IRAN AND SYRIA: ONE AXIS, TWO POLES

Number 37 ● 30 December 2009

Iran and Syria appear to have an informal agreement about the acceptable parameters of a renewed Syrian-Israeli peace process. Yet despite such an agreement, there may be important differences between how Iran and Syria view their respective interests vis-א-vis Israel.  

Senior Iranian officials' successive visits to Damascus – first, Sa’id Jalili, the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, on December 3rd, and then Mohammad Vahidi, the Defense Minister, a week later – may indicate that Iran is concerned that Washington would advance its diplomatic objectives in the region through a Syrian-Israeli peace process. In addition to the nuclear question and Syrian-Iranian cooperation on security issues that was reinforced by the public announcement of a military cooperation agreement, Iran and Syria wish to consolidate a joint strategy regarding the possible renewal of Israeli-Syrian negotiations.

The very need for a renewed clarification between Iran and Syria regarding the dialogue with Israel suggests that Iran is suspicious about Syria’s intentions. As in the past, it appears that while there is mutual agreement about the definition of the common enemy, there is less harmony with respect to the peace process. During a joint press conference held by the two states’ defense ministers, Vahidi used a determined tone declaring that “Cooperation between Iran and Syria and unlimited support of the two countries for one another has set the strong foundations of resistance in the political and security literatures of the region and affected the regional equation in favor of resistance.” However, his Syrian counterpart, Ali Habib Mahmoud,  said that “Tehran- Damascus relations have improved significantly over the past few years” and that the two states are determined to respond to regional challenges and to make an effort to strengthen regional security.

Although Vahidi does not explicitly refer to the Syrian-Israeli dialogue, one can infer from his statement that Iran and Syria do not see eye-to-eye on the possibility of such talks. For example, Vahidi referred to the “support of resistance” – whether it is Hizbullah or Hamas – and omitted any reference to a Syrian-Israeli dialogue, suggesting Iran was not supportive of the notion. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad also hinted at Iran's dissatisfaction with this idea during the former Syrian Defense Minister Hassan Turkmani's visit to Tehran in May 2008. He stated that “I am sure that the Syrian leadership will manage the situation with wisdom and will not abandon the front line until the complete removal of the Zionist threat.” These remarks were made against the background of the indirect dialogue between Israel and Syria through Turkish mediation.  However, Iran’s Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki’s comment that “the Zionist regime must withdraw from the Golan, and we support Syrian efforts to repossess the Heights,” suggests a certain kind of pragmatism from the Iranians vis-א-vis the Syrian-Israeli dialogue.

Iran's rationale was articulated by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former President of Iran and current chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council, who said in a June 2008 interview with Al- Jazeera: “I asked the Syrians several times [about the purpose of the talks with Israel] and they answered that they are having the negotiations in order to have the lands of the Golan Heights returned.” He then added “we do not object to these kinds of negotiations, but if we learn that the negotiations abandon the Palestinian interests we will resist it.”

It is worth noting that Rafsanjani refers to only part of a dialogue between Israel and Syria – the return of the Golan Heights to Syrian sovereignty – but omits the less comfortable issue from Iran's point of view – the possibility of a peace agreement between Syria and Israel.  This omission is apparent in Ahmadinezhad’s statement as well, even if in practical terms, “the complete removal of the Zionist threat” could be achieved through a peace agreement between Israel and Syria.

In this context, the Iranian “silence” regarding the Turkish-Israeli diplomatic “brawl” surrounding the question of mediation with Syria should also be noted. While Syria and Israel have both stated their preferred mediators – Syria prefers Turkey and Israel prefers France – Iran avoided mentioning the mere possibility of a renewal of the negotiations and made no remark about the issue of mediators.  Thus, when the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdo ğan, visited Tehran in October 2009, Iranian officials made no reference – whether positive or negative – about the present or future role of Turkey in a dialogue between Israel and Syria. The Iranian silence is important because similar to Ahmadinezhad’s indirect statement and Rafsanjani’s more straightforward clarification about the Syrian-Israel dialogue, it may outline the points of agreement and contention between Syria and Iran.

Three principles characterize what may be considered to be an informal agreement between Iran and Syria: (1) A dialogue between Israel and Syria will not take place at the expense of Syria’s relationship with Iran; a principle which Syrian officials insisted upon when they rejected any demand to sever Syria’s ties with Iran as a precondition for a dialogue with Israel. (2) Iran recognizes that it cannot prevent a dialogue between Syria and Israel and the parallel Syrian rapprochement with the US, just like it could not prevent dialogue between Syria and Israel during Hafiz al-Asad’s rule (1992-1996). Therefore, Iran phrases its acceptance of this process in a manner that will not contradict its basic position towards Israel; meaning that negotiations aimed at the return of occupied territories are legitimate as long as they do not entail normalization, and, all the more so, peace. (3) Iran will not be forced to give up its “stronghold” of resistance through movements like Hizbullah and Hamas as a price that Syria may be forced to pay as part of the dialogue. The sanctity of Iran's ties to Hizbullah, and Hamas was implicit in Rafsanjani’s remark that Iran will oppose the bilateral dialogue if it turns out that the Palestinian's rights are abandoned, which includes their right to a national struggle.

However, while there is complete agreement for now between Syria and Iran on the first principle, the other two may be potential points of contention. Syria adopted the principle of Land for Peace, and even if the “depth of peace” between Israel and Syria has not yet been defined, it is clear that for Israel full diplomatic relations are a basic condition that will precede a retreat from the Golan Heights. Iran seemingly recognizes that it will be difficult to veto or dictate terms to Syria on this issue. Replacing the relations with Iran with improved relations with the US and Europe will put Syria in a stronger position and force Iran to take measure of Syrian policy unless Iran intends to “punish” Syria by severing their relations. It is highly unlikely that Iran would take such a step, because it would restrict Iran's access to the region and limit its potential to influence political developments in the Arab world.

Iran’s ties to Hizbullah and Hamas require Syria’s cooperation for practical reasons – financing and arms transfers – as well as political interests. For now, both Syria and Iran express their common interest in a rapprochement between Fath and Hamas, as such a course would guarantee the continued influence of both states in the Palestinian political process, and they both have a common interest in leveraging Hizbullah in Lebanon. Both countries are also concerned that a dialogue that would lead to a peace agreement between Syria and Israel might erode their influence with Fath and Hamas and this is what the debate between Syria and Iran is all about: Iran is looking for a way to design a model that will balance Syria’s ambition to regain sovereignty over the Golan Heights with Iran’s desire to maintain its influence in Palestinian and Lebanese affairs. This model would force Iran to accept – perhaps unwillingly, and certainly not explicitly – a Syrian- Israeli and a Syrian-American channel of negotiation in order to preserve its strategic alliance between Iran and Syria and not test it in light of the “temptation” presented by the Syrian rapprochement to the US; certainly not at a preliminary stage where Israel and Syria are just beginning to examine the feasibility of negotiations■

*Zvi Bar’el is a Senior Correspondent on Middle East affairs for Haaretz, as well as a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University.  

**This essay was translated by Rami Regavim.  

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Iran Pulse 37 ● December 30, 2009

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