IRAN AND NORTH-KOREA MILITARY COOPERATION: A PARTNERSHIP WITHIN THE "AXIS OF EVIL"

Number 10 ● 26 February 2007

In February 2007, North Korea and the other members of the Six Party Talks - South Korea, Japan, Russia, China and the United States - reached an agreement whereby North Korea would freeze its nuclear program. If North Korea will indeed follow the "Libyan model" and indorse a nuclear free zone in the Korean Peninsula, what might be the ramifications for Iran's nuclear program?

In mid-January 2007 Kim Yong Nam, North Korea's Second in Command, met with Iran's Vice Foreign Minister Mahdi Safari. The meeting highlighted the good relations between these two countries facing international outcry regarding their nuclear programs. These relations have become a key issue in the international arena, especially following U.S. President George W. Bush's State of the Union address, on January 29 2002, in which he declared that North Korea and Iran belong to the "Axis of Evil". The following short commentary will focus on the security relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). It will elaborate on the rising military technological cooperation between the two states in the field of missiles and nuclear technology.

The Iran-Iraq war was a vital factor in improving the relations between Iran and North Korea. In the early 1980s, North Korea's enhanced missile technology became an important share of domestic export and Iran became one of North Korea's best customers, due to its growing military needs. Indeed, several analysts believe that Iran was the primary financial supporter of North Korea's missile development program, although sources in Iran have denied the intelligence reports on this issue. One example of the cooperation between the two states took place at the beginning of the 1980s, when Iran agreed to fund the reverse engineering of the Scud-B missile in exchange for the option to purchase production models.

By 1984, North Korea had produced and flight-tested an indigenous version of the Scud-B. In 1985, Pyongyang reached an agreement with Tehran whereby Iran would contribute funding for missile development and production in exchange for an option to purchase North Korean missiles in the future. Iran's ballistic missile "war of the cities" with Iraq created an opportunity for North Korea to earn foreign exchange and increase economies of scale in production.

Two aspects of the Iran-North Korea relationship are particularly interesting: Iran's use of oil to purchase North Korean missiles, and the potential use of Iranian test-sites for North Korean missiles. The mutual benefits of the Iranian use and testing of North Korean missile technology have been significant, although this practice - along with North Korea's missile exports to other Middle Eastern countries - bears a destabilizing international influence.

North Korea's financial pressures surmounting in the early 1990s, along with a restructuring of North Korea's debt to Iran in 1987 permitting debt repayment in goods rather than cash, led to a new relationship between the two countries that allowed for Iranian test-sites for North Korean missiles and encouraged military information-sharing. The decrease in financial assistance from China and the Soviet Union (and later Russia) to North Korea led to economic difficulties in the 1990s. Following termination of the favorable oil prices North Korea had once received from China and the former Soviet Union, the country was left in perpetual need for oil. These problems encouraged North Korea to increase its military cooperation and trade with Arab states and with Iran.

The May 1991 test-launch of the Scud-C missile in Qom - another manifestation of the cooperation between Iran and North Korea - also signaled a new phase in the relationship between the two states. This first successful test led to an increase in the military cooperation between the two countries. Further examples exist of North Korean-Iranian cooperation in missile technology. Tehran's use of the Hwasŏng-5\Scud-B provided Pyongyang with performance data that would have required extensive flight-testing in North Korea. In addition the North Korean Hwasŏng-6 missile served as the model for Shihab-2. The Iranian medium-range ballistic missile, Shihab-2, can carry up to 900 kilograms and has a range of up to 700 km, and thus capable of reaching Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and Iraq.

In late 1993, North Korea appeared ready to use Iran's Lut Desert test-site for the Nodong-1. However, the test was cancelled, probably due to international pressure. More recently, Iran may have shared test data with North Korea from its July 23, 1998 launch of the Shihab-3. Russian assistance to Iran's missile program in metallurgy and other fields may also indirectly benefit Pyongyang's own missile programs.

Another example of the cooperation between the two states involved reports of the joint development of an advanced version of the C-802 cruise missile, used by the Hezbollah in the last Lebanon war against the Israeli battleship "Hanit". On July 4, 2006, North Korea held missile testing that included the failed launch of the Taepodong-2 (ICBM) missile and other upgraded short and middle range missiles. According to foreign sources, an Iranian delegation participated in the missile tests.

These events provided yet another indicator of the continuing missile collaboration between the two states. Such cooperation not only increases North Korea's domestic export, but also allows Pyongyang to share information and benefit from missile experiments in Iran while avoiding political costs of conducting flight tests on home ground. Furthermore, the partnership contributes in advancing North Korean missile sales to other customers in the Middle East, such as Syria and Egypt.

Moreover, nuclear cooperation between Iran and North Korea has raised widespread international concern. During the last two decades, nuclear experts and political delegates from North Korea and Iran have held visitations and increased the technological collaboration between the two states. Delegations from both countries have visited Pakistan as well. According to

intelligence communities, Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan has provided the knowledge and some of the hardware for both the Iranian and the North Korean nuclear programs. Foreign intelligence sources even stated that the North Korean nuclear program was partially funded by Iran. The increase in Iranian financial assistance to the North Korean nuclear program, in conjunction with a decrease in other foreign assistance to that country, has made Iran an important ally to North Korea. According to intelligence reports, the nuclear test that North Korea conducted in October 2006 coupled with the sanctions on North Korea, Security Council resolution 1718, and the tension between Iran and the United States will further increase the nuclear collaboration between Iran and North Korea.

In February 2007, the members of the Six-Party Talks declared that they reached an agreement that will lead to the freeze of the North Korean nuclear program. From the U.S. perspective, this agreement is an important step towards dealing with Iran on the nuclear issue. Yet past problems in implementation of such agreements lead member states to cautious optimism in regard to the present understanding. Following a history of non-compliance with agreements in this regard, the current process will be gradual, planned to take place under international inspection. Although all members of the Six-Party Talks expressed optimism that the new agreement will succeed, they are also very cautious about the problems that might arise by the implementation of the accord. Furthermore, some critical questions still remain unanswered: Will North Korea implement the planned total freeze of its nuclear program? Will Kim Jong-il follow Muammar al-Qadhdhafi's model and renounce the nuclear program? And how will this process influence North Korean nuclear technology relations with Iran? Only time will uncover the answers to these questions■

*Alon Levkowitz is a lecturer at the Department of East Asian Studies, Tel-Aviv University.

The Alliance Center for Iranian Studies (ACIS)

Tel Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv 61390, Tel Aviv P.O.B. 39040, Israel

Email: IranCen@post.tau.ac.il Phone: +972-3-640-9510 Fax: +972-3-640-6665

Iran Pulse 10 ● February 26, 2007 © All rights reserved.