Previous Reviews
Number 75 ● July 30, 2015
The Nuclear Accord with Iran: The Day After
Prof. David Menashri*
Much has already been said about the nuclear accord between Iran and the P5+1. Some details may not yet have become public knowledge; and, at this stage, its full consequences and implications are not entirely clear. Yet, some conclusions are already unequivocal: this agreement represents an important turning point in Iran’s domestic and regional realities as well as its international relations. It also has significant repercussions for the region at large. Even if certain points in the agreement might have been negotiated differently, in the long term, many of its implications would remain unchanged—simply because there is an agreement (although still subject to approval by both sides), and it focuses only on nuclear matters.
For Iran, this is a seminal event. The Islamic regime has secured international legitimacy; its broader nuclear program has been recognized and even received an international “stamp of approval.” The threats that it now faces, at home and abroad, have diminished, at least for the time being. Once defined as part of an “axis of evil,” Iran is being courted now politically, economically and diplomatically. Previously portrayed as “part of the problem” in the region, Iran is quickly becoming “part of the solution.” The smiles on the faces of Iranian negotiators and their optimistic statements tell the story of their satisfaction, even if radical naysayers at home denounce the concessions made and call for the renunciation of the agreement.
Iran entered the current negotiations, some two years ago, weak domestically and saddled with serious challenges abroad. It has emerged from the process strengthened. The depth of Iran’s weakness was evident: domestically, the severe effects of the sanctions forced the government to enter serious negotiations. The value of its currency (riyal) was dropping precipitously; unemployment and inflation were sky high; and public discontent was short of the boiling point. Iran’s regional standing was also at a low point. Its main allies (Syria, Hezbollah and the Shiite government in Iraq) were all seemingly losing power. The tremendous sums that Iran had invested in those allies did not seem to be bearing adequate dividends—a subject of criticism at home.
In his 2013 election campaign, Hassan Rouhani promised to turn challenges into opportunities. Indeed, since then he has recorded significant successes. Among other things, he has made good, at least partially, on his pledge to return to the people “the value of the riyal” and “value of the passport” (national honor and international standing).
The nuclear agreement will indeed decelerate the progress of Iran’s nuclear program and ensure some level of supervision. Also, the burdensome sanctions have not been completely lifted. Nevertheless, the agreement gives Iran a break that allows it to achieve other significant goals. That the negotiations were limited to the issue of nuclear capabilities, and did not address important domestic issues (such as human and political rights), nor regional policy (Syria, Hizballah, Yemen), was much to the dismay of those who wished to use negotiations for significant policy change, not to say regime change.
In addition, the realities on the ground in the Middle East and the new general atmosphere (plus the tailwinds from Russia and China) are similarly working in Iran’s favor. The rise of ISIS, for example, makes Iran seem less of a threat and casts it as “part of the solution.” It is no surprise then that multinational companies are already descending upon Tehran in an effort to sign contracts. At the same time, a handful of leading European countries are working to upgrade their diplomatic ties. It will be very hard to reverse this course. Relative to where it stood at the beginning of the negotiations, Iran has gained much.
For his part, President Barak Obama included dialogue with Iran as an integral part of his 2008 election campaign and has pursued that goal since entering office. Now he has successfully achieved an agreement that enjoys international support and the unanimous approval of the UN Security Council. It is noteworthy that the US was simultaneously able to maintain its transatlantic alliance and bypass the some objections of Russia and China to both the sanctions and the negotiations process—surely not an easy task considering the opposing interests.
Both sides were eager to reach agreement. Yet the US seemed more enthusiastic, and Iran, with its shrewd diplomacy and negotiating skills, took full advantage to advance higher demands at lower “price” for itself. The Obama government has argued that the breakthrough became possible due to the change in Iranian policy after Rouhani’s election in June 2013. But the fact is the US actually changed its own approach towards Iran much before. Recently, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reminded the media that the American offer to enter into dialogue with Iran was already made during the tenure of the (radical) President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. A few months after Obama took office, in June 2009, the “Green Movement” mobilized against the government. President Obama did not speak publically on the matter for few days and only ten days later he denounced the violence used by the government (much different from his pressuring in 2011 Egyptian President Mubarak to leave office). With the election of Rouhani, however, the whispers of “courtship” found a more sympathetic ear in Tehran.
