Previous Reviews

Number 82 ● December 22, 2017

 

Mysticism in the Islamic Republic’s Political Debate

Elisheva Machlis*

 

Nearly four decades after the Islamic revolution, Iran is still contemplating the relationship between Islam and politics. Cultural issues, the role of women in society, and even universal values such as freedom and representation are all part of this continuous debate over the implementation of the revolutionary ideals in a society that is torn between diverse political factions. An important, yet little noticed, phenomenon in this endless struggle over the relationship between religion and politics is the mystical dimension, which has been gaining growing significance particularly since the 1990s, when the reformist Mohammad Khatami and neo-conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad were elected, in turn, to the presidency.

 

In Shi’i Iran, theoretical mysticism is known as ‘irfān, a notion deriving from the Arab verb ‘arafa, denoting unique perception of knowledge, and reflecting an individualist recognition of God. As an authentic expression of Iranian culture, this concealed, inner perception of knowledge has been gathering momentum among Iran’s diverse political factions in the past few decades, together with the revival of Persian literature, poetry and ancient holidays.[1]

 

Sufi orders existed in Iran for centuries and occupied an important role in the public sphere, as a reflection of the unique Iranian culture and society. Nevertheless, Shi’i centers of learning had an ambivalent position towards mysticism due to their focus on Islamic law (fiqh), while ‘irfān was only marginally accepted.Under the authority of the Supreme Leader, the Islamic Republic began persecuting Sufi orders that were deemed a threat to the exclusive worldview of the new regime. Concurrently, Iran is witnessing a growing attraction to theoretical mysticism within the religious establishment itself, the backbone of the Islamic state. Religious scholars and intellectuals, as well as some people in the political establishment are showing interest in ‘irfān.

 

While rejecting organized Sufism, key representatives of the Islamic regime promote ‘irfān, and also give it new political readings. Leading members of the conservative faction, ardent supporters of vilayāt-e faqih (“guardianship of the Islamic jurist”) have become engaged in theosophy. ‘Irfānwas also adopted by Iranian intellectuals, many of whom backed the reformist camp, with its support for greater political freedoms. Consequently, ‘irfān became a tool for debating the political direction of the state, and the relationship between its revolutionary and republican elements.

 

Representing the conservative camp, Grand Ayatollah Abdollahavādī-Amolī was a leading cleric, philosopher and politician, who expressed a traditional notion of ‘irfān by emphasizing that the Prophets and the Imams were the first to pursue the quest for Islamic spiritualism.[2] Delineating the stages of the spiritual journey, Javādī-Amolī listed “the belief in God” as the first step established through the good deeds of the believer; steadfastness or persistence (thabāt), followed by intention (niyya), are part of the second stage.[3] According to Javādī-Amolī, who draws on the philosophy of 10th-11th century thinkers, most notably Avicenna (Ibn Sina) and Abdullah Ansari, intention is accompanied by truthfulness and devotion. He further added a new take on the mystical notion of seclusion, arguing that one does not need to actually remove himself from society, but ratheritreflect on the divine existence and refrain from wrongdoing.[4]

 

Another senior cleric, Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, is a leading figure among the regime’s hardliners and was thought to hold significant influence over President Ahmadinejad’s government (2005-2013).[5] In the early days of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi began giving lectures in Qom on the basic principles of Islamic philosophy, including epistemology, metaphysics and theosophy.[6] Reiterating the traditional notion of a journey (suluk), Mesbah-Yazdi stressed that Islamic Gnosticism‎is both a theory and a practice. The Islamic wayfarer can only achieve closeness to God through a mystical path that leads him, stage-by-stage, towards experiencing spiritual realms, in a process known as “unveiling” (kashf).[7] Mesbah-Yazdi explained that the wayfarer passes though different stations in his ultimate goal to reach the unity of existence (waḥdat al-wujūd).[8]

 

A similar spiritual inclination is apparent not only among Iran’s hardliners but also among leading reformists, who provide a very different political take on mysticism. Former president Khatami (1997-2005), a key member of the reformist camp, exemplified this tendency. In Islam, Dialogue and Civil Society published in 2000, Khatami expressed clear criticism towards the hardliners’ worldview. Resorting to mystical terminology, Khatami stressed that the believer must travel in the path of the heart and that “a true understanding of religion” will bring Muslims back to their real values.[9] Khatami emphasized that the essence of the Islamic Revolution was in its spiritual message. The regime should emphasize the core values of Islam, “instead of resorting to force, suppression and domination.”[10]

