ACIS Iran Pulse no.1
Number 01 ● 2 Agust 2006
"THE SHI'I CRESCENT" - IRANIAN DREAM OR ARAB NIGHTMARE?
Uzi Rabi*
Iran's growing influence in the Middle East and its highly charged relationships with most of the Arab states has become an important regional issue in recent years. There has been a growing concern over the emergence of a "Shi'i Crescent", orchestrated by Iran, stretching from the head of the Persian Gulf (Iraq, where Shi'is make up about 60% of the population; Bahrain, 70%; and perhaps Kuwait, 30% and Saudi Arabia, 13%) through Syria (which Iran supports and influences), to Lebanon (where the Shi'is are the largest sect, constituting 40% of the population).
In December 2004, Abdullah, King of Jordan, claimed that the Shi'i Crescent threatened to rip apart the Arab and Islamic world. The president of Egypt, Husni Mubarak, and the Saudi foreign minister, Sa'ud al-Faisal, have since made similar statements on various occasions. These statements expressed the Sunni Arab states' fear of Iran's strengthening position in the area and concern that Shi'i communities in various Arab states would fall under Iran's sway. The present crisis in Lebanon has fueled apprehension about the Shi'i Crescent.
The Islamic Republic of Iran considers itself as the hegemonic leader in the region and behaves accordingly. It owes its increasing influence not only to rising oil revenues and the extensive efforts of the militant core under the presidency of Mahmud Ahmadinejad, but also, and primarily, to Iran's exploitation of weakness in the Arab world.
The fall of Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi ruler and long-time enemy of Iran, is a landmark event that attested to this weakness and served to whet Iran's regional appetite. Iran has since sent massive numbers of activists to Shi'i-dominated southern Iraq and its holy Shi'i cities through the ill-protected borders between the two countries. This enabled Iran to exert considerable influence in this area. Moreover, most members of the present Shi'i-dominated "United National Government" of Iraq under the leadership of Nuri al-Maliki are friendly toward Iran. Consequently, a precedent has been established in post-Saddam Iraq. For the first time, Shi'is have become a dominant player in an Arab state, and with the active help of the United States (and of Iran), they have affected a major shift in the balance of power between Sunnis and Shi'is. Thus, Iran's influence, which had long existed in Damascus and Beirut, has extended into Baghdad as well. This situation has ratcheted up concerns about Iran among Sunni Arab states.
And yet, it seems that the premise of the emergence of a united Shi'i front running through the heart of the Middle East is simplistic and misleading.The Shi'is in the various Arab states are indeed well aware of their religious identity and bear a sense of solidarity with their co-religionists across the region. However, experience has shown that in most cases, the various Shi'i communities in Arab states operate on the basis of particular and local interests. Often, when they have raised the Shi'i flag, it has been to express social protest and improve Shi'i socio-economic and socio-political conditions on a local level.
Even in Iraq, the only Arab country with a dominant Shi'i influence, Shi'is do not constitute a single united front. Secular and religious factions do not share a vision for the future of Iraq and the Shi'a as a whole, struggle for dominance. Additionally, Arab-Iranian ethnic schisms are unlikely to give way to broad Shi'i acceptance of Iranian hegemony.
That being the case, the primary concern of the Sunni leadership of Saudi-Arabia, Egypt and Jordan -- all pro-American - seems to lie elsewhere. Their concern stems from the negative influence that successful radical Islamic movements supported by Iran (such as Hamas and Hizballah) might have on the stability and legitimacy of their own governments. Hizballah's determination in its continued struggle against Israel and its success in forcing Israel to withdraw from Lebanon in May 2000 earned it the applause of the Arab masses. Currently, large demonstrations are being held in the streets of Cairo and Amman in support of Hizballah. Victory, or even a partial victory for Hizballah in the present crisis, could inspire the Islamist opposition in Saudi-Arabia, Egypt and Jordan. This explains the harsh criticism against Hizballah in the early days of the crisis for "its adventurous and impetuous policy that might bring disaster upon Lebanon." Conversely, the defeat of Hizballah could potentially weaken the opposition at home and expose the limitations of Iranian strength.
At the same time, the moderate Arab regimes wish for a speedy end to the fighting and a resolution to the humanitarian crisis in Lebanon. They have been confronted with domestic criticism for joining with the United States and Israel. These countries, especially Saudi-Arabia and Egypt, have made concerted efforts to obtain a cease fire in a way that would not be interpreted as a victory for radical elements operating according to the instructions of Iran.
All things considered, the discourse about the Shi'i Crescent attests to tensions between Iran and the Arab states. Furthermore, it harbors the potential to create new blocs and different alignments in the Middle Eastern arena. Iran's ambitions for regional hegemony and its potential acquisition of nuclear capability have pushed various Arab states into forging an opposing camp. The open questions are whether and to what extent this camp could regain the former balance between the Arab states and Iran■
* Uzi Rabi is a senior researcher at the Center for Iranian Studies.
The Alliance Center for Iranian Studies (ACIS)
Tel Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv 61390, Tel Aviv P.O.B. 39040, Israel
Email: irancen@tauex.tau.ac.il Phone: +972-3-640-9510 Fax: +972-3-640-6665
Iran Pulse 1 ● August 2, 2006 © All rights reserved.
