors right-wing ideologies and that 37 percent in the east and 22 percent in the west were prejudiced against foreigners.

**Extreme Right Violence**

For the past ten years, the BfV and the justice authorities have been concerned by signs of an increasing readiness on the part of extreme right-wing activists to use violent means to achieve their aims or to disseminate their message. Since German reunification in 1990, over 100 people have died as a result of right-wing terror.

As in previous years, the president of BfV warned in 2000 of the growing capability of right-wing extremist groups to carry out major terrorist acts. Weapons and explosives, many of which were supplied through foreign contacts or stolen from the Bundeswehr (German army), were confiscated by the police from the homes of far right militants and neo-Nazis. These included (according to the BfV) small-bore rifles, machine guns, pipe-bombs and equipment for laying bombs. According to a report of the BKA (Federal Criminal Office) in 2000, the German far right maintains contacts in more than 40 countries, thus facilitating the transport and production of weapons as well as propaganda material, illegal sound carriers and literature from abroad.

In 2000 the total number of extreme right-wing crimes reported reached 15,951 compared to 10,037 in 1999. This number includes 998 violent incidents (746 in 1999), a peak since World War II. Until July 2000 a decrease in numbers was expected. However, a bomb attack in Dusseldorf on 27 July (see below) inspired many imitators. Also, public discussion concerning the banning of extreme right-wing parties, particularly the NPD (see below), stirred up extreme right feelings. In autumn, the outbreak of the *al-Aqsa intifada* (see *General Analysis*) encouraged militant right-wingers to exploit anti-Jewish sentiment to increase their activities. At the end of 2000 there was a rise of 58 percent in right-wing crimes, mostly directed against foreigners and Jews, while violent
crimes motivated by extreme right-wing sympathizers increased by 33.8 percent compared to the previous year.

Neo-Nazi violence against immigrants was highlighted by the murder in June of Alberto Adriano, a Mozambique-born German citizen, in the east German town of Dessau. It should be noted that a high percentage of xenophobic attacks took place in the east. Whole areas of eastern towns have been declared “nationally liberated zones” and some schools are terrorized by extreme right activists.

Parades
Parades of extreme right-wing members through the streets of German cities have become a relatively common sight. The Saxonian capital Dresden has turned into a parade center for young and old Nazis: nine pro-Nazi demonstrations took place there in 2000. Although frequently met by anti-fascist counter-demonstrations, police troops or even forbidden by court order, activists of the extreme right, in particular those incited by the NPD youth organization, strive to maximize their presence on the streets. Together with the JN, the NPD alone succeeded in mobilizing skinheads and neo-Nazis in over 50 demonstrations in 2000.

For the first time since 1945, on 29 January 2000, two days after the official Holocaust Day and the eve of the 67th anniversary of Adolf Hitler’s assumption of office, neo-Nazis staged a march through Berlin’s historic Brandenburg Gate, the traditional parade route of Hitler’s NSDAP. The occasion for the demonstration was the official laying of a foundation stone at the site of the Berlin Holocaust memorial – that “monument of shame in the center of Berlin,” according to Voigt – near the Reichstag building. Some 700 neo-Nazis distributed Nazi propaganda and chanted racist and antisemitic slogans, such as “No cash for memorials,” “Jobs instead of Jewish agitation” and “Holocaust? Don’t let them take the piss out of you.” Although officially organized by the NPD, it was noticeable that the militant Gesinnungsgemeinschaft der Neuen Front (GdNF), an umbrella organization of neo-Nazi groups, was in fact controlling the event, which was led by Christian Worch, Thomas Wulff and Oliver Schweigert, all leading figures of the GdNF.

Infiltration of the Army
An increasing number of neo-Nazis are joining the Bundeswehr. Their aim is to receive military training and to recruit activists and sympathizers from among the ranks of young soldiers. An increase of 45 percent in right-wing incidents in the army registered in 2000, has alarmed the authorities. According to an opinion poll conducted by the Sinus Trend 2000 Institute, 16 percent of potential army volunteers identify with extreme right-wing parties, notably the NPD and the DVU.
Infiltration of Prisons

According to Bernd Wagner, a leading authority on the German extreme right, neo-Nazis have developed an elaborate prisoner-support network in east German jails aimed at recruiting activists. "The prisons are running the risk of discharging more neo-Nazis than they admit," he warned. Brandenburg's justice minister concedes that virtually every jail there contains a hard core of young neo-Nazi offenders who see themselves as political prisoners with a mission to convert other inmates.

Extreme right-wing inmates are assisted from outside by the neo-Nazi Support Association for National Prisoners (known by its German initials HNG), which provides them with access to lawyers, propaganda materials and help in recruiting others. The HNG (see ASW 1998/9) has developed into one of the largest neo-Nazi organizations in Germany. One of its leaders is the Berlin lawyer Wolfgang Narrath, formerly head of the outlawed neo-Nazi Viking Youth organization. The HNG's recruitment tactics include a pen-pal scheme, which enables neo-Nazis to keep in touch with young inmates. The HNG publish HNG-News and have increased their activities on the Internet.

ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITIES AND HATE PROPAGANDA

While during the first quarter of the year 2000, 140 antisemitic incidents were reported, the number in the last quarter more than tripled. The total number for the year amounted to 1,378 — an almost 70 percent rise compared to the previous year — according to the official report of the Ministry of Interior. The dramatic increase during the last quarter is due in large part to the al-Aqsa intifada which inspired radical Islamists to anti-Jewish acts and served as a catalyst for extreme right-wing antisemites (see General Analysis).

Violence, Vandalism and Threats

An analysis of violent antisemitic attacks in 2000 reveals that the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada coincided with traditional action days of the extreme right, with the Jewish High Holy Days (Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur), and with the anniversaries of German unification on 3 October and the Reichskristallnacht on 9 November. Common anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist feelings seem to have temporarily united radical Islamists and extreme right-wingers who, in general, are located in opposing camps.

Shortly before Yom Kippur, a crowd of about 100 Palestinian and Lebanese demonstrators tried to storm the Old Synagogue in the German city of Essen, today a Jewish museum and Holocaust memorial center. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer instantly condemned the attack and declared that Germany would not permit Jewish institutions to be targets of violence. Other incidents during October 2000 included violent attacks on synagogues in Dusseldorf and Berlin and desecration of cemeteries, as well as threats and fake letter bombs addressed to representatives of the Jewish communities. On 27
July 2000 ten persons were injured, six of them Jews, when the Wehrhahn railway station in Dusseldorf was bombed.

Throughout the year Jewish cemeteries were once again the main targets of right-wing extremists throughout Germany. These included the cemeteries of Göttingen, Erfurt, Guben, Georgsmund, Hanover, Hillersleben, Uckermunde, Anklam, Eberswalde, Potsdam, Leipzig, Grabow, Saarbrueck and Solms. According to Prof. Julius Schoeps, director of the Moses Mendelson Center of the University of Potsdam, an average of two to three Jewish cemeteries are desecrated per week. This is three times higher than the official number released by the BfV for 2000 – 54 for the whole year (47 in 1999).

Synagogues and Holocaust memorials were also the targets of extreme right violence. The Erfurt synagogue, for example, was torched on 20 April, the anniversary of Hitler's birthday. Since 1945 Jewish cemeteries and property have been damaged on more than 1,000 occasions.

Young Jewish soccer players were the target of several antisemitic attacks in 2000. At the end of August an 18-year-old player from the Frankfurt TuS Maccabia was physically assaulted and insulted with the words “Schwein Jude” (Jewish swine). In October insults were also hurled at other young players of the club; these included: “You are on Schindler’s list” and “We want to see you burned.” In Niederwisel, stones were thrown at Maccabi players.

**Propaganda**

*Hate through Music.* The music scene is an important means of disseminating extreme right propaganda and recruiting sympathizers among the young. The Internet offers a range of music for downloading, including the Horst-Wessel-Lied, Black Metal music and neo-Nazi—skinhead music of the Blood & Honour group, which is forbidden in Germany. Also available is the music of the “national bard,” Frank Rennike, a former member of the banned Viking Youth. The music, offered in digital form, is of CD quality.

Skinhead music is aggressive and often serves as a means of indoctrination. The oldest German neo-Nazi website Thulenet offers access to forbidden (indizierte) music through the link “Liable to penalty.” The groups are called Kraftschlag, Kraft und Ehre (Power and Honor), Klansmen, No Remorse, Neo Hate and Rahowa (the slogan of the White Power movement, short for “Racial Holy War”).

Production of White Power music flourishes, both on and off the Internet. A central figure is Torsten Lemmer. A former REP, he took over the management of the Nazi skinhead band Stoerkraft. The music label RockNord serves both as the name of a mail-order business for badges, flags, CDs and T-shirts, and a Nazi-skin-music magazine.

In December, 2000 it was widely reported that many illegal neo-Nazi music titles, inciting to murder, were being traded on the Internet music exchange Napster. The German media enterprise Bertelsmann, a new partner of Napster
condemned this abuse. The neo-Nazi volume “Macht und Ehre,” for example, instigates a second extermination of the Jews. The text of the lyric of “The Eternal Jew” reads: “Auschwitz, Dachau and Buchenwald / there we kill the Jews again.”

Hate music is also distributed on CDs, thousands of which were confiscated in 2000. In October 2000 the “national bard” Frank Rennike was sentenced in Baden Württemberg to ten months imprisonment and his wife fined DM1,000 for collaborating in the dissemination of hate and xenophobia. They were ordered to refund DM70,000 for sales of their CDs.

Concerts by racist and antisemitic bands have become the meeting point not only for neo-Nazis but also for young people without previous contact with extreme right-wing ideology. However, according to the BfV, although the number of skinhead bands rose slightly to 101 (93 in 1999), the number of public performances dropped by over 25 percent to 82 concerts (109 in 1999).

Internet. In 2000 the number of websites operated by German right-wing extremists amounted to 800, compared to 32 in 1996, 80 in 1997, 200 in 1998 and 330 in 1999. Homepages with illegal content are disseminated mainly through US providers. German right-wing extremists thus exploit the freedoms granted by the US First Amendment to circumvent the German law banning the dissemination of neo-Nazi propaganda and denial of the Holocaust on the web (see also below).

There was a marked radicalization of messages on the Internet, including a repeated call on various forums for taking up arms against the Federal Republic. The distribution of hit lists through the net, already observed in 1999, is an indication of the increasing readiness for violent struggle. These lists are sometimes combined with operational plans for preparing explosives.

Other means, such as mailing lists, reaching hundreds of members, are used to disseminate hate messages. In August 2000 NPD member Horst Mahler sent an e-mail message to members of the Bundestag, and to many citizens, appealing to “Citizens of the German Reich.”

Many mainstream publications and parties provide “open forums” for discussing daily issues. However, within a few weeks of their creation these forums are often infiltrated and eventually taken over almost completely by extreme right-wing activists.

In response to the drastic increase in German hate sites and extreme right-wing activities on the web, the German authorities together with the Zentralrat established a link on the Internet that leads surfers who use search terms such as Sieg Heil directly to anti-violence websites (see below).

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HOLOCAUST AND THE NAZI ERA

The increase in antisemitic and xenophobic manifestations in Germany has prompted both the Protestant Church and the Evangelical Church to issue
statements emphasizing their solidarity with the Jews and admitting their complicity in the Holocaust.

Holocaust Denial
Denial of the Holocaust is a crime in Germany and punishable under paragraphs 130, 185 and 186 of the Criminal Code. Thus, Holocaust denial publications are distributed mostly from abroad, especially Belgium through the international forum for Holocaust deniers Vrij Historisch Onderzoek (VHO). Germar Rudolf (see ASW 1996/7), for example, a leader of the international Holocaust denial campaign, is one of the forces behind the pseudo-scientific journal Vierteljahreshefte für freie Geschichtsforschung (VfG), the most influential publication of Holocaust denial in Europe. Translated into various languages, it reaches an enormous public through the Internet. Rudolf, sentenced in 1995 for Holocaust denial in Germany, distributes his publications, as well as those of other deniers, through his publishing house Castle Hill from exile in the UK.

In December 2000 the Federal Court reversed a decision of the Manheim district court, ruling that Holocaust denial, disseminated through the Internet, is a punishable crime. This ruling applies also for material originating from abroad.

Holocaust denier Günther Deckert’s defense lawyer Ludwig Bock was fined DM9,000 for trivializing the Holocaust.

The Berlin school administration authorities took disciplinary measures against a high-school teacher in Steglitz, in December 2000, on the grounds of extreme right-wing statements made in the classroom. Parents filed a complaint against him because of his dissemination of the “Auschwitz lie.”

The Reception of Finkelstein’s Book in Germany
Norman Finkelstein’s controversial The Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering, first published in English in the United States, became the subject of a heated discussion even months before its publication in Germany in early 2001, when it became an immediate best seller. Finkelstein claims that the memory and true essence of the Holocaust have been systematically distorted, manipulated and misused by Israel and the US Jewish community to serve their ideological and political aims.

Some 130,000 copies were sold in the first six weeks, and there was non-stop reportage and commentary in every major German media outlet. Wolfgang Benz, director of the Berlin Technical University’s Center for Research of Antisemitism, sees the debate less as a matter for historians than as a problem of political culture. Whereas in the US the debate took place only within the left camp, Benz is worried about the praise for Finkelstein by the average “armchair warrior” in Germany.

Publication of his book coincided with an opinion poll that showed that 65 percent of Germans totally or partially agreed with Finkelstein’s assertion that
“Jewish organizations make exaggerated compensation demands on Germany to enrich themselves.”

Ernst Nolte and the Konrad Adenauer Prize
On 4 June right-wing historian Ernst Nolte, the main figure in the 1986 “historians debate” (see Richard J. Evans, In Hitler’s Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past, London: I.B. Tauris, 1989), was awarded the Konrad Adenauer prize in Munich. The prize was presented to Nolte by Horst Möller, director of the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich, which has traditionally enjoyed a reputation as a center for serious historical research. Möller lavishly praised Nolte’s contribution to historical studies, while at the same time attempting to distance himself from Nolte’s most provocative theses. Subsequently, the German media was filled with sharp criticism of both Nolte and Möller. The latter was accused of condoning “an intellectual political offensive aimed at integrating rightist and revisionist positions into the conservative mainstream.”

Nolte is supported mainly by publications such as Junge Freiheit, which describes itself as a newspaper in Germany for “patriotic right-wingers.” In tones reminiscent of the NSDAP, Junge Freiheit has criticized German politicians as “decadent windbags” who “no longer possess an iota of honor,” and calls for “an end to the self-hatred of Germans” (17 Aug. 2000, World Socialist Web Site).

Compensation
On 24 March 2000 Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s cabinet approved legislation granting compensation to Nazi slave workers. A global figure of one billion marks had already been agreed upon in December 1999. Because of the poor participation in the fund (the money was to have been raised from firms which had employed slave workers), a citizens’ initiative was organized in Munich to urge large firms to contribute. In Frankfurt, Klaus Zickel, head of IG Metall, the largest workers’ union in Germany, called on citizens of the city to donate DM20 each to compensate the victims of Nazi era slave workers. Nobel Prize winner Günther Grass made a similar appeal to all Germans. The sum is to be paid to the Foundation of Commemoration, Responsibility and Future. Solidarity funds were also set up by various professional unions.

In April 2000 the German federal government launched a website catalog of over 2,000 paintings, mostly looted from Jews by the Nazis. The Internet is regarded as the last opportunity for the heirs to recover their property.

RESPONSES TO RACISM AND ANTISEMITISM

Official and Public Activity
On 9 November, the anniversary of the Reichskristallnacht, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder called for an “uprising of the decent” to combat racism,
xenophobia and antisemitism. The message, he said, should echo, across Europe where support for far right groups was growing. During the year hundreds of thousands demonstrated against right-wing extremism in Berlin, Dortmund, Augsburg, Regensburg, Munich, Dessau and other cities throughout Germany.

Germany’s Interior Minister Otto Schilly has announced plans to aid young people quit neo-Nazi and far right groups. The program includes a telephone hotline, help finding work and housing, financial assistance and even the provision of a new identity. “The point is to weaken and destabilize the far right scene,” said Schilly.

In view of the growing threat of right-wing extremism, many initiatives have been taken on the net to counter this phenomenon. NetzGegenRechts (Anti-Right Net), for example, launched on 8 November, is supported by more than 20 of the leading German media outlets in an attempt to inform about right-wing extremism and to promote democratic values. To date, more than half a million Internet users have accessed the site and several hundred firms and private individuals have placed the NetzGegenRechts logo on their homepages. One month later, six German states launched a joint Internet site against right-wing extremism.

Mut gegen rechte Gewalt (Courage in the Face of Right-Wing Violence) is an initiative of the news magazine Stern, which has donated 2 million marks to support centers for victims of right-wing-violence and community groups by donating equipment and providing access to the Internet.

**Outlawing the NPD – The Public Debate**

Under Germany’s Basic Law, the Constitutional Court may ban a party if the government demonstrates that it pursues anti-democratic goals. This process may take several years. When West Germany promulgated the Basic Law after World War II, it sought to eradicate Nazism and disassociate itself from any political party espousing the same or similar goals and values as those of the Nazi Party. “Parties which, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to impair or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany, shall be unconstitutional” (Basic Law, article 21[2]).

Two parties have been banned in Germany in the postwar era. The neo-Nazi Sozialistische Reichspartei (SRP) was outlawed in 1952, and the Kommunistische Partei Deutschland (KPD) in 1956. Since 1980, 23 extreme right-wing groups have been declared illegal. In 2000, Hamburger Sturm (in August), and Blood & Honour division Deutschland and its youth organization White Youth were declared illegal.

The increasing radicalism and violence of the NPD and its enthusiasm for Nazi ideology have brought the discussion about banning the party to the top of the public agenda. “We have gathered so much convincing material and
recorded so many terrible ideological, aggressive and hateful remarks that we would be negligent to do nothing,” said Interior Ministry official Cornelia Sonntag-Wullfag.

On 3 November 2000, a spokesman of the Federal Ministry of the Interior reported that more than 350 complaints had been filed against members and sympathizers of the NPD. The BfV published 600 pages of material against the party, demonstrating that NPD officials call openly for a take-over of power in Germany, by force, “if necessary.” A wide range of political leaders have called for banning the NPD. On 8 November the federal government decided to submit a request to ban the NPD to the Federal Constitutional Court. In January 2001 the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe confirmed that the application to outlaw the NPD – comprising 73 files – had been lodged.

The liberal Freie Demokraten (Free Democratic Party – FDP) opposed the ban, saying the NPD (whose membership rose considerably in 2000/1) was not a mortal threat to democracy. “We consider a ban the wrong way to fight far right extremism,” said FDP chairman Guido Westerwelle. “It is well-intentioned, but well-intentioned is often the opposite of well done... The NPD is the least successful of all the far right parties... [Its] electoral results do not confirm the presence of this danger,” he claimed.

Banning an extreme right-wing party prevents it from participating in state elections. However, declaring these parties unconstitutional may encourage members and sympathizers of such organizations to affiliate with mainstream groups. Those who oppose the ban also point out that groups that have been declared illegal in the past have continued their activities underground, making it more difficult for the authorities to monitor them. By resorting to high-tech means, for example, extreme rightists, especially those of forbidden organizations, effectively evade surveillance.
GREECE

Several Jewish sites were vandalized and defaced with neo-Nazi slogans and graffiti in the first half of 2000, including the Jewish cemetery in Athens and Holocaust memorials in Athens and Thessaloniki. The neo-Nazi group Chrissi Avgi was responsible for at least one of these attacks. The extreme right accused the Jewish community of responsibility for annulment of the law which requires a person's religion to be recorded in identity cards.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

Greek Jews number 5,000 out of a total population of 10 million. The two largest communities are Athens (3,000) and Thessaloniki (1,000).

The Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece (Kentrikó Israelitikó Symvoulío Ellados), the main communal organization, is recognized as a legal body under state law, functioning under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education and Religions.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITIES

Political Organizations
The neo-Nazi Chrissi Avgi (Golden Daybreak) was the only far right group active in 2000. It was responsible for at least one antisemitic act (see below) and for attacks against left-wing targets.

The neo-fascist Proti Grammi (Front Line) party, formed in 1999 and led by Holocaust denier Kostas Plevris, took part in the April 2000 elections, but won few votes.

Antisemitic Activity
Several Jewish sites were vandalized in 2000. One of the most serious attacks was the desecration of the Jewish cemetery in Athens, on the night of 25–26 May 2000. More than 50 tombstones, the Holocaust memorial and the building used for burial services were daubed with SS symbols, swastikas and slogans, such as "Hitler was right," and "Jews out" (see also ASIV 1999/2000).

In February vandals defaced the commemorative plaque dedicated to victims of the Holocaust, located in Greek Jewish Martyrs Square, Athens. In addition, on the night of 20 April (the date of Hitler's birthday, the 1967 colonels' military coup and the visit of many Israeli supporters of the Maccabi Tel Aviv basketball team), swastikas and antisemitic slogans were painted on the site of the Holocaust memorial and on the Monastirioton synagogue in Thessaloniki. The graffiti was signed by Chrissi Avgi. The synagogue suffered a
further desecration on 7 May, abusive slogans, feces and urine were found at
the entrance, shortly before a Holocaust remembrance ceremony was due to
take place there.

Also in May, suspected neo-Nazis vandalized the home of the late Greek
minister of culture Melina Merkouri, and of the well-known Jewish film
director Jules Dassin, with swastikas and slogans such as “Death to the Jews.”

The antisemitic incidents in May occurred in the wake of the Socialist
government’s decision to abolish the law requiring a person’s religion to be
recorded in identity cards. Members of parliament sympathetic toward the
Greek Orthodox Church or the right-wing camp, such as George Karatzafaris,
accused Greek Jews of responsibility for annulment of the law. On the other
hand, the Independent Authority for the Protection of Personal Data
determined that religion was personal data of a private nature and thus should
not be stated in identity cards. The decision was welcomed by the justice
minister and is binding on the authorities.

The al-Aqsa intifada sparked a few small pro-Palestinian demonstrations
(under 200 protestors each) in front of the Israeli embassy in Athens, organized
by leftist groups and the Communist Party. No violent incidents occurred.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HOLOCAUST AND THE NAZI ERA

The municipality of Serres, near Thessaloniki, has declared an annual Holocaust
Remembrance Day to be observed on 3 March, the date in 1943 when the
entire local Jewish population of 600 was arrested by the Bulgarian authorities,
then allies of the Nazis, and deported to concentration camps. There has been
no Jewish community in Serres since then.

The traveling exhibition “Anne Frank – A History for Today,” arrived in
Greece for a two-year tour. Many schools visited the exhibition when it was on
display in Athens and Piraeus.

A large number of participants submitted short stories on the theme “In
Memory of Greek Jewish Martyrs of the Holocaust.” The competition was
organized by the Board and by the State Broadcasting Radio, within the context
of a series of anti-racist initiatives begun in 1997. The prizes were presented at a
public ceremony in Athens in July.

The Greek delegation to the Stockholm Forum on the Holocaust in January
2000 was led by Foreign Minister G. Papandreou. Nineteen Greek members of
the European Parliament co-signed the subsequent European Union resolution
pledging annual commemoration of the Holocaust in member countries.

The Greek Supreme Court has upheld a claim for 20 million pounds sterling
compensation by surviving relatives of 218 non-Jews from the village of
Distomo who were murdered by the Nazis in June 1944. Germany has refused
to pay, arguing that Greek reparations claims were settled by a 1960 treaty,
which provided war compensation but which, in effect, covered mainly
administrative expenses. The court also ordered the confiscation of three
German government buildings in Athens. However, the Greek government decided to postpone the confiscation. The case is being examined by a Special Supreme Court which will determine the validity of a decision by Greek courts to prosecute foreign governments.
ITALY

In 2000 there was a 30 percent rise in antisemitic manifestations over 1999, partly because of the al-Aqsa intifada. The Italian parliament passed a law in 2000 establishing Holocaust Memorial Day on 27 January. A small segment of the population complains of a sense of saturation with Jewish themes. Holocaust denial has become a recurrent phenomenon in recent years. A movement for reaffirming values more consistent with traditional theology has been noted in the Catholic Church.

JEWISH COMMUNITIES

Some 30,000 Jews live in Italy out of a total population of 57 million. The largest communities are in Rome (15,000) and Milan (10,000) and there are smaller communities in Turin, Florence, Livorno, Trieste, Genoa and several other cities.

Jews have lived in Italy for over two thousand years and have developed unique customs and traditions.

The Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane (UCEI) is the roof organization of Italian Jewry. In addition to providing religious, cultural and educational services, it represents the community in official matters. Several international Jewish organizations have affiliates in Italy. There are Jewish schools in the main communities. The Jews of Rome publish a monthly journal, Shalom, and the Milan community puts out the monthly Bollettino.

PARLIAMENTARY PARTIES AND EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS

Political Parties

The Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance – AN), founded in 1995 at the Fiuggi Congress, absorbed almost all the leaders and members of the neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (Social Italian Movement). Later it joined the Polo delle Libertà (PdL), together with Forza Italia, CCD-CDU (Biancofiore – White Flower), and other small center-right parties. In November 2000 the coalition changed its name to Casa delle Libertà (Freedom House – CdL). In the May 2001 general elections, AN obtained 12 percent of the votes, corresponding to 46 senators and 96 deputies in the Chamber of Deputies. In the center-right government established after the elections, AN leader Gianfranco Fini became deputy prime minister. Four other AN representatives received ministerial appointments.
During its second programmatic conference, held in February 2001, AN continued to project the image of a party no longer affiliated with the fascist right (see ASW 1997/8, 1998/9). Nevertheless, Fini has remained loyal to his commitment to traditional values, namely, "God, Fatherland and Family," as proclaimed in the AN political manifesto as the underlying values of the state.

There is ample proof that some members of the party, as well as voters and sympathizers, still adhere to the old values. For example, at the annual conference dealing with the teachings of the racist, antisemite and doyen of Italian fascism Julius Evola, one senior AN member Giulio Maceratini declared that he was proud of having served in the neo-fascist revolutionary Ordine Nuovo (New Order) movement. The agricultural councilor for the Puglia Region, Mario De Cristofaro, distributed a gift calendar featuring the former dictator Benito Mussolini. (The councilor was later summoned to appear before the party disciplinary committee). A Rome branch of the AN participated in a demonstration of solidarity with Austria's Jörg Haider. Celtic crosses, pro-Haider flags and anti-immigrant banners and slogans, such as, "Benito Mussolini taught us: To beat the communists is not a crime," were observed at the electoral rally of AN candidate for the Lazio regional presidency Francesco Storace (subsequently elected president – or governor, as the new regional presidents from center-right parties prefer to call themselves – in the 2000 regional elections).

AN members are also involved in the historical discourse over remembrance of the fascist period and its influence on present-day Italy (see below). Officially, the AN condemns antisemitism, and the party has supported an official Holocaust Memorial Day. On the other hand, there is growing resentment in the party against "this continuous asking forgiveness from the Jews," "those never ending tests," or the numerous futile attempts to establish official contacts with Israel. The roof organization of Italian Jewry, UCEI, refuses to establish formal relations with the AN because of the presence of extremist elements within its ranks. The UCEI also objects to Fini paying an official visit to Israel. According to the UCEI, the AN has not yet publicly admitted that the RSI (Repubblica Sociale Italiana, 1943–45) actively participated in property confiscation, arrests and deportations of Jews from Italy. Similar criticism was leveled by some AN figures, such as councilor and National Assembly member Enzo Palmesano, founder of the Centro Studi Giorgio Perlasca (see ASW 1997/8). It should be noted that II Secolo d'Italia, the party newspaper, still follows the traditional editorial line, glorifying fascist leaders, as well as poets and writers who became fascists outside Italy in the interwar period, and celebrating Italy's colonial adventure in Ethiopia during the fascist era.

Lega Nord per L'indipendenza della Padania (Northern League for Padanian Independence – LN) is led by Umberto Bossi, a member of the European Parliament. The party is active mainly in Italy's northern regions. LN
participated in the May 2001 elections within the CdL coalition, obtaining only 3.9 percent of the vote on the national level (a minimum of 4 percent is required to enter the Chamber of Deputies – see below). However, LN candidates obtained 30 seats in the Chamber and 17 in the Senate as a result of previous agreements with the CdL, and holds three ministries (Bossi is minister of institutional reform and devolution). The party has three seats in the European Parliament.

In January 2000, LN shelved its secessionist plans in favor of a federalist alternative after it suffered a loss of support and signed an electoral agreement with the PdL (in the 2000 regional elections – see below). The party political line, however, adheres to the old notion of granting autonomy to “Padania” (the northern regions of Italy), whose borders are not well defined. Constructing a “Padanian identity” includes some elements which identify LN with the New Right, for example, the use of mythical themes such as the Celtic origins of “the Padanian people,” defense of localism, radical opposition to globalization and hostility toward non-European Union (EU) immigrants. La Padania, the party newspaper, claims to sell 45,000 copies daily. Its articles often elaborate alleged conspiracy theories against the Italian or Padanian people. Although, officially, LN objects only to illegal immigration, its publication treats immigrants with suspicion, generally branding them criminals. At best, immigration is considered an alien invasion; at worst, it is an instrument of globalization aimed at destroying local communities and favoring a global market. (At the end of 2000, the number of foreign citizens regularly residing in Italy was 1.69 million, representing about 2.9 percent of the Italian population. A EU survey conducted by Fondazione Nord Est revealed that immigration is the cause of much social unrest in Italy – as well as in Great Britain.) The paper reaffirms Italy’s Catholic identity and opposes a secular culture which supports a pluralistic school system. La Padania openly distances itself from skinhead organizations and their violent activity. However, antisemitic organizations, extreme right publishers (such as Società Editrice Barbarossa, which issues the monthly Orion), and Catholic integralist groups (such as Sodalitium and Fraternità Sacerdotale S. Pio X) sometimes advertise in its pages. It opposes Muslim construction of mosques and settlement of the Roma. La Padania underlined the many similarities between LN and the Austrian FPÖ until its electoral agreement with the PdL.

The Movimento Sociale–Fiamma Tricolore (Social Movement–Tricolor Flame – MS-FT), founded in 1995, gathered in its ranks all those MSI members who refused to join Fini’s AN. There are 61 local sections. At the October 2000 party congress, Pino Rauti was re-elected as leader. However, some activists, such as Chieti’s mayor Nicola Cucullo, a well known sympathizer of Mussolini, have left the party, accusing Rauti of being too dictatorial, old-fashioned and unimaginative. Cucullo’s trial for an antisemitic statement made in 1994 (see
ASW 1999/2000), was postponed until October 2001. He was elected mayor of Chieti for the third time in 2001 with 59.3 percent of the vote.

For the regional elections of April 2000, the party reached an electoral agreement with the center-right coalition. It did not pass the minimum 4 percent threshold needed to obtain a seat in the Chamber of Deputies. However, owing to an electoral agreement with the center-right Casa delle Libertà in Sicilia, it gained a seat in the Senate.

The October 2000 party congress manifesto declared that immigrants from non-EU countries endangered the social fabric of the country. At the same time, the foreign policy committee stated its support of the oppressed Palestinians and defense of their right to have their own country. A Palestinian delegation led by Y. Mohid, first secretary of the Palestinian mission in Rome, was received by the congress participants with pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel slogans.

Extra-parliamentary Groups
Numerous small ultra-right organizations were formed in Italy to oppose globalization, petty crime and non-EU immigration. These groups are in constant flux, members moving from one group to another and some groups barely functioning after their foundation. After its movement toward the center, the AN left a large group of radical supporters without a strong political reference point. The need to unite them into a single movement increased when a electoral law was passed in 1994 introducing a 4 percent threshold for election to the Chamber of Deputies. MS-FT tried to assume this role, but Rauti seems unable to attract many groups.

Forza Nuova, founded in 1997, is led by Roberto Fiore, a former Terza Posizione militant who co-founded the movement with the late Massimo Morsello (who died in March 2001), formerly of Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari. Both had returned to Italy in 1999 after 18 years in London as fugitives from justice (see ASW 1998/9, 1999/2000). According to police in the UK, Fiore and Morsello had a thirty billion lire tourist business in London. The movement opposes globalization and immigration, which are viewed as part of an international conspiracy aimed at annihilating nationalism. It identifies with European fascism of the interwar years and the myths of the RSI. FN militants, who have been involved in several acts of violence, find fertile ground for their propaganda among soccer supporters. Following a December 2000 bomb attack against the left-wing newspaper Il Manifesto, there was wide support for outlawing the movement. Open and violent antisemitism can be found in the literature of some local sections of Forza Nuova and in discussion forums on the Internet. Its uncompromising anti-Israel/pro-Palestinian views are evident at demonstrations, in official documents and on its website.

A few other small extreme right groups should also be mentioned. Partito Liberal-Popolare in Europa con Haider (a solidarity party with Jörg Haider),
led by Diego Volpe Masini, was founded prior to the May 2001 elections. **Fronte Nazionale** was formed in 1992 by Franco Freda, who was convicted in 1995 of having re-established a fascist party. In November 2000 the front was dissolved by a decree of the minister of interior affairs. **Movimento Sociale Europeo** (MSE) was founded in January 2000 by Roberto Bigliardo, who was elected to the European Parliament in 1999 on the MS-FT ticket. The new party attracted MS-FT and Fronte Nazionale members. It has a cultural movement, Rinascita Nazionale (National Rebirth), which is associated with several extreme right publications such as L’Uomo, Libero and Orientamenti. The party is anti-American, anti-European Union, anti-globalization and anti-multiracialism. Its main organ Rinascita (edited by Ugo Gaudenzi) publishes vehemently anti-Israel articles (to the point of denying Israel’s right to exist) and antisemitic commentaries. In an article published in May 2001 the paper justified the massacre of the Jews of Jedwabne (Poland) in 1941 by their fellow citizens as a popular “reaction” against the Jews, because they had allegedly welcomed the Soviet army into Poland.

The **Movimento Fascismo e Libertà** (Mfel), founded by Giorgio Pisanò and led by Giuseppe Martorana, follows the traditional fascism of Benito Mussolini. According to its congress proceedings, “party militants agreed that globalization is a war instrument in the hands of international Zionism.”

**Skinheads.** According to police, there are 2,000–3,000 skinhead sympathizers in Italy, of whom 191 have criminal records (about 40 in Veneto, 35 in Lombardia and 30 in Lazio). **Veneto Fronte Skinhead** (VFS) is one of the bigger and better-organized groups. The smaller and less active **Azione Skinhead**, which operates mainly in Milan, is led by Dulio Canu who has joined Forza Nuova. Other groups include the **Liguria Skinheads** and the **Hammerskins**.

**Catholic Integralist Organizations.** **Militia Cristi**, founded in 1992, is active mainly in Rome. It rejects the Second Vatican Council reforms (1965), which it considers a product of Jewish, Bolshevik and homosexual influence over Catholicism, with the aim of destroying Christianity. **Fraternità Sacerdotale S. Pio X**, based in Albano Laziale (Rome), celebrates rites in churches and chapels throughout Italy in the pre-Council way. Founded by the schismatic Monsignor Marcel Lefebvre (see ASW 1999/2000), it maintains close ties with related fraternities in France and Belgium. **Istituto Mater Bonii Consilii** at Verrua Savoia is a small, but very active group centered around the periodical Sodalitium. The Centro Librario Sodalitium (Solidarity Book Center), part of the same group, has published seven anti-Jewish books in the last few years (out of 18 publications).

Among the most extreme Catholic fundamentalist periodicals, mention should be made of Ex Novo (Monza), headed by Giulio Ferrari. Its stand is pre-
Council and anti-Jewish and it publishes articles defending Holocaust denying individuals and publications. A similar position is taken by the monthly Chiesa Viva (Brescia), edited by Don Luigi Villa, and by Teologia, issued by Edizioni Segno (Udine) and edited by Piero Mantero, which publishes articles "proving" the existence of a Jewish-Masonic plot.

ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITIES

A survey of Italian attitudes toward Jews, conducted by Istituto di Studi sulla Pubblica Opinione (ISPO) in December 2000, reveals an improvement compared with the findings nine years previously. Nevertheless, in 2000 there was a 30 percent increase in antisemitic manifestations over 1999, when even then, as in the last six years, a substantial number of occurrences was noted. This rise was probably influenced by the legitimization of antisemitic stereotypes that has accompanied the general desensitization of the Italian social and political atmosphere in recent years. The al-Aqsa intifada also caused an intensification of antisemitic manifestations.

One hundred incidents of antisemitic mail or leaflets and insulting remarks or jokes by politicians or in everyday conversations were reported. The most common slurs referred to traditional Jewish stereotypes of wealth, power, shrewdness and exclusivity. There has been a tremendous growth of hate on the Internet, including the dissemination of antisemitic and anti-Zionist materials. An extremely antisemitic site, apparently linked to Forza Nuova, was shut down by its Pisa provider in 2000 as a result of legal proceedings (under the Mancino law against racial, ethnic or religious discrimination).

The custom of branding a sports opponent "a Jew" is still prevalent, particularly on the soccer field. A banner held by supporters of the Lazio team during a derby match against the Rome team on 29 April 2001 in Rome's Olympic stadium, read: "Negro team, Jewish arc [the section of the stadium for the Rome club supporters]." At a meeting between the presidents of the Rome Jewish community and the Lazio club, the latter reaffirmed his commitment to combat such antisemitic manifestations.

Latent antisemitic messages can be found in the mainstream media, for example, in the case of Luis Ignacio Marsiglia, a Uruguayan citizen and Catholic religion teacher of Jewish origin, whom the media repeatedly referred to as "the Jewish professor." According to police, Marsiglia had invented tales about antisemitic discrimination and intimidation in order to avoid being transferred from his school. The Jewish identity of the director of Channel One (Raiuno) news was also stressed when he was hired and when he later resigned, leading to remarks and jokes about the power of the Jews. He himself declared in an interview that "the antisemitic argument" had surprisingly begun to be used against him.

In the last months of 2000, in the wake of the al-Aqsa intifada, and especially in early 2001, Italian public opinion became more radically anti-Israel and
uncritically pro-Palestinian. Frequently the media blurred the distinction between the terms “Israeli and “Jew.” Participants in a discussion forum concerning the publication of a picture of an Israel baby killed by a Palestinian sniper in Hebron, on the website of the daily newspaper La Repubblica, equated Israelis with Nazis, referred to “the Jewish victim syndrome” and even denied the Holocaust.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WAR, THE HOLOCAUST AND THE FASCIST ERA

In recent years there has been exceptional public awareness of both Jewish culture in general and the Holocaust in particular. This attitude was clearly demonstrated when the Italian parliament passed a law in July 2000 establishing Holocaust Memorial Day on 27 January, “in memory of the extermination and persecution of the Jewish people and Italian soldiers and politicians in the Nazi camps.” The 2001 commemoration was marked by broad national press coverage, special programs on TV networks and an unprecedented number of educational initiatives involving both students and teachers throughout the country. President of the Republic Carlo Azelio Ciampi and Pope John Paul II dedicated speeches to the day; testimonies and documents were published, as well as a list of deportees; 40,000 copies of the movie Memoria (a collection of testimonies of ex-prisoners), by Ruggiero Gabbai, were sold and most pupils chose the theme of the Shoah for the July 2000 high school final exam.

However, a small segment of the population complained of a sense of saturation with Jewish themes. In a survey conducted by the ISPO on a sample of 5,000 interviewees 9.8 percent said that the Jews’ extermination was mentioned too often (the percentage grew slightly with interviewee age); 9.1 percent thought that the Nazi extermination of millions of them in gas chambers was a lie; and 37.1 percent asserted that the Jews should stop behaving like victims since the Holocaust and persecutions took place 50 years ago. At the same time, there has been increasing exposure to Holocaust denial, particularly among schoolchildren. In October, for example, a school teacher in Mestre read texts from Holocaust deniers such as Jürgen Graf and Richard Harwood. Moreover, numerous websites are devoted entirely or in part to Holocaust denial. Most, such as the Belgian Vrij Historisch Onderzoek and the French AARGH, are run by extreme rightists or Catholic integralists.

Some new books denying the Holocaust or translations of well-known foreign ones have been published. The Effepi publishing house (Genova), which seems to have ties to the extreme right, began a two-volume translation of Richard Harwood’s Did Six Million Really Die? and a translation of Maurice Bardèche’s Nuremberg, the Promised Land. In October the left-wing publishing house Graphos issued a translation of Robert Faurisson’s Is the Diary of Anne Frank Genuine? Other books, not specifically dealing with this theme, contain chapters or paragraphs with Holocaust denial content. Examples include
Curzio Nitoglia’s *Sionismo e fondamentalismo* and Mario Spataro’s *Olocausto. Dal drama al business*. Frequently Holocaust denial ideas appear in letters to the editors of established newspaper which enjoy relatively large circulation, such as *La Padania* or the conservative Catholic daily *Il Giornale*. These papers defend the freedom to debate Holocaust denial.

While public promotion of Holocaust denial is a phenomenon of the extremist fringe, the attempt to whitewash the negative significance of the fascist era is more mainstream. Supporters of this school try to minimize the conflict of principles between fascists and anti-fascists, on the basis that the Italian identity should be based on values shared by the whole nation. It is led mainly by members of AN who attempt to reinterpret RSI history as a “necessary” step to saving Italy’s honor after it had “betrayed” its German ally. The AN therefore requests modifications in twentieth century history textbooks, considered too divisive and deeply influenced by communist historiography. Several conferences have been organized to support this line.

**Nazi War Criminals**

In November 2000 a Verona military tribunal sentenced to life imprisonment former SS Lance-Corporal Michael Seifert, nicknamed Misha, who tortured and killed at least 18 prisoners in Italy’s Bolzano concentration camp (between 1944 and 1945). Italy will request the extradition of Seifert, who lives in Vancouver, Canada.

Friedrich Engel, an ex-SS commander in Liguria between 1944 and 1945, was traced to Hamburg by two German TV journalists. In November 1999 he was sentenced to life imprisonment by a Torino military tribunal for the death of 246 persons (non-Jews). German Minister of Interior Otto Schilly declared that Engel could not stand trial in Germany because of his age and poor health.

In May 2001, the Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) rejected an appeal for a pardon for Erich Priebke, who is serving a life sentence for his part in the Fosse Ardeatine massacre (see *ASW* 1997/8). Priebke’s lawyer Carlo Taormina has decided to request a pardon from the president of the republic.

**Jewish Assets**

At the beginning of May 2001 the special committee established in 1998 by the prime minister to locate Jewish property confiscated by the fascist authorities and never returned after the end of the war, presented their report. It found that most of the property had been returned in 1945 and only a small part has yet to be restituted.

After prolonged public pressure, the Italian insurer Generali of Trieste has agreed to compensate beneficiaries (and their heirs) of policies held by Holocaust victims throughout Central and Eastern Europe.
RESPONSES TO ANTISEMITISM AND RACISM

In addition to the outlawing of groups such as Freda's Fronte Nazionale, under the Mancino law, individual right-wing extremists were convicted for infringing this law. At the end of September 2000, 43 VFS militants were charged with instigating racial hatred after they had participated in a rally during which flags with Celtic crosses were waved and antisemitic slogans such as Juden Raus and slogans against globalization and American imperialism were chanted. In February 2001, nine skinheads, apparently also VFS members, were arrested for provoking a brawl in a bar with three Moroccan immigrants and injuring two of them. In August 2000 a case of racism against a young colored man was investigated. He was insulted by a group of skinheads after a festival in the city of Bressanone. In February 2001, thirteen members of the Austrian Blood & Honour organization were arrested in Italy for violating the Mancino law. They were also charged with involvement in several incidents of violence. Eight more are under investigation. Members of this group are residents of the northern region of Alto Adige, having come from the city of Merano, considered a linguistic and cultural "extension" of Austria. Although outlawed in Italy because of its neo-Nazi ideology, the Austrian organization maintains contacts with Italian skinheads in Alto Adige, Friuli Venezia Giulia and Emilia Romagna.

The Vatican

In recent years the Vatican's attitude toward Judaism has undergone considerable change. Openness toward Judaism is now official Church policy. Nevertheless, two declarations made in September 2000 (as well as the beatification of Pius IX) reveal attempts to reaffirm values more consistent with traditional theology. Cardinal Ratzinger, prefect for the Doctrine of the Faith Congregation, issued the first, known as the Dominus Iesus, which states that only a Catholic can be redeemed; Cardinal Giacomo Biffi, archbishop of Bologna, issued the second, which petitions politicians to prefer Catholic over Muslim immigration. In December the Emilia-Romagna bishops' conference, headed by Biffi, issued a booklet entitled Islam and Christianity, on the incompatibility of Muslim immigrant culture with Italian culture. The declarations represent an attempt to conciliate those within the Church who demand a more restrictive interpretation of the 1965 Vatican Council resolutions.
NETHERLANDS

An increase in the number and severity of antisemitic incidents was recorded in 2000 compared with the previous year. Antisemitic manifestations appeared to have been triggered by the issue of restitution of Jewish property and by the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada. The number of complaints of racism and antisemitism on the Internet tripled from the previous year.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

An estimated 30,000 Jews live in the Netherlands today out of some 16 million inhabitants. The majority live in Amsterdam. Dutch Jewry is represented by three councils, based on affiliation: the Nederlands Israelitisch Kerkgenootschap, the Verbond van Liberaal Religieuze Joden and the Portugees Israelitisch Kerkgenootschap. The community, which sustains a variety of religious and educational institutions, publishes the newspaper Nieuw Israelisch Weekblad.

In spring 2000, the Dutch government awarded the Jewish community 400 million guilders (US$160 million), of which 50 million is earmarked for Jewish causes throughout the world “as a way of finally acknowledging the criticisms” leveled at the treatment of victims during the restitution process. Moreover, in July 2000 Dutch banks and the Amsterdam stock exchange (bourse) signed an agreement with representatives of the Jewish communities in the Netherlands according to which they will pay Dutch survivors and their heirs 314 million guilders (US$130 million). The banks and the bourse also agreed to publish announcements in leading newspapers condemning their own activities during the war and apologizing to Dutch Jewry; to publish a book about the activities of the bourse during the war and to install a memorial tablet to commemorate the plunder of assets of Dutch Jewry.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS

Political Parties
The structure of the extreme right wing in the Netherlands has changed little with respect to 1999. The main parties are the Centrumdemocraten (CD), the Nieuwe Nationale Partij (NNP) and the Nederlands Blok. The NNP, which is the most active, recruits support through moderate slogans. It was formed when a rift within the CP'86 (see ASW 1997/8, 1998/9) almost wiped out the extreme right. The CD is the only extreme right party to have sat in the Dutch parliament – from 1989 to 1998. They had three seats in 1994, which they lost in 1998. Locally, the CD is represented only on the Schiedam town
council. In Utrecht, where elections took place in 2000 following a municipal redistribution, the Nederlands Blok lost its only seat.

**Extra-parliamentary Groups**
The main groups of the extreme right are Voorpost and the nationalist student platform Landelijk Actieplatform voor Nationalistische Studenten (LANS). The leaders of Voorpost are former members of CP'86, such as Marcel Ruter, Tim Mudde, Marc de Boer and Marc Hoogstra. CP’86 was banned in 1998.

Neo-Nazi groups include the virulently racist and antisemitic Actiefront Nationale Socialisten (ANS), the Fundamentalistische Arbeiderspartij (FAP), the Nederlandse Volksunie (NVU), the Nationaal Offensief and Stormfront.

**Meetings of European Extremists in the Netherlands**
Several meetings of European extreme right activists took place in the Netherlands in 2000. On 13 February, for example, the Nederlandse Volks Unie met to commemorate Hitler's seizure of power on 30 January 1933. About 100 people participated from the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. On 26 August, the NVU organized a memorial service for Rudolf Hess in Echt, attended by fifty activists from the Netherlands and Germany. They waved flags bearing runic symbols which resembled swastikas. The police arrested ANS leader Eite Homan but released him following pressure from the demonstrators. The demonstrators marched through Echt waving banners reading “Rudolf Hess, martyr for peace.” In 2001 Eite Homan and the neo-Nazi activist Constant Kusters were to stand trial for this demonstration. On 12 November in Mook, the NVU commemorated Hitler’s abortive coup attempt in 1923. About 100 participants attended from the Netherlands and Germany, without police intervention.

**ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITIES**

**Violence, Vandalism and Abuse**
An increase in the number and severity of antisemitic incidents was recorded in 2000 compared with the previous year, continuing the trend which began in 1997. While in 1999 only one violent incident was registered, in 2000 there were six incidents involving physical violence or threat of violence. In Oss, for example, on the Day of Atonement in October, the windows of a synagogue were smashed and a service disrupted with chants such as “Heil Hitler.” Similarly, acts of vandalism of Jewish sites rose from two in 1999 to eight in 2000. Moreover, the number of cases of verbal defamation rose from 17 in 1999 to 32 in 2000.

Antisemitic letters, graffiti and slogans indicated that anti-Jewish manifestations in the Netherlands in 2000 were triggered mainly by the
question of restitution of Jewish property and by the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada. Many slogans smeared on Jewish sites, as well as pamphlets and letters sent to individuals and Jewish institutions, contained implied threats referring to the Holocaust, such as: “They forgot to gas you”; “Adolf forgot you, but you’ll get your turn soon – you get a train ride to Poland”; or “6,000,000 Jews were not enough.”

Noteworthy was the number of antisemitic threats against Jews by members of the Moroccan community in the Netherlands, especially after the outbreak of the intifada. There were three pro-Palestinian/anti-Israel demonstrations involving members of this community, who bore antisemitic symbols and shouted antisemitic slogans. The organizers included the Committee of Moroccan Workers in the Netherlands (Komité Marokkaanse Arbeiders in Nederland – KMAN). In Amsterdam, for example, on 14 October, demonstrators yelled “Hitler, Hitler, Hitler” and “Hamas, Hamas, all Jews to the gas.” Interviews with Moroccan youths in the magazine VRIJ Nederland (24 March 2001) revealed the influence of extremist Islamist sentiments in Morocco, including antisemitic motifs, on young Moroccans in the Netherlands, mainly the economically and socially dislocated. Although Arab immigrants are frequently the target of hate crimes committed by right extremists, they are influenced by antisemitic expressions of the far right and have adopted some of their main slogans, which can be heard frequently in football stadiums.

Internet
There was an increase in the number of extreme right sites on the Internet in 2000, and the number of complaints of racism on the Internet tripled. Out of 550 complaints of racism to Meldpunt Discriminatie Internet, 203 were allegedly antisemitic. Two new phenomena in this regard were racist/antisemitic messages sent via SMS message boards and the sale of extreme right-wing music to customers in the Netherlands through the international music provider Napster.

RESPONSES TO ANTISEMITISM AND RACISM

Public and Educational Activities
There is a Dutch anti-racist network involving tens of organizations (see ASW 1999/2000). They exchange information and organize joint demonstrations, as well as annual activities around the national anti-racism day (21 March). Some Dutch anti-racist organizations are part of ENAR – European Network against Racism. Local events take place regularly, such as the publicity campaign Amsterdam leeft samen (Coexistence in Amsterdam) and the ADB Noord-Holland’s poster campaign Als discriminatie verliest, wint de sport (A loss for discrimination is a victory for sport).
Two successful educational programs were carried out in Dutch schools in 2000: "School without racism" and "A world of difference" (initiated by the ADL).

