Previous Reviews

​

Number 84 ● November 1, 2018

 Iran Lays Foundation for Eurasian Multilateral Security Cooperation with Russia, China, and India

Micha’el Tanchum*

With Iran's convening of its first "Regional Security Dialogue" in late September 2018, Tehran has taken a significant step toward creating a multilateral framework for Eurasian security cooperation. Ostensibly devoted to combatting terrorism in Afghanistan, Iran hosted a summit of national security and deputy national security advisors from Russia, China, India, and Afghanistan on September 26, 2018.However, thedeclaration of pointsagreed upon at the summit of national security advisors indicates a far more sweeping stabilization agenda whose area of strategic cooperation was defined as extending from Syria eastward to include all of Central Asia. The participants also agreed to formalize the framework by convening an annual summit of national security advisors to deepen multilateral cooperation.

By virtue of its geography and history, Iran requires no 'pivot' to Asia. Persian empires, in their various forms from antiquity through medieval times, were quintessential Eurasian powers extending their political and cultural influence eastward as far away as Dushanbe near the border of present-day China and Delhi in the heart of India. Nevertheless, the Islamic Republic consciously attempted to re-orient its foreign policy toward Asia under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad (2005-2013). Facing increasingly crippling sanctions from the U.S. and its EU partners in the Atlantic alliance, then President Ahmedinejad inaugurated his "Look East" policy. However, despite robust commercial relations with both Russia and China, the Eurasian region's ascendant powers, Tehran was not able to bring either Moscow or Beijing into alignment with its anti-U.S. and anti-Western positions. Tehran's new approach to Eurasia by operating through a multilateral framework for collective security cooperation seems to be proving far more successful.

For Tehran, the success is well-timed as Iran is facing renewed sanctions from the United States which seeks to pressure its Western and other partners into reducing their commercial relations with Iran. In anticipation of U.S. President Donald Trump's March 2018 withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal (officially known asJoint Comprehensive Plan of Action), Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei declared in February 2018 that one of the new priorities in Iran's foreign policy orientation is "preferring East to West." The fact that Tehran chose a multilateral approach in contrast to its earlier 'Look East' policy reflects, in part, the success Iran experienced with the Astana Framework for cooperation in Syriawith Russia and Turkey. For Russia, China, and India, each of whom respectively faces threats of low intensity conflict from various local and transnationalSunni extremist groups, Shiite-dominated Iran is also viewed as a natural partner in combatting terrorism.

Nonetheless, Point 9 of the Regional Security Dialogue's closing declaration reveals the overarching geostrategic interests that are compelling Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi to engage in multilateral strategic cooperation with Iran: the competition over the emerging architecture of Eurasian commercial connectivity. Point 9 defines"one of the objectives" of multilateral security cooperation among Iran, Russia, China, and India as "economic and commercial development" involving "establishing secure transit routes using existing infrastructure as well as creating new infrastructures." Beijing, with its massive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is at the forefront of the effort to create new Eurasian commercial corridors oriented toward Beijing's commercial interests. Known as the One Belt, One Road Initiative until 2016, Beijing has advanced its plans to construct a China-to-Europe commercial transportation corridor consisting of a cluster of Chinese-built overland rail and road routes extending westward and southward from Central Asia known as the Silk Road Economic Belt (the “one belt”) and a series of Chinese-built port installations extending westward across the Indian Ocean called the 21st Maritime Silk Road (the “one road”). For Beijing, Iran is critical to establishing a viable route for its overland China-to-Europe corridor that does not cross Russian territory. Presently, China must use the Baku-Tblisi-Kars railroad that will then connect to the multibillion-dollar high speed railway that Beijing is constructing across the length of Turkey. However, this current non-Russian route requires ferrying cargoes across the Caspian Sea from Central Asia to Baku, Azerbaijan. An Iranian rail link would provide a more efficient route.

A China-Iran rail link would also constitute an essential north-south vertical axis connecting China's main East-West Corridor to the Middle East and the Arabian Sea. Beijing has already been creating a similar north-south vertical axis with its $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that would connect the Chinese-built, deep-sea port in Gwadar, Pakistan to Kasghar in China's restive Xinjiang province. In contrast to CPEC, a China-Iran Corridor offers the added benefit of direct overland connections with the Middle East while facing fewer security and engineering challenges. Beijing's CPEC runs through Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, historically the stronghold of Taliban militancy, and Balochistan, home to an ethnonationalist unrest. Moreover, rail construction needs to cross the formidable Karakoram Mountain range. In contrast, the China-Iran corridor would not traverse sucha dangerous security environment and would simply involve the upgrading present rail links to high-speed rail with uniform, standard gauge tracks.

During January and February 2016, the first China-Iran cargo train made its maiden journey from China's eastern Zhejiang province south of Shanghai to Iran. Carrying 32 containers, the cargo train completed the 10,399 km (6,462 mi) route in 14 days, beating the time of the maritime route from Shanghai to Bandar Abbas by two-thirds. Leaving from the market city of Yiwu (also known as Jinhua), the train crossed Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, requiring two breaks-of-gauge because of the Soviet-era, non-standard gauge track still used in the two Central Asian republics. High speed rail links using standard gauge would likely even further reduce the travel time of the Eastern China-Tehran route.

Likewise, India regards Iran as the critical transit link for creating a commercial transit corridor for Indian Ocean-Europe trade. While Iran and India traditionally have been allies in Afghanistan against Pakistan, New Delhi's drive to construct a deep-sea port at the Iranian city of Chabahar, along with commercial transportation corridors running northward has been motivated by New Delhi’s economic rivalry with Beijing. India's answer to the China's BRI is New Delhi’s grand International North-South Transit Corridor (INSTC) initiative. With India’s overland access to Central Asia is blocked by Pakistan, the Chabahar deep-sea port and the INSTC running northward through Iran and Afghanistan will provide New Delhi vital access to Central Asian, Russian, and ultimately European markets, enabling India to effectively compete with China. The Chabahar port, 72 km (45 mi) west of the Chinese-built port at Gwadar, Pakistan, will serve as the Indian Ocean outlet for the INSTC that is estimatedto be 30% more cost effective that the traditional maritime route via the Red Sea, Suez Canal, and the Mediterranean Sea.

Russia shares similar interests in a north-south corridor with Iran. For Moscow, the most immediate interest in partnering with Tehran is to secure Russia's influence over the South Caucasus and Caspian Sea Basin. The success of Turkey's energy and transportation partnership with Azerbaijan has enabled Ankara to expand its influence in the South Caucasus and extend it further into Turkmenistan and the other Central Asian republics.The potential expansion of Ankara's influence among the Turkic peoples of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as within the territorial borders of Russia and China, presents an enduring challenge for Russia as well as China. In the competition for influence in the southern rim of the Eurasian land mass, the area encompassing the Middle East and the Caucasus, Iran is an indispensable partner for Russia, China, and India. Tehran's efforts todevelop multilateral security cooperation has provided the framework by which Asia's giants can partner with Iran.

*Dr. Micha’el Tanchum is a Fellow at the Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, Hebrew University and non-resident, affiliated scholar with the Center for Strategic Studies at Başkent University in Ankara, Turkey (Başkent-SAM).