AFTER THE WAR IN LEBANON: IRANIAN MIGHT AND ITS IMITATIONS

Number 02 ● 20 Agust 2006

The short period which has passed since the cease-fire in Lebanon does not allow for definite conclusions of the range of influences the war has had on the region in general and on each of the sides in particular. However, it is already clear that the processes which led to the war, the chain of events throughout the war and the war's results will yield profound impact on the region. Perhaps this is not the "new Middle East", but we are certainly witnessing profound changes and a different Middle East. Iran is already perceived as a regional power and its leaders even express themselves as if Iran was a global power as well. What did the war contribute to Iran's status and which risks did it expose the country to?

Against its own interests, Lebanon over the past three decades has turned into a conflict arena of foreign players, including the stronghold captured there by Palestinians after the 1967 war, Syria's intervention in 1975 and the Israeli wars mainly in 1982 and now. The Hizballah fought the recent war, and Iran considers itself the beneficiary - while the price was paid for the most part in "Lebanese currency". The US, Arab nations and Europe monitored the developments with concern, apprehensive about the forces behind Hizballah - with Iran at the helm.

Iran holds special interests in Lebanon, including the goal of preserving this strategic stronghold on the Israeli border. It maintained ties with the Shiites in Lebanon even before the revolution of 1979, and it has backed Hizballah since its establishment, through ideological, moral, political and economic support, as well as through the provision of military training and equipment. Iran takes pride in its support for Hizballah, while Hizballah, for its part, recognizes the spiritual authority of the "Supreme Leader" of Iran (Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i) - as apparent in the Hizballah charter and the Ayatollah's posters waved frequently in pro-Hizballah rallies and hung in the headquarters of the organization's leaders.

A series of developments have in fact strengthened the status of Iran in the region on the eve of the war and have enhanced it even further since then:

The increase in radicalism within Iran: The war broke out at a time in which the radical camp in Iran was gaining fortitude and, in turn, added to its power. At the end of eight years of presidency, during which Mohammad Khatami strived towards relatively pragmatic policy, Mahmud Ahmadi-nejad - one of the most radical candidates - was elected in July of 2005. Since then, he has upgraded his status and became a prominent figure with a global reputation, and has attempted to promote his objectives. Significant internal and external developments assisted him. Domestically, these include the rise in oil prices; the weakening of the pragmatic camp, at least for the time-being; as well as Ahmadi-nejad's success in rallying the public around Iran's nuclear program, which is viewed as a national interest. His rise to power was an outcome, and in itself a further contributor, to the growing might of the radical camp, demonstrated in the local and parliamentary elections (in 2003 and 2004, respectively). The major external factors enhancing Iran's status were the fall of Saddam Hussein, the American entanglement in Iraq, the passivity of Arab countries in regional politics and the strengthening of the Shiite communities.

Iran on the Forefront of the Clash of Civilizations: The Lebanese front turned into a microcosm of a broader conflict - a clash of civilizations along two parallel spheres: Western culture vis-à-vis the Muslim civilization, which Iran seeks to lead; and within the Muslim world - the Sunni majority versus the awakening Shiites, for whom Iran represents the strongest element.

The weakness of the Arab world: The "Arab World" has in many ways ceased to function as such, and following fateful events (especially in Iraq and now in Lebanon), it is characterized by passivity. The eradication of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2002, the defeat of Saddam Hussein in 2003, and the withdrawal of Israel in 2000 and of Syria in 2005 from Lebanon have all strengthened the status of Iran in the region and provided it with a broad space to maneuver, not only in the Persian Gulf, but also in the Fertile Crescent. Even in its strategic alliance with Syria, Iran has become the senior partner. The popularity of the Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah and of Ahmadi-nejad in the Arab street also highlights the widening gap between segments of the public and the political elites in some of the countries. Moreover, the Hizballah's steadfastness has inspired radical movements in these states, as well as increased Iran's prestige as the "academy of the Islamic revolution".

Strengthening the Shiite influence on the Islamic arena tilts the inner-Islamic balance between the Sunni majority and the Shiite minority to the advantage of the latter, even though the Shiites themselves are not monolithic and the Sunnis form a vast majority. The top Iraqi religious leader, Ayatollah 'Ali Sistani - of Iranian origins himself - rejects some of basic ideas of Ayatollah Khomeini, including the "Rule of the Jurist". It is also clear that the Sunni Islam still rules the majority of the Muslim world, and that the Shiites are a small minority (less than 15%). Yet despite this, the uplift in the status of the Shiites presents a substantial change in the Middle East. Besides Iran - which has been predominantly Shiite since the early sixteenth century - Iraq is the first Arab state in which the Shiites (approximately 60% of the population) have achieved political dominance, and in Lebanon the Shiites represent the largest religious sect (approximately 40%). This "Shiite crescent" infuses a sense of empowerment for Iran, as well as cause for concern in Arab states.