**Court Cases**

Several court cases involving antisemitic utterances and the distribution of antisemitic, Holocaust denial and neo-Nazi material in the Netherlands were adjudicated in 2000. The Belgium Holocaust denier Siegfried Verbeke lost his appeal in April against the Anne Frank Organization and the Anne Frank Foundation. The case concerned a pamphlet in the revisionist series *Anne Frank Een kritische benadering*, in which Verbeke questioned the authenticity of *The Diary of Anne Frank*. The case had been pending since 1991. While admitting the right of freedom of expression, the court stated that this freedom was limited by law, which took into consideration the rights and freedoms of other people. The court forbade Verbeke from distributing the brochure in Holland.

Three right-wing extremists were convicted in November of desecrating the Portuguese-Jewish cemetery and Holocaust memorials in the Hague with swastikas and antisemitic slogans. They were sentenced to short jail sentences of less than a month each. Present in the court was Joop Glimmerveen, leader of Nederlandse Volksunie, together with several supporters wearing brown shirts, and black pants and jackets.

The Public Prosecutor in Utrecht ordered that the four perpetrators who beat up a Jewish youth in Woudenberg perform one hundred hours of community service "for public violence motivated by racism," and pay 1,900 guilders in damages to the victim. One of the four had a previous conviction for discrimination.

An Arnhem sub-district court fined, in absentia, an Internet user 1,500 guilders and put him on two years probation for disseminating virulently antisemitic and racist texts on the Internet. This was the first conviction of a user for discrimination on the Internet.

It should be noted that despite the prosecution of racist activists and antisemites in 2000 and the complaints of anti-discrimination organizations, the police often prefer not to bring charges against football fans who use racist symbols and slogans.
SPAIN

Little antisemitic activity was recorded in Spain in 2000 prior to the upsurge in violence between Palestinians and Israelis in late September. Several attacks on Jewish institutions were recorded in October, shortly after some Muslim communities called for demonstrations in support of the Palestinians. An armed attack on Moroccan workers in the town of El Ejido in February was one of the most serious racist incidents ever to occur in Spain.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

The Jewish population of Spain numbers 14,000 out of a total population of 39.1 million. The main Jewish centers are Madrid (3,500) and Barcelona (3,500). Smaller communities are located in other cities and towns, notably Málaga, as well as Ceuta and Melilla in Spanish North Africa.

The Federación de Comunidades Israelitas de España (Federation of Jewish Communities in Spain) represents Jewish interests to the government. There are Jewish day schools in Barcelona, Madrid and Málaga. A cultural journal, Raíces (Roots) appears regularly. The Segovia-Israel Association of Cultural Relations was established for studying the influence of Jewish culture in Spain.

In July 2000 Spain agreed to contribute US$1.5 million to a fund to benefit Sephardi Holocaust survivors.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS

Political Parties

Two days before the general election of March 2000, French FN leader Jean-Marie Le Pen arrived in Madrid to support the campaign of the recently formed España 2000 in a new attempt to reunify the extreme right. The four groups which comprise España 2000 are: Democracia Nacional; Partido Nacional de los Trabajadores (National Workers Party), whose headquarters are in Murcia; Movimiento Social Republicano, associated with former leftist republicans; and Vértice Social Español, which split from the Falange (see below). The alliance, which won only 9,769 votes (0.04 percent) in the election, hopes to improve its results in the 2003 municipal elections.

The leading group, Democracia Nacional (DN), which emerged in 1995 after the dissolution of CEDADE (see ASW 1995/6) and the Juntas Españolas of Juan Peligro, also includes elements from Acción Radical, Nación Joven, Vanguardia Nacional Revolucionaria and Bases Autónomas. Emulating the FN, DN's populist and xenophobic message promises full employment, economic protectionism, the expulsion of illegal immigrants and total rejection of
European structures and regional autonomies. The party has no seats either in the Spanish parliament or in the European Parliament.

As leader of the senior partner in the alliance, Francisco Pérez Corrales heads España 2000. Ernesto Mil, a former Fuerza Nueva activist and founder of Frente Nacional de la Juventud, Juan A. Aguilar, once a member of the neo-Nazi Bases Autónomas, and Christian Ruiz and Laureano Luna, formerly ideologists of CEDADE, were also driving forces behind the formation of España 2000. Excluded from its ranks were former Fuerza Nueva president and traditionalist Blas Pilar and AUN leader Sáenz de Ynestrillas, because of his criminal record. Since he began serving a prison term, de Ynestrillas, leader of the Alianza por la Unidad Nacional (AUN), has disappeared from the political scene (see ASW 1999/2000). A few days before the election, the party announced it would not run in order to avoid fragmentation of the extreme right. In September 2000, four members of AUN were arrested after Molotov cocktails were found in their possession. The party organ La voz de AUN appears from time to time.

The various tiny fascist Falange parties, including Española de las JONS, Falange Española Independiente (FEI) and Falange Española Auténtica, struggle mainly to survive. Confederación de Ex-Combatientes is an umbrella organization for associations of veterans that hanker after Spain’s fascist era (1936–75). A traditionalist fascist party, Partido Demócrata Español (PaDE), established in 1997 and led by Juan Ramón Calero, formerly of Alianza Popular, got a mere 12,200 votes (0.05 percent) in the 2000 election.

The populist Grupo Independiente Liberal (GIL), led by Atlético de Madrid president Jesús Gil, had some success in the 1999 municipal elections (see ASW 1999/2000). When introducing his candidates for the 2000 elections, Gil declared that democracy was “the worst of all dictatorships” and that “with Franco life was better.” GIL went to the polls in 18 provinces, obtaining a total of 71,914 votes (0.31 percent) but no seats.

Extra-parliamentary Groups
Sources in the police, who have been monitoring the scene closely, report that political awareness within the extreme right has increased, due in part to the fact that university graduates have taken over the leadership. The political far right now eclipses smaller and more violent groups such as skinheads, and may become a significant factor on the political scene, as it has in Germany, France and Belgium. Cyberspace communication facilitates this trend.

Militants of the almost defunct neo-Nazi, anarchist Bases Autónomas (BBAA) now operate through other organizations, such as Resistencia, DN, the Internet group Nuevo Orden, cultural groups associated with the Falange, or the Coordinadora Nacionalista Revolucionaria (National Revolutionary Coordinating Body). Some cells similar to BBAA still exist, such as Hermandad Nacional Socialista Armagedón (Armageddon National
Socialist Brotherhood), which is active in Valencia and environs and which split from Acción Radical in 1998 (see ASW 1998/9). The brotherhood claimed responsibility for the Molotov cocktail attacks against branches of the Popular, Socialist and Izquierda Unida parties several days before the March election, in some towns near Valencia. The police, who were monitoring this group since its inception, arrested 13 of its neo-Nazi members in connection with the attacks. They allegedly have links to fascist groups in Italy.

Members of the International Third Position, one of the most active national revolutionary groups in the United Kingdom, continue to reconstruct the seven ruined houses they purchased in the abandoned town of Los Pedriches, 92 kms from Valencia (see ASW 1999/2000). The group is supposedly using Los Pedriches as a place of "refuge and respite."

According to the police, soccer fans in Spain include almost 10,000 followers of extremist groups. Of this number, only some 640 rightist skinheads and another 330 leftists (red skins) in 16 fan clubs, are considered dangerous. These groups were protected by the managers of the soccer clubs until the late 1990s, when some courts declared that the clubs were responsible for the criminal conduct of their fans. The principal radical fan groups in Madrid are now in decline. Nevertheless, some small neo-Nazi groups within Ultra Sur (the Real Madrid fan club), which was reduced to 500 members, have been attempting to revive it. Four skinheads from this club were arrested in 2000 after police found in a backpack a stick, a knife, pamphlets with Nazi and antisemitic texts (e.g., "Jewish blood must flow") and a black flag inscribed with the words "Rommel Korps."

Bastión, the most violent group associated with Atlético de Madrid, and connected to BBAA, suffered a setback when 11 of their 35–40 members were ordered to stand trial for illegal association and public disorder (see below).

Rex, a cultural association created to rehabilitate the deceased Belgian Nazi Leon Degrelle, spiritual mentor of the Spanish neo-Nazi movement, continues to publish a magazine run by Degrelle’s close collaborator, the lawyer José Luis Jerez Riesco.

In Spanish universities, student associations identified with parliamentary political parties are losing ground to extremists – the revolutionary left and the far right – although they are still a minority. The revolutionary leftist movements, mostly anti-fascist, are usually labeled "anti-establishment" because of their ties to the global resistance movement and their rejection of representation in government. The extreme right, on the other hand, are better organized and do not reject the representative system in the universities. In the Spanish University Union (SEU) the number of activists with ties to Falange Española and the JONS tripled in one year. In several regions the vote for right-wing extremists increased from 1,200 to 7,000, and they now have representation in the university councils of Málaga, Salamanca, Oviedo and Jaén.
The Rise of Militant Islamism in Spain
There are half a million Muslims in Spain, mostly immigrants from the Maghreb. According to El Pais (1 Oct. 2000), an intensifying struggle for control of Islam in Spain is taking place in the country’s 45 mosques between Muslim moderates and extremists. The moderates claim that lack of state aid is helping extremist groups, which are funded by Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia’s embassy denies these allegations.

ANTISEMITIC AND RACIST ACTIVITY

Antisemitic Incidents
Little antisemitic activity was recorded prior to the upsurge of violence between Palestinians and Israelis in late September/October; the most serious incident was the desecration of the Holocaust memorial in Barcelona. A series of attacks on Jewish institutions began in October after some Muslim communities called for demonstrations in support of the Palestinians. The glass door at the entrance of the Ceuta synagogue was smashed twice, in October and December, and windows were broken in the Madrid synagogue. Graffiti reading “Jew murderers” was found near an olive tree planted on the occasion of the donation of a house to the local Jewish association Oveido, on the night of 8 October (Yom Kippur).

Another serious incident was an attack by right-wing extremists on pro- and anti-Israel demonstrators outside a Madrid stadium where a soccer match between Spain and Israel was taking place on 7 October. Police arrested several neo-Nazis who shouted racist or antisemitic slogans, distributed antisemitic literature or threw bars of soap at policemen.

Racist Incidents
Anti-immigrant violence was common throughout the year, mostly perpetrated by neo-Nazis. An attack on Moroccan workers by gangs armed with iron rods and baseball bats in the town of El Ejido (Almeria) in February was one of the most serious racial incidents ever to occur in Spain. They also set fire to cars and buildings. The attack, which left 55 injured, was apparently sparked by the killing of a young Spanish woman by a Moroccan man. It was condemned by various official Spanish organizations, by the Moroccan government and by European and UN human rights bodies.

A group of students tried to disrupt a meeting devoted to Tolerance Week and to the memory of Violeta Friedman, the well-known Holocaust survivor (see below), at the Political Science and Sociology School at Complutense University of Madrid. The speakers included Prof. Tomás Calvo Buezas, a member of the European Commission against Racism, Alberto Benasuly, president of the Commission for Human Rights of B’nai B’rith, and a representative of the Movement against Intolerance. After they were forced to leave the meeting, some 30 hooded people, allegedly the same group of
students, destroyed a classroom in the nearby School of Economics at the university. They also attacked participants at a meeting on the Israeli-Palestinian situation, organized by the extreme right, at which the speaker was the Argentinean antisemite and advisor to the Venezuelan president, Norberto Cerezo. The police stated that the students belonged to radical anti-establishment groups.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HOLOCAUST AND THE NAZI ERA

Holocaust Commemoration

Over one thousand children gathered in Madrid’s Circle of Fine Arts to pay homage to Anne Frank at the conclusion of an exhibition of photographs and the original text of her diaries. The exhibit moved on to other centers of the region.

The book *A Spaniard in the Face of the Holocaust*, by Diego Carcedo, was launched at Madrid’s Circle of Fine Arts in March. The book tells of the Spanish diplomat Angel Sanz Briz, who saved the lives of thousands of Hungarian Jews when he was ambassador in Budapest during the Nazi occupation. In 1991 he was awarded the title of Righteous among Gentiles by Yad Vashem. Participating in the ceremony were the journalist Luaki Gabilondo and the brothers Jaime and Enrique Vandor, all saved by Sanz Briz.

The City Council of Madrid announced that it would erect a monument at Juan Carlos I Park, in memory of the victims of the Holocaust.

Between 1 and 10 May several Jewish associations campaigned for a series of ceremonies to commemorate the Holocaust and to promote Holocaust education. The main event in the campaign took place in the regional parliament (Asamblea de Madrid) on 3 May.

Violeta Friedman, survivor of Auschwitz, who in Spain was considered a symbol of the Holocaust, died in Madrid on 4 October. She was commemorated at Madrid’s synagogue on 4 December, in the presence of the Israeli ambassador, the president of the regional parliament, and representatives of universities and human rights representatives.

RESPONSES TO RACISM AND ANTISEMITISM

Court Cases

In the case of Pedro Varela, convicted in 1998 for Holocaust denial (see *ASW* 1998/9, 1999/2000), in February 2000 the Constitutional Court censured the Barcelona court of Appeals for procedural defects in its claim of unconstitutionality of Article 607.2 of the Penal Code. According to the Barcelona Court, this article, which punishes the promotion of genocide, could contravene Varela’s right to freedom of expression established in the constitution. As a result, the file was returned to the Barcelona court and the trial delayed for 15 months.
Ricardo Guerra, convicted of the homicide of a fan of the Real Sociedad soccer club Aitor Zabaleta, together with ten of his friends, will be tried in Madrid for illegal association and public disorder. This is the first time that such a charge will be made in Spain against a group of neo-Nazis. According to the prosecution, the 11 accused youngsters were allegedly members of an organization (Bastión – see above) which "took advantage of soccer games in order to display violent behavior." The Movement against Intolerance, acting as a private party, commented that it was a clear warning to violent neo-Nazi groups.

**Official and Public Activity**
The short documentary film *Stories of a Bookseller* was screened at the Second Festival of Jewish Cinema of Barcelona. This work by David Mauas, an Argentinean-born Israeli producer, shows scenes from the trial of extreme right leader Pedro Varela, owner of the Europa Bookstore in Barcelona. At the trial Varela claimed he sold only historical books. He was then shown in a flashback inciting hatred and violence at a neo-Nazi rally in Madrid.

In July the inhabitants of the town of Hervas in Extremadura held its annual commemoration of its Jewish past by performing the play *The Convert from Hervas* by the Spanish-Argentinean writer Solly Wolodarsky (see also *ASW* 1998/9).

The recipient of the Príncipe de Asturias Award for the Arts for the year 2000 was the North American soprano Barbara Hendricks, for her support of refugees and for speaking out against xenophobia, antisemitism and intolerance.

The mayor of Barcelona, Joan Clos, ordered the removal of all Nazi memorabilia from the souvenir shop at the military museum in Montjuic Castle.
SWEDEN

Two violent anti-Jewish incidents were recorded in Sweden in 2000, one during a pro-Palestinian demonstration following the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada. There was much less violent racist activity than in 1999, but the public debate and official initiatives in 2000 were influenced by the events of that year. Sweden remains one of the world’s largest producers of White Power music, race hate videos and CDs, and neo-Nazi skinhead merchandise.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

Sweden has a Jewish population of about 18,000 out of a general population of 8.9 million. The majority, approximately 10,000, belong to the major communities in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö. Smaller Jewish communities can be found in Boras, Uppsala, Norrköping and Helsingborg. The various communities are independent, but linked through the Council of Swedish Jewish Communities.

Several of the major international Jewish organizations have affiliates in Sweden. A Stockholm-based magazine, Jewish Chronicle, appears bi-monthly, as well as Tachless, the magazine of the Jewish Congregation. Shechita (Jewish ritual slaughter) is prohibited and kosher meat is imported from abroad.

By hosting the January 2000 Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust, attended by forty-five heads of state, who declared that the Holocaust “challenged the foundations of civilization,” Sweden became a leading force for raising awareness of the Shoah. Its Living History Project has become a model of Holocaust education. As an outcome of that parley, plans were announced to establish the European Institute of Jewish Studies in Sweden, Paideia. In January 2001, Stockholm was the venue for the Second International Forum for Combating Intolerance, which had as its goal “counteracting and preventing xenophobia, racism, antisemitism and other extremist ideas and movements.”

POLITICAL PARTIES AND EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS

Political Parties
In 1999 and 2000, the Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats – SD), led since 1995 by Mikael Jansson, cemented its position as Sweden’s leading xenophobic party, after the 1998 election left it as the single surviving such party with a nationwide organization and the potential to expand its electoral base.
The SD is focusing on making a further breakthrough in the upcoming 2002 national election, and much of the party activity in 2000 was directed at building organizational machinery. The party is vocally against Swedish membership in the European Union, and also calls for Sweden leaving the UN. It has been particularly successful at the local level with an aggressive anti-immigrant campaign, which highlights the responsibility of all immigrants for the crimes of individuals. It claims, for example, that gang rape was “an unheard-of phenomenon” before immigrants began arriving in Sweden.

Although the SD have been careful not to voice antisemitic sentiments, the party homepage has carried articles “exposing” Masonry and “illuminati” conspiracies, drawing upon antisemitic conspiracy theorists such as David Icke and the Swede Lars Adelskog (see below).

The SD have been connected to Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Euronat since 1998. However, exposure of their relations with Le Pen during the period of the FN split (see ASW 1999/2000 and France, in this volume), as well as SD’s relations with other Euronat parties, began to damage the party’s image. In summer 1999, it left Euronat and made international relations the task of its youth organization, Sverigedemokraterna Ungdom (SDU), claiming it was only an “observer” at international meetings. However, the French Front National de la Jeunesse homepage noted that the SDU had rejoined Euronat as a full member in fall 2000.

The SD is composed of a number of closely related anti-immigration propaganda groups, including Blågula Frågor (Blue-Yellow Questions – BgF) and Medborgerliga Studiegrupper (Citizens Study Groups – MSG). Although both BgF and MSG are small groups, they are important components of Swedish xenophobia. The BgF is led by Jan Milid, a former member of the mainstream Social Democratic Labor Party, and Anders Sundholm, a former member of the Green Party. In contrast to most xenophobic groups, they define themselves as “leftist,” or “progressive,” rather than “nationalist,” a tactic they use in order to appeal to a different public. A third anti-immigrant propaganda organization is Fri Information (Free Information – FI), led by Eva Bergqvist, which splintered from the Conservative Party.

Following its initial success as a regional and anti-immigrant alliance on its formation in 1997, Skanes Väl (Scania’s Welfare – SV) was plagued in 1999/2000 by defections and bitter infighting, with one faction arguing for a merger with the Sweden Democrats.

Extra-parliamentary Groups and Racist Activity
Since the mid-1990s, Sweden has been one of the world’s largest producers of White Power music, race hate videos, CDs and neo-Nazi skinhead merchandise. Throughout the 1990s, much attention was focused on the bitter internal warfare between the two largest White Power production companies, Ragnarock Records and Nordland, mainly over the funds generated by the
industry. Hostilities came to an end in 1998, with Ragnarock as the dominating factor.

**Ragnarock Records**, and the video division **NS88**, is led by Norwegian-born veteran Nazi Erik Blücher and, until his death in February 2001, the German born Marcel Schilf. Together they reshaped Ragnarock into the political organization **Blood & Honour/Scandinavia** (B&H), aligned with the British terrorist organization Combat 18 (see *UK and ASW 1999/2000*). B&H is headquartered in Helsingborg in south Sweden.

When, in 1999 Combat 18 formally moved its activities to a post box address in Denmark run by Marcel Schilf, Ragnarock/B&H became the center of C18’s international operations. Ronald Schröder, 25, a Berliner, has been named as Schilf’s successor and has moved to south Sweden.

Ragnarock/B&H stepped up its anti-Jewish and anti-ZOG (Zionist Occupation Government) propaganda in 1999 and 2000. Following a police raid on a B&H safe-house in Langeland, south Denmark, in late 1999, B&H published a statement on its Internet homepage denouncing “blue pigs and red scum.” B&H claimed that “ZOG police” and the “anarchist anti-racist movement” were working together to smash the nationalist movement. B&H stubbornly continued to defend killing police officers, bank robberies, bombings and neo-Nazi terrorist activities in a number of texts in 2000.

In 1999, William Pierce, a leading far right figure in the US (see *USA*) rescued Nordland, the loser in the feud with Ragnarock, by purchasing the record production part of the company. At the same time *Nordland Magazine* and most of the Nordland activists merged with *Folkrivunen* (The Peoples Tribune), the mouthpiece of **Nationell Ungdom** (National Youth – NU), the Swedish Nazi organization closest to Pierce and his National Alliance.

NU is led by Erik Hägglund and Klas Lund, the latter a veteran skinhead convicted in 1986 for manslaughter of an anti-racist, and head in the early 1990s of the terrorist network **Vitt Ariskt Motstand** (White Aryan Resistance – VAM). Much of the NU core is made up of former VAM activists.

NU is closely aligned with the German neo-Nazi NPD, with which it exchanges visits. In summer 2000 the NU held a “survivalist training course” for members of the NPD youth organization. A key factor in the NU-NPD network is veteran Swedish Nazi Per Lennart Aae, who in 1964 emigrated to Bavaria where in the mid-1990s he emerged as a chief ideologist of the NPD.

Also associated with NU is **Anti-Antifa** (Anti-AFA), a neo-Nazi “intelligence network,” led by Robert Vesterlund, editor of the radical, pro-violence *Info-14*. Anti-AFA, which consists of a circle of hard-core neo-Nazi activists, has been responsible for much of the recent violence (see *ASW 1999/2000*). Anti-AFA’s function is to identify and track “ZOG agents,” such as Jews, journalists, police officers and anti-racist activists and politicians. Information on suitable targets for harassment campaigns is compiled and shared with local neo-Nazi organizations.
The fastest growing neo-Nazi organization in Sweden in the mid-1990s, the **National Socialist Front** (National Socialist Front – NSF), began to decline in 2000. In late 1999 the party’s founder and permanent leader Anders Högström renounced extreme right ideology and began campaigning in schools with a sober anti-Nazi message. Högström was replaced by a troika leadership made up of Björn Björkqvist, a virulent antisemite heading the party propaganda department, Anders Ärleskog, one of the remaining original founders, and Hans Himmler Pettersson, head of NSF security and a close associate of Erik Blücher and Ragnarock Records. A fourth executive member named in 2000 was Bo Nilsson, a former local SD leader.

**Svensk Hednisk Front** (Swedish Heathen Front – SHF) is an emerging Nazi organization of increasing importance. Mixing Odinism, anti-Christianity and antisemitism, the organization was originally formed in Norway by the convicted killer and former Satanist Varg Vikernes. From his prison cell, Vikernes is also a key organizer of the so-called National Socialist Black Metal music scene, NSBM.

In early 2000 Vikernes moved his outlet in Norway for his black metal band Burzum, Cymophane, to Stockholm and changed its name to Cymophane Records–Nordland (Nordland being the name of the White Power company bought by William Pierce – see above). Evidence suggests that Cymophane-Nordland is an outlet of Pierce’s NSBM company Cymophane-Vinland, which he launched in the US in June 2000.

There was much less violent racist activity than in 1999, but the public debate and official initiatives in 2000 were influenced by the events of that year (see *ASW* 1999/2000). Nevertheless, a Hungarian immigrant working as a ticket clerk in an underground railway station in Stockholm was brutally beaten in December 2000 by a gang of youths, who, when caught, claimed to be neo-Nazis.

**ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITIES**

**Violence and Vandalism**
The most serious violent incident reported was the beating of a Norwegian Jewish businessman wearing a kippa, in September, in the town of Uddevalla in south-west Sweden. The man was hospitalized as a result of his injuries. The three skinhead attackers, who shouted Nazi and antisemitic slogans, were not caught. It should be noted that during that same weekend (9–10 September), 20 neo-Nazis attacked passers-by in the village of Nora, between Stockholm and Göteborg.

In Malmö, the old Jewish cemetery was vandalized in February. Gravestones were damaged and a swastika was carved on the synagogue door. A facility in the new cemetery was also set alight. Two months later the old cemetery was vandalized again. Some 50 graves were severely damaged or destroyed and 156 gravestones toppled.
Although reaction in Sweden to the *al-Aqsa intifada* was less extreme than in other European countries such as France and the UK, some anti-Jewish activity was recorded. A group of demonstrators broke away from a pro-Palestinian rally in Malmö and attacked a Jewish shop; also a police station in Malmö received an anonymous call on 2 October that a synagogue in the city would be hit.

**Propaganda**

Nordland and Ragnarock continued to disseminate antisemitism through White Power CD recordings, videos and various publications. The NSF, through its propaganda chief Björn Björkqvist and magazine *The True National Socialist*, leads much of the ideological antisemitic rhetoric.

*Salt*, a new up-market “radical-conservative” magazine published by yuppie philosophers Carl Johan de Geer and Peter Bolinder and financed by millionaire businessman Bertel Nathorst, has aroused concern because of its impressive circulation and its display in mainstream shop windows. The magazine was launched in late 1999 as a “voice of reason” against the “decadence of modern society,” targeting feminism, the gay community and left-wing radicalism. *Salt’s* definition of the latter is so broad that it includes almost the entire political spectrum, from mainstream conservatism to anarchism. Although an obvious propaganda vehicle of the extreme right for racist and antisemitic opinions, the magazine has attracted a number of mainstream conservative writers.

The spring 2000 edition targeted the Stockholm Holocaust conference, claiming for instance that the Holocaust had become “on official state religion.” It also alleged that the memory of the Holocaust is kept alive for economic reasons, since it forces European countries to pay large amounts of money to the State of Israel. Another feature was a lengthy interview with British revisionist historian David Irving, who defamed Deborah Lipstadt, the defendant in the libel case he lost in Britain in 2000 (see *ASW 1999/2000*).

A number of antisemitic Internet homepages are published by neo-Nazi organizations, including B&H, National Youth and the National Socialist Front. Ahmed Rami’s web page Radio Islam continued to slander Jews, although the page was down for large parts of 2000.

Although hard-core antisemitism is still mostly limited to the militant neo-Nazi scene, antisemitic conspiracy theories are also disseminated through various so-called New Age outlets. New Age bookstores in 2000 sold copies of *The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*, books by David Icke and the conspiracy journal *Nexus*, which quotes from the magazine *Spotlight*, one of the most antisemitic publications in the US.
RESPONSES TO RACISM AND ANTISEMITISM

Public Activity and Holocaust Education
The Swedish Committee against Antisemitism (SKMA) continued to hold educational seminars on antisemitism, Holocaust denial, neo-Nazism and White Power music, focusing on teachers. Study trips to former concentration camps are part of a recent strategy to combat racism and antisemitism.

The Association of Holocaust Survivors, established in 1992, arranges visits to schools throughout the country, often coinciding with thematic weeks designated to learn more about racism and the Holocaust.

Much official activity in 2000 was centered around the January 2000 Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust (see ASW 1999/2000), which was followed by a January 2001 conference on general intolerance. Prior to the Holocaust conference, Prime Minister Göran Persson admitted before parliament that the Swedish authorities had failed in their dealings and responsibilities during World War II.

It was decided in 2000 that the government-sponsored education project Levande Historia (Living History), an initiative of the prime minister, designed to combat antisemitism and Nazi revisionism, would become a permanent government institution. Some of its sub-projects, including the book on the Holocaust by Stéphane Bruchfeld and Paul Levine, Tell Ye your Children... (which was printed in almost one million copies and translated into many languages), are produced in cooperation with the SKMA.

Legal Proceedings
Much public attention was focused in 2000 on the aftermath of the neo-Nazi terrorist attacks in 1999 (see ASW 1999/2000), mainly the trials of the killers of two police officers in Malexander and the killers of trade unionist Björn Söderberg. The Malexander murders resulted in life sentences for the three neo-Nazi perpetrators and lesser sentences for four other activists who were part of the same group, known as the National Revolutionary Army. The three Söderberg murderers, all associates of Anti-Antifa leader Robert Vesterlund, were given lengthy sentences. Police also suspect that Anti-Antifa was involved in the car bomb attack which injured journalist Peter Karlsson and his son in June 1999. However, no arrests have been made.

The authorities have taken a notably tougher stand against neo-Nazi propaganda in recent years, although convictions have been few compared to the number of actual offenses. This is partly due to the fact that the judicial system and some prosecutors lack knowledge of extreme right politics and the White Power scene.

Much attention was focused on the trials of Erik Blücher for incitement to racial hatred and distribution of White Power records in 1996, and again in 1999. After an appeals court had reduced his three-month prison sentence to a fine, Blücher was again charged with racial hatred and tried in 2000, together
with Marcel Schilf (who subsequently died) and Himmler Pettersson. A sloppy police investigation and the prosecution’s lack of knowledge of Blücher’s involvement in neo-Nazism, and his various businesses and front organizations, were undoubtedly factors in influencing the not-guilty verdict.
SWITZERLAND

Although manifestations of antisemitism declined after the settlement on dormant bank accounts in early 2000, they resurfaced with the outbreak of violence in the Middle East in late September. There was a rise in far right activity in 2000.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

Some 18,000 Jews live in Switzerland out of a total population of 7.13 million. More than half live in the German-speaking part of the country. Some small communities, such as those in La Chaux-de-Fonds and Biel, are declining since younger people are moving to larger cities. The umbrella organization of Swiss Jews is the Schweizerischer Israelitischer Gemeindebund/Fédération Suisse des Communautés Israélites (SIG/FSCI). The German-language Jewish publications Israelitisches Wochenblatt and Jüdische Rundschau merged under the name Taches in April 2001.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS

Political Parties

Nationalist and extreme right parties continued their anti-foreigner campaign in 2000 (see ASW 1999/2000). The nationalist populist Schweizerische Volkspartei/Union Démocratique du Centre (Swiss People's Party – SVP/UDC), together with the far right Schweizer Demokraten/Democrates Suisses (Swiss Democrats – SD) and Lega dei Ticinesi (Ticino League), supported a proposal to limit the number of Switzerland’s foreign residents to 18 percent of the total population. It was rejected by 64 percent of voters in a referendum.

Two lawyers active on the extreme right scene have connections to the Geneva section of SVP/UDC: Pascal Junod, who has close ties to Holocaust deniers and skinheads, and Pierre Schifferli, who was seen giving the Nazi salute when he left the party convention. According to an article in the weekly Dimanche.ch, various members of the Geneva section have significant religious (namely, converts to Islam) and financial ties with Islamic countries, such as Iran.

The Swiss section of the German extreme right-wing Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschland (NPD) was founded by a skinhead from Bern, David Mulas. He was immediately prosecuted for infringing the Swiss anti-racism law. Although a spokesperson claimed the party had been dissolved,
in June 2000 the first issue of NPD Switzerland, Das nationale Blatt (The National Paper), was published and NPD stickers were seen in the streets of the capital.

**Extra-parliamentary Groups**

According to a 2000 federal government report, the number of skinheads increased from 300 to 1,000 within two years. The new recruits are younger (13 and over), more radical and more inclined to employ violence. Two branches are well organized nationally: Hammerskins and Blood & Honour. The former, who consider themselves a white racist and élitist brotherhood, meet almost weekly in a club in Malters, near Lucerne. The latter, a Swiss branch of the movement founded by British neo-Nazi rocker Ian Stewart Donaldson, are based on Waffen-SS traditions. The first issue of Blood & Honour Romandie in French was published in June.

The pseudo-intellectual **New Right**, led by Geneva lawyer Pascal Junod, arranges lectures on a regular basis through his organizations Cercle Proudhon, Cercle Thulé, Synergies Européennes and Amis de Robert Brasillach. These meetings, at which fascist propaganda of Julius Evola, Jean Mabire, Robert Brasillach and others is sold, are frequented by skinheads and Holocaust deniers. Roger Wüthrich, head of the far right organization **Avalon**, tries to unite right-wing extremists from different camps. He considers himself the "general consultant" to the Swiss far right and demands "free space for racist thought and action."

Erwin Kessler (see *ASW* 1996/7) uses the pretext of Jewish ritual slaughter of animals (*shechita*) to further his antisemitic and Holocaust denial attacks through his Association against Animal Factories (Verein gegen Tierfabrik/ Association contre les Usines d’Animaux).

**ANTISEMITIC AND RACIST ACTIVITIES**

A public opinion survey on Swiss attitudes toward Jews and the Holocaust was released in March by the GfS Research Institute. The survey, which received extensive media coverage, was conducted on behalf of the American Jewish Committee and the Committee against Antisemitism and Defamation (CICAD, a Jewish organization which combats antisemitism in Switzerland). Key findings of the study show that 16 percent openly express anti-Jewish feelings, while 57 percent identify antisemitism as a problem in Switzerland and a large majority (94 percent) rejects Holocaust denial. Similar results were found concerning the reassessment of Switzerland’s controversial attitude during the Holocaust. Fifty-six percent accept the historical findings that clearly demonstrate Switzerland’s antisemitic immigration policy during World War II. At the same time, however, a majority thinks that Switzerland’s behavior was justified by the circumstances of war and that no apology is necessary. The survey revealed poor factual knowledge of the Holocaust, but overwhelming support for
Holocaust remembrance and education in schools. The SVP/UDC, as well as some Swiss Jewish circles, criticized the results of the poll, claiming it reflected an exaggeratedly negative image of Switzerland.

Although manifestations of antisemitism declined with the settlement on dormant accounts (see _ASW 1999/2000_ and below), they resurfaced with the outbreak of violence in the Middle East in late September/early October. Many anti-Israel and pro-Palestinian demonstrations took place at which antisemitic slogans were shouted ("Death to the Jews," etc.). The most violent speech was heard on 8 October in United Nations Square, Geneva, where 1,000 Muslims gathered for the Friday prayer. The head of the Geneva Islamic Center, Hani Ramadan, publicly called for jihad to liberate Palestine as the only way to stop Israeli "aggression." Hani Ramadan, the grandson of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Bana, abetted by his three brothers, is one of the most outspoken Islamist activists in Switzerland. The day after Yom Kippur, hundreds of demonstrators gathered in the square to protest this call to murder and violence against Jews.

Events in the Middle East prompted letters to the editor, some of which not only defamed Israel but were explicitly antisemitic. They often revealed a desire for "revenge" on the Jews following the resolution of the issue of dormant bank accounts. This period was also marked by a spate of antisemitic insults, graffiti, stickers, hate mail or calls, and threats.

This form of spontaneous and disorganized antisemitism in response to events in the Middle East should be distinguished from far right activity which increased in 2000. The most blatant incident occurred on 1 August, Switzerland's national holiday, on the historic site of Mt. Rutli (where a declaration of independence from Austrian rule was signed in 1291). While Minister Kaspar Villiger was speaking, a few skinheads waved Nazi flags, gave the Nazi salute and yelled fascist slogans. The police did not intervene and the minister ignored the disturbance. The media covered the incident extensively, thus raising public awareness about far right activity.

Skinheads have been using the Internet increasingly to incite violence. For example, they posted a call for the murder of two left-wing activists, showing photos of the two with the headline, "Born to be killed." Police say skinheads are now more heavily equipped with sophisticated, illegal weapons. However, they still lack organizational structure and a charismatic leader.

It should be noted, too, that racist slogans were often shouted at players during soccer matches throughout Switzerland in 2000.

**Propaganda and Holocaust Denial**

Eighty-year-old Gaston-Armand Amaudruz continues to publish his monthly _Courrier du Continent_ (readership, 400) and maintains ties with skinhead groups. The organization _Vérité & Justice_ (Truth & Justice – V&J), led by Jürgen Graf, René-Louis Berclaz and Philippe Brennenstuhl, members of the younger
generation of Holocaust deniers, sends out a two-page newsletter to members and promotes the sale of various antisemitic and Holocaust denying publications. In 2000, the organization distributed “Le contre-rapport Bergier” (The Anti-Bergier Report), an allegedly historically-based reply to the official Bergier Committee report on Switzerland’s wartime asylum policy (see ASW 1999/2000 and below). This pamphlet, inter alia, accuses the Jews of plotting against the Swiss government and of attempting to create a so-called Holocaust cult as part of a “new world order.” During its “official” presentation in a restaurant in the Valais city of Sion, access was denied to a reporter. A few weeks later, the report was mailed to all members of parliament. One of them, Patrice Mugny, a Greens representative for Geneva, filed a suit against V&R. Other publications were seized at the organization’s headquarters, and its leaders were to stand trial.

Other far right publications include Alias (appears 15 times a year; also online), an ultra-conservative bulletin founded in Valais, which defends Amaudruz’ theses; the bimonthly l’Atout (also online), headed by former member of parliament Geneviève Aubry, which regularly expresses antisemitic views; and Examiner+Agir (Examine+Act), the French version of Emil Rahm’s Prüfen+Handeln, which considers the United Nations and the European Union to be secret societies manipulated by a Jewish-Masonic plot. Max Wahl continues sending Eidgenoss to a “circle of friends,” in spite of previous convictions. Holocaust denier Bernhard Schaub, who wrote the preface to “The Anti-Bergier Report,” published a new edition of his racist and antisemitic book Rose und Adler.

In December, hundreds of antisemitic stickers appeared in Geneva, with the caption, “Only Jews have the right to be racist.” This campaign echoes a similar one in Geneva in December 1999. Four complaints were filed but the police have few leads.

In 2000, the Universal Church (see ASW 1996/7), which is known for its anti-Jewish attitudes, distributed a circular called “The Inner Light,” which read: “Snakes from the Jewish rabble will act against the guru of the Universal Church [Peter Leach-Lewis] as they did against Jesus. This vermin has spread all over the world and reached positions of unimaginable wealth and power wherever they live.”

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HOLOCAUST

Following the global settlement between Swiss banks and Jewish organizations reached in early 2000, US Supreme Court Judge Edward Korman appointed New York lawyer Judah Gribetz to supervise the distribution of $1.25 billion to entitled beneficiaries.

The Bergier report on Switzerland’s asylum policy toward Jews drew criticism from the older generation and from nationalist circles, which did not gain much public support. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in the public surveys
mentioned above, many Swiss have difficulty in understanding the moral aspect of the debate over the country’s attitude during World War II. The question of its behavior toward Jewish refugees was raised again in the case of Joseph Spring, whose suit against Switzerland came before the Swiss Federal Court. In 1943, Joseph Spring, along with his cousin and a friend, tried to cross the border into Switzerland. A Swiss guard caught them and handed them over to the Nazis (who occupied France), identifying them as Jews. Spring is the only one of the three who survived Auschwitz. An Australian resident, he filed suit against Switzerland for moral harm and asked for compensation of SF100,000. The judges stated that “morals can not influence a legal decision,” and that “Switzerland’s asylum policy, as hard as it may have been, was legally acceptable.” Rejecting all moral responsibility, they granted Spring the amount he was asking as “expenses.”

The Historians’ Committee, headed by Professor Jean-François Bergier, set up to examine Switzerland’s attitude during World War II, released an intermediary report about the country’s discriminatory asylum policy toward Gypsies (Roma). The final report is due at the end of 2001.

The Swiss Solidarity Foundation, announced by Minister Kaspar Villiger in 1997, is to allocate SF7 billion of national gold reserves to fight violence and poverty in Switzerland and abroad. However, this project will probably be rejected in a referendum as the various political parties propose different uses for the money.

Two influential bodies apologized to Jews in 2000 for the behavior of Switzerland during the war. The Geneva canton expressed its regrets to victims and their families for its attitude toward Jewish refugees, admitting partial responsibility for their tragic fate. Geneva is one of the very few cantons with complete archives from the years 1933 to 1945. The Conference of Swiss Bishops asked forgiveness for its attitude toward Jews during the Holocaust: “Too little was done to protect and help persecuted people. Protests against antisemitic Nazi ideology were not enough,” the statement read.

RESPONSES TO RACISM AND ANTI-SEMITISM

Court Cases
In October 2000, Holocaust denier Jürgen Graf was due to begin a 15-month jail sentence for writing and disseminating antisemitic texts. However, he fled Switzerland and is said to have found refuge in Iran, where he carries on his activities freely, using the Iranian media as a forum for his Holocaust denial. Graf was also one of the main organizers of the aborted international conference of Holocaust deniers which was to have taken place in Beirut in early April 2001.

The far right activist Aldo Ferraglia was given a 20-day suspended prison sentence for selling illegal antisemitic books, such as Roger Garaudy’s Founding
Myths of Israeli Politics. He has moved to Vuadens, a small village near Fribourg in Switzerland.

A higher canton court reduced to three months a one-year jail sentence imposed by a Lausanne court in April 2000 on veteran Nazi Gaston-Armand Amaudruz for infringing the anti-racism law. Amaudruz had published articles in Courrier du Continent, denying the existence of the gas chambers and minimizing the Holocaust. The decision was criticized by the media and by anti-racist and Jewish organizations for disregarding antisemitism and underestimating Amaudruz’ influence on the far right. Amaudruz has filed an appeal to the Federal Court. In the meantime he continues his activities.

Former Waffen-SS member Walter Stoll, 79, was given a four-month suspended sentence for sending antisemitic threats by mail.

Two federal employees were dismissed, one because of racist postings on the Internet, the other for his sustained ties with the far right.

**Official and Public Activity**

The Federal Commission against Racism lacks the means and scope to exert real influence and still relies on privately funded organizations to conduct educational programs, lectures and public opinion polls in the struggle against racism and antisemitism. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it would allocate SF10 million (about US$6 million) to anti-racism educational projects, but most of the money will be given to the Federal Commission to hire new employees.

After the skinhead incident on Swiss National Day, Minister of Justice and Police Ruth Metzler said: “We take far right extremism seriously, but without dramatizing it.” She added that it was not a critical security matter or a threat to public order. A legal study mandated by the Justice Ministry suggested the following measures: creating a list of acts of hooliganism committed in Switzerland; making far right and racist gestures (such as the Nazi salute) and displaying symbols (such as the swastika) punishable by law; forbidding entry into Switzerland to notorious far right activists from abroad; monitoring mail, phone, fax and e-mail of far right activists; and relinquishing Switzerland’s reservations about freedom of speech in the International Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Racism. So far, none of these measures has been implemented, at least officially.

A federal report on racism, including issues linked to the Internet and preventive measures, was due in 2001.
UNITED KINGDOM

There was a 50 percent rise over the previous year in antisemitic incidents in the UK in 2000. Thirty-six percent of the year’s total occurred during October and November, reflecting the upsurge in tensions between Palestinians and Israelis. An even steeper rise in racist incidents was reported. In April British Holocaust denier David Irving lost his libel action against Deborah Lipstadt and Penguin Books. The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 passed in November, strengthens and extends the scope of the 1976 Race Relations Act. The Terrorism Act, passed in 2000, came into force in February 2001.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

The Jewish community of the United Kingdom numbers 280,000 out of a total population of 58 million. Two-thirds of the community is concentrated in Greater London. Other major Jewish centers are Manchester (30,000), Leeds (10,000) and Glasgow (6,500). The Jewish population has experienced a marked decline since 1967, mainly due to a low birth rate, intermarriage and emigration.

The central organization of British Jewry is the Board of Deputies of British Jews (BoD). Security and defense activity is organized through the Community Security Trust (CST). Welfare and education are given high communal priority, through organizations such as the United Jewish Israel Appeal and Jewish Care. A network of Jewish day schools operates in London and in other major cities. There are also a number of Jewish tertiary study centers, including the London School of Jewish Studies (formerly Jews College) for training Orthodox rabbis, Leo Baeck College for training Reform and Liberal rabbis, and the Oxford Center for Hebrew and Jewish Studies at York. The main community papers are the 160-year-old Jewish Chronicle, the Jewish Telegraph, published simultaneously in northern cities, and the London Jewish News.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS

Political Parties
The British National Party (BNP) remains the largest extreme right-wing group, but its leadership was beset by internal conflict during 2000. Nick Griffin, who replaced founding chairman John Tyndall in 1999, faced a challenge to his leadership toward the middle of the year from the influential deputy chairman Sharon Edwards, her husband Steve, and party treasurer Michael Newland. Their allegations that Griffin and others were defrauding the party led to their being sacked. As they were among the more successful party organizers, planned events such as the Red White and Blue festival, modeled on
that of the French Front National, and the party annual meeting, were much less successful than they might otherwise have been, and party activity declined.

Nevertheless, the primary focus remained on elections, in which the leadership attempted to project an image of a dynamic new right-wing party, opposed to European integration and the admission of asylum seekers, and involved in animal rights and supporting the farming community. In the local elections in May, when over 3,000 local council seats were contested, and which coincided with elections for the newly constituted Greater London Authority, the BNP obtained 7.63 percent of the poll. In the London Assembly elections it gained 47,670 votes (2.87 percent), and in the London mayoral election the party candidate, Michael Newland, received 33,569 votes in the first round and 45,337 votes in the second round (4.57 percent).

Despite the reduction in activity, the BNP nevertheless managed to establish three new sub-groupings: the Association of British Ex-Servicemen, the Young BNP, and the Patriotic Students Association. Friendship organizations which had been established the previous year in support of the BNP now exist in the US, South Africa and Australia, although it is only the first, led by Mark Cotterill, that maintains any ongoing program of activity, with regular monthly and fundraising meetings.

The BNP continues to promote white supremacy, Holocaust denial and a belief in Jewish world domination, although in more muted form than in previous years.

The National Front (NF) was also beset by leadership problems and is now led by Tom Holmes, a veteran member. Activity again focused on demonstrations against refugees and asylum seekers from former Yugoslavia, particularly in some south coast port towns where they had been successful in recruiting local residents. National Democratic Party (NDP) activity virtually ceased in 2000, although members participated in public events organized by others.

Extra-parliamentary Groups

Combat 18 (C18), which was established in 1992 as an informal stewarding group by the BNP, reduced its activity, partly due to lack of support. However, during the course of the year it strengthened its links with the loyalist Ulster Defence Association.

C18 controls part of the Blood & Honour (B&H) music organization (formed by the late Ian Stewart Donaldson), and maintains close connections with skinhead bands such as No Remorse, Razors Edge and Chingford Attack. The other part of B&H is controlled by the British Movement, which otherwise is inactive. The concerts performed by these groups constitute the main local activity for C18 supporters, both in Britain and elsewhere in Europe, particularly Scandinavia.
The **Nationalist Socialist Movement**, a splinter group of C18, was closed down by its leadership following the trial and conviction of David Copeland (see below). Its deputy leader, Steve Sargent, subsequently established *Albion Eyrd*, a publication focusing on English folk heritage and Aryan mythology.

The national revolutionary **International Third Position** (ITP), again the product of a split within the NF, promotes the Lefebvrist Catholic ideology espoused by a part of the traditionalist French and Spanish extreme right (see previous reports). It continues to build its contacts in Eastern Europe, former Yugoslavia and in France and Spain, where it now supports nationalist communes (see *Spain*). A Charity Commission investigation into its fundraising associates, the Trust of St Michael the Archangel and the St George Educational Trust, begun in late 1999 to examine its funding of a Spanish commune, resulted in the commission freezing the charities’ assets. The ITP is closely associated with Roberto Fiore and, up to his death in 2001, with Massimo Morsello, former members of the Italian national revolutionary terrorist group the Armed Revolutionary Nuclei.

Like other Third Positionists or national revolutionary groups, the range of ITP’s international contacts is disproportionate to its size or political influence. These extend to the US via the **American Coalition of Third Positionists**, and Eastern Europe with its emerging national revolutionary groups, based particularly in Poland, Romania, the Baltic states and Russia. Through its journals, its Internet sites and its publishing house, the **Legionary Press**, ITP promotes fascist and antisemitic literature and Nazi memorabilia.

The **National Revolutionary Faction**, formerly known as the English Nationalist Movement, was formed in late 1997, as a breakaway from the ITP. It is a revolutionary white nationalist group adhering to the concept of leaderless resistance, and claims a cell-based structure. It advocates close cooperation with other European Third Positionists and is a member of the clandestine **European Liberation Front Network**. It is the most outspokenly anti-Zionist and pro-Islamist of all the radical right-wing groups. Despite its international perspectives and range of contacts, its sphere of activity is essentially confined to south London. Besides demonstrating outside events associated with the Jewish community in recent years, the group has organized few public activities.

Attempts to establish the **Ku Klux Klan** (KKK) in Britain have all failed although occasional Klan activity, such as cross-burnings or meetings, takes place. Likewise, the **World Church of the Creator** (WCOTC) (see *USA*) has failed to establish itself in Britain. The BNP publication *Spearhead* carries advertisements for WCOTC books and the US contact address.

Several other small extreme nationalist or white supremacist groups exist, often with overlapping membership. They are frequently linked to a publication rather than to political activities. Among them are *Choice*, led until mid-1999 by the late Lady Jane Birdwood of the **British Solidarity** group, and its associated
publishing venture **Inner City Researchers**. These are now organized by Martin Webster, former leader of the NF, and by Peter Marriner. Their supporters overlap with those of **Candour**, a journal edited by Rosine de Bouneville until her death in late 1999, and established by the late A.K. Chesterton, founder of the NF. **Candour** supports the ITP, sharing its Lefebvrist Catholic ideology. Both de Bouneville and Birdwood acted as mentors for many on the extreme right, and allowed their homes to be used as meeting places. Their supporters also overlap with those of **Bloomfield Books** and **On Target Publications**, owned by Donald Martin, who publishes and distributes white supremacist and antisemitic literature. Their other focus of activity is promotion of a white Commonwealth, for which purpose they maintain connections in South Africa, Australia and Canada. The **League of St George** continues to publish its magazine **League Sentinel** occasionally, and overlapping membership exists with the **Friends of Oswald Mosley**, comprising former supporters of the **British Union of Fascists** and the **Union Movement**.

**Militant Islamist and Other Islamist Groups**

Although the UK's Muslim community is overwhelmingly Asian, it contains representatives and active cells of Middle East groups engaged in violent insurrection in their countries of origin. **Hizballah** and **Hamas** retain support groups and fund-raising networks; the Hamas journal **Filastin al-Muslima** is published in London; the English-language **Palestine Times** is also highly supportive of Hamas.

The most active Islamist group in the UK is **al-Muhajiroun** (The Emigrants - AM). While claiming to bear no animosity toward Jews, AM are extremely hostile toward Israel and use the terms Israeli, Jew and Zionist interchangeably. Speakers at AM events have often called for the killing of Jews or predicted gruesome fates for Jews at the hands of Muslims. AM members also deny the Holocaust in their speeches and leaflets (see below). AM promote their public activities by extensive illegal flyer-posting and by faxing regular press releases to other Muslim groups, the Jewish community and the media. They frequently use front groups such as the **Khilafah Movement**, to book venues and establish university societies. AM boast of their fund-raising and recruitment efforts for the international terrorist Usama bin Ladin, Hamas and other jihadist groups. They sponsor survival training and martial arts courses for their members and encourage them to support jihad in every possible way through associated groups **Sakina Security Services** (SSS) and **al-Maddad**. While the leadership disavows any political violence in the UK, their rhetoric encourages direct action against Western or Israeli targets.

**Hizb ut-Tahrir** (HUT), from which al-Muhajiroun split in 1996 under the leadership of its founder Omar Bakri Muhammad, was seldom active during 2000, reflecting the Middle East-based leadership's divisions, but its antisemitism was as acute. Like AM, HUT aims to establish an Islamic state and
supports the activities of violent jihadist groups in other countries. Neither AM nor HUT has a large membership, but they are influential among young people and at street level.

The Supporters of Shariah (SOS), led by Mustafa Kamil, aka Abu Hamza al-Masri, are likewise associated with AM and SSS. Unlike AM, however, they do not advertise for recruits and do not appear to have a formal membership. SOS is extremely hostile to the Jewish community, often propagating virulent Islamist antisemitism, combining traditional religious anti-Judaism with Protocols-style conspiracy theories. SOS are in direct contact with jihad groups around the world, for some of which Abu Hamza acts as public spokesman to the Western media.

