IRAN’S HAND IN THE IRAQI PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Number 39 ● 2 September 2010

The U.S. invasion of Iraq in April 2003 created a new opportunity for the Islamic Republic of Iran to increase its influence in neighboring Iraq. Most recently, Iran has been involved in the politics of the March 7, 2010 Iraqi parliamentary elections and has attempted to benefit from their outcome. Despite its strenuous efforts so far, Iran has not achieved all its goals in Iraqi politics.   

Iran hopes that elections will hasten the end of the U.S. occupation, which limits Iran's influence in Iraq. On a strategic level, Iran feels encircled by the U.S. military presence in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf.  Further, Iran objects to the U.S. military presence in the region on principle.  The March elections in Iraq represented at least the appearance of stability and the rule of law, which has been one of the preconditions for U.S. withdrawal.  Iran has used the elections to highlight its disapproval of foreign intervention in the region, claiming that the U.S. and Arab countries interfere and promote violence in Iraq, while Iran tries to promote political freedom and security.

Iran has also supported the elections as a way to enable the Shi’i majority to have more control in the country. A Shi'i-dominated government in Baghdad enables  Iran  to  extend its domination over Iraq based on its extensive and intimate ties with Iraqi Shi'is, who constitute an estimated 55 percent of the population.  Iraq is also an important destination for Iranian Shi'i pilgrims.  Each year millions of Iranians visit Iraq to worship at the shrines of the holy Shi'i Imams. The Islamic Republic also has strong economic and cultural interests in developing its influence in Iraq.  

In order to expand its political influence in Iraq during the elections, Iran worked to bring the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and the Sadrist Movement together as the Iraqi National Alliance (al-Ittilaf al-Watani al-Iraqi), a Shi’i, pro-Iranian bloc of candidates.  `Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim and Moqtada al-Sadr, the leaders of the two parties, reside in Iran and negotiated the alliance in Tehran (Historiae.org, August 24, 2009). 

Though Iran used to express support for the incumbent Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who ran as the leader of the State of Law Coalition, Tehran has been disappointed by his attempts to distance himself from Iran and his refusal to join a coalition with the other Shi'i parties.  For Iran, Maliki’s independent stand may be reminiscent of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), during which many Iraqi-Shi’is failed to support the Islamic Republic, indicating their preference for the political and ethnic Arab affiliation over the common Shi'i bond.   

Despite its support for elections, a successful democracy in Iraq poses a challenge to Iran by presenting a rival model to its authoritarian system of vilayat-e faqih (rule of the jurist), and by highlighting Iran's controversial June 2009 presidential elections.  Iran has therefore supported Iraq's electoral process only as a way to bring the Shi’i majority to power.

Iran’s careful positioning regarding the elections reflect how its strategy in Iraq is based on a double game.  First, while it has supported multiple Shi'i groups and parties and sees Iraqi Shi’is as its closest and natural allies, Iran maintains ties with Sunni, Kurdish and secular groups, which at times have opposed Iran's Shi'i allies.  It has established relations with as many actors as possible in order to ensure that whoever holds power will be connected to Iran and will therefore be likely to serve Iran’s interests.  Second, while it works to increase its influence and while its extensive involvement is manifest, Iran denies interfering in Iraq.  Iran's goal is to attain an inconspicuous domination of Iraq so that it can both bolster its power and maintain its rhetorical support for an independent Iraq free of foreign intervention.  Again, its stance in the elections represents that trend.

On 15 January 2010, the Accountability and Justice Commission (AJC) overseeing the Iraqi elections announced that more than 500 candidates would be barred from running.  Many of those rejected were secularists and Sunnis charged with promoting Ba'thist ideology, which was banned by the Iraqi constitution adopted in October 2005.  Critics accused the commission's leaders, ‘Ali Faisal al-Lami and Ahmad Chalabi, both Shi'is with known ties to Tehran, of disqualifying the candidates at the behest of Shi'i politicians and Iranian leaders.  Tehran denied interference in the decision and accused others of using the ruling to vilify Iran, yet it quickly lauded the move.  The return of Sunnis and Ba'thists to power in Iraq is a scenario that Tehran has worked to prevent. The disqualification of such candidates opposed to Iranian influence could only improve the chances that Iran’s allies would be elected.    

Two days after the decision was announced, the conservative Iranian newspaper Jomhuri-ye Eslami, closely associated with Supreme Leader Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamene’i, praised the decision and warned that Iraqis "must anticipate the intensification of the efforts by the occupying powers to [...] counter that revolutionary move."  The next development seemed to verify those claims.  In early February 2010, U.S. Vice President Biden traveled to Iraq to help the Iraqis resolve the crisis. Prime Minister Maliki, however, rejected the American suggestion to review the candidates after the election, and instead instituted a pre-election review process in which the disqualified candidates could appeal the commission’s ruling.  Of the 171 candidates who appealed, only 26 were reinstated (The New York Times, Feb. 13, 2010).

Despite the controversy leading up to March 7, and despite the violence on the day of voting, the Iraqi elections were held on schedule.  When the tallies revealed that the nationalist, secular Iraqiya alliance had gained a plurality of votes by winning 91 parliament seats, Iranian leaders tried to make the best of a bad situation. They strove to reassert their authority over Iraqi politics by implementing their two-pronged strategy in a way that reflected the election results. 

Iranian leaders called for Iraqis to include Sunnis in the new government and urged Shi’i and Sunni politicians to unite.  Likewise, they invited delegations from all political parties to Iran and offered their help in forming a government, thereby marginalizing the U.S. role in the process and preserving their own influence.  Shortly thereafter, a delegation of the Iraqiya alliance traveled to Iran (as had delegations from the other Iraqi alliances) (The New York Times, April 11, 2010). 

At the same time, Iran strove to bring the rival Shi’i factions together.  In early May as ballot recounts were completed, the two Shi’i parties, Maliki's State of Law Coalition and the Iraqi National Alliance, which received 89 and 70 seats, respectively, announced a plan to unite, thus leading the way for a Shi’i-dominated government.  That decision was reportedly the direct result of Iranian intervention: "The Iranian ambassador met with the Shiite parties [...] and told them that Iran considers it a matter of its national security that the Shiites put aside their differences to form a government," a former Iraqi minister told The Nation (May 5, 2010). 

Since that decision in early May, the Iraqi parties have continued to haggle over  leadership in the new government and have not yet reached an agreement.  The protraction of that process reflects the limitations on Iran’s ability to influence Iraqi internal politics and to force its allies to compromise.

Iran's position and intervention in the Iraqi elections should be understood in terms of its strategic, economic, and cultural interests in Iraq. Moreover, these latest events have demonstrated Iran's tactical pragmatism in advancing its strategic goal of expanding its hegemony over Iraq, in particular, and the region as a whole■

*Annie Tracy Samuel is a Ph.D. candidate in the Graduate School of Historical Studies and a research fellow at the Center for Iranian Studies, Tel Aviv University.

T h e    C e n t e r    f o r    I r a n i a n    S t u d i e s   ( A C I S )

Tel Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv 61390, Tel Aviv P.O.B. 39040, Israel

Email: IranCen@post.tau.ac.il  Phone: +972-3-640-9510

F a x :   + 9 7 2 - 3 - 6 4 0 - 6 6 6 5

Iran Pulse 39 ● 2 Sepember 2010

© All rights reserved