ACIC_IP96
ACIS Iran Pulse no. 96 | July 11, 2019
Iran's Enrichment Gambit will Create a Breach Beyond Repair
Micha'el Tanchum*
On July 8, 2019, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) announced that it had enriched Uranium to 4.5 percent, breaching the 3.67 percent enrichment cap to which Iran agreed in the 2015 nuclear deal (ISNA). While the AEOI's spokesperson said that Iran is "fully prepared to enrich uranium at any level and with any amount," Iran's government declared its intention to breach the agreement by increments every 60 days (Reuters ). Hoping to increase its bargaining leverage, Tehran's aim is to create sufficient alarm to convince Germany, France, and the United Kingdom to save the deal by convincing Washington to ease its crippling sanctions on Iran in exchange for talks or abandoning their compliance with U.S. sanctions if Washington refuses. Having breached the agreement twice already, Tehran's stratagem could easily backfire prompting America's European allies to abandon the deal entirely and even support a military strike on Iran.
On the day of the enrichment breach, Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif declared via twitter that all of Iran's steps in violation of the nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) are reversible if the three European signatories – the "E-3" of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom – cease abiding by the crippling economic sanctions re-imposed on Iran by the United States when it pulled out of the accord (Zarif on twitter). While Tehran's framework of breaching the JCPOA in incremental steps every two months may appear to be a calibrated approach to walk back the current crisis to the negotiating table, its prospects for success are tenuous because Iran's post-JCPOA advances in nuclear technology development have drastically reduced the time Tehran needs to create a nuclear weapon.
At the time of the JCPOA, the expert consensus agreed that Iran's "breakout point" – the point at which Iran possesses sufficient weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear bomb – was one year. For Iran to have a deployable weapon, it would have to convert uranium gas to a solid, equip it with an explosive package that would trigger the necessary fission reaction, and presumably then deploy it on a ballistic missile. The estimated time for Iran to do this is anywhere from an additional several months to one year.
In the most conventional method of creating a nuclear weapon, a bomb requires 25 kg of uranium that has been enriched to 90 percent. Uranium enriched above 20 percent is considered highly enriched uranium (HEU) and has no civilian use. 25 kg of HEU enriched to 90 percent can be produced from 1,050 kg of low enriched uranium (LEU). Under the JCPOA, Iran was required to ship 98 percent of its LEU outside the country to remain under the 300kg LEU limit stipulated by the accord. Prior to the 3.67 percent enrichment breach, Iran already breached the JCPOA on July 1, 2019 by exceeding its 300 kg limit on LEU, as confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
With this first breach, the time-clock on reaching 1,050kg began ticking. However, even if the expert consensus in 2015 was correct, the assumptions upon which it was based are no longer relevant for calculating of Iran's 2019 breakout point. Under the JCPOA, Iran was permitted to keep 6,104 centrifuges operational and continue enrich uranium to 3.67 percent for civilian purposes. All of these centrifuges were Iran's most basic IR1 model and Iran operated 5,060 during the JCPOA period and through January 2019. The JCPOA did not restrict Iranian development of more efficient centrifuges nor did it explicitly prohibit Iran from developing its ballistic missiles to carry nuclear warheads – two controversial aspects of the original agreement considered as critical flaws by the JCPOA's detractors. The European signatories have condemned Tehran over its continued development of nuclear capable ballistic missiles, which the E-3 claim does violate the JCPOA as it was enshrined into international law with the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2331.
At the time of the JCPOA, Iran had approximately 19,000 IR1 centrifuges and 1,000 of the more advanced IR2 centrifuges. As part of the deal, Iran put approximately 15,000 IR1 centrifuges into storage for 10 years.
Enrichment centrifuges are essential for a nuclear weapon's program because a nuclear bomb requires the rare U-235 uranium isotope that can sustain a fissile chain reaction. Natural uranium is comprised of only 0.72 percent U-235 with remaining 99 percent consisting of U-238 plus a miniscule trace of U-234. An enrichment centrifuge is a cylinder that spins uranium gas at high speed to separate isotopes, throwing the slightly heavier U-238 to edge while the lighter U-235 collects at the center. Like a convection oven, the bottom of the cylinder is also heated some 300 degrees centigrade hotter than the top to force all the U-235 isotopes upward to the top where the enriched uranium is collected.
The enrichment process is difficult to perform in part because the stresses placed on the centrifuge's parts from spinning at high speeds, along with the destructive vibrations produced, cause the material in centrifuges to crack or degrade in other ways, resulting in centrifuge failure. The rate of failure is dependent on the type of materials from which a particular centrifuge is made and the design of its mechanisms.
