IRAN AND BAHRAIN: A NEW CHAPTER IN AN OLD GULF STORY

Number 14 ● 14 Agust 2007

Iran's regional resurgence has changed the dynamic of Middle Eastern politics. It was made possible by the US invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, which shattered the erstwhile balance of power and undermined American influence. The conservative Arab Gulf monarchies view Iran's bid to establish regional hegemony with serious concern, and Bahrain, which has been the target of Iranian challenges to its sovereignty throughout the twentieth century, has reason to be particularly concerned.

On 9 July 2007, Hossein Shariatmadari, the editor of the conservative daily paper Kayhan and an advisor to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamene‘i, published a controversial editorial entitled, "Street Garden Song." Shariatmadari's assertion that Bahrainis supported reunification with Islamic Iran, and that such a reunification was "an indisputable right for Iran and the people of this province [Bahrain] and should not and cannot be overlooked," caused a brief but serious regional and international uproar. Shariatmadari's remarks were part of a broad response to a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) statement issued a week earlier, calling for Iran to participate in a dialogue to resolve the dispute regarding the UAE's ownership claims to the three islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs.

Bahrain is ruled by the Sunni Muslim Al Khalifa family which captured the Bahraini archipelago from the Iranian-based Al Madhkur family in 1782-1783. In the nineteenth century the Al Khalifa, acting in a fashion similar to that of other Gulf shaykhdoms, secured its territory by entering into a series of treaties within the framework of a Pax Britannica. The British remained an imperial power in the region with bases in Bahrain until the 1971 withdrawal from the Gulf. On the eve of the British withdrawal, the Shah withdrew Iran's claim to Bahrain after a UN supervised plebiscite indicated that the majority of Bahrain's population favored independence. However, in the 1970s, when the US and Iran were close allies and Iran served - with Saudi Arabia - as one of the "Twin Pillars" of the US regional security strategy, the Shah objected to America's establishing permanent naval bases in Bahrain. The 1979 Islamic Revolution exacerbated regional tensions by directing anti-monarchical rhetoric at the Gulf's states and undermining the authority of the ruling families. In 1981 the Iranian-backed Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain failed in its attempt to overthrow the Bahraini rulers. In 1996, Bahraini authorities identified a plot to topple the ruling regime that was planned by members of Bahraini Hizballah and the al-Quds Forces, with support from Iranian intelligence.

Above and beyond the geo-politics, there is a socio-political component that further fuels the tension between Iran and Bahrain. The Bahraini island-state is ethnically more diverse than its Gulf neighbors. According to various estimates, 65 to 70 percent of the population is Shiite. The tension between the ruling Sunni elites and the Shiites resulted in severe rioting in some of the poorer Shiite villages in Bahrain during much of the last decade.

Following Shariatmadari's comm-ents, the Bahraini press responded in outrage. Many Bahrainis, primarily Sunnis, protested outside the Iranian Embassy and one Sunni Bahraini parliament member, Shaykh Jasim al-Sa‘idi, went as far as to issue a fatwa calling for the death of Shariatmadari. Iran's Foreign Minister, Mannouchehr Mottaki, visited Bahrain on 13 July to smooth things over and re-assure the ruling Al Khalifa family that Iran respects Bahrain's national sovereignty. He did not offer an apology, stating that "if something was published in a Bahraini newspaper, we would not expect an apology from the government of Bahrain," and added, "our message to our neighbor is peace and friendship."

However, Mottaki's weak attempts at conciliation prompted a nationalistic backlash in Iran. Daryoush Ghanbari, a member of Iran's Majlis, responded to Mottaki's visit to Bahrain by stating, "Unfortunately there is a contradiction in our foreign policy. There is an unyielding policy against the US and the West...and an ineffectual policy toward the small regional countries. Whenever they make a protest, we are at a loss and trample down our national dignity."

The Bahraini issue provides Iran's unpopular Islamic regime with a nationalistic rallying point that transcends the regime's Islamic ideology. As domestic problems with the Iranian economy persist - such as the gasoline rationing that triggered riots in Tehran on 26 June - Iran's leaders may view foreign policy bombast and confrontation as the best tactic for generating solidarity between the people and the state in Iran. The nuclear issue, Iran's involvement in Iraq, and its territorial claims in the Gulf are all issues that evoke long-standing national aims that are not unique to the Islamic Republic's political agenda. These issues temporarily divert public attention away from the deteriorating socio-economic situation the regime is struggling to come to terms with.

Shariatmadari's 17 July follow-up editorial employed Khomeini's rhetoric. For example, referring to the GCC's statement regarding Abu Musa and the Two Tunbs he claimed: "You are - most unfortunately - talking for America and its allies in this preposterous case. While Iran is in the thick of an all-out struggle against America and Israel, you are trying to open a new front against Islamic Iran. The American and Israeli crimes against Muslim nations don't bother you at all, do they? You are not worried about the massacre of the oppressed Palestinians, Iraqi men, women and children and the death of righteous Lebanese Muslims, are you?"

The period following Khomeini's death (1989) through Mohammad Khatami's presidency (1997-2005) is often known as the "Second Republic," referring to a perceived moderation in Tehran's foreign and economic policies. Shariatmadari's editorial, if indeed it is representative of the state's position, may therefore be another indication of Iran's return to the radical principles of Khomeini's "First Republic," and the confrontational policies with Iran's Arab Gulf neighbors which characterized those turbulent years■

Tel Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv 61390, Tel Aviv P.O.B. 39040, Israel

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Iran Pulse 14 ● August 14, 2007 © All rights reserved.