MOHSEN REZA'I: FROM HARD-LINE GENERAL TO PRAGMATIC PRINCIPLE-IST?

Number 31 ● 11 June 2009

 

MOHSEN REZA'I: FROM HARD-LINE GENERAL TO PRAGMATIC PRINCIPLE-IST?

 

Brandon Friedman*

 

Mohsen Reza'i lacks widespread popular appeal and has never been elected to public office in Iran. Many analysts believe he is unlikely to be Iran's next president.  However, the 54-year old Khuzestan province native is a powerful figure in Iran with a distinguished revolutionary pedigree and has a good chance to take important votes away from incumbent President Ahmadinejad's core constituency among the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC or Sepah-e Pasdaran).  It is fair to say then that Reza'i's candidacy may play an important role in the outcome of Friday's presidential elections. 

Mohsen Reza'i's given name was Sabzevar, and he was born in the small Khuzestan village of Masjed-e Soleyman in southwestern Iran, where his father was a farmer.  He attended school at night, and as a college student at the age of 17 was arrested by the Shah's regime and served 6 months in prison. In 1972, he was a founder of Mansurun (the Victors), a political group that opposed the Shah. After the revolution Reza'i became a member of the Islamic Republican Party and joined the newly formed  IRGC in its  intelligence unit. His name was changed to "Mohsen" when he became Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC, a position he held for sixteen years, 1981-1997 (BBC World Monitoring Service, June 1,2009). 

Reza'i's political influence and legitimacy derive from his longstanding leadership role in the IRGC, which has been one of the institutional pillars of the Islamic Republic.  The IRGC, which, separate from the conventional military, maintains its own ground, naval, air, and paramilitary forces (Basij), and is tasked by the constitution (article 150) with guarding the revolution and its achievements. The IRGC played the leading role on the battlefield during the Iran-Iraq War, and Reza'i was the public face of the IRGC during the war, which lasted eight years and resulted in hundreds of thousands of Iranian casualties. 

Reza'i was forced to resign as Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC on September 9th, 1997, following his outspoken pre-election opposition to the new president, Mohammad Khatami.  Reza'i transitioned to a new position as Secretary of the Expediency Council, whose members are appointed by the Supreme Leader, and whose governing role is to arbitrate legislative disputes between the Iranian Majlis (parliament) and the Guardian Council.  Following his resignation from the IRGC, Reza'i also studied at Tehran University and between 1990 and 2000 and obtained a Ph.D degree in economics. Reza'i incorporated his education into his policy work on the economics committee of the Expediency Council (Mardom-Salari, Feb.,

15, 2005). He also takes credit for his involvement in the extensive IRGC infrastructure projects in Iran that followed the Iran-Iraq War, including the Karkheh dam construction project.  In 2002, Reza'i with support from the head of the Expediency Council, 'Ali 'Akbar Rafsanjani, participated in track two diplomacy with the U.S., which took place in Cyprus. Reza'i also established the Baztab (currently known as Tabnak) Internet-based news web site in 2002, to provide an alternative to the proliferation of reformist web sites.  

            Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC and the generation of Iran-Iraq War veterans have played an increasingly influential role in Iranian economics, politics and civil society.  As the IRGC organizational structure has grown and matured as a result of its symbiotic relationship with the ruling clerics, it has institutionalized its ability to economically, morally, ideologically, and politically mobilize and indoctrinate Iran's younger generation.  As a result, its leadership wields greater direct and indirect influence in Iranian politics.  Reza'i, as one of the pioneers of the IRGC organization, is particularly well-connected to current IRGC commanders, as well as highly placed government officials who served in the IRGC during Reza'i's leadership, including: 'Ali Ardeshir Larijani (the Speaker of Majlis), Mohammad Qalibaf (Mayor of Tehran), and Ezzatolah Zarghami (head of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting).  

            Iranian media reports have suggested that the head of the Expediency Council, 'Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, urged Reza'i to join the presidential race in order to weaken the chances of the incumbent president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  Reza'i has denied this kind of collaboration with Rafsanjani, but, in many respects, his very candidacy underscores the domestic political battle within Iran between Ahmadinejad's supporters and his apparent opponents. Indeed, social or personal networks are often more important than formal political parties in Iranian politics. Reza'i has used his short presidential campaign to attack Ahmadinejad's economic development policies and his foreign policy “adventurism.” Reza'i campaign has focused on improving Iran's economy and managing Iran's nascent strategic leverage in the region.