Iran has attained a superior status in Lebanon already at the eve of the war, and sees its outcome as a further success. Granted, the definition of success or failure in this type of war is dependent to a large extent on the public perception. However, the sense of victory that Hizballah and Iran (as well as Syria) project, in contrast to the despondency and soul searching in Israel, feeds the sentiment that Hizballah's path provides the ultimate means towards the defeating of Israel and the enemies of Islam from outside, as well as those who cooperate with them from within.

In the meantime, the Iranian nuclear program continues, and Iran shows no intent to withdraw from its plans. The war in Iraq increased Iran's resolve to continue pursuing its plans, seeking to attain the same status as North Korea and not to expose itself to invasion as in Iraq. The United States' difficulties in Iraq and the fact that no "smoking gun" was found there contribute as well to the Iranian initiative. The increase in oil prices strengthened Iran's self-confidence, while its claim for Islamic leadership intensified its ambition to be included in the prestigious club of the nuclear states. The fact that other states in the region - Israel, India and Pakistan - possess nuclear capabilities is a further incentive. Moreover, the lack of unity among western states has allowed Iran to continue to pursue its nuclear program. China and Russia seemed unwilling to rush to lay sanctions against Iran, the position of European states has not appeared to be decisive to this moment, and even American public opinion does not necessarily support drastic measures against Iran. Furthermore, the war in Lebanon has diverted global attention away from Iran's nuclear program, even if apparently not for the long run.

Finally, it is critical to note the Iranian diplomatic skill. Iran has a rich and long tradition of managing foreign policy - more so than any other state in the region. Since the revolution, its leaders have demonstrated great sophistication, managing a dual policy through the use of a double tongue, balancing along fine lines and on occasions even utilizing intentional disinformation. They take full advantage of the interests of various states (including China and Russia) in order to "gain time" for advancing their nuclear program.

However, Iran is also vulnerable to significant risks, which overshadow to a large extent its accomplishments in the Lebanese war.

Domestically, public disgruntlement is growing, particularly due to economic difficulties and the restriction of civil liberties. Growing complaints are voiced in some quarters over the financial aid given to foreign movements at the expense of domestic investments. Major investment in Lebanon's reconstruction may reinforce such voices in Iran; failure to do so may intensify criticism in Lebanon and the Arab world. The rise in oil prices could yield a negative influence as well, if and when the public demands government's accountability for the misuse of the increased revenues. History, of course, does not repeat itself, but it would be unwise to ignore its lessons. After all, the revolution of 1979 broke out a short time after the dramatic rise in oil prices in 1973.

Internationally, the world is becoming increasingly aware of the challenges inherent in Muslim radicalism, and even the European states appear today to be more cognizant of the challenges that Iran and religious radicalism raise, including to their own interests. Following the war, it is likely that the pressure on Iran will increase (as is apparent already in the Security Council resolution of the 31^st of July, which threatens sanctions for the first time). Tensions between Iran and its neighbors are also mounting, whether over policy in Iraq, Lebanon or the Palestinian question, or whether over Iran's nuclear policy. Furthermore, despite celebrations of victory, Hizballah has suffered a blow, its military might has been harmed and the damage caused by the war increased public resentment against it, as well as against Iran, at least in the eyes of the non-Shiite population in Lebanon and of leaders of the Arab world. Iran might be now exposed to growing Lebanese and Arab criticism and - no less important - to the rage of Sunni clergy on Shiite and\or Persian bases. A peace initiative between Israel and Syria could also damage Iran's status, as would a potential agreement with the Palestinians - developments which appear today to be a distant dream. Even more threatening from the Iranian perspective is the fact that President Bush is intent on fighting what he has labeled the "Axis of Evil".

Finally, the United States and Europe (and, indirectly, the moderate Arab states as well), have allotted Israel a significant period of time to fight Hizballah before they demanded a cease-fire. From the perspective of the United States at least, the war in Lebanon is just one phase in the broader war against Islamic radicalism, for which Iran is the main country providing the inspiration and patronage. Israel, for its part, viewed the war in Lebanon as an Israeli war. However, the broader challenges which Iran presents - first and foremost the nuclear question - demand primarily the attention of the free world, particularly the United States and its allies in the West, not necessarily of Israel.

To sum up, Iran's balance of gains and losses is not unequivocal at such a short period after the cessation of hostilities. In contrast to the impressions emerging from statements of Iranian leaders, it seems that the war also yielded significant challenges for Iran. Therefore, in the long run, it appears that the negative by-products which may arise from the war and confront Iran are no less potent than the short-term gain which Iran has won - mostly before the war has started■

*David Menashri, Director of the Center for Iranian Studies, Nazarian Professor of Middle Eastern History and Dean of Special Programs at Tel Aviv University.

The Alliance Center for Iranian Studies (ACIS)

Tel Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv 61390, Tel Aviv P.O.B. 39040, Israel

Email: IranCen@post.tau.ac.il Phone: +972-3-640-9510 Fax: +972-3-640-6665

Iran Pulse 2 ● August 20, 2006 © All rights reserved.