The design of Iran's IR1 model was originally based upon Pakistan's P1 reactor, the South Asian nuclear power's first centrifuge. Using an aluminum cylinder, the P1 proved to be unreliable, as has Iran's IR1. Iran's 1,000 IR2 centrifuges are based on the design of Pakistan's P2 model that A. Q. Khan had sold to Iran two decades ago. These centrifuges are stronger because they use maraging steel. Iran has improved on the Pakistani design with its current IR2 model, which like Iran's subsequent and more sophisticated models features carbon fiber parts.
At the time of the JCPOA's signing, the relatively primitive technology of the IR1 resulted in a failure rate of 40 percent. Prohibited from manufacturing new centrifuges, it was assumed that Iran's breakout point would remain the same or even become longer.
At the time of the JCPOA, Iran had approximately 19,000 IR1 centrifuges and 1,000 of the more advanced IR2 centrifuges. As part of the deal, Iran put approximately 15,000 IR1 centrifuges into storage for 10 years.
Enrichment centrifuges are essential for a nuclear weapon's program because a nuclear bomb requires the rare U-235 uranium isotope that can sustain a fissile chain reaction. Natural uranium is comprised of only 0.72 percent U-235 with remaining 99 percent consisting of U-238 plus a miniscule trace of U-234. An enrichment centrifuge is a cylinder that spins uranium gas at high speed to separate isotopes, throwing the slightly heavier U-238 to edge while the lighter U-235 collects at the center. Like a convection oven, the bottom of the cylinder is also heated some 300 degrees centigrade hotter than the top to force all the U-235 isotopes upward to the top where the enriched uranium is collected.
The enrichment process is difficult to perform in part because the stresses placed on the centrifuge's parts from spinning at high speeds, along with the destructive vibrations produced, cause the material in centrifuges to crack or degrade in other ways, resulting in centrifuge failure. The rate of failure is dependent on the type of materials from which a particular centrifuge is made and the design of its mechanisms.
The design of Iran's IR1 model was originally based upon Pakistan's P1 reactor, the South Asian nuclear power's first centrifuge. Using an aluminum cylinder, the P1 proved to be unreliable, as has Iran's IR1. Iran's 1,000 IR2 centrifuges are based on the design of Pakistan's P2 model that A. Q. Khan had sold to Iran two decades ago. These centrifuges are stronger because they use maraging steel. Iran has improved on the Pakistani design with its current IR2 model, which like Iran's subsequent and more sophisticated models features carbon fiber parts.
At the time of the JCPOA's signing, the relatively primitive technology of the IR1 resulted in a failure rate of 40 percent. Prohibited from manufacturing new centrifuges, it was assumed that Iran's breakout point would remain the same or even become longer.
Under the pre-JCPOA time clock, Iran would now be 1 year away from breakout point and about 1.5 years away from a deliverable nuclear weapon, barring the existence of another clandestine program or Iran receiving enriched uranium or critical technology from an outside source. Given the advances of Iran's nuclear program under the JCPOA, Iran's breakout could be only 4 months or less with the addition of a few thousand of its more sophisticated centrifuges. In this case, Iran's time to a deployable nuclear weapon could be six months or less.
The half year or less timetable for Iran to possess a Hiroshima-sized weapon deliverable by a ballistic missile from its considerable missile arsenal will push the E-3 to abandon the JCPOA and likely provide at least tacit and probably active support, for a U.S. strike on Iran's air defense systems and offensive missile capabilities. The key breach will be if Iran activates a combination IR1 and more sophisticated centrifuges to enrich uranium to 20 percent. Because 20 percent enrichment constitutes a kind of gatekeeper threshold between LEU and HEU, amassing a stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium would cut Iran's breakout time by more than half.
The prospect of Tehran's gambit succeeding is tenuous at best. It has also set into motion a dynamic that rapidly decreases the time-window available for diplomacy to succeed. If that diplomacy does not succeed and Iran chooses to begin enriching to 20 percent, it will have committed a breach beyond repair. Given Iran's post-JCPOA development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, the price of this breach will be European support, and possibly even tacit Russian and Chinese support, for a U.S.-led strike on Iran's air defenses, missiles, and nuclear facilities.
*Dr. Micha’el Tanchum is a senior fellow at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Studies (AIES), a fellow at the Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, the Hebrew University, Israel, and non-resident fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies at Başkent University in Ankara, Turkey (Başkent-SAM). @michaeltanchum
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ACIS Iran Pulse No. 96 ● July 11, 2019
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