THE US AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN IRAN

Number 34 ● 19 July 2009

When nations in democratic societies go to vote they determine, at best, the fate of their own country. When the citizens of the United States go to the ballots their vote often has an impact far beyond their borders. In this context the link between the character of the American Administrations and Iranian quest for freedom catches the eye.

Historically, U.S. Presidents from the Democratic Party that set human rights and political freedoms high on their agendas blew wind into the sails of liberal movements in Iran, inspiring their struggle for freedom. Thus was the case of the national movement under the leadership of Mohammad Mosaddeq in the early 1950s, during the Truman presidency; the rise of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as a leader of national scale in the early 1960s, during the Kennedy presidency; and the 1979 Islamic revolution, during the Carter presidency. Just a few short months after the inauguration of President Barack Obama, riots and disorder broke out in Iran—the most extensive ones since 1979—and the storm is not over yet.

The Islamic Republic and the Obama effect

The rise of Obama from a very modest background to the presidency of the United States captured the imagination of many throughout the world, including Iran. His election slogan “yes we can” appeared to many in Iran as relevant for their own situation, and many saw the reformist candidate for the presidency, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, as a local Obama.

The name Barack Hussein Obama has a particular appeal for Iranians. “Barack” comes from the word baraka, which means “blessing” in Persian and Swahili (as common in Kenya); Hossein is the most revered Shi’i Imam, a symbol of the struggle for justice and the example of utmost self-sacrifice; and the Farsi spelling of the name Obama reads “he with us” (u-ba-ma), and during 2008 campaign some headlines in Iran maintained u-ba-ma ast —meaning, “he is with us.”

Obama’s initiative for a dialogue encouraged the supporters of reform in Iran and raised optimism about the possibility of détente with the U.S. His refreshing approach towards the Islamic world, such as his Cairo speech earlier this year, pushed further in the same direction. The radicals in Iran understood well the dangers embodied in the new American approach. If Obama’s approach was perceived in America as a "carrot-and-stick" policy, the radicals in Iran were quick to warn that the carrot is poisoned, maintaining: u-ba-ma nist or “he is not with us.” They rightly estimated that a warm American embrace would challenge the regime's ideology and embolden the "children of the revolution". Clearly, the growing hardships in Iran were fertile ground for the message. The influence of what we might call “Obama-ism” on Iran's lively civil society was unmistakable. The masses of protestors were encouraged by Western ideas of freedom and looked to the West (particularly Washington) in expectation for backup.

Obama was faced with a serious dilemma: In 1953 the United States interfered in Iran’s internal politics and the consequent Iranian hostility is still apparent more than a half a century later. By contrast, in 1979 President Carter chose not to interfere and his inaction eased the victory of the Islamic revolution. To be or not to be involved and in what shape or dose, was the question. Clearly, dialogue is a major pillar of the President’s policy and non-interference an important principle of his platform, and unnecessary expressions could bring about the opposite of the intended result by eliminating common ground for dialogue with official Iran, without benefiting the reformists. President Obama chose first not to directly refer to the events in Iran, and only later conveyed his support of respecting the principles of political freedom and human rights. Maybe not too little, but too late to meet the reformists’ expectations.

Rifts within the “children of the revolution”

If on the surface it appears that the radicals of the Islamic Republic managed to calm the situation, beneath the surface the fire of rebellion still rages on.  Iran of July 2009 is not the same Iran of the prior months. The chants “death to the dictator”—initially directed at President Ahmadinejad—express deep disappointment, and appear to be directed also at higher levels. The Supreme Leader Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamene’i, who never really had full religious credentials, the political status, and personal charisma of Ayatollah Khomeini, managed to preserve Ahmadinejad as the president. But unlike his predecessor, who always made clear to stand above the factionalism and to bridge the divides during periods of crisis as an omnipotent arbitrator, Khamene’i became identified with one side of the political system and directly involved in factional politics. If, during the election campaign, the competition appeared to be a struggle within the family and the candidates were all considered to be loyal to the regime, it now appears that the rift between the followers of Ayatollah Khomeini is deeper than ever, reflecting completely different attitudes regarding almost every issue.

