"TERROR SPIRAL" IN IRAN: THE BALUCHI MINORITY AND JUNDULLAH

Number 41 ● 19 December 2010

On December 15th, 2010 two explosions ripped through a crowd of Shi‘is outside the Imam Hossein Mosque during the annual ‘ashura ceremonies in Chabahar, a city in southeast Iran on the coast of the Gulf of Oman. Shortly after the blasts which killed at least 38, the separatist organization Jundullah ("The Army of God") claimed responsibility for both explosions and named two of its members, Sif al-Rahman Chabahari and Hassan Khashy as the suicide bombers. In its blog <junbish.blogspot.com>, Jundullah posted the bombers photos and also announced that these attacks were in retaliation for the unjust persecution and execution of Jundullah's martyrs (shuhada) by the Iranian regime. Following the capture of Jundullah's founder and former leader, ‘Abdul Malek Rigi, and his public execution on June 19th, 2010, these attacks also indicate Jundullah's determination to continue its violent struggle against the regime on behalf of  minority groups in the Islamic Republic.

Roots of the Struggle

Jundullah, also known by its members as the People's Resistance Movement of Iran (PRMI), was formed in 2002 in response to the Iranian regime's policy toward Sunnis, particularly the Baluchi minority (its logo here on the right). The organization, which purports to represent all Iranian Baluchis, calls for the termination of Iran's system of governance, velayat-i faqih (guardianship of the jurisconsult), and advocates equal rights for Sunni Iranians. Jundullah’s demand for equal rights is reflected in its slogan, “living proudly or dying with dignity" (zadegi ba azat ya marg ba sharf). To this end, since 2005 Jundullah has launched several spectacular and violent attacks against civilians and military personnel that have left over 180 dead and over 300 wounded.

The Iranian Baluchi minority (around 2 percent of the country's 70 million citizens) is primarily comprised of Sunni Muslims residing in Iran’s southeast Sistan-Baluchistan province, which is part of a larger territorial region known as Baluchistan. In the nineteenth century the British authorities divided Baluchistan between Iran, Afghanistan, India, and what later became Pakistan. This partition divided the Baluchis into minority communities within different national territories despite their claim to regional autonomy.  Consequently, various reports indicated the Baluchis were poorly integrated within the social, cultural, economic and political fabrics of their new homelands.

During the Pahlavi era (1925-1979), the Baluchis contended with the state's centralization policies that included cultural unification. For instance, the Baluchis were not allowed to publish or teach in their language. The regime also tried to settle non-Baluchi ethnic Iranians in Sistan-Baluchistan, as part of its attempt to weaken any separatist inclinations which may have been incubating in the Baluchi community. This policy continued after the 1979 revolution, as the new regime viewed Shi‘i Islam as a primary component of Iranian national identity and was suspicious of its Sunni communities. With the rise of the Islamic Republic, the Baluchis had to endure not only ethnic discrimination but also religious intolerance, which increased the majority's animosity towards them.

During the June 2009 presidential campaign the issue of minority rights received increased attention. Three of the candidates – Mir Hossein Musavi, an Azeri, and Mohsen Reza’i and Mehdi Karoubi, both Lors –advocated greater political and cultural freedom for minorities in Iran. Whereas a slight majority of Iranians identify themselves as Persian and Shi‘i Muslims, 49 percent of the population belongs to an ethnic and/or religious minority. Like other minority groups - including the Kurds who demand territorial autonomy and as such are regarded as a more immediate threat to the regime, and excluding the Azeris who have managed to successfully integrate into Iranian society - the Baluchis claim to have limited access to economic resources, and low political and social status.

Accordingly, the Baluchis' struggle is intended to improve their rights and living conditions in Iran; however, it cannot be understood solely in socio-economic terms. In a social and cultural environment that legitimizes Perso-Shi‘i identity and rejects other incompatible identities, Jundullah's violent attacks against the regime also reflect some of the Baluchi's determination to preserve their particular ethnic identity.

Recently, Jundullah's high-profile operations have captured the public's attention, especially following the failed assassination attempt of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during his December 2005 visit to the town of Zabul in the Sistan-Baluchistan province (The Washington Quarterly 2006-7). In May 2009, one month before the presidential elections, the organization took responsibility for a bomb planted near a Shi‘i mosque in the city of Zahedan (The capital of the Sistan-Baluchistan province) during an annual mourning ceremony for Fatima, the daughter of the prophet. This incident resulted in 19 civilian deaths and more than 60 wounded (BBC News, May 28, 2009).

