David Mark Kovacs

Department of Philosophy, Tel Aviv University

What Makes an Explanation Causal?

The distinction between causal and non-causal explanations is an important one for philosophers of science. How we draw the distinction helps adjudicate the debate between those who think that all scientific explanations are causal (Lewis 1986, Skow 2014) and those who deny this (Sober 1983, Saatsi and Pexton 2013); it can also help us understand the nature of causal explanation itself. The distinction is important for metaphysicians, too. For example, it can sharpen our understanding of what is distinctive about grounding explanations and what the status of mixed explanations (featuring both causation of grounding) is. In this talk, I will consider and reject several candidate criteria of what makes an explanation causal. Eventually, I will come down in favor of a criterion formulated in terms of proportionality: the level of grain of causal (and only causal) explanantia must fit the level of grain of what they are invoked to explain.

Gathering begins at 17:45 near room 449

Chair: Shaul Katzir