The Islamic Observation Center (IOC), led by Yasir al-Sirri, aka Abu ‘Ammar, has no formal UK membership and publishes only irregular reports. Al-Sirri is one of the leaders of the Egyptian al-Jihad group and their offshoot the Vanguards of Conquest, both of which have a record of violence inside and outside Egypt. He sought asylum in Britain after having been condemned to death in Egypt for his part in the attempted assassination of former Prime Minister Dr. ‘Atif Sidqi in 1993. IOC acts as a focal point for the dissemination of information about Islamist groups throughout the Muslim world.

The publications of Friends of al-Aqsa (FOA), formed in 1988 to highlight the issue of Israeli occupation of Jerusalem and the al-Aqsa Mosque, are extremely hostile to Israel and their anti-Zionism is frequently tainted with antisemitism. Participants in FOA activity have included former Hamas activists, HUT leaders and other Islamists.

Crescent International, associated with the now defunct Muslim Parliament and Muslim Institute, regularly features extremely antisemitic articles, particularly those by the Washington-based Muhammad al-‘Asi and the UK-based convert Yakub Zaki (formerly James Dickie).

The Nation of Islam (NOI) continues its activity, but at a low level, having failed to make any real impact on Britain’s Afro-Caribbean community.

ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITIES

Violence, Vandalism, Threats and Insults
There were 405 antisemitic incidents reported during 2000, a 50 percent increase over the previous year (270 incidents). Thirty-six percent of the year’s total (147 incidents) occurred during October and November, compared with 17 percent during the same period in 1999, reflecting the overspill of tensions between Palestinians and Israelis.

Unlike 1999 and 1998, there were two acts of life-threatening violence, both of which occurred in October. One was the attempted murder of Mayer David Myers in the Stamford Hill suburb of London on 16 October. The trial of the attacker, an Algerian asylum seeker, was to take place in mid-2001.
There were 51 non-life threatening physical assaults (13 percent of the total), 30 percent of which took place in Manchester, which has a Jewish population of some 30,000 (11 percent of the total UK Jewish population). This is a new and worrying trend, but one which clearly reflects the level of street crime in north Manchester where the majority of the Orthodox community lives. However, criminal break-ins of communal property declined, possibly reflecting the enhanced security coverage of the community by both the police and CST.

Vandalism of communal property constituted 13 percent of the total (73 incidents), compared to 25 incidents (9 percent) in 1999. In the most serious incident, during two days in June, over 500 gravestones were smashed at the Federation of Synagogues’ cemetery in Edmonton, north London.

The largest proportion of incidents were acts of abusive behavior against members of the community. There were 196 such incidents (48 percent), compared to 127 (47 percent) in 1999.

The targeted mass distribution of antisemitic literature declined to 44 reported incidents (11 percent) from 54 incidents (20 percent) in 1999, reflecting the success, or fear, of prosecutions, under the Public Order Act, as well as the death of Lady Jane Birdwood and the increasing infirmity of some of her colleagues, who in recent years were collectively responsible for a significant proportion of large-scale antisemitic leaflet distribution.

The experience of the Jewish community mirrors that of the population in general. Racist incidents reported to the police increased yet again, to 47,814 incidents in 1999/2000 from 23,049 incidents in 1998/99, a rise of 107 percent.

**Propaganda**

Britain’s race hatred laws are now generally effective, and the political will exists to enforce them. As a consequence, neo-Nazi and other extreme right groups rarely publish crude or overt antisemitic propaganda. However, most still disseminate more subtle anti-Jewish material, and all denigrate the Holocaust and Jewish claims to restitution.

David Irving’s failed libel action against Professor Deborah Lipstadt (see below) has effectively halted Holocaust denial propaganda in the UK, although Islamists remain generally uninfluenced by these legal decisions and some of the groups mentioned above increased their output, particularly after the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada.

During the month of October there was an unprecedented number of demonstrations by Islamist groups in London, Manchester and elsewhere. Some of the slogans were virulently anti-Jewish, as well as anti-Israel, such as: “Jewish occupiers kill them when you see them”; “Global death for Israelis”; and “Khaybar Khaybar ya yahud, jaysh Muhammad sawfa ya’ud” (Khaybar Khaybar, Oh Jews! The army of Muhammad will return; see Arab Countries).

AM issued a printed “warning to all Jews” not to show any support for Israel or “you will become a part of the conflict.” Muslim Internet discussion
boards posted calls to "publish a list of important Jewish personalities" and the "need to use militant groups all over the world against Jewish and Western targets." Others called for a stop to demonstrations as "we should concentrate on strategy for jihad on the Jews."

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HOLOCAUST AND THE NAZI ERA

Holocaust Commemoration
Britain marked the first Holocaust Memorial Day on 27 January, the anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz. Activities were planned and coordinated by a steering committee of the Home Office and Department for Education officials, together with representatives of the Holocaust Education Trust, the BoD and other Jewish organizations. Local authorities were asked to mark the day with communal services, and educational packs were made available to all schools. The national memorial meeting was held at Westminster Central Hall and addressed by the prime minister, in the presence of the Prince of Wales, and broadcast live on television and radio. Although focusing on the Holocaust, the Memorial Day is intended to be used as an educational tool against racism, and part of the educational material and the service were devoted to subsequent acts of genocide. Consequently, half the proceedings of the national memorial meeting were devoted to the atrocities committed in Cambodia, Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. In general, the media were supportive and devoted considerable space to relevant articles, although criticism was mounted from some quarters that the massacres of the Armenians in the late 19th century and particularly during World War I were excluded. Most faith groupings participated in the events, except for the Muslim community organizations, which were represented by a single senior imam.

Britain’s National Holocaust Museum opened early in 2000 in a newly-built wing of the Imperial War Museum in South London. Like the Memorial Day, the initiative came from the central authorities rather than the Jewish community, and funding for both was made available from these sources.

Holocaust Denial
In April David Irving lost his libel action against Deborah Lipstadt and Penguin Books in the High Court in London, following a two month trial. In a damning verdict, the judge confirmed that Irving was a racist, an antisemite and an active Holocaust denier who associated with right-wing extremists, and in a second judgment in May ordered him to pay £150,000 on account for Lipstadt and Penguin’s costs. Although he was refused leave to appeal, Irving was allowed to challenge the decision in a personal application to the Appeal Court which was to be heard in June 2001.

Although Penguin declined to pursue Irving for their costs, on commercial grounds, it is expected that Lipstadt’s lawyers will do so. Irving continues to publicize his intention to sue writer Gitta Sereny and The Guardian newspaper in
the defamation action that he brought against them; however, it is now unclear whether this will go ahead.

Although the BoD has yet to advise the government formally that it no longer wishes to introduce legislation making Holocaust denial a criminal offense, the government accepted the results of the law panel established by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research which reported in June. The panel's members were eminent lawyers and academics, who found that there was little need to recommend specific legislation against Holocaust denial, but that existing legislation might be amended by the removal of the "threatening, abusive or insulting" conditions to allow the incitement offense to encompass the more subtle and sophisticated manifestations of Holocaust denial, and other forms of antisemitism and racism.

AM are among the most active proponents of Holocaust denial among Islamist groups. In an interview with the Jewish Chronicle in November, AM leader Omar Bakri Muhammad stated: "To say six million died in the Holocaust is a fallacy used to justify Zionism. We believe that the Nazis killed about 60,000 Jews during the war. The story of the Holocaust is full of myths and lies." In a series of planned meetings in January 2001 AM continued the theme with an advertising poster which stated "How could Hitler kill 6,800,000 Jews, when there were only 3,500,000 Jews living in Europe? This talk will trace back the lie of the holocaust and show how it had been used to justify the on-going holocaust and genocide against the innocent Muslims in Palestine and to legitimize the existence of the terrorist state of Israel." A leaflet issued in February, entitled "Holocaust: Fact or Fiction," stated "Why are the Zionist Jews so determined to deceive the world by spreading the lie of the 'Holocaust', even though there is little if any evidence to substantiate this claim."

**War Crimes**

Despite having wound up the Metropolitan Police War Crimes Unit the government and police continue their enquiries and provide assistance to other countries investigating war crimes. Such support has been given to the Latvian and Lithuanian governments, which led in February 2001 to the latter requesting the extradition from Scotland of Antanas Gecas, head of an auxiliary police battalion attached to the SS, who was responsible for murdering thousands of Jews and other civilians in Lithuania. Gecas had lost a libel action that he brought against Scottish TV, which accused him of war crimes; the judge stated that he was satisfied that Gecas was a war criminal. He was subsequently the subject of a UK war crimes investigation, but there was insufficient evidence available in the UK to indict him.

In January 2001 the home secretary announced that he might consider stripping suspect war criminals of their citizenship, after amending the 1981 British Nationality Act. The way would then be open to deport them to the countries where their crimes were committed. The proposal arose as a result of
new evidence that a large body of Ukrainian members of the Waffen-SS entered Britain in 1947 without adequate investigation into their wartime activities.

RESPONSES TO RACISM AND ANTISEMITISM

Legislation
The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 was passed in November, strengthening and extending the scope of the 1976 Race Relations Act. It prohibits discrimination in all public sector institutions such as the armed forces, police, local councils and government bodies. The act is radical in its approach in that it gives statutory force to the imperative of tackling institutionalized racism.

The long-awaited Terrorism Act, passed in 2000, came into effect in February 2001. It replaces temporary legislation and puts Britain’s treaty obligations under the January 2000 UN Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism Financing onto a statutory footing. The act allows for the proscription of terrorist groups and prevents members or supporters of such groups from raising finance or organizing other material aid in the UK, or planning acts of terrorism abroad. It also allows for the prosecution of those attacking British interests abroad, and those engaged in cyber terrorism, while fully enforcing Britain’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. It is expected that among its targets will be some of the Islamist groups currently active in the UK, and which have been the subject of continued diplomatic complaints from some Middle Eastern countries.

Court Cases
There were several convictions of activists with connections to far right groups. In July David Copeland was given six life sentences at the Central Criminal Court for the London nail bombings of 1999 (see ASW 1999/2000). Acting alone, Copeland had been a member of the BNP before moving on to the NSM, which provided a more focused outlet for his Nazi views and hatred of colored immigrants.

Another former BNP member, Cameron Martin Dudley of Grimsby, was sentenced to five years for planning to import guns and ammunition from American neo-Nazi groups in order to kill Jews and Asians. His planned purchases had been conducted over the Internet and were intercepted by US federal law enforcement officers.

In June Simon Shepherd of the Heretical Press of Hull, a current BNP member, was sentenced to nine months for publishing and distributing leaflets parodying the deaths of Jews in the Holocaust. He had previously been imprisoned in Holland for similar offenses.

C18 members Andy Frain from Reading, and Jason Marriner from Feltham, who is also a KKK member, were sentenced to seven and six years
imprisonment, respectively, on charges of committing violent disorder and affray. Their trial arose out of a BBC television investigation into football violence but both had previous convictions for racist violence and in Frain’s case possession of racist and antisemitic material. Television footage was shown to the court at their trial of the visit both men had made in the company of other C18 members to Auschwitz where they gave Nazi salutes, insulted visiting survivors and even climbed into a crematorium oven.

The trial of veteran neo-Nazi leader Colin Jordan, and publisher and printer Anthony Hancock, was due to take place in June 2001 in York Crown Court. They are charged with various offenses under the Public Order Act relating to the printing and distribution of antisemitic postcards in 1997 which called on the recipients to harass Eldred Tabachnik, then president of the BoD, as well as various antisemitic leaflets.

Several Islamists were also convicted. In January Imam Sa`id `Ali Abouzaid, a member of HUT, was convicted of racially aggravated assault for an unprovoked attack on two Jewish men outside the Western Marble Arch Synagogue in London.

In October members of al-Muhajiroun were arrested in various parts of the country, and subsequently charged with distributing leaflets which called for the killing of Jews. The police investigation into the production and dissemination of anti-Jewish material from Islamist sources was widened at the end of the year, and is expected to lead to further arrests.

**Police Activity**
The Metropolitan Police launched Operation Athena in March against extreme right activists involved in violent and non-violent racist crimes. On one day alone 109 people were arrested. The operation is part of the police initiative to crack down heavily on racist violence and is co-ordinated by the Racial and Violent Crime Task Force established in 1999. The Task Force is aided by independent advisors, including the CST. During 2000 it also hosted a series of local meetings of community leaders throughout London at which the Jewish community’s experience and expertise were commended to other communities.

**International Meetings**

In October Britain joined with other Council of Europe member states in signing a Political Declaration at the European Conference against Racism, formulated in Strasbourg in preparation for the September 2001 world conference in South Africa. Expressing alarm, they noted “the continued and violent occurrence of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, antisemitism and related intolerance.” The governments committed themselves to implementing fully the relevant universal and European human rights
instruments, adopting and implementing effective national legislation and administrative measures that specifically counter and prohibit racial discrimination, bringing to justice those responsible for racist acts, and establishing national policies and plans to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, antisemitism and related intolerance, giving particular attention to education at all levels of society and to reinforcing and strengthening international bodies among governmental organizations engaged in combating these problems. The declaration also stated that “the Holocaust must never be forgotten.”

The General Conclusions Document, in which governments spelt out how the principles of the declaration would be enforced, recognized that violent acts against members of Jewish communities and the dissemination of antisemitic material continued and suggested that all member states now make Holocaust denial a punishable offense.
Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
FORMER SOVIET UNION

OVERVIEW

Jewish Communities
The Jewish population of the former Soviet Union (FSU) at the beginning of 2001 was about 580,000. Of this number, some 485,000 (83.5 percent) live in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, about 50,000 in the six Muslim states of the former Soviet Union, 22,700 in the three Baltic states and the rest in Moldova and Georgia.

The population is diminishing rapidly, both because of emigration to Israel (about 51,000 in 2000) and to Western countries (about 30,000 in 2000), and because of the negative birth rate, which accounted for about 12,000 people in 2000. The total figure of over 90,000 represents a decrease of 16 percent of the population from the previous year.

Jewish Activity
Although there are significant differences between these countries, in all of them Jews engage in organized activities and enjoy the right to emigrate. There are about 600 Jewish organizations and religious foundations, which undertake a variety of activities, most groups receiving support from Israel and from Jewish organizations in the West. These include Jewish education (about 20,000 children and young people study in 230 educational institutions), aid to the needy, preserving Jewish culture and tradition, and commemorating the memory of the Holocaust. They publish about 50 newspapers and periodicals.

In contrast to the past, the year 2000 saw increasing interference by local governments in organized Jewish communal life, with the unmistakable aim of subjecting it to the regime, diminishing the influence of Israel and Western Jewish organizations and removing Zionist content from their activities.

Antisemitic Activity – General Characteristics
No country of the former Soviet Union includes antisemitism in its official policy or state ideology. Jews continue to be prominent in the economic and cultural life of their countries, some serving in leadership positions in Jewish organizations as well. There was, however, some distancing of Jews from the political life of these countries, especially in Russia, where they had been prominent in the recent past; at the same time in Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states and particularly in Russia, widespread antisemitic activity, differing according to the political configuration of each country, continued in 2000.
BALTIC REPUBLICS

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

At the beginning of 2001 there were about 22,800 Jews in the Baltic states; 12,300 in Latvia, 7,500 in Lithuania, and 3,000 in Estonia. During the year the Jewish population deceased by 1,700 of whom 800 emigrated to Israel and 700 to the West, and the rest were lost to the declining birth rate.

About 35 Jewish organizations and religious communities function in the Baltic republics, their leaders representing the Jewish population when dealing with the local authorities and with Jewish organizations in the West and in Israel. They operate independently of those in the other states of the former Soviet Union, and enjoy increasing cooperation with European and American Jewish organizations. Their principal concerns are Jewish education (they maintain 14 schools serving about a thousand students), preservation of Jewish traditions, commemoration of the Holocaust, combating antisemitism, which is still a factor in these states, and providing for the needy.

ANTISEMITISM AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HOLOCAUST

Relations between the native population and other national minorities, such as the large Slavic or the small Jewish minorities, continued to be a subject of public discourse in 2000 and early 2001 (see ASW 1999/2000). The problem of the ethnic Slavic population, particularly those who settled in the Baltic republics after World War II, is gradually being resolved, under pressure from the European Community, into which the Baltic republics seek to be integrated.

The events of the years 1940–45 gave rise to complex national and historical issues, touching on national identity, which are still being debated, particularly in Latvia and Lithuania. A crucial aspect of this identity crisis is the Baltic people’s contemporary perception of the Jews, the Holocaust and the active participation of the native population in the extermination of the Jews who lived in their lands before World War II. Opinions range from justifying the Holocaust, on the grounds that the Jews betrayed their homelands by cooperating with the Soviets and participating in the murder and exile of many Baltic people in 1940–41, to denying any involvement of the local population in the extermination of Jews during the Nazi era, or admitting to the participation of a few isolated individuals. The continued discussion of these questions results, in part, from a hesitant and ambiguous government policy regarding the veterans of Baltic SS divisions (especially in Latvia) and the trials of Nazi war
criminals in Lithuania. However, with the passage of time, the level of acrimony in the public discourse has declined and antisemitism is on the wane. The number of ideologically antisemitic organizations has decreased and relations between the Jewish community and the regime are correct.

LATVIA

Political Parties and Extreme Right Groups
Several nationalist organizations exist on the political fringe in Latvia. For the Fatherland and Freedom, which has 17 out of the 100 representatives in the Latvian parliament, seeks recognition of Latvian SS veterans as national heroes. Its most extreme wing fights the extradition and trial of Nazi war criminals and supports the re-issuing of the virulently antisemitic Nazi collection Baigas Gads (Years of Awe, 1997; see ASW 1999/2000), which it disseminates on the Internet in Latvian, Russian and English. Nine members of Perkonkrusts (Thundercross – the Latvian version of the swastika), a party now banned, were sentenced on 29 May 2000 to varying periods in jail for vandalizing sites which mark the period of Soviet conquest of Latvia. The Latvian branch of the Russian Nazi party Russian National Unity (RNE) has a decreasing membership and mainly distributes nationalist propaganda amongst Russian-speaking Latvians. It is not a registered party and is under permanent surveillance of the local security service. Party leader Evgenii Osipov was fined on 16 June 2000 for conducting illegal political activity.

Antisemitic Activities
There were a few antisemitic incidents in Latvia in 2000 and early 2001. The ruins of a Riga synagogue in which the Nazis burned 2,000 Jews in 1941 were desecrated. On 3 July 2000, the eve of the official Latvian Holocaust Memorial Day, when the president presented a decoration to five Latvians who had saved the lives of Jews during World War II, a memorial to Jews killed in the Holocaust in the Rumbula forest was vandalized and swastikas appeared on the walls of the Shalom restaurant in Riga. The president and Prime Minister Andris Berzins deeply censured these acts. Two Russian residents of Daugavpils were found guilty, on 24 May 2000, of desecrating a Holocaust memorial site on 25 October 1999 in that city, and sentenced to three years in prison.

Since public interest in the Latvian past and the status of Russian-speaking Latvians has decreased, the large circulation newspapers have carried less antisemitic material. Also, the Latvian legal authorities have taken steps to curb open antisemitism in the media. The editor of the magazine Patriots (printed in Liepaja from October 1999 to January 2000), Guntars Landmanis, was sentenced to eight months in jail on 12 January 2001 for publishing racist and antisemitic materials in the journal, under Article 78 of the Latvian criminal code. Editor-in-chief of the economic periodical Kapitals, Guntis Rozenbergs,
and reporter Normunds Lisovskis were being investigated for the latter’s antisemitic article “The Jews Run the World,” which appeared in the August 2000 issue. However, several Latvian newspapers, such as Lauku Avīze (The Country Paper) and Latvietis Latvija (The Latvian in Latvia), continued to carry antisemitic articles without any legal measures being taken against them.

Attitudes toward the Holocaust
The public discourse in Latvia in 2000/1 focused on two issues: the disposition of the Latvian government to try Latvian Nazi war criminals and the status of Latvian SS division veterans. The Latvian authorities have shown increasing readiness to try war criminals. Senior government officials, including President Vaira Vike-Freiberga (elected 18 February 2000), denounced Nazi war criminals, including Latvians, stressing the need to try them without regard to the statute of limitations. Konrads Kaleis and Karlis Ozols, both over 90 and living in Australia, allegedly took part in the murder of tens of thousands of Jews in Latvia and Belarus. The Latvian authorities began criminal proceedings against both men on the basis of Articles 71 and 74 of the Latvian criminal code dealing with genocide and war crimes. Karlis Ozols died on 23 March 2001 in Australia. The request of the attorney general for the extradition of Kaleis, made on 12 December 2000, has still not been acted upon, despite the decision of a Melbourne court on 14 March 2001.

On 16 March 2000, as in past years, veterans of the Waffen-SS 15th and 19th Latvian divisions held parades through Riga. Two thousand men, including 400 SS veterans, marched in memory of the first battle between these divisions and the Soviet army in 1944. The official status given this date in 1998 was rescinded by the Latvian parliament in early 2000. Now only a public event, government officials refrain from appearing at it. The president considered the celebration a mistake, and remarked that she understood the rationale of foreign, especially Russian, protests, of this event. This attitude should be seen in the context of Latvia’s aspirations to join the European Union. In 2001, there was no parade at all since the Latvian freedom statue which served as the focus for the parades was being repaired.

LITHUANIA

Antisemitic Incidents
A few antisemitic incidents occurred in 2000 and early 2001. Nazi flags were waved and antisemitic slogans appeared in Vilnius and Kaunas on 20 April 2000, the anniversary of Hitler’s birthday. Jewish cemeteries were desecrated in Pasaušalis on 2 June 2000, and in Vilnius, Kaunas and Kelme in August. The perpetrators in the last two cases were apprehended and face criminal charges.
Attitudes toward the Holocaust

In Lithuania, as in Latvia, the prosecution of war criminals in 2000 and the first half of 2001 was impeded by bureaucratic delays. The cases of Aleksandras Lileikis, commander of the security police, 1941-44, and his deputy Kazys Gimzauskas, both 92, were on trial for over three years. Both men had been deprived of their citizenship and deported (Lileikis in 1996 and Gimzauskas in 1993) from the United States, where they had lived since the end of World War II, for concealing their Nazi past. In February 1999, their trials were halted on the grounds of ill health since Lithuanian law forbade trying a man who was unable to appear in court. On 15 February 2000 parliament amended this law to permit those suspected of genocide to be tried even when their health did not permit their appearance in court, and the trials of both were re-opened at the end of April 2000.

In contrast to the legal delays and the evident unwillingness of the Lithuanian public to re-examine cases of World War II criminals, the official position of the government is firmly in favor of trying Lithuanian Nazi war criminals and of combating any evidence of current antisemitism. This was the position taken by President Valdas Adamkus and by Prime Minister Andrius Kubelius on 22 September 2000 when they marked the memorial day to those killed in the Vilnius ghetto. The Lithuanian Catholic Church joined them in condemning antisemitism when, at a conference of bishops on 13 March 2000, the participants expressed regret that during the Nazi period “some of the faithful showed no charity to the persecuted Jews, failed to grasp an opportunity to defend them and lacked the determination to influence those who aided the Nazis.”

In the course of 2000 the trials of Nazi war criminals drew to their close with the death of Aleksandras Lileikis on 27 September, before the court could issue a decision, and a guilty verdict for Kazys Gimzauskas at his trial by a Vilnius court on 14 February 2001. No jail sentence was imposed on Gimzauskas on the grounds that he suffered from Alzheimer’s disease. At the same time, the Lithuanian government asked Britain to extradite Antanas Gecas, 85, who lived in Edinburgh, and who is suspected of taking part in the mass murder of Jews during World War II in Lithuania and Belarus. Investigation of Gecas’ activities was begun in 1987, under the Soviet regime in Lithuania, but was hastily closed when there seemed to be little evidence.

In this connection it should be mentioned that on 12 September 2000, there was an attempt by extreme rightists in parliament to give national status to the parliamentary declaration of 23 June 1941, when a provisional government was set up under the Nazis. Public outrage at this legislation, which would have made Lithuania, and not the conquering power, culpable of the mass murder of Jews during the war, forced the lawmakers to retract and cancel this proposal within a week. The Nazis themselves had actually abolished Lithuanian independence on 5 August 1941, less than two months after the provisional
government was declared, adding Lithuania to their province Ostland, which also included Latvia, Estonia and bordering Russian areas.

ESTONIA

There were no violent antisemitic incidents reported in Estonia in 2000 and early 2001. A small group of neo-Nazis in Tallinn marked Adolf Hitler's birthday on 20 April 2000. Russian branches of the ultra-nationalist Russian National Unity (RNE) continued to work among the Russian minority in Tallinn and Narva. From time to time the Estonian police searched the homes of party activists in an attempt to confiscate nationalist and antisemitic propaganda smuggled into Estonia from Russia. The scope of activity of the RNE in Estonia is decreasing.

In Estonia, as in Latvia and Lithuania, in 2000/1, the commemoration of events in World War II had antisemitic overtones. A public dispute arose after Estonian President Lennart Meri placed 19 citizens who had fought the Red Army during the war, including veterans of the Estonian SS division, on the list of those to receive the Eagle Cross decoration on 8 February 2000. In the resort city of Parnawa, during July–August 2000, an exhibition on the Estonian SS legion was held. The local Jewish population protested the declaration of Minister of Education Tonis Lukas, on 23 October 2000, that he saw no reason to study the Holocaust or mark Holocaust Day in the schools. This was in direct contradiction of a decision of education ministers made at a meeting of the Council of Europe in Kharkov, Poland, in October 2000.
BELARUS

Following the trend of previous years, antisemitism in Belarus declined even further in 2000/1. Nonetheless, a Molotov cocktail was thrown into the synagogue in Minsk on 28 December 2000 and Jewish sites were vandalized several times. The Belarus branch of the neo-Nazi Russian National Unity increased its activities markedly.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

At the beginning of 2001 there were 27,200 Jews in Belarus, following a year in which 2,600 Jews left for Israel and 2,100 for Western countries; the rest were lost to the negative birth rate.

There are 20 Jewish organizations and religious communities in Belarus, most of them in the capital Minsk. As in Russia and Ukraine, they are engaged in Jewish education, aid for the needy, and preserving Jewish traditions and the memory of the Holocaust.

EXTREMIST GROUPS

The dictatorial regime under President Aleksandr Lukashenko, although supportive of the Jewish community, represses all movements not to its taste. Thus the number of extremist political movements, left or right and never large in any case, has decreased. Banned by law, insignificant as a factor in public life, these organizations include:

- the **Belarus National Bolsheviks**, under Viktor Gordeev, a local branch of the Russian organization led by Eduard Limonov, now under arrest for possession of military weapons;
- **RUS**, led by Gennadii Vlasov, a cover organization which attempts to legitimatize the ultra-right party Slavianskii Sobor (The Slavic Academy), which is banned by law;
- the **Belarus People’s Patriot Movement** (NPDB), headed by Viktor Chikin;
- the **Freedom Party**, under Serzhuk Visotzki;
- the **LDPB**, the Belarus branch of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party of Vladimir Zhirinovskii, led by Sergei Gaidukevich;
- the **Right Revanche**, led by Slavomir Adamovich and Ales Pushkin.

There was an attempt to reactivate the **White Legion**, a Nazi party which tries to act like a civil defense organization, and **Krai**, which masquerades as a sports group, using a stylized swastika as its logo.
The Belarus branch of the neo-Nazi **Russian National Unity** (RNE), led by Andrei Sakovich since his predecessor Andrei Valliulin was killed in Minsk on 5 August 2000 by a party member, increased its activities markedly. They now have branches in 11 cities, the most active in Minsk and Vitebsk. They frequently demonstrate in the major cities, distributing nationalist and antisemitic material, unhindered by the authorities. Their ideology is promoted in their newspaper *Russkii poriadod* (The Russian Order), and in books and posters produced in Russia. Government apathy to the RNE may be explained by the fact that, in addition to its racism, the movement supports the unity of Slavic peoples in one country, a position common to both the Russian and Belarus regimes.

**ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITY**

Following the trend of previous years, antisemitism in Belarus declined even further in 2000/1. Nonetheless, a Molotov cocktail was thrown into the synagogue in Minsk on 28 December 2000 and Jewish sites were vandalized several times; a Holocaust memorial site was desecrated in Brest on 15 October 2000 and again on 26 June 2001; and Jewish cemeteries in Borispol, Gomel and Vitebsk were desecrated in August 2000. The legal authorities announced that the perpetrators had been arrested in the first half of 2001 and would be tried on criminal charges.

Officials of the Belarus government, including President Lukashenko, have repeatedly expressed their support for the Jewish population of the country. In a speech in Minsk on 10 July 2000, he promised to fight racism and antisemitism. On 24 May 2000, the government press commission issued a warning to publishers of the mass media who regularly print antisemitic articles. The newspapers included *Nasha niva* (Our Wheatfield), *Narodnaia volia* (People’s Freedom) and the *Belarus Commercial Newspaper*.

On the other hand, local Jewish organizations lost their case against the distribution of an antisemitic book, *War According to the Law of Abomination* (Minsk, February 2000), published by the religious organization Orthodox Initiative in an edition of 30,000 copies. In the course of the trial, 16 March 2000 to 11 May 2000, the court declared it would not decide on a book involved in a historical dispute over *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, which constitutes a chapter of the book. The book thus continued to be distributed in Belarus, particularly through the bookshop chain of the Russian Orthodox Church.
RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Both political and violent antisemitism in Russia declined in 2000, not as the result of governmental action but because of the more authoritarian tendencies of the Putin administration. Nonetheless, several acts of antisemitic vandalism were recorded. There remains a clear reluctance on the part of the authorities to take legal action against the dissemination of antisemitic material and to deal leniently with those guilty of perpetrating violent antisemitic acts.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

The Jewish population of Russia at the beginning of 2001 was about 335,000, following a decrease of about 35,000 in the past year, of whom 19,000 went to Israel and the rest to Western countries or were lost through the negative birth rate. From the beginning of the wave of mass emigration in 1989 to the present, 286,300 Russian Jews have departed for Israel.

Organized Jewish activity continued, often with the increasing support of international Jewish groups such as the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and Habad, which together contributed tens of millions of dollars to this effort. Russian Jewish millionaires, many of whom have key positions in local communal affairs, continued their contributions, but at a lower level than in the past.

A variety of Jewish organizations are active in most Russian cities with a large Jewish population. They are gathered under several umbrella organizations: the Russian Jewish Congress (REK), founded in January 1996 and led by millionaire Leonid Nevzlin, who replaced Vladimir Gusinskii on 1 March 2001; the Federation of Jewish Communities in Russia (FEOR), founded in November 1999 on the initiative of Boris Berezovskii and the Russian government, led by Habad Rabbi Berl Lazar; and the Federation of Jewish Communal Organizations of Russia (Va’ad), founded in December 1989 and led by Mikhail Chlenov. These organizations compete for the representation of Russian Jewry. They are, for the first time in recent history, divided along the general political lines of the country. The present Russian administration, including President Vladimir Putin, has been attempting to break up the existing organizations with the intention of creating a central Jewish body amenable to the government’s “Jewish policy,” which includes lessening foreign involvement, Israeli or Western, in the affairs of the local Jewish community, removing Zionist content from their activities and reducing emigration from Russia to Israel or to the West. However, organized Jewish activity involves only about 10 percent of the Russian Jewish population and is
thus not a major factor in the life of most Russian Jewry. Primarily, the Jews are concerned with the domestic political, economic and security situation of the country, to which many have reacted by emigrating, principally to Israel.

In September 2000 the new Moscow Jewish Community Center was opened on the site of the Marina Roscha Synagogue, which was destroyed by arsonists in 1993. The ceremony was attended by President Vladimir Putin.

EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS AND ANTISEMITISM

In recent years antisemitism has been used as a weapon in the political battles within Russia, particularly by the Communist Party and its parliamentary faction, which accused the government of selling out to the Jews (see ASW 1999/2000). Concerned that opposition to racism and antisemitism would be construed as contrary to the national spirit, the government responded hesitantly. The Putin administration’s extremely nationalist character has altered the situation radically: its take over of political positions once occupied by the far right and far left opposition (Communist Party, National Bolsheviks, etc), plus the fact that only a few identified Jews serve in the new administration, have undercut the opposition’s claims, with the result that antisemitism has lost importance as a political and social issue in Russia today.

There has been a marked drop in the activity of extremist groups such as the neo-Nazis, who have suffered internal division. Aleksandr Barkashov, veteran leader of Russian National Unity (RNE), for example, was expelled from the organization on 22 September 2000 (for ideological and personal reasons) and replaced by his second, Oleg Kasin. The authorities increased surveillance of the activities of extremist groups, less because the administration opposes ultra-nationalist tendencies than because it is attempting to restrict freedom of political activity in general and to prevent political ferment. This government, however, is as reluctant as Boris Yeltsin’s was to enforce the law against the dissemination of racist or antisemitic propaganda and the existence of extremist organizations. Hundreds of antisemitic publications, newspapers, periodicals and leaflets continue to appear and tens of ultra-nationalist and antisemitic organizations flourish on the fringes of the political map, without interference by the authorities.

Defining Russia as the “key to white survival,” former US Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke has targeted it as a means to broaden his popularity internationally and find a receptive audience for his antisemitic message. He has visited Russia at least twice during the past year, meeting with leading nationalists and right-wing extremists. His booklet The Jewish Question through the Eyes of an American, which is actually a Russian version of the chapter on the Jewish question from his autobiography My Awakening, was also distributed in Russia.
Islamist Activity

Some 25 million Muslims live on the territory of the Russian Federation, concentrated mainly in the northern Caucasus, Tatarstan and Bashkirstan, as well as in the large cities (1.5 million in Moscow). With the collapse of the USSR the influence of Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Pakistan, in the northern Caucasus increased significantly. Extremist Islamic tendencies intensified during the war in Chechenya when Chechen rebels were joined by extremist Muslims from the Middle East and Afghanistan, who came to their aid in their struggle against the Russian army.

Some Muslim organizations working among the local population are funded and guided ideologically by extremist foreign elements, mainly from the Middle East. Well aware of the dangers represented by Muslim extremism, the Russian government demanded in October 1999 that the governments of Syria, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait prevent extremist Islamic factors within their respective borders from intervening in the internal affairs of Russia, including extending support to Muslim rebels in the northern Caucasus and Muslim extremists elsewhere in Russia. Despite these protests, guidance centers and centers for Islamic ideological indoctrination continue to exist throughout Russia. They work under cover of legitimate bodies, such as Muslim seminaries or the Society for Social Reform, headed by Ramis Khalitov and funded by the Kuwait Joint Relief Committee, a front for the terrorist Middle East-based Muslim Brotherhood. (The committee's center in the FSU is in Chimkent, Kazakhstan, headed by a Jordanian citizen, 'Ali Salah 'Ali Zaitar.)

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) reported on 17 October 2000 that it had uncovered cells of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in 49 of Russia's 89 administrative regions, as well as in other FSU states. It stated that the heads of the Muslim Brotherhood in Russia coordinate their activities with Islamic terrorist organizations and leaders in the Middle East (such as al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya, al-Jihad al-Islami and Usama bin Ladin) and in Bosnia. The FSB report also noted that following the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada, the heads of the Chechen rebels in the northern Caucasus had informed the heads of the Palestinian terrorist organizations Hamas and al-Jihad al-Islami operating in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that they were prepared to send experienced Chechen fighters to their aid.

Summer camps for Muslim youth take place throughout Russia (near Moscow, Tiumen, Orenburg, Samara, etc.), with counselors from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Some young people are chosen to continue their studies in Arab countries and some even undergo military training and are sent to fight against the Russian army in Chechenya.

ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITY

There were several violent antisemitic incidents in Russia in 2000, although fewer than in 1999. For example: Jewish cemeteries were desecrated in Nizhnii
Novgorod on 4 June, and in Samara on 15 August. Community property was vandalized in Vladimir on 5 January, and in Nalchik, on 3 May. In Riazan a school was vandalized by members of the neo-Nazi RNE on 17 September. Russian extremist organizations held marches and demonstrations, such as the one in Moscow on 28 June in which 150 neo-Nazis participated.

The reaction of the authorities was irresolute, both toward antisemitism and racism and toward these demonstrations. A few legal steps were taken to control antisemitic propaganda, such as warning the editors of several ultranationalistic dailies and attempting to prevent the convening of chauvinist congresses in some cities. On the other hand, there was clearly a reluctance to take legal action against the dissemination of antisemitic material and those guilty of violent incidents were let off lightly. Nikita Krivchun, who attacked the director of the Cultural Center in Moscow on 13 July 1999, was declared of unsound mind by a Moscow court on 23 February 2000; he was sent for counseling and received no jail sentence. In Riazan the authorities claimed the damage to the Jewish school by young Nazis on 17 September was hooliganism.

The spread of antisemitic and anti-Zionist ideology, which began in the late 1990s among the Muslim population of Russia, was intensified in 2000 both by Chechen rebels in the Caucasus and by Islamist activists in the central regions of Russia. This propaganda has not, as yet, resulted in any confrontations between Muslims and Jews. Extremist Muslim propaganda centers include the Voice of Islam radio station, whose broadcasts from Dagestan include virulent antisemitism.
UKRAINE

Political antisemitism as well as vandalism of Jewish sites has declined in Ukraine in comparison to the early days of independence of that country. In accordance with this trend, the number and intensity of attacks decreased in 2001 compared with the previous year.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

At the beginning of 2001 the Jewish population of Ukraine numbered 135,000, the majority of whom resided in the large cities of Kiev, Odessa, Kharkov, Kherson and Dnipropetrovsk. The population declined by 40,000 in 2000, of whom 23,500 left for Israel and about 15,000 for Western countries, while the rest were lost to the negative birth rate. Since the mass emigration began in 1989 some 292,000 Jews have left Ukraine for Israel.

Some 95 Jewish organizations and religious communities are active in about 60 cities. Their umbrella organizations include the Union of Jewish Communities and Organizations of Ukraine (founded 1991), the Council of Jewish Organizations (founded 1992) and the Union of Orthodox Jewish Organizations (founded 1992). Most of these organizations also belong to the Ukrainian Jewish Congress (VEK, founded September 1997) and the Chief Coordinating Council of Ukrainian Jewish Communities (GKSEOU, founded February 1999). Frictions based on personalities and economics which have characterized the Ukrainian Jewish communities in recent years, account for the multiplicity of groups and organizations. Moreover, there is intense rivalry over which organization should represent the community to the local authorities, to Jewish organizations abroad and to the State of Israel.

As in the Russian Federation, Jewish organizations in Ukraine are involved in Jewish education, maintaining Jewish traditions and the memory of the Holocaust, and caring for the aging population.

ULTRA-NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS

In contrast to Russia, antisemitism has played almost no role in political and economic rivalries in Ukraine in the last decade. The image of deeply rooted antisemitism as characteristic of the sovereign state of Ukraine was reinforced by the immediate emigration of Jews who feared widespread xenophobia, especially in the provinces. Blaming Russia rather than the Jews for the worsening economic and social situation is evidence of a change in attitude toward the Jews, who play a much more modest role in the political, public and
economic life of Ukraine than they do in Russia. Ukrainian antisemitism is also moderated by Ukrainian aspirations to be accepted into NATO and to shake off Russian political pressure. Accepting European values implies curbing extreme nationalist and antisemitic organizations, even to the point of taking legal action against them.

However, on the political fringe, particularly in the western provinces, antisemitism is integral to the ideologies of a number of small ultra-nationalist groups. They include: the State Independence of Ukraine (DSU), Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUND), Ukrainian Idealist, Congress of Ukrainian Intelligentsia (KUI), Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN) and Association of Ukrainian Enlightenment (PROVSIT). These groups publish a number of periodicals and newspapers, some of which have been decreasing rapidly in circulation in recent years. Papers which routinely carry antisemitic material are: Nezhorima Natsia (The Unconquered Nation), Neskorena Natsia, (The Invincible Nation), Idealist, Za Vilnu Ukrainu (For a Free Ukraine), Vechirni Kiyiv, a Kiev evening paper with a nationalist orientation, and Samostina Ukraina (Sovereign Ukraine). Although the government has done little to curb antisemitic propaganda, on 8 December 2000 a Kharkov court ordered the intellectual, government-funded association PROSVIT to cease publication of its youth newspaper Djereltsje (The Source), and fined them $4,400 for printing an antisemitic article in September 1999. This decision, taken after accusations by local Jewish organizations in March 2000, is a precedent, which could serve as a warning to all antisemitic and ultra-nationalist publications.

ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITIES

A number of Jewish sites were vandalized in 2000, some clearly motivated by antisemitism and others simply acts of hooliganism. The number and intensity of these attacks diminished compared to the previous year. There was one cemetery desecration (in Slavuta in January 2000), compared to six in 1999; a memorial to Jews killed in World War II was vandalized in Dnepropetrovsk in September 2000; and the library of the People of the Torah congregation in Kiev was torched in June 2000. In the case of the cemetery desecration in Kalinovka on 28 July 1999, the three perpetrators were tried on 8 February 2000 and given prison sentences.
CZECH REPUBLIC

Although there was little antisemitic activity of note in 2000 and early 2001, a neo-Nazi concert held in April 2001 caused a public outcry in the country. The arrest and imprisonment of National Alliance leader Vladimir Skoupy demonstrates that the authorities have begun taking some steps to curb extreme rightist activity.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

The Czech Republic has some 5,000 Jews out of a total population of 10.5 million. The great majority are concentrated in Prague, with smaller communities in Brno, Plzen, and Olomouc. The main communal organization is the Federation of Jewish Communities of the Czech Republic; other Jewish organizations include the Society for Jewish Culture, and the Union of Jewish Youth.

The community is largely secular, but religious activity, which until recent years was mostly centered on the holidays, is increasing. The Lauder Foundation sponsors a Talmud Torah and a Jewish kindergarten. However, the Czech Federation of Jewish Communities is aiming at broadening its communal activities and membership to include non-Orthodox organizations and become more pluralistic.

International Jewish organizations take an active part in the restoration of Jewish sites and property as well as in fostering educational activity at the Terezin concentration camp site.

There has been a significant revival of Jewish life, marked by the exploration of Jewish roots, and many Czechs are showing a greater interest in the Jewish legacy of their country. This upsurge of interest in Jewish culture, also stimulated by the presence of Jews from Western countries, is well reflected in the Czech media and in numerous cultural activities.

Since the establishment of the Rychtzky Commission, chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Pavel Rychtzky in March 1999, there has been considerable movement on the issue of restoration of Jewish communal property seized during the war by the German authorities and later by the communist regime. In March 2000 the Czech government created the Holocaust Victims’ Foundation and allocated an initial 300 million kroner (about US $8 million) to the foundation to advance the restitution of Holocaust-era Jewish communal and private property. In May 2000 the Czech parliament enacted legislation to restore Jewish property plundered during the Holocaust to the original owners (or their legal heirs). This legislation was ratified by the Czech Senate in July
and approved by the president. It covers properties seized during the period September 1938 to May 1945. The new legislation also paves the way for the transfer of 63 paintings from the National Gallery to the Jewish Museum in Prague. Plundered Jewish objects d’art have also been listed on an Internet site to facilitate their return.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS

While there has been no significant growth in the number of members and sympathizers of ultra-right organizations, they are still very much present in the Czech Republic. In fact, persistent economic difficulties and political instability could be a breeding ground for increased extremism.

The **Assembly for the Republic–Czech Republican Party** (AFR-RSC), led by Miroslav Sladek, continued to disseminate racist, xenophobic and anti-Western propaganda, despite the dramatic loss of support it suffered in the 1998 election (see *ASW* 1998/9, 1999/2000).

Since 1998 there have been significant developments among extra-parliamentary extremists in the Czech Republic. Skinheads, who constitute a major and dangerous element among extremists, especially in their opposition to Roma and foreigners, have intensified their efforts to win respectability (see *ASW* 1999/2000). The independent Movement for Civic Solidarity and Tolerance, which monitors neo-Nazi activities and has anarchist leanings, suggested that the skinheads wanted to fill the political vacuum left by the Republican Party, which was effectively removed from the political arena after the 1998 election. Jakub Polák, a founder of the Movement for Civic Solidarity and editor-in-chief of the anarchist magazine *A-Kontra* said that the “skinhead movement is so political and its methods so sophisticated that it avoids methods to link it directly with Nazism” (*Prague Post*, 25 April–1 May 2001).

Another development has been the heightened profile of the ultra-right-wing **National Alliance**. Alliance leader Vladimír Skoupy, a Holocaust denier, gained considerable publicity with his extremist speeches and statements. He was arrested in February and in June 2000, and found guilty of “support and propagation of a movement that aimed at suppressing citizens’ rights and freedoms and defaming a nation, race or conviction.” He was given a one-year prison sentence and a two-year suspended sentence, which he was expected to appeal.

The National Alliance, often called the National Social Alliance, is known for its ties with skinheads, and may provide some of the cover for the skinheads’ attempts to legitimize their activities. However, if Czech skinheads are indeed endeavoring to change their tactics and win “respectability,” their cooperation with the National Alliance reveals their true nature, since the latter, especially its leader Skoupy, engages in vitriolic racist and antisemitic propaganda. In 2000 the Czech Interior Ministry refused to register the National Social Alliance as a political party (see *ASW* 1999/2000).
ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITIES

A neo-Nazi rock concert held outside Prague in April 2001 and attended by some 400 fans caused a public uproar in the country. The concert was attended by neo-Nazis from Slovakia, Poland and Germany. Among the groups was the Slovak band Juden Mord (Death to the Jews), whose album jacket features the gates of the Auschwitz death camp (see JTA, 11 April 2001). The concert’s timing was linked to Hitler’s birthday which, according to The Prague Post, has become a rallying day for skinheads and neo-Nazi groups. Another smaller concert was also held in the same month. Both were described by the organizers as “private” events (see below).

Extremist publications with antisemitic content include Národní Boj (National Struggle), Pochoden Denska (Torch of Today) and Dnesek (Today). Several dozen small skinhead publications with racist content appear on an irregular basis. The main skinhead magazine Vlajka publishes antisemitic material.

The National Alliance serves as a major channel of fascist propaganda. Prior to his arrest in 2000, Skoupý made speeches denying the Holocaust and used Nazi symbols at demonstrations.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HOLOCAUST AND THE NAZI ERA

Denial of the Holocaust in the Czech Republic is rare. In the past few years, Czech society has attempted to cope with some of the taboos on the years of the Nazi occupation, enforced during the period of the communist regime. This has included soul-searching on the nature of collaboration and the low level of effective resistance. Moreover, recent Czech scholarship has emphasized the suffering and fate of the Jewish community.

However, basic information about the Jews and their past is still lacking in Czech schools (see ASW 1999/2000). In 2000/1, there were signs of a growing awareness among historians and educators of the need to include the Holocaust and antisemitism in the school curriculum. Follow-up activities and practical results to the Stockholm Forum of January 2000 were expected to be felt in educational activities during 2001.

RESPONSES TO RACISM AND ANTISEMITISM

Since early 1999, the Czech authorities have been actively endeavoring to stamp out racism. Their attempts to enforce the law follow European Union warnings on the prospects of the Czech Republic joining the community should racist attacks persist. The major targets of racist attacks continued to be the Roma, whose fate, as in other East and Central European states, is a major topic in the public and political discourse.

Police investigations and legal procedures against perpetrators of racist attacks are often slow, as is the case in other East European states. The legal
authorities are aware of the urgency of dealing with the growing number of racist attacks – the steps against Vladimir Skoupy reveal some progress in this regard. The neo-Nazi rock concert in April 2001 may serve as a new test case for the authorities. Following strong public criticism that the police failed to act during this neo-Nazi event, Interior Minister Stanislav Gross said that the fight against far right activities will become a “top priority.” Vladimir Skoupy’s response was that “if Gross’ activities damage our organization we will file a lawsuit against him.” President Vaclav Havel hoped that the police role would be properly examined (JTA, 11 April 2001).

In fact the neo-Nazi concert scene is regarded by skinheads as a challenge to their ability to act in the face of public uproar. In the case of the larger “private” concert held in April 2001, the police maintained they had no legal right to interfere, a claim strongly rejected by Jewish community leaders, such as Tomas Jelinek, vice chairman of the Prague Jewish community, who said that “when you have a band called Juden Mord, what more do you need?”

Many critics felt that the Czech Republic was a convenient location for such activities because the authorities have done little to deter them. According to both Prague Post and JTA, leftist and anti-racist groups claimed that there was police complicity with the neo-Nazis because some officers sympathized with them.

One of the strongest reactions came from Chief Rabbi Karol Sidon, who warned of “neo-Nazi tendencies” among segments of society. The Czech Council of Bishops supported Sidon’s stand on 21 May 2001. Activists of the Roma community also joined the condemnation of neo-Nazi activities and of racist intolerance. Jewish-Roma cooperation on these issues tends to be ambivalent: on the hand, there is a natural affinity between opponents of racism and all forms of intolerance; on the other, some Roma activists reject cooperation with the Jewish community and the Czech establishment because previous Roma calls to combat racism did not meet with an adequate response.

The strong reaction from the Jewish community, from public figures and from the Czech media has generated so much public debate that the Czech Senate will probably hold a discussion on the overall issue of racism and intolerance in the course of 2001.
HUNGARY

Antisemitic manifestations in Hungary in 2000 remained on the same level as the previous year. Memorialization of the Holocaust and Holocaust education were incorporated into the 2001 school curriculum.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

The 80,000 Jews living in Hungary, out of a total population of 10.55 million, constitute the largest Jewish community in Eastern Europe outside the borders of the former Soviet Union. The great majority live in Budapest, with smaller communities in large urban centers such as Miskolc and Debrecen, as well as in smaller cities.

The Federation of Jewish Communities is the main body of Hungarian Jewry. Several major organizations are active in Hungary, especially the Lauder Foundation, whose summer camps attract youth from across Central and Eastern Europe. The Hungarian Jewish Cultural Association publishes a monthly, 
Szombat
(Saturday), and conducts a wide variety of cultural and educational activities. The quarterly 
Mulc es Jovo
(Past and Present) publishes original and translated essays on a wide variety of topics. The bi-weekly 
Uj Elet
(New Life) is the official publication of the Jewish community, and its content also reflects the religious revival among some segments of the Jewish population.

In December 2000, a formal agreement was signed between the Hungarian government and the Jewish community promoting the “political, social and economic stability of Hungarian Jewry.” This was the first such agreement in Hungary since the mid-nineteenth century. The agreement pledges commemoration of the Holocaust and the introduction of Holocaust education into the school curriculum. The Hungarian government has signed communal accords with most other faiths in Hungary.

A Hungarian constitutional court in December 2000 nullified a 1999 law which had allocated what the court termed “a shameful sum” of US$100 in a lump payment to relatives of Holocaust victims. This is in contrast to the $3,000 awarded victims of communist excesses.