            Reza'i's political platform is much more pragmatic than his unsuccessful presidential campaign in 2005 and Majles campaign 2000.  This appears to be a function of Iran's stronger geopolitical position in the wake of the U.S. challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan.  In his May 3rd press conference, Reza'i emphasized Iran's new geopolitical position, “We are a pillar of power in the region, which is both an opportunity and a source of threat for us” (Fars News Agency, May 4, 2009). He also said, “The global financial crisis is another opportunity for which I have a program.” And, in perhaps the most interesting departure from Reza'i's revolutionary background, as well as from President Ahmadinejad's foreign policy statements, Reza'i added: “The [Iranian] society is desperately in need of peace and stability for progress."  Reza'i also said:  "At the moment, America needs us and we should act from a position of strength to secure our interests.”

Reza'i also offered blunt criticism of Ahmadinejad's economic policies, saying: "By the end of 1387 [year beginning March 2008] the revenue from the sale of gas and oil stood at 340 billion dollars, which was a good opportunity for investment, but nothing was done in this respect." He added, "Creating jobs and providing a source of income for the people is one of my main priorities, and utilizing unique opportunities in the history of the Iranian nation is another. We are faced with an ocean of opportunities.”

In contrast to Ahmadinejad's Holocaust rhetoric, Reza'i wants to remove this issue from the political discourse and has said, “We believe that the subject of the holocaust should move from the political literature to the academic literature, and this issue does not concern us [is none of our business].”  He maintained the Islamic regime's hard line position regarding Israel, stating: “The Zionist regime should end its 70-year massacres, and we should end up with a Palestine with a constitution. I will do my best to ensure that the extremist Zionists cannot exploit their position in the region, as they are doing."  This position is not new for Reza'i who was a founder of the International Anti-Zionist Movement, which, in the past, has equated Zionism to Nazi-ism and apartheid (BBC World Monitoring Service Nov.,16, 2000).

Reza'i position on Iran's nuclear program is relatively moderate and suggests that he would be amenable to a deal that would allow uranium enrichment on Iranian soil, but under foreign supervision. He said: "We will continue enrichment with the help of foreigners. This maybe hard to believe, but we will follow up the issue of an international consortium" (BBC World Monitoring Service, 2 June 2009). He elaborated further in an earlier interview: "I will definitely pursue uranium enrichment in our country. However, I will not continue it like the way it has been done in the past. I will pursue uranium enrichment with the cooperation of the world, so that they [foreign countries] will not worry about it. We will create a consortium in Iran, with the participation of the European and regional countries. We will manufacture the products inside Iran and sell them to everyone. Every Iranian nuclear centre will be able to buy these products. However the technology will remain in Iran but the process will go on" (BBC World Monitoring Service, May.,27, 2009) Reza'i's argument for a transparent deal with the international community is an interesting development, though it raises questions regarding the nature of his involvement in Iran's covert nuclear program during the 1980s and 1990s.

Reza'i may not be elected Iran's next president, but his candidacy may affect President Ahmadinejad's chances to obtain a necessary majority to win re-election in the first round of the elections on June 12th. Reza'i's campaign statements are important apart from their potential impact on the election because they reflect ideas which may be held by a powerful group of current and former IRGC officers in Iran, which is a political faction with growing influence in the Islamic regime. Mohsen Reza'i provides valuable insight into the policy positions of this important node of influence within the Iranian system of government. In particular, Reza'i's campaign statements suggest he sees Iran's current geopolitical strength as opportunity to secure Iran's regional influence and stabilize the economy for the long-term.  To that end, his comments indicate that he may be open to détente with the U.S. and an international agreement on Iran's nuclear program. Ultimately, final authority belongs to the Supreme Leader, 'Ali Khamene'i; however, Khamene'i tries to arbitrate or balance between various competing centers of power within the Islamic system in order to arrive at a consensus. Whether Reza'i is elected or not, he will continue to be able to influence government policy■

 


*Brandon Friedman is a research fellow of the Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University.


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Iran Pulse 31 ● June 11, 2009 © All rights reserved.

 

 

 

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