IS IT ALL ABOUT IRAN? IRAN, HAMAS, ISRAEL, AND THE GAZA WAR

Number 28 ● 03 November 2009

The December 2008-January 2009 warfare between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza Strip has brought to the fore the question of Iranian involvement in the conflict. Iran’s ongoing support for Hamas and its reported financial and military aid for the group suggest a central Iranian role in the conflict between Israel and its neighbors.  Further, when assessing the 2008-09 warfare in the context of regional and international circumstances, an important question comes to light:  Is it all about Iran

The reason many observers place Iran at the center of the conflict derives first from the political and rhetorical support Iran gives Hamas, as well as the funds, weapons, training, and intelligence it reportedly provides. After Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in 2006, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad reportedly assured Hamas leader Khaled Mash'al that Iran would support his regime.  “Since the divine treasures are infinite,” Ahmadinejad said to Mash'al, “you should not be concerned about economic issues” (New York Times, Feb. 2006). In 2008, a senior Hamas commander described Iran as “our mother.  She  gives  us information, military  supplies and financial support” (London Sunday Times, Mar. 2008).  Because of such reports of Iranian patronage to Hamas, some scholars label the group an Iranian proxy.  

Analysts also interpret Iran’s support for Hamas in the 2008-09 war with Israel as a strategic move designed to distract the world from its nuclear program and the Iranian population from its troubled economy. Given the extension of Iranian power from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean, the conflict between Israel and Hamas has become a conflict amas has between two Middle Eastern camps:   Israel, its western supporters, and the “moderate” Arab states including Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia on the one side, and Iran, Syria, Hizbollah, and Hamas on the other.  The conflict, therefore, is about the future of the Middle East, and demonstrates how Iranian power has contributed to transforming the peace process.

Those who are directly involved in the fighting also argue that Iran plays a primary role in the 2008-09 conflict.  Israeli officials assert that Iran backs Hamas with weapons and funding and that the Israeli campaign is aimed at curbing  Iranian power in Gaza. By emphasizing the Iranian relationship to Hamas and the broader context of the conflict, Israeli leaders have sought to underline the urgency and scale of their actions.

Similarly, Egyptian officials explain their country’s posture in the conflict largely in terms of Iran.  Egypt’s fear that an increasingly powerful Iran will destabilize the Middle East and Egypt itself and supplant Egypt as a major player in the region explains why its leaders blame Hamas for provoking the latest hostilities and their work to broker a cease-fire.  Growing Iranian power also worries Jordanian and Saudi Arabian leaders, including a member of the Saudi Arabian Shura Council, who similarly identify Iran as the gravest threat to the region (National Review, Dec. 30, 2008).

Iran’s position in the conflict is also demonstrated by the actions of Iranians and their leaders.  President Ahmadinejad fiercely condemned Israel for its attack on Gaza and chastised Arab leaders for complicity in Israel’s massacre and as traitors to Islam (The Economist, Jan. 17, 2009).  During the hostilities leaders of Iran and Hamas met publicly in Syria and Lebanon.  An article published in the Iranian newspaper E’temad-e Melli reflects the Egyptian position that Iran encouraged Hamas not to accept a cease-fire.  “With no doubt Hamas must continue resistance and it will definitely win,” it urged (New York Times, Jan. 12).  In comments that suggest a material connection between Iran and Hamas, former Iranian president ‘Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani called on Muslim states to send weapons to Gaza, and President Ahmadinejad asserted that “political and spiritual support for the Palestinians is among the most important duties of Islamic states” (Ha'aretz, Jan. 3; Iran Daily, Jan. 5, 2009). 

