IRAN'S MAJLIS ELECTIONS: ALL IN THE FAMILY

Number 20 ● 28 March 2008

On the 14^th of March 2008, Iranians voted for the first round of the eighth Majlis (Parliament). Even before the final results (including the second round) are known, it is clear that the conservatives will maintain their comfortable majority. Still, given the rifts within the revolutionary ranks and the growing discontent with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s politics and posture, he will probably be facing greater criticism during the coming year leading up to the 2009 presidential elections. 

The structure of the regime and the political system in Iran permits only a limited range of change. Still, the current generation of Iranians has voted more frequently than in any other country—once a year on average since 1979: nine presidential elections, eight parliamentary elections, three referendums, three municipal elections, and four elections for the Assembly of Experts (and all these excluding run-offs). The relatively high turnout quoted by government officials for 2008 (around 60%, similar to previous elections) has been interpreted by the regime not only as a sign of democracy, but also as an indication of its legitimacy and continuous popular support.

Although candidates in the elections were perceived as loyal to the basic revolutionary tenets, nevertheless they provided some alternatives, and allowed the regime to present its show of free elections. Approximately 4,500 candidates ran for 290 seats in 207 constituencies. In the 2006 local elections and the contemporaneous elections for the Assembly of Experts (a clerical assembly empowered to select the Supreme Leader), the conservative-activists within the Principlists—Ahmadinejad’s supporters —lost ground to traditionalist and less conservative-minded Principlists. Thus, the 2008 Majlis election was not only a contest between Reformists-Principlists, but perhaps more importantly a battle within the ruling Principlist camp.

The Principlists (Osulgarayan)—those desiring to return to Islamic principles—have experienced internal strife due to Ahmadinejad’s style of political engagement, and, no less importantly, differences on key policy issues.

* Hard-line Principlists supporting Ahmadinejad have coalesced under the umbrella of the United Principlist Front (Jebhe-ye Mottahed-e Osulgarayan) led by the Parliament Speaker Gholam-‘Ali Haddad ‘Adel. They generally advocate firm opposition to the West, and more specifically demand resilience vis-à-vis American efforts to thwart Iran’s nuclear program.

* The Broad Principlist Coalition (E’telaf-e Faragir-e Osulgarayan) generally advocates decisive economic reform and a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy. It is associated with Ahmadinejad’s critics like former nuclear negotiator, ‘Ali Larijani; Tehran Mayor, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf; and former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Mohsen Reza’i. Larijani and Qalibaf are said to have ambitions for the 2009 presidential elections.

The Coalition of Reformists (E'telaf-e Eslah-talaban) tends to support political openness and a less confrontational approach to the West. However here too there are sub-groupings. The Coalition of Reformists is represented by the largest Reformist faction, the Islamic Iran Participation Front, formerly led by Mohammad Reza Khatami, the brother of former President Khatami. Another faction, the National Confidence Party is headed by former Majlis Speaker Mehdi Karoubi (more conservative than most of his Reformist colleagues). In addition there are also many independent candidates, as well as supporters of the Chairman of the Assembly of Experts, Ayatollah ‘Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.

The most important issue in the election campaign was the ailing economy. Dissatisfaction with the economy is also shared by some Principlists. Reformists view President Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy as impeding economic progress.   Some of the more liberal elements within the reformist camp tend to support voluntary suspension of uranium enrichment and others simply prefer a less hostile approach to a possible dialogue with the US. 

The recent elections were conducted within the strict political parameters of the Islamic revolutionary system. The vetting process—a prevailing feature of all elections in the Islamic Republic—eliminated a significant number of candidates.  In fact, the Guardian Council used its supervisory power to disqualify “unfit” candidates. In 1999 Ayatollah Hossein ‘Ali Montazeri accused the Council of overstepping its authority: rather than “supervising the elections,” they were “supervising the candidates.” The Council, he added, created a two-tier electoral system, in which the Council pre-selects the candidates and only then allows people to choose from among those who have survived “the filter” of the Council’s preferences. Many expressed a similar concern in 2008.

Out of the registered 7,200 candidates in the current elections, only 4,500 ultimately ran: many were disqualified (some were later reinstated and some dropped out). Most of the disqualified candidates in this decidedly partisan vetting process were Reformists. Hamidreza Taraqi, speaking for the ruling elite, claimed they were not rejected because they were reformists, but due to their perceived disloyalty to the Constitution or the system:  “They can be part of society, but they should not hold power.”

A preliminary analysis of the results is intricate. Reformists were excluded from a significant number of constituencies and in many others they were left with less eminent candidates. There is also a widespread accusation that government hardliners have rigged or “engineered the election” (mohandesi-ye entekhabat) to eliminate Reformist competition. Critics also point to interference with the vote and count; campaign harassment; media control and censorship; and intimidation. The timing of the elections was also well calculated—the results for the important Tehran province were announced  shortly before  the New Year, so that complaints would have to wait  until “ba‘d  az ‘eid” (after the holidays). 

What can we learn from the first round results?

The elections were held to vote for a new Majlis and not to decide the fate of the regime. This being the case, the ruling system tolerates a “democratic game,” provided the basic foundation of the Islamic Republic is not challenged.

More importantly, since 1979, despite some oscillations, the scope of political activities and extent of permissible discourse have been significantly narrowed. Two liberal revolutionaries, Mehdi Bazargan and Abul-Hasan Bani Sadr served as the Islamic Republic’s first Prime Minister and President, respectively. In the first Majlis elections (1980), various political factions participated: liberals, leftists (including the Tudeh Communist Party) and Mojahedin-e Khalq. Since then—to use the opposition claim—the revolution has been “intercepted” by Ayatollah Khomeini's loyal disciples. After his death (1989), the struggle evolved between conservatives and reformists among his disciples vying for power. The Reformists gained temporary control over the elected institutions of government: the presidency (1997 and 2001), municipal (1999) and Majlis elections (2000). This trend of reformism—signified by unprecedented openness—was reversed with the conservatives striking back: winning the municipal (2003), Majlis (2004) and presidential elections (2005).

In 2008 the reformists may be able to slightly expand their representation, but in general their power in the Majlis will continue to be limited. No less important was their  failure,  at  least  in  the  first round,  to secure  the election of their candidates in the important Tehran constituencies (they still have several candidates for the run-off).

The main political contest today is within the conservative Principlist camp. Also, veteran traditionalist-conservatives have been continuously losing ground in recent parliamentary and presidential elections, and clerical representation in the Majlis has declined continuously since the early 1980s. Some of the clerics have been replaced by conservatives from various backgrounds, many of whom are affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards and\or veterans of the Iran-Iraq War.

It is therefore, all in the Conservative-Principlist family, which seems, however, gravely divided. Clearly, when two groups of Principlist candidates compete against one another, with one claiming to represent a “united front” and the other a “broad coalition,” there must be some acute divisions in their ranks.

Thus, in the new Majlis there will be a substantial group of members (less radical conservatives, reformists and independents) who are likely to challenge the president, mainly on his economic policy—an issue of extreme sensitivity, not only because of Ahmadinejad’s pledges to the people in 2005, but also due to the approaching 2009 presidential elections■

*David Menashri, Director of the Center for Iranian Studies, Nazarian Professor of Middle Eastern History and Dean of Special Programs at Tel Aviv University. 

The Aliiance Center for Iranian Studies (ACIS)

Tel Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv 61390, Tel Aviv P.O.B. 39040, Israel

Email: IranCen@post.tau.ac.il Phone: +972-3-640-9510 Fax: +972-3-640-6665

Iran Pulse 20 ● March 28, 2008 © All rights reserved