FOLLOWING THE IRANIAN ELECTION: THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR CHALLENGE

Number 35 ● 24 July 2009

The fascinating internal developments in Iran on the eve of the June 12 presidential elections and what appeared as a lively celebration of democracy changed into scenes of hard-handed oppression against demonstrators struggling for freedom after the announcement of the dubious results. These developments have captivated international attention and diverted it away from the Iranian nuclear program. While the world watches in awe the heroic struggle of the reform-minded demonstrators and their forceful oppression, Iran’s nuclear clock continues ticking.

In search for an answer to the Iranian nuclear challenge many eyes are turned to Israel, expecting it to deal with this “hot potato” if necessary. Vice President Joe Biden recently maintained that Israel, as a sovereign state, is allowed to defend its vital interests as it pleases. This focus on Israel is not without reason. Israeli officials talk far too often about “preventive actions” in Iran: Israel’s previous actions against the nuclear facilities in Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007) and the very public training of long-distance flights and aerial refueling, could also lead to the conclusion that Israel has the capability, and perhaps the will to take military action against Iran.

Declarations regarding the military option are useful in signaling that all the options are open. They also help preserve the public’s awareness of this issue. Also, as Uzi Arad, head of the Israeli National Security Council, indicated, the more tangible and credible such threats are, the less likely there will be need to use them—in the spirit of the Roman dictum, si vis pacem, para bellum ("if you wish for peace, prepare for war"). Yet public threats do not necessarily lend credibility.  In fact, Israel attacked the Iraqi nuclear reactor without warning or attribution, and the media's report that Israel destroyed a Syrian nuclear site has remained unconfirmed.

Moreover, it is wrong to portray the Iranian nuclear program as merely or even primarily an Israeli concern, and thus, Israel's responsibility to thwart it. Iran’s nuclear program is similarly a threat to neighboring Islamic countries, major American interests, and European states.  Not every solution needs a “made in Israel” label on it.  A more restrained Israeli approach was expressed by the former Chief of Staff, Dan Halutz, who said, that the Iranian nuclear program is a problem for the whole world, unless it is discovered that the world is not doing what needs to be done. The operational difficulties, uncertainties of the results, and the possible ramifications all need to be carefully weighed. 

It may be necessary to leave the military option available—not necessarily an Israeli one—but other options to halt or delay the Iranian nuclear program must first be exhausted:  The global realm: Iran is not immune to pressure, and from the earliest days of the revolution it has made numerous ideological compromises while demonstrating a normative, rational and pragmatic approach. With authority often comes responsibility that has required the Islamic regime to adjust its dogma to reality.  In fact, in almost every case when the revolutionary dogma clashed with the interests of the state (and from the point of view of the revolutionary ideologues the interest of the regime, the state, and Islam are identical), state interest prevailed over dogma.

Despite broad consensus in Iran concerning the nuclear program, there may be a more important goal to Iran's leadership: the survival of the regime. To this end the leaders of Iran may be ready to reach an arrangement with the U.S. For the reform camp, the domestic politics clearly seem to have higher priority today over any other issue.

Animosity towards the United States was one of the pillars of the revolutionary dogma to which steadfast adherence had been by and large preserved. However, when Iran felt under threat it proved willing to negotiate even with the U.S. Such was the case in 1985 during the Iran-Iraq War (the “Iran-Contra Affair”), and the same in 2003 when the American military forces were marching toward Baghdad. Yet when the U.S. demonstrated weakness, Tehran turned steadfast as a result of its own sense of strength. Hence a situation in which both sides enter negotiations feeling weak and end them equally dissatisfied, may lead to a breakthrough.

The combination of dialogue and pressure under American leadership could yield results if it is executed with the right balance, determination, and sensitivity, and if it is backed by broad international consensus and a clear timetable. President Obama has announced his willingness to dialogue during President Ahmadinejad's first term in the office. Therefore, in principle, there is no obstacle to such a dialogue now. But since Obama’s first offer of dialogue, the base of Ahmadinejad’s legitimacy, and to a degree, the status of the Supreme Leader, have been considerably impaired. When the political storm in Iran calms, it may be possible to begin a dialogue. It won’t be easy and it won’t be the result of a sudden mutual acceptance, but as a result of an unavoidable necessity for both sides.

