THE IRANIAN THREAT IN THE ARAB MEDIA

Number 50 ● 20 March 2012

A year ago, in March 2011, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene‘i, referred to the popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, better known as “the Arab Spring,” as a harbinger of an Islamic Awakening inspired by the Iranian Revolution of 1979. A month later, during a Friday sermon he further emphasized, in Arabic, the obligation of Iran to support the protesters in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, Libya and Yemen who were choosing Islam as their path. In additional statements regarding the Arab Spring made since then, Ayatollah Khamene‘i and other Iranian officials have systematically avoided mentioning the popular revolts in Syria. According to the narrow Iranian perception, these revolts were fomented by an American and Zionist conspiracy against President Bashar Assad and his government (see also Iran Pulse no. 46, 13 November 2011). The distinction these statements make between different “types” of revolts of the Arab Spring has triggered a growing interest throughout the Arab world regarding Iran’s plans and intentions in the region. Juxtaposed with a cumulative sense of suspicion about the Islamic Republic of Iran’s policy (since 1979) of seeking to export its revolution as a model for other Islamic societies, this interest is a sign of the concern underlying debates conducted in the Arab media.

      In recent years, Iran’s regional policies and aspirations are a recurrent topic in the Arab news media. A growing number of commentators and journalists are inclined to warn the Sunni world against the Shi’i enemy, which operates under the guise of Islam. Although the debates in Arab media outlets vary in tone, substance and perspective, several identifiable tendencies are present in all discussions about Iran on the official websites of pan-Islamic and pan-Arabic movements.

           One tendency common in recent arguments raised by Arab intellectuals and journalists draw parallels between the Zionist and the Iranian agendas. During the latter half of the twentieth century, the Arab World directed its hostility in the region toward the “Zionist enemy,” who came to represent the source of all evil in the Middle East. Emotionally-charged sentiments about the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict are now enlisted by activists, journalists, and politicians in the Arab media when discussing the Shi‘i threat and the regional ambitions of Iran. The present tendency to view Iran as the prime enemy in the region is prevalent in pro-Arab intellectual circles, especially in the Gulf States like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The geographical proximity of the Gulf Arab States to Iran is probably the main reason for their concern about the Islamic Republic’s plans, as well as their relatively large Shi’i communities that are, in some cases, actually the majority of the population.

            In January 2007, in an interview with the program “Open Dialogue” on Al-Jazeera, the Kuwaiti intellectual and journalist Sami al-Nusf, explicitly warned the Arab and Islamic World against the current Irano-Persian threat, which is more hazardous than the Zionist one. Defending his statement, Al-Nusf claimed that the Irano-Persian threat, as opposed to the Zionist threat, includes an element of conversion, directed at propagating the Iranian-style Shi‘a among Sunni populations. He further stipulated that while the Israelis declare their willingness to negotiate with the Palestinians, the Iranians object to negotiations over territorial disputes with Arab Gulf States (concerning territories like Abu Musa and the two Tunb islands) (al-Jazeera, 20 January 2007). In another interview with the Kuwaiti TV network al-Rai’, al-Nusf also compared the Israeli and Iranian nuclear policies. Al-Nusf indicated that although Israel has possessed nuclear capability since the 1960s, it has never threatened to use it, not even under serious circumstances like the Arab-Egyptian attack opening the October 1973 War, or when subjected to the Iraqi aerial assaults of Scud missiles in 1991. On the other hand, he emphasizes, the apparent irrationality of the Iranian leadership indicates they could decide to employ their weapons of mass destruction, similar to Saddam Hussein, who used unconventional weapons against Iranians and Iraqi-Kurds (al-Rai’, 28 August 2006, as quoted in MEMRI). Al-Nusf, who often gives interviews to Arab media outlets, also made similar remarks in a later article entitled “Their Enemy is Our Enemy, Our Enemy is Their Friend,” (al-Anbaa, 29 November 2010). Although al-Nusf’s comparisons are not shared by many commentators and journalists in the Arab media, they point to a recent tendency within the Arab discourse that positions Iran, instead of Israel, as the major threat to the Arabs and the Muslim World. 

           The Jordanian intellectual Ghalib al-Furayjat also regards the religious pretense of Iran as much more serious threat to the Arab World than the threat posed by Israel. Al-Furayjat’s view reflects a second tendency prevailing in the Arab discourse on the Iranian threat, de-legitimization of the Shi‘a. In this respect, al-Furayjat and other journalists, tend to expand on the Persians’ undermining role and conduct in several historical episodes and major events in Islamic history. Aiming to show how the Shi‘a was never an integral part of the Arab socio-religious world, advocates of de-legitimization emphasize how acclaimed Shi’i “heroes,” for instance, worked against the interests of the Islamic community. Within this framework, Shi’is are quite often presented as collaborators with the enemy in its quest to conquer Islamic lands and undermine the Islamic faith during times of crisis, like the crusades and the Mongol invasion (Shabakat al-Basra, 6 December  2007). 