 

From the mid-1990s, Iranian moderates began calling for greater openness in the political and cultural arenas, in line with the regime’s republican element. Following his election as president in 1997, Khatami began speaking about the inter-connectivity between freedom, mysticism and reason. Mesbah-Yazdi, on the other hand, limited the significance of freedom, emphasizing that it cannot be an absolute notion as accepted in the West, but a reflection of true values.[11] Supporting the rule of the Supreme Jurist, Mesbah-Yazdi emphasized that there is no place for democracy and human rights in Islam.[12] Similarly, Reza Davari Ardakani, a philosopher and supporter of the conservative faction, explained that the Islamic system is neither a democracy nor a despotic rule.[13]Davari, who is considered the philosopher of the regime’s hardliners, defended the notion of vilayat-e faqih, by linking philosophy to religious knowledge.

 

Representing the reformist faction, Hāerī Yazdī, reversed this equation, placing philosophy at the center of political thought, arguing that the question of government cannot be determined by Islamic jurisprudence, but by human reason and philosophy. Relying on the thought of the 16th century Mula Sadra, Hāerī Yazdī contended that the role of the faqih is not limited to jurisprudence but must encompass also the mystical and spiritual aspects of Islam.[14]In place of vilayat-e faqih Hāerī Yazdī argued that society should be governed by the principle of representation emphasizing that freedom is an important value from both a philosophical and political perspective.

 

While Hāerī Yazdī focused on the values of representation and freedom, Islamic scholar and reformer Abdol Karim Soroush concentrated on human rights and pluralism. He began promoting this agenda in Iran during Khatami’s era and continued to advance this goal from the West following his exile from Iran. For Soroush, ‘irfān was a means for promoting religious pluralism. Emphasizing the centrality of the individual, Soroush expressed his criticism of the notion of vilayat-e faqih, stressing the contradiction between this Islamic model and popular sovereignty. In place of this system, Soroush advocated what he called a “religious democracy,” based on freedom of faith.

 

This ongoing discourse on spirituality reflects a continuation of the historical Muslim debate on mysticism, interwoven with modern notions. Scholars in Iran embrace traditional, mystical notions such as unveiling, illumination, intuition, path of the heart, journey and stages, while also creating unique fusions of mysticism and Western philosophy, and of mysticism and politics. Both conservatives and reformists rely on philosophy and ‘irfān to support their diverse political agendas, as part of the continuous factional struggle over the relationship between the regime’s republican and revolutionary elements, within the continuous factional struggle in Iran, and correlating with their respective positions on the relationship between reason, knowledge and revelation. Members of Iran’s diverse factions also emphasized a correlation between mysticism, legal rationalism and the Shari’a (Islamic Law).They demonstrate an in-depth knowledge of Western thought, and combine it with apologetic discourse on the compatibility between Islam and progressive universal values. This cross-factional debate on mysticism creates an agreed-upon spiritual basis of legitimacy for the Islamic Republic. Concurrently, it also reflects the continuous struggle between Iran’s diverse factions over the direction of the regime, and the relationship between its republican and revolutionary components.

 

 


  *Elisheva Machlis (PHD) is a research fellow at the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies, Tel Aviv University, and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 

 


[1] See Kamran Scot Aghaie, “Islamic-Iranian Nationalism and its Implications for the Study of Political Islam and Iranian Nationalism” in Afshin Marashi and Kamran Scot Aghaie (eds.) Rethinking Iranian Nationalism and Modernity (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2014), 181-203.

 

[2]This included the following passages: “Believers’ father is the light and their mother is mercy.” See Seyyed Muhammad Rastgoo Far and Mahdi Dasht Bozorgi, “The Origins of Mysticism and Sufism in Hadith”, Religious Inquiries 2:3 (Winter and Spring 2013), 103-117.

 

[3]Ayatollah Abdullah Javadi Amuli, “Stations of the Spiritual Journey. Part I: Faith & Persistence.” Translated by Mohammad Reza Farajian, Spiritual Quest 1:1 (Winter and Summer 2011), 33-50.