Significant US political involvement in Iran began only after World War II. Since then, the election of various Democratic presidents committed to human rights and political freedoms has often encouraged the Iranian opposition to struggle for change—expecting the backing of Washington. That pattern first manifested itself with the inauguration of Truman in 1949 and the emergence of an opposition that brought about the government of Mohammad Mosaddeq (1951) and the temporary exile of the Shah—which lasted until the counterrevolution, aided by the United States and Britain in August 1953, during the presidency of Eisenhower (a Republican). Kennedy’s presidency again led to a major uprising (1961-64)—that Ayatollah Khomeini became one of its main heroes—but one that the Shah was able to subdue. Shortly after Carter took office, the opposition again mobilized, and this time it installed the Islamic regime. During the period of the Islamic Revolution, however, up to the mid-1990s, it was more difficult to launch protest within Iran. During the Clinton years, public demonstrations began only in 1999 and were severely suppressed.
The opposition awoke again in June 2009, only few months after Obama entered office. But then, instead of pinning his hopes on the opposition, Obama apparently opted for dialogue with the more pragmatic elements within establishment. Thus, while many demonstrated in Iran and were violently attacked, Obama initially preferred not to referr to the developments publicly. In Persian, “Obama” with a slightly different pronunciation (u-ba-ma) means: “He’s with us.” However, at the height of protests some chanted “u-ba-ma nist” (“he is not with us”). Others cried out, “Are you with us, or are you with them”? It is hard to know if this was a calculated policy with a long-term perspective.
It remains to be seen whether the Islamic regime will now chart a new course with more moderate domestic and foreign policies, or whether it will seek enjoy the benefits promised by the agreement and continue its radical policies at home and abroad (support for radical Islamic movements, involvement in matters of neighboring countries, cries of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel”).
In fact, more than once the US has served, perhaps inadvertently, revolutionary Iran’s national interests. In fact, the United States was the principle force responsible for removing two of Iran’s major enemies: its number one enemy to the west, Saddam Hussein (in 1991 and 2003), and to the east, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (in 2002). These moves enabled Iran to expand its regional influence and consolidate its position at home. However, Iran never expressed its gratitude to the United States for these important services. Will Iran behave differently this time?
Change in Iran might be discernable within a relatively short time. Consider these issues. At home: how will the unfrozen bank funds be used? Will the voices of reformist circles be heard? Will some political prisoners (or those under house arrest) be released? Will we see more women wearing colorful veils in streets? Will freedom of expression be more tolerated? From a regional perspective: how will Iranian involvement in other countries (Lebanon, Syria, Iraq) and within radical movements (Hezbollah, Houthis) change? And finally in the international sphere: to what degree will the tirades against western civilization and “international arrogance,” led by the US, soften?
In terms of its relationship with the United States, Iran has made it clear that it distinguishes between the nuclear negotiations (in which the US was a partner) and rapprochement with the US. Khamenei publicly expressed his displeasure several times when there were signs of camaraderie between the Iranian negotiators (President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif) and US leaders (phone conversation between Obama and Rouhani during the UN General Assembly in 2013, and overly friendly meetings between Secretary of State Kerry and Froreign Minister Zarif). For the Islamic revolutionary regime—for which enmity to the United States is a central plank of its platform and which has already shed many of its dogmatic principles—scaling back significantly the rhetoric against the US and the forces of “international arrogance” will be extremely difficult. In speeches given while talks were underway in Vienna, and most recently at the end of Ramadan, Khamenei explained how the fight against the West, led by the US, is part of the very essence of the Islamic revolution. Change will not be easy nor will it come quickly. However, growing ties with the West and very direct nature of negotiations with the United States may gradually move Iran closer to the West and open it more fully to the forces of globalization.
The main losers in the agreement are traditional friends of the US in the region: primarily Israel, which made opposition to Iran’s nuclear program and this specific agreement a major element in its foreign policy. Other losers include Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Sunni states more generally. They are grumbling that the US abandons allies (e.g., the Shah in 1979, Egypt’s President Mubarak in 2011), turns against the interests of friendly countries (such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt), and determinedly courts a regime that has not abandoned its radical doctrine and continues to consider the US the “Great Satan.”
The Islamic regime’s hostility to Israelhas its origins in a combination of ideological opposition to the very existence of a Jewish state, and the fact that it does not see a significant, pragmatic incentive for changing its stance. For Iran, Israel is a distant and convenient enemy; in the words of a well-known Persian adage, Israel is a “low wall” (divar-e kutah), that can be easily climbed over or stepped on. Hostility towards Israel costs little for Iran itself but brings considerable benefits. It is difficult (especially for Shi’i country) to strive for regional hegemony while not hoisting the Palestinian flag. For a revolution that has had its share of challenges, it is always good to have a distant enemy, far abroad to taunt, to blame for its troubles, and to promote internal unity. Let it also be said that Iran is not the only country that uses an external enemy to promote its objectives and ensure its viability.