Europe can flex its moral muscles by supporting human rights and political freedom in Iran.  In the spring of 1997 all of the EU countries (but one) put enormous pressure on Tehran by withdrawing their ambassadors from Tehran following a legal ruling from a Berlin Court which found Iranian officials involved in terrorist activity in Germany.  A month later Khatami was elected president. Today, even Shirin Ebadi (the 2003 Noble Peace Prize Laureate) is calling for diplomatic pressure urging EU states to downgrade their representation to chargé d’affaires level. She knows what could hurt the leaders of her country, but the EU states—protecting their particular interests—have seemed unwilling to go that far. The West could also influence Iran through various economic and diplomatic means.  But when such pressure on Iranian banks initiated by the U.S. began to bear fruit in 2007, the National Intelligence Estimate declared that Iran had ceased its military nuclear program in 2003, a declaration that eased the pressure on Iran.

There is no certainty that an American dialogue with Iran will bear fruit, but without a sincere attempt it will be hard for the U.S. to undertake a more rigorous policy approach. True, a dialogue would grant legitimacy to the Islamic regime, especially after the disputed elections. But it would also force the revolutionary leadership to grant legitimacy to the United States—the “Great Satan”—in the doctrine of the Islamic regime.

At the same time, a dialogue at this juncture may also suffer from significant drawbacks: an Iranian-American dialogue during the current political controversy in Iran could serve as a life-preserver for Iranian radicals without necessarily forcing them to deliver on Western expectations. With its traditional talent for diplomacy, Iran could tactically waste months in negotiations and finish the dialogue with a typical Iranian “Yes, but” answer, that would bring it back to the starting point.  In a usual pre-dialogue phase the parties would discuss where to meet, the level of diplomatic personnel, or the details of the negotiating agenda. Iran and the U.S. have not yet clarified such issues. They, therefore, seemed at a pre-pre-dialogue phase before the elections, and have even moved back since.

  The regional realm: presently Israel and its moderate Arab neighbors face a common challenge; therefore, one possible way to weaken the regional status of Iran is an Arab-Israeli initiative to resolve their conflicts. Mastering the Arab-Israeli negotiation with the assistance of moderate Arab regimes may be an appropriate answer to the regional radicalization pushed by Iran and other Islamist movements. Progress in the Israeli-Palestinian arena or progress with Syria (or ideally progress in both arenas) does not appear likely or easy these days, but it has the potential of weakening Iran, above and beyond the benefits it would bestow upon the negotiating parties. To this end, Saudi Arabia can contribute to weakening Iran by recognizing Israel and forming diplomatic ties, more than it can by allowing Israel an aerial “corridor” for its airplanes on their way to Iran.

The local realm: Finally, a change in Iran is still possible, even if in the longer run. The current ruling system could agree to moderate its policy or an internal change could force an overhaul of Iran’s policies including the suspension of its nuclear program. In the last 120 years the Iranian public has shown an impressive level of political involvement that has brought about major changes, more than any other country in the Muslim Middle East. Iran experienced two popular revolutions during the twentieth century (the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 and the Islamic Revolution of 1979), and in between experienced a popular movement headed by Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq (1951-1953). Since the Islamic Revolution, the youth, the women, the press, the movie industry, and the immense popularity and usage of the internet, all have surprised foreign observers. But will the internal domestic changes in Iran catch up to the nuclear arms race? It is hard to say. Popular movements don’t send out alarm signals and are totally unpredictable.

It seems as if two trains have left the main terminal in Iran: One carries a message of social-political reform and the other the nuclear message. The primary interest of the international community is to make sure that the nuclear train is not the first to reach its final destination. With an active and passive policy the international community still has the ability to influence the interplay between these two trends■

*David Menashri is the head of the Center for Iranian Studies at the Tel Aviv University.

The Alliance Center for Iranian Studies (ACIS)

Tel Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv 61390, Tel Aviv P.O.B. 39040, Israel

Email: IranCen@post.tau.ac.il Phone: +972-3-640-9510 Fax: +972-3-640-6665

Iran Pulse 35 ● July 24, 2009 © All rights reserved.