THE RED CARPET- MADE IN THE USA: MAHMOUD AHMADINEJAD'S VISIT TO IRAQ

Number 19 ● 18 March 2008

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stole the headlines again with his momentous visit to Iraq (March 2-3). He is the first Iranian President to visit Iraq since the 1979 Revolution and the subsequent Iran-Iraq War. As Ahmadinejad confidently strutted through the markets of Baghdad near the Green Zone, the UN Security Council passed its third round of sanctions against Iran. Also on the same day, the Guardian Council released its list of candidates who are permitted to run for Iran's Majlis elections—a contest that will affect the balance of power within the Islamic revolutionary system, and will indicate the degree of Ahmadinejad's popularity a year before the presidential elections. Some observers speculate that Ahmadinejad aimed to demonstrate to Iranian voters, that under his leadership, Iran's influence in the region is a force to be reckoned with. Aside from the strategic timing, the real significance of his visit lies in the message that he clearly conveyed to the United States: the US will have to work harder to isolate Iran from its Arab neighbors, as Iran presently enjoys undeniable soft power in the region. He showcased this message through his meetings in Baghdad with Iraqi politicians in which he discussed the improvement and expansion of relations with Iraq. Yet, the cities that he neglected to visit, and the meetings that he did not have may reveal no less interesting aspects of his trip.

Trading Punches

On March 1st, President Bush urged Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, to tell Ahmadinejad to stop exporting sophisticated equipment and terror, as well as fomenting sectarian violence. In Ahmadinejad's 36 hour visit, he appeared in four press conferences, denying American accusations and returning swift rhetorical jabs at George W. Bush, blasting his quagmire in Iraq. Throughout the media frenzy surrounding the visit, he delivered scathing criticism of US policy, stating simply that the Iraqis do not like Americans, and that "six years ago, there were no terrorists in our region." He added, "the others” landed there [Iraq] and “we witnessed their arrival and presence" (Chicago Tribune, March 3, 2008). In another press conference, he stated that, "US officials talk too much." Their accusations, he added, “are not important, as they are solely based on false information." He extended "a friendly piece of advice”: “Accusing others for one's own failures has never solved any problems" (Daily World Affairs Report, March 2, 2008).

Aside from the exchange of accusations with the US Administration, the Iranian president also demonstrated that keeping Iran isolated from its Arab neighbors is a formidable task and a prong of US foreign policy that should be re-examined. Despite President Bush's efforts to galvanize support from US moderate Sunni allies for his policy of isolation, Ahmadinejad has been graciously hosted in Mecca, Doha, Abu Dhabi and Muscat throughout the past year. Moreover, some Gulf States have been providing direly needed economic relief to Iran, breaching the US's isolation policy. Saudi Prince Saud al-Faisel underscores this in his reaction to the visit: "We are neighbors to Iran, and as such we are careful that peace and tranquility reign between the region's countries. We have relations with Iran, and we talk to them, and if we felt any danger, we would not hesitate to discuss it with them" (Los AngelesTimes, March 4, 2008). Clearly, Ahmadinejad's visit to Iraq renders it difficult for the US administration to continue to deny the deterioration of the isolation policy.

The scuffle between Bush and Ahmadinejad surrounding the visit led to a cancellation over purportedly scheduled talks in which Iran and the US were to discuss Iraqi security. What was supposed to be the fourth direct encounter between Iranian and American officials was cancelled earlier this month. The Iranians cited "technical problems." Accounts vary, but apparently remnants of Ahmadinejad's mission stayed behind and offered to talk to Americans before they returned to Iran. US officials claim that they were not given enough notice to prepare negotiating teams and refused the offer. While reports about Ahmadinejad's visit chiefly revolved around Iranian-American acrimonious relations, it constituted a turning point in Iranian-Iraqi relations.

Ahmadinejad and Iraqi Leaders

Ahmadinejad and his entourage were ceremoniously greeted by the Kurdish President Jalal Talabani on a red carpet. President Talabani, who hails from the eastern flank of Kurdistan which borders Iran, is keenly aware of the delicate political balance between Iran and Iraq; his experience leading the Iraqi Kurdish community through years of crisis involving both countries has afforded him this insight. After discussing political, economic and security issues, Talabani told the President in a press conference to call him "Uncle Jalal."