One should not underestimate Israel’s efforts to slow and check Iran’s nuclear program, create awareness of its danger and mobilize opposition to the agreement, mainly in the US. However, in the arena of international diplomacy, Israel has made quite a few mistakes: it appropriated the Iranian nuclear issue, making it appear that it is solely an Israeli problem. On a number of occasions, it was perhaps too quick to denounce and threaten. In its behavior, Israel moved away from the biblical advice: “by stratagems you wage war.“ In short, Israel has played backgammon while the Iranians were playing chess.
The strained relations with the White House and lapse of support for Israel in Europe and other corners of the world have not served Israel’s interests at such a crucial time. It is not hard to see that Israel became, at least in the final stretch of the nuclear negotiations, increasingly irrelevant. Prospects for short-circuiting the approval of the agreement are not promising and it is not at all certain that, even if efforts were successful in the US Congress, the clock can be really turned back. Will Russia or China or even European states simply surrender to Congressional opposition and reinstate the sanctions? Moreover, what would be the price for Israel and world Jewry?
Advancing Israel’s international standing requires a political strategy that is more attune to the new regional realities. Rather than conducting a vocal orchestra, it is more advisable for Israel to take a back seat this time. Above all, it should “gird its loins” to safeguard, through dialogue with neighboring countries and in coordination with its friends worldwide, the advancement of common interests in a “new Middle East” that is unfolding before our eyes.
*David Menashri is Professor (emeritus), founding director of the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University; and a Visiting Fellow at Princeton University
ACIS Iran Pulse editor: Dr. Liora Hendelman-Baavur
T h e A l l i a n c e C e n t e r f o r I r a n i a n S t u d i e s ( A C I S )
Tel Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv 61390, Tel Aviv P.O.B. 39040, Israel
Email: IranCen@post.tau.ac.il , Phone: +972-3-640-9510
F a x : + 9 7 2 - 3 - 6 4 0 - 6 6 6 5
Iran Pulse No. 75 ● July 30, 2015
©All rights reserved
Number 75 ● July 30, 2015
The Nuclear Accord with Iran: The Day After
Prof. David Menashri*
Much has already been said about the nuclear accord between Iran and the P5+1. Some details may not yet have become public knowledge; and, at this stage, its full consequences and implications are not entirely clear. Yet, some conclusions are already unequivocal: this agreement represents an important turning point in Iran’s domestic and regional realities as well as its international relations. It also has significant repercussions for the region at large. Even if certain points in the agreement might have been negotiated differently, in the long term, many of its implications would remain unchanged—simply because there is an agreement (although still subject to approval by both sides), and it focuses only on nuclear matters.
For Iran, this is a seminal event. The Islamic regime has secured international legitimacy; its broader nuclear program has been recognized and even received an international “stamp of approval.” The threats that it now faces, at home and abroad, have diminished, at least for the time being. Once defined as part of an “axis of evil,” Iran is being courted now politically, economically and diplomatically. Previously portrayed as “part of the problem” in the region, Iran is quickly becoming “part of the solution.” The smiles on the faces of Iranian negotiators and their optimistic statements tell the story of their satisfaction, even if radical naysayers at home denounce the concessions made and call for the renunciation of the agreement.
Iran entered the current negotiations, some two years ago, weak domestically and saddled with serious challenges abroad. It has emerged from the process strengthened. The depth of Iran’s weakness was evident: domestically, the severe effects of the sanctions forced the government to enter serious negotiations. The value of its currency (riyal) was dropping precipitously; unemployment and inflation were sky high; and public discontent was short of the boiling point. Iran’s regional standing was also at a low point. Its main allies (Syria, Hezbollah and the Shiite government in Iraq) were all seemingly losing power. The tremendous sums that Iran had invested in those allies did not seem to be bearing adequate dividends—a subject of criticism at home.
In his 2013 election campaign, Hassan Rouhani promised to turn challenges into opportunities. Indeed, since then he has recorded significant successes. Among other things, he has made good, at least partially, on his pledge to return to the people “the value of the riyal” and “value of the passport” (national honor and international standing).
