Previous Reviews
Number 64 ● January 5, 2014
THE RETURN OF THE EULOGISTS TO THE POLITICAL ARENA IN IRAN
Raz Zimmt*
Last week Iranian media reported that Mahmoud Karimi, one of the most prominent religious preachers in Tehran - known in Iran as maddahan (eulogists) - pulled his pistol and fired at a young couple who accidently crashed his car. Despite the circulation of contradicting versions of this incident, it re-fueled the public debate in the Islamic Republic about the political and social status of the maddahan.
In recent months two other populist preachers publicly criticized President elect Hassan Rouhani and the chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council, Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafasanjani. In October 2013, Tehran-based preacher Mansour Arzi strongly attacked Rafsanjani and expressed wishes for his death. During a religious ceremony in Tehran, Arzi addressed the reservations recently raised by Rafsanjani concerning the slogan “Down with the USA,” and stated, “If only God would bring about [Rafsanjani’s] death!” (Entekhab, October 15, 2013). Several days later, preacher Sa’id Haddadian discussed the possible ministerial appointment of J'afar Towfighi as Minister of Science and Higher Education. Haddadian, one of the representatives of Supreme Leader, Ali Khamene’i, on the board of Tehran University, cautioned the President not to appoint ministers who had been involved in the riots that erupted after the presidential elections of 2009. He also cautioned Majlis members not to ratify this appointment in case it is submitted for their approval by Rouhani (Entekhab, October 17, 2013). Such statements offer additional evidence of the growing resonance of the “eulogists” in Iran’s domestic political arena, a phenomenon that began to gather momentum since the mid-1990s and increased during Ahmadinejad's administration (2005-2013).
Image source: Khordad News, November 12, 2013
The religious preachers: From 'Ashura ceremonies to the political arena
Even prior to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, eulogists or maddahan played a key role mediating between Shi'i clergy and Iranian public. Their role was to excite and rouse the enthusiasm of the congregation at religious ceremonies, and especially at the mourning processes held in the month of Muharram to commemorate the 'Ashura, the day of the massacre of Imam Husayn and his supporters at the Battle of Karbala in 680 CE. At these ceremonies, the clergy lead the mourning processions, reciting lamentations for the dead and recount the martyrdom of Imam Husayn and his supporters (Ta'aziyeh) in poetry and rhyme.
After the Islamic Revolution, the activities of the religious eulogists expanded, with the support of the state. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), eulogists such as Sadegh Ahangaran and Gholam Koveitpoor played a major role in raising soldiers’ moral at the front and recruiting public support for the war effort. From the mid-1990s, several preachers began to address controversial political issues and increasingly criticized the economic and social reforms led by President Rafsanjani (1989-1997) and Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005). Although there are no precise statistics on the number of political preachers, at least several thousand estimated preachers currently operate in affiliation with various organizations, such as the Council of Islamic Fighters.
Hajj Mansour Arzi is the most prominent of these political preachers. Arzi, born in 1953 in Tehran, has been identified since the mid-1990s with the radical Ansar-e-Hezbollah movement, which was involved in violent actions against activists and senior reform supporters, as well as in the attempted assassinations of political rivals. During the presidential elections of 1997, Arzi used the 'Ashura ceremonies to urge the faithful not to vote for Khatami (Aftab News, October 16, 2013). In the 2005 elections, Arzi strongly attacked two candidates who ran against Ahmadinejad in the elections: former president Rafsanjani and Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, the mayor of Tehran. Arzi likened Qalibaf to Umar ibn Sa’ad, who had led the troops of the First Umayyad Caliph, Yazid that murdered Huasyn ibn Ali in the Battle of Karbala (Aftab News, October 16, 2013).
During his first term as president (2005-2009), Ahmadinejad maintained close ties with the political preachers. The roots of their collaboration can be traced to the assistance that Ahmadinejad extended to their activities when he headed Tehran’s municipality (2003-2005). His messianic ideas and sympathy for expressions of popular Islam created a convenient foundation for a close relationship between the president and several preachers, especially Arzi. For example, Arzi took an active role in the nationwide tours of the president and his government members. On his part, the president made sure to meet regularly with the preachers close to his inner circle (ISNA, October 19, 2013).
The maddahan’s support of Ahmadinejad persisted in the 2009 presidential elections and the subsequent political crisis. Nonetheless, the president’s identification with the “deviant faction” in the second half of his term, and his continued unreserved support for Rahim Masha’i, his controversial chief of staff, triggered a major conflict between the president and the maddahan. The eulogists began to sharply criticize the president and his office chief attacking his policy on economic, religious, and social affairs and blaming him for offending Islamic values. In January 2010, Arzi declared that Masha’i was even worse than Salman Rushdie, against whom a fatwa was issued by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 (Aftab News, January 20, 2010). At the height of the tension between the President and the maddahan, the government filed a complaint with the judiciary against Arzi and Haddadian on the charge of offending the president. The complaint was handled very slowly, possibly due to the President’s bitter power struggle with the Supreme Leader and the judiciary towards the end of his term in office; ultimately, Arzi was merely sentenced to a fine.