Brotherly affection permeated the many photo ops and press conferences. Ahamadinejad was also warmly received by the Shi'ite Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki who lauded the visit as "an expression of a strong desire of enhancing relations and developing mutual interests after the past tension during the dictatorship era." He also stated that Iran's position towards Iraq is "extremely helpful" and called it a "positive message to the Arab world." His meetings concluded with a signed agreement outlining numerous areas of cooperation mainly in the fields of oil, energy, and transport. They also discussed building joint industrial mini-cities along their border, and Ahmadinejad committed to a $1b loan to be received by Iraqis in the form of Iranian goods and services. The Iranian president also indicated that Iran would consider upgrading Iranian-Iraqi relations to the ambassadorial level.

Before leaving, he visited the Imam Musa al-Kazim Shrine in Kazimiyah, the burial site of the seventh Shi'ite Imam, north of Baghdad. He emphasized that Iran and Iraq share a common history and civilization and have "intimate sentimental and societal relations." He even discussed building airports in Najaf and Karbala to easily facilitate religious pilgrimage. If Ahamdinejad's visit was highlighted by gracious hospitality and high level meetings that evidently produced important understandings regarding future cooperation, his visit should also be defined by the Iraqi leaders who stayed away from the cameras.

Interestingly, Ahmadinejad, a devout Shi'ite, did not fit in trips to the holiest Shi'ite cities, Najaf and Karbala. While pro-government Shi'ite politicians welcomed him, according to the Iraqi TV channel, al-Sharqiyah, around 16 other Shi'ite politicians and important religious leaders such as Grand Ayatollah Sayyid ‘Ali Husseini al-Sistani and Muqtada al-Sadr, reportedly refused to meet with him. While some Shi'ite leaders kept their distance due to their reluctance to mix religion and politics, others, such as al-Sistani apparently resent Iran's interference, and wish to curtail its hegemonic aspirations in Iraq, and specifically in the holy cities.

Sunnis shunned Ahmadinejad in protest of his country's increased involvement in Iraq and role in the sectarian violence. The Sunni Vice President, Tareq al-Hashemi refrained from meeting with him, while Sunnis demonstrated in Fallujah and graffitied their cities with slogans denouncing Ahmadinejad as a criminal who finances the Shi'ite death squads. An important Sunni politician, ‘Adnan al-Dulaimi called for restraint from his community, but did not hesitate to call on the US and Iran to stop using Iraq as a battleground. He admitted that Ahmadinejad's visit symbolizes strong Iranian influence in Iraq, but also added that he hopes it would decrease deep rooted tensions between the countries. Other Sunnis are less optimistic; the Kirkuk Iraqi Front stated that "Iran is a poisoned dagger in the chest of Iraqis."

Although Ahmadinejad's visit produced a memorandum of cooperation on many issues and an agreement to expand ties between Iran and Iraq, progress on other issues was limited. Prime Minister al-Maliki caused a political stir when he said that the 1975 Algiers Border treaty between the two countries is void and demanded renegotiation. Ahead of the visit, Iraq sent a delegation to Tehran in order to negotiate this matter and prepare Ahmadinejad and al-Maliki for such a conversation during the trip. However, to al-Maliki's dismay, on the day of the Ahmadinejad's arrival, the Iranian Foreign Ministry announced that this sensitive topic was off the table.

President Ahmadinejad's visit was not just a landmark in Iraqi-Iranian relations, but also a visit laden with loaded messages for numerous players in Iraqi politics. While this trip was in many ways a triumph for the President and seemingly served both his domestic and foreign policy interests, his presence was certainly not welcomed by all, and there were clear limitations to its success■

* Rachel Kantz is a research fellow of the Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University

The Alliance Center for Iranian Studies (ACIS)

Tel Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv 61390, Tel Aviv P.O.B. 39040, Israel

Email: IranCen@post.tau.ac.il Phone: +972-3-640-9510 Fax: +972-3-640-6665

Iran Pulse 19 ● March 18, 2008 © All rights reserved