 

[4]Ayatollah Abdullah Jawadi Amuli, “Stages of Mystics and Stations of the Spiritual Journey. Part II: Intention, Truthfulness, Returning, Devotion, Seclusion and Contemplation.” Translated by Mohammad Reza Farjian Shoushtari, 35-62. See also, Amuli, “Stages of the Mystics and Stations of the Spiritual Journey. Part III: Fear and Sadness, 45-67.

 

[5]See also Farhad Khosrokhavar, “Neo-Conservative Intellectuals in Iran”, Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 19 (Fall 2001), 5-30; Khosrokhavar, “The New Intellectuals in Iran”, Social Compass 51 (2) (2004), 191-202.

 

Following the revolution, Mesbah-Yazdi served as deputy speaker of parliament and since 1990 served as a member of the Assembly of Experts. See - www.mesbahyazdi.org/english/?biography/index.htm; Mohebat Ahdiyyih, “Ahmadinejad and the Mahdi”, The Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2008), 27-36. Mesbah-Yazdi established academic learning centers and also headed the Centre for Cooperation of Seminars and Universities (daftar-e hamkari-ye houzevadeneshgah).See Frida A. Nome and Kari Vogt, “Islamic Education in Qom: Contemporary Developments”, ActaOrientalia (2008), 35-75. See also, City of Knowledge: The Transmission of Shī’ī Learning in Qom, Iran.

 

[6]Mesbah-Yazdi, Philosophical Instructions… See also Ayatullah Muhammad Taqi Misbah-Yazdi, A Cursory Glance at the Theory of Wilayat al-Faqih, Translated by Mansoor L. Limba, Ahlul Bayt World Assembly. See also Muhammad Taqi Misbah-Yazdi, “A Glimpse at the Political Philosophy of Islam”, Introducing Islam.

 

[7]Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi MisbahYazdi, Al-Tawhid  or Monotheism as in the Ideological and the Value Sstem of Islam, The Islamic Propaganda Organization.

 

[8]More on this linkage see Rahnema, Superstition as Ideology in Iranian Politics, 35-75. See also Mesbah-Yazdi’s website: http://mesbahyazdi.ir/

 

[9]Muhammad Khatami, Islam, Dialogue and Civil Society, Centre for Persian and Central Asian Studies, School of Language, Literature, and Culture Studies, The Jawaharlal Nehru University, 2003, 30-42.

 

[10]See GolnareMehran, “Khatami, Political Reform and Education in Iran’, Comparative Education 39:3 (August 2003), 311-328.

 

[11]MesbahYazdi, al-Tawhid or Monotheism, p. 12. See MesbahYazdi’s criticism on un-limited freedom in the West, al-Tawhid, 121.

 

[12]Mohammad Hadi Ma’rifat was another neo-conservative intellectual who defended the doctrine of vilayat-e faqih, through a philosophical discourse. For Hadi Ma’rifat’s biography see, http://arabic.al-shia.org/%D9%88%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AE-%D9%85%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%AF-%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%87%D9%8A/

 

[13]FarzinVahdat, “Post-Revolutionary Islamic Discourses on Modernity in Iran: Expansion and Contraction of Human Subjectivity”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 35:4 (Nov., 2003), 599-631.On his notion of freedom see, Ardalan Rezamand, Identity and Academic Philosophy in the Islamic Republic of Iran: The Case of Reza Davari Ardakani (MA Thesis, Simon Fraser University, Fall 2012).

[14]See Meysam Badamchi, “Reasonableness, Rationality and Government: The Liberal Political Thought of Mehdi Ha’eri Yazdi”, Iranian Studies 47:4 (2014), 519-534.

 


 

Tel Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv 61390, Tel Aviv P.O.B. 39040, Israel   

Email:   IranCen@post.tau.ac.il , Phone: +972-3-640-9510    

F a x : + 9 7 2 - 3 - 6 4 0 - 6 6 6 5   

ACIS Iran Pulse No. 82 ● December 22,  2017 

©All rights reserved

 

 

Tel Aviv University makes every effort to respect copyright. If you own copyright to the content contained
here and / or the use of such content is in your opinion infringing, Contact us as soon as possible >>