Ahmadinejad in the company of a group of eulogists. On the right, Mansour Arzi.
Source image: Asr-e Iran, March 17, 2012
The eulogists’ social status increases at the expense of the established clergy
The eulogists’ social status and public influence have increased in recent years, mainly among the poor and young people. The strengthening of their status is especially notable in view of the diminishing status of the religious establishment. In contrast to the latter who are frequently identified with Iran’s political establishment, the maddahan are more closely identified with the general public and are more aware of its concerns and hardships. The maddahan are also considered to be more adept at mobilizing the general public, because of their rhetorical skills and their ability to arouse enthusiasm among the believers.
Blogger Reza Taran, a theology student at a religious seminarye in Qom, who maintains a personal blog on theology students’ lives, has repeatedly commented on the rising popularity if the maddahan at the expense of the state’s official clergymen. In a post published in March 2012, Taran wrote that preachers with no religious training are gradually replacing members of the clergy and are enjoying social status that was previously reserved for the latter (Reza Taran blog). In July 2012, Taran once again emphasized his reservations about the growing status of the maddahan and preachers who lack official religious training. He noted that the CDs of various religious sermons are for sale throughout Qom, presenting religion in a manner that he believes is superficial and offensive to Islam. He argued that many eulogists who are not clerics focus on criticism against Satan worshippers, the Jews, the Free Masons, and Wahhabism, as if they are to blame for Iran’s social problems. Taran attributed the maddahan’s growing influence to the disconnection between the religious establishment and the citizens. In the past, the clerics maintained good ties with the citizens on a regular basis: They visited homes, participated in family events, and met regularly with the citizens. The public looked upon them as a major source of authority, and supported them financially. Today, most clerics contend themselves with a weekly Friday sermons in a mosque and avoid almost all contact with the public. Many clerics prefer to appear on television, or address speeches to large audiences, teach courses, establish new institutions, or devote time to administrative duties—and this has an adverse impact on their ties with the public. Under these circumstances, the eulogists are replacing the clerics’ role as representatives of the public.
In recent years, the Iranian religious establishment has shown growing concern for the rising status of the popular maddahan. Several senior clerics have warned against dissemination of “superstitions” and “deviations from Islam” by maddahan, some of whom lack any official religious training. In June 2011, Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi, declared that the public should study religion only from the clerics and not from “ignorant eulogists” whose declarations are used by the Shi’a’s enemies against the Shi'is (Hawzah News, June 8, 2011). At the same time, conservative media accused the eulogists of moral and economic corruption, and argued that their salary is outrageous and unjustified.
The religious establishment is concerned that the activities of the popular eulogists and the Sufi orders, as well as manifestations of popular and messianic Islam, might undermine the clerics’ status and prompt independent interpretations. These concerns led to the imposition of restrictions, among other things, on Shi’a mourning ceremonies and other practices, such as self-flagellation, the incorporation of pictures of Shi’a imams, and use of musical instruments. The authorities also took action against the distribution of religious CDs that were not certified by the authorities. These governmental restrictions were designed to increase control of religious expressions that are inconsistent with the “official” interpretation accepted by Iran’s current religious establishment and consistent with the concept of the rule of the jurisprudent (velayat-e-faqih) (see Iran Pulse No. 13, July 19, 2007).
The two preachers’ caustic attacks against Rouhani and Rafsanjani, reopened the criticism against the political eulogists. In its commentary, the website Asr-eIran argued that the eulogists—like all Iranian citizens— are entitled to express their opinion on state affairs, but they must maintain a proper style and should not use their religious standing to hurl insults or make undignified statements. The website also argued that several political maddahan acted “without any vision” in recent years, and are continuing to do so in the present. The website concluded, “This is the Islamic Republic of Iran, not the republic of the eulogists.” (Asr-e Iran, October 19, 2013).
The criticism voiced in recent months by several maddahan against the President’s supporters may indicate their intention to increase their political involvement once again, in an attempt to prevent domestic or foreign policy changes that they believe deviate from revolutionary values. If necessary, the eulogists might be used by senior government officials as an additional means of limiting the President’s power and mobilizing public support against the President’s policies■
*Dr. Raz Zimmt (PhD) is a research fellow at the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies
T h e A l l i a n c e C e n t e r f o r I r a n i a n S t u d i e s ( A C I S )
Tel Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv 61390, Tel Aviv P.O.B. 39040, Israel
Email: IranCen@post.tau.ac.il , Phone: +972-3-640-9510
F a x : + 9 7 2 - 3 - 6 4 0 - 6 6 6 5
Iran Pulse No. 64 ● 5 January 2014
© All rights reserved