The nuclear agreement will indeed decelerate the progress of Iran’s nuclear program and ensure some level of supervision. Also, the burdensome sanctions have not been completely lifted. Nevertheless, the agreement gives Iran a break that allows it to achieve other significant goals. That the negotiations were limited to the issue of nuclear capabilities, and did not address important domestic issues (such as human and political rights), nor regional policy (Syria, Hizballah, Yemen), was much to the dismay of those who wished to use negotiations for significant policy change, not to say regime change.
In addition, the realities on the ground in the Middle East and the new general atmosphere (plus the tailwinds from Russia and China) are similarly working in Iran’s favor. The rise of ISIS, for example, makes Iran seem less of a threat and casts it as “part of the solution.” It is no surprise then that multinational companies are already descending upon Tehran in an effort to sign contracts. At the same time, a handful of leading European countries are working to upgrade their diplomatic ties. It will be very hard to reverse this course. Relative to where it stood at the beginning of the negotiations, Iran has gained much.
For his part, President Barak Obama included dialogue with Iran as an integral part of his 2008 election campaign and has pursued that goal since entering office. Now he has successfully achieved an agreement that enjoys international support and the unanimous approval of the UN Security Council. It is noteworthy that the US was simultaneously able to maintain its transatlantic alliance and bypass the some objections of Russia and China to both the sanctions and the negotiations process—surely not an easy task considering the opposing interests.
Both sides were eager to reach agreement. Yet the US seemed more enthusiastic, and Iran, with its shrewd diplomacy and negotiating skills, took full advantage to advance higher demands at lower “price” for itself. The Obama government has argued that the breakthrough became possible due to the change in Iranian policy after Rouhani’s election in June 2013. But the fact is the US actually changed its own approach towards Iran much before. Recently, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reminded the media that the American offer to enter into dialogue with Iran was already made during the tenure of the (radical) President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. A few months after Obama took office, in June 2009, the “Green Movement” mobilized against the government. President Obama did not speak publically on the matter for few days and only ten days later he denounced the violence used by the government (much different from his pressuring in 2011 Egyptian President Mubarak to leave office). With the election of Rouhani, however, the whispers of “courtship” found a more sympathetic ear in Tehran.
Significant US political involvement in Iran began only after World War II. Since then, the election of various Democratic presidents committed to human rights and political freedoms has often encouraged the Iranian opposition to struggle for change—expecting the backing of Washington. That pattern first manifested itself with the inauguration of Truman in 1949 and the emergence of an opposition that brought about the government of Mohammad Mosaddeq (1951) and the temporary exile of the Shah—which lasted until the counterrevolution, aided by the United States and Britain in August 1953, during the presidency of Eisenhower (a Republican). Kennedy’s presidency again led to a major uprising (1961-64)—that Ayatollah Khomeini became one of its main heroes—but one that the Shah was able to subdue. Shortly after Carter took office, the opposition again mobilized, and this time it installed the Islamic regime. During the period of the Islamic Revolution, however, up to the mid-1990s, it was more difficult to launch protest within Iran. During the Clinton years, public demonstrations began only in 1999 and were severely suppressed.
The opposition awoke again in June 2009, only few months after Obama entered office. But then, instead of pinning his hopes on the opposition, Obama apparently opted for dialogue with the more pragmatic elements within establishment. Thus, while many demonstrated in Iran and were violently attacked, Obama initially preferred not to referr to the developments publicly. In Persian, “Obama” with a slightly different pronunciation (u-ba-ma) means: “He’s with us.” However, at the height of protests some chanted “u-ba-ma nist” (“he is not with us”). Others cried out, “Are you with us, or are you with them”? It is hard to know if this was a calculated policy with a long-term perspective.
It remains to be seen whether the Islamic regime will now chart a new course with more moderate domestic and foreign policies, or whether it will seek enjoy the benefits promised by the agreement and continue its radical policies at home and abroad (support for radical Islamic movements, involvement in matters of neighboring countries, cries of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel”).
In fact, more than once the US has served, perhaps inadvertently, revolutionary Iran’s national interests. In fact, the United States was the principle force responsible for removing two of Iran’s major enemies: its number one enemy to the west, Saddam Hussein (in 1991 and 2003), and to the east, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (in 2002). These moves enabled Iran to expand its regional influence and consolidate its position at home. However, Iran never expressed its gratitude to the United States for these important services. Will Iran behave differently this time?