In January 2001, the French government donated 3.2 million francs to the Jewish community in Hungary to assist it in establishing a Holocaust documentation center and permanent exhibition in a former synagogue building in Budapest (see ASW 1999/2000).
Political Parties
Since the 1998 elections, the Hungarian parliament has become a forum for the nationalist, xenophobic and veiled antisemitic rhetoric of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP) (for the elections, see ASW 1998/9). The MIEP hopes to become a decisive factor in the survival of the present right-center coalition in the general elections scheduled for May 2002. Analysts believe that the silence of the governing FIDESZ party regarding the extremist, sometimes antisemitic, rhetoric of MIEP leader Istvan Csurka is motivated by electoral calculations. Although, officially, FIDESZ leaders have rejected the idea of a coalition with the ultra-nationalist MIEP, their support might be vital if the balance between the left and the center-right is upset by electoral gains of the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP), which led the coalition between 1994 and 1998.

The Independent Smallholders Party, led by Jozsef Torgyan, has moderated its populist rhetoric since joining the coalition government in 1998, and racist and antisemitic undertones have been noticeably absent (see ASW 1999/2000). Torgyan, who is minister of agriculture and regional development, declared at a conference on Jewish issues organized by the Jewish community in Debrecen in June 2000 that it was impossible to imagine Hungary and its achievements in the past without the Jews. By early 2001 the party was undergoing significant changes as Torgyan's leadership was challenged and weakened by internal power struggles and economic scandals.

Extra-Parliamentary Groups
The number of neo-Nazis is small, but they are visible in public demonstrations on national days or anniversaries linked to World War II. The most notorious neo-Nazi group is the Hungarian Welfare Association, which has appeared under various names and in different forms and which adheres openly to the legacy of the Hungarian fascist Arrow Cross movement, led during the war by Ferenc Szalasi.

Skinhead numbers have not increased in the last few years and their activities might even have diminished. Nevertheless, this violent sub-culture with its neo-Nazi symbols continues to be a visible threat to public order. As in other East European countries, the skinheads act as "shock troops" of Hungarian extremism, manipulated by politicians who seek to project a more respectable image. In February 2000 and 2001, Hungarian police battled groups of local neo-Nazis who were celebrating the anniversary of the attempt by Hungarian and Nazi troops in 1945 to break out of Soviet-besieged Budapest. Following these displays of neo-Nazi power, the authorities promised to clamp down on such demonstrations. The marches in 2000 and 2001 were much smaller in scale than in 1999, but have become an annual display of neo-Nazism and Holocaust revisionism.
A principal defender of the skinheads is former parliament member Izabella B. Kiraly, president of the small Hungarian Interest Party whose organ is *Kottot Keve* (Tied Sheaf). The party signed a “brotherhood” agreement with the Iraqi Ba’ath Party, and a delegation from Saddam Husayn promised its support (*Kottot Keve*, 3/2001). At the signing Dr. Tugyi Lajos, claiming to quote from “US President Benjamin Franklin [sic],” said that his “prophecies on the Jews” had become a reality, and “our duty is to stand by Saddam Husayn who dares to oppose the attempts by the Zionists to rule the world.”

**ANTISEMITIC AND RACIST ACTIVITIES**

Antisemitic manifestations in 2000 remained on the same level as the previous year. In November 2000 some 30 tombstones were damaged by vandals in Budapest’s main Jewish cemetery. Antisemitic slogans and symbols were reported by the Hungarian media at soccer matches and public events. In June 2000 the ADL appealed to the Hungarian prime minister to take legal measures against soccer fans who displayed antisemitic and racist behavior. A commonly used slogan is, “The train is leaving for Auschwitz.”

There were also antisemitic manifestations during the MIEP demonstration in Budapest in March 2000 commemorating the 1848–49 revolution (see *ASW* 1999/2000).

**Propaganda**

Extreme right motifs of “Hungarian superiority” and the nation’s “mission” in the Carpathian Basin often echo the interwar East European nationalist and extremist language of exclusiveness and elitism. The Jewish role in the communist movement and the regime is still frequently raised, so as to portray the Jews as the source of all Hungary’s misfortunes. The weekly *Magyar Forum*, MIEP’s organ, published a regular column by Csurka, entitled “With Hungarian Eyes.” On 24 April 2001, Csurka combined the following motifs: Jewish culpability in the Tiszaeszlár blood libel of 1882 (see *ASW* 1999/2000), ongoing Jewish attempts since the last century to destabilize Hungary and harm the Hungarian nation; Israeli-Jewish support for Roma protests to the European Union against discrimination in Hungary. In addition, Jewish immigration to Hungary in the nineteenth century is described as “the invasion from Galicia of almost a million ‘Khazars’ [a term used to undermine the Jewish community’s claim to be part of the ancient Jewish nation].”

Globalization was a major target of attack by extremists such as Csurka, who accused Jewish interests of enslaving Hungary spiritually, morally, financially, militarily and politically. Csurka’s party, which has representatives on the boards of directors of the public broadcasting commission and the media, has been active in “unmasking” the “socialist-liberal [read ‘Jewish’]” spirit in the media. There has been a campaign to cleanse the media in Hungary since the collapse of the communist regime, and the struggle between leftist and
nationalist forces for positions of influence seems to have intensified. The
Pannon Radio station is identified with the MIEP line, and “Sunday Journal,” a
popular Sunday radio show on Hungarian state radio, has become a major
forum for airing nationalist and extremist views, as well as criticism of Jewish
issues.

Both the weekly and the monthly Magyar Forum regularly publish lengthy
exposés of the dangers facing Hungary from globalization, which is presented
as an international Jewish attempt to keep world power in its hands. The article
“Satan’s Agents,” which appeared in the 14 December 2000 issue, was
especially outspoken. Its author, Szentmihalyi Szabo Peter, while not using the
word “Jew,” wrote of those “who live among us in Hungary but hate us. There
is no difficulty in recognizing them.” He continued with a physical description
of those “who are constantly packing up but are not leaving.” Their “sweaty
palms, pale complexion, cold feet, and distorted smile betray them.” The
accusation that they are “internationalists and cosmopolitans at the same time,”
was followed by a list of Hungarian communists of Jewish origin. The article
ended with the words “Hell awaits them.”

The racist, antisemitic and Holocaust denying monthly Hunnia changed its
format in early 2000, appearing as a smaller, bi-monthly journal (see ASW
1999/2000). Despite the transformation, it continues to advertise publications
and video cassettes with antisemitic material, and to print articles similar to
those in the earlier version.

The weekly Magyar Demokrata has become a regular forum for the
publication of antisemitic, anti-Israel and anti-Zionist articles. Since the
outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada, it has accused Israel of committing war crimes.
Following the protest of a group of Roma families against Hungary, the paper
lashed out for weeks against the Jews and Israel. The basic message of such
articles, as well as of Magyar Forum and similar publications, is that while Jewish-
Israeli capital flows into Hungary and influences the Hungarian market, Jews
are slandering Hungary in various ways in order “to buy cheap.” Yet, while the
Jews complain about antisemitism and support activities by the Roma, they
actually fare quite well, relative to the size of the community (see, for example,
Magyar Demokrata, 13/2001). Further, the Jews have total, or almost total,
control of the economy and other centers of power and influence, and their
attempt at destabilizing Hungary is part of their overall strategy.

In this context, articles dealing with the size and impact of Israeli-Jewish
financial interests in Hungary are published in almost every issue of Magyar
Demokrata and Magyar Forum. In the west of the country, the MIEP organized a
press conference to protest the selling of land to foreigners. The headline of the
report was “We do not want to share the fate of the Palestinians” (Magyar
Forum, 7 Sept. 2000). Another frequent topic is the constant growth in the
Jewish “mafia” from the former Soviet Union who import their violent sub-
culture into Hungary (see, for example, Magyar Demokrata, 20/2000).
Among the numerous articles slandering Israel following the outbreak of the intifada was a report in Magyar Forum (19 Oct. 2000) on “blood donations in Hungary for wounded Palestinians.” The report stressed that the humanitarian gesture took place following the paper’s presentation of a long list of allegedly lethal Israeli actions against the Palestinians.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HOLOCAUST AND THE NAZI ERA

As in previous years, much extremist activity was focused on attacks on any type of memorial activity related to the Holocaust in which Hungarian participation was recalled, and on Jewish demands for compensation from Hungary. Frequent mention was made of the “communist holocaust” in which Jewish communist leaders were allegedly involved (see ASW 1999/2000). The incorporation of activities in the school curriculum commemorating and educating about the Holocaust was vehemently rejected by extremists. Kiraly B. Izabella wrote in Kottot Keve (3/2001) that “instead of a memorial day we demand justice,” adding that in the new textbooks Hungarian children would learn that “their grandparents were a bunch of antisemitic, fascist and racist Hungarians, while the most miserable but also the most gifted nation on earth are the Jews.”

Csurka’s MIEP party representatives in parliament and in the Budapest city council opposed all remembrance activities on Holocaust Day 2001 with a variety of arguments but not those of Holocaust deniers. Rather they attacked the alleged manipulation of the Holocaust against the Hungarian nation by Jewish elements, especially local Jewish community leaders.

The Hungarian parliament held a Holocaust Remembrance Day ceremony attended by Prime Minister Viktor Orban (Uj Elet, 1 May 2001). Members of Csurka’s parliamentary faction were absent from the proceedings.

RESPONSES TO RACISM AND ANTISEMITISM

Relations between the Hungarian population and the authorities with the Roma minority remained problematic, despite government pledges to ease tensions by promoting cultural and educational activities (see ASW 1999/2000).

Protest activities by Roma, especially at the gates of the European Union offices, focused attention on their situation in Hungary. The official position is that the government is doing its best to cope with the issues involved; extremists link the Roma issue to the Jewish support given them.

As part of Hungary’s commitment to fight racism and antisemitism given at the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust in January 2000, memorialization of the Holocaust and Holocaust education were incorporated into the school curriculum in 2001.
POLAND

Although only a small Jewish community exists in present-day Poland, antisemitism can still be found in the mainstream, as well as on the political fringe. The resounding defeat of extreme right candidates in the presidential election of October 2000, however, indicates that despite a tolerance for manifestations of antisemitism and xenophobia by some mainstream politicians, such extremists have little electoral appeal. During the late 1990s the case of Dr. Dariusz Rataficzzyk and his supporter Prof. Ryszard Bender indicated that Poland was not immune to the phenomenon of Holocaust denial. The intensification of debates on issues concerning the Jews in general, and especially the wartime history of Polish-Jewish relations sparked by revelations about the Jedwabne massacre, has highlighted patterns of prejudice still present in some strata of Polish society. The discernible change in the attitude of the Catholic Church, notably resulting from the Pope’s widely reported visit to Israel in March 2000, was an important development. Nevertheless, antisemitic attitudes have not disappeared amongst the clergy, and its primate Jozef Cardinal Glemp has a long record of vitriolic remarks about Jews.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

There are some 5,000–10,000 Jews in Poland out of a total population of close to 40 million. Most Jews live in Warsaw, Wroclaw, Krakow and Lodz, but there are smaller communities in several other cities. There are virtually no Jews in the eastern part of Poland where once large, important communities existed, such as those of Lublin and Bialystok.

The Union of Jewish Religious Communities (Zwiazek Kongregacji Wyznania Mojzeszowego), or Kehilla, and the secular Jewish Socio-Cultural Society (Towarsztwo Społeczno-Kulturalne Zydowskie), or Ferband, are the two leading communal organizations and these, together with other Jewish groups, are linked by membership in the KKOZRP, which acts as an umbrella organization.

There is a Jewish primary school in Warsaw maintained by the Lauder Foundation, which has been active in rehabilitating Jewish life in Poland, especially through youth projects, including summer and winter camps. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee is also active in Poland, particularly in social welfare activities. The leading Jewish publications are the monthly Midrasz, Dos Jidische Wort, Jidele for youth and Sztendlar for primary school children. Significantly, all of these publications appear in Polish, except for Dos Jidische Wort which is published in a bi-lingual Yiddish-Polish edition.
Other important institutions are the Jewish Historical Institute (which opened its revamped museum in June 2000), E.R. Kaminska State Yiddish Theater in Warsaw and the Jewish Cultural Center in Krakow. There are centers for Jewish studies in Warsaw University and the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. At the beginning of 2000, it was announced that the first Polish chair of Holocaust studies would be established at the University of Gdansk. Plans are proceeding to build an inter-active museum of Polish Jewry in Warsaw.

In April 2001, President Kwasniewski vetoed legislation that would have provided for the restoration of private property to Polish citizens only – clearly discriminating against Jewish claimants, the great majority of whom are not domiciled in Poland and are not Polish citizens. In the absence of legislation, no mechanism yet exists that would provide for the return of private assets and the matter continues to be the subject of national and international debate. Jewish factionalism has interrupted the smooth functioning of the fund created to retrieve Jewish communal assets.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS

The extreme right in Poland comprises numerous small groups, among them an estimated 15,000 activists. Hopes for the creation of a strong, independent, nationalist political movement patterned after Haider’s FPÖ in Austria were not fulfilled in 2000. However, the extreme right has maintained and developed its own social and cultural activities, with bases extending from the sports stadium to the university. Some extreme right activists maintain relations with respected mainstream politicians.

Nationalist candidates who attempted to run for the presidency in the October elections without the support of the conservative right received only a handful of votes. The most aggressively antisemitic candidate, the independent businessman Roman Pawlowski, received 0.1 percent of the vote. The former Solidarity leader and president Lech Walesa received little support. During the election campaign he resorted to antisemitic comments directed against the incumbent Social Democrat (former Communist) Aleksander Kwasniewski. On 7 July 2000 Walesa suggested Kwasniewski had no right to take part in a pilgrimage to the Vatican because of his allegedly Jewish descent. On a campaign stop in Bialystok Walesa voiced his opposition to antisemitism but proclaimed that he himself was sorry he was not of Jewish origin because then “I would probably be richer.” Walesa, once a national hero credited with bringing down the communist regime, received a mere one per cent of the vote, while Kwasniewski obtained 54 percent, which gave the president a first-round victory.

The most dynamic antisemitic organization, Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski (National Rebirth of Poland – NOP), led by Adam Gmurczyk, is a part
of the International Third Position (see United Kingdom). The party claims to be an incarnation of the pre-war extreme right-wing group Oboz Narodowo-Radykalny (National Radical Camp – ONR). As in 1999, in the summer of 2000 the NOP hosted extreme right activists from several countries, including from the German extreme right NPD, at an annual paramilitary and ideological training meeting in Duszniki-Zdrój. NOP membership is estimated at several hundred, consisting mainly of skinheads. The organization is primarily active at the grass-roots level and one of its preferred recruiting grounds is the football stadium. The NOP draws its strength from the antisemitic sub-culture active in the stadiums, where rival gangs routinely call each other’s clubs “Jewish” as a term of abuse.

The NOP continues to publish its magazine Szczerbiec (The Sword), financed partly by supporters in Western countries, which devotes considerable space to virulent antisemitism, some in the form of Holocaust denial or distortion. According to NOP leader Adam Gmurczyk, the co-publishers of Szczerbiec are Roberto Fiore of the Italian Forza Nuova and Derek Holland from the ITP. Financial help comes from the self-styled Polish Historical Institute in the US, led by Mirosław Dragan. The NOP is also involved in the neo-Nazi skinhead music scene. During the presidential campaign the NOP supported Jan Lopuszanski, an MP and head of Porozumienie Polskie (Polish Alliance – PP) (see below). Lopuszanski is known for his opposition to Polish membership in NATO and in the European Union as well as for his open admiration of Austria’s Jörg Haider.

A similar but smaller organization is Wojciech Podjacki’s Związek Białego Orla (White Eagle Union – ZBO), which has been involved in assaults on left-wing meetings in Gdansk and Chelm and repeatedly uses antisemitic slogans.

Obsessive antisemitism and neo-paganism are the hallmarks of the Polska Wspólnota Narodowa–Polskie Stronnictwo Narodowe (Polish National Community– Polish National Party) led by former Marxist sociologist Bolesław Tejkowski, who once suggested that Pope John Paul II was actually a clandestine Jew. In 2000 it established some contacts in the ecology movement, such as with Zielone Brigady (Green Brigades) magazine. A newly formed alliance of “green” activists and extreme rightists/racists is called Confederation for Our Earth (Konfederacja dla Naszej Ziemi – KNZ).

The Niklot Association, a nationalist pagan member of KNZ, led by the former leftist Tomasz Szczepanski, is a small but growing organization which recruits its members from the skinhead and Black Metal music sub-cultures. Its ideology is based on the pre-war Zadrzuga group, which sought to purge Poland of “Judeo-Christianity.” Szczepanski was a member of the electoral campaign committee of General Tadeusz Wilecki (see below) who ran for the presidency. In July 2000 he was shown on the cover of the weekly Wprost with a group of his supporters giving the Hitler salute. In December 2000 a Warsaw court upheld the claim of the anti-fascist journalist Marcin Kornak that Niklot was
“chauvinist and antisemitic.” Niklot cooperates with the New Right group Zakorzenienie (Rootedness), led by former anarchist Remigiusz Okraska and long-time extreme right activist Jaroslaw Tomsiewicz.

Młodzież Wszechpolska (All-Polish Youth – MW) is a nationalist Catholic youth movement based on the tradition of a pre-war group of the same name. In the 1920s and 1930s the MW was responsible for numerous acts of violence (including murders) against Jewish students at Polish universities, most notably in Lwow. Today the MW consists largely of skinheads but it also has close ties with certain Roman Catholic clergymen (for example, it has its own weekly program on the Catholic fundamentalist Radio Maryja – see below) and with certain right-wing parliamentarians. Despite basic ideological differences, the MW has also collaborated with Niklot on a number of occasions.

The MW is linked to the Stronnictwo Narodowe (National Party – SN), whose ideology derives from that of the pre-war antisemitic Endecja (National Democratic) movement led by Roman Dmowski. The SN in its present shape was created in April 2000 out of a merger of two previously rival nationalist parties. It is now led by Boguslaw Kowalski, who served as spokesman of former President Lech Walesa in 1995. The SN supported General Tadeusz Wilecki, former chief of staff of the Polish army, as its presidential candidate. Wilecki demanded, inter alia, that all other candidates prove their Polish ancestry to the fifth generation and praised the housing policy of Adolf Hitler. Despite high expectations he received only 0.16 percent of the vote. The SN is not represented in parliament, but has close ties with the small parliamentary party Stronnictwo Polskiej Racji Stanu (Reason of State Party – SPRS), as well as with the Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej–Ojczyzna (Confederation of an Independent Poland—Fatherland – KPN-O, or Alternative Social Movement). The KPN-O hosted a deputy leader of the French FN in December 2000 and announced its plans to invite leader Jean-Marie Le Pen to visit Poland in 2001. The SN also has good relations with senior members of the influential Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish Peasant Party – PSL).

Another party claiming the tradition of National Democracy is the Zjednoczenie Chrzescijansko–Narodowe (Christian National Union – ZChN) More moderate than the SN, it is a member of the mainstream right-wing ruling bloc Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnosc (Electoral Action Solidarity – AWS) and is represented in the government. The party avoids expressions of blatant antisemitism, but xenophobic statements can still be found in some party bulletins. In April 2000 party spokesman Michal Kaminski caused a minor scandal after his public declaration of support for the infamous slogan “Poland for Poles,” which is traditionally directed against Jews and other ethnic minorities. Also, in 2000, a group of former activists of the MW became members of the ZCh-N.

The Porozumienie Polskie (Polish Alliance – PP) party is led by presidential candidate Jan Lopuszanski, formerly of the ZCh-N. Initially
supported by the influential Radio Maryja, the PP lost much of its appeal after Lopuszanski fell out with Father Tadeusz Rydzik, the founder of the station, which transferred its support to the conservative right candidate. As a result, Lopuszanski received only 0.8 per cent of the vote.

PP member of parliament Witold Tomczak stirred controversy in December 2000 when he protested against an exhibition featuring an avant garde (and to many, rather offensive) sculpture of the Pope at a Warsaw state-owned art gallery. In an open letter, Tomczak called for the dismissal of the gallery’s director, Anda Rottemberg, suggesting, in a clear reference to Rottemberg’s Jewish origins, that she spent the taxpayers’ money in Israel rather than in Poland. Many Church figures claimed they did not find the exhibition offensive, but on 11 January 2001 Tomczak wrote another open letter, again calling for Rottemberg’s dismissal, signed by himself and 90 other right-wing MPs (out of a total of 460 members of the Sejm – parliament).

The Prawica Narodowa (National Right – PN) is a tiny extremist group that has been very successful in infiltrating the mainstream right. The PN was formed in the mid-1990s as a radical antisemitic and racist organization modeled on the French FN, whose publications featured, inter alia, Holocaust-denying articles written by the late Leon Degrelle, the commander of the Belgian SS legion during the war. Since then the PN as a group has joined the ranks of the AWS and some of its leaders currently occupy important government posts. Marcin Libicki, chairman of the Polish delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, is both a member of the PN and of the newly formed conservative Porozumienie Prawicy (Alliance of the Right).

The tiny Stronnictwo Polityki Realnej (Real Politics Party – SPR) is another extreme right member of the AWS. The SPR, led by Mariusz Dzierzawski, was created after a split in the Unia Polityki Realnej (Real Politics Union – UPR). Its activities have included organizing joint street actions with the militant extreme right NOP. Its ideological mouthpiece is the magazine Stanczyk, which promotes thinly veiled antisemitism and Holocaust denial.

The skinhead Narodowa Scena Rockowa (National Rock Scene – NSR) produces racist records and T-shirts and organizes concerts of Polish and foreign bands. In 2000, neo-Nazi bands from Great Britain and Russia gave guest performances in Szczecin and Jawor. NSR also publish books, using the label of the Rekonkwista publishing house. One recent title justifies Narodowe Sily Zbrojne (National Armed Forces – NSZ), a far right organization of the 1940s. The book was published with financial support from the Warsaw University Students’ Union, as well as from the State Office for Ex-combatants.

Skinheads and other extremist groups have increasingly looked to the Internet as a vehicle for spreading racist ideology: some extreme right fanzines
have moved to the Internet, which is both cheaper and more effective in reaching the wider youth scene.

ANTISEMITIC AND RACIST ACTIVITIES

Several Jewish cemeteries and synagogues were desecrated in 2000 (for example, in Lodz, Krakow, Wlodawa, Oswiecim, Wadowice, Tarnobrzeg, Swidnica, Lelow). However, the main victims of extremist violence in 2000 were Roma and anti-fascist youth.

Antisemitic graffiti reappeared in many cities and towns across Poland, despite campaigns to remove it. For example, in Lodz in March 2000, immediately following a much publicized campaign to clean antisemitic slogans off the city’s walls, neo-Nazis daubed antisemitic graffiti and party symbols of the NOP on the synagogue and on the home of Marek Edelman, the last surviving commander of the 1943 Warsaw Ghetto uprising (see ASW 1999/2000).

The xenophobic Radio Maryja has hundreds of thousands of Catholic listeners daily throughout Poland. Although it can be argued that a majority of the station’s audience are attracted by the religious rather than the political content, it remains an important political force since it frequently allows members of extremist organizations to broadcast their political message (see also ASW 1999/2000).

Antisemitic undertones can be found in various publications, from serious quarterlies such as Fronda (sponsored by the Ministry of Culture) to the daily Nasz Dziennik (connected to Radio Maryja). For several years Fronda has had its own program on Channel 1 of public television. Antisemitic periodicals include Szczecinec, Stanczyk, Mysz Polska and Nasza Polska, as well as various low-brow titles published by Leszek Bubel. Bubel, head of the marginal Polska Partia Naradowa (Polish Nationalist Party), offered the sum of $25,000 to Henryk Biedrzycki, whose grandfather owned the barn where many of the Jedwabne Jews were burned, in order to give the land to a group of Jedwabne villagers who deny that Poles massacred their neighbors. Bubel has published books alleging Jews were guilty of crimes against Poles, which are distributed by the state-owned publishing company Ruch.

Antisemitic, Holocaust distorting, as well as Holocaust denying, books published by Rekonkwista, Rachocki, Nortom or Antyk can often be found on the shelves of respectable bookshops. After intervention by the anti-fascist Never Again Association, antisemitic publications of the Nortom publishing house were removed from the official Polish exhibition at the international book fair in Frankfurt/Main in November 2000. Nevertheless, Nortom’s books are still regularly exhibited at numerous book fairs organized in Poland. In December 2000 Norbert Tomczyk, owner and director of the publishing house and one of the leaders of the SN, was re-elected a member of the Board of Control of the Polish Chamber of Book Publishers.
On 9 November 2000 NOP members confronted participants of a vigil organized in Wroclaw by the Polish Union of Jewish Students and various other groups to commemorate victims of Kristallnacht. The NOP members bore anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli slogans and claimed their action to be in support of the Palestinian intifada.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HOLOCAUST AND THE NAZI ERA

In December 1999 the local court in Opole declared that Dr. Dariusz Ratajczyk, a researcher at the University of Opole, had infringed the law against Holocaust denial in his book Tematy niebezpieczne (Dangerous Topics), but that his crime was “socially harmless” (see ASW 1999/2000). Two liberal mainstream newspapers Gazeta Wyborcza (Electoral Gazette) and Rzeczpospolita (Republic) thought that Ratajczyk should not be prosecuted, in the name of freedom of speech. Ratajczyk was accompanied in court by the notorious antisemitic activist Kazimierz Switon (well known for having planted crosses at Auschwitz) and by the publisher Leszek Bubel. The latter was quick to profit from the publicity surrounding the case and issued a pocket edition of the book, which was distributed widely by the state company Ruch. Several days after the verdict Ratajczyk was the guest at a political meeting organized by the SN. It should be noted that both Ratajczyk and Ryszard Bender (see below) were roundly condemned by the academic community in Poland and by the Archbishop of Lublin.

After months of deliberating, the University of Opole finally dismissed Ratajczyk from his academic post. Ryszard Bender, professor of history at the Catholic University of Lublin, had been defending Ratajczak in a regular column published in Glos, a radical right-wing weekly published by Antoni Macierewicz, a former minister of home affairs and currently a member of parliament. Disciplinary proceedings were begun against Bender after he, together with Ratajczyk and a historian of the Polish Church Peter Raina, participated in a Radio Maryja broadcast in January 2000, but no action was taken against him.

Holocaust denial has found support in the right-wing weeklies Mysl Polska and Najwyzszy Czas. The former published an open letter of a group of right-wing academics signed, inter alia, by Andrzej L. Szczesniak, author of numerous history textbooks, some of which were tainted with antisemitism.

Several weeks after the Radio Maryja broadcast, the anti-fascist magazine Nigdy Wiecz (Never Again) exposed the fact that Bellona, a state-owned publishing house of the Ministry of Defense, intended to put out a translation of British Holocaust denier David Irving’s biography of Hermann Göring. Public pressure forced Bellona to cancel both the book and a planned promotional trip by Irving to Poland in the spring of 2000. However, the publishing house still employs Bartlomiej Zborski, the first translator of Irving’s
books into Polish and a regular antisemitic contributor to the NOP's Szczegółki, the main forum for Holocaust deniers in Poland.

Intensification of debates on issues concerning the Jews in general, and the wartime history of Polish-Jewish relations in particular, has not only led to a polarization of attitudes but has highlighted patterns of prejudice structurally present in Polish culture. There were many more incidents of verbal abuse than in the previous year. The most intense debate was sparked by the publication of Neighbors, by the Polish-born New York university professor Jan T. Gross and the film of the same name by Agnieszka Arnold. According to some observers, grassroots antisemitism has been exacerbated by the revelations contained in the Gross book, which describes the slaughter in the town of Jedwabne in 1941 that claimed the lives of up to 1,600 Jews by local Poles and which challenges the long-held and nearly universal perception of Poles as victims and not as perpetrators. The book and the revelations that similar massacres took place in some other Polish villages, have been the subject of numerous articles and heated discussions in the Polish press, including on the pages of the leading dailies Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita. Some of the articles were apologetic and even antisemitic and hinted that Jewish collaboration with Soviet troops before 1941, during the 1939–June 1941 occupation, could serve as an explanation and even as a justification for the pogrom. To some extent this view has been propagated by the Roman Catholic primate Cardinal Glemp (who also compared Jedwabne to “bloodshed among neighbors in Palestine”) and the Jedwabne parish priest Edward Orłowski, but has been attacked by others, including Jozef Zycinski, archbishop of Lublin, in the liberal Catholic monthly Wiez.

Research and public discussions are an important part of Poland’s reckoning with the antisemitic elements of its past, which until recently remained relatively unknown to the wider public. It should be pointed out that Polish publications have striven to “prove” that the Germans were to blame for the killings, not local Poles who were coerced into violence. It was also claimed that the Jews got their just desserts because of their role in imposing Stalinist rule in Poland. On the other hand, on 27 May 2001 the Polish Episcopate publicly apologized to God for the sins perpetrated against the Jews in Jedwabne and elsewhere. That apology was tempered by Cardinal Glemp’s suggestion that Jews apologize to Poles for their role in imposing communism on Poland and for the atrocities committed by Jewish members of the hated secret police in the Stalinist years. Father Henryk Jankowski, the Gdansk priest and ally of Lech Walesa, who has a long record of vituperative remarks against Jews, was roundly condemned by the mainstream media for displaying in his church a model of the Jedwabne barn in which Jews were burned and suggesting that the crime never happened.

Significantly, the inscription on the new monument to be unveiled in July 2001 is sufficiently ambiguous to leave doubts as to who the perpetrators of the
slaughter at Jedwabne were. It does not clearly state that the murders were perpetrated by local Poles as Jewish circles had hoped.

Ryszard Bugaj, a respected intellectual of the Polish left, provided evidence of deeply embedded patterns of prejudice in an article published in the liberal Gazeta Wyborcza in January 2001, in which he warned that Gross’ book strengthened an unjust stereotype of an antisemitic Poland and served powerful interests of Jews who have material claims against Poland in the context of the proposed law on re-privatization. Bugaj ignored the fact that the bill (mentioned above) excludes from compensation former owners who were not considered Polish citizens in 1999 (in practice mainly Polish Jews – Holocaust survivors who emigrated from 1939 on). The Polish Foreign Ministry had asked the parliament not to exclude non-citizens from compensation, but the AWS faction enforced an amendment to that effect proposed by the ZCh-N.

Similarly, the widespread reaction of the right-wing press to the revelations on Jedwabne was to link them with material claims of “the international Jewish lobby.” To support this thesis, Norman Finkelstein’s book The Holocaust Industry was commonly quoted (see Germany). Finkelstein himself gave interviews to a number of antisemitic magazines (for example, the weekly Nasza Polska) repeating his claim of a conspiracy of international Jewish organizations that aimed at humiliating and exploiting European nations, among which Poland was one of the most vulnerable, and warned Poland to be vigilant against an impending Jewish assault. (Nasza Polska also strongly condemned the chapter on Poland in ASW 1999/2000).

Other ongoing controversies, involving representatives of international Jewish organizations, concern the appropriate commemoration of sites linked to the Holocaust. These include the opening of a disco in the former tannery building adjacent to the Auschwitz camp and plans to build dwelling units on the site of the Umschlagplatz in Warsaw, the point of departure of Jews to death camps.

RESPONSES TO RACISM AND ANTISEMITISM

The year 2000 witnessed contradictory messages from the nation’s leadership regarding antisemitism and racism. On the one hand, Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek participated in the March of the Living and condemned antisemitism on a number of occasions, not least during his February visit to Israel when he promised to stamp out antisemitism at sporting events. On the other hand, he nominated Krzysztof Kawecki, leader of the extreme right PN, to the post of deputy minister of education responsible for sports. Kawecki was the editor of Prz魁cia Narodziwa that published Holocaust-denying material written by Leon Degrelle.

It may be argued that the prolonged toleration of wide-ranging racist activities of the NOP and other extremist groups by the political establishment is simply a sign of tacit approval of the presence of antisemitic organizations as
an integral part of the political system. It has become “normal” for radical political discontent to be expressed through antisemitic discourse, which is seen as legitimate by some sections of the cultural and political establishment. It is not uncommon to deny the increase, or even the existence, of antisemitism in Poland even in the face of evidence of open antisemitism. For example, in 2000 right-wing chairman of the Polish delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Marcin Libicki (see above), criticized a report on extremism, claiming there was no extremism in Poland. He was supported by the remaining members of the Polish delegation, including representatives of the center and the left. Similarly, the Polish government reacted angrily to the 2000 report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) because it stated that antisemitism “remains a problem in Polish society.” Another instance of disproportionate reaction against those who question the validity of the claim that Poland is a country without antisemitism was the fierce debate that followed Sergiusz Kowalski’s May 2000 article in Gazeta Wyborcza, which gave examples of collaboration between the extreme right and the mainstream right. The conservative daily Zycie is particularly zealous in condemning those who speak out against antisemitism.

**Legal Activity**

The results of legal actions against racism and antisemitism in 2000 were mixed. Polish law, including the penal code, has provisions against hate speech as well as against Holocaust denial. Nevertheless, the judicial system seems highly reluctant to use the law against perpetrators of hate crimes. The trial of Dariusz Ratajczyk, discussed above, closed without a serious outcome. One of the most notorious Polish antisemites, Kazimierz Switon, received a suspended six months jail sentence in January 2000 for distributing antisemitic leaflets at Auschwitz in 1998. In June this sentence was reduced to one month. In February charges against Switon for planting explosives in the neighborhood of the Auschwitz camp were dropped by the state prosecutor. Finally, in December 2000 the court acquitted Switon of earlier charges of incitement. On leaving the court Switon pledged to continue his struggle against “Jewish chauvinists.” In April 2000 the state prosecutor in Warsaw rejected a request from the Ombudsman’s Office to investigate the activities of Leszek Bubel, the publisher of antisemitic literature, including a pocket edition of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion and Holocaust denial material (distributed also by the state company Ruch). After further intervention an investigation was finally launched but has progressed extremely slowly.

There were, however, some important legal cases with a more positive outcome. Most notably, at least three investigations were launched – in Kielce, Lodz and Rzeszow – regarding antisemitic material on the Internet. The Kielce investigation ended in May 2000 in a trial and a ten months suspended sentence.
The Office for the Protection of the State prevented several gatherings of neo-Nazi skinheads (in Olsztyn and Lublin), but many similar events, although reported to the police, went ahead as planned without interference by the authorities. The NOP, in particular, has been able to continue its activities unhindered despite the fact that its sister organization, the NPD, was likely to be banned in Germany.

In April 2000, in reaction to the March incident in Lodz (see above), Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek promised to take legal action against the NOP (on the basis of Article 13 of the constitution, which prohibits racist organizations) as well as to stop the distribution of antisemitic literature by Ruch. No such action was subsequently taken, possibly because right-wing elements within the ruling bloc depend on the support of Radio Maryja and nationalist MPs, *inter alia*, who took part in protests against "the conspiracy to silence the patriotic press."

**Public Activity**

The newly established Institute for National Memory has pledged to carry out a thorough investigation of all crimes perpetrated against Polish citizens (irrespective of their nationality or religion) under Nazism and communism, and irrespective of the nationality and religion of the perpetrators. Significantly, Dr Leon Kieres, the head of the institute and a non-Jew, has himself come under attack as being a stooge of the Jews for his on-going investigation of the slaughter at Jedwabne and his role in the prosecution of a Pole employed by the Germans at the death camp in Chelmno.

It should be noted that the civil response to racism has become more widely heard and resistance against xenophobia is growing, especially among youth and the intelligentsia. The Never Again Association's magazine of the same name (*Nigdy Wiele*) monitors manifestations of racism and neo-fascism. The association also runs educational campaigns using music and sports in communicating an anti-racist message to the young. The newly formed Open Republic Association against Antisemitism and Xenophobia is composed of prominent intellectuals who, among other actions, protested against the antisemitic statements of Witold Tomczak (see above). In several cities local groups organized campaigns to remove antisemitic graffiti. On 9 November 2000, the anniversary of *Kristallnacht*, events were held across Poland commemorating the victims of racism and antisemitism. This initiative was coordinated by UNITED for Intercultural Action, an Amsterdam-based European anti-racist network together with its Polish partner groups.

A quest for a more inclusive understanding of "Polishness" illustrated, among others, by the case of Emmanuel Olisadebe, the first ever black player on the national football team, is underway. This tendency, reinforced by the new wave of migration, can be viewed as a restoration of an earlier, centuries' long tradition of a multi-ethnic Poland.
Finally, despite the continuing existence of the strongly xenophobic Radio Maryja, and the antisemitic threads that appeared from time to time in speeches of Cardinal Jozef Glemp, the primate of the Polish Roman Catholic Church, there has been an important evolution in the attitude of the Catholic Church, exemplified by numerous statements and writings of figures such as Archbishop Jozef Zycinski and Father Michal Czajkowski, recently appointed co-chairman of the Polish Council of Christians and Jews. These voices received moral support from the March 2000 visit of the Pope to Israel and the official apology of the Vatican for the persecution of the Jewish people.
ROMANIA

The success of the Greater Romania Party (PRM) and its leader Vadim Tudor in the November 2000 general and presidential elections was the most significant development on the Romanian political scene. The dangers of a rise in extremism were widely discussed in the Romanian media and several public activities were organized to warn of them. There was an increase in antisemitic activity following the PRM’s electoral gains, including a brutal attack on workers in the Jewish Historical Museum in Bucharest.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

The dwindling Jewish community in Romania numbers about 14,000 out of a total population of 23.5 million. The major centers are in Bucharest, Iasi, Cluj and Oradea, where the local communities are well organized. Jewish life is also fostered in some smaller communities. The Federation of Jewish Communities of Romania promotes and coordinates the activities of the communities. Besides publishing a monthly, Realitatea Evreiasca, the federation documents the history of Jewish life in Romania and its publications and symposia are well covered by the Romanian media. The Lauder Foundation operates a Jewish primary school in Bucharest. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee has been especially active in fostering welfare work among the impoverished elderly Jews of Romania.

The University of Cluj and the University of Bucharest have academic centers for Jewish studies, and hold conferences on Jewish topics and on Romania’s Jewish past (see also below).

The issue of restitution of private and communal property has yet to be resolved in Romania, although the community has secured the return of several individual items. Maintaining the vast number of synagogues and cemeteries, a reminder of the large Jewish population that resided in Romania before the war, is a daunting task for the diminished community.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS

The most significant development in Romanian politics, which also had international repercussions, was the surprising electoral success of the Greater Romania Party (PRM), led by Corneliu Vadim Tudor, the most nationalist and antisemitic party in the Romanian parliament. Led by nationalists, formerly communist hacks and pseudo-intellectuals, the party obtained 4.54 percent and 4.46 percent in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, respectively, in the November 1996 general elections. It increased its share in the June 2000 local
elections, which were seen as a test for the general elections of November 2000. The 21 percent it won in these elections made the PRM the second largest party. In the second round of the presidential elections, Vadim Tudor gained 33 percent of the vote, compared with 67 percent for Ion Iliescu who became president. On the eve of the second round of the presidential elections, there was a growing fear, especially among the Jewish community, of a rise in extremism, especially if Vadim Tudor were to win the presidency. Such concerns were reflected in an article by Ruth E. Gruber published by the JTA (Jewish Telegraph Agency) on 4 December 2000, which focused on the record of the PRM and its leader.

Themes associated with Israel and the Jews figured frequently in the party’s attacks on outgoing President Emil Constantinescu, especially in the party’s organ Romania Mare (see ASW 1999/2000). The PRM also focused on the dangers of Hungarian irredentist claims, and the alleged anti-social nature of the Roma community. The party’s traditional ties with Le Pen’s FN, as well as with the Iraqi regime, remained close. After the elections, Vadim Tudor reportedly said (Reuters, 29 Nov. 2000), that “his newspapers may print slogans offensive to Jews, but he is a man of peace who would rid Romania of ‘mafia’ and corruption.” Moreover, he has “friends who are Gypsies, Jews and Hungarians.” His claim on the eve of the elections that he had received letters of support from Jewish community officials, was flatly denied.

The dangers of the rise of extremism were discussed extensively in the Romanian media, and various analysts attributed the results of the elections to Romania’s overall economic and social problems. Western analysts, such as Jonathan Eyal from the London-based Royal United Services Institute, asserted that Vadim Tudor was “playing the institutional mechanisms of the country in order to reverse them” (Reuters, 29 Nov. 2000). The Jerusalem Post carried an article on 22 November 2000 stressing that “11 years shaky post-communist reforms have left Romania’s 22 million people in deep poverty.”

The popular support for the PRM indicates the difficulties post-communist Romania is facing on the road to reform and prosperity. This dangerous extremism means that Romania and the PRM will be closely monitored by the international community, especially by the European bodies of integration which Romania seeks to join, and by world Jewry. (For a penetrating study of the PRM, see Michael Shafir, “Radical Continuity in Romania: The Greater Romania Party,” Parts A, B, RFE/RL – East European Perspectives (EEP) 16 Aug. 2000, 13 Sept. 2000.)

The Romanian Party of National Unity (PUNR) has a strong nationalist, anti-Hungarian, but not overtly antisemitic, line. According to Shafir, “antisemitism, though less prominent in daily pronouncements, has also played a role in the party’s evolution.” However, its close cooperation with the PRM makes it open to extreme nationalism and antisemitism. The party fared badly in the June 2000 local elections (less than 2 percent of the overall vote), an

Since it lost its parliamentary representation in the 1996 elections, the Socialist Labor Party (SLP), a leading claimant to the legacy of the defunct former ruling Communist Party, has intensified its nationalist line. The party is led by Adrian Paunescu, who publishes two weeklies critical of alleged Jewish interference and participation in Romanian affairs.

Small nationalist, xenophobic and antisemitic Iron Guard, or Legionnaire, groups (derived from the wartime fascist movement) form the extreme right wing in Romania. “Nests” (the original name of local branches of the movement) of such groups exist in various localities. The Bucharest “nest” of the Legionnaire movement owns the Majadahonda publishing house, which issues works by Iron Guard founder Corneliu Zelea Codreanu and books about the movement.

ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITIES

Following the PRM’s electoral success there was an increase in antisemitic activity, which although not directly related to party members or supporters was apparently influenced by political developments. In late December 2000 the small Jewish Historical Museum in Bucharest was vandalized by two persons who demanded to see “soap made from the fat of Jews” and who then brutally attacked the elderly guide and guard and smashed windows (International Herald Tribune, 30 Dec. 2000). The attack, which took place during the Jewish festival of Hanukkah, was linked, by Jewish community sources, to the rise of extremism in the country. The Romanian media reported on 29 December 2000 that the PRM had issued a communiqué censuring the attack, which it ascribed to “criminal elements” that the party had promised to combat in its electoral campaign. President Ion Iliescu strongly condemned it, and called for immediate action against the perpetrators.

As in previous years, antisemitic propaganda accompanied the continuing campaign to rehabilitate the legacy of wartime fascist ruler Ion Antonescu and to cleanse historical memory of the fate of Romanian Jewry during the Holocaust (see below). Jewish topics were frequently raised by extremists and widely discussed by the Romanian media. During the election campaign the PRM attempted to distance itself from accusations of antisemitism, and lowered its tone. It even claimed it opposed racism and ethnic discrimination against Hungarians, Jews and Roma. However, it resumed its customary rhetoric shortly after its electoral success.

Since the al-Aqsa intifîda broke out at the height of the Romanian electoral campaign, the PRM concentrated on the home political front, especially during the second round of the presidential elections. However, in late November the
PRM's weekly Romania Mare resumed and intensified its anti-Israel campaign, emphasizing the Jewish state's long history of barbarity.

Several antisemitic publications appeared in early 2001. A book of Jewish jokes published by a Cluj publishing house was withdrew after Jewish protests. According to the Israeli Romanian-language paper Olina Ora and the June 2001 issue of the monthly Minimum, published in Tel Aviv, Mein Kampf was displayed at the Bucharest book fair in May.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HOLOCAUST AND THE NAZI ERA

Since the PRM’s electoral success, the pro-Antonescu school of Holocaust and World War II revisionism has gained considerable ground. The election of Gheorghe Buzatu, a historian who has long defended Antonescu, as vice president of the Romanian Senate on the PRM ticket was symptomatic of this trend.

In May 2001, the 55th anniversary of the dictator's execution, a bust of Antonescu was unveiled in a Bucharest church courtyard. When the Jewish community protested, recalling the role of Antonescu in the Holocaust (a term rejected by Romanian nationalists) in Romania, Romania Mare lashed out at the community, asserting: "We are in Romania and not in Israel; they should not confuse us with the Palestinians who have been terrorized and massacred for decades. How can these Zionist agents... discredit the history of the Romanian nation? Why are they causing antisemitism?... The enslavement of Romanians by the Choral Temple [the main synagogue in Bucharest] is over. We are fed up with this 'empire of infiltration' which tortures and robs the planet." Likewise, Corneliu Vadim Tudor spoke of the "death of the martyr" [Antonescu] who had "defended the Jews," in a speech to the Romanian Senate on 4 June 2001, repeating Romania's refusal to hand over the Jews to Nazi Germany, but ignoring the killing fields of Transnistria, the massacre of Iasi in June 1941 and similar atrocities. Vadim Tudor emphasized that "600,000 Hungarian Jews were rounded up and handed over in such a hurry that Eichmann asked Hungary's ruler Horthy to slow down as there were no more places in the gas chambers." Vadim Tudor also came to the defense of Major General Mircea Chilaru, a recently retired chief of staff who attended the ceremony honoring Antonescu.

RESPONSES TO RACISM AND ANTISEMITISM

A seminar for Romanian teachers held in Yad Vashem, Jerusalem, in May 2000 was a significant step in educating Romanians about the country's Jewish past and the Holocaust (see ASW 1999/2000). Similar seminars were held at the Babes-Bolyai University's Institute for Judaic Studies in Cluj. The institute's training program for educators, which includes lectures by Israeli academics, promotes the introduction of the Holocaust and antisemitism into the Romanian educational system.
On the eve of the presidential run-off elections in December 2000, several public activities were aimed at warning of the dangers of the PRM’s electoral success. In Iasi the first public memorial honoring the more than 13,000 victims of the June 1941 pogrom was held (see, for example, AP report, Dec. 2000). The ceremony took place only a short distance from the local party offices of the PRM.

On 7 December 2000 some 800 people held a march and several hundred students held a separate demonstration in Bucharest to warn of the dangers of extremism.

The Federation of Jewish Communities actively opposed the PRM. They issued a statement asserting that Vadim Tudor “had for years been a staunch enemy of the Jews,” and had repeatedly displayed antisemitism and xenophobia. They also condemned the PRM’s discriminatory stance toward the Hungarian and Roma minorities.
SLOVAKIA

Rehabilitation of the wartime Tiso regime continued to be the main theme of the struggle, in 2000, between neo-fascist and antisemitic elements, and liberal and democratic forces in Slovakia. A cemetery desecration in the port city of Dunajská was the most serious violent antisemitic act reported.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

Slovakia has some 3,000 Jews out of a total population of 5.35 million. The largest Jewish community is in the capital Bratislava; smaller communities exist in Kosice, Presov, Komarno and Dunajská Sreda.

The Central Union of Jewish Religious Communities in the Slovak Republic is the main communal organization. In general, the Jewish community is an aging one; however, there are signs of a revival of interest in Jewish roots among many of the younger generation. In recent years local branches of B'nai B'nith and Maccabi have been established, and the Lauder Foundation and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee are active in promoting activities for Jewish youth.

The Institute of Jewish Studies, established in 1996 at Comenius University in Bratislava, conducts a wide range of courses and other activities related to the Jewish legacy in Slovakia. The Museum of Jewish Culture has built up an impressive collection displaying the rich Jewish heritage of the country and organizes cultural and educational activities, as well as seminars for teachers, and prepares documentary films featuring Holocaust survivors. In May 2000 it organized an international conference on antisemitism at the end of the twentieth century (see below).

In April 2000, a joint commission was established by the government with the Jewish community to pursue the restitution of Jewish property sequestered during the Holocaust.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITY

Nationalist parties and movements often blend xenophobic and antisemitic attitudes with more moderate positions on these issues. The Slovak National Party (SNS), for example, a partner in the Meciar-led coalition government until it lost the 1998 general elections, is clearly an extremist nationalist party. SNS has been behind the continuing campaign to rehabilitate Jozef Tiso, head of the wartime fascist regime, which was responsible for the deportation of the country's Jews to the death camps. Despite the loss of its power base, the party
continued its efforts to rehabilitate Tiso’s regime under Jan Slota, the controversial former leader of the SNS, who resigned his party position and became mayor of the town of Zilina.

Other extremist nationalist organizations include the fringe Slovak People’s Party (SLS), which continued to spread xenophobic hate messages, and the Slovenska Pospolitost (Slovak Community), formed in 1996 by skinheads and other right-wing extremists. Together with several other organizations, Slovenska Pospolitost publishes bulletins of its activities on the website of the International Third Position, based in the UK.

The desecration of the cemetery in the southern Slovak port city of Dunajská in June was the main antisemitic event recorded in 2000. Five tombstones were overturned. The perpetrators were not caught.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HOLOCAUST AND THE NAZI ERA

Rehabilitation of the wartime Tiso regime continued to be the main theme of the struggle in 2000 between neo-fascist and antisemitic elements, and liberal and democratic forces in Slovakia. The former maintained the high level of activity begun in 1999, largely in connection with the 60th anniversary of the founding of the wartime Slovak fascist state (14 March 1939). Slovak extremists marked the 61st anniversary of the wartime state with a meeting at Tiso’s grave at the Martin cemetery in Bratislava and an authorized demonstration attended by neo-fascists and skinheads in front of the presidential offices in Bratislava.

Another indication of the continuing attempts to rehabilitate Tiso was the decision of the Zilina town council in March 2000 to erect a plaque honoring Tiso on the spot where he proclaimed, in October 1938, the “autonomy of the Slovak state,” which was the first step that led to the formation of the pro-Nazi puppet state. Following numerous protests by groups within and outside Slovakia, including the staff of the Slovak Museum of Jewish Culture and Israeli historians, the town council rescinded its plan. The Slovak leadership had obviously been embarrassed by the original decision to erect the plaque, partly because it coincided with a meeting of European rabbis held in Bratislava, and Slovak Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan spoke of “disturbing reactions abroad.”

On the other hand, nationalist publications such as Zmena (no. 524/2000) asserted that “Freemasons, communists and democrats are not content with the fact that Tiso has been hanged once already,” while Slovenska Republika (10 March 2000) claimed that “political terrorism has forced the council [in Zilina] to change its decision.”

The Zilina affair placed the Slovak Catholic Church in a delicate position. The Slovak Bishops’ Conference of 1998, while in fact siding with much of Tiso’s legacy, also tried to be perceived as sympathetic to the Jewish tragedy. A spokesman of the Church leadership stated that the conference had adopted a document on the Church’s attitude toward the Holocaust, yet “neither historians nor politicians have sufficiently clarified Tiso the man.” Evidently,
the Church is seeking to preserve Tiso in a light similar to that reflected in the nationalist journal *Kultura*—"remaining in the people’s memories as a luminous exception amidst Stalinism and Hitlerite Nazism." It should be noted that since 1998 *Kultura* has published numerous articles attempting to whitewash the Tiso legacy.

In early 2000 the Slovak media reported widely on the proceedings that culminated in the marking of the anniversary of the wartime Slovak state. Events such as the January 2000 Stockholm Forum on the Holocaust and the visit by Slovak President Rudolf Schuster to Israel were linked to the public debate over the plaque honoring Tiso. The nationalist *Zmena* described the demonstration of skinheads and neo-fascists at the presidential palace and at Tiso’s grave in sympathetic terms, emphasizing the “young age” of the participants.

