ALONE AND SURROUNDED: IRAN'S SECURITY CONCERNS

Number 11 ● 14 May 2007

This paper aims to explain some of Iran's major security concerns. A few points of clarification at the outset may be helpful. First, a distinction between Iranians in general and the current regime in Iran is important. Second, Iran's revolution has not yet run its course. Therefore, separating the rulers' statements that reflect the "revolutionary cause" from those that speak of "the national interest," is essential. Third, the recent elections in Iran have confirmed that President Mahmud Ahmadinejad and the faction he represents do not enjoy the support of the majority of Iranians. Therefore, Ahmadinejad has neither the authority that his title suggests (especially in light of Ayatollah 'Ali Khamenei's position as the Supreme Leader), nor the popularity that his presidential election may have implied in the run-off of 2005.[1] Finally, governance in the Islamic Republic is collective, requiring consensus on important policies as several powerful groups are in constant competition for power. Each group behaves as a tribe with an influential cleric as its leader. Thus, the Iranian government does not always present a unified front.

Nuclear Policy

Nuclear deterrence plays a significant role in explaining Iran's threat perception. In contrast to the country's defense policy, which is based on a security issue and is thus a military concern, Iran's nuclear policy is fundamentally political. That is not to say that Iran's nuclear and defense policies are totally unrelated; rather, they are different and distinct from one another. Iran's nuclear policy serves several interests. These are:

1. Independent Deterrence: Iranians are not likely to forget that during the Iran-Iraq War, Western suppliers of their military hardware rendered Iran's formidable air force and armor useless by embargoing supplies and spare parts. Moreover, Iran purchased 10% of the French Uranium Enrichment Company Eurodif for one billion dollars in 1975 (equivalent to about $2.5 billion dollars today), but even as a significant shareholder, Iran has not received any fuel from the company yet.

2. External Prestige: Iranians are bitter for they feel they have not received the respect and recognition that they deserve. Mastery of nuclear technology will force the international community to take notice that Iranians may no longer be ignored.

3. Internal Pride: Iranians have pursued modern scientific and technological goals ever since they sent their first students to Europe some two hundred years ago. They genuinely seek the self-confidence and self-validation that scientific and technological achievements could provide. On the issue of nuclear enrichment, for instance, they consider it discriminatory that non-nuclear NPT signatories such as Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, Brazil, Argentina and others have enrichment capacity, while Iran is being denied that capability.

4. Energy Security: Oil and gas are not renewable and will expire world-wide. Iranians find the argument that they are sitting on a sea of oil and gas (and thus should not seek alternative sources of energy) self-serving, prejudicial, and hollow. Iran is a major energy consumer, rapidly outstripping supply capacity. Precious oil and gas are exhaustible and have appreciable value if kept in the ground. Exhausting these resources is not in Iran's national interest.

Although mastering nuclear technology (by gaining nuclear capability) serves the above purposes, the actual use or even testing of nuclear devices would not. Testing or using a nuclear device would be counterproductive to national interest, as it could turn Iran into a target. Therefore, from the Iranian perspective, the nuclear issue is by far more political than military in nature.

Defense Policy

Iran's regional defense policy is nuanced and is consistently fine-tuned to counter external threats perceived by the current regime. Iranians viewed their country as the traditional protector of its entire region before the Revolution of 1978 - a role that the United States had encouraged. Iranians today seek to regain that status. Perceived sources of external threat may be divided into the following categories:

•1. Threats from the United States and its Allies:

•a. Propaganda to Incite Rebellion within Iran: The US and its allies are considered hostile to Iran's regime and interested in inciting the regime's overthrow by internal rebellion. Controlling the flow of information, creating a multi-layered police state, and fanning the flame of nationalism are all means of neutralizing this campaign.

•b. Propaganda Aimed at Turning the Region against Iran: The US and its allies are perceived as trying to turn Iran's neighbors against it. A campaign of this sort is in fact taking place, and has been effective with governments in the region.

•c. Military Attack by the United States or a US Proxy: To deter and counter such a threat, Iran would utilize various means including missiles, large militias, asymmetric warfare, insurgencies, propaganda, armed resistance groups (such as the Hezbollah), regional public opinion, and potentially nuclear capability.

•2. Incitement of Ethnic Disturbances: Iranian ethnic groups such as Arabs, Baluch, Azeris, and Kurds may be incited through incidents intended to create ethnic strife. To counter such attempts, the regime would rely upon Iranians' deep sense of nationalism and the long memory of repeated past attempts to carve up Iran's territory.

•3. Spill-Over Border Incidents: An ongoing serious concern is the potential for disturbances in neighboring areas such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Caucasus and Iraq to cross the border into Iran.

•4. Regional Turmoil and Instability: Contrary to some beliefs, Iran is not interested in a civil war in Iraq, chaos in Pakistan, state failure in Afghanistan, instability in Central Asia, warfare in the Caucasus, and upheaval in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. Iran's basic aim has been regional stability, provided that the Islamic Republic is recognized as a regional power. Turmoil in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq or other neighboring states could have dire consequences that Iran would wish to avoid.

In conclusion, the United States was not considered a threat to Iran before the Islamic Revolution, but conflict with the US emerged as central to the Islamic Republic's revolutionary ideology. Although Iran welcomed the United States' interventions in Afghanistan and in Iraq against the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, the country considers continued US presence in the region destabilizing. Iran is concerned that US presence denies its regional status, justifiable by the country's size, population and history. Stability in the area is essential for Iran's international trade. Iran will assume considerable burdens to assure such stability, provided that its status and ideals are not challenged. Yet despite this interest, Iran will intervene in the region when it perceives its interests threatened■

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[1] Ahmadinejad received 19.48% of the vote by 12.2% of eligible voters in the first round. In the run-off he faced former president Rafsanjani, who had received 21.01% of the vote by 13.16% of eligible voters. Ahmadinejad received 61.69% of the vote by 36.93% of the eligible voters in the run-off, against Rafsanjani's 35.93% of the vote by 21.46% of the eligible voters. The final phase of the election, therefore, reflected an overwhelming rejection of Rafsanjani and the clerics, rather than an avalanche of support for Ahmadinejad and fundamentalism.

* Fariborz Mokhtari, Professor of Political Science, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University.

** This brief summary expresses the opinions of Professor Mokhtari as presented in a special session of Forum-Iran at The Center for Iranian Studies of Tel Aviv University, January 10, 2007.

The Alliance Center for Iranian Studies (ACIS)

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Iran Pulse 11 ● May 14, 2007 © All rights reserved.