Change in Iran might be discernable within a relatively short time. Consider these issues. At home: how will the unfrozen bank funds be used? Will the voices of reformist circles be heard? Will some political prisoners (or those under house arrest) be released? Will we see more women wearing colorful veils in streets? Will freedom of expression be more tolerated? From a regional perspective: how will Iranian involvement in other countries (Lebanon, Syria, Iraq) and within radical movements (Hezbollah, Houthis) change? And finally in the international sphere: to what degree will the tirades against western civilization and “international arrogance,” led by the US, soften?
In terms of its relationship with the United States, Iran has made it clear that it distinguishes between the nuclear negotiations (in which the US was a partner) and rapprochement with the US. Khamenei publicly expressed his displeasure several times when there were signs of camaraderie between the Iranian negotiators (President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif) and US leaders (phone conversation between Obama and Rouhani during the UN General Assembly in 2013, and overly friendly meetings between Secretary of State Kerry and Froreign Minister Zarif). For the Islamic revolutionary regime—for which enmity to the United States is a central plank of its platform and which has already shed many of its dogmatic principles—scaling back significantly the rhetoric against the US and the forces of “international arrogance” will be extremely difficult. In speeches given while talks were underway in Vienna, and most recently at the end of Ramadan, Khamenei explained how the fight against the West, led by the US, is part of the very essence of the Islamic revolution. Change will not be easy nor will it come quickly. However, growing ties with the West and very direct nature of negotiations with the United States may gradually move Iran closer to the West and open it more fully to the forces of globalization.
The main losers in the agreement are traditional friends of the US in the region: primarily Israel, which made opposition to Iran’s nuclear program and this specific agreement a major element in its foreign policy. Other losers include Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Sunni states more generally. They are grumbling that the US abandons allies (e.g., the Shah in 1979, Egypt’s President Mubarak in 2011), turns against the interests of friendly countries (such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt), and determinedly courts a regime that has not abandoned its radical doctrine and continues to consider the US the “Great Satan.”
The Islamic regime’s hostility to Israelhas its origins in a combination of ideological opposition to the very existence of a Jewish state, and the fact that it does not see a significant, pragmatic incentive for changing its stance. For Iran, Israel is a distant and convenient enemy; in the words of a well-known Persian adage, Israel is a “low wall” (divar-e kutah), that can be easily climbed over or stepped on. Hostility towards Israel costs little for Iran itself but brings considerable benefits. It is difficult (especially for Shi’i country) to strive for regional hegemony while not hoisting the Palestinian flag. For a revolution that has had its share of challenges, it is always good to have a distant enemy, far abroad to taunt, to blame for its troubles, and to promote internal unity. Let it also be said that Iran is not the only country that uses an external enemy to promote its objectives and ensure its viability.
One should not underestimate Israel’s efforts to slow and check Iran’s nuclear program, create awareness of its danger and mobilize opposition to the agreement, mainly in the US. However, in the arena of international diplomacy, Israel has made quite a few mistakes: it appropriated the Iranian nuclear issue, making it appear that it is solely an Israeli problem. On a number of occasions, it was perhaps too quick to denounce and threaten. In its behavior, Israel moved away from the biblical advice: “by stratagems you wage war.“ In short, Israel has played backgammon while the Iranians were playing chess.
The strained relations with the White House and lapse of support for Israel in Europe and other corners of the world have not served Israel’s interests at such a crucial time. It is not hard to see that Israel became, at least in the final stretch of the nuclear negotiations, increasingly irrelevant. Prospects for short-circuiting the approval of the agreement are not promising and it is not at all certain that, even if efforts were successful in the US Congress, the clock can be really turned back. Will Russia or China or even European states simply surrender to Congressional opposition and reinstate the sanctions? Moreover, what would be the price for Israel and world Jewry?
Advancing Israel’s international standing requires a political strategy that is more attune to the new regional realities. Rather than conducting a vocal orchestra, it is more advisable for Israel to take a back seat this time. Above all, it should “gird its loins” to safeguard, through dialogue with neighboring countries and in coordination with its friends worldwide, the advancement of common interests in a “new Middle East” that is unfolding before our eyes.
*David Menashri is Professor (emeritus), founding director of the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University; and a Visiting Fellow at Princeton University
ACIS Iran Pulse editor: Dr. Liora Hendelman-Baavur
T h e A l l i a n c e C e n t e r f o r I r a n i a n S t u d i e s ( A C I S )
Tel Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv 61390, Tel Aviv P.O.B. 39040, Israel
Email: IranCen@post.tau.ac.il , Phone: +972-3-640-9510
F a x : + 9 7 2 - 3 - 6 4 0 - 6 6 6 5
Iran Pulse No. 75 ● July 30, 2015
©All rights reserved