No less important, the basis of the regime’s legitimacy has also narrowed significantly. If the strength of the regime had been a reliance on rigorous adherence to the revolutionary doctrine and Islamic values, now it appears that the regime is relying heavily on oppressive measures undertaken by the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij. The principal of velayat-e faqih ("guardianship of the jurisprudent")—the main historical achievement of the Islamic revolution—has received a critical blow.

Still worse, at the root of the public rage is a deep frustration with the thwarted expectations. For over a century the Iranian people fought to achieve two major goals: freedom and welfare; social-economic justice and political justice. These were also the main goals of the 1979 revolution (and not necessarily the return to religion). The disappointment from these failures continues to smear oil on the wheels of growing public discontent. Despite the oil revenues, economic hardships and social inequality continue to be a large burden; despite the promise for “Islamic democracy”, freedom has not yet appeared. If during the Shah’s reign criticism against the regime was considered a crime, now it is a sin. The crowded prisons are the best testimony of that.

For now, the radicals have managed to suppress the street riots. They were able to apply their religious legitimacy to oppress the protestors in the name of protecting God’s will. No less important, they enjoy the military strength to suppress the riots. Additionally, they are determined to fight for the preservation of their political status and survival of the regime. In fact, for the radicals the destiny of the regime, Islam and the ruling elite appear to be the same. They have no intention of voluntarily giving up their control of the government. Clearly, they learned the lessons from their own revolution and they are unwavering in their intention not to allow their opponents to do to them what they did to the Shah’s regime.

The struggle for revolutionary Iran continues

Some inherent weaknesses of the reformists also played into the hands of the government. The “children of the revolution” seem to lack a cohesive alternative ideology, structured organization, and a more charismatic militant leadership. In some respect, it was easier for Khomeini who wanted to uproot the old system entirely than for Mousavi who “merely” wants to improve the system from within. The explicit, unequivocal, catchy slogans of 1979 (“the Shah must go,” “Islam is the solution”), have not yet been met with worthy equivalents in 2009.

Iranians, however, have an impressive tradition of public involvement in politics and more than any other regional nation interfered to actively decide the destiny of their nation. Shi’is, for their part, are no strangers to struggles for a legitimate ruler and against an unjust heir. In a way, this is the raison d'être of the   emergence of this “party” (Shi’a) and the core of its doctrine. In fact, Shi’i Iran is the only country in the Middle East that had a constitutional revolution (in 1906) and an Islamic revolution (1979)—two revolutions in one century!

The reform movement appears to be even stronger than its leader, Mousavi, and has wide-ranging support among the youth and the public in general, and several senior members of the clergy. Yet, the radicals hold the reins of the government. It is not yet clear if we’re heading towards a new wave of demonstrations that will challenge the regime, but the memories of the past and the events of June 2009 are a serious alarm signal for the Islamic regime.

Are we at the beginning of a revolutionary wave that will sweep Iran? It is hard to say. Mass movements are difficult to predict and they don’t ring out early warning signals. The scholars of the past have no ability to predict an eruption of massive-popular change—a reverse of the historical trend. If the public will decide to change course, the decision will not the result of the government’s success or failure to “return to Islam,” but rather a measure of whether the revolutionary regime has answered the expectation that fed the Iranian revolution from its very beginning—the promise of greater welfare and more freedom for the people of Iran.

Still, with all the emotional enthusiasm of the internal developments in Iran, the main concern of the international community regarding the Islamic Republic’s policy was and still is Iran’s nuclear program. Meanwhile, there should be no mistaking that the clock of Iran's nuclear program is ticking on■

*David Menashri is the head of the Center for Iranian Studies at the Tel Aviv University.

The Alliance Center for Iranian Studies (AَCIS)

Tel Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv 61390, Tel Aviv P.O.B. 39040, Israel

Email: IranCen@post.tau.ac.il Phone: +972-3-640-9510 Fax: +972-3-640-6665

Iran Pulse 34 ● July 19, 2009 © All rights reserved.