MAHMOUD AHMADINEJAD: "THE MIRACLE OF THE THIRD MILLENIUM" OR AN UNFULFILLED PROMISE

Number 33 ● 11 June 2009

Four years ago, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad surprised many observers of Iranian politics, when he won the second round of the 2005 presidential elections with more than 61 percent of the votes. The son of a blacksmith, Ahmedinejad managed to defeat one of the most experienced and influential politicians of the Islamic Republic, former president and head of the Expediency Council, 'Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani

Ahmadinejad was born in 1956 in the village of Aradan, southeast of Tehran, but grew up in the capital. He holds a doctoral degree in traffic transportation engineering and planning from Iran University of Science and Technology. A devout Muslim, he was a student activist in the university's Islamic association, and following the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79, he became a member of the Office for Strengthening Unity, an Islamic student organization. During the Iran-Iraq War, he served in different units within the engineering wing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards. He began his political career as governor in Maku and Khoy, in West Azerbaijan province, during the 1980s. Later, he became an advisor to the governor-general of Kurdistan province, and in 1993, he was appointed as the governor-general of Ardabil province. Following the election of Mohammad Khatami as president in 1997, Ahmedinejad returned to his academic life. However, after the conservatives' victory in the nation-wide municipal elections of 2003, he reemerged on the political scene and was appointed mayor of Tehran by the local city council.

He was not widely known when he had first entered the presidential race, but he managed to attract many lower-class voters, mainly due to his humble background and lifestyle but also owing to his promises to fight corruption, distribute national resources more fairly, and share oil revenue with the common people. Despite his lack of experience on the national political level, he soon became a very active president eager to demonstrate his influence not only in domestic affairs but also in foreign policy, which was traditionally regarded as the Supreme Leader's sphere of influence.

Ahmedinejad’s economic policy aimed at realizing his vision of social justice. One of his first initiatives was to allocate more than one billion dollars to the Mehr-e Reza Fund. This fund offered low-interest loans to young couples to help them cover the costs of marriage and housing. In October 2005, he announced plans to distribute some state-owned companies' assets among low-income workers as "justice shares" (saham-e edalat). But despite his promises to improve Iran's economy, his policies contributed to a sharp rise in inflation and a decline in economic growth. He soon faced harsh criticism from economists, politicians and even clerics. In two open letters, published in June 2006 and June 2007, top Iranian economists lambasted the   president   for  his "populist"  policies.   He   was criticized for spending too much of the oil revenues and raising the inflation and unemployment rates even higher. 

Ahmadinejad's economic policies resulted in growing popular disapproval as well. His gas rationing plan, launched in the summer of 2007 in an attempt to reduce the country's fuel consumption, ignited a wave of protests. In October 2008, Ahmadinejad had to suspend implementation of a new value added tax (VAT) after Iran's traditional merchants in the Bazaar went on strike in a number of cities. He also had to postpone his sweeping subsidy reform plan following harsh political and professional criticism. His critics asserted that this plan to annul hefty subsidies and to compensate low-income families with direct cash payment would only add to double-digit inflation.

His domestic policies aroused criticism among high-ranking clerics as well. On several occasions, senior clerics expressed their concern over the rising inflation, which threatened to fuel social unrest. In addition, the relations between the president and the religious establishment grew strained as a result of several controversial decisions made by Ahmadinejad. His decision in April 2006, for example, to allow women into football stadiums provoked outrage among hardline clerics. The president's messianic views undermined his relations with the religious establishment still further. His frequent references to the expected return of the "Hidden Imam" were criticized by traditional clerics. The growing rift between the president and the clerics became evident as the Combatant Clergy Association (Jame'e-ye Rowhaniyat-e Mobarez), one of the most influential conservative bodies, decided to maintain silence over the issue of extending support to Ahmadinejad ahead of the June election.

While Ahmadinejad's internal policies faced growing domestic opposition, it was his foreign policy views which attracted most attention. Shortly after becoming the president, he began to demonstrate growing involvement in foreign policy issues. He intended to alter the policy pursued by the previous government, which tried to ease tensions between Iran and the international community. His policy was based upon his vision that the current world order should be revised because it reflects American hegemony.  He considered the United States responsible for most of the world's problems and said on various occasions that the "American empire" was reaching the end of its road. He nevertheless expressed his willingness to hold negotiations with the United States should it change its policy towards Iran and even congratulated Barack Obama after his election as president. His numerous fiery speeches and declarations in which he referred to the Holocaust as a "myth" and called for Israel to be wiped off the map had spurred much interest in Iran and around the world.

Regarding Iran's nuclear program, he adopted defiant and nationalistic rhetoric. He criticized as "disgraceful" the 2003 agreement his predecessor had reached with Europe to suspend uranium enrichment and said that his policy to stand up to the West had restored Iran's dignity. In a recent visit to Semnan, where Iran tested a new long-range missile, he said that this decision was drawn up by Iran's enemies as part of their colonial designs. Although his declarations concerning Iran's nuclear program tend to reflect the official Iranian view, they encountered the occasional domestic criticism. An editorial published, for instance, in January 2007 by the conservative daily Jomhuri-ye Eslami asserted that the president should avoid fiery rhetoric, which only provides Iranian enemies with excuses to impose further pressure on Iran. His critics also slammed his recent statements regarding Iran's readiness to negotiate with the United States as well as his fierce criticism of his predecessor's nuclear policy, saying that only the Supreme Leader could stake those strategic positions.