On July 16th, 2010 Jundullah claimed responsibility for a double suicide attack, similar to the December 15th bombings, which took place near a Shi‘i mosque in Zahedan during the birthday celebration for Imam Hossein. Iranian officials condemned the attack which they claimed aimed to "undermine unity among Shi‘a and Sunni Muslims" in the Sistan-Baluchistan province (IRNA, July 16, 2010). The regime also imprisoned several of the organization's members, charged them with treason and sentenced some to death.

Shortly after its founder was apprehended, Jundullah named Muhammad Zaher Baluch as his successor and even emphasized that this appointment enjoys the full support of all tribes in Sistan-Baluchistan. Jundullah also declared a jihad (struggle) until "the last drop [of its members'] blood." In this respect, it seems as though the Iranian regime's intransigence is driving Jundullah towards a "terror spiral." The regime has not indicated its willingness to improve Baluchi living conditions, and Jundullahhas vowed it will not cease the armed struggle until its demands for Sunni and Baluchi equality are met by the regime.In these circumstances, Jundullah's struggle could evolve from an instrumental mechanism by which to defend Baluchi cultural boundaries into an inseparable element of identity for its members and perhaps even other Baluchi groups. This would render the struggle more intractable for both the regime and Jundullah.

The Regime's Response

In an attempt to weaken any separatist voices within Iranian minority groups, the regime has initiated a campaign to demonize Jundullah and its leadership. In the mainstream Iranian media, which usually reflects the regime's viewpoint, Jundullah is portrayed as a terrorist organization which destabilizes the regime's security and stability, and even undermines the Iranian nation by contacting Baluchi communities in Afghanistan and Pakistan in their joint effort to form an autonomous Baluchi region.

The regime's effort to delegitimize the Jundullah's leadership has included claims that Jundullah's leaders associate with extremist Taliban and drug trafficking circles (Aftab, April 4, 2007). Following Rigi's arrest last summer, the Ministry of Justice published a statement on its website indicating that he was charged with inter alia, armed robbery, weapons smuggling, public terrorization, acting against national security and attempting to kill and injure dozens of civilians and soldiers. The regime has also attempted to undermine Jundullah's claim that all tribal groups in Sistan-Baluchistan support its agenda, by quoting Baluchis who opposed the Jundullah's tactics and praised the Iranian security forces for fighting it (IRNA, June 20, 2010).

Additionally, the main theme of the regime's campaign against Jundullah defines the organization's activities as part of an imperialist conspiracy to destabilize Iran and topple the current regime. Furthermore, Jundullah is often depicted in the Iranian media as acting as a proxy for foreign powers and conspiring with foreign intelligence agencies against the revolution (Keyhan, February 24, 2010; IRNA, March 6, 2010). After the July 16th attack, president Ahmadinejad criticized the US hypocrisy for sending condolences to the family victims while, at the same time, supporting the terrorist attackers both financially and logistically (BBC Farsi, July 19, 2010).   

The Islamic Republic's vigilant campaign against Jundullah has been tailored to prevent the organization from couching its struggle in ethnic and/or religious terms. This is a product of the regime's fear that Jundullah's activities could encourage other marginalized ethno-religious groups to take action and further undermine the country's unity. In the regional and international arenas, the Iranian regime works to present itself as a victim forced to struggle against domestic and foreign forces that strive to effectuate its collapse. This struggle is depicted as part of its defensive policy that protects Iran's sovereignty and its citizens' security. In this manner, the Iranian regime aspires to reinforce its national unity at a time of growing discontent among different social groups.

The December 15th blasts prompted the Islamic Republic to convene its Supreme National Security Council, which announced it would arrest all terrorists involved in the attack. Officials used the incident to frame the regime's response in a nationalist guise; the Iranian minister of the interior, Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar, blamed "the oppressor powers" for trying to weaken Iranian religious and national unity on a day of sanctity while others directly blamed the US and the Zionist regime for the attack (IRNA, December 15, 2010; IRNA, December 15, 2010). It remains to be seen whether the government will address the roots of the Baluchis' concerns; in the meantime, it seems likely the terror spiral will continue■

*Ran A. Levy is a research assistant for the Center for Iranian Studies and an M.A. student at the Department of Middle Eastern and African History, Tel Aviv University.

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Iran Pulse No. 41 ● December 19, 2010

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