Signs of the connections between Iran and Hamas continued after Israel and Hamas each declared a unilateral cease-fire.  On February 1, 2009, Hamas leader Khaled Mash'al met with Ayatollah Khamene'i and President Ahmadinejad in Tehran, where he declared “The Islamic Republic of Iran has a big share in our victory in the Gaza Strip” (Ha'aretz/ Reuters).  The day before, Isma'il Haniya addressed a letter to Khamene'i in which he thanked Iran for “its all-out support” of Palestine and emphasized that in order to survive, Gazans required “the continuing support of your Excellency and the Iranian nation” (Press TV). On February 17, Iranian Majlis Speaker 'Ali Larijani urged all Islamic countries to support Gazans, and announced that Iran would host a conference on the situation in Gaza in the near future (Mehr News Agency).

Other analysts, however, argue that the importance of Iran to the conflict has been exaggerated.   They say that placing Iran at the center of the fighting can oversimplify the situation and divert the focus from the conflict’s main protagonists, Israel and Hamas (and to a certain extent Egypt), and their respective actions, grievances, and motivations, as well as the most prominent issues involved:  Israel’s security and the fate of Gaza. 

Attributing to Iran a leading role in the conflict can also misconstrue Iran’s actions.  Though Iranian leaders have been vocal in their support for Gaza, they have not directly intervened in the conflict, and forbade Iranians from traveling to Gaza to fight for Hamas.  To a certain extent, Iran’s reaction to the fighting exposes its limited ability to intervene more aggressively, as doing so might provoke a direct conflict with Israel, which would threaten Iran’s national interests. The isolated rockets fired at Israel from Lebanon during the recent conflict, and Iran’s restrained position, demonstrate Iran’s intention not to give Israel a pretext for attacking it.

Perhaps the two most important perspectives to take into consideration in determining whether or not it is all about Iran are those of Israel and Hamas, for they are the parties fighting each other directly. 

From the Israeli perspective, it seems that the Iranian threat was an important reason for the operation against Hamas, and particularly the scale it took.  Israel has suffered as a result of Iran’s extended power, most severely in the rocket barrages from Lebanon in 2006 and Gaza at the end of 2008.  The official objective of the Israeli campaign was to prevent Hamas from shooting rockets into Israeli territory, which entailed preventing the group from smuggling weapons into Gaza that likely came from Iran.  “Hamas is at the service of Iran and militant Islam.  Israel cannot tolerate an Iranian base next to its cities,” argued Benjamin Netanyahu (The Telegraph, Jan. 13).  Israel is also deeply concerned about a nuclear Iran, as Iranian leaders have declared their desire to see Israel destroyed.  To Israeli leaders, Iran endangers their country’s survival, and they want the international community to understand that their actions against Hamas reflect the magnitude of the Iranian threat.

When considering the perspective of Hamas, a different picture of the Iranian role emerges.  By firing rockets at Israel, Hamas’s goal was to force Israel to lift the blockade of Gaza and to display its power as the representative of the Palestinian people.  Though Hamas shares certain goals and positions with Iran, it was not acting on Iran’s behalf.  Hamas likely benefits from its connections to Iran and is aware that it contributes to the growing Iranian influence in the region, but it is an independent movement with roots and ideologies distinct from those of the Islamic Republic. 

So, is it all about Iran?  As with most such general and politically-charged questions, the simple answer is no, it is not all about Iran.  To place such weight on the Iranian role would be to marginalize the most important protagonists—Israel, Hamas, and the populations of Israel and Gaza—and to marginalize their most immediate grievances and goals.  Nevertheless, Iran has interpreted the conflict as an opportunity to serve its cause and extend its power, and is determined to make the most of it. The influence of Iran in this conflict and its connections with Hamas cannot be dismissed, as they represent the growing influence of the Islamic Republic, its drive for regional power, and the threat this presents to Israel■

* Anne E. Tracy is a PhD candidate at Tel Aviv University and research fellow at the Center for Iranian Studies

The Alliance Center for Iranian Studies (ACIS)

Tel Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv 61390, Tel Aviv P.O.B. 39040, Israel

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Iran Pulse 28 ● March 3, 2009 © All rights reserved.