Despite his mismanagement of the economy and the growing criticism concerning his domestic and foreign policies, Ahmadinejad's chances to be re-elected are considered quite strong. This is due not only to his control over state resources, including the national media, but also to the support he still enjoys among the lower echelons of Iranian society; his power base within the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij militia, and the backing he seems to enjoy from the Supreme Leader.

During his tenure in office, Ahmadinejad held nearly 60 provincial tours throughout Iran, visiting more than 500 cities and towns. Unlike most Iranian senior politicians, including the other three presidential candidates, Ahmadinejad has been seen by a large number of Iranian citizens. Many citizens living in distant regions still regard Ahmadinejad as a "popular president" committed to helping them. Accordingly, although most of his promises were not fulfilled, he still enjoys wide support. A young man, who runs two kebab stands in Tehran, talked with Der Spiegel reporter (March 25, 2008) about how Ahmadinejad visited Tehran's filthy narrow streets. "May God protect him," said another young woman, who managed to move from the poor south to the center of town due to government grants she had received. Many Iranians still believe Ahmadinejad when he declares inflation a global phenomenon and accuses the previous administrations for the country's current economic problems. His aggressive foreign policy is considered as an even greater accomplishment of his government. His uncomp-romising  stance  concerning  Iranian  right  for  a  full

nuclear fuel circle was adopted by most Iranian officials, including all three other presidential candidates. Most of them believe that it was Ahmadinejad's policy which forced the West to acknowledge Iranian nuclear rights following years of rejection. Even his main presidential rival, Mir-Hosein Musavi, rejected any compromise on Iran's right to develop nuclear technology (on Musavi, see Iran Pulse#32). 

Ahmadinejad still enjoys the support of significant parts of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Basij. Since his election as president, he has promoted former IRGC officers to senior political posts.  During the last few years, the IRGC and Basij have become more politically involved, expressing their support for conservative candidates in various election campaigns. In a June 2005 letter to the Supreme Leader, former Parliament speaker and presidential candidate, Mehdi Karubi, accused the IRGC and Basij of illegal interference in favor of Ahmadinejad. IRGC's senior commanders’ support for Ahmadinejad continues, however (on Karubi, see Iran Pulse#30). Sobh-e Sadeq weekly, affiliated with the Supreme Leader’s representative in the IRGC, has become a mouthpiece for Ahmadinejad's supporters. The president seems to enlist the support of Hasan Firouzabadi, the Iranian Chief of Staff, as well. At a conference to commemorate the 30^th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, held last January, he explicitly endorsed Ahmadinejad's candidacy in the upcoming elections while criticizing his opponents.

Ahmadinejad's most important asset, however, seems to be the backing of the Supreme Leader. Though he has, at times, rebuked several decisions made by Ahmadinejad, Ayatollah 'Ali Khamene'i has more often shown his support for the president and praised him for "standing up" to the West. Last April, Khamene'i urged the public in a televised speech, in Bijar, in western Iran, not to vote for pro-Western candidates. He accused them of being tools of Iran's enemies, meant to sow division within the nation and seduce  the  people  away  from   their   religion  and revolutionary values. A week earlier, he said people should vote for candidates who  understand  the pain of the  people;   live  in  a  modest  fashion, and   keep away from corruption and aristocracy. Ahmadinejad's supporters took these remarks as an evidence of Khamene’i’s support for their candidate, although in a public gathering held in Mashhad earlier in March, Khamene'i told a huge  crowd that  his support of the President and his policies should not be interpreted as support for his re-election.

Despite the leader's implicit backing; the support he enjoys among certain social strata; his control over state resources, and his connections within the armed forces, it is still not clear if all this will get Ahmadinejad -- described by one of his most devoted supporters as "the miracle of the third millennium" -- re-elected. After all, he failed to implement most of his promises. Should he falter in the next election, he will be the first president since 1981 not to be re-elected to a second term.

However, even if he is not re-elected, his legacy will not necessarily disappear. His foreign policy views, if not his rhetoric, seem to be shared by the Iranian leadership, including the Supreme Leader. The Iranian economy is likely to face further structural problems that might require some of Ahmadinejad's policies, for example, his subsidy reforms. Last but not least, Ahmadinejad represents the new generation of Iranian politicians and tends to reflect the ideas of a large portion of the Islamic Revolution's second generation. Many of them fought during the Iran-Iraq war and feel contempt towards the older generation of Iranian politicians who abandoned Iran’s earlier ideals and values. They acknowledge the need for economic development but, at the same time, want to build a more just and equal society. Unlike most of their parents, they are not intimidated by the West; rather, they maintain that the West is in decline. They are ready to interact with the international community but not to compromise Iranian national rights, independence and territorial integrity. Ahmadinejad might go, but "Ahmadi-nejadism" will stay■

*Raz Zimmt is a research fellow at the Centre for Iranian Studies and a PhD Candidate of the Graduate School of Historical Studies at Tel Aviv University.

The Alliance Center for Iranian Studies (ACIS)

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Iran Pulse 33 ● June 11, 2009 © All rights reserved.