Various groups identified with fostering Tiso’s legacy were present at these commemorative events, such as the Andrej Hlinka Society, the Jozef Tiso Society and the League of Anti-Communist Resistance. According to the liberal SME of 20/21 March 2000, the participants of the European Conference of Rabbis had to enter the presidential palace by a side-door due to a noisy neo-fascist demonstration; this, after the meeting had been transferred from Vienna in protest against Jörg Haider’s electoral victory in Austria.

The nationalist organization *Matica Slovenska* published the proceedings of its pro-Tiso conference held in Bratislava in March 2000 (see *ASW* 1999/2000). The volume *The Slovak Republic (1939–1945)* includes contributions by well-known defenders of the Slovak clerical-fascist regime, such as Milan S. Durica (see below), Frantisek Vnuk, Robert Letz and Jozef M. Rydl. The editor of the volume claims that the essays were written without “political and ideological partiality and prejudices.” Yet, they follow the line of previous publications defending Tiso’s legacy, presenting him as “anti-German” and as a patriot fighting against “bolshevism,” which was considered the main danger to Slovakia on the eve of World War II, and not Nazism. The Slovak fascist state is portrayed as a bulwark against the bolshevization of Europe, and an “oasis of democracy and peace” Thus a completely distorted image is conveyed of the essence and deeds of the wartime Slovak state.

Historian Milan S. Durica (see also *ASW* 1999/2000), former émigré and outspoken defender of the Tiso legacy, emphasized in several nationalist publications that his task was to provide objective information on the innocence of Tiso, who in fact hated Hitler and was in turn hated by Hitler. For example, in an article in *Extra* (11/2000), he wrote of the great progress toward democracy made in wartime Slovakia and dismissed Tiso’s culpability for the tragedy of Slovak Jewry. Durica continued to publish and re-publish previous studies which attempted to prove Tiso’s innocence, such as a new edition of his book *Dr. Jozef Tiso as Evaluated by Hitler’s Diplomats and Secret Agents*, initially issued in 1992. German assessments that Tiso was “anti-German” were quoted
in order to demonstrate that there was little trust between the security forces of the Reich and of their Slovak allies. Yet, Durica, like other Tiso defenders, fails to account for Tiso’s role in the fate of the Jews – as has been demonstrated in several authoritative studies - and for the fact that Hitler kept the Slovak leadership in power.

Several other volumes defending the Tiso legacy were published in 2000. Vladimir Repka’s Conversations from Afar includes interviews, conducted after the fall of communism, with some twenty exiles who served the Slovak state and left for the West in 1945 or in 1968. The National Yearbook 2001, published by Matica Slovenska (see above), mentions several clerics and populists recalled on various anniversaries as pre-war and wartime “nation builders,” as leading Slovaks who “must be remembered.” These include Andrej Hlinka, Vojtech Tuka and Jozef Tiso. Some of the studies in Testimonies of the Truth about Slovakia, edited by Frantisek Vnuk, reiterate the claim that in fact Tiso “saved” Jews from the Germans. The previous two volumes were criticized by the historian and director of the Jewish Museum in Bratislava Pavol Mestan in Antisemitism in Slovak Politics (1989–1999), also published in 2000, in Slovak and English (see ASW 1999/2000).

As in Hungary and Romania, the on-going debates in the Slovak media reveal that the revisionist line is often a sophisticated one, presented through careful manipulation of historical memory, whitewashing the past and rewriting history. One rarely sees a clear statement to the effect that the “Jews were the enemies of the Slovak nation,” even though such views do appear; it is enough to distort the facts about the Tiso regime, to portray him as “anti-German,” a “democrat” and a “patriot,” and then to hint at the Jewish campaign against his legacy in order to convey such opinions.

In late 2000 Mein Kampf was published in two volumes with a 30-page commentary. The right to re-issue the book, which never appeared in Slovak during the Tiso regime, was defended by the publisher Agnesa Burdova, who claimed it was an attempt to teach the people the meaning of dictatorship and intolerance. However, in summer 2001 the justice authorities were still examining the legality of publishing it.

RESPONSES TO ANTISEMITISM

Members of the Jewish community, as well as liberal and democratic forces, continued to play an active role in combating antisemitism, and especially the campaign to rehabilitate the Tiso era. Nevertheless, despite government promises and activities to support these endeavors, historical revisionism appeared to be continuing.

President Rudolf Schuster’s visit to Israel in February 2000, including Yad Vashem, was an important landmark in Slovak-Israeli/Jewish relations. Characteristic of the extremist reaction in Slovakia was Zmena’s (521/2000) accusation that Schuster was a Slovakian representative of “an Israel that
occupies and bombards.” Schuster strongly opposed the decision of the Zilina city council to erect the plaque honoring Tiso. He initiated legal steps to have 9 September — the date when the antisemitic “Jewish laws” were passed by the Slovak state in 1941 — declared as a memorial day to victims of the Holocaust and racist violence. The bill was enacted on 30 October 2000 by a majority of 85 out of the 87 deputies present.
YUGOSLAVIA

Antisemitic manifestations increased after the war in Yugoslavia and the fall of President Slobodan Milosevic in October 2000. Antisemitic themes also emerged during the last months of the Milosevic regime, when Jews were accused of being active opponents of the president.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

There are 2,000 Jews in Yugoslavia out of a total population of 10 million. Most of the Jews live in Belgrade the capital, but there are smaller communities in Novi Sad, Nis, Sambor and Subotica. During the 1999 NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia, many Jews, mainly women, children and the elderly, left the country, and not all have returned. The Federation of Jewish Communities in Yugoslavia is the community roof organization. Inter-marriage is traditionally high in Yugoslavia, but among mixed families there is a high level of affiliation with the community. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee has been especially active in catering to the spiritual and material well-being of the Jews of Yugoslavia.

BACKGROUND – THE END OF THE MILOSEVIC ERA

The end of the Milosevic regime in Yugoslavia in October 2000 ushered in a new era under the presidency of Vojislav Kostunica, who is committed to bringing Yugoslavia closer to the Western community and to deepening the process of democratization. The small Jewish community has praised Kostunica’s policies but also expressed alarm at the upsurge in antisemitic activity since his rise to power (see below). Aca Singer, president of the Federation of Jewish Communities in Yugoslavia, spoke of a “a paradox, we can’t explain. Antisemitism does not run deep among Serbs, but still we are concerned at the trend and are watching the situation” (JTA [Jewish Telegraph Agency], 2 May, 14 May 2001). It should be noted that antisemitic eruptions also followed the fall or decline of strong repressive regimes such as the former Soviet Union and Argentina.

The Kostunica regime has made various gestures of respect and good will toward the Jewish community. Kostunica was the first Yugoslav leader to attend a Holocaust Day memorial ceremony, in April 2001, along with Israeli diplomats. Although Yugoslav leaders, including Milosevic, had often stressed the close ties between Serbs and Jews during World War II, this was more in the context of Yugoslav, or rather Serb, opposition to rehabilitation of the
World War II fascist Croat legacy, than of the overall fate of the Jews during the Holocaust. Generally, Serbian Jews abroad, including in Israel, were more sympathetic to the Serb side in the "Yugoslav wars of succession" because of their wartime anti-fascist legacy and especially because of their suffering under the fascist regime.

Relations with Israel have also improved since Milosevic's downfall, although diplomatic relations and ties continued throughout the recent Balkan wars, including during the NATO offensive against Yugoslavia in 1999.

**ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITIES**

Following the NATO offensive against Yugoslavia in 1999, antisemitic factors within and outside Serbia, as in East and Central European countries, attempted to link Jewish interests with US and NATO policies and claimed that top Jewish officials in the US were behind the attacks. After the war and the fall of Milosevic, antisemitic manifestations increased. A series of antisemitic manifestations was registered beginning in October 2000. Anti-Jewish slogans and swastikas were daubed in several cities, including on the building of the Jewish community in Belgrade, and Jewish memorial plaques in the towns of Kikinda and Zrenjanin were vandalized. In February 2001 Jewish gravestones in Zrenjanin were desecrated. The Yugoslav media reported widely on the incidents and President Kostunica condemned them in a letter to the Jewish community. The antisemitic slogans and swastikas in Belgrade might have been related to the opening of an exhibition on the life and plight of Roma – since usually pro-Roma activities are linked by antisemites to Jewish interests – and to the visit by the president of the World Jewish Congress, Israel Singer, to Yugoslavia for talks on the return of Jewish property.

Antisemitic themes had actually emerged during the last months of the Milosevic regime. Besides having allegedly initiated and led the US-NATO attack against Yugoslavia, Jews were accused of having been active in the opposition working to topple Milosevic. As the Yugoslav authorities, prior to the fall of Milosevic, attempted to silence the opposition media, the Serbian Defense League (SDL) website spread vicious racist and anti-Jewish allegations. In May 2000 it reported "based on an e-mail" from Serbia that "once again subservient Serbs are demonstrating under orders from their Jew masters. The Jew servants are deceiving the youth into joining the opposition [against Milosevic] created by Jews." This item and several others like it lashed out at the involvement of Hungarian-born Jewish philanthropist George Soros in supporting the anti-Milosevic opposition by providing fellowships in the US for opponents of the regime.

The SDL website also promotes Holocaust denial and accuses Jews of "demonizing Serbs." "The SDL's most wanted Jews for genocide of Serbs" list, with accompanying photos, includes Clinton administration officials such as Madeleine Albright, Sandy Berger, William Cohen and Richard Holbrook, as
well as US politicians of Jewish origin, such as Tom Lantos, Joe Lieberman and Dianne Feinstein.

The SDL even referred to the period during which “Tito (Josif Walter Weiss) and his Jews ruled with an iron hand.” It should be noted that Serb neo-Nazi activity – which is ironical considering the Serb record of anti-Nazi partisan warfare during World War II – was initiated by Serb immigrants in the US.
The Middle East
ARAB COUNTRIES

GENERAL ANALYSIS

The year 2000 witnessed a sharp increase in antisemitic expressions in the Arab media. At the beginning of the year developments in the Middle East, such as the military escalation in Lebanon, coincided with events in Europe and the US, such as the trial of Holocaust denier David Irving, serving to radicalize the anti-Israel and antisemitic rhetoric. In the last quarter of the year, the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada brought in its wake a further upsurge in antisemitism, which included the previously unknown phenomenon of acts of vandalism against Jewish holy sites in the West Bank. The intifada also spilled over into cyberspace, creating a new battlefield for the Arab-Israeli conflict. Aside from these additional features, the usual Arab antisemitic themes were repeated – virulent attacks on Israel and the Jews, calls from religious leaders, especially during Friday sermons, for jihad and martyrdom, the equation of Zionism with Nazism, and Holocaust denial.

The intifada highlighted the religious dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a basic tenet of Islamic fundamentalist ideology, blurring the lines between the national and Islamist discourse and radicalizing the discourse against Israel, Zionism and the Jews, as well as against the US. The intifada provided fuel for the anti-normalization movement and suppressed most proponents of the peace process. The anti-normalization movement proved yet again that its attitude toward peace and Israel is part of a broader worldview and agenda.

It should be noted that incitement against Israel did not always take the form of antisemitism, but exacerbated by the media, was based on national, pan-Arab and pan-Islamic sentiments and symbols. However, the frequency of antisemitic manifestations decreased remarkably, especially in the Palestinian press, with the prolongation of the intifada.

THE PRE-INTIFADA PERIOD (JANUARY–SEPTEMBER)

The sharp increase in antisemitic expressions in the Arab media in 2000 continued a trend discerned in the last months of 1999 (see ASW 1999/2000), which seemed to be an adverse projection of the renewed peace negotiations between Israel and Syria in November 1999, and later between Israel and the Palestinians. Issues such as the controversy over Jörg Haider’s participation in the Austrian government, the trial of British Holocaust denier David Irving, and Joseph Lieberman’s appointment as the Democratic candidate for US vice-president, which coincided with the military escalation in Lebanon and French
Prime Minister Lionel Jospin’s utterances on Hizballah, the visit of Pope John Paul II to Egypt, Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA), the commemoration of the Palestinian nakba (catastrophe), and statements by Shas religious leader Ovadia Yosef defaming the Palestinians, contributed to radicalizing the anti-Israel and antisemitic rhetoric.

The Syrian Press
In the midst of the Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations, begun in November 1999, Syrian dailies, and particularly the weekly organ of the Syrian Arab Writers’ Association, al-Usbu‘ al-Adabi, published anti-Israel and anti-Zionist articles filled with antisemitic motifs. Articles such as “The Peace of Zion,” “Syria Will Lose Its Soul,” “The Zionist Mentality in Negotiating” and “Zionist Racism and Jerusalem,” dealt with inherent Jewish traits and the alleged Zionist scheme to infiltrate Arab countries and destroy their societies physically, spiritually and culturally (al-Usbu‘ al-Adabi, 1, 22 Jan.; 5, 22, 27 Feb.; 5 March; 12 Aug.). Major themes in the Syrian anti-Israel discourse were the equation of Zionism with Nazism and the portrayal of Israel as a terrorist and racist state. Articles to this effect, such as “Zionism and Nazism,” “Israel: A Terrorist Racist Enterprise,” “The Zionist Entity Carries the Elements of Its Own Destruction” and “Those Are the Jews! From the Exile Lie to the Establishment of Israel,” were published in the political and cultural weekly magazine of the daily Tishrin (Tishrin al-Usbu‘i, 15 Aug.; 7, 14 Oct.; 14, 21 Nov.; 24 Dec.). These themes were also incorporated in Syrian textbooks for grades 4 to 11. A study of Syrian textbooks, conducted by Meyrav Wurmser, executive director of the Washington-based Middle East Media Research Institute, revealed that Israel is portrayed as the ultimate enemy and as an illegitimate state, while Zionism is a “Nazi movement that aims at colonizing the Arab world.” The Syrian curriculum, Wurmser asserted, “expands the hatred of Israel and Zionism to antisemitism directed at all Jews. Its inevitable conclusion is that all Jews must be annihilated” (MEMRI, News Release – memri.org; Ma‘ariv, 28 April; JP, 30 April).

The equation of Zionism with Nazism was a frequently reiterated theme following the escalation of tensions in Lebanon in February, which led Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy to swear vengeance for Hizballah’s attacks. The Syrian parliament unanimously approved a statement branding Israeli raids on Lebanese infrastructure as “Nazi actions” (CNN, 18 Feb.; Egyptian Mail, 19 Feb.). A spate of articles described the Nazi mentality of Zionism and called for sentencing Israeli leaders as Nazi war criminals (al-Ba‘th, 10 Feb.; al-Thawra, 12, 22 Feb.; Tishrin, 13, 14, 21, 23, 26, 27, 28 Feb.; 15 March; FT, 27 Feb.; al-Usbu‘ al-Adabi, 12 Feb., 22 April; Ha’aretz, 14, 16, 20 Feb.). Syrian radio commented on 24 February that when speaking from the rostrum of the Knesset, Levy resembled Hitler, “with the same stance, the same gestures, the same voice, the same manner and the same threats. This theme was also shown in a video clip,
which interchanged Levy’s image with that of Hitler, captioned with similar words, as well as on Lebanese and Syrian TV and on Hizballah’s Internet site (al-Hayat, 25 Feb.; Ha‘aretz, Yedi‘ot Aharonot, 27 Feb.; JP, 28 Feb.; ADL Backgrunder, Antisemitism and Demonization of Israel in the Arab Media, March; Tishrin, 13 March). French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin was labeled a Nazi for referring to Hizballah as a terrorist group during his visit to Israel in February (Tishrin, 26, 27 Feb.; JP, 3 March).

It should be noted that this reaction was not confined to the Syrian and Lebanese media. Levy’s two statements in February as well as Jospin’s remarks caused an outrage in the entire Arab world (al-Hayat, 25-28 Feb.; Ha‘aretz, JP, 27 Feb.; al-Hayat al-Jadida, 28, 29 Feb.; al-Abram Weekly, 2 March; al-‘Ahd, 10 March). This same pattern of reaction recurred with the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada – mass demonstrations, an unscheduled meeting of Arab foreign ministers in Beirut including the first visit of President Mubarak to Lebanon, and a barrage of anti-Israel/anti-Zionist articles and caricatures in both official and opposition papers. They all reinforced the image of Israel as the embodiment of neo-Nazism, which threatened the whole world (see for instance: Egyptian al-Wafd, 26 Feb.; al-‘Arabi, 5 March; October, 20 Feb.; al-Akhbar, 14 Feb.; al-Sha‘b, 15 Feb.; Lebanese al-Aqkar, Feb.; al-Hayat, 11, 19 Feb.; Palestinian al-Hayat al-Jadida, 13 Feb.).

The other major theme in Syrian papers was Holocaust denial. On 31 January, before Levy’s utterances and Israel’s retaliation in Lebanon, Tishrin editor Muhammad Khayr al-Wadi wrote an editorial entitled “The Plague of the Third Millenium,” which included typical motifs of the traditional Arab discourse on the Holocaust. He asserted that Zionism had created the Holocaust myth to blackmail European states and institutions, and “to strangle any voice that reveals the truth.” “The Nazi war machine annihilated more than 50 million lives,” he alleged, but “Zionism erased the blood of all those victims from human memory and focused on the suffering of the Jews... despite the fact that there is sound historical proof that Zionist leaders collaborated with the Nazis in order to escalate the Jewish problem.” He concluded with a call to the world “to confront the new Nazi plague which is nesting in Israel,” as it had condemned Nazi crimes. Published against the backdrop of David Irving’s trial, heightened anxiety about Haider’s party joining the government coalition in Austria, the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust, and amidst efforts to jump-start the stalled Israeli-Syrian talks, the article gained worldwide attention and condemnation (Tishrin, 31 Jan.; Reuters, al-Hayat, 1, 4 Feb.; Yedi‘ot Aharonot, Ma‘ariv, 1 Feb.; JP, 1, 13 Feb.; Ha‘aretz, 1, 7, 9 Feb.; Metro West Jersey News, 10 Feb.; MEMRI, dispatch no. 71, 2 Feb.; ADL Backgrunder, March). Hizballah’s mouthpiece al-‘Ahd considered that the reaction to the article reflected one of the most important issues in the Israeli perception of reconciliation with the Arabs. Israel, it said, was striving to reconstruct a new culture upon the ruins of the religious and national foundations of Arab
culture. The Israeli attack on Syria, allegedly supported by the US, proved that the Israelis, who had succeeded in inculcating a guilt complex in the West for the Jewish Holocaust in order to extract political, financial and moral benefits, aspired to do the same to the Arabs (al-'Abd, 4 Feb.; al-Hayat, 6 March).

On 6 September, Syria Times published an article in the same vein by journalist Muhammad Dawud, who said that history had “not witnessed a people who had mastered lying, dodgery and creating myths as the Israelis had,” pointing to the “so-called” Holocaust as their “most famous myth” (Syria Times, 6 Sept.; JP, 7 Sept.).

Frequent references to the Holocaust were made in the Syrian media during the discussion of issues such as the restitution of Jewish property, the Stockholm conference, Haider and the Pope’s visit to Israel and the PA (see also below). These included the political and material gains of Israel and Zionism, on the one hand, and Israeli and Zionist collective crimes against the Palestinian people, on the other. Unlike discussions of the Holocaust in the Egyptian or Lebanese press, representation of the Holocaust in the Syrian press was monolithic, adhering to the traditional Arab approach of denial. Drawing lessons from the so-called Israeli experience, writers raised new demands for compensation after Israel’s withdrawal from the Golan Heights, and for an apology and repentance from the Christian world for the Crusader wars, a major motif which emerged in the discussion of the Pope’s visit by other Arab writers (see below; Tishrin, 10, 24, 26 Jan.; 16, 20, 22 March).

In the wake of the Syrian-Israeli negotiations, the issue of normalization came to the fore and was fervently debated. The most common approach was total rejection of normalization, either out of fear of Israeli/Jewish hegemony or the loss of Arab self esteem. “Due to the differences in character between Israeli and Arab culture,” said Syrian intellectual Riyadh al-Turk in an interview, peace means putting an end to armed conflict but not normalization. The Israeli culture, he maintained, “rejects the Other and places everyone under the title ‘gentile’ due to its supremacist attitude as ‘God’s chosen people’ armed in modern times with colonialist settlements.” Arab intellectuals, added Burhan Ghalyun – a Syrian intellectual living in Paris – will refrain from cooperating with Israel, “not out of fear of possible hegemony of Israeli culture... but rather due to a reservation deriving from a feeling that their self-respect does not allow them to grovel before the victorious power” (MEMRI, dispatch no. 92, 10 May). Hisham al-Dajani, a Palestinian writer living in Damascus, was one of the few voices to defend cultural normalization with Israel. Criticizing anti-normalization intellectuals as imposing intellectual terrorism, he declared “it is about time that we get rid of many of our delusions... Israel is not going to swallow us.” On the contrary, Syria’s role as a regional power would only be enhanced by peace. Al-Dajani’s articles were strongly criticized, and he was reportedly ousted from the Syrian Arab Writers Association (al-Hayat, 15 Jan.; 7, 9, 24, Feb.; 2, 21 March).
The Palestinian Discourse

In the introduction to an article on antisemitism in the Palestinian media, Israeli journalist Haggai Huberman wrote that if the blood libel was a typical accusation against the Jews in the 19th century, the allegation of poisoned food products was widespread in the PA on the threshold of the 21st century (Hatzofeh, 11 Feb.). This claim, made several times in the past, drew attention in November 1999 when Suha Arafat accused Israel of intentionally contaminating the Palestinian water supply and using cancerous tear gas (see ASW 1999/2000). Perusal of Palestinian newspapers verifies Huberman’s assertion. Palestinians seem to be haunted by fears of contaminated and spoiled food pouring into the PA’s markets. Greedy traders were accused of purchasing cheap merchandise from Israeli farmers, including from settlers in the territories. This prompted the PA’s ministries of agriculture and supply to urge Palestinians to remove certain products from the shelves, stop consuming Israeli produce and boycott goods originating from the settlements. The occupation was said to have spread mental and social diseases and increased cases of violence among youth (al-Hayat al-Jadida, 20 Jan.; 27, 31 May). Why do the Palestinians use these motifs? Is it a ploy to enforce the consumption of their own produce in order to develop the economy? Are they fighting normalization? PA Minister of Supply Abu ‘Ali Shahin, might have provided at least a partial answer when he said that organizations and individuals should refrain from normalizing relations with the occupation as long as the Palestinians did not obtain their full national rights and Palestinian prisoners had not been freed (al-Hayat al-Jadida, 29 May; Hatzofeh, 1 June).

The Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon instilled new hope in the Palestinians and a strong conviction that Israel was not invincible. Statements by PA officials, editorials, greetings to Hizballah and popular demonstrations of support created a mood bordering on incitement against the occupation and Israel. The Israeli withdrawal was interpreted as a victory for Hizballah, its philosophy and choice of action, “the victory of Allah.” It was proof that the Islamist alternative was the right solution to the Arab predicament, which had haunted the Arab world for the past two hundred years. Hizballah’s experience was held up as a model for emulation by the Muslim umma in its struggle against the Zionist/Jewish enemy, who was revealed as a meek cowardly enemy, “a spider web,” when confronted with death and destruction (al-Hayat al-Jadida, 24, 28–30 May; statements by Hasan Nasrallah on Jerusalem Day, 31 Dec. 1999 and after the Israeli withdrawal on 26 May – Hizballah site; Hatzofeh, 1 June).

During the Camp David summit (on the final phase of the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians held under the auspices of US President Bill Clinton) and especially after its failure on 25 July, the Palestinian people had reportedly reached crisis point. Itamar Marcus, director of the Jerusalem-based Palestinian Media Watch (PMW), which monitors Palestinian radio and television, issued a report in early September pointing out that during the
summer there had been a notable increase of footage on Palestinian television of violent clashes between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian youth, particularly from the first intifada of the late 1980s. It focused on the heroism and martyrdom of youngsters, portrayed Israeli soldiers as rapists and cold-blooded murderers, and in broadcasts of Friday sermons presented the Palestinians as the spearhead of an eternal struggle between Muslims and Jews. A major theme in deductive and history TV programs was the representation of any peace agreement as a temporary phase, until the liberation of all of Palestine, extending from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean. Israel was said to be doomed (al-Hayat al-Jadida, 24 July; 30 Aug.; PMW, Report nos. 30, 31, 11, 17 Sept.; MEMRI, dispatch no. 132, 6 Oct.; Jewish Week, 20 Dec. 2000).

The reconstruction of a Palestinian national narrative is another issue that preoccupies the Palestinian media. Academic conferences, debates in the press and television programs and new textbooks deal extensively with this subject. A conference of historians convened in February in Cairo by the Center of Modern Egyptian History, was entitled “Palestine – Fifty Years after the 1948 War.” Among the participants were Yunan Labib Rizq, Muhammad Ra’uf ‘Abbas, ‘Adil Hasan Ghanayim and Latifa Salim, from Egypt, and Muhammad Khalid al-Az‘ar, from the PA. The conference called for the establishment of an institute for the study of the Palestinian question in Cairo, which would collect all relevant documents and studies on the subject. They appealed to colleges and universities to encourage research on the contemporary history of Palestine, and especially aspects of “the colonial and Zionist invasion of the Arab homeland in the 20th century” (al-Hayat al-Jadida, 25 Feb.).

Palestinian playwrights such as Ahmad Harb, Ahmad Rafiq ‘Awadh and ‘Abdallah Tayih have also played a part in the national effort, developing a unique Palestinian genre of historical or fictional writing that deals, inter alia, with the Jewish-Zionist personality. The play The End of the Century, by Ahmad ‘Awadh, for instance, depicts the difficulties Palestinians confront under the occupation, while the Jews “distort and steal the history” of Palestine (al-Hayat, 14 May).

The representation of Jews, Israel and Zionism in Palestinian textbooks, which is of paramount importance in a process of reconciliation and trust building, aroused the interest of Jewish as well as international bodies. After reviewing 15 new Palestinian textbooks for grades one and six issued in September, the Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace (CMIP), a US non-profit organization, concluded that they continued to ignore and de-legitimize Israel, while asserting their people’s historical roots in Palestine. However, depictions of the Jews as treacherous or evil, which abound in Egyptian and Jordanian textbooks used previously in Palestinian schools, were omitted. Palestinians, for their part, contend that the curriculum “is not anti-anyone.” The fact that Israel does not appear in the books’ maps, explained Na‘im Abu Hummus, deputy minister of education, is because “Israel’s borders are not yet
defined.” Nevertheless, some Palestinian educators have criticized the books as simplistic and inadequate. Ibrahim Abu Lughod, a Palestinian academic who headed a committee funded by UNESCO on reforming the education system, was disappointed by the books. The failure of the textbooks to deal with Israel, he said, “is symptomatic of a larger failure of the new curriculum. The traditional system of rote learning was not replaced with a more analytical approach, and this, he insisted, “is far more worrisome to me as a Palestinian and an educator than the textbooks’ omissions on Israel, Jews and peacemaking” (Ha’aretz, 4 Sept. 2000; 2 Jan. 2001; WP, 5 Sept.; LA Times, 18 Feb. 2001).

PA Undersecretary of Planning and International Cooperation Anis al-Qaq, who led a delegation in April to a symposium on “How to Strengthen Peace through Education,” in Cyprus, admitted that it would be “difficult to remove anti-Israel expressions from the Arab curricula.” Nevertheless, he favored including the subject of the Holocaust in the school curriculum. “We cannot be proud of anything, until we know about the subject,” he said. Al-Qaq’s remarks provoked angry reactions, as well as outright rejection (al-Quds al-‘Arabi, 11 April; see also MEMRI, dispatch no. 187, 21 Feb. 2001). Reiterating a traditional Arab argument, Musa al-Zu’but, chairman of the Education Committee of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), denied any attempt to include the history of the Holocaust in the Palestinian curriculum. “The Holocaust has been exaggerated in order to present the Jews as victims of a great crime,” he said. “If the purpose is to express sympathy, this is useless for us since we are the ones who suffered as a result.” Chairman of the Political Committee of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) Ziyad Abu ‘Amr added: “We are in dire need of studying our own heritage” (al-Risala, 13 April). Another PLC member and Fatah leader Hatim ‘Abd al-Qadir considered teaching the Holocaust “a great danger to the developing Palestinian mentality.” The Jews, he said, should learn first about the Palestinian disaster which is still alive, whereas “the so-called Holocaust has already been moved into the museum of history.” Palestinian intellectual ‘Abdallah Hourani warned of the trendy “culture of peace” derived from globalization and promoted by the US, which seeks “to erase the memory of nations and efface their national heritage and history, as well as any opposition to foreign ideological or cultural invasion.” Al-Qaq, he suggested, should have noted the doubts raised about the Holocaust by leading European intellectuals (al-Istiglal, 20 April). Egyptian leftist Ahmad Baha’ al-Din completely rejected Holocaust education since Arabs “had no part in the Holocaust” (al-‘Arabi, 20 April).

**Debating the Holocaust**

The fact that the Holocaust continues to generate both sympathy and international support for Israel is a deep cause of Arab frustration. But, “while once used primarily in the effort to create sympathy for Palestinian ‘victims’, 
the Holocaust weapon has now become a form of political aggression,” wrote Gerald Steinberg (JP, 10 March). Nevertheless, a more open and less monolithic discourse on the Holocaust is developing, involving a growing circle of writers, and continuing a trend which became evident in the mid-1990s (see ASW 1997/8, 1998/9).

The traditional Arab approach toward the Holocaust, reflected in numerous articles and statements, has not basically changed. It rejects the so-called Zionist narrative on the Holocaust, which focuses only on Jewish suffering during World War II, has inflated its dimensions and turned it into a myth. It accuses the Zionists of cooperating with the Nazis in the extermination of Jews, and charges Israel with exploiting it to extort the West and justify its crimes against the Palestinians (see for instance: al-Sha'b, 11 April, 9 May; al-Watan al-'Arabi, 14 April; al-'Arabi, May; Ruz al-Yunsuf, 18 Aug.).

The book The Holocaust between Confirmation and Denial, by Ramsis ‘Awadh, published in Egypt in 2000, discusses sections of Norman Finkelstein’s book The Holocaust Industry, Deborah Lipstadt’s Denying the Holocaust and the trial proceedings of British Holocaust denier David Irving. The book tries to prove that in the last two decades the Holocaust has become a debatable issue. Hence, the author suggests that the Arabs should “draw lessons from the historical and cultural conflict with Israel” and propose measures to counter the Jewish-Israeli Holocaust campaign (Ramsis ‘Awadh, al-hilucaj bayna al-inkar wal-ta'kid, Cairo, 2000, p. 9). The Leuchter Report, a pseudo-scientific document which allegedly proves that Zyklon B was not used to exterminate human beings, was translated into Arabic and sold at the International Book Fair in Cairo in January 2001 (al-Sha'b, 16 May; Yediot Aharonot, 23 Feb. 2001). Finkelstein’s book, which accused the leadership of Jewish organizations of turning the Holocaust into a profitable industry, has been also translated into Arabic and discussed in several articles in the Arab press (al-Hayat, 30 Jan.; 29 Sept.; al-Sharq al-Awsat, 18 Aug.; al-Ra'y, 5 Aug.).

These motifs representing the Holocaust appeared repeatedly during the year. A Hamas press release explained that the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust in January (see Sweden) “aimed at forging history by hiding the truth about the so-called Holocaust.” The Zionist entity used “psychological and ideological terrorism” through the conference and the “Nazi Holocaust story,” the statement asserted and called upon states that participated in the conference to revise their positions and renounce their “sympathetic understanding of Zionist arrogance and continuing blackmail” (Press Release, “On the Stockholm Conference concerning the So-called Jewish Holocaust,” 3 Feb.; Reuven Paz, “Palestinian Holocaust Denial,” PeaceWatch 255, 21 April). Al-Hayat editor ‘Abd al-Wahhab Badrakhan considered the conference a rebirth of the “Holocaust business,” and depicted Holocaust studies “as an injection in the blood or the head” of the student. In the future, he concluded, Arab countries would be required to amend their curriculum “to produce a new
generation that would accept Israel and its crimes against humanity” (al-Hayat, 30 Jan.). Egyptian writers repeatedly quoted Roger Garaudy on the Holocaust (see also ASW 1998/9), and his criticism of the conference as perpetrating racial discrimination by focusing only on Jewish suffering (al-Ahram, 8 Feb.; al-Akhbar, 10 March).

The furore aroused by the success of Jörg Haider’s party in the 1999 elections and its inclusion in the coalition government formed at the beginning of 2000, was interpreted in Arab commentaries as “Western hypocrisy” and interference in Austrian internal affairs. Haider was described as a victim of yet another Israeli campaign against those who defy the “Zionist narrative” and resist brainwashing. Israel points an accusing finger at the Austrian government, Egyptian Fakhri Labib wrote in the leftist paper al-Abdal, in order to divert attention from its own crimes and right-wing parties. Editor of the Palestinian daily al-Hayat al-Jadida Hafiz al-Barghuti also likened the European right with the Israeli extreme right, whose hatred of the Arabs was similar to Haider’s hostility toward all foreigners, and not only Jews. Muhammad Auwal, assistant professor at California State University, wondered why Western leaders did not punish Israel when former Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu had formed a coalition with the Moledet party, “that openly called for mass deportation of all Palestinians from Israel and the occupied territories.” Several writers paralleled the uproar against Haider to the Jewish reaction to the election of Kurt Waldheim as Austrian president in 1988, and contended that Israel and its policy of blackmail were contributing to the rise of neo-Nazism in Europe (al-‘Ahd, 4 Feb.; al-Hayat al-Jadida, 5 Feb.; al-Hayat, 6, 19, 24 Feb.; al-Akhbar, 6, 7, 8 Feb.; al-Ahram, 6 Feb.; Mohammad Auwal, “Cruel Joke of the West: Hugging Bloody Putin, Decrying Rhetorical Haider,” 7 Feb. – iviews.com; A khbar al-Yaum, 12 Feb.; al-Jumhuriyya, 22 Feb.; al-Abdal, 15 March; Filastin al-Muslima, March; October, 2 July; see also MEMRI, dispatch no. 77, 16 March).

Similar views were voiced in response to David Irving's trial in London, which ended in June (see ASW 1999/2000). Most Arab writers defended Irving, seeing the Jewish attack on him as a campaign to silence dissension and limit the basic right of freedom of expression, as in the case of French Holocaust denier Roger Garaudy in 1996–98. Egyptian columnist Ahmad Bahjat, told al-Ahram Weekly, that he believed it was the duty of writers, intellectuals and historians to seek out the truth. Jews, he said, “should not be upset if some question the number of Jewish victims of Nazi Germany because, regardless of whether they were 300,000, 600,000 or six million, the Holocaust remains a crime.” Another Egyptian writer, Nabil Omar, argued that “the mythology of the Holocaust is the brainchild of those who stand to gain from it.” ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Masiri, author of the Encyclopedia on Jews, Judaism and Zionism, confided that as a Muslim he does not deny the Holocaust, because it is a human and ethical issue. But, he questions “the Zionist theory of right,”
which constructs the Holocaust and the right on Palestine as a “sacred Jewish history,” that cannot be questioned or “put into a historical or human perspective.” In interviews with both *al-Abram* in April and the Qatari satellite channel al-Jazira, Irving criticized the passive stand of the Arabs in his case. Implying that there was a natural affinity between his cause and that of the Arabs, he asserted that “Arabs are their own enemies,” since they lacked a sense of identity (*al-Abram*, 25, 26 Jan.; 16 April; *al-Akhbar*, 26 Jan.; *al-Hayat*, 31 Jan.; *al-Sha'b*, 8 Feb.; *al-'Arabi*, 9 Feb.; October, 7 May; *al-Abrah Weekly*, 11 May).

Two other issues also highlighted the Holocaust: the Pope’s visit, first, to Egypt in February, then to Jordan, Israel and the PA between 20 and 26 March, and the Vatican declaration of 12 March, “Memory and Reconciliation: The Church and the Faults of the Past” (see *ASW 1999/2000*). Two major themes emerged in the Arab reaction. One depicted the quest for forgiveness as “a selective apology,” expressed dismay at the Pope’s failure to mention the Arabs or Muslims who had “endured sufferings at the hand of the Church,” and demanded a specific apology for “two centuries of aggression against the Muslim east” by the Crusaders (*al-Abram Weekly*, 16 March). Egyptian pro-Islamist writer Fahmi Huwaydi argued that the Pope “gave precedence to the Jews over all others, as ‘first class’ victims.” The document is “shameful” on two counts, for “not only failing to condemn and apologize for what was done, but also denying responsibility for it” (*al-Abram*, 22 March). It seemed that the Arabs, and particularly the Palestinians, were competing with Israel for the Pope’s sympathy. A month before the 12 March declaration, the Palestinians made an unprecedented political gain. On 15 February, during a visit to the Vatican, PA Chairman Yasir Arafat signed an agreement between the PLO and the Holy See, recognizing the special status of Jerusalem and the legitimate right of self-determination for the Palestinian people (*al-Hayat*, 16, 20, 27 Feb.; 7, 18 March).

In light of this rivalry, Palestinians were concerned about the political implications of his visit to Israel. Accordingly, the second theme in the Arab reaction was the expressed fear of Israeli exploitation of the visit to gain legitimacy for the occupation. “Apologizing to the Jews for the Holocaust is one thing,” wrote *al-Hayat* editor Badrakhan, “but apologizing to Israel for it is something totally different” (*al-Hayat*, 22 March). PLO representative to the Holy See ‘Afif Safieh, hoped that the Pope’s message would not be exploited by the “Israeli state and its powerful machine to grant Israel immunity from legitimate criticism from here to eternity.” Safieh, like other Palestinian writers, trusted that the Pope’s apology would prompt Israel to conduct its “own self-examination and soul searching,” admit the injustices it had inflicted on the Palestinians and issue a historical apology to pave the way for peace and reconciliation. Arafat had reportedly concluded an article he wrote for the Italian newspaper *La Repubblica* with similar expectations (*al-Hayat al-Jadida*, 20, 23 March; *al-Abram Weekly*, 30 March). Hizballah’s organ *al-‘Ahd*, was
concerned by the imbalance in the Pope’s attitude, complaining that he spoke in two languages, one for the Jews and the other for the Arabs (al-‘Ahd, 24
March; see also al-Abram, 23 Feb.; al-Hayat, 18, 19 March, 8 April; Ha’aretz, 21
March; al-Sha’b, 21 March, 14 April; al-Hayat al-Jadida, 22, 23 March; al-Ahwal, 29
March; al-Sabil, 11 April; al-Liwa’, 27 Sept.).

The statement of the mufti of Jerusalem, Shaykh Sabri ‘Ikrama, made a day
prior to his meeting with the Pope, received the greatest attention. The
Holocaust, he said, had been exaggerated by Israel to gain international
support. While insisting that he did not deny the Holocaust, he asked why “this
Holocaust in particular” was more important? “When it comes to our cause,
nobody pays attention,” he said and repeated the traditional Arab position that
the Holocaust was not the Muslims’ problem. “It’s not my fault that Hitler
hated the Jews,” he stated, adding “they hate them just about everywhere” (AP,
25 March; NYT, Ha’aretz, 26 March; IHT, 3 May).

The debate on the Holocaust also contained theses which challenged the
traditional Arab representation (see ASW 1997/8, 1998/9). Some writers
suggested an alternative reading of the Holocaust, mainly because they believed
that the traditional approach was detrimental to the Arabs and weakened their
cause. Palestinian writer Khalid al-Hurub, based in London, argued that
drawing lessons from the Holocaust would be a sublime goal, were it not for
the Jewish organizations’ attempts to exploit it. There was excessive
preoccupation with the Holocaust, which had been the end result of brute
racism. Hence, despite the growing centrality of the Holocaust in Western
consciousness, racism toward the Other was increasing, he contended. Al-
Hurub opposes the legal limitation of Holocaust denial and advocates freedom
of speech, fearing that the trend of shattering sacred myths most prevalent in
the West would also impinge upon the Holocaust (al-Hayat, 18 Feb.). Similarly,
Dalal al-Baziri reproached the Arabs for ignoring the antisemitic core in
Naziism, which considered the Arabs, too, the scum of nations. The Arabs, he
said, should ask themselves several questions. “If the Holocaust was a historical
fact, how does it affect our cause?” “Does the veracity of this event negate the
depiction of Zionism as executioners?” “Shouldn’t we understand for ourselves
and not through intermediaries the dimensions of the Holocaust?” He,
therefore, called on the Arabs to conduct independent research on the
Holocaust and Jewish history in Europe. Such studies would establish them as
“the present victims of past victims,” he maintained (al-Hayat, 30 April).

Another Palestinian writer, Marwan Bishara attacked the link made by the
Arabs between the Holocaust and the establishment of the State of Israel, which,
he claimed, implied they accepted the Zionist narrative (al-Hayat, 6
April). In their article “Universalizing the Holocaust,” which won them the
“Common Ground Award for Journalism in the Middle East,” Lebanese author
and commentator Hazim Saghiya and North African writer Salah Bashir
developed the Holocaust as “the most complex and intractable knot in the Middle
East conflict.” They considered the “dissociation between acknowledgement of the Holocaust and what Israel is doing” the starting point for the development of a discourse aimed at proving that “the Holocaust does not free the Jewish state or the Jews of accountability” for the Palestinian tragedy. “If the memory of the Holocaust,” they claimed, comes between the Jews and “their capacity to coexist with other peoples at whose expense the ‘Jewish question’ was solved, it will be a victory for Hitlerism after its defeat” (Haaretz, 21 Feb.).

Several Arab writers criticized the Arab defense of Haider. Egyptian journalist and intellectual Ahmad Sid Ahmad viewed the Arab attempt to downplay the threat that Haider represented as “extremely dangerous.” The Arab stand, he said, “should not necessarily be the opposite of that taken by Israel.” Haider’s rise, he warned, was “chillingly similar” to Hitler’s,” and he was a populist hero who exploited his countrymen’s “insecurities and xenophobia” (al-Ahram Weekly, 17 Feb.). Lebanese editor Joseph Samaha, rejected the Arab depiction of Israel as a Nazi state despite its deeds (al-Hayat, 5 March). According to chief editor of Egypt’s al-Ahram strategic report Wahid ‘Abd al-Majid, the Arab belief that Israel had mobilized the campaign against Haider was an extension of the myth about international Zionism controlling the media, finance and the world economy (al-Hayat, 18 Feb.), and Lebanese writer and researcher Raghid al-Sulh, warned that “Jörg Haider will not help the Arabs” (al-Hayat, 5 March). Syrian poet and journalist Sa‘id ‘Ali Ahmadi (Adonis), who supported the European condemnation of Haider and the European extreme right, was scorned by the Association of Arab Writers (al-Hayat, 5 March; al-Ahali, 22 March).

Arab intellectuals and writers, such as Egyptians Rida Hilal, ‘Abd al-Mun‘im Sa‘id, Khalid al-Mubarak, and columnists Joseph Samaha and Jihad al-Khazin criticized Arab identification with Western Holocaust revisionists and their acceptance as natural allies. This stand, they said, played into the hands of Israel and ignored the racist tendencies of those historians who target Jews and Muslims alike. Instead, the Arabs need to stress the irony of the fact that the Jews, “after surviving Nazi atrocities, have themselves become oppressors” (al-Hayat, 15, 16, 22, 30 April; JP, al-Ahram al-‘Arabi, 2 May; al-Ahram Weekly, 11 May). It is in the Arab interest, concluded Joseph Samaha, “for the world to universalize some sort of moral limitation to any oppression or vile action.” This would enable the Arabs “to benefit from any apology for a crime committed against the Jews or others” (al-Hayat, 2 April). Perhaps, in an attempt to profit from the lessons of the Holocaust, Egypt, Morocco and the PA submitted a last-minute request to participate in the Stockholm International Forum (al-Hayat, 28 Jan.).

This notion that the Arabs should join the international community in drawing lessons from the Holocaust was also behind many articles linking the Holocaust and the nakba. “The nakba is the moral heir of the Holocaust,” wrote Samaha (al-Hayat, 21 May), while Palestinian academic Ghada Karmi, accused
the West and Israel of “nakba denial” (*al-Abram Weekly*, 6 April). Israel, these articles contended, should acknowledge its responsibility for the Palestinian tragedy, apologize for it and pay compensation, exactly as the Germans did (*al-Hayat*, 29 Jan.; 19 Feb.; 15 April; *al-Liwa*, 23 Feb.; *al-Abram al-'Arabi*, 15 April). Following the Pope’s visit to Yad Vashem, the Palestinians proposed building a parallel *nakba* museum, as “a mute expression” which would play a similar role in convincing the world of their tragedy (*al-Hayat al-Jadida*, 25 March).

**THE AL-AQSA INTIFADA (SEPTEMBER–DECEMBER)**

The *al-Aqsa intifada*, which broke out at the end of September following the visit of then Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon, to the Temple Mount (*al-haram al-sharif* – the area of the holy mosques), unleashed an unprecedented wave of incitement and antisemitic manifestations throughout the Arab world and among Arab and Muslim communities worldwide (see General Analysis and country chapters).

The following analysis is by no means a comprehensive account of the *intifada*. It deals neither with its causes nor with its evolution, but focuses on anti-Israel and anti-Jewish manifestations in Arab and Muslim reactions during the first three months.

**Popular and Official Arab Expressions of Support and Solidarity**

The *intifada* engendered solidarity with the Palestinian cause throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds, and encouraged Arab and Muslim leaders to convene urgent summits in support of the Palestinians. Two levels of defense of the Palestinian cause could be discerned in the Arab reaction: a popular one, encompassing a spontaneous and organized response, and an official one, reflecting Arab government positions and actions. They complemented but also contradicted each other, indicating a gap between the prevailing extreme anti-Israeli mood of the Arab masses and the cautious pragmatic approach of Arab regimes.

On 21–22 October Arab leaders convened in Cairo for an emergency summit of the Arab League in response to the outbreak of the *intifada*. The summit concluded its meetings with a condemnation of Israel’s “gruesome atrocities” against the Palestinians, and proposed a war crimes tribunal to prosecute right-wing Israeli politician Ariel Sharon and others. But the summit stopped short of ordering any immediate, across-the-board economic or diplomatic actions against Israel, as some hard-line member countries had demanded (*Washington Post*, *NYT*, 23 Oct. 2000).

These decisions reflected the Arab leaders’ wish to avoid plunging the entire region into a spiral of violence (*Al-Abram Weekly*, 26 Oct. 2000), on the one hand, and to create a balance between the popular demand for anti-Israel action while simultaneously maintaining public order and national interests, on the other (*Jordan Times*, 25 Oct. 2000). The outcome of the summit was widely
criticized, mainly by the Palestinian media and by Iraq, whose president Saddam Hussein sought to capitalize on the intifada to establish himself as the champion of the Palestinian cause (*al-Hayat al-Jadida*, 10, 21, 23, 24 Oct.; *al-Jumhuriyya*, 23 Oct.; MEMRI, dispatch no. 143, 25 Oct.)

On 12–14 November the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), a body comprising 56 Muslim states, convened in Doha, Qatar, and discussed the Arab and Muslim reaction to the al-Aqsa intifada. "Al-Aqsa defines once more the Islamic solidarity path," wrote *al-Quds al-‘Arabi* (*al-Hayat*, 11, 13 Nov.; *al-Quds al-‘Arabi*, 14 Nov.), but despite the harsh anti-Israeli rhetoric, the conference resolutions basically echoed those of the Arab summit.

Between the two conferences Morocco and Tunisia had closed their diplomatic missions in Israel; Oman had shut its trade office immediately after the Arab summit; Qatar eventually bowed to Saudi and Iranian pressure in order to save the ICO summit it was to host. After this summit Egypt recalled its ambassador to Israel and Jordan refrained from sending its new one, but neither succumbed to pressure to close the Israeli embassies in their capitals.

Both the Arab summit in Cairo and the ICO summit in Qatar resolved to provide financial support for the Palestinian intifada and to establish two funds: the al-Aqsa Fund and the al-Intifada Fund. Iraq decided to award $10,000 to families of martyrs and $1,000 each for the wounded, and Iran opened a special account for volunteer donations (*al-Hayat al-Jadida*, 9 Oct.; IRNA, 22 Oct.; *Jerusalem Report*, 4 Dec. 2000; *Yedioth Aharonot*, 13 Dec. 2000; *Haaretz*, 2 Jan. 2001). But, for the most part, Arab governments have not fulfilled their pledges of financial assistance, and have "continued to combine rhetorical belligerency with practical self-restraint" (Mark Heller, "After the Elections: Ariel Sharon and the Challenge of the Intifada," *Tel Aviv Notes*, no. 12, 21 Feb. 2001. Internet version).

The declarations of the two meetings were criticized by Palestinian writers, who described them as "a big, fat zero" (*Palestine Times* 114, Dec. 2000), aimed at calming the Arab public’s rage, weakening the PA, and "suffocating the intifada and increasing the pressure on the Palestinian people" (*Al-Manar*, 11 Dec. – MEMRI, dispatch no. 178, 16 Jan. 2001).

Tens of thousands of people of all walks of life in the Arab and Muslim worlds participated in demonstrations and marches to vent their fury at Israel and the United States. Carrying banners equating the swastika with the Star of David and chanting "Death to Israel," they called for jihad and burned Israeli and American flags (*al-Hayat al-Jadida*, 1–27 Oct.; *al-Liwa*, 4 Oct.; *al-Iraq*, 5 Oct.; *The Economist*, 7 Oct.; *JP*, 17 Oct.; *Haaretz*, 9, 17, 18, 25 Oct.; *Filastin al-Muslima*, Nov.). Demonstrations were also held in Saudi Arabia, where they are usually forbidden. Several demonstrations were dispersed by police when they threatened to violate public order, such as in Jordan, where protesters tried to march on to the Israeli embassy. Syrian police used tear gas to disperse some 2,000 angry demonstrators who had tried to reach the US embassy in

In Egypt intellectuals, artists and professional syndicates, traditionally known for their anti-normalization position, held rallies and sit-ins, flew the Palestinian flag at theaters and observed a one-minute silence in honor of Palestinian martyrs. They also submitted petitions to President Mubarak and to government ministers, requesting a ban on the entry of Israeli tourists into Egypt; the dismissal of Israeli agricultural experts; the closure of the Israeli embassy in Cairo; and bringing to an end all steps toward normalization with Israel. A group of approximately 20 NGOs and 20 individuals formed the Egyptian Popular Committee for Solidarity with the intifada to encourage Palestinians and Egyptians to coordinate action, such as donations of blood and money, preparing lists for the boycott of Israeli products and organizing petitions. (Al-Ahram Weekly, 19 Oct. 2000). On the eve of the Arab summit three Egyptian bodies – the Anti-normalization Committee, a large group of intellectuals and journalists, including ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Masiri and Muhammad Salim al-‘Awa, and the General Federation of Entertainers Syndicates – published statements calling on the summit to support the intifada with money, arms and manpower; reduce relations with “the imperialist state that supports Israel”; end all forms of normalization and all forms of Israeli political, economic and cultural presence in Arab lands; use Arab oil to protect Arab blood; and rekindle the Joint Arab Defense Agreement (Al-Ahram Weekly, 26 Oct. 2000). On 23 November, the Popular Committee submitted a petition to the UN secretary general in the same vein (Press Release, 23 Nov. 2000 – MSANEWS).