            In the Arab media debate, intellectuals, journalists and commentators frequently attribute the Persians’ collaboration with the enemies of Islam to their long-standing antagonism and hatred toward the Arab peoples, but they disagree about its precise historical origin. Advocates of pan-Arabism associate it with the seventh century “Battle of Dhi Qar” (circa 609 A.D.) in southern Iraq, which symbolizes the first victory of Arab tribesmen over the Persian forces of the Sassanid emperor Khosrow Parviz or Khosrow II (590-628), known among the Arabs as Casra’. On the other hand, advocates of pan-Islamism in the Arab media associate it with the “Battle of Qadisiyya,” which culminated in the Islamic conquest of the Iranian plateau (636 A.D.).

            Thus, while pan-Arab nationalists accentuate the precedence of the Arab identity as the unifying force of tribes and communities residing in the region, advocates of pan-Islamism consider the emergence of the golden age of Islam as primary reason for the defeat of the Persian Empire, and consequently other great empires like Byzantium. In this regard, the Saudi intellectual Ibrahim al-Turki argues that the involvement of Persians and Shi’is in the 2003 conquest of Iraq is not surprising considering the part their ancestors played during the Mongol invasion and their collaboration with the massacre of more than one million Muslims in Baghdad. Al-Turki also equates the contemporary role of Khamene‘i and Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Iraq’s internal affairs with that of Nasir al-Din al-Tusi and the wazir Ibn al-Alkami, who assisted the Mongols in conquering Islamic lands in the thirteenth century. According to this view, contemporary Iran is a continuum of the old Persian forces of aggression, and their Shi’i doctrine is designed to undermine the unity of the (Sunni) Muslim world.

            In debates appearing in Arab media outlets about the Iranian Shi‘i threat, most intellectuals, commentators and clerics tend to disregard existing distinctions between varying sects within the Shi‘a, such as the Isma‘ilis, the Fatimids, the Karmites or the Twelver Shi’is (Ithna-Asharis, the largest sect in Iran). Instead, they refer to the Iranian Shi‘is as a monolithic, treacherous faction that will not hesitate to strike and weaken the Sunni world as soon as the opportunity rises. Accordingly, a third tendency in contemporary debates in the Arab media on Iran’s regional ambitions is the frequent inclusion of references to ancient and modern Muslim authorities warning against the Shi‘a doctrine and its conspiracies against the Sunni-Muslim world in general and the Arab World in particular. By introducing anti-Sunni religious edicts (fatwas) of Shi‘i scholars, discussions in the Arab media lay bare the Shi‘a’s sheer contempt toward Muslim founding figures who are greatly admired by the Sunnis, like the "Sahaba" (the companions of the Prophet). On several occasions, advocates of pan-Islamism even introduce Shi‘i religious edicts that permit adherents of the Shi‘a to kill Sunnis and rob their lands.

            In a similar vein, Arab advocates of pan-Islamism also tend to saturate media debates with quotations of anti-Shi‘a religious pundits in support of its de-legitimacy, underscoring historical warnings against the deceptive foundations upon which it is built. Allegations of falsification of the Qor’an and the rejection of Shi‘i sources not only exposes the deep disparity between the two schools, but also suggests an irresolvable gap between them. According to some Sunni clerics the gap is so wide that any attempt to reconcile the two schools is futile.

            The public debate over Iran’s threat to the region was accelerated in the Arab media during the 2011 Arab Spring, further accentuating the three tendencies discussed above. The frequency of articles and the polemical rhetoric employed by pan-Islamic and pan-Arab nationalists, intellectuals, pundits, journalists and clerics are intrinsically connected with ongoing events and developments in the Middle East. Moreover, it is also affected by changing currents in Iranian foreign policy towards the Arab states. The Islamic Republic’s occasional intervention in the internal affairs of post-Saddam Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its support of Assad’s regime in Syria, and its collaboration with subversive organizations and movements in the Middle East, all influence the ways in which Iran is viewed and depicted in the Arab media. In addition, the contemporary tendency of Iran’s leadership to express its opinion and make its presence felt on every issue and challenge faced by the region, increases the suspicion of pan-Arab nationalists and pan-Islamic advocates about Tehran’s true motivations and intentions in the region■

T h e    A l l i a n c e    C e n t e r    f o r    I r a n i a n    S t u d i e s  ( A C I S )

Tel Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv 61390, Tel Aviv P.O.B. 39040, Israel

Email: IranCen@post.tau.ac.il Phone: +972-3-640-9510

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Iran Pulse No. 50 ● 20 March 2012

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