The demonstrations were directed against the US, too, not only because of its allegedly biased role as a mediator in the peace process, but also as a result of the perceived identification of the US as the leader of an anti-Islamic and anti-Arab struggle in collaboration with Israel and Zionism. “The recent demonstration of rage,” wrote London-based Palestinian Islamist ‘Azzam Tamimi, was an “expression of hostility and hatred for a project that is seen by Arabs and Muslims alike as an imperialist invasion aimed at sustaining the
weakness and even paralysis of the Muslim umma” (‘Azzam Tamimi, “The Days of Rage and the Beginning of the End,” 8 Nov. – MSANEWS).

Acts of Vandalism against Jewish Sites
The outbreak of the intifada provoked a wave of violent incidents against Jews worldwide and acts of vandalism against Jewish sites, perpetrated at least in part by members of Muslim communities in the West (see General Analysis and country chapters). Whereas these attacks were generally viewed as antisemitic, terrorist acts carried out against the Israeli population, whether within Israel or in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, were considered anti-Israel expressions which reflected the state of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hence, they were not dealt with in our reports, unless they were clearly antisemitic. Terrorist acts within Israel and the territories were also carried out during the intifada, as well as unprecedented acts of vandalism against Jewish holy sites in the West Bank. The first such act was perpetrated after the withdrawal of IDF troops from Joseph’s Tomb, a Jewish holy site in Nablus, on 7 October. Tens of Palestinians entered the site and proceeded to loot it. They then demolished the five-room building, and set the tomb on fire, torching the study rooms and burning thousands of Jewish prayer books. Although the PA minister of information issued a statement expressing regret for the act and a commitment to renovate the site and maintain the security of those who wished to pray there, the tomb, which is considered by the Palestinians to contain the remains of a holy shaykh, was turned into a mosque. The incident was reported in the Palestinian papers as an act of liberation. According to al-Hayat al-Jadida, “the occupying army withdrew from the site of Prophet Joseph, and the citizens prayed their evening prayer there, rejoicing in its liberation.” Another commentator wondered whether the liberation of Bilal bin Rabab mosque (Rachel’s Tomb) was also possible (al-Hayat al-Jadida, Ha’aretz, 8 Oct.; al-Ayyam, 10 Oct.). Hamas issued a statement also rejoicing in the “liberation” of the site and called for the establishment of a committee to “purify” it and restore it as a mosque (al-Hayat al-Jadida, 9 Oct.). The Palestinians, however, said the mob’s anger had little to do with antisemitism and more to do with the killing of two Palestinian boys by Israeli soldiers (WP, 28 Oct).

The old synagogue in Jericho, built in the early Islamic era, was torched on 12 October. The synagogue had been under the jurisdiction of the PA, which was committed to safeguarding it under the Oslo accords (Ha’aretz, 13 Oct.). The Tiferet Avot synagogue in Efrat, a settlement in the vicinity of Hebron, was vandalized on 27 October. Swastikas and Arabic graffiti – “Hitler exterminates germs” and “Hizbollah will remain a thorn in your throats” – were sprayed on the walls (Ha’aretz, 29 Oct.). The cemetery in Kibbutz Giv’at Oz was desecrated and swastikas were painted on the tombs (Ma’ariv, 24 Dec.).

Acts of vandalism were also carried out against American and British targets in Egypt. In an act symbolizing opposition to US support of Israel, protesters

**Incitement and Antisemitic Expressions**

Besides popular demonstrations and violence, the intifada led to the radicalization of anti-Israel and antisemitic rhetoric – inflammatory declarations by Arab leaders, Friday sermons encouraging jihad and sanctifying martyrdom, calls for an Arab boycott of Israel and American goods, TV programs mobilizing the masses, newspaper articles featuring antisemitic motifs and Holocaust denial, and an Internet war.

**Incitement by Arab Leaders.** Since the beginning of the peace process in the early 1990s, overt antisemitic expressions in Arab countries had been confined to leaders of Islamist movements, and to the press, whereas political leaders generally refrained from making statements that could be interpreted as being antisemitic. As the intifada escalated, the rhetoric of Arab leaders grew more extreme, especially during the Arab summit and the ICO conference. The most notorious statements were made by Syrian President Bashshar al-Asad, who aligned himself with Iraqi President Saddam Husayn and Iranian leader Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamene’i. During the ICO summit in November Asad likened Israelis to Nazis, asserting that Israelis were perpetrating “a new Nazism with no precedent in history” (*Ha’aretz*, 14 Nov.; *JP*, 17 Nov.).

Two months later, he referred to the conflict as “a struggle between truth and falsehood; between the spirit of tolerance and peace of Islam and the Zionist path of racism and aggression.” He described Israeli leaders as “racist gangs,” and Israel as “a state based on loathsome racist values and hatred of Arabs and Islam” (Special Dispatch, No. 177, 12 Jan. 2001 [MEMRI]). The terminology used by Asad reflected the Islamist discourse and ideology which defined the contours of the rhetoric during the intifada.

Soon after the intifada began, Iraq’s foreign minister denounced Israel as “a midget entity, a usurper, and a claw of colonialism.” A few days later, Saddam asserted that “an end must be put to Zionism,” and declared his intention to create a “Jerusalem army” of 21 divisions that would liberate Palestine “from the river to the sea” and rescue it from “Zionism and its accursed deformed entity” (Iraqi TV, 2, 3 Oct [BBC]; *al-Iraq*, 3, 13, 14 Oct.; *Al-Hayat al-Jadida*, 5, 18 Oct.; *Washington Times*, 17 Oct. 2000; Ofra Bengio, “The Iraqi-Palestinian-Israeli Triangle,” *Tel Aviv Notes*, no. 14, 8 March 2001). The Iraqi government decided on 2 December that “the only solution to the Middle East crisis would be the departure of the Jews from the fabricated, usurper entity of Israel” (Iraqi TV, 2 Dec [BBC]).
Encouraging Jihad and Sanctifying Martyrdom. “From infancy, Palestinians are inculcated with the virus of nationalism and the burden of revenge,” wrote Middle East analyst Chris Hedges, and “Martyrdom is the only route offered to those who want to achieve a measure, however brief, of recognition and glory” (Chris Hedges, “The New Palestinian Revolt,” Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb. 2001 [Aqidah Islamic Information Service]). Friday sermons at mosques throughout the Arab world were dominated by angry denunciations of Israeli brutality and calls for jihad, which was viewed as a religious duty incumbent upon all Muslims, while the conflict was seen as a struggle between truth and falsehood (al-Hayat al-Jadida, 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 14, 15, 21, 22, 24 Oct. 2000). Following Friday noon prayers, reported al-Abram Weekly, worshippers poured onto the streets to chant slogans of resistance (al-Abram Weekly, 19 Oct. 2000).

Shaykh Muhammad ibn ‘Abdallah al-Subayl, imam and khatib (Friday prayers’ speaker) of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, called on Muslims worldwide to perform jihad against “the enemies of God and Islam and humanity,” and to stop “Zionist oppression and carnage against the Palestinians.” Subayl evoked several verses from the Qur’an, which permit the oppressed and the victims to retaliate against oppressors and aggressors (IAP-Net, “Imam of Mecca’s Grand Sacred Mosque Calls for Jihad against Zionist Carnage,” 10 Oct. 2000). Egypt’s Shaykh al-Azhar Muhammad Tantawi also called for jihad against Israel “as long as the Jews attack us, violate our rights and shed our blood” (al-Hayat al-Jadida, 10, 11, 12 Oct.). Iraqi clerics, for their part, issued a fatwa calling for jihad (al-Iraq, 12 Oct.; al-Hayat al-Jadida, 15 Oct.).

Hamas put out statements in which it encouraged the Palestinian people to pursue the intifada, and called on Arabs and Muslims worldwide to support it financially and morally (3, 15, 26 Oct. – palestine-info.org). Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders also warned that they would carry out terror attacks against Israelis (al-Hayat al-Jadida, La Stampa, 14 Oct [BBC]). Shaykh Ahmad Yasin reiterated that “Israel is a foreign body, imposed by force and will be eliminated by force” (al-Hayat al-Jadida, 11 Oct.), and a Hamas statement of 9 November depicted the “occupying Jews” as “enemies of humanity” and “monsters in the shape of human beings.”

Shaykh ‘Abd al-Fattah in Gaza considered war inevitable, “part of a final, apocalyptic battle that will drive the Jews off Islamic soil.” The intifada, he believed would spread throughout the entire Arab world, uniting all the Muslims behind the Palestinian struggle. “All the Jews who came here from other countries… must now go back. Those that are from Palestine can stay, as long as they are peaceful,” he asserted (Chris Hedges, “The New Palestinian Revolt,” Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb. 2001 [Aqidah Islamic Information Service]).

Ahmad Abu Halabiyya, former acting rector of the Islamic University in Gaza, delivered a Friday sermon, broadcast live on the PA’s official television channel, in which he called on his co-religionists “to have no mercy on the Jews, no matter where they are… Fight them where you are… kill them… and
those Americans who are like them. They are all in the same trench against the Arabs and the Muslims because they established Israel here, in the beating heart of the Arab world, in Palestine.” Halabiyya, who is also a member of the PA-appointed Fatwa Council, quoted a Qur'anic verse often used by Islamists: “Oh, you who believe, do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies, for they are allies of one another. Who from among you takes them as allies will indeed be one of them” (MEMRI, dispatch no. 138, 14 Oct.; Yedi'ot Aharonot, 16 Oct.; NYP, 22 Oct.).

Shaykh Omar ‘Abd al-Rahman, the spiritual leader of Egypt’s largest Islamic militant group al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, imprisoned in the US for his involvement in the bombing of the New York Trade Center in 1993, called on Muslims to kill Jews worldwide. “Jihad is now a duty for the entire umma until Palestine and the al-Aqsa mosque are liberated and Jews are either pushed into their graves or back where they came from,” he said (CNN, 5 Oct.).

The leader of the Pakistani Islamist movement Hizb al-Mujahidin, Sayyid Tasawar Gardezi criticized “the hypocrisy of Muslim rulers and the fake leadership of the Muslims.” He also declared that a contingent of mujahidin was ready to leave for Palestine, since it was a religious and national obligation to take part in jihadi movements and the struggle aimed at freeing the Muslims (Pakistan, 18 Oct. 2000).

Although it is difficult to assess the impact of such calls, it can be safely assumed that they resonated in the minds of youngsters sent to perpetrate suicide attacks against Jews (Ibrahim Alloush, “A Report from the Street Battles of Amman,” Free Arab Voice, 6 Oct. 2000.)

*Mobilizing through TV Programs.* The Arab and the Palestinian media played a crucial mobilizational role during the intifada, “providing a constant flow of reportage on events, interspersed with nationalistic music and iconography.” In the first weeks of the intifada, Friday sermons, which emphasized Muslim-Jewish antagonism were broadcast widely on Palestinian TV. Arab satellite TV, particularly al-Jazira, provided regular commentary from Palestinian and Arab analysts, political thinkers and leaders, which helped define the meaning and the goals of the intifada for the local population (Rema Hamami and Salim Tamari, “Anatomy of Another Rebellion,” MERIP [Middle East Research and Information Project] 4, Winter 2000, p. 1; NYT, 24 Oct.; Ha’aretz, 25 Oct. 2000).

“The quantity and intensity of libels and false accusations increased during the intifada, with the aim of presenting Israel and Jews as evil, treacherous enemies that pose a mortal danger to the Palestinians, to Islam, and to all that is holy to them,” wrote Itamar Marcus. The intent of this campaign, he claimed, “is to intensify the hostile atmosphere toward Israel and is consistent with the PA’s policy of fostering hatred toward Israel” (see PMW, 31 Oct. 2000; 25 Feb. 2001).
Antisemitic Motifs and Holocaust Denial in the Arab Media. The Arab press exacerbated anti-Israel incitement by radicalizing the terminology used to describe the intifada and by repeating Qur'anic verses urging unity and steadfastness. The incidents on the Temple Mount at the outbreak of the intifada were depicted as a massacre (majzara) and slaughter (mazbaha). Devotion to the intifada was seen as a “blood oath” (bay'at al-damm). During the first weeks of the intifada the Palestinian daily al-Hayat al-Jadida ran a slogan in bold red letters at the head of each page reading: “The masses continue to pledge their blood for al-Aqsa” (al-Hayat al-Jadida, 30 Sept.; 4, 9 Oct. 2000). In addition to this kind of incitement, the Arab press published articles and caricatures, replete with antisemitic and Holocaust denial motifs. Ariel Sharon, who was blamed for igniting the intifada, was grossly attacked in the Arab media. In one cartoon he was depicted as an elephant on which a stereotypical Jew with a beard and a long nose was sitting, guiding him toward al-Aqsa mosque (al-Hayat al-Jadida, 1 Oct.).

Jordanian journalist, Rami Khouri considered Sharon “the embodiment of the Ugly Jew, the violent, tormented, perpetually provocative braggart,” although he warned against confusing Sharon’s “brand of sick, racist, militaristic, blood-curdling Zionism” with “normal human perspectives of the Jewish or Israeli people” (Jordan Times, 4 Oct.). An Egyptian writer referred to him as “the Nero of Sabra and Shatila,” who had entered the Haram al-Sharif on a mission of “humiliation” (al-Ahram Weekly, 19 Oct.), and Palestinian papers referred to him as “the general of death” (al-Hayat al-Jadida, 4 Oct.).

A caricature published in a Palestinian daily (which appeared irregularly after the outbreak of the intifada), depicted Palestine as an innocent girl crucified on a cross, with an arrow in her chest which bore the American flag at one end and the Israeli flag at the other, observed by Orthodox Jewish figures at the foot of the cross (al-intifada, 11 Dec. – www.pinonline.net).

Egyptian mainstream papers made an unprecedented number of references to Israel as a Nazi model state, and to Zionism as a racist ideology (al-Ahram, 13, 23 Oct.; 2 Nov.; al-Ahram Weekly, 12 Oct.; Akhbar al-Yawm, 14 Oct.). An Iraqi daily published an article by Shaykh 'Abd al-Ghaffar al-'Abbasi on “the image of the Jews portrayed in the Qur'an as a treacherous people,” reiterating that Jews should not be trusted because of their scheming, treachery, love of money, violation of agreements and arrogance (al-Iraq, 20 Oct.).

The accusation that Jews used the blood of Christians to make Passover matzot, resurfaced. In a television debate on the Qatari al-Jazira channel on 24 October, Palestinian Liberation Army Mufti Shaykh Colonel Nadir al-Tamimi, claimed that there can be no peace with the Jews because they suck the blood of Arabs for use on the holidays of Passover and Purim. Al-Tamimi also called for the overthrow of Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, prompting the Egyptian government to call for a boycott of the Qatari channel and to close its offices in Egypt. However, the Egyptian press was in agreement with al-
Tamimi about the Jews’ use of Arab blood for religious worship. The semi-official daily al-Ahram, published in October a full-page article by columnist ‘Adil Hammuda accusing the Jews of using the blood of slain Palestinian children for the preparation of Passover matzot. “Every time I see the children of the stones in occupied Palestine as they spring like blood from the arteries, I remember my grandfather who used to gather all the neighborhood children in his home in Alexandria to give them candy and tell them the tale of the Jew who slaughtered a boy and made Passover matzah from his blood.” Hammuda revealed that he had thought his grandfather’s story was a fairy tale. But when he matured, he realized that it was true, and that all the details were recorded in the Islamic religious courts in Damascus (al-Ahram, 28 Oct.; see also MEMRI, dispatch no. 150, 6 Nov.). A month later, an article in the Jordanian Islamist weekly al-Liwa’ quoted an American study, allegedly confirming the Jewish ritual of killing of a child at least once a year for drinking his blood (al-Liwa’, 13 Dec.).

Although not new, accusations of blood libel resurfaced with the increase of Palestinian-Israeli tensions. In response to Hammuda’s article, the ADL called on Egyptian President Mubarak to publicly condemn propagation of the blood libel and antisemitic incitement in the Egyptian press (Press Release, 7 Nov.). It issued a similar call to the PA, following an anti-Israel rally in Ramallah, during which a donkey draped with a tallith (Jewish prayer shawl) and clothes sprayed with swastikas and Stars of David, was paraded through the crowd (New Jersey Jewish News, 18 Jan. 2001).

Palestinian commentator Khalid Amayreh attacked Israelis and Zionists as blood-suckers, following the death of the 11-year old Palestinian child Muhammad al-Durra, in Gaza, during an exchange of fire between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian rioters in October. “The haunting specter of the murder, which, more or less, epitomizes Israel’s long standing treatment of Palestinians, Lebanese and other Arabs… testifies to the brutal ugliness of the Zionist mentality and its callous disregard for the sanctity of human life,” he wrote and went on to describe the Israeli soldier as “a vile thug, a sadist, a Zionist SS soldier,” who kills for joy (JAP-Net, 3 Oct. 2000).

The Egyptian weekly October published in December a two-part series entitled “The Jewish Personality and Israeli Action.” The author, General (Res.) Hasan Suwaylam, discussed at length the “Jewish personality” from ancient history to modern times. “Historians, race-studies professors and sociologists agree that humanity… has never known a race such as the Jewish race in which so many base and loathsome qualities have been gathered,” explained Suwaylam. “The Jews had a quality which distinguished them from others: whenever they gathered in a particular place and felt comfortable there, they turned the place into a den of evil… There is no difference between yesterday’s Jew and those of today, or between the Jewish and the Israeli personality, as some claim. This is because Israel, as a state, is nothing but a receiving vessel
for all of the Jews in the world... Zionism is the political and colonialist aspect of the Jewish faith. Therefore, an investigation of the traits of the Jewish personality... is a fundamental step in our war against it.” According to Suwaylam, “Jewish characteristics” included violation of agreements, paranoia and “reliance on lies as a means to achieve goals” (October, 26 Nov.; 3, 10 Dec.; see also MEMRI, dispatch no. 166, 19 Dec. 2000).

Palestinian columnist Hasan Khadr attacked the Arab depiction of the Jews, accusing them of misrepresenting the Islamic legacy. The meaning of the call “Khaybar, Khaybar, Oh Jews [Khaybar, an oasis in the Arabian Peninsula settled by Jews, symbolizing their defeat at the hands of Muhammad in 628],” he argued, had been turned into a political slogan in order to prove that the conflict between Muslims and Jews was religiously-based and that as in the historic precedent, Muslim armies would return to take their revenge. But in fact, said Khadr, Muslims had traditionally been tolerant toward Jews, and relations between Muslims and Jews had prospered for centuries. Khadr presumed that the problem with Judaism had begun with the identification between religion and nationalism made by Zionism, despite the fact that Jews had different origins and identities. Moreover, there was an agreement between Zionists and antisemites to seek permanent Jewish traits that did not change over the years under diverse geographic and cultural conditions. Thus, use of the slogan not only indicated acceptance of the Zionist claim on the continuity of the Jewish race but jeopardized the moral superiority of Muslims, and above all, threatened to turn a national conflict into a religious one (al-Ayyam, 7 Nov.).

Holocaust denial was also a recurring theme in the Arab media. Jarir al-Kidwa, an education adviser to Yasir ‘Arafat, branded the claims that Jews were murdered in the Holocaust baseless lies fabricated to evoke world sympathy. There was “no Dachau, no Auschwitz,” he said. “[They] were disinfecting sites” (Jewish Week, 20 Dec. 2000). In the Palestinian TV program “Pages from our History,” broadcast on 29 November, ‘Isam Sisalim, history lecturer at the Islamic University in Gaza, considered an expert on Jews and Judaism, accused the Jews of inventing the lie of extermination in order to justify the establishment of Israel, a “foreign entity, implanted as a cancer” in the Arab land. “[The Jews] always portrayed themselves as victims, and they built a center for heroism and Holocaust. Whose heroism? Holocaust? Heroism is our nation’s, the holocaust was against our people...We were the victims, but we shall not remain victims forever” (PATV, 29 Nov. – PMW). During a workshop at the Islamic University on the occasion of anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, Sisalim contended that the declaration had no legal or historic basis, and that the Jews, “an international gang,” had succeeded in extorting British consent (al-Ayyam, 6 Nov.).

An article published in Palestine Times, raised a similar accusation, describing Zionist Jews as “God’s Lying People,” whose lies are readily accepted in the West, “where the mass media are controlled by Jews” (PT 114, Dec. 2000).
Taysir Khalaf, a Palestinian writer living in Doha, referred to the “huge Holocaust empire” as not just a question of hegemony over the media or an anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian bias, but “a dangerous, destructive malady nesting in the minds of the chosen people, who strive to control the consciousness of humanity, and to reconstruct human values according to the Zionist point of view” (al-Quds al-‘Arabi, 14 Nov.).

Egyptian writer, Muhsin Hasanayn wrote that Hitler was a baby compared to the “terrorist Sharon.” He equated the “imagined stories” of the extermination of the Jews by Hitler with the “real ongoing holocausts” perpetrated by “Israel’s Nazis.” Aware of the anger the term aroused in Israelis, he claimed there was no other term to match their deeds. “So die in your anger, oh Nazis, sons of Nazis, descendants of Nazis!” (October, 8 Oct.). Hasan Suwaylam also discussed the Holocaust in his article on the Jewish personality, mentioned above, maintaining that the Jews’ approach to the Holocaust manifested a deep-rooted characteristic of the Jewish personality — lying. The Holocaust, he alleged, was a huge lie which they had managed to market around the world. Through this lie, they had extorted many countries, “even though many have proved that [the Holocaust] was not practically possible... Today, nobody in Europe may doubt the Holocaust or accuse the Jews of extortion, without finding himself in jail” (October, 26 Nov.; 3, 10 Dec.; see also MEMRI, dispatch no. 166, 19 Dec. 2000). Jordanian writer Muhammad al-Qadha argued that the real holocaust was that of the Palestinian people, who have been experiencing a policy of murder, massacre and racial transfer for hundreds of years (al-Ra‘y, 13 Nov.).

Analyzing the incitement and antisemitic manifestations during the intifada, Gary Rosenblatt, editor and publisher of the New York City Jewish Week, contended that they indicated that “the Jews have no historic ties to the land; that Israel, the enemy, must be destroyed; and that the peace process is temporary, and a means to achieving the ultimate goal of replacing the Jewish state with Palestine.” The renewed intifada, then, is not about borders or settlements or contested holy places. It is about a complete denial of Jewish history, including any claim to Jerusalem’s Western Wall as a site holy to the Jewish people (Jewish Week, 20 Dec. 2000).

The Internet War. The struggle for world public opinion during the intifada highlighted the Internet as a new battleground between Arabs and Israelis. In October, Israelis crashed the server of Hizballah’s website by flooding it with requests. Hizballah responded by attacking Israeli government sites, including those of the Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister’s Office. Hackers also attacked AIPAC’s site, causing damage to lists and records. A Jordanian journalist explained that the hackers were using their skills for “patriotic purposes, seeking vengeance for crimes committed against the Palestinian people” (Star 20, 2 Nov. – MSANews; al-Ayyam, 6 Nov.).
Pictures of martyrs, demonstrators and grieving mothers filled the Palestinian sites. An American Muslim site circulated in November the first chapter of Henry Ford’s antisemitic book *The International Jew*, a move criticized by American Muslim Bilal Cleland, who described Ford as “a filthy exploiter of millions of poor,” and claimed that “this sort of rubbish” does not weaken Zionism. “Zionism relies upon the fear of many Jews of antisemitism... [This] policy... does not help the Muslims as it strengthens Jewish support and Western post-Holocaust opinion behind the Israeli state” (MSANews).

**CRITICAL VIEWS AND CONCLUSION**

The *al-Aqsa intifada* proved the power of the religious dimension as a mobilizing force of Arab and Muslim masses. Only a symbol such as the sacred Islamic site of al-Aqsa in Jerusalem could have sparked off such an aggressive Muslim reaction. But after the first spontaneous tide of demonstrations, violent acts against Jewish targets worldwide and harsh anti-Israel and antisemitic rhetoric, the struggle reverted to the Palestinian-Israeli scene. The Palestinian issue remained the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian people remained the main bearers of the burden. The Islamists who had succeeded in inculcating their perception of the struggle against Israel and the Jews among more moderate and secular Arabs and Muslims, and in radicalizing the Arab discourse, failed to incite an all-out jihad. As already indicated (see ASW 1999/2000), the Arab media and popular sentiment against Israel are much more belligerent than the Arab governments, on whom they exert pressure to radicalize their positions in dealing with Israel.

Most Arab analysts share the view that the *intifada* has revived “a spirit of pan-Arabism among the Arab public,” and discredited the US as an honest broker (*al-Quds al-‘Arabi*, 27 Nov. [Middle East Mirror]). According to Egyptian pro-Islamist commentator Fahmi Huwaydi, the *intifada* destroyed the myths of the Arab-Israeli conflict and proved that conviction and will could prevail over military strength, as was the case in Algeria and Vietnam (*al-Hayat al-Jadida*, 18 Oct.). However, few voices criticized Arab leaders such as Saddam Husayn for exploiting the Palestinian issue for their own interests (*al-Hayat*, 7 Dec.). Those who did, saw the *intifada* as a revolt not only against Oslo but also against “a group of responsible Palestinians who should admit their mistakes” (*al-Hayat*, 12 Dec.). In an interview with the Arab-Israeli weekly *Kul al-‘Arab*, published on 17 November, Hussam Khadhr, a Palestinian Legislative Council member affiliated with the Fatah movement, harshly condemned the PA’s actions in the *intifada*. PA citizens, he said, “feel that [civil] institutions are not being built and there is no struggle against corruption. These feelings led to an accumulation of [tension] which was unloaded in the struggle against the occupation” (MEMRI, dispatch no. 154, 21 Nov.).

Palestinian official Mar’i ‘Abd al-Rahman, also criticized the “irresponsible positions” and the escalation of the Palestinian rhetoric. He claimed that the
voices calling for the destruction of Israel proved a lack of understanding of "the Israeli enemy and the Jewish problem" and were detrimental to the Palestinian cause (al-Itihad, 4 Dec. – MEMRI, dispatch no. 163, 11 Dec.).

Few Arab writers or intellectuals, supporters of peace with Israel, spoke out during the intifada to deplore violence and defend peace. MIFTAH, a Palestinian group for the promotion of global dialogue and democracy, issued a statement in mid-November to the Israeli public, expressing concern "that the conflict has, at times, dangerously spiraled, into an ethnic/religious one, such as the pogroms against Arab citizens of Nazareth, the lynching of the two Israeli soldiers in Ramallah and the numerous mob attacks on synagogues and mosques have shown" (online petition, 16 Nov. 2000).

Egyptian playwright ‘Ali Salim and author Amin al-Mahdi were concerned by the deterioration of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In an interview to al-Ahram al-‘Arabi, Salim criticized the Arab tendency to think justice was only on their side. He refused "to repent" for his position on peace, insisting that all parties were responsible for what was happening, and lashed out at the Arab media for inflaming the crisis and inciting the public (al-Ahram al-‘Arabi, 21 Oct.; see also MEMRI, dispatch no. 145, 31 Oct.).

Amin al-Mahdi also blamed the media for creating an atmosphere of violence by using fundamentalist rhetoric. "Fundamentalist slogans have appeared, while justice, humanism and human rights have been forsaken," he claimed. The rejection of the Israeli prime minister’s proposals at Camp David in July and the outbreak of the intifada were seen by al-Mahdi as "the latest of missed opportunities for peace" in the history of the conflict. The Arabs "have been incessantly and hopelessly reproducing the same historical moment for the past 50 years," he contended, and with the intifada, they had completed what Sharon had begun, supporting "an indirect alliance between the forces of Zionist expansion and Arab fascism."

Al-Mahdi, known for his harsh criticism of Arab society (see ASW 1999/2000), wrote bluntly: "The Arab mind has proved itself repeatedly to be merely a religious mind." Thus, the struggle for Palestinian rights has become transformed from "a rational action into an expression of hate and violence. Political emotions have taken the place of reason; the glory of suicide, killing and disrespect for human life have prevailed." The Arab mentality, he concluded, "has not realized that even imperfect peace agreements are preferable to war... because true peace is democracy, co-existence, development and modernization – things that the authoritarian Arab regimes are not ready for" (al-Hayat, 6 Dec., 2000; Ha’aretz, 19 Jan. 2001).

The proliferation of antisemitic expressions triggered a debate over their significance for the Arab attitude toward the Jews and Israel. "For anyone still disposed to credit the standard Muslim-Arab contention that, so far as Palestine is concerned, Arabs have never had anything against Judaism or Jews but only against Zionism and Zionists, this fall’s anti-Israel riots should have gone far to
dispel any remaining illusions. And if not the riots themselves, or the wanton destruction of ancient Jewish sites in Nablus and Jericho, then the words accompanying them; and if not the words shouted by frenzied mobs, then the presumably more reflective words articulated by leaders and dignitaries,” asserted Efraim Karsh, head of Mediterranean studies at King’s College, University of London (Efraim Karsh, “Intifada II: The Long Trail of Arab Antisemitism,” Commentary, Dec. 2000, p. 49). Pointing to the Islamic roots of anti-Jewish bigotry, Karsh contends that Arab anti-Zionism “has invariably reflected a hatred well beyond the ‘normal’ level of hostility to be expected of a prolonged and bitter conflict,” and seems to suggest that it is “a manifestation of longstanding prejudice that has been brought out into the open by the vicissitudes of the Arab-Israeli conflict” (Karsh, p. 50). Israeli scholar Raphael Israeli from the Middle East Department at the Hebrew University also wondered whether the virulence of Arab utterances against Israel and the Jews were “indicative of the predisposition of the Arab masses to absorb [such rhetoric]” (Raphael Israeli, Arab and Islamic Antisemitism, ACPR Policy Paper, No. 104 [Ariel Center for Policy Research], March 2000, p. 15).

Daniel Pipes and Gary Rosenblatt argued that Israelis “have clearly chosen to de-emphasize or even ignore” the phenomenon of Arab rejectionism and rhetoric which were dismissed by Shimon Peres as “only words” (Daniel Pipes, “Israel’s Moment of Truth,” Commentary, Feb. 2000, p. 23; Jewish Week, 20 Dec.).

These views are not shared by all scholars who deal with Arab antisemitism. Nissim Rejwan, a Middle East scholar who published a critique of the late Yehoshafat Harkabi’s prognosis of the Arab-Israeli conflict, referred to the antisemitic pronouncements as “empty rhetoric of the weak and helpless.” He ultimately rejected the use of the term antisemitism to describe Arab attitudes toward Israelis and Jews, claiming that the term was loaded with European-Christian connotations totally alien to the culture of the region (Nissim Rejwan, Arab Aims and Israeli Attitudes: A Critique of Yehoshafat Harkabi’s Prognosis of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Davis Occasional Papers, The Leonard Davis Institute, Jerusalem, 2000).

The debate over the term as well as the discussion of the impact of antisemitic rhetoric on the Arab attitude towards Israel and the Jews is likely to continue. Perhaps the definition of the term should be expanded to reflect more accurately the Arab portrayal of Israelis and Jews, which has so smoothly combined imported European antisemitic motifs with old Islamic tracts against the Jews.
IRAN

The conviction of ten Jews on charges of spying for Israel in 2000 has continued to trouble the Jewish community. The religious aspects of the Iranian approach to the question of Palestine and the harsh criticism of Israel following the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada inflamed anti-Jewish sentiments.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

The Islamic Revolution of 1979 was a major turning point in the history of modern Iran, which brought about a dramatic change in the life of the Iranian Jewish community (almost 100,000 on the eve of the revolution; now about 25,000). Twenty-three years later, the community continues to be influenced by two main factors: the legacy of the past and the Iranian-Shi’i attitude toward non-Muslims; and the revolutionary doctrine and its attitude toward religious minorities. Two recent developments have had a further impact on the life of the Jews. First, growing tensions within the ruling élite and the conservatives’ crackdown on the reform camp after the Majlis (Parliament) elections of spring 2000 resulted in the adoption of a harder line in the country. Second, and more importantly, the al-Aqsa intifada, which broke out in late September 2000, led to harsher statements against Israel and Zionism, as well as to an increase in anti-Jewish expressions. In addition, the arrest of 13 Jews charged with spying for Israel, and the conviction and imprisonment of ten of them (see ASW 1999/2000), continued to instill a sense of insecurity among the Jews of Iran.

PAST HERITAGE AND REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS

The history of Iranian Jewry has been marked by periods of suppression, persecution and harassment, as well as of relative security and freedom, such as in the years preceding the Islamic Revolution. The Golden Era of Iranian Jewry, as it became known, from 1963 to 1979, when the Jews enjoyed cultural and religious autonomy under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, economic progress and political rights similar to those of their Muslim compatriots, came abruptly to an end with the ascendancy of the Islamic regime. Although there was no governmental incitement or systematic harassment, Iranian Jews received “harsher treatment” than other recognized religious minorities, that is, excluding the Baha’is who are not recognized as such (Eliz Sanasarian, Religious Minorities in Iran, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000, p. 110). This attitude was the result of the legacy of maltreatment of Jews, which continued to leave its mark on popular attitudes; the basic tenets of the revolutionary doctrine
and the writings of leading revolutionary figures prior to the revolution (see *ASW* 1994), and the fact that many Jews were part of the Shah’s elite. In addition, economic difficulties in Iran, and pressure from the outside world (the US policy of “dual containment” and the subsequent sanctions against Iran) were also attributed, at least in part, to Israel and the Jews, who were believed to be “moving the wheels” of the world economy. Also, the religious aspects of the Iranian approach to the question of Palestine entailed anti-Jewish arguments.

Following Khomeini’s triumphant return to Iran in 1979, the leaders of the Jewish community met with him to pledge their loyalty. Khomeini adopted their formula on the difference between Judaism and Zionism stating: “We distinguish between Jews and Zionists. Zionism has nothing to do with religion.” Vague as it often appears, this distinction is still generally endorsed in official policy, although not always adhered to in public statements (see below). Once the revolution had stabilized, the recognized religious minorities came to rely on a measure of tolerance and protection. The regime could not altogether disclaim the traditional responsibility toward the *dhimmis* (protected non-Muslim minorities) that devolved upon a Muslim ruler, nor disregard the norms of behavior toward minority groups expected by the community of nations. Moreover, the government was aware that the Jews did not pose a political threat, and were generally loyal to the state and the regime. As a religious minority group, the Jews were given representation in the Majlis and their freedom of worship was not restricted. About a dozen synagogues are now active in Tehran alone and, given the overall religious atmosphere in the country and the community’s need to reorganize following the revolution, they are well frequented.

The election of Mohammad Khatami as president in 1997, his relative pragmatism and his quest for substantial reform, led to some relaxation in statements regarding Jews. Some intellectuals who had advocated dialogue between Islam and other faiths, including Judaism, before his election (see *ASW* 1997/8), reinforced their call after he became president. Yet, the conservative press continued its critical tone, even when discussing purely Jewish issues (see below). The life of the Jewish community, too, appears to have been influenced by the ongoing domestic tensions. The *al-Aqsa intifada* led to a further intensification of hostile expressions against Israel and Zionism, and occasionally also against Jews in general.

The US State Department’s report on human rights in Iran for 2000 described Iran’s record as “poor.” Religious minorities, it specified, experience “varying degrees of officially sanctioned discrimination, particularly in the areas of employment, education and housing.” Moreover, they “suffer discrimination in the legal system, receiving lower awards in injury and death lawsuits, and incurring heavier punishments than Muslims.” Its annual report on religious freedom for 2000 stated that the government “fuels anti-Baha’i and anti-Jewish sentiment” in the country “for political purposes.”
The discriminatory law of inheritance and blood money (diyeh, compensation for criminal damage) favoring Muslims, is a matter of considerable concern for the religious minorities. In April, Supreme Leader Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamene’i issued an edict regarding a family inheritance dispute among the Zoroastrian community, stating that if there are Muslim members in the family, infidels cannot receive any inheritance (Iranshahr, 22 June 2001). This means that if one member of a minority group converts to Islam, that person is entitled to the entire inheritance. A report by the Committee for Religious Minority Rights in Iran (CRMRI), affiliated with the Council of Iranian American Jewish Organizations, stated that at least one Jewish family has recently received a similar unfavorable ruling in court (CRMRI, “Anti Jewish Trends in Iran: Update, June 2001”).

Addressing the Majlis in extraordinarily critical tones (24 Dec. 2000), Jewish representative Maurice Mo’tamed lashed out at the widespread discrimination against non-Muslims. He specified discrimination in academic education, government recruitment, job promotion, restrictions on Hebrew instruction and discrimination in criminal law. “The exclusion of our university-educated young people from key official posts in the state administration goes against the noble goals of the Islamic Revolution,” he said, also criticizing the judiciary for the denial of rights to religious minorities. He expressed the hope that the difficulties facing the Jewish community, as well as other religious minorities, “will be resolved with the wisdom and good will of the authorities” (AP, AFP, 24 Dec. 2000). Vice-Chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations Malcolm Hoenlein went further, portraying Iranian Jewry as cut off from the rest of the Jewish world and living in constant fear. The situation in Iran, he said, “has deteriorated sharply for the Jews.” While it is “an overall deterioration,” he said, it particularly affects the Jews, “who are very depressed and very fearful” (Jerusalem Post, 20 Feb. 2001).

All in all, while Iranian Jews are occasionally criticized, they are generally treated with a measure of tolerance, which – albeit precariously – so far prevails. This situation has allowed a large number of Jews to remain in Iran, but has not mitigated their concerns. Even though the majority of Jews left the country after the revolution, there are still more Jews living in Iran than in any other Muslim country.

THE IMPACT OF THE JAILED JEWS AND THE AL-AQSA INTIFADA

The conviction of 10 Jews on charges of spying for Israel in 2000 has continued to trouble the community (see ASM 1999/2000). This, and previous statements of revolutionary leaders critical of the Jews, seemed to give further credence to the charge that Jews betray their governments, preferring the interests of Israel. In fact, as their defense lawyer Esma’il Naseri stated, the trial had “a very bad impact” on Iranian Jews, as “Jews were turned into spies” (Agence France Presse, 21 June 2000). In September, an appeals court overturned their
convictions for forming an illegal organization and recruiting agents, but upheld
the charge of illegal contacts with Israel. (Their sentences were subsequently
reduced to between two and nine years imprisonment). Mo'tamed reported in
February 2001 that he had visited the prisoners for the first time and that they
are being well treated. He confirmed that they had appealed to Ayatollah
Khamene'i to request clemency on the occasion of the anniversary of the
Islamic Revolution (Iran Daily and IRNA, 6 Feb. 2001). Yet, the three supreme
court judges who studied their appeal found it to have no legal basis (IRNA,

The religious aspects of the Iranian approach to the question of Palestine, and
the harsh criticism of Israel following the al-Aqsa intifada, were bound to promote
anti-Jewish sentiments. As was the case in the Arab world, the distinction between
Jews, Israel and Zionism was often blurred. Israel was referred to as a “bunch of
Jews,” the American Jews were often termed Zionists, and there was even
mention of seventh century Jews as “the Zionists of [the Prophet] Muhammad’s
time.” With the outbreak of the intifada, the number of anti-Jewish expressions
increased.

Addressing an international conference on Palestine, held in Tehran in April
2001, Ayatollah Khamene'i stated that there was “evidence on hand that a large
number of non-Jewish hooligans and thugs of Eastern Europe were forced to
migrate to Palestine as Jews.” The purpose, he said, was “to install in the heart
of the Islamic world an anti-Islamic state under the guise of supporting the
victims of racism,” thus dividing the world of Islam. Khamene'i added that
historical documents attested to “close collaboration of the Zionists with Nazi
Germany,” and that the “exaggerated numbers” of Jews killed in the Holocaust,
were “fabricated to solicit the sympathy of world public opinion, lay the ground
for the occupation of Palestine and justify the atrocities of the Zionists”
(IRNA, 24 April 2001).

In a Friday sermon (18 May 2001), Ayatollah Khamene'i dwelt in length on
the animosity of the Jewish communities towards the Prophet Muhammad in
the early Islamic era. Typifying the Jews of Arabia, he pointed to their
economic control and intellectual domination over the populace and their sense
of superiority which led them to mock and ridicule the people. Khamene'i
named the Jews as one of the main enemies of the Prophet, and enumerated
their acts of obstructionism, conspiracies and betrayal. He singled out the cases
of three Jewish communities accused of betrayal and animosity toward the
Prophet: Bani Nazir, who were banished, but allowed to take some of their
belongings with them; Bani Qaynuqa’, who were expelled and their assets given
to the faithful Muslims; and Bani Qurayza, who conspired to stab the Prophet
in the back, for which all their young males were executed (Kayhan, 20 May
2001). Such a speech “at the height of the Israeli-Palestinian mini war,” said the
CRMRI report, could be interpreted as an open threat to the Jews of Iran
The link between events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Holocaust was made even more frequently in the last year. Reporting from the West Bank, IRNA stated on the eve of Holocaust Memorial Day in 2001, that this year the commemoration had occurred in the midst of "a genocidal war" launched by the Jews against the Palestinians. Indeed, the report went on, the brutality and utter callousness of the Israeli repression prompted the analogy between "the German holocaust" against Jews and "the Jewish holocaust" against the Palestinians. Although such an analogy would probably be dismissed as "exaggerated" by the Zionist-influenced media in the West, the Israeli torment of Palestinian civilians made it far from implausible "both at the practical and theoretical levels." The siege and encirclement of the Palestinian population, which had effectively turned these towns and villages into "concentration camps," was hardly an un-Nazi practice (IRNA, 19 April 2001).

The impact on popular sentiment is obvious. The State Department reports on International Religious Freedoms and on Human Rights (Sept. 2000 and Feb. 2001, respectively) pointed out that the government's stated hostility to Israel and the perception among some conservative elements that Jews support Zionism and Israel, as well as the trial of the 13 Jews, created a "threatening atmosphere" for the Jewish community. Former President 'Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani chose to examine the situation from a different perspective, but his arguments could be construed as leading to a similar conclusion. Referring to developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he said that the situation "does not benefit the Jews, either." Jews throughout the world "are feeling insecure" that they have to "pay the cost of the atrocities perpetrated within the Palestinian territories." Of course, he said, the Jews are not responsible for such actions and they do not endorse them. In Iran, he said, "the Jewish community has issued a statement, condemning the Zionist movement." Yet, he went on, "those who are here [presumably the Iranian Jews] may become victims of the people's sentiments and wrong judgments." The Zionist action has "provoked the people's sentiments and makes them unhappy" (Radio Tehran, 27 Oct. 2000).

IRAN AND HOLOCAUST DENIAL

Even when discussing purely Jewish issues, segments of the Iranian press continued its hard line, alleging that the Holocaust was "one of the biggest frauds of the outgoing century" and that it was a story "made up by the Zionists to blackmail the West" (see ASW 1999/2000).

In fact, Iran has recently become a center for disseminating Holocaust revisionist views. After the visit to Iran by Roger Garaudy in 1998, German-born Fredrick Toben (who lives in Australia) arrived in December 1999 (see ASW 1998/9 and 1999/2000). Toben said recently that he would apply for political refugee status in Iran if his position in Australia became insecure (Teheran Times, 22 April 2001). Jürgen Graf, who left Switzerland after being
sentenced to prison for his views on the Holocaust, also went to Iran. He lectured at Iranian universities and began, with the assistance of his hosts, to organize an international conference on the Holocaust, which was to have been held in Beirut in March 2001 but was banned by the Lebanese government (WINEP, 25 April 2001).

Some Iranian newspapers publish Holocaust denial views and are harshly critical of the Jews. The Jews claim a "right to be paranoid," wrote Tehran Times (28 Sept. 2000), because they feel that the world is "after them." Yet, listing key Jewish members in the US administration, the paper stressed that in this predominantly Christian state, Jews "have a hand in every sensitive government post." Not only government, but all the major publishing houses, newspapers and the entertainment industry there "are headed by Jews." Does being "historically persecuted," the paper asked, give them the right to "rule the world" to "occupy it, usurp it, control it... without any resistance?" The main power in the US, asserted Jomhuri-ye Islami (7 Nov. 2000), is in the hands of a minority of influential Zionists. While the Jews make up less than 3.5 percent of the population, over half of the sensitive posts in the Congress, Senate, Cabinet and advisory positions in the Clinton administration, were held by Jews. Under such circumstances, obviously there cannot be much difference in the nature, tendency and performance of US presidents: They are, after all, "only executives of the Zionists' wishes."

Tehran Times seemed especially obsessed with the Holocaust. Perhaps "the biggest lie in history," a 25 January 2001 article maintained, took formal shape during the Nuremberg trials, where a confession "obtained by means of torture" became "the cornerstone of the official Auschwitz version." No one has ever asked "the Jewish swindlers," who present themselves as "gas chamber witnesses" any critical questions. Yet, "the terrible accusation" of genocide, is based only upon "the lies of a handful of Jewish swindlers like Rudolf Vrba, Filip Mueller and Elie Wiesel," and "the confessions of Auschwitz commandant Rudolf Hoess who was tortured for three days by his Jewish and British interrogators before signing the statement his tormentors had prepared for him" (Tehran Times, 17 Feb. 2001). There is "no documentary evidence for the gassing of even one human being in a German camp," it added, and the German documents do not confirm "the Holocaust story," in fact, they "directly refute it" (1 Feb. 2001). According to Tehran Times, about 150,000 prisoners died in Auschwitz, "mostly from diseases." There were also executions, the paper admitted, but this was only "for acts of resistance and sabotage." Yet, it complained, the "massive reductions" of the Auschwitz death toll do not affect the "sacrosanct figure" of six million Jewish "Holocaust victims." This figure, "remains as solid as the pyramids." That is the "holocaust mathematics" (Tehran Times, 29 Jan. 2001). Had Auschwitz been an extermination camp, it suggested (19 Feb. 2001), "virtually no Jew would have survived it." Yet, the memoirs of former Auschwitz inmates "fill whole
libraries.” The paper concluded that “professional survivors” who present themselves as witnesses of the “Holocaust” are themselves “living proof that the alleged extermination of the Jews did not take place.”
TURKEY

The Turkish fundamentalist (Islamist) press gave an antisemitic slant to its coverage of a wide range of subjects connected with Jews and Israel. It tended to focus more on Middle East topics in the latter part of the year when the al-Aqsa intifada broke out.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

The Turkish Jewish community consists of approximately 20,000 citizens out of a total population of 65 million. Some 18,000 live in Istanbul, 1,500 in Izmir and the rest are scattered throughout the country.

The Jewish community is represented by the chief rabbinate, headed by the Haham Bashi. There are about 30 active synagogues in Turkey, more than half of them in Istanbul, where there are also Jewish schools. The community publishes a weekly newspaper, Shalom, in Turkish and Ladino, and a bi-monthly magazine Tiyaki.

ANTISEMITISM AND THE TURKISH POLITICAL ARENA

A wide range of subjects related to Jews and Israel were treated with an antisemitic slant by the fundamentalist (Islamist) media. These included the weapons trade between the two countries; agricultural projects in southeast Turkey connected to GAP (the South-East Anatolia Agricultural Irrigation Project), involving Israeli experts; mutual visits between Turkish and Israeli officials; and the alleged role of the Mossad in Turkey. Another theme discussed frequently in the fundamentalist media was "Domme," concerning the followers of Shabtai Zvi (1626–76) who converted to Islam.

With the upsurge of tensions in the Middle East in the last months of 2000, the fundamentalist media focused more on Middle East politics. Mass protests took place at universities and mosques at which Israel was cursed and its flag burnt. The radical Islamist terrorist Turkish Hizballah have transferred their activities from the rural areas to the big cities and, according to police, are planning to strike at Jewish targets. On the Internet, two Turkish sites were active in promoting anti-Jewish and anti-Israel sentiments, one supported by right-wing activists as well.

The mainstream Turkish media was criticized for mentioning the religion of non-Muslim peoples in negative news items and three major newspapers promised to refrain from mentioning religion in the future. As in previous years, several journalists of mainstream publications, such as Sedat Sertğlu,
Güneri Civağolu, Ertuğrul Özkök, Güngör Mengi, Serdar Turgut and Hadi Uluengin, condemned antisemitism.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HOLOCAUST

Holocaust denial and distortion continues to be a disturbing phenomenon in Turkey, with occasional articles sympathetic to Roger Garaudy or David Irving appearing in the fundamentalist press. On the other hand, Turkey participated in the January 2000 Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust and agreed to set an official Holocaust memorial day.
North America
CANADA

The 280 antisemitic incidents reported in Canada in 2000 represented a 5 percent increase over the previous year. In October–November, after the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada, reported antisemitic incidents more than doubled and were more violent, compared with the same two months in 1999. Quebec experienced a sharp rise in antisemitic incidents in 2000. Renewed activity was reported within the extreme right Heritage Front camp.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

Canada’s Jewish population numbers 365,000, representing 1.3 percent of the total population of 27 million. The largest communities are Toronto (170,000) and Montreal (100,000). Other important Jewish centers are Vancouver (30,000), Winnipeg (15,000) and Ottawa (12,000).

The B’nai B’rith Canada and the Canadian Jewish Congress are leading national Jewish organizations. Canadian Jews publish some 20 newspapers and journals, including B’nai B’rith’s Jewish Tribune, the largest circulation Jewish newspaper in Canada, and the Toronto-based Canadian Jewish News.

EXTREMIST GROUPS

The Extreme Right

The Canadian white supremacist scene has been scattered and without coherent leadership for the latter part of the last decade, although Internet recruitment has enabled various individuals to affiliate themselves with pre-established hate groups in urban centers. There has been renewed activity within the Heritage Front camp. The Canadian Heritage Alliance (CHA), set up in the London/Kitchener-Waterloo corridor, seems to be an attempt to fill the void left by the diminishing Front and to inject some youthful vigor into the “freedom of expression” groups, such as Canadian Association for Free Expression (CAFE) and Canada First Immigration Reform Committee (CFIRC). Canadian Ethnic Cleansing Team (CECT) is another new white supremacist group which may have some affiliation with the Heritage Front group in the same area. There were also reports of Heritage Front activity in the Maritime provinces, including an assault by members on some Japanese tourists in a restaurant. In Saint John, New Brunswick, white supremacist leaflets were found in a city hall newspaper box. The material exhorted “White Canada” to “Wake up. No Jews. No Niggers. No gays. Take it from us. We will win the holy war. Keep Canada strong.”
The World Church of the Creator (WCOTC) is active in some small Ontario cities and in British Columbia (BC). In Brantford, Ontario, a man known as Bud Gallant, has been operating a WCOTC website.

On the skinhead front, the Vinland Skinheads are rumored to be organizing in both the anglophone and francophone communities in Quebec, while the Arrowcross Skins put out a call for members in the Toronto area on the US Stormfront message board on the Internet.

Islamist Groups
Hizballah, Hamas, al-Qa’ida (Usama bin Ladin’s organization in Afghanistan – see General Analysis) and other Sunni Islamic extremist groups are reportedly active in Canada. According to the National Post Online (4 May 2000), the head of CSIS (Canadian Security Intelligence Service), Ward Elcock, stated that he considers Islamic terrorists Canada’s prime security threat, and that Canada is facing a crisis of transnational Islamic terrorism. CSIS states that many of these groups blend into local immigrant communities where they fund-raise and spread bias and friction, often in mosques and other religious institutions. Canadian citizens in immigrant communities report that they have been intimidated and manipulated to support these groups. In late 1999 and early 2000 there was a massive manhunt for Algerian terrorists in Canada, after Ahmed Ressam, purported to be an agent of al-Qa’ida, was discovered transporting bomb-making materials to the United States via British Columbia, as reported in the National Post. CSIS indicates that it is monitoring 50 organizations and 350 individuals. Some names of extremist Muslim groups appeared in threats made to Jewish organizations during the Middle East tensions in late 2000. It is most likely, however, that rather than actually representing these groups, unaffiliated individuals are using their names to intimidate their targets.

ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITIES
There were 280 antisemitic incidents reported to B’nai B’rith Canada’s League for Human Rights (hereafter, the League) in 2000. This represents a 5 percent increase from the 267 incidents in 1999. Harassment (including assault, threats, hate propaganda distribution and hate mail, verbal slurs and systemic discrimination) comprised the largest proportion of incidents for 2000 (192). This is a decrease of 6 percent from the 205 cases of harassment in 1999. However, many of the incidents were far more violent than in years past. In 2000, there were 88 reported acts of vandalism across the country, a 42 percent increase from the 62 reported incidents in 1999. This is the second consecutive year showing an increase in reported acts of vandalism.

The number of antisemitic acts fluctuated only slightly across Canada during the year until the outbreak of violence in the Middle East in late September, which was accompanied by a wave of incidents. In October and November,
reported antisemitic incidents more than doubled, from 40 to 96, compared with the same two months in the previous year. It is certainly possible that perceived anti-Israel bias by some mainstream media outlets gave various elements tacit approval for their antisemitism.

Also markedly different was the severity of the incidents (see below). There were no assaults in October and November 1999 compared with seven assaults during this period in 2000. Incidents of vandalism (including fire bombings of synagogues) increased by over 200 percent, from 12 to 40. There were five bomb threats to Jewish or Israel-related organizations and four death threats to lay leaders and staff people of Jewish community groups. Although several assaults were purported to be committed by Arab Canadians most of the incidents reported during this period appear to have been acts of opportunistic hate groups or individual antisemites, who used Middle East tensions as a pretext or catalyst for their expressions of hatred, rather than as a reflection of pro-Palestinian sentiments.

Regionally, throughout the year, there were 110 reported incidents of antisemitism in Toronto, representing 39 percent of all reported incidents in Canada in 2000. These included a number of death threats, bomb threats, assaults, and serious acts of vandalism. Although this represents a 7.6 percent decrease from 1999, when 119 incidents were reported, several of the incidents were far more severe than in the past.

In regional Ontario (not including the city of Toronto or the National Capital Region) there was a 13 percent decrease in antisemitic incidents, with 41 reported in 2000 compared to 47 the previous year.

The 24 reported incidents in the Ottawa area represent a 25 percent decrease from the 32 reported incidents in 1999; they included one arson attack.

There were 14 reported incidents of antisemitism in Saskatchewan and Alberta in 2000, including the fire bombings of two synagogues in Edmonton in October, one of them bombed twice in three weeks, representing a significant increase in antisemitic incidents over the five incidents in 1999. The presence of a large Muslim community in these regions may account for the rise in attacks.

British Columbia (BC) had nine reported incidents in 2000, the second consecutive decrease from the 12 reported in 1999 and 17 reported in 1998.

Only one antisemitic incident was reported in the Maritime region in 2000 compared with three in 1999.

Quebec
The year 2000 saw an extraordinarily sharp rise in antisemitic incidents in Quebec. These were connected mainly with white supremacy activity, Middle East related incidents, and events surrounding the so-called Michaud affair. This affair began in December 2000 when former member of the Quebec
legislature (the National Assembly) and Parti Québécois nationalist hardliner Yves Michaud announced his intention to seek the party's nomination in the Montreal area riding of Mercier. A few days earlier, when interviewed on CKAC radio he said: "It's always about you [Jews]. You're the only people in the world to have suffered in the history of humanity. I had just about had it."

The next day, in a brief to the Estates General on Language, he suggested that the residents of a largely Jewish suburb of the City of Montreal were anti-Quebec, referring to them as immigrants, despite the fact that most had been born and raised in Quebec. The National Assembly voted unanimously to condemn Michaud for his remarks.

Antisemitism in the Montreal area increased markedly in the year 2000, particularly following the outbreak of violence in the Middle East. There were 71 reported antisemitic acts in 2000, an 87 percent increase over the 37 incidents recorded in 1999 and a 255 percent increase over the 20 incidents reported in 1998.

Montreal Jews were victims of vandalism, threats, and a number of assaults resulting in bodily harm. For example, on 10 October two individuals attacked an identifiably Jewish man at a metro station in Montreal, knocking him unconscious. Bystanders intervened when the attackers tried to throw him onto the subway rails. Further, a rabbi was harassed and insulted on a Montreal bus by 10-15 youths. When two women came to the rabbi's aid, one was slapped and spit upon. During the weekend of Succoth, seven Jewish-owned summer homes were vandalized in Ste. Agathe, Quebec. The mezuzahs were removed and the interior of one of the houses was virtually destroyed. Graffiti on the walls included curses and the words "Die in hell." The offenders have been identified and are to appear in a criminal youth court.

**Propaganda**

Concealing hate literature in books is a technique commonly used by hate groups. A customer in a used book store found a virulently antisemitic pamphlet inside a book. The pamphlet advertised classes in an Ottawa library which teach about the evils of Jews, including "how to detect a Jew by smell," "how to send money to Hamas and Hizballah through embassies in Ottawa" and "how to kill a Jew with your bare hands." It continued with Holocaust denial diatribes and "the Zionist-American Nazi plan to murder the entire Muslim population in the Middle East." Similarly, a man perusing the book *The History of the Jews* in a major Ontario bookstore found a Holocaust denial pamphlet tucked into the pages.

Sigfrida Publications, a magazine "for and about white women in the racist struggle" continues to sell white supremacist material from their BC headquarters.
Anti-Jewish propaganda intensified during the autumn. At pro-Palestinian rallies in Montreal, Toronto and Ottawa participants chanted "Kill the Jews" and carried placards equating the Star of David with the Nazi swastika.

There were 21 documented incidents of targeted Internet hate in Canada in 2000, not counting the many websites that disseminate racism and antisemitism. One message warned that they "want to kill Jews... Long live the Klan." Although there was a significant rise in hate sites promoting antisemitism or white supremacy in the last few years, the rate of increase has slowed down. In addition, since there is no evidence of an increase in followers of white supremacy ideology in North America, the effectiveness of the sites in swaying masses of people to this cause appears to be limited.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HOLOCAUST AND THE NAZI ERA

Holocaust Denial and Trivialization

Ernst Zündel, known worldwide for his distribution of hate propaganda published by Samisdat, his own publishing house, and on Zundelsite, his Internet website, has been involved in an ongoing case (over five years) before the Canadian Human Rights Commission (see ASW 1997/8, 1998/9, 1999/2000). In 2000 Zündel lost his motion to have one of the commissioners removed because of reasonable apprehension of bias. Meanwhile, the right extremist Paul Fromm of the Canadian Association for Free Expression seems to have taken over the case from Zündel, who has ceased attending the hearings. This case is significant because it deals not only with Holocaust denial but also with the jurisdiction of the Canadian Human Rights Act over the Internet.

Holocaust trivialization runs the gamut of socio-political interactions. For example, a man was assigned the word "Gestapo" as a computer password by his company's technician and had to explain its offensiveness in order to receive a new password. Various political groups have referred to the policies of their provincial governments as "Nazi-like" or reminiscent of World War II Germany. Equating the swastika with the Star of David appeared to be a popular formula, especially in anti-Israel propaganda and placards of both the extreme right and extremist Muslims.

Holocaust Commemoration and Education

Nova Scotia, British Columbia, Manitoba and Alberta declared Yom ha-Shoah (Holocaust Remembrance Day) to be an official Provincial Memorial Day, bringing the number of provinces to eight (the others are Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Quebec and New Brunswick).

The League continued to be involved in several Holocaust education projects in 2000. It again sponsored the "Holocaust and Hope" student study tour to Israel and the Educators' Study Tour to Germany, Poland and Israel. The program provides Holocaust education to multi-faith groups in the context
of anti-racist education in Canada. It also conducted a research project entitled: "Holocaust Education in Canada: A Review and Analysis of Curriculum, Policies, Programs and Teacher Training."

In order to bolster the availability of Holocaust educational resources and to support the commitment made by Canada at the Stockholm International Forum on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research held in January 2000, the League has prepared the Yom ha-Shoah (Holocaust Memorial Day) Teacher's Guide with funding from the Department of Canadian Heritage.

RESPONSES TO RACISM AND ANTISEMITISM

Court Cases
One of the original members of the Northern Hammerskins in Winnipeg, Manitoba, was arrested in April of 2000 for assault. Eugene Welsh, long involved in the White Power skinhead movement, was also a defendant in a 1997 murder trial.

Donna Upson, a card-carrying member of the white supremacist Ku Klux Klan, Aryan Nations and the Nationalist Party, was sent to Nova Scotia on a recruiting drive for one or more of these groups. She was arrested after threatening a black pastor. With several previous convictions for hate-related offenses, Upson was sentenced to two years in prison. The hate motivation of these crimes acted as an aggravating factor upon the sentence, which she is appealing.

Public Activity
Several national and community-based projects to foster tolerance and human rights were launched in 2000, with the active participation of the League. The City of London (Ontario) escalated its initiatives against racism and hate. The League is also assisting London's Anti-Racism and Anti-Hate Committee to conduct research and to set up an anti-hate hot line. London is becoming a model of a close cooperative effort between police, government and community groups.

"Connecting Communities with Counsel" (CCWC) is a community initiative developed in cooperation with the Law Society of Upper Canada's Equity Department. The CCWC is setting up infrastructure for matching lawyers who are interested in donating their services with community groups concerned with human rights.

In February 2000, to commemorate Black History Month, the League launched the highly acclaimed Black/Jewish Dialogue Program to strengthen this relationship in order to jointly counter racism and antisemitism.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The number of antisemitic incidents in 2000 increased by 4 percent over 1999. Several right-wing extremist groups exploited the increased tensions in the Middle East in the fall to propagate their antisemitic and anti-Israel biases. Former Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke began a campaign to build on nationalist sentiments in Russia. Exploitation of the Internet by hatemongers and extremists continued unabated.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

The Jewish community in the United States today numbers 5.6 million, out of a total population of over 283 million. American Jews constitute the largest concentration of Jews in the world, currently making up approximately 2.1 percent of the American population. Jews of East European origin make up the majority of American Jewry, while the United States is also home to the largest number of Holocaust survivors outside the State of Israel.

The bulk of American Jewry lives in several large cities and their environs, including New York City (1.45 million), Los Angeles (519,000), Southeast Florida (514,000), Chicago (261,000), Boston (227,000), San Francisco (210,000), Philadelphia (206,000) and Cleveland (81,000). The intermarriage rate is high, today accounting for more than 50 percent of all unions involving a Jewish partner.

Leading national Jewish organizations include the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), Anti-Defamation League (ADL), B’nai B’rith, Hadassah, Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), Jewish War Veterans (JWV) and many other religious, fraternal and Zionist groups. The Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations acts as the domestic and foreign policy umbrella group for 55 member organizations. A merger between the Council of Jewish Federations, United Israel Appeal and United Jewish Appeal in 1998 created the United Jewish Communities (UJC), which represents and serves Jewish community federations and independent Jewish communities throughout North America.

There is an active Jewish press and almost every community with a large Jewish population supports its own English-language weekly newspaper.

EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS AND GROUPS

Among organized right-wing hate groups active in the United States today, the National Alliance is one of the most dangerous. Led by veteran antisemite
and racist William Pierce since 1974, this neo-Nazi organization is increasingly active, with continued growth in number of members and contacts. Pierce’s purchase in 1999 of Resistance Records, the largest distributor of hate-rock music in the country, expanded his multimedia approach, targeting young people. In 2000 Pierce launched the neo-Nazi black metal music company Cymophane Records. Evidence suggests that Cymophane Records—Nordland in Stockholm is an outlet of the same company (see Sweden). The National Alliance continues to use leafleting as a means of disseminating its propaganda, especially on college campuses. There have been bulk mailings of tapes of Pierce’s speeches and of the National Alliance’s magazine National Vanguard, in addition to Pierce’s weekly radio broadcast “American Dissident Voices,” also available on the web.

The National Alliance’s current strength is based on its skillful use of technology, especially the Internet, its willingness to cooperate with other extremists, its energetic recruitment and promotional activities, and its vicious, but pseudo-intellectual propaganda.

The Christian “Identity” movement promotes its racist, antisemitic agenda through pseudo-religious themes. It holds that white Anglo-Saxons are the “chosen people” of the Bible, that Jews are the children of Satan, and that the white race is superior to others. Some of the leading “Identity” groups include Pete Peters’ Scriptures for America, America’s Promise Ministries of Sandpoint, Idaho, Dan Gayman’s Church of Israel, and Thomas Robb’s Kingdom Identity. In addition, right-wing Patriot leader Bo Gritz recently converted to Christian “Identity.”

Vincent Bertollini, a wealthy extreme-right propagandist, and Carl Story, both of Sandpoint, Idaho, lead the 11th Hour Remnant Messenger, a Christian “Identity” organization with a pseudo-theological bent that shares the antisemitic, white supremacist philosophy of Aryan Nations. The two men have used wealth acquired from Silicon Valley computer ventures to finance mass mailings and other activities. Recently they helped re-capitalize Aryan Nations, after a court judgment bankrupted the group (see below).

Led by Richard Butler, Aryan Nations is a paramilitary neo-Nazi group based in Hayden Lake, Idaho. Story and Bertollini, acquaintances of Butler, worked to promote “Identity” theology and white supremacy through leaflet mailings and large donations. In 1999, they temporarily discontinued their support of Aryan Nations after the group was sued (see below). In August 2001, Pastor Neuman Britton, a longtime member whom the elderly Butler had appointed his successor in 1998, died.

The virulently antisemitic and racist World Church of the Creator (WCOTC) promotes the creation of “an all-white nation and ultimately an all-white world,” rejecting Christianity altogether in favor of a “race-based,” whites-only religion. (In contrast to Christian “Identity,” a theological hate movement, WCOTC repudiates Christianity along with all other religions). The
group has recently made a concerted effort to recruit college students, and to spread its propaganda by dropping booklets on lawns or inserting fliers in free newspapers. After its founder and leader Ben Klassen committed suicide in 1993, the group suffered a decline, until its resurrection by Matt Hale in 1996. Hale calls himself “Pontifex Maximus,” or “supreme leader,” of the group. The reborn WCOTC, based in East Peoria, Illinois, has a small but growing membership of dedicated individuals who call themselves “Creators” and who are involved in an aggressive campaign to disseminate WCOTC’s “Creativity” propaganda and recruit new members.

During the unrest in the Middle East that began in late September, Hale made repeated verbal attacks against Israel, declaring a “Day of Rage” against “Jewish imperialism” in October. He also attempted to garner greater media coverage for his group’s activities. Hale has taken advantage of recent news events to reinforce the idea of a Jewish conspiracy to control the world. For example, he presented Senator Joseph Lieberman’s vice presidential nomination and the unrest in the Middle East as examples of what he and other extremists label a “Jewish Occupied Government,” in which too many Jews hold too much power. In February 2001, Hale – a law school graduate – was denied a license to practice law in Montana, as he had been in Illinois the year before.

The National Socialist Aryan Party (NSAP), based in Nebraska, exemplifies the growing trend of hate organizations which began on the Internet and which are now trying to form grassroots chapters in California, New York and Oregon, among other states. NSAP’s stated mission is “to advance the Aryan race.” Its motto, “We must secure the existence of our race and a future for white children,” is known as “The 14 Words,” a battle cry for white supremacists and neo-Nazis coined by David Lane of The Order.

The National Socialist Movement, based in Minneapolis, is one of the most active, expanding neo-Nazi groups. It has begun conducting armed paramilitary training in Ohio.

Founded by Willis Carto in 1955, Liberty Lobby was for decades the most influential antisemitic propaganda organization in the United States. Liberty Lobby had considerable impact on the growth of American militia groups, through three media vehicles: The Spotlight, a weekly newspaper which published antisemitic, anti-Israel and anti-government conspiracy theories, with a circulation of about 100,000; Liberty Lobby’s national radio programs, “Radio Free America” and “Editor’s Roundtable,” which broadcast interviews with hate group leaders and conspiracy theorists; and The Barnes Review (after Harry Elmer Barnes, one of the first Holocaust deniers), a monthly magazine focusing on historical revisionism and Holocaust denial, with a claimed circulation of 11,000. Carto launched this publication after he broke with the Institute for Historical Review, which publishes the Journal of Historical Review.

In December 2000, Spotlight reported that a legal settlement in which Liberty Lobby had filed for bankruptcy protection had been overturned. Bankruptcy
protection would have enabled Liberty Lobby to continue avoiding payment of
 DAMAGES owed to IHR (see below) as the result of a longstanding legal and
 financial dispute rooted in Carro’s break with IHR. In July 2001, Liberty Lobby
 was denied protection and forced to liquidate its assets, which meant ceasing
 publication of Spotlight. However, a month later, a new and almost identical
 newspaper called American Free Press was launched by the Spotlight staff.

 Defining Russia as the “key to white survival,” former Ku Klux Klan leader
 David Duke has targeted this country as a means of broadening his popularity
 internationally and finds a receptive audience for his antisemitic message (see
 Russia). Duke’s organization NOFEAR (National Organization for European
 American Rights), based in Mandeville, Louisiana, with 26 chapters in 17 US
 states listed on their website, stands to gain publicity from his visits and
discussions there. Duke has also used leaflets to try to recruit more members,
sporadically distributing pamphlets in many communities across the United
 States.

 Militia groups in the United States have decreased in number in the past
 few years, but still pose a criminal threat, as they direct anti-government fervor
 into action. Although most militia groups profess to be non-racist, some militia
 members have expressed racism or antisemitism, such as Mark Koernke’s
 frequent references to the “Kosher Mafia.” The militias are most active in
 Texas, Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky and California. Leaders of the movement
 include Koernke of Michigan, Charlie Puckett of Kentucky, and John
 Trochman of Montana. In connection with the turn of the millennium (Y2K),
militia members conspired to commit criminal acts of violence against federal
 buildings and officials and engage in confrontations with police officials. The
 Y2K event was exploited by militia leaders to promote extremist conspiracy
 theories such as the notion that, with its onset, the US government would take
 violent and repressive measures against its citizens. This idea is a familiar
 rallying cry of the militia movement, based on reactions to, among other things,
 the violent Ruby Ridge and Waco standoffs with the government (see ASW
 1995/6). Recently, splinter groups have been breaking away from the militias,
deeming them not radical enough; these groups are characterized by the
 phenomenon known as “cell activity,” or “leaderless resistance.” In December
 1999, militia leader Donald Beauregard was arrested in Florida for six criminal
 offenses, including conspiring to steal explosives from National Guard facilities
 in Florida. Western Illinois Militia leader Dan Shoemaker was convicted on
 eight of the 13 counts brought against him on 3 November 2000.

 The Church of the American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, led by Jeff
 Berry of Butler, Indiana, is one of the most active Klan (KKK) organizations in
 America. Berry established the American Knights of the KKK in 1995. (Its
 current name was adopted in 1999.) While most other Klans across the country
 have declined, the American Knights have been active, spreading propaganda
 and attempting to hold rallies across the country. Prior to his arrest (see below),

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Berry was one of the most active Klan figures in America. His group held frequent rallies in cities, including New York and others throughout the Midwest and the South. It also distributed propaganda by illegally stuffing fliers in free local newspapers. Other active Klan groups include the Imperial Klans of America (IKA) and the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. The headquarters of the IKA moved this year from Powderly, Kentucky, to Prospect Heights, IL. In addition, Ron Edwards, who had previously headed the group, was replaced by Jamey Keith. Most Klan groups are virulently antisemitic.

Despite substantially toning down his rhetoric during Saviors’ Day in February 2000 and at the Million Family March (MFM) in October 2000, Minister Louis Farrakhan, leader of the Black separatist Nation of Islam (NOI), continues to preach that Jews control the lives of African-Americans.

Khallid Abdul Muhammad, national chairman of another racist, black nationalist movement, the New Black Panther Party (NBPP), died on 17 February 2001. Four members of the NBPP may compete for leadership of the group – Aarron Michaels, Malik Shabazz, Hashim Nzingha and Quanell X from Houston.

During Saviors’ Day, the NOI’s annual convention celebrating the birth of NOI founder Master Fard Muhammad, Farrakhan invited Rabbi David Weiss of Neturei Karta (a group of ultra-Orthodox Jews with a record of hostility to Israel and Zionism) to speak. Weiss repeatedly attacked Zionism and Israel, telling the crowd that the Holocaust was punishment on the Jewish people for trying to establish the State of Israel. Neturei Karta members also showed up at the MFM.

In front of a nationally televised audience a day before the MFM, Farrakhan reiterated his belief that Jews control black athletes and professionals, calling it a “master-slave relationship.” Farrakhan had also made several other antisemitic statements on his US tour promoting the MFM.

The main NOI website maintains links to several of Farrakhan’s past speeches, including some in which he makes racist and antisemitic remarks. Other NOI links lead to the NOI’s infamous publication The Secret Relationship between Blacks and Jews and to a range of hostile articles on Jews. The NOI has posted many anti-Israel articles in regard to the recent Middle East conflict.

ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITIES

Organized hate groups such as the various neo-Nazi organizations, KKK factions and “Identity” churches remain unremitting sources of anti-Jewish hostility. Smaller extremist and white supremacist groups operating Internet sites have succeeded in reaching an audience that is disproportionate to their size. While most antisemitic activity in the US is limited to hate propaganda, members of extremist organizations and their associates sometimes engage in threats, violence and vandalism.
Violence and Vandalism
The total number of antisemitic incidents in 2000 increased in comparison with 1999. Forty four states, and the District of Columbia, reported approximately 1,606 antisemitic incidents, marking an rise of 59 incidents above the 1999 total. This represents a 4 percent increase in anti-Jewish activity, reversing the downward trend prior to 1999, which saw a 4 percent decline.

Antisemitic activity reported in 2000 consisted of acts of harassment (intimidation, threats and assaults) and vandalism (light property damage as well as arson and cemetery desecrations). As in the past, antisemitic acts of harassment, threats or assaults against Jewish individuals or institutions made up more than half of all anti-Jewish activity reported (55 percent), with a total of 877 incidents, up from 868 in 1999. Acts of antisemitic vandalism showed an increase in 2000 after a slight decrease in 1999. A total of 729 incidents of vandalism were recorded, compared with 679 in 1999 – an increase of 7 percent.

New York, the state with the largest Jewish population, once again recorded the highest number of antisemitic acts. There were 481 such incidents in 2000, an increase of 37 percent over the previous year. California registered the second-highest rate of antisemitic activity with 257, a 7 percent decrease over the year before. New Jersey was third, with 213 cases, a decrease of 6 percent from the previous year. Massachusetts reported 128, an increase of 15 percent.

The small increase in antisemitic incidents may be related to the rise in tensions in the Middle East since the end of September (the highest monthly number of the year’s incidents took place in October). While there is usually an increase in antisemitic incidents during the Jewish High Holy Days, when Jews are more visible, in 2000 there were at least 34 incidents that were linked by the perpetrator to the unrest in the Middle East.

On 12 October 2000, three assaults occurred on the same night in the same Chicago, Illinois, neighborhood; two were known to have been perpetrated by Palestinian Americans. The most serious incident involved a rabbi who was shot at (but not injured) while sitting in his car. On 10 July 2000, an individual entered the Los Angeles Holocaust Museum, gave the Nazi salute and said, “We should have killed all you Jews.”

Internet
The exploitation of the Internet and World Wide Web by hatemongers and religious and racial extremists continued unabated in 2000. Antisemites and racists used the Internet to spread hateful messages, to raise funds and to recruit and organize members. Because of the near total anonymity offered by the Internet, haters are free to expound their ideas and mask their identities. As a result, there are literally hundreds of websites that spread racism and antisemitism. A number of sites are also devoted to Holocaust denial and revisionism.

Among the extremists with established hate sites were Don Black of Stormfront, David Duke and his newly-founded National Organization for
European American Rights, William Pierce and his National Alliance, Tom Metzger and his White Aryan Resistance, the “Identity” church movement, Matt Hale and the WCOTC, neo-Nazi skinheads, “Aryan” women’s groups and several KKK chapters. Holocaust denial groups such as the Institute for Historical Review and the Committee for Open Debate on the Holocaust, as well as militia groups, also made their presence felt online.

In the aftermath of the selection of Senator Joseph Lieberman for Democratic vice president, antisemites, racists and bigots took to the Internet to spread antisemitic vitriol in various general chat rooms and online message boards. While the majority of the messages were posted by antisemites and racists with the intention of reaching others of a similar bent, remarks also appeared on a handful of racist web pages operated by some notorious antisemites, including Don Black’s Stormfront and Matt Hale’s WCOTC.

Numerous groups and individuals have created and maintained websites promoting the antisemitic, racist ideas of Adolf Hitler’s Nazi party. The website for the National Alliance, the most prominent, overtly neo-Nazi organization in the United States today, features transcripts of broadcasts from leader William Pierce’s weekly antisemitic radio broadcasts, the text of articles from the group’s National Vanguard magazine, and a catalog of over 600 books.

In addition, although today’s Ku Klux Klan is extremely fragmented, the various groups have been setting up websites as a means to revitalize themselves.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HOLOCAUST AND THE NAZI ERA

Holocaust Denial

Since its inception in 1979, the Institute for Historical Review (IHR), a California-based Holocaust denial organization founded by Willis Carto of Liberty Lobby, has promoted the antisemitic conspiracy theory that Jews fabricated tales of their own genocide to manipulate the sympathies of the non-Jewish world. In 1991, IHR’s attempts to attract attention led the American Historical Association to issue a statement condemning Holocaust denial and adding, “No serious historian questions that the Holocaust took place.” IHR entered a period of institutional decline when, in 1993, it ousted Carto over alleged financial improprieties. Deprived of Carto’s monetary resources and focusing most of its attention on its continuing lawsuits against him, IHR was unable to produce its pseudo-scholarly Journal of Historical Review regularly. Nevertheless, IHR remained the world’s single most important outlet for Holocaust denial propaganda, keeping in print such classics as Arthur Butz’s The Hoax of the Twentieth Century, and Fred Leuchter’s The Leuchter Report. In 1996 a California court ruled against Carto and awarded IHR’s parent corporation, the Legion for the Survival of Freedom, $6 million. The appeals process continued into mid-2001, when Liberty Lobby was denied bankruptcy protection, forced to liquidate assets and pay damages to IHR (see above).
newly invigorated IHR held a "revisionist" conference in May 2000 – its first since 1992 – at which David Irving, Robert Faurisson, Arthur Butz, Jürgen Graf, Ernst Zündel and Bradley Smith, as well as former US Congressman Paul McCloskey, Jr., were among the speakers.

Since 1988, Bradley Smith, head of the Committee for Open Debate on the Holocaust (CODOH), has been attempting to disseminate Holocaust denial propaganda on college campuses by placing advertisements in student newspapers. To date he has run ad campaigns in eight campus newspapers; he has also purchased smaller ads promoting his website, and has been able to have copies of a pamphlet entitled The Revisionist inserted into several newspapers. His major ads have always provoked controversy and have been turned down by most college newspapers; since 1998, in particular, Smith has been able to place ads only in the newspapers of smaller and less prestigious colleges. In response to his decreasing effectiveness, he announced in January 2001 his intention to begin using more subtle tactics for spreading Holocaust denial, including the submission of op-ed style opinion pieces, which would deal with Holocaust denial only obliquely.

In May 2000, one month after losing his lawsuit against Deborah Lipstadt in a British High Court, British Holocaust denier David Irving arrived in the United States for three months of speaking appearances. He began in California, where he spoke at the thirteenth Holocaust denial conference of the Institute for Historical Review and finished his tour with his own Holocaust denial conference, "Real History, USA," which took place in Cincinnati, from 22 to 24 September. This was his second conference in the United States (the first one was in 1999), and featured, among others, Bradley Smith, Charles Provan, John Sack and Germar Rudolf. Irving is currently planning a 2001 conference, which he says will take place in New Orleans.

RESPONSES TO RACISM AND ANTISEMITISM

Legislation/Law Enforcement

The majority of states now have penalty-enhanced hate crime laws. Moreover, the Federal Hate Crime Statistics Act requires the Justice Department to acquire data on crimes which "manifest prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity" from law enforcement agencies across the country and to publish an annual summary of its findings.

The Hate Crimes Prevention Act, designed to eliminate gaps in federal authority to investigate and prosecute hate crimes, was approved by the Senate in July 1999 but eventually stripped from a congressional appropriations bill by conservative lawmakers. The issue, however, remained high on the national agenda, with legislation promoted as an important factor in deterrence.
Court Cases

In September, a jury awarded $6.3 million to a mother and son of part American Indian origin who were attacked by Aryan Nations guards outside the group’s northern Idaho headquarters. The jury found the group, its 82-year-old leader Pastor Richard Butler, and its corporate entity guilty, of negligence in the selection, training and supervision of the security guards. The judgment was large enough to cripple the group. In late October, Butler and 30 followers held a parade under the Aryan Nations banner and pledged to continue spreading their racist message in northern Idaho.

In November, Butler was forced to declare bankruptcy and liquidate his assets in order to pay off debts. The 20-acre Aryan Nations compound and the Aryan Nations name were legally handed over to the plaintiffs, forcing Butler to rename his organization the Aryan National Alliance.

Buford O’Neal Furrow, the 37-year-old former Aryan Nations guard who shot and killed a Filipino-American postal worker and wounded four youngsters and a receptionist at the North Valley Jewish Community Center in Granada Hills, outside Los Angeles, California, in August 1999, received a life sentence in January 2001.

Jeff Berry, leader of the Indiana-based Church of the American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, was ordered to pay $120,000 to two television journalists who claimed that in November 1999 he had locked them in a room until they handed over their interview tapes, because he suspected their report would criticize the Klan. Berry was also charged with theft, conspiracy to commit intimidation and conspiracy to commit robbery with a deadly weapon.

San Diego-based Alex Curtis, a radical voice of the racist right, was arrested in November on three federal counts of conspiracy to violate civil rights. He hopes that a violent revolution will topple the United States government, which he considers “a Jew-occupied government,” and replace it with a “race-centered” government, with citizenship and residency restricted to “those of pure White ancestry.” Curtis employed the Internet, his Nationalist Observer magazine and telephone hotlines to spread his ideas.
Latin America
OVERVIEW

There was no significant change in the extent of antisemitism in Latin America in 2000. Laws against discrimination and racism helped to prevent the dissemination of antisemitic material; however, rightist groups continued to operate, including neo-Nazis who were active in recruitment. These groups routinely publish antisemitic propaganda leaflets and maintain various Internet sites, which are closely linked. Chile and Brazil are the primary locations for radical right activity. A major figure is the ultra-rightist Argentinean leader Alejandro Biondini.

With the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada there was an upsurge in antisemitic incidents, mainly in countries such as Chile and Venezuela, with large Muslim communities and radical Islamist activity.
ARGENTINA

The Argentinean authorities closed the offices and newspaper of the ultranationalist Partido Nuevo Orden Social Patriótico, following a complaint of antisemitism. The other extreme nationalist movement, Partido Nuevo Triunfo, continues to function, mainly as an Internet site. Several violent antisemitic incidents were recorded, mostly in the first half of the year.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

With about 200,000 Jews out of a total population of over 35 million, Argentina has the largest Jewish community in Latin America. The great majority of Jews live in Buenos Aires and its environs; however, there are also sizable communities in Rosario, Córdoba, and Santa Fe. Most Argentinean Jews are the descendants of nineteenth and twentieth century immigrants from Europe and the Middle East.

The Jewish community maintains many educational, cultural and religious institutions, including a Hebrew and a Yiddish press, publishing houses and an educational system from kindergarten through university. The leading Jewish organization is DAIA (Delegación de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas), which represents communities and organizations to the authorities and is responsible for safeguarding the rights of members. AMIA (Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina) is the main organization of the Jewish community. The Vaad ha-Kehilot is the umbrella organization of all the communities in the provinces.

In recent years the economic situation of Jews in Argentina has deteriorated severely, particularly in the wake of the collapse of Jewish banks, and this has deleteriously affected Jewish activity (see ASW 1998/9).

EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS

The two main ultra-right-wing nationalist movements in Argentina are Partido Nuevo Triunfo and Partido Nuevo Orden Social Patriótico. Partido Nuevo Triunfo (New Triumph Party – PNT), led by Alejandro Biondini, evolved from an Internet publication. His present site, Ciudad Libertad de Opinión (City of Freedom of Opinion), in Spanish and various other European languages, is a portal to all the neo-Nazi organizations in Latin America and Europe, and provides links to 300 extreme right-wing sites around the world. The site has a news agency, Kalki (Biondini’s nickname). PNT’s activities both on the Internet and as a party violate the anti-discrimination law forbidding incitement to racism (see below).
The party was active during the year distributing propaganda promoting Biondini’s candidature in the 2003 presidential elections. It also held a meeting in a Buenos Aires hotel in September 2000, the proceedings of which were transmitted by the commercial TV channel Crónica, including the speech of Chilean neo-Nazi leader Alexis López Tapia.

**Partido Nuevo Orden Social Patriótico** (New Order Social Patriotic Party – PNOSP), led by Alejandro Ivan Franze, has a relatively inactive site on the Internet. The police closed their headquarters as well as their newspaper *Nuestra será la Victoria* (the last issue appeared in March 2000), and they were forbidden to publish leaflets. They now meet privately and participate in demonstrations and parades of other groups, but have no organized activities of their own. Because of the anti-discrimination law, Franze refers only indirectly to Jews, but he and his followers are known neo-Nazis and covert antisemites.

**ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITIES**

Several violent antisemitic incidents were recorded, mostly in the first half of the year. One serious attack occurred in October, shortly after the outbreak of the *al-Aqsa intifada*: a 14-year-old boy’s teeth were broken by a man who tried to enter a synagogue in suburban Buenos Aires. He then threw stones at the synagogue until arrested by police. In May, graves were desecrated in the Jewish cemetery in the northern city of Posadas. Seven youngsters were detained in this connection.

Besides neo-Nazi and antisemitic graffiti found on Jewish institutions and in public places, personal insults and discrimination made up a large proportion of antisemitic incidents. Antisemitic groups were behind some of them. For example, during a visit to Argentina in February, a commercial delegation from Israel was harassed by Argentinean neo-Nazis in the city of Comodoro Rivadavia.

In another case a popular Argentinean singer, Ricardo Iorio, told the *Rolling Stone* pop music magazine: “If you are not Jewish you shouldn’t sing [the Hebrew song] ‘Hava Nagila’ and if you are Jewish you shouldn’t sing the Argentinean anthem.” Victor Ramos, president of INADI (National Anti-discrimination Institute), promised to institute legal proceedings against the singer and against the magazine.

In August, ex-banker Raúl Moneta of the city of Mendoza accused Jewish journalists of attacking him in the press because he was a Catholic. According to the DAIA, which lodged a complaint before a federal judge in Mendoza, he used antisemitic expressions which violated the anti-discrimination law.

Several incidents were recorded in the soccer stadium. In June, bars of soap (used as a symbol to defame the Jews and the memory of the Holocaust) were thrown onto the field by supporters of Defensores de Belgrano during a match against the Atlanta team, which has no Jewish players, but is from a Jewish neighborhood. Another match was suspended by the referee after fans sang
antisemitic songs. A youth was also detained there for wearing a chain with a swastika.

The following traditionalist nationalist publications sometimes contain latent or indirect antisemitism:

- **Patría Argentina.** Nationalist monthly edited by Elías Rafiaa; distributed nationally since the mid-1980s; represents nationalist groups from different provinces.
- **Cábido.** Closed during the democratic regime of President Raúl Alfonsín in the 1980s but resumed publication in 1999; refers to Jews as the “anti-discriminators,” because they are allegedly behind the anti-discrimination law.
- **El Fortín.** Journal of the fascist Evolian Study Center; edited by Marcos Ghio; appears irregularly.
- **El Mosquito.** Local publication of the upper-class Vicente López municipality of Buenos Aires province. Because of the paper’s influential connections, the municipality ensures that its pro-Islamist and virulently anti-Israel propaganda appear in all the local newspapers.

### PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY

A public opinion survey on attitudes toward Jews and the Holocaust in Argentina, commissioned by the American Jewish Committee and AMIA, was carried out by the Gallup agency in Argentina in April/May 2000. It found that while 71 percent of Argentines supported preserving the memory of the Holocaust, their factual knowledge was poor. Nevertheless, the vast majority agreed that the Holocaust did happen and Holocaust denial seems to have had little impact in Argentina.

The results indicate that Argentineans are located at the lower end of the scale in terms of factual knowledge of the Holocaust. Seventy-two percent affirmed that there were groups with Nazi ideology in Argentina.

On their attitudes toward Jews, a solid majority strongly agreed or partly agreed with the statement that the Jewish community had a right to its own institutions. On the other hand, a majority also agreed with the statement that “the Jewish community in Argentina shows greater interest in itself than in national life.”

Compared to a similar survey conducted in 1992, a positive trend was evident in the response to the question, “Compared with other ethnic groups in Argentina today, are Jews and their descendants more integrated or less integrated into the country?” In 2000 35 percent said they were equally integrated, 33 claimed they were more and 22 percent less integrated. (The 1992 figures were 39 percent, 21 percent and 34 percent, respectively.)

In response to the question about having Jews as neighbors, there was a negative trend compared with the 1992 survey. In 2000, 75 percent said it made no difference to them to have a Jewish neighbor, 8 percent would like to have
one and 15 percent preferred not to have one. (The 1992 figures were 76 percent, 15 percent and 8 percent, respectively.)

RESPONSES TO EXTREMISM AND ANTISEMITISM

Legal Activity
The DAIA has been vigilant in recent years in monitoring observance of the 1988 anti-discrimination law (see, for example, ASIV 1998/9, 1999/2000). In March 2000 it lodged complaints to the judicial authorities against the PNT and the PNOSP, demanding that these organizations be closed down. These cases are still pending.

One of the most important public events in 2000 was the abrogation of two laws passed during the democratic government of Raúl Alfonsín (1983–89), relating to the period of the military dictatorship, 1976–83. The two laws were Obediencia Debida (Law of Obligatory Obedience), which absolved lower-ranking military personnel from responsibility for perpetrating crimes during that period because they were obeying orders, and Punto Final (Statute of Limitations). Annulling these laws made the military once again vulnerable to new charges. As a result the military employed the services of attorney Enrique Torres Bande to defend 662 officials who were liable to stand trial for their involvement in the regime of the dictator. When it became public knowledge that Bande was also representing the PNT and had ties to Biondini, they relinquished his services. It should be noted that liberal groups have repeatedly accused the army of nationalist sympathies.

In Israel an inter-ministerial commission was set up by the attorney general in 2000 to determine whether Israel can prosecute members of the military junta for crimes committed against its citizens. An estimated 1,800–2000 Jews disappeared during the period of military dictatorship, some of whom had Israeli citizenship.

Two book stalls selling antisemitic and Nazi literature were closed by the authorities in March, one of them owned by PNOSP leader Alejandro Franze.

The AMIA and Israeli Embassy Cases
An important landmark has been reached in the AMIA case, dating from 1994, with the recent decision to accept an oral, rather than the more common written, trial of those who are being held in connection with the bombing. This will ensure a speedier end to the case.

The authorities announced in February that 20 Argentineans would be tried in connection with the AMIA bombing. Prosecutors will seek life sentences for six of the accused – five of them former policemen. The rest, including 11 policemen, are being charged with lesser crimes.

On 18 July, thousands gathered to commemorate the 6th anniversary of the bombing and to demand justice. At an open session in parliament,
congressmen tabled a motion urging the necessity of continuing with the police investigation and of bringing the guilty to trial.

There was no progress in the investigation of the Israeli embassy bombing of 1992. A ceremony, attended by President Fernando de la Rúa, was held in March naming the site of the bombed embassy Israeli Embassy Plaza.

Official and Public Activity
In response to the rapid growth of neo-Nazi and antisemitic Internet activity in Latin America, a new Spanish-language website, Shalom Online, was launched on 1 January 2000. It provides news and information on Jewish and Israeli religious and cultural events and serves as a forum for countering neo-Nazism and antisemitism. The site, based in Buenos Aires, is backed by Jewish and non-Jewish institutions.

During a ceremony marking the 57th anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, in April 2000, Argentinean President Fernando de la Rúa apologized to Holocaust survivors and the Jewish community for his country’s harboring of war criminals after World War II. He also acknowledged that antisemitism remained a problem in Argentina. He reiterated his apology in June during a visit to the US.

The Argentinean government recalled its ambassador to Austria in February after his statement that FPÖ leader Jörg Haider was a “democrat” and that claims of neo-Nazi trends in the country were “journalistic exaggeration.”

The government tightened security on Jewish institutions in early 2000 following threats by Islamic extremists in south Lebanon to attack Jews everywhere.
BRAZIL

Brazil experienced a growth in antisemitism in 2000 compared with 1999. Many of the incidents were recorded in the last three months of the year, apparently in response to the al-Aqsa intifada.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

Brazil, the largest country in Latin America, has a Jewish population of about 110,000, out of a total population of over 160 million inhabitants. Most of the Jews live in Brazil’s major cities – Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and Porto Alegre – but some live in small communities on the shores of the Amazon River and in other remote locations, such as Bahia, Belem and Manaus.

The central body representing all the Jewish federations and communities in Brazil is the Confederação Israelita do Brazil (CONIB), founded in 1951. This umbrella body includes 200 organizations engaged in promoting Jewish and Zionist activities, as well as Jewish education, culture and charity. Most Jewish activity takes place in the Hebraica clubs and in privately-owned, exclusive social clubs. The University of São Paulo offers Judaic studies. All major international Zionist organizations and Zionist youth movements are represented in Brazil. Brazilian Jews publish a number of newspapers and journals in Portuguese.

EXTREMIST GROUPS

Several groups suffer discrimination in Brazil, among them punks, homosexuals and Nordestinos (natives from the poor northeast of Brazil), because they allegedly represent the antithesis of family values.

Various carecas (roughly, skinheads, but varying in origins and ideology from European skinheads) groups are active in Brazil, mainly in the cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Like their counterparts in Europe, many include neo-Nazism, antisemitism and xenophobia in their world view, and almost all are homophobic. It should be noted in this context that Brazil has the highest rate of homosexual murders in the world: 1,830 killings of homosexuals and transvestites were recorded between 1980 and 1999.

Brazilian carecas began their activities within the punk movement in 1977 in the areas bordering São Paulo. Some of them turned against the punk culture once they left the movement and began espousing clean living (anti-drugs, family values, etc.). The main groups are:
Carecas do Suburbio: They use Nazi symbols but admit blacks and nordestinos whom other groups consider racially inferior. They are homophobic, xenophobic and anti-punk.

Carecas ABC: Numbering about 100, they originated in São Paulo in the 1980s as a group of radical nationalists, and their ideology is similar to that of Carecas do Suburbio. They tend to be family oriented and work in security enterprises or as military policemen. Their ideology is taken from the Brazilian fascist movement of the 1930s (Ação Integralista Brasileira – AIB) of Plínio Salgado and the antisemitic literature of the Brazilian antisemite Gustavo Barroso. While neither anti-black nor anti-Nordestine, they are anti-American, antisemitic and homophobic.

Carecas do Brasil: A nationalist, paramilitary group which accepts mulattos, but persecutes blacks, Jews and homosexuals. Their principal enemies, however, are the punks. Their paramilitary units are led by “generals,” headed by Anasio Lara Campos, who is the link between the extreme right and the youth of the movement.

SP Oil!: Like other skinheads they live in the southern and eastern suburbs of São Paulo. Their name is derived from the disc entitled “Oil! Oil! Oil!” of the British punk group Cockney Rejects. Their main target is foreign immigrants.

Carecas “White Power”: The 200–300 members of this group in the south of the country and in São Paulo are middle-class citizens who became radicalized because of economic problems. More violent than the other groups, they practice martial arts and threaten homosexuals and Jews with physical aggression. They also call for the expulsion of the nordestinos from the big cities where they flock to find work, and for the separation of the northeastern region from the rest of Brazil. Their symbols and slogans are adopted from Nazism and the Ku Klux Klan, and they have contacts with skinheads throughout the world.

Poder Negro (Black Power): Black neo-Nazis who aspire to the creation of an independent State in Bahia, Segipe and Rio de Janeiro. On their Internet site they call for the murder of whites, Jews and homosexuals.

Other small groups include the neo-Nazi Head Bangers do ABC and the homophobic Frente Anti-Caos (Anti-Chaos Front), who have an Internet site.

In Bauru, a town near São Paulo, members of an unidentified skinhead group were arrested in 2000 and released without trial. Their literature, music disks and paraphernalia reflect their admiration for Nazism in general and Hitler in particular.

Mention should be made of the extreme right-wing Terrorismo Nunca Más (Terrorism Never Again [implying leftist terrorism]), founded in 1998. This is a group of some 40 ex-servicemen and civilians in Rio de Janeiro led by Juarez de Deus Gomes. In 2000 they launched an Internet site.
ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITIES

Brazil experienced a growth in antisemitism in 2000, compared with 1999, which was reflected mainly in the Internet, in threatening phone calls and e-mail and in the mainstream press.

Violence, Vandalism, Threats and Abuse
Antisemitic incidents were recorded in the earlier part of the year, and intensified during the al-Aqsa intifada. For example, in early February 2000, mezzuzot were removed and swastikas and the letters “SS” scrawled on the entrance of two synagogues in northern Rio de Janeiro. Police were sent to patrol the areas of the city where synagogues and Jewish schools are located. There were also several antisemitic threats, all anonymous. In addition, two Jewish lawyers received e-mail murder threats in February.

The governor of Parana, Jaime Lerner, was accused by a leader of landless rural workers (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra – MST), João Pedro Stedile, of being the only Jew in Brazil who practiced Nazism. This allegation, unprecedented in Brazil, followed a confrontation between police and workers in Parana during which a worker was killed. A week later a group, bearing a placard reading “The Jew Lerner uses Nazi tactics,” demonstrated in front of the governor’s residence.

With the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in the autumn, a large number of threats to Jewish organizations and individuals was recorded, especially in October. The Rio de Janeiro Jewish Museum website received an abusive e-mail comparing Jews to Hitler and threatening to blow up the museum. A telephone caller threatened to kill policemen guarding the Bynian Olam synagogue in Campinas near São Paulo. The caller added that if more police were sent, he would put a bomb in the synagogue in order to kill everyone. The O Hebreu Jewish newspaper in São Paulo received three e-mail messages threatening to bomb facilities belonging to the Jewish Federation in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, as well as the Israeli embassy in Brasilia and the consulates in Rio and São Paulo. The letters were signed in the name of Hizballah and Usama bin Ladin (see Arab Countries).

In the city of Belo Horizonte, the Jewish club received a phone call threatening that it would be bombed; a few days later slogans such as ”Kill the Jews” were scrawled on the glass door and wall of the building.

The negative image of the money-grubbing Jew is being spread to millions of Brazilians through the popular comedy show Escolinha do Barulho (Cool School). The long-running series screened by the Record TV channel draws many young viewers to its lineup of stereotyped characters in the classroom: the outrageous homosexual, the dumb blonde, the simple peasant and Samuel Blaunstein, the miserly Jew, dressed in modern Orthodox garb. In the episode of 30 December 1999, at the end of the school year, each character received his final grade. The “teacher” informed Blaunstein that he would have to repeat the
year because he had “used our school during the whole year to make money selling low-quality products to your fellow students.” The series has been so successful that the advertising industry has used the Blaunstein character in billboard marketing campaigns for store sales, reinforcing the stereotypical Jewish love of money. To quell discomfort arising from the use of such stereotyping, proponents of the series argue that the actor who plays Blaunstein, Marcos Plonka, is a Jew himself, that other social and ethnic groups are also lampooned and that the aim of the program is after all just humor. As the Brazilian Jewish community is small and concentrated in a few urban centers, millions of young people experience their first (and perhaps only) contact with a Jew through the character Samuel Blaunstein. In addition, many Jewish children are at risk of developing a negative self-image.

**Antisemitic Propaganda and Holocaust Denial**

A new literary journal, *Humanus*, which has a Holocaust denial slant, appeared at the beginning of 2000 in Campinas, São Paulo state. The magazine appears to be linked to a sect called Oaska – Centro Espiritual Beneficente União do Vegetal, which has its own village and temple, as well as connections to the Sama Multimídia publishing house, which issues it. The cover of the journal bears the Nazi rune symbol. There is a 20-page article about the Nazi sculptor Arno Brecker, whom the writer considers is the most important sculptor after Michelangelo. Other articles condemn the kosher slaughter ritual and criticize Marx, Freud and Einstein. A second volume of the journal which came out in February 2001 included an article on the “Nazi essence” of Zionism.

The writer and lawyer Huascar Terra do Vale claimed in the article “Os misterios de Jesus” (Jesus Mysteries) in the independent publication *O Tempo* of the city of Belo Horizonte that Jesus was crucified as a criminal by the Jews because they hated him and that the populace was instigated by the Jewish religious leadership, the Sanhedrin. He concluded that Jesus was not a Jew but a Samaritan.

On the national TV program *The Manhattan Connection* in February 2001, the anti-communist philosopher Olavo Carvalho, who contributes to several national publications, relativized the Holocaust by saying that any discussion of it should include the crimes of the Soviet regime.

Cooperation between South American neo-Nazis in cyberspace is increasing. Brazil leads South America in the number of antisemitic websites (nine). Antisemitism is also found on other websites. For example, in November 2000 the *Star Media* portal created a discussion forum on the crisis between Israel and the Palestinians. Opinions about Israel and Jews were so negative that a Jewish journalist who was participating said that the Jewish stereotypes described were a result of ignorance and that their opinions about the conflict reflected antisemitic prejudice.
The antisemitic site *Jews in Brazil* published a list of Jews living in Brazil, organized by occupation, in order to prove that the Jews had undue socio-economic and political influence in Brazil, and that they constituted a powerful pressure group because of their alleged ties with the government and with the federal police.

**RESPONSES TO ANTISEMITISM**

**Court Cases**
After a trial lasting several years, in April 2000 a federal high court judge sentenced 71-year-old Siegfried Ellwanger, owner of the Editora Revisão publishing house, to two years imprisonment for incitement to racism. Ellwanger had published various antisemitic and Holocaust denial books, such as his own *German or Jewish Holocaust?*, Gustavo Barroso's *Brazil, A Colony of Bankers*, as well as other titles of this 1930s’ Brazilian antisemite; and “classics” of antisemitic literature, such as *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and Henry Ford’s *The International Jew*.

**Legislation**
Brazilian law no. 2889/56 (1956) condemns genocide and the destruction of national, ethnic, racial and religious groups. The Code of Telecommunications, no. 4117/62, proscribes the use of the media to promote discriminatory practices. National Security Law no. 8091/78 forbids incitement to hatred or racial discrimination. Brazil is also a signatory to international treaties protecting human rights. In March 2000, Gradi – Group for Repressing and Analyzing Crimes of Intolerance (Grupo de Repressão e Analise dos delitos de Intolerância) was created by the government. Its task is to investigate crimes of racism, antisemitism and discrimination.
CHILE

There was no change in the level of antisemitism in Chile in 2000. Several threatening phone calls were reported after the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in September. Due to strong public protests and eventual government measures, the international congress planned by the Patria Nueva Sociedad for April did not take place. The number of Chilean neo-Nazi websites increased considerably in 2000.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

The Jewish community of Chile, numbering approximately 21,000 out of a total population of 14.5 million, is mostly concentrated in the city of Santiago de Chile, with a scattering in the provinces of Valparaíso, Viña del Rancagua, Concepción, Temuco and Valdivia. Most of the Jews are descendants of refugees from Germany and are religiously unaffiliated. The Representative Committee of Jewish Organizations in Chile (CREJ) encompasses all the Jewish communities and organizations in the country. There is a large Jewish school and several publications cater to the needs of the community.

ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITIES AND EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS

Antisemitic Activities

Although there was no change in the level of antisemitic incidents from the previous year, in 2000 several threatening phone calls and several incidents of graffiti scrawled on Jewish institutions were reported, especially from October after the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada. For example, death threats were received by a member of the community and by the Jewish organization Estadio Israelita. In addition, suspicious photographic activity around synagogues reported during the year troubled community members. The perpetrators of these antisemitic incidents seem to have been both neo-Nazis and Arab and Muslim extremists.

Neo-Nazi Organizations and Publications

The Patria Nueva Sociedad (PNS) focused its activity in the first part of 2000 on preparing for the First International National Socialist Ideological Encounter (Primer Encuentro Ideológico Internacional Nacional-Socialista) that was scheduled for 17 to 22 April (see also ASW 1999/2000). Led by Alexis López Tapia, the organizing committee (including Ignacio Arce, José Olivares, Felipe Moraga, Catherina Pinoleo and Jorge Gracia), advertised the congress in the media and at meetings on university campuses. On 11 April the
government issued a list of 100 possible participants in the congress whose entry into the country would be prohibited (for a detailed account of the efforts to prevent the congress from taking place in Chile, see ASW 1999/2000). One day before the congress was due to open, López Tapia was detained on charges of irregular economic dealings and a bank debt dating from 1998. Police then entered the congress venue where fewer than ten people were gathered. They arrested and deported a Bolivian and a Peruvian. Two days later, López was released from custody and a new attempt was made to hold the congress in Santiago de Chile. According to López, participants came from Argentina, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador. The resolutions were published on the Internet. These included setting up a pan-Latin American communication network for coordination and cooperation; reaffirming their intention to use the legal system in gain political power and consolidate the party, and to begin collecting signatures for this purpose; calling for a second meeting to be held in Bolivia in 2001. Participant groups would be Patria Nueva Sociedad (Chile), Partido Nuevo Triunfo (Argentina) and Partido Nueva Sociedad Venezolana (Venezuela). The coordinator is a 20-year-old Bolivian student from La Paz, Gerardo Veale. An Internet page has been created to propagandize the meeting.

Despite the failure to hold the congress as planned, López Tapia and his movement were active throughout the year. They radicalized their ideology and augmented their links with other neo-Nazi groups, especially in Argentina.

In August a new PNS web page, Chilean Action (Accion Chilena), appeared on the Internet server Libre Opinión of the Argentinean neo-Nazi Alejandro Biondini. The PNS played an active part in promoting Biondini’s presidential candidacy (see Argentina). At the launching of a journal by the same name in September, López Tapia said that it would replace the publication Pendragon, which he had edited, because the latter’s ideology no longer represented his movement. The group behind the new page is extremely pro-Palestinian and anti-Israel and in October called for a mass protest outside the Israeli embassy.

It should be noted that there was a considerable growth in the number of Chilean neo-Nazi web pages in 2000, which now number 17. They include sites such as Era Hitleriana, Aberrazion, SOSPatagonia, and Mito Antartic. This list represents a variety of groups disseminating antisemitic and neo-Nazi ideology, some focusing on the alleged Jewish-Zionist conspiracy to conquer areas of South America. Many use the server of Argentinean neo-Nazi leader Alejandro Biondini, who was undoubtedly instrumental in helping them set up their pages.

In May and October the PNS held two Nationalist Socialist leadership courses. The trainees were indoctrinated in Nazi ideology and its dissemination.

In December López Tapia appeared on the national television program “El Termómetro” (The Thermometer). The subject was “Are we, the Chilean people, racist?” López Tapis denied his ideology was neo-Nazi and labeled Zionism an extremely xenophobic and racist movement.
The content of the cultural and political quarterly *Revista Ciudad de los Céspedes* is nationalist and ultra-right-wing, without being openly Nazi. Its founder is the publisher Erwin Robertson, a professor of history with revisionist tendencies. In August the journal published an article supporting the convening of the neo-Nazi congress.

The contributors to the journal organized a conference, which took place on 8–10 September 2000 in Santiago de Chile. This event is a traditional meeting of Chilean neo-Nazis. The propaganda for the event was published in the journal and on the Internet, especially in Biondini’s *Libre Opinión*. More than 50 persons attended this event, most of them prosperous elderly people.

The antisemitic and Holocaust denying group **Acción NS Individual** is known principally through the messages of its leader, 24-year-old “Wotan Goebbels,” honoring Rudolf Hess on various neo-Nazi pages of the Internet. “Goebbels” allegedly had contacts with the antisemitic Movimiento Nacional Sindicalista (MNS; see *A/S*W 1998/9) and the defunct Vanguardia Nacionalista. This Internet group is composed mainly of university student friends of the leader.

Neo-Nazi skinheads, concentrated in the cities of Santiago, Viña del Mar and Valparaíso, among others, are especially numerous in Chile. The Valparaíso group reportedly met on 5 September, the date Chilean neo-Nazis traditionally commemorate the killing of a group of National Socialists by government forces in 1938. According to the largest daily in the country *El Mercurio*, a group of 50 youngsters, wearing black clothes with Nazi symbols, met on the Las Torpederas beach. When the press tried to talk to them, they dispersed. This meeting was much smaller than in previous years.

The skinheads, who are extremely antisemitic and xenophobic, were relatively inactive in 2000. There have been no known violent attacks by skinheads in Chile. Relations with the PNS are unfriendly. Some skinheads, such as the Maipú and the Al Sur del Mundo, have begun using the Internet to communicate with each other and spread their ideology.

**Palestinian Extremism**

The Palestinian community in Chile, numbering 300,000, is one of the largest in the world. Several Palestinian organizations, such as the Asociación de Jóvenes por Palestina (Pro-Palestine Youth Association – AJP), the Frente para la Liberación de Palestina (Front for the Liberation of Palestine – FPLP) and the Palestinian embassy in Chile, have been active since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in September, pressing leading Chilean figures to condemn Israel and encouraging neo-Nazi groups to join their activities. Notable among these groups is Patria Nueva Sociedad, whose antisemitism serves as a common denominator with some of the Palestinian organizations.

The publication *Diario Estado Palestino*, edited by Club Palestino, which began appearing in October, uses extremely inflammatory language against...
Israelis and Jews. Eugenio Chachuán, who runs a research center, Centro de Estudios Arabes, within the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Chile, has declared himself anti-Jewish, as well as anti-Israel. He claims that the Israeli embassy’s warnings about a possible bomb attack in Chile against a Jewish target mean that Israel itself is preparing to carry out such an attack. According to Argentinean intelligence, Chile is one of the Latin American countries most vulnerable to an Islamist terrorist attack, possibly because it is a democratic country with no anti-discrimination laws to curb extremist activity.
MEXICO

The year 2000 was relatively quiet in terms of anti-Jewish manifestations until the upsurge of violence between Palestinians and Israelis in late September, when there was an intensification of antisemitism, mainly in the media.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

The Jewish community numbers about 40,000, out of a total population of 98 million. Most Jews live in the capital Mexico City and its suburbs, while the rest are located in the cities of Guadalajara, Monterrey, Tijuana, and in the new community of Cancún.

Jewish immigrants to Mexico formed communities according to their place of origin, a way of life that has persisted until today. The main communities, together with the Jewish Sports Center, are represented in the Jewish Central Committee of Mexico (JCCM).

High enrollment in Jewish day schools and a very low rate of intermarriage characterize the Jewish community, which is highly organized and cohesive, with a wide range of welfare and educational services. A variety of periodicals reflect the different political, cultural and ideological trends.

ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITIES AND RACIST GROUPS

On 2 July, presidential and general elections were held in Mexico. After 70 years of rule, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) lost the presidency to Vicente Fox, the candidate of the center-right Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), as well as its majority in Congress. The Jewish community has close relations with the new ruling party and is encouraged by their more pluralistic approach to cultural, religious and ethnic diversity. No racist issues were raised in the elections.

The year 2000 was relatively quiet in terms of anti-Jewish manifestations until the outbreak of violence between Palestinians and Israelis in late September. Earlier in the year there were a few isolated acts of vandalism, including stone-throwing at two Jewish schools in Mexico City in January. Windows were broken, but no one was injured. Pamphlets accusing the Jews of corrupting Mexico’s leaders so that the country’s wealth could be plundered were distributed in Monterrey in February, and anti-Jewish graffiti and stickers (urging Mexicans to keep Mexico “clean” by “casting out” Zionists, for example) appeared sporadically in Mexico City. It is not known who was behind these incidents. In addition, stickers promoting a Mexican neo-Nazi
homepage on the website of Argentinean neo-Nazi Alejandro Biondini were found in telephone booths in Mexico City.

As in previous years, articles alleging the existence of an international Zionist conspiracy, as well as Holocaust denial arguments appeared in the extreme right-wing publication Surge. In issue no. 191 (May 2001), it was claimed that Jews “want the Holocaust to be more holy than the Crucifixion. For them arithmetically, six million Jews are more than one Jesus Christ.”

In the wake of the al-Aqsa intifada, a Jewish school in Mexico City was vandalized in October by stone-throwers. Further, the representative of the Palestinian Authority in Mexico, Fawzi Youssif, launched an intensive anti-Israel and anti-Zionist campaign in the mass media. His office also inaugurated a new web page, including a visitors book which became filled with comments exhorting people to fight and/or exterminate Israel and the Jews.

The upsurge in violence in the Middle East led to a considerable increase in anti-Zionist expressions in the national media: “Unfortunately, the Israeli government, the product of the Holocaust, is utilizing the same methods and implementing the same theories [as the Nazis]” (Guillermo Almeyra, La Jornada, 15 Oct. 2000); “Israel exists to exterminate those around it… For 1,800 years, Palestine was a land free of Jews… Money is Israel’s and the Jews’ real god” (Arnaldo Córdova, Uno Mas Uno, 20 Oct.). In letters to the editor, antisemitic and anti-Zionist arguments and allegations were expressed in La Jornada and Extélior.

Tribuna Israeliita (see below) was the target of several insulting e-mails, questioning Israel’s right to exist, demanding the expulsion of Mexican Jews, denying the Holocaust and denigrating its web page “The Jewish Presence in Downtown Mexico” (see also ASW ’99/2000).

The Jewish community attempted to counter these antisemitic and anti-Israel attacks by publishing articles of Jewish and non-Jewish journalists and intellectuals in the national press, meeting with senior representatives of the mass media and participating in interviews on radio and television.

RESPONSES TO RACISM AND ANTI-SEMITISM

In preparation for the UN World Conference on Racism to be held on September 2001 in South Africa, the public opinion and analysis agency Tribuna Israeliita (which combats antisemitism), together with the Mexican Academy of Human Rights, the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights and the National Indigenous Congress, organized, in November 2000, a Mexican and Central American Regional Forum on Racism, Discrimination and Intolerance, at which specialists discussed the political, historical, cultural, social and economic factors that encourage the development of racism, discrimination, xenophobia, antisemitism and other forms of intolerance in the region, as well as ways to prevent them. The concluding document condemned antisemitism and Holocaust denial.
As a follow up, representatives of the Jewish community attended the Citizens Conference and Regional Forum against Racism held in Chile, in December. The concluding document included a paragraph defining antisemitism as a specific form of discrimination.

A Holocaust remembrance program, including a photographic exhibition of the Warsaw Ghetto, dialogues with survivors and workshops on the Holocaust and human rights, was organized at universities and cultural centers in Tijuana, Mexicali, Estado de México and the Tec University, with an attendance of more than 20,000 visitors.

Workshops, seminars and cultural activities, part of a program designed to improve relations between Jewish and non-Jewish students and provide information on Judaism and Israel, were organized at leading universities. A decrease in antisemitic incidents at those institutions, as well as better integration of Jews, testify to its success.

Mexican law does not explicitly refer to the protection of groups or individuals who are vulnerable to physical, verbal, psychological or written attacks because of their racial, religious or ethnic origin. For several years Tribuna Israelita has been promoting the adoption of legislation that defines racism and antisemitism as crimes punishable by law to be integrated into the Mexican Penal Code. During the year 2000 this proposal was approved by all the candidates for the presidency. Since the new government took office in December 2000, members of the Jewish community have been working on this issue with the recently created Anti-discrimination Legal Commission.
URUGUAY

No major antisemitic incidents were recorded in Uruguay in 2000. Lawyers representing the Jewish community have begun moves to amend the 1989 anti-discrimination law.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

The Jewish community of Uruguay is estimated at about 25,000 out of a general population of 3.2 million. *Conversos* were among the earliest settlers of the region; however, today most Uruguayan Jews are descendants of twentieth century immigrants of both Sephardi and Ashkenazi origin. The majority of Jews live in the capital Montevideo, with a smaller community in the city of Paysandú. Jewish families are scattered throughout other parts of the country but not in organized communities.

The Comité Central Israelita del Uruguay (CCIU), embracing some 60 communities and organizations, functions as a national Jewish representative body. There are a number of well-attended Jewish day schools.

EXTREMIST GROUPS AND ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITIES

The year 2000 witnessed no major antisemitic incidents and no radical Islamic group appeared to have been involved in anti-Jewish activity in Uruguay. Unsigned antisemitic graffiti appeared in various public places, including on the Holocaust memorial in Montevideo, in February 2000.

A 54-year old member of a previously unknown group, Frente Nacional Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Front – FNR), who distributed Nazi literature, drew graffiti on walls and called for a “Fourth Artiguista Reich” (Cuarto Reich Artiguista – after a nineteenth century revolutionary hero), was arrested and sentenced under the anti-discrimination law (see below).

In early December, a bus driver was suspended by his company for insulting a Jewish passenger. A witness had complained to the CCIU which lodged a protest with the bus company.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HOLOCAUST AND NAZI ERA

A series of seminars on the Holocaust was held in August–September in Montevideo. Organized by the Nueva Congregación Israelita, together with the Ariel Hebrew-Uruguayan Institute (Instituto Ariel Hebreo-Uruguayo), the sponsors included the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Municipality of Montevideo, the national educational coordinating body CODICEN and
various Jewish organizations. Each panel included educators, journalists and leading cultural figures in the country and began with the personal story of a Holocaust survivor living in Uruguay. There was also an essay competition on the subject, “The Ideology of Intolerance: Nazism – Uruguayan Research,” as well as a series of films on the Holocaust.

RESPONSES TO EXTREMISM AND ANTISEMITISM

Lawyers representing CCIU have begun moves to amend the 1989 anti-discrimination law, which is a part of the Penal Code. They claim that the law is difficult to implement in cases of Holocaust denial because the accused claim they are “revisionists.”

Cases such as the FNR member mentioned above resulted in a conviction under the law and a prison term. He was the seventh person to have been sentenced under this law. In several raids, the National Intelligence Directorate had confiscated Nazi literature, photos of the man in Nazi uniform and a video in which he expressed his intention of founding a political party.
VENEZUELA

The al-Aqsa intifada had a significant impact in Venezuela because of its large and influential Arab population. The radical language used against Israel was not infrequently antisemitic.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

Venezuela’s Jewish community numbers about 22,000 out of a total population of nearly 22 million. Most of the Jews live in the capital Caracas, while the second largest community is located in Maracaibo. The Confederación de Asociaciones Israelitas de Venezuela (CAIV) embraces four organizations: Asociación Israelita de Venezuela (Sephardi), Unión Israelita de Caracas (Ashkenazi), the Zionist Organization and B’nai B’rith. All but one of the 15 synagogues are Orthodox and over 75 percent of school-age children attend Jewish schools. The community publishes the newspaper Nuevo Mundo Israelita.

ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITY

The al-Aqsa intifada had a significant impact in Venezuela because of its large and influential Arab population (1.3 million, according to Arab sources in the country, but probably higher). Responses to the intifada in the media, in wall graffiti and by Arab organizations in Venezuela such as FEARAB (Arab Federation for Latin America) were directed at de-legitimizing the State of Israel, which was accused of causing the Palestinian tragedy.

The radical language used against Israel was not infrequently antisemitic, for example, the comparison of Israeli soldiers with Nazis. The economic journal Reporte (5 Oct. 2000) published a full-page message by the Special Mission for Palestine in Venezuela (Mision Especial de Palestina en Venezuela), stating, inter alia, that “Israelis have to admit that our people are suffering a holocaust... [and] many pogroms... and [they have created] a diaspora because of the politics of the State of Israel.”

The national Caracas-based El Nacional, and El Sol, an independent newspaper published on Margarita Island, printed a FEARAB announcement on 17 October 2000, stating that “the occupation of the Palestinian territories by the savage aggression of the Zionist military machinery confirms once again the presence of neo-Nazism in the Middle East and that Barak’s Zionist government violates international and humanitarian norms and carries out mass killings of innocent people, mostly children, women and old people.” FEARAB called on progressive parties in Venezuela “to sustain the intifada so as to
pressure the Nazi-Zionist government of Israel into recognizing a Palestinian state as a homeland of the Palestinians, with Jerusalem as its capital.”

In Caracas, and especially on the campus of the Catholic University of Venezuela (UCV), a leaflet of the International Solidarity Committee (Comité de Solidaridad Internacional – COSI) was circulated, calling for a demonstration outside the Israeli embassy on 20 October 2000, during which a petition would be conveyed to the embassy protesting “the cruel massacres of the heroic people of Palestine.” Some 60 demonstrators arrived on the day, bearing Palestinian and Syrian flags and posters, and handed out leaflets which distorted the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict and de-legitimized the State of Israel.

An article by Jaled Ali Ayoub Bazzi, in the newspaper Ultimas Noticias of 24 November 2000 and entitled “Arab Terrorists?,” claimed that it was not the Palestinians who were terrorists but international Zionism, which had turned the Arabs into victims in 1948.

Graffiti which appeared on the bridge leading from Plaza Venezuela to the Central University on 24 October, stated, inter alia: “International revulsion for Zionist garbage.” Similar slogans were also reported in November.
BOLIVIA

Some 500 Jews live in Bolivia (down from 10,000 in the 1940s) out of a total population of 7.6 million. Most live in the capital La Paz, and others are domiciled in Santa Cruz and Cochabamba. The Círculo Israelita de La Paz, which represents the Jewish community, maintains two synagogues, a home for the aged and a cemetery. WIZO and Maccabi are active Jewish organizations. The Colegio Boliviano Israelita includes a kindergarten, primary and secondary school, but the majority of its pupils are non-Jews.

Posters of the Orgullo Skinheads (see ASW 1999/2000) appeared in the main cities in September. They featured Hitler’s face decorated on either side with swastikas and eagles. The posters urged people to counter “the plague of the Jews and their accomplices: capitalists, neo-liberals and communists.”

ECUADOR

There are 1,000 Jews in Ecuador out of a total population of 11.8 million. Most Jews live in the capital Quito and there are a few in Guayaquil. There had been a steady decline in the number of Jews (in 1950 there were some 4,000) until recently when the community was bolstered by an influx of Jews from other Latin American countries. The central communal body is the Asociación Israelita de Quito — and its parallel in Guayaquil. Jewish centers and organizations function in both cities.

Nazi graffiti (“Sonder-Komando SK,” “SS” and swastikas) appeared on the walls of two neighborhoods of Quito in May. The signature “Oi” was also found, probably signifying that it was the work of skinheads. Swastikas were also drawn on the walls of the Einstein Jewish School in Quito on the night of 14 July.

EL SALVADOR

The 120 Jews in El Salvador, out of a total population of nearly 6 million, represent only one-third of the community that existed before the civil war of 1976. The Comunidad Israelita de El Salvador was established in 1944. There is a synagogue and Jewish center, but since 1980 services have been conducted in a private home.
The newspaper *La Presencia Gráfica* published an article by the evangelical pastor Edgard López Bertrand, known as Brother Tobi, claiming that God has not forgiven the Jewish people for what they did to him. Brother Tobi has made similar remarks in the past bordering on antisemitism. Apparently, he refuses to accept the reforms of the Second Vatican Council and the Nostra Aetate declaration of 1965, and those written subsequently.

**PARAGUAY**

There are 1,000 Jews in Paraguay out of a total population of more than 5 million. Nearly all the Jews live in Asunción, the capital. The community is represented by the Consejo Representativo Israelita de Paraguay, but there are other communal organizations, including WIZO, B’nai B’rith and several youth movements. Most Jewish children attend the Colegio Integral Estado de Israel, which provides a Jewish primary and secondary education. Three synagogues cater to the religious needs of the Jews of Paraguay.

In June 2000 neo-Nazis distributed pamphlets at the American University in Asunción. The pamphlets invited all those with complaints against Jews to come to a meeting. A teacher was dismissed from the same university following a complaint accusing him of telling antisemitic jokes.
Australia and South Africa
AUSTRALIA

A dramatic increase in antisemitic incidents was recorded following the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in late September 2000. Forty-two percent of the total for the year occurred in the three months from October to December. Findings in two complaints to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission were delivered in 2000.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

The 115–120,000 Jews in Australia out of a total population of 17,850,000 constitute the largest Jewish community in the East Asia Pacific Region. The great majority of Australian Jews live in Melbourne (50,000) and Sydney (45,000) but there are also significant communities in Perth, Brisbane, the Gold Coast and Adelaide. Australia is a favorite destination of Jewish emigrants from the former Soviet Union and from South Africa. Jews were among the first convicts who settled Australia in the eighteenth century. After World War II, many Holocaust survivors were admitted into the country and today it has the largest per capita number of survivors of any community in the Diaspora.

The leading communal organization is the Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ). The community is served by two Jewish weeklies and several other periodicals. High enrollment in Jewish day schools and a comparatively low rate of intermarriage are characteristic features of Australian Jewry. Nearly all major Jewish and Zionist organizations have affiliates in Australia.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS AND EXTREMIST ACTIVITY

In the year 2000 struggles between competing groups, which have persisted since 1996, as well as efforts by mainstream political parties to stem their influence, resulted in a setback for organized far right groups in Australia. The realignment of loyalties by supporters of these groups contributed to the volatility of this arena. The Internet has allowed some individuals and organizations to heighten their profile and to increase their influence in right-wing circles. The presence of parliamentarians representing the One Nation Party in some state parliaments also played a part in determining the allegiance of many members of the far right constituency.

The theme of an international Jewish conspiracy is central to the worldview of overtly antisemitic organizations such as the Australian League of Rights, the Adelaide Institute and the Citizens Electoral Councils. Extreme elements within some migrant communities also promote this mythology. The notion that Judaism is anti-Christian plays a part in the conspiracy theories of a number of
extremist organizations, including the Adelaide Institute, the Australian League of Rights, the British Israel World Federation, “Identity” churches and some self-styled Biblical Fundamentalists.

The Adelaide Institute, a loose conglomeration of individuals around Holocaust revisionist Fredrick Toben, disseminates possibly the most virulent anti-Jewish propaganda of any Australian group. Its Internet homepage is linked to major Holocaust denial sites internationally and it continues to publish material, despite a complaint to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC, 1996 – see below) and Toben’s jail term in Germany (1999) for denial of the Holocaust. British Holocaust denier David Irving wrote in his “Action Report” of 20 July 2000 that Fredrick Toben’s “antisemitic website” was a liability to Holocaust revisionists.

The Australian League of Rights was described by the HREOC as “undoubtedly the most influential and effective, as well as the best organized and most substantially financed, racist organization in Australia.” Wolf Herfurth, a former activist in Germany’s far right NPD, was enthusiastically received when he addressed a meeting of the League in February 2000.

Under new director Betty Luks, the League publishes weekly newsletters (On Target and On Target Bulletin), monthly magazines (Intelligence Service, New Times and Social Creditor) and a quarterly (Heritage), and established a website in 2000. Most overt antisemitism is found in On Target and On Target Bulletin.

The Australian Civil Liberties’ Union (ACLU) continued to advocate Holocaust denial. Over the years the ACLU has become best known for public announcements advocating the “rights” of Holocaust deniers or other racists. John Bennett, who is the Union’s motivating force, sits on the editorial advisory committee of the California-based Journal of Historical Review.

Australian Friends of Europe (AFE), formerly Australian Friends of the BNP (British National Party), seeks to foster cooperation between “nationalist” groups against “globalist” socialism. The main AFE activists are Mark Wilson, former BNP organizer in Epping, UK, and Wolf Herfurth, formerly of Germany’s NDP. The group has made contact with, and been invited to address, the neo-Nazi Australian National Action, the Australian League of Rights and branches of the One Nation party.

Among the “Identity” churches, the Christian Separatist Church Society is the most militantly antisemitic, even ridiculing anti-Jewish propagandist Frank Dowsett of the (“Identity” church) Covenant Vision Ministry as being too moderate.

The reversal in fortunes suffered by the Australian imitators of the US “militia” groups, which began in 1996, continued during 2000. Factors contributing toward their decline included more restrictive gun ownership legislation introduced in the wake of the 1996 Port Arthur mass murder and the rise of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party, which offered their constituency a seemingly more viable means of “rescuing” Australia.
Racist skinheads not necessarily aligned with any formal organization are known to be present in small numbers in cities and towns throughout Australia and have allegedly been involved in racist violence against Asian students and harassment of members of left-wing groups. Attempts to exploit these groups or direct their violence toward Jews and other minorities are common.

The leader of the neo-Nazi Australian National Action, Michael Brander, claimed on his website that he was being persecuted because he did not believe the plan to exterminate Europe’s Jews in World War II was proven. During a defamation hearing in 1999, an Adelaide magistrate noted that “denial of the Holocaust and failure to condemn the principles espoused by Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party” were proof of his racism.

Some antisemitic organizations perceive Australia’s ethnic communities, particularly from Central and Eastern Europe, as fertile ground for recruitment. Since the fall of the Soviet Union there appears to have been an active debate within many of Australia’s Eastern and Central European communities on the matter of restitution of Jewish property and prosecution of Nazi war criminals, which often includes references to the need to investigate Jewish behavior as much as that of Nazis and their collaborators. Within some of these communities the anniversary of the Nazi occupation is marked as a national day rather than the date of post-Soviet-era independence.

In recent years antisemitism has been increasingly articulated by groups and individuals who represent New Age or other fringe, alternative lifestyle elements. The rhetoric of these groups is heavily laden with conspiracy theories, providing common ground for a large overlap between fringe far right organizations, and these groups.

Although the many small groups which comprise the Australian far left often make declarations critical of racism in all its forms, demonization of Israel is a common thread and the extremes of language used to condemn Zionism and Israel are almost indistinguishable from those of the far right, among them, promoting the concepts of Zionism as an “international conspiracy” and of Jews as Nazis.

Australia’s Arabic-speaking community is large and vibrant. It should be emphasized that Jews and Muslims in Australia interact on a number of levels and there is a good level of inter-communal cooperation on a range of matters, including opposition to far right political groups, the need to extend religious freedom and liberty, highlighting the religiously diverse nature of the Australian community and promoting knowledge of dietary and other religious requirements of minority faiths. However, there is antagonism, by no means only related to the political situation in the contemporary Middle East, which is a serious obstacle to a deeper relationship between the communities. Locally-based extreme Arabs and Muslims were reportedly behind some or even many of the incidents directed against the Jewish community, as well as behind the distribution of antisemitic publications (see below).
ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITIES

The year 2000 was characterized by three key events which had an impact on the behavior of extremist groups. The commencement of "Y2K" brought to the fore a number of millennialist and other extremist organizations which, it was feared, would exploit any confusion caused by the changeover to the new millennium.

Second, the Olympic Games, held in Sydney, were considered a possible scene for extremist action. The arrest of a self-styled neo-Nazi white supremacist, in possession of weapons and hate literature, was one of the results of a massive security sweep prior to the games.

The outbreak of violence between Palestinians and Israelis in late September coincided with a dramatic increase in reports of incidents of anti-Jewish harassment, vandalism and threats. The month of October 2000 exceeded by 25 percent any month since reports were first kept in a national database. During the three months from October to December, 42 percent of the entire year's reports were received, including 63 percent of reports of assault and property vandalism. Although there were few positive identifications of perpetrators of acts of vandalism, assault or harassment, anecdotal evidence suggests that approximately one-quarter, including some from the local Arab community, were committed by individuals who were responding to negative media portrayal of Israel. Many incidents were committed by individuals associated with far right-wing groups, although most of this activity came in the form of propaganda and threat rather than physical actions.

Violence, Vandalism, Intimidation and Harassment

There were 372 incidents of violence, vandalism, intimidation and harassment directed at individuals and Jewish communal institutions recorded during 2000, an increase of 47 percent over the previous twelve months, and 62 percent higher than the average over the previous ten years. The combined number of incidents involving physical assault, property damage and direct face-to-face harassment was 6 percent above the annual average.

The combined total of threatening telephone calls and hate mail was nearly 50 percent above the average over the previous ten years. Antisemitic telephone calls were reported by synagogues, communal institutions and individual members of the Jewish community.

Jewish individuals and institutions are sometimes the target of regular hate mail. One person, addressing Jewish homes in Sydney, regularly claims Jews are "the vermin of humanity" and urges "death to Jews." Another, writing from Adelaide, accuses Jewish religious teaching of responsibility for all contemporary social evils.

The Jewish community received reports of antisemitic graffiti on Jewish institutions and private homes, in areas frequented by Jewish community
members as well as in other locations. However, the rate was 60 percent below the prior ten year average.

Antisemitic and threatening e-mail now equals traditionally mailed material as the most common means of antisemitic harassment. Reports of receipt of electronic hate mail in 2000 were nearly three times the average over the previous ten years. Further, antisemitic individuals, and groups greatly increased their presence on Australian-based newsgroups in 2000, for the second year in succession, participating in discussions on such diverse matters as the visit to Australia by Louis Farrakhan in 1998, developments within the Middle East, questions relating to One Nation and issues of Jewish concern.

**Propaganda and Holocaust Denial**

Virtually all Australian antisemitic organizations either promote Holocaust denial or argue that Holocaust deniers have a right to be given serious academic consideration. In the majority of cases Holocaust denial appears as a central plank in the platform of the organization, and some of these groups simultaneously espouse admiration of Adolf Hitler's policies toward Jews.

Holocaust denial is also promoted by some Arab nationalists and Muslim extremists. A noteworthy development in this area – representative of the growing cooperation between extremist Arabs and Muslims and members of the extreme right (see below) – was promotion of the plan to convene an international Holocaust revisionist symposium in an Arab country, which was subsequently aborted.

Australian Jews are regularly blamed by members of extremist organizations and by a small number of commentators in the mainstream media for controversial federal and state policies on social matters, financial programs and the weakening of “Christian” or “British” institutions. The high profile of a number of individual Jewish Australians, particularly in the business community, is used as evidence of Jewish power. Government decisions which have accorded with public positions adopted by the Jewish community are also presented as evidence of Jewish control of the leaders of political power. The adoption of state and federal anti-racism laws over a ten-year period, negotiations with Baltic countries concerning the extradition of Nazi war criminals and support for Israel in international forums, are some examples of government decisions on which antisemitic commentators have sought to incite ill will towards the Jewish community.

Some antisemitic commentary was reported in the national ethnic media, including on SBS radio, which broadcasts foreign-language programs for various ethnic groups, although the language was not always obviously antisemitic when translated into English. Another issue of concern is the presence in Australia of foreign-language antisemitic publications, which circulate particularly amongst older members of some postwar immigrant communities. The book *Mojmir – A Migrant's Lot*, published first in Croatian
and then in English (under the title *Thorn Lace*) in 2000, included some blatant antisemitic expressions.

Both the Arabic-speaking and the Islamic communities are served by a vigorous media, in Arabic and English, which generally avoid inflammatory or offensive language, but do reflect the existence of extremist and antisemitic opinions within the communities they serve. For example, the publication *Nida'ul Islam*, which is available on the Internet and as a glossy magazine, prints extreme views of members of the Islamic community in Australia and of a range of overseas commentators. Typical of material published in the magazine identified the Jews as both political and religious enemies of the Islamic revival. The magazine's website includes many disparaging references to "the Children of Israel," "Jewish rabbis," "Zionism" and "Arafat's Jewish agents."

Extreme anti-Jewish rhetoric of this type is also found on the Internet site *al-Moharrer al-Australi*. New material added to this site in 2000 included the claim: "[The United States] is being controlled and manipulated by Zionist interests. Tax payers money is being siphoned to 'Israel', the illegitimate state in Palestine." The site also disseminates Holocaust denial arguments from the *Arab Journal* (Chicago) and from the Turkish antisemite Adnan Oktar, who writes under the pseudonym Harun Yahya.

*Islamic Offerings from Australia*, the Internet site of Keysar Trad, who represents the *Islamic Council of NSW*, includes links to the writings of the anti-Jewish shaykh Ahmed Deedat and to Ahmed Rami's Holocaust denying Radio Islam.

The violence in the Middle East during the last three months of 2000 generated many anti-Jewish slurs. These included claims that Jews themselves were likely to be behind antisemitic violence (articulated by Australia's official representative of the Palestinian Authority) and many allegations that Israel was behaving in a manner reminiscent of Nazi Germany. A major rally by opponents of Israel in Sydney featured an overtly antisemitic speech, in English, by a well-known extreme right activist, Jack King. A number of anti-Israel demonstrations also included anti-Jewish language.

"Identity" groups and other anti-Jewish propagandists have been quick to appreciate the possibilities of the Internet for spreading hatred and vilification, and this has provided anti-Jewish groups with much defamatory literature and the facility to reproduce "state of the art" antisemitism. The submission of pieces from Australia defaming Judaism in online discussion groups of religion, which began in 1994, continued throughout 2000. Misrepresentations of the Talmud were at the base of leaflets, hate mail and abusive telephone calls.

The Victoria-based newspaper *Strategy*, which draws inspiration from the US-based racists of the Patriot movement, prints items drawn from a variety of sources. In 2000 it promoted a range of extremist organizations and publications, including Holocaust denier Olga Scully's book, video and cassette, and various anti-immigration and "Identity" church groups, among them the
British Israel World Federation (which believes that the British peoples are the true descendants of the Israelites).

Because of their common hatred of Jews, there is cross-pollinization and fraternal support among some elements of the Islamic and Arabic-speaking communities and white supremacists, "Identity" groups and other overt racists. For example, Islamic Offerings from Australia, Scott Balson's Australian National News of the Day and The Strategy, have drawn on the Holocaust denial of Ahmed Rami's Radio Islam, while the New Age Annwn site, the Adelaide Institute and Scott Balson have all quoted US white supremacist William Pierce.

National Action West Australia's new website has links to the Southern Cross Hammerskins, Drumbeat Music, the Adelaide Institute and the Church of the Creator (NSW). It also stated that it stood for opposition to "the unproportional influence of zionists in many western governments [sic]" which it would "never accept in our country."

The Christian Separatist Church Society (CSCS) announced its presence in advertisements in The Strategy and The New Australian Times (a journal targeting alienated conservative rural Christians). The website of CSCS is militantly antisemitic. CSCS activists such as Dr. Ken Cratchley used phrases such as "Talmudist Jews," "the bandit state of so-called Israel" and "Judeo-Christianity."

An Australian woman, Jane Qantrill, using an e-mail signature identifying her as an active supporter of the white supremacist National Alliance, ran a "club" on Yahoo! called "The Holocaust Revised," which served as a vehicle of communication between Holocaust deniers and promoted their beliefs. Other Australian forums disseminating antisemitism and racism include "The Nugget Forum," related to the far right Freedom for Australia site, and the "Matilda Australian Political Message Board."

Several individuals who had publicly confronted racist rhetoric in a variety of forums were subjected to anonymous personal threats, circulated in general discussion lists such as newsgroups and online clubs.

Coverage of issues relating to the Australian Jewish community by the mainstream media is extensive and out of all proportion to the community's size within the Australian population. On reparations and compensation claims resulting from the Nazi Holocaust, the coverage has been generally sympathetic to the community, while that of Israel and the Middle East is less sympathetic. A few columnists, contributors or correspondents to mainstream newspapers expressed open or veiled antagonism to Jews and/or Judaism, and/or compared Israel with Nazi Germany. One such example was the article by Robert Mackline in The Canberra Times of 14 October. Antisemitic comments were sometimes heard on talkback radio, but the hosts would apologize once this was brought to their attention.

Australia's political institutions are not completely free of anti-Jewish prejudice. In one particularly notorious case during the period in review, South
Australian State Liberal parliamentarian Graham Gunn made an openly anti-Jewish comment, invoking the stereotype of greed as a Jewish characteristic. After he was condemned by his political opponents as well as by Jewish and ethnic leaders, and eventually by his own party, he issued a public apology.

RESPONSES TO RACISM AND ANTISEMITISM

Findings in two complaints to the HREOC in 1996 were delivered in 2000. The cases were lodged by the ECAJ against Olga Scully and against Fredrick Toben of the Adelaide Institute. The commissioner determined that Scully had imputed to Jews many negative “attributes.” She was to desist from her unlawful conduct and apologize. Similarly, the commissioner directed Toben to cease his use of the Internet to promote antisemitic propaganda and apologize to the complainants. Neither has abided by the commission’s orders. Since the HREOC does not have the power to enforce its directions, the complainants applied to the Federal Court for an enforcement order. The cases were to be heard in 2001.

An outstanding moral voice against racism came from Governor-General Sir William Deane, who made a series of speeches on this theme during 2000. Churches, such as the Uniting Church in Australia, were also important proponents of diversity and tolerance, often in concert with the Jewish community. The Catholic Church promoted inter-religious and multi-faith understanding as a particular focus in the lead up to the year 2000.

Australia was among the countries which endorsed the final declaration of the January 2000 Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust. The federal government has demonstrated this commitment, *inter alia*, through its promotion of an anti-racism education campaign and the ongoing public awareness programs conducted by the HREOC. Community organizations, the business sector and individuals are also involved in a broad range of educational initiatives.

Individuals operating alone, such as Dr. David Maddison of Melbourne, or in small groups, are using the Internet to counter the propaganda of racists and antisemites, either by participating in newsgroups or developing websites, such as the NSW Jewish Board of Deputies’ Holocaust Education Internet resource.
SOUTH AFRICA

There was an increase in antisemitic activity in South Africa during 2000, largely as a result of the breakdown of peace negotiations in the Middle East and the subsequent eruption of violence in late September. Apart from the vandalizing of two Jewish cemeteries, however, most of the anti-Jewish activity was in the propaganda sphere.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

There are approximately 85,000 Jews living in South Africa out of a total population of some 43 million. Most Jews live in Johannesburg (55,000) and Cape Town (18,000); other centers are Durban (3,000) and Pretoria (1,500).

The community has been in steady decline since it reached a peak of almost 120,000 in 1980; today, it consists of a relatively high proportion of aged people. The flight of skilled and moneyed members of the community has been attributed to the political uncertainty and increasing violence that characterized the last decade of minority white rule and the unprecedented rise in domestic crime and general lack of confidence in the country's leadership following the transfer of power to the black majority in 1994. Nevertheless, the community remains cohesive and well-organized, with a highly developed network of educational and welfare institutions. About 80 percent of Jewish children are currently enrolled in Jewish day schools.

The South African Jewish Board of Deputies (SAJBD), which monitors levels of antisemitism in the country and takes action where necessary, has good relations with the ruling African National Congress (ANC), which controls two-thirds of the seats in the 400-member House of Assembly. The ANC is committed to a non-racial and democratic society and has generally shown itself to be sympathetic toward the concerns and fears of the local Jewish community. South African Jews have traditionally played a prominent role in the political, economic and cultural life of the country and have continued to do so in the post-apartheid era.

The Holocaust Center in Cape Town is designed to commemorate those who perished in the Shoah as well as develop a human rights culture. In January 2000 former President Nelson Mandela attended the opening of the South African Jewish Museum in Cape Town.

South African Jews publish a number of newspapers and journals. The two most significant are the weekly Jewish Herald Times and the Board of Deputies quarterly Jewish Affairs.
POLITICAL PARTIES AND EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS

The White Right
Right-wing extremist groups have become a negligible factor in today’s South Africa and pose little threat to the Jewish community. During 2000 the far right continued to decline and was further weakened by the death of Jaap Marais, veteran leader of the Herstigte Nasionale Party (Reconstituted National Party – HNP). It suffered a further blow with the imprisonment for assault of Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (Afrikaner Resistance Movement) leader Eugene Terreblanche. Mainstream conservative white political groups have also virtually disappeared from South African political life, as shown by their poor performance in the November municipal elections.

Muslim Extremism
Antisemitism in South Africa emanates mainly from Muslim extremist groupings, particularly in Cape Town. Islamic extremist movements tend to have small but militant followings, which are particularly active in the Eastern and Western Cape. They include PAGAD (People against Gangsterism and Drugs), ostensibly a civic anti-crime body, but in practice a front for Islamic militants; Qibla, which has ties with the Lebanese Hizballah; and the Islamic Unity Convention (IUC). All three organizations are closely linked.

PAGAD came under considerable pressure from the authorities during 2000 due to the fact that many of its members were implicated in a series of bombings that took place in Cape Town during the period 1997–2000. These bombings were sometimes directed against Jewish or American targets (such as the attacks on Planet Hollywood and the Wynberg Synagogue in 1998) or against official institutions (such as police stations), but often seemed to be random acts of terror against the public at large. In the course of the trial of several PAGAD members suspected of bombing the Wynberg Synagogue, two former members who were due to give testimony against their erstwhile colleagues for a failed bomb attempt in the city’s Bellville suburb, were murdered at the end of December.

Extremist Muslim views on the State of Israel and Jews in general first came to the fore during the Lebanon War in 1982 and have been part of the South African scene ever since. The militant voice of Islam tends to prevail since the high degree of intimidation and civil strife results in moderates being afraid to speak out. Because most Muslims are non-white and hence suffered alongside blacks under apartheid, and because of the close relationship that existed between Israel and South Africa during the last two decades of the apartheid era, Muslim propagandists have always found a sympathetic ear in the majority black population. There is widespread black support for the Palestinian cause but black antisemitism, with a few individual exceptions, has not surfaced as a problem in South Africa to date.
ANTISEMITIC ACTIVITIES

Violence, Vandalism and Harassment
Two serious instances of antisemitic vandalism took place in 2000 in Jewish cemeteries, in Maitland, Cape Town, and in Lichtenburg in the North West Province. Nearly all 60 tombstones on Jewish graves in Lichtenburg were overturned; a number of graves in the adjoining general cemetery were also damaged. The suspected culprits, four white schoolboys from the local Afrikaans high school, were later arrested. The case was continuing.

The outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada sparked a wave of antisemitic manifestations. Several incidents of antisemitic harassment against individual Jews at Johannesburg shopping centers were reported, including the physical harassment of a group of Jewish teenagers by Muslim youths at Rosebank. Anti-Israel and antisemitic graffiti appeared in numerous places in Johannesburg, but especially in areas with large Jewish or Muslim concentrations and on walls by busy roads. They included slogans such as “Judaism is racism,” “Jewish Pigs” and “We’ll kill the Jews.” Jewish school pupils at David High School were also subjected to antisemitic insults at sporting events. In October, a gymnasium in Johannesburg received a call from an unidentified man who claimed to have placed a bomb there because he assumed the club was mostly patronized by Jews and because a slogan “One Arab, one bullet” had been painted on a wall near the club. No bomb was found.

Propaganda
Apart from Die Afrikaner, the low-circulation Afrikaans weekly of the HNP, antisemitism in the press was largely confined to the appearance of an occasional letter to the editor. A letter entitled “Yasser Arafat’s Groveling a Sickening Sight,” by Abdul Harambi, which appeared in the Sunday Independent on 13 August, stated that Arafat could not rely on the world powers to enforce Palestinian rights “especially where Jewish money and Jewish power are involved.” Firoz Osman (Star, 11 June) referred to “a pronounced tendency among Zionists and Jews in general to portray their sufferings in the past as the ultimate in human suffering.”

Mathatha Tsedu, deputy editor of the Star, published two articles with anti-Jewish overtones, on 18 August and 17 October, including the demand that Jews stop regarding themselves as a superior breed “that God loves more than others.”

A letter entitled “Only Re-colonization Can Redeem Africa” and purportedly written by “Shlomo Aaron Jacobovsky,” appeared in the mainly black-patronized Sunday World. The letter was discovered to be a hoax aimed at stirring up anti-Jewish feeling amongst blacks. Similar hoaxes have taken place in the past in which anti-Jewish and anti-Israel writers have submitted letters under fictitious Jewish names to newspapers (see, for example, ASW 1998/9).
Ian Fraser, a leftist stand-up comic turned computer columnist, recommended Muslim anti-Jewish hate sites to his readers in his column in the *Star* on 24 October. They included, he observed, extensive Holocaust denial material (which he condemned) but were a “major resource of news on occupied Palestine.”

A high proportion of anti-Israel letters in the press originated from an extremist Muslim group calling itself the Media Review Network, which placed many of its letters in the largely black-patronized daily *Sowetan*. Dr. Anver Suliman used the writings of Jewish anti-Zionists Israel Shahak and Noam Chomsky to portray the Middle East conflict as a US plot to control the region through its surrogate Israel (*Daily News*, 3 Aug.), and Iqbal Jassat (*Daily News*, 5 July), blamed Jewish pressure groups such as the ADL for US anti-terrorist legislation that he claimed was intended to target Muslims.

Despite the legal proceedings involving the Cape Town Muslim community station Radio 786, run by the IUC (see below), and a further complaint lodged by SAJBD in December 1999, the station continued to broadcast antisemitic propaganda. On 18, 20 and 22 January, it relayed three pre-recorded sermons, originally delivered in Washington, DC, by Imam Muhammad al-‘Asi. The sermons contained numerous references to alleged Jewish conspiracies against Muslims as well as Jewish greed and treachery. An additional complaint was lodged, the outcome of which will depend on the case already in court.

At a Muslim conference held on the Unisa Campus in February, copies of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, as well as the works of French Holocaust denier Roger Garaudy, were sold. The books were obtained from an Islamic bookstore, Iquan Agency, in Laudium, Pretoria. The store owner claimed that he had been unaware of the ban and that his stock of the works had already been sold out.

Numerous anti-Israel demonstrations took place during the year, particularly following the outbreak of violence in late September, at some of which antisemitic and anti-Zionist slogans were used. At one such demonstration on 11 October, organized by the ANC, the protestors shouted “Death to the Jews.” In addition, at a demonstration in Cape Town organized by Qibla to protest the Chechenya crisis in January, it was reported that a memorandum was handed to the Israeli consulate threatening that if the Russians did not stop their activities there, the Jewish community in South Africa would be affected.

A South African Islamic website, launched in April 1997, contains extensive antisemitic material, including the article “The Jewish-Broederbond Syndicate,” which claims that a secret alliance between Jews and Afrikaner intellectuals ruled South Africa for the previous 50 years and continues to dominate the power structures of the country. The standard Holocaust denial text, “The ‘Holocaust’: 120 Questions and Answers,” originally published by the Institute for Historical Review, also appears there.
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HOLOCAUST AND THE NAZI ERA

Holocaust denial continued to be propagated by Islamic fringe groups, including on the Islamic website noted above.

Dr. Barney Pityana, chairman of the Human Rights Commission, was quoted as saying (Cape Times, 2 June) that it was inherently unfair that Jews were receiving reparations for the crime of the Holocaust while black Africans were not receiving comparable reparations for the crimes of slavery and colonialism. Pityana did not respond to a letter of protest sent by the SAJBD.

The exhibition “Children of Terezin,” children’s art from Terezin camp, was held in Cape Town and Durban as a joint project of the Jewish Board of Deputies, the Cape Town Holocaust Centre and the Embassy of the Czech Republic. A representative of the Minister of Education was guest speaker at the Cape Town opening.

A major step forward in advancing Holocaust awareness in South Africa took place in May when the South African parliament adopted a motion endorsing the principles of the Stockholm Declaration. The declaration, which committed the participating countries to keep alive the memory of the Holocaust and to “use this universal memory to fight the evils of genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, antisemitism and xenophobia,” was formulated at the Stockholm Forum on the Holocaust held in January 2000.

RESPONSES TO RACISM AND ANTISEMITISM

On 26 January 2000, the South African parliament passed a far-reaching Equality Bill, which stipulates the setting up of courts to enforce the laws against discrimination on grounds of “race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, color, sexual orientation, age disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language or birth.” The burden of proof is now placed on those accused of violating those laws.

A complaint lodged by the SAJBD against the Muslim community Radio 786 to the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), may eventually reach the Constitutional Court, where it could become a landmark case with regard to determining the boundaries of freedom of expression in South Africa. The SAJBD’s protest arose from an hour-long program broadcast by Radio 786 on 8 May 1998, which featured many instances of antisemitism and Holocaust denial. The IUC, which runs the station, has applied to the Johannesburg High Court to set aside the IBA’s decision to hold a hearing regarding the SAJBD’s complaint, on the grounds that the relevant section of the Board’s Code of Conduct is unconstitutional.
APPENDICES

The tables in this section refer to violent acts perpetrated against Jewish targets worldwide during 2000. The figures are based on the database of the Stephen Roth Institute and reports of the Coordination Forum for Countering Antisemitism.

The data in the tables are classified into two categories:

(1) Major attacks. Includes attacks and attempted attacks by violent means, such as arson, firebombs, shootings, etc.

(2) Major violent incidents. Includes harassment and vandalism of Jewish property and sites, such as damage to community buildings, desecration of synagogues and street violence not involving the use of a weapon.

It should be stressed that the numbers of incidents presented in the various tables reflect only serious acts of antisemitic violence.
## Violent Anti-Semitic Activities

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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</tr>
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</table>

The graph shows the trend of major attacks and major violent incidents from 1989 to 2000. The y-axis represents the number of incidents, ranging from 0 to 250. The x-axis represents the years from 1989 to 2000. The line chart indicates a general increase in violent anti-Semitic activities over the period, with peaks in 1995 and 1999, and a slight decrease in 1997 and 1998.
MAJOR ATTACKS IN 2000
Breakdown by Continent

- North America: 1 (2%)
- CIS & Baltic States: 6 (9%)
- Eastern Europe: 14 (21%)
- Western Europe: 3 (5%)
- Australia: 41 (61%)
- Latin America: 6 (9%)
MAJOR ATTACKS IN 2000
Breakdown by Modus Operandi

- Arsons: 2 (3%)
- Explosive Devices: 5 (8%)
- Shootings / Knifings: 1 (2%)
- Deliberate Hit and Runs: 58 (87%)
MAJOR ATTACKS IN 2000
Breakdown by Target

- Persons: 11 (17%)
- Schools & Community Centers: 12 (18%)
- Synagogues: 7 (11%)
- Private Property: 36 (54%)
MAJOR VIOLENT INCIDENTS IN 2000
Breakdown by Continent

- Latin America: 120 (64%)
- CIS & Baltic States: 36 (19%)
- Australia: 10 (5%)
- North America: 4 (2%)
- Eastern Europe: 6 (3%)
- Western Europe: 10 (5%)
- Africa: 3 (2%)
MAJOR VIOLENT INCIDENTS IN 2000
Breakdown by Target

- Persons: 66 (34%)
- Schools & Community Centers: 62 (33%)
- Cemeteries & Memorials: 4 (2%)
- Synagogues: 37 (20%)
- Private Property & Businesses: